Appeal against District Municipal Council Denied for Lack of Public Road AccessImprocedencia de apelación contra Concejo Municipal de Distrito por acceso a calle pública

Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Judicial Circuit II of San José, Annex A Building Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Email [email protected] __________________________________________________________________ FILE: 18-005518-1027-CA MATTER: Municipal Appeal APPELLANT: Or Ahayim S.A.

RESPONDENT: Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano No. 215-2020 ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION TRIBUNAL. THIRD SECTION, ANNEX A OF JUDICIAL CIRCUIT II OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at eight hours fifteen minutes on the twentieth of April, two thousand twenty.- This Tribunal, acting as a non-hierarchical legality supervisor, hears the appeal filed by Or Ahayim S.A., legal identification number 3-101-311695, represented by its general attorney-in-fact without limit of amount, Mrs. Emilia Tal, holder of residence card 13760006709, against the agreement adopted in subsection h), article iv of ordinary session 106-18, of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano, in which its request for a concession in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) was rejected, because the plot in question does not have access to a public street.

Judge Leiva Poveda writes.

Considering.

I.- Preliminary consideration regarding the dispensing of a list of proven facts: Given the characteristics of this procedure, the preparation of a list of proven facts is unnecessary, since the only factual elements of relevance for the resolution of this proceeding are already stated in the header of this resolution.

II.- Origin, evolution, and current situation of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito: Due to the turbulent process experienced by these bodies in recent years, regarding their competencies and legal nature, this Chamber deems it necessary to offer a series of clarifications about these bodies in order to understand their state of development today, the only ones with constitutionally based autonomy. From the outset, a necessary clarification: the “Concejos Municipales de Distrito” regulated in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Political Constitution and in the Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, are bodies distinct from the “Concejos de Distrito,” whose normative basis is in Articles 54 to 60 of the Municipal Code. It was during the validity of the previous Political Constitution enacted in 1871 that the institute of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito emerged, as a response to Article 130 of the cited constitutional text which established the existence of one Municipality per province, in what was a rural State with an incipient road system. It is in the year 1938, when by virtue of Law 118, Law of Municipal Structure, the figure is regulated stating: “when a district has revenues greater than three thousand colones, and its main commercial or agricultural center is kilometers or more from the head of its canton, it may be governed by a neighborhood board that shall be called Concejo de Distrito.” The functioning of these bodies was regulated in 1939 through the Decree titled Normas para los Concejos de Distrito. The duality that exists today regarding the two types of district administration mentioned above, which are clearly bodies with very different competencies but with similar names, arose in the 1970-1971 biennium. In 1970 the first Municipal Code in our history was enacted -Law 4574-, whose Article 63 regulated the “Concejos de Distrito” as we know them today. This implied a clear clash with the district administration bodies pre-existing even before the current Constitution, which functioned in practice similarly to a municipal administration. This led to the enactment in 1971 of Law 4892, Law for the reform of the Municipal Code, which changed the nomenclature of the aforementioned district administrations distant from the cantonal centers to that of “Concejos Municipales de Distrito.” Said legislation also provided a legal basis for the legal personality granted to the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. In 1975, Executive Decree No. 5595-G was enacted, called Reglamento Orgánico de los Consejos Municipales de Distrito, which regulated the scope of said legal personality of what were then “entities” of Public Law. It was precisely the granting of such status that was the aspect that caused the Constitutional Chamber, in 1994, to annul all the legal regulations issued in this matter since 1971, given the impact on municipal autonomy that such provisions implied, this because said “entities” lacked a constitutional basis. It was through vote 6000-1994 that the cited Chamber resolved: “The action is declared with standing and consequently, transitional article I of Article 63 of the Municipal Code and Executive Decrees No. 5595-G of November 12, 1975 are declared unconstitutional and eliminated from the legal system.” Due to the scope of the aforementioned ruling, a year later in 1995, Law 7564 was enacted, called Ley que Amplía el Código Municipal sobre Concejos Municipales de Distrito; this legislation again introduced an entirely new Title to the then Municipal Code, including a large number of articles and re-taking the legal personality of these district administrations. In 1998, the current Municipal Code was enacted through Law 7794, whose text, just as happened with the 1970 Code, lacked regulations regarding the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. Therefore, three months later, Law No. 7812, Ley que Adiciona los Concejos Municipales de Distrito al Código Municipal, was enacted. This law added "Title VIII. Concejos municipales de distrito,” highlighting the incorporation in the text of the new Article 173, which included the definition of said administrations as “auxiliary public law entities.” As was to be expected, the entire just-referenced title was challenged before the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote 5445-1999 declared a varied set of provisions unconstitutional, which of course included the articles introduced to the Municipal Code through Law 7812, again due to the lack of constitutional basis for the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. In the year 2001, Law 8105, Law for the Reform of Article 172 of the Political Constitution, was approved, which textually states: “For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create concejos municipales de distrito, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to form the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total deputies, shall set the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.” That same year, Law 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, was enacted; this regulation, together with the constitutional one, is the basis of the current regulation of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, in their condition as “organs” of the municipal administration. This text has recently been reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote number 21271-2019, rejected the action filed; however, beyond the foregoing, it did redefine the contours of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, offering the following considerations: “In order to understand the nature of these entities, it is necessary to examine the scope of some of these concepts. First, the norm states that it is an ‘organ attached to the respective municipality.’ This means that the Concejo de Distrito forms part of the organizational structure of the respective Municipality. In the discussion that took place within the Legislative Assembly, Deputy Urpí Pacheco (proponent and reviewing deputy for the project) stated that ‘(…) The concejos municipales will have administrative autonomy, but they will continue to depend on the municipality regarding budget, legal personality, and guiding government policies, as organs, not entities that belong to the same municipality. (…) It is appropriate to warn that these are two different autonomies. When analyzing the limits and content that the legislators gave to said autonomy, it is concluded that they refer to functional autonomy, that is, that capacity for self-administration that grants the organ freedom to organize its work and dispose of its resources independently of the ‘mother’ Municipality, in short, to ‘function’ independently. No other interpretation can be given because administrative autonomy in the strict sense (or of the first degree) supposes a degree of independence like that of autonomous institutions; the reading of the legislative records allows concluding that this was not what the legislator had in mind when creating the concejos municipales. Secondly, the norm states that the creation of the concejo shall be done in ‘qualified cases.’ (…) From the reading of the records, it is clearly concluded that the legislator's intention when enacting the reform was to solve some of the problems that arise in those communities located far from the cantonal head. In that sense, the bill's statement of motives stated: ‘It is important to note that there is a sociological reality that demands the existence of these forms of organization, for historical reasons, geographic remoteness, or others, which had definitively maintained the existence of those until they were declared unconstitutional. (…) It is evident, then, that the intention of the derived constituent when enacting the reform was not to create mini-cantons through an irregular procedure. Thus, the Concejos cannot, as the plaintiffs intend, act as small ‘district municipalities’ with full autonomy, so as to independently receive the taxes destined for the localities. Interpreting it in that way would suppose dismembering the national territory and giving the made constitutional reform a greater scope than the legislator had in mind. The legislator granted them functional autonomy so that they could use the basic administrative tools to function efficiently, with some degree of organizational independence from the mother municipality. The legislator's idea was that such concejos serve as a ‘support point in their municipal management,’ in those places that due to their remoteness had difficulties communicating with the cantonal head. However, they lack any other type of autonomy. They do not have initiative in budgetary matters and cannot intervene in the collection and investment of the ‘mother’ Municipality's revenues. Their budget is that which is assigned to them by the Municipality to which they are attached and on which they organically depend, because although the Intendente is the executive organ, their Superior remains the Municipal Council, which remains the superior. The concejos cannot act autonomously beyond the limits that that autonomy imposes on them, being clear that they are ‘organs attached to the respective municipality,’ that lack legal personality and are subject to a relationship of subordination in budgetary, governmental, and normative matters.” It is in light of this redefinition of the competency powers of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito that this Section proceeds to resolve the present appeal.

III.- Regarding the specific case: In order to facilitate understanding of this pronouncement, this considerando will set forth the grievances raised by the appellant party as well as this Tribunal's opinion on their merits. Having reviewed the file, it is clear to this Chamber that the main point in controversy in the file under study is that relating to whether or not the property whose concession was rejected has access to a public street. As stated in the header of this resolution, the petition of the appellant company was rejected because the Concejo Municipal de Distrito considered that the requested plot does not have access to a public street. As a first grievance, the appellant indicates that in the file there is proof of the existence of a public road. To demonstrate its assertion, it points to the existence of: A topographical survey and a sketch prepared by a municipal inspector. It adds that the file contains the cadastral plan (plano catastrado) P-180217-2015, which describes property 6-211255-000, in which it is indicated that the eastern boundary of that property is precisely the road that is north of the requested plot, which implies a tacit acceptance of the road by the Concejo Municipal de Distrito. For its part, the respondent Concejo indicates that it is not true that the requested plot borders a public road to the north, an aspect of which there is proof in the file. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. The presented reproach orbits around two arguments: a- That in the file there is proof that on the northern boundary (lindero) of the plot there is a public road, and, b- That the Concejo Municipal de Distrito has tacitly accepted the existence of the referenced access road. Regarding the first aspect, the party refers to documents in which the existence of the cited road as a boundary is recorded, one of them being a cadastral plan (plano catastrado) of a property belonging to a third party. Given this assertion, it is necessary for this Tribunal to determine whether the cited documentation is full proof of the existence of a road, or if it is simply an indication of its possible existence by virtue of a tacit acceptance thereof by the district administrative organ. To date, the Third Section has repeatedly had to address the issue of whether references to public roads as boundaries in cadastral plans (planos catastrados) subsequently permit the existence of those roads to be considered proven. In this regard, this Section has stated: “III.- Regarding the evidentiary value of cadastral plans (planos catastrados) of individual properties for determining the existence of a public road recorded as a boundary. In the forensic practice of Administrative Law, it is not uncommon to seek to demonstrate the existence of a public road based on the boundaries recorded in cadastral plans (planos catastrados) of specific estates, whether they are approved (visados) or not by the respective municipality. Such proof is particularly important, because insofar as this is achieved, the juris tantum presumption established by Article 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) will be applicable in that specific case. It is not disputed here that a cadastral plan (plano catastrado) can prove the existence of a public road, but rather it is simply specified that this will be conditioned, among other aspects, by the type of plan involved. It is clarified that the following considerations do not apply to subdivision (fraccionamiento) plans, urbanization plans, etc., in which the existence of public roads is proven within the plan. Regarding the evidentiary value of plans that indicate they border public roads, it is noted that recently the First Chamber has addressed their evidentiary weight regarding the proof of the existence of a public road in the following terms: “Although it is true that the principle of immatriculation postulates that registry inscription is not necessary for a property to be considered as public domain (demanial), neither should it be interpreted as meaning that the simple inclusion in a cadastral plan (plano catastral) allows affirming said nature, since it does not have the capacity to modify material reality but merely reproduces it. On the contrary, the principle in question means that, if there are sufficient indications to consider that the assumptions established in the law exist when the assignment of public character was regulated, it is not relevant that it is not registered in the name of the State or a public institution. Now then, the plans whose improper valuation is alleged do not have the virtue of determining the public nature of the street or access in question.” First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 1448-F-S1-2014, of 10:10 minutes on November 7, 2014. Having said the above, it must first be specified that the inclusion of boundaries in a plan is a requirement for its approval by the Catastro Nacional, all of which is regulated in Articles 8 and 34 subsection e) of the Regulation to the Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro), norms that textually establish: “Article 8.-Delimitation of the property. Properties shall be delimited taking into account the titles registered in the Real Estate Registry (Registro Inmobiliario) and, where applicable, the possession of the property and the coincidence or conformity of the respective titleholders or possessors and adjoining owners or disparities or objections of one and the other regarding the identification or fixing of the boundaries (linderos) that separate their properties.”// “Article 34.-Information that must be supplied in the Body of the survey plan. The information that must be supplied in the body of the survey plan is the following: (...) e. Details: Without needing to perform the respective survey, the plan must graphically and literally indicate any physical feature, such as canals, rivers, streams (quebradas), irrigation ditches (acequias), lagoons, reservoirs, estuaries, cuts (tajos), tunnels, bridges, dikes, dams, sewers, spillways, curbs (cordones), ditches (cunetas), road shoulders (espaldones), roadways (calzadas) and any other similar ones, except when they border or cross the boundary, in which case, a detailed survey will be necessary. Likewise, the use of the property must be indicated, depending on the activity in question, marking with approximate lines, if it concerns several different uses, the demarcation thereof and delineate the existing constructions, at the same scale at which the surveyed polygon was drawn.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, in order to specify what type of information must be proven with the plan of a specific property, it is clarified that the regulatory requirement of including boundaries in the plans of a specific property is a formal requirement, but said information is not covered by the public faith recognized in Article 12 of Law 4294, Law on the Practice of Topography and Surveying (Ley de Ejercicio de la Topografía y Agrimensura). In this direction, canon 19 of the Regulation to the National Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro Nacional) establishes: “Article 19.-Public faith of the surveyor. The data related to the traverse (derrotero), area, and location contained in the survey plan are inserted in it under the public faith and responsibility that the surveying (agrimensura) professionals have, in accordance with the provisions established in the.” (The original is not highlighted). In this sense, the regulation under analysis clearly establishes which aspects or information contained in the survey plan of a property are covered by said legal presumption of veracity. Regarding the boundaries (linderos), these could indeed be effectively proven—including for the application of Article 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones)—if this is done through the means of proof established by the National Cadastre Law (Ley de Catastro Nacional) in the following terms: “Article 11.- Boundary demarcation and identification document (acta de deslinde e identificación) is the document drawn up on the land itself, in accordance with the formalities of this law. The owner or possessor, or their representative, shall sign said document, stating that they accept the data referring to the location and boundaries (linderos) of their property, which appear in it.” The foregoing norm is developed by the Regulation to the Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro) in the following terms: “Article 12.-Conformity and identification documents. The boundaries (linderos) determined in the conformity documents (actas de conformidad) signed by the adjacent owners themselves, or through their legitimate representatives or attorneys-in-fact, jointly with the owners or possessors of the bordering properties, or who sign identification documents (actas de identificación) pointing out the boundaries (linderos) of their own properties in such a way that they coincide with those indicated by the owners or possessors of the bordering properties, shall be definitively determined as they appear in said documents.” Furthermore, the same legal body establishes with utmost clarity the limited effects of the registry publicity of plans and the evidentiary value they have. In this direction, canon 57 of that regulatory body states: “Article 57.-Effects of cadastral publicity. The main objective of the survey plan is to contribute to the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of the cadastre, to define in graphic form the property, and to give publicity to its boundaries (linderos). The cadastral plan (plano catastrado) is not in itself absolute proof of what is stated in it. The survey plan drawn up unilaterally by the interested party, even if it is registered in the Catastro, by itself cannot affect third parties, does not constitute a title transferring ownership, does not prove ownership or possession in accordance with the provisions of Article 301 of the Civil Code.” From the relation of the just-exposed norms, it follows that, in case of intending to use surveying (agrimensura) tools as proof for determining boundaries (linderos)—and especially that one is a public road—the use of adequate evidentiary elements such as identification documents (actas de identificación) will be necessary, a situation that does not arise when the existence of the road is indicated within the plan and not as a boundary. In this latter case, the plan is proof of the existence of the road, regardless of its inclusion in the respective municipal records.” (Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Third Section, vote 44-2015. In this same direction see from this Tribunal, among others, votes 336-2015, 309-2017, and 223-2018.) In view of the content of the just-transcribed criterion, the same being that held by the Tribunal, regarding the referenced documentation, including the cited cadastral plan (plano catastrado) P-1802170-2015, it is concluded that they are not, per se, full proof of the existence of the road. Given the foregoing, the analysis must proceed to whether, by virtue of them, there is a tacit acceptance of the road by the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano in the terms referenced by the appellant company in its appeal. Regarding the possibility of the existence of tacit decisions by the public administration—in this case an acceptance—the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states: “Article 137.-The behaviors and material activities of the Administration that have a univocal meaning and that are incompatible with a different will, shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance thereof requires express manifestation.” From the review of the file, although the administrative conducts of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito pointed out by the appellant are appreciated in the record, it is also true that the file of this case contains inspection reports on the property from: October 2016, December 2016, February 2017, May 2017, June 2017, and April 2018, in which it is stated that the northern boundary of the plot is not a public road. Thus, it is not possible for this Chamber to conclude that from the evidence existing in the file, a univocal will of the municipal organ to accept the road in question as a public road can be extracted. In view of the foregoing, given that the file does not establish as proven the existence of a public road on the north side of the plot, in the terms indicated by the appellant company, it is unavoidable for this Section to reject this first grievance. Secondly, the appellant party indicates that this is an administrative dysfunction attributable to the INDER, which affects its legal situation. In this direction, the appellant alleges: “That it is public (general) knowledge that both for our case and for other files encountering the same situation, it is the INDER that has been delaying the completion of such procedures, by virtue of the fact that it must deliver some areas destined for public streets.” This grievance is unfounded and is rejected. The circumstance of the possible existence of omissionary conduct attributable to the INDER, an aspect on which this Chamber makes no pronouncement as it exceeds its competence, has no effect whatsoever on the validity or efficacy of the appealed agreement that is the object of review by this Tribunal. Finally, the representation of the challenging company states: “With all that has been said, we see the recommendation of the Municipal Intendancy as an act of veiled bad intentions and with a dark purpose, in order to pursue an end not visible against us, which warns and prepares us to repel and even straighten out the pertinent legal actions, in defense and in claim of the rights that assist us as administered parties and against the officials who may have fostered this persecution.” The Tribunal respects such statements, but of this allegation that constitutes a grievance of Misuse of Power (Desviación de Poder) in the terms established in Article 131 subsection 3) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record, nor a development of foundations that relate the existing evidence to the end of proving the transcribed affirmation, all of which obliges this chamber to reject the last grievance and with it the challenge in its entirety. As there is no further recourse in this venue, the administrative channel must be considered exhausted.

IV.- Regarding the return of the file. Having been processed at this venue electronically, it is available to the parties to obtain a comprehensive copy containing both the administrative file sent by the Municipal Corporation as well as the entirety of the pieces that make up the present appeal, for which purpose the party must provide the electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, should physical or electronic documentation have been submitted (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) that remain in the custody of the Office, whoever contributed it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Regulation on the Electronic File before the Judicial Branch (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Corte Plena in session no. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin no. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session no. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

Por Tanto.

The appeal filed is declared without merit and consequently the appealed act is confirmed. The administrative channel is considered exhausted.

Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa Rodolfo Marenco Ortiz FILE: 18-005518-1027-CA MATTER: Municipal Appeal APPELLANT: Or Ahayim S.A.

RESPONDENT: Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano *3OQITOWHVV861* JORGE LEIVA POVEDA, DECISOR JUDGE ELEUTERIO RODOLFO MARENCO ORTIZ, DECISOR JUDGE EVELYN SOLANO ULLOA, DECISOR JUDGE File 18-005518-1027-CA Vote 215-2020 Page.

1 of 17.

**Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo,** **II Circuito Judicial de San José, Edificio Anexo A** Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico [email protected] __________________________________________________________________ **EXPEDIENTE**: 18-005518-1027-CA **ASUNTO:** Recurso Municipal **RECURRENTE:** Or Ahayim S.A. **RECURRIDO:** Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano **No. 215-2020** **TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.** Goicoechea, at eight hours fifteen minutes on the twenty-first of April two thousand twenty.- This Tribunal hears, in its capacity as non-hierarchical controller of legality, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by **Or Ahayim S.A.**, legal identification number 3-101-311695, represented by its absolute general attorney-in-fact (apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma) Mrs. Emilia Tal, holder of residence card 13760006709, against the agreement adopted in subsection h), article iv of ordinary session 106-18, of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano, in which its application for a concession (concesión) in the maritime-terrestrial zone (zona marítimo-terrestre) was rejected, because the parcel in question does not have access to a public road (calle pública).

Judge Leiva Poveda writes.

**Considering.** **I.- Preliminary consideration regarding the absence of a list of proven facts:** In view of the characteristics of this proceeding, the preparation of a list of proven facts (elenco de hechos probados) is unnecessary, since the only factual elements of relevance for the resolution of this process are already set forth in the heading of this resolution.

**II.- Origin, evolution and current situation of the Concejo Municipales de Distrito:** Given the convulsive process experienced by these bodies in recent years, with respect to their powers and legal nature, this Chamber deems it necessary to offer a series of clarifications regarding these bodies in order to understand their state of development today, the only ones with constitutionally-based autonomy. First, a necessary clarification: the "Concejos Municipales de Distrito" regulated in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Political Constitution and in the Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, are different bodies from the "Concejos de Distrito", whose normative basis lies in Articles 54 to 60 of the Código Municipal. It was during the validity of the previous Political Constitution issued in 1871 that the institution of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito emerged, as a response to Article 130 of the cited constitutional text which established the existence of one Municipality per province, in what was a rural State with an incipient system of communication routes. It is in the year 1938, when by virtue of Ley 118, Ley de Estructura Municipal, the figure is regulated stating: *"when a district has revenues greater than three thousand colones, and its principal commercial or agricultural center is six kilometers or more from the head of its canton, it may be governed by a board of residents (junta de vecinos) to be called Concejo de Distrito"*. The operation of these bodies was regulated in 1939 by the Decree entitled *Normas para los Concejos de Distrito*. The duality that exists today with respect to the two types of district administration mentioned above, which are clearly bodies with very different powers but with similar names, arose in the 1970-1971 biennium. In 1970, the first Código Municipal in our history was issued -Ley 4574-, whose Article 63 regulated the "Concejos de Distrito" as we know them today. This implied an evident clash with the district administration bodies pre-existing even the current Constitution, which in practice functioned similarly to a municipal administration. This led to the enactment in 1971 of Ley 4892, Ley de reforma al Código Municipal, which changed the nomenclature of the referred remote district administrations from the canton centers to that of "Concejos Municipales de Distrito". Said legislation also provided a legal basis for the legal personality (personalidad jurídica) granted to the Concejos Municipales de Distrito.

In 1975, Executive Decree No. 5595-G was promulgated, called *Reglamento Orgánico de los Consejos Municipales de Distrito*, which regulated the scope of that legal personality of what were then "entities" of Public Law. It was precisely the granting of such condition that caused the Constitutional Chamber, in 1994, to annul all legal regulations issued in this matter since 1971, given the affectation to municipal autonomy that such provisions implied, this because said "entities" lacked constitutional basis. It was through vote 6000-1994 that the cited Chamber resolved: "*The action is granted, and consequently, transitory article I of article 63 of the Código Municipal and Executive Decrees No. 5595-G of November 12, 1975, are declared unconstitutional and are eliminated from the legal system*". By reason of the scope of the referred pronouncement, a year later in 1995, Law 7564 is issued, called *Ley que Amplía el Código Municipal sobre Concejos Municipales de Distrito*, said legislation again introduced an entirely new Title to the then Código Municipal, including a large number of articles and retaking the legal personality of these district administrations. In 1998, the current Código Municipal is issued through Law 7794, whose text, as happened with the 1970 Code, lacked regulations regarding the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. Therefore, three months later, Law No. 7812 was issued, *Ley que Adiciona los Concejos Municipales de Distrito al Código Municipal*. This law added "Title VIII. Concejos municipales de distrito", highlighting the incorporation in the text of the new article 173, in which the definition of said administrations was incorporated as "*auxiliary entities of public law*". As expected, the entire newly referred title was challenged before the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote 5445-1999 declared a varied set of provisions unconstitutional, in which, of course, the articles introduced to the Código Municipal through Law 7812 were included, again given the lack of constitutional basis of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. In the year 2001, Law 8105 was approved, Ley de Reforma al artículo 172 de la Constitución Política, which textually indicates: "*For the administration of the interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create concejos municipales de distrito, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total number of deputies, shall establish the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.*". This same year, Law 8173 is issued, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, said regulation together with the constitutional one, is the basis of the current regulation of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, in their condition as "bodies" of the municipal administration. Said text has been recently reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote number 21271-2019, rejected the action filed, however, despite the foregoing, it did redefine the contours of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, offering the following considerations: "*In order to understand the nature of these entities it is necessary to examine the scope of some of these concepts. In the first place, the norm indicates that it is a 'body attached to the respective municipality'. This means that the Concejo de Distrito forms part of the organizational structure of the respective Municipality. In the discussion that took place within the Legislative Assembly, Deputy Urpí Pacheco (deputy proponent and opinion drafter of the project) pointed out that '(...) The concejos municipales will have administrative autonomy, but will continue depending on the municipality in matters of budget, legal personality, and guiding government lines, as bodies, not entities that belong to the same municipality. (...) It is opportune to warn that these are two distinct autonomies. Upon analyzing the limits and the content that the legislators gave to said autonomy, it is concluded that they refer to functional autonomy, that is, that self-administration capacity that grants the body freedom to organize its work and dispose of its resources independently of the "mother" Municipality, in a few words, to 'function' independently. Another interpretation cannot be given since administrative autonomy in the strict sense (or first degree) supposes a degree of independence like that of autonomous institutions; the reading of the legislative records allows concluding that this was not what the legislator had in mind when creating the concejos municipales. In the second place, the norm indicates that the creation of the concejo will be done in "qualified cases". (...) From the reading of the records it is clearly concluded that the intention of the legislator when promulgating the reform was to solve some of the problems that arise in those communities that are located far from the seat of the canton. In that sense, the statement of motives of the project indicated: "It is important to point out that there is a sociological reality that demands the existence of these forms of organization, for historical reasons, geographic remoteness, or others, that definitively had maintained the existence of those until they were declared unconstitutional." (...) It is evident then that the intention of the derived constituent power when promulgating the reform was not to create mini cantons through an irregular procedure. Thus, the Concejos cannot, as the claimants intend, serve as small "municipalidades de distrito" with full autonomy, such that they independently receive the taxes destined to the localities. Interpreting it that way would suppose dismembering the national territory and giving the constitutional reform enacted a greater scope than the legislator had in mind.*" The legislator granted them functional autonomy so that they may use basic administrative tools to function efficiently, with some degree of organizational independence from the parent municipality. The legislator's idea was that such councils would serve as a "support point in their municipal management," in those places that, due to their remoteness, had communication difficulties with the canton seat. However, they lack any other type of autonomy. They have no initiative in budgetary matters and cannot intervene in the collection and investment of the revenues of the "parent" Municipality. Their budget is that which is assigned to them by the Municipality to which they are attached and on which they depend organically, for although the District Intendant is the executive organ, their Superior remains the Municipal Council, which remains hierarchically superior. The councils cannot act autonomously beyond the limits that this autonomy imposes upon them, it being clear that they are "organs attached to the respective municipality," which lack legal personality and are subject to a relationship of subordination in budgetary, governmental, and regulatory matters." It is in light of this redefinition of the jurisdictional attributions of the District Municipal Councils that this Section proceeds to resolve the present appeal.

**III.- The specific case**: In order to facilitate the understanding of the present ruling, in this recital the grievances raised by the appellant party will be set forth, as well as this Court's criterion regarding their merit. Having reviewed the case file, it is clear to this Chamber that the main point in controversy in the file under study is that relating to whether the property whose concession was denied does or does not have access to a public road. As was stated in the heading of this resolution, the petition of the appellant company was denied because the District Municipal Council considered that the requested plot does not have access to a public road. As a first grievance, the appellant indicates that in the file there is proof regarding the existence of a public road. To demonstrate her assertion, she points to the existence of: A topographic survey and a sketch prepared by a municipal inspector. She adds that in the file appears the cadastral map P-180217-2015, which describes property 6-211255-000, in which it is indicated that the eastern boundary of that property is precisely the road that is north of the requested plot, which implies a tacit acceptance of the road by the District Municipal Council. For its part, the respondent Council indicates that it is not true that the requested plot borders a public thoroughfare to the north, an aspect of which there is proof in the file. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. The objection presented revolves around two arguments: a- That in the file there is proof that a public road exists on the northern boundary of the plot, and, b- That the District Municipal Council has tacitly accepted the existence of the aforementioned access route. Regarding the first aspect, the party refers to documents in which the existence of the cited road as a boundary is recorded, one of them being a cadastral map of a property belonging to a third party. By reason of such assertion, it is necessary for this Court to specify whether the cited documentation constitutes full proof of the existence of a road, or simply constitutes an indication of its possible existence by virtue of a tacit acceptance thereof by the district administrative body. To date, Section Three has on repeated occasions had to address the issue of whether references to public roads as boundaries in cadastral maps subsequently allow the existence of those thoroughfares to be considered proven. This Section has indicated in this Directorate: "**III.- Regarding the probative value of cadastral maps of individual properties for determining the existence of a public road recorded as a boundary.** In the forensic practice of Administrative Law, it is not unusual to attempt to prove the existence of a public road based on the boundaries recorded in cadastral maps of specific estates, whether or not these are approved by the respective municipality. Such proof presents special importance, because insofar as this is achieved, the iuris tantum presumption established by article 7 of the Construction Law will be applicable in that specific case. What is not disputed here is that a cadastral map can prove the existence of a public road, but it is simply specified that this will be conditioned, among other aspects, by the type of map involved. It is clarified that the following considerations do not apply to subdivision plans, development plans, etc., in which the existence of public roads is proven within the plan itself. Regarding the probative value of maps that indicate they border public roads, it is noted that recently the First Chamber has addressed their evidentiary weight regarding the proof of the existence of a public road in the following terms: 'While it is true that the principle of first registration postulates that registry inscription is not necessary for a property to be considered public domain, it must also not be interpreted to mean that the simple inclusion in a cadastral map allows such nature to be affirmed, since said map does not have the capacity to modify material reality but merely reproduces it. On the contrary, the principle in question leads to the conclusion that, if sufficient indications exist to consider that the assumptions established in the law when the assignment of a public character was regulated are present, it is not relevant that it is not registered in the name of the State or a public institution. Now, the maps whose improper valuation is alleged do not have the virtue of determining the public nature of the street or access in question.' First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, Voto 1448-F-S1-2014, of 10:10 a.m. on November 7, 2014. Having said the foregoing, it must first be specified that the inclusion of boundaries on a map is a requirement for its approval by the National Cadastre, all of which is regulated in articles 8 and 34(e) of the Regulation to the Cadastre Law, norms that textually establish: 'Article 8.- Delimitation of the property.

The properties shall be delimited taking into account the titles registered in the Real Estate Registry and, as applicable, the possession of the property and the agreement or conformity of the respective owners or possessors and adjoining landowners, or the disagreements or objections of each regarding the identification or establishment of the boundaries that separate their properties.// “Article 34.-Information to be provided in the body of the survey plan (plano de agrimensura). The information to be provided in the body of the survey plan (plano de agrimensura) is the following: (...) e. Details: Without the need to carry out the respective survey, the plan must graphically and literally indicate any physical feature, such as channels, rivers, streams (quebradas), irrigation ditches (acequias), lagoons, reservoirs, estuaries (esteros), cuts (tajos), tunnels, bridges, dikes, dams, sewers, spillways, curbs (cordones), gutters (cunetas), shoulders (espaldones), roadways (calzadas) and any other similar features, except when they abut or cross the boundary, in which case a detailed survey will be necessary. Likewise, the use of the property must be indicated, depending on the activity in question, indicating with approximate lines, if it involves several different uses, the demarcation (deslinde) of the same and outlining the existing constructions, at the same scale at which the surveyed polygon was drawn.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, in order to specify what type of information must be accredited with the plan of a specific property, it is clarified that the regulatory requirement to include the boundaries in the plans of a specific property is a formal requirement, but said information is not covered by the public faith recognized in Article 12 of Law 4294, Law on the Practice of Topography and Surveying (Ley de Ejercicio de la Topografía y Agrimensura). In this regard, canon 19 of the Regulation to the National Cadastre Law establishes: “Article 19.-Public faith of the surveyor (agrimensor). The data relating to the course (derrotero), area, and location contained in the survey plan (plano de agrimensura) are inserted therein under the public faith and responsibility held by surveying professionals, in accordance with the provisions thereof.” (Original not highlighted). In this sense, the regulation under analysis clearly establishes which aspects or information contained in the survey plan (plano de agrimensura) of a property are covered by said legal presumption of truthfulness. Regarding boundaries, these could indeed be effectively accredited—including for the application of Article 7 of the Construction Law—if this is done through the means of proof established by the National Cadastre Law in the following terms: “Article 11.- The document (acta) drawn up on the land itself, in accordance with the formalities of this law, is called a boundary demarcation and identification act (acta de deslinde e identificación). The owner or possessor, or their representative, shall sign such act (acta), stating that they accept the data referring to the location and boundaries of their property that appear therein.” The previous rule is developed by the Regulation to the Cadastre Law in the following terms: “Article 12.-Conformity and identification acts (Actas de conformidad y de identificación). The boundaries determined in the conformity acts (actas de conformidad) signed by the adjoining landowners by themselves, or through their legal representatives or proxies, jointly with the owners or possessors of the abutting properties, or who sign identification acts (actas de identificación) indicating the boundaries of their own properties in such a way that they coincide with those indicated by the owners or possessors of the abutting properties, shall be definitively determined in the form that appears in said acts (actas).” Furthermore, the same legal body establishes with crystal clarity the limited effects of the registry publicity of the plans and the evidentiary value they have. In this regard, canon 57 of that regulatory body indicates: “Article 57.-Effects of cadastral publicity. The main objective of the survey plan (plano de agrimensura) is to contribute to the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of the cadastre, to graphically define the property, and to publicize its boundaries. The cadastral plan (plano catastrado) is not in itself absolute proof of what is recorded in it. The survey plan (plano de agrimensura) drawn up unilaterally by the interested party, even if registered in the Cadastre, by itself cannot affect third parties, does not constitute a document of title transfer (título traslativo de dominio), does not prove ownership or possession in accordance with the provisions of Article 301 of the Civil Code.” From the set of rules just set forth, it follows that, in the event of seeking to use surveying tools as proof for the determination of boundaries—and especially that one of them is a public road—the use of suitable elements of conviction would be necessary, such as identification acts (actas de identificación), a situation that does not arise when the existence of the road is indicated within the plan and not as a boundary. In this latter case, the plan is indeed proof of the existence of the road, regardless of its inclusion in the respective municipal records.” (Contentious Administrative Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo), Third Section, vote 44-2015. In this same direction, see from this Court, among others, votes 336-2015, 309-2017, and 223-2018.) In view of the content of the criterion just transcribed, which is the one upheld by the Court, the referred documentation, including the cited cadastral plan (plano catastrado) P-1802170-2015, it is concluded that they are not, per se, full proof of the existence of the road. For this reason, an analysis must be undertaken as to whether, by virtue of them, there is a tacit acceptance of the road by the District Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal de Distrito) of Cóbano in the terms referred to by the appellant company in its appeal. Regarding the possibility of the existence of tacit decisions by the public administration—in this case, an acceptance—the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) indicates: “Article 137.-The unambiguous material behaviors and activities of the Administration, which are incompatible with a different will, shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance thereof requires express manifestation.” From the review of the case file, while the administrative conduct of the Concejo Municipal de Distrito pointed out by the appellant is evident in the record, it is also true that the file in this case contains inspection reports for the property from: October 2016, December 2016, February 2017, May 2017, June 2017, and April 2018, which indicate that the northern boundary of the parcel is not a public road. This being the case, it is not possible for this Chamber to conclude that an unequivocal intention of the municipal body to accept the road in question as a public road can be drawn from the evidence in the file. In view of the foregoing, given that the existence of a public road on the north side of the parcel, in the terms indicated by the appealing company, is not proven in the file, it is unavoidable for this Section to reject this first grievance.

Secondly, the appellant indicates that there is an administrative dysfunction attributable to INDER, which affects its legal situation. In this regard, the appellant alleges: “*That it is public (general) knowledge that both for our case and for other files that find themselves in the same situation, it is INDER that has been delaying the completion of such procedures, by virtue of the fact that it must hand over some areas destined for public roads.*” This grievance is unfounded and is rejected. The circumstance of the possible existence of omissive conduct attributable to INDER, an aspect on which this Chamber makes no pronouncement as it exceeds its jurisdiction, has no effect whatsoever on the validity or effectiveness of the appealed agreement that is the subject of review by this Tribunal. Finally, the representative of the challenging company states: “*With all that has been said, we see the recommendation of the Intendencia Municipal as an act of veiled bad intentions and with a dark purpose, in pursuit of an end not visible against us, which warns and prepares us to repel and even pursue the pertinent legal actions, in defense and claim of the rights that assist us as administered parties and against the officials who may have fostered this persecution.*” The Tribunal respects such affirmations, but from this argument, which constitutes a grievance of misuse of power (desviación de poder) under the terms established in article 131, subsection 3) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record, nor a development of reasoning that links the existing evidence to substantiate the transcribed affirmation, all of which compels this chamber to reject the final grievance and with it the challenge in its entirety. As there is no further recourse in this venue, the administrative channel must be deemed exhausted.

**IV.- On the return of the case file.** As this venue has been processed electronically, a comprehensive copy containing both the administrative file sent by the Corporación Municipal and all the pieces that make up this appeal is available to the parties, for which they must provide an electronic storage device (USB drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) that still remains in the custody of the Office has been submitted, the party who submitted it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of article 12 of the Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by the Corte Plena in session no. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial no. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session no. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

**Por Tanto.** The appeal filed is declared without merit and, consequently, the appealed act is confirmed. The administrative channel is deemed exhausted.

**Jorge Leiva Poveda** **Evelyn Solano Ulloa Rodolfo Marenco Ortiz** **EXPEDIENTE**: 18-005518-1027-CA **ASUNTO:** Recurso Municipal **RECURRENTE:** Or Ahayim S.A.

**RECURRIDO:** Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano

**II.- Origin, Evolution, and Current Situation of the District Municipal Councils (Concejos Municipales de Distrito):** Given the tumultuous process experienced by these bodies in recent years, with respect to their powers and legal nature, this Chamber deems it necessary to offer a series of clarifications regarding these bodies in order to understand their state of development today, the only ones with a constitutional-based autonomy. As an initial necessary precision, the "District Municipal Councils (Concejos Municipales de Distrito)" regulated in the second paragraph of article 172 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and in the General Law of District Municipal Councils, are bodies distinct from the "District Councils (Concejos de Distrito)", whose normative basis is in articles 54 to 60 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal). It was during the validity of the former Political Constitution issued in 1871, that the institution of the District Municipal Councils emerged, as a response to article 130 of the cited constitutional text which established the existence of one Municipality per province, in what was a rural State with an incipient system of communication routes. It is in the year 1938, when by virtue of Law 118, Law of Municipal Structure, the figure is regulated indicating: *"when a district has revenues greater than three thousand colones, and its main commercial or agricultural center is kilometers or more distant from the head of its canton, it may be governed by a board of residents that shall be called a District Council (Concejo de Distrito)"*. The functioning of these bodies was regulated in 1939 through the Decree titled *Norms for the District Councils (Normas para los Concejos de Distrito)*.

The duality that exists today with respect to the two types of district administration mentioned above, which are clearly bodies with very different competencies but with similar names, arose in the 1970-1971 biennium. In 1970, the first Municipal Code in our history was issued—Law 4574—whose Article 63 regulated the “District Councils (Concejos de Distrito)” as we know them today. This implied an evident clash with the district administration bodies that predated even the current Constitution, which functioned in practice similarly to a municipal administration. This led to the enactment in 1971 of Law 4892, the Law Reforming the Municipal Code, which changed the nomenclature of the aforementioned district administrations distant from cantonal centers to that of “Municipal District Councils (Concejos Municipales de Distrito).” This legislation also provided a legal basis for the legal personality (personalidad jurídica) granted to Municipal District Councils. In 1975, Executive Decree No. 5595-G was enacted, called the Organic Regulations of the Municipal District Councils (Reglamento Orgánico de los Consejos Municipales de Distrito), which regulated the scope of said legal personality of what were then “entities” of Public Law. It was precisely the granting of such status that caused the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in 1994 to annul all legal regulations issued in this matter since 1971, given the impact on municipal autonomy that such provisions implied, because said “entities” lacked constitutional basis. It was through ruling 6000-1994 that the aforementioned Chamber resolved: “The action is granted, and consequently, the transitory article I of Article 63 of the Municipal Code and Executive Decree No. 5595-G of November 12, 1975 are declared unconstitutional and are eliminated from the legal system.” Due to the scope of the referenced pronouncement, a year later in 1995, Law 7564 was issued, called the Law that Expands the Municipal Code on Municipal District Councils (Ley que Amplía el Código Municipal sobre Concejos Municipales de Distrito). This legislation again introduced an entirely new Title to the then Municipal Code, including a large number of articles and retaking the legal personality of these district administrations. In 1998, the current Municipal Code was issued through Law 7794, whose text, just as happened with the 1970 Code, lacked regulations regarding Municipal District Councils. Therefore, three months later, Law No. 7812, the Law that Adds Municipal District Councils to the Municipal Code (Ley que Adiciona los Concejos Municipales de Distrito al Código Municipal), was enacted. This law added the “Title VIII. Municipal District Councils (Título VIII. Concejos municipales de distrito),” highlighting the incorporation into the text of the new Article 173, in which the definition of said administrations was incorporated as “auxiliary entities of public law.” As expected, the entire recently referenced title was challenged before the Constitutional Chamber, which through ruling 5445-1999 declared a varied set of provisions unconstitutional, in which, of course, the articles introduced to the Municipal Code through Law 7812 were included, again due to the lack of a constitutional basis for Municipal District Councils.

In 2001, Law 8105, the Law Reforming Article 172 of the Political Constitution, was approved, which textually states: *“For the administration of interests and services in the districts of the canton, in qualified cases the municipalities may create district municipal councils, as bodies attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy, which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to constitute the municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total deputies, shall set the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, functioning, and financing.”* That same year, Law 8173, the General Law of District Municipal Councils, was issued; this regulation, together with the constitutional one, forms the basis of the current regulation of District Municipal Councils, in their condition as “bodies” of the municipal administration. Said text has been recently reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote number 21271-2019, rejected the action filed; however, despite the foregoing, it did redefine the contours of the District Municipal Councils, offering the following considerations: *“In order to understand the nature of these entities, it is necessary to examine the scope of some of these concepts. In the first instance, the norm indicates that it is a ‘body attached to the respective municipality.’ This means that the District Council forms part of the organizational structure of the respective Municipality. In the discussion that took place within the Legislative Assembly, Deputy Urpí Pacheco (deputy proponent and rapporteur of the bill) pointed out that ‘(…) The municipal councils will have administrative autonomy, but will continue to depend on the municipality in matters of budget, legal personality, and guiding governmental lines, as bodies, not entities that belong to the same municipality. (…) It is appropriate to warn that these are two distinct autonomies. Upon analyzing the limits and the content that the legislators gave to said autonomy, it is concluded that they refer to functional autonomy, that is, that capacity for self-administration that grants the body freedom to organize its work and dispose of its resources independently of the “mother” Municipality, in a few words, to ‘function’ independently. No other interpretation can be given because administrative autonomy in the strict sense (or first-degree) supposes a degree of independence like that held by autonomous institutions; the reading of the legislative minutes allows concluding that this was not what the legislator had in mind when creating the municipal councils. In the second place, the norm indicates that the creation of the council shall be done in ‘qualified cases.’ (…) From the reading of the minutes, it is clearly concluded that the legislator’s intention when enacting the reform was to solve some of the problems that arise in those communities that are located far from the canton seat. In that sense, the bill’s statement of motives indicated: ‘It is important to point out that there is a sociological reality that demands the existence of these forms of organization, for historical reasons, geographic distance, or others, that definitively had maintained their existence until they were declared unconstitutional. (…) It is evident then that the intention of the derived constituent power when enacting the reform was not to create mini cantons through an irregular procedure. Thus, the Councils cannot, as the plaintiffs intend, serve as small “district municipalities” with full autonomy, such that they independently receive the taxes destined for the localities. Interpreting it that way would imply dismembering the national territory and giving the constitutional reform made a greater scope than what the legislator had in mind.* The legislator granted them functional autonomy with the aim of enabling them to use the basic administrative tools to function efficiently, with some degree of organizational independence from the parent municipality. The legislator's idea was that such councils would serve as a "fulcrum in their municipal management," in those places that, due to their remoteness, had communication difficulties with the canton seat. However, they lack any other type of autonomy. They have no initiative in budgetary matters and cannot intervene in the collection and investment of the "parent" Municipality's revenues. Their budget is that which is assigned to them by the Municipality to which they are attached and on which they organically depend, for although the District Intendant is the executive body, its hierarchical superior remains the Municipal Council, which remains superior. The councils cannot act autonomously beyond the limits that this autonomy imposes on them, it being clear that they are "organs attached to the respective municipality," which lack legal personality and are subject to a relationship of subordination in budgetary, governmental, and normative matters." It is in light of this redefinition of the jurisdictional attributions of the District Municipal Councils (Concejos Municipales de Distrito) that this Section proceeds to resolve the present appeal.

**III.- Of the specific case [...]** Upon review of the case file, it is clear to this Chamber that the main point of controversy in the file under study is that relating to whether the property whose concession was denied has or does not have access to a public road. As was stated in the heading of this resolution, the petition of the appellant corporation was denied because the District Municipal Council determined that the requested parcel does not have access to a public road. As a first grievance, the appellant indicates that in the case file there is proof regarding the existence of a public road. To demonstrate her assertion, she points to the existence of: A topographic survey and a sketch prepared by a municipal inspector. She adds that the case file contains the cadastral map P-180217-2015, which describes property 6-211255-000, in which it is indicated that the eastern boundary of that property is precisely the road that is to the north of the requested parcel, which implies a tacit acceptance of the road by the District Municipal Council. For its part, the respondent Council indicates that it is not true that the requested parcel borders a public road to the north, an aspect of which there is proof in the case file. The grievance is unfounded and is rejected. The complaint presented revolves around two arguments: a- That in the case file there is proof that on the northern boundary of the parcel there exists a public road, and, b- That the District Municipal Council has tacitly accepted the existence of the referenced access road. Regarding the first aspect, the party refers to documents in which the existence of the cited road is recorded as a boundary, one of them being a cadastral map of a property belonging to a third party. By reason of such assertion, it is necessary for this Tribunal to specify whether the cited documentation constitutes full proof of the existence of a road, or if it is simply an indication of its possible existence by virtue of its tacit acceptance by the district administrative body. To date, the Third Section has on repeated occasions had to address the issue of whether references to public roads as boundaries on cadastral maps subsequently allow the existence of those roads to be taken as proven. In this regard, this Section has indicated: **"III.- On the probative value of cadastral maps of individual properties for determining the existence of a public road recorded as a boundary.** In the forensic practice of Administrative Law, it is not unusual for parties to attempt to prove the existence of a public road based on the boundaries recorded in cadastral plans of specific properties, whether or not these plans have been approved by the respective municipality. Such proof is particularly important, because to the extent it is achieved, the iuris tantum presumption established in article 7 of the Construction Law will be applicable in that specific case. The question here is not whether a cadastral plan can prove the existence of a public road, but rather it is simply specified that this will be conditioned, among other aspects, by the type of plan in question. It is clarified that the following considerations do not apply to plans for subdivisions (fraccionamientos), developments, etc., in which the existence of public roads is certified within the plan. Regarding the evidentiary value of plans that indicate they border public roads, the First Chamber has recently addressed their probative weight concerning the proof of the existence of a public road in the following terms: "While it is true that the principle of first registration postulates that registration is not necessary for a property to be considered public domain, it also should not be interpreted to mean that mere inclusion in a cadastral plan allows for the assertion of such nature, since the plan does not have the capacity to modify material reality but merely reproduces it. On the contrary, the principle in question leads to the conclusion that, if there are sufficient indications to consider that the assumptions established by law exist when the assignment of public character was regulated, it is not relevant that it is not registered in the name of the State or a public institution. However, the plans whose improper assessment is alleged do not have the virtue of determining the public nature of the street or access in question." First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, decision 1448-F-S1-2014, at 10:10 a.m. on November 7, 2014. Having stated the above, it must first be specified that the inclusion of boundaries in a plan is a requirement for its approval by the Catastro Nacional, all of which is regulated in articles 8 and 34(e) of the Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro, rules that textually state: "Article 8º-Delimitation of the property. Properties shall be delimited taking into account the titles registered in the Registro Inmobiliario and, where applicable, the possession of the property and the coincidence or conformity of the respective titleholders or possessors and adjoining landowners or disparities or objections among them regarding the identification or setting of the boundaries that separate their properties." // "Article 34.-Information to be provided in the body of the survey plan. The information to be provided in the body of the survey plan is the following: (...) e. Details: Without the need to carry out a respective survey, the plan must indicate graphically and literally any physical feature, such as canals, rivers, creeks, irrigation ditches, lagoons, reservoirs, estuaries, quarries, tunnels, bridges, dikes, dams, sewers, spillways, curbs, gutters, shoulders, roadways and any other similar features, except when they adjoin or cross the boundary, in which case it will be necessary to carry out a detailed survey." Likewise, the use of the property must be indicated; depending on the activity in question, if there are several different uses, the boundaries between them and the outline of existing constructions must be shown with approximate lines, at the same scale at which the surveyed polygon was drawn." Notwithstanding the foregoing, in order to specify what type of information must be certified by the survey plan of a specific property, it is clarified that the regulatory requirement to include the boundaries on the survey plans of a specific property is a formal requirement, but that information is not covered by the public faith (fe pública) recognized in Article 12 of Ley 4294, Ley de Ejercicio de la Topografía y Agrimensura. In this regard, canon 19 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro Nacional establishes: "Article 19.-Public faith (Fe pública) of the surveyor. The data relating to the survey description (derrotero), area, and location contained in the survey plan are inserted therein under the public faith and responsibility held by surveying professionals, in accordance with the provisions established therein." (The original is not highlighted). In this sense, the regulation under analysis clearly establishes which aspects or information contained in the survey plan of a property are covered by this legal presumption of truthfulness. Regarding the boundaries, these could indeed be effectively certified—including for the application of Article 7 of the Ley de Construcciones—if this is done through the means of proof established by the Ley de Catastro Nacional in the following terms: "Article 11.- The term act of boundary demarcation and identification (acta de deslinde e identificación) is given to that which is drawn up on the land itself, in accordance with the formalities of this law. The owner or possessor, or their representative, shall sign such act, stating that they accept the data regarding the location and boundaries of their property that appear therein." The preceding rule is developed by the Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro in the following terms: "Article 12.-Acts of conformity and identification (Actas de conformidad y de identificación). The boundaries determined in the acts of conformity signed by the adjoining owners themselves, or through their legitimate representatives or agents, jointly with the owners or possessors of the bordering properties, or who sign acts of identification indicating the boundaries of their own properties in such a way that they coincide with those indicated by the owners or possessors of the bordering properties, shall be definitively determined in the form they appear in said acts." Furthermore, the same legal body establishes with clear precision the limited effects of the cadastral publicity of the plans and the evidentiary value they possess. In this regard, canon 57 of that regulatory body states: "Article 57.-Effects of cadastral publicity. The main objective of the survey plan is to contribute to the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of the cadastre, to graphically define the property, and to give publicity to its boundaries.

The cadastral map is not in itself absolute proof of what is recorded on it. The survey map (plano de agrimensura) prepared unilaterally by the interested party, even if it is registered in the Catastro, cannot by itself affect third parties; it does not constitute a title transferring ownership (título traslativo de dominio), nor does it prove property or possession in accordance with the provisions of Article 301 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)." From the set of rules just set forth, it follows that, in the event of seeking to use surveying tools as evidence for the determination of boundaries (linderos) - and especially that one of them is a public road (camino público)-, it will be necessary to use suitable elements of conviction, such as identification reports (actas de identificación), a situation that does not arise when the existence of the road is indicated within the map and not as a boundary. In this latter case, the map is indeed evidence of the existence of the road, regardless of its inclusion in the respective municipal records." (Contencioso-Administrative Tribunal, Section Three, vote 44-2015 [...]) In light of the above, an analysis must be made of whether, by virtue of those elements, a tacit acceptance of the road by the Municipal District Council of Cóbano is present, in the terms referenced by the appellant company in its appeal. As for the possibility of the existence of tacit decisions by the public administration -in this case, an acceptance- the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states: "Article 137.-The administrative behaviors and material activities that have an unequivocal meaning and are incompatible with a different intent shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance thereof requires an express manifestation." Upon review of the case file, although the administrative actions of the Municipal District Council pointed out by the appellant are indeed observed in the record, it is also true that the dossier of this case contains inspection reports for the property dated October 2016, December 2016, February 2017, May 2017, June 2017, and April 2018, which indicate that the northern boundary of the parcel is not a public road. This being the case, it is not possible for this Chamber to conclude that an unequivocal intent can be extracted from the existing evidence in the file that the municipal body accepted the route in question as a public road.

In view of the foregoing, and since the file does not establish the existence of a public road on the northern side of the parcel, in the terms indicated by the appellant company, it is unavoidable for this Section to reject this first grievance." This led to the enactment of Law 4892, the Law Reforming the Municipal Code, in 1971, which changed the nomenclature of the aforementioned district administrations located far from cantonal centers to “Concejos Municipales de Distrito”. This legislation also provided a legal basis for the legal personality (personalidad jurídica) granted to the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. In 1975, Executive Decree No. 5595-G, called Reglamento Orgánico de los Consejos Municipales de Distrito, was promulgated, which regulated the scope of said legal personality of what were then “entities” (entes) of Public Law. It was precisely the granting of such status that led the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in 1994 to annul all legal regulations issued in this matter since 1971, given the impact on municipal autonomy (autonomía municipal) that such provisions implied, because these “entities” lacked a constitutional basis. It was through vote 6000-1994 that the aforementioned Chamber resolved: “The action is upheld and consequently, the transitory article I of article 63 of the Municipal Code and Executive Decrees No. 5595-G of November 12, 1975, are declared unconstitutional and are eliminated from the legal system.” Due to the scope of the mentioned ruling, a year later in 1995, Law 7564, called Ley que Amplía el Código Municipal sobre Concejos Municipales de Distrito, was issued; this legislation once again introduced an entire new Title to the then Municipal Code, including a large number of articles and reinstating the legal personality of these district administrations. In 1998, the current Municipal Code was issued through Law 7794, whose text, as occurred with the 1970 Code, lacked regulations regarding the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. Therefore, three months later, Law No. 7812, Ley que Adiciona los Concejos Municipales de Distrito al Código Municipal, was issued. This law added “Título VIII. Concejos municipales de distrito,” standing out the incorporation in the text of the new article 173, which incorporated the definition of these administrations as “auxiliary entities of public law” (entes auxiliares de derecho público). As expected, the entire recently referred title was challenged before the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote 5445-1999 declared a varied set of provisions unconstitutional, which of course included the articles introduced to the Municipal Code through Law 7812, again due to the lack of a constitutional basis for the Concejos Municipales de Distrito. In 2001, Law 8105, Law Reforming Article 172 of the Political Constitution, was approved, which textually states: “For the administration of interests and services in the cantonal districts, in qualified cases, municipalities may create district municipal councils, as bodies (órganos) attached to the respective municipality with their own functional autonomy (autonomía funcional propia), which shall be integrated following the same popular election procedures used to form municipalities. A special law, approved by two-thirds of the total deputies, shall set the special conditions under which they may be created and shall regulate their structure, operation, and financing.”. This same year, Law 8173, General Law of Concejos Municipales de Distrito, was issued; this regulation, together with the constitutional one, is the basis of the current regulation of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, in their condition as “bodies” (órganos) of the municipal administration. Said text has recently been reviewed by the Constitutional Chamber, which through vote number 21271-2019 rejected the action filed; however, in spite of the foregoing, it did redefine the contours of the Concejos Municipales de Distrito, offering the following considerations: “In order to understand the nature of these entities (entes), it is necessary to examine the scope of some of these concepts. First, the regulation indicates that it is a ‘body attached to the respective municipality’ (órgano adscrito a la respectiva municipalidad). This means that the District Council (Concejo de Distrito) forms part of the organizational structure of the respective Municipality. In the discussion that took place within the Legislative Assembly, Deputy Urpí Pacheco (proponent and rapporteur of the bill) indicated that ‘(…) The municipal councils shall have administrative autonomy, but they shall continue to depend on the municipality in terms of budget, legal personality (personería jurídica), and governing guidelines, as bodies, not entities (entes) that belong to the same municipality. (…) It is pertinent to note that these are two different autonomies. When analyzing the limits and content that the legislators gave to said autonomy, it is concluded that they refer to functional autonomy, that is, that capacity for self-administration that grants the body freedom to organize its work and dispose of its resources independently of the “parent” Municipality, in short, to ‘function’ independently. No other interpretation can be given because administrative autonomy in the strict sense (or of the first degree) supposes a degree of independence like that of autonomous institutions; reading the legislative records allows us to conclude that this was not what the legislator had in mind when creating the municipal councils. Secondly, the regulation indicates that the creation of the council shall be done in ‘qualified cases’ (casos calificados). (…) From reading the records, it is clearly concluded that the intention of the legislator in enacting the reform was to solve some of the problems that arise in those communities that are located far from the cantonal head. In that sense, the explanatory memorandum of the bill indicated: ‘It is important to point out that there is a sociological reality that demands the existence of these forms of organization, for historical reasons, geographical distance, or others, which in short had maintained the existence of these until they were declared unconstitutional. (…) It is evident then that the intention of the derived constituent in enacting the reform was not to create mini-cantons through an irregular procedure.” Thus, the Councils cannot, as the plaintiffs intend, act as small "district municipalities" with full autonomy, such that they independently receive taxes destined for the localities. Interpreting it in that way would imply dismembering the national territory and giving the constitutional reform enacted a scope greater than that which the legislator had in mind. The legislator granted them functional autonomy so that they could use basic administrative tools to function efficiently, with some degree of organizational independence from the parent municipality. The legislator's idea was that such councils would serve as a "point of support in its municipal management," in those places that, due to their remoteness, had communication difficulties with the canton seat. However, they lack any other type of autonomy. They have no initiative in budgetary matters and cannot intervene in the collection and investment of the revenues of the "parent" Municipality. Their budget is that which is assigned to them by the Municipality to which they are attached and on which they organically depend, for although the Intendente is the executive body, its Hierarch remains the Municipal Council, which is maintained as superior. The councils cannot act autonomously beyond the limits imposed by that autonomy, it being clear that they are "bodies attached to the respective municipality," which lack legal personality and are subject to a relationship of subordination in budgetary, governmental, and regulatory matters." It is in light of this redefinition of the jurisdictional attributions of the District Municipal Councils that this Section proceeds to resolve the present appeal.

**III.- The Specific Case**: In order to facilitate the understanding of this ruling, the grievances raised by the appellant party, as well as this Court's criterion on their merit, will be set forth in this recital. Having reviewed the case file, it is clear to this Chamber that the main point in controversy in the file under study relates to whether the parcel whose grant was denied has or does not have access to a public road. As stated in the heading of this resolution, the petition of the appellant entity was denied because the District Municipal Council considered that the requested parcel has no access to a public road. As a first grievance, the appellant indicates that in the case file there is proof regarding the existence of a public road. To demonstrate its assertion, it points to the existence of: a topographic survey and a sketch prepared by a municipal inspector. It adds that the file includes cadastral map P-180217-2015, which describes farm 6-211255-000, in which it is indicated that the eastern boundary of that property is precisely the road that is to the north of the requested parcel, which implies a tacit acceptance of the road by the District Municipal Council. For its part, the appellee Council indicates that it is not true that the requested parcel borders a public road to the north, an aspect for which proof exists in the file. The grievance is without merit and is rejected. The complaint presented revolves around two arguments: a- That in the file there is proof that a public road exists on the northern boundary of the parcel, and, b- That the District Municipal Council has tacitly accepted the existence of the referred access road. Regarding the first aspect, the party refers to documents in which the existence of the cited road is recorded as a boundary, one of them being a cadastral map of a property belonging to a third party. By reason of such an assertion, it is necessary for this Court to specify whether the cited documentation constitutes full proof of the existence of a road, or whether it simply constitutes evidence of its possible existence by virtue of a tacit acceptance thereof by the district administrative body. To date, this Third Section has repeatedly had to address the issue of whether references to public roads as boundaries in cadastral maps subsequently allow the existence of those roads to be taken as proven. This Directorate has indicated in this Section: **"III.- The probative value of cadastral maps of individual farms for the determination of the existence of a public road recorded as a boundary.** In the forensic practice of Administrative Law, it is not unusual to attempt to prove the existence of a public road based on the boundaries recorded in cadastral maps of specific parcels, whether or not these have been approved by the respective municipality. Such accreditation is particularly important, since to the extent it is achieved, the rebuttable presumption established by Article 7 of the Construction Law will be applicable in that specific case. What is not discussed here is whether a public road's existence can be accredited by means of a cadastral map, but rather it is simply specified that this will be conditioned, among other aspects, by the type of map in question. It is clarified that the following considerations do not apply to maps of subdivisions, urbanizations, etc., in which the existence of public roads is accredited within the map. Regarding the probative value of maps indicating boundaries with public roads, it is noted that the First Chamber has recently addressed their probative weight regarding the accreditation of a public road's existence in the following terms: 'While it is true that the principle of entry registration postulates that registry inscription is not necessary for property to be considered public domain, it also must not be interpreted in the sense that the simple inclusion in a cadastral map allows one to affirm said nature, for the map does not have the capacity to modify material reality but only reproduces it. On the contrary, the principle in question means that, if there is sufficient evidence to consider that the assumptions established in the law when the assignment of a public character was regulated are met, it is not relevant that it is not registered in the name of the State or a public institution. That said, the maps whose improper valuation is alleged do not have the virtue of determining the public nature of the street or access in question.' Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Voto 1448-F-S1-2014, of 10:10 a.m. on November 7, 2014." Having said the above, it must first be clarified that the inclusion of boundaries on a survey plan is a requirement for its approval by the National Cadastre (Catastro Nacional), all of which is regulated in Articles 8 and 34(e) of the Regulation to the Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro), provisions that literally state: “Article 8º.—Delimitation of the property. Properties shall be delimited taking into account the titles registered in the Real Estate Registry (Registro Inmobiliario) and, where applicable, the possession of the asset and the coincidence or conformity of the respective titleholders or possessors and adjoining owners, or the disparities or objections of any of them regarding the identification or establishment of the boundaries that separate their properties.” // “Article 34.—Information that must be provided in the Body of the survey plan. The information that must be provided in the body of the survey plan is as follows: (...) e. Details: Without needing to conduct the respective survey, the plan must indicate graphically and literally any physical feature (accidente físico), such as canals, rivers, streams (quebradas), irrigation ditches (acequias), lagoons, reservoirs, estuaries (esteros), cuts (tajos), tunnels, bridges, dikes, dams, sewers, spillways (vertederos), curbs (cordones), gutters (cunetas), shoulders (espaldones), roadways (calzadas) and any other similar features, except when they adjoin or cross the boundary, in which case it will be necessary to conduct a detailed survey. Likewise, the use of the property must be indicated; depending on the activity in question, if it involves several distinct uses, the demarcation (deslinde) of these uses must be shown with approximate lines and existing constructions must be outlined, at the same scale at which the surveyed polygon was drawn.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, in order to clarify what type of information must be accredited with the survey plan of a specific property, it is clarified that the regulatory requirement to include boundaries on the plans of a specific property is a formal requirement, but said information is not covered by the public faith (fe pública) recognized in Article 12 of Law 4294, Law on the Practice of Topography and Surveying (Ley de Ejercicio de la Topografía y Agrimensura). In this regard, canon 19 of the Regulation to the National Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro Nacional) establishes: “ Article 19.—Public faith of the surveyor. The data relating to the route (derrotero), area, and location contained in the survey plan are inserted therein under the public faith and responsibility held by surveying professionals, in accordance with the provisions of the Law.” (The original is not highlighted). In this sense, the regulation under analysis clearly establishes which aspects or information contained in the survey plan of a property are covered by said legal presumption of truthfulness. Regarding boundaries, these could indeed be effectively accredited—including for the application of Article 7 of the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones)—if this is done through the means of proof established by the National Cadastre Law (Ley de Catastro Nacional) in the following terms: “ Article 11.— An act of demarcation and identification (acta de deslinde e identificación) is the one drawn up on the land itself, in accordance with the formalities of this law. The owner or possessor, or their representative, shall sign such act, stating that they accept the data regarding the location and boundaries of their property that appear therein.” The foregoing norm is developed by the Regulation to the Cadastre Law (Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro) in the following terms: “Article 12.—Acts of conformity and of identification (Actas de conformidad y de identificación). The boundaries determined in the acts of conformity signed by the adjoining owners themselves, or through their legitimate representatives or agents, jointly with the owners or possessors of the neighboring properties, or who sign acts of identification indicating the boundaries of their own properties in such a way that they coincide with those indicated by the owners or possessors of the neighboring properties, shall be definitively determined in the form they appear in said acts.” Furthermore, the same legal body establishes with clear precision the limited effects of the cadastral publicity of the plans and the evidentiary value they have. In this regard, canon 57 of that regulatory body states: “Article 57.—Effects of cadastral publicity. The main objective of the survey plan is to contribute to the establishment, improvement, and maintenance of the cadastre, to define the property graphically, and to publicize its boundaries. The cadastral plan is not, in and of itself, absolute proof of what is recorded in it. The survey plan drawn up unilaterally by the interested party, even if registered in the Cadastre, by itself cannot affect third parties, does not constitute a title of transfer of ownership (título traslativo de dominio), and does not prove ownership or possession in accordance with the provisions of Article 301 of the Civil Code (Código Civil).” From the relationship of the norms just set forth, it follows that, in the event of attempting to use surveying tools as proof for the determination of boundaries—and especially that any one of them is a public road—the use of appropriate elements of conviction will be necessary, such as acts of identification (actas de identificación), a situation which is not present when the existence of the road is indicated within the plan and not as a boundary. In this latter case, the plan is proof of the existence of the road, regardless of its inclusion in the respective municipal registries.” (Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Third Section, Voto 44-2015. In this same direction, see from this Tribunal, among others, Votos 336-2015, 309-2017 and 223-2018.) In view of the content of the opinion just transcribed, which is the one upheld by the Tribunal, the referred documentation, including the cited cadastral plan P-1802170-2015, it is concluded that they are not per se, full proof of the existence of the road. For this reason, it is necessary to enter into the analysis of whether, by virtue of them, there is a tacit acceptance of the road by the District Municipal Council (Concejo Municipal de Distrito) of Cóbano in the terms referred to by the appellant company in its appeal.

Regarding the possibility of the existence of tacit decisions by the public administration—in this case, an acceptance—the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states: “Article 137.- The material behaviors and activities of the Administration that have a unequivocal meaning and that are incompatible with a different will, shall serve to express the act, unless the nature or circumstance of the act requires express manifestation.” From the review of the case file, although the administrative conducts of the District Municipal Council pointed out by the appellant are observed in the records, it is also true that, in the dossier of this case, there are inspection reports for the property from: October 2016, December 2016, February 2017, May 2017, June 2017, and April 2018, in which it is indicated that the northern boundary of the parcel is not a public road. This being the case, it is not possible for this Chamber to conclude that from the existing evidence in the case file, an unequivocal will can be extracted from the municipal body to accept the road in question as a public road. In view of the foregoing, and since the existence of a public road on the north side of the parcel has not been proven in the terms indicated by the appellant company, it is unavoidable for this Section to reject this first grievance.

Secondly, the appellant indicates that there is an administrative dysfunction attributable to INDER, which affects its legal situation. In this regard, the appellant alleges: “That it is of public (general) knowledge that both for our case and for other case files that find the same situation, it is INDER that has been delaying the completion of such procedures, by virtue of the fact that it must deliver some areas destined for public street.” This grievance is inadmissible and is rejected. The circumstance of the possible existence of omissions attributable to INDER, an aspect on which this Chamber makes no pronouncement as it exceeds its competence, has no effect whatsoever on the validity or efficacy of the appealed agreement that is under review by this Tribunal. Finally, the representative of the challenging company states: “With all that has been said, we see the recommendation of the Municipal Intendancy as an act of veiled bad intentions and with a dark purpose, in pursuit of a goal not visible against us, which warns us and prepares us to repel and even straighten out the pertinent legal actions, in defense and in claim of the rights that assist us as administered parties and against the officials who have fostered this persecution.” The Tribunal respects such affirmations, but for this allegation, which constitutes a grievance of Misuse of Power (Desviación de Poder) in the terms established in Article 131 subsection 3) of the General Law of Public Administration, there is no evidence whatsoever in the records, nor a development of reasoning linking the existing evidence with the purpose of proving the transcribed affirmation, all of which obliges this chamber to reject the last grievance and with it the challenge in its entirety. As there is no further appeal in this venue, the administrative route must be considered exhausted.

IV.- On the return of the case file. Since this venue has been processed electronically, the parties have at their disposal the option of obtaining a complete copy containing both the administrative file sent by the Municipal Corporation as well as all the documents that make up the present appeal, for which purpose they must provide the electronic storage device (flash drive or compact disc). Likewise, in the event that physical or electronic documentation (plans, photographs, reports, etc.) has been submitted that still remains in the custody of the Office, the party who provided it may withdraw it within a period of 30 business days, in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judiciary (Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial), approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in Judicial Bulletin No. 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

Por tanto.

The appeal filed is declared without merit and consequently the appealed act is confirmed. The administrative route is considered exhausted.

Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa Rodolfo Marenco Ortiz ASUNTO: Recurso Municipal RECURRENTE: Or Ahayim S.A.

RECURRIDO: Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano <table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 0pt; width: 100%;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 200%; margin: 5.1pt 0pt 0pt; orphans: 0; text-align: center; widows: 0;"><span style="font-family: Tahoma; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: bold;">&nbsp;</span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="font-size: 14pt; line-height: 200%; margin: 5.1pt 0pt 0pt; orphans: 0; text-align: center; widows: 0;"><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal;">- C&oacute;digo Verificador -</span><br /><span style="font-family: 'WASP 39 L'; font-size: 14pt; font-weight: normal;">*3OQITOWHVV861*</span><br /><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: normal;">3OQITOWHVV861</span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <table style="border-collapse: collapse; margin-left: 0pt; width: 100%;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding-left: 5.4pt; padding-right: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top; width: 400pt;"> <p style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 200%; margin: 5.1pt 0pt 0pt; orphans: 0; text-align: center; widows: 0;"><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal;">Documento firmado por:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal;">JORGE LEIVA POVEDA, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span><br /><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal;">ELEUTERIO RODOLFO MARENCO ORTIZ, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span><br /><span style="font-family: 'Arial Unicode'; font-size: 10pt; font-weight: normal;">EVELYN SOLANO ULLOA, JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>

Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Central 2545-00-03 Fax 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico [email protected] __________________________________________________________________ ASUNTO: Recurso Municipal RECURRENTE: Or Ahayim S.A.

RECURRIDO: Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano No. 215-2020 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. SECCIÓN TERCERA, ANEXO A DEL II CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las ocho horas quince minutos del veinte de abril de dos mil veinte.- Conoce este Tribunal en condición de contralor no jerárquico de legalidad, del recurso de apelación presentado por Or Ahayim S.A., cédula de persona jurídica 3-101-311695, representada por su apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma señora Emilia Tal, portadora de la cédula de residencia 13760006709, en contra del acuerdo adoptado en el inciso h), artículo iv de la sesión ordinaria 106-18, del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano, en el cual se rechazó su solicitud de concesión en zona marítimo-terrestre, por cuanto la parcela en cuestión no tiene acceso a calle pública.

Redacta el juez Leiva Poveda.

Considerando.

I.- Consideración preliminar respecto de la prescindencia de un elenco de hechos probados: En vista de las características del presente procedimiento se hace innecesaria la elaboración de un elenco de hechos probados, pues los únicos elementos fácticos de relevancia para la resolución del presente trámite, ya están consignados en el encabezado de esta resolución.

II.- Origen, evolución y situación actual de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito: En razón del convulso proceso experimentado por estos órganos en los últimos años, en lo que hace a sus competencias y naturaleza jurídica, esta Cámara entiende necesario ofrecer una serie de aclaraciones en torno a estos órganos con el fin de comprender su estado de desarrollo al día de hoy, únicos con autonomía de base constitucional. De inicio una precisión necesaria, los “Concejos Municipales de Distrito” regulados en el párrafo segundo del artículo 172 de la Constitución Política y en la Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, son órganos distintos de los “Concejos de Distrito”, cuya base normativa está en los artículos 54 a 60 del Código Municipal. Fue durante la vigencia de la anterior Constitución Política emitida en 1871, que surgió el instituto de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, como una respuesta al artículo 130 del citado texto constitucional que establecía la existencia de una Municipalidad por provincia, en lo que era un Estado rural con un incipiente sistema de vías de comunicación. Es en el año de 1938, cuando en virtud de la Ley 118, Ley de Estructura Municipal, se regula la figura indicando: “cuando un distrito cuente con rentas mayores de tres mil colones, y su principal centro comercial o agrícola diste kilómetros o más de la cabecera de su cantón, podrá ser regido por una junta de vecinos que se denominará Concejo de Distrito". El funcionamiento de estos órganos fue reglamentado en 1939 mediante el Decreto titulado Normas para los Concejos de Distrito. La dualidad que hoy existe en lo que respecta a los dos tipos de administración distrital antes mencionados, que claramente son órganos con competencias muy distintas pero con denominaciones similares, surgió en el bienio 1970-1971. En 1970 es emitido el primer Código Municipal de nuestra historia -Ley 4574-, cuyo artículo 63 reguló los “Concejos de Distrito” como hoy los conocemos. Ello implicó un evidente choque con los órganos de administración distrital preexistentes incluso a la Constitución actual, que funcionaban en la práctica de forma similar a una administración municipal. Esto llevó a que en 1971 se promulgara la Ley 4892, Ley de reforma al Código Municipal, que varió la nomenclatura de las referidas administraciones distritales lejanas de los centros cantonales a la de “Concejos Municipales de Distrito”. Dicha legislación además brindó base legal a la personalidad jurídica otorgada a los Concejos Municipales de Distrito. En 1975, fue promulgado el Decreto Ejecutivo N° 5595-G, denominado Reglamento Orgánico de los Consejos Municipales de Distrito, el cual reglamentó los alcances de dicha personalidad jurídica de los que entonces eran “entes” de Derecho Público. Fue justamente el otorgamiento de tal condición el aspecto que provocó que en 1994, la Sala Constitucional anulara todas las regulaciones jurídicas emitidas en esta materia a partir de 1971, dada la afectación a la autonomía municipal que tales disposiciones implicaban, esto por cuanto dichos “entes” carecían de base constitucional. Fue mediante voto 6000-1994, que la citada Sala resolvió: “Se declara con lugar la acción y en consecuencia, se declaran inconstitucionales y se eliminan del ordenamiento jurídico el artículo transitorio I del artículo 63 del Código Municipal y los Decretos Ejecutivos No. 5595-G de 12 de noviembre de 1975”. En razón de los alcances del pronunciamiento referido, un año más tarde en 1995, es emitida la Ley 7564, denominada Ley que Amplía el Código Municipal sobre Concejos Municipales de Distrito, dicha legislación introdujo nuevamente todo un nuevo Título al entonces Código Municipal, incluyendo una gran cantidad de artículos y retomándose la personalidad jurídica de estas administraciones distritales. En 1998 es emitido mediante Ley 7794, el Código Municipal vigente, cuyo texto, al igual que sucedió con el Código de 1970, carecía de regulaciones respecto de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito. Por ello tres meses más tarde, fue emitida la Ley Nº 7812, Ley que Adiciona los Concejos Municipales de Distrito al Código Municipal. Esta ley agregó el "Título VIII. Concejos municipales de distrito”, destacándose la incorporación en el texto del nuevo artículo 173, en el que se incorporó la definición de dichas administraciones como “entes auxiliares de derecho público”. Como era de esperar, el título completo recién referido fue impugnado ante la Sala Constitucional, quien mediante el voto 5445-1999 declaró inconstitucionales un variado conjunto de disposiciones, en las que claro está, se incluían los artículos introducidos al Código Municipal mediante Ley 7812, de nuevo dada la inexistencia de base constitucional de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito. En el año 2001 fue aprobada la Ley 8105, Ley de Reforma al artículo 172 de la Constitución Política, el cual textualmente indica: “Para la administración de los intereses y servicios en los distritos del cantón, en casos calificados las municipalidades podrán crear concejos municipales de distrito, como órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad con autonomía funcional propia, que se integrarán siguiendo los mismos procedimientos de elección popular utilizados para conformar las municipalidades. Una ley especial, aprobada por dos tercios del total de los diputados, fijará las condiciones especiales en que pueden ser creados y regulará su estructura, funcionamiento y financiación.". Este mismo año, se emite la Ley 8173, Ley General de Concejos Municipales de Distrito, dicha normativa junto a la constitucional, es la base de la regulación actual de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, en su condición de “órganos” de la administración municipal. Dicho texto ha sido recientemente revisado por la Sala Constitucional, la cual mediante voto número 21271-2019, rechazó la acción presentada, sin embargo, amén de lo anterior, si redefinió los contorno de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, ofreciendo las siguientes consideraciones: “Con el objeto de comprender la naturaleza de estos entes es necesario examinar el alcance de algunos de estos conceptos. En primer término, la norma señala que se trata de un “órgano adscrito a la respectiva municipalidad”. Ello significa que el Concejo de Distrito forma parte de la estructura organizativa de la respectiva Municipalidad. En la discusión que se dio en el seno de la Asamblea Legislativa, la diputada Urpí Pacheco (diputada proponente y dictaminadora del proyecto) señaló que “(…) Los concejos municipales tendrán autonomía administrativa, pero seguirán dependiendo de la municipalidad en materia de presupuesto, de personería jurídica y de líneas orientadoras de gobierno, como órganos, no entes que pertenecen a la misma municipalidad. (…) Es oportuno advertir que se trata de dos autonomías distintas. Al analizar los límites y el contenido que los legisladores dieron a dicha autonomía, se concluye que se refieren a la autonomía funcional, es decir, aquella capacidad de auto-administrarse que otorga al órgano libertad para organizar su trabajo y disponer de sus recursos con independencia de la Municipalidad “madre”, en pocas palabras, para ‘funcionar’ de forma independiente. Otra interpretación no puede darse pues la autonomía administrativa en sentido estricto (o de primer grado) supone un grado de independencia como el que tienen las instituciones autónomas; la lectura de las actas legislativas permite concluir que eso no fue lo que tuvo en mente el legislador al crear los concejos municipales. En segundo lugar, la norma señala que la creación del concejo se hará en “casos calificados”. (…) De la lectura de las actas se concluye claramente que la intención del legislador al promulgar la reforma fue solventar algunos de los problemas que se presentan en aquellas comunidades que están localizadas lejos de la cabecera del cantón. En ese sentido en la exposición de motivos del proyecto se indicó: “Es importante señalar que existe una realidad sociológica que demanda la existencia de estas formas de organización, por razones históricas, de alejamiento geográfico, u otras, que en definitiva habían mantenido la existencia de esos hasta que fueron declarados inconstitucionales. (…) Es evidente entonces que la intención del constituyente derivado al promulgar la reforma no fue crear mini cantones mediante un procedimiento irregular. Así, no pueden los Concejos, como pretenden los accionantes, fungir como pequeñas “municipalidades de distrito” con autonomía plena, de manera que perciban de manera independiente los impuestos destinados a las localidades. Interpretarlo de esa forma, supondría desmembrar el territorio nacional y dar a la reforma constitucional hecha, un alcance mayor al que tuvo en mente el legislador. El legislador les otorgó autonomía funcional con el objeto de que puedan utilizar las herramientas administrativas básicas para funcionar de manera eficiente, con algún grado de independencia organizativa de la municipalidad madre. La idea del legislador fue que tales concejos sirvieran como “punto de apoyo en su gestión municipal”, en aquellos sitios que por su lejanía tuvieran dificultades de comunicación con la cabecera del cantón. Sin embargo, carecen de cualquier otro tipo de autonomía. No tienen iniciativa en materia presupuestaria y no pueden intervenir en la recaudación e inversión de los ingresos de la Municipalidad “madre”. Su presupuesto es el que les asigne la Municipalidad a la cual están adscritos y de la cual dependen orgánicamente, pues si bien el Intendente es el órgano ejecutivo, su Jerarca sigue siendo el Consejo Municipal, que se mantiene como superior. Los concejos no pueden actuar en forma autónoma más allá de los límites que esa autonomía les impone, teniendo claro que son “órganos adscritos a la respectiva municipalidad”, que carecen de personalidad jurídica y están sujetos a la relación de subordinación en materia presupuestaria, de gobierno y normativa.” Es bajo la luz de esta redefinición de las atribuciones competenciales de los Concejos Municipales de Distrito, que esta Sección procede al resolver el presente recurso de apelación.

III.- Del caso concreto: Con el fin de facilitar la comprensión del presente pronunciamiento, en este considerando serán enunciados los agravios planteados por la parte recurrente así como el criterio de este Tribunal sobre su procedencia. Revisado el expediente es claro para esta Cámara que el principal punto en controversia en el expediente bajo estudio, es el relativo a si la finca cuya concesión fue rechazada tiene o no acceso a calle pública. Como fue referido en el encabezado de esta resolución la petición de la sociedad recurrente se rechazó por cuanto el Concejo Municipal de Distrito estimó que la parcela requerida no tiene acceso a calle pública. Como primer agravio, la apelante indica que en el expediente existe prueba respecto de la existencia de un camino público. Para demostrar su afirmación señala la existencia de: Un levantamiento topográfico y un croquis elaborado por un inspector municipal. Agrega que en el expediente consta el plano catastrado P-180217-2015, que describe la finca 6-211255-000, en el que se indica que la colindancia este de aquel inmueble es justamente el camino que está al norte de la parcela solicitada, lo que implica una aceptación tácita del camino por parte del Concejo Municipal de Distrito. Por su parte el Concejo recurrido indica que no es cierto que la parcela requerida colinde al norte con una vía pública, aspecto de lo cual existe prueba en el expediente. El agravio es improcedente y se rechaza. El reproche presentado orbita en torno a dos argumentos: a- Que en el expediente hay prueba de que en el lindero norte de la parcela existe un camino público, y, b- Que el Concejo Municipal de Distrito ha aceptado tácitamente la existencia de la referida vía de acceso. En cuanto al primer aspecto, la parte hace referencia a documentos en los que se consigna la existencia del citado camino como lindero, siendo uno de ellos, un plano catastrado de un inmueble perteneciente a un tercero. En razón de tal afirmación, es menester que este Tribunal precise si la citada documentación es plena prueba de la existencia de un camino, o simplemente se trata de un indicio de su posible existencia en virtud de una aceptación tácita de este por parte del órgano administrativo distrital. A la fecha ya la Sección Tercera en reiteradas ocasiones ha debido abordar el tema de si, las referencias a caminos públicos como linderos en planos catastrados, permiten posteriormente tener por probada la existencia de esas vías. En esta Dirección esta Sección ha indicado: “III.- Del valor probatorio de los planos catastrados de fincas individuales para la determinación de la existencia de un camino público consignado como lindero. En la práctica forense del Derecho Administrativo no es extraño que se pretenda demostrar la existencia de un camino público, a partir de los linderos consignados en planos catastrados de fundos específicos, estén estos visados o no por la respectiva municipalidad. Tal acreditación presenta especial importancia, pues en el tanto ello se logre, será aplicable en ese caso concreto la presunción iuris tantum que establece el artículo 7 de la Ley de Construcciones. Aquí no se discute el que mediante un plano catastrado se pueda acreditar la existencia de un camino público, sino simplemente se precisa que esto estará condicionado entre otros aspectos por el tipo de plano del que se trate. Se aclara que las consideraciones siguientes no aplican a planos de fraccionamientos, urbanizaciones, etc, en los que dentro del plano se acredita la existencia de caminos públicos-. Respecto del valor probatorio de los planos que indican que colindan con caminos públicos, se tiene que recientemente la Sala Primera ha abordado su peso probatorio en lo que hace a la acreditación de la existencia de un camino público en los siguientes términos: “ Si bien es cierto el principio de inmatriculación postula que la inscripción registral no es necesaria para que un bien sea considerado como demanial, tampoco debe ser interpretado en el sentido de que la simple inclusión en un plano catastral permite afirmar dicha naturaleza, pues éste no tiene la aptitud de modificar la realidad material sino que únicamente la reproduce. Por el contrario, el principio en cuestión lleva a que, si existen indicios suficientes para considerar que se dan los supuestos establecidos en la ley cuando se reguló la asignación de carácter público, no sea relevante que no se encuentre inscrito a nombre del Estado o de una institución pública. Ahora bien, los planos cuya indebida valoración se alega no tienen la virtud de determinar la naturaleza de pública de la calle o acceso en cuestión. ” Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 1448-F-S1-2014, de las 10:10 minutos del 7 de noviembre de 2014. Dicho lo anterior, se debe precisar en primer término que la inclusión de los linderos en un plano es un requisito para su aprobación por parte del Catastro Nacional, todo lo cual encuentra regulación en los artículos 8 y 34 inciso e) del Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro, normas que textualmente establecen: “Artículo 8º-Delimitación del inmueble. Los inmuebles serán delimitados teniendo en cuenta los títulos inscritos en el Registro Inmobiliario y en su caso la posesión del bien y la coincidencia o conformidad de los respectivos titulares o poseedores y colindantes o disparidades u objeciones de unos y otros en cuanto a la identificación o fijación de los linderos que separan sus propiedades.”// “Artículo 34.-Información que se debe suministrar en el Cuerpo del plano de agrimensura. La información que se debe suministrar en el cuerpo del plano de agrimensura es la siguiente: (...) e. Detalles: Sin necesidad de hacer el levantamiento respectivo, en el plano se debe indicar gráfica y literalmente, cualquier accidente físico, tales como canales, ríos, quebradas, acequias, lagunas, embalses, esteros, tajos, túneles, puentes, diques, represas, alcantarillados, vertederos, cordones, cunetas, espaldones, calzadas y cualesquiera otros similares, excepto cuando colinden o atraviesen el lindero, en cuyo caso, será necesario realizar levantamiento detallado. Asimismo, se debe indicar el uso del inmueble, dependiendo de la actividad de que se trate, señalando con líneas aproximadas, si trata de varios usos distintos, el deslinde de los mismos y delinear las construcciones existentes, a la misma escala en que se dibujó el polígono levantado.”No obstante lo anterior, a fin de precisar qué tipo de información es la que debe acreditarse con el plano de un inmueble específico, se aclara que el requerimiento reglamentario de incluir los linderos en los planos de un inmueble específico, es un requisito formal, pero dicha información no está cubierta por la fe pública reconocida en el artículo 12 de la Ley 4294, Ley de Ejercicio de la Topografía y Agrimensura. En esta dirección el canon 19 del Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro Nacional establece: “ Artículo 19.-Fe pública del agrimensor. Los datos relativos al derrotero, área y ubicación contenidos en el plano de agrimensura son insertados en él bajo la fe pública y responsabilidad que tienen los profesionales de la agrimensura, de conformidad con lo establecido en la.” (El original no está destacado). En este sentido, el reglamento bajo análisis claramente establece qué aspectos o información contenida en el plano de agrimensura de un inmueble están cubiertos por dicha presunción legal de veracidad. Respecto de los linderos se tiene que estos sí podrían quedar efectivamente acreditados -incluso para la aplicación del artículo 7 de la Ley de Construcciones-, si esto se efectúa por los medios de prueba que establece la Ley de Catastro Nacional en los siguientes términos: “ Artículo 11.- Se denomina acta de deslinde e identificación a la que se levanta en el propio terreno, de acuerdo con las formalidades de esta ley. El propietario o poseedor, o su representante, suscribirá tal acta, haciendo constar que acepta los datos referentes a ubicación y linderos de su inmueble, que figuran en ella” . La norma anterior es desarrollada por el Reglamento a la Ley de Catastro en los siguientes términos: “Artículo 12.-Actas de conformidad y de identificación. Los linderos determinados en las actas de conformidad firmadas por los colindantes por sí, o por medio de sus legítimos representantes o apoderados, conjuntamente con los propietarios o poseedores de los inmuebles limítrofes, o que firmen actas de identificación señalando los linderos de sus propios inmuebles en forma tal que coincidan con los señalados por los propietarios o poseedores de los inmuebles limítrofes, quedarán determinados definitivamente en la forma que aparezcan en dichas actas.” Más aún, el mismo cuerpo legal establece con meridiana claridad, los efectos limitados de la publicidad registral de los planos y el valor probatorio que estos tienen. En esta dirección el canon 57 de ese cuerpo reglamentario señala: “Artículo 57.-Efectos de la publicidad catastral. El objetivo principal del plano de agrimensura es contribuir al establecimiento, mejora y mantenimiento del catastro, definir en forma gráfica el inmueble y dar publicidad a sus linderos. El plano catastrado no es de por sí prueba absoluta de lo que en él se consigna. El plano de agrimensura levantado unilateralmente por el interesado, aunque esté inscrito en el Catastro, por sí mismo no puede afectar a terceros, no constituye título traslativo de dominio, no comprueba la propiedad ni la posesión de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el artículo 301 del Código Civil.” De la relación de normas recién expuestas, se tiene que, en caso de pretender utilizar las herramientas de agrimensura como prueba para determinación de linderos - y en especial de que alguno es un camino público-, será necesaria la utilización de elementos de convicción adecuados como las actas de identificación, situación que no es la que se presenta cuando la existencia del camino se señala dentro del plano y no como lindero. En este último caso, el plano sí es prueba de la existencia del camino, al margen de su inclusión en los registros municipales respectivos.” (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Tercera, voto 44-2015. En esta misma dirección ver de este Tribunal entre otros los votos 336-2015, 309-2017 y 223-2018.) En vista del contenido del criterio recién transcrito, mismo que es el sostenido por el Tribunal, la documentación referida, incluyendo el citado plano catastrado P-1802170-2015, se concluye que ellos no son per se, plena prueba de la existencia del camino. En razón de lo anterior, debe ingresarse en el análisis de si en virtud de ellos se está ante una aceptación tácita del camino por parte del Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano en los términos referidos por la sociedad recurrente en su recurso. En cuanto a la posibilidad de la existencia de decisiones tácitas de la administración pública, -en este caso de una aceptación- la Ley General de la Administración Pública indica: “Artículo 137.-Los comportamientos y actividades materiales de la Administración que tengan un sentido unívoco y que sean incompatibles con una voluntad diversa, servirán para expresar el acto, salvo que la naturaleza o circunstancia de éste exijan manifestación expresa.”. De la revisión del expediente si bien se aprecian en autos las conductas administrativas del Concejo Municipal de Distrito señaladas por la recurrente, también es verdad que, en el legajo de esta causa constan oficios de inspección en el inmueble de: octubre de 2016, diciembre de 2016, febrero de 2017, mayo 2017, junio 2017 y abril 2018, en los que se indica que el lindero norte de la parcela no es camino público. Así las cosas, no es posible para esta Cámara concluir que de las pruebas existentes en el expediente, se pueda extraer una voluntad unívoca del órgano municipal, de aceptar la vía en cuestión como camino público. Visto lo anterior, siendo que del expediente no se tiene por acreditada la existencia de un camino público en el costado norte de la parcela, en los términos indicados por la sociedad apelante, resulta indefectible para esta Sección rechazar este primer agravio. En segundo término, la parte recurrente indica que se está ante una disfunción administrativa atribuible al INDER, que afecta su situación jurídica. En esta dirección la apelante alega: “Que es de conocimiento público (general) que tanto para nuestro caso como para otros expedientes que encuentran la misma situación, que es el INDER el que ha venido atrasando la culminación de tales procedimientos, en virtud de que éste debe hacer entrega de algunas áreas destinadas a calle pública.”. Este agravio es improcedente y se rechaza. La circunstancia de la posible existencia de conductas omisivas atribuibles al INDER, aspecto sobre el cual esta Cámara no hace ningún pronunciamiento por exceder su competencia, no tiene efecto alguno en la validez o la eficacia del acuerdo recurrido que es objeto de revisión por este Tribunal. Finalmente, la representación de la sociedad impugnante indica: “Con todo lo dicho vemos la recomendación de la Intendencia Municipal como un acto de malas intenciones solapadas y con propósito oscuro, en aras de perseguir un fin no visible en contra nuestra, lo que nos advierte y prepara para repeler y hasta enderezar las acciones legales que sean pertinentes, en defensa y en reclamo de los derechos que como administrados nos asisten y en contra de los funcionarios que haya propiciado esta persecución.” El Tribunal respeta tales afirmaciones, pero de este alegato que constituye un agravio de Desviación de Poder en los términos establecidos en el artículo 131 inciso 3) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, no hay prueba alguna en autos, ni un desarrollo de fundamentaciones que relacionen la prueba existente con el fin de acreditar la afirmación transcrita, todo lo cual obliga a esta cámara a rechazar el último agravio y con él la impugnación en su totalidad. Al no existir ulterior recurso en esta sede debe darse por agotada la vía administrativa.

IV.- De la devolución del expediente. Al haberse sustanciado esta sede en forma electrónica, queda a disposición de las partes obtener una copia integral que contiene tanto el expediente administrativo remitido por la Corporación Municipal así como la totalidad de las piezas que conforman la presente alzada, para lo cual deberá aportar el dispositivo electrónico de almacenamiento (llave maya o disco compacto). Asimismo, en caso que hubiere ingresado documentación física o electrónica (planos, fotografías, informes, etc.) que permanezca aún en custodia el Despacho, podrá retirarla quien la aportó en un plazo de 30 días hábiles, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 12 del Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión n.° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial n.° 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión n.° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

Por Tanto.

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación presentado y en consecuencia se confirma el acto recurrido. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.

Jorge Leiva Poveda Evelyn Solano Ulloa Rodolfo Marenco Ortiz ASUNTO: Recurso Municipal RECURRENTE: Or Ahayim S.A.

RECURRIDO: Concejo Municipal de Distrito de Cóbano *3OQITOWHVV861*