Downward reassignment bonuses — duty of probity and statute of limitationsSobresueldos por reasignación descendente — deber de probidad y prescripción

**Review of the Document** Res. 000221-A-TC-2021 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT OF CASATION. San José, at nine forty-five on the twenty-eighth of October, two thousand twenty-one.

In the ordinary proceeding, declared to be on pure points of law, brought by MARLENE CHAVES MORALES, a graduate in human resources, holder of identity card number 106150903, represented by her special judicial attorney-in-fact César Hines Céspedes, lawyer, holder of identity card number 700610989; against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, with legal entity identification number 4-000-042143-11, represented by its special judicial attorney-in-fact Francisco Antonio Villegas Ramírez, lawyer, holder of identity card number 601610997, and RICARDO RODRÍGUEZ BARQUERO, a graduate in Planning and holder of a Master's degree in Project Administration, holder of identity card number 203790749, with legal representation, initially, by Alexánder Gómez María, lawyer, holder of bar association card number 18484 and, later, by his special judicial attorney-in-fact Bryan David Hidalgo Fallas, lawyer, holder of identity card number 114100246 and bar association card number 23551; both the attorney for the plaintiff and for the defendant Institute filed respective cassation appeals challenging judgment number 95-2019-VI, issued by the Sixth Section of the Contentiious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court at 13:50 on July 31, 2019.

Drafted by Judge Jiménez Ramírez **CONSIDERING**

I.In accordance with the facts the Court held as proven and were not challenged by the appellants, it is established that by official letter no. PE-3139-2005 of June 8, 2005, the then Executive President of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), today the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), requested a clarification from the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) regarding the situation of indemnities for downward reassignment, since that oversight body rejected the partial indemnities applied by that entity. In official letter no. FOE-AM-0350 (8048) of July 6 of that year, the CGR indicated, in the relevant part: “[…] In this regard, you are informed that, given that the proposed homologation adjustments are a purely administrative matter and not a judicial one, as you rightly point out in the cited official letter No. PE-3139-2005, the administrative resolution justifying each particular case must be provided, in which document the administrative authorities of the IDA state, for example, the reasons for the proposed movement, the employee's situation at the time of the restructuring, and the technical justification for the official's new situation. […] In addition to the above, it is important to make it clear that these expenditures must be classified and not under the sub-item 'Indemnities,' since the nature of the proposed adjustment is not aimed at compensating any harm caused by the Administration to the official. On the contrary, what is intended is not to harm the employee by reducing their salary, and the sum that allows them to maintain the official's working conditions must be transferred as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) under the item 'Personal Services.' This salary supplement (sobresueldo) is recognized for the person and not the position in the new organizational structure, and therefore must be maintained as such for the time the official continues providing their services to this Institution.” In official letter no. PE-3804-2005 of August 22 of the same year, the Executive Presidency of the IDA submitted a request for reconsideration of the previous official letter, in accordance with Article 13 of the Lineamientos Generales de Política Salarial y Empleo para el Sector Público. By official letter no. FOE-AM-0525 (11668) of September 21 of the same year, in the relevant part, the CGR stated: "In this regard, you are informed that the payment of indemnities for downward homologations of positions is appropriate based on subsection c) of the cited Article 13 if the conditions set forth in this rule are met, that is, that the placement of the server was not possible within the six months stipulated in subsection a) of this article and that the official did not accept the demotion proposed by the IDA Administration. However, it is recalled that since the homologation adjustments are a purely administrative matter and not a judicial one, the administrative resolution justifying each particular case must be provided as a requirement for budget approval. It is reiterated what was indicated in this regard in official letter No. 8048 of July 2005 issued by this Contraloría General, to the effect that said resolution must contain a minimum of information about the reasons for the proposed movement, the employee's situation at the time of the restructuring, and the technical justification for the official's new situation. It is clarified that the foregoing applies to the case of officials with whom it was not possible to reach an agreement regarding their employment situation, and therefore the employment relationship must be terminated, an assumption in which such indemnity would proceed. Finally, in relation to the terms of the cited official letter No. 8048, it is clarified that what is provided therein applies to the case of officials who remain in the institution because an agreement was possible regarding their employment status, in which case the payment of an indemnity does not proceed but rather the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for the salary difference not recognized in their new salary category." By resolution no. 2-2010 at 9:00 a.m. on February 16, 2010, the Executive Presidency of the IDA issued a criterion regarding the downward reassignment of Mr. Ricardo Alberto Rodríguez Bonilla. To this effect, it ordered: "POR TANTO. [...] we proceed to apply what was established by the oversight entity [sic] in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 and therefore we proceed to the assignment of the aforementioned salary supplement (sobresueldo). For this purpose, the difference between the salary corresponding to the position of DIRECTOR REGIONAL Y PROFESIONAL E will be considered, according to the detail established by the Human Resources Area, which is and is [sic] considered an integral part of this resolution." Mr. Ricardo expressed his agreement with the content of that resolution by a document dated the 24th of that month, where he indicated: "It being understood for all purposes, that the negative salary difference that would be generated by said procedure will be applied as a salary supplement (sobresueldo)." On April 5 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department, held, at that time, by Marlene Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Rodríguez Bonilla, indicating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) of ₡645,942.00, effective February 25, 2010, for the change of position. That day, February 25, 2010, Mr. Ricardo and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary indemnity settlement (finiquito), where it was expressed, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation to his position, which implied a downward reassignment, would be paid as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official letter no. PE-794-2011 of May 17, 2011, the Executive Presidency indicated to Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz, Subregional Chief of Liberia: "For the management of your salary situation, the administrative precedent that originates and is based on official letter No. 11668 (FOE-AM-0525) of September 21, 2005, from the Contraloría General de la República will be applied. As indicated by the Oversight Body, what is appropriate in your case is the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for the salary difference not recognized in your new salary category. In this way, you will not suffer any harm to your income. [...]". Said proposal was accepted by the official in a document dated the 24th of that month. On July 7 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department, held at that time by Ms. Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Novo Díaz, indicating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in the amount of ₡322,100.50 effective the 11th of that month and year for the change of position. On August 17, 2011, Mr. Novo Díaz and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary indemnity settlement (finiquito), where it was expressed, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation to his position, which implied a downward reassignment, would be paid as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official letter no. DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos of the INDER analyzed the request for the preparation of a settlement for the change of position of an official of that entity. In the relevant part, it stated: “[…] More exactly, to apply what is indicated here [referring to Article 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711-H], we must be in the presence of the following circumstances: 1- That there is a variation towards classifications of a lower salary level than the original one. 2- That said variation is the product of changes in institutional manuals. Reassignments, comprehensive studies, homologations, or system conversions. As can be seen in the case brought to our attention, as well as in previous cases, the same, although there is a variation towards a salary classification lower than the original, the consequence thereof is not the product of changes in the institutional manual, of a reassignment (there is no technical reassignment study), of a comprehensive study, of a homologation, or of a system conversion. […] Consequently, applying Article 13 of the Procedimiento para la aplicación de las directrices generales y regulaciones de política salarial, empleo y clasificación de puestos de los ministerios, entidades públicas y demás órganos según corresponda cubiertas por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria para el año 2005, in these cases, passing the salary difference between positions as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in favor of the officials, constitutes a totally illegal act that must be corrected immediately." Consequently, it recommended conducting a review of the previously approved cases to take the corresponding corrective measures. By official letter no. A-PE-0220-2013 of February 20, 2013, from the Executive Presidency, signed by the legal advisor of that body and the then Executive President, they departed from said criterion. They indicated that, in downward reassignment procedures, the provisions of Article 101 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and its regulations are applicable. As a result of which, they ordered the then Coordinator of the Human Resources Area to apply the methodology indicated therein. In official letter no. DFOE-EC-0417 (07581) of July 24, 2014, the CGR indicated, in response to a request for clarification raised by the Internal Audit of said entity, regarding the procedure to follow in case of reclassifications of positions to a lower category: "[...] In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that the cited official letters refer to specific situations of a group of officials, therefore, what was resolved on that occasion cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." It referred to Decreto Ejecutivo no. 37078-H, specifically, to numeral 12, a rule from which, it set forth that the Administration had three possible alternatives to resolve cases where position reclassifications to a lower level occurred. By official letter no. A-ADV-076-2014 of September 16, 2014, the Internal Audit communicated to the Executive Presidency: "[...] In official letter ARH-073-2014, the basis for proceeding with the payment of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) is explained and the Administration justifies it with the pronouncement of the Contraloría General de la República FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005. However, the oversight entity [sic] with pronouncement 07581 of July 24, 2014, clarified that official letter FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005, refers to a specific situation of a group of officials and cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." By official letter no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the head of the Departamento Administrativo communicated to the Executive Presidency that, by official letter A-PE-906-2014 of September 9, 2014, the Executive Presidency was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation into the salary supplement (sobresueldo) payments made to server Walter Mora Leiva. In official letter no. PE-259-2015 of the 26th of that month, the Executive Presidency requested the Unidad de Relaciones Laborales to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official letter DA-017-2015. By official letter no. URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, the Unidad de Relaciones Laborales issued a preliminary investigation report. It considered that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged improper granting of salary supplements (sobresueldos) in cases of downward reassignments. Likewise, it stated that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was recognized the salary supplement (sobresueldo) effective July 11, 2011, through personnel action no. 3841-2011, which has been paid since the second half of July 2011. Furthermore, regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that salary supplement (sobresueldo) was recognized through personnel action no. 792-2010 effective February 25, 2010. That report pointed out that, as of the date of its issuance, both salary supplements (sobresueldos) were being paid. For this reason, it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request a criterion from the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos on the pertinence of initiating another type of procedure to stop the alleged improper payments and recover the money that could have been illegally recognized as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for downward reassignment. In official letter no. PE-505-2016 of April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of the INDER appointed the directing body for the procedure for the alleged improper recognition of salary supplements (sobresueldos) for downward reassignments against, among others, official Marlene Chaves Morales. By an act at 9:00 a.m. on June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure (file URL-002-2015) issued the statement of charges, imputing the conduct to be investigated to Ms. Chaves Morales. Likewise, in the relevant part, it was indicated: "With said actions described in facts 1 and 2 above, official Marlene Chaves Morales may have satisfied a private interest over the public interest by allegedly executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the downward reassignment procedure provided for in Article 13 of the Procedimiento para la aplicación de las directrices generales y regulaciones de política salarial, empleo y clasificación puestos del ministerios [sic], entidades públicas y demás órganos según corresponda cubiertos por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria" contained in Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of March 16, 2004, in that, with the described conduct, Ms. Chaves Morales may have contravened Articles 3, 4 (duty of probity), and 38 subsection b) of the Ley contra la Corrupción e [sic] Enriquecimiento Ilícito N°8422. [...]". Reference was made to canons 11 of the Constitución Política; 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP); 3, 4, 38 of Ley no. 8422; as well as precept 13 of Decreto no. 31711. Also, she was informed of the possible consequences of the procedure regarding the eventual disciplinary sanctions to be imposed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. The oral and private hearing was held on September 14, 2016. In an act at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the directing body issued conclusions report no. 23-2016. It recommended exonerating the investigated person, Marlene Chaves Morales, considering that there was no responsibility for the actions charged. With official letter no. URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, the directing body referred the disciplinary file to the Junta de Relaciones Laborales for its knowledge. In record no. 2-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the Junta de Relaciones Laborales of the INDER, disciplinary procedure file no. URL-0002-2015 was heard. In the agreement adopted in Article IV, it was decided, unanimously, to depart from the recommendation of the directing body. This, because there is no evidence in the file that the two investigated officials availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 et seq. of the LGAP, alleging the duty of obedience. Therefore, it indicated, it will be up to the Executive Presidency or the Superior Administration to establish, under the protection of the LGAP -Article 213- and canons 3, 38, and 39 of the Ley de Enriquecimiento Ilícito, the quantum of the sanction. It recommended, prior to establishing it, that the Administration request the Departamento Administrativo to quantify the amount that has been improperly disbursed by the Administration for having approved those salary supplement (sobresueldo) payments. Together with official letter no. RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017, the Junta de Relaciones Laborales referred administrative file URL-002-2015 to the Executive Presidency for the purpose of issuing the final act. By resolution no. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the then Executive President of the INDER, Master Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero, issued the final act. It ordered: "POR TANTO: In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 192 of the Constitución Política, numeral 26 subsection j) of Ley No. 9036 that transforms the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) into the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) and creates the Secretaría Técnica de Desarrollo Rural, Articles 3, 4, 38 subsection d) and of the of the [sic] Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 11, 210 subsection 1), 113, 211 et seq. and concordant of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, 2 of the Reglamento de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Article 111 subsection d) of the Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil and Article 13 subsection c) of the Lineamientos Generales de Política Salarial y Empleo para el Sector Público, this Deciding Body resolves to partially accept the recommendations of the Investigating Body and consequently declares [...] Marlene Chaves Morales [...] responsible for the most serious fault, thus classified by this Administrative Authority, for the attributed charge of Irregular recognition of Salary Supplement (Sobresueldo) payments, lack of oversight, and violation of the duty of probity. By reason of the foregoing and given the evident breach of the duty of probity and the principles of efficacy and efficiency of public service, it is resolved to apply to the defendant the disciplinary sanction of one month of suspension without pay, which takes effect from May 15, 2017, until June 15, 2017. [...] It is ordered to certify pieces to the Prosecutor's Office of the Ministerio Público of the II Circuito Judicial de Goicoechea, so that the irregular conduct aired herein may be investigated. [...]". This act was communicated to Ms. Marlene on April 28, 2017. In a document dated May 2 of that year, Ms. Chaves Morales filed a motion for reconsideration, which, by resolution no. 41-2017 at 2 p.m. on the 9th of the same month, was rejected by the Executive Presidency of the INDER, an act communicated that same day.

II.On June 15, 2017, the special judicial attorney-in-fact for Ms. Chaves Morales filed the present ordinary proceeding against the INDER and Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero. He requested, according to the adjustment made at the preliminary hearing session held on February 20, 2018: 1) that the absolute nullity of resolution no. 37-2012 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, be declared; 2) that his principal be fully reimbursed the salary that was deducted from her on the occasion of the sanction imposed and executed; 3) as a consequence of the absolute nullity of said resolution, that the co-defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay damages, for which he specified: a) the cause that gives rise to them: the opening, development, and sanction of an administrative sanctioning procedure, "terminated" from its origin, which subjected the plaintiff, first, to a process of anguish and unease affecting her moral heritage, which she had no duty to suffer because the actions charged against her at the time were in accordance with the orders issued by the highest body in the administrative hierarchy; furthermore, she had to bear a financial burden to defend herself in a case that should never have come into legal existence, in addition to which is added the loss of her income for one month, required for the maintenance of her family; b) these damages consist of the loss of tranquility and the "manhandling" of her dignity, by imputing to her, as an irregularity, legally valid conduct and, moreover, of mandatory compliance, labeling her as an incompetent official. Hence, the double dimension of the damage, moral and material, the former due to the diminishment and decline in her personal worth and, the latter, due to the loss of her income in the form of salary for a full month, as well as the outlay she had to cover to exercise her defense, without having the duty to bear either; c) she estimated the moral damage, prudentially, at ₡5,000,000.00 and the material damage at ₡3,000,000.00; 4) likewise, she requested ₡1,000,000.00, paid for professional fees for her defense; 5) on all sums to which they are ordered to pay, she requested the recognition of interest, calculated from the moment of disbursement, in the case of attorney's fees and the salary deduction; and, from the final judgment, for the other economic awards; 6) she also requested that they be ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding; 7) finally, she requested the payment of interest on the costs from the finality of the ruling until their effective payment. Both co-defendants, in respective briefs, opposed. The attorney for the INDER raised the defense of lack of right, and Mr. Rodríguez Barquero, in addition to the indicated one, raised the defense of lack of passive standing. By an order at 1:36 p.m. on November 29, 2017, considering that Mr. Ricardo did not comply with the formal requirement made by the order at 9:04 a.m. on October 24, 2017, the complaint was deemed affirmatively answered regarding the facts marked with numbers 6, 11, 12, 13, 16, and 19. Likewise, at the preliminary hearing session indicated above, this litis was declared as a proceeding on pure points of law, with the parties rendering their conclusions orally. The Court, in its judgment, rejected the objection of lack of passive standing. It upheld the defense of lack of right. Consequently, it dismissed the claim filed. It decided without an award for costs. In disagreement, both the representative of the plaintiff and of the INDER filed respective cassation appeals.

III.APPEAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY. VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES. In the sole ground of disagreement formulated for this cassation reason, folio 11 of the cassation file, the appellant announced that he was filing it based on the ground provided in subsection c) of canon 137 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA): "Lack of clear and precise determination, in the judgment, of the facts proven by the Court or for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or ones introduced illegally into the process." To this effect, he stated that, in proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16 of the challenged judgment, the Court entered, as part of the factual framework, situations alien to the facts charged against his client and those claimed by her as violative of her rights. He summarized it as follows: 1) the plaintiff claimed the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power because, even with the erroneous application of numeral 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR) since five years had already elapsed counted from the date she signed the first personnel action - that of Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010; also, number 3841-2011, in favor of Ronaldo Novo Díaz (Considering XV final part). The sanctioning procedure began in 2016, six years later for the first; and five years and six months later for the second; 2) the Court rejected the claim regarding the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power, by pointing out, in proven fact no. 15, that by official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos communicated to the Executive President to order a preliminary investigation for salary supplement (sobresueldo) payments in favor of Walter Mora Leiva. However, the case of that official was not charged against the plaintiff in the sanctioning procedure, and therefore it was not subject to examination. Consequently, being a situation totally alien to the plaintiff, it is incapable of producing interrupting effects on the statute of limitations; 3) likewise, he added, the Court held as proven fact no. 16) that, by official letter P.E. 259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive President ordered the preliminary investigation. However, the Court did not notice that this preliminary investigation was limited to investigating the payment of salary supplements (sobresueldos) to official Walter Mora Leiva, as requested in official letter DA-017-2015; 4) as it was a preliminary investigation into a different matter, the preliminary investigation did not interrupt the statute of limitations period. In resolving the claimed statute of limitations, he noted, based on a factual framework alien to the cause, dealing with different conduct, persons, and responsible parties, the ruling incurred the ground under subsections c) and d) of Article 137 ibid, which is why he requested to quash the judgment with the consequences of that decision. According to what is indicated in subsection c) of said numeral, the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts proven by the Court "for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or ones introduced illegally into the process," is a ground for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Court relied on official letter DA-017-2015 and official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, both from 2015, to reject the statute of limitations claim, but overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not charged against the plaintiff in the administrative procedure. Due to that confusion by the Court, he argued, the ruling curtailed her right to invoke the statute of limitations for the sanctioning power, in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010, and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, since six years had elapsed in the case of the first; and five years and six months for the second. The ruling also incurred a lack of reasoning, on which this Chamber, he affirmed, has indicated in multiple judgments that it occurs when there is an absence or, also, when it is confused, as in the present case, where the analysis of the time periods to determine the statute of limitations was conducted on facts alien to the plaintiff, the cause, and the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, he concluded by requesting that the judgment be quashed and, deciding on the merits, that the claim be granted in its entirety.

IV.Regarding what was related in the preceding section, it is necessary to indicate that numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides a material requirement necessary both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This is the reasoning of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under comment provides, the factual and legal foundation of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been held as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of evidence), or with the circumstances that occurred in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it concerns a problem presented regarding the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the block of legality, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified.

In both procedural and evidentiary violations, factual reasons may concur alongside legal reasons (which are always necessary); in that sense, the referenced grounds must be addressed in both respects, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that from the legal grounding, the indication of those canons relating to the value of the erroneously assessed evidentiary element or elements is exempted by express legal mandate. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the rules that the lower court incorrectly used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the same appealed ruling. And of course, it is not indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, time limits, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than the citation of these latter, what is indispensable is that they are complied with, that they be put into practice at the moment of preparing and filing the cassation appeal. Thus, the grounding ordered by law may be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles, or legal rules are mentioned, interwoven or concatenated among themselves and reasonably linked from a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the attacked judgment. To the extent that a set of legal norms are cited (or, if applicable, a single one of them), pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal grounding. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not pertain to their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated interpreting Article 139 of reference, "it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal grounding ... the reasons upon which it bases its action must be explained, combatting the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that supports it" (Resolution No. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). The grounding is, therefore, alien to the confused deployment of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or else, to the recounting of errors considered committed in the appealed judgment, unsupported by norms or legal criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes proves impertinent or manifestly and evidently unconnected to the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal grounding," and therefore, fails to comply with the requirement established in section 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to what is set forth in Article 140 subsection c) of the same Code of reference. Similarly, this Chamber, repeatedly, has indicated that for an appeal to pass the admission control, it is required, in addition to the sufficient exposition of reasons, the corresponding mention and linkage with the contested judgment of the applicable norms that are deemed infringed. In this regard, among many others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 927-A-S1-2018 of 11 hours 25 minutes of October 25, 2018, and 2525-A-S1-2020 of 11 hours 10 minutes of November 10, 2020, may be consulted.

V.Regarding what was alleged by the cassation appellant, it is necessary to point out the following. First. The appellant, at folio 12, indicated: "Effectively, in accordance with what is indicated in subsection c) the lack of a clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Tribunal for having been based on illegitimate means of proof or means introduced illegally into the process, is a ground for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Tribunal relied on official letter DA-017-2015 and official letter P.E-259-2015 of February 26, 2015 to reject the claim of statute of limitations, but it overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not attributed to the plaintiff in the administrative procedure." (The highlighting is from the original). In the preliminary hearing, held on February 20, 2018, at the point of "ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE," at minute 14:32, according to the minute visible at images 135 to 138 of the electronic judicial file, the procedural judge admitted the entirety of the administrative file (which consists of a folder and a disk with the recordings of the hearing in the administrative venue). Likewise, he admitted the disk with the copy of the plaintiff's personal file. In accordance with what is indicated in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16, official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015 appears at folios 2 to 4 of the administrative file and official letter no. PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, at folio 1 of that same file. Therefore, said proven facts, different from what was indicated by the appellant, were not based on illegitimate means of proof nor means introduced illegally into the process.

VI.Second. The challenger, on the same folio indicated, affirmed: "Due to that confusion of the Tribunal, the ruling curtailed her right to avail herself of the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010 and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, insofar as 6 years had elapsed in the case of the first and 5 years and 6 months for the second." The judges, in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, indicated the following: "[...] 15) By official letter DA-017-2015 dated February 20, 2015, the head of the Administrative Department communicates to the Executive Presidency that through official letters A-PE-0906-2014 of September 9, 2014, by which a preliminary investigation was requested from the Executive Presidency, regarding the additional salary payments made to the employee Walter Mora Leiva. (Folios 2-4 front of the administrative file) 16) Through official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive Presidency requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official letter DA-017-2015, indicated in the previous section. (Folio 1 of the administrative file) 17) Through official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016 of the Labor Relations Unit, a report of the preliminary investigation is issued, in which it was deemed that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged improper granting of additional salaries in cases of downward reassignments. (Folios 118-151 of the administrative file) 18) That in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016 of the Labor Relations Unit, indicated in the previous section, it is set forth that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was granted the additional salary as of July 11, 2011, through personnel action 3841-2011, which is paid to him as of the second fortnight of July 2011. Regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that additional salary was granted to him through personnel action 792-2010 as of February 25, 2010. That report indicates that, as of its issuance date, both additional salaries were being paid. For that reason it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request an opinion from the Directorate of Legal Affairs on the pertinence of initiating another type of procedure to stop the presumed improper payments and recover the money that might have been illegally granted as an additional salary due to downward reassignment. (Folios 148, 150 of the administrative file) 19) Through official letter PE-505-2016 dated April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of INDER designates the directing body of the procedure for the alleged improper granting of additional salaries due to downward reassignments against the officials Guiselle Vargas Sánchez and Marlene Chávez Morales. (Folio 155 of the administrative file) 20) By act of 09 hours of June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure (file URL-002-2015) issues the statement of charges in which, the following conducts were attributed to the plaintiff: "Fact No. 1: For having allegedly carried out, the official Marlene Chávez Morales acting as Coordinator of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, the personnel action dated February 25, 2010, for the change of position of the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to Professional E, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of the IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes and apparently proceeding to grant an additional salary to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to Professional E, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of the IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes and apparently proceeding to grant an additional salary to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, according to the mechanism for the application of the additional salary established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (...) Fact No. 2: For having apparently carried out, the official Marlene Chaves Morales as Head of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, the personnel action of June 11, 2011, where the position change of Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz is carried out, supposedly signed by Mrs. Chaves Morales (...) in which she grants an additional salary to the official Novo Díaz, according to the mechanism for the application of the additional salary established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic. With said actions described in facts 1 and 2 set forth above, the official Marlene Chaves Morales, may have satisfied a private interest above the public interest by allegedly executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the downward reassignment procedure provided for in Article 13 of the Procedure for the Application of General Guidelines and Regulations of Salary, Employment and Position Classification Policy of Ministries, Public Entities and Other Organs as Applicable Covered by the Scope of the Budgetary Authority" contained in Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004, Mrs. Chaves Morales possibly having contravened with the described conduct Articles 3, 4 (duty of probity) and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and [sic] Illicit Enrichment No. 8422. (...)." Immediately following, reference was made to sections 11 of the Magna Carta, 11 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), 3, 4, 38 of Law No. 8422, precept 13 of Decree No. 31711. Indications were made about the possible consequences of the procedure regarding the eventual disciplinary sanctions to impose, while the rights of the investigated party within the procedure were expressed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. (Folios 173-188 back of the administrative file) [...]". Then, in section VII of the contested judgment, called "Analysis of the statute of limitations in the specific case," regarding matters of interest, they indicated: "In that sense, the timeframe for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its section 44 ["Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function" of October 6, 2004] , which refers to the five-year statute of limitations rule established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428 ["Organic Law of the CGR" of September 7, 1994]. Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is established that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary case date back to the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the truth of the matter is that such facts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the pertinence of which is not reproached, a prior phase within which, the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the statute of limitations period referred to in section 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to section 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment when the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective possibility of exercising it, that the cited period must begin to run. Thus, in cases like the present one where the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidentiary indicia, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges, the starting point of the statute of limitations operates upon the notification of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the records it is established that after that referral of the preliminary report in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016 of the Labor Relations Unit, through official letter PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative head designated the directing body, an instance which on June 28, 2016 issues the respective statement of charges, the same which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date when the head could validly order disciplinary actions until the moment the opening of the internal case was communicated to the plaintiff, the five-year period governing this type of conflicts had not expired. On the other hand, it is established that by act of 15 hours 45 minutes of October 14, 2016, the Directing Body renders its conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official letter URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report is referred to the Labor Relations Board, for its knowledge. In minute No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017 of the Labor Relations Board of INDER, the opinion of that instance is issued in the sense of departing from the recommendation of the directing body, since there is no evidence in the file indicating that the investigated officials, among them, the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 and following of the LGAP regarding pleading the duty of obedience. This decision was brought to the knowledge of the Executive Presidency by official letter RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, through resolution No. 037-2017 of 10 hours 37 minutes of April 28, 2017, the Executive Presidency of INDER issued the final act within the administrative procedure No. URL-002-2015, an act brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff on that same date. As INDER posits, it is clear that the statute of limitations for issuing the final act must be computed from the moment when the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective possibility of its exercise. This occurs on March 31, 2017, when the Labor Relations Board refers the file to the Executive Presidency. Then, on April 28, 2017, the final procedural act is issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia the plaintiff accuses is not observed, to the extent that, between the referral of the file by the Labor Relations Board and the final decision of the case, not even a period of one month elapsed. Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which implies the rejection of the charge under examination." (The underlining is supplied). In the reproach under study, the cassation appellant did not question the application of the five-year period provided for in Article 71 of the LOCGR nor the pertinence of the preliminary investigation carried out. His objection centered on the fact that, since the request made by the Head of the Administrative Department to the Executive Presidency of INDER (issued through official letter no. DA-017-2015) to initiate a preliminary investigation, was to investigate the additional salary payments made to Mr. Walter Moral Leiva, whose case was not attributed to his client, it had no interrupting effects on the statute of limitations. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate, regarding the nature and characteristics of preliminary investigations, the Constitutional Chamber, in vote no. 2014001384 of 9 hours 5 minutes of January 1, 2014, indicated: "III.- ON THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. In the matter at issue, the violations of Fundamental Rights alleged by the appellant refer to the initiation of preliminary investigations from which an administrative disciplinary procedure could later result. On this topic, this Court has repeatedly considered that the inherent guarantees of due process are not applicable in preliminary investigations, since it will be in the administrative or judicial procedure, where the different manifestations of that fundamental right must be respected in all their extent. In this regard, this Chamber has declared the following: “On this point, the Chamber has maintained the criterion that a correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process requires admitting that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes indispensable to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries, since the Administration – prior to opening the administrative file – could require the performance of a prior investigation, through which it is possible not only to identify the possible person responsible for the fault being investigated, but also to determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure, if merit for it is found. The prototype case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is gathered during the preliminary investigation. This evidence, thus gathered, cannot be used during the procedure itself, given that for its obtaining the participation of the investigated party was not available, and therefore, they would have been left defenseless. Likewise, if it concerns evidence that by its nature is definitive and irreproducible, it is undoubtedly useless for the purposes of supporting the final act, if for its gathering the affected party has not been provided due process and the right of defense as legally corresponds; however, if it is understood that these are preliminary acts to determine the pertinence or not of subsequently opening an administrative file against an employee, this Chamber has stated that in its collection the Administration may or may not include the investigated person. The foregoing thus constitutes a power of the competent administrative body, in order to determine whether there is merit or not to initiate a process aimed at ascertaining the true reality of the facts under investigation, and it is once the procedure itself has been opened, with the formation of the Directing Body, that the opportune procedural moment arises where the investigated employee can indeed speak out regarding the charges attributed to them and consequently, have access to the pieces of the file of interest to them, as well as to be assisted by a lawyer and to be able to witness the gathering of testimonial evidence and any other that is ordered and before which they can exercise their right of defense. In this reasoning, the appellant's assertions regarding the disrespect of due process and the right of defense in acts carried out during the preliminary phase of the investigation, which was opened on the occasion of complaints filed [sic] by several patients against him, are not admissible, since within that phase one cannot speak of the existence of due process proper nor is the concurrence of the elements indicated supra as constituting his right of defense necessary.” (Resolution 2003-09125 of nine hours and twenty-one minutes of August twenty-nine, two thousand three). In this same vein, this Chamber considers that in the case in question and the accused violations correspond to the phase of the preliminary investigation, given that a procedure against the appellant has not yet been initiated. Consequently, the Chamber considers that the refusal to facilitate access to the file at this stage to the protected party or the lack of hearings, has not caused injury to the constitutional right of defense or the principle of due process (see in the same sense resolution No. 2010009906 of fourteen hours and thirty-eight minutes of June ninth, two thousand ten). That being the case, the amparo is deemed inadmissible, as indicated in the operative part of this resolution." (The underlining is supplied. In the same sense, ruling no. 2020017654 of 9 hours 20 minutes of September 18, 2020, of that Chamber may be consulted). For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, has indicated: "III.- [...] On the topic under study, the preliminary investigation to determine administrative sanctioning procedures, is a discretionary task of the administration, to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible persons and additionally [sic] elements of relevant judgment, with which they issue a recommendation; with the aim of verifying the viability of a fault that merits carrying out a procedure to determine or not its existence. In the opinion of this Chamber, the preparatory act carried out in report no. OD 04-2008 of the Directing Body, which required evidence, documentation, intervene the offices of the Cooperative and issue opinions, in the preliminary investigation, are legitimate material actions, since the task of gathering evidence and issuing recommendations, is a discretionary power, used to define the appropriateness or not of a sanctioning procedure." (The underlining is supplied. Judgment no. 1101-F-S1-2011 of 10 hours 15 minutes of September 8, 2011. In the same sense, mutatis mutandis, resolution no. 1228 of 14 hours 30 minutes of October 22, 2015 of that Chamber may be consulted). In accordance with the factual framework transcribed above, it is established that, through official letter no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Head of the Administrative Department of INDER communicated to the Executive Presidency of that entity that, in official letter no. A-PE-0906-2014 of September 9, 2014, they were requested to open a preliminary investigation into the additional salary payments made to the employee Walter Mora Leiva. The Executive Presidency, in official letter no. PE-259-2015 of the following 26th, requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate the preliminary investigation, regarding what was indicated in official letter DA-017-2015. Said Unit, in official letter no. URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, issued the results of the preliminary investigation. It set forth that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was granted the additional salary as of July 11, 2011, through personnel action no. 3841-2011, which is being paid to him as of the second fortnight of the month of July 2011. The same occurs with Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, whose additional salary was granted to him in personnel action no. 792-2010 of February 25, 2010. As a consequence of this, the Executive Presidency, in official letter no. PE-505-2016 of April 27, 2016, designated the directing body of the procedure, for the alleged improper granting of additional salaries due to downward reassignments against, among others, the plaintiff, Marlene Chaves Morales, whose file was processed under no. URL-002-2015. At 9 hours of June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure issued the statement of charges, referring to the personnel actions prepared by Mrs. Chaves Morales concerning Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz, for applying an additional salary due to downward reassignment erroneously. In accordance with the foregoing and, considering the nature and characteristics of the preliminary investigation - set forth above - (where its primary purpose, we reiterate, is to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible persons and other relevant elements of judgment, in order to verify the viability of a fault that merits the opening of an administrative procedure to determine or not its existence), despite the fact that the preliminary investigation ordered by the Executive Presidency of INDER was to analyze the alleged payment of additional salaries made to Mr. Walter Mora Leiva (proven fact no. 15), the truth is that, after it was carried out, its result determined that the cases of Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz and Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla should be investigated, which was thus attributed to Mrs. Marlene in the statement of charges (proven fact 20). Such a situation, unlike what the appellant tries to make it seem, does not constitute any flaw or irregularity, nor was she placed in a state of defenselessness, since, it is repeated, the notice of charges and the administrative sanctioning procedure referred to the cases of Mr. Novo Díaz and Mr. Rodríguez Bonilla, where the plaintiff was afforded all the guarantees of defense. Nor did it have an effect regarding the statute of limitations period, as the cassation appellant attempts to portray, since, as the Tribunal correctly indicated, it began to run from March 16, 2016, the date on which the report of the preliminary investigation was brought to the knowledge of the Executive Presidency, in accordance with the provisions of canon 71 subsection b) of the LOCGR, without the five-year period having elapsed according to the summary made by the judges, transcribed above.

VII.Third. As was indicated, the appellant pointed out, in the first place, the procedural ground provided for in subsection 1) point c) of section 137 of the CPCA. In this regard, this Chamber has indicated that one of the essential elements of any judgment is the establishment of the factual framework that can be inferred from the evidentiary elements incorporated into the process based on the assessment carried out by the judges according to the rules of sound criticism (Article 82 of the CPCA), and in attention to the legal norms applicable to the specific case, since these allow establishing which facts acquire legal relevance (on this aspect, judgment no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes of February 8, 2018 may be consulted; as well as resolution no. 7-A-TC-2017 of 11 hours of January 26, 2017). It is clear, then, that the establishment of these factual circumstances based on the evidence is one of the fundamental aspects of the judgment, to the extent that the resolution of the dispute depends on it. It is for this reason that this intellectual task developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is susceptible to being reviewed from different perspectives in cassation venue, which, moreover, must not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may be due to substantive aspects, when the factual framework that the Tribunal held as proven does not match the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, provided for in Article 138 CPCA), or else, to procedural errors, whether for having been based on illegitimate means of proof or means introduced illegally into the process or due to a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Tribunal, upon establishing the pertinent factual framework for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confused manner, in such a way that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation it intends to make explicit is, or else, when there exists a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the assessment was that the judges made when deliberating. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which have the objective of guaranteeing that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process has proceeded through the channels provided by the legal system, as well as that the judgments have been issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable procedural rules. Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the establishment of the facts carried out is or is not consistent with the evidence exceeds the scope proper to this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. In this regard, among many others, the indicated judgment of this Chamber no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes of February 8, 2018 may be consulted. This is not the scenario of this litigation. The facts that the Tribunal held as proven are neither confused nor contradictory among themselves. Furthermore, in section V of this resolution, the reasons were given why official letters numbers DA-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 are neither illegitimate nor were introduced illegally into the process. Ergo, this ground for violation of procedural norms alleged is not established.

VIII.Fourth. The appellant also invoked the procedural defect provided for in subsection 1) point d) of the cited canon: lack of reasoning. Both the First Chamber and this Tribunal have indicated that it arises when the reasoning of the judgment is omitted, whether because it does not exist, or else, because its development is extremely confused or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative section of the resolution, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, specifically, that of due process.

The issue is not whether the adjudicator ruled on all the claims brought into the proceeding; rather, it is whether the judgment contains the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that this is a procedural ground, which implies that it pertains to potential breaches of the adjective provisions that regulate the procedural path or the ruling, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial proceeding and from which rights and obligations derive. It must not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of the law or the weighing of the evidence carried out by the adjudicator in the whereas clauses of the ruling, for which the Code of Procedure establishes autonomous grounds (Article 138 ibid), as otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. In this regard, among many others, one may consult the judgments of the First Chamber numbers 1277-F-S1-2019 of 14 hours 40 minutes of 18 July 2019 and 2521-F-S1-2020 of 10 hours 50 minutes of 10 November 2020. In light of what was set forth in section VI point two of this ruling, where the considerations made by the adjudicators in section VII of the challenged judgment regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) were transcribed, insofar as relevant, this Chamber determines that, contrary to what the appellant argued, the adjudicators provided the reasons why, in this litigation, the five-year period provided for in the LOCGR was not fulfilled. Consequently, the reasoning in the challenged ruling is not omitted; it exists. Nor is its development confusing or contradictory. On the contrary, it is clear regarding the reasoning provided to adopt the decision set forth therein. Ergo, it contains the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. As a result, this cassation ground is also not established.

IX.VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE NORMS. In the first objection under this cassation ground, folio 12, the appellant announced that he was lodging it because the judgment declared that the statute of limitations (prescripción) did not occur. He invoked the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA: “When a legal norm has been unduly applied or interpreted, or has not been applied.” In this litigation, he argued, the Court applied numeral 71 of the LOCGR to reject the statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged, by considering that the plaintiff’s conduct violated Article 3 of Law No. 8422, “Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito” (LCCEI), which refers to the prescriptive period indicated in precept 71 of the LOCGR. With that conclusion, he stated, an erroneous application of those norms was incurred, with a simultaneous failure to apply precept 603 of the Labor Code, now 414. Violation of Articles 3 and 38 of the LCCEI and concomitant infringement of numeral 71 of the LOCGR due to undue application. The rejection of the exception of statute of limitations (prescripción) alleged, he noted, was due to an undue application of the aforementioned canon 3, with omission in applying 38, both of the LCCEI, with an erroneous application of Article 71 of the LOCGR. The indicated numeral 3 of Law No. 8422, he expounded, contains undefined legal concepts that must be concretized in each particular case. Breach of the “duty of probity (deber de probidad),” he pointed out, must be specified in relation to the factual scenario alleged. It requires, he noted, identifying the elements of the imputed conduct contrary to the meanings of each of the terms used by the legislator. In this proceeding, he alleged, the acts imputed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without giving him proper advice. Those material acts, he indicated, fall outside the characterization of the aforementioned Article 3 of the LCCEI; namely: a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not breach the orientation of management toward satisfying the public interest; b) it neither violated nor exposed priority collective needs; c) planning, regulation, efficiency, or equality of the inhabitants of the Republic were not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act of execution of a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that requires no analysis or assessment, because, previously, the holder of the authority authorized it; and f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. From what was stated, he declared, the undue application of Article 3 of the LCCEI arose from the insertion of the imputed conduct of the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of the factual scenarios. Additionally, to that lack of concretization in the judgment, he added, the application of precept 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contains the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of Article 39 ibid. That is, the judgment should have linked Article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct attributed to the plaintiff was contemplated in the latter, in order to thus justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR, which establishes a 5-year prescriptive period. Since the plaintiff did not typify any of the conduct-generating administrative responsibility under the LCCEI regime, he asserted, the applicable rule was Article 603 of the Labor Code (now canon 414) because it involved, at most, a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. The succession of legal violations in the challenged judgment, he noted, occurs with the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff’s conduct as violative of the duty of probity (deber de probidad), without contemplating the exhaustive nature of the conduct subject to sanction derived from Article 38 of the LCCEI. It unduly applied numeral 3 with omission of 38, both of Law No. 8422; which, in turn, led to the undue application of Article 71 of the LOCGR with the failure to apply Article 603 of the Labor Code (currently 414), which imposes a one-month period as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power for cases outside the provisions of Law No. 8422. As a corollary to the aforementioned, he indicated, the period to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff’s conduct expired one month after having executed them and, as a consequence of the preceding, resolution no. 037 of 10 hours 37 minutes of 28 June 2017, is absolutely null, because it arises from an invalid administrative procedure, as the Administration’s sanctioning power has prescribed. For which reason, he requested that the appeal be granted and the complaint be declared with merit in all its aspects. Likewise, he invoked the cassation ground provided for in subsection a) of ordinal 138 of the CPCA: “When an undue weighing of the evidence is attributed or it has been pretermitted.” He also claimed an undue weighing of the evidence for the rejection of the claim regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the alleged sanctioning power, due to an erroneous calculation of the prescriptive periods. Even under the legal supposition that Article 71 of the LOCGR applies, he noted, the first personnel action signed by the plaintiff in execution of the superior order of the Executive President of the IDA was on 25 February 2010 (Considering XV), which means that by 24 February 2015 the 5 years provided for in that norm had elapsed. That defect in the judgment originated because the Court considered the statute of limitations (prescripción) interrupted as of official letter PE-259-2015 of 26 February 2015 —which equally produced the expiration of the statute of limitations by two days—, without noticing that this official letter ordered an investigation into facts unrelated to the plaintiff. In proven fact 15) of the judgment, the Court concluded that, by official letter no. DA-017-2015 of 20 February 2015, the Executive President of INDER was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation into the payment of extra salary (sobresueldos) “to the servant Walter Mora Leiva,” without referring to the officials Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla or Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff and for which she was investigated. In proven fact 16) of the judgment, the Court concluded that, by official letter no. PE-259-2015 of 26 February 2015, the Executive Presidency ordered the preliminary investigation “regarding the facts indicated in official letter DA-017-2015”; delimiting the scope of the preliminary investigation to the payment of extra salary (sobresueldos) to the servant Walter Mora Leiva. He stressed that the personnel actions, whose irregularity is attributed to the plaintiff, were in relation to the payment of extra salary (sobresueldos) to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz. For the foregoing, he expressed, the judgment concluded, with a non-conforming weighing of the evidence, that the initiation of the preliminary investigation, arising under the auspices of official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015, interrupted the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the causes imputed to the plaintiff, when, in reality, they involved different causes in which the material action of signing the personnel actions attributed to the plaintiff remained outside the preliminary investigation and, therefore, the prescriptive period established in Article 71 of the LOCGR was not interrupted. Proven facts 15 and 16 are clear and precise in that official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 were intended to resolve other situations distinct from those attributed to the plaintiff, and therefore they lack the interruptive effect on the statute of limitations (prescripción). For that reason, he concluded by requesting that the judgment be quashed and, ruling on the merits, that the complaint be declared with merit in all its aspects.

X.In this regard, it is pertinent to note the following. First. The appellant stated at folio 13: “[…] additionally to that lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of Article 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contains the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of Article 39 ibid […]”. (The underlining is supplied). What was alleged regarding Article 38 causes surprise. The Court, in Considering X, insofar as relevant, stated: “Thus viewed, the material and formal unlawfulness materializes in the normative provision that was intimated to the plaintiff, specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of ordinal 13 subsection c) of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of 16 March 2004.” That is, in a clear and express manner, contrary to what the appellant stated, it applied it. Likewise, with respect to the assertion that precept 38 of the LCCEI establishes the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of canon 39 ibidem, said norm states: “Grounds for administrative liability. / Without prejudice to other grounds provided for in the regime applicable to the respective service relationship, the public official who: […] shall have administrative liability”. (The underlining is supplied). From its literal tenor it is easily determined, contrary to what the cassation appellant stated, said norm does not provide an exhaustive list of grounds for administrative liability; on the contrary, it refers to those provided for in the regime applicable to the respective service relationship. Second. The Court, in Considering VII of the challenged judgment, alluded to in section VI point two of this ruling, insofar as relevant, stated: “[…] while the duty of probity (deber de probidad) imposes a behavioral framework consistent with official duties, as well as with the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented toward preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of public function, as is inferred from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, such that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely within the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant’s fault entails an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and inadequate management of public funds or the public finances (hacienda pública). […] Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary proceeding, the content of the intimated conduct is analyzed, in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the period for the exercise of the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the internal corrective power is the common one-month period imposed by the doctrine of current ordinal 414 of the Labor Code, former 603 of that same source, the same period established by referral from precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute, or whether, on the contrary, because we are faced with the scenarios that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the aforementioned period is extended by the application of the rule provided for in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the facts that were imputed to the plaintiff, as is the case of having permitted the adoption of conduct that generated an undue recognition of salary bonuses to two INDER officials through downward reassignment (reasignación descendente). Although they do not refer to a direct disposition of Public Finances (Hacienda Pública), they definitively constitute conduct that led to the disposition of salary-related expenditures, covered with public resources, which, it is argued within the ordinary disciplinary proceeding, were illegitimately granted. In the judgment of this Chamber, the substantial content of the intimated conduct and the subject of the proceeding constitutes manifestations deemed antagonistic to the internal control regime and the duty of probity (deber de probidad) imposed in the exercise of public function. From this plane, the plaintiff seems to confuse the responsibility of those who directly administer public finances (hacienda pública), called hierarchical superiors or subordinate holders, with the responsibility that is proper to her solely by virtue of her condition as a public servant, and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity (deber de probidad). In that sense, the time margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power applicable in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which refers to the five-year rule of statute of limitations (prescripción) established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. […].” (The underlining is supplied). However, the appellant did not duly challenge the basis indicated by the Court in order to determine the application, in this litigation, of the five-year period provided for in precept 71 of the LOCGR. He put forth an argumentation completely divorced from the reasons given by the adjudicators. To that effect, he stated: “In the case at bar, the acts imputed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without giving him proper advice. Those material acts by the plaintiff are outside the characterization of Article 3 of the LCCEI, namely a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not breach: (I list) the orientation of management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; b) it neither violated nor exposed priority collective needs; c) planning, regulation, efficiency, or equality of the inhabitants of the Republic were not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act of execution of a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that requires no analysis or assessment because the holder of the authority previously authorized it; f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. / From what was stated, the undue application of Article 3 of the LCCEI arises from the insertion of the imputed conduct of the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of the factual scenarios; additionally, to that lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of Article 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contains the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of Article 39 ibid, that is, the judgment should have linked Article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct attributed to the plaintiff was contemplated in the latter, in order to thus justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR, which establishes a 5-year prescriptive period. / Since the plaintiff did not typify any of the conduct-generating administrative liability under the LCCEI regime, the applicable rule was Article 603 of the Labor Code (current Article 414 of the same legislative body) because it involved, at most, a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. / In synthesis: The succession of legal violations in the challenged judgment occurs with the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff’s conduct as violating the duty of probity (deber de probidad), without contemplating the exhaustive nature of conduct subject to sanction derived from Article 38 of the LCCEI, it unduly applied numeral 3 with omission of 38, both of Law 8422, which in turn led to the undue application of Article 71 of the LOCGR with failure to apply Article 603 of the Labor Code (currently 414), which imposes a one-month period as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power for cases outside the provisions of law 8422. As a corollary to the foregoing, the period to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff’s conduct expired one month after having executed them, and as a consequence of the foregoing, resolution 037 of 1037 hours of 28 June 2017, is absolutely null because it arises from an invalid administrative procedure, as the Administration’s sanctioning power has prescribed.” As is easily determined, the statements do not go beyond being a purely argumentative submission, completely divorced from the grounds provided by the Court. Ergo, what was alleged in the objection under examination is anodyne in terms of overturning the resolved matter.

XI.Third. This Chamber shares what was affirmed by the Court, in the sense that the facts imputed to the plaintiff relate to the matter of public finances (hacienda pública), because they refer to conduct that entailed the disposition of salary-related expenditures covered with public resources, their illegality having been determined. We also share the position that the intimated conduct and, therefore, the subject of the administrative proceeding, constitute manifestations antagonistic both to the internal control regime and to the duty of probity (deber de probidad). Regarding the latter, because, definitively, given the conduct imputed to the plaintiff, we are faced with conduct that conflicts with the proper performance of the powers granted to her and with an inadequate management of public funds or public finances (hacienda pública), such that the public interest was not satisfied. In this sense, Reglamento Ejecutivo no. 32333 of 12 April 2005, “Reglamento a la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública”, in Article 1, Definitions, insofar as relevant, states: “14) Duty of probity (Deber de probidad): Obligation of the public official to orient his or her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest, which is expressed, fundamentally, in the following actions: / a) Identify and attend to priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; / b) Demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; c) Ensure that the decisions adopted in compliance with his or her duties conform to impartiality and to the institutional objectives proper to the institution in which he or she serves; / d) Administer public resources adhering to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily; / e) Reject gifts, presents, prizes, rewards, or any other emolument, honorarium, stipend, salary, or benefit from individuals or legal entities, national or foreign, by reason of or on the occasion of the performance of his or her functions, within the country or abroad; except in cases permitted by Law; / f) Refrain from hearing and deciding a matter when the same grounds for recusal and challenge exist as established in the Ley Orgánica de Poder Judicial, the Código Procesal Civil, and other laws; / g) Orient his or her administrative activity toward primarily satisfying the public interest.” (The underlining is supplied). The plaintiff was reproached for having acted negligently in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her as Human Resources Coordinator; furthermore, as already indicated, her reprehensible conduct affected poor management of public resources or public finances (hacienda pública). Hence, indeed, as the adjudicators indicated, the intimated conduct is antagonistic to the duty of probity (deber de probidad). Likewise, it contrasts with the internal control regime. In this sense, the Ley General de Control Interno, no. 8292 of 31 July 2002, insofar as relevant, states: “Article 7.- Obligation to have an internal control system. Entities and bodies subject to this Law shall have internal control systems, which must be applicable, complete, reasonable, integrated, and congruent with their institutional competencies and duties. In addition, they must provide assurance in the fulfillment of those duties and competencies; all in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 3 of this Law. […] Article 12.- Duties of the head and subordinate holders in the internal control system. In matters of internal control, the head and subordinate holders shall be responsible for fulfilling, among others, the following duties: / a) Ensure the adequate development of the activity of the entity or body under their charge. / b) Immediately take corrective measures in the face of any evidence of deviations or irregularities. / c) Analyze and immediately implement the observations, recommendations, and provisions formulated by the internal audit, the Contraloría General de la República, the external audit, and other corresponding control and oversight institutions. / d) Ensure that the internal control systems comply at least with the characteristics defined in Article 7 of this Law. / e) Present an end-of-tenure report and formally hand over the entity or body to their successor, in accordance with the directives issued by the Contraloría General de la República and by the competent entities and bodies of the active administration. / Article 13.- Control environment. Regarding the control environment, the duties of the head and subordinate holders shall be, among others, the following: / a) Maintain and demonstrate integrity and ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as contribute with their leadership and actions to promote them in the rest of the organization, for the effective compliance by the other officials. / b) Develop and maintain a management philosophy and style that allow managing a determined level of risk, oriented toward achieving results and measuring performance, and that promote an open attitude toward mechanisms and processes that improve the internal control system. / c) Evaluate the functioning of the institution’s organizational structure and take the pertinent measures to guarantee the fulfillment of institutional purposes; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / d) Clearly establish hierarchy relationships, assign the authority and responsibility of officials, and provide adequate communication channels so that processes are carried out; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / e) Establish appropriate human resources management policies and practices, mainly regarding hiring, linking, training, evaluation, promotion, and disciplinary actions; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / Article 14.- Risk assessment. In relation to risk assessment, the duties of the head and subordinate holders shall be, among others, the following: / a) Identify and analyze the relevant risks associated with the achievement of institutional objectives and goals, defined both in the annual operational plans and in the medium- and long-term plans. / b) Analyze the possible effect of the identified risks, their importance, and the probability of their occurrence, and decide the actions to be taken to manage them. / c) Adopt the necessary measures for the adequate functioning of the risk assessment system and to situate the organization at least at an acceptable organizational risk level. / d) Establish the operational mechanisms that minimize risk in the actions to be executed.” (The underlining is not from the original). In this proceeding, it is clear that having signed personnel actions, through which extra salary (sobresueldos) was improperly granted through downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), contravenes the internal control systems. So much so that, as was indicated, in the final act as well as in the challenged judgment (considering X), it was determined that the unlawfulness imputed to the plaintiff materializes in what is provided for, among others, in precept 38 subsection d) of the LCCEI, which states: “Weakens the internal control of the organization or omits the necessary actions for its design, implementation, or evaluation, in accordance with the applicable technical regulations.” Hence, on the matter of the statute of limitations (prescripción), the norm to apply is that contained in precept 44 of Law no. 8422, which states: “Statute of limitations for administrative liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa). The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legislation related to Public Finances (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, of 7 September 1994.” For its part, Article 43 of Law no. 8292 states: “Article 43.- Statute of limitations for administrative liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa). The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall prescribe according to Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, of 7 September 1994. / It shall be deemed a serious fault on the part of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the infractor to prescribe, without justified cause.” For its part, canon 71 of the LOCGR prescribes: “Article 71.-Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria). The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legislation shall prescribe according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. / b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious—understood as that fact that requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. / The prescription shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. / When the author of the fault is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he or she terminates his or her service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. / It shall be deemed a serious fault on the part of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the infractor to prescribe, without justified cause. / (Thus reformed by subsection a) of Article 45 of the Ley de Control Interno, N° 8292 of 31 July 2002)”. (The underlining is supplied). In light of what is provided for by this provision, the prescriptive period, contrary to what the appellant stated and, as the Court correctly pointed out, began to run when the result of the preliminary investigation was made known to the Executive Presidency, i.e., 16 March 2016, the five-year prescriptive period not having elapsed, according to what was set forth in considering VI of this ruling. A computation that this Court, consistent with the merits of the case file, endorses.

XII.Fourth. Regarding the indirect violation alleged, the crux of the appellant’s argument lies in that, in his understanding, the prescriptive period elapsed because, in accordance with official letter no. PE-259-2015, an investigation was ordered into facts unrelated to the plaintiff. According to proven facts 15 and 16, by official letter no. DA-017-2015, the Executive Presidency was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation regarding the official Walter Mora Leiva. It did not refer to servants Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla or Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff. Which was thus ordered by official letter no. PE-259-2015. The matter now aired by the appellant was already the subject of analysis in section VI point two of this ruling, when the characteristics and nature of the preliminary investigation were analyzed; therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary reiteration, we refer to what was set forth there.

Therefore, the judgment does not incur the evidentiary error attributed to it when stating: \"[…] Under that perspective, in the instant case, it is found that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary proceeding date from the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the fact of the matter is that such events were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the pertinence of which is not challenged, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to in section 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to section 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment when the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective position to exercise it, that said period must begin to run. Thus, in cases such as the present one, where the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidentiary indications, so as to allow the issuance of a properly supported statement of charges, the starting point of the prescription operates upon the communication of the aforementioned report.\" (The underlined portion is supplied), especially considering that the appellant did not challenge what was stated regarding the necessity and pertinence of conducting the preliminary investigation.

XIII.In the second objection for violation of substantive rules, folio 14, the cassation appellant announced that it was formulated based on the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. This, he stated, because the judgment concluded that the plaintiff should have disobeyed the superior's order. In Considerando VIII of the challenged decision, he noted, the argument regarding the duty of obedience was rejected. He concluded that it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obligated to disobey the superior's order since it constituted illegitimate conduct, which, pursuant to section 108 of the LGAP, she should have, at the very least, placed on record her rejection. That conclusion, he asserted, results from a biased reading of that canon. That precept provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order involves carrying out acts "evidently extraneous to the competence of the subordinate" and the act is manifestly "arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime". In this litigation, he noted, it is clear that the Executive President's order to prepare and sign the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz is beyond the scope of that rule, as they were neither acts extraneous to the competence of the Human Resources Directorate nor arbitrary or criminal. In proven facts numbers 2), 3), 4), 5) 11), 12), 13) and 14), the disagreements between the lawyers of the CGR and INDER were accredited. A controversy that, he stated, reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Directorate of Legal Affairs indicated that the application of salary supplements for demoted officials was illegal and, less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-2013 of February 20, 2013, imposed the one he considered valid. The plaintiff, he indicated, lacks legal training, such that if among the specialist lawyers of the CGR and INDER there were three different opinions on how to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to impute to the claimant a violation of Article 108 of the LGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal opinions among the Legal Directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the CGR. In view of the foregoing, he stated, the Tribunal's application of the aforementioned section 108 of the LGAP is unfortunate and devoid of all logic, reasonableness, and substantiation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, different from those imputed to the plaintiff. Due to the foregoing and the erroneous application of Article 108 of the LGAP to a situation different from that foreseen by the legislator, he concluded, the ruling typified the defect indicated in subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, and therefore the judgment must be vacated and, resolving on the merits, declared fully with merit.

XIV.In the grievance under examination, the appellant invoked several hypotheses dissimilar to each other, but, by the way they were alleged, they are inseparable. He announced he was lodging the objection for direct violation of law, by virtue of an improper application of precept 108 of the LGAP, which is consistent with what is stated on folios 14 and 15, in the sense that: "In Considerando VIII, the challenged decision rejected the plaintiff's argument regarding the duty of obedience, because it concludes that it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obligated to disobey the superior's order because it constituted illegitimate conduct that, pursuant to section 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (LEGAP), she should have, at the very least, placed on record her rejection. That conclusion of the Tribunal results from a biased reading of canon 108 of the LEGAP. This article provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order involves carrying out acts 'evidently extraneous to the competence of the subordinate' and the act is manifestly 'arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime […] Due to the foregoing and the erroneous application of Article 108 of the LEGAP to a situation diametrically different from that foreseen by the legislator, the ruling typified the defect indicated in subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, and therefore the judgment must be vacated and, resolving on the merits, declared fully with merit." (Only the underlined portion is supplied). However, on that same folio, he stated: "[…] In proven facts 2), 3), 4), 5) 11) 12) 13) and 14), the disagreements between the lawyers of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the legal advisors of INDER were held as proven; a controversy that reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Directorate of Legal Affairs indicated that the application of salary supplements for demoted officials was illegal and, less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President, Oscar Hernández Cedeño, dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-20I3 of February 20, 2013, imposed that it was [sic] valid." What is now alleged - the supposed disagreements between the lawyers of the CGR and those of INDER; as well as the difference between the Directorate of Legal Affairs and the legal advisor of the Executive Presidency - would constitute, if true, an indirect violation of law, due to their improper assessment. Then, on folio 15, the objector pointed out: "It is necessary to add that the plaintiff lacks legal training, such that if among the specialist lawyers of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the IDA (INDER) there were three different opinions on how [sic] to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to impute to the claimant a violation of Article 108 of the LEGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal opinions among the Legal Directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic." (The underlined portion is supplied). The appellant alleged a violation of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Furthermore, by invoking logic, he alludes to an aspect of evidentiary assessment, which is reaffirmed by the preterition of the supposed three legal opinions. He added on that same folio: "In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal's application of section 108 of the General Law of Public Administration is unfortunate and devoid of all logic, reasonableness, and substantiation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, different from those imputed to the plaintiff." In addition to the direct violation of precept 108 of the LGAP, the appellant once again alluded to evidentiary assessment when he referred to logic; he also invoked the violation of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In turn, he alluded to a cassation ground for violation of procedural rules, that of lack of substantiation or reasoning. The ambiguity revealed conflicts with cassation technique, which requires that the grounds for the appeal must be indicated clearly and precisely (Article 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA).

XV.Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for the sake of greater legal argument, it is necessary to note the following. In the heading of the grievance under examination, the appellant announced he was objecting to what was stated in section VIII of the challenged judgment. Subsequently, as indicated in the preceding Considerando, on folio 14, in the relevant part, he stated: "In Considerando VIII, the challenged decision rejected the plaintiff's argument regarding the duty of obedience, because it concludes that it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obligated to disobey the superior's order because it constituted illegitimate conduct that, pursuant to section 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (LEGAP), she should have, at the very least, placed on record her rejection. That conclusion of the Tribunal results from a biased reading of canon 108 of the LEGAP. […]" (The underlined portion is supplied). What is indicated causes confusion. In said Considerando VIII of the judgment under question, the adjudicators, contrary to what was argued by the cassation appellant, merely performed a legislative theoretical analysis of the concepts of the duty of obedience and disobedience. They did not perform any analysis of the arguments of the plaintiff; therefore, they did not reject them there. Nor did they apply precept 108 of the LGAP to the claimant. In addition to that norm, in that section of the challenged judgment, the adjudicators analyzed other sections of the LGAP. For a proper understanding, that section will be reproduced, in its relevant part: "VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience. As part of the internal relations that arise in the provision of public competences, hierarchy entails the power of one body to direct and verify the conduct of other bodies that are inferior. As established by section 101 of the LGAP, the administrative hierarchical relationship presupposes that the competences of the superior encompass those of the inferior by reason of territory or subject matter, and that they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 ejusdem sets the general powers of the hierarchical superior as follows: […] In that exercise, according to subsection a) of that norm, the hierarch may issue orders to his inferiors, which entails the imposition of a specific conduct, of specific content, a measure that constitutes a source that must be weighed and assessed by the public agent in the exercise of his competences. The unjustified disregard of that imposition may well lead to internal disciplinary consequences, as well as to the review of the content of the inferior's act, so that the natural hierarch, in the review phase, ex officio or upon petition by a party, may carry out the comparison of the inferior's conduct with the orders issued. Even so, the principle of submission to the Law imposes that the public agent adapt his conduct to the rules that govern his behavior, according to the hierarchical scale of sources (arts. 6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 128, 132, among others, of the LGAP). Hence, although, in the face of the hierarch's orders, the duty of obedience arises, the same LGAP imposes criteria from which the public official must disregard those orders. As a general rule, the inferior must obey the orders, instructions, or circulars issued by his immediate superior. However, when any of the following circumstances concur, the official is bound by the duty of disobedience: a) That the act does not originate from a hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (art. 107.2 LGAP). If the duty of obedience finds support in relationships of subordination, it is evident that a body that does not hold hierarchy over another cannot validly issue an order, before which it is clear that it cannot be imposed on another body that, with respect to that act, is not inferior; b) That the act involves carrying out conduct notoriously extraneous to his competence (art. 108.1.a) ídem). Competence constitutes a fundamental subjective material element for the legitimate exercise of powers and competences, such that, in the absence of competence, the invalidity of the act is undeniable. This follows with complete clarity from precept 129 of the LGAP, such that the ordering of behaviors extraneous to the inferior's competence is conduct that is in itself irregular, and which, therefore, is not imbued with the duty of obedience; c) That the act is openly arbitrary, because its execution constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime (art. 108.1.b) ejusdem. Abuse of authority as an undue and/or excessive exercise of administrative power, constitutes a pathology in the provision of public competences, which determines the invalidity of what was carried out. This is imposed by the relationship of subsections 3) and 4) of section 146 of the LGAP. Precept 108 subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in stating that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the liability of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and potentially criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm alludes to the liability of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the issued order, which does not exclude the liability of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those indicated circumstances. However, by virtue of the duty under analysis, as has been pointed out, the same law establishes scenarios in which what is imposed upon the public agent is negative conduct, that is, to disregard the issued order, because it constitutes a pathological manifestation, voidable due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the liability derived from the execution and compliance with those null acts. Now, when the act does not present any of the indicated circumstances of exception, precept 109 of the cited law imposes upon the official the duty to obey the act, even when it is estimated that such conduct is contrary to the Legal Order, for any other concept. However, in this scenario, the same norm imposes a new duty, on this occasion, consisting of warning and communicating to the administrative hierarch about his objections. Such a requirement implies a release from the eventual liability that could derive from the execution of the invalid act, but with the survival of the duty of execution. In urgent cases, mandate 110 of the LGAP stipulates that the inferior may reserve his liability verbally, for which purpose it requires the presence of two witnesses. In this sense, the same canon 109 ejusdem complements that when it is a matter of avoiding serious damages of impossible or difficult reparation that the immediate execution of the issued act may produce, the inferior may suspend the execution thereof, subject to the liability that could result, in the event that the justificatory causes were, finally, non-existent or improper. It should be noted that said execution of null acts constitutes a distortion of the principle of non-executability of acts with absolute nullity imposed by sections 146.3 and 169 of the same legal source, and therefore, the communication of objections justifies the dispensation of the inferior's liability, reserving that framework of imputation to the superior. Having said this, in order to define the cases in which the duty of obedience or disobedience concurs, it is necessary to specify that the notoriety of the causes of illegitimacy that oblige one to disassociate from the conduct of a hierarch, is an aspect that must be assessed in each case, for which purpose, it is primary to analyze whether the public agent was in a position or had an objective duty to know the irregularity of the conduct he is required to execute. For this, the doctrine of section 213 of the LGAP sets guidelines to follow in these matters, imposing the criterion that the framework of liability is proportional to the level of hierarchy of the public servant and the technical nature of his functions. In this way, the higher the hierarchy and technical competence level, the greater the duty to know and assess the defects of the act, and, consequently, the more intense the duty of disobedience. Hence, it is necessary to analyze, in each situation, the position held, the profile of functions, the technical level inherent to the position, as prior parameters for weighing the existence (a priori) of a duty or power to know the illegitimacy of the conduct ordered by the superior and, from there, either opt for disobedience or for obedience under protest, with the due expression of the reasons constituting the objection. On that basis, it must be defined whether the inferior has incurred or not the framework of liability that the law imposes upon him, either for disobeying improperly, or for obeying an order that, by legal imperative, he should have disregarded. Therefore, the release from liability is not configured by the simple obedience of an act that does not present the circumstances indicated above, it being the duty of the inferior to communicate to the hierarch the objections pertaining to the content of the ordered act, as a cause for dispensing his liability for the adoption or execution of those acts. When such reproach is not recorded in the administrative file of the respective proceeding, the inferior equally assumes liability for that execution, when he had the power or duty to demonstrate the deficiencies of the act. Having made those necessary clarifications, we proceed to the analysis of the specific case." The lack of concordance between what is stated in that Considerando and what is alleged by the appellant is evident. Therefore, what has been stated is moot for the purpose of overturning the decision.

XVI.In the third ground of disagreement for transgression of substantive rules, folio 15, the cassation appellant indicated that Considerando IX of the appealed ruling concluded that his client incurred a breach of her duties, insofar as the Manual de Puestos imposed on her the task of "advising" her superiors on matters specific to the position. The conclusion, he stated, is invalid for the following reasons. The ruling, he indicated, accepted the argument of the defendants regarding the provisions of the Manual de Puestos in relation to the position held by the plaintiff. However, he added, it omitted to indicate whether it was based on the Manual de Puestos in force in 2010 or 2011, when the personnel actions of Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed; or, if it referred to the one in force on the date the jurisdictional action was filed. That omission regarding the effective date of the Manual de Puestos on which it bases its decision, he asserted, is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the ruling for lack of legal substantiation. The advisory functions of the Human Resources Coordinator, he indicated, are limited to the management and administration of human resources. She is extraneous, he noted, to legal advice, because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules concerning the ways of regulating service relationships. She knows, in detail, the contracting procedure, but not matters related to provisions or directives emanating from the CGR, whose legal complexity demands the advice of the Legal Department. The situation was so complicated, he stated, that not even among the legal advisors of the defendant entity could they agree on the applicable methodology, as is accredited by official letters DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013. Sufficient reason to reject the obligation of the plaintiff, as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not. His client, he noted, applied the legal order according to the legal design established by the legal advisors. In addition to the fact that the actions imputed to his client are extraneous to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury. The Tribunal, he commented, endorsed the imputation by INDER that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President. This, he stated, with logical error regarding the competences of the position in relation to the claim of advisory function, insofar as the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the CGR, regarding the procedure for the rehiring of demoted personnel, corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office of the entity and to the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the application guidelines for the other institutional offices. The contradictory, imprecise, and discordant substantiation of the ruling, he stated, typifies the ground provided in subsection a) of article 138 of the CPCA, because it failed to assess the following: a) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by the latter, for each of the cases and, subsequently, were endorsed by two agreements signed between INDER and officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Diaz (proven facts 5 through 10); b) the agreements were endorsed by the Legal Department (same facts); c) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials (there is no evidence supporting that conclusion); d) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to which the resolutions signed by the Executive President were attached; e) that the plaintiff was assisted by a principle of legitimate expectations, insofar as the decisions of the Executive President are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, such that it is they who are responsible for assessing the legality of the superior's decision. With the indicated assessment omissions, he stated, the ruling violated, by non-application, Article 356 of the LGAP, because the resolutions of the Executive President of INDER, referring to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz, ended the conflict. There was a mandatory and prior consultation with the Legal Advisor, as provided by that norm. By omitting its application, the Tribunal improperly transferred responsibility to his client, when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor in the event he provided it erroneously. The judgment, he noted, must also be vacated for non-application of Article 146 subsection 3) íbid, by erroneously transferring liability to the plaintiff. He reproduced that provision. In this litigation, and in the eventuality that the accused personnel actions were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance corresponds to the Executive President of INDER, by that express legal provision, which, he concluded, was omitted by the Tribunal, thereby incurring the claimed defect.

XVII.In the grievance under examination, the appellant once again alleged several hypotheses dissimilar to each other, but, by the way the objection was formulated, they are inseparable. In this sense, on folio 15, the objector stated: "The ruling accepts the argument of the defendants regarding the provisions of the Manual de Puestos in relation to the plaintiff's position, but omitted to indicate whether the Jurisdictional Chamber relied on the Manual de Puestos in force in 2010 and 2011 when the personnel actions of Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed, or if it refers to the Manual de Puestos in force on the date the jurisdictional action was filed. That omission regarding the effective date of the Manual de Puestos on which it bases its decision is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the ruling for lack of legal substantiation." If what was argued were true, it would give rise to a defect for violation of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1) point d) of canon 137 of the CPCA: lack of reasoning. However, the appellant did not indicate how each of the versions he mentioned differs (if they exist). Furthermore, he did not challenge what was stated in the judgment, regarding that: "As stated by INDER and reiterated by the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, the Institution's Manual de Puestos assigns the following details to that position: 'Nature of work. Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities. Positions included in this class: Human Resources Coordinator. (...) General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator. Advises the institution's heads in matters of personnel administration. Consequences of error. Errors committed may cause losses, damages, or delays of high consideration, and therefore activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision. Personal characteristics of the occupant. Analytical, critical, and synthesis capacity.'" (Only the underlined portion is supplied). Therefore, what is indicated is moot for the purpose of overturning the decision. The appellant added on that same folio: "Independently of what is stated in the preceding paragraph, the advisory functions of the Human Resources Coordinator are limited to the management and administration of human resources, entirely extraneous to legal advice because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules concerning the ways of regulating service relationships; she knows in detail the contracting procedure, but not matters related to provisions or directives emanating from the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, whose legal complexity demands the advice of the Legal Department." What has been stated is no more than a purely argumentative allegation, devoid of factual support. Furthermore, it contrasts with what the Institution's Manual de Puestos indicates as duties for the person holding the position of Human Resources Coordinator. The cassation appellant continued to state on said folio: "The situation was so complicated that not even among the legal advisors of the IDA (INDER) could they agree on the applicable methodology, as is accredited by official letters DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013; sufficient reason to reject the obligation of the plaintiff as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not." What has been stated would give rise to the cassation ground provided in subsection a) of section 138 of the CPCA, for indirect violation of law. In the last paragraph of said folio, the appellant argued: "The plaintiff applies the legal order according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, in addition to the fact that the actions imputed to my client are extraneous to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury. The Tribunal, in the ruling, endorsed INDER's imputation that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President with logical error regarding the competences of the plaintiff's position in relation to the claim of advisory function insofar as the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic regarding the procedure for the rehiring of demoted personnel, corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office of the entity and to the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the application guidelines for the other institutional offices." What is indicated is a purely argumentative allegation devoid of factual and legal support. Furthermore, the fact that the claimant applies the legal order according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, as indicated by the appellant, strays from what is stated in the Manual de Puestos as the official duties of the Human Resources Coordination of INDER. Moreover, in section XI point three of this resolution, the reasons were provided for which this Chamber considers that the conduct imputed to the plaintiff is antagonistic to both the duty of probity and the internal control regime.

On page 16, the appellant indicated: "The contradictory, imprecise, and discordant reasoning of the ruling typifies the ground under subsection a) of Article 138 of the CPCA because it failed to assess the following: / h) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by the latter for each of the cases, and subsequently endorsed by two agreements signed between the IDA (INDER) and the concerned officials, Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Diaz (See proven facts 5 through 10); / i) the agreements were countersigned by the Legal Department (same facts 5 through 10), / j) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials; (there is no evidence to support that conclusion) / k) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to which were attached the resolutions signed by the Executive President; / l) the ruling failed to assess that the plaintiff was entitled to a principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), insofar as the Executive President's decisions are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, such that it is these advisors who are responsible for assessing the legality of the Superior's decision. / 3) With the evaluative omissions noted above, the ruling violated, by non-application, Article 356 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LEGAP), because the resolutions of the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) regarding the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz ended the conflict, and there was mandatory prior consultation with the Legal Advisor as provided by Article 356 of the LEGAP; by omitting the application of that norm, the Court improperly transferred responsibility to my client when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor in the event he provided it erroneously." In what was argued by the appellant, two different cassation grounds were mixed: first, one for violation of procedural rules: lack of reasoning; and, then, another for transgression of substantive rules, due to indirect violation of law. Regarding the cassation appellant's assertion that the plaintiff was entitled to the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), it is necessary to point out. The plaintiff cannot hide behind said postulate to justify the disregard of the duty of probity (deber de probidad) and the rules of internal control (control interno). This would undoubtedly foster the result that the purpose provided in Law No. 8422—to prevent, detect, and sanction corruption in the exercise of public function—becomes innocuous. If the Public Administration, in the past, issued acts irregularly or illegally, as happened in this litigation, it would suffice for the public official to follow that conduct without questioning its legitimacy, despite it being their official duty, by alleging the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) to evade their responsibility, thus violating or disregarding the norms and guiding principles of internal control (control interno) and the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de la Función Pública), especially the duty of probity (deber de probidad). A situation that, by all lights, cannot be endorsed. The plaintiff was appointed to the position of Human Resources Coordinator of INDER because she met the profile indicated in the Position Manual of that entity. Among her duties is that of advising the heads on personnel administration matters; for which she performs functions of planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of INDER, as well as the execution of corresponding activities. In accordance with this, the plaintiff should have noticed the irregularity presented in the case of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz, bringing it to the attention of the Executive Presidency. Not simply continue with that irregularity, hiding behind a misunderstood legitimate expectation (confianza legítima). That is, by virtue of her investiture, she could not presume, based on those prior irregular actions, the legitimacy of her conduct. Hence, the principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima) was not violated. In this regard, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, among others, the judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) numbers 93-F-S1-2011 of 9 hours 5 minutes of February 3, 2011; 1692-F-S1-2012 of 10 hours 10 minutes of December 13, 2012; 256-F-S1-2019 of 16 hours 24 minutes of March 20, and 409-F-S1-2019 of 10 hours 55 minutes of May 16, both of the year 2019. Finally, the cassation appellant stated on said page: "The ruling must also be cassated for non-application of Article 146, subsection 3) of the LEGAP by erroneously transferring responsibility to the plaintiff. The recently mentioned subsection states: […] In the present case and in the eventuality that the accused personnel actions were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance lies with the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) by that express legal provision, which was omitted by the Court, incurring the claimed defect, and I request that it be so declared." What was indicated, if it occurred, would give rise to the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, that is, for direct violation of law. On the other hand, the eventual responsibility of the person who held the Executive Presidency at the time the challenged employer orders were issued does not exclude or exonerate the responsibility of the plaintiff, as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, by virtue of the duty of probity (deber de probidad) in public function and the internal control (control interno) regime, already set forth in recital XI point three of this resolution. The Court set it forth in section VIII of the challenged judgment, indicating: "Precept 108 subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in pointing out that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the responsibility of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and eventually criminal sphere. It is worth highlighting that this norm alludes to the responsibility of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the issued order, which does not exclude the responsibility of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those noted circumstances. However, by virtue of the duty being analyzed, as has been indicated, the same law establishes scenarios in which what is imposed on the public agent is negative conduct, that is, to disregard the issued order, for constituting a pathological manifestation, vitiated with nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the responsibility derived from the execution and compliance with those null conducts." (The underlining is supplied). Which was not duly challenged by the cassation appellant. As has already been indicated, the confusion evidenced is contrary to the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds of the appeal be indicated in a clear and precise manner.

XVIII.Without prejudice to the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. The judges, in recitals IX and X of the challenged judgment, in what is of interest, pointed out: "IX.- Analysis on the defenses relating to the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia) of the plaintiff. The defense formulated in this case, and upon which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she limited herself to complying with the orders issued by whoever at that date acted as Executive President. In order to what has been set forth, such allegation requires the analysis of the circumstances in which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia) in the face of that conduct. In this case, on the date of the issuance of the personnel actions in the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the plaintiff held the Human Resources Coordination of the defendant entity. […] Considering these particularities, this Court deems that the very condition of Human Resources Coordinator places the plaintiff under the duty, or at least, the possibility of knowing the set of antecedents and regulations that are inherent to downward personnel movements. This suggests that faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue personnel actions recognizing the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn of the necessary existence of the due technical and legal prerequisites for that recognition, and if applicable, to bring to said hierarchy’s knowledge the need to request the internal opinions that would provide legitimate support for that decision. As mentioned by the Position Manual in the section indicated above, part of the plaintiff's general activities was to advise the heads on personnel administration matters. From this, a functional duty emerges from that profile which imposed upon her the obligation to warn her superior that the issued conduct did not find support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The allegation of automatic application without any objection of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, by derivation of the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia), does not imply the release from responsibility that is sought, when the same LGAP indicates the scenarios in which the public agent had to disobey, but also when the same internal regulations and the profile of her tasks imposed upon her the need to know of the requirement for prior technical and/or legal analyses that would evidence the pertinence, in the charged cases, of the actions ordered by her superior. In any case, even considering that it has not been proven that any of the conditions that imposed the duty to disregard the order existed, given her knowledge and responsibilities in Human Management matters, it was her duty to warn that in downward reassignments it was not feasible to grant the salary bonus assigned in those personnel actions, based on the lack of technical analyses that would support those decisions. This in order that the hierarch could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to free herself from responsibility for the execution of those conducts. However, the case file does not show that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders issued through the issuance of the respective personnel actions, conferring, ultimately, illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the INDER budget. By not having expressed those disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes responsibility for the indolence in the fulfillment of these legally assigned duties, which are consistent with her functions, therefore, demandable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the position profile she occupied. / X.- Viewed thus, the material and formal illegality is concretized in the normative provision that was charged to the plaintiff, specifically, Article 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of Article 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the applied sanction is sustained on the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that would support the issued order and that she chose to execute, dispensing with the fulfillment of minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules of imputation of responsibility established by canon 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the issued act and the adopted conducts. From that standpoint, the position of Human Management Coordinator implies a degree of technical specialization based on which the plaintiff's allegation is untenable regarding the dispensation from responsibility due to simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency regarding the personnel actions that recognized a right to payment of a salary supplement for downward reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive requirements pertaining to the case. Gross fault (culpa grave) is thus observed in that procedure, which implies responsibility for the issuance and permissiveness of acts that improperly created patrimonial rights, with the corresponding economic detriment to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by committing public funds without the proper verification of the conformity of the procedures that led to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. No legal excuse or permissiveness to disregard the deficiencies that later formed the basis for the imposed sanction is observed. It is a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuance of this type of conduct or, in any case, to set forth the reasons for disagreement as a warning, in order to thereby generate a release from responsibility. By not doing so, the factual premise (conditioning antecedent) that was charged to the plaintiff, and which permits the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the notice of charges (traslado de cargos), is incurred. Such assessment of the behavior referable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In the relevant part, within the reasons given by the Executive Presidency it was stated: […] Said references evidence the weightings from which the defendant entity considered that the plaintiff's conduct injured the norms of Law No. 8422, due to the omission of control regarding the due technical analyses for the granting of downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the salary supplement granted to both referred officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures typical of her position, pertaining to personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks of the neglect of those duties and consequently of the responsibility that derives from those conducts. As observed, that analysis connects and harmonizes with the reasonings given by this Court in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the reported inaccuracies are not observed." (The underlining is supplied). As is clearly determined, the appellant did not duly challenge the arguments or foundations used by the Court in order to determine the plaintiff's responsibility for breach of the duty of probity (deber de probidad) and the internal control (control interno) regime. As indicated in the previous section, he limited himself to making merely argumentative allegations, divorced from the reasons set forth in the challenged judgment. Which, by the way, this Chamber shares. It is clear, by virtue of the plaintiff's official duties as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, her duty to know and manage the regulations concerning downward personnel movements of the institution. Hence, the need to have the technical and legal prerequisites for the recognition of salary supplements in cases of downward personnel movements. Therefore, by not warning the Executive Presidency of that circumstance, she must assume her responsibility, in accordance with precept 213 of the LGAP.

XIX.In the fourth reproach, page 16, the appellant objected to the rejection of the nullity for lack of reasoning of the sanctioning resolution. One of the reasons for the claimed nullity, he noted, was the lack of reasoning of resolution No. PE-037 of 10 hours 37 minutes of June 28, 2017. The judgment rejected the arguments and resolved that the administrative decision fulfilled the requirements of reasoning, explaining what it considered is the reasoning. In that explanation, he said, the ruling started from a quantitative perspective of reasoning. Contrary to what was resolved, he stated, said resolution lacks reasoning because it omitted to specify, to pinpoint the content of the plaintiff's conduct that breached the specific rules of the legal system to which she was subject. The reasoning, he pointed out, involves four substantial elements: a) the absolute verification of the facts without subjective interpretation or assessment. It is the pure and simple verification of the occurrence of an event regardless of the reasons that gave rise to it; b) the irrefutable proof that those facts were the consequence of a specific conduct; c) the subsumption of those facts into precise legal norms, without interpretative twists; and d) that the facts indicated in section a) can be attributed to one or several persons. Both administrative resolution No. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment, he indicated, omitted to specify the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it was only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. The legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact were omitted, he added, limiting to a disorderly mention of several legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conducts subsumed in each one. The judicial ruling, he asserted, endorsed that administrative act lacking reasoning, infringing Article 136 of the LGAP which requires it as a validity requirement, because reasoning is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct. In this litigation, he stated, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of INDER resolved that the officials Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid a salary supplement (sobresueldo), as a substitute for the payment of the entire settlement in a single installment, as a consequence of their partial settlement due to demotion (descenso en el cargo); b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action; c) after the signing of the personnel action, agreements were signed with the indicated officials and countersigned by the Legal Department. The proof of those facts, he indicated, the Court detailed in proven facts 5) to 10) of the judgment. The legal support that backed the facts were the resolutions of the CGR and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued. The challenged judgment abandoned the analysis of those three basic and unique elements that should have been incorporated in the administrative resolution, incurring in the same defect of lack of reasoning. The mere reading of the administrative resolution, he asserted, proves the defect attributed to the challenged ruling, namely: a) it omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the challenged and confirmed administrative act; b) there is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; c) the judicial resolution did not concretize the undefined legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) of: "duty of probity (deber de probidad), sound management of public resources" in relation to the concrete facts attributed to the plaintiff; d) it omitted to indicate the concrete and specific facts executed by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity (deber de probidad); e) it omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete responsibility attributable to the plaintiff in the handling of public resources (also omitted by the challenged administrative act). The two resolutions (administrative No. 037-2017 and the judgment) did not identify the imperative legal rules for the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public resources, subjecting her to the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). He brought up that, in accordance with resolution No. 623-A-S1-2013, of 10 hours 25 minutes of May 16, 2013, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) concluded that, to determine the application of the rules of Article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since the responsibility derives from the infraction of the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and not from the official's position. He reproduced, in what is of its interest, what was considered therein. According to said judicial body, he noted, both the administrative sanctioning act No. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment lacked the specification of the reasons why the signature stamped by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz infringed the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). That lack of legal precision, with argumentative omission, he concluded, is grounds for absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the administrative resolution and for revocation of the objected judgment.

XX.Once again, the appellant alleged several dissimilar hypotheses, but, due to the way he structured the grievance, they are inseparable. On page 17, he indicated: "Both administrative resolution number 037 of 10:37 hours of June 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI omitted to specify the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it is only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. / The legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact were omitted [sic], limiting to a disorderly mention of several legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conducts subsumed in each one." What was indicated, if it occurred, would originate the defect for breach of procedural rules provided in subsection 1) point d) of Article 137 of the CPCA: lack of reasoning. Furthermore, what is argued is no more than a merely argumentative commentary, completely divorced from the challenged judgment. The appellant added: "The judicial ruling endorsed that administrative act lacking that reasoning, infringing Article 136 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) which requires it as a validity requirement, because reasoning is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct." What was now alleged would give rise to the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of Article 138 ibid, for direct breach of law. Then, the appellant indicated: "In the present case, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) resolved that the officials Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid a salary supplement (sobresueldo) as a substitute for the payment of the entire settlement in a single installment as a consequence of their partial settlement due to demotion (descenso en el cargo); b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action; c) after the signing of the personnel action, agreements were signed with the indicated officials and countersigned by the Legal Department; the proof of those facts: the Court detailed them in proven facts 5) to 10) of the judgment; the legal support that backed the facts were the resolutions of the General Comptroller's Office of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued." What was indicated would give rise to the cassation ground provided in subsection a) of canon 138 ejúsdem, for indirect violation of law, due to the improper assessment of both the resolutions of the CGR and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued, by not properly analyzing the facts that occurred in this litigation. The appellant continued stating: "Judgment 095-2019-V1 abandoned the analysis of those three basic and unique elements that should have been incorporated in resolution 037 of 10:37 hours of April 28, 2017, incurring in the same defect of lack of reasoning, in this case, of the judgment. The mere reading of resolution 037 of 10:37 hours of April 28, 2017, proves the defect attributed to ruling 095-2019-VI, namely: / It omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the challenged and confirmed administrative act; / There is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; / The judicial resolution does not concretize the undefined legal concepts (conceptos jurídicos indeterminados) of: 'duty of probity (deber de probidad), sound management of public resources' in relation to the concrete facts attributed to the plaintiff, / It omitted to indicate the concrete and specific facts executed by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity (deber de probidad), / It omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete responsibility attributable to the plaintiff in the handling of public resources, (also omitted by the challenged administrative act). / The two resolutions (037 of 10:37 hours of April 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI) do not identify the imperative legal rules for the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public resources, subjecting her to the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública)." What was stated would give rise to the defect for breach of procedural rules already indicated: lack of reasoning. In this regard, it is necessary to indicate that, differently from what was pointed out by the appellant, in section VI of the challenged judgment, the judges analyzed, from a theoretical, doctrinal, and legal perspective, the figure of the "duty of probity (deber de probidad)". Then, in recital VII, they expressed the reasons why, in this litigation, the prescriptive period provided in Article 71 of the LOCGR is applicable and why it did not elapse. In sections VIII, IX, and X, they set forth the reasons (factual and legal) why responsibility was imputable to the plaintiff, by virtue of her position as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, for breach of both the duty of probity (deber de probidad) and the internal control (control interno) regime, by not having warned of the necessary existence of due technical and legal prerequisites to recognize salary supplements (sobresueldos) for downward movements. That is, differently from what was indicated by the cassation appellant, in this Chamber's view, the judges clearly, orderly, and meticulously reasoned the reasons why the plaintiff was responsible for her omission conduct. The appellant continued pointing out on pages 17 and 18: "It is important to bring up that, in accordance with judgment 623-A-S1-2013 of 10:25 hours of May 16, 2013, this Honorable First Chamber (Sala Primera) concluded that, to determine the application of the rules of Article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since the responsibility derives from the infraction of the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and not from the position of the concerned official. It so stated: […] According to the First Chamber (Sala Primera), the administrative sanctioning act 037 of 10:37 hours of June 28, 2017, like judgment 095-2019-VI, lacked the specification of the reasons why the signature stamped by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz infringed the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). That lack of legal precision with argumentative omission is [sic] grounds for absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of resolution 037 of 10:37 hours of April 28, 2017, and for revocation of judgment 095-2019-VI, and I request that it be so declared." Said resolution of the First Chamber (Sala Primera), in this litigation, constitutes a means of conviction. Therefore, what was argued regarding it, if it occurred, would give rise to the cassation ground provided in subsection a) of Article 138 of the CPCA, for indirect breach of law. Then, in the last indicated paragraph, the cassation appellant also invoked the cassation ground for violation of procedural rules already indicated, of lack of reasoning. The ambiguity manifested, as has already been stated, contravenes cassation technique.

XXI.Without prejudice to what was indicated in the previous recital and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to indicate. In recital XI of the challenged judgment, the judges provided the reasons why, in their understanding, the challenged final act is duly reasoned. In what is of interest, they stated: "XI.- On the lack of reasoning alleged. On the other hand, an improper reasoning of the final act of the procedure is alleged. […] in the case at hand, the act does not present the reasoning deficiencies that are alleged. As has been set forth above, in what has been the subject of objection, the challenged conducts clearly offer the set of antecedent circumstances upon which it has sustained its decision. The final act indicates the reasons of fact and of law upon which the content of the act is sustained. In the section of proven facts, that act refers to the elements of conviction from which it derived each factual assertion. For its part, in the analysis of the merits, it conducts an assessment of the evidence incorporated into the procedure, while explaining the reasons why it deemed the charged conducts proven, the considerations by which it concluded that it was a fault against the probity regime, detailing the obligations inherent to the position the plaintiff held at the time of the facts, as well as the value judgment that led it to establish the sanction definitively applied. In that regard, in numeral 'V.V.

[sic] Regarding the sanction to be imposed," it stated: "Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission to act, this body considers it to be relevant; since, there was serious and pernicious damage to the institution's budget by granting benefits to officials who were not afforded due process to determine whether or not they qualified for the reassignment of descending positions; for this reason, in order not to overlook said action; but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent conduct in the functions she performed, this decision-making body imposes the sanction of ONE-MONTH SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, estimating the seriousness of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution, and considering that the purpose of the disciplinary procedure is corrective (...) ". In this way, the final challenged resolution duly sets forth the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were deemed accredited with a detail of the elements of conviction upon which they were deduced. Such development enables the understanding of the reasons that support the grounds for the act. Then, it addressed the various allegations presented by the parties involved and elaborates on the legal reasons why, given the determined facts, it obtained the assessments and legal consequences ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, this exposition shows logical congruence between the facts and the applied law, as a support for the final decision, which allows for the (logical) understanding of the base reasons for the administrative will. It is worth noting that, in order of what is prescribed by ordinal 136 subsection c) of the LGAP, this statement of reasons (motivación) allows the decision to be supported against the recommendation report issued by the investigating body (órgano instructor) and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), both criteria of a non-binding nature under the terms of precept 303 of the aforementioned LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of due statement of reasons (motivación debida), as was carried out in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with these considerations and development, but this does not imply that the defect she points to is realized. From this standpoint, the argument under examination must be rejected." However, the appellant made an argument divorced from this foundation. He merely stated: "The judgment rejects the arguments and resolves that the administrative decision meets the requirements of the grounds (fundamentación), explaining what it considers to be the statement of reasons (motivación). In that explanation, the ruling starts from a quantitative perspective of the statement of reasons (motivación). Contrary to what the Court resolved in Considering X, decision P.E.037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, lacks grounds (fundamentación) because it omitted to specify the contents of the plaintiff's conduct that violated the specific rules of the legal system to which she was subject." That is, he made a brief and very generic account, without specifically questioning what the Court pointed out. Therefore, what was stated in the censure under study is futile for the purpose of breaking the resolved matter.

XXII.In the fifth ground of disagreement, folio 18, the appellant objected to the resolved matter regarding that the applied sanction is correct. In considering XII, he stated, the ruling concluded that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was correct, since the applicable legal regime is that contained in Article 39 of the LCCEI. It rejected the argument that the 30-day suspension without pay violated precept 68 subsection c) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo); and it tried to rely on the Public Law regime, to which the plaintiff is subject, with support in precepts 112 of the LGAP, 585 today 682 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and 39 of the LCCEI. He added that the validity analysis of personnel actions numbers 792-2010 and 3841-2011 (Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz) is independent and, moreover, unrelated to the infraction of the duty of probity. He transcribed, in his interest, what was considered by the Court. The analysis of the validity or invalidity of the personnel actions, he noted, is a fundamental requirement to determine if the duty of probity was violated. It is from the reasons or elements that support that invalidity that the liability would arise, since it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law could generate official liability for infringement of the duty of probity. The ruling, he noted, relied on some (isolated) resolutions, without adjusting what in doctrine is called the "differentiating fact" (hecho diferenciador), as a keystone for extrapolating jurisprudence from one case to another. To validate the application of Article 39 of the LCCEI, he stated, it was necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff against the probity claimed because, being an indeterminate legal concept, it was up to the Administration and, in this case to the Court, to make it concrete. His client, he indicated, was not shown, in the administrative or judicial venue, to have incurred in any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in Article 38 of the LCCEI, a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in numeral 39 ibid, exclusive to the grounds of canon 38 cited. As the violation of the LCCEI by the plaintiff's conduct was undemonstrated, he concluded, the ruling incurred the defect of subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying Articles 3 and 39 ibidem.

XXIII.As has been set forth, the Court, in sections VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, not only explained why the provisions of laws numbers 7428, 8292 and 8422 are applicable to this litigation; but also, meticulously analyzed the reasons why the plaintiff, unlike what was stated by the appellant, violated the duty of probity and the internal control rules. Said argumentation, as has been indicated, was not duly questioned by the cassation appellant (casacionista). Specifically, as indicated in sections X and XVIII of this resolution, in considering X, the judging persons were eloquent in indicating that the material and formal unlawfulness lies in what is provided by the regulations notified to the plaintiff. Specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law no. 8422 and 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) no. 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, they indicated, the subjective basis of the sanction is the duty to have requested the technical and legal inputs that supported the order issued and which she chose to execute, exempting compliance with minimum requirements. That is, contrary to what was stated by the challenger, the Court explained that the plaintiff's reprehensible conduct fit within the provisions of canon 38 of Law no. 8422. Which, it is insisted, was not duly objected to by the challenger. Therefore, the application of precept 39 ibid is appropriate, regarding the sanction imposed, and not ordinal 68 subsection c) of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). Which, as has been indicated, this Chamber agrees with. The appellant stated on folio 18: "We regret that conclusion [he refers to what was stated by the Court regarding that the validity analysis of the personnel actions granted in favor of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz does not constitute a preliminary question (cuestión prejudicial), to which the possibility of instructing the corresponding disciplinary procedure is subject]. The analysis of the validity or invalidity of the personnel actions is a “fundamental” requirement to determine if the duty of probity was violated, because it is from the reasons or elements that support that invalidity that the liability would arise, because it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law can generate official liability for infringement of the duty of probity." The Court, in section XII of the objected judgment, indicated in this regard: "Regarding this independence of object between both procedures, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), in exercise of the powers of the Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) (pursuant to temporary provision I in relation to Article 136 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), Law No. 8508), has already ruled, among others, in resolutions numbers 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 and 000003-F-TC-2018. Ergo, the flaw upon which the plaintiff bases her reproaches is not observed." Indeed, this cassation body, regarding public finances (hacienda pública), has indicated that the substantiation of a sanctioning-type procedure is autonomous with respect to the processing of the annulment procedure. In this regard, in addition to those indicated by the judging persons, ruling no. 114-F-TC-2016 of 11:10 a.m. on September 22, 2016, can be consulted. That is, that there is a previously decreed nullity of a specific act harmful to public finances (hacienda pública) is not a sine qua non requirement to validly exercise the sanctioning regime against the public servant responsible for that harmful conduct or omission. There is no conditioning or subordination of one and the other procedure. Both are fully independent of each other and differentiable in terms of their object and scope. The cassation appellant (casacionista), on the indicated folio 18, merely stated: "The ruling relies on some (isolated) resolutions without adjusting what in doctrine is called the “differentiating fact” (hecho diferenciador) as a keystone for extrapolating jurisprudence from one case to another." What was stated is nothing more than a merely argumentative allegation. It does not delve into the reasons why, in his opinion, the indicated precedents are not applicable to this litigation. The appellant added on said folio 18: "To validate the application of Article 39 of the LCCEI, it was absolutely necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff against the probity claimed, because being an indeterminate legal concept, it was up to the Administration and in this case to the Court, to make it concrete." Precisely, it is insisted, that was what the Court did in the indicated considerings of the challenged ruling, as explained in section XX of this resolution. On folio 19, the cassation appellant (casacionista) alleged: "The plaintiff was not shown, in the administrative or judicial venue, to have incurred in any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in Article 38 of the LCCEI: a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in Article 39 ibid, exclusive to the grounds of Article 38 cited. / As the violation of the LCCEI by the plaintiff's conduct was undemonstrated, the ruling incurred the defect of subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying Articles 3 and 39 of the LCCEI, and for this reason, I request that it be reversed (case) and, resolving on the merits, the claim be granted in all its extremes." Unlike what was affirmed by the appellant, it is repeated, the judging persons, in section X of the challenged judgment, with support, in addition, from what was meticulously stated in the preceding considerings, with total clarity, reproached the plaintiff for having incurred the notified unlawfulness —for violation of the duty of probity and the internal control regime—, specifically, the conduct provided for in subsection d) of precept 38 of Law no. 8422, which, it is insisted, was not the subject of questioning by the challenger. Ergo, what was stated is futile for the purpose of modifying the resolved matter.

XXIV.In the sixth and final attack against the challenged judgment for violation of substantive norms, folio 19, the cassation appellant (casacionista) objected to what was resolved regarding that the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero is not liable. The Court concluded that no liability is attributable to him because the assumptions of Article 199 of the LGAP are not met, which he does not agree with. Subsection 1) of that numeral, he indicated, attributes personal liability to the official who acts with intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this sub-lite, he added, he acted with intent (dolo), because, from the beginning of the sanctioning procedure, he knew that the Executive Presidents who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the salary supplements (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single tract of their partial benefits). However, he added, he did not charge them, nor those who were favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal). He limited himself to imputing the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that this official had limited herself to signing the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies. The Court, he asserted, made a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of that norm, by considering that, in the case, the co-defendant did not incur in manifest illegality because he did not deviate from opinions or consultative opinions. However, he pointed out, he ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality. He reproduced, in his interest, that norm. It leaves open the list of possibilities of illegalities. In this case, he noted, his client stated, in the administrative procedure, having limited herself to complying with superior orders, requesting the joinder of the lawsuit (integración de la litis) with those who issued them. However, it was emphatically rejected by the co-defendant without a valid legal reason, with personal liability for those decisions. Articles 108 and 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), he argued, establish the cases for civil, administrative, and criminal liability of public officials subject to those norms, as is the case of the co-defendant. In subsection e) of numeral 110, he alleged, the actions leading to that liability are established. He reproduced that provision. It is clear, he commented, the co-defendant used his position and public resources for purposes other than those intended by law. If what he sought was the true truth of the facts and to determine civil and administrative responsibilities, he had the obligation to bring into the procedure all those who participated in the conducts. However, he insists, he limited himself to imputing to the plaintiff the acts ordered by her peers, with an evident misuse of power (desviación de poder) and resources towards personal ends prohibited by the transcribed rule. For the above reasons, and given the non-application of Article 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos), he concluded, the ruling typified the provisions of Article 138 subsection c). For this reason, he requested that it be reversed (case) with the legal consequences.

XXV.In the present ground of disagreement, the appellant again alleges different hypotheses, but due to the way it was structured, they are inseparable. In this sense, on folio 19 he affirmed: "In the sub-lite, the co-defendant Rodríguez Solís [sic] acted with intent (dolo) because from the beginning of the sanctioning procedure he knew that [sic] the executive presidents [sic] who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the salary supplements (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single tract of their partial benefits) and yet, he did not charge them, nor those who were favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal), limiting himself to imputing the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that this official had limited herself to signing [sic] the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies." (The underlining is supplied). The factual circumstance, that the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero acted with "malicious political calculation" was not accredited by the judging persons. Hence, if it were to occur, it would give rise to a defect for breach of substantive norms, by indirect violation of law (subsection a) of precept 138 of the CPCA). However, the appellant did not indicate by which means of conviction his statement is accredited. On the other hand, he also alleged improper interpretation of canon 199 subsection 3) of the LGAP, which would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) ibid; that is, direct violation of law. Likewise, he invoked, as determined from what is set forth on folio 20, the direct violation of precept 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos) (subsection c) ibid), for not having joined all those who participated in the questioned conducts to the lawsuit (in the disciplinary administrative process). The ambiguity revealed, it is reiterated, violates the technique of cassation (casación).

XXVI.Notwithstanding the foregoing in the previous considering and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. First. In section XIII of the challenged judgment, entitled "Regarding the liability of the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero," the judging persons, in their interest, stated: "[…] In this sense, from the analysis of the allegations in which the claimant party claims the liability of the co-defendant, it is evident that it is subject to the final decision adopted within the disciplinary procedure followed against him being invalid. However, in what has been the subject of challenge, that specific conduct does not present the deficiencies attributed, which is why the criterion of manifest illegality in question is not present. This being the case, the liability reproached to Mr. Rodríguez Barquero is improper due to the lack of the basic criterion on which that disciplinary referability framework would be based. Consequently, the claim must be rejected in that particular." (The underlining is supplied). As is easily determined, the cassation appellant (casacionista) made an argument completely divorced from the challenged judgment. He did not object to what the Court indicated in order to reject said liability of the co-defendant. He limited himself to indicating: "The Court makes a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of Article 199 by considering that in the case the co-defendant did not incur in manifest illegality because he did not deviate from opinions or consultative opinions, however, it ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality, because the norm expressly indicates: […] leaving open the list of possibilities of illegalities." (The underlining is supplied). Which is unrelated to what the Court indicated, that is, that no liability lies against the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero because the final act is valid. Ergo, what was stated in the grievance under study is futile for the purpose of breaking the resolved matter.

XXVII.Second. The argument put forth by the appellant in the censure under study, regarding the lack of joinder of the administrative process with all those who participated in the questioned conducts, in order to attribute liability to the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, was not timely proposed nor debated in this process. Note, the Court was emphatic in indicating that, after the analysis of the allegations made by the plaintiff party, to claim that liability, it is determined that it is subject, only, to the final decision, adopted within the administrative disciplinary procedure followed against her, being invalid, which was not the case. This is corroborated by what was set forth in the claim, image 2 of the virtual judicial file: "The personal liability of the defendant Rodríguez Barquero arises from the provisions of Article 199, subsection 3) of the LEGAP, since he deviated from the criterion of the directing body composed of legal specialists, without any legally valid justification, moreover, this liability was extended to the fact that in the appeal for revocation or reconsideration the legal defects of the resolution were punctually indicated, and he equally maintained the sanction, through a lack of resolution, which, pursuant to Article 329.2 in relation to 211 of the LEGAP, is deemed a serious fault of service and therefore, of a personal nature." Ergo, what has now been stated in cassation (casación), being novel, cannot be subject to analysis by this Chamber.

XXVIII.APPEAL OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF INDER. In the sole grievance, the appellant announced lodging it for breach of substantive norms, according to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. There exists, he indicated, an improper interpretation of the legal norm. The Court, he noted, upon knowing and resolving the procedural costs (costas procesales), considered that the plaintiff had sufficient reason to litigate, since the investigating body (órgano instructor) of the procedure issued an opinion proposing to relieve her of all liability in the disciplinary cause instructed against her. In this sense, he said, it estimated that this boast granted her an "objective reason" to try to refute the final decision that imposed the decreed suspension sanction. Consequently, it resolved without special condemnation in costs (costas). The judgment, he affirmed, incorrectly applied precept 193 subsection b) of the CPCA and, as such, gave an improper interpretation to the legal norm. The exoneration of costs in favor of the plaintiff party is not appropriate, he said, by applying subsection b) of Article 193. He reproduced said precept. He transcribed, from the Regulation of the Labor Relations Unit and the Labor Relations Board of INDER, numerals 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33 and 53. What happened in this administrative sanctioning process, he noted, was in compliance with said internal regulations. All these procedures, in the case of INDER, must always pass through the review and approval of the Labor Relations Board. Thus, although the conclusions report of the directing body of the process was concluded on time, it had to be submitted, for its evaluation, to the Labor Relations Board. This is recorded in folio 287 of the main file - no. URL-002-2015-. This Board, in turn, forwarded it to the decision-making body. The issuance of the final act occurred on April 28, 2017, being notified that same day to the plaintiff. He carried out a theoretical analysis of the grounds or statement of reasons (fundamentación o motivación) of the final act of the procedure in general; then, he referred to said formal requirement in the act issued in the procedure followed against the plaintiff. He highlighted, in order of what is prescribed by ordinal 136 subsection c) of the LGAP, this statement of reasons (motivación) allowed the decision to be supported against the recommendation report issued by the investigating body (órgano instructor) and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board. Both criteria of a non-binding nature under the terms of precept 303 ibidem. The investigating body (órgano instructor) of the procedure issued an opinion proposing to relieve the plaintiff here of all liability in the disciplinary cause instructed against her; but this, he pointed out, is not constitutive of an "objective reason." On the contrary, in a subjective reasoning, by which one can justify that the plaintiff had sufficient volitional elements to try to refute the final decision adopted, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with the considerations and development of the final act against the recommendations issued by the directing body (instructor of all preparatory acts to the issuance of the final act). But this, he added, does not imply that such an appreciation materializes into an objective value judgment sufficient for the judge to equate it to a sufficient reason to litigate and, therefore, exempt from the payment of procedural costs (costas procesales) as corresponds in law. Likewise, he referred to the differences and competencies of the directing and decision-making bodies within the administrative process. He indicated, the error of the Court is having improperly interpreted a legal norm (193 subsection b of the CPCA) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate. The reason why it decided that the plaintiff party should be exonerated from costs, was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against INDER, because the recommendation issued by the directing body was favorable to her. However, he stated, this is not the suitable act for the declaration of rights in favor of the Administrated parties, for which the Court violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law: principles of legality, reasonableness (razonabilidad), proportionality, legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and equality, by valuing, as having merit, said "objective reason to litigate." In his opinion, there is an improper application of the legal norm, since the reasons for which the judging person decides that the plaintiff party should be exonerated from costs do not exist. Consequently, he requested that the challenged judgment be revoked with respect to the exoneration of the plaintiff party from the payment of costs (costas). He requested that this duty be imposed, with the recognition of interest and indexation in favor of his client. Under the protection of numerals 119, 138 subsection c) and 193 of the CPCA, he concluded, we are not in the presence of an exemption from the payment of costs (costas) against the losing plaintiff, so the payment of both costs of the process should be imposed on her.

XXIX.In folio 1 verso of the legajo, the appellant indicated: "The resolution incorrectly applied Article 193 subsection b) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) and as such gave it an improper interpretation of the legal norm. In this case, we are in the presence of the ground of subsection c) of Article 138 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)." (The underlining is not from the original). That is, the cassation appellant (casacionista) announced lodging the objection for direct violation of law. He reiterated this on folio 8, when he stated: "Therefore, for this representation there exists an improper application of the legal norm, since the reasons for which the judge decides that the plaintiff party should be exonerated from costs do not exist, since, [sic] for which it is respectfully requested that resolutions [sic] No. 095-2019-VI issued by the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda) be revoked, with respect to exonerating the plaintiff party from the payment of costs, and that it be rectified and the plaintiff party be condemned to the payment of personal costs (costas personales), procedural costs (costas procesales), interest and indexation in favor of Inder. / Therefore, under the protection of numerals 119 and 138 subsection c), 193, following and concordant of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), this representation estimates that we are not in the presence of an exemption from the payment of costs against the losing plaintiff, so the payment of both costs of the process should be imposed on the plaintiff party." (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). However, on that same folio 8, the appellant stated: "Having said the above, it must be indicated that the error of the Court is having improperly interpreted a legal norm (art. 193 subsection b) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate, as it considered, that the reason why it decided that the plaintiff party should be exonerated from costs (without special condemnation in costs), was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against Inder, because the recommendation issued by the directing body was favorable to her, this not being the suitable act for the declaration of rights in favor of the Administrated parties, for which the Court in the appealed resolution violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law, Principle of Legality, reasonableness (razonabilidad), proportionality, legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and equality, by valuing as having merit said 'objective reason to litigate'." (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). Now, the appellant alleged the cassation ground, for breach of substantive norms, provided for in subsection d) of precept 138 of the CPCA: "When the judgment violates the norms or principles of Constitutional Law, among others, reasonableness (razonabilidad), proportionality, legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and equality." The confusion evidenced, as has been indicated, violates the technique of cassation (casación), which requires that the grounds of the appeal must be indicated clearly and precisely (numeral 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA).

XXX.Notwithstanding the foregoing in the previous considering and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to note the following. The Court, in considering XVI of the challenged judgment, stated: "Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable when there has been, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this Court estimates that the plaintiff has had sufficient reason to litigate, since the investigating body (órgano instructor) of the procedure issued an opinion proposing to relieve her of all liability in the disciplinary cause instructed against her. In this sense, it is this Chamber's consideration that this circumstance grants her an objective reason to try to refute the final decision that imposed the decreed suspension sanction. Therefore, it is resolved without special condemnation in costs." (The underlining is supplied). This Chamber agrees with what the judging persons resolved, in accordance with the reasons set forth below. Precept 193 subsection b) of the CPCA provides: "In judgments and orders with the character of a judgment, the losing party shall be condemned to the payment of personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales), a pronouncement that must be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when: […] b) Due to the nature of the debated questions, there has existed, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate." (The underlining is supplied).

In contentious-administrative proceedings, this Court has repeatedly indicated that, in accordance with said canon —193 of the CPCA—, the pronouncement on the costs of the proceeding must be made sua sponte, ordering the losing party to pay them. Consequently, the award of costs is imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. That is, for losing the litigation, without this meaning that there was insufficient reason to litigate or that the party is considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant. For its part, said provision sets forth the circumstances under which the party may be exempted from their payment. In this regard, although it is a discretionary power, the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, since both in its exercise and in its failure to apply it, a violation of law may occur and, to that extent, the improper omission is not and should not be synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the adjudicating person themselves. Especially if it involves an empowerment granted to the judge with specific circumstances that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this particular point, it is considered that the mere application of the general rule of Article 193 of the CPCA (awarding costs to the losing party for both sets of costs) does not close the doors to the cassation appeal, because, on the contrary, the matter is admissible for a substantive review (provided the legal requirements are met) in the event of a potential omission defect in the application of the legal provisions authorizing the exoneration from said costs. Therefore, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In the specific case, the cassation appellant challenges the exoneration from the payment of costs, alleging improper application or interpretation of subsection b) of said precept. That provision, as has been resolved, does not enable exemption in the case of adequate procedural conduct; but rather because the nature of the claim allows one to infer that, in the Court's judgment, the debate was necessary to elucidate whom the Law favored. In the specific case under review, it must be noted, without disregarding the legal nature of the report or recommendation of the directing body of the administrative procedure, like the adjudicating persons, this Chamber considers that the existence of that opinion from the directing or investigating body (issued by two professionals from INDER) recommending the exoneration of the plaintiff from liability, determines or entails that the debate was necessarily required to elucidate whether the plaintiff was right or not. Consequently, the adjudicating persons did not incur the legal violations alleged by the appellant.

XXXI.By virtue of the reasons stated, given the evident omission in systematically and specifically challenging the grounds of the appealed decision, not with simple and generic disagreements of criterion, this Chamber determines that the filed appeals are insufficient to generate the review of the contested judgment in this venue as they lack legal foundation, therefore, their flat rejection is required (provision 140 subsection c) of the CPCA).

POR TANTO

The appeals filed are rejected flatly.

Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jessica Jiménez Ramírez 8048 cited above, it is clarified that the provisions therein apply to the case of officials who remain in the institution because an agreement was possible regarding their employment status, in which case the payment of a severance (indemnización) is not appropriate, but rather the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for the salary difference not recognized in their new salary category." By resolution no. 2-2010 of 9:00 a.m. on February 16, 2010, the Executive Presidency of the IDA issued a criterion regarding the downward reassignment (reasignación descendente) of Mr. Ricardo Alberto Rodríguez Bonilla. To this effect, it ordered: "THEREFORE. [...] the provisions established by the [sic] comptroller entity in official communication No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 are applied, and therefore the aforementioned salary supplement (sobresueldo) is assigned. For this purpose, the difference between the salary corresponding to the position of DIRECTOR REGIONAL Y PROFESIONAL E shall be considered, according to the detail established by the Human Resources Area, which is and is [sic] considered an integral part of this resolution." Mr. Ricardo expressed his agreement with the content of that resolution through a writing on the following 24th, in which he stated: "It being understood for all purposes, that the negative salary difference that would be generated by said procedure, will be applied as a salary supplement (sobresueldo)." On April 5 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department, occupied at that time by Marlene Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Rodríguez Bonilla, stating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in the amount of ₡645,942.00, effective February 25, 2010, due to the change of position. That day, February 25, 2010, Mr. Ricardo and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary severance settlement (finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial), where it was stated, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation from his position, which implied a downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), would be paid to him as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official communication no. PE-794-2011 of May 17, 2011, the Executive Presidency indicated to Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz, Subregional Chief of Liberia: "For the management of your salary situation, the administrative precedent originating and based on official communication No. 11668 (FOE-AM-0525) from September 21, 2005, of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) will be applied. As indicated by the Comptroller body, the appropriate course in your case is the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for the salary difference not recognized in your new salary category. In this way, you will have no detriment to your income. [...]". This proposal was accepted by the official in a writing on the following 24th. On July 7 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department, occupied at that time by Mrs. Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Novo Díaz, stating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in the amount of ₡322,100.50, effective the 11th of that month and year, due to the change of position. On August 17, 2011, Mr. Novo Díaz and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary severance settlement (finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial), where it was stated, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation from his position, which implied a downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), would be paid to him as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official communication no. DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Directorate of Legal Affairs of INDER analyzed the request for the preparation of a settlement (finiquito) for the change of position of an official of that entity. Of interest, it pointed out: “[…] More exactly, to apply what is indicated here [it refers to Article 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711-H], we must be in the presence of the following circumstances: 1- That there is a variation towards classifications of a lower salary level than the original. 2- That said variation is the product of changes in the institutional manuals. Reassignments, comprehensive studies, homologations, or system conversion. As can be seen in the case brought to our attention, as well as in previous cases, although there is a variation towards a lower salary classification than the original, the consequence thereof is not the product of changes in the institutional manual, of a reassignment (no technical reassignment study exists), of a comprehensive study, of a homologation, or of a system conversion. […] Consequently, applying Article 13 of the Procedure for the application of general guidelines and regulations on salary policy, employment, and position classification for ministries, public entities, and other bodies as applicable covered by the scope of the Budgetary Authority for the year 2005, in these cases, passing the salary difference between positions as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in favor of the officials, constitutes a totally illegal act that must be corrected immediately." Consequently, it recommended conducting a review of the cases previously approved, in order to take the corresponding corrective measures. By official communication no. A-PE-0220-2013 of February 20, 2013, from the Executive Presidency, signed by the legal advisor of that body and the then Executive President, they departed from said criterion. They pointed out that, in the procedures of downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Service Statute (Estatuto de Servicio Civil) and its regulation are applicable. As a result of which, they ordered the then Coordinator of the Human Resources Area to apply the methodology indicated therein. In official communication no. DFOE-EC-0417 (07581) of July 24, 2014, the CGR pointed out, in response to a request for clarification raised by the Internal Audit Office of said entity, regarding the procedure to follow in cases of reclassifications of positions to a lower category: "[...] In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that the cited communications are referred to specific situations of a group of officials, therefore, what was resolved at that time cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." It made allusion to Decreto Ejecutivo no. 37078-H, specifically, to numeral 12, a norm from which it stated that the Administration had three possible alternatives to resolve cases where reclassifications of positions to a lower level occurred. By means of official communication no. A-ADV-076-2014 of September 16, 2014, the Internal Audit Office communicated to the Executive Presidency: "[...] In official communication ARH-073-2014, the basis for proceeding with the payment of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) is explained, and the Administration justifies it with the pronouncement of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005. However, the [sic] comptroller entity, with pronouncement 07581 of July 24, 2014, clarified that official communication FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005, refers to a specific situation of a group of officials and cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." By official communication no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the head of the Administrative Department communicated to the Executive Presidency that, by official communication A-PE-906-2014 of September 9, 2014, a preliminary investigation was requested from the Executive Presidency regarding the salary supplement (sobresueldo) payments made to the servant Walter Mora Leiva. In official communication no. PE-259-2015 of the following 26th, the Executive Presidency requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official communication DA-017-2015. By means of official communication no. URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, the Labor Relations Unit issued a report on the preliminary investigation. It considered that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged improper granting of salary supplements (sobresueldos) in cases of downward reassignments (reasignaciones descendentes). Likewise, it stated that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was recognized the salary supplement (sobresueldo) as of July 11, 2011, by personnel action no. 3841-2011, which has been paid to him since the second half of July 2011. Furthermore, regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that salary supplement (sobresueldo) was recognized to him by personnel action no. 792-2010 as of February 25, 2010.

That report indicated that, as of its date of issuance, both salary supplements were being paid. For that reason, it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request a legal opinion from the Directorate of Legal Affairs on the pertinence of initiating another type of proceeding to stop the presumed improper payments and recover the money that may have been illegally recognized as a salary supplement due to downward reassignment (reasignación descendente). In official communication no. PE-505-2016 of April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of INDER appointed the directing body of the proceeding for the alleged improper recognition of salary supplements for downward reassignments against, among others, the official Marlene Chaves Morales. By act of 9:00 a.m. on June 24, 2016, the directing body of the proceeding (file URL-002-2015) issued the statement of charges, imputing the conduct under investigation to Mrs. Chaves Morales. Likewise, with respect to the matter of interest, it was stated: "With said actions described in facts 1 and 2 set forth above, the official Marlene Chaves Morales, may have satisfied a private interest over the public interest by presumably executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the procedure for downward reassignment (reasignación descendente) provided in article 13 of the Procedure for the Application of General Directives and Regulations of Salary Policy, Employment and Position Classification of ministries [sic], public entities and other bodies as applicable covered by the scope of the Budgetary Authority contained in Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004, and Mrs. Chaves Morales, with the described conduct, may have contravened articles 3, 4 (duty of probity) and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment [sic] No. 8422. [...]". Reference was made to canons 11 of the Political Constitution; 11 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP); 3, 4, 38 of Law No. 8422; as well as precept 13 of Decree No. 31711. Also, she was informed of the possible consequences of the proceeding regarding the potential disciplinary sanctions to be imposed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. The oral and private hearing was held on September 14, 2016. In the act of 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the directing body issued the conclusions report No. 23-2016. It recommended exonerating the investigated party, Marlene Chaves Morales, considering that there was no liability for the charged actions. With official communication no. URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, the directing body sent the disciplinary file to the Labor Relations Board for its consideration. In record no. 2-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the INDER Labor Relations Board, the disciplinary proceeding file no. URL-0002-2015 was heard. In the agreement adopted in article IV, it was resolved, unanimously, to separate from the recommendation of the directing body. This is because there is no evidence in the file that the two investigated officials availed themselves of the procedure established in articles 107 and following of the LGAP, invoking the duty of obedience. Therefore, it indicated, it would be the responsibility of the Executive Presidency or the Senior Administration to establish, under the LGAP – article 213 – and canons 3, 38 and 39 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment, the quantum of the sanction. It recommended that, prior to establishing it, the Administration request the Administrative Department to proceed to quantify the amount that has been improperly disbursed by the Administration by having approved those salary supplement payments. Together with official communication no. RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017, the Labor Relations Board sent administrative file URL-002-2015 to the Executive Presidency for the purpose of issuing the final act. By means of resolution no. 037-2017 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the then Executive President of INDER, Master Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero, issued the final act. He ordered: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, articles 192 of the Political Constitution, numeral 26 subsection j) of Law No. 9036 that transforms the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA) into the Institute of Rural Development (INDER) and creates the Technical Secretariat of Rural Development, articles 3, 4, 38 subsection d) and of the [sic] Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, 11, 210(1), 113, 211, following and concordant of the General Law of Public Administration, 2 of the Regulation of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, article 111 subsection d) of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute and article 13 subsection c) of the General Guidelines on Salary and Employment Policy for the Public Sector, this Deciding Body resolves to partially accept the recommendations of the Investigating Body and consequently declares [...] Marlene Chaves Morales [...] responsible for the very serious fault, as qualified by this Administrative Authority, for the charge attributed of Irregular recognition of Salary Supplement payments, lack of oversight and violation of the duty of probity. In view of the foregoing and the evident breach of the duty of probity and the principles of effectiveness and efficiency of the public service, it is resolved to apply to the accused the disciplinary sanction of one month suspension without pay, which is effective from May 15, 2017, until June 15, 2017. [...] It is ordered that certified copies be sent to the Prosecutor's Office of the Public Ministry of the II Judicial Circuit of Goicoechea, so that the irregular conduct aired herein may be investigated. [...]". This act was communicated to Mrs. Marlene on April 28, 2017. In a writing dated May 2 of that year, Mrs. Chaves Morales filed a motion to reconsider (recurso de reposición), which, through resolution no. 41-2017 of 2:00 p.m. on the 9th day following, was rejected by the Executive Presidency of INDER, an act communicated that same day.

II.On June 15, 2017, the special judicial representative of Mrs. Chaves Morales filed this action against INDER and Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero. He requested, according to the adjustment made in the preliminary hearing session held on February 20, 2018: 1) that the absolute nullity of resolution no. 37-2012 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, be declared; 2) that it be ordered that his client be fully reimbursed the salary that was deducted from her on the occasion of the sanction imposed and executed; 3) as a consequence of the absolute nullity of said resolution, the co-defendants be jointly and severally condemned to pay damages, for which he indicated: a) the originating cause: the opening, development, and sanction of a disciplinary administrative proceeding, "expired" from its origin, which subjected the plaintiff, first, to a process of anguish and unease affecting her moral standing, which she had no duty to suffer by reason of the fact that the actions imputed to her at the time were in compliance with the orders issued by the highest body in the administrative hierarchy; furthermore, she had to bear a financial burden to defend herself in a case that should never have come into legal existence, in addition to the loss of her income for one month, required for the support of her family; b) those damages consist of the loss of tranquility and the "manhandling" of her dignity, by imputing to her, as an irregularity, legally valid conduct that was, moreover, mandatory, marking her as an incompetent official.

Hence, the dual dimension of the harm, moral (daño moral) and material, the former due to the diminution and decline in her personal value and, the latter, due to the loss of her income by way of salary for an entire month, as well as the disbursement she had to cover to exercise her defense, without having the duty to bear either; c) she estimated the non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), prudentially, at ₡5,000,000.00 and, the pecuniary damage, at ₡3,000,000.00; 4) likewise, she requested ₡1,000,000.00, paid for professional fees for her defense; 5) on all sums to which they are condemned, she requested the recognition of interest, calculated from the moment of disbursement, in the case of the attorney's fees and the salary deduction; and, from the final judgment (sentencia firme), on the other economic condemnations; 6) she also requested that they be condemned to pay the costs of the proceeding (costas del proceso); 7) lastly, she required the payment of interest on the costs from the finality of the ruling and until its effective payment. Both co-defendants, in separate briefs, opposed. The attorney-in-fact for INDER raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) and Mr. Rodríguez Barquero, in addition to the aforementioned, raised that of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva). By order (auto) of 1:36 p.m. on November 29, 2017, considering that Mr. Ricardo did not comply with the warning (prevención) issued by order of 9:04 a.m. on October 24, 2017, the complaint was deemed affirmatively answered with respect to the facts marked with numbers 6, 11, 12, 13, 16, and 19. Similarly, in the session of the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) indicated above, this lite was declared a pure legal proceeding (proceso de puro derecho), with the parties rendering their conclusions orally. The Court, in its judgment (sentencia), rejected the objection (excepción) of lack of passive standing. It upheld that of lack of right. Consequently, it dismissed the complaint filed. It ruled without condemnation in costs (costas). Dissatisfied, both the representative of the plaintiff and of INDER filed respective cassation appeals (recursos de casación).

III.APPEAL OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF THE PLAINTIFF PARTY. VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES. In the sole ground of disagreement formulated for this cassation reason, folio 11 of the cassation file, the appellant announced he would file it based on the cause provided in subsection c) of canon 137 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA): "Lack of clear and precise determination, in the judgment, of the facts accredited by the Court or for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding." To this effect, he stated, in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16 of the questioned judgment, the Court entered, as part of the factual framework, situations extraneous to the facts imputed to his principal and those claimed by her as violating her rights. He summarized it as follows: 1) the plaintiff claimed the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power because, even with the erroneous application of numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), since five years had already elapsed counted from the date she signed the first personnel action -that of Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010-; also, number 3841-2011, in favor of Ronaldo Novo Díaz (Considering XV, final part). The sanctioning proceeding began in 2016, six years later for the first; and five years and six months later for the second; 2) the Court rejected the claim of statute of limitations of the sanctioning power, by pointing out, in proven fact no. 15, that through official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Directorate of Legal Affairs communicated to the Executive President the ordering of a preliminary investigation for over-salary payments in favor of Walter Mora Leiva. However, the case of that official was not imputed to the plaintiff in the sanctioning proceeding, so it was not subject to examination. Consequently, being a situation totally extraneous to the plaintiff, it is incapable of producing interruptive effects on the statute of limitations; 3) likewise, he added, the Court held as proven fact no. 16) that, through official letter P.E. 259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive President ordered the preliminary investigation. However, the Court did not realize that this preliminary investigation was limited to investigating the payment of over-salaries to the official Walter Mora Leiva, as requested in official letter DA-017-2015; 4) since it was a preliminary investigation on a different matter, the preliminary investigation did not interrupt the limitation period. When resolving the requested claim of statute of limitations, he noted, based on a factual framework extraneous to the cause, being different conduct, persons, and responsible parties, the ruling incurred the cause of subsections c) and d) of article 137 ibid, for which reason he requested the judgment be quashed with the consequences of that decision. In accordance with that indicated by subsection c) of said numeral, the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Court "for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding," is a ground for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Court based itself on official letter DA-017-2015 and on official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, both from 2015 to reject the claim of statute of limitations, but it overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not imputed to the plaintiff in the administrative proceeding. Due to that confusion of the Court, he argued, the ruling curtailed her right to avail herself of the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power, in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010 and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, as six years had elapsed in the case of the first; and five years and six months for the second. The ruling also incurred a lack of motivation (falta de motivación), regarding which this Chamber, he affirmed, in multiple judgments, has indicated it occurs when there is absence or, also, when it is confusing, as in the present case, where the analysis of the timeframes to determine the statute of limitations was carried out regarding facts extraneous to the plaintiff, the cause, and the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, he concluded by requesting the judgment be quashed and, resolving on the merits, the complaint be declared admissible in all its claims.

IV.Regarding the matters discussed in the preceding section, it is necessary to indicate, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides a material order requirement necessary both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This is the motivation of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under commentary provides, the factual and legal foundation (fundamentación fáctica y jurídica) of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been held as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it concerns a problem expounded regarding the application, omission, or erroneous interpretation of any norm that makes up the legality block, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the appealed judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violation, alongside the always necessary legal reasons, factual reasons may concur, and, in that sense, the referenced foundations must be directed along both pathways, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that from the legal foundation, the indication of those canons related to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exonerated by express legal mandate. Similarly, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the jurisdictional body of the instance erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the same appealed pronouncement. And of course, it is not indispensable to cite the precepts establishing the requirements, timeframes, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. More than the citation of these latter, what is essential is that they be complied with, that they be put into practice at the time of drafting and filing the cassation. Thus, the foundation provided by law can be understood, roughly, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles, or legal rules interwoven or concatenated among themselves and reasonably linked in a dual perspective, are mentioned: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack.

To the extent that a set of legal norms is cited (or if applicable, a single one of them), pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will on occasion reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not pertain to their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated in interpreting the referenced article 139, "the appeal is required to have a minimum legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica) ... the reasons on which the action is based must be explained, challenging the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that supports it" (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). Substantiation (fundamentación) is, therefore, alien to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or, as the case may be, to the recounting of the errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica)," and therefore, fails to comply with the requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140 subsection c) of the same referenced Code. Likewise, this Chamber, repeatedly, has indicated that for an appeal to pass the admissibility review, it is required, in addition to a sufficient statement of grounds, the corresponding mention and linkage with the contested judgment of the applicable norms that are considered infringed. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 927-A-S1-2018 of 11 hours 25 minutes of October 25, 2018, and 2525-A-S1-2020 of 11 hours 10 minutes of November 10, 2020.

V.Regarding what has been alleged by the appellant (casacionista), the following must be pointed out. First. The appellant, on folio 12, stated: "Indeed, according to what is indicated in subsection c) the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Court for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or those introduced illegally into the process, is a cause for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Court relied on official letter DA-017-2015 and official letter P.E-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, to reject the claim of prescription, but it overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not imputed to the claimant in the administrative procedure." (The highlighting is from the original). At the preliminary hearing, held on February 20, 2018, under the point of "ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE," at minute 14:32, according to the minutes visible at images 135 to 138 of the electronic judicial case file, the procedural judge admitted the entirety of the administrative file (which consists of a folder and a disk with the recordings of the hearing at the administrative venue). Likewise, it admitted the disk with the copy of the claimant's personal file. In accordance with what is indicated in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16, official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, appears on folios 2 to 4 of the administrative file and official letter no. PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, on folio 1 of that same file. Therefore, said proven facts, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant, were not based on illegitimate evidentiary means nor those introduced illegally into the process.

VI.Second. The challenger, on the same folio indicated, stated: "Due to this confusion by the Court, the ruling curtailed her right to invoke the prescription of the sanctioning power in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010, and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, given that 6 years had passed in the case of the first and 5 years and 6 months for the second." The adjudicators, in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, indicated the following: "[…] 15) By official letter DA-017-2015 dated February 20, 2015, the head of the Administrative Department communicates to the Executive Presidency that through official letter A-PE-0906-2014 of September 9, 2014, a preliminary investigation was requested from the Executive Presidency regarding the overpayments made to the employee Walter Mora Leiva. (Folios 2-4 front of the administrative file) 16) Through official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive Presidency requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official letter DA-017-2015, indicated in the previous section. (Folio 1 of the administrative file) 17) Through official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, the preliminary investigation report was issued, in which it was considered that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged undue granting of overpayments in cases of downward reassignments. (Folios 118-151 of the administrative file) 18) That in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, indicated in the previous section, it is set forth that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was recognized the overpayment from July 11, 2011, through personnel action 3841-2011, which has been paid to him since the second half of July 2011. Regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that overpayment was recognized through personnel action 792-2010 from February 25, 2010. That report indicates that, at the date of its issuance, both overpayments were being paid. For that reason, it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request an opinion from the Legal Affairs Directorate on the pertinence of instituting another type of procedure to stop the presumed improper payments and recover the money that could have been illegally recognized as a downward reassignment overpayment. (Folios 148, 150 of the administrative file) 19) Through official letter PE-505-2016 dated April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of INDER designates the directing body of the procedure for the alleged undue recognition of overpayments through downward reassignments against the officials Guiselle Vargas Sánchez and Marlene Chávez Morales. (Folio 155 of the administrative file) 20) By act of 09 hours of June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure (file URL-002-2015) issues the statement of charges in which, the following conducts were imputed to the claimant: 'Fact No. 1: For the official Marlene Chávez Morales, acting as Coordinator of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, having supposedly carried out the personnel action dated February 25, 2010, for the position change of the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to E Professional, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes, and apparently proceeding to recognize an overpayment to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to E Professional, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes, and apparently proceeding to recognize an overpayment to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, according to the mechanism for the application of the overpayment established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Contraloría General de la República (...) Fact No. 2: For the official Marlene Chaves Morales, as Head of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, having apparently carried out the personnel action of June 11, 2011, where the position change of Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was made, supposedly signed by Mrs. Chaves Morales (...) in which she recognizes an overpayment to the official Novo Díaz, according to the mechanism for the application of the overpayment established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Contraloría General de la República.'

With the actions described in facts 1 and 2 set forth above, official Marlene Chaves Morales may have satisfied a private interest over the public interest by allegedly executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the downward reassignment (reasignación descendente) procedure provided for in Article 13 of the "Procedure for the Application of General Guidelines and Regulations on Salary Policy, Employment, and Position Classification of Ministries, Public Entities, and Other Bodies, as Applicable, Covered by the Scope of the Budgetary Authority," contained in Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of March 16, 2004, and Ms. Chaves Morales, by the described conduct, may have contravened Articles 3, 4 (duty of probity (deber de probidad)), and 38, subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción e Enriquecimiento Ilícito) No. 8422. (...)." Reference was then made to ordinances 11 of the Carta Magna, 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), 3, 4, 38 of Law No. 8422, and precept 13 of Decree No. 31711. The possible consequences of the procedure regarding the potential disciplinary sanctions to be imposed were indicated, while the rights of the investigated party within the procedure were expressed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. (Folios 173-188 vuelto of the administrative file) [...]. Then, in section VII of the challenged judgment, called "Analysis of the prescription (prescripción) in the specific case," regarding the matter of interest, they stated: "In that sense, the temporal margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44 ["Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública" of October 6, 2004], which refers to the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) norm established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428 ["Ley Orgánica de la CGR" of September 7, 1994]. Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is understood that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary cause date from April 2010 and June 2011, the truth of the matter is that such facts were the subject of a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), the pertinence of which is not reproached, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to in ordinance 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to numeral 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment when the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective possibility of exercising it that the cited period must begin to run. Thus, in cases such as this one where the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and gathering evidentiary indications, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges (traslado de cargos), the starting point of the prescription (prescripción) operates with the notification of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the case file, it is understood that after that referral of the preliminary report in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, by official letter PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative head designated the directing body (órgano director), an instance that on June 28, 2016, issued the respective statement of charges (traslado de cargos), which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date when the head could validly order disciplinary actions until the moment the plaintiff was notified of the opening of the internal cause, the five-year period governing this type of conflicts had not expired. On the other hand, it is understood that by an act at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) rendered conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official letter URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report was sent to the Junta de Relaciones Laborales for its knowledge. In record No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the Junta de Relaciones Laborales of INDER, that body's opinion was issued, deciding to depart from the recommendation of the directing body (órgano director), because there is no evidence in the file indicating that the investigated officials, including the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 and following of the LGAP regarding alleging the duty of obedience. This decision was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency by official letter RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, by resolution No. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the Executive Presidency of INDER issued the final act within administrative procedure No. URL-002-2015, an act brought to the plaintiff's attention on that same date. As INDER postulates, it is clear that the prescription (prescripción) for issuing the final act must be computed from the moment when the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective possibility of exercising it. This occurred on March 31, 2017, when the Junta de Relaciones Laborales sent the file to the Executive Presidency. Then, on April 28, 2017, the final act of the procedure was issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia alleged by the plaintiff is not observed, to the extent that, between the referral of the file from the Junta de Relaciones Laborales and the final decision of the cause, not even a period of one month elapsed. Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which means the rejection of the charge under examination." (The underlining is supplied). In the reproach under study, the appellant did not question the application of the five-year period provided for in Article 71 of the LOCGR, nor the pertinence of the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) carried out. His objection focused on the fact that, since the request made by the Head of the Administrative Department to the Executive Presidency of INDER (issued via official letter no. DA-017-2015) to initiate a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) was for investigating the payments of additional salary (sobresueldos) made to Mr. Walter Moral Leiva, whose case was not imputed to his representative, it had no interrupting effects on the prescription (prescripción). In this regard, it is necessary to indicate, regarding the nature and characteristics of preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares), the Sala Constitucional, in vote no. 2014001384 at 9:05 a.m. on January 1, 2014, stated: "III.- ON THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (INVESTIGACIÓN PRELIMINAR). In the matter in question, the violations of Fundamental Rights alleged by the appellant refer to the initiation of preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares) from which an administrative disciplinary procedure could later result. On the subject, this Tribunal has repeatedly considered that the guarantees inherent to due process are not applicable in preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares), since it will be in the administrative or judicial procedure where the different manifestations of that fundamental right must be respected in their entirety. In this regard, this Chamber has declared the following: “In this regard, the Chamber has maintained the criterion that a correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process requires admitting that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes essential to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries, as the Administration – prior to opening the administrative file – could require conducting a prior investigation, through which it can not only individualize the possible person responsible for the fault under investigation, but also determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure, if there is merit for it. The prototype case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is gathered during the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar). Such gathered evidence cannot be asserted during the procedure itself, considering that its collection did not involve the investigated party's participation, and therefore, would have resulted in defenselessness." Similarly, if it concerns evidence that by its nature is definitive and irreproducible, it is undoubtedly useless for the purposes of supporting the final act, if the affected party was not afforded due process and the right of defense as legally required during its taking; however, if it is understood that these are preliminary acts to determine the pertinence or not of subsequently opening an administrative file against a public servant, this Chamber has stated that in its collection, the Administration may or may not include the investigated person as a party. The foregoing constitutes, therefore, a power of the competent administrative body, in order to determine whether or not there is merit to initiate a proceeding aimed at ascertaining the real truth of the facts under investigation, and it is when the proceeding itself has been opened, with the formation of the Directing Body, that the opportune procedural moment arises where the investigated public servant can indeed express his views on the charges attributed to him and, consequently, have access to the pieces of the file that interest him, as well as be assisted by a lawyer and be able to witness the taking of testimonial evidence and any other that is ordered and against which he can exercise his right of defense. In this understanding, the assertions of the appellant regarding the disrespect of due process and the right of defense in acts carried out in the preliminary phase of the investigation, which was opened on the occasion of the complaints filed by several patients against him, are not admissible, given that within that phase one cannot speak of the existence of a due process proper nor is the concurrence of the elements indicated above as constitutive of his right of defense necessary.” (Resolution 2003-09125 of nine hours and twenty-one minutes of the twenty-ninth of August of two thousand three). In this same vein, this Chamber considers that in the case in question, the alleged violations correspond to the preliminary investigation phase, given that a proceeding against the appellant has not yet been initiated. Consequently, the Chamber considers that the refusal to facilitate access to the file at this stage to the amparo petitioner or the lack of hearings has not caused injury to the constitutional right of defense or to the principle of due process (see in the same vein resolution N° 2010009906 of fourteen hours and thirty-eight minutes of the ninth of June of two thousand ten). Thus, the amparo is resolved as inadmissible, as indicated in the operative part of this resolution." (The underlined is supplied. In the same vein, one may consult ruling of that Chamber no. 2020017654 of 9 hours 20 minutes on 18 September 2020). For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "III.- […] Regarding the subject under study, the preliminary investigation to determine sanctioning administrative procedures is a discretionary task of the administration, to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible parties, and also relevant elements of judgment, with which they issue a recommendation; in order to verify the viability of a fault that merits carrying out a procedure to determine or not its existence. In this Chamber's opinion, the preparatory act carried out in report no. OD 04-2008 of the Directing Body, which requested evidence, documentation, intervention in the Cooperative's offices, and issuance of criteria, in the preliminary investigation, are legitimate material actions, since the task of gathering evidence and issuing recommendations is a discretionary power, used to define the propriety or not of a sanctioning procedure." (The underlined is supplied. Judgment no. 1101-F-S1-2011 of 10 hours 15 minutes on 8 September 2011. In the same vein, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, resolution of that Chamber no. 1228 of 14 hours 30 minutes on 22 October 2015). In accordance with the factual framework transcribed above, it is established that, through official communication no. DA-017-2015 of 20 February 2015, the Head of the Administrative Department of INDER notified the Executive Presidency of that entity that, in official communication no. A-PE-0906-2014 of 9 September 2014, it had been requested to open a preliminary investigation into the payment of salary supplements (sobresueldos) made to the official Walter Mora Leiva. The Executive Presidency, in official communication no. PE-259-2015 of the following 26th, requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate the preliminary investigation, regarding what was indicated in official communication DA-017-2015. Said Unit, in official communication no. URL-032-2016 of 15 March 2016, issued the results of the preliminary investigation. It stated that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was granted the salary supplement (sobresueldo) as of 11 July 2011, through personnel action no. 3841-2011, which is paid to him starting from the second fortnight of July 2011. The same applies to Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, whose salary supplement (sobresueldo) was granted to him in personnel action no. 792-2010 of 25 February 2010. As a consequence thereof, the Executive Presidency, in official communication no. PE-505-2016 of 27 April 2016, appointed the directing body of the procedure, for the alleged improper recognition of salary supplements (sobresueldos) due to descending reassignments against, among others, the plaintiff, Marlene Chaves Morales, whose file was processed under no. URL-002-2015. At 9 hours on 24 June 2016, the directing body of the procedure issued the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), referring to the personnel actions prepared by Mrs. Chaves Morales concerning Messrs. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, for erroneously applying a salary supplement (sobresueldo) due to a descending reassignment. In accordance with the foregoing and, considering the nature and characteristics of the preliminary investigation -set forth above- (where its primary purpose, it is reiterated, is to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible parties, and other relevant elements of judgment, in order to verify the viability of a fault that merits the opening of an administrative procedure to determine or not its existence), despite the fact that the preliminary investigation ordered by the Executive Presidency of INDER was to analyze the alleged payment of salary supplements (sobresueldos) made to Mr. Walter Mora Leiva (proven fact no. 15), the truth is that, after being carried out, its result determined that the cases of Messrs. Ronald Novo Díaz and Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla should be investigated, which was thus charged to Mrs. Marlene in the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) (proven fact 20). Such a situation, contrary to what the appellant wishes to portray, does not constitute any defect or irregularity nor was she placed in a state of defenselessness, since, it is repeated, the notification of charges (intimación de cargos) and the sanctioning administrative procedure referred to the cases of Messrs. Novo Díaz and Rodríguez Bonilla, in which the plaintiff was afforded all guarantees of defense. Nor did it have an effect regarding the prescriptive period, as the cassation appellant wishes to portray, since, as the Court well indicated, it began to run from 16 March 2016, the date on which the report of the preliminary investigation was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency, in accordance with the provisions of canon 71 subsection b) of the LOCGR, without the five-year period having elapsed according to the summary made by the judging persons, transcribed above.

**VII.** **Third.** As indicated, the appellant pointed out, in the first place, the procedural ground provided for in subsection 1) point c) of numeral 137 of the CPCA. In this regard, this Chamber has indicated that one of the essential elements of any judgment is the establishment of the factual framework that can be inferred from the evidentiary elements incorporated into the process based on the assessment (valoración) carried out by the judges according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) (article 82 of the CPCA), and in attention to the legal rules applicable to the specific case, since these allow establishing which facts acquire legal relevance (on this aspect, one may consult judgment no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on 8 February 2018; as well as resolution no. 7-A-TC-2017 of 11 hours on 26 January 2017). It is clear, then, that the establishment of these factual circumstances based on the evidence is one of the fundamental aspects of the judgment, to the extent that the solution of the dispute depends on this. It is for this reason that this intellective task carried out by the judging persons in relation to the facts of the case is susceptible to review from different perspectives at the cassation stage, which, furthermore, must not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes.

In this regard, the challenge may stem from substantive issues, when the factual scenario that the Court held to be proven does not match the reality evident from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or law, as provided in Article 138 CPCA), or from procedural errors, whether by having relied on illegitimate evidentiary means or those introduced illegally into the proceeding, or by a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Court, in establishing the relevant factual scenario for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation is that it seeks to make explicit, or when there exists a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what assessment the judges made during deliberation. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the various stages that make up the judicial proceeding have followed the channels provided by the legal order, and that the judgments have been issued in the form prescribed by the applicable procedural rules. For this reason, any questioning as to whether the determination of the facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, instead, of one of a substantive nature. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the indicated ruling of this Chamber no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on February 8, 2018. This is not the situation in this litigation. The facts that the Court held to be proven are neither confusing nor contradictory among themselves. Furthermore, in Section V of this resolution, the reasons were given why official letters DA-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 are not illegitimate nor were they illegally introduced into the proceeding. Ergo, this ground for breach of procedural rules as alleged does not materialize.

VIII.Fourth. The appellant also invoked the procedural defect provided in subparagraph 1) point d) of the cited canon: lack of reasoning. Both the First Chamber and this Court have indicated that it arises when the reasoning of the judgment is omitted, either because it does not exist, or because its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the resolution, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, specifically, that of due process. It is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the proceeding; but, on the contrary, that the judgment has the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that it is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it pertains to potential non-compliance with the procedural provisions that regulate the procedural course or the resolution, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial proceeding and from which rights and obligations derive. It should not be confused with a mechanism to enter into a discussion of the application of the Law or the assessment of the evidence carried out by the judge in the recitals of the resolution, for which the Procedural Code establishes autonomous grounds (Article 138 ibid), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the rulings of the First Chamber numbers 1277-F-S1-2019 of 14 hours 40 minutes on July 18, 2019, and 2521-F-S1-2020 of 10 hours 50 minutes on November 10, 2020. In light of what was set forth in Section VI point two of this resolution, where the relevant considerations of the judges in Section VII of the challenged ruling concerning the statute of limitations were transcribed, this Chamber determines, contrary to what the appellant alleged, that the judges provided the reasons why, in this litigation, the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period provided in the LOCGR was not met. As a corollary, the reasoning in the challenged resolution is not omitted; it exists. Nor is its development confusing or contradictory. On the contrary, it is clear as to the reasoning provided for adopting the decision set forth therein. Ergo, it has the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Consequently, this cassation ground does not materialize either.

IX.VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES. In the first objection on this cassation ground, folio 12, the appellant announced he was lodging it because the ruling declared that the statute of limitations (prescripción) had not occurred. He invoked the cassation ground provided in subparagraph c) of Article 138 of the CPCA: "When a legal rule has been applied or interpreted improperly or has been left unapplied." In this litigation, he argued, the Court applied numeral 71 of the LOCGR to reject the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción), by considering that the plaintiff's conduct violated Article 3 of Law no. 8422, "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito" (LCCEI), which refers to the prescriptive period indicated in precept 71 of the LOCGR. With that conclusion, he stated, an erroneous application of those rules was incurred, with the simultaneous non-application of precept 603 of the Labor Code, now 414. Violation of Articles 3 and 38 of the LCCEI and concomitant infringement of numeral 71 of the LOCGR due to improper application. The rejection of the alleged affirmative defense of statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción), he noted, was due to an improper application of the referred canon 3, with an omission to apply 38, both of the LCCEI, with erroneous application of Article 71 of the LOCGR. The indicated numeral 3 of Law no. 8422, he explained, contains indeterminate legal concepts that must be concretized in each particular case. The breach of the "duty of probity," he indicated, must be specified against the factual assumption in which it is alleged. It demands pointing out, he noted, the elements of the conduct attributed contrary to the meanings of each of the terms used by the legislator. In this proceeding, he alleged, the acts attributed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without giving him due advice. Those material acts, he indicated, fall outside the classification of the indicated Article 3 of the LCCEI; namely: a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not breach the orientation of management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; b) it did not violate nor expose priority collective needs; c) the planning, regulation, efficiency, or equality of the inhabitants of the Republic was not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act executing a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that does not demand analysis or assessment, because, previously, the holder of the authority authorized it; and f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. From what was indicated, he stated, the improper application of Article 3 of the LCCEI arose from the insertion of the conduct attributed to the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of its factual assumptions. In addition to that lack of concretization in the ruling, he added, the application of precept 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contemplates the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of Article 39 ibid. That is, the ruling should have linked Article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct attributed to the plaintiff was contemplated in this second one, in order to thus justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR, which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period. Since the plaintiff's conduct did not fall under any of the types generating administrative liability under the LCCEI regime, he asserted, the applicable rule was Article 603 of the Labor Code (now canon 414) because it was, at most, a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. The succession of legal violations in the challenged ruling, he noted, occurs according to the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff's conduct as violative of the duty of probity, without contemplating the exhaustive list of conduct subject to sanction derived from Article 38 of the LCCEI. It applied, improperly, numeral 3 with omission of 38, both of Law no. 8422; which, in turn, led to the improper application of Article 71 of the LOCGR with non-application of Article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414), which imposes a period of one month as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning authority for cases outside the provisions of Law no. 8422. As a corollary to the foregoing, he indicated, the period to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff's conduct expired one month after having carried it out and, as a consequence of the foregoing, resolution no.

037 at 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, is absolutely null, as it stems from an invalid administrative procedure, because the Administration's sanctioning power has prescribed. For which reason, she requested that the appeal be granted and the claim be declared with merit in all its terms. Likewise, she invoked the cassation ground provided for in subsection a) of section 138 of the CPCA: "When an improper assessment of the evidence is attributed, or it has been pretermitted." She also claimed an improper assessment of the evidence for the rejection of the claimed prescription of the sanctioning power, due to an erroneous accounting of the prescriptive periods. Even under the anti-juridical supposition that article 71 of the LOCGR applied, she noted, the first personnel action signed by the plaintiff in execution of the superior order of the Executive President of the IDA was on February 25, 2010 (Considering XV), which means that by February 24, 2015, the 5 years provided for in that norm had elapsed. This defect in the judgment originated because the Tribunal considered the prescription interrupted as of official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015 –which, equally, produced the prescription by two days–, without noticing that this official letter ordered an investigation into facts unrelated to the plaintiff. In proven fact 15) of the judgment, the Tribunal concluded that, through official letter no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Executive President of INDER was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation regarding the payment of salary supplements "to the servant Walter Mora Leiva," without referring to the officials Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla nor Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff and for which she was investigated. In proven fact 16) of the judgment, the Tribunal concluded that, through official letter no. PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive Presidency ordered the preliminary investigation "regarding the facts indicated in official letter DA-017-2015"; limiting the scope of action of the preliminary investigation to the payment of salary supplements to the servant Walter Mora Leiva. She emphasized that the personnel actions, whose irregularity is attributed to the plaintiff, were in relation to the payment of salary supplements to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz. Therefore, she stated, the judgment concluded, with an inconsistent assessment of the evidence, that the initiation of the preliminary investigation, born under the auspices of official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015, interrupted the prescription of the causes imputed to the plaintiff, when, in reality, they were different causes in which the material action of signing the personnel actions attributed to the plaintiff remained outside the preliminary investigation and, therefore, the prescription period established in article 71 of the LOCGR was not interrupted. Proven facts 15 and 16 are clear and precise in that official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 were intended to resolve situations other than those attributed to the plaintiff, and therefore they lack the interruptive effect on the prescription. For that reason, she concluded by requesting that the judgment be reversed and, resolving on the merits, the claim be declared with merit in all its terms.

X.In this regard, it is necessary to note the following. First. The appellant stated on folio 13: "[…] in addition to that lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of article 38 of the LCCEI which contemplates the exhaustive causes for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of article 39 ibid was omitted […]". (The underlining is supplied). What is alleged regarding article 38 causes surprise. The Tribunal in considering X, in what is relevant, indicated: "Thus seen, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision that was intimated to the plaintiff, specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of section 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004." That is, in a clear and express manner, unlike what was indicated by the appellant, it applied it. Likewise, regarding the assertion that precept 38 of the LCCEI establishes the exhaustive causes of administrative liability subject to the sanctions of canon 39 ibidem, said norm states: "Causes of administrative liability. / Without prejudice to other causes provided for in the regime applicable to the respective employment relationship, the public official shall have administrative liability who: […]". (The underlining is supplied). From its literal tenor, it is determined, with ease, unlike what was stated by the cassationist, that said norm does not provide an exhaustive list of causes of administrative liability; on the contrary, it refers to those provided for in the regime applicable to the respective employment relationship. Second. The Tribunal, in Considering VII of the questioned judgment, alluded to in section VI point two of this resolution, in what is relevant, indicated: "[…] although the duty of probity imposes a behavioral framework consistent with the official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented towards preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of public office, as can be inferred from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's fault involves an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. […] Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary proceeding, the content of the intimate conduct is analyzed, in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the period for the exercise of the statute of limitations of the internal corrective power is the common one of one month imposed by the doctrine of the current ordinal 414 of the Labor Code, former 603 of that same source, the same period set by remittal of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute, or if, on the contrary, because it is facing the situations that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the cited period is extended by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the facts that were imputed to the plaintiff, such as having allowed the adoption of conduct that generated an undue recognition of salary supplements to two INDER officials by downward reassignment. Although they do not refer to a direct disposition of the Public Treasury, they ultimately comprise conduct that led to the provision of salary-related disbursements, covered with public resources, which, it is alleged within the ordinary disciplinary proceeding, were illegitimately granted. In the opinion of this Chamber, the substantial content of the intimate conduct and the object of the proceeding constitute manifestations that are considered antagonistic to the internal control regime and the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public office. From this perspective, the plaintiff seems to confuse the liability of those who directly administer the public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate titleholders, with the liability that is inherent to her by her mere condition as a public servant, and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the time margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which refers to the five-year prescription norm established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. […]." (The underlining is supplied). However, the appellant did not question, in due form, the basis indicated by the Tribunal in order to determine the application, to this litigation, of the five-year period provided for in precept 71 of the LOCGR.

He presented an argumentation completely divorced from the reasons given by the judges. To that effect, he stated: "*In the subjudice case, the acts attributed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without providing due advice. Those material acts of the plaintiff fall outside the classification of article 3 of the LCCEI, namely a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not violate: (I list) the orientation of management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; b) it did not violate nor expose priority collective needs; c) the planning, regulation, efficiency, nor equality of the inhabitants of the Republic were not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act of executing a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that does not demand analysis or assessment because the holder of the authority previously authorized it; f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. / Based on the foregoing, the improper application of article 3 of the LCCEI arises from inserting the conduct attributed to the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of the factual scenarios; additionally, to this lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of article 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contemplates the exhaustive causes of administrative responsibility subject to the sanctions of article 39 ibid, that is, the judgment should have linked article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct ascribed to the plaintiff was contemplated in this second one in order to justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción). / Since the plaintiff did not typify any of the conducts generating administrative responsibility under the LCCEI regime, the applicable rule was article 603 of the Labor Code (current article 414 of the same legislative body) because it was at most a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. / In summary: The succession of legal violations in the contested judgment occurs with the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff's conduct as violating the duty of probity without contemplating the exhaustive list of conducts subject to sanction derived from article 38 of the LCCEI, it improperly applied numeral 3 while omitting 38, both of Law 8422, which in turn led to the improper application of article 71 of the LOCGR with the misapplication of article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414) which imposes a one-month term as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power for cases outside the provisions of law 8422. As a corollary of the foregoing, the term to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff's conduct expired one month after having executed them and, as a consequence of the foregoing, resolution 037 of 1037 hours on June 28, 2017, is absolutely null because it stems from an invalid administrative procedure due to the Administration's sanctioning power having prescribed.*" As is easily determined, what was stated amounts to nothing more than a merely argumentative allegation, completely divorced from the foundations provided by the Court. Therefore, the allegation in the objection under study is inconsequential in breaking what was decided.

**XI. Third.** This Chamber shares the Court's assertion that the facts attributed to the plaintiff relate to the issue of the public treasury (hacienda pública), because they refer to conduct that involved the disposition of salary-related expenditures covered with public resources, their illegality having been determined. It also agrees with the position that the charged conduct and, therefore, the object of the administrative procedure, constitute manifestations antagonistic to both the internal control regime and the duty of probity. Regarding this second one, because, definitively, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff constitutes behavior that clashes with the proper performance of the powers granted to her and represents an inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública), thus failing to satisfy the public interest. In this regard, Executive Decree No. 32333 of April 12, 2005, "Regulation to the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function", in article 1, Definitions, in what is relevant, states: "**14) Duty of probity:** *Obligation of the public official to orient his management to the satisfaction of the public interest, which is expressed, fundamentally, in the following actions:* / **a)** *Identify and attend to the priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under equal conditions for the inhabitants of the Republic;* / **b)** *Demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law;* **c)** *Ensure that the decisions adopted in compliance with his attributions conform to impartiality and to the objectives of the institution in which he serves;* / **d)** *Administer public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily;* / **e)** *Reject gifts, presents, awards, rewards, or any other emolument, fee, stipend, salary, or benefit from natural or legal persons, national or foreign, by reason of the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof, inside the country or outside it; except for cases admitted by Law;* / **f)** *Refrain from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for disqualification and recusal established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the Civil Procedure Code, and other laws exist;* / **g)** *Orient his administrative activity to satisfy primarily the public interest.*" (The underlining is supplied). The plaintiff was reproached for having acted negligently in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her as Human Resources Coordinator; furthermore, as already indicated, her reprehensible conduct impacted a poor management of public resources or the public treasury (hacienda pública). Hence, in effect, as the judges indicated, the charged conduct is antagonistic to the duty of probity. Similarly, it contrasts with the internal control regime. In this regard, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, in what is relevant indicates: "**Article 7.**- **Obligatoriness of having an internal control system**.* The entities and bodies subject to this Law shall have internal control systems, which must be applicable, complete, reasonable, integrated, and consistent with their institutional competencies and attributions. Additionally, they must provide assurance in the fulfillment of those attributions and competencies; all in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 3 of this Law. […] **Article 12**.- **Duties of the head of the agency and of subordinate officials in the internal control system**. In matters of internal control, the head of the agency and the subordinate officials shall be responsible for fulfilling, among others, the following duties: / a) Ensure the adequate development of the activity of the entity or body under their charge. / b) Immediately take corrective measures, in the face of any evidence of deviations or irregularities. / c) Analyze and immediately implement the observations, recommendations, and provisions made by the internal audit office, the Contraloría General de la República, the external audit office, and the other relevant control and oversight institutions. / d) Ensure that the internal control systems meet at least the characteristics defined in Article 7 of this Law. / e) Present an end-of-management report and carry out the formal handover of the entity or body to their successor, in accordance with the directives issued by the Contraloría General de la República and by the competent entities and bodies of the active administration. / **Article 13**.- **Control environment.** Regarding the control environment, the duties of the head of the agency and of the subordinate officials shall be, among others, the following: / a) Maintain and demonstrate integrity and ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as contribute with their leadership and their actions to promoting them in the rest of the organization, for the effective compliance by the other officials. / b) Develop and maintain a management philosophy and style that allow administering a determined level of risk, oriented toward the achievement of results and the measurement of performance, and that promote an open attitude toward mechanisms and processes that improve the internal control system. / c) Evaluate the functioning of the organizational structure of the institution and take the pertinent measures to guarantee the fulfillment of institutional purposes; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / d) Clearly establish the hierarchy relationships, assign the authority and responsibility of the officials, and provide adequate communication channels, so that the processes are carried out; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / e) Establish appropriate human resources management policies and practices, principally regarding hiring, onboarding, training, evaluation, promotion, and disciplinary actions; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / **Article 14.**- **Risk assessment**. In relation to risk assessment, the duties of the head of the agency and the subordinate officials shall be, among others, the following: / a) Identify and analyze the relevant risks associated with the achievement of institutional objectives and goals, defined both in the annual operating plans and in the medium- and long-term plans. / b) Analyze the possible effect of the identified risks, their importance, and the probability of their occurrence, and decide the actions that will be taken to administer them. / c) Adopt the necessary measures for the adequate functioning of the risk assessment system and to place themselves at least at an acceptable level of organizational risk. / d) Establish the operational mechanisms that minimize the risk in the actions to be executed." (The underlining is not from the original). In this process, it is clear that, having signed personnel actions, through which, improperly, salary supplements for downward reassignment were granted, the internal control systems are contravened. So much so that, as indicated, in the final act as well as in the contested judgment (Considerando X), it was determined that the unlawfulness attributed to the plaintiff is embodied in the provisions, among others, of precept 38 subsection d) of the LCCEI, which states: "Weakens the internal control of the organization or omits the necessary actions for its design, implementation, or evaluation, in accordance with the applicable technical regulations." Hence, on the issue of the statute of limitations for disciplinary responsibility (prescripción), the applicable rule is that contained in precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which states: "**Prescripción of administrative responsibility**. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legal system related to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." For its part, Article 43 of Law No. 8292 indicates: "**Article 43**.- **Prescripción of administrative responsibility.** The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, shall prescribe according to Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause." For its part, canon 71 of the LOCGR, prescribes: "**Article 71**.- **Prescripción of disciplinary responsibility.** The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal system, shall prescribe according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.

/ b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding. / Prescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding. / When the perpetrator of the fault is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause. / (Thus amended by subsection a) of article 45 of the Internal Control Law, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002). (The underlining is supplied). In light of the provisions of this article, the prescriptive period, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant and as the Trial Court rightly pointed out, began to run when the result of the preliminary investigation was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency, that is, on March 16, 2016, the five-year prescriptive period not having elapsed, as outlined in considerando VI of this resolution. A computation that this Chamber, according to the merits of the case file, endorses.

XII.Fourth. Regarding the alleged indirect violation, the crux of what was argued by the appellant lies in their understanding that the prescriptive period elapsed because, in accordance with official letter no. PE-259-2015, an investigation was ordered into acts unrelated to the plaintiff. According to proven facts 15 and 16, through official letter no. DA-017-2015, the Executive Presidency was requested to carry out a preliminary investigation regarding the official Walter Mora Leiva. It did not refer to the servants Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla or Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff. Which was thus ordered through official letter no. PE-259-2015. The issue now raised by the appellant was already the subject of analysis in section VI, second point, of this resolution, when the characteristics and nature of the preliminary investigation were analyzed, so, in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, reference is made to what was stated there. Therefore, the judgment does not incur the evidentiary error attributed to it by stating: "[…] Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is noted that, although the drafting of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary case date from the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the fact of the matter is that such acts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the relevance of which is not challenged, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to in article 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to article 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment in which the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective position to exercise it, that the said period must begin to run. Thus, in cases such as the present one, in which the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidence, such that they allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges, the starting point of the prescription operates with the communication of the aforementioned report." (The underlining is supplied), especially considering that the appellant did not question what was indicated regarding the necessity and relevance of carrying out the preliminary investigation.

XIII.In the second objection for violation of substantive norms, folio 14, the appellant announced that they were lodging it for the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. This, they stated, was because the judgment concluded that the plaintiff should have disobeyed the superior's order. In Considerando VIII of the challenged resolution, they noted, the argument related to the duty of obedience was rejected. It concluded it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obliged to disobey the superior's order since it involved illegal conduct, for which, pursuant to article 108 of the LGAP, she should have at least left a record of her refusal. That conclusion, they affirmed, results in a biased reading of that article. This precept provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order involves carrying out acts that are "evidently foreign to the competence of the subordinate" and the act is manifestly "arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime." In this dispute, they noted, it is clear that the order of the Executive President, to draft and sign the personnel actions for Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, is outside the scope of that norm, since they were not acts foreign to the competence of the Human Resources Directorate nor were they arbitrary or criminal. In accredited facts numbers 2), 3), 4), 5), 11), 12), 13), and 14), the disagreements between the lawyers of the CGR and INDER were accredited. A controversy that, they stated, reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Legal Affairs Directorate indicated that the application of salary supplements for downgraded officials was illegal and, less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-2013 of February 20, 2013, imposed the one he considered valid. The plaintiff, they indicated, lacks legal training, so, if there were three different opinions among the specialist lawyers of the CGR and INDER on how to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to charge the plaintiff with the violation of article 108 of the LGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal opinions between the Legal Directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the CGR. In light of the above, they stated, the application by the Trial Court of the indicated article 108 of the LGAP becomes unfortunate and lacking all logic, reasonableness, and foundation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, unlike those attributed to the plaintiff. Therefore, and given the erroneous application of article 108 of the LGAP to a situation different from that provided for by the legislator, they concluded, the ruling typified the defect indicated in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA, for which the judgment must be vacated and, resolving on the merits, be declared with merit in all its extremes.

XIV.In the grievance under study, the appellant invoked several dissimilar hypotheses, but, by the way they argued them, they are inseparable. They announced they were lodging the reproach for direct violation of law, by virtue of an undue application of article 108 of the LGAP, which is in accordance with what is indicated on folios 14 and 15, to the effect that: "In Considerando VIII, the challenged resolution rejected the plaintiff's argument related to the duty of obedience, because it concludes it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obliged to disobey the superior's order because it involved illegal conduct, for which, pursuant to article 108 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP), she should have at least left a record of her refusal. That conclusion of the Trial Court results in a biased reading of article 108 of the LGAP.

This article provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order has as its purpose the performance of acts "evidently outside the competence of the subordinate" and that the act is manifestly "arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime" [...]. Therefore, and given the erroneous application of article 108 of the LEGAP to a situation diametrically different from that envisioned by the legislator, the ruling classified the defect indicated in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA, for which reason the judgment must be vacated and, ruling on the merits, the claim be granted in all its terms." (Only the underlined text is supplied). However, on that same folio, it stated: "[...] In proven facts 2), 3), 4), 5), 11), 12), 13), and 14), the disagreements between the attorneys of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the legal advisors of INDER were held as proven; a controversy that reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Legal Affairs Directorate (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) indicated that the application of bonus payments for demoted officials was illegal and less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President, Oscar Hernández Cedeño, dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-2013 of February 20, 2013, imposed that it was [sic] valid." What is now alleged—the supposed disagreements between the attorneys of the CGR and those of INDER; as well as the difference between the Legal Affairs Directorate and the legal advisor to the Executive Presidency—would constitute, if it occurred, an indirect violation of law, due to its improper assessment. Then, on folio 15, the appellant indicated: "It is necessary to add that the plaintiff lacks legal training, so if among the specialist attorneys of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the IDA (INDER) there were three different criteria on how [sic] to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to impute to the plaintiff the violation of article 108 of the LEGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal criteria among the legal directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the Comptroller General of the Republic." (The underlined text is supplied). The appellant alleged a violation of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Furthermore, by invoking logic, he alludes to an aspect of evidentiary assessment, which is reaffirmed by the omission of the supposed three legal criteria. He added on that same folio: "In light of the above, the application by the Court of numeral 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) becomes unfortunate and devoid of all logic, reasonableness, and substantiation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, different from those imputed to the plaintiff." In addition to the direct violation of precept 108 of the LGAP, the appellant, again, alluded to evidentiary assessment when referring to logic; he also invoked the breach of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In turn, he alluded to a cassation ground for violation of procedural rules, that of lack of substantiation or reasoning. The ambiguity put into evidence clashes with the cassation technique, which requires that the grounds for the appeal must be indicated clearly and precisely (article 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA).

**XV.** Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to note the following. In the heading of the grievance under study, the appellant announced an objection to what was stated in section VIII of the contested judgment. Next, as indicated in the preceding recital, on folio 14, in the relevant part, he indicated: "*In Recital VIII, the contested decision rejected the plaintiff's argument regarding the duty of obedience, because it concludes that it was inapplicable in the case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obligated to disobey the superior's order because it was an illegitimate conduct that, in accordance with numeral 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (LEGAP), should have, at the very least, left a record of her rejection. That conclusion of the Court becomes a biased reading of canon 108 of the LEGAP* [...]." (The underlined text is supplied). What is indicated causes confusion. In said Recital VIII of the questioned judgment, the judges, contrary to what was argued by the cassation appellant, limited themselves to carrying out a legislative theoretical analysis of the figures of the duty of obedience and disobedience. They did not perform any analysis of the plaintiff's arguments; therefore, they did not reject them there. Nor did they apply precept 108 of the LGAP to the plaintiff. Besides that norm, in that section of the contested judgment, the judges analyzed other numerals of the LGAP. For a complete understanding, said section is reproduced in the relevant part: "**VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience.** *As part of the internal relations that occur in the provision of public competencies, hierarchy implies the power of one body to govern and verify the conduct of other bodies that are subordinates. As established by article 101 of the LGAP, the administrative hierarchy relationship implies that the competencies of the superior encompass those of the subordinate by reason of territory or subject matter, and they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 ejusdem sets the generic powers of the hierarchical superior in the following sense:* [...] *In that exercise, according to subsection a) of that norm, the head may issue orders to his subordinates, which implies the imposition of a concrete conduct, of specific content, a measure that constitutes a source that must be weighed and assessed by the public agent in the exercise of his competencies. The unjustified disregard of that imposition may well lead to internal disciplinary consequences, as well as to the review of the content of the subordinate's act, so that the natural head, in the review phase ex officio or at a party's request, can carry out the comparison of the subordinate's conduct with the orders issued. However, the principle of submission to the Law requires that the public agent adapt his conduct to the rules governing his behavior, according to the hierarchical scale of sources (arts. 6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 128, 132, among others, of the LGAP). Hence, although the duty of obedience arises before the orders of the head, the LGAP itself imposes criteria based on which the public official must disregard those orders. As a general rule, the subordinate must obey the orders, instructions, or circulars issued by his immediate superior. However, when any of the following circumstances concur, the duty of disobedience is imposed on the official: a) That the act does not come from a hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (art. 107.2 LGAP).* If the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia) is grounded in relationships of subordination, it is evident that an organ that does not hold hierarchy over another cannot validly issue an order, and therefore, it is clear that it cannot be imposed on another organ that, with respect to that act, is not inferior; b) That the act has as its purpose the performance of conduct clearly outside its competence (Art. 108.1.a idem). Competence constitutes a fundamental subjective material element for the legitimate exercise of powers and competencies, such that, in the absence of competence, the invalidity of the act is unquestionable. This is clearly derived from precept 129 of the LGAP, such that ordering behaviors outside the competence of the inferior is a conduct that is in itself irregular, and which, therefore, is not imbued with the duty of obedience; c) That the act is openly arbitrary, because its execution constitutes an abuse of authority or any other crime (Art. 108.1.b) ejusdem. The abuse of authority, as the improper and/or excessive exercise of administrative power, constitutes a pathology in the provision of public competencies, which determines the invalidity of the actions taken. This is imposed by the relationship of subsections 3) and 4) of numeral 146 of the LGAP. Precept 108, subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in stating that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the liability of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and eventually criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm alludes to the liability of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the order given, which does not exclude the liability of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those indicated circumstances. However, by virtue of the duty being analyzed, as has been pointed out, the law itself establishes assumptions in which what is imposed on the public agent is a negative behavior, that is, to disregard the order given, for constituting a pathological manifestation, vitiated by nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the liability derived from the execution and compliance with those null conducts. Now, when none of the exceptional circumstances indicated concur in the act, precept 109 of the cited law imposes on the official the duty to obey the act, even if that conduct is considered contrary to the Legal System for any other reason. However, in this case, the same norm imposes a new duty, on this occasion, consisting of warning and informing the administrative head about their objections. Such a requirement implies a release from any liability that might derive from the execution of the invalid act, but with the survival of the duty of execution. In cases of urgency, mandate 110 of the LGAP establishes that the inferior may reserve their liability verbally, for which purpose the presence of two witnesses is required. In this sense, the same canon 109 ejusdem complements that when it comes to avoiding serious damages of impossible or difficult reparation that the immediate execution of the issued act may produce, the inferior may suspend the execution thereof, subject to the liability that might result, should the justifying causes be, definitively, non-existent or improper. It should be noted that the execution of null acts constitutes a distortion of the principle of non-enforceability of conducts with absolute nullity imposed by ordinals 146.3 and 169 of the same legal source, for which reason, the communication of objections justifies the dispensation of the inferior's liability, reserving that framework of imputation to the superior. That said, in order to define the cases in which the duty of obedience or disobedience arises, it is necessary to specify that the notoriety of the causes of illegitimacy that require disengagement from a superior's conduct is an aspect that must be assessed in each case, for which purpose it is primary to analyze whether the public agent was in a position or objective duty to know the irregularity of the conduct required to be executed. For this, the doctrine of ordinal 213 of the LGAP sets guidelines to be followed in these matters, imposing the criterion that the framework of liability is proportional to the level of hierarchy of the public servant and the technical nature of their functions. Thus, the higher the hierarchy and technical competence level, the greater the duty to know and assess the defects of the act, and, consequently, the more intense the duty of disobedience. Hence, it is necessary to analyze, in each situation, the position held, the profile of functions, the technical level inherent to the position, as prior parameters for weighing the existence (a priori) of a duty or power to know the illegitimacy of the conduct ordered by the superior and, based on that, either to opt for disobedience or for obedience under protest, with the due expression of the reasons that constitute the objection. On that basis, it must be defined whether the inferior has incurred or not within the framework of liability imposed by law, either by disobeying improperly, or by obeying an order that, by legal imperative, should have been disregarded. Therefore, the release from liability is not configured by the simple obedience of an act that does not present the circumstances indicated above, it being the duty of the inferior to communicate to the head the objections regarding the content of the order given, as a cause for dispensation from their liability for the adoption or execution of those acts. When such reproach does not appear in the administrative file (expediente administrativo) of the respective proceeding, the inferior equally assumes liability for that execution, when they had the power or duty to demonstrate the deficiencies of the act. Having made these necessary clarifications, we proceed to the analysis of the specific case." The lack of concordance between what is stated in that recital (considerando) and what is alleged by the appellant is evident. Therefore, what is stated is meaningless for the purpose of overturning the decision.

XVI.In the third ground of disagreement for violation of substantive norms, folio 15, the appellant indicated that Considering IX of the appealed judgment concluded that their client incurred a failure in their duties, since the Job Manual (Manual de Puestos) imposed on them the task of "advising" their superiors in the matters specific to the position. The conclusion, they stated, is invalid for the following reasons. The judgment, they indicated, accepted the defendants' allegation regarding the provisions of the Job Manual concerning the position held by the plaintiff. However, they added, it omitted to indicate whether it was based on the Job Manual in force in 2010 or 2011, when the actions of Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed; or whether it referred to the one in force at the date of the filing of the jurisdictional action. That omission regarding the effective date of the Job Manual on which it bases its decision, they asserted, is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the judgment for lack of legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica). The advisory functions of the Human Resources Coordinator, they indicated, are limited to the management and administration of human resources. It is foreign, they noted, to legal advice, because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules concerning the ways of regulating service relationships. She knows, in detail, the contracting procedure, but not matters related to the provisions or directives emanating from the CGR, whose legal complexity requires the advice of the Legal Department. The situation was so complicated, they stated, that not even among the legal advisors of the defendant entity did they agree on the applicable methodology, as is accredited with official communications DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013. Sufficient reason to discard the obligation of the plaintiff, as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not. Their client, they pointed out, applied the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors. In addition to the fact that the actions attributed to their client are foreign to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). The Tribunal, they commented, endorsed INDER's imputation that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President (Presidente Ejecutivo). This, they stated, is based on logical ambiguity regarding the competencies of the position in relation to the advisory role, since the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the CGR, regarding the procedure for the rehiring of descending personnel, corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Legal) of the entity and to the Legal Advisor of the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the applicable guidelines for the other institutional offices.

The contradictory, imprecise, and nonconforming reasoning of the judgment, she argued, typifies the ground under subsection a) of Article 138 of the CPCA, because it failed to assess the following: a) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by him for each of the cases and, subsequently, were endorsed by two agreements signed between INDER and the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz (proven facts 5 through 10); b) the agreements were countersigned by the Legal Department (same facts); c) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials (there is no evidence to support that conclusion); d) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to which the resolutions signed by the Executive President were attached; e) the plaintiff was entitled to a principle of legitimate reliance (principio de confianza legítima), insofar as the Executive President's decisions are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, so it is these advisors who are responsible for assessing the legality of the superior's decision. With the indicated evaluative omissions, she stated, the judgment violated, through misapplication, Article 356 of the LGAP, because the resolutions of the Executive President of INDER regarding the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz ended the conflict. There was a mandatory prior consultation with the Legal Advisor, as required by that provision. By omitting its application, the Court improperly shifted responsibility to his client, when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor if the advice was given erroneously. The judgment, she noted, must also be overturned for misapplication of Article 146 subsection 3) ibid, by erroneously shifting responsibility to the plaintiff. She reproduced that provision. In this dispute, and in the event that the personnel actions challenged were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance falls on the Executive President of INDER, by that express legal provision, which, she concluded, was omitted by the Court, incurring the defect claimed.

XVII.In the grievance under consideration, the appellant once again raised several hypotheses that are dissimilar to each other, but, due to the way the objection was formulated, they are inseparable. In this regard, at folio 15, the appellant stated: "The judgment accepts the defendants' argument regarding what the Manual de Puestos provides in relation to the plaintiff's position, but it omitted to indicate whether the Jurisdictional Chamber relied on the Manual de Puestos in effect in 2010 and 2011 when the actions for Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed, or whether it refers to the Manual de Puestos in effect at the date of the filing of the jurisdictional action. That omission regarding the effective date of the Manual de Puestos on which it bases its decision is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the judgment for lack of legal reasoning." If what was argued were to occur, it would give rise to a defect for violation of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1) point d) of canon 137 of the CPCA: failure to state reasons (falta de motivación). However, the appellant did not indicate how each of the versions he pointed out differ (if they exist). Furthermore, he did not challenge what was stated in the judgment, regarding: "According to what INDER states and co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero reiterates, the Institution's Manual de Puestos assigns the following details to that position: «Nature of work. Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities. Positions included in this class: Coordinator (a) of Human Resources. (...) General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator. Advises the institution's management in matters of personnel administration. Consequences of error. Errors committed can cause losses, damages, or delays of high consideration, so activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision. Personal characteristics of the incumbent. Analytical, critical, and synthesis capacity.»". (Only the underlining is supplied). Therefore, what was indicated proves to be inconsequential in terms of breaking what was decided. The appellant added on that same folio: "Regardless of what was stated in the preceding paragraph, the advisory duties of the Human Resources Coordinator are limited to the management and administration of human resources, completely unrelated to legal advice because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules pertaining to the ways of regulating service relationships; she knows the hiring procedure in detail, but not matters related to the provisions or guidelines emanating from the Contraloría General de la República, whose legal complexity demands the advice of the Legal Department." The foregoing is nothing more than a merely argumentative claim, devoid of factual support. Moreover, it contrasts with what the Institution's Manual de Puestos indicates as duties for the person holding the position of Human Resources Coordinator. The cassation appellant continued, stating on said folio: "The situation was so complicated that not even among the IDA's (INDER's) own legal advisors did they agree on the applicable methodology, as evidenced by official letters DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013; sufficient reason to dismiss the plaintiff's obligation, as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not." What was stated would give rise to the grounds for cassation provided for in subsection a) of numeral 138 of the CPCA, for indirect breach of law. In the last paragraph of said folio, the appellant argued: "The plaintiff applies the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, in addition to the fact that the actions attributed to my client are unrelated to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). The Court endorsed in the judgment INDER's imputation that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President with logical ambiguity regarding the competencies of the plaintiff's position in relation to the advisory function, since the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the Contraloría General de la República on the procedure for the rehiring of descending personnel corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office of the entity and the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the applicable guideline for the other institutional offices." What was indicated constitutes an argumentative claim devoid of factual and legal support. Furthermore, that the plaintiff applies the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, as the appellant stated, differs from what is set out in the Manual de Puestos as official duties of the Human Resources Coordination of INDER. On the other hand, in section XI third point of this resolution, the reasons were provided why this Chamber considers that the conduct attributed to the plaintiff is antagonistic both to the duty of probity and to the internal control system.

On page 16, the appellant indicated: "The contradictory, imprecise, and inconsistent reasoning of the judgment typifies the ground under subsection a) of article 138 of the CPCA because it failed to assess the following: / h) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by him for each of the cases, and subsequently endorsed by two agreements signed between the IDA (INDER) and the officials concerned, Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz (See proven facts 5 to 10); / i) the agreements were countersigned by the Legal Department (same facts 5 to 10), / j) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials; (there is no evidence to support that conclusion) / k) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to [sic] which the resolutions signed by the Executive President were attached; / l) the judgment failed to assess that the plaintiff was protected by a principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), insofar as the decisions of the Executive President are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, such that it is they who are responsible for assessing the legality of the Superior's decision. / 3) With the aforementioned evaluative omissions, the judgment violated, by non-application, article 356 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública), because the resolutions of the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) regarding the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz ended the conflict; there was a mandatory prior consultation with the Legal Advisor as stipulated in numeral 356 of the LGAP; by omitting the application of that norm, the Court improperly transferred the responsibility to my client when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor in the event it was given erroneously." In what was argued by the appellant, two different cassation grounds were mixed: first, one for violation of procedural norms: lack of reasoning; and, later, another for transgression of substantive norms, for indirect violation of law. With respect to the cassation appellant's assertion that the plaintiff was protected by the principle of legitimate expectations, it is necessary to point out. The plaintiff cannot shield herself behind said postulate to justify the disregard of the duty of probity and the internal control rules. This would undoubtedly render ineffective the purpose provided for in Law no. 8422, to prevent, detect, and punish corruption in the exercise of public function. If the Public Administration, in the past, issued acts in an irregular or illegal manner, as happened in this litigation, it would suffice for the public official to follow that conduct without questioning its legitimacy, despite it being her official duty, alleging the principle of legitimate expectations, to evade her responsibility, thereby violating or disregarding the norms and guiding principles of internal control and of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de la Función Pública), especially the duty of probity. A situation that, by all lights, cannot be endorsed. The plaintiff was appointed to the position of Human Resources Coordinator of INDER because she met the profile indicated in the Job Manual (Manual de Puestos) of that entity. Among her duties is that of advising management on personnel administration matters; for which she performs planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation functions of the technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of INDER, as well as the execution of corresponding activities. In accordance with this, the plaintiff should have noticed the irregularity presented in the case of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz, making it known to the Executive Presidency. Not simply continue with that irregularity, shielding herself behind a misunderstood legitimate expectations. That is, by virtue of her office, she could not presume, based on those prior irregular actions, the legitimacy of her conduct. Hence, the principle of legitimate expectations was not infringed. In this regard, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, among others, the judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) numbers 93-F-S1-2011 of 9 hours 5 minutes of February 3, 2011; 1692-F-S1-2012 of 10 hours 10 minutes of December 13, 2012; 256-F-S1-2019 of 16 hours 24 minutes of March 20, 409-F-S1-2019 of 10 hours 55 minutes of May 16, both of the year 2019. Lastly, the cassation appellant stated on said page: "The judgment must also be overturned for non-application of article 146, subsection 3) of the LGAP by erroneously transferring responsibility to the plaintiff. The recently mentioned subsection indicates: [...] In the specific case and in the event that the accused personnel actions were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance corresponds to the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) by that express legal provision, which was omitted by the Court, incurring the claimed defect, and I request that it be so declared." The matter indicated, if it were to occur, would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of precept 138 of the CPCA, that is, for direct violation of law. On the other hand, the eventual responsibility of the person who held the Executive Presidency at the time the questioned employer orders were issued does not exclude or exonerate the plaintiff's responsibility, as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, by virtue of the duty of probity in the public function and the internal control regime, already set forth in recital XI point three of this resolution. This is how the Court stated it in section VIII of the questioned judgment, when indicating: "Precept 108 subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in pointing out that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the responsibility of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and eventually criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm alludes to the responsibility of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the order given, which does not exclude the responsibility of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those pointed-out circumstances. Nevertheless, by virtue of the duty being analyzed, as has been indicated, the same law establishes assumptions in which what is imposed on the public agent is negative behavior, that is, disregarding the order given, as it constitutes a pathological manifestation, vitiated by nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the responsibility derived from the execution and compliance with those null conducts." (The underlining is supplied). Which was not duly challenged by the cassation appellant. As has already been indicated, the confusion revealed is contrary to the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds for the appeal be indicated clearly and precisely.

XVIII.Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. The judges, in recitals IX and X of the questioned judgment, in what is of interest, indicated: "IX.- Analysis on the defenses relating to the plaintiff's duty of obedience. The defense formulated in this case, and on which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she merely complied with the orders issued by the person who on those dates served as Executive President. In order to what has been presented, such allegation requires the analysis of the circumstances under which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience in the face of that conduct.

In the specific case, as of the date the personnel actions were issued in April 2010 and June 2011, the plaintiff occupied the Human Resources Coordination of the defendant entity. […] Taking these particularities into account, this Tribunal considers that the very position of Human Resources Coordinator places the plaintiff under the duty, or at least, in the position of being able to know the set of background information and regulations that are inherent to downward personnel movements. This leads one to suppose that, faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions that recognized the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn about the necessary existence of the required technical and legal prerequisites for that recognition, and, as the case may be, to inform that hierarchy of the need to request the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision. As the Job Manual mentions in the section indicated above, part of the plaintiff's general activities was to advise leadership in matters of personnel administration. Hence, a functional duty is derived from that profile that imposed on her the obligation to warn her leadership that the conduct issued found no support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The allegation of automatic and unqualified application of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, as a derivation of the duty of obedience, does not entail the release from liability that is sought, when the LGAP itself indicates the assumptions under which the public servant should disobey, but also when the same internal regulations and the profile of her tasks imposed on her the duty to know of the need for prior technical and/or legal analyses that would make evident the pertinence, in the specific cases, of the actions ordered by her leadership. In any case, even if we were to consider that it has not been proven that any of the conditions imposing the duty to disregard the order were present, given her knowledge and responsibilities in matters of Human Resources Management, it was her duty to warn that, in downward reassignments, it was not permissible to grant the salary supplement assigned in those personnel actions, given the lack of technical analyses that would support those decisions. This was so that the senior official could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to release herself from liability for the execution of those acts. However, it is not evident in the case records that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders issued by means of the issuance of the respective personnel actions, ultimately conferring illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the INDER budget. By not having expressed those disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes responsibility for the negligence in fulfilling these legally assigned duties, which are consistent with her functions and, therefore, enforceable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the job profile she occupied. / **X.-** Seen in this way, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision that was charged against the plaintiff, specifically, subsection 38 d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of subsection 13 c) of Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the applied sanction is based on the duty to have requested the technical and legal inputs that would support the order dictated and which she chose to execute, dispensing with the fulfillment of minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules for the imputation of liability established by Article 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the issued act and the adopted conduct. From that perspective, the position of Human Resources Management coordinator entails a degree of technical specialization, in light of which, the plaintiff's argument regarding the release from liability for simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency regarding the personnel actions that recognized a right to the payment of a salary supplement through downward reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive demands pertinent to the case, is not admissible. Consequently, gross negligence is observed in that conduct, which entails liability for the issuance and permissibility of acts that unduly created patrimonial rights, with the corresponding economic harm to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by compromising public funds without the proper verification of conformity of the procedures that led to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissibility to ignore the shortcomings that later gave rise to the imposed sanction is observed. This is a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, to set forth the reasons for disagreement as a warning, thus generating a release from liability. By failing to do so, she incurs the factual precondition (conditioning antecedent) that was charged against the plaintiff and that permits the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the statement of charges. Such an assessment of the conduct attributable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In the relevant part, among the reasons given by the Executive Presidency, the following was stated: "[…] These references make evident the considerations from which the defendant entity found that the plaintiff's conduct violated the provisions of Law No. 8422, due to the lack of control over the technical analyses required for the granting of the downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the salary supplement granted to the two referenced officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures inherent to her position concerning personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks to the disregard of those duties and consequently the liability derived from that conduct. As can be observed, this analysis links and harmonizes with the reasoning given by this Tribunal in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the denounced incorrectness is not observed." (The underlining is added).

As can be clearly determined, the appellant did not properly challenge the arguments or grounds put forth by the Court to determine the plaintiff's liability for breach of the duty of probity and the internal control system. As indicated in the previous section, he limited himself to making merely argumentative allegations, divorced from the reasons set forth in the challenged judgment. Which, it is worth noting, this Chamber shares. It is clear, by virtue of the plaintiff's official duties as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, that she had a duty to know and manage the regulations concerning downward personnel movements (movimientos descendentes de personal) within the institution. Hence, the need for the technical and legal prerequisites for the recognition of additional salaries in cases of downward personnel movements. Therefore, having failed to alert the Executive Presidency to that circumstance, she must assume her responsibility, in accordance with provision 213 of the LGAP.

**XIX.** In the **fourth** objection, folio 16, the challenger objected to the rejection of the nullity for lack of statement of reasons (motivación) of the sanctioning resolution. One of the reasons for the claimed nullity, he noted, was the lack of statement of reasons in resolution no. PE-037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017. The judgment rejected the arguments and resolved that the administrative decision met the requirements of substantiation, explaining what it considered to be the statement of reasons. In that explanation, he said, the ruling started from a quantitative perspective of the statement of reasons. Contrary to what was resolved, he stated, said resolution lacked substantiation because it omitted to specify, to state precisely the elements of the plaintiff's conduct that breached the specific legal rules to which she was subject. The statement of reasons, he pointed out, implies four substantial elements: a) the absolute verification of the facts without subjective interpretation or assessment. It is the pure and simple verification of the occurrence of an event regardless of the reasons that gave rise to it; b) irrefutable proof that those facts were the consequence of a specific conduct; c) the subsumption of those facts under precise legal rules, without interpretive twists; and d) that the facts indicated in section a) can be attributed to one or more persons. Both administrative resolution no. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment, he indicated, omitted specifying the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it was only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. It was omitted to indicate, he added, the legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact, limiting itself to a disordered mention of various legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conduct subsumed under each one. The judicial ruling, he asserted, endorsed that administrative act lacking a statement of reasons, in violation of numeral 136 of the LGAP, which requires it as a requirement of validity, because the statement of reasons is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct. In this dispute (lite), he stated, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of INDER resolved that employees Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid an additional salary, as a substitute for the payment of the entire settlement in a single installment, as a consequence of their partial settlement due to a downgrade in position; b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action (acción de personal); c) after the signing of the personnel action, the agreements with the indicated employees were signed and countersigned by the Legal Department. The proof of those facts, he indicated, was detailed by the Court in proven facts 5) through 10) of the judgment. The legal support that underpinned the facts were the resolutions of the CGR and the legal opinions existing at the time the personnel actions were issued. The challenged judgment abandoned the analysis of those three basic and unique elements that should have been incorporated into the administrative resolution, incurring the same defect of lack of statement of reasons. The mere reading of the administrative resolution, he asserted, proves the defect attributed to the challenged ruling, namely: a) it omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the contested and confirmed administrative act; b) there is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; c) the judicial resolution did not concretize the indeterminate legal concepts of: "*duty of probity, good management of public resources*" in relation to the specific facts attributed to the plaintiff; d) it omitted to indicate the specific and concrete facts executed by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity; e) it omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete liability attributable to the plaintiff in the management of public funds (also omitted by the contested administrative act). Both resolutions (administrative no. 037-2017 and the judgment) did not identify the legal rules imposing duties on the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public funds, subjecting her to the control and oversight (fiscalización) rules of the public treasury (hacienda pública). He brought up that, in accordance with resolution no. 623-A-S1-2013, of 10:25 a.m. on May 16, 2013, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) concluded that, to determine the application of the rules of Article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since liability arises from the breach of the control and oversight rules of the public treasury and not from the official's position. He reproduced, in what was relevant to his interest, what was considered therein. According to that judicial body, he pointed out, both the administrative sanctioning act no. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment lacked the specification of the reasons why the signature affixed by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz breached the control and oversight rules of the public treasury. That lack of legislative precision, with argumentative omission, he concluded, is grounds for absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the administrative resolution and for reversal of the objected judgment.

**XX.** Once again, the appellant alleged several dissimilar hypotheses, but, due to the way he structured the grievance, they are inseparable. On folio 17, he indicated: "*Both administrative resolution number 037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI omitted specifying the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it is only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. / The indication [sic] of the legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact was omitted, limiting itself to a disordered mention of various legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conduct subsumed under each one.*" The foregoing, if it occurred, would give rise to the defect for breach of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1), point d) of provision 137 of the CPCA: lack of substantiation. Furthermore, what was argued is nothing more than a merely argumentative comment, completely divorced from the challenged judgment. The challenger added: "*The judicial ruling endorsed that administrative act lacking that statement of reasons, in violation of numeral 136 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which requires it as a requirement of validity, because the statement of reasons is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct.*" What is now alleged would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of Article 138 ibid, for direct breach of law.

Subsequently, the appellant indicated: "In the case at hand, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) resolved that the employees Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid a salary supplement (sobresueldo) as a substitute for the payment of the entirety of their settlement in a single lump sum as a consequence of their partial settlement due to demotion; b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action; c) after the signing of the personnel action, the agreements were signed with the aforementioned employees and countersigned by the Legal Department; the proof of these facts: the Court detailed them in proven facts 5) through 10) of the judgment; the legal backing that supported the facts were the resolutions of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued." The foregoing would give rise to the ground for cassation provided for in subsection a) of canon 138 ejúsdem, for indirect violation of law, due to the improper assessment of both the resolutions of the CGR and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued, by not duly analyzing the facts that occurred in this dispute. The appellant continued stating: "Judgment 095-2019-V1 abandoned the analysis of these three basic and only elements that should have been incorporated in resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, incurring in the same defect of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación), in this case, of the judgment. A mere reading of resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, proves the defect attributed to ruling 095-2019-VI, namely: / It omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the challenged and confirmed administrative act; / There is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; / The judicial resolution does not concretize the indeterminate legal concepts of: 'duty of probity, proper management of public funds' in relation to the specific facts attributed to the plaintiff, / It omitted to point out the concrete and specific acts carried out by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity, / It omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete responsibility attributable to the plaintiff in the management of public funds, (also omitted by the challenged administrative act). / The two resolutions (037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI) do not identify the legal rules imposed on the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public funds, subjecting her to the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública)." The foregoing would give rise to the defect for breach of procedural rules already indicated: lack of reasoning. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that, contrary to what was stated by the appellant, in section VI of the questioned judgment, the adjudicators analyzed, from a theoretical, doctrinal, and legal perspective, the concept of the "duty of probity." Later, in recital VII, they set out the reasons why the prescriptive period provided for in article 71 of the LOCGR is applicable to this dispute and why it did not elapse. In sections VIII, IX, and X, they set out the reasons (factual and legal) why the plaintiff, by virtue of her position as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, could be held responsible for breaching both the duty of probity and the internal control regime (régimen de control interno), by not having warned of the necessary existence of the proper technical and legal prerequisites to approve salary supplements (sobresueldos) due to downward movements. That is, contrary to what was indicated by the cassation appellant, in the opinion of this Chamber, the adjudicators clearly, orderly, and thoroughly reasoned why the plaintiff was responsible for her omission. The appellant continued stating on pages 17 and 18: "It is important to bring up that, in accordance with judgment 623-A-S1-2013 of 10:25 a.m. on May 16, 2013, this Honorable First Chamber concluded that to determine the application of the rules of article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since the responsibility stems from the breach of the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury and not from the position of the concerned official. It stated so: […] According to the First Chamber, the sanctioning administrative act 037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI, failed to specify the reasons why the signature affixed by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz breached the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury. This lack of legislative precision with argumentative omission is [sic] grounds for the absolute nullity of resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, and for the revocation of judgment 095-2019-VI, and I so request it be declared." Said resolution of the First Chamber, in this dispute, constitutes a means of proof. Therefore, what is argued regarding it, if it were to occur, would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection a) of precept 138 of the CPCA, for indirect breach of law. Then, in the last paragraph indicated, the cassation appellant also invoked the cassation ground for violation of procedural rules already indicated, that of lack of reasoning. The ambiguity revealed, as has already been stated, contravenes cassation technique.

**XXI.** Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding recital and, for the sake of further reasoning, it is necessary to point out. In recital XI of the challenged judgment, the adjudicators provided the reasons why, in their understanding, the final act under question is duly reasoned. On the relevant point, they stated: "**XI.- Regarding the alleged lack of reasoning.** On the other hand, an improper substantiation of the final act of the procedure is alleged. […] in the case at hand, the act does not present the reasoning deficiencies that are alleged. As has been stated supra, regarding what has been the subject of objection, the challenged conducts clearly offer the set of antecedent circumstances on which it has based its decision. The final act points out the reasons of fact and law on which the content of the act is based. In the section on proven facts, that act refers to the evidentiary elements from which it inferred each factual assertion. For its part, in the substantive analysis, it carries out an assessment of the evidence incorporated into the procedure, while also explaining the reasons why it deemed the charges proven, the considerations why it concluded that it was a breach of the probity regime, detailing the obligations inherent to the position held by the plaintiff at the time of the facts, as well as the value judgment that led it to establish the sanction ultimately applied. In that regard, in numeral 'V.V.

[sic] Regarding the penalty to be imposed, he stated: "Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission to act, this body considers it relevant; since, there was serious and pernicious damage to the budget of the institution by granting benefits to officials who were not afforded due process to determine whether or not they qualified for the reassignment of descending positions; for this reason, in order not to overlook said action; but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent behavior in the duties she performed, this deciding body imposes the penalty of ONE-MONTH SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, estimating the seriousness of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution and, considering that the purpose of the disciplinary procedure is corrective (...) ". In this way, the final resolution being challenged duly captures the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were held as accredited with detail of the elements of conviction on which they were deduced. Such development enables the understanding of the reasons that support the motive of the act. Then, it addressed the various allegations presented by the parties involved and elaborates on the reasons of law by which, in light of the determined facts, it obtained the assessments and legal consequences ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, that exposition shows logical congruence between the facts and the applied law, as support for the final decision, which allows for the (logical) understanding of the foundational reasons for the administrative will. It is worth noting that in accordance with the provisions of section 136 (c) of the LGAP, that statement of reasons (motivación) allows the decision to be sustained against the recommendation report issued by the investigative body and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board, both criteria being non-binding in nature according to the tenor of precept 303 of the aforementioned LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of due statement of reasons, as was achieved in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with those considerations and development, but that does not imply that the defect she points out materializes. From that standpoint, the argument under examination must be rejected." However, the appellant made an argument divorced from said foundation. He limited himself to indicating: "The judgment rejects the arguments and resolves that the administrative decision complies with the requirements of substantiation (fundamentación), explaining what it considers to be the statement of reasons (motivación). In that explanation, the ruling starts from a quantitative perspective of the statement of reasons. Contrary to what was resolved by the Court in Considering X, the decision P.E.037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017 lacks substantiation because it omitted to specify precisely the contents of the plaintiff's conduct that breached the specific rules of the legal system to which she was subject." That is, he made a brief and very generic account, without questioning, punctually, what was indicated by the Court. Therefore, what is pointed out in the censure under review is futile for the purpose of breaking what was resolved.

**XXII.** In the **fifth** ground of disagreement, folio 18, the appellant objected to what was resolved regarding that the applied sanction is correct. In considering XII, he stated, the ruling concluded that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was correct, since, the applicable legal regime is that contained in article 39 of the LCCEI. He rejected the argument that the sanction of 30 days without pay breached precept 68 (c) of the Labor Code; and intended to sustain himself in the Public Law regime, to which the plaintiff is subject, with support in precepts 112 of the LGAP, 585 now 682 of the Labor Code and 39 of the LCCEI. He added that the analysis of validity of personnel actions numbers 792-2010 and 3841-2011 (Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz) is independent and, moreover, unrelated to the breach of the duty of probity. He transcribed, in what was of interest to him, what was considered by the Court. The analysis of validity or invalidity of the personnel actions, he noted, is a fundamental requirement to determine if the duty of probity was breached. It is from the motives or elements that sustain that invalidity that liability would arise, since it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law could generate official liability for breach of the duty of probity. The ruling, he noted, relied on some (isolated) resolutions, without adjusting what in doctrine is called the "differentiating fact," as a keystone for extrapolating jurisprudence from one case to another. To validate the application of article 39 of the LCCEI, he stated, it was necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff in light of the required probity because, being an indeterminate legal concept, it was up to the Administration and, in this case, the Court, to concretize it. To his principal, he indicated, it was not demonstrated, in the administrative or judicial venue, that she had incurred in any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in article 38 of the LCCEI, a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in numeral 39 ibidem, exclusive for the grounds of the cited canon 38. As the violation of the LCCEI with the plaintiff's conduct was undemonstrated, he concluded, the ruling incurred the defect of subparagraph (c) of article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying articles 3 and 39 ibidem.

**XXIII.** As has been set forth, the Court, in sections VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, not only explained why the provisions of laws numbers 7428, 8292 and 8422 are applicable to this litigation; but also analyzed, with prolixity, the reasons why the plaintiff, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant, breached the duty of probity and the internal control rules. Said argumentation, as has been indicated, was not duly challenged by the appellant. Specifically, as indicated in sections X and XVIII of this resolution, in considering X, the judging persons were eloquent in indicating that the material and formal unlawfulness lies in what is provided by the regulations notified to the plaintiff. Specifically, numeral 38 (d) of Law No. 8422 and 13 (c) of the Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711 of March 16, 2004. They also indicated that the subjective support for the sanction is the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that would give backing to the order dictated and that she chose to execute, exempting compliance with minimum requirements. That is, contrary to what was pointed out by the challenger, the Court explained that the reprehensible conduct of the plaintiff fits within the provisions of canon 38 of Law No. 8422. Which, it is insisted, was not duly objected to by the challenger. Therefore, the application of precept 39 ibidem is appropriate, regarding the sanction imposed and not section 68 (c) of the Labor Code. Which, as has been indicated, this Chamber shares.

The appellant stated on folio 18: "*We lament that conclusion* [referring to what was indicated by the Court regarding that the analysis of validity of the personnel actions granted in favor of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz does not constitute a preliminary question (cuestión prejudicial), to which the possibility of initiating the corresponding disciplinary procedure is subordinated]. *The analysis of validity or invalidity of the personnel actions is a 'fundamental' requirement to determine if the duty of probity was breached, because it is from the motives or elements that sustain that invalidity that liability would arise, because it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law could generate official liability for breach of the duty of probity.*" The Court, in section XII of the contested judgment, in that regard indicated: "*On this independence of purpose between both procedures, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has already ruled in exercise of the powers of the Court of Cassation (pursuant to Transitional Provision I in relation to article 136 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, Law No. 8508), among others, in resolutions numbers 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 and 000003-F-TC-2018.*" Therefore, the deficiency on which the petitioner bases her objections is not observed." In effect, this cassation body, regarding the public treasury (hacienda pública), has indicated that the processing of a sanctioning procedure is autonomous with respect to the processing of the annulment procedure. In this regard, in addition to those indicated by the adjudicating persons, ruling no. 114-F-TC-2016 of 11 hours 10 minutes on September 22, 2016, may be consulted. That is, the existence of a previously decreed nullity regarding a specific act harmful to the public treasury is not a requisite -sine qua non- to validly exercise the sanctioning regime against the public servant responsible for that damaging conduct or omission. There is no conditioning or subordination of one procedure to the other. Both are fully independent of each other and differentiable in terms of their object and scope. The appellant, on the indicated page 18, merely stated: "The ruling relies on some (isolated) resolutions without adjusting what in doctrine is called the 'distinguishing fact' ('hecho diferenciador') as the keystone to extrapolate jurisprudence from one case to another." What was stated does not go beyond being a merely argumentative allegation. It does not delve into the reasons why, in his view, the cited precedents are not applicable to this litigation (lite). The appellant added on said page 18: "To validate the application of Article 39 of the LCCEI, it was absolutely necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff regarding the claimed probity, because as it is an undefined legal concept, it was up to the Administration and in this case the Court, to make it concrete." Precisely, it is insisted, that is what the Court did in the indicated recitals of the questioned ruling, as explained in section XX of this resolution. On page 19, the appellant alleged: "It was not demonstrated to the plaintiff in administrative or judicial proceedings that she had incurred any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in Article 38 of the LCCEI: a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in Article 39 ibid, exclusive for the grounds of the cited Article 38. / Since the violation of the LCCEI through the plaintiff's conduct remains undemonstrated, the ruling incurred the defect of subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying Articles 3 and 39 of the LCCEI, and for this reason, I request that it be quashed and, ruling on the merits, the claim be upheld in all its extremes." Contrary to what was stated by the appellant, it is repeated, the adjudicating persons, in section X of the questioned judgment, with support, furthermore, in what was meticulously indicated in the preceding recitals, with total clarity, reproached the plaintiff for having incurred the notified unlawfulness -due to breach of the duty of probity and the internal control regime-, specifically, the conduct provided in subsection d) of precept 38 of Law no. 8422, which, it is insisted, was not subject to challenge by the contesting party. Ergo, what is indicated is futile for the purpose of modifying what was resolved.

XXIV.In the sixth and last attack against the questioned judgment for violation of substantive norms, page 19, the appellant objected to what was resolved regarding the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero not being responsible. The Court concluded that no responsibility is attributable to him because the presuppositions of Article 199 of the LGAP were not met, which he does not share. Subsection 1) of that numeral, he indicated, attributes personal responsibility to the official who acts with malice (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this litigation (lite), he added, he acted with malice, because, from the start of the sanctioning procedure, he knew that the Executive Presidents who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the additional salaries (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single block of their partial benefits). However, he added, he did not charge them, nor those favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal). He limited himself to questioning the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that she had limited herself to signing the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies. The Court, he asserted, performed a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of that norm, by considering that, in the case, the co-defendant did not incur manifest illegality because he did not depart from opinions or advisory opinions. However, he pointed out, it ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality. He reproduced, as relevant, that norm. It leaves the list of circumstances of illegality open. In this case, he noted, his principal indicated, in the administrative procedure, having limited himself to complying with superior orders, requesting the inclusion in the litigation (integración de la litis) of those who issued them. Yet, it was emphatically rejected by the co-defendant without valid legal reason, with personal responsibility for those decisions. Articles 108 and 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, he argued, establish the cases for the civil, administrative, and criminal liability of public servants subject to those norms, as is the case of the co-defendant. In subsection e) of numeral 110, he alleged, the actions leading to that responsibility are established. He reproduced that provision. It is clear, he commented, that the co-defendant used his position and public resources for purposes other than those intended by law. If what he sought was the real truth of the facts and to determine civil and administrative responsibilities, he had the obligation to bring into the procedure all who participated in the conduct. However, he insists, he limited himself to charging the plaintiff with acts ordered by her peers, with an evident deviation of power and resources towards personal ends prohibited by the transcribed rule. For the foregoing reasons, and given the non-application of Article 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, he concluded, the ruling typified what is provided in Article 138, subsection c). Therefore, he requested it be quashed with the legal consequences.

XXV.In the present ground for disagreement, the appellant again alleges different hypotheses, but due to the way it was structured, they are inseparable. In this sense, on page 19 he stated: "In the case at hand (sublite), the co-defendant Rodríguez Solís [sic] acted with malice because from the start of the sanctioning procedure he knew that [sic] the executive presidents [sic] who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the additional salaries (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single block of their partial benefits) and yet, he did not charge them, nor those favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal), limiting himself to charging the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that this official had limited herself to signing [sic] the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies." (The underline is supplied). The factual circumstance that the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero acted with "malicious political calculation" was not proven by the adjudicating persons. Hence, if it occurred, it would originate a defect due to breach of substantive norms, for indirect violation of law (subsection a) of precept 138 of the CPCA). However, the appellant did not indicate with which means of conviction his statement is proven. On the other hand, he also alleged improper interpretation of canon 199, subsection 3) of the LGAP, which would originate the cassation ground provided in subsection c) ibid; that is, direct violation of law. Likewise, he invoked, as determined from what was set forth on page 20, the direct violation of precept 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (subsection c) ibid), for not having included in the litigation (integrado la litis) (in the disciplinary administrative process) all those who participated in the questioned conduct. The manifested ambiguity, it is reiterated, violates the technique of cassation.

XXVI.Without prejudice to what is set forth in the preceding recital and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. First.

In section XIII of the challenged judgment, entitled "Regarding the liability of the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero," the adjudicators, in what is relevant, stated: "[…] *In this sense, from the analysis of the allegations in which the claimant seeks liability against the co-defendant, it is evident that it is contingent upon the final decision adopted within the disciplinary procedure followed against him being invalid. However, in what has been challenged, that specific conduct does not present the deficiencies attributed to it, which is why the criterion of manifest illegality in question is not present. Thus, the liability attributed to Mr. Rodríguez Barquero is unfounded due to the lack of the basic criterion on which that framework of disciplinary referability would be based. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim in that regard must be ordered.*" (The underlining is supplied). As is easily determined, the cassation appellant made an argument completely divorced from the challenged judgment. He did not object to what the Court indicated in order to dismiss said liability of the co-defendant. He merely stated: "*The Court makes a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of Article 199 by considering that in this case the co-defendant did not incur in manifest illegality because he did not depart from expert reports or advisory opinions, however, it ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality, because the norm expressly indicates: […] leaving the list of possible illegalities open.*" (The underlining is supplied). This is unrelated to what was indicated by the Court, that is, that no liability lies against the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero because the final act is valid. Therefore, what was stated in the grievance under study is futile for the purpose of overturning the decision.

**XXVII. Second.** The argument put forth by the appellant in the censure under study, concerning the failure to integrate the administrative process with all those who participated in the challenged conduct, in order to attribute liability to the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, was not timely proposed or debated in this process. It should be noted that the Court was emphatic in indicating that, after analyzing the allegations made by the plaintiff to claim that liability, it is determined that it is contingent solely upon the final decision, adopted within the administrative disciplinary procedure followed against him, being invalid, which it was not. This is corroborated by what was stated in the claim, image 2 of the virtual judicial file: "*The personal liability of the defendant Rodríguez Barquero arises from the provisions of Article 199, subsection 3) of the LEGAP, because he departed from the criterion of the directing body composed of legal specialists, without any legally valid justification, furthermore, that liability was extended to the fact that in the motion for reversal or reconsideration, the legal defects of the resolution were pointedly indicated to him, and he likewise maintained the sanction, through a failure to resolve, which according to Article 329.2 in relation to Article 211 of the LEGAP, is deemed a serious failure of service and, therefore, of a personal nature.*" Ergo, what is being pointed out now, in cassation, being novel, cannot be the subject of analysis by this Chamber.

**XXVIII. APPEAL OF THE ATTORNEY OF INDER.** In the sole grievance, the appellant announced that he would file it for breach of substantive norms, according to the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. There exists, he indicated, an incorrect interpretation of the legal norm. The Court, he noted, upon hearing and deciding on the procedural costs, considered that the plaintiff had sufficient reason to litigate, since the investigating body of the procedure issued an expert report proposing to relieve her of all liability in the disciplinary cause brought against her. In that sense, he said, it considered that this circumstance granted her an "objective reason" (*razón objetiva*) to try to rebut the final decision that imposed the decreed sanction of suspension. Consequently, it decided without a ruling on costs. The judgment, he asserted, incorrectly applied precept 193 subsection b) of the CPCA and, as such, gave an incorrect interpretation to the legal norm. The exemption of costs in favor of the plaintiff is not appropriate, he said, applying subsection b) of Article 193. He reproduced said precept. He transcribed, from the Regulation of the Labor Relations Unit and the Labor Relations Board of INDER, numerals 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33, and 53. What occurred in this sanctioning administrative procedure, he added, was in compliance with said internal regulations. All these procedures, in the case of INDER, must always go through the review and approval of the Labor Relations Board. Thus, even though the concluding report of the procedure's directing body was concluded in time, it had to be referred, for its evaluation, to the Labor Relations Board. This is reflected in folio 287 of the main file - no. URL-002-2015-. This Board, in turn, referred it to the decision-making body. The issuance of the final act occurred on April 28, 2017, and it was notified that same day to the plaintiff. He conducted a theoretical analysis on the reasoning or statement of reasons for the final act of the procedure in general; then, he referred to said formal requirement in the act issued in the procedure against the plaintiff. He emphasized, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 136 subsection c) of the LGAP, said statement of reasons allowed the decision to be supported against the recommendation report issued by the investigating body and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board. Both criteria of a non-binding nature according to precept 303 ibidem. The investigating body of the procedure issued an expert report proposing to relieve the plaintiff here of all liability in the disciplinary cause brought against her; but that, he pointed out, does not constitute an "objective reason" (*razón objetiva*). On the contrary, in a subjective reasoning, by which it can be justified that the plaintiff had sufficient volitional elements to try to rebut the final decision adopted, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with the considerations and development of the final act compared to the recommendations issued by the directing body (investigator of all preparatory acts leading to the issuance of the final act). But this, he added, does not imply that such an assessment becomes an objective value judgment sufficient for the adjudicator to equate it to a sufficient reason to litigate and, therefore, an exemption from the payment of procedural costs as legally corresponds. Likewise, he referred to the differences and competencies of the directing and decision-making bodies within the administrative process. He indicated that the error of the Court was having unduly interpreted a legal norm (193 subsection b of the CPCA) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate. The reason why it decided that the plaintiff should be exempted from costs was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against INDER, due to the fact that the recommendation issued by the directing body was favorable to her. However, he argued, that is not the appropriate act for declaring rights in favor of the administered parties, which is why the Court violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law: principles of legality, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality, by valuing said "objective reason to litigate" as having merit. In his view, there is an improper application of the legal norm, since the reasons for which the adjudicator decides that the plaintiff should be exempted from costs do not exist. Consequently, he requested the challenged judgment be revoked regarding the exemption of the plaintiff from the payment of costs. He requested that this duty be imposed on her, with the recognition of interest and indexation in favor of his client.

Pursuant to numerals 119, 138(c), and 193 of the CPCA, it concluded that there is no exemption from the payment of costs against the losing plaintiff, and therefore she must be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding.

**XXIX.** On folio 1 verso of the case file, the appellant stated: "*The resolution incorrectly applied article 193(b) of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code and thereby gave it an improper interpretation of the legal norm.* *In this case, the ground under subsection (c) of article 138 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code is present.*" (The underlining is not from the original). That is to say, the cassation appellant announced that he was filing the objection for direct violation of law. He reiterated this on folio 8, when he indicated: "*Therefore, in this representation's view, there is an improper application of the legal norm, because the reasons for which the judge decided that the plaintiff should be exonerated from costs do not exist, therefore,* [sic] *for which it is respectfully requested that Resolution No. 095-2019-VI issued by the Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Tribunal, regarding the exoneration of the plaintiff from the payment of costs, be revoked and that it be rectified, and the plaintiff be ordered to pay personal costs, procedural costs, interest, and indexation in favor of INDER.* / *Therefore, pursuant to numerals 119 and 138(c), 193, and following and concordant articles of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, this representation considers that there is no exemption from the payment of costs against the losing plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff must be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding.*" (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). However, on that same folio 8, the appellant pointed out: "*Having said the above, it must be indicated that the Tribunal's error was having improperly interpreted a legal norm (art. 193(b)) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate, because it considered that the reason why it decided that the plaintiff should be exonerated from costs (without special order as to costs), was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against INDER, based on the recommendation issued by the directing body being favorable to her, this not being the appropriate act for the declaration of rights in favor of the Administrated Parties, so the Tribunal in the appealed resolution violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law, the Principle of Legality, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality, by assessing said "objective reason to litigate" as meritorious*". (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). Now, the appellant alleged the cassation ground for breach of substantive norms, provided for in subsection (d) of precept 138 of the CPCA: "*When the judgment violates the norms or principles of Constitutional law, among others, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality.*" The confusion made evident, as has been indicated, contravenes the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds for the appeal must be stated clearly and precisely (numeral 139(3) of the CPCA).

**XXX.** Notwithstanding the foregoing in the preceding whereas clause, and for the sake of further expanding on the reasoning, the following must be noted. The Tribunal, in Whereas Clause XVI of the challenged judgment, stated: "***Costs.** *In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the defeated party by the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this order is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party.* *In the instant case, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff has had sufficient reason to litigate, inasmuch as the instructing body of the procedure issued an opinion proposing to relieve her of all responsibility in the disciplinary cause brought against her. In that sense, it is this Chamber's consideration that this circumstance grants her an objective reason to try to refute the final decision that imposed the decreed suspension sanction.* *Therefore, it is resolved without special order as to costs.*" (The underlining is supplied). This Chamber shares the decision of the judges, in accordance with the reasons set forth below. Precept 193(b) of the CPCA provides: "*In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, the defeated party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs, a pronouncement which must be made ex officio.* *Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defeated party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when:* […] ***b)*** *Due to the nature of the debated issues there existed, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate.*" (The underlining is supplied). In administrative contentious proceedings, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated that, in accordance with said canon -193 of the CPCA-, the pronouncement on the costs of the proceeding must be made ex officio, ordering the defeated party to pay them. Consequently, the order is imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. That is, for losing the litigation, without this meaning they did not have sufficient reason to litigate or that they are considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant. For its part, said numeral provides the circumstances under which they may be exempted from their payment. In this regard, although it is a discretionary power, the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, since both in its exercise and in its non-application, a violation of law may occur and, to that extent, the improper omission is not and must not be synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the judge themselves. Especially if it involves an empowerment granted to the judge with specific circumstances that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this particular point, it is considered that the mere application of the general rule of article 193 of the CPCA (order for the defeated party to pay both costs) does not close the door to the cassation appeal, because, on the contrary, the matter is admissible for examination on the merits (provided the legal requirements are met) in the event of a potential omission defect in the application of the legal provisions authorizing the exoneration of said costs. Therefore, according to the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In the specific case, the cassation appellant challenges the exoneration from the payment of costs, alleging improper application or interpretation of subsection (b) of said precept. That provision, as has been resolved, does not enable the exemption in case of proper procedural conduct; but rather because the nature of what was claimed allows one to conclude that, in the Tribunal's judgment, the debate was necessary to elucidate whom the Legal System favored. In the specific case under examination, it must be noted, without disregarding the legal nature of the report or recommendation from the directing body of the administrative procedure, like the judges, this Chamber considers that the existence of that opinion from the directing or instructing body (issued by two INDER professionals) recommending exoneration of the plaintiff from responsibility, determines or entails that the debate was necessary to elucidate whether or not the plaintiff was right.

Consequently, the adjudicating persons did not incur the legal violations alleged by the appellant.

**XXXI.** By virtue of the reasons stated, given the evident failure to systematically and specifically challenge the grounds of the appealed decision, not with simple and general disagreements of opinion, this Chamber determines that the filed appeals are insufficient to generate a review of the contested judgment at this venue, as they lack juridical substantiation, and their outright rejection is therefore imposed (subsection c) of Article 140 of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The filed appeals are rejected outright.

**Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jessica Jiménez Ramírez** Thus, the legally required legal reasoning (fundamentación) can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, interwoven or concatenated with one another and reasonably linked in a dual perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or, as the case may be, a single one of them) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the claims made, but, generally, they do not constitute their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated in interpreting the referenced Article 139, “a minimum legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica) is required ... the reasons on which the motion is based must be explained, challenging the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that provides support” (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, at 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). The reasoning is, therefore, alien to the confused deployment of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions about the appropriateness or justice of the case, or else, to the recounting of the errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks “complete legal reasoning (total fundamentación jurídica)”, and therefore, fails to meet the requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of Article 140, subsection c) of the same referenced Code. Likewise, this Chamber, repeatedly, has indicated that for an appeal to pass the admission control, in addition to a sufficient exposition of grounds, the corresponding mention of and link to the questioned judgment of the applicable norms deemed violated is required. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, resolutions of this Chamber numbers 927-A-S1-2018 of 11 hours 25 minutes of October 25, 2018, and 2525-A-S1-2020 of 11 hours 10 minutes of November 10, 2020." **VIII.** **Fourth.** The appellant also invoked the procedural defect provided for in subsection 1) point d) of the indicated canon: failure to state reasons (falta de motivación). Both the First Chamber and this Tribunal have indicated that this arises when the reasoning of the decision is silent, either because it does not exist, or else, because its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasonings that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the resolution, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, specifically, that of due process. It is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims brought into the process; but, on the contrary, that the judgment contains the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was made.

Likewise, it must be borne in mind that this is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it pertains to potential non-compliance with the adjective provisions that regulate the procedural path or the decision, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial proceeding and from which rights and obligations derive. It should not be confused with a mechanism to enter into a discussion of the application of the Law or the assessment of the evidence carried out by the adjudicator in the recitals (considerandos) of the decision, for which the Code of Procedure establishes autonomous grounds (Article 138 ibid), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the judgments of the First Chamber numbers 1277-F-S1-2019 of 14 hours 40 minutes on July 18, 2019, and 2521-F-S1-2020 of 10 hours 50 minutes on November 10, 2020. In light of what is set forth in section VI, point two of this decision, in which what was considered by the adjudicators in section VII of the contested judgment regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) was transcribed, where relevant, this Chamber determines, contrary to what is alleged by the appellant, that the adjudicators provided the reasons why, in this dispute, the five-year period provided for in the LOCGR was not met. Corollary, the reasoning in the contested decision is not an omission; it exists. Nor is its development confusing or contradictory. On the contrary, it is clear with respect to the reasoning provided to adopt the decision set forth therein. Ergo, it has the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Consequently, this cassation ground is not configured either." Regarding this matter, this Chamber has declared the following: "On this subject, the Chamber has maintained the criterion that a correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process (debido proceso) requires admitting that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes indispensable to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries, since the Administration—before opening the administrative file (expediente administrativo)—may require the conduct of a prior investigation, by means of which it is possible not only to individualize the possible person responsible for the fault being investigated, but also to determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure, if there is merit to do so. The prototypical case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is taken during the preliminary investigation. Such evidence taken in this manner cannot be used during the procedure itself, given that for its procurement the participation of the investigated person was not provided, and therefore, that person would have been left defenseless. Likewise, if it concerns evidence that by its nature is definitive and irreproducible, undoubtedly it is useless for the purposes of grounding the final act, if for its taking the affected person has not been provided due process and the right of defense as legally corresponds; however, if it is understood that these are preliminary acts to determine the pertinence or not of subsequently opening an administrative file against a public servant, this Chamber has stated that in its collection the Administration may or may not have the investigated person as a party. The foregoing thus constitutes a power of the competent administrative body (órgano), in order to determine whether there is merit or not to initiate a proceeding aimed at ascertaining the real truth of the facts under investigation, and it is when the procedure itself has been opened, with the formation of the Directing Body (Órgano Director), that the opportune procedural moment arises in which the investigated public servant can indeed make statements regarding the charges attributed to him and, consequently, have access to the pieces of the file that interest him, as well as be assisted by a lawyer and be able to witness the taking of testimonial evidence and any other evidence that is ordered and in respect of which he can exercise his right of defense." In this understanding, the appellant's assertions regarding the violation of due process and the right of defense in acts carried out during the preliminary phase of the investigation, which was opened as a result of complaints filed [sic] by several patients against him, are not admissible, since within that phase one cannot speak of the existence of a due process proper nor is the concurrence of the elements indicated supra as constitutive of his right of defense necessary." (Resolution 2003-09125 of nine hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-ninth of August, two thousand three). In this same sense, this Chamber considers that in the case in question, the alleged violations correspond to the preliminary investigation phase, given that a proceeding against the appellant has not yet been initiated. As a consequence, the Chamber considers that the refusal to facilitate access to the file at this stage to the protected party or the lack of hearings has not caused injury to the constitutional right of defense or to the principle of due process (see in the same sense resolution No. 2010009906 of fourteen hours and thirty-eight minutes on the ninth of June, two thousand ten). Thus, the amparo is resolved as inadmissible, as indicated in the operative part of this resolution." (The underlining is supplied. In the same sense, see ruling of that Chamber no. 2020017654 of 9 hours 20 minutes on September 18, 2020). For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "III.- […] Regarding the subject under study, the preliminary investigation to determine administrative sanctioning proceedings is a discretionary task of the administration, to identify presumed irregular acts, eventual responsible parties and, additionally [sic], relevant evidentiary elements, with which they issue a recommendation; in order to verify the viability of an infraction that warrants conducting a proceeding to determine or not its existence. In the opinion of this Chamber, the preparatory act carried out in report no. OD 04-2008 of the Directing Body, which required evidence, documentation, intervened the Cooperative's offices and issued criteria, in the preliminary investigation, are legitimate material actions, since the task of gathering evidence and issuing recommendations is a discretionary power, used to define the appropriateness or not of a sanctioning proceeding." (The underlining is supplied. Judgment no. 1101-F-S1-2011 of 10 hours 15 minutes on September 8, 2011. In the same sense, see, mutatis mutandis, the resolution of that Chamber no.

"VII. Third. As indicated, the appellant first alleged the procedural ground provided for in subsection 1), point c) of numeral 137 of the CPCA. In this regard, this Chamber has pointed out that one of the essential elements of any judgment is the determination of the factual findings (cuadro fáctico) that can be inferred from the evidentiary elements incorporated into the process, based on the assessment carried out by the judges according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) (article 82 of the CPCA), and in consideration of the legal rules applicable to the specific case, since these allow establishing which facts acquire legal relevance (on this aspect, see judgment no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on February 8, 2018; as well as resolution no. 7-A-TC-2017 of 11 hours on January 26, 2017). It is clear, then, that the establishment of these factual circumstances based on the evidence is one of the fundamental aspects of the judgment, insofar as the resolution of the dispute depends on it. It is for this reason that this intellectual task developed by the judging persons in relation to the facts of the case is capable of being reviewed from different perspectives in cassation, which, moreover, must not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may be due to substantive aspects, when the factual findings that the Tribunal considered proven do not conform to the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, provided for in article 138 CPCA), or, to procedural errors, whether for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means illegally introduced into the process, or due to a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Tribunal, in establishing the relevant factual findings for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of the factual situation it intends to make explicit, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of the assessment carried out by the judges during deliberation. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to ensure that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process have proceeded through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgments have been issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable procedural rules. Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the determination of the facts made is consistent with the evidence or not exceeds the specific scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. In this regard, see, among many others, the aforementioned judgment of this Chamber no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on February 8, 2018. This is not the scenario in this dispute.

The facts that the Court considered proven are not confusing or contradictory to one another. Moreover, in section V of this resolution, the reasons were given as to why official letters numbers DA-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 are not illegitimate nor were they illegally introduced into the proceeding. Ergo, this ground due to the alleged breach of procedural rules is not established." **XI. Third.** This Chamber agrees with the statement made by the Court, in the sense that the facts imputed to the plaintiff relate to the matter of the public treasury (hacienda pública), because it refers to conduct that involved the disposition of salary-related expenditures covered with public resources, their illegality having been determined. The position is also shared that the conduct under investigation and, therefore, the purpose of the administrative procedure, constitute actions antagonistic to both the internal control regime and the duty of probity. Regarding this second aspect, because, ultimately, through the conduct imputed to the plaintiff, we are faced with conduct that conflicts with the proper exercise of the powers granted to her and with inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública), such that the public interest was not satisfied. In this sense, Executive Decree No.

32333 of April 12, 2005, "Reglamento a la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", in Article 1, Definitions, in pertinent part, states: "14) Duty of probity (Deber de probidad): Obligation of the public official to orient his or her management toward the satisfaction of the public interest (interés público), which is expressed, fundamentally, in the following actions: / a) Identify and attend to priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under conditions of equality for the inhabitants of the Republic; / b) Demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law; c) Ensure that the decisions adopted in the performance of his or her duties conform to impartiality and the objectives of the institution in which he or she serves; / d) Administer public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily; / e) Reject gifts, presents, prizes, rewards, or any other emolument, honorarium, stipend, salary, or benefit from natural or legal persons, national or foreign, by reason of the performance of his or her duties or on the occasion thereof, within the country or abroad; except in cases permitted by Law; / f) Refrain from hearing and deciding a matter when the same grounds for disqualification and recusal (impedimento y recusación) established in the Ley Orgánica de Poder Judicial, in the Código Procesal Civil, and in other laws exist; / g) Orient his or her administrative activity toward satisfying primarily the public interest (interés público)." (The underlined text is supplied).

The plaintiff was reproached for having acted negligently in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her as Human Resources Coordinator; furthermore, as already indicated, her objectionable conduct resulted in the mismanagement of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública). Hence, indeed, as the adjudicators indicated, the alleged conduct is antithetical to the duty of probity. Similarly, it contrasts with the internal control framework. In this regard, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, states, as relevant: "**Article 7.***- Obligation to have an internal control system. The entities and bodies subject to this Law shall have internal control systems, which must be applicable, complete, reasonable, integrated, and congruent with their institutional powers and duties.*" Furthermore, they must provide assurance in the fulfillment of those powers and competencies; all in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 3 of this Law. […] **Article 12**.- **Duties of the head official and of subordinate officials in the internal control system**. Regarding internal control, the head official and the subordinate officials shall be responsible for complying, among others, with the following duties: / a) Ensure the proper development of the activity of the entity or body under their charge. / b) Immediately take corrective measures in the face of any evidence of deviations or irregularities. / c) Immediately analyze and implement the observations, recommendations, and provisions made by the internal audit (auditoría interna), the Contraloría General de la República, the external audit (auditoría externa), and the other corresponding control and oversight institutions. / d) Ensure that the internal control systems meet at least the characteristics defined in Article 7 of this Law. / e) Submit an end-of-term report (informe de fin de gestión) and formally transfer the entity or body to their successor, in accordance with the directives issued by the Contraloría General de la República and by the competent entities and bodies of the active administration. / **Article 13**.- **Control environment.** Regarding the control environment (ambiente de control), the duties of the head official and of the subordinate officials shall be, among others, the following: / a) Maintain and demonstrate integrity and ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as contribute through their leadership and actions to promoting them in the rest of the organization, for effective compliance by the other officials. / b) Develop and maintain a philosophy and a management style that allow for administering a determined level of risk, oriented toward achieving results and measuring performance (medición del desempeño), and that promote an open attitude toward mechanisms and processes that improve the internal control system. / c) Evaluate the functioning of the institution’s organizational structure and take the pertinent measures to guarantee the fulfillment of institutional purposes; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / d) Clearly establish lines of authority, assign the authority and responsibility of officials, and provide adequate communication channels so that processes are carried out; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / e) Establish appropriate human resources management policies and practices, mainly regarding hiring, onboarding, training, evaluation, promotion, and disciplinary actions; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical framework. / Article 14.- Risk assessment.

Regarding risk assessment, the duties of the head of the entity and subordinate titleholders shall include, among others, the following: / a) Identify and analyze the relevant risks associated with the achievement of institutional objectives and goals, defined both in the annual operative plans and in the medium- and long-term plans. / b) Analyze the possible effect of the identified risks, their importance and the probability of their occurrence, and decide the actions that will be taken to manage them. / c) Adopt the necessary measures for the proper functioning of the risk assessment system and to place it at least at an acceptable organizational risk level. / d) Establish the operative mechanisms that minimize the risk in the actions to be executed." (The underlining is not from the original). In this process, it is clear that the signing of personnel actions, through which, unduly, additional salaries were granted by downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), contravenes the internal control systems. So much so that, as indicated, in the final act as well as in the challenged judgment (Considerando X), it was determined that the unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) imputed to the plaintiff is specified in what is set forth, among others, in precept 38, subsection d) of the LCCEI, which states: "Weakens the internal control of the organization or omits the necessary actions for its design, implementation or evaluation, in accordance with the applicable technical regulations." Hence, on the matter of the statute of limitations (prescripción), the applicable norm is that contained in precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which indicates: "Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of 7 September 1994." In turn, article 43 of Law No.

8292, states: "**Article 43.- Statute of limitations for administrative liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa).** The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law shall be subject to a statute of limitations (prescribirá) pursuant to Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to be time-barred, without justified cause." For its part, canon 71 of the LOCGR, prescribes: "**Article 71.- Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria).** The administrative liability of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight regulations shall be subject to a statute of limitations according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. / b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an investigation or an audit to report its possible irregularity—liability shall be time-barred in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. / The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act that orders the initiation of the administrative procedure. / When the author of the fault is the head, the term shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to be time-barred, without justified cause. / (Thus amended by subsection a) of Article 45 of the Internal Control Law (Ley de Control Interno), No. 8292 of July 31, 2002)". (The underlining is supplied).

In light of the provisions of this rule, the prescriptive period, unlike what was indicated by the appellant and, as the Court correctly pointed out, began to run when the result of the preliminary investigation was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency, that is, on March 16, 2016, the five-year prescriptive period not having elapsed, as outlined in Considerando VI of this resolution. A calculation that this Court, according to the merits of the case file, endorses." **XVIII.** Without prejudice to the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. The judges, in Considerandos IX and X of the challenged judgment, as relevant, indicated: "**IX.- Analysis of the defenses relating to the duty of obedience of the plaintiff.** The defense formulated in this case, and on which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she limited herself to complying with the orders issued by whoever at that time was serving as Executive President. In accordance with what has been stated, such allegation requires the analysis of the circumstances in which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience with respect to that conduct. In this case, on the date the personnel actions were issued in the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the plaintiff held the position of Coordinator of Human Resources of the defendant entity. […] Taking into account these particularities, this Court considers that the very condition of Coordinator of Human Resources places the plaintiff in the duty, or at least, in the possibility of knowing the set of background information and regulations that are inherent to the descending movements of personnel. This makes it presumed that in the face of a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions recognizing the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn of the necessary existence of the technical and legal requirements for that recognition, and, if applicable, to bring to the attention of that hierarchy the need to request the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision.

As mentioned in the Job Manual in the section indicated above, part of the plaintiff's general activities was to advise management on personnel administration (administración de personal). Hence, it follows from that profile a functional duty that required her to warn her superior that the conduct issued was not supported by the legal framework applicable to that type of personnel actions (movimientos). The claim of automatic application without any objection whatsoever of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, derived from the duty of obedience, does not entail the release from liability that is sought, when the LGAP itself indicates the cases in which the public servant (agente pública) was obliged to disobey, but furthermore when the very internal regulations and the profile of her tasks required her to be aware of the need for prior technical and/or legal analyses that would have demonstrated the pertinence, in the cases contested, of the actions ordered by her superior. In any event, even if we were to consider that it has not been proven that any of the conditions that imposed the duty to disregard the order occurred, given her knowledge and responsibilities in Human Resources Management (Gestión Humana), it was her duty to warn that in downward reassignments (reasignaciones descendentes) it was not feasible to grant the salary bonus (plus salarial) assigned in those personnel actions (acciones de personal), given the absence of technical analyses to support those decisions. This was so that the head of the agency (jerarca) could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to release her liability for the execution of those conducts. However, there is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders issued through the issuance of the respective personnel actions (acciones de personal), ultimately conferring illegitimate, illegal benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the INDER budget. By not having expressed these disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes responsibility for the indolence in the fulfillment of these legally assigned duties, which are consistent with her functions and, therefore, enforceable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the job profile (perfil de puesto) she held. / X.- Thus seen, the substantive and formal unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) is materialized in the specific regulatory provision cited to the plaintiff, specifically, section 38(d) of Law No.

8422, and the violation of the content of clause 13(c) of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the applied sanction is based on the duty to have requested the technical and legal inputs that would support the issued order and that she chose to execute it, dispensing with compliance with minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules of imputation of responsibility established by canon 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the issued act and the adopted behaviors. From that standpoint, the position of coordinator of Human Management (Gestión Humana) implies a degree of technical specialization in function of which, the plaintiff's allegation regarding the dispensation of responsibility for the simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency regarding the personnel actions that recognized a right to the payment of a salary supplement due to downward reassignment (sobresueldo por reasignación descendente), which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive requirements pertinent to the case, is not admissible. Gross negligence (culpa grave) is therefore observed in that conduct, which entails responsibility for the issuance and permissibility of acts that unduly created patrimonial rights, with the corresponding economic damage to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by compromising public funds without the due verification of conformity of the procedures (trámites) that led to the issuance of the aforementioned personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissibility to disregard the flaws that later provided the basis for the imposed sanction is observed. It is a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, to state the reasons for disagreement as a warning, so as to generate a release from responsibility. By not doing so, the factual premise (conditioning antecedent) that was notified to the plaintiff and that allows the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) is incurred. That assessment of the behavior attributable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017).

In relevant part, among the reasons given by the Executive Presidency it was stated: […] These references highlight the considerations from which the respondent entity considered that the plaintiff's conduct violated the rules of Law No. 8422, due to the omission of control regarding the due technical analyses for the granting of the downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the additional salary granted to both referred officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures inherent to her position, pertaining to personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks to the neglect of those duties and consequently the responsibility derived from those conducts. As observed, that analysis links and harmonizes with the reasoning given by this Tribunal in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the alleged inaccuracies are not observed." (The underlined is supplied). As is clearly determined, the appellant did not duly challenge the arguments or grounds put forth by the Tribunal to determine the plaintiff's liability for breach of the duty of probity and the internal control regime. As indicated in the preceding section, she limited herself to making merely argumentative allegations, divorced from the reasons set forth in the questioned judgment. Which, incidentally, this Chamber shares. It is clear, by virtue of the plaintiff's official duties as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, her duty to know and manage the regulations concerning downward personnel movements of the institution. Hence, the need to have the technical and legal prerequisites for the recognition of additional salaries in cases of downward personnel movements. Therefore, by not advising the Executive Presidency of that circumstance, she must assume responsibility, in accordance with precept 213 of the LGAP." "XXX. Notwithstanding the foregoing in the previous considerando and, for greater abundance of reasons, the following must be noted. The Tribunal, in considerando XVI of the questioned judgment, stated: "Costs. In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there was, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff has had sufficient reason to litigate, given that the investigating body of the proceeding issued an opinion proposing to release her from all liability in the disciplinary cause brought against her. In that sense, it is the consideration of this Chamber that this circumstance grants her an objective reason to attempt to refute the final decision that imposed the decreed sanction of suspension. Therefore, it is resolved without a special award of costs." (The underlined is supplied). This Chamber shares the resolution of the adjudicating persons, in accordance with the reasons set forth below.

Precept 193(b) of the CPCA provides: "In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, the losing party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a pronouncement that must be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the losing party may be exempted from paying costs, when: […] b) Due to the nature of the issues debated, there existed, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient grounds to litigate." (The underlining is supplied). In contentious-administrative proceedings, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated that, in accordance with said canon —193 of the CPCA—, the pronouncement on the costs of the proceeding must be made ex officio, ordering the losing party to pay them. Consequently, the order to pay costs is imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. That is to say, for losing the litigation, without this meaning that the party lacked sufficient grounds to litigate or is considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant. For its part, said provision sets forth the circumstances under which the party may be exempted from payment. In this regard, although it is a discretionary power, it is true that it is not immune to cassation review, since in both its exercise and its non-application, a violation of law may occur and, to that extent, the improper omission is not and must not be synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the adjudicator themselves. Especially if it involves an empowerment granted to the judge with specific assumptions that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this particular point, it is considered that the mere application of the general rule of Article 193 of the CPCA (ordering the losing party to pay both types of costs) does not close the doors to a cassation appeal, since, on the contrary, the matter is admissible for an examination on the merits (provided the legal requirements are met) in the face of a potential omission defect in the application of the legal provisions authorizing the exoneration from said costs. Therefore, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In the specific case, the cassation appellant challenges the exoneration from the payment of costs, alleging improper application or interpretation of subparagraph b) of said precept. That provision, as has been resolved, does not enable exemption in the case of proper procedural conduct; but rather because the nature of what was claimed allows it to be inferred that, in the Tribunal's judgment, the debate was necessary to elucidate what the Law provided for. In the specific case under examination, it must be noted, without disregarding the legal nature of the report or recommendation of the directing body of the administrative procedure, that, like the adjudicators, this Chamber considers that the existence of that opinion of the directing or instructing body (issued by two INDER professionals) recommending that the plaintiff be exonerated from liability, determines or entails that the debate was necessary to elucidate whether the plaintiff was in the right or not.

Therefore, the judging persons did not incur the legal violations alleged by the appellant.

**Exp. 17-004005-1027-CA** **Res. 000221-A-TC-2021** **TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA.** San José, at nine hours forty-five minutes on the twenty-eighth of October of two thousand twenty-one.

In the ordinary proceeding, declared purely a matter of law, filed by **MARLENE CHAVES MORALES**, a human resources professional, holder of identity card number 106150903, represented by her special judicial agent César Hines Céspedes, attorney, holder of identity card number 700610989; against the **INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL**, with legal entity identification number 4-000-042143-11, represented by its special judicial agent Francisco Antonio Villegas Ramírez, attorney, holder of identity card number 601610997 and **RICARDO RODRÍGUEZ BARQUERO**, a Planning professional with a Master's in Project Administration, holder of identity card number 203790749, with legal counsel initially provided by Alexánder Gómez María, attorney, holder of bar association number 18484 and, later, by his special judicial agent Bryan David Hidalgo Fallas, attorney, holder of identity card number 114100246 and bar association card 23551; both the agent of the plaintiff and of the defendant Institute filed respective cassation appeals challenging judgment number 95-2019-VI, issued by the Sixth Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda at 13 hours 50 minutes on July 31, 2019.

**Drafted by Judge Jiménez Ramírez** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.** In accordance with the facts that the lower court deemed proven and that were not challenged by the appellants, it is established that by official letter no. PE-3139-2005 of June 8, 2005, the then Executive President of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), now the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), requested the Contraloría General de la República (CGR) for a clarification regarding the situation of downward reassignment indemnities, since that comptroller body had rejected the partial indemnities applied by that entity. In official letter no. FOE-AM-0350 (8048) of July 6 of that year, the CGR indicated, in relevant part: “[…] In this regard, you are hereby informed that since the proposed equalization adjustments are a purely administrative matter and not a judicial one, as you correctly point out in cited Official Letter No. PE-3139-2005, the administrative resolution justifying each particular case must be provided, in which document the IDA administrative authorities set forth, for example, the reasons for the proposed move, the employee's situation at the time of the restructuring, and the technical justification for the official's new situation. […] In addition to the above, it is important to clarify that these expenditures must be classified and not under the sub-item of “Indemnities” since the nature of the proposed adjustment is not aimed at compensating for any harm caused by the Administration to the official. On the contrary, the intention is not to harm the employee by lowering their salary, and the sum that allows maintaining the official's working conditions must be transferred as a salary supplement under the item “Personal Services”. This salary supplement is recognized to the person and not to the position in the new organizational structure, so it must be maintained as such for as long as the official continues to provide services to that Institution”. In official letter no. PE-3804-2005 of August 22 of the same year, the IDA Executive Presidency filed a request for reconsideration of the previous official letter, in accordance with article 13 of the General Guidelines on Salary and Employment Policy for the Public Sector. By means of official letter no. FOE-AM-0525 (11668) of September 21 of the same year, as pertinent, the CGR stated: "In this regard, you are hereby informed that the payment of indemnities for downward equalizations of positions is appropriate based on subsection c) of cited article 13 if the conditions set forth in this norm are met, that is, that placing the public servant was not possible within the six months stipulated in subsection a) of this article and that the official did not accept the downward reassignment proposed by the IDA Administration. However, it is recalled that since equalization adjustments are a purely administrative and not judicial matter, the administrative resolution justifying each particular case must be provided as a requirement for budget approval. What was indicated in this regard in Official Letter No. 8048 of July 2005 issued by this Contraloría General is reiterated, to the effect that said resolution must contain a minimum of information regarding the reasons for the proposed move, the employee's situation at the time of the restructuring, and the technical justification for the official's new situation. It is clarified that the above applies to the case of officials with whom it was not possible to reach an agreement regarding their employment situation, and therefore the employment relationship must be terminated, a scenario in which such an indemnity would be appropriate. Finally, in relation to the terms of aforementioned Official Letter No. 8048, it is clarified that what was provided therein applies to the case of officials who remain in the institution because an agreement was possible regarding their employment status, in which case the payment of an indemnity is not appropriate but rather the recognition of a salary supplement for the wage difference not recognized in their new salary category". By resolution no. 2-2010 of 9 hours on February 16, 2010, the IDA Executive Presidency issued a criterion regarding the downward reassignment of Mr. Ricardo Alberto Rodríguez Bonilla. To this effect, it ordered: "POR TANTO.

[...] the provisions established by the Comptroller General's office in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 are applied, and therefore, the previously indicated salary supplement (sobresueldo) is assigned. For this purpose, the difference between the salary corresponding to the positions of REGIONAL DIRECTOR AND PROFESSIONAL E will be considered, according to the detail established by the Human Resources Department, which is [sic] and is considered an integral part of this resolution." Mr. Ricardo indicated his agreement with the content of that resolution through a written statement on the 24th, in which he indicated: "It being understood for all purposes, that the negative salary difference that would be generated by said procedure, will be applied as a salary supplement (sobresueldo)." On April 5 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department Head, held at that time by Marlene Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Rodríguez Bonilla, indicating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) of ₡645,942.00, as of February 25, 2010, due to the change of position. On that day, February 25, 2010, Mr. Ricardo and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary compensation settlement (finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial), where it was expressed, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation to his position, which implied a downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), would be paid to him as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official letter no. PE-794-2011 of May 17, 2011, the Executive Presidency indicated to Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz, Subregional Chief of Liberia: "For the management of your salary situation, the administrative precedent that originates and is based on the official letter of the Contraloría General de la República No. 11668 (FOE-AM-0525) of September 21, 2005, will be applied. As indicated by the Comptroller Office, what is appropriate in your case is the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for the salary difference not recognized in your new salary category. In this way, you will not have any detriment to your income. [...]". Said proposal was accepted by the official in a written statement on the 24th. On July 7 of that year, the Executive Presidency and the Human Resources Department Head, held at that time by Ms. Chaves Morales, issued a personnel action in favor of Mr. Novo Díaz, indicating the recognition of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for an amount of ₡322,100.50 as of the 11th day of that month and year due to the change of position. On August 17, 2011, Mr. Novo Díaz and the Executive Presidency signed a partial salary compensation settlement (finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial), where it was expressed, in the fourth clause, that the official accepted that the negative salary difference arising from the resignation to his position, which implied a downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), would be paid to him as a salary supplement (sobresueldo). In official letter no. DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Legal Affairs Directorate of INDER analyzed the request for the preparation of a settlement for the change of position of an official of that entity. Regarding the matter of interest, it pointed out: “[…] More exactly, to apply what is indicated here [it refers to article 13 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711-H], we must be in the presence of the following circumstances: 1- That there exists a variation towards classifications of a lower salary level than the original. 2- That said variation is the product of changes in the institutional manuals. Reassignments, comprehensive studies, standardizations (homologaciones) or system conversions. As can be seen in the case brought to our attention, as well as in previous cases, although there exists a variation towards a salary classification lower than the original, the consequence of this is not the product of changes in the institutional manual, of a reassignment (there is no technical reassignment study), of a comprehensive study, of a standardization (homologación) or of a system conversion. […] Consequently, applying article 13 of the Procedure for the application of the general guidelines and regulations of salary policy, employment and job classification of the ministries, public entities and other bodies as applicable covered by the scope of the Budgetary Authority for the year 2005, in these cases, passing the salary difference between positions as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) in favor of the officials, constitutes a totally illegal act that must be corrected immediately." Consequently, it recommended carrying out a review of the cases previously approved, in order to take the corresponding corrective measures. By official letter no. A-PE-0220-2013 of February 20, 2013, from the Executive Presidency, signed by the legal advisor of that body and the then Executive President, they departed from said criterion. They indicated that, in the processes of downward reassignment (reasignación descendente), the provisions of article 101 of the Estatuto de Servicio Civil and its regulation are applicable. As a result of which, they ordered the then Coordinator of the Human Resources Department to apply the methodology indicated there. In official letter no. DFOE-EC-0417 (07581) of July 24, 2014, the CGR indicated, in response to a request for clarification made by the Internal Audit Office of said entity, regarding the procedure to follow in cases of reclassifications of positions to a lower category: "[...] In this regard, I am permitted to inform you that the cited official letters are referred to specific situations of a group of officials, therefore, what was resolved on that occasion cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." It alluded to Decreto Ejecutivo no. 37078-H, specifically, to numeral 12, a rule from which it stated that the Administration had three possible alternatives to resolve cases where position reclassifications to a lower level occurred. Through official letter no. A-ADV-076-2014 of September 16, 2014, the Internal Audit Office communicated to the Executive Presidency: "[...] In official letter ARH-073-2014, the basis for proceeding with the payment of a salary supplement (sobresueldo) is explained, and the Administration justifies it with the pronouncement of the Contraloría General de la República FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005. However, the comptroller entity [sic] with pronouncement 07581 of July 24, 2014, clarified that official letter FOE-AM-0525 of September 21, 2005, is referred to a specific situation of a group of officials and that it cannot be used as a reference to establish a generalized policy within the institution." By official letter no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the head of the Administrative Department communicated to the Executive Presidency that, through official letter A-PE-906-2014 of September 9, 2014, the Executive Presidency was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation into the payments of salary supplements (sobresueldos) made to the employee Walter Mora Leiva. In official letter no. PE-259-2015 on the 26th of that month, the Executive Presidency requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official letter DA-017-2015. Through official letter no. URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, the Labor Relations Unit issued a preliminary investigation report. It considered that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged improper granting of salary supplements (sobresueldos) in cases of downward reassignments (reasignaciones descendentes). Likewise, it stated that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was recognized the salary supplement (sobresueldo) as of July 11, 2011, through personnel action no. 3841-2011, which has been paid to him since the second half of July 2011. Furthermore, regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that salary supplement (sobresueldo) was recognized to him through personnel action no. 792-2010 as of February 25, 2010. That report indicated that, at the date of its issuance, both salary supplements (sobresueldos) were being paid. For this reason, it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request a criterion from the Legal Affairs Directorate on the pertinence of initiating another type of procedure to stop the alleged improper payments and recover the money that could have been illegally recognized as a salary supplement (sobresueldo) for downward reassignment (reasignación descendente). In official letter no. PE-505-2016 of April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of INDER appointed the directing body of the procedure for the alleged improper recognition of salary supplements (sobresueldos) for downward reassignments (reasignaciones descendentes) against, among others, the official Marlene Chaves Morales.

By an act at 9:00 a.m. on June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure (case file URL-002-2015) issued the statement of charges, charging Mrs. Chaves Morales with the conduct to be investigated. Likewise, with respect to the relevant matter, it was stated: "With the described actions in facts 1 and 2 set forth above, the official Marlene Chaves Morales may have satisfied a private interest over the public interest by allegedly executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the downgrading reassignment procedure (procedimiento de reasignación descendente) provided in Article 13 of the Procedure for the application of general directives and regulations on salary policy, employment, and job classification of ministries [sic], public entities, and other bodies, as applicable, covered by the scope of the Budgetary Authority (Autoridad Presupuestaria) contained in Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004, and Mrs. Chaves Morales may have contravened, with the described conduct, Articles 3, 4 (duty of probity) and 38 subsection b) of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment No. 8422. [...]". Reference was made to canons 11 of the Political Constitution; 11 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP); 3, 4, 38 of Law No. 8422; as well as precept 13 of Decree No. 31711. Also, she was advised of the possible consequences of the procedure regarding the potential disciplinary sanctions to be imposed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. The oral and private hearing was held on September 14, 2016. In an act at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the directing body issued conclusions report No. 23-2016. It recommended exonerating the investigated party, Marlene Chaves Morales, considering that there was no liability for the charged actions. By official letter No. URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, the directing body referred the disciplinary case file to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) for its consideration. In minutes No. 2-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the INDER Labor Relations Board, disciplinary procedure case file No. URL-0002-2015 was considered. In the agreement adopted in Article IV, it was resolved, unanimously, to depart from the recommendation of the directing body. This, because there is no evidence in the case file that the two investigated officials availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 and following of the LGAP, alleging the duty of obedience. Therefore, it indicated, it will be up to the Executive Presidency (Presidencia Ejecutiva) or the Senior Administration (Administración Superior) to establish, under the LGAP—Article 213—and canons 3, 38 and 39 of the Law on Illicit Enrichment, the quantum of the sanction. It recommended, prior to establishing it, that the Administration request the Administrative Department to proceed to quantify the amount that has been improperly disbursed by the Administration by having approved those additional salary (sobresueldo) payments. Together with official letter No. RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017, the Labor Relations Board referred administrative case file URL-002-2015 to the Executive Presidency, for the purpose of issuing the final act. By resolution No. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the then Executive President of INDER, Master Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero, issued the final act. It ordered: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 192 of the Political Constitution, numeral 26 subsection j) of Law No. 9036 which transforms the Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA) into the Institute of Rural Development (INDER) and creates the Technical Secretariat for Rural Development, Articles 3, 4, 38 subsection d) of the [sic] Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service, 11, 210 subsection 1), 113, 211, and related articles of the General Law of Public Administration, 2 of the Regulation of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service, 71 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Article 111 subsection d) of the Regulation to the Civil Service Statute and Article 13 subsection c) of the General Guidelines on Salary and Employment Policy for the Public Sector, this Deciding Body (Órgano Decisor) resolves to partially accept the recommendations of the Instructing Body (Órgano Instructor) and consequently declares [...] Marlene Chaves Morales [...] responsible for the very serious fault (falta gravísima), so classified by this Administrative Authority, for the attributed charge of Irregular recognition of Additional Salary payments, lack of oversight and violation of the duty of probity. By reason of the foregoing and given the evident breach of the duty of probity and of the principles of efficacy and efficiency of the public service, it is resolved to apply to the defendant the disciplinary sanction of one month of suspension without pay, which is effective from May 15, 2017, until June 15, 2017. [...] It is ordered to certify pieces for the Prosecution Office (Fiscalía) of the Public Ministry of the Second Judicial Circuit of Goicoechea, so that the irregular conduct ventilated herein may be investigated. [...]". This act was communicated to Mrs. Marlene on April 28, 2017. In a writing of May 2 of that year, Mrs. Chaves Morales filed a reconsideration appeal (recurso de reposición), which, by resolution No. 41-2017 at 2:00 p.m. on the 9th of the following month, was rejected by the Executive Presidency of INDER, an act communicated that same day.

II.On June 15, 2017, the special judicial representative of Mrs. Chaves Morales filed the present proceeding for declaratory relief against INDER and Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero. He requested, according to the adjustment made at the preliminary hearing held on February 20, 2018: 1) that the absolute nullity of resolution No. 37-2012 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, be declared; 2) that the defendants be ordered to fully reinstate to his client the salary that was deducted from her on the occasion of the sanction imposed and executed; 3) as a consequence of the absolute nullity of that resolution, that the co-defendants be joint and severally ordered to pay damages and losses, for which he indicated: a) reason that originates them: the opening, development and sanctioning of an administrative sanctioning procedure, "extinguished" (fenecido) from its origin, which subjected the plaintiff, first, to a process of anguish and unease affecting her moral heritage, which she had no duty to suffer because the actions charged to her at the time were in accordance with the orders issued by the highest body in the administrative hierarchy; furthermore, she had to bear a financial burden to defend herself in a cause that should never have come into legal existence, to which is added the loss of her income for one month, required for the support of her family; b) those damages consist of the loss of tranquility and the "manhandling" of her dignity, by charging her, as an irregularity, with legally valid conduct that was, moreover, mandatory to perform, marking her as an incompetent official.

Hence, the dual dimension of the harm, moral (daño moral) and material, the former due to the diminution and decline in her personal value and, the latter, due to the loss of her income by way of salary for an entire month, as well as the disbursement she had to cover to exercise her defense, without having the duty to bear either; c) she estimated the non-pecuniary damage (daño moral), prudentially, at ₡5,000,000.00 and, the pecuniary damage, at ₡3,000,000.00; 4) likewise, she requested ₡1,000,000.00, paid for professional fees for her defense; 5) on all sums to which they are condemned, she requested the recognition of interest, calculated from the moment of disbursement, in the case of the attorney's fees and the salary deduction; and, from the final judgment (sentencia firme), on the other economic condemnations; 6) she also requested that they be condemned to pay the costs of the proceeding (costas del proceso); 7) lastly, she required the payment of interest on the costs from the finality of the ruling and until its effective payment. Both co-defendants, in separate briefs, opposed. The attorney-in-fact for INDER raised the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) and Mr. Rodríguez Barquero, in addition to the aforementioned, raised that of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva). By order (auto) of 1:36 p.m. on November 29, 2017, considering that Mr. Ricardo did not comply with the warning (prevención) issued by order of 9:04 a.m. on October 24, 2017, the complaint was deemed affirmatively answered with respect to the facts marked with numbers 6, 11, 12, 13, 16, and 19. Similarly, in the session of the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) indicated above, this lite was declared a pure legal proceeding (proceso de puro derecho), with the parties rendering their conclusions orally. The Court, in its judgment (sentencia), rejected the objection (excepción) of lack of passive standing. It upheld that of lack of right. Consequently, it dismissed the complaint filed. It ruled without condemnation in costs (costas). Dissatisfied, both the representative of the plaintiff and of INDER filed respective cassation appeals (recursos de casación).

III.APPEAL OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF THE PLAINTIFF PARTY. VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL RULES. In the sole ground of disagreement formulated for this cassation reason, folio 11 of the cassation file, the appellant announced he would file it based on the cause provided in subsection c) of canon 137 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA): "Lack of clear and precise determination, in the judgment, of the facts accredited by the Court or for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding." To this effect, he stated, in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16 of the questioned judgment, the Court entered, as part of the factual framework, situations extraneous to the facts imputed to his principal and those claimed by her as violating her rights. He summarized it as follows: 1) the plaintiff claimed the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power because, even with the erroneous application of numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, LOCGR), since five years had already elapsed counted from the date she signed the first personnel action -that of Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010-; also, number 3841-2011, in favor of Ronaldo Novo Díaz (Considering XV, final part). The sanctioning proceeding began in 2016, six years later for the first; and five years and six months later for the second; 2) the Court rejected the claim of statute of limitations of the sanctioning power, by pointing out, in proven fact no. 15, that through official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Directorate of Legal Affairs communicated to the Executive President the ordering of a preliminary investigation for over-salary payments in favor of Walter Mora Leiva. However, the case of that official was not imputed to the plaintiff in the sanctioning proceeding, so it was not subject to examination. Consequently, being a situation totally extraneous to the plaintiff, it is incapable of producing interruptive effects on the statute of limitations; 3) likewise, he added, the Court held as proven fact no. 16) that, through official letter P.E. 259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive President ordered the preliminary investigation. However, the Court did not realize that this preliminary investigation was limited to investigating the payment of over-salaries to the official Walter Mora Leiva, as requested in official letter DA-017-2015; 4) since it was a preliminary investigation on a different matter, the preliminary investigation did not interrupt the limitation period. When resolving the requested claim of statute of limitations, he noted, based on a factual framework extraneous to the cause, being different conduct, persons, and responsible parties, the ruling incurred the cause of subsections c) and d) of article 137 ibid, for which reason he requested the judgment be quashed with the consequences of that decision. In accordance with that indicated by subsection c) of said numeral, the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Court "for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the proceeding," is a ground for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Court based itself on official letter DA-017-2015 and on official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, both from 2015 to reject the claim of statute of limitations, but it overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not imputed to the plaintiff in the administrative proceeding. Due to that confusion of the Court, he argued, the ruling curtailed her right to avail herself of the statute of limitations of the sanctioning power, in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010 and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, as six years had elapsed in the case of the first; and five years and six months for the second. The ruling also incurred a lack of motivation (falta de motivación), regarding which this Chamber, he affirmed, in multiple judgments, has indicated it occurs when there is absence or, also, when it is confusing, as in the present case, where the analysis of the timeframes to determine the statute of limitations was carried out regarding facts extraneous to the plaintiff, the cause, and the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, he concluded by requesting the judgment be quashed and, resolving on the merits, the complaint be declared admissible in all its claims.

IV.Regarding the matters discussed in the preceding section, it is necessary to indicate, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides a material order requirement necessary both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This is the motivation of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under commentary provides, the factual and legal foundation (fundamentación fáctica y jurídica) of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been held as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it concerns a problem expounded regarding the application, omission, or erroneous interpretation of any norm that makes up the legality block, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the appealed judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violation, alongside the always necessary legal reasons, factual reasons may concur, and, in that sense, the referenced foundations must be directed along both pathways, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that from the legal foundation, the indication of those canons related to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exonerated by express legal mandate. Similarly, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the jurisdictional body of the instance erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the same appealed pronouncement. And of course, it is not indispensable to cite the precepts establishing the requirements, timeframes, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. More than the citation of these latter, what is essential is that they be complied with, that they be put into practice at the time of drafting and filing the cassation. Thus, the foundation provided by law can be understood, roughly, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles, or legal rules interwoven or concatenated among themselves and reasonably linked in a dual perspective, are mentioned: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack.

To the extent that a set of legal norms is cited (or if applicable, a single one of them), pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will on occasion reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not pertain to their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated in interpreting the referenced article 139, "the appeal is required to have a minimum legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica) ... the reasons on which the action is based must be explained, challenging the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that supports it" (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). Substantiation (fundamentación) is, therefore, alien to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or, as the case may be, to the recounting of the errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal substantiation (fundamentación jurídica)," and therefore, fails to comply with the requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140 subsection c) of the same referenced Code. Likewise, this Chamber, repeatedly, has indicated that for an appeal to pass the admissibility review, it is required, in addition to a sufficient statement of grounds, the corresponding mention and linkage with the contested judgment of the applicable norms that are considered infringed. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 927-A-S1-2018 of 11 hours 25 minutes of October 25, 2018, and 2525-A-S1-2020 of 11 hours 10 minutes of November 10, 2020.

V.Regarding what has been alleged by the appellant (casacionista), the following must be pointed out. First. The appellant, on folio 12, stated: "Indeed, according to what is indicated in subsection c) the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the Court for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or those introduced illegally into the process, is a cause for invalidity of the ruling. In this case, the Court relied on official letter DA-017-2015 and official letter P.E-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, to reject the claim of prescription, but it overlooked that the request referred to Walter Mora Leiva, which was not imputed to the claimant in the administrative procedure." (The highlighting is from the original). At the preliminary hearing, held on February 20, 2018, under the point of "ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE," at minute 14:32, according to the minutes visible at images 135 to 138 of the electronic judicial case file, the procedural judge admitted the entirety of the administrative file (which consists of a folder and a disk with the recordings of the hearing at the administrative venue). Likewise, it admitted the disk with the copy of the claimant's personal file. In accordance with what is indicated in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15 and 16, official letter DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, appears on folios 2 to 4 of the administrative file and official letter no. PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, on folio 1 of that same file. Therefore, said proven facts, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant, were not based on illegitimate evidentiary means nor those introduced illegally into the process.

VI.Second. The challenger, on the same folio indicated, stated: "Due to this confusion by the Court, the ruling curtailed her right to invoke the prescription of the sanctioning power in relation to the personnel actions related to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla number 792-2010 of February 25, 2010, and Ronald Novo Diaz number 3841-2011 of June 2011, given that 6 years had passed in the case of the first and 5 years and 6 months for the second." The adjudicators, in the proven facts preceded by numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20, indicated the following: "[…] 15) By official letter DA-017-2015 dated February 20, 2015, the head of the Administrative Department communicates to the Executive Presidency that through official letter A-PE-0906-2014 of September 9, 2014, a preliminary investigation was requested from the Executive Presidency regarding the overpayments made to the employee Walter Mora Leiva. (Folios 2-4 front of the administrative file) 16) Through official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive Presidency requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding the facts mentioned in official letter DA-017-2015, indicated in the previous section. (Folio 1 of the administrative file) 17) Through official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, the preliminary investigation report was issued, in which it was considered that there was sufficient basis to initiate disciplinary actions for the alleged undue granting of overpayments in cases of downward reassignments. (Folios 118-151 of the administrative file) 18) That in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Labor Relations Unit, indicated in the previous section, it is set forth that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was recognized the overpayment from July 11, 2011, through personnel action 3841-2011, which has been paid to him since the second half of July 2011. Regarding Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, that overpayment was recognized through personnel action 792-2010 from February 25, 2010. That report indicates that, at the date of its issuance, both overpayments were being paid. For that reason, it indicated that the Executive Presidency should evaluate whether it was appropriate to request an opinion from the Legal Affairs Directorate on the pertinence of instituting another type of procedure to stop the presumed improper payments and recover the money that could have been illegally recognized as a downward reassignment overpayment. (Folios 148, 150 of the administrative file) 19) Through official letter PE-505-2016 dated April 27, 2016, the Executive Presidency of INDER designates the directing body of the procedure for the alleged undue recognition of overpayments through downward reassignments against the officials Guiselle Vargas Sánchez and Marlene Chávez Morales. (Folio 155 of the administrative file) 20) By act of 09 hours of June 24, 2016, the directing body of the procedure (file URL-002-2015) issues the statement of charges in which, the following conducts were imputed to the claimant: 'Fact No. 1: For the official Marlene Chávez Morales, acting as Coordinator of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, having supposedly carried out the personnel action dated February 25, 2010, for the position change of the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to E Professional, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes, and apparently proceeding to recognize an overpayment to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, from Regional Director to E Professional, based on resolution No. 002-2010 of nine hours of February 16, 2010, of the Executive President of IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes, and apparently proceeding to recognize an overpayment to the official Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, according to the mechanism for the application of the overpayment established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Contraloría General de la República (...) Fact No. 2: For the official Marlene Chaves Morales, as Head of the Human Resources Area of the IDA, having apparently carried out the personnel action of June 11, 2011, where the position change of Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was made, supposedly signed by Mrs. Chaves Morales (...) in which she recognizes an overpayment to the official Novo Díaz, according to the mechanism for the application of the overpayment established in official letter No. 11668 FOE-AM-0525 dated September 21, 2005, issued by the Contraloría General de la República.'

With the actions described in facts 1 and 2 set forth above, official Marlene Chaves Morales may have satisfied a private interest over the public interest by allegedly executing administrative acts in erroneous application of the downward reassignment (reasignación descendente) procedure provided for in Article 13 of the "Procedure for the Application of General Guidelines and Regulations on Salary Policy, Employment, and Position Classification of Ministries, Public Entities, and Other Bodies, as Applicable, Covered by the Scope of the Budgetary Authority," contained in Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 of March 16, 2004, and Ms. Chaves Morales, by the described conduct, may have contravened Articles 3, 4 (duty of probity (deber de probidad)), and 38, subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley contra la Corrupción e Enriquecimiento Ilícito) No. 8422. (...)." Reference was then made to ordinances 11 of the Carta Magna, 11 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), 3, 4, 38 of Law No. 8422, and precept 13 of Decree No. 31711. The possible consequences of the procedure regarding the potential disciplinary sanctions to be imposed were indicated, while the rights of the investigated party within the procedure were expressed. That act was personally notified to her on June 28, 2016. (Folios 173-188 vuelto of the administrative file) [...]. Then, in section VII of the challenged judgment, called "Analysis of the prescription (prescripción) in the specific case," regarding the matter of interest, they stated: "In that sense, the temporal margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44 ["Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública" of October 6, 2004], which refers to the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) norm established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428 ["Ley Orgánica de la CGR" of September 7, 1994]. Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is understood that, although the preparation of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary cause date from April 2010 and June 2011, the truth of the matter is that such facts were the subject of a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar), the pertinence of which is not reproached, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to in ordinance 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to numeral 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment when the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective possibility of exercising it that the cited period must begin to run. Thus, in cases such as this one where the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and gathering evidentiary indications, so as to allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges (traslado de cargos), the starting point of the prescription (prescripción) operates with the notification of the aforementioned report. From the analysis of the case file, it is understood that after that referral of the preliminary report in official letter URL-032-2016 of March 15, 2016, from the Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, by official letter PE-5050-2016 of April 27, 2016, the administrative head designated the directing body (órgano director), an instance that on June 28, 2016, issued the respective statement of charges (traslado de cargos), which was notified on that same date. Therefore, from the date when the head could validly order disciplinary actions until the moment the plaintiff was notified of the opening of the internal cause, the five-year period governing this type of conflicts had not expired. On the other hand, it is understood that by an act at 3:45 p.m. on October 14, 2016, the Directing Body (Órgano Director) rendered conclusions report No. 023-2016. By official letter URL-143-2016 of October 18, 2016, that report was sent to the Junta de Relaciones Laborales for its knowledge. In record No. 002-2017 of the session held on March 15, 2017, of the Junta de Relaciones Laborales of INDER, that body's opinion was issued, deciding to depart from the recommendation of the directing body (órgano director), because there is no evidence in the file indicating that the investigated officials, including the plaintiff, availed themselves of the procedure established in Articles 107 and following of the LGAP regarding alleging the duty of obedience. This decision was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency by official letter RL-032-2017 of March 31, 2017. Ultimately, by resolution No. 037-2017 at 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, the Executive Presidency of INDER issued the final act within administrative procedure No. URL-002-2015, an act brought to the plaintiff's attention on that same date. As INDER postulates, it is clear that the prescription (prescripción) for issuing the final act must be computed from the moment when the holder of the decision-making power is in an objective possibility of exercising it. This occurred on March 31, 2017, when the Junta de Relaciones Laborales sent the file to the Executive Presidency. Then, on April 28, 2017, the final act of the procedure was issued and communicated. Between both phases, the inertia alleged by the plaintiff is not observed, to the extent that, between the referral of the file from the Junta de Relaciones Laborales and the final decision of the cause, not even a period of one month elapsed. Therefore, the expiration of that exercise has not occurred, which means the rejection of the charge under examination." (The underlining is supplied). In the reproach under study, the appellant did not question the application of the five-year period provided for in Article 71 of the LOCGR, nor the pertinence of the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) carried out. His objection focused on the fact that, since the request made by the Head of the Administrative Department to the Executive Presidency of INDER (issued via official letter no. DA-017-2015) to initiate a preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar) was for investigating the payments of additional salary (sobresueldos) made to Mr. Walter Moral Leiva, whose case was not imputed to his representative, it had no interrupting effects on the prescription (prescripción). In this regard, it is necessary to indicate, regarding the nature and characteristics of preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares), the Sala Constitucional, in vote no. 2014001384 at 9:05 a.m. on January 1, 2014, stated: "III.- ON THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (INVESTIGACIÓN PRELIMINAR). In the matter in question, the violations of Fundamental Rights alleged by the appellant refer to the initiation of preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares) from which an administrative disciplinary procedure could later result. On the subject, this Tribunal has repeatedly considered that the guarantees inherent to due process are not applicable in preliminary investigations (investigaciones preliminares), since it will be in the administrative or judicial procedure where the different manifestations of that fundamental right must be respected in their entirety. In this regard, this Chamber has declared the following: “In this regard, the Chamber has maintained the criterion that a correct understanding of the character and foundations of due process requires admitting that, prior to the opening of an administrative procedure, it is sometimes essential to carry out a series of preliminary inquiries, as the Administration – prior to opening the administrative file – could require conducting a prior investigation, through which it can not only individualize the possible person responsible for the fault under investigation, but also determine the need to continue with the formalities of the procedure, if there is merit for it. The prototype case occurs when, without the intervention of the interested parties, certain evidence is gathered during the preliminary investigation (investigación preliminar). Such gathered evidence cannot be asserted during the procedure itself, considering that its collection did not involve the investigated party's participation, and therefore, would have resulted in defenselessness." Similarly, if it concerns evidence that by its nature is definitive and irreproducible, it is undoubtedly useless for the purposes of supporting the final act, if the affected party was not afforded due process and the right of defense as legally required during its taking; however, if it is understood that these are preliminary acts to determine the pertinence or not of subsequently opening an administrative file against a public servant, this Chamber has stated that in its collection, the Administration may or may not include the investigated person as a party. The foregoing constitutes, therefore, a power of the competent administrative body, in order to determine whether or not there is merit to initiate a proceeding aimed at ascertaining the real truth of the facts under investigation, and it is when the proceeding itself has been opened, with the formation of the Directing Body, that the opportune procedural moment arises where the investigated public servant can indeed express his views on the charges attributed to him and, consequently, have access to the pieces of the file that interest him, as well as be assisted by a lawyer and be able to witness the taking of testimonial evidence and any other that is ordered and against which he can exercise his right of defense. In this understanding, the assertions of the appellant regarding the disrespect of due process and the right of defense in acts carried out in the preliminary phase of the investigation, which was opened on the occasion of the complaints filed by several patients against him, are not admissible, given that within that phase one cannot speak of the existence of a due process proper nor is the concurrence of the elements indicated above as constitutive of his right of defense necessary.” (Resolution 2003-09125 of nine hours and twenty-one minutes of the twenty-ninth of August of two thousand three). In this same vein, this Chamber considers that in the case in question, the alleged violations correspond to the preliminary investigation phase, given that a proceeding against the appellant has not yet been initiated. Consequently, the Chamber considers that the refusal to facilitate access to the file at this stage to the amparo petitioner or the lack of hearings has not caused injury to the constitutional right of defense or to the principle of due process (see in the same vein resolution N° 2010009906 of fourteen hours and thirty-eight minutes of the ninth of June of two thousand ten). Thus, the amparo is resolved as inadmissible, as indicated in the operative part of this resolution." (The underlined is supplied. In the same vein, one may consult ruling of that Chamber no. 2020017654 of 9 hours 20 minutes on 18 September 2020). For its part, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has indicated: "III.- […] Regarding the subject under study, the preliminary investigation to determine sanctioning administrative procedures is a discretionary task of the administration, to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible parties, and also relevant elements of judgment, with which they issue a recommendation; in order to verify the viability of a fault that merits carrying out a procedure to determine or not its existence. In this Chamber's opinion, the preparatory act carried out in report no. OD 04-2008 of the Directing Body, which requested evidence, documentation, intervention in the Cooperative's offices, and issuance of criteria, in the preliminary investigation, are legitimate material actions, since the task of gathering evidence and issuing recommendations is a discretionary power, used to define the propriety or not of a sanctioning procedure." (The underlined is supplied. Judgment no. 1101-F-S1-2011 of 10 hours 15 minutes on 8 September 2011. In the same vein, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, resolution of that Chamber no. 1228 of 14 hours 30 minutes on 22 October 2015). In accordance with the factual framework transcribed above, it is established that, through official communication no. DA-017-2015 of 20 February 2015, the Head of the Administrative Department of INDER notified the Executive Presidency of that entity that, in official communication no. A-PE-0906-2014 of 9 September 2014, it had been requested to open a preliminary investigation into the payment of salary supplements (sobresueldos) made to the official Walter Mora Leiva. The Executive Presidency, in official communication no. PE-259-2015 of the following 26th, requested the Labor Relations Unit to initiate the preliminary investigation, regarding what was indicated in official communication DA-017-2015. Said Unit, in official communication no. URL-032-2016 of 15 March 2016, issued the results of the preliminary investigation. It stated that Mr. Ronald Novo Díaz was granted the salary supplement (sobresueldo) as of 11 July 2011, through personnel action no. 3841-2011, which is paid to him starting from the second fortnight of July 2011. The same applies to Mr. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, whose salary supplement (sobresueldo) was granted to him in personnel action no. 792-2010 of 25 February 2010. As a consequence thereof, the Executive Presidency, in official communication no. PE-505-2016 of 27 April 2016, appointed the directing body of the procedure, for the alleged improper recognition of salary supplements (sobresueldos) due to descending reassignments against, among others, the plaintiff, Marlene Chaves Morales, whose file was processed under no. URL-002-2015. At 9 hours on 24 June 2016, the directing body of the procedure issued the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), referring to the personnel actions prepared by Mrs. Chaves Morales concerning Messrs. Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, for erroneously applying a salary supplement (sobresueldo) due to a descending reassignment. In accordance with the foregoing and, considering the nature and characteristics of the preliminary investigation -set forth above- (where its primary purpose, it is reiterated, is to identify alleged irregular facts, eventual responsible parties, and other relevant elements of judgment, in order to verify the viability of a fault that merits the opening of an administrative procedure to determine or not its existence), despite the fact that the preliminary investigation ordered by the Executive Presidency of INDER was to analyze the alleged payment of salary supplements (sobresueldos) made to Mr. Walter Mora Leiva (proven fact no. 15), the truth is that, after being carried out, its result determined that the cases of Messrs. Ronald Novo Díaz and Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla should be investigated, which was thus charged to Mrs. Marlene in the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) (proven fact 20). Such a situation, contrary to what the appellant wishes to portray, does not constitute any defect or irregularity nor was she placed in a state of defenselessness, since, it is repeated, the notification of charges (intimación de cargos) and the sanctioning administrative procedure referred to the cases of Messrs. Novo Díaz and Rodríguez Bonilla, in which the plaintiff was afforded all guarantees of defense. Nor did it have an effect regarding the prescriptive period, as the cassation appellant wishes to portray, since, as the Court well indicated, it began to run from 16 March 2016, the date on which the report of the preliminary investigation was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency, in accordance with the provisions of canon 71 subsection b) of the LOCGR, without the five-year period having elapsed according to the summary made by the judging persons, transcribed above.

**VII.** **Third.** As indicated, the appellant pointed out, in the first place, the procedural ground provided for in subsection 1) point c) of numeral 137 of the CPCA. In this regard, this Chamber has indicated that one of the essential elements of any judgment is the establishment of the factual framework that can be inferred from the evidentiary elements incorporated into the process based on the assessment (valoración) carried out by the judges according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) (article 82 of the CPCA), and in attention to the legal rules applicable to the specific case, since these allow establishing which facts acquire legal relevance (on this aspect, one may consult judgment no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on 8 February 2018; as well as resolution no. 7-A-TC-2017 of 11 hours on 26 January 2017). It is clear, then, that the establishment of these factual circumstances based on the evidence is one of the fundamental aspects of the judgment, to the extent that the solution of the dispute depends on this. It is for this reason that this intellective task carried out by the judging persons in relation to the facts of the case is susceptible to review from different perspectives at the cassation stage, which, furthermore, must not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes.

In this regard, the challenge may stem from substantive issues, when the factual scenario that the Court held to be proven does not match the reality evident from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or law, as provided in Article 138 CPCA), or from procedural errors, whether by having relied on illegitimate evidentiary means or those introduced illegally into the proceeding, or by a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Court, in establishing the relevant factual scenario for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation is that it seeks to make explicit, or when there exists a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what assessment the judges made during deliberation. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the various stages that make up the judicial proceeding have followed the channels provided by the legal order, and that the judgments have been issued in the form prescribed by the applicable procedural rules. For this reason, any questioning as to whether the determination of the facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, instead, of one of a substantive nature. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the indicated ruling of this Chamber no. 12-F-TC-2018 of 9 hours 15 minutes on February 8, 2018. This is not the situation in this litigation. The facts that the Court held to be proven are neither confusing nor contradictory among themselves. Furthermore, in Section V of this resolution, the reasons were given why official letters DA-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 are not illegitimate nor were they illegally introduced into the proceeding. Ergo, this ground for breach of procedural rules as alleged does not materialize.

VIII.Fourth. The appellant also invoked the procedural defect provided in subparagraph 1) point d) of the cited canon: lack of reasoning. Both the First Chamber and this Court have indicated that it arises when the reasoning of the judgment is omitted, either because it does not exist, or because its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the resolution, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, specifically, that of due process. It is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the proceeding; but, on the contrary, that the judgment has the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that it is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it pertains to potential non-compliance with the procedural provisions that regulate the procedural course or the resolution, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial proceeding and from which rights and obligations derive. It should not be confused with a mechanism to enter into a discussion of the application of the Law or the assessment of the evidence carried out by the judge in the recitals of the resolution, for which the Procedural Code establishes autonomous grounds (Article 138 ibid), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. In this regard, one may consult, among many others, the rulings of the First Chamber numbers 1277-F-S1-2019 of 14 hours 40 minutes on July 18, 2019, and 2521-F-S1-2020 of 10 hours 50 minutes on November 10, 2020. In light of what was set forth in Section VI point two of this resolution, where the relevant considerations of the judges in Section VII of the challenged ruling concerning the statute of limitations were transcribed, this Chamber determines, contrary to what the appellant alleged, that the judges provided the reasons why, in this litigation, the five-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period provided in the LOCGR was not met. As a corollary, the reasoning in the challenged resolution is not omitted; it exists. Nor is its development confusing or contradictory. On the contrary, it is clear as to the reasoning provided for adopting the decision set forth therein. Ergo, it has the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. Consequently, this cassation ground does not materialize either.

IX.VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES. In the first objection on this cassation ground, folio 12, the appellant announced he was lodging it because the ruling declared that the statute of limitations (prescripción) had not occurred. He invoked the cassation ground provided in subparagraph c) of Article 138 of the CPCA: "When a legal rule has been applied or interpreted improperly or has been left unapplied." In this litigation, he argued, the Court applied numeral 71 of the LOCGR to reject the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción), by considering that the plaintiff's conduct violated Article 3 of Law no. 8422, "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito" (LCCEI), which refers to the prescriptive period indicated in precept 71 of the LOCGR. With that conclusion, he stated, an erroneous application of those rules was incurred, with the simultaneous non-application of precept 603 of the Labor Code, now 414. Violation of Articles 3 and 38 of the LCCEI and concomitant infringement of numeral 71 of the LOCGR due to improper application. The rejection of the alleged affirmative defense of statute of limitations (excepción de prescripción), he noted, was due to an improper application of the referred canon 3, with an omission to apply 38, both of the LCCEI, with erroneous application of Article 71 of the LOCGR. The indicated numeral 3 of Law no. 8422, he explained, contains indeterminate legal concepts that must be concretized in each particular case. The breach of the "duty of probity," he indicated, must be specified against the factual assumption in which it is alleged. It demands pointing out, he noted, the elements of the conduct attributed contrary to the meanings of each of the terms used by the legislator. In this proceeding, he alleged, the acts attributed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without giving him due advice. Those material acts, he indicated, fall outside the classification of the indicated Article 3 of the LCCEI; namely: a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not breach the orientation of management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; b) it did not violate nor expose priority collective needs; c) the planning, regulation, efficiency, or equality of the inhabitants of the Republic was not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act executing a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that does not demand analysis or assessment, because, previously, the holder of the authority authorized it; and f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. From what was indicated, he stated, the improper application of Article 3 of the LCCEI arose from the insertion of the conduct attributed to the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of its factual assumptions. In addition to that lack of concretization in the ruling, he added, the application of precept 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contemplates the exhaustive grounds for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of Article 39 ibid. That is, the ruling should have linked Article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct attributed to the plaintiff was contemplated in this second one, in order to thus justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR, which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción) period. Since the plaintiff's conduct did not fall under any of the types generating administrative liability under the LCCEI regime, he asserted, the applicable rule was Article 603 of the Labor Code (now canon 414) because it was, at most, a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. The succession of legal violations in the challenged ruling, he noted, occurs according to the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff's conduct as violative of the duty of probity, without contemplating the exhaustive list of conduct subject to sanction derived from Article 38 of the LCCEI. It applied, improperly, numeral 3 with omission of 38, both of Law no. 8422; which, in turn, led to the improper application of Article 71 of the LOCGR with non-application of Article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414), which imposes a period of one month as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning authority for cases outside the provisions of Law no. 8422. As a corollary to the foregoing, he indicated, the period to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff's conduct expired one month after having carried it out and, as a consequence of the foregoing, resolution no.

037 at 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, is absolutely null, as it stems from an invalid administrative procedure, because the Administration's sanctioning power has prescribed. For which reason, she requested that the appeal be granted and the claim be declared with merit in all its terms. Likewise, she invoked the cassation ground provided for in subsection a) of section 138 of the CPCA: "When an improper assessment of the evidence is attributed, or it has been pretermitted." She also claimed an improper assessment of the evidence for the rejection of the claimed prescription of the sanctioning power, due to an erroneous accounting of the prescriptive periods. Even under the anti-juridical supposition that article 71 of the LOCGR applied, she noted, the first personnel action signed by the plaintiff in execution of the superior order of the Executive President of the IDA was on February 25, 2010 (Considering XV), which means that by February 24, 2015, the 5 years provided for in that norm had elapsed. This defect in the judgment originated because the Tribunal considered the prescription interrupted as of official letter PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015 –which, equally, produced the prescription by two days–, without noticing that this official letter ordered an investigation into facts unrelated to the plaintiff. In proven fact 15) of the judgment, the Tribunal concluded that, through official letter no. DA-017-2015 of February 20, 2015, the Executive President of INDER was requested to conduct a preliminary investigation regarding the payment of salary supplements "to the servant Walter Mora Leiva," without referring to the officials Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla nor Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff and for which she was investigated. In proven fact 16) of the judgment, the Tribunal concluded that, through official letter no. PE-259-2015 of February 26, 2015, the Executive Presidency ordered the preliminary investigation "regarding the facts indicated in official letter DA-017-2015"; limiting the scope of action of the preliminary investigation to the payment of salary supplements to the servant Walter Mora Leiva. She emphasized that the personnel actions, whose irregularity is attributed to the plaintiff, were in relation to the payment of salary supplements to Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz. Therefore, she stated, the judgment concluded, with an inconsistent assessment of the evidence, that the initiation of the preliminary investigation, born under the auspices of official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015, interrupted the prescription of the causes imputed to the plaintiff, when, in reality, they were different causes in which the material action of signing the personnel actions attributed to the plaintiff remained outside the preliminary investigation and, therefore, the prescription period established in article 71 of the LOCGR was not interrupted. Proven facts 15 and 16 are clear and precise in that official letters AD-017-2015 and PE-259-2015 were intended to resolve situations other than those attributed to the plaintiff, and therefore they lack the interruptive effect on the prescription. For that reason, she concluded by requesting that the judgment be reversed and, resolving on the merits, the claim be declared with merit in all its terms.

X.In this regard, it is necessary to note the following. First. The appellant stated on folio 13: "[…] in addition to that lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of article 38 of the LCCEI which contemplates the exhaustive causes for administrative liability subject to the sanctions of article 39 ibid was omitted […]". (The underlining is supplied). What is alleged regarding article 38 causes surprise. The Tribunal in considering X, in what is relevant, indicated: "Thus seen, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision that was intimated to the plaintiff, specifically, numeral 38 subsection d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of section 13 subsection c) of Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004." That is, in a clear and express manner, unlike what was indicated by the appellant, it applied it. Likewise, regarding the assertion that precept 38 of the LCCEI establishes the exhaustive causes of administrative liability subject to the sanctions of canon 39 ibidem, said norm states: "Causes of administrative liability. / Without prejudice to other causes provided for in the regime applicable to the respective employment relationship, the public official shall have administrative liability who: […]". (The underlining is supplied). From its literal tenor, it is determined, with ease, unlike what was stated by the cassationist, that said norm does not provide an exhaustive list of causes of administrative liability; on the contrary, it refers to those provided for in the regime applicable to the respective employment relationship. Second. The Tribunal, in Considering VII of the questioned judgment, alluded to in section VI point two of this resolution, in what is relevant, indicated: "[…] although the duty of probity imposes a behavioral framework consistent with the official duties, as well as the rules that modulate the conduct of the public agent, that regulation is oriented towards preventing, detecting, and sanctioning corruption in the exercise of public office, as can be inferred from ordinal 1 of the cited Law No. 8422, so that the understanding of the concept of probity must be carried out precisely in the context of that legal purpose, that is, when the servant's fault involves an aspect linkable (directly) to corruption, illicit enrichment, and the inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury. […] Therefore, it is necessary that in each disciplinary proceeding, the content of the intimate conduct is analyzed, in order to establish whether the legal regime that specifies the period for the exercise of the statute of limitations of the internal corrective power is the common one of one month imposed by the doctrine of the current ordinal 414 of the Labor Code, former 603 of that same source, the same period set by remittal of precept 51 of the Civil Service Statute, or if, on the contrary, because it is facing the situations that Law No. 8422, or Law No. 8292, seeks to protect, the cited period is extended by the application of the rule provided in mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. In that context, the facts that were imputed to the plaintiff, such as having allowed the adoption of conduct that generated an undue recognition of salary supplements to two INDER officials by downward reassignment. Although they do not refer to a direct disposition of the Public Treasury, they ultimately comprise conduct that led to the provision of salary-related disbursements, covered with public resources, which, it is alleged within the ordinary disciplinary proceeding, were illegitimately granted. In the opinion of this Chamber, the substantial content of the intimate conduct and the object of the proceeding constitute manifestations that are considered antagonistic to the internal control regime and the duty of probity imposed in the exercise of public office. From this perspective, the plaintiff seems to confuse the liability of those who directly administer the public treasury, called hierarchical superiors or subordinate titleholders, with the liability that is inherent to her by her mere condition as a public servant, and therefore, subject to the regulations of the duty of probity. In that sense, the time margin for the exercise of the disciplinary power that applies in this case is that imposed by Law No. 8422 in its numeral 44, which refers to the five-year prescription norm established by mandate 71 of Law No. 7428. […]." (The underlining is supplied). However, the appellant did not question, in due form, the basis indicated by the Tribunal in order to determine the application, to this litigation, of the five-year period provided for in precept 71 of the LOCGR.

He presented an argumentation completely divorced from the reasons given by the judges. To that effect, he stated: "*In the subjudice case, the acts attributed to the plaintiff were: signing two personnel actions in execution of orders from the Executive President without providing due advice. Those material acts of the plaintiff fall outside the classification of article 3 of the LCCEI, namely a) signing personnel actions in execution of superior orders does not violate: (I list) the orientation of management toward the satisfaction of the public interest; b) it did not violate nor expose priority collective needs; c) the planning, regulation, efficiency, nor equality of the inhabitants of the Republic were not at stake; d) rectitude and good faith were not betrayed, because it was an act of executing a superior mandate; e) signing personnel actions is a material act that does not demand analysis or assessment because the holder of the authority previously authorized it; f) the plaintiff does not administer public resources. / Based on the foregoing, the improper application of article 3 of the LCCEI arises from inserting the conduct attributed to the plaintiff that does not fit the legal rule in any of the factual scenarios; additionally, to this lack of concretization in the judgment, the application of article 38 of the LCCEI was omitted, which contemplates the exhaustive causes of administrative responsibility subject to the sanctions of article 39 ibid, that is, the judgment should have linked article 3 with 38 to determine if the conduct ascribed to the plaintiff was contemplated in this second one in order to justify the application of numeral 71 of the LOCGR which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations (prescripción). / Since the plaintiff did not typify any of the conducts generating administrative responsibility under the LCCEI regime, the applicable rule was article 603 of the Labor Code (current article 414 of the same legislative body) because it was at most a simple administrative error of a strictly labor nature. / In summary: The succession of legal violations in the contested judgment occurs with the following flowchart: by erroneously considering the plaintiff's conduct as violating the duty of probity without contemplating the exhaustive list of conducts subject to sanction derived from article 38 of the LCCEI, it improperly applied numeral 3 while omitting 38, both of Law 8422, which in turn led to the improper application of article 71 of the LOCGR with the misapplication of article 603 of the Labor Code (current 414) which imposes a one-month term as the limit for the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the sanctioning power for cases outside the provisions of law 8422. As a corollary of the foregoing, the term to investigate any irregularity in the plaintiff's conduct expired one month after having executed them and, as a consequence of the foregoing, resolution 037 of 1037 hours on June 28, 2017, is absolutely null because it stems from an invalid administrative procedure due to the Administration's sanctioning power having prescribed.*" As is easily determined, what was stated amounts to nothing more than a merely argumentative allegation, completely divorced from the foundations provided by the Court. Therefore, the allegation in the objection under study is inconsequential in breaking what was decided.

**XI. Third.** This Chamber shares the Court's assertion that the facts attributed to the plaintiff relate to the issue of the public treasury (hacienda pública), because they refer to conduct that involved the disposition of salary-related expenditures covered with public resources, their illegality having been determined. It also agrees with the position that the charged conduct and, therefore, the object of the administrative procedure, constitute manifestations antagonistic to both the internal control regime and the duty of probity. Regarding this second one, because, definitively, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff constitutes behavior that clashes with the proper performance of the powers granted to her and represents an inadequate management of public funds or the public treasury (hacienda pública), thus failing to satisfy the public interest. In this regard, Executive Decree No. 32333 of April 12, 2005, "Regulation to the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function", in article 1, Definitions, in what is relevant, states: "**14) Duty of probity:** *Obligation of the public official to orient his management to the satisfaction of the public interest, which is expressed, fundamentally, in the following actions:* / **a)** *Identify and attend to the priority collective needs in a planned, regular, efficient, continuous manner and under equal conditions for the inhabitants of the Republic;* / **b)** *Demonstrate rectitude and good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by law;* **c)** *Ensure that the decisions adopted in compliance with his attributions conform to impartiality and to the objectives of the institution in which he serves;* / **d)** *Administer public resources in accordance with the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency, rendering accounts satisfactorily;* / **e)** *Reject gifts, presents, awards, rewards, or any other emolument, fee, stipend, salary, or benefit from natural or legal persons, national or foreign, by reason of the performance of his duties or on the occasion thereof, inside the country or outside it; except for cases admitted by Law;* / **f)** *Refrain from hearing and resolving a matter when the same grounds for disqualification and recusal established in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, the Civil Procedure Code, and other laws exist;* / **g)** *Orient his administrative activity to satisfy primarily the public interest.*" (The underlining is supplied). The plaintiff was reproached for having acted negligently in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her as Human Resources Coordinator; furthermore, as already indicated, her reprehensible conduct impacted a poor management of public resources or the public treasury (hacienda pública). Hence, in effect, as the judges indicated, the charged conduct is antagonistic to the duty of probity. Similarly, it contrasts with the internal control regime. In this regard, the General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002, in what is relevant indicates: "**Article 7.**- **Obligatoriness of having an internal control system**.* The entities and bodies subject to this Law shall have internal control systems, which must be applicable, complete, reasonable, integrated, and consistent with their institutional competencies and attributions. Additionally, they must provide assurance in the fulfillment of those attributions and competencies; all in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 3 of this Law. […] **Article 12**.- **Duties of the head of the agency and of subordinate officials in the internal control system**. In matters of internal control, the head of the agency and the subordinate officials shall be responsible for fulfilling, among others, the following duties: / a) Ensure the adequate development of the activity of the entity or body under their charge. / b) Immediately take corrective measures, in the face of any evidence of deviations or irregularities. / c) Analyze and immediately implement the observations, recommendations, and provisions made by the internal audit office, the Contraloría General de la República, the external audit office, and the other relevant control and oversight institutions. / d) Ensure that the internal control systems meet at least the characteristics defined in Article 7 of this Law. / e) Present an end-of-management report and carry out the formal handover of the entity or body to their successor, in accordance with the directives issued by the Contraloría General de la República and by the competent entities and bodies of the active administration. / **Article 13**.- **Control environment.** Regarding the control environment, the duties of the head of the agency and of the subordinate officials shall be, among others, the following: / a) Maintain and demonstrate integrity and ethical values in the exercise of their duties and obligations, as well as contribute with their leadership and their actions to promoting them in the rest of the organization, for the effective compliance by the other officials. / b) Develop and maintain a management philosophy and style that allow administering a determined level of risk, oriented toward the achievement of results and the measurement of performance, and that promote an open attitude toward mechanisms and processes that improve the internal control system. / c) Evaluate the functioning of the organizational structure of the institution and take the pertinent measures to guarantee the fulfillment of institutional purposes; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / d) Clearly establish the hierarchy relationships, assign the authority and responsibility of the officials, and provide adequate communication channels, so that the processes are carried out; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / e) Establish appropriate human resources management policies and practices, principally regarding hiring, onboarding, training, evaluation, promotion, and disciplinary actions; all in accordance with the applicable legal and technical order. / **Article 14.**- **Risk assessment**. In relation to risk assessment, the duties of the head of the agency and the subordinate officials shall be, among others, the following: / a) Identify and analyze the relevant risks associated with the achievement of institutional objectives and goals, defined both in the annual operating plans and in the medium- and long-term plans. / b) Analyze the possible effect of the identified risks, their importance, and the probability of their occurrence, and decide the actions that will be taken to administer them. / c) Adopt the necessary measures for the adequate functioning of the risk assessment system and to place themselves at least at an acceptable level of organizational risk. / d) Establish the operational mechanisms that minimize the risk in the actions to be executed." (The underlining is not from the original). In this process, it is clear that, having signed personnel actions, through which, improperly, salary supplements for downward reassignment were granted, the internal control systems are contravened. So much so that, as indicated, in the final act as well as in the contested judgment (Considerando X), it was determined that the unlawfulness attributed to the plaintiff is embodied in the provisions, among others, of precept 38 subsection d) of the LCCEI, which states: "Weakens the internal control of the organization or omits the necessary actions for its design, implementation, or evaluation, in accordance with the applicable technical regulations." Hence, on the issue of the statute of limitations for disciplinary responsibility (prescripción), the applicable rule is that contained in precept 44 of Law No. 8422, which states: "**Prescripción of administrative responsibility**. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, and in the legal system related to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), shall prescribe, according to Article 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno and Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994." For its part, Article 43 of Law No. 8292 indicates: "**Article 43**.- **Prescripción of administrative responsibility.** The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law, shall prescribe according to Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, No. 7428, of September 7, 1994. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause." For its part, canon 71 of the LOCGR, prescribes: "**Article 71**.- **Prescripción of disciplinary responsibility.** The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight legal system, shall prescribe according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act.

/ b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as an act that requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding. / Prescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding. / When the perpetrator of the fault is the head, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. / It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause. / (Thus amended by subsection a) of article 45 of the Internal Control Law, No. 8292 of July 31, 2002). (The underlining is supplied). In light of the provisions of this article, the prescriptive period, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant and as the Trial Court rightly pointed out, began to run when the result of the preliminary investigation was brought to the attention of the Executive Presidency, that is, on March 16, 2016, the five-year prescriptive period not having elapsed, as outlined in considerando VI of this resolution. A computation that this Chamber, according to the merits of the case file, endorses.

XII.Fourth. Regarding the alleged indirect violation, the crux of what was argued by the appellant lies in their understanding that the prescriptive period elapsed because, in accordance with official letter no. PE-259-2015, an investigation was ordered into acts unrelated to the plaintiff. According to proven facts 15 and 16, through official letter no. DA-017-2015, the Executive Presidency was requested to carry out a preliminary investigation regarding the official Walter Mora Leiva. It did not refer to the servants Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla or Ronald Novo Díaz, whose personnel actions were the only ones signed by the plaintiff. Which was thus ordered through official letter no. PE-259-2015. The issue now raised by the appellant was already the subject of analysis in section VI, second point, of this resolution, when the characteristics and nature of the preliminary investigation were analyzed, so, in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, reference is made to what was stated there. Therefore, the judgment does not incur the evidentiary error attributed to it by stating: "[…] Under that perspective, in the case at hand, it is noted that, although the drafting of the respective personnel actions that led to the opening of the disciplinary case date from the month of April 2010 and June 2011, the fact of the matter is that such acts were the subject of a preliminary investigation, the relevance of which is not challenged, a prior phase within which the respective report was communicated to the Executive President on March 16, 2016. In accordance with the rules for computing the prescriptive period referred to in article 71 of Law No. 7428 in relation to article 44 of Law No. 8422, it is from the moment in which the holder of the disciplinary power is in an objective position to exercise it, that the said period must begin to run. Thus, in cases such as the present one, in which the preliminary investigation phase was necessary for defining relevant facts and collecting evidence, such that they allow the issuance of a duly supported statement of charges, the starting point of the prescription operates with the communication of the aforementioned report." (The underlining is supplied), especially considering that the appellant did not question what was indicated regarding the necessity and relevance of carrying out the preliminary investigation.

XIII.In the second objection for violation of substantive norms, folio 14, the appellant announced that they were lodging it for the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. This, they stated, was because the judgment concluded that the plaintiff should have disobeyed the superior's order. In Considerando VIII of the challenged resolution, they noted, the argument related to the duty of obedience was rejected. It concluded it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obliged to disobey the superior's order since it involved illegal conduct, for which, pursuant to article 108 of the LGAP, she should have at least left a record of her refusal. That conclusion, they affirmed, results in a biased reading of that article. This precept provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order involves carrying out acts that are "evidently foreign to the competence of the subordinate" and the act is manifestly "arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime." In this dispute, they noted, it is clear that the order of the Executive President, to draft and sign the personnel actions for Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz, is outside the scope of that norm, since they were not acts foreign to the competence of the Human Resources Directorate nor were they arbitrary or criminal. In accredited facts numbers 2), 3), 4), 5), 11), 12), 13), and 14), the disagreements between the lawyers of the CGR and INDER were accredited. A controversy that, they stated, reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Legal Affairs Directorate indicated that the application of salary supplements for downgraded officials was illegal and, less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-2013 of February 20, 2013, imposed the one he considered valid. The plaintiff, they indicated, lacks legal training, so, if there were three different opinions among the specialist lawyers of the CGR and INDER on how to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to charge the plaintiff with the violation of article 108 of the LGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal opinions between the Legal Directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the CGR. In light of the above, they stated, the application by the Trial Court of the indicated article 108 of the LGAP becomes unfortunate and lacking all logic, reasonableness, and foundation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, unlike those attributed to the plaintiff. Therefore, and given the erroneous application of article 108 of the LGAP to a situation different from that provided for by the legislator, they concluded, the ruling typified the defect indicated in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA, for which the judgment must be vacated and, resolving on the merits, be declared with merit in all its extremes.

XIV.In the grievance under study, the appellant invoked several dissimilar hypotheses, but, by the way they argued them, they are inseparable. They announced they were lodging the reproach for direct violation of law, by virtue of an undue application of article 108 of the LGAP, which is in accordance with what is indicated on folios 14 and 15, to the effect that: "In Considerando VIII, the challenged resolution rejected the plaintiff's argument related to the duty of obedience, because it concludes it was inapplicable in this case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obliged to disobey the superior's order because it involved illegal conduct, for which, pursuant to article 108 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP), she should have at least left a record of her refusal. That conclusion of the Trial Court results in a biased reading of article 108 of the LGAP.

This article provides that the public servant must disobey the superior when the order has as its purpose the performance of acts "evidently outside the competence of the subordinate" and that the act is manifestly "arbitrary because its exercise constitutes abuse of authority or any other crime" [...]. Therefore, and given the erroneous application of article 108 of the LEGAP to a situation diametrically different from that envisioned by the legislator, the ruling classified the defect indicated in subsection c) of article 138 of the CPCA, for which reason the judgment must be vacated and, ruling on the merits, the claim be granted in all its terms." (Only the underlined text is supplied). However, on that same folio, it stated: "[...] In proven facts 2), 3), 4), 5), 11), 12), 13), and 14), the disagreements between the attorneys of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the legal advisors of INDER were held as proven; a controversy that reached its climax when, through official letter DAJ-096-2013 of February 12, 2013, the Legal Affairs Directorate (Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos) indicated that the application of bonus payments for demoted officials was illegal and less than 10 days later, the legal advisor to the Executive President, Oscar Hernández Cedeño, dismissed that legal opinion and, through official letter A-PE-220-2013 of February 20, 2013, imposed that it was [sic] valid." What is now alleged—the supposed disagreements between the attorneys of the CGR and those of INDER; as well as the difference between the Legal Affairs Directorate and the legal advisor to the Executive Presidency—would constitute, if it occurred, an indirect violation of law, due to its improper assessment. Then, on folio 15, the appellant indicated: "It is necessary to add that the plaintiff lacks legal training, so if among the specialist attorneys of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the IDA (INDER) there were three different criteria on how [sic] to apply a legal rule, it is disproportionate, illogical, and unreasonable to impute to the plaintiff the violation of article 108 of the LEGAP, without assessing the existence of three disparate legal criteria among the legal directorate, the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, and the Comptroller General of the Republic." (The underlined text is supplied). The appellant alleged a violation of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Furthermore, by invoking logic, he alludes to an aspect of evidentiary assessment, which is reaffirmed by the omission of the supposed three legal criteria. He added on that same folio: "In light of the above, the application by the Court of numeral 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) becomes unfortunate and devoid of all logic, reasonableness, and substantiation, without considering that the requirements for authorizing disobedience without punishment are exhaustive, clear, and precise, different from those imputed to the plaintiff." In addition to the direct violation of precept 108 of the LGAP, the appellant, again, alluded to evidentiary assessment when referring to logic; he also invoked the breach of the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In turn, he alluded to a cassation ground for violation of procedural rules, that of lack of substantiation or reasoning. The ambiguity put into evidence clashes with the cassation technique, which requires that the grounds for the appeal must be indicated clearly and precisely (article 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA).

**XV.** Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to note the following. In the heading of the grievance under study, the appellant announced an objection to what was stated in section VIII of the contested judgment. Next, as indicated in the preceding recital, on folio 14, in the relevant part, he indicated: "*In Recital VIII, the contested decision rejected the plaintiff's argument regarding the duty of obedience, because it concludes that it was inapplicable in the case. According to the ruling, the plaintiff was obligated to disobey the superior's order because it was an illegitimate conduct that, in accordance with numeral 108 of the General Law of Public Administration (LEGAP), should have, at the very least, left a record of her rejection. That conclusion of the Court becomes a biased reading of canon 108 of the LEGAP* [...]." (The underlined text is supplied). What is indicated causes confusion. In said Recital VIII of the questioned judgment, the judges, contrary to what was argued by the cassation appellant, limited themselves to carrying out a legislative theoretical analysis of the figures of the duty of obedience and disobedience. They did not perform any analysis of the plaintiff's arguments; therefore, they did not reject them there. Nor did they apply precept 108 of the LGAP to the plaintiff. Besides that norm, in that section of the contested judgment, the judges analyzed other numerals of the LGAP. For a complete understanding, said section is reproduced in the relevant part: "**VIII.- On the content of the duty of obedience.** *As part of the internal relations that occur in the provision of public competencies, hierarchy implies the power of one body to govern and verify the conduct of other bodies that are subordinates. As established by article 101 of the LGAP, the administrative hierarchy relationship implies that the competencies of the superior encompass those of the subordinate by reason of territory or subject matter, and they hold functions of the same nature. Canon 102 ejusdem sets the generic powers of the hierarchical superior in the following sense:* [...] *In that exercise, according to subsection a) of that norm, the head may issue orders to his subordinates, which implies the imposition of a concrete conduct, of specific content, a measure that constitutes a source that must be weighed and assessed by the public agent in the exercise of his competencies. The unjustified disregard of that imposition may well lead to internal disciplinary consequences, as well as to the review of the content of the subordinate's act, so that the natural head, in the review phase ex officio or at a party's request, can carry out the comparison of the subordinate's conduct with the orders issued. However, the principle of submission to the Law requires that the public agent adapt his conduct to the rules governing his behavior, according to the hierarchical scale of sources (arts. 6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 128, 132, among others, of the LGAP). Hence, although the duty of obedience arises before the orders of the head, the LGAP itself imposes criteria based on which the public official must disregard those orders. As a general rule, the subordinate must obey the orders, instructions, or circulars issued by his immediate superior. However, when any of the following circumstances concur, the duty of disobedience is imposed on the official: a) That the act does not come from a hierarchical superior, whether immediate or not (art. 107.2 LGAP).* If the duty of obedience (deber de obediencia) is grounded in relationships of subordination, it is evident that an organ that does not hold hierarchy over another cannot validly issue an order, and therefore, it is clear that it cannot be imposed on another organ that, with respect to that act, is not inferior; b) That the act has as its purpose the performance of conduct clearly outside its competence (Art. 108.1.a idem). Competence constitutes a fundamental subjective material element for the legitimate exercise of powers and competencies, such that, in the absence of competence, the invalidity of the act is unquestionable. This is clearly derived from precept 129 of the LGAP, such that ordering behaviors outside the competence of the inferior is a conduct that is in itself irregular, and which, therefore, is not imbued with the duty of obedience; c) That the act is openly arbitrary, because its execution constitutes an abuse of authority or any other crime (Art. 108.1.b) ejusdem. The abuse of authority, as the improper and/or excessive exercise of administrative power, constitutes a pathology in the provision of public competencies, which determines the invalidity of the actions taken. This is imposed by the relationship of subsections 3) and 4) of numeral 146 of the LGAP. Precept 108, subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in stating that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the liability of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and eventually criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm alludes to the liability of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the order given, which does not exclude the liability of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those indicated circumstances. However, by virtue of the duty being analyzed, as has been pointed out, the law itself establishes assumptions in which what is imposed on the public agent is a negative behavior, that is, to disregard the order given, for constituting a pathological manifestation, vitiated by nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the liability derived from the execution and compliance with those null conducts. Now, when none of the exceptional circumstances indicated concur in the act, precept 109 of the cited law imposes on the official the duty to obey the act, even if that conduct is considered contrary to the Legal System for any other reason. However, in this case, the same norm imposes a new duty, on this occasion, consisting of warning and informing the administrative head about their objections. Such a requirement implies a release from any liability that might derive from the execution of the invalid act, but with the survival of the duty of execution. In cases of urgency, mandate 110 of the LGAP establishes that the inferior may reserve their liability verbally, for which purpose the presence of two witnesses is required. In this sense, the same canon 109 ejusdem complements that when it comes to avoiding serious damages of impossible or difficult reparation that the immediate execution of the issued act may produce, the inferior may suspend the execution thereof, subject to the liability that might result, should the justifying causes be, definitively, non-existent or improper. It should be noted that the execution of null acts constitutes a distortion of the principle of non-enforceability of conducts with absolute nullity imposed by ordinals 146.3 and 169 of the same legal source, for which reason, the communication of objections justifies the dispensation of the inferior's liability, reserving that framework of imputation to the superior. That said, in order to define the cases in which the duty of obedience or disobedience arises, it is necessary to specify that the notoriety of the causes of illegitimacy that require disengagement from a superior's conduct is an aspect that must be assessed in each case, for which purpose it is primary to analyze whether the public agent was in a position or objective duty to know the irregularity of the conduct required to be executed. For this, the doctrine of ordinal 213 of the LGAP sets guidelines to be followed in these matters, imposing the criterion that the framework of liability is proportional to the level of hierarchy of the public servant and the technical nature of their functions. Thus, the higher the hierarchy and technical competence level, the greater the duty to know and assess the defects of the act, and, consequently, the more intense the duty of disobedience. Hence, it is necessary to analyze, in each situation, the position held, the profile of functions, the technical level inherent to the position, as prior parameters for weighing the existence (a priori) of a duty or power to know the illegitimacy of the conduct ordered by the superior and, based on that, either to opt for disobedience or for obedience under protest, with the due expression of the reasons that constitute the objection. On that basis, it must be defined whether the inferior has incurred or not within the framework of liability imposed by law, either by disobeying improperly, or by obeying an order that, by legal imperative, should have been disregarded. Therefore, the release from liability is not configured by the simple obedience of an act that does not present the circumstances indicated above, it being the duty of the inferior to communicate to the head the objections regarding the content of the order given, as a cause for dispensation from their liability for the adoption or execution of those acts. When such reproach does not appear in the administrative file (expediente administrativo) of the respective proceeding, the inferior equally assumes liability for that execution, when they had the power or duty to demonstrate the deficiencies of the act. Having made these necessary clarifications, we proceed to the analysis of the specific case." The lack of concordance between what is stated in that recital (considerando) and what is alleged by the appellant is evident. Therefore, what is stated is meaningless for the purpose of overturning the decision.

XVI.In the third ground of disagreement for violation of substantive norms, folio 15, the appellant indicated that Considering IX of the appealed judgment concluded that their client incurred a failure in their duties, since the Job Manual (Manual de Puestos) imposed on them the task of "advising" their superiors in the matters specific to the position. The conclusion, they stated, is invalid for the following reasons. The judgment, they indicated, accepted the defendants' allegation regarding the provisions of the Job Manual concerning the position held by the plaintiff. However, they added, it omitted to indicate whether it was based on the Job Manual in force in 2010 or 2011, when the actions of Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed; or whether it referred to the one in force at the date of the filing of the jurisdictional action. That omission regarding the effective date of the Job Manual on which it bases its decision, they asserted, is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the judgment for lack of legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica). The advisory functions of the Human Resources Coordinator, they indicated, are limited to the management and administration of human resources. It is foreign, they noted, to legal advice, because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules concerning the ways of regulating service relationships. She knows, in detail, the contracting procedure, but not matters related to the provisions or directives emanating from the CGR, whose legal complexity requires the advice of the Legal Department. The situation was so complicated, they stated, that not even among the legal advisors of the defendant entity did they agree on the applicable methodology, as is accredited with official communications DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013. Sufficient reason to discard the obligation of the plaintiff, as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not. Their client, they pointed out, applied the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors. In addition to the fact that the actions attributed to their client are foreign to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). The Tribunal, they commented, endorsed INDER's imputation that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President (Presidente Ejecutivo). This, they stated, is based on logical ambiguity regarding the competencies of the position in relation to the advisory role, since the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the CGR, regarding the procedure for the rehiring of descending personnel, corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Legal) of the entity and to the Legal Advisor of the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the applicable guidelines for the other institutional offices.

The contradictory, imprecise, and nonconforming reasoning of the judgment, she argued, typifies the ground under subsection a) of Article 138 of the CPCA, because it failed to assess the following: a) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by him for each of the cases and, subsequently, were endorsed by two agreements signed between INDER and the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz (proven facts 5 through 10); b) the agreements were countersigned by the Legal Department (same facts); c) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials (there is no evidence to support that conclusion); d) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to which the resolutions signed by the Executive President were attached; e) the plaintiff was entitled to a principle of legitimate reliance (principio de confianza legítima), insofar as the Executive President's decisions are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, so it is these advisors who are responsible for assessing the legality of the superior's decision. With the indicated evaluative omissions, she stated, the judgment violated, through misapplication, Article 356 of the LGAP, because the resolutions of the Executive President of INDER regarding the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz ended the conflict. There was a mandatory prior consultation with the Legal Advisor, as required by that provision. By omitting its application, the Court improperly shifted responsibility to his client, when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor if the advice was given erroneously. The judgment, she noted, must also be overturned for misapplication of Article 146 subsection 3) ibid, by erroneously shifting responsibility to the plaintiff. She reproduced that provision. In this dispute, and in the event that the personnel actions challenged were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance falls on the Executive President of INDER, by that express legal provision, which, she concluded, was omitted by the Court, incurring the defect claimed.

XVII.In the grievance under consideration, the appellant once again raised several hypotheses that are dissimilar to each other, but, due to the way the objection was formulated, they are inseparable. In this regard, at folio 15, the appellant stated: "The judgment accepts the defendants' argument regarding what the Manual de Puestos provides in relation to the plaintiff's position, but it omitted to indicate whether the Jurisdictional Chamber relied on the Manual de Puestos in effect in 2010 and 2011 when the actions for Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz were signed, or whether it refers to the Manual de Puestos in effect at the date of the filing of the jurisdictional action. That omission regarding the effective date of the Manual de Puestos on which it bases its decision is a defect whose sanction is to revoke the judgment for lack of legal reasoning." If what was argued were to occur, it would give rise to a defect for violation of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1) point d) of canon 137 of the CPCA: failure to state reasons (falta de motivación). However, the appellant did not indicate how each of the versions he pointed out differ (if they exist). Furthermore, he did not challenge what was stated in the judgment, regarding: "According to what INDER states and co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero reiterates, the Institution's Manual de Puestos assigns the following details to that position: «Nature of work. Planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation of technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, as well as the execution of the corresponding activities. Positions included in this class: Coordinator (a) of Human Resources. (...) General Activities of the Human Resources Coordinator. Advises the institution's management in matters of personnel administration. Consequences of error. Errors committed can cause losses, damages, or delays of high consideration, so activities must be carried out with extreme care and precision. Personal characteristics of the incumbent. Analytical, critical, and synthesis capacity.»". (Only the underlining is supplied). Therefore, what was indicated proves to be inconsequential in terms of breaking what was decided. The appellant added on that same folio: "Regardless of what was stated in the preceding paragraph, the advisory duties of the Human Resources Coordinator are limited to the management and administration of human resources, completely unrelated to legal advice because the plaintiff lacks the academic and technical training to interpret the Decrees and other rules pertaining to the ways of regulating service relationships; she knows the hiring procedure in detail, but not matters related to the provisions or guidelines emanating from the Contraloría General de la República, whose legal complexity demands the advice of the Legal Department." The foregoing is nothing more than a merely argumentative claim, devoid of factual support. Moreover, it contrasts with what the Institution's Manual de Puestos indicates as duties for the person holding the position of Human Resources Coordinator. The cassation appellant continued, stating on said folio: "The situation was so complicated that not even among the IDA's (INDER's) own legal advisors did they agree on the applicable methodology, as evidenced by official letters DAJ-096-2013 and A-PE-220-2013; sufficient reason to dismiss the plaintiff's obligation, as a human resources specialist, to resolve what the lawyers could not." What was stated would give rise to the grounds for cassation provided for in subsection a) of numeral 138 of the CPCA, for indirect breach of law. In the last paragraph of said folio, the appellant argued: "The plaintiff applies the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, in addition to the fact that the actions attributed to my client are unrelated to the systems of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública). The Court endorsed in the judgment INDER's imputation that the plaintiff omitted to advise the Executive President with logical ambiguity regarding the competencies of the plaintiff's position in relation to the advisory function, since the analysis, assessment, and interpretation of the Decrees and the Directive of the Contraloría General de la República on the procedure for the rehiring of descending personnel corresponds to the Legal Advisory Office of the entity and the Legal Advisor to the Executive President, who are the ones who must set the applicable guideline for the other institutional offices." What was indicated constitutes an argumentative claim devoid of factual and legal support. Furthermore, that the plaintiff applies the legal system according to the legal design established by the legal advisors, as the appellant stated, differs from what is set out in the Manual de Puestos as official duties of the Human Resources Coordination of INDER. On the other hand, in section XI third point of this resolution, the reasons were provided why this Chamber considers that the conduct attributed to the plaintiff is antagonistic both to the duty of probity and to the internal control system.

On page 16, the appellant indicated: "The contradictory, imprecise, and inconsistent reasoning of the judgment typifies the ground under subsection a) of article 138 of the CPCA because it failed to assess the following: / h) the two personnel actions signed by the plaintiff jointly with the Executive President were preceded by two resolutions issued by him for each of the cases, and subsequently endorsed by two agreements signed between the IDA (INDER) and the officials concerned, Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz (See proven facts 5 to 10); / i) the agreements were countersigned by the Legal Department (same facts 5 to 10), / j) the plaintiff did not participate in the negotiations between the Executive President and the aforementioned officials; (there is no evidence to support that conclusion) / k) the plaintiff's conduct was limited to executing two administrative acts through two personnel actions to [sic] which the resolutions signed by the Executive President were attached; / l) the judgment failed to assess that the plaintiff was protected by a principle of legitimate expectations (principio de confianza legítima), insofar as the decisions of the Executive President are issued with the prior assistance of his legal advisors, such that it is they who are responsible for assessing the legality of the Superior's decision. / 3) With the aforementioned evaluative omissions, the judgment violated, by non-application, article 356 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública), because the resolutions of the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) regarding the officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz ended the conflict; there was a mandatory prior consultation with the Legal Advisor as stipulated in numeral 356 of the LGAP; by omitting the application of that norm, the Court improperly transferred the responsibility to my client when it is attributable to the Executive President (in the event he did not request the pertinent legal advice) or to the legal advisor in the event it was given erroneously." In what was argued by the appellant, two different cassation grounds were mixed: first, one for violation of procedural norms: lack of reasoning; and, later, another for transgression of substantive norms, for indirect violation of law. With respect to the cassation appellant's assertion that the plaintiff was protected by the principle of legitimate expectations, it is necessary to point out. The plaintiff cannot shield herself behind said postulate to justify the disregard of the duty of probity and the internal control rules. This would undoubtedly render ineffective the purpose provided for in Law no. 8422, to prevent, detect, and punish corruption in the exercise of public function. If the Public Administration, in the past, issued acts in an irregular or illegal manner, as happened in this litigation, it would suffice for the public official to follow that conduct without questioning its legitimacy, despite it being her official duty, alleging the principle of legitimate expectations, to evade her responsibility, thereby violating or disregarding the norms and guiding principles of internal control and of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de la Función Pública), especially the duty of probity. A situation that, by all lights, cannot be endorsed. The plaintiff was appointed to the position of Human Resources Coordinator of INDER because she met the profile indicated in the Job Manual (Manual de Puestos) of that entity. Among her duties is that of advising management on personnel administration matters; for which she performs planning, organization, coordination, control, and evaluation functions of the technical, scientific, and administrative tasks provided in the administrative, financial, and technical services or processes of INDER, as well as the execution of corresponding activities. In accordance with this, the plaintiff should have noticed the irregularity presented in the case of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz, making it known to the Executive Presidency. Not simply continue with that irregularity, shielding herself behind a misunderstood legitimate expectations. That is, by virtue of her office, she could not presume, based on those prior irregular actions, the legitimacy of her conduct. Hence, the principle of legitimate expectations was not infringed. In this regard, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, among others, the judgments of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) numbers 93-F-S1-2011 of 9 hours 5 minutes of February 3, 2011; 1692-F-S1-2012 of 10 hours 10 minutes of December 13, 2012; 256-F-S1-2019 of 16 hours 24 minutes of March 20, 409-F-S1-2019 of 10 hours 55 minutes of May 16, both of the year 2019. Lastly, the cassation appellant stated on said page: "The judgment must also be overturned for non-application of article 146, subsection 3) of the LGAP by erroneously transferring responsibility to the plaintiff. The recently mentioned subsection indicates: [...] In the specific case and in the event that the accused personnel actions were absolutely null, the responsibility for their issuance corresponds to the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) by that express legal provision, which was omitted by the Court, incurring the claimed defect, and I request that it be so declared." The matter indicated, if it were to occur, would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of precept 138 of the CPCA, that is, for direct violation of law. On the other hand, the eventual responsibility of the person who held the Executive Presidency at the time the questioned employer orders were issued does not exclude or exonerate the plaintiff's responsibility, as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, by virtue of the duty of probity in the public function and the internal control regime, already set forth in recital XI point three of this resolution. This is how the Court stated it in section VIII of the questioned judgment, when indicating: "Precept 108 subsection 2) of the LGAP is clear in pointing out that obedience in any of those hypotheses or circumstances produces the responsibility of the official, in the disciplinary (administrative), civil, and eventually criminal spheres. It should be noted that this norm alludes to the responsibility of the official who, having the legal duty to disobey, decides to comply with the order given, which does not exclude the responsibility of the public agent who has issued an illegitimate order due to the concurrence of any of those pointed-out circumstances. Nevertheless, by virtue of the duty being analyzed, as has been indicated, the same law establishes assumptions in which what is imposed on the public agent is negative behavior, that is, disregarding the order given, as it constitutes a pathological manifestation, vitiated by nullity due to arbitrariness, under penalty of personally assuming the responsibility derived from the execution and compliance with those null conducts." (The underlining is supplied). Which was not duly challenged by the cassation appellant. As has already been indicated, the confusion revealed is contrary to the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds for the appeal be indicated clearly and precisely.

XVIII.Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. The judges, in recitals IX and X of the questioned judgment, in what is of interest, indicated: "IX.- Analysis on the defenses relating to the plaintiff's duty of obedience. The defense formulated in this case, and on which the invalidity of the imposed sanction is alleged, was that, at that time, she merely complied with the orders issued by the person who on those dates served as Executive President. In order to what has been presented, such allegation requires the analysis of the circumstances under which that order was issued and the concurrence or not of the duty of obedience in the face of that conduct.

In the specific case, as of the date the personnel actions were issued in April 2010 and June 2011, the plaintiff occupied the Human Resources Coordination of the defendant entity. […] Taking these particularities into account, this Tribunal considers that the very position of Human Resources Coordinator places the plaintiff under the duty, or at least, in the position of being able to know the set of background information and regulations that are inherent to downward personnel movements. This leads one to suppose that, faced with a unilateral decision by the Executive Presidency to issue the personnel actions that recognized the two officials to whom that type of movement was applied, it was the duty of that Coordination to warn about the necessary existence of the required technical and legal prerequisites for that recognition, and, as the case may be, to inform that hierarchy of the need to request the internal opinions that would give legitimate support to that decision. As the Job Manual mentions in the section indicated above, part of the plaintiff's general activities was to advise leadership in matters of personnel administration. Hence, a functional duty is derived from that profile that imposed on her the obligation to warn her leadership that the conduct issued found no support in the regime applicable to that type of movement. The allegation of automatic and unqualified application of what was ordered by the Executive Presidency, as a derivation of the duty of obedience, does not entail the release from liability that is sought, when the LGAP itself indicates the assumptions under which the public servant should disobey, but also when the same internal regulations and the profile of her tasks imposed on her the duty to know of the need for prior technical and/or legal analyses that would make evident the pertinence, in the specific cases, of the actions ordered by her leadership. In any case, even if we were to consider that it has not been proven that any of the conditions imposing the duty to disregard the order were present, given her knowledge and responsibilities in matters of Human Resources Management, it was her duty to warn that, in downward reassignments, it was not permissible to grant the salary supplement assigned in those personnel actions, given the lack of technical analyses that would support those decisions. This was so that the senior official could weigh those objections and, if he persisted in his conduct, allow the plaintiff to release herself from liability for the execution of those acts. However, it is not evident in the case records that the plaintiff made such warnings or objections to the Executive President, and, on the contrary, without any reservation, she proceeded to execute the orders issued by means of the issuance of the respective personnel actions, ultimately conferring illegitimate benefits that compromised the public funds allocated to the INDER budget. By not having expressed those disagreements, despite having the duty to do so, the plaintiff assumes responsibility for the negligence in fulfilling these legally assigned duties, which are consistent with her functions and, therefore, enforceable as a derivation of her knowledge and experience in the job profile she occupied. / **X.-** Seen in this way, the material and formal unlawfulness is concretized in the normative provision that was charged against the plaintiff, specifically, subsection 38 d) of Law No. 8422, and the violation of the content of subsection 13 c) of Executive Decree No. 31711 of March 16, 2004. Likewise, the subjective component of the applied sanction is based on the duty to have requested the technical and legal inputs that would support the order dictated and which she chose to execute, dispensing with the fulfillment of minimum requirements. In that sense, in accordance with the rules for the imputation of liability established by Article 213 of the LGAP, by virtue of which, the greater the hierarchy of functions and the greater their technical scope, the greater the duty to consider the potential defect of the issued act and the adopted conduct. From that perspective, the position of Human Resources Management coordinator entails a degree of technical specialization, in light of which, the plaintiff's argument regarding the release from liability for simple obedience of orders issued by the then head of the Executive Presidency regarding the personnel actions that recognized a right to the payment of a salary supplement through downward reassignment, which did not satisfy the procedural or substantive demands pertinent to the case, is not admissible. Consequently, gross negligence is observed in that conduct, which entails liability for the issuance and permissibility of acts that unduly created patrimonial rights, with the corresponding economic harm to the budget of the co-defendant entity, by compromising public funds without the proper verification of conformity of the procedures that led to the issuance of the cited personnel actions. Therefore, no legal excuse or permissibility to ignore the shortcomings that later gave rise to the imposed sanction is observed. This is a matter that was fully verifiable a priori and that obliged the adoption of corrective actions to reduce the risks of issuing this type of conduct or, in any case, to set forth the reasons for disagreement as a warning, thus generating a release from liability. By failing to do so, she incurs the factual precondition (conditioning antecedent) that was charged against the plaintiff and that permits the application of the legal consequence anticipated in the statement of charges. Such an assessment of the conduct attributable to the plaintiff was duly expressed in the final act (resolution No. 037-2017). In the relevant part, among the reasons given by the Executive Presidency, the following was stated: "[…] These references make evident the considerations from which the defendant entity found that the plaintiff's conduct violated the provisions of Law No. 8422, due to the lack of control over the technical analyses required for the granting of the downward reassignments and the respective recognition of the salary supplement granted to the two referenced officials, emphasizing the absence of contingency measures inherent to her position concerning personnel administration procedures and processes, which speaks to the disregard of those duties and consequently the liability derived from that conduct. As can be observed, this analysis links and harmonizes with the reasoning given by this Tribunal in the present ruling, a treatment in which, consequently, the denounced incorrectness is not observed." (The underlining is added).

As can be clearly determined, the appellant did not properly challenge the arguments or grounds put forth by the Court to determine the plaintiff's liability for breach of the duty of probity and the internal control system. As indicated in the previous section, he limited himself to making merely argumentative allegations, divorced from the reasons set forth in the challenged judgment. Which, it is worth noting, this Chamber shares. It is clear, by virtue of the plaintiff's official duties as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, that she had a duty to know and manage the regulations concerning downward personnel movements (movimientos descendentes de personal) within the institution. Hence, the need for the technical and legal prerequisites for the recognition of additional salaries in cases of downward personnel movements. Therefore, having failed to alert the Executive Presidency to that circumstance, she must assume her responsibility, in accordance with provision 213 of the LGAP.

**XIX.** In the **fourth** objection, folio 16, the challenger objected to the rejection of the nullity for lack of statement of reasons (motivación) of the sanctioning resolution. One of the reasons for the claimed nullity, he noted, was the lack of statement of reasons in resolution no. PE-037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017. The judgment rejected the arguments and resolved that the administrative decision met the requirements of substantiation, explaining what it considered to be the statement of reasons. In that explanation, he said, the ruling started from a quantitative perspective of the statement of reasons. Contrary to what was resolved, he stated, said resolution lacked substantiation because it omitted to specify, to state precisely the elements of the plaintiff's conduct that breached the specific legal rules to which she was subject. The statement of reasons, he pointed out, implies four substantial elements: a) the absolute verification of the facts without subjective interpretation or assessment. It is the pure and simple verification of the occurrence of an event regardless of the reasons that gave rise to it; b) irrefutable proof that those facts were the consequence of a specific conduct; c) the subsumption of those facts under precise legal rules, without interpretive twists; and d) that the facts indicated in section a) can be attributed to one or more persons. Both administrative resolution no. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment, he indicated, omitted specifying the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it was only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. It was omitted to indicate, he added, the legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact, limiting itself to a disordered mention of various legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conduct subsumed under each one. The judicial ruling, he asserted, endorsed that administrative act lacking a statement of reasons, in violation of numeral 136 of the LGAP, which requires it as a requirement of validity, because the statement of reasons is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct. In this dispute (lite), he stated, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of INDER resolved that employees Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid an additional salary, as a substitute for the payment of the entire settlement in a single installment, as a consequence of their partial settlement due to a downgrade in position; b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action (acción de personal); c) after the signing of the personnel action, the agreements with the indicated employees were signed and countersigned by the Legal Department. The proof of those facts, he indicated, was detailed by the Court in proven facts 5) through 10) of the judgment. The legal support that underpinned the facts were the resolutions of the CGR and the legal opinions existing at the time the personnel actions were issued. The challenged judgment abandoned the analysis of those three basic and unique elements that should have been incorporated into the administrative resolution, incurring the same defect of lack of statement of reasons. The mere reading of the administrative resolution, he asserted, proves the defect attributed to the challenged ruling, namely: a) it omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the contested and confirmed administrative act; b) there is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; c) the judicial resolution did not concretize the indeterminate legal concepts of: "*duty of probity, good management of public resources*" in relation to the specific facts attributed to the plaintiff; d) it omitted to indicate the specific and concrete facts executed by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity; e) it omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete liability attributable to the plaintiff in the management of public funds (also omitted by the contested administrative act). Both resolutions (administrative no. 037-2017 and the judgment) did not identify the legal rules imposing duties on the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public funds, subjecting her to the control and oversight (fiscalización) rules of the public treasury (hacienda pública). He brought up that, in accordance with resolution no. 623-A-S1-2013, of 10:25 a.m. on May 16, 2013, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) concluded that, to determine the application of the rules of Article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since liability arises from the breach of the control and oversight rules of the public treasury and not from the official's position. He reproduced, in what was relevant to his interest, what was considered therein. According to that judicial body, he pointed out, both the administrative sanctioning act no. 037-2017 and the challenged judgment lacked the specification of the reasons why the signature affixed by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz breached the control and oversight rules of the public treasury. That lack of legislative precision, with argumentative omission, he concluded, is grounds for absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the administrative resolution and for reversal of the objected judgment.

**XX.** Once again, the appellant alleged several dissimilar hypotheses, but, due to the way he structured the grievance, they are inseparable. On folio 17, he indicated: "*Both administrative resolution number 037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI omitted specifying the facts, the evidence, the legal rule, and the specific attribution of those facts to the plaintiff, regarding whom it is only indicated that she signed the personnel actions without having advised the superior. / The indication [sic] of the legal rules pertaining to the attributed fact was omitted, limiting itself to a disordered mention of various legal and regulatory rules without specifying the conduct subsumed under each one.*" The foregoing, if it occurred, would give rise to the defect for breach of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1), point d) of provision 137 of the CPCA: lack of substantiation. Furthermore, what was argued is nothing more than a merely argumentative comment, completely divorced from the challenged judgment. The challenger added: "*The judicial ruling endorsed that administrative act lacking that statement of reasons, in violation of numeral 136 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), which requires it as a requirement of validity, because the statement of reasons is the harmonious conjunction of the facts, the evidence, the specific legal rules that subsume those facts, and the identification of the active subject of the conduct.*" What is now alleged would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection c) of Article 138 ibid, for direct breach of law.

Subsequently, the appellant indicated: "In the case at hand, the pure and simple facts were: a) the Executive President of the IDA (INDER) resolved that the employees Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz would be paid a salary supplement (sobresueldo) as a substitute for the payment of the entirety of their settlement in a single lump sum as a consequence of their partial settlement due to demotion; b) once the resolution was issued and signed by the Executive President, the plaintiff was ordered to proceed with the personnel action; c) after the signing of the personnel action, the agreements were signed with the aforementioned employees and countersigned by the Legal Department; the proof of these facts: the Court detailed them in proven facts 5) through 10) of the judgment; the legal backing that supported the facts were the resolutions of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued." The foregoing would give rise to the ground for cassation provided for in subsection a) of canon 138 ejúsdem, for indirect violation of law, due to the improper assessment of both the resolutions of the CGR and the legal criteria existing at the time the personnel actions were issued, by not duly analyzing the facts that occurred in this dispute. The appellant continued stating: "Judgment 095-2019-V1 abandoned the analysis of these three basic and only elements that should have been incorporated in resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, incurring in the same defect of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación), in this case, of the judgment. A mere reading of resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, proves the defect attributed to ruling 095-2019-VI, namely: / It omitted to identify the motive, cause, and purpose of the challenged and confirmed administrative act; / There is no logical thread leading to the conclusion; / The judicial resolution does not concretize the indeterminate legal concepts of: 'duty of probity, proper management of public funds' in relation to the specific facts attributed to the plaintiff, / It omitted to point out the concrete and specific acts carried out by the plaintiff that breached that duty of probity, / It omitted to substantiate the specific and concrete responsibility attributable to the plaintiff in the management of public funds, (also omitted by the challenged administrative act). / The two resolutions (037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI) do not identify the legal rules imposed on the plaintiff to: safeguard, administer, guarantee, protect, distribute, collect public funds, subjecting her to the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury (hacienda pública)." The foregoing would give rise to the defect for breach of procedural rules already indicated: lack of reasoning. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that, contrary to what was stated by the appellant, in section VI of the questioned judgment, the adjudicators analyzed, from a theoretical, doctrinal, and legal perspective, the concept of the "duty of probity." Later, in recital VII, they set out the reasons why the prescriptive period provided for in article 71 of the LOCGR is applicable to this dispute and why it did not elapse. In sections VIII, IX, and X, they set out the reasons (factual and legal) why the plaintiff, by virtue of her position as Human Resources Coordinator of INDER, could be held responsible for breaching both the duty of probity and the internal control regime (régimen de control interno), by not having warned of the necessary existence of the proper technical and legal prerequisites to approve salary supplements (sobresueldos) due to downward movements. That is, contrary to what was indicated by the cassation appellant, in the opinion of this Chamber, the adjudicators clearly, orderly, and thoroughly reasoned why the plaintiff was responsible for her omission. The appellant continued stating on pages 17 and 18: "It is important to bring up that, in accordance with judgment 623-A-S1-2013 of 10:25 a.m. on May 16, 2013, this Honorable First Chamber concluded that to determine the application of the rules of article 71 of the LOCGR, the objective material criterion is used, since the responsibility stems from the breach of the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury and not from the position of the concerned official. It stated so: […] According to the First Chamber, the sanctioning administrative act 037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017, and judgment 095-2019-VI, failed to specify the reasons why the signature affixed by the plaintiff on the personnel actions of Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla and Ronald Novo Díaz breached the rules of control and oversight of the public treasury. This lack of legislative precision with argumentative omission is [sic] grounds for the absolute nullity of resolution 037 of 10:37 a.m. on April 28, 2017, and for the revocation of judgment 095-2019-VI, and I so request it be declared." Said resolution of the First Chamber, in this dispute, constitutes a means of proof. Therefore, what is argued regarding it, if it were to occur, would give rise to the cassation ground provided for in subsection a) of precept 138 of the CPCA, for indirect breach of law. Then, in the last paragraph indicated, the cassation appellant also invoked the cassation ground for violation of procedural rules already indicated, that of lack of reasoning. The ambiguity revealed, as has already been stated, contravenes cassation technique.

**XXI.** Notwithstanding what was indicated in the preceding recital and, for the sake of further reasoning, it is necessary to point out. In recital XI of the challenged judgment, the adjudicators provided the reasons why, in their understanding, the final act under question is duly reasoned. On the relevant point, they stated: "**XI.- Regarding the alleged lack of reasoning.** On the other hand, an improper substantiation of the final act of the procedure is alleged. […] in the case at hand, the act does not present the reasoning deficiencies that are alleged. As has been stated supra, regarding what has been the subject of objection, the challenged conducts clearly offer the set of antecedent circumstances on which it has based its decision. The final act points out the reasons of fact and law on which the content of the act is based. In the section on proven facts, that act refers to the evidentiary elements from which it inferred each factual assertion. For its part, in the substantive analysis, it carries out an assessment of the evidence incorporated into the procedure, while also explaining the reasons why it deemed the charges proven, the considerations why it concluded that it was a breach of the probity regime, detailing the obligations inherent to the position held by the plaintiff at the time of the facts, as well as the value judgment that led it to establish the sanction ultimately applied. In that regard, in numeral 'V.V.

[sic] Regarding the penalty to be imposed, he stated: "Analyzing the degree of culpability of the official in her omission to act, this body considers it relevant; since, there was serious and pernicious damage to the budget of the institution by granting benefits to officials who were not afforded due process to determine whether or not they qualified for the reassignment of descending positions; for this reason, in order not to overlook said action; but at the same time to invite the official to reflect on her negligent behavior in the duties she performed, this deciding body imposes the penalty of ONE-MONTH SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY. Said quantum is considered adequate, estimating the seriousness of the facts, that the official has a long career in the Institution and, considering that the purpose of the disciplinary procedure is corrective (...) ". In this way, the final resolution being challenged duly captures the set of precedents of the case, lists the facts that were held as accredited with detail of the elements of conviction on which they were deduced. Such development enables the understanding of the reasons that support the motive of the act. Then, it addressed the various allegations presented by the parties involved and elaborates on the reasons of law by which, in light of the determined facts, it obtained the assessments and legal consequences ultimately adopted. Strictly speaking, that exposition shows logical congruence between the facts and the applied law, as support for the final decision, which allows for the (logical) understanding of the foundational reasons for the administrative will. It is worth noting that in accordance with the provisions of section 136 (c) of the LGAP, that statement of reasons (motivación) allows the decision to be sustained against the recommendation report issued by the investigative body and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board, both criteria being non-binding in nature according to the tenor of precept 303 of the aforementioned LGAP, but which, ultimately, imposed the duty of due statement of reasons, as was achieved in this case. Certainly, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with those considerations and development, but that does not imply that the defect she points out materializes. From that standpoint, the argument under examination must be rejected." However, the appellant made an argument divorced from said foundation. He limited himself to indicating: "The judgment rejects the arguments and resolves that the administrative decision complies with the requirements of substantiation (fundamentación), explaining what it considers to be the statement of reasons (motivación). In that explanation, the ruling starts from a quantitative perspective of the statement of reasons. Contrary to what was resolved by the Court in Considering X, the decision P.E.037 of 10:37 a.m. on June 28, 2017 lacks substantiation because it omitted to specify precisely the contents of the plaintiff's conduct that breached the specific rules of the legal system to which she was subject." That is, he made a brief and very generic account, without questioning, punctually, what was indicated by the Court. Therefore, what is pointed out in the censure under review is futile for the purpose of breaking what was resolved.

**XXII.** In the **fifth** ground of disagreement, folio 18, the appellant objected to what was resolved regarding that the applied sanction is correct. In considering XII, he stated, the ruling concluded that the sanction imposed on the plaintiff was correct, since, the applicable legal regime is that contained in article 39 of the LCCEI. He rejected the argument that the sanction of 30 days without pay breached precept 68 (c) of the Labor Code; and intended to sustain himself in the Public Law regime, to which the plaintiff is subject, with support in precepts 112 of the LGAP, 585 now 682 of the Labor Code and 39 of the LCCEI. He added that the analysis of validity of personnel actions numbers 792-2010 and 3841-2011 (Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz) is independent and, moreover, unrelated to the breach of the duty of probity. He transcribed, in what was of interest to him, what was considered by the Court. The analysis of validity or invalidity of the personnel actions, he noted, is a fundamental requirement to determine if the duty of probity was breached. It is from the motives or elements that sustain that invalidity that liability would arise, since it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law could generate official liability for breach of the duty of probity. The ruling, he noted, relied on some (isolated) resolutions, without adjusting what in doctrine is called the "differentiating fact," as a keystone for extrapolating jurisprudence from one case to another. To validate the application of article 39 of the LCCEI, he stated, it was necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff in light of the required probity because, being an indeterminate legal concept, it was up to the Administration and, in this case, the Court, to concretize it. To his principal, he indicated, it was not demonstrated, in the administrative or judicial venue, that she had incurred in any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in article 38 of the LCCEI, a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in numeral 39 ibidem, exclusive for the grounds of the cited canon 38. As the violation of the LCCEI with the plaintiff's conduct was undemonstrated, he concluded, the ruling incurred the defect of subparagraph (c) of article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying articles 3 and 39 ibidem.

**XXIII.** As has been set forth, the Court, in sections VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, not only explained why the provisions of laws numbers 7428, 8292 and 8422 are applicable to this litigation; but also analyzed, with prolixity, the reasons why the plaintiff, contrary to what was indicated by the appellant, breached the duty of probity and the internal control rules. Said argumentation, as has been indicated, was not duly challenged by the appellant. Specifically, as indicated in sections X and XVIII of this resolution, in considering X, the judging persons were eloquent in indicating that the material and formal unlawfulness lies in what is provided by the regulations notified to the plaintiff. Specifically, numeral 38 (d) of Law No. 8422 and 13 (c) of the Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711 of March 16, 2004. They also indicated that the subjective support for the sanction is the duty to have required the technical and legal inputs that would give backing to the order dictated and that she chose to execute, exempting compliance with minimum requirements. That is, contrary to what was pointed out by the challenger, the Court explained that the reprehensible conduct of the plaintiff fits within the provisions of canon 38 of Law No. 8422. Which, it is insisted, was not duly objected to by the challenger. Therefore, the application of precept 39 ibidem is appropriate, regarding the sanction imposed and not section 68 (c) of the Labor Code. Which, as has been indicated, this Chamber shares.

The appellant stated on folio 18: "*We lament that conclusion* [referring to what was indicated by the Court regarding that the analysis of validity of the personnel actions granted in favor of Messrs. Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Díaz does not constitute a preliminary question (cuestión prejudicial), to which the possibility of initiating the corresponding disciplinary procedure is subordinated]. *The analysis of validity or invalidity of the personnel actions is a 'fundamental' requirement to determine if the duty of probity was breached, because it is from the motives or elements that sustain that invalidity that liability would arise, because it is legally improbable that a personnel action adjusted to Law could generate official liability for breach of the duty of probity.*" The Court, in section XII of the contested judgment, in that regard indicated: "*On this independence of purpose between both procedures, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has already ruled in exercise of the powers of the Court of Cassation (pursuant to Transitional Provision I in relation to article 136 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure, Law No. 8508), among others, in resolutions numbers 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 and 000003-F-TC-2018.*" Therefore, the deficiency on which the petitioner bases her objections is not observed." In effect, this cassation body, regarding the public treasury (hacienda pública), has indicated that the processing of a sanctioning procedure is autonomous with respect to the processing of the annulment procedure. In this regard, in addition to those indicated by the adjudicating persons, ruling no. 114-F-TC-2016 of 11 hours 10 minutes on September 22, 2016, may be consulted. That is, the existence of a previously decreed nullity regarding a specific act harmful to the public treasury is not a requisite -sine qua non- to validly exercise the sanctioning regime against the public servant responsible for that damaging conduct or omission. There is no conditioning or subordination of one procedure to the other. Both are fully independent of each other and differentiable in terms of their object and scope. The appellant, on the indicated page 18, merely stated: "The ruling relies on some (isolated) resolutions without adjusting what in doctrine is called the 'distinguishing fact' ('hecho diferenciador') as the keystone to extrapolate jurisprudence from one case to another." What was stated does not go beyond being a merely argumentative allegation. It does not delve into the reasons why, in his view, the cited precedents are not applicable to this litigation (lite). The appellant added on said page 18: "To validate the application of Article 39 of the LCCEI, it was absolutely necessary to identify the content and effects of the acts attributed to the plaintiff regarding the claimed probity, because as it is an undefined legal concept, it was up to the Administration and in this case the Court, to make it concrete." Precisely, it is insisted, that is what the Court did in the indicated recitals of the questioned ruling, as explained in section XX of this resolution. On page 19, the appellant alleged: "It was not demonstrated to the plaintiff in administrative or judicial proceedings that she had incurred any of the 15 grounds for sanction established in Article 38 of the LCCEI: a reason that makes it impossible to apply the sanctioning regime established in Article 39 ibid, exclusive for the grounds of the cited Article 38. / Since the violation of the LCCEI through the plaintiff's conduct remains undemonstrated, the ruling incurred the defect of subsection c) of Article 138 of the CPCA, by improperly applying Articles 3 and 39 of the LCCEI, and for this reason, I request that it be quashed and, ruling on the merits, the claim be upheld in all its extremes." Contrary to what was stated by the appellant, it is repeated, the adjudicating persons, in section X of the questioned judgment, with support, furthermore, in what was meticulously indicated in the preceding recitals, with total clarity, reproached the plaintiff for having incurred the notified unlawfulness -due to breach of the duty of probity and the internal control regime-, specifically, the conduct provided in subsection d) of precept 38 of Law no. 8422, which, it is insisted, was not subject to challenge by the contesting party. Ergo, what is indicated is futile for the purpose of modifying what was resolved.

XXIV.In the sixth and last attack against the questioned judgment for violation of substantive norms, page 19, the appellant objected to what was resolved regarding the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero not being responsible. The Court concluded that no responsibility is attributable to him because the presuppositions of Article 199 of the LGAP were not met, which he does not share. Subsection 1) of that numeral, he indicated, attributes personal responsibility to the official who acts with malice (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave). In this litigation (lite), he added, he acted with malice, because, from the start of the sanctioning procedure, he knew that the Executive Presidents who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the additional salaries (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single block of their partial benefits). However, he added, he did not charge them, nor those favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal). He limited himself to questioning the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that she had limited herself to signing the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies. The Court, he asserted, performed a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of that norm, by considering that, in the case, the co-defendant did not incur manifest illegality because he did not depart from opinions or advisory opinions. However, he pointed out, it ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality. He reproduced, as relevant, that norm. It leaves the list of circumstances of illegality open. In this case, he noted, his principal indicated, in the administrative procedure, having limited himself to complying with superior orders, requesting the inclusion in the litigation (integración de la litis) of those who issued them. Yet, it was emphatically rejected by the co-defendant without valid legal reason, with personal responsibility for those decisions. Articles 108 and 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, he argued, establish the cases for the civil, administrative, and criminal liability of public servants subject to those norms, as is the case of the co-defendant. In subsection e) of numeral 110, he alleged, the actions leading to that responsibility are established. He reproduced that provision. It is clear, he commented, that the co-defendant used his position and public resources for purposes other than those intended by law. If what he sought was the real truth of the facts and to determine civil and administrative responsibilities, he had the obligation to bring into the procedure all who participated in the conduct. However, he insists, he limited himself to charging the plaintiff with acts ordered by her peers, with an evident deviation of power and resources towards personal ends prohibited by the transcribed rule. For the foregoing reasons, and given the non-application of Article 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law, he concluded, the ruling typified what is provided in Article 138, subsection c). Therefore, he requested it be quashed with the legal consequences.

XXV.In the present ground for disagreement, the appellant again alleges different hypotheses, but due to the way it was structured, they are inseparable. In this sense, on page 19 he stated: "In the case at hand (sublite), the co-defendant Rodríguez Solís [sic] acted with malice because from the start of the sanctioning procedure he knew that [sic] the executive presidents [sic] who preceded him were the ones who issued the resolutions through which the additional salaries (sobresueldos) were paid to officials Rodríguez Bonilla and Novo Días (to avoid the total payment in a single block of their partial benefits) and yet, he did not charge them, nor those favored by those decisions (which in any case were legal), limiting himself to charging the plaintiff —the weakest link— with malicious political calculation and express knowledge that this official had limited herself to signing [sic] the actions ordered by the Executive Presidencies." (The underline is supplied). The factual circumstance that the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero acted with "malicious political calculation" was not proven by the adjudicating persons. Hence, if it occurred, it would originate a defect due to breach of substantive norms, for indirect violation of law (subsection a) of precept 138 of the CPCA). However, the appellant did not indicate with which means of conviction his statement is proven. On the other hand, he also alleged improper interpretation of canon 199, subsection 3) of the LGAP, which would originate the cassation ground provided in subsection c) ibid; that is, direct violation of law. Likewise, he invoked, as determined from what was set forth on page 20, the direct violation of precept 110 of the Financial Administration and Public Budgets Law (subsection c) ibid), for not having included in the litigation (integrado la litis) (in the disciplinary administrative process) all those who participated in the questioned conduct. The manifested ambiguity, it is reiterated, violates the technique of cassation.

XXVI.Without prejudice to what is set forth in the preceding recital and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. First.

In section XIII of the challenged judgment, entitled "Regarding the liability of the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero," the adjudicators, in what is relevant, stated: "[…] *In this sense, from the analysis of the allegations in which the claimant seeks liability against the co-defendant, it is evident that it is contingent upon the final decision adopted within the disciplinary procedure followed against him being invalid. However, in what has been challenged, that specific conduct does not present the deficiencies attributed to it, which is why the criterion of manifest illegality in question is not present. Thus, the liability attributed to Mr. Rodríguez Barquero is unfounded due to the lack of the basic criterion on which that framework of disciplinary referability would be based. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim in that regard must be ordered.*" (The underlining is supplied). As is easily determined, the cassation appellant made an argument completely divorced from the challenged judgment. He did not object to what the Court indicated in order to dismiss said liability of the co-defendant. He merely stated: "*The Court makes a biased and limited reading of subsection 3) of Article 199 by considering that in this case the co-defendant did not incur in manifest illegality because he did not depart from expert reports or advisory opinions, however, it ignored that this is one of the possibilities of manifest illegality, because the norm expressly indicates: […] leaving the list of possible illegalities open.*" (The underlining is supplied). This is unrelated to what was indicated by the Court, that is, that no liability lies against the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero because the final act is valid. Therefore, what was stated in the grievance under study is futile for the purpose of overturning the decision.

**XXVII. Second.** The argument put forth by the appellant in the censure under study, concerning the failure to integrate the administrative process with all those who participated in the challenged conduct, in order to attribute liability to the co-defendant Rodríguez Barquero, was not timely proposed or debated in this process. It should be noted that the Court was emphatic in indicating that, after analyzing the allegations made by the plaintiff to claim that liability, it is determined that it is contingent solely upon the final decision, adopted within the administrative disciplinary procedure followed against him, being invalid, which it was not. This is corroborated by what was stated in the claim, image 2 of the virtual judicial file: "*The personal liability of the defendant Rodríguez Barquero arises from the provisions of Article 199, subsection 3) of the LEGAP, because he departed from the criterion of the directing body composed of legal specialists, without any legally valid justification, furthermore, that liability was extended to the fact that in the motion for reversal or reconsideration, the legal defects of the resolution were pointedly indicated to him, and he likewise maintained the sanction, through a failure to resolve, which according to Article 329.2 in relation to Article 211 of the LEGAP, is deemed a serious failure of service and, therefore, of a personal nature.*" Ergo, what is being pointed out now, in cassation, being novel, cannot be the subject of analysis by this Chamber.

**XXVIII. APPEAL OF THE ATTORNEY OF INDER.** In the sole grievance, the appellant announced that he would file it for breach of substantive norms, according to the cassation ground provided in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA. That is, for direct violation of law. There exists, he indicated, an incorrect interpretation of the legal norm. The Court, he noted, upon hearing and deciding on the procedural costs, considered that the plaintiff had sufficient reason to litigate, since the investigating body of the procedure issued an expert report proposing to relieve her of all liability in the disciplinary cause brought against her. In that sense, he said, it considered that this circumstance granted her an "objective reason" (*razón objetiva*) to try to rebut the final decision that imposed the decreed sanction of suspension. Consequently, it decided without a ruling on costs. The judgment, he asserted, incorrectly applied precept 193 subsection b) of the CPCA and, as such, gave an incorrect interpretation to the legal norm. The exemption of costs in favor of the plaintiff is not appropriate, he said, applying subsection b) of Article 193. He reproduced said precept. He transcribed, from the Regulation of the Labor Relations Unit and the Labor Relations Board of INDER, numerals 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33, and 53. What occurred in this sanctioning administrative procedure, he added, was in compliance with said internal regulations. All these procedures, in the case of INDER, must always go through the review and approval of the Labor Relations Board. Thus, even though the concluding report of the procedure's directing body was concluded in time, it had to be referred, for its evaluation, to the Labor Relations Board. This is reflected in folio 287 of the main file - no. URL-002-2015-. This Board, in turn, referred it to the decision-making body. The issuance of the final act occurred on April 28, 2017, and it was notified that same day to the plaintiff. He conducted a theoretical analysis on the reasoning or statement of reasons for the final act of the procedure in general; then, he referred to said formal requirement in the act issued in the procedure against the plaintiff. He emphasized, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 136 subsection c) of the LGAP, said statement of reasons allowed the decision to be supported against the recommendation report issued by the investigating body and against the considerations made by the Labor Relations Board. Both criteria of a non-binding nature according to precept 303 ibidem. The investigating body of the procedure issued an expert report proposing to relieve the plaintiff here of all liability in the disciplinary cause brought against her; but that, he pointed out, does not constitute an "objective reason" (*razón objetiva*). On the contrary, in a subjective reasoning, by which it can be justified that the plaintiff had sufficient volitional elements to try to rebut the final decision adopted, it is understandable that the petitioner disagrees with the considerations and development of the final act compared to the recommendations issued by the directing body (investigator of all preparatory acts leading to the issuance of the final act). But this, he added, does not imply that such an assessment becomes an objective value judgment sufficient for the adjudicator to equate it to a sufficient reason to litigate and, therefore, an exemption from the payment of procedural costs as legally corresponds. Likewise, he referred to the differences and competencies of the directing and decision-making bodies within the administrative process. He indicated that the error of the Court was having unduly interpreted a legal norm (193 subsection b of the CPCA) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate. The reason why it decided that the plaintiff should be exempted from costs was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against INDER, due to the fact that the recommendation issued by the directing body was favorable to her. However, he argued, that is not the appropriate act for declaring rights in favor of the administered parties, which is why the Court violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law: principles of legality, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality, by valuing said "objective reason to litigate" as having merit. In his view, there is an improper application of the legal norm, since the reasons for which the adjudicator decides that the plaintiff should be exempted from costs do not exist. Consequently, he requested the challenged judgment be revoked regarding the exemption of the plaintiff from the payment of costs. He requested that this duty be imposed on her, with the recognition of interest and indexation in favor of his client.

Pursuant to numerals 119, 138(c), and 193 of the CPCA, it concluded that there is no exemption from the payment of costs against the losing plaintiff, and therefore the payment of both costs of the proceeding must be imposed upon her.

**XXIX.** On folio 1 verso of the file, the appellant indicated: "*The decision incorrectly applied article 193(b) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo and therefore gave an improper interpretation of the legal norm*. *In this case, there is the ground under subsection (c) of article 138 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo*." (The underlining is not from the original). That is, the appellant announced they were filing the objection based on a direct violation of law. This was reiterated on folio 8, when they stated: "*Therefore, in this representation's view, there is an improper application of the legal norm, since the reasons for which the judge decided that the plaintiff should be exonerated from costs do not exist, because,* [sic] *therefore, it is respectfully requested that the rulings be revoked* [sic] *Resolución N° 095-2019-VI issued by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, with respect to exonerating the plaintiff from the payment of costs, and that it be rectified and the plaintiff be ordered to pay personal costs, procedural costs, interest, and indexation in favor of the Inder.* / *Therefore, pursuant to numerals 119 and 138(c), 193, and following and concordant articles of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, this representation considers that there is no exemption from the payment of costs against the losing plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff must be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding.*" (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). However, on that same folio 8, the appellant indicated: "*Having said the above, it must be noted that the Tribunal's error was having improperly interpreted a legal norm (art. 193(b)) by considering that there was sufficient reason to litigate, since it considered that the reason why it decided that the plaintiff should be exonerated from costs (without a special order as to costs), was that she had sufficient reason to litigate against the Inder, based on the rationale that the recommendation issued by the directing body was favorable to her, this not being the appropriate act for a declaration of rights in favor of the Administered Parties, and therefore the Tribunal, in the appealed decision, violated the norms and principles of Constitutional Law, the Principle of Legality, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality, by evaluating said «objective reason to litigate» as having merit*." (The underlining and highlighting are from the original). Now, the appellant alleged the cassation ground for breach of substantive norms, provided for in subsection (d) of precept 138 of the CPCA: "*When the judgment violates the norms or principles of Constitutional Law, among others, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality.*" The confusion brought to light, as has been indicated, violates the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds of the appeal must be stated clearly and precisely (numeral 139(3) of the CPCA).

**XXX.** Notwithstanding what is stated in the preceding recital, and for greater abundance of reasoning, it is pertinent to note the following. The Tribunal, in recital XVI of the challenged judgment, indicated: "***Costas.** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so. Dispensation from this order is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, this Tribunal considers that the plaintiff has had sufficient reason to litigate, because the investigating body of the procedure issued an opinion proposing to release her from all responsibility in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against her. In that sense, it is this Chamber's consideration that this circumstance grants her an objective reason to try to rebut the final decision that imposed the decreed sanction of suspension on her. Therefore, it is resolved without a special order as to costs.*" (The underlining is supplied). This Chamber shares what was resolved by the judges, in accordance with the reasons set forth below. Precept 193(b) of the CPCA provides: "*In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, the losing party shall be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made ex officio.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when:* […] ***b)** *Due to the nature of the issues debated, there has existed, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate.*" (The underlining is supplied). In contentious-administrative proceedings, this Tribunal has repeatedly indicated that, in accordance with that canon -193 of the CPCA-, the ruling on the costs of the proceeding must be made ex officio, ordering the losing party to pay them. Consequently, the order of costs is imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. That is, for losing the litigation, without this meaning they did not have sufficient reason to litigate or that they are considered a reckless or bad-faith litigant. For its part, that numeral provides the circumstances under which they may be exempted from their payment. In this regard, although it involves a discretionary power, the truth is that it is not immune to cassation review, since both in its exercise and in its non-application, a violation of law may occur, and, to that extent, an undue omission is not and should not be synonymous with arbitrariness, in such case, committed by the judge themselves. Especially if it involves a grant of power to the judge with specific circumstances that limit their discretionary power in this matter. Consequently, on this point, it is considered that with the mere application of the general rule of article 193 of the CPCA (order against the losing party for the payment of both costs), the doors to a cassation appeal are not closed, since, on the contrary, the matter is admissible for examination on the merits (provided the legal requirements are met) in the event of a potential defect by omission in the application of the legal provisions authorizing the exoneration from said costs. Therefore, depending on the circumstances of the case, a cassation appeal may indeed be appropriate. In the specific case, the appellant claims against the exoneration from the payment of costs, alleging improper application or interpretation of subsection (b) of said precept. That provision, as has been resolved, does not authorize the exemption in the case of proper procedural conduct; but rather because the nature of what was claimed allows one to infer that, in the Tribunal's judgment, the debate was necessary to clarify to whom the Legal System lent its support. In the specific case under examination, it must be noted, without disregarding the legal nature of the report or recommendation of the directing body of the administrative procedure, like the judges, this Chamber considers that the existence of that opinion from the directing or investigating body (issued by two INDER professionals) recommending exonerating the plaintiff from responsibility, determines or entails that the debate was necessary to clarify whether the plaintiff was right or not.

Consequently, the adjudicating persons did not incur the legal infractions alleged by the appellant.

**XXXI.** By virtue of the reasons noted, given the evident omission in systematically and specifically combating the grounds of the challenged resolution, not with simple and generic disagreements of criteria, this Chamber determines that the appeals filed are insufficient to generate review of the contested ruling in this venue as they lack legal grounding, and therefore their outright rejection is warranted (numeral 140 subsection c) of the CPCA).

**POR TANTO** The appeals filed are rejected outright.

**Rocío Rojas Morales** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** **Jessica Jiménez Ramírez**

Revisión del Documento  Res. 000221-A-TC-2021 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del veintiocho de octubre de dos mil veintiuno.

En el proceso de conocimiento, declarado de puro derecho, formulado por MARLENE CHAVES MORALES, licenciada en recursos humanos, portadora de la cédula de identidad número 106150903, representada por su apoderado especial judicial César Hines Céspedes, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número 700610989; contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, con cédula de persona jurídica número 4-000-042143-11, representado por su apoderado especial judicial Francisco Antonio Villegas Ramírez, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número 601610997 y RICARDO RODRÍGUEZ BARQUERO, licenciado en Planificación y máster en Administración de Proyectos, portador de la cédula de identidad número 203790749, con el patrocinio letrado, en un inicio, de Alexánder Gómez María, abogado, portador del carné de colegiado número 18484 y, luego, de su apoderado especial judicial Bryan David Hidalgo Fallas, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número 114100246 y del carné de colegiado 23551; tanto el apoderado de la actora como del Instituto demandado formularon sendos recursos de casación impugnando la sentencia número 95-2019-VI, emitida por la Sección Sexta del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda a las 13 horas 50 minutos del 31 de julio de 2019.

Redacta la magistrada Jiménez Ramírez

CONSIDERANDO

I.De conformidad con los hechos que tuvo por acreditados el Tribunal y no fueron cuestionados por los recurrentes, se tiene que mediante oficio no. PE-3139-2005 del 8 de junio de 2005, el entonces Presidente Ejecutivo del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), le solicitó a la Contraloría General de la República (CGR) una aclaración respecto a la situación de las indemnizaciones por reubicación descendente, pues, esa instancia contralora rechazó las indemnizaciones parciales aplicadas por ese ente. En oficio no. FOE-AM-0350 (8048) del 6 de julio de ese año, la CGR indicó, en lo de interés: “[…] Al respecto, se le comunica que en vista de que los ajustes por homologación planteados es un asunto puramente administrativo y no judicial como bien lo apunta su persona en el oficio No. PE-3139-2005 citado, se debe aportar la resolución administrativa que justifique cada caso en particular, en cuyo documento las autoridades administrativas del IDA planteen por ejemplo las razones del movimiento propuesto, situación del empleado en el momento de la reestructuración y la justificación técnica para la nueva situación del funcionario. […] Además de lo anterior es importante dejar claro que estos egresos deben clasificarse y no en la subpartida de “Indemnizaciones” ya que la naturaleza del ajuste propuesto no se orienta a compensar algún perjuicio provocado por Administración del funcionario. Por el contrario, lo que se pretende es no perjudicar al empleado rebajando su salario y la suma que le permite mantener las condiciones laborales del funcionario debe trasladarse como un sobresueldo en la partida de “Servicios Personales”. Este sobresueldo se reconoce a la persona y no al puesto de la nueva estructura organizacional, por lo que debe mantenerse como tal durante el tiempo que el funcionario se mantenga prestando sus servicios a esa Institución”. En oficio no. PE-3804-2005 del 22 de agosto del mismo año, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del IDA formuló solicitud de reconsideración del anterior oficio, de conformidad con el artículo 13 de los Lineamientos Generales de Política Salarial y Empleo para el Sector Público. Mediante el oficio no. FOE-AM-0525 (11668) del 21 de setiembre del mismo año, en lo conducente, la CGR manifestó: "Al respecto, se le comunica que el pago de indemnizaciones por homologaciones descendentes de puestos procede con fundamento en el inciso c) del artículo 13 citado si se dan las condiciones dispuestas en esta norma, es decir, que la ubicación del servidor no fuere posible en los seis meses estipulados en el inciso a) de este artículo y que el funcionario no aceptare el descenso propuesto por la Administración del IDA. No obstante, se recuerda que en vista de que los ajustes por homologación es un asunto puramente administrativo y no judicial se debe aportar como requisito para la aprobación presupuestaria la resolución administrativa que justifique cada caso en particular. Se reitera lo señalado al respecto en el oficio No. 8048 de julio de 2005 emitido por esta Contraloría General, en el sentido de que dicha resolución debe contener un mínimo de información acerca de las razones del movimiento propuesto, situación del empleado en el momento de la reestructuración y la justificación técnica para la nueva situación del funcionario. Se aclara que lo anterior aplica para el caso de funcionarios con quienes no fue posible llegar a un acuerdo acerca de su situación laboral, y por lo tanto debe darse por terminada la relación laboral, supuesto en el que procedería tal indemnización. Finalmente, en relación con los términos del oficio No. 8048 antes citado, se aclara que lo ahí dispuesto aplica para el caso de funcionarios que se mantienen en la institución por cuanto fue posible un acuerdo en relación con su estatus laboral, en cuyo caso no procede el pago de indemnización sino el reconocimiento de un sobresueldo por la diferencia salarial no reconocida en su nueva categoría salarial ". Por resolución no. 2-2010 de las 9 horas del 16 de febrero de 2010, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del IDA emitió criterio en cuanto a la reasignación descendente del señor Ricardo Alberto Rodríguez Bonilla. Al efecto dispuso "POR TANTO. [...] se procede a aplicar lo establecido por el ente [sic] contralor en el oficio N° 11668 FOE-AM-0525 y por lo tanto se procede a la asignación del sobresueldo antes señalado. Para tal efecto se considerará la diferencia entre el salario correspondientes al puesto de DIRECTOR REGIONAL Y PROFESIONAL E, según el detalle establecido por el Área de Recursos Humanos, el cual se y se [sic] tiene como parte integral de esta resolución." Don Ricardo mostró su conformidad con el contenido de esa resolución mediante escrito del día 24 siguiente, en donde indicó: "Entendiéndose para todo efecto, que la diferencia salarial negativa que se estaría generando por dicho procedimiento, estará siendo aplicado como un sobresueldo." El 5 de abril de ese año, la Presidencia Ejecutiva y la Jefatura de Recursos Humanos, ocupada, en ese momento, por Marlene Chaves Morales, emitieron acción de personal a favor del señor Rodríguez Bonilla, en donde se indicó el reconocimiento de un sobresueldo de ₡645.942,00, a partir del 25 de febrero de 2010 por el cambio de puesto. Ese día, 25 de febrero del 2010, don Ricardo y la Presidencia Ejecutiva, suscribieron finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial, donde se expresó, en la cláusula cuarta, que el funcionario aceptaba que la diferencia salarial negativa surgida a raíz de la renuncia a su puesto, que implicaba una reasignación descendente, le sería cancelada como sobresueldo. En oficio no. PE-794-2011 del 17 de mayo de 2011, la Presidencia Ejecutiva le indicó al señor Ronald Novo Díaz, Jefe Subregional de Liberia: "Para el manejo de su situación salarial, se aplicará el precedente administrativo que tiene origen y fundamento en el oficio de la Contraloría General de la República N° 11668 (FOE-AM-0525) de 21 de setiembre de 2005. Tal como lo indica el órgano Contralor, lo procedente en su caso es el reconocimiento de un sobresueldo por la diferencia salarial no reconocida en su nueva categoría salarial. De esta manera, usted no tendrá ningún perjuicio en su ingreso. [...]". Dicha propuesta fue aceptada por el funcionario en escrito del día 24 siguiente. El 7 de julio de ese año, la Presidencia Ejecutiva y la Jefatura de Recursos Humanos, ocupada en ese momento por la señora Chaves Morales, emitieron acción de personal a favor del señor Novo Díaz, indicándose el reconocimiento de un sobresueldo por un monto de ₡322.100,50 a partir del día 11 de ese mes y año por el cambio de puesto. El 17 de agosto de 2011, el señor Novo Díaz y la Presidencia Ejecutiva suscribieron finiquito de indemnización salarial parcial, en donde se expresó, en la cláusula cuarta, que el funcionario aceptaba que la diferencia salarial negativa surgida a raíz de la renuncia a su puesto, que implicaba una reasignación descendente, le sería cancelada como sobresueldo. En oficio no. DAJ-096-2013 del 12 de febrero de 2013, la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos del INDER analizó la solicitud de confección de finiquito del cambio de puesto de un funcionario de esa entidad. En lo de interés, señaló: “[…] Más exactamente, para aplicar lo aquí indicado [se refiere al artículo 13 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 31711-H], debemos de estar en presencia de las siguientes circunstancias: 1- Que exista una variación hacia clasificaciones de menor nivel salarial que la original. 2- Que dicha variación sea producto de cambios en los manuales institucionales. Reasignaciones, estudios integrales, homologaciones o conversión de sistemas. Como se puede ver en el caso que se nos pone en conocimiento, así como en casos anteriores, los mismos, si bien existe una variación hacia una clasificación salarial inferior a la original, la consecuencia de ello no es producto de cambios en el manual institucional, de una reasignación (no existe un estudio técnico de reasignación), de un estudio integral, de una homologación o de una conversión de sistemas. […] Consecuentemente, aplicar el artículo 13 del Procedimiento para la aplicación de las directrices generales y regulaciones de política salarial, empleo y clasificación de puestos de los ministerios, entidades públicas y demás órganos según corresponda cubiertas por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria para el año 2005, en estos casos, pasando la diferencia salarial entre puestos como un sobresueldo a favor de los funcionarios, constituye un acto totalmente ilegal que debe proceder corregirse de inmediato." En consecuencia, recomendó realizar una revisión de los casos aprobados con antelación, a fin de tomar las medidas correctivas correspondientes. Por oficio no. A-PE-0220-2013 del 20 de febrero de 2013 de la Presidencia Ejecutiva, suscrito por el asesor legal de ese órgano y el entonces Presidente Ejecutivo, se apartaron de dicho criterio. Señalaron que, en los trámites de reasignación descendente resulta aplicable lo previsto en el artículo 101 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil y su reglamento. Producto de lo cual, ordenaron, al entonces Coordinador del Área de Recursos Humanos, aplicar la metodología ahí señalada. En oficio no. DFOE-EC-0417 (07581) del 24 de julio de 2014, la CGR señaló, en atención a solicitud de aclaración planteada por la Auditoría Interna de dicho ente, sobre el procedimiento a seguir en caso de reclasificaciones de plazas a una categoría inferior: "[...] Al respecto me permito informar que los oficios citados están referidos a situaciones concretas de un grupo de funcionarios, por lo tanto, lo resuelto en esa oportunidad no puede utilizarse como referencia para establecer una política generalizada dentro de la institución." Hizo alusión al Decreto Ejecutivo no. 37078-H, en concreto, al numeral 12, norma de la cual, expuso que la Administración tenía tres posibles alternativas para resolver los casos donde se produjeran reclasificaciones de puestos a un menor nivel. Mediante oficio no. A-ADV-076-2014 del 16 de setiembre de 2014, la Auditoria Interna le comunicó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva: "[...] En el oficio ARH-073-2014 se explica el fundamento para proceder al pago de un sobresueldo y lo justifica la Administración con el pronunciamiento de la Contraloría General de la República FOE-AM-0525 del 21 de setiembre de 2005. Sin embargo, el ente [sic] contralor con el pronunciamiento 07581 de 24 de julio de 2014 aclaró que el oficio FOE-AM-0525 de 21 de setiembre de 2005 está referido a una situación concreta de un grupo de funcionarios y que no puede utilizarse como referencia para establecer una política generalizada dentro de la institución." Por oficio no. DA-017-2015 del 20 de febrero de 2015, la jefatura del Departamento Administrativo le comunicó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva que, mediante oficio A-PE-906-2014 del 9 de setiembre de 2014, se solicitó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva una investigación preliminar sobre los pagos de sobresueldos realizados al servidor Walter Mora Leiva. En el oficio no. PE-259-2015 del día 26 siguiente, la Presidencia Ejecutiva le solicitó a la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales iniciar una investigación preliminar respecto de los hechos mencionados en el oficio DA-017-2015. Mediante oficio no. URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo de 2016, la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales emitió informe de la investigación preliminar. Estimó que existía base suficiente para iniciar acciones disciplinarias por el presunto otorgamiento indebido de sobresueldos en casos de reasignaciones descendentes. Asimismo, expuso que al señor Ronald Novo Díaz se le reconoció el sobresueldo desde el 11 de julio de 2011, mediante acción de personal no. 3841-2011, el cual se le paga desde la segunda quincena de julio del 2011. Además, en lo atinente al señor Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, ese sobresueldo le fue reconocido mediante acción de personal no. 792-2010 desde el 25 de febrero de 2010. Ese informe señaló que, a la fecha de su emisión, ambos sobresueldos se estaban cancelando. Por tal motivo, indicó que la Presidencia Ejecutiva debía evaluar si correspondía solicitar criterio a la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos sobre la pertinencia de instruir otro tipo de procedimiento para detener los presuntos pagos indebidos y recuperar el dinero que pudo ser ilegalmente reconocido como sobresueldo por reasignación descendente. En oficio no. PE-505-2016 del 27 de abril de 2016, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER designó el órgano director del procedimiento por el supuesto reconocimiento indebido de sobresueldos por reasignaciones descendentes en contra, entre otra, de la funcionaria Marlene Chaves Morales. Por acto de las 9 horas del 24 de junio de 2016, el órgano director del procedimiento (expediente URL-002-2015) emitió el traslado de cargos, imputándole a la señora Chaves Morales las conductas a investigar. Asimismo, en lo de interés, se indicó: "Con dichas actuaciones descritas en los hechos 1 y 2 supra expuestos, la funcionaria Marlene Chaves Morales, pudo haber satisfecho un interés privado por encima del interés público al presuntamente ejecutar actos administrativos en aplicación errónea del procedimiento de reasignación descendente previsto en el artículo 13 del Procedimiento para la aplicación de las directrices generales y regulaciones de política salarial, empleo y clasificación puestos del ministerios [sic], entidades públicas y demás órganos según corresponda cubiertos por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria" contenido en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004, pudiendo haber contravenido la señora Chaves Morales con el actuar descrito los artículos 3, 4 (deber de probidad) y 38 inciso b) de la Ley contra la Corrupción e [sic] Enriquecimiento Ilícito N°8422. [...]". Se hizo referencia a los cánones 11 de la Constitución Política; 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP); 3, 4, 38 de la Ley no. 8422; así como del precepto 13 del Decreto no. 31711. También, se le indicó sobre las posibles consecuencias del procedimiento en cuanto a las eventuales sanciones disciplinarias a imponer. Ese acto le fue notificado de manera personal el 28 de junio de 2016. La audiencia oral y privada se celebró el 14 de setiembre de 2016. En acto de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 14 de octubre de 2016, el órgano director rindió el informe de conclusiones no. 23-2016. Recomendó exonerar a la investigada, Marlene Chaves Morales, al estimar que no existía responsabilidad por las actuaciones intimadas. Con el oficio no. URL-143-2016 del 18 de octubre de 2016, el órgano director remitió a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales el expediente disciplinario para su conocimiento. En acta no. 2-2017 de la sesión realizada el 15 de marzo de 2017 de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales del INDER, se conoció el procedimiento disciplinario expediente no. URL-0002-2015. En el acuerdo adoptado en el artículo IV, se dispuso, por unanimidad, separarse de la recomendación del órgano director. Esto, porque no existe en el expediente ninguna prueba de que las dos funcionarias investigadas se acogieron al procedimiento establecido en los artículos 107 y siguientes de la LGAP, alegando el deber de obediencia. Por ende, indicó, corresponderá a la Presidencia Ejecutiva o a la Administración Superior establecer, al amparo de la LGAP -artículo 213- y los cánones 3, 38 y 39 de la Ley de Enriquecimiento Ilícito, el quantum de la sanción. Recomendó, previo a establecerla, la Administración le solicite al Departamento Administrativo proceder a efectuar una cuantificación del monto que ha sido erogado de manera indebida por la Administración al haber aprobado esos pagos de sobresueldo. Junto con el oficio no. RL-032-2017 del 31 de marzo de 2017, la Junta de Relaciones Laborales remitió a la Presidencia Ejecutiva el expediente administrativo URL-002-2015, a efectos de emitir el acto final. Mediante resolución no. 037-2017 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de abril del 2017, el entonces Presidente Ejecutivo del INDER, máster Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero, emitió el acto final. Dispuso: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, los artículos 192 de la Constitución Política, numeral 26 inciso j) de la Ley No. 9036 que transforma el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) en el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) y crea la Secretaría Técnica de Desarrollo Rural, artículos 3, 4, 38 inciso d) y de la de la [sic] Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 11, 210 inciso 1), 113, 211, siguientes y concordantes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, 2 del Reglamento de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, el artículo 111 inciso d) del Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil y el artículo 13 inciso c) de los Lineamientos Generales de Política Salarial y Empleo para el Sector Público, este Órgano Decisor resuelve acoger parcialmente la recomendaciones del Órgano Instructor y en consecuencia se declara [...] a Marlene Chaves Morales [...] responsable de la falta gravísima, así calificada por esta Autoridad Administrativa, por el cargo atribuido de Reconocimiento irregular de pagos de Sobresueldos, falta de fiscalización y violación al deber de probidad. En razón de lo anterior y ante la evidente falta al deber de probidad y de los principios de eficacia y eficiencia del servicio público, se resuelve aplicar a la encausada la sanción disciplinaria de un mes de suspensión sin goce de salario, la cual rige a partir del día 15 de mayo del 2017 hasta el 15 de junio de 2017. [...] Se ordena testimoniar piezas para ante la Fiscalía del Ministerio Público del II Circuito Judicial de Goicoechea, a efecto de que se investiguen las conductas irregulares aquí ventiladas. [...]". Este acto le fue comunicado a doña Marlene el 28 de abril de 2017. En escrito del 2 de mayo de ese año, la señora Chaves Morales formuló recurso de reposición, el cual, mediante resolución no. 41-2017 de las 14 horas del día 9 siguiente, fue rechazado por la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER, acto comunicado ese mismo día.

II.El 15 de junio de 2017, el apoderado especial judicial de la señora Chaves Morales formuló el presente proceso de conocimiento en contra del INDER y de don Ricardo Rodríguez Barquero. Solicitó, según el ajuste efectuado en la sesión de la audiencia preliminar celebrada el 20 de febrero de 2018: 1) se declare la nulidad absoluta de la resolución no. 37-2012 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de abril de 2017; 2) se ordene reintegrarle a su mandante, en su totalidad, el salario que le fue rebajado con ocasión de la sanción impuesta y ejecutada; 3) como consecuencia de la nulidad absoluta de dicha resolución, se condene, de manera solidaria a los codemandados, al pago de los daños y perjuicios, para lo cual señaló: a) motivo que los origina: la apertura, desarrollo y sanción de un procedimiento administrativo sancionatorio, "fenecido" desde su origen, que sometió a la actora, primero, a un proceso de angustia y desazón con afectación a su patrimonio moral, que no tenía el deber de sufrir en razón de que las actuaciones imputadas en su oportunidad fueron apegadas a las órdenes emitidas por el órgano máximo en la jerarquía administrativa; además, debió soportar una carga financiera para defenderse en una causa que nunca debió nacer a la vida jurídica, a lo que se le suma la pérdida de sus ingresos por un mes, requeridos para la manutención de su familia; b) esos daños consisten en la pérdida de tranquilidad y en el "manoseo" de su dignidad, al imputarle, como irregularidad, conductas jurídicamente válidas y, además, de cumplimiento obligatorio, señalándola como funcionaria incompetente. De ahí, la doble dimensión del daño, moral y material, el primero por la disminución y decaimiento en su valor personal y, el segundo, por la pérdida de sus ingresos a título de salario por un mes completo, así como el desembolso que debió cubrir para ejercitar su defensa, sin que tuviese el deber de soportar ninguno de los dos; c) el daño moral lo estimó, prudencialmente, en ₡5.000.000,00 y, el material, en ₡3.000.000,00; 4) asimismo, solicitó de ₡1.000.000,00, cancelado por concepto de honorarios profesionales para su defensa; 5) sobre todas las sumas a las que resulten condenados, pidió el reconocimiento de los intereses, calculados desde el momento del desembolso, en el caso de los honorarios de abogado y la deducción del salario; y, desde la sentencia firme, en las demás condenatorias económicas; 6) también, solicitó se les condene al pago de las costas del proceso; 7) por último, requirió la cancelación de los réditos sobre las costas desde la firmeza del fallo y hasta su efectivo pago. Ambos codemandados, en sendos memoriales, se opusieron. El apoderado del INDER alegó la defensa de falta de derecho y el señor Rodríguez Barquero, además de la indicada, la de falta de legitimación pasiva. Por auto de las 13 horas 36 minutos del 29 de noviembre del 2017, considerando que don Ricardo no cumplió la prevención formulada mediante auto de las 9 horas 4 minutos del 24 de octubre del 2017, se tuvo por contestada afirmativamente la demanda en cuanto a los hechos marcados con los números 6, 11, 12, 13, 16 y 19. De igual manera, en la sesión de la audiencia preliminar antes indicada, se declaró esta lite como proceso de puro derecho, rindiendo las partes sus conclusiones de manera oral. El Tribunal, en su sentencia, rechazó la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva. Acogió la de falta de derecho. En consecuencia, rechazó la demanda incoada. Resolvió sin condena en costas. Disconformes, tanto el representante de la actora como del INDER formularon sendos recursos de casación.

III.RECURSO DEL APODERADO DE LA PARTE ACTORA. VIOLACIÓN DE NORMAS PROCESALES. En el único motivo de disconformidad formulado por este motivo casacional, folio 11 del legajo de casación, el recurrente anunció interponerlo por la causal prevista en el inciso c) del canon 137 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA): "Falta de determinación clara y precisa, en la sentencia, de los hechos acreditados por el Tribunal o por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos ilegalmente al proceso." Al efecto, manifestó, en los hechos probados antecedidos con los números 15 y 16 de la sentencia cuestionada, el Tribunal ingresó, como parte del cuadro fáctico, situaciones ajenas a los hechos imputados a su mandante y los reclamados por esta como violatorios de sus derechos. Lo resumió de la siguiente manera: 1) la actora reclamó la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria porque, aún con la errónea aplicación del numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (LOCGR) en tanto ya habían transcurrido cinco años contados a partir de la fecha en que firmó la primera acción de personal -la del señor Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla número 792-2010 del 25 de febrero de 2010-; también, la número 3841-2011, a favor de Ronaldo Novo Díaz (Considerando XV parte final). El procedimiento sancionatorio se inició en el año 2016, seis años después para la primera; y cinco años seis meses después para la segunda; 2) el Tribunal rechazó la pretensión de prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria, al señalar, en el hecho probado no. 15, que mediante oficio DA-017-2015 del 20 de febrero de 2015, la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos le comunicó al Presidente Ejecutivo ordenar una investigación preliminar por pagos de sobresueldos a favor de Walter Mora Leiva. Sin embargo, el caso de ese funcionario no le fue imputado a la actora en el procedimiento sancionatorio, por lo que no fue objeto de examen. En consecuencia, siendo una situación totalmente ajena a la actora, es incapaz de producir efectos interruptores de la prescripción; 3) asimismo, añadió, el Tribunal tuvo como hecho probado no. 16) que, mediante oficio P.E. 259-2015 del 26 de febrero de 2015, el Presidente Ejecutivo ordenó la investigación preliminar. No obstante, el Tribunal no se percató que esa investigación preliminar estaba limitada a investigar el pago de sobresueldos al funcionario Walter Mora Leiva, según lo solicitado en el oficio DA-017-2015; 4) al tratarse de una investigación preliminar sobre un asunto distinto, la investigación preliminar no interrumpió el plazo de prescripción. Al resolver la pretensión de prescripción solicitada, anotó, basado en un cuadro fáctico ajeno a la causa, por tratarse de distintas conductas, personas y responsables, el fallo incurrió en la causal de los incisos c) y d) del artículo 137 íbid, razón por la cual solicitó casar la sentencia con las consecuencias de esa decisión. De acuerdo con lo señalado con el inciso c) de dicho numeral, la falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos acreditados por el Tribunal "por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos ilegalmente al proceso", es causal de invalidez del fallo. En este caso, el Tribunal se basó en el oficio DA-017-2015 y en el oficio PE-259-2015 del 26 de febrero, ambos del año 2015 para rechazar la pretensión de prescripción, pero obvió que la solicitud se refería a Walter Mora Leiva, lo que no le fue imputado a la actora en el procedimiento administrativo. Debido a esa confusión del Tribunal, argumentó, el fallo le cercenó su derecho a acogerse a la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria, en relación con las acciones de personal relacionadas con Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla número 792-2010 del 25 de febrero de 2010 y Ronald Novo Diaz número 3841-2011 de junio de 2011, en tanto habían transcurrido seis años en el caso de la primera; y cinco años seis meses para la segunda. El fallo también incurrió en falta de motivación, sobre la que esta Sala, afirmó, en múltiples sentencias, ha señalado que se produce cuando hay ausencia o, bien, cuando es confusa, como en el caso presente, donde el análisis de los plazos para determinar la prescripción se realizó sobre hechos ajenos a la actora, a la causa y las pruebas. Por las razones anteriores, concluyó solicitando se case la sentencia y, resolviendo sobre el fondo, se declare con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.

IV.En torno a lo relacionado en el apartado anterior, es menester indicar, el numeral 139 inciso 3 del CPCA prevé un requerimiento de orden material necesario tanto para la admisibilidad del recurso como para su posterior valoración por el fondo. Se trata de la motivación del recurso que, por las características de la casación, ha de ser clara y precisa. En este sentido, debe contener, tal como lo dispone el precepto de comentario, la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso. Fáctica, en la medida en que se muestre inconforme con los hechos que se han tenido por demostrados o por indemostrados (lo cual lleva a la ponderación de las probanzas), o con las circunstancias acaecidas en la violación de normas procesales. Jurídica, cuando se trata de un problema que se expone acerca de la aplicación, omisión o indebida interpretación de cualquier norma que integre el bloque de juricidad, incluidos, por supuesto, los principios de rango constitucional, o aquella que también opera por efecto reflejo o indirecto, después de que se modifican los hechos de la sentencia impugnada. Tanto en la infracción procesal, como en la probatoria, pueden concurrir, junto con las razones jurídicas (siempre necesarias), las de carácter fáctico y, en ese sentido, los fundamentos de referencia deberán ser dirigidos en ambas vertientes, so pena de inadmisibilidad. Por su parte, es necesario aclarar que de la fundamentación jurídica se exonera, por expreso mandato legal, la indicación de aquellos cánones relativos al valor del elemento o elementos probatorios mal apreciados. De igual forma, resulta innecesario citar las normas que equivocadamente utilizó y mencionó el órgano jurisdiccional de instancia para emitir y razonar su decisión, porque constan en el mismo pronunciamiento recurrido. Y desde luego, no es indispensable citar los preceptos que establecen los requisitos, plazos y reglas básicas para la admisión del recurso. Antes que la cita de estas últimas, lo imprescindible es que se cumplan, que se pongan en práctica al momento de elaborar e interponer la casación. Así las cosas, la fundamentación dispuesta por ley, puede entenderse, grosso modo, como aquella argumentación técnico-jurídica en la que se mencionan una serie de artículos, o reglas jurídicas entrelazadas o concatenadas entre sí y vinculadas razonablemente en una doble perspectiva: con los argumentos del recurso y con la sentencia atacada. En la medida en que se cite un conjunto de normas jurídicas (o si es del caso, una sola de ellas), atinente y vinculada de manera clara con la sentencia combatida (ya sea en el sustento de hecho o derecho) y los argumentos del recurso, hay fundamentación jurídica. Los agregados jurisprudenciales o las eventuales citas doctrinales, reforzarán en ocasiones las alegaciones efectuadas, pero, por lo general, no hacen a su esencia. Como ya lo ha indicado esta Sala interpretando el artículo 139 de referencia, “se requiere que el recurso cuente con una fundamentación jurídica mínima ... deben explicarse las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión, combatiendo los argumentos de derecho de la sentencia recurrida y consignando, al menos, alguna referencia normativa que le dé sustento” (Resolución no. 318-A-2008, de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 8 de mayo de 2008). La fundamentación es, por tanto, ajena al despliegue confuso de normas y alegatos; a la mezcla de argumentos ininteligibles o a la simple exposición de opiniones sobre la procedencia o justicia del caso, o bien, al recuento de los desaciertos que se consideran cometidos en la sentencia recurrida, sin respaldo en normas o criterios jurídicos. De allí que, si el recurso omite por completo esa relación técnico-normativa a la que se ha hecho referencia, o la que realiza, resulta impertinente o desvinculada al caso de manera manifiesta y evidente, habrá que entender que carece de “total fundamentación jurídica”, y por tanto, incumple el requisito establecido en el numeral 139.3, que se sanciona con el rechazo de plano, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso c) del mismo Código de referencia. De igual manera, esta Sala, en forma reiterada, ha señalado, para que un recurso pase el control de admisión, se precisa, además de la suficiente exposición de motivos, la correspondiente mención y vinculación con la sentencia cuestionada de las normas aplicables que se estimen infringidas. En este sentido, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las resoluciones de esta Cámara números 927-A-S1-2018 de las 11 horas 25 minutos del 25 de octubre de 2018 y 2525-A-S1-2020 de las 11 horas 10 minutos del 10 de noviembre de 2020.

V.En torno a lo alegado por el casacionista, precisa apuntar lo siguiente. Primero. El recurrente, a folio 12, indicó: "Efectivamente, de acuerdo con lo señalado con el inciso c) la falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos acreditados por el Tribunal por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos ilegalmente al proceso, es causal de invalidez del fallo. En este caso, el Tribunal se basó en el oficio DA-017-2015 y en el oficio P.E-259-2015 del 26 de febrero de 2015 para rechazar la pretensión de prescripción, pero obvió que la solicitud se refería a Walter Mora Leiva, lo que no le fue imputado a la actora en el procedimiento administrativo." (Lo resaltado es del original). En la audiencia preliminar, celebrada el 20 de febrero de 2018, en el punto de "ADMISIÓN DE PRUEBA", al minuto 14:32, según la minuta visible a imágenes 135 a 138 del expediente judicial electrónico, el juzgador de trámite admitió la totalidad del expediente administrativo (el cual consta de una carpeta y un disco con las grabaciones de la audiencia en sede administrativa). Asimismo, admitió el disco con la copia del expediente personal de la actora. De conformidad con lo señalado en los hechos probados antecedidos con los números 15 y 16, el oficio DA-017-2015 del 20 de febrero de 2015 consta a folios 2 a 4 del expediente administrativo y el oficio no. PE-259-2015 del 26 de febrero de 2015, a folio 1 de ese mismo expediente. Por lo tanto, dichos hechos probados, diferente a lo señalado por el recurrente, no se fundaron en medios probatorios ilegítimos ni introducidos ilegalmente al proceso.

VI.Segundo. El impugnante, en el mismo folio indicado, afirmó: "Debido a esa confusión del Tribunal, el fallo le cercenó su derecho a acogerse a la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria en relación con las acciones de personal relacionadas con Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla número 792-2010 del 25 de febrero de 2010 y Ronald Novo Diaz número 3841-2011 de junio de 2011, en tanto había transcurrido 6 años en el caso de la primera y 5 años y 6 meses para la segunda." Las personas juzgadoras, en los hechos probados antecedidos con los números 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 y 20, indicaron lo siguiente: "[…] 15) Por oficio DA-017-2015 de fecha 20 de febrero del 2015, la jefatura del Departamento Administrativo comunica a la Presidencia Ejecutiva que mediante oficios A-PE-0906-2014 del 09 de septiembre del 2014, mediante el cual se solicitó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva, investigación preliminar sobre los pagos de sobresueldos realizados al servidor Walter Mora Leiva. (Folios 2-4 frente del administrativo) 16) Mediante el oficio PE-259-2015 del 26 de febrero del 2015, la Presidencia Ejecutiva solicitó a la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales iniciar una investigación preliminar respecto de los hechos que se mencionan en el oficio DA-017-2015, indicado en el aparte previo. (Folio 1 del administrativo) 17) Mediante el oficio URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo del 2016 de la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, se emite informe de la investigación preliminar, en el cual se estimó que existía base suficiente para iniciar acciones disciplinarias por el presunto otorgamiento indebido de sobresueldos en casos de reasignaciones descendentes. (Folios 118-151 del administrativo) 18) Que en el oficio URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo del 2016 de la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, señalado en el aparte previo, se expone que al señor Ronald Novo Díaz se le reconoció el sobresueldo desde el 11 de julio del 2011, mediante acción de personal 3841-2011, el que se le paga desde la segunda quincena de julio del 2011. En lo atinente al señor Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, ese sobresueldo le fue reconocido mediante acción de personal 792-2010 desde el 25 de febrero del 2010. Ese informe señala que, a la fecha de su emisión, ambos sobresueldos se estaban cancelando. Por tal motivo señaló que la Presidencia Ejecutiva debía evaluar si corresponde solicitar criterio a la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos sobre la pertinencia de instruir otro tipo de procedimiento para detener los presuntos pagos indebidos y recuperar el dinero que pudo ser ilegalmente reconocido como sobresueldo por reasignación descendente. (Folios 148, 150 del administrativo) 19) Mediante oficio PE-505-2016 de fecha 27 de abril del 2016, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER designa el órgano director del procedimiento por el supuesto reconocimiento indebido de sobresueldos por reasignaciones descendentes en contra de las funcionarias Guiselle Vargas Sánchez y Marlene Chávez Morales. (Folio 155 del administrativo) 20) Por acto de las 09 horas del 24 de junio del 2016, el órgano director del procedimiento (expediente URL-002-2015) emite traslado de cargos en el cual, se imputaron a la accionante las siguientes conductas: "Hecho N°1: Por haber realizado supuestamente, la funcionaria Marlene Chávez Morales fungiendo como Coordinadora del Área de Recursos Humanos del IDA, la acción de personal con fecha 25 de febrero del 2010, de cambio de puesto del funcionario Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, de Director Regional a Profesional E, con base a la resolución No. 002-2010 de las nueve horas del 16 de febrero de 2010, del Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes y aparentemente se procede a reconocer sobresueldo al funcionario Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, de Director Regional a Profesional E, con base a la resolución No. 002-2010 de las nueve horas del 16 de febrero de 2010, del Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA, Carlos Bolaños Céspedes y aparentemente se procede a reconocer sobresueldo al funcionario Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, según mecanismo para la aplicación del sobresueldo establecido en el oficio N° 11668 FOE-AM-0525 de fecha 21 de setiembre de 2005, emitido por la Contraloría General de la República (...) Hecho N° 2: Por haber realizado aparentemente la funcionaria Marlene Chaves Morales como Jefe del Área de Recurso Humanos del IDA, la acción de personal del 11 de junio del 2011, donde se realiza el cambio de plaza de don Ronald Novo Díaz, supuestamente firmada por la señora Chaves Morales (...) en la cual reconoce sobresueldo al funcionario Novo Díaz, según mecanismo para la aplicación del sobresueldo establecido en oficio N° 11668 FOE-AM-0525 de fecha 21 de setiembre de 2005, emitido por la Contraloría General de la República. Con dichas actuaciones descritas en los hechos 1 y 2 supra expuestos, la funcionaria Marlene Chaves Morales, pudo haber satisfecho un interés privado por encima del interés público al presuntamente ejecutar actos administrativos en aplicación errónea del procedimiento de reasignación descendente previsto en el artículo 13 del Procedimiento para la aplicación de las directrices generales y regulaciones de política salarial, empleo y clasificación puestos del ministerios, entidades públicas y demás órganos según corresponda cubiertos por el ámbito de la Autoridad Presupuestaria" contenido en el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004, pudiendo haber contravenido la señora Chaves Morales con el actuar descrito los artículos 3, 4 (deber de probidad) y 38 inciso b) de la Ley contra la Corrupción e (sic) Enriquecimiento Ilícito N°8422.(...)." De seguido se hizo referencia a los ordinales 11 de la Carta Magna, 11 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP), 3, 4, 38 de la Ley No. 8422, precepto 13 del Decreto No. 31711. Se indicó sobre las posibles consecuencias del procedimiento en cuanto a las eventuales sanciones disciplinarias a imponer, a la vez que se expresaron los derechos de la investigada dentro del procedimiento. Ese acto le fue notificado de manera personal en fecha 28 de junio el 2016. (Folios 173-188 vuelto del administrativo) […]". Luego, en el apartado VII de la sentencia objetada, denominado "Análisis de la prescripción en el caso concreto", en lo de interés, indicaron: "En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44 ["Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública" del 6 de octubre de 2004] , que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428 ["Ley Orgánica de la CGR" del 7 de setiembre de 1994]. Bajo esa perspectiva, en el caso de marras, se tiene que, si bien la confección de las respectivas acciones de personal que llevaron a la apertura de la causa disciplinaria datan del mes de abril del año 2010 y junio del 2011, lo cierto del caso es que tales hechos fueron objeto de una investigación preliminar, cuya pertinencia no se reprocha, fase previa dentro de la cual, el respectivo informe fue comunicado al Presidente Ejecutivo en fecha 16 de marzo del 2016. De conformidad con las reglas del cómputo del plazo prescriptivo a que refiere el ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428 en relación al numeral 44 de la Ley No. 8422, es a partir del momento en que el titular de la potestad disciplinaria se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de ejercerla, que se han de hacer correr el citado lapso. Así, en casos como el presente en el que la fase de investigación preliminar era necesaria para la definición de hechos relevantes y recolección de indicios de prueba, de suerte que permitan la emisión de un traslado de cargos debidamente sustentado, el punto de partida de la prescripción opera con la puesta en conocimiento del informe aludido. Del análisis de los autos se tiene que luego de esa remisión del informe preliminar en oficio URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo del 2016 de la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales, mediante el oficio PE-5050-2016 del 27 de abril del 2016, el jerarca administrativo designó el órgano director, instancia que en fecha 28 de junio del 2016 emite el respectivo traslado de cargos, mismo que fuese notificado en esa misma data. Por ende, desde la fecha en que el jerarca podía válidamente disponer las acciones disciplinarias hasta el momento en que se comunica a la actora la apertura de la causa interna, no había fenecido el plazo quinquenal que rige este tipo de conflictos. Por otro lado, se tiene que por acto de las 15 horas 45 minutos del 14 de octubre del 2016, el Órgano Director rinde informe de conclusiones No. 023-2016. Por oficio URL-143-2016 del 18 de octubre del 2016, ese informe es remitido a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, para su conocimiento. En acta No. 002-2017 de la sesión realizada el 15 de marzo del 2017 de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales del INDER, se emite la opinión de esa instancia en el sentido de separarse de la recomendación del órgano director, por cuanto no existe en el expediente ninguna prueba que indique que las funcionarias investigadas, dentro de ellas, la accionante, se acogieron al procedimiento establecido en los artículos 107 y siguientes de la LGAP en cuanto a alegar el deber de obediencia. Esta decisión fue puesta en conocimiento de la Presidencia Ejecutiva por oficio RL-032-2017 del 31 de marzo del 2017. En definitiva, mediante resolución No. 037-2017 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de abril del 2017, la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER emitió acto final dentro del procedimiento administrativo No. URL-002-2015, acto puesto en conocimiento de la accionante en esa misma fecha. Tal y como lo postula el INDER, es claro que la prescripción para el dictado del acto final ha de ser computada desde el momento en que el titular de la potestad decisora se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de su ejercicio. Esto acontece en fecha 31 de marzo del 2017, cuando la Junta de Relaciones Laborales remite a la Presidencia Ejecutiva el expediente. Luego, el 28 de abril del 2017, se emite y comunica el acto final del procedimiento. Entre ambas fases no se observa la inercia que acusa la actora, en la medida en que, entre la remisión del expediente de parte de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales y la decisión final de la causa, no transcurrió siquiera el plazo de un mes. Por ende, no se ha producido el fenecimiento de ese ejercicio, lo que se supone el rechazo del cargo bajo examen." (Lo subrayado es suplido). En el reproche en estudio, el casacionista no cuestionó la aplicación del plazo quinquenal previsto en el artículo 71 de la LOCGR ni tampoco la pertinencia de la investigación preliminar efectuada. Su objeción se centró en que, como la solicitud efectuada por la Jefatura del Departamento Administrativo a la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER (emitida mediante oficio no. DA-017-2015) de iniciar una investigación preliminar, lo fue para para investigar los pagos de sobresueldos realizados al señor Walter Moral Leiva, cuyo caso no le fue imputado a su representante, no tuvo efectos interruptores de la prescripción. Al respecto, es menester indicar, en torno a la naturaleza y características de las investigaciones preliminares, la Sala Constitucional, en el voto no. 2014001384 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 1 de enero de 2014, indicó: "III.- SOBRE LA INVESTIGACIÓN PRELIMINAR. En el asunto en cuestión, las violaciones a los Derechos Fundamentales a las cuales aduce el recurrente, se refieren a la incoación de investigaciones preliminares de lo que luego podría resultar un procedimiento administrativo disciplinario. Sobre el tema, este Tribunal en reiteradas ocasiones ha considerado que las garantías inherentes al debido proceso no resultan aplicables en las investigaciones preliminares, pues será en el procedimiento administrativo o judicial, donde se deben respetar en toda su extensión las diferentes manifestaciones de ese derecho fundamental. Al respecto esta Sala ha declarado lo siguiente: “Sobre el particular, la Sala ha mantenido el criterio de que una correcta inteligencia del carácter y fundamentos del debido proceso exige admitir que, de previo a la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo, en ocasiones es indispensable efectuar una serie de indagaciones preliminares, pues la Administración –con anterioridad a la apertura del expediente administrativo– podría requerir la realización de una investigación previa, por medio de la cual se pueda no solo individualizar al posible responsable de la falta que se investiga, sino también determinar la necesidad de continuar con las formalidades del procedimiento, si se encuentra mérito para ello. El caso prototipo ocurre cuando, sin intervención de las partes interesadas, se evacuan ciertas pruebas durante la investigación preliminar. Estas pruebas así evacuadas no pueden hacerse valer durante el procedimiento propiamente dicho, habida cuenta que para su obtención no se contó con la participación del investigado, y por lo tanto, habría quedado en indefensión. De igual forma, si se trata de pruebas que por su naturaleza son definitivas e irreproducibles, a no dudarlo son inútiles para los efectos de fundamentar el acto final, si para su evacuación no se ha brindado al afectado el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa como en derecho corresponde; sin embargo, si se entiende que se trata de actos preliminares para determinar la pertinencia o no de abrir con posterioridad un expediente administrativo en contra de un servidor, esta Sala ha manifestado que en su recolección puede la Administración tener o no como parte a la persona investigada. Lo anterior constituye entonces una facultad del órgano administrativo competente, a fin de determinar si existe mérito o no para iniciar un proceso que tienda a averiguar la verdad real de los hechos objeto de las pesquisas y es cuando se ha abierto el procedimiento propiamente dicho, con la conformación del Órgano Director, que surge el momento procesal oportuno donde el servidor investigado sí puede manifestarse sobre los cargos que le son atribuidos y en consecuencia, tener acceso a las piezas del expediente que le interesan, así como a ser asistido por un abogado y poder presenciar la evacuación de la prueba testimonial y cualquier otra que se ordene y ante la cual pueda ejercer su derecho de defensa. En esta inteligencia, no son procedentes las aseveraciones del recurrente en cuanto al irrespeto del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa en actos realizados en la fase preliminar de la investigación, que se abrió con ocasión de las denuncias presentada [sic] por varios pacientes en su contra, puesto que dentro de esa fase no puede hablarse de la existencia de un debido proceso propiamente dicho ni resulta necesaria la concurrencia de los elementos señalados supra como constitutivos de su derecho de defensa”. (Resolución 2003-09125 de las nueve horas con veintiún minutos del veintinueve de agosto de dos mil tres). En este mismo sentido, estima esta Sala, que en el caso en cuestión y las acusadas violaciones corresponden a la fase de la investigación preliminar, dado que aún no se ha iniciado un procedimiento en contra del recurrente. Como consecuencia estima la Sala que la negativa a facilitar el acceso al expediente en esta etapa al amparado o la falta de audiencias, no ha causado la lesión al derecho constitucional de defensa o al principio de debido proceso (véase en igual sentido la resolución Nº 2010009906 de las catorce horas y treinta y ocho minutos del nueve de junio del dos mil diez). Así las cosas, el amparo resuelta improcedente, tal y como se indica en la parte dispositiva de esta resolución." (Lo subrayado es suplido. En igual sentido, puede consultarse el fallo de esa Cámara no. 2020017654 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 18 de setiembre de 2020). Por su parte, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ha indicado: "III.- […] Sobre el tema en estudio, la investigación preliminar para determinar los procedimientos administrativos sancionadores, es una labor facultativa de la administración, para identificar presuntos hechos irregulares, eventuales responsables y además [sic] elementos de juicio relevantes, con lo que emiten una recomendación; con el fin de comprobar la viabilidad de una falta que amerite realizar procedimiento que determine o no su existencia. En criterio de esta Sala, el acto preparatorio que se realizó en el informe no. OD 04-2008 del Órgano Director, que requirió prueba, documentación, intervenir las oficinas de la Cooperativa y emitir criterios, en la investigación preliminar, son actuaciones materiales legítimas, ya que la labor de recabar pruebas y emitir recomendaciones, es una potestad facultativa, utilizada para definir la procedencia o no de un procedimiento sancionador." (Lo subrayado es suplido. Sentencia no. 1101-F-S1-2011 de las 10 horas 15 minutos del 8 de setiembre de 2011. En igual sentido, puede consultarse, mutatis mutandis, la resolución de esa Sala no. 1228 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 22 de octubre de 2015). Acorde al cuadro fáctico antes transcrito, se tiene que, mediante oficio no. DA-017-2015 del 20 de febrero de 2015, la Jefatura del Departamento Administrativo del INDER le comunicó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva de ese ente que, en oficio no. A-PE-0906-2014 del 9 de setiembre de 2014, se le solicitó abrir una investigación preliminar sobre los pagos de sobresueldos efectuados al funcionario Walter Mora Leiva. La Presidencia Ejecutiva, en oficio no. PE-259-2015 del día 26 siguiente, le solicitó a la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales iniciar la investigación preliminar, respecto a lo indicado en el oficio DA-017-2015. Dicha Unidad, en oficio no. URL-032-2016 del 15 de marzo de 2016, emitió los resultados de la investigación preliminar. Expuso que al señor Ronald Novo Díaz se le reconoció el sobresueldo desde el 11 de julio de 2011, mediante acción de personal no. 3841-2011, el cual se le cancela desde la segunda quincena del mes de julio de 2011. Lo mismo sucede con el señor Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, cuyo sobresueldo le fue reconocido en acción de personal no. 792-2010 del 25 de febrero de 2010. Como consecuencia de ello, la Presidencia Ejecutiva, en oficio no. PE-505-2016 del 27 de abril de 2016, designó al órgano director del procedimiento, por supuesto reconocimiento indebido de sobresueldos por reasignaciones descendentes en contra, entre otra, de la actora, Marlene Chaves Morales, cuyo expediente se tramitó con el no. URL-002-2015. A las 9 horas del 24 de junio de 2016, el órgano director del procedimiento emitió el traslado de cargos, referido a las acciones de personal confeccionadas por la señora Chaves Morales atinentes a los señores Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, por aplicar un sobresueldo por reasignación descendente de manera errónea. Acorde a lo anterior y, atendiendo a la naturaleza y características de la investigación preliminar -antes expuestas- (en donde su fin primordial, se reitera, es identificar presuntos hechos irregulares, eventuales responsables y demás elementos de juicio relevantes, a fin de comprobar la viabilidad de una falta que amerite la apertura de un procedimiento administrativo para determinar o no su existencia), pese a que la investigación preliminar ordenada por la Presidencia Ejecutiva del INDER fue para analizar el supuesto pago de sobresueldos efectuados al señor Walter Mora Leiva (hecho probado no. 15), lo cierto es que, luego de efectuarse, su resultado determinó que debían investigarse los casos de los señores Ronald Novo Díaz y Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla, lo cual así le fue imputado a doña Marlene en el traslado de cargos (hecho probado 20). Tal situación, distinto a como lo quiere hacer ver el recurrente, no constituye ningún vicio ni irregularidad ni se le colocó en estado indefensión, pues, se repite, la intimación de cargos y el procedimiento administrativo sancionador se refirieron a los casos de los señores Novo Díaz y Rodríguez Bonilla, en donde a la actora se le brindaron todas las garantías de defensa. Tampoco tuvo efecto respecto al plazo prescriptivo, como lo quiere hacer ver el casacionista, pues, como bien lo indicó el Tribunal, empezó a correr a correr desde el día 16 de marzo de 2016, fecha en la cual se le puso en conocimiento a la Presidencia Ejecutiva el informe de la investigación preliminar, de conformidad con lo previsto en el canon 71 inciso b) de la LOCGR, sin que transcurriera el plazo quinquenal según la reseña efectuada por las personas juzgadoras, antes transcrita.

VII.Tercero. Como se indicó, el recurrente señaló, en primer lugar, la causal procesal prevista en el inciso 1) punto c) del numeral 137 del CPCA. Al respecto, esta Cámara ha señalado que uno de los elementos esenciales de cualquier sentencia es la fijación del cuadro fáctico que se logra inferir de los elementos probatorios incorporados al proceso con base en la valoración realizada por los juzgadores según las reglas de la sana crítica (artículo 82 del CPCA), y en atención a las normas jurídicas aplicables al caso concreto, toda vez que estas permiten establecer cuáles hechos adquieren relevancia jurídica (sobre este aspecto, puede consultarse la sentencia no. 12-F-TC-2018 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 8 de febrero de 2018; así como la resolución no. 7-A-TC-2017 de las 11 horas del 26 de enero de 2017). Resulta claro, entonces, que el establecimiento de estas circunstancias fácticas con base en la prueba es uno de los aspectos fundamentales de la sentencia, en la medida en que de esta depende la solución del diferendo. Es por tal razón que esta labor intelectiva desarrollada por las personas juzgadoras en relación a los hechos del caso es pasible de ser revisada desde distintas ópticas en sede casacional, las cuales, además, no deben ser confundidas, no solo porque conducen a efectos distintos, sino porque responden a finalidades diversas. En este sentido, la inconformidad puede obedecer a aspectos sustanciales, cuando el cuadro fáctico que tuvo por demostrado el Tribunal no es conteste con la realidad que se desprende de las pruebas (en cuyo caso se trata de un error de hecho o de derecho, previstos en el artículo 138 CPCA), o bien, a yerros procesales, ya sea por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos en forma ilegal al proceso o por una defectuosa formulación (falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos). Este último vicio se produce cuando el Tribunal, al establecer el cuadro fáctico pertinente para el caso concreto, formula uno o varios hechos de manera confusa, de forma tal que no sea posible tener un adecuado entendimiento de cuál es la situación fáctica que pretende explicitar, o bien, cuando exista una contradicción en el elenco de hechos probados de tal envergadura que sea imposible tener certeza de cuál fue la valoración realizada por los juzgadores al deliberar. Esto responde a la finalidad de las causales procesales que dan cabida a este medio impugnaticio extraordinario, las cuales tienen por objetivo garantizar que la tramitación de las distintas etapas que conforman el proceso jurisdiccional hayan discurrido por los cauces previstos por el ordenamiento jurídico, así como que las sentencias se hayan dictado en la forma prescrita por las normas adjetivas aplicables. Por ello, cualquier cuestionamiento relativo a si la fijación de los hechos realizada resulta acorde o no a las pruebas excede el ámbito propio de esta causal, formando parte, por el contrario, de una de índole sustantivo. Al respecto, puede consultarse, entre muchas otras, la indicada sentencia de esta Cámara no. 12-F-TC-2018 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 8 de febrero de 2018. Este no es el supuesto de esta lite. Los hechos que tuvo por probados el Tribunal no son confusos ni contradictorios entre sí. Además, en el apartado V de esta resolución, se dieron las razones por las cuales los oficios números DA-017-2015 y PE-259-2015 no son ilegítimos ni fueron introducidos ilegalmente al proceso. Ergo, no se configura esta causal por quebranto de normas procesales alegada.

VIII.Cuarto. También invocó el recurrente el vicio procesal previsto en el inciso 1) punto d) del canon señalado: falta de motivación. Tanto la Sala Primera como este Tribunal han indicado que surge cuando la motivación del fallo es omisa, ya sea porque no exista, o bien, por cuanto su desarrollo resulta en extremo confuso o contradictorio, de forma tal que se impida tener claridad en cuanto a los razonamientos que derivaron en la decisión adoptada en el acápite dispositivo de la resolución, lo que vulneraría los derechos procesales de las partes, en concreto, el del debido proceso. No se trata de determinar si la persona juzgadora se pronunció sobre todas las pretensiones incorporadas al proceso; sino, por el contrario, que el fallo cuente con los fundamentos sobre los cuales se adoptó la decisión correspondiente. De igual manera, debe tenerse presente, se trata de un motivo de índole procesal, lo cual implica que es atinente a eventuales incumplimientos de las disposiciones adjetivas que regulan el íter procesal o la resolución, así como la relación jurídica que vincula a las partes y al juez en el marco de un proceso judicial y de la cual derivan derechos y obligaciones. No debe confundirse con un mecanismo para entrar a discutir la aplicación del Derecho o la valoración de la prueba realizada por el juzgador en los considerandos de la resolución, para lo cual el Código de rito establece causales autónomas (artículo 138 íbid), ya que de lo contrario se desnaturalizaría el motivo casacional específico. Al respecto, pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras, las sentencias de la Sala Primera números 1277-F-S1-2019 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 18 de julio de 2019 y 2521-F-S1-2020 de las 10 horas 50 minutos del 10 de noviembre de 2020. A la luz de lo expuesto en el apartado VI punto segundo de esta resolución, en donde se transcribió, en lo de interés, lo considerado por las personas juzgadoras en el apartado VII de la sentencia cuestionada tocante a la prescripción, determina esta Cámara, distinto a lo alegado por el recurrente, las personas juzgadoras brindaron las razones por las cuales, en esta lite, no se cumplió el plazo quinquenal previsto en la LOCGR. Corolario, la motivación en la resolución cuestionada no es omisa, existe. Tampoco su desarrollo es confuso o contradictorio. Por el contrario, resulta clara en cuanto a los razonamientos brindados para adoptar la decisión ahí expuesta. Ergo, cuenta con los fundamentos sobre los cuales se adoptó la decisión correspondiente. En consecuencia, tampoco se configura este motivo casacional.

IX.VIOLACIÓN DE NORMAS SUSTANTIVAS. En la primera censura por este motivo casacional, folio 12, el recurrente anunció interponerla porque el fallo declaró que no acaeció la prescripción. Invocó el motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA: "Cuando se haya aplicado o interpretado indebidamente una norma jurídica o se haya dejado de aplicar." En esta lite, argumentó, el Tribunal aplicó el numeral 71 de la LOCGR para rechazar la prescripción alegada, al considerar que la conducta de la actora violó el artículo 3 de la Ley no. 8422, "Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito" (LCCEI), que remite el plazo prescriptivo indicado en el precepto 71 de la LOCGR. Con esa conclusión, manifestó, se incurrió en una errónea aplicación de esas normas con simultánea desaplicación del precepto 603 del Código de Trabajo, hoy 414. Violación de los artículos 3 y 38 de la LCCEI e infracción concomitante del numeral 71 de la LOCGR por indebida aplicación. El rechazo de la excepción de prescripción alegada, anotó, se debió a una indebida aplicación del referido canon 3, con omisión aplicativa del 38, ambos de la LCCEI, con errónea aplicación del artículo 71 de la LOCGR. El indicado numeral 3 de la Ley no. 8422, expuso, contiene conceptos jurídicos indeterminados que se deben concretizar en cada caso particular. El incumplimiento del "deber de probidad", señaló, debe puntualizarse frente al supuesto de hecho en el que se alega. Demanda señalar, apuntó, los elementos de las conductas imputadas contrarias a los significados de cada uno de los términos utilizados por el legislador. En este proceso, alegó, los actos imputados a la actora fueron: firmar dos acciones de personal en ejecución de órdenes del Presidente Ejecutivo sin darle la debida asesoría. Esos actos materiales, señaló, están fuera de la tipificación del indicado artículo 3 de la LCCEI; a saber: a) firmar las acciones de personal en ejecución de órdenes superiores no quebranta la orientación de la gestión a la satisfacción del interés público; b) no violentó ni dejó al descubierto necesidades colectivas prioritarias; c) no estaba en juego la planificación, regulación, eficiencia ni igualdad de los habitantes de la República; d) no se traicionó la rectitud ni buena fe, porque fue un acto de ejecución de un mandato superior; e) firmar acciones de personal es un acto material que no demanda análisis ni valoración, porque, previamente, el titular de la potestad lo autorizó; y f) la actora no administra recursos públicos. De lo señalado, manifestó, la indebida aplicación del artículo 3 de la LCCEI nació por la inserción de las conductas imputadas a la actora que no calzan con la regla jurídica en ninguno de los supuestos de hecho. Adicionalmente a esa falta de concretización en el fallo, añadió, se omitió la aplicación del precepto 38 de la LCCEI que contempla las causales taxativas de responsabilidad administrativa sujetas a las sanciones del artículo 39 íbid. Es decir, el fallo debió enlazar el artículo 3 con el 38 para determinar si la conducta endilgada a la actora estaba contemplada en este segundo para así justificar la aplicación del numeral 71 de la LOCGR que dispone un plazo de 5 años de prescripción. Como la actora no tipificó ninguna de las conductas generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa bajo el régimen de la LCCEI, aseveró, la regla aplicable era el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (hoy canon 414) porque se trataba, a lo sumo, de un simple error administrativo de naturaleza estrictamente laboral. La sucesión de violaciones jurídicas del fallo impugnado, apuntó, se produce con el siguiente flujograma: al considerar erróneamente las conductas de la actora como violatorias del deber de probidad, sin contemplar la taxatividad de conductas sujetas a sanción derivadas del artículo 38 de la LCCEI. Aplicó, indebidamente, el numeral 3 con omisión del 38, ambos de la Ley no. 8422; lo que, a su vez, condujo a la aplicación indebida del artículo 71 de la LOCGR con desaplicación del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (actual 414), el cual impone el plazo de un mes como límite a la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria para los casos ajenos a lo dispuesto en la Ley no. 8422. Como corolario de lo anterior, indicó, el plazo para investigar cualquier irregularidad en las conductas de la actora, vencían al mes de haberlas ejecutado y, como consecuencia de lo anterior, la resolución no. 037 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de junio de 2017, es absolutamente nula, por provenir de un procedimiento administrativo inválido, por haber prescrito la potestad sancionatoria de la Administración. Por lo cual, pidió se acoja el recurso y se declare con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. De igual modo, invocó el motivo casacional previsto en el inciso a) del ordinal 138 del CPCA: "Cuando se atribuya a la prueba una indebida valoración o se haya preterido." Reclamó, también, una indebida valoración de la prueba para el rechazo de la pretensión de prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria alegada, por una errónea contabilidad de los plazos prescriptivos. Aún en el supuesto antijurídico de que aplicara el artículo 71 de la LOCGR, anotó, la primera acción de personal suscrita por la actora en ejecución de la orden superior del Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA, fue el 25 de febrero de 2010 (Considerando XV) lo que significa que al 24 de febrero de 2015 transcurrieron los 5 años previstos en esa norma. Ese vicio del fallo se originó porque el Tribunal consideró interrumpida la prescripción a partir del oficio PE- 259-2015 del 26 de febrero de 2015 -lo que, igualmente, produjo la prescripción por dos días-, sin percatarse que ese oficio ordenó una investigación por hechos ajenos a la actora. En el hecho probado 15) de la sentencia, el Tribunal concluyó que, mediante oficio no. DA-017-2015 del 20 de febrero de 2015, se le solicitó al Presidente Ejecutivo del INDER realizar una investigación preliminar sobre el pago de sobresueldos "al servidor Walter Mora Leiva", sin referirse a los funcionarios Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla ni Ronald Novo Díaz, cuyas acciones de personal fueron las únicas suscritas por la actora y por las cuales se le investigó. En el hecho probado 16) del fallo, el Tribunal concluyó que, mediante oficio no. PE-259-2015 del 26 de febrero de 2015, la Presidencia Ejecutiva ordenó la investigación preliminar "sobre los hechos señalados en el oficio DA-0l7-2015"; delimitando el ámbito de acción de la investigación preliminar al pago de sobresueldos al servidor Walter Mora Leiva. Recalcó, las acciones de personal, cuya irregularidad se le atribuye a la actora, fueron en relación con el pago de sobresueldos a Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz. Por lo anterior, expresó, la sentencia concluyó, con disconforme valoración de la prueba, que el inicio de la investigación preliminar, nacida al amparo de los oficios AD-017-2015 y PE-259-2015, interrumpió la prescripción de las causas imputadas a la actora, cuando, en realidad, se trataba de causas diferentes en las que la acción material de firmar las acciones de personal atribuidas a la actora quedaron fuera de la investigación preliminar y, por lo tanto, el plazo de prescripción establecido en el artículo 71 de la LOCGR no se interrumpió. Los hechos probados 15 y 16 son claros y precisos en cuanto a que los oficios AD-017-2015 y PE-259-2015 estaban destinados a resolver otras situaciones a las atribuidas a la actora por lo que carecen del efecto interruptor de la prescripción. Por esa razón, concluyó solicitando se case la sentencia y resolviendo por el fondo, se declare con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.

X.Al respecto, precisa anotar lo siguiente. Primero. Manifestó el recurrente a folio 13: "[…] adicionalmente a esa falta de concretización en el fallo, se omitió la aplicación del artículo 38 de la LCCEI que contempla las causales taxativas de responsabilidad administrativa sujetas a las sanciones del artículo 39 íbid […]". (Lo subrayado es suplido). Lo alegado en torno al artículo 38 causa sorpresa. El Tribunal en el considerando X, en lo de interés, señaló: "Así visto, la antijuridicidad material y formal se concreta en la previsión normativa que le fue intimada a la accionante, en concreto, numeral 38 inciso d) de la Ley No. 8422, y la vulneración del contenido del ordinal 13 inciso c) del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004." Es decir, de manera clara y expresa, distinto a lo señalado por el recurrente, lo aplicó. Asimismo, respecto del aserto de que el precepto 38 de la LCCEI dispone las causales taxativas de responsabilidad administrativas sujetas a las sanciones del canon 39 ibídem, dicha norma señala: "Causales de responsabilidad administrativa. / Sin perjuicio de otras causales previstas en el régimen aplicable a la respectiva relación de servicios, tendrá responsabilidad administrativa el funcionario público que: […]". (Lo subrayado es suplido). De su tenor literal se determina, con facilidad, distinto a lo manifestado por el casacionista, dicha norma no prevé un listado taxativo de causales de responsabilidad administrativa, por el contrario, remite a las previstas en el régimen aplicable a la respectiva relación de servicios. Segundo. El Tribunal, en el Considerando VII del fallo cuestionado, aludido en el apartado VI punto segundo de esta resolución, en lo de interés indicó: "[…] si bien el deber de probidad impone un marco de comportamiento acorde a los deberes funcionariales, así como a las reglas que modulan las conductas del agente público, esa regulación se orienta a prevenir, detectar y sancionar la corrupción en el ejercicio de la función pública, según se desprende del ordinal 1 de la citada Ley No. 8422, de manera que la comprensión del concepto de probidad, ha de realizarse precisamente en el contexto de esa finalidad legal, sea, cuando la falta del servidor suponga un aspecto vinculable (directamente) a la corrupción, el enriquecimiento ilegítimo y la inadecuada gestión de fondos públicos o la hacienda pública. […] Por ende, es necesario que en cada procedimiento de corte disciplinario, se analice el contenido de las conductas intimadas, de cara a establecer si el régimen jurídico que precisa el plazo para el ejercicio de la prescripción de la potestad correctiva interna, es el común de un mes que impone la doctrina del actual ordinal 414 del Código de Trabajo, anterior 603 de esa misma fuente, mismo plazo fijado por remisión del precepto 51 del Estatuto de Servicio Civil, o si por el contrario, por estar frente a los supuestos que busca tutelar la Ley No. 8422, o bien la No. 8292, el citado plazo se ensancha por la aplicación de la regla prevista en el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. En ese contexto, los hechos que le fueron imputados a la accionante, como es el caso de haber permitido la adopción de conductas que generaron un reconocimiento indebido de pluses salariales a dos funcionarios del INDER por reasignación descendente. Si bien no se refieren a una disposición directa de Hacienda Pública, en definitiva componen conductas que llevaron a disponer de erogaciones de orden salarial, cubiertas con recursos públicos, las que, se aduce dentro del procedimiento ordinario de corte disciplinario, fueron ilegítimamente otorgados. A juicio de esta Cámara, el contenido sustancial de las conductas intimadas y objeto del procedimiento constituyen manifestaciones que se estiman antagónicas del régimen de control interno y del deber de probidad que se impone en el ejercicio de la función pública. Desde este plano, la accionante parece confundir la responsabilidad de quienes administran hacienda pública de manera directa, denominados superiores jerárquicos o titulares subordinados, con la responsabilidad que le resulta propia por su sola condición de servidora pública, y por tanto, sujeto a las regulaciones del deber de probidad. En ese sentido, el margen de temporalidad para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria que aplica en este caso, es el que impone la Ley No. 8422 en su numeral 44, que remite a la norma quinquenal de prescripción que estatuye el mandato 71 de la Ley No. 7428. […]." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Empero, el recurrente no cuestionó, en debida forma, el fundamento señalado por el Tribunal a efecto de determinar la aplicación, a esta lite, del plazo quinquenal previsto en el precepto 71 de la LOCGR. Efectuó una argumentación divorciada, por completo de las razones dadas por las personas juzgadoras. Al efecto, señaló: "En el subjudice los actos imputados a la actora fueron: firmar dos acciones de personal en ejecución de órdenes del Presidente Ejecutivo sin darle la debida asesoría. Esos actos materiales de la actora están fuera de la tipificación del artículo 3 de la LCCEI, a saber a) firmar las acciones de personal en ejecución de órdenes superiores no quebranta: (enlisto) la orientación de la gestión a la satisfacción del interés público; b) no violentó ni dejó al descubierto necesidades colectivas prioritarias; c) no estaba en juego la planificación, regulación, eficiencia ni igualdad de los habitantes de la República; d) no se traicionó la rectitud ni buena fe, porque fue un acto de ejecución de un mandato superior; e) firmar acciones de personal es un acto material que no demanda análisis ni valoración porque previamente el titular de la potestad lo autorizó; f) la actora no administra recursos públicos. / De lo señalado, la indebida aplicación del artículo 3 de la LCCEI nace por la inserción de las conductas imputadas a la actora que no calzan con la regla jurídica en ninguno de los supuestos de hecho; adicionalmente a esa falta de concretización en el fallo, se omitió la aplicación del artículo 38 de la LCCEI que contempla las causales taxativas de responsabilidad administrativa sujetas a las sanciones del artículo 39 ibid, es decir, el fallo debió enlazar el artículo 3 con el 38 para determinar si la conducta endilgada a la actora estaba contemplada en este segundo para así justificar la aplicación del numeral 71 de la LOCGR que dispone un plazo de 5 años de prescripción. / Como la actora no tipificó ninguna de las conductas generadoras de responsabilidad administrativa bajo el régimen de la LCCEI, la regla aplicable era el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (artículo 414 actual del mismo cuerpo legislativo) porque se trataba a lo suma de un simple error administrativo de naturaleza estrictamente laboral. / En síntesis: La sucesión de violaciones jurídicas del fallo impugnado se produce con el siguiente flujograma: al considerar erróneamente las conductas de la actora como violatorias del deber de probidad sin contemplar la taxatividad de conductas sujetas a sanción derivadas del artículo 38 de la LCCEI, aplicó indebidamente el numeral 3 con omisión del 38, ambos de la Ley 8422, lo que a su vez condujo a la aplicación indebida del artículo 71 de la LOCGR con desaplicación del artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo (actual 414) que impone el plazo de un mes como límite a la prescripción de la potestad sancionatoria para los casos ajenos a lo dispuesto en la ley 8422. Como corolario de lo anterior, el plazo para investigar cualquier irregularidad en las conductas de la actora, vencían al mes de haberlas ejecutado y como consecuencia de lo anterior, la resolución 037 de las 1037 horas del 28 de junio de 2017, es absolutamente nula por provenir de un procedimiento administrativo inválido por haber prescrito la potestad sancionatoria de la Administración." Como se determina fácilmente, lo afirmado no pasa de ser un alegato meramente argumentativo, divorciado, por completo de los fundamentos brindados por el Tribunal. Ergo, lo alegado en el reparo en estudio resulta anodino a efecto de quebrar lo resuelto.

XI.Tercero. Esta Cámara comparte lo afirmado por el Tribunal, en el sentido de que los hechos imputados a la actora se relacionan con el tema de la hacienda pública, porque se refiere a conductas que implicaron la disposición de erogaciones de orden salarial cubiertas con recursos públicos, habiéndose determinado su ilegalidad. También se participa de la posición de que las conductas intimadas y, por ende, el objeto del procedimiento administrativo, constituyen manifestaciones antagónicas tanto al régimen de control interno como al deber de probidad. En cuanto a este segundo, porque, en definitiva, por las conductas imputadas a la actora, se está ante una conducta que riñe con el buen desempeño de las potestades que le fueron otorgadas y por una inadecuada gestión de fondos públicos o de la hacienda pública, por lo que no se satisfizo el interés público. En este sentido, el Reglamento Ejecutivo no. 32333 del 12 de abril de 2005, "Reglamento a la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública", en el artículo 1, Definiciones, en lo de interés, señala: "14) Deber de probidad: Obligación del funcionario público de orientar su gestión a la satisfacción del interés público, el cual se expresa, fundamentalmente, en las siguientes acciones: / a) Identificar y atender las necesidades colectivas prioritarias de manera planificada, regular, eficiente, continua y en condiciones de igual para los habitantes de la República; / b) Demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de las potestades que le confiere la ley; c) Asegurar que las decisiones que adopte en cumplimiento de sus atribuciones se ajustan a la imparcialidad y a los objetivos propios de la institución en la que se desempeña; / d) Administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia, rindiendo cuentas satisfactoriamente; / e) Rechazar dádivas, obsequios, premios, recompensas, o cualquier otro emolumento, honorario, estipendio, salario o beneficio por parte de personas físicas o jurídicas, nacionales o extranjeras, en razón del cumplimiento de sus funciones o con ocasión de éstas, en el país o fuera de él; salvo los casos que admita la Ley; / f) Abstenerse de conocer y resolver un asunto cuando existan las mismas causas de impedimento y recusación que se establecen en la Ley Orgánica de Poder Judicial, en el Código Procesal Civil, y en otras leyes; / g) Orientar su actividad administrativa a satisfacer primordialmente el interés público." (Lo subrayado es suplido). A la actora se le recriminó haber actuado de manera negligente en el ejercicio de las potestades que le fueron conferidas como Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos; además, como ya se indicó, su actuar reprochable incidió en un mal manejo de los recursos públicos o de la hacienda pública. De ahí que, en efecto, como lo indicaron las personas juzgadoras, las conductas intimadas resultan antagónica al deber de probidad. De igual manera, contrastan con el régimen de control interno. En este sentido, la Ley General de Control Interno, no. 8292 del 31 de julio de 2002, en lo de interés indica: "Artículo 7.- Obligatoriedad de disponer de un sistema de control interno. Los entes y órganos sujetos a esta Ley dispondrán de sistemas de control interno, los cuales deberán ser aplicables, completos, razonables, integrados y congruentes con sus competencias y atribuciones institucionales. Además, deberán proporcionar seguridad en el cumplimiento de esas atribuciones y competencias; todo conforme al primer párrafo del artículo 3 de la presente Ley. […] Artículo 12.- Deberes del jerarca y de los titulares subordinados en el sistema de control interno. En materia de control interno, al jerarca y los titulares subordinados les corresponderá cumplir, entre otros, los siguientes deberes: / a) Velar por el adecuado desarrollo de la actividad del ente o del órgano a su cargo. / b) Tomar de inmediato las medidas correctivas, ante cualquier evidencia de desviaciones o irregularidades. / c) Analizar e implantar, de inmediato, las observaciones, recomendaciones y disposiciones formuladas por la auditoría interna, la Contraloría General de la República, la auditoría externa y las demás instituciones de control y fiscalización que correspondan. / d) Asegurarse de que los sistemas de control interno cumplan al menos con las características definidas en el artículo 7 de esta Ley. / e) Presentar un informe de fin de gestión y realizar la entrega formal del ente o el órgano a su sucesor, de acuerdo con las directrices emitidas por la Contraloría General de la República y por los entes y órganos competentes de la administración activa. / Artículo 13.- Ambiente de control. En cuanto al ambiente de control, serán deberes del jerarca y de los titulares subordinados, entre otros, los siguientes: / a) Mantener y demostrar integridad y valores éticos en el ejercicio de sus deberes y obligaciones, así como contribuir con su liderazgo y sus acciones a promoverlos en el resto de la organización, para el cumplimiento efectivo por parte de los demás funcionarios. / b) Desarrollar y mantener una filosofía y un estilo de gestión que permitan administrar un nivel de riesgo determinado, orientados al logro de resultados y a la medición del desempeño, y que promuevan una actitud abierta hacia mecanismos y procesos que mejoren el sistema de control interno. / c) Evaluar el funcionamiento de la estructura organizativa de la institución y tomar las medidas pertinentes para garantizar el cumplimiento de los fines institucionales; todo de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico y técnico aplicable. / d) Establecer claramente las relaciones de jerarquía, asignar la autoridad y responsabilidad de los funcionarios y proporcionar los canales adecuados de comunicación, para que los procesos se lleven a cabo; todo de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico y técnico aplicable. / e) Establecer políticas y prácticas de gestión de recursos humanos apropiadas, principalmente en cuanto a contratación, vinculación, entrenamiento, evaluación, promoción y acciones disciplinarias; todo de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico y técnico aplicable. / Artículo 14.- Valoración del riesgo. En relación con la valoración del riesgo, serán deberes del jerarca y los titulares subordinados, entre otros, los siguientes: / a) Identificar y analizar los riesgos relevantes asociados al logro de los objetivos y las metas institucionales, definidos tanto en los planes anuales operativos como en los planes de mediano y de largo plazos. / b) Analizar el efecto posible de los riesgos identificados, su importancia y la probabilidad de que ocurran, y decidir las acciones que se tomarán para administrarlos. / c) Adoptar las medidas necesarias para el funcionamiento adecuado del sistema de valoración del riesgo y para ubicarse por lo menos en un nivel de riesgo organizacional aceptable. / d) Establecer los mecanismos operativos que minimicen el riesgo en las acciones por ejecutar." (Lo subrayado no es del original). En este proceso, es claro que, el haberse suscrito acciones de personal, mediante las cuales, indebidamente, se otorgaban sobresueldos por reasignación descendente, se contravienen los sistemas de control interno. Tanto es así que, como se indicó, en el acto final como en la sentencia impugnada (considerando X), se determinó la antijuridicidad imputada a la actora se concreta en lo dispuesto, entre otros, en el precepto 38 inciso d) de la LCCEI, el cual indica: "Debilite el control interno de la organización u omita las actuaciones necesarias para su diseño, implantación o evaluación, de acuerdo con la normativa técnica aplicable." De ahí que, en el tema de la prescripción, la norma a aplicar es la contenida en el precepto 44 de la Ley no. 8422, la cual señala: "Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública, prescribirá, según el artículo 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno y el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994." Por su parte, el artículo 43 de la Ley no. 8292, indica: "Artículo 43.- Prescripción de la responsabilidad administrativa. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley, prescribirá según el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, Nº 7428, de 7 de setiembre de 1994. / Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada." Por su parte, el canon 71 de la LOCGR, preceptúa: "Artículo 71.-Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: / a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. / b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. / La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. / Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. / Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada. / (Así reformado por el inciso a) del artículo 45 de la Ley de Control Interno, N° 8292 de 31 de julio del 2002)". (Lo subrayado es suplido). A la luz de lo previsto por esta disposición, el plazo prescriptivo, distinto a lo señalado por el recurrente y, como bien lo señaló el Tribunal, empezó a correr cuando se puso en conocimiento del resultado de la investigación preliminar a la Presidencia Ejecutiva, sea el 16 de marzo de 2016, no habiendo transcurrido el plazo quinquenal prescriptivo, según lo reseñado en el considerando VI de esta resolución. Cómputo que este Tribunal, acorde al mérito de los autos, avala.

XII.Cuarto. En torno a la violación indirecta alegada, el meollo de lo argüido por el recurrente estriba en que, a su entender, el plazo prescriptivo transcurrió porque, de conformidad con el oficio no. PE-259-2015, se ordenó una investigación de hechos ajenos a la actora. Acorde a los hechos probados 15 y 16, mediante el oficio no. DA-017-2015, se le solicitó a la Presidencia Ejecutiva realizar una investigación preliminar respecto al funcionario Walter Mora Leiva. No se refirió a los servidores Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla ni a Ronald Novo Díaz, cuyas acciones de personal fueron las únicas suscritas por la actora. Lo cual así fue ordenado mediante oficio no. PE-259-2015. El tema ahora ventilado por el recurrente ya fue objeto de análisis en el apartado VI punto segundo de esta resolución, cuando se analizaron las características y naturaleza de la investigación preliminar, por lo que, a fin de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias se remite a lo ahí consignado. Por lo tanto, la sentencia no incurre en el error probatorio endilgado al señalar: "[…] Bajo esa perspectiva, en el caso de marras, se tiene que, si bien la confección de las respectivas acciones de personal que llevaron a la apertura de la causa disciplinaria datan del mes de abril del año 2010 y junio del 2011, lo cierto del caso es que tales hechos fueron objeto de una investigación preliminar, cuya pertinencia no se reprocha, fase previa dentro de la cual, el respectivo informe fue comunicado al Presidente Ejecutivo en fecha 16 de marzo del 2016. De conformidad con las reglas del cómputo del plazo prescriptivo a que refiere el ordinal 71 de la Ley No. 7428 en relación al numeral 44 de la Ley No. 8422, es a partir del momento en que el titular de la potestad disciplinaria se encuentra en posibilidad objetiva de ejercerla, que se han de hacer correr el citado lapso. Así, en casos como el presente en el que la fase de investigación preliminar era necesaria para la definición de hechos relevantes y recolección de indicios de prueba, de suerte que permitan la emisión de un traslado de cargos debidamente sustentado, el punto de partida de la prescripción opera con la puesta en conocimiento del informe aludido." (Lo subrayado es suplido), máxime considerando que el recurrente no cuestionó lo indicado en torno a la necesidad y pertinencia de efectuar la investigación preliminar.

XIII.En el segundo reparo por violación de normas sustantivas, folio 14, el casacionista anunció formularlo por el motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) del canon 138 del CPCA. Es decir, por violación directa de ley. Ello, expuso, porque la sentencia concluyó que la actora debió desobedecer la orden del superior. En el Considerando VIII de la resolución impugnada, acotó, se rechazó el alegato en relación con el deber de obediencia. Concluyó que resultaba inaplicable en la especie. Según el fallo, la actora estaba obligada a desobedecer la orden del superior ya que se trataba de una conducta ilegítima, la cual, conforme al numeral 108 de la LGAP debió, cuando menos, dejar constancia de su rechazo. Esa conclusión, afirmó, deviene en una lectura sesgada de ese canon. Ese precepto dispone que el servidor público deberá desobedecer al superior cuando la orden tenga por objeto la realización de actos "evidentemente extraños a la competencia del inferior" y que el acto sea manifiestamente "arbitrario por constituir su ejercicio abuso de autoridad o cualquier otro delito". En esta lite, anotó, está claro que la orden del Presidente Ejecutivo, de confeccionar y firmar las acciones de personal de Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, está fuera de los alcances de esa norma, pues, no eran actos ajenos a la competencia de la Dirección de Recursos Humanos ni tampoco arbitraros o delictuosos. En los hechos acreditados números 2), 3), 4), 5) 11), 12), 13) y 14) se acreditaron los desacuerdos entre los abogados de la CGR y del INDER. Controversia que, expueso, llegó a su clímax cuando, mediante oficio DAJ-096-2013 del 12 de febrero de 2013, la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos señaló que la aplicación de los sobresueldos para los funcionarios descendidos era ilegal y, menos de 10 días después, el asesor legal de la Presidente Ejecutiva desechó ese criterio jurídico y, mediante oficio A-PE-220-2013 del 20 de febrero de 2013, impuso el que consideró válido. La actora, indicó, carece de formación jurídica, de manera que, si entre los abogados especialistas de la CGR y del INDER había tres criterios distintos sobre cómo aplicar una regla jurídica, resulta desproporcionado, ilógico e irrazonable que se le impute a la accionante la violación del artículo 108 de la LGAP, sin valorar la existencia de tres criterios jurídicos dispares entre la Dirección Jurídica, el Asesor Jurídico del Presidente Ejecutivo y la CGR. Frente a lo anterior, manifestó, la aplicación por parte del Tribunal, del indicado numeral 108 de la LGAP, deviene desafortunada y despojada de toda lógica, razonabilidad y fundamentación, sin considerar que los requisitos para autorizar la desobediencia sin castigo son taxativos, claros y precisos, distintos a los imputados a la actora. Por lo anterior y ante la errónea aplicación del artículo 108 de la LGAP a una situación distinta a la prevista por el legislador, concluyó, el fallo tipificó el vicio señalado en el inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA, por lo que la sentencia debe ser casada y resolviendo por el fondo, se declare con lugar en todos sus extremos.

XIV.En el agravio en estudio, el recurrente invocó varias hipótesis disímiles entre sí, pero, por la manera cómo las alegó, resultan inseparables. Anunció interponer el reproche por violación directa de ley, en virtud de una indebida aplicación del precepto 108 de la LGAP, lo cual está acorde a lo indicado a folios 14 y 15, en el sentido de que: "En el Considerando VIII, la resolución impugnada rechazó el alegato de la actora en relación con el deber de obediencia, porque concluye que resultaba inaplicable en la especie. Según el fallo, la actora estaba obligada a desobedecer la orden del superior porque se trataba de una conducta ilegítima que conforme con el numeral 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LEGAP) debió, cuando menos, dejar constancia de su rechazo. Esa conclusión del Tribunal deviene en una lectura sesgada del canon 108 de la LEGAP. Este artículo dispone que el servidor público deberá desobedecer al superior, cuando la orden tenga por objeto la realización de actos "evidentemente extraños a la competencia del inferior" y; que el acto sea manifiestamente "arbitrario por constituir su ejercicio abuso de autoridad o cualquier otro delito […] Por lo anterior y ante la errónea aplicación del artículo 108 de la LEGAP a una situación diametralmente distinta a la prevista por el legislador, el fallo tipificó el vicio señalado en el inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA, por lo que la sentencia debe ser casada y resolviendo por el fondo, se declare con lugar en todos sus extremos." (Solo lo subrayado es suplido). Sin embargo, en ese mismo folio, manifestó: "[…] En los hechos probados 2), 3), 4), 5) 11) 12) 13) y 14) se tuvo por probado los desacuerdos entre los abogados de la Contraloría General de la República y los asesores legales del INDER; controversia que llegó a su clímax cuando mediante oficio DAJ-096-2013 del 12 de febrero de 2013 la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos señaló que la aplicación de los sobresueldos para los funcionarios descendidos era ilegal y menos de 10 días después el asesor legal de la Presidente Ejecutiva, Oscar Hernández Cedeño, desechó ese criterio jurídico y mediante oficio A-PE-220-20I3 del 20 de febrero de 2013, impuso que era [sic] válido." Lo ahora alegado -los supuestos desacuerdos entre los abogados de la CGR y los del INDER; así como la diferencia entre la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos y el asesor legal de la Presidencia Ejecutiva- constituiría, de darse, un quebranto indirecto de ley, por su indebida valoración. Luego, a folio 15, señaló el impugnante: "Es necesario abonar que la actora carece de formación jurídica de manera que si entre los abogados especialistas de la Contraloría General de la República y del IDA (INDER) había tres criterios distintos sobre como [sic] aplicar una regla jurídica, resulta desproporcionado, ilógico e irrazonable que se le impute a la accionante la violación del artículo 108 de la LEGAP, sin valorar la existencia de tres criterios jurídicos dispares entre la Dirección jurídica, el Asesor Jurídico del Presidente Ejecutivo y la Contraloría General de la República." (Lo subrayado es suplido). El recurrente, alegó violación a los principios constitucionales de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. Además, al invocar la lógica, alude a un aspecto de valoración probatoria, lo cual se reafirma con la preterición de los supuestos tres criterios jurídicos. Añadió en ese mismo folio: "Frente a lo anterior, la aplicación por parte del Tribunal del numeral 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública deviene en desafortunada y despojada de toda lógica, razonabilidad y fundamentación, sin considerar que los requisitos para autorizar la desobediencia sin castigo, son taxativos, claros y precisos, distintos a los imputados a la actora." Además de la violación directa del precepto 108 de la LGAP, el recurrente, de nuevo, aludió a la valoración probatoria, cuando se refirió a la lógica; también, invocó el quebranto de los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. A su vez, aludió a un motivo casacional por violación de normas procesales, el de falta de fundamentación o motivación. La ambigüedad puesta de manifiesto riñe con la técnica de la casación, la cual impone que los motivos del recurso deben indicarse de manera clara y precisa (artículo 139 inciso 3) del CPCA).

XV.Sin perjuicio de lo anterior y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, precisa anotar lo siguiente. En el epígrafe del agravio en estudio, el recurrente anunció objetar lo expuesto en el apartado VIII de la sentencia impugnada. De seguido, como se indicó en el considerando anterior, a folio 14, en lo de interés indicó: "En el Considerando VIII, la resolución impugnada rechazó el alegato de la actora en relación con el deber de obediencia, porque concluye que resultaba inaplicable en la especie. Según el fallo, la actora estaba obligada a desobedecer la orden del superior porque se trataba de una conducta ilegítima que conforme con el numeral 108 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LEGAP) debió, cuando menos, dejar constancia de su rechazo. Esa conclusión del Tribunal deviene en una lectura sesgada del canon 108 de la LEGAP. […]". (Lo subrayado es suplido). Lo indicado causa confusión. En dicho considerando VIII de la sentencia cuestionada, las personas juzgadoras, distinto a lo argüido por el casacionista, se limitaron a realizar un análisis teórico legislativo de las figuras del deber de obediencia y desobediencia. No efectuaron análisis alguno de los alegatos de la parte actora, por ende, ahí no los rechazaron. Tampoco le aplicaron a la accionante el precepto 108 de la LGAP. Además de esa norma, en ese apartado de la sentencia cuestionada, las personas juzgadoras analizaron otros numerales de la LGAP. Para tener una cabal compresión, se reproducirá, en lo de interés, dicho apartado: "VIII.- Sobre el contenido del deber de obediencia. Como parte de las relaciones internas que se producen en la prestación de las competencias públicas, la jerarquía supone el poder de un órgano para regir y verificar las conductas de otros órganos que son inferiores. Según lo establece el ordinal 101 de la LGAP, la relación de jerarquía administrativa supone que las competencias del superior abarcan la del inferior por razón de territorio o materia, y ostenten funciones de la misma naturaleza. El canon 102 ejusdem fija las potestades genéricas del superior jerárquico en el siguiente sentido: […] En ese ejercicio, acorde al inciso a) de esa norma, el jerarca puede dictar órdenes a sus inferiores, lo que supone la imposición de una conducta concreta, de contenido específico, medida que se constituye en una fuente que debe ser ponderada y valorada por el agente público en el ejercicio de sus competencias. La desatención injustificada de esa imposición bien puede llevar a consecuencias internas de orden disciplinario, así como a la revisión del contenido del acto del inferior, a efectos de que el jerarca natural, en la fase de revisión de oficio o a gestión de parte, pueda realizar el cotejo de las conductas del inferior con las órdenes dictadas. Con todo, el principio de sometimiento al Derecho, impone que el agente público adapte sus conductas a las normas que rigen su comportamiento, según la escala jerárquica de las fuentes (arts. 6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 128, 132, entre otros, de la LGAP). De ahí que si bien, frente a las órdenes del jerarca, surge el deber de obediencia, la misma LGAP impone criterios a partir de los cuales el funcionario público debe desatender esas órdenes. Como regla general, el inferior debe obedecer las órdenes, instrucciones o circulares dictadas por su superior inmediato. Sin embargo, cuando concurra alguna de las siguientes circunstancias, se impone al funcionario el deber de desobediencia: a) Que el acto no provenga de un superior jerárquico, sea o no inmediato (art. 107.2 LGAP). Si el deber de obediencia encuentra sustento en las relaciones de subordinación, resulta evidente que el órgano que no ostente jerarquía respecto de otro, no puede emitir válidamente una orden, ante lo cual, es claro que no puede imponerse a otro órgano que, respecto de ese acto, no es inferior; b) Que el acto tenga por objeto la realización de conductas notoriamente ajenas a su competencia (art. 108.1.a) ídem). La competencia constituye un elemento material subjetivo fundamental para el ejercicio legítimo de las potestades y competencias, de suerte que, ante la falta de competencia, es indudable la invalidez del acto. Así se desprende con toda claridad del precepto 129 de la LGAP, de suerte que la ordenación de comportamientos ajenos a la competencia del inferior es una conducta en sí misma irregular, y que, por ende, no se encuentra impregnada por el deber de obediencia; c) Que el acto sea abiertamente arbitrario, por constituir su ejecución, abuso de autoridad o cualquier otro delito (art. 108.1.b) ejusdem. El abuso de autoridad como ejercicio indebido y/o desbordado del poder administrativo, supone una patología en la prestación de las competencias públicas, que determina la invalidez de lo actuado. Así lo impone la relación de los incisos 3) y 4) del numeral 146 de la LGAP. El precepto 108 inciso 2) de la LGAP es diáfano al señalar que la obediencia en cualquiera de esas hipótesis o circunstancias, produce la responsabilidad del funcionario, en el ámbito disciplinario (administrativo), civil y eventualmente penal. Cabe destacar que esta norma alude a la responsabilidad del funcionario que, teniendo el deber legal de desobedecer, decide acatar la orden dictada, lo que no excluye la responsabilidad del agente público que ha emitido una orden ilegítima por la concurrencia de alguna de esas circunstancias apuntadas. No obstante, en virtud del deber que se analiza, como se ha señalado, la misma ley fija supuestos en los que lo que se impone al agente público es un comportamiento en negativo, sea, desatender la orden dictada, por constituir una manifestación patológica, viciada de nulidad por arbitrariedad, so pena de asumir personalmente la responsabilidad derivada de la ejecución y acatamiento de esas conductas nulas. Ahora bien, cuando no concurra en el acto alguna de las circunstancias de excepción señaladas, el precepto 109 de la ley de cita impone a la persona funcionaria el deber de obedecer el acto, aun y cuando se estime que esa conducta es contraria al Ordenamiento Jurídico, por cualquier otro concepto. Empero, en este supuesto, la misma norma impone un nuevo deber, en esta ocasión, consistente en advertir y comunicar al jerarca administrativo sobre sus objeciones. Tal exigencia implica una liberación de la eventual responsabilidad que pudiere derivar de la ejecución del acto inválido, pero con la pervivencia del deber de ejecución. En casos de urgencia, el mandato 110 de la LGAP estatuye que el inferior puede hacer reserva de su responsabilidad de manera verbal, para lo cual, requiere de la presencia de dos testigos. En este sentido, el mismo canon 109 ejusdem complementa que cuando se trate de evitar daños graves de imposible o difícil reparación que la ejecución inmediata del acto emitido pueda producir, el inferior puede suspender la ejecución de aquel, sujeto a la responsabilidad que pudiere resultar, caso de que las causas justificantes fueren, en definitiva, inexistentes o improcedentes. Cabe destacar que dicha ejecución de actos nulos constituye una distorsión al principio de inejecutividad de las conductas con nulidad absoluta que imponen los ordinales 146.3 y 169 de la misma fuente legal, por lo cual, la comunicación de objeciones justifica la dispensa de responsabilidad del inferior, reservando ese marco de imputación al superior. Dicho esto, de cara a definir los casos en que concurre el deber de obediencia o desobediencia, es necesario precisar que la notoriedad de las causas de ilegitimidad que obligan a desvincularse de la conducta de un jerarca, es un aspecto que debe valorarse en cada caso, a efectos de lo cual, es primario analizar si el agente público se encontraba en posibilidad o deber objetivo de conocer la irregularidad de la conducta que le es requerida ejecutar. Para ello, la doctrina del ordinal 213 de la LGAP fija pautas a seguir en estas lides, imponiendo el criterio de que el marco de responsabilidad es proporcional al nivel de jerarquía del servidor público y el carácter técnico de sus funciones. De esa manera, a mayor jerarquía y nivel técnico competencial, mayor es el deber de conocer y apreciar los vicios del acto, y, en consecuencia, más intenso el deber de desobediencia. De ahí que sea debido analizar, en cada situación, el puesto desempeñado, perfil de funciones, nivel técnico inherente al puesto, como parámetros previos de la ponderación de la existencia (a priori) de un deber o poder de conocer la ilegitimidad de la conducta dictada por el superior y a partir de ello, bien optar por la desobediencia o por la obediencia bajo protesta, con la debida expresión de las razones que constituyen la objeción. Sobre esa base, debe definirse si el inferior ha incurrido o no en el marco de responsabilidad que le impone la ley, ora por desobedecer de manera indebida, o por obedecer una orden que, por imperativo legal, debía desatender. Por tanto, la liberación de responsabilidad no se configura por la simple obediencia de un acto que no presenta las circunstancias arriba señaladas, siendo deber del inferior comunicar al jerarca las objeciones propias del contenido de la orden dictada, como causa de dispensa de su responsabilidad frente a la adopción o ejecución de esos actos. Cuando tal reproche no conste en el expediente administrativo de la respectiva actuación, el inferior asume igualmente la responsabilidad por esa ejecución, cuando tuviera el poder o deber de evidenciar las deficiencias del acto. Realizadas esas precisiones necesarias, se ingresa al análisis del caso concreto." Es evidente la falta de concordancia entre lo expuesto en dicho considerando y lo alegado por el recurrente. Por ende, lo manifestado resulta anodino a efecto de quebrar lo resuelto.

XVI.En el tercer motivo de disconformidad por transgresión de normas sustantivas, folio 15, indicó el casacionista, el Considerando IX del fallo recurrido concluyó que su mandante incurrió en una falta a sus deberes, en tanto el Manual de Puestos le imponía la tarea de "asesorar" a sus superiores en las materias propias del cargo. La conclusión, manifestó, es inválida por las siguientes razones. El fallo, indicó, acogió el alegato de los demandados sobre lo dispuesto en el Manual de Puestos en relación con el ocupado por la actora. Sin embargo, añadió, omitió señalar si se basó en el Manual de Puestos vigente en el año 2010 o 2011, cuando se firmaron las acciones de Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz; o, si se refirió al vigente a la fecha de la interposición de la acción jurisdiccional. Esa omisión sobre la fecha de eficacia del Manual de Puestos en el que sostiene su decisión, aseveró, es un vicio cuya sanción es revocar el fallo por falta de fundamentación jurídica. Las funciones de asesoría de la Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos, indicó, está limitada al manejo y administración de los recursos humanos. Es ajena, anotó, a la asesoría jurídica, porque la actora carece de la formación académica y técnica para interpretar los Decretos y demás reglas atinentes a las formas de regular las relaciones de servicio. Conoce, con detalle, el procedimiento de contratación, mas no lo relacionado con las disposiciones o directrices emanadas de la CGR, cuya complejidad jurídica demanda la asesoría del Departamento Legal. Tan complicada era la situación, expuso, que ni entre los mismos asesores legales del ente demandado se pusieron de acuerdo en la metodología aplicable, como se acredita con los oficios DAJ-096-2013 y A-PE-220-2013. Razón suficiente para descartar la obligación de la actora, como especialista de recursos humanos, en resolver lo que los abogados no pudieron. Su mandante, acotó, aplicó el ordenamiento jurídico de acuerdo al diseño jurídico establecido por los asesores legales. Sumado a que las actuaciones imputadas a su patrocinada son ajenas a los sistemas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. El Tribunal, comentó, avaló la imputación del INDER de que la actora omitió asesor al Presidente Ejecutivo. Esto, expuso, con equivocidad lógica sobre las competencias del puesto en relación con la pretensión de asesoría, en tanto el análisis, valoración e interpretación de los Decretos y la Directriz de la CGR, sobre el procedimiento para las recontrataciones de personal en descenso, le corresponde a la Asesoría Legal de la entidad y al Asesor Legal del Presidente Ejecutivo, quienes son los que deben marcar la pauta aplicativa para las demás oficinas institucionales. La fundamentación contradictoria, imprecisa y disconforme del fallo, manifestó, tipifica la causal del inciso a) del artículo 138 del CPCA, porque dejó de valorar lo siguiente: a) las dos acciones de personal suscritas por la actora conjuntamente con el Presidente Ejecutivo, estuvieron precedidas de dos resoluciones emitidas por este, para cada uno de los casos y, posteriormente, fueron avaladas por dos convenios suscritos entre el INDER con los funcionarios Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Diaz (hechos probados del 5 al 10); b) los convenios fueron refrendados por el Departamento Legal (mismos hechos); c) la actora no participó en las negociaciones entre el Presidente Ejecutivo y los funcionarios aludidos (no hay prueba que sustente esa conclusión); d) la conducta de la actora se limitó a ejecutar dos actos administrativos a través de dos acciones de personal a la que se les adjuntó las resoluciones suscritas por el Presidente Ejecutivo; e) que a la actora le asistía un principio de confianza legítima, en tanto las decisiones del Presidente Ejecutivo son emitidas previa asistencia de sus asesores legales, de manera que es a estos a quienes les corresponde valorar la legalidad de la decisión del superior. Con las omisiones valorativas indicadas, expuso, el fallo violentó, por inaplicación, el artículo 356 de la LGAP, porque las resoluciones del Presidente Ejecutivo del INDER, referentes a los funcionarios Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz, finalizaba el conflicto. Hubo consulta obligada y previa al Asesor Jurídico, como lo dispone esa norma. Al omitir el Tribunal su aplicación, trasladó, indebidamente, la responsabilidad hacia su patrocinada, cuando es atribuible al Presidente Ejecutivo (en caso que no hubiese solicitado la asesoría jurídica pertinente) o al asesor legal en caso que la hubiese dado de manera errónea. La sentencia, anotó, también debe casarse por inaplicación del artículo 146 inciso 3) íbid, al trasladar, erróneamente, la responsabilidad a la actora. Reprodujo esa disposición. En esta lite, y en la eventualidad de que las acciones de personal acusadas fuesen absolutamente nulas, la responsabilidad de su emisión le corresponde al Presidente Ejecutivo del INDER, por esa expresa disposición legal, la cual, concluyó, fue omitida por el Tribunal, incurriendo en el vicio reclamado.

XVII.En el agravio de estudio, el recurrente volvió a alegar varias hipótesis disímiles entre sí, pero, por la manera cómo se formuló el reparo, resultan inseparables. En este sentido, a folio 15, manifestó el impugnante: "El fallo acoge el alegato de los demandados sobre lo que dispone el Manual de Puestos en relación con el puesto de la actora, pero omitió señalar si la Cámara Jurisdiccional se basó en el Manual de Puestos vigente en el 2010 y 2011 cuando se firmaron las acciones de Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz, o si se refiere al Manual de Puestos vigente a la fecha de la interposición de la acción jurisdiccional. Esa omisión sobre la fecha de eficacia del Manual de Puestos en el que sostiene su decisión es un vicio cuya sanción es revocar el fallo por falta de fundamentación jurídica." De darse lo argüido, originaría el vicio por quebranto de normas procesales previsto en el inciso 1) punto d) del canon 137 del CPCA: falta de motivación. No obstante, el recurrente no indicó en qué difieren cada una de las versiones que señaló (si es que existen). Además, no cuestionó lo señalado en la sentencia, respecto a que: "Según lo manifiesta el INDER y reitera el co-accionado Rodríguez Barquero, el Manual de Puestos de la Institución asigna a ese puesto los siguientes detalles: «Naturaleza del trabajo. Planeamiento, organización, coordinación, control y evaluación de labores técnicas, científicas y administrativas que se prestan en los servicios o procesos administrativos, financieros y técnicos del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, así como la ejecución de las actividades correspondientes. Cargos que integran esta clase: Coordinador (a) de Recursos Humanos. (...) Actividades Generales del Coordinador de Recursos Humanos. Asesora a las jefaturas de la institución en materia de administración de personal. Consecuencias del error. Los errores cometidos pueden causar pérdidas, daños o atrasos de alta consideración, por lo que las actividades deben ser realizadas con sumo cuidado y precisión. Características personales del ocupante. Capacidad analítica, crítica y de síntesis.»". (Solo lo subrayado es suplido). Por lo tanto, lo indicado resulta anodino a efecto de quebrar lo resuelto. Agregó el recurrente en ese mismo folio: "Con independencia de lo señalado en el parágrafo anterior, las funciones de asesoría de la Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos, está limitada al manejo y administración de los recursos humanos, totalmente ajena a la asesoría jurídica porque la actora carece de la formación académica y técnica para interpretar los Decretos y demás reglas atinentes a las formas de regular las relaciones de servicio; conoce con detalle el procedimiento de contratación, no así lo relacionado con las disposiciones o directrices emanadas de la Contraloría General de la República, cuya complejidad jurídica demanda la asesoría del Departamento Legal." Lo expuesto, no pasa de ser un alegato meramente argumentativo, ayuno de sustento fáctico. Además, contrasta con lo que el Manual de Puestos de la Institución señala como deberes para la persona que ostenta el cargo de Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos. Continuó manifestando el casacionista en dicho folio: "Tan complicada era la situación que ni entre los mismos asesores legales del IDA (INDER) se pusieron de acuerdo en la metodología aplicable, como se acredita con los oficios DAJ-096-2013 y A-PE-220-2013; razón suficiente para descartar la obligación de la actora como especialista de recursos humanos, en resolver lo que los abogados no pudieron." Lo señalado, daría lugar al motivo casacional previsto en el inciso a) del numeral 138 del CPCA, por quebranto indirecto de ley. En el último párrafo de dicho folio, arguyó el recurrente: "La actora aplica el ordenamiento jurídico de acuerdo al diseño jurídico establecido por los asesores legales, sumado a que las actuaciones imputadas a mi patrocinada, son ajenos a los sistemas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. El Tribunal avaló en el fallo la imputación del INDER de que la actora omitió asesor al Presidente Ejecutivo con equivocidad lógica sobre las competencias del puesto de la actora en relación con la pretensión de asesoría en tanto el análisis, valoración e interpretación de los Decretos y la Directriz de la Contraloría General de la República sobre el procedimiento para las recontrataciones de personal en descenso, le corresponde a la Asesoría Legal de la entidad y al Asesor Legal del Presidente Ejecutivo, quienes son los que deben marcar la pauta aplicativa para las demás oficinas institucionales." Lo indicado, resulta un alegato argumentativo ayuno de sustento fáctico y jurídico. Además, el que la accionante aplique el ordenamiento jurídico de acuerdo al diseño jurídico establecido por los asesores legales, según lo indicó el recurrente, dista de lo expuesto en el Manual de Puestos como deberes funcionariales de la Coordinación de Recursos Humanos del INDER. Por otro lado, en el apartado XI punto tercero de esta resolución, se brindaron las razones por las cuales esta Cámara estima que la conducta intimada a la actora resulta antagónica tanto al deber de probidad como al régimen de control interno. En el folio 16, indicó el recurrente: "La fundamentación contradictoria, imprecisa y disconforme del fallo tipifica la causal del inciso a) del artículo 138 del CPCA porque dejó de valorar lo siguiente: / h) las dos acciones de personal suscritas por la actora conjuntamente con el Presidente Ejecutivo, estuvieron precedidas de dos resoluciones emitidas por éste para cada uno de los casos, y posteriormente avaladas por dos convenios suscritos entre el IDA (INDER) con los funcionarios concernidos, Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Diaz (Véase hechos probados del 5 al 10); / i) los convenios fueron refrendados por el Departamento Legal (mismos hechos del 5 al 10), / j) la actora no participó en las negociaciones entre el Presidente Ejecutivo y los funcionarios aludidos; (no hay prueba que sustente esa conclusión) / k) la conducta de la actora se limitó a ejecutar dos actos administrativos a través de dos acciones de personal a la [sic] que se les adjuntó las resoluciones suscritas por el Presidente Ejecutivo; / l) el fallo dejó de valorar que a la actora le asistía un principio de confianza legítima, en tanto las decisiones del Presidente Ejecutivo son emitidas previa asistencia de sus asesores legales de manera que es a estos a quienes les corresponde valorar la legalidad de la decisión del Superior. / 3) Con las omisiones valorativas arriba señaladas, el fallo violentó por inaplicación, el artículo 356 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, porque las resoluciones del Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA (INDER) referentes a los funcionarios Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz finalizaba el conflicto, hubo consulta obligada y previa al Asesor Jurídico como lo dispone el numeral 356 de la LEGAP; al omitir el Tribunal la aplicación de esa norma, trasladó indebidamente la responsabilidad hacia mi patrocinada cuando ésta es atribuible al Presidente Ejecutivo (en caso que no hubiese solicitado la asesoría jurídica pertinente) o al asesor legal en caso que la hubiese dado de manera errónea." En lo argüido por el recurrente se mezclaron dos motivos casacionales diferentes: primero, uno por violación de normas procesales: falta de motivación; y, luego, otro por transgresión de normas sustantivas, por violación indirecta de ley. En lo que respecta al aserto del casacionista de que a la actora le asistía el principio de confianza legítima, precisa señalar. La demandante no se puede escudar en dicho postulado para justificar la desatención del deber de probidad y las reglas de control interno. Esto fomentaría, indudablemente, que el fin previsto en la Ley no. 8422, prevenir, detectar y sancionar la corrupción en el ejercicio de la función pública, resulte inocuo. Si la Administración Pública, en el pasado, emitió actos de manera irregular o ilegal, como sucedió en esta lite, le bastaría a la persona funcionaria pública seguir esa conducta sin cuestionarse su legitimidad, pese a ser su deber funcionarial, alegando el principio de confianza legítima, para eludir su responsabilidad, vulnerando o desconociendo, de esta manera, las normas y principios rectores del control interno y de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito de la Función Pública, especialmente, el deber de probidad. Situación que, a todas luces, no puede avalarse. A la actora se le designó en el puesto de Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos del INDER porque cumplía con el perfil señalado en el Manual de Puestos de ese ente. Dentro de sus deberes está el de asesorar a las jefaturas en materia de administración de personal; para lo cual realiza funciones de planeamiento, organización, coordinación, control y evaluación de labores técnicas, científicas y administrativas que se prestan en los servicios o procesos administrativos, financieros y técnicos del INDER, así como la ejecución de las actividades correspondientes. De conformidad con esto, la actora debió haberse percatado de la irregularidad presentada en el caso de los señores Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz, haciéndoselo del conocimiento de la Presidencia Ejecutiva. No, simplemente, seguir con esa irregularidad, escudándose en una mal entendida confianza legítima. Es decir, en virtud de su investidura, no podía presumir, con base en esas actuaciones previas irregulares, la legitimidad de su conducta. De ahí que no se haya conculcado el principio de confianza legítima. Al respecto, pueden consultarse, mutatis mutandis, entre otras, las sentencias de la Sala Primera números 93-F-S1-2011 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 3 de febrero de 2011; 1692-F-S1-2012 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 13 de diciembre de 2012; 256-F-S1-2019 de las 16 horas 24 minutos del 20 de marzo, 409-F-S1-2019 de las 10 horas 55 minutos del 16 de mayo, ambas del año 2019. Por último, manifestó el casacionista en dicho folio: "El fallo también debe casarse por inaplicación del artículo 146, inciso 3) de la LEGAP al trasladar erróneamente la responsabilidad a la actora. Señala el inciso recién mencionado: […] En la especie y en la eventualidad de que las acciones de personal acusadas fuesen absolutamente nulas, la responsabilidad de su emisión le corresponde al Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA (INDER) por esa expresa disposición legal, que fue omitida por el Tribunal incurriendo en el vicio reclamado y así solicito que se declare." Lo indicado, de darse, daría lugar al motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) del precepto 138 del CPCA, es decir, por violación directa de ley. Por otro lado, la eventual responsabilidad de la persona que ocupó la Presidencia Ejecutiva al momento de emitirse las órdenes patronales cuestionadas, no excluye o exonera la responsabilidad de la actora, como Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos del INDER, en virtud del deber de probidad en la función pública y al régimen de control interno, ya expuestos en el considerando XI punto tercero de esta resolución. Así lo expuso el Tribunal en el apartado VIII de la sentencia cuestionada, al indicar: "El precepto 108 inciso 2) de la LGAP es diáfano al señalar que la obediencia en cualquiera de esas hipótesis o circunstancias, produce la responsabilidad del funcionario, en el ámbito disciplinario (administrativo), civil y eventualmente penal. Cabe destacar que esta norma alude a la responsabilidad del funcionario que, teniendo el deber legal de desobedecer, decide acatar la orden dictada, lo que no excluye la responsabilidad del agente público que ha emitido una orden ilegítima por la concurrencia de alguna de esas circunstancias apuntadas. No obstante, en virtud del deber que se analiza, como se ha señalado, la misma ley fija supuestos en los que lo que se impone al agente público es un comportamiento en negativo, sea, desatender la orden dictada, por constituir una manifestación patológica, viciada de nulidad por arbitrariedad, so pena de asumir personalmente la responsabilidad derivada de la ejecución y acatamiento de esas conductas nulas." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Lo cual no fue cuestionado en debida forma por el casacionista. Como ya se ha indicado, la confusión puesta en evidencia está a contra pelo de la técnica de la casación, la cual impone que los motivos del recurso se indiquen de manera clara y precisa.

XVIII.Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, es menester apuntar lo siguiente. Las personas juzgadoras, en los considerandos IX y X de la sentencia cuestionada, en lo de interés, señalaron: "IX.- Análisis sobre las defensas relativas al deber de obediencia de la accionante. La defensa que se formula en esta causa, y sobre la cual alega la invalidez de la sanción impuesta, fue que, a ese momento, se limitó a acatar las órdenes emitidas por quien para esas fechas fungía como Presidente Ejecutivo. En orden a lo que se ha venido exponiendo, tal alegación exige el análisis de las circunstancias en que se emitió esa orden y la concurrencia o no del deber de obediencia frente a esa conducta. En la especie, a la fecha del dictado de las acciones de personal en el mes de abril del año 2010 y junio del 2011, la accionante ocupaba la Coordinación de Recursos Humanos del ente accionado. […] Atendiendo a estas particularidades, estima este Tribunal que la condición misma de Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos coloca a la accionante en el deber, o al menos, en la posibilidad de conocer el conjunto de antecedentes y regulaciones que son inherentes a los movimientos descendentes de personal. Esto hace suponer que frente a una decisión unilateral de la Presidencia Ejecutiva en el sentido de emitir las acciones de personal que reconocieran a los dos funcionarios a quienes se aplicó ese tipo de movimiento, era deber de esa Coordinación, advertir la necesaria existencia de los presupuestos técnicos y jurídicos debidos para ese reconocimiento, y de ser el caso, poner en conocimiento de esa jerarquía la necesidad de requerir los dictámenes internos que dieran soporte legítimo a esa decisión. Tal y como menciona el Manual de Puestos en el aparte arriba señalado, parte de las actividades generales de la accionante era la de asesorar a las jefaturas en materia de administración de personal. De ahí que se desprende de ese perfil un deber funcional que le imponía advertir a su jefatura que la conducta emitida no encontraba respaldo en el régimen aplicable a ese tipo de movimientos. La alegación de aplicación automática y sin reparo alguno de lo ordenado por la Presidencia Ejecutiva, por derivación del deber de obediencia, no supone la liberación de responsabilidad que se pretende, cuando la misma LGAP señala los supuestos en que la agente pública debía desobedecer, pero además cuando la misma normativa interna y el perfil de sus tareas, le imponían conocer de la necesidad de contar con análisis técnicos y/o jurídicos antecedentes que pusieran en evidencia la pertinencia, en los casos intimados, de las acciones ordenadas por su jefatura. En todo caso, aún de estimar que no se ha acreditado que se diera alguna de las condiciones que imponían el deber de desatender la orden, dado su conocimiento y responsabilidades en materia de Gestión Humana, era su deber advertir que en reasignaciones descendentes no era dable conceder el plus salarial asignado en aquellas acciones de personal, a partir de la carencia de los análisis técnicos que dieran respaldo a esas decisiones. Esto a fin de que el jerarca pudiera ponderar esas objeciones y si persistía en su conducta, permitir que la demandante liberara su responsabilidad frente a la ejecución de esas conductas. Sin embargo, no consta en autos que la actora haya realizado dichas advertencias u objeciones al Presidente Ejecutivo, y, por el contrario, sin reserva alguna, procedió a ejecutar las órdenes dictadas mediante la emisión de las respectivas acciones de personal, confiriendo, en definitiva, beneficios ilegítimos que comprometieron los fondos públicos asignados al presupuesto del INDER. Al no haber expresado esas disconformidades, pese a tener el deber de hacer, la accionante asume la responsabilidad por la indolencia en el cumplimiento de estos deberes legalmente asignados, y que son congruentes con sus funciones, por tanto, exigibles como derivación de su conocimiento y experiencia en el perfil de puesto que ocupaba. / X.- Así visto, la antijuridicidad material y formal se concreta en la previsión normativa que le fue intimada a la accionante, en concreto, numeral 38 inciso d) de la Ley No. 8422, y la vulneración del contenido del ordinal 13 inciso c) del Decreto Ejecutivo N° 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004. De igual manera, el componente subjetivo de la sanción aplicada se sustenta en el deber de haber requerido los insumos técnicos y legales que dieran respaldo a la orden dictada y que optó por ejecutar, dispensando del cumplimiento de requisitos mínimos. En ese sentido, de conformidad con las reglas de imputación de responsabilidad que establece el canon 213 de la LGAP, en virtud de la cual, a mayor jerarquía de funciones y mayor ámbito técnico de las mismas, mayor el deber de considerar el vicio potencial del acto dictado y las conductas adoptadas. Desde ese plano, la posición de coordinadora de Gestión Humana supone un grado de especialización técnica en función de la cual, no es de recibo el alegato de la demandante en cuanto a la dispensa de responsabilidad por la simple obediencia de órdenes dictadas por el entonces titular de la Presidencia Ejecutiva en cuanto a las acciones de personal que reconocían un derecho al pago de un sobresueldo por reasignación descendente, que no satisfacía las exigencias procedimentales ni sustantivas atinentes al caso. Se observa por ende una culpa grave en ese proceder que supone una responsabilidad por la emisión y permisibilidad de actos que crearon derechos de orden patrimonial de manera indebida, con el correspondiente perjuicio económico para el presupuesto del ente co-accionado, al comprometer fondos públicos sin la debida constatación de conformidad de los trámites que llevaron a la emisión de las citadas acciones de personal. No se observa por ende una excusa legal o una permisibilidad de desconocer las falencias que luego dieron base a la sanción impuesta. Se trata de un tema que era plenamente verificable a priori y que obligaba a adoptar acciones correctivas para reducir los riesgos de emisión de este tipo de conductas o, en todo caso, sentar las razones de disconformidad a modo de advertencia, para así, generar una liberación de responsabilidad. Al no hacerlo, se incurre en el presupuesto de hecho (antecedente condicionante) que fuese intimado a la accionante y que permite la aplicación de la consecuencia jurídica anticipada en el traslado de cargos. Tal valoración del comportamiento referible a la accionante fue debidamente expresada en el acto final (resolución No. 037-2017). En lo relevante, dentro de las razones dadas por la Presidencia Ejecutiva se expuso: […] Dichas referencias ponen en evidencia las ponderaciones a partir de las cuales el ente accionado consideró que la conducta de la accionante lesionaba las normas de la Ley No. 8422, por la omisión de control respecto de los análisis técnicos debidos para el otorgamiento de las reasignaciones descendentes y el respectivo reconocimiento del sobresueldo otorgado a ambos funcionarios referidos, enfatizando en la ausencia de medidas de contingencia propias de su cargo, atinentes a procedimientos y trámites de administración de personal, lo que dice de la desatención a esos deberes y en consecuencia de la responsabilidad que le deriva de esas conductas. Como se observa, ese análisis engarza y armoniza con los razonamientos dados por este Tribunal en el presente fallo, tratamiento en el que, en consecuencia, no se observan las incorrecciones denunciadas." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Como se determina con nitidez, el recurrente no cuestionó en debida forma los argumentos o fundamentos esgrimidos por el Tribunal a efecto de determinar la responsabilidad de la actora por quebranto al deber de probidad y al régimen de control interno. Como se indicó en el apartado anterior, se limitó a efectuar alegaciones meramente argumentativas, divorciadas de las razones expuestas en la sentencia cuestionada. Las cuales, dicho sea de paso, comparte esta Cámara. Resulta claro, en virtud de los deberes funcionariales de la actora como Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos del INDER, su deber de conocer y manejar las regulaciones referentes a los movimientos descendentes de personal de la institución. Por ello, la necesidad de contarse con los presupuestos técnicos y jurídicos para el reconocimiento de sobresueldos en los casos de movimientos de personal en descenso. De ahí que, al no advertir esa circunstancia a la Presidencia Ejecutiva, debe asumir su responsabilidad, acorde al precepto 213 de la LGAP.

XIX.En el cuarto reproche, folio 16, el impugnante objetó el rechazo de la nulidad por falta de motivación de la resolución sancionatoria. Una de las razones de la nulidad reclamada, acotó, fue la falta de motivación de la resolución no. PE-037 de las 10 horas 37 minutos del 28 de junio de 2017. La sentencia rechazó los argumentos y resolvió que la decisión administrativa cumplía con los requisitos de la fundamentación, explicando lo que consideró es la motivación. En esa explicación, dijo, el fallo partió de una perspectiva cuantitativa de la motivación. Contrario a lo resuelto, expuso, dicha resolución carece de fundamentación porque omitió puntualizar, precisar los contenidos de la conducta de la actora que quebrantaron las específicas reglas del ordenamiento jurídico al que estaba sometida. La motivación, señaló, implica cuatro elementos sustanciales: a) la comprobación absoluta de los hechos sin interpretación ni valoración subjetiva. Es la comprobación pura y simple del acaecimiento de un evento con independencia de las razones que le dieron lugar; b) la prueba irrefutable de que esos hechos fueron consecuencia de una específica conducta; c) la subsunción de esos hechos en normas jurídicas precisas, sin requiebres interpretativos; y d) que los hechos señalados en el acápite a) puedan ser atribuidos a una o varias personas. Tanto la resolución administrativa no. 037-2017 como la sentencia cuestionada, indicó, omitieron precisar los hechos, las pruebas, la regla jurídica y la atribución puntual de esos hechos a la actora, de quien solo se indicó que suscribió las acciones de personal sin haber asesorado al superior. Se omitió señalar, agregó, las reglas jurídicas atinentes al hecho atribuido, limitándose a la mención desordenada de varias reglas legales y reglamentarias sin precisar las conductas subsumidas en cada una. El fallo judicial, aseveró, avaló ese acto administrativo carente de motivación con infracción al numeral 136 de la LGAP que la exige, como requisito de validez, porque la motivación es la armoniosa conjunción de los hechos, las pruebas, las reglas jurídicas puntuales que subsumen esos hechos y la identificación del sujeto activo de la conducta. En esta lite, expuso, los hechos puros y simples fueron: a) el Presidente Ejecutivo del INDER resolvió que a los funcionarios Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz se les pagaría un sobresueldo, como sustituto del pago de la totalidad de la liquidación en un único tracto, como consecuencia de su liquidación parcial por descenso en el cargo; b) emitida y firmada la resolución por el Presidente Ejecutivo, se le ordenó a la actora proceder con la acción de personal; c) posterior a la firma de la acción de personal, se suscribieron los convenios con los funcionarios señalados y refrendados por el Departamento Legal. La prueba de esos hechos, indicó, el Tribunal la detalló en los hechos probados del 5) al 10) de la sentencia. El respaldo jurídico que ampararon los hechos fueron las resoluciones de la CGR y los criterios jurídicos existentes al momento de la emisión de las acciones de personal. La sentencia cuestionada abandonó el análisis de esos tres elementos básicos y únicos que debían estar incorporados en la resolución administrativa, incurriendo en el mismo vicio de falta de motivación. La sola lectura de la resolución administrativa, aseveró, acredita el vicio atribuido al fallo cuestionado, a saber: a) omitió identificar el motivo, causa y fin del acto administrativo impugnado y confirmado; b) no hay hilo lógico conductor a la conclusión; c) la resolución judicial no concretizó los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados de: "deber de probidad, buen manejo de los recursos públicos" en relación con los hechos concretos atribuidos a la actora; d) omitió señalar los hechos concretos y específicos ejecutados por la actora que quebrantaron ese deber de probidad; e) omitió fundamentar la responsabilidad específica y concreta atribuible a la actora en el manejo de los recursos públicos (omitida también el acto administrativo impugnado). Las dos resoluciones (la administrativa no. 037-2017 y la sentencia) no identificaron las reglas jurídicas impositivas a la actora para: resguardar, administrar, garantizar, proteger, distribuir, recaudar recursos públicos, sujetándola a las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Trajo a colación que, conforme con la resolución no. 623-A-S1-2013, de las 10 horas 25 minutos del 16 de mayo de 2013, la Sala Primera concluyó que, para determinar la aplicación de las reglas del artículo 71 de la LOCGR, se utiliza el criterio material objetivo, pues, la responsabilidad deviene de la infracción de las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública y no del cargo del funcionario. Reprodujo, en lo de su interés, lo ahí considerado. De acuerdo con dicho órgano judicial, apuntó, tanto al acto administrativo sancionatorio no. 037-2017 como a la sentencia impugnada, les faltó puntualizar las razones por las cuales, la firma estampada por la actora en las acciones de personal de Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, infraccionó las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Esa falta de precisión legislativa, con omisión argumentativa, concluyó, es causal de nulidad absoluta de la resolución administrativa y de revocatoria de la sentencia objetada.

XX.Una vez más, el recurrente alegó varias hipótesis disímiles, pero, por la manera cómo estructuró el agravio, resultan inseparables. A folio 17, indicó: "Tanto la resolución administrativa número 037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de junio de 2017 como la sentencia 095-2019-VI omitieron precisar los hechos, las pruebas, la regla jurídica y la atribución puntual de esos hechos a la actora, de quien solamente se indica que suscribió las acciones de personal sin haber asesorado al superior. / Se omitió señalar [sic] las reglas jurídicas atinentes al hecho atribuido, limitándose a la mención desordenada de varias reglas legales y reglamentarias sin precisar las conductas subsumidas en cada una." Lo indicado, de darse, originaría el vicio por quebranto de normas procesales previsto en el inciso 1) punto d) del precepto 137 del CPCA: falta de fundamentación. Además, lo argüido no pasa de ser un comentario meramente argumentativo, divorciado, por completo de la sentencia cuestionada. Añadió el impugnante: "El fallo judicial avaló ese acto administrativo carente de esa motivación con infracción al numeral 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública que la exige como requisito de validez, porque la motivación es la armoniosa conjunción de los hechos, las pruebas, las reglas jurídicas puntuales que subsumen esos hechos y la identificación del sujeto activo de la conducta." Lo ahora alegado daría lugar al motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) del artículo 138 íbid, por quebranto directo de ley. Luego, indicó el recurrente: "En la especie, los hechos puros y simples fueron: a) el Presidente Ejecutivo del IDA (INDER) resolvió que a los funcionarios Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz se les pagaría un sobresueldo como sustituto del pago de la totalidad de la liquidación en un único tracto como consecuencia de su liquidación parcial por descenso en el cargo; b) emitida y firmada la resolución por el Presidente Ejecutivo, se le ordenó a la actora proceder con la acción de personal; c) posterior a la firma de la acción de personal, se suscribieron los convenios con los funcionarios señalados y refrendados por el Departamento Legal; la prueba de esos hechos: el Tribunal la detalló en los hechos probados del 5) al 10) de la sentencia; el respaldo jurídico que ampararon los hechos fueron las resoluciones de la Contraloría General de la República y los criterios jurídicos existentes al momento de la emisión de las acciones de personal." Lo indicado, daría lugar al motivo de casación previsto en el inciso a) del canon 138 ejúsdem, por violación indirecta de ley, por la indebida valoración tanto de las resoluciones de la CGR como de los criterios jurídicos existentes al momento de la emisión de las acciones de personal, al no analizarse, en debida forma, los hechos acontecidos en esta lite. Siguió manifestado el recurrente: "La sentencia 095-2019-V1 abandonó el análisis de esos tres elementos básicos y únicos que debían estar incorporados en la resolución 037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de abril de 2017, incurriendo en el mismo vicio de falta de motivación en este caso, de la sentencia. La sola lectura de la resolución 037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de abril de 2017 acredita el vicio atribuido al fallo 095-2019-VI a saber: / Se omitió identificar el motivo, causa y fin del acto administrativo impugnado y confirmado; / No hay hilo lógico conductor a la conclusión; / La resolución judicial no concretiza los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados de: "deber de probidad, buen manejo de los recursos públicos" en relación con los hechos concretos atribuidos a la actora, / Omitió señalar los hechos concretos y específicos ejecutados por la actora que quebrantaran ese deber de probidad, / Omitió fundamentar la responsabilidad específica y concreta atribuible a la actora en el manejo de los recursos públicos, (omitida también el acto administrativo impugnado). / Las dos resoluciones (037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de abril de 2017 y la sentencia 095-2019-VI) no se identifican las reglas jurídicas impositivas a la actora para: resguardar, administrar, garantizar, proteger, distribuir, recaudar recursos públicos haciéndola sujetándola a las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública." Lo manifestado, daría lugar al vicio por quebranto de normas procesales ya indicado: falta de motivación. Al respecto, precisa indicar, diferente a lo señalado por el recurrente, en el apartado VI de la sentencia cuestionada, las personas juzgadoras analizaron, desde una perspectiva teórico, doctrinal y legal la figura del "deber de probidad". Luego, en el considerando VII, externaron las razones por las cuales, a esta lite, le es aplicable el plazo prescriptivo previsto en el ordinal 71 de la LOCGR y por qué no transcurrió. En los apartados VIII, IX y X, expusieron las razones (fácticas y jurídicas) por las cuales, a la actora, en virtud de su posición como Coordinadora de Recursos Humanos del INDER, le era achacable responsabilidad, por quebranto tanto al deber de probidad como al régimen de control interno, al no haber advertido la necesaria existencia de presupuestos técnicos y jurídicos debidos para reconocer sobresueldos por movimientos en descenso. Es decir, diferente a lo indicado por el casacionista, en criterio de esta Cámara, las personas juzgadoras, de manera clara, ordenada y prolija, motivaron las razones por las cuales la actora era responsable por su conducta omisiva. Siguió señalando el recurrente a folios 17 y 18: "Es importante traer a colación que conforme con la sentencia 623-A-S1-2013 de las 10.25 horas del 16 de mayo de 2013, esta Honorable Sala Primera concluyó que para determinar la aplicación de las reglas del artículo 71 de la LOCGR, se utiliza el criterio material objetivo, pues la responsabilidad deviene de la infracción de las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública y no del cargo del funcionario concernido. Así lo expresó: […] De acuerdo con la Sala Primera, el acto administrativo sancionatorio 037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de junio de 2017 como a la sentencia 095-2019-VI, les faltó puntualizar las razones por las que la firma estampada por la adora en las acciones de personal de Ricardo Rodríguez Bonilla y Ronald Novo Díaz, infraccionó las reglas de control y fiscalización de la hacienda pública. Esa falta de precisión legislativa con omisión argumentativa esa [sic] causal de nulidad absoluta de la resolución 037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de abril de 2017 y de revocación de la sentencia 095-2019-VI y así pido se declare." Dicha resolución de la Sala Primera, en esta lite, constituye un medio de convicción. Por ende, lo argüido en torno a ella, de darse, daría lugar al motivo casacional previsto en el inciso a) del precepto 138 del CPCA, por quebranto indirecto de ley. Luego, en el último párrafo indicado, el casacionista también invocó el motivo de casación por violación de normas procesales ya indicado de falta de motivación. La ambigüedad puesta de manifiesto, como ya se ha expuesto, contraviene la técnica de la casación.

XXI.Sin perjuicio de lo indicado en el considerando anterior y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, precisa indicar. En el considerando XI de la sentencia impugnada, las personas juzgadoras brindaron las razones por las cuales, a su entender, el acto final cuestionado se encuentra debidamente motivado. En lo de interés, manifestaron: "XI.- Sobre la falta de motivación alegada. Por otro lado, se alega una indebida fundamentación del acto final del procedimiento. […] en el caso de marras, el acto no presenta las deficiencias de motivación que se alegan. Como se ha expuesto ut supra, en lo que ha sido motivo de objeción, las conductas impugnadas ofrecen con claridad el conjunto de circunstancias antecedentes sobre las cuales ha sustentado su decisión. El acto final señala las razones de hecho y de derecho sobre las cuales sustenta el contenido del acto. En el aparte de hechos probados, ese acto refiere a los elementos de convicción sobre los cuales desprendió cada aserto fáctico. Por su lado, en el análisis de fondo, realiza una valoración de las pruebas incorporadas al procedimiento, a la vez que explicita las razones por las cuales tuvo por acreditadas las conductas intimadas, las consideraciones por las cuales concluyó que se trataba de una falta al régimen de probidad, con detalle de las obligaciones propias del cargo que ocupaba la actora al momento de los hechos, así como el juicio valorativo que le llevó a establecer la sanción en definitiva aplicada. En ese particular, en el numeral "V.V. [sic] Sobre la sanción a imponer", señaló: "Analizando el grado de culpabilidad de la funcionaria en su omisión de actuación, considera este órgano que es relevante; ya que, existió un daño grave y pernicioso al presupuesto de la institución otorgando beneficios a funcionarios que no se les llevó el debido proceso para determinar si cumplían o no para la reasignación de puestos descendentes; por tal motivo, en aras de no dejar pasar por alto dicha acción; pero a la vez para invitar a la funcionaria a meditar sobre su actuar negligente en las funciones que desempeñaba, este órgano decisor impone la sanción de SUSPENSIÓN DE UN MES SIN GOCE DE SALARIO. Dicho quantum se considera adecuado, estimando la gravedad de los hechos, que la funcionaria tiene una larga trayectoria en la Institución y, considerando que el fin del procedimiento disciplinario es correctivo (...) ". De esa manera, la resolución final atacada, plasma de manera debida el conjunto de precedentes del caso, enlista los hechos que fueron tenidos por acreditados con detalle de los elementos de convicción sobre los que fueron deducidos. Tal desarrollo posibilita la comprensión de las razones que amparan el motivo del acto. Luego, abordó los diversos alegatos presentados por las partes involucradas y abunda sobre las razones de derecho por las cuales, frente a los hechos determinados, obtuvo las valoraciones y consecuencias jurídicas en definitiva adoptadas. En rigor, esa exposición muestra congruencia lógica entre los hechos y el derecho aplicado, como soporte de la decisión final, lo que permite la comprensión (lógica) de las razones base de la voluntad administrativa. Cabe destacar que en orden a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 136 inciso c) de la LGAP, esa motivación permite sustentar la decisión frente al informe de recomendación vertido por el órgano instructor y frente a las consideraciones realizadas por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, ambos criterios de naturaleza no vinculante al tenor del precepto 303 de la citada LGAP, pero que, en definitiva, imponían el deber de motivación debida, como en este caso fue concretado. Ciertamente, es comprensible que la petente disienta de esas consideraciones y desarrollo, pero ello no implica que se concrete el defecto que apunta. Desde ese plano, el alegato bajo examen debe ser rechazado." Sin embargo, el recurrente efectuó un alegato divorciado de dicho fundamento. Se limitó a indicar: "La sentencia rechaza los argumentos y resuelve que la decisión administrativa cumple con los requisitos de la fundamentación, explicando lo que considera que es la motivación. En esa explicación, el fallo parte de una perspectiva cuantitativa de la motivación. Contrario a lo resuelto por el Tribunal en el Considerando X, la decisión P.E.037 de las 10.37 horas del 28 de junio de 2017 carece de fundamentación porque omitió puntualizar precisar los contenidos de la conducta de la actora que quebrantaron las especificas reglas del ordenamiento jurídico al que estaba sometida." Es decir, efectuó un relato somero y muy genérico, sin cuestionar, puntualmente, lo señalado por el Tribunal. Por lo tanto, lo señalado en la censura en estudio resulta fútil a efecto de quebrar lo resuelto.

XXII.En el quinto motivo de disconformidad, folio 18, el recurrente objetó lo resuelto en torno a que la sanción aplicada es correcta. En el considerando XII, manifestó, el fallo se concluyó que la sanción impuesta a la actora fue la correcta, pues, el régimen jurídico aplicable es el contenido en el artículo 39 de la LCCEI. Rechazó el argumento de que la sanción de 30 días sin goce de salario quebrantó el precepto 68 inciso c) del Código de Trabajo; e intentó sostenerse en el régimen de Derecho Público, al que está sometida la accionante, con apoyo en los preceptos 112 de la LGAP, 585 hoy 682 del Código de Trabajo y 39 de la LCCEI. Agregó que el análisis de validez de las acciones de personal números 792-2010 y 3841-2011 (Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz) es independiente y, además, ajeno a la infracción al deber de probidad. Transcribió, en lo de su interés, lo considerado por el Tribunal. El análisis de validez o invalidez de las acciones de personal, acotó, es un requisito fundamental para determinar si se quebrantó el deber de probidad. Es a partir de los motivos o elementos que sustentan esa invalidez, que surgiría la responsabilidad, ya que es jurídicamente improbable que una acción de personal ajustada a Derecho pueda generar responsabilidad funcionarial por infracción al deber de probidad. El fallo, anotó, se apoyó en algunas resoluciones (aisladas), sin ajustar lo que en doctrina se denomina el “hecho diferenciador”, como clave de bóveda para extrapolar jurisprudencia de una causa a otra. Para validar la aplicación del artículo 39 de la LCCEI, manifiestó, era necesario identificar el contenido y efectos de los actos imputados a la actora frente a la probidad reclamada porque, al tratarse de un concepto jurídico indeterminado, correspondía a la Administración y, en este caso al Tribunal, concretizarlo. A su mandante, indicó, no se le demostró, en sede administrativa ni judicial, que hubiese incurrido en alguna de las 15 causales de sanción establecidas en el artículo 38 de la LCCEI, razón que imposibilita aplicar el régimen sancionatorio establecido en el numeral 39 íbid, exclusivo para las causales del canon 38 citado. Al estar indemostrada la violación a la LCCEI con la conducta de la actora, concluyó, el fallo incurrió en el vicio del inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA, al aplicar indebidamente los artículos 3 y 39 ibídem.

XXIII.Como se ha expuesto, el Tribunal, en los apartados VI, VII, VIII, IX y X, no solo explicó por qué a esta lite le resultan aplicables las disposiciones de las leyes números 7428, 8292 y 8422; sino también, analizó, con prolijidad, las razones por las cuales, la demandante, distinto a lo señalado por el recurrente, conculcó el deber de probidad y las reglas de control interno. Dicha argumentación, como se ha indicado, no fue debidamente cuestionada por el casacionisa. En concreto, como se indicó en los apartados X y XVIII de esta resolución, en el considerando X, las personas juzgadoras fueron elocuentes al indicar que la antijuricidad material y formal está en lo dispuesto por la normativa intimada a la actora. Específicamente, el numeral 38 inciso d) de la Ley no. 8422 y 13 inciso c) del Decreto Ejecutivo no. 31711 del 16 de marzo de 2004. Asimismo indicaron, el sustento subjetivo de la sanción es el deber de haber requerido los insumos técnicos y legales que dieran respaldo a la orden dictada y que optó por ejecutar, exonerando el cumplimiento de requisitos mínimos. Es decir, contrario a lo señalado por el impugnante, el Tribunal explicó que la conducta reprochable de la actora se encuadró en lo previsto en el canon 38 de la Ley no. 8422. Lo cual, se insiste, no fue debidamente objetado por el impugnante. Por lo tanto, resulta procedente la aplicación del precepto 39 íbid, en cuanto a la sanción impuesta y no el ordinal 68 inciso c) del Código de Trabajo. Lo cual, como se ha indicado, comparte esta Cámara. Manifestó el recurrente a folio 18: "Lamentamos esa conclusión [se refiere a lo señalado por el Tribunal en cuanta a que el análisis de validez de las acciones de personal otorgadas a favor de los señores Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Díaz no constituye una cuestión prejudicial, a la que se supedita la posibilidad de instruir el correspondiente procedimiento disciplinario]. El análisis de validez o invalidez de las acciones de personal es un requisito “fundamental" para determinar si se quebrantó el deber de probidad, porque es a partir de los motivos o elementos que sustentan esa invalidez, que surgiría la responsabilidad, porque es jurídicamente improbable que una acción de personal ajustada a Derecho pueda generar responsabilidad funcionarial por infracción al deber de probidad." El Tribunal, en el apartado XII de la sentencia objetada, al respecto indicó: "Sobre esta independencia de objeto entre ambos procedimientos se ha pronunciado ya la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en ejercicio de las competencias del Tribunal de Casación (conforme al transitorio I en relación al artículo 136 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Ley No. 8508), entre otras, en las resoluciones números 00516-2014, 79-F-TC-2017 y 000003-F-TC-2018. Ergo, no se observa la falencia sobre la cual la accionante sustenta sus reproches." En efecto, este órgano casacional, tocante a la hacienda pública, ha señalado que la sustanciación de un procedimiento de corte sancionatorio es autónoma respecto a la tramitación del procedimiento anulatorio. Al respecto, además de las indicadas por las personas juzgadoras, puede consultarse el fallo no. 114-F-TC-2016 de las 11 horas 10 minutos del 22 de setiembre de 2016. Es decir, que exista nulidad decretada previamente, sobre un determinado acto lesivo a la hacienda pública, no es requisito -sine qua non- para ejercer válidamente el régimen sancionatorio contra el servidor público responsable de esa conducta u omisión dañosa. No existe condicionamiento o subordinación de uno y otro procedimiento. Ambos son plenamente independientes entre sí y diferenciables en cuanto su objeto y alcances. El casacionista, en el indicado folio 18, se limitó a indicar: "El fallo se apoya en algunas resoluciones (aisladas) sin ajustar lo que en doctrina se denomina el “hecho diferenciador” como clave de bóveda para extrapolar jurisprudencia de una causa a otra." Lo manifestado no pasa de ser un alegato meramente argumentativo. No ahonda en razones del porqué, en su criterio, los precedentes señalados no resultan aplicables a esta lite. Agregó el recurrente en dicho folio 18: "Para validar la aplicación del artículo 39 de la LCCEI, era absolutamente necesario identificar el contenido y efectos de los actos imputados a la actora frente a la probidad reclamada, porque al tratarse de un concepto jurídico indeterminado, correspondía a la Administración y en este caso al Tribunal, concretizarlo." Precisamente, se insiste, eso fue lo efectuado por el Tribunal en los considerandos indicados del fallo cuestionado, según se explicó en el apartado XX de esta resolución. A folio 19 alegó el casacionista: "A la actora no se le demostró en sede administrativa ni judicial, que hubiese incurrido en alguna de las 15 causales de sanción establecidas en el artículo 38 de la LCCEI: razón que imposibilita aplicar el régimen sancionatorio establecido en el artículo 39 ibid, exclusivo para las causales del artículo 38 citado. / Al estar indemostrada la violación a la LCCEI con la conducta de la actora, el fallo incurrió en el vicio del inciso c) del artículo 138 del CPCA, al aplicar indebidamente los artículos 3 y 39 de la LCCEI y por ello solicito que se case y resolviendo por el fondo, se acoja la demanda en todos sus extremos." Distinto a lo afirmado por el recurrente, se repite, las personas juzgadoras, en el apartado X de la sentencia cuestionada, con sustento, además, en lo señalado prolijamente en los considerandos precedentes, con total claridad, le recriminaron a la actora haber incurrido en la antijuricidad intimada -por quebranto al deber de probidad y al régimen de control interno-, concretamente, la conducta prevista en el incido d) del precepto 38 de la Ley no. 8422, lo cual, se insiste, no fue objeto de cuestionamiento por el impugnante. Ergo, lo que lo señalado resulta fútil a efecto de modificar lo resuelto.

XXIV.En el sexto y último embate contra la sentencia cuestionada por violación de normas sustantivas, folio 19, el casacionista objetó lo resuelto en torno a que el codemandado Rodríguez Barquero no es responsable. Concluyó el Tribunal que no le es atribuible ninguna responsabilidad por no cumplirse los presupuestos del artículo 199 de la LGAP, lo cual no lo comparte. El inciso 1) de ese numeral, indicó, atribuye responsabilidad personal al funcionario que actúe con dolo o culpa grave. En esta lite, agregó, actuó con dolo, porque, desde el inicio del procedimiento sancionatorio, conocía que los Presidentes Ejecutivos que lo precedieron fueron los que emitieron las resoluciones mediante las cuales se pagaron los sobresueldos a los funcionarios Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Días (para evitar el pago total en un único tracto de sus prestaciones parciales). Sin embargo, agregó, no los imputó ni tampoco a quienes resultaron favorecidos con esas decisiones (que en todo caso fueron legales). Se limitó a cuestionar a la actora -eslabón más débil- con doloso cálculo político y expreso conocimiento que ella se había limitado a firmar las acciones ordenadas por las Presidencias Ejecutivas. El Tribunal, aseveró, realizó una lectura sesgada y limitada del inciso 3) de esa norma, al considerar que, en la especie, el codemandado no incurrió en ilegalidad manifiesta porque no se apartó de dictámenes ni opiniones consultivas. No obstante, apuntó, desconoció que esa es una de las posibilidades de ilegalidad manifiesta. Reprodujo, en lo de interés, esa norma. Deja abierto el listado de posibilidades de ilegalidades. En este caso, anotó, su mandante señaló, en el procedimiento administrativo, haberse limitado a cumplir órdenes superiores, pidiendo la integración de la litis con los que las emitieron. Empero, fue enfáticamente rechazado por el codemandado sin razón jurídica válida, con responsabilidad personal por esas decisiones. Los artículos 108 y 110 de la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, argumentó, establecen los casos para la responsabilidad civil, administrativa y penal de los funcionarios públicos sujetos a esas normas, como es el caso del codemandado. En el inciso e) del numeral 110, alegó, se establecen las acciones que conducen a esa responsabilidad. Reprodujo esa disposición. Está claro, comentó, el codemandado utilizó su cargo y los recursos públicos para fines distintos a los destinados por ley. Si lo que buscaba era la verdad real de los hechos y determinar las responsabilidades civiles y administrativas, tenía la obligación de traer al procedimiento a todos los que participaron de las conductas. Sin embargo, insiste, se limitó a imputarle a la actora los actos ordenados por sus pares, con una evidente desviación de poder y de recursos hacia fines personales prohibidos por la regla transcrita. Por las razones anteriores, y ante la inaplicación del artículo 110 de la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos, concluyó, el fallo tipificó lo dispuesto en el artículo 138 inciso c). Por ello, pidió se case con las consecuencias de ley.

XXV.En el presente motivo de disconformidad, el recurrente vuelve a alegar diferentes hipótesis, pero por la manera cómo se estructuró, resultan inseparables. En este sentido, a folio 19 afirmó: "En el sublite, el codemandado Rodríguez Solís [sic] actuó con dolo porque desde el inicio del procedimiento sancionatorio conocía de que [sic] los presidentes ejecutivos [sic] que lo precedieron fueron los que emitieron las resoluciones mediante las que se pagó los sobresueldos a los funcionarios Rodríguez Bonilla y Novo Días (para evitar el pago total en un único tracto de sus prestaciones parciales) y sin embargo, no los imputó ni tampoco a quienes resultaron favorecidos con esas decisiones (que en todo caso fueron legales) limitándose imputar a la actora -eslabón más débil- con doloso cálculo político y expreso conocimiento que esta funcionaria se había limitado a firmas [sic] las acciones ordenadas por las Presidencias Ejecutivas." (Lo subrayado es suplido). La circunstancia fáctica, de que el codemandado Rodríguez Barquero actuara con "doloso cálculo político" no fue acreditada por las personas juzgadoras. De ahí que, de darse, originaría un vicio por quebranto de normas sustantivas, por violación indirecta de ley (inciso a) del precepto 138 del CPCA). Empero, el recurrente no señaló con cuál medio de convicción de acredita su dicho. Por otro lado, también alegó indebida interpretación del canon 199 inciso 3) de la LGAP, lo cual originaría el motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) íbid; es decir, violación directa de ley. Asimismo, invocó, según se determina de lo expuesto a folio 20, la violación directa del precepto 110 de la Ley de Administración Financiera y Presupuestos Públicos (inciso c) íbid), por no haber integrado la litis (en el proceso administrativo disciplinario), con todos los que participaron en las conductas cuestionadas. La ambigüedad puesta de manifiesta, se reitera, conculca la técnica de la casación.

XXVI.Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto en el considerando anterior y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, es menester apuntar lo siguiente. Primero. En el apartado XIII de la sentencia cuestionada, denominado "Sobre la responsabilidad del co-accionado Rodríguez Barquero", las personas juzgadoras, en lo de interés, señalaron: "[…] En ese sentido, del análisis de las alegaciones en que la parte reclamante reclama la responsabilidad del co-accionado, es evidente que se supedita a que la decisión final adoptada dentro del procedimiento disciplinario seguido en su contra, sea inválida. Empero, en lo que ha sido objeto de impugnación, esa conducta en concreto no presenta las deficiencias endilgadas, razón por la cual, no se presenta el criterio de ilegalidad manifiesta en cuestión. Así las cosas, la responsabilidad reprochada al señor Rodríguez Barquero es improcedente por la carencia del criterio de base en que se sustentaría ese marco de referibilidad disciplinaria. En consecuencia, debe disponerse el rechazo de la demanda en cuanto a ese particular." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Como se determina con facilidad, el casacionista efectuó un alegato divorciado, por completo, de la sentencia cuestionada. No objetó lo indicado por el Tribunal a efecto de rechazar dicha responsabilidad del codemandado. Se limitó a indicar: "El Tribunal realiza una lectura sesgada y limitada del inciso 3) del artículo 199 al considerar que en la especie el codemandado no incurrió en ilegalidad manifiesta porque no se apartó de dictámenes ni opiniones consultivas, sin embargo, desconoció que esa es una de las posibilidades de ilegalidad manifiesta, porque expresamente la norma indica: […] dejando abierto el listado de posibilidades de ilegalidades." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Lo cual resulta ajeno a lo indicado por el Tribunal, es decir, que no cabe responsabilidad en contra del codemandado Rodríguez Barquero porque el acto final es válido. Ergo, lo señalado en el agravio en estudio resulta fútil a efecto de quebrar lo resuelto.

XXVII.Segundo. El argumento esbozado por el recurrente en la censura en estudio, tocante a la falta integración del proceso administrativo con todos los que participaron en las conductas cuestionadas, a fin de achacarle responsabilidad al codemandado Rodríguez Barquero, no fue oportunamente propuesto ni debatido en este proceso. Nótese, el Tribunal fue enfático al indicar que, luego del análisis de las alegaciones efectuadas por la parte actora, para reclamar esa responsabilidad, se determina que está supeditada, únicamente, a que la decisión final, adoptada dentro del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario seguido en su contra, fuera inválida, lo cual no fue así. Esto se corrobora con lo expuesto en la demanda, imagen 2 del expediente judicial virtual: "La responsabilidad personal del demandado Rodríguez Barquero, deviene por lo dispuesto en el artículo 199, inciso 3) de la LEGAP, pues se apartó del criterio del órgano director compuesto por especialistas en Derecho, sin ninguna justificación jurídicamente válida, además, se extendió esa responsabilidad al hecho de que en el recurso de revocatoria o reconsideración se le indicó puntualmente los vicios legales de la resolución, e igualmente mantuvo la sanción, a través de una falta de resolución, que conforme al artículo 329.2 en relación con el 211 de la LEGAP, es reputado como falta grave de servicio y por ende, de carácter personal." Ergo, lo señalado hasta ahora, en casación, al resultar novedoso no puede ser objeto de análisis por parte de esta Cámara.

XXVIII.RECURSO DEL APODERADO DEL INDER. En el único agravio, anunció el recurrente interponerlo por quebranto de normas sustantivas, acorde al motivo casacional previsto en el inciso c) del canon 138 del CPCA. Es decir, por violación directa de ley. Existe, indicó, una interpretación indebida de la norma jurídica. El Tribunal, anotó, al conocer y resolver sobre las costas procesales, consideró que la actora contó con motivo suficiente para litigar, pues, el órgano instructor del procedimiento emitió dictamen que proponía relevarle de toda responsabilidad en la causa disciplinaria instruida en su contra. En ese sentido, dijo, estimó que esa jactancia le concedió una “razón objetiva” para tratar de rebatir la decisión final que le impuso la sanción de suspensión decretada. En consecuencia, resolvió sin condena en costas. La sentencia, afirmó, aplicó incorrectamente el precepto 193 inciso b) del CPCA y, por tal, le dio una interpretación indebida a la norma jurídica. No es procedente la exoneración de costas a favor de la parte actora, dijo, aplicando el inciso b) del artículo 193. Reprodujo dicho precepto. Transcribió, del Reglamento de la Unidad de Relaciones Laborales y la Junta de Relaciones Laborales del INDER, los numerales 2, 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 33 y 53. Lo sucedido en este proceso administrativo sancionatorio, acotó, fue en acatamiento en dicha normativa interna. Todos estos procedimientos, en el caso del INDER, deben pasar siempre por la revisión y aprobación de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Es así que, aunque el informe de conclusiones del órgano director del proceso se concluyó en tiempo, se debió remitir, para su evaluación, a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Así consta a folio 287 del expediente principal -no. URL-002-2015-. Esta Junta, a su vez, lo remitido al órgano decisor. El dictado del acto final acaeció el 28 de abril de 2017, siendo notificado ese mismo día a la demandante. Efectuó un análisis teórico sobre la fundamentación o motivación del acto final del procedimiento en general; luego, se refirió dicho requisito formal en el acto emitido en el procedimiento seguido a la actora. Destacó, en orden a lo preceptuado por el ordinal 136 inciso c) de la LGAP, esa motivación permitió sustentar la decisión frente al informe de recomendación vertido por el órgano instructor y frente a las consideraciones realizadas por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Ambos criterios de naturaleza no vinculante al tenor del precepto 303 ibídem. El órgano instructor del procedimiento emitió dictamen que proponía relevar a la aquí actora de toda responsabilidad en la causa disciplinaria instruida en su contra; pero ello, apuntó, no es constitutiva en una “razón objetiva”. Por el contrario, en un razonamiento subjetivo, por la cual se pueda justificar que la demandante contó con los elementos volitivos suficientes para tratar de rebatir la decisión final adoptada, es comprensible que la petente disienta de las consideraciones y desarrollo del acto final frente a las recomendaciones vertidas por el órgano director (instructor de todo acto preparatorio al dictado del acto final). Pero ello, añadió, no implica que tal apreciación se concrete en un juicio de valor objetivo suficiente para que el juzgador lo equipare a un motivo suficiente para litigar y, por ende, eximente para del pago de las costas procesales como en derecho le corresponde. Asimismo, se refirió a las diferencias y competencias de los órganos director y decisor dentro del proceso administrativo. Indicó, el yerro del Tribunal es haber interpretado, indebidamente, una norma jurídica (193 inciso b del CPCA) al considerar que existió motivo bastante para litigar. La razón por la cual decidió que la parte actora fuera exonerada en costas, fue que tenía suficiente motivo para litigar contra el INDER, en razón de que la recomendación vertida por el órgano director le era favorable. Sin embargo, expuso, no es ese el acto idóneo de declaración de derechos a favor de los Administrados, por lo que el Tribunal violentó las normas y principios del Derecho Constitucional: principios de legalidad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad, al valorar, como de mérito, dicha “razón objetiva para litigar". En su criterio, existe una indebida aplicación de la norma jurídica, por cuanto las razones por las cuales decide la persona juzgadora que la parte actora debe ser exonerada en costas no existen. En consecuencia, solicitó se revoque la sentencia cuestionada, respecto a la exoneración a la parte actora del pago de las costas. Pidió se le imponga ese deber, con el reconocimiento de los intereses e indexación a favor de su patrocinado. Al amparo de los numerales 119, 138 inciso c) y 193 del CPCA, concluyó, no se está en presencia de una eximente en el pago de costas en contra de la actora-perdedora, por lo que deberá imponérsele el pago de ambas costas del proceso.

XXIX.En el folio 1 vuelto del legajo, indicó el recurrente: "La resolución aplicó incorrectamente el artículo 193 inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y por tal le dio una interpretación indebida de la norma jurídica. En este caso se está en presencia de la causal del inciso c) del artículo 138 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo." (Lo subrayado no es del original). Es decir, el casacionista anunció interponer el reparo por violación directa de ley. Esto lo reiteró a folio 8, cuando señaló: "Por lo que para esta representación existe una indebida aplicación de la norma jurídica, por cuanto las razones por las que decide el juez que la parte actora debe ser exonerada en costas no existen, por cuanto, [sic] por lo que se solicita respetuosamente que se revoque las resoluciones [sic] N°095-2019-VI dictada por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, con respecto a que exonera a la parte actora al pago de las costas y se rectifique y se condene a la parte actora al pago de costas personales, costas procesales, interés e indexación a favor del Inder. / Por lo que al amparo de los numerales 119 y 138 inciso c), 193, siguientes y concordantes del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, esta representación estima que no se está en presencia de una eximente en el pago de costas en contra de la actora-perdedora, por lo que deberá imponérsele el pago de ambas costas del proceso a la parte actora." (Lo subrayado y resaltado es del original). No obstante, en ese mismo folio 8, señaló el recurrente: "Dicho lo anterior se debe indicar que el yerro del Tribunal es haber interpretado indebidamente una norma jurídica (art. 193 inciso b) al considerar que existió motivo bastante para litigar, pues consideró, que la razón por la cual decidió que la parte actora fuera exonerada en costas (sin especial condenatoria en costas), fue que tenía suficiente motivo para litigar contra el Inder, en razón que la recomendación vertida por el órgano director le era favorable, no siendo este el acto idóneo de declaración de derechos a favor de los Administrados, por lo que el Tribunal en la resolución recurrida violentó las normas y principios del Derecho constitucional, Principio de Legalidad, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad, al valorar como de méritos dicha «razón objetiva para litigar»". (Lo subrayado y resaltado es del original). Ahora, el recurrente alegó el motivo casacional, por quebranto de normas sustantivas, previsto en el inciso d) del precepto 138 del CPCA: "Cuando la sentencia viole las normas o los principios del Derecho constitucional, entre otros, la razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad." La confusión puesta en evidencia, según se ha indicado, conculca la técnica de la casación, la cual impone que los motivos del recurso deban señalarse de manera clara y precisa (numeral 139 inciso 3) del CPCA).

XXX.Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto en el considerando anterior y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, precisa anotar lo siguiente. El Tribunal, en el considerando XVI de la sentencia cuestionada, señaló: "Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, estima este Tribunal que la accionante ha contado con motivo suficiente para litigar, por cuanto el órgano instructor del procedimiento emitió dictamen que proponía relevarle de toda responsabilidad en la causa disciplinaria instruida en su contra. En ese sentido, es consideración de esta Cámara que esa circunstancia le concede una razón objetiva para tratar de rebatir la decisión final que le impuso la sanción de suspensión decretada. Por ende, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas." (Lo subrayado es suplido). Esta Cámara comparte lo resuelto por las personas juzgadoras, acorde a las razones que de seguido se exponen. Dispone el precepto 193 inciso b) del CPCA: "En las sentencias y los autos con carácter de sentencia, se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales, pronunciamiento que deberá hacerse de oficio. No obstante lo anterior, la parte vencida podrá ser exonerada del pago de las costas, cuando: […] b) Por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo bastante para litigar." (Lo subrayado es suplido). En procesos contenciosos administrativos, este Tribunal reiteradamente ha señalado que, de conformidad con dicho canon -193 del CPCA-, el pronunciamiento sobre las costas del proceso debe hacerse de oficio, condenando al vencido a su pago. Por consiguiente, la condenatoria se impone al perdidoso por el hecho de serlo. Es decir, por perder el litigio, sin que ello signifique no haya tenido motivo bastante para litigar ni se le considere litigante temerario o de mala fe. Por su parte, dicho numeral dispone los supuestos por los cuales podrá eximírsele de su pago. Al respecto, aunque se trate de una facultad, es lo cierto que no se encuentra inmune al control casacional, pues tanto en su ejercicio como en su inaplicación, puede operar una violación de ley y, en esa medida, la indebida omisión no es ni debe ser sinónimo de arbitrariedad, en tal caso, cometida por la propia persona juzgadora. Máxime si se trata de un apoderamiento al juez otorgado con supuestos específicos que limitan su poder discrecional en esta materia. En consecuencia, sobre este particular, se estima, con la sola aplicación de la regla general del artículo 193 del CPCA (condenatoria al vencido al pago de ambas costas) no se cierran las puertas al recurso de casación, pues, por el contrario, el asunto es admisible para su examen de fondo (siempre y cuando se cumplan los requisitos de ley) ante un eventual vicio omisivo en la aplicación de las disposiciones legales que autorizan la exoneración de dichas costas. Entonces, según las circunstancias del caso, sí puede resultar procedente un recurso de casación. En el caso concreto, el casacionsita reclama contra la exoneración del pago de las costas, alegando indebida aplicación o interpretación del inciso b) de dicho precepto. Esa disposición, conforme se ha resuelto, no habilita la exención en caso de adecuada conducta procesal; sino porque la naturaleza de lo reclamado permita colegir que, a juicio del Tribunal, el debate era necesario para dilucidar a quién asistía el Ordenamiento. En el caso concreto de examen, debe señalarse, sin desconocer la naturaleza jurídica del informe o recomendación del órgano director del procedimiento administrativa, al igual que las personas juzgadoras, esta Cámara estima que la existencia de ese dictamen del órgano director o instructor (emitido por dos profesionales del INDER) remendando exonerar de responsabilidad a la actora, determina o conlleva que el debate se imponía necesario para dilucidar si le asistía razón o no a la actora. Por consiguiente, no incurrieron las personas juzgadoras en las infracciones legales acusadas por el recurrente.

XXXI.En mérito de las razones apuntadas, ante la evidente omisión en combatirse de manera sistemática y específica los fundamentos de la resolución impugnada, no con simples y genéricas disconformidades de criterio, esta Cámara determina que los recursos interpuestos resultan insuficientes para generar la revisión del fallo controvertido en esta sede al carecer de fundamentación jurídica, por lo que se impone su rechazo de plano (numeral 140 inciso c) del CPCA).

POR TANTO

Se rechazan de plano los recursos formulados.

Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jessica Jiménez Ramírez