Statute of limitations for public servants' disciplinary sanctions is governed by LOCGR, not the Labor CodePrescripción disciplinaria de servidores públicos bajo la LOCGR desplaza el plazo del Código de Trabajo

**Review of the Document** *140000871027CA* Res. 000117-F-TC-2018 CASSATION COURT OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY. San José, at twelve hours four minutes on the twelfth of September, two thousand eighteen.

Ordinary proceeding, declared purely legal, established in the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court by Nombre167738, a public official, resident of Alajuela; against the INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE TURISMO, represented by its general manager Juan Carlos Borbón Marks. Acting as special judicial representative of the plaintiff, Nombre35728; for the ICT, Nombre71324, does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre111490, does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre40767, resident of Heredia, Nombre111491, does not indicate qualifications or domicile. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, attorneys, residents of San José.

**WHEREAS**

1.- Based on the facts she set forth and the legal provisions she cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding, seeking a judgment declaring: “…a) That the sanction of written reprimand imposed in this case on my client, through resolutions G-0394-2013 of nine hours on the twenty-first of February, two thousand thirteen, issued by the General Management of the Defendant Entity, and which was ratified by resolution of the same Management No. 1424-2013 of nine hours on the thirteenth of June, two thousand thirteen, as well as by the agreement of the Board of Directors taken in Ordinary Session No. 5810, Article 5), Section VIII, of August 13, 2013, and which was communicated to the plaintiff via official letter SJD-364- of August 16, 2013, are illegal and contrary to the legal system, both in substance in that the fault attributed to the plaintiff as such does not exist, and in form, given that the administrative acts containing said resolutions were issued when the employer's disciplinary power had already prescribed, as established by Article 603 of the Labor Code, applicable to this case, and as they are absolutely null they should produce no legal effect whatsoever. b) Consequently, the sanction constituting a written reprimand imposed on the plaintiff, resulting from the administrative procedure referenced in this judicial process, and materialized in the resolutions and documents indicated in the preceding paragraph, is absolutely null and, as such, must be legally and materially eliminated from the plaintiff's personnel file at the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo, and thus the plaintiff expressly requests that the defendant Administration be so ordered, which must be verifiable at any time by the plaintiff. c) The defendant Institution must be ordered to pay the moral damages caused to my client as a result of the facts that have generated this judicial process, which is symbolically estimated at the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES. d) The defendant must be ordered to pay interest on ALL sums owed, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, including the costs of the proceeding. e) The defendant Entity must be ordered to pay INDEXATION. F) The defendant institution must be ordered to pay both sets of costs for this action…” (sic)

2.- The defendant responded negatively and raised the defenses of defects in the complaint not timely corrected that prevent a ruling on the merits (withdrawn in the preliminary hearing), lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva).

3.- At 13 hours 33 minutes on July 3, 2014, the preliminary hearing was held, attended by the representatives of both parties. The procedural judge declared the matter to be purely legal.

4.- The Contentious-Administrative Court, Sixth Section, composed of Judge Cynthia Abarca Gómez and Judges Christian Hess Araya and José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, in judgment no. 194-2014-VI of 8 hours 55 minutes on November 28, 2014, resolved: “The defenses of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) raised by the defendant entity are rejected. The defense of lack of right is upheld only regarding the inadmissibility of the payment of moral damages, interest, and indexation claimed. The rest is rejected. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff is partially upheld in the following terms, it being understood denied where not expressly stated: 1) The absolute nullity of the following formal administrative acts is declared: a) Final act No. G-0394-2013, issued at nine hours on the twenty-first of February, two thousand thirteen. b) Resolution G-1424-2013, of nine hours on the thirteenth of June, two thousand thirteen. c) The agreement adopted by the ICT Board of Directors in ordinary session No. 5810, article 5, section VII, held on the thirteenth of August, two thousand thirteen. 2) By connection, the absolute nullity of official letter SJD-364-2013, of the sixteenth of of (sic) August, two thousand thirteen, is declared. 3) This declaration of absolute nullity has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled acts, all without prejudice to good faith acquired rights. 4) The Instituto Costarricense de Turismo is ordered to eliminate from the plaintiff's personnel file any material or legal record of the sanction that has been annulled herein. 5) This matter is resolved without special award of costs.” 5.- The representative of the defendant entity files an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) indicating the reasons on which he relies to refute the Court's thesis.

6.- In the proceedings before this Court, the prescriptions of law have been observed. Substitute Judge Aragón Cambronero participates in the decision of this matter.

Judge Aragón Cambronero drafts the opinion.

**WHEREAS** I.- According to the facts of the complaint, by resolution no. PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012, notified on the 29th of that month and year, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Ms. Nombre167738, an official of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (hereinafter ICT or Institute). She was charged with an alleged breach of duties for having known and not informing her superior that one of her co-workers, on the occasion of an event called “Vuelta al Lago Arenal,” decided to take the official vehicle he was driving to a relative's house and stay overnight there—not at the hotel designated for the work trip. The General Management of the Institute, through resolution no. G-0394-2013 of February 21, 2013, ordered the imposition of a written reprimand on the official. She filed appeals for reconsideration (reposición) and appeal (apelación). Both challenges were dismissed, and by resolution SJD-364-2013 of August 16, 2013, the ICT Board of Directors deemed the administrative channels exhausted. Nombre69778 sued the Institute, seeking in judgment: 1) A declaration of nullity of the sanction imposed; 2) An order to the defendant to eliminate the reference to that sanction from the plaintiff's personnel file; 3) An order to pay moral damages, estimated at the sum of ¢500,000.00; 4) Recognition of the respective interest and indexation; 5) The imposition on the defendant of both sets of costs of the proceeding. The ICT answered negatively and raised the defenses of defective complaint—withdrawn in the preliminary hearing—, lack of right, and lack of standing in both forms. The Court rejected this last defense and partially upheld the lack of right defense regarding moral damages—which were denied in their entirety—, interest, and indexation. It partially granted the complaint; annulled the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, ordered its elimination from the official's personnel file, and exempted the defendant from both sets of costs. Disagreeing with the ruling, the Institute's representation filed an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación).

II.- Before analyzing the grievances raised by the appellant in cassation, it is worth recalling that their legal classification corresponds exclusively to this Collegiate Body, for which the substance and true nature of the allegation are considered. It is clear that the analysis in question will be admissible provided that, within the corresponding classification, the charges adduced satisfy the requirements imposed by procedural regulations for their substantive review. Thus, given the manner in which they have been set forth in this challenge, the grounds will be reclassified and grouped according to their correct nature (in this case, substantive), for the purpose of conducting an adequate review of the aspects that this appeal seeks to have examined. In the single censure, within which the single procedural charge and both substantive ones are subsumed, the appellant in cassation criticizes what he considers to be a total uncertainty regarding the legal body applicable to the legal concept of prescription (prescripción), when dealing with faults committed to the detriment of the public treasury and internal control and anti-corruption regulations. He disagrees with the Court's thesis insofar as, for the same case, it applied two different norms relating to prescription (prescripción), namely articles 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, hereinafter LOCGR) and 603 of the Labor Code. He argues, in this case, the plaintiff is attributed a breach of internal control norms and the duty of probity, in that she supposedly failed to observe her oversight duties regarding institutional assets under her responsibility. Therefore, he emphasizes, the only prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) applicable to the specific case is that of Article 71 of the LOCGR. He considers that article violated because, in his view, there is no justification for applying different prescriptive periods (plazos prescriptivos) according to the different stages of the disciplinary procedure. Such a position, he charges, means contradicting the technique of normative interpretation and ignoring the spirit of the legislator when enacting the LOCGR. Thus, he asserts, the period contained in that numeral is interrupted with effects continuing until the issuance of the final act, without the application of Article 603 of the Labor Code being admissible at any procedural stage. As a consequence of the above, he also charges a breach of Articles 11 and 49 of the Constitution (Carta Magna), and of the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica).

III.- Regarding the applicable prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) in the specific case. Before the enactment of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the general rule applicable in disciplinary matters of public employment, and particularly regarding prescription (prescripción), was Article 603 of the Labor Code, by express reference of Article 51 of the Civil Service Statute (in the case of officials covered by that regime), which states: “The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe (prescribir) in one month, which shall begin to run from when cause for separation was given or, as the case may be, from when the facts giving rise to disciplinary correction were known.” With the entry into force of the LOCGR (Law no. 7428 of September 7, 1994), the legislator, based on the need to ensure greater and better control of the Treasury, as well as to hold accountable those who incurred in its mismanagement, established a differentiated disciplinary regime for servants of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), particularly concerning prescription (prescripción). Article 71 of that law provided: “The disciplinary responsibility of the servant of the Public Treasury shall prescribe (prescribir) within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the fault by the competent body, to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, Article 603 of the Labor Code and any other legal provisions that oppose it are reformed with respect to public officials or servants. The proof of knowledge of the fault may be effected by any means of evidence, with the value it holds, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the author of the fault is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he/she terminates his/her service relationship with the respective entity, enterprise, or body. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the responsibility of the offender to prescribe (prescribir), without justified cause.” In this way, the liability regime provided in the norm and its respective prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) was defined around the concept of “servant of the Public Treasury,” understood in general terms as one whose functional sphere includes competence in the management and disposition of public funds, whether from an accounting or legal standpoint. The cited provision was reformed by Article 45, subsection a) of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), Law no. 8292 of July 31, 2002. Currently, Article 71 of the LOCGR provides: “Prescription of disciplinary liability (Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria). The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight framework shall prescribe (prescribir) in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe (prescribir) in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act which requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—liability shall prescribe (prescribir) in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the head of the entity (jerarca) or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. // The prescription (prescripción) shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure. // When the author of the fault is the head of the entity (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he/she terminates his/her service relationship with the respective entity, enterprise, or body. // It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure not to initiate it in a timely manner or to allow the liability of the offender to prescribe (prescribir), without justified cause.” By virtue of this reform, not only was the prescription period (plazo de prescripción) increased from 2 to 5 years, but the concept of “servant of the Public Treasury” was also eliminated. That is, a shift occurred from a subjective regime, in which the special conditions of the servant (whether or not a servant of the Public Treasury) were assessed, to an objective one, where the applicable prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) for the public official (within the meaning of Article 111 of the General Law of Public Administration) is defined not only by his/her status as such, but also by the very nature of the conduct deemed to constitute a fault. That is, whether the alleged fault goes beyond simple disciplinary liability and falls within the infractions provided for in the LOCGR, or in the superior control and oversight framework. It thus constitutes a particular regime, which establishes special rules for prescription (prescripción), which override the general regime applicable in matters of public employment (theory of provisions 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), Law 8422; 43 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), Law 8292; and 71 of the LOCGR, Law 7428). Now, in accordance with provisions 2, 3, and 38 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, and 8 and 39 of the General Law of Internal Control, it is clear that the fault attributed to the plaintiff is governed by the prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) contemplated in the LOCGR. Nombre69778 was charged with alleged improper uses of institutional vehicles, and for allegedly knowing of and omitting to timely inform her superior that one of her co-workers, during a work trip, drove the official vehicle to an unauthorized location—the house of a relative—and kept it there overnight for two nights, exposing it to unnecessary risks. Such facts, in the judgment of the ICT's disciplinary authorities, constituted a breach of duties on the part of the official in her capacity as “Liaison” between the Institute's Regional and Central Offices, and as Tourism Executive 2 of the Regional Offices Process and Tourism Management Macroprocess (see resolutions PAD-003-JFL-2012 from folios 28 to 37 of the administrative file, G-0394-2013 from folios 91 to 101 of the administrative file, and SJD-364-2013 from folios 133 to 136 of the administrative file). Regardless of whether, in terms of substance, the facts narrated constitute a fault or not—a topic on which no pronouncement will be made due to how the matter is resolved—, the truth is that Ms. Nombre167738 was charged, in her capacity as a public servant, with the alleged violation of the duty of probity and internal control systems regarding the custody and use of public resources, specifically institutional vehicles. This infraction is inferred from the principles and norms contained in the LOCGR, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, the General Law of Internal Control, the ICT's Autonomous Work Regulations (Reglamento Autónomo de Trabajo), the Code of Ethics for Institute Officials, and the Regulations for Control and Use of Vehicles Owned by the ICT. It is for this reason that, in this specific case, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff falls within the special regime referenced above, and consequently, the prescriptive period (plazo de prescripción) that must be applied in the sub-examine is that provided by canon 71 of the LOCGR.

IV.- Regarding prescription (prescripción) in the specific case. Having established the applicable prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) for the fault attributed to Ms. Nombre167738, it is then necessary to determine whether that legal concept (figura) operated in this case. It is worth clarifying that, in her complaint, the plaintiff exclusively invokes that prescription (prescripción) had occurred at the time the final act was issued, and for that reason claims the nullity of the sanction; hence, the cassational review will be limited to that particular topic. On this point, it is pertinent to cite what the Court resolved: “As observed, the plaintiff's reproach is directed at the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective power to issue the final act and adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted to his/her knowledge by the directing body. (…), in official letter PAD-003-JFL-2012, of 15 hours 30 minutes on November 9, 2012, the directing body recommended to the General Management that the pertinent steps be taken before the Board of Directors to notify the parties of the suspension of the issuance of the final act, in order not to incur the causal of prescription (prescripción) regulated in Article 603 of the LC (folio 90 of the administrative file). The Court considers that, from the moment that said report of recommendations was communicated, the file was ready for the issuance of the final act by the deciding body, in this case, the General Manager of the ICT, which—as already explained—had to occur within the following month. The precise date on which the recommendation made by the instructing body reached the aforementioned head of the entity's (jerarca) desk is not on record (unproven fact 1); however, the truth is that the latter's resolution (wherein he orders the written reprimand for the plaintiff) was not issued until February 21, 2013 (proven fact 8), that is, three months after the matter was ready for judgment; and it was communicated to the plaintiff only on March first of that same year. Unlike the thesis outlined by the defendant entity, we are of the view that, in this case, the time available to the head of the entity (jerarca) to issue the sanctioning act was the ordinary period of one month, and not the special period of five years established by Article 71 of Law No. 7428. It must be remembered that, even though we are dealing with public treasury matters, the five-year period regulated by that norm is the one for the initial exercise of the sanctioning power, i.e., for the head of the entity (jerarca) to determine whether or not to open the disciplinary procedure (…) But that is not the prescription (prescripción) alleged in this case. Here, the prescription (prescripción) of the period established for ordering the sanction, once the file is ready to be decided, is reproached. And, as we already explained, that period is one month and derives from Article 603 of the LC (…).” This Cassation Court disagrees with those considerations, for the reasons set forth below. According to what is expressly stated in Article 71 of the LOCGR, what it regulates is the prescription (prescripción) of the official's liability, subject to a five-year period, or what is the same for practical purposes, the prescription (prescripción) of the disciplinary fault. It does not define, as the Court understands it, the maximum period within which the Administration must exercise its corrective power, meaning for the formal opening of the disciplinary procedure (materialized by the notification of the statement of charges to the interested party). It is true that there will be particular cases where this initial exercise becomes decisive for verifying compliance with the fatal period, but that is not the case here, since, as indicated supra, the prescription (prescripción) alleged by the plaintiff is limited to the period elapsed between the moment the procedure was ready for the issuance of the final act and the respective communication to the interested party. This Cassation Court considers that the effects of the norm are not exhausted by that formal act of opening the disciplinary proceeding, precisely because the scope of that provision does not fall upon the procedure itself, but upon the fault itself, since it is what is subject to expiration by negative prescription (prescripción). It should be noted that the article under commentary expressly establishes that the prescription (prescripción) shall be interrupted by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the procedure, with continuing effects during its development and until the issuance of the final act. This means that, once the notification of charges to the investigated official occurs, the prescriptive period (plazo prescriptivo) begins to run again, that is, the five-year period restarts its computation prospectively, without the time elapsed before that procedural action being able to be considered. This provision is also consistent with the doctrine of Articles 340.3) and 341 of the LGAP, the latter provision stating: “The expiration (caducidad) of the procedure shall not by itself produce the expiration or prescription (caducidad o prescripción) of the actions of the individual, but expired (caducados) procedures shall not interrupt the period of such expiration or prescription (caducidad o prescripción)” (emphasis supplied). From that norm, interpreted a contrario sensu, it can be inferred that ongoing proceedings do have the virtue of interrupting the prescription (prescripción) during their processing, until the final act is adopted. Consequently, in light of the literal wording of Article 71 of the LOCGR and the technical meaning of the words the legislator used when enacting it, it is not permissible to interpret that its effects are limited to the formal act of opening the procedure as the Court understands it, and as a result, a kind of normative gap arises forcing recourse to the method of integration, in order to draw upon other legal bodies to apply different prescriptive periods (plazos prescriptivos) according to the different procedural stages. We reiterate, the meaning of that provision is not to impose a time limit on the initial exercise of the Administration's corrective power, but rather to regulate the prescription (prescripción) of the official's liability, the occurrence of which must be assessed according to the scenarios contemplated in that norm. Therefore, in the specific case, it is not appropriate to integrate the Labor Code and apply the period contemplated in its Article 603 to determine whether, at the time of the issuance of the final sanctioning act, the prescription (prescripción) had operated or not. This examination must be carried out based on canon 71 of the LOCGR, not only due to the nature of the alleged fault for which there is special regulation, analyzed in Considering III, but also due to what has already been set forth regarding the correct interpretation of the scope of that provision. Thus, given that the order initiating the procedure—and consequent statement of charges—(resolution PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012) was notified to the official on August 29, 2012, the prescription (prescripción) is deemed interrupted with effects continuing until the issuance of the final act, adopted in the ICT Board of Directors' ordinary session no. Placa18560, article 5, section VII, held on August 13, 2013, and notified to the plaintiff via official letter SJD-364-2013 on the 16th of that month and year. Consequently, in this case, the prescription (prescripción) of the fault attributed to the plaintiff did not operate, and the agreed sanction is valid. In the subjúdice, the Court considered the sanction null because the final act by which it was agreed was issued more than one month after the matter was ready for judgment, that is, from when the instructing body submitted its recommendation report to the head of the entity (jerarca). However, as stated, this analysis originated from the lower court's interpretation of Article 71 of the LOCGR, which has been refuted in this venue. The truth is that during the procedural iter (iter procedimental), after the statement of charges, the prescription (prescripción) remained interrupted continuously until the issuance of the final act, so the Court's approach regarding the time the head of the entity (jerarca) took to order the sanction after being apprised of the content of the instructing body's report lacks relevance. In line with the above, given that the alleged normative violations are verified, the formulated objection must be upheld, with the consequences to be stated.

V.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal must be upheld, and the appealed judgment annulled insofar as it declared the reprimand sanction and related formal acts absolutely null, on the grounds they were expired due to negative prescription (prescripción). It shall also be annulled insofar as it ordered the Institute to eliminate from the plaintiff's personnel file any material or legal record of the imposed sanction. Given how the matter is resolved, the file shall be remanded to the Court of origin, so it may proceed to examine the remaining allegations raised by the plaintiff as grounds for her annulment claim.

**THEREFORE** The appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) is granted. The appealed judgment is annulled regarding the declaration of absolute nullity of the sanction and related formal acts, on grounds of expiration due to negative prescription (prescripción); also insofar as it ordered the defendant to eliminate the sanction from the plaintiff's personnel file.

Return the file to the court of origin, which must resolve the remaining arguments of nullity raised in the lawsuit.

Nombre45162 Nombre574 Yazmín Aragón Cambronero gcr 1 *140000871027CA* **Exp. 14-000087-1027-CA** **Res. 000117-F-TC-2018** **TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA**. San José, at twelve hours four minutes on the twelfth of September of two thousand eighteen.

Ordinary proceeding, declared purely on points of law, established before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda by **Nombre167738** , a public employee, resident of Alajuela; against the **INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE TURISMO**, represented by its general manager Juan Carlos Borbón Marks. Acting as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Nombre35728 ; for the ICT, Nombre71324 , who does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre111490 , who does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre40767 , resident of Heredia, Nombre111491 , who does not indicate qualifications or domicile. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, residents of San José.

**RESULTANDO**

**1.-** Based on the facts she set forth and the legal provisions she cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding so that the judgment declares: *“…a) That the sanction of written reprimand imposed in this case on my represented party, through resolutions G-0394-2013 at nine hours on the twenty-first of February of the year two thousand thirteen, issued by the General Management of the Defendant Entity and, which was ratified by resolution of the same Management **No. 1424-2013 at nine hours on the thirteenth of June, two thousand thirteen, as well as by the agreement of the Board of Directors taken in Ordinary Session No. 5810, Article 5), Section VIII, of August 13, 2013 and, which was communicated to the plaintiff, through official communication SJD-364- of August 16, 2013, are illegal and** contrary to the legal system, both on the merits since the imputed fault as such does not exist for the plaintiff, and on procedural grounds, since the administrative acts containing said resolutions were issued when the employer's disciplinary power had already prescribed, as established by article 603 of the Labor Code, applicable to this case and, since they are absolutely null, they must not produce any legal effect. b) Consequently, with the foregoing, the sanction constituting a written reprimand imposed on the plaintiff, resulting from the administrative procedure referenced in this judicial proceeding and, which is materialized in the resolutions and documents indicated in the preceding section, is absolutely null and, as such, must be legally and materially eliminated from the plaintiff's personal file in the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo and, thus expressly requests that the defendant Administration be ordered to do so, which must be verifiable at any time by the plaintiff party. c) The defendant Institution must be ordered to pay the moral damages caused to my represented party as a result of the facts that have generated this judicial proceeding, which is estimated symbolically in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES. d) The defendant party must be ordered to pay interest on ALL sums owed and which will be liquidated in the sentence execution phase, including the costs of the proceeding. e) The Defendant Entity must be ordered to pay the INDEXATION. F) The defendant institution must be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action…”* (sic)

**2.-** The defendant party answered negatively and raised the exceptions of defects in the complaint not corrected in a timely manner that prevent issuing a ruling on the merits (dismissed at the preliminary hearing), lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva).

**3.-** At 13 hours 33 minutes on July 3, 2014, the preliminary hearing was held, attended by the representatives of both parties. The procedural judge declared the matter purely on points of law.

**4.-** The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Sexta, composed of Judge Cynthia Abarca Gómez and Judges Christian Hess Araya, José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, in judgment no. 194-2014-VI at 8 hours 55 minutes on November 28, 2014, resolved: *“The exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva) raised by the defendant entity are rejected. The exception of lack of right is granted only with respect to the inadmissibility of the payment of moral damages, interest, and indexation claimed. For the rest, it is rejected. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff is partially granted in the following terms, it being understood denied in that which is not expressly indicated: **1)** The absolute nullity of the following formal administrative conduct is declared: a) The final act No. G-0394-2013, issued at nine hours on the twenty-first of February of two thousand thirteen. b) Resolution G-1424-2013, at nine hours on the thirteenth of June of two thousand thirteen. c) The agreement adopted by the ICT Board of Directors in ordinary session No. 5810, article 5, section VII, held on the thirteenth of August of two thousand thirteen. **2)** By connection, the absolute nullity of the official communication SJD-364-2013, of the sixteenth of August of two thousand thirteen, is declared. **3)** This declaration of absolute nullity has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled acts, all without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. **4)** The Instituto Costarricense de Turismo is ordered to eliminate from the plaintiff's personal file any material or legal record of the sanction that has been annulled here. **5)** This matter is resolved without special order as to costs.”* **5.-** The representative of the defendant entity files a cassation appeal indicating the reasons on which he relies to refute the Tribunal's thesis.

**6.-** In the proceedings before this Tribunal, the prescriptions of law have been observed. The substitute magistrate Aragón Cambronero participates in the decision of this matter.

**Drafted by Magistrate Aragón Cambronero** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.-** According to the facts of the complaint, through resolution no. PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012, notified on the 29th of that month and year, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Mrs. Nombre167738 , an employee of the Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (hereinafter ICT or Institute). She was accused of an alleged breach of duties, for having known of, and not informing her superior, that one of her coworkers, on the occasion of an event called "Vuelta al Lago Arenal," decided to take the official vehicle he was driving to a relative's house and spend the night there—not in the hotel designated for the work trip. The General Management of the Institute, through resolution no. G-0394-2013 of February 21, 2013, ordered the imposition of a sanction of written reprimand on the employee. She filed motions for reconsideration (reposición) and appeal (apelación). Both challenges were dismissed, and through resolution SJD-364-2013 of August 16, 2013, the ICT Board of Directors deemed the administrative channel exhausted. Nombre69778 sued the Institute seeking that the judgment: 1) Declare the nullity of the imposed sanction; 2) Order the defendant to eliminate the reference to that sanction from the plaintiff's personal file; 3) Order payment of moral damages, estimated in the sum of ¢500,000.00; 4) Recognize the respective interest and indexation; 5) Impose both sets of proceeding costs on the defendant. The ICT answered negatively and raised the exceptions of defective complaint—dismissed at the preliminary hearing—, lack of right, and lack of standing in its two forms. The Tribunal rejected this last defense and partially granted the lack of right exception regarding moral damages—which was denied in its entirety—, interest, and indexation. It declared the lawsuit partially with merit; annulled the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, ordered its elimination from the employee's personal file, and exonerated the defendant from both sets of costs. Disagreeing with the resolution, the Institute's representation files a cassation appeal.

**II.-** Prior to the analysis of the grievances raised by the appellant in cassation, it is worth remembering that their legal qualification corresponds exclusively to this collegiate Body, for which purpose the substance and true nature of the allegation are examined. It is clear that the analysis in question will be pertinent provided that within the corresponding qualification, the alleged charges satisfy the requirements imposed by procedural regulations for their examination on the merits. Thus, based on the manner in which they have been presented in this challenge, the grounds will be reclassified and grouped according to their correct nature (in this case substantive), for the purpose of conducting an adequate review of the aspects this appeal seeks to have revised. In the **single** censure, within which the single procedural charge and both substantive ones are subsumed, the appellant in cassation reproaches what in his opinion implies a total uncertainty regarding the legal framework applicable to the statute of limitations (prescripción), when dealing with faults committed to the detriment of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and the internal control and anti-corruption regulations. He disagrees with the Tribunal's thesis insofar as, for the same case, it applied two different rules relating to the statute of limitations, namely articles 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (hereinafter LOCGR) and 603 of the Labor Code. He argues that, in this instance, the plaintiff is attributed a breach of internal control rules and the duty of probity, as she supposedly failed to observe her obligation of vigilance regarding institutional assets under her responsibility. By virtue of this, he emphasizes, the only prescriptive period that is applicable to the specific case is article 71 of the LOCGR. He considers that ordinance violated because, in his opinion, there is no justification for applying different prescriptive periods according to the different stages of the disciplinary proceeding. A position in that sense, he accuses, means contravening the technique of regulatory interpretation and ignoring the spirit of the legislator when enacting the LOCGR. Thus, he asserts, the period contained in that numeral is interrupted with continued effects until the issuance of the final act, without the application of cardinal 603 of the Labor Code being pertinent at any procedural stage. As a consequence of the foregoing, he also accuses violation of articles 11 and 49 of the Magna Carta, and of the principle of legal certainty.

**III.-** **Of the prescriptive period applicable to the specific case.** Prior to the enactment of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, the general rule applicable in disciplinary matters of public employment, and particularly regarding statutes of limitations (prescripción), was article 603 of the Labor Code, by express reference of cardinal 51 of the Estatuto del Servicio Civil (in the case of employees covered by that regime), which provides: *"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which will begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known."* With the entry into force of the LOCGR (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994), the legislator, based on the need to ensure greater and better control of the Treasury, as well as to hold accountable those who incurred in its mismanagement, established a differentiated disciplinary regime for public treasury servants (servidores de la Hacienda Pública), particularly regarding the statute of limitations. Ordinance 71 of that law provided: *"The disciplinary liability of the public treasury servant (servidor de la Hacienda Pública) shall prescribe within the period of two years, counted from the verified knowledge of the fault by the competent body to initiate the respective sanctioning proceeding. For these purposes, article 603 of the Labor Code and any other legal provisions that oppose it are hereby reformed, with respect to public officials or servants. The verification of the knowledge of the fault may be carried out by any means of proof, with the value that it has, in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública and, supplementarily, in accordance with common law. When the author of the fault is the hierarch (jerarca), the period will begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause."* In this way, the liability regime provided for in the rule and its respective prescriptive period was defined around the concept of "public treasury servant (servidor de la Hacienda Pública)," this being generally understood as one whose functional orbit includes competence in the management and disposition of public funds, whether from an accounting or legal standpoint. The cited precept was reformed by article 45, subsection a) of the Ley General de Control Interno, Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002. Currently, cardinal 71 of the LOCGR provides: *"**Prescription of disciplinary liability.** The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is made known to the hierarch (jerarca) or the competent official to initiate the respective proceeding.* // *The prescription shall be interrupted, with continued effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative proceeding.* // *When the author of the fault is the hierarch (jerarca), the period will begin to run from the date on which he terminates his service relationship with the entity, company, or respective body.* // *It shall be deemed a serious fault of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning proceeding, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the liability of the offender to prescribe, without justified cause*". By virtue of this reform, not only was the prescriptive period increased from 2 to 5 years, but the concept of "public treasury servant (servidor de la Hacienda Pública)" was also eliminated. That is to say, it moved from a subjective regime, in which the special conditions of the servant (whether or not a public treasury servant) were assessed, to an objective one, where the prescriptive period applicable to the public official (in the sense of numeral 111 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública) is defined not only by his character as such, but by the very nature of the conduct deemed to constitute a fault. That is, if the alleged fault goes beyond simple disciplinary liability and falls within the infractions provided for in the LOCGR, or in the superior control and oversight regulations. It is therefore a particular regime, which establishes special rules of prescription (prescripción) that override the general regime applicable in matters of public employment (theory of precepts 44 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, Law 8422; 43 of the Ley General de Control Interno, Law 8292; and 71 of the LOCGR, Law 7428). Now then, pursuant to numerals 2, 3 and 38 of the Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, 8 and 39 of the Ley General de Control Interno, it is clear that the fault attributed to the plaintiff is governed by the prescriptive period contemplated in the LOCGR. Nombre69778 was charged with alleged improper uses of institutional vehicles, and for apparently knowing of and omitting to inform her superior in a timely manner that one of her coworkers, during a work trip, drove the official vehicle to an unauthorized location—a relative's house—and had it spend the night there for two nights, exposing it to unnecessary risks.

Such acts, in the judgment of the disciplinary authorities of the ICT, constituted a breach of duties by the official in her capacity as "Liaison" between the Regional and Central Offices of the Institute, and as Tourism Executive 2 of the Regional Offices Process and Tourism Management Macroprocess (see resolutions PAD-003-JFL-2012 at folios 28 to 37 of the administrative record, G-0394-2013 at folios 91 to 101 of the administrative record, and SJD-364-2013 at folios 133 to 136 of the administrative record). Regardless of whether, on the merits, the acts described constitute a fault—a matter on which no ruling will be made due to the manner in which this shall be resolved—, the fact is that Mrs. Nombre167738 was formally charged, in her capacity as a public servant, with the alleged violation of the duty of probity and internal control systems regarding the custody and use of public resources, specifically institutional vehicles. An infraction that is inferred from the principles and norms contained in the LOCGR, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment (Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito), the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), the Autonomous Labor Regulations of the ICT (Reglamento Autónomo de Trabajo del ICT), the Code of Ethics for Officials of the Institute (Código de Ética de los Funcionarios del Instituto), and the Regulations for the Control and Use of Vehicles Owned by the ICT (Reglamento de Control y Uso de los Vehículos Propiedad del ICT). It is for the foregoing reasons that, in the specific case, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff falls within the special regime mentioned above and, consequently, the statute of limitations period that must be applied in the sub-examine is that provided by canon 71 of the LOCGR.

**IV.- On the statute of limitations in the specific case.** Having established the prescriptive period applicable to the fault charged to Mrs. Nombre167738, it is now appropriate to determine whether that figure operated in the present case. It should be clarified that, in her complaint, the plaintiff exclusively claims that the statute of limitations had run at the time the final act was issued and for that reason seeks the annulment of the sanction; hence, the cassation review will be limited to that particular issue. On this point, it is pertinent to cite what was resolved by the Trial Court: “*As observed, the plaintiff's challenge is directed at the maximum time limit that the holder of the corrective power has to issue the final act and adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for its consideration by the investigating body.* (…), *in official communication PAD-003-JFL-2012, at 15 hours 30 minutes on November 9, 2012, the investigating body recommended to the General Management that the pertinent steps be taken before the Board of Directors in order to inform the parties of the suspension of the issuance of the final act, so as not to incur the ground for statute of limitations regulated in article 603 of the CT* * (folio 90 of the administrative record).* *The Trial Court considers that, from the moment that recommendation report was communicated, the file was ready for the issuance of the final act by the decision-making body, in this case, the General Manager of the ICT, which—as already explained—had to occur before the following month. There is no record of the precise date on which the recommendation made by the investigating body reached the office of the aforementioned senior official* * (unproven fact 1);* *however, the truth is that his resolution (in which he orders a written reprimand to the plaintiff) was not issued until February 21, 2013* * (proven fact 8), that is, three months after the matter was ready for judgment; and was communicated to the plaintiff until the first of March of that same year. Unlike the thesis outlined by the defendant entity, we are of the opinion that, in this case, the time limit available to the senior official to issue the sanctioning act was the ordinary one of one month and not the special one of five years established by numeral 71 of Ley No. 7428. It must be kept in mind that, even though we are dealing with public treasury matters, the five-year period regulated by that norm is the statute of limitations for the initial exercise of the sanctioning power, that is, for the senior official to determine whether or not to open the disciplinary proceeding* (…) *But that is not the statute of limitations alleged in this case. What is challenged here is the expiration of the period established to decide the sanction, once the file is ready to be adjudicated. And, as we already explained, that period is one month and derives from numeral 603 of the CT* (…)”. This Court of Cassation disagrees with those considerations, for the reasons set forth below. As expressly indicated in article 71 of the LOCGR, what it regulates is the statute of limitations for the liability of the official, subject to a five-year period, or what is the same for practical purposes, the statute of limitations for the disciplinary fault. It does not define, as the Trial Court understands it, the maximum period available to the Administration to exercise its corrective power, meaning for the formal opening of the disciplinary proceeding (materialized by the notification of the statement of charges to the interested party). It is true that there will be particular cases where that initial exercise becomes decisive for purposes of verifying compliance with the fatal deadline, but that is not the case here, given that, as indicated supra, the statute of limitations alleged by the plaintiff is confined to the time elapsed between the moment the proceeding was ready for the issuance of the final act and its respective communication to the interested party. This Court of Cassation considers that the effects of the norm are not exhausted in that formal act of opening the disciplinary case, precisely because the scope of that precept does not fall upon the proceeding itself, but upon the fault itself, since it is the fault that is subject to termination by negative prescription. Note that the ordinance under comment expressly establishes that the statute of limitations shall be interrupted by the notification to the alleged responsible party of the act ordering the initiation of the proceeding, with continued effects during its development and until the issuance of the final act. This means that, once the statement of charges is communicated to the investigated official, the prescriptive period begins to run again, that is, the five-year period restarts its computation going forward, without the time elapsed before that procedural action being able to be considered. Such provision is furthermore consistent with the doctrine of articles 340.3) and 341 of the LGAP, the latter precept establishing: “*The expiration of the proceeding shall not by itself produce the expiration or statute of limitations of the actions of the individual, but* *expired proceedings shall not interrupt the period of such expiration or statute of limitations*” (emphasis supplied). From that norm, interpreted *a contrario sensu*, it is deduced that ongoing proceedings do have the virtue of interrupting the statute of limitations during their processing, until the final act is adopted. Thus, in light of the literal wording of ordinance 71 of the LOCGR and the technical meaning of the words used by the legislator when enacting it, it is not feasible to interpret that its effects are limited to the formal act of opening the proceeding as the Trial Court understands it and, as a consequence, for a kind of normative vacuum to arise that obliges resorting to the integration method, in order to draw upon other legal bodies to apply different prescriptive periods according to the different procedural stages. It is reiterated that the meaning of that numeral is not to impose a time limit on the initial exercise of the Administration's corrective power, but to regulate the statute of limitations for the liability of the official, the occurrence of which must be assessed according to the scenarios contemplated in that norm. Therefore, in the specific case, it is not appropriate to integrate the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and apply the period contemplated in its numeral 603 to determine whether, at the time of the issuance of the final sanctioning act, the statute of limitations had operated or not. That examination must be carried out based on canon 71 of the LOCGR, not only because of the nature of the fault charged for which there is special regulation, analyzed in Considering III, but also due to what has been set forth regarding the correct interpretation of the scope of that numeral. Thus, given that the order for the opening of the proceeding—and consequent statement of charges—(resolution PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012) was notified to the official on August 29, 2012, the statute of limitations is understood to be interrupted with continued effects until the issuance of the final act, adopted in ordinary session of the Board of Directors of the ICT no. Placa18560, article 5, section VII, held on August 13, 2013, and notified to the plaintiff via official communication SJD-364-2013 on the 16th day of that month and year. Consequently, in the present case, the statute of limitations for the fault attributed to the plaintiff did not operate and the agreed sanction is valid. In the subjúdice, the Trial Court considered the sanction null because the final act by which it was agreed was issued more than one month after the matter was ready for judgment, that is, from the time the investigating body brought its recommendation report to the knowledge of the senior official. But, as stated, that analysis originated from the interpretation of article 71 of the LOCGR made by the trial court, which has been refuted in this venue. The truth is that during the procedural iter, after the statement of charges, the statute of limitations has remained continuously interrupted until the issuance of the final act, such that the approach taken by the Trial Court regarding the time the senior official took to decide the sanction after being informed of the content of the investigating body's report lacks relevance. In accordance with what has been indicated, upon verification of the alleged normative infractions, the objection formulated must be upheld, with the consequences that will be stated.

**V.-** Pursuant to the foregoing, it shall be appropriate to grant the appeal and annul the appealed judgment insofar as it declared the sanction of reprimand and related formal actions absolutely null, on the grounds that they were terminated by negative prescription. It shall also be annulled insofar as it ordered the Institute to eliminate from the plaintiff's personnel file any material or legal record of the imposed sanction. By the manner in which this is resolved, the file shall be remanded to the Court of origin, so that it may proceed to examine the remaining allegations raised by the plaintiff as the basis for her annulment claim.

**POR TANTO** The appeal of cassation is declared with merit. The appealed judgment is annulled regarding the declaration of absolute nullity of the sanction and related formal actions, for reasons of termination by negative prescription; also insofar as it ordered the defendant to eliminate the sanction from the plaintiff's personnel file.

Remit the case file to the court of origin, which must resolve the remaining claims of nullity raised in the lawsuit.

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San José, at twelve hours and four minutes on the twelfth of September, two thousand eighteen. Ordinary proceeding, declared a pure matter of law, established in the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court by **Nombre167738**, a public official, resident of Alajuela; against the **COSTA RICAN TOURISM INSTITUTE**, represented by its general manager Juan Carlos Borbón Marks. Appearing as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff, Nombre35728; for the ICT, Nombre71324, does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre111490, does not indicate qualifications or domicile, Nombre40767, resident of Heredia, Nombre111491, does not indicate qualifications or domicile. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the caveats made, married, attorneys, residents of San José. **WHEREAS** **1.-** Based on the facts she set forth and the legal provisions she cited, the plaintiff established an ordinary proceeding, so that the judgment declares: *“…a) That the written warning (amonestación escrita) sanction imposed in this case on my client, through resolutions G-0394-2013 of nine hours on the twenty-first of February of the year two thousand thirteen, issued by the General Management of the Defendant Entity and, which was ratified by resolution of the same Management **No. 1424-2013 of nine hours on the thirteenth of June, two thousand thirteen, as well as by the agreement of the Board of Directors taken in Ordinary Session No. 5810, Article 5), Section VIII, of August 13, 2013 and, which was communicated to the plaintiff, through official letter SJD-364- of August 16, 2013, are illegal and** contrary to the legal system, both on the merits in that the fault imputed as such to the plaintiff does not exist, and in form, since the administrative acts containing said resolutions were issued when the employer's disciplinary power had already prescribed, as established by article 603 of the Labor Code, applicable to this case and, as they are absolutely null, they must not produce any legal effect. b) Consequently, with the foregoing, the sanction constituting a written warning imposed on the plaintiff, as a result of the administrative procedure referred to in this judicial process and, which materializes in the resolutions and documents indicated in the previous section, is absolutely null and, as such, must be legally and materially eliminated from the plaintiff's personal file at the Costa Rican Tourism Institute and, thus, it is expressly requested that the defendant Administration be ordered to do so, which must be verifiable at any time by the plaintiff. c) The defendant Institution must be ordered to pay the moral damages (daño moral) caused to my client as a result of the facts that have generated this judicial process, which is symbolically estimated in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES. d) The defendant party must be ordered to pay interest on ALL sums owed and which will be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, including the costs of the proceeding. e) The defendant Entity must be ordered to pay INDEXATION. F) The defendant institution must be ordered to pay both cost assessments of this action…”* (sic) *** **2.-** The defendant party responded negatively and raised the pleas of defects in the complaint not timely corrected that prevent ruling on the merits (waived in preliminary hearing), lack of right, and lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam). **3.-** At 13 hours 33 minutes on July 3, 2014, the preliminary hearing was held, attended by the representatives of both parties. The procedural judge declared the matter a pure matter of law. **4.-** The Contentious-Administrative Court, Sixth Section, composed of Judge Cynthia Abarca Gómez and Judges Christian Hess Araya, José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, in judgment no. 194-2014-VI of 8 hours 55 minutes on November 28, 2014, resolved: *“The pleas of lack of active and passive standing filed by the defendant entity are rejected. The plea of lack of right is upheld only regarding the inadmissibility of the payment of moral damages, interest, and indexation claimed. In all other respects, it is rejected. Consequently, the complaint filed by the plaintiff is partially upheld in the following terms, it being understood as denied in what is not expressly indicated: **1)** The absolute nullity of the following formal administrative conducts is declared: a) The final act No. G-0394-2013, issued at nine hours on the twenty-first of February, two thousand thirteen. b) Resolution G-1424-2013, of nine hours on the thirteenth of June, two thousand thirteen. c) The agreement adopted by the ICT Board of Directors in ordinary session No. 5810, article 5, section VII, held on the thirteenth of August, two thousand thirteen. **2)** By connection (conexidad), the absolute nullity of official letter SJD-364-2013, of the sixteenth of (sic) August, two thousand thirteen, is declared. **3)** This declaration of absolute nullity has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled acts, all without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. **4)** The Costa Rican Tourism Institute is ordered to eliminate from the plaintiff's personal file any material or legal record of the sanction that has been annulled here. **5)** This matter is resolved without special award of costs (costas).”* **5.-** The representative of the defendant entity filed a cassation appeal indicating the reasons on which he relies to refute the Court's thesis. **6.-** In the proceedings before this Court, the prescriptions of law have been observed. Substitute Magistrate Aragón Cambronero participates in the decision of this matter. **Authored by Magistrate Aragón Cambronero** **CONSIDERING** **I.-** According to the facts of the complaint, through resolution no. PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012, notified on the 29th of that month and year, a disciplinary procedure was initiated against Ms. Nombre167738, an official of the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (hereinafter ICT or Institute). She was charged with an alleged breach of duties, for having known and not informed her superior that one of her co-workers, on the occasion of an event called “Vuelta al Lago Arenal”, decided to take the official vehicle he was driving to a relative's house and stay overnight there – not at the hotel designated for the work trip -. The General Management of the Institute, through resolution no. G-0394-2013 of February 21, 2013, ordered that a sanction of written warning be imposed on the official. She filed motions for reconsideration (reposición) and appeal (apelación). Both challenges were dismissed, and through resolution SJD-364-2013 of August 16, 2013, the ICT Board of Directors deemed the administrative remedies exhausted. Nombre69778 sued the Institute, seeking in judgment: 1) To declare the nullity of the imposed sanction; 2) To order the defendant to eliminate the reference to that sanction from the plaintiff's personal file; 3) To order the payment of moral damages, estimated in the sum of ¢500,000.00; 4) To recognize the respective interest and indexation; 5) To impose both cost assessments of the proceeding on the defendant. **The ICT responded negatively and raised the pleas of defective complaint –waived in the preliminary hearing–, lack of right, and lack of standing in both modalities. The Court rejected this last defense and partially upheld that of lack of right regarding moral damages –which were denied in their entirety–, interest, and indexation. It declared the complaint partially with merit; annulled the sanction imposed on the plaintiff, ordered its elimination from the official's personal file, and exonerated the defendant from both cost assessments. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Institute's representation filed a cassation appeal.** **II.-** Prior to the analysis of the grievances raised by the cassation appellant, it is appropriate to recall that their legal qualification corresponds exclusively to this Collegiate Body, for which the background and true nature of the allegation are examined. It is clear that the analysis in question will be admissible provided that, within the corresponding qualification, the charges adduced meet the requirements imposed by procedural regulations for their substantive examination. Thus, due to the manner in which they have been set forth in this challenge, the grounds will be reclassified and grouped according to their correct nature (in this case, substantive), in order to conduct a proper study of the aspects that it is requested be reviewed through this appeal. In the **sole** censure, within which both the sole procedural charge and both substantive ones are subsumed, the cassation appellant criticizes what, in his opinion, implies a total uncertainty regarding the legal body applicable to the statute of limitations (prescripción), when dealing with faults committed to the detriment of the public treasury (hacienda pública) and the internal control and anti-corruption regulations. He disagrees with the Court's thesis insofar as, for the same case, it applied two different rules relating to the statute of limitations, namely articles 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (hereinafter LOCGR) and 603 of the Labor Code. He argues, in this specific case, that the plaintiff is charged with a breach of internal control rules and the duty of probity, in that she allegedly failed to observe her duty of vigilance (obligación de vigilancia) regarding the institutional assets under her responsibility. By virtue of this, he emphasizes, the only statute of limitations period applicable to the specific case is 71 of the LOCGR. He considers that ordinal to have been violated because, in his opinion, there is no justification for applying different statutes of limitations periods according to the different stages of the disciplinary procedure. A position in that sense, he accuses, means contravening the technique of regulatory interpretation and ignoring the spirit of the legislator when enacting the LOCGR. Thus, he asserts, the period contained in that numeral is interrupted with continuing effects until the issuance of the final act, without the application of cardinal 603 of the Labor Code being appropriate at any procedural stage. As a consequence of the foregoing, he also accuses a breach of articles 11 and 49 of the Magna Carta, and of the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica). **III.-** **Of the statute of limitations period applicable to the specific case.** Before the enactment of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the general rule applicable in disciplinary matters of public employment, and particularly in matters of statute of limitations, was article 603 of the Labor Code, by express reference of cardinal 51 of the Civil Service Statute (in the case of officials covered by that regime), which provides: *“The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when the cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known.”* With the entry into force of the LOCGR (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994), the legislator, depending on the need to ensure greater and better control of the Treasury (Hacienda), as well as to hold accountable those who incurred in poor management of it, established a differentiated disciplinary regime for Public Treasury servants, particularly regarding the statute of limitations. Ordinal 71 of that law provided: *“The disciplinary responsibility of the Public Treasury servant shall prescribe within a period of two years, counted from the proven knowledge of the fault by the competent body, to initiate the respective sanctioning procedure. For these purposes, article 603 of the Labor Code and any other opposing legal provisions are hereby reformed, with respect to public officials or servants. The verification of knowledge of the fault may be carried out by any means of proof, with the value it has, in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration and, supplementally, in accordance with common law. When the author of the fault is the chief officer (jerarca), the period shall begin to run from the date on which he ends his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body. It shall be deemed a serious fault of the competent official to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the offender's responsibility to prescribe, without justified cause.”* In this way, the liability regime provided for in the rule and its respective statute of limitations period was defined around the concept of “Public Treasury servant”, understood in general terms as one whose functional sphere includes competence in the management and disposition of public funds, whether from an accounting or legal standpoint. The cited precept was reformed by article 45, subsection a) of the General Law of Internal Control, Law No. 8292 of July 31, 2002. Currently, cardinal 71 of the LOCGR provides: ***“Statute of limitations for disciplinary liability.** The administrative liability of the public official for infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight system shall prescribe according to the following rules: a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious – understood as that act which requires an investigation or an audit study to report on its possible irregularity – liability shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the chief officer or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure.* // *The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged offender of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure.* // *When the author of the fault is the chief officer, the period shall begin to run from the date on which he ends his service relationship with the respective entity, company, or body.* // *It shall be deemed a serious fault of the official competent to initiate the sanctioning procedure, the failure to initiate it in a timely manner or allowing the offender's responsibility to prescribe, without justified cause*”. By virtue of this reform, not only was the statute of limitations period increased from 2 to 5 years, but the concept of “Public Treasury servant” was also eliminated. That is, it moved from a subjective regime, in which the special conditions of the servant (whether or not an official of the Public Treasury) were assessed, to an objective one, where the statute of limitations period applicable to the public official (in the sense of numeral 111 of the General Law of Public Administration) is defined not only by their status as such but by the very nature of the conduct deemed to constitute a fault. That is, if the asserted fault goes beyond simple disciplinary liability and falls within the infractions provided for in the LOCGR, or in the higher control and oversight system.

It is therefore a particular regime, which establishes special rules for the statute of limitations (prescripción), which override the general regime applicable in matters of public employment (theory of precepts 44 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, Ley 8422; 43 of the General Law of Internal Control, Ley 8292; and 71 of the LOCGR, Ley 7428). That said, in accordance with numerals 2, 3, and 38 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, 8 and 39 of the General Law of Internal Control, it is clear that the misconduct charged against the plaintiff is governed by the prescriptive period set forth in the LOCGR. Nombre69778 was charged with alleged improper use of institutional vehicles, and for apparently knowing about and failing to timely inform her superior that one of her coworkers, during a field trip, drove the official vehicle to an unauthorized location—a relative's house—and kept it there overnight for two nights, exposing it to unnecessary risks. Such acts, in the judgment of the ICT's disciplinary authorities, constituted a breach of duties by the official in her capacity as "Liaison" between the Institute's Regional and Central Offices, and as Tourism Executive 2 of the Regional Offices Process and Tourism Management Macroprocess (see resolutions PAD-003-JFL-2012 at folios 28 to 37 of the administrative file, G-0394-2013 at folios 91 to 101 of the administrative file, and SJD-364-2013 at folios 133 to 136 of the administrative file). Regardless of whether, on the merits, the acts described constitute misconduct—a matter on which no pronouncement will be made due to the manner in which this case will be resolved—the fact remains that Ms. Nombre167738 was charged, in her capacity as a public servant, with the alleged violation of the duty of probity and internal control systems regarding the custody and use of public resources, specifically institutional vehicles. This infraction is inferred from the principles and rules contained in the LOCGR, Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment, General Law of Internal Control, ICT Autonomous Labor Regulations, Code of Ethics for the Institute's Officials, and Regulations for the Control and Use of Vehicles Owned by the ICT. It is for these reasons that, in this specific case, the conduct attributed to the plaintiff falls within the special regime referenced above and, consequently, the prescriptive period to be applied sub-examine is that set forth in canon 71 of the LOCGR.

**IV.- Regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) in the specific case.** Having established the prescriptive period applicable to the misconduct charged against Ms. Nombre167738, it is now appropriate to determine whether that legal figure operated in this case. It is worth clarifying that, in her complaint, the plaintiff exclusively invokes the statute of limitations (prescripción) as having been completed at the time the final act was issued and for that reason claims the nullity of the sanction, hence the cassation review will be limited to that particular issue. On this point, it is pertinent to cite the Tribunal's ruling: “*As can be seen, the plaintiff's objection is directed at the maximum time limit available to the holder of the corrective power to issue the final act and adopt the sanction, once the file has been submitted for their consideration by the investigating body. (…), in official letter PAD-003-JFL-2012, of 3:30 p.m. on November 9, 2012, the investigating body recommended to the General Management that the relevant steps be taken before the Board of Directors to notify the parties of the suspension of the issuance of the final act, in order to avoid incurring the ground for prescription regulated in article 603 of the CT (folio 90 of the administrative file). The Tribunal considers that, from the moment that recommendation report was communicated, the file was ready for the issuance of the final act by the decision-making body, in this case, the General Manager of the ICT, which—as already explained—had to occur before the following month. The precise date on which the recommendation issued by the investigating body reached the office of the aforementioned official is not recorded (unproven fact 1); however, the truth is that the resolution by the latter (in which it orders a written reprimand for the plaintiff) was not issued until February 21, 2013 (proven fact 8), that is, three months after the matter was ready for judgment; and it was communicated to the plaintiff only on March first of that same year. Unlike the thesis outlined by the defendant entity, we are of the opinion that, in this case, the period available to the official to issue the sanctioning act was the ordinary one of one month and not the special five-year period established by numeral 71 of Law No. 7428. It must be kept in mind that, although we are dealing with a public treasury matter, the five-year period regulated by that norm is the statute of limitations for the initial exercise of the sanctioning power, that is, for the official to determine whether or not to open the disciplinary proceeding* (…) *But that is not the prescription alleged in this case. What is objected to here is the expiration of the period established to agree upon the sanction, once the file is ready to be decided. And, as we already explained, that period is one month and derives from numeral 603 of the CT* (…)”. This Cassation Court disagrees with those considerations, for the reasons set forth below. As expressly stated in article 71 of the LOCGR, what it regulates is the prescription of the official's liability, subject to a five-year period, or, what is the same for practical purposes, the prescription of the disciplinary infraction. It does not define, as the Tribunal understands it, the maximum period available to the Administration to exercise its corrective power, meaning for the formal opening of the disciplinary proceeding (materialized by the notification of the statement of charges to the interested party). It is true that there will be particular cases where that initial exercise becomes decisive for verifying compliance with the fatal deadline, but this is not one of them, since, as indicated supra, the prescription alleged by the plaintiff is constrained to the time elapsed between the moment the proceeding was ready for the issuance of the final act and the respective communication to the interested party. This Cassation Court considers that the effects of the norm are not exhausted in that formal act of opening the disciplinary case, precisely because the scope of that precept does not fall upon the proceeding itself, but upon the infraction itself, since it is the infraction that is subject to extinguishment by negative prescription. Note that the article under comment expressly establishes that the statute of limitations (prescripción) shall be interrupted by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the commencement of the proceeding, with continued effects during its development and until the issuance of the final act. This means that, once the notification of charges to the investigated official has occurred, the prescriptive period begins to run anew, that is, the five-year period restarts its calculation into the future, without the time elapsed before that procedural action being able to be considered. Furthermore, such a provision is consistent with the doctrine of articles 340.3) and 341 of the LGAP, the latter precept establishing: “*The expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding shall not by itself produce the expiration (caducidad) or statute of limitations (prescripción) of the private party's actions, but expired proceedings shall not interrupt the period of such expiration (caducidad) or prescription (prescripción)*” (emphasis supplied). From that norm, interpreted *a contrario sensu*, it is inferred that ongoing proceedings do have the power to interrupt the statute of limitations during their processing, until the final act is adopted. Therefore, in light of the literal wording of article 71 of the LOCGR and the technical meaning of the words used by the legislator in enacting it, it is not permissible to interpret that its effects are limited to the formal act of opening the proceeding as the Tribunal understands it and, as a consequence, a kind of normative vacuum arises that requires resorting to the method of integration, in order to draw on other legal bodies to apply different prescriptive periods according to the different procedural stages. It is reiterated, the sense of that numeral is not to impose a temporary limit on the initial exercise of the Administration's corrective power, but rather to regulate the prescription of the official's liability, the occurrence of which must be assessed according to the scenarios contemplated in that norm. Therefore, in this specific case, it is not appropriate to integrate the Labor Code and apply the period set forth in its numeral 603 to determine whether, at the time of issuing the final sanctioning act, the statute of limitations had or had not occurred. That examination must be conducted based on canon 71 of the LOCGR, not only because of the nature of the misconduct charged for which there is special regulation, analyzed in Considerando III, but also due to what has already been stated regarding the correct interpretation of the scope of that numeral. Thus, given that the order opening the proceeding—and consequent notice of charges—(resolution PAD-003-JFL-2012 of August 20, 2012) was notified to the official on August 29, 2012, the statute of limitations (prescripción) is understood to be interrupted with continued effects until the issuance of the final act, adopted in the ordinary session of the ICT Board of Directors no. Placa18560, article 5, section VII, held on August 13, 2013, and notified to the plaintiff by official letter SJD-364-2013 on the 16th of that month and year. Consequently, in this case, the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the misconduct attributed to the plaintiff did not operate and the agreed-upon sanction is valid. In the subjúdice, the Tribunal considered the sanction null because the final act by which it was agreed was issued more than one month after the matter was ready for judgment, that is, since the investigating body brought its recommendation report to the attention of the official. But, as stated, that analysis originated from the interpretation of article 71 of the LOCGR made by the lower court, which has been disproven in this venue. The truth is that during the procedural iter, after the notice of charges, the statute of limitations (prescripción) has been continuously interrupted until the issuance of the final act, such that the analysis carried out by the Tribunal regarding the time the official took to agree on the sanction after being informed of the content of the investigating body's report is irrelevant. In line with what has been indicated, upon verifying the alleged normative violations, the objection raised must be upheld, with the consequences that will be stated.

**V.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal will be upheld, and the appealed judgment shall be annulled insofar as it declared the sanction of reprimand and related formal acts absolutely null, finding them expired due to negative prescription. It shall also be annulled insofar as it ordered the Institute to remove from the plaintiff's personal file any material or legal record of the imposed sanction. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, the file shall be remanded to the Tribunal of origin, so that it may proceed to examine the remaining allegations put forward by the plaintiff as grounds for her annulment claim.

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal is granted. The appealed judgment is annulled regarding the declaration of absolute nullity of the sanction and related formal acts, for reasons of expiration due to negative prescription; also insofar as it ordered the defendant to remove the sanction from the plaintiff's personal file. The file is remanded to the Tribunal of origin, which must resolve the remaining claims of nullity raised in the complaint.

Nombre45162 Nombre574 Yazmín Aragón Cambronero gcr

Revisión del Documento *140000871027CA* Res. 000117-F-TC-2018 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las doce horas cuatro minutos del doce de setiembre de dos mil dieciocho.

Proceso de conocimiento, declarado de puro derecho, establecido en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda por Nombre167738 , funcionaria pública, vecina de Alajuela; contra el INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE DE TURISMO, representado por su gerente general Juan Carlos Borbón Marks. Figura como apoderado especial judicial de la actora, Nombre35728 ; por el ICT, Nombre71324 , no indica calidades ni domicilio, Nombre111490 , no indica calidades ni domicilio, Nombre40767 , vecina de Heredia, Nombre111491 , no indica calidades ni domicilio. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados, vecinos de San José.

RESULTANDO

1.- Con base en los hechos que expuso y disposiciones legales que citó, la actora estableció proceso de conocimiento, para que en sentencia se declare: “…a) Que la sanción de amonestación escrita impuesta en este caso a mi representada, mediante las resoluciones G-0394-2013 de las nueve horas del veintiuno de febrero del año dos mil trece, emitida por la Gerencia General del Ente Demandado y, que fuera ratificada por resolución de la misma Gerencia No. 1424-2013 de las nueve horas del trece de junio, dos mil trece, así como por el acuerdo de Junta Directiva tomado en Sesión Ordinaria No. 5810, Arrticulo 5), Inciso VIII, del 13 de agosto, 2013 y, que le fuera comunicado a la actora, mediante oficio SJD-364- del 16 de agosto, 2013, son ilegales y contrarias al ordenamiento jurídico, tanto por el fondo en cuanto a que no existe la falta imputada como tal a la actora, como por la forma, ya que, los actos administrativos que contienen dichas resoluciones, fueron emitidos, cuando la potestad disciplinaria del patrono ya había prescrito, según lo establece el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, aplicable a este caso y, al resultar absolutamente nulas las mismas no deben producir efecto jurídico alguno. b) En consecuencia, con lo anterior, la sanción constitutiva de una amonestación escrita impuesta a la actora, producto del procedimiento administrativo a que se hace referencia en este proceso judicial y, que se materializa en las resoluciones y documentos indicados en el aparte anterior, resulta absolutamente nula y, como tal, debe ser eliminada jurídica y materialmente del expediente personal de la actora en el Instituto Costarricense de Turismo y, así en forma expresa resolicita que se le ordene a la Administración demandada, lo cual debe ser constatable en cualquier momento por la parte actora. c) La Institución demandada debe ser condenada al pago del daño moral causado a mi representado producto de los hechos que han generado este proceso judicial, el cual se estima en forma simbólica en la suma de QUINIENTOS MIL COLONES. d) La parte demandada debe ser condenada al pago de intereses sobre TODAS las sumas adeudadas y que se liquidarán en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, incluyendo las costas del proceso. e) El Ente demandado debe ser condenado al pago de la INDEXACIÓN. F) La institución demandada debe ser condenada al pago de ambas costas de esta acción…” (sic)

2.- La parte demandada contestó negativamente y opuso las excepciones de defectos en el escrito de la demanda no subsanados oportunamente que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo (desistida en audiencia preliminar), falta de derecho y falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva.

3.- Al ser las 13 horas 33 minutos del 3 de julio de 2014, se efectuó la audiencia preliminar, a la que asistieron los representantes de ambas partes. La jueza tramitadora declaró el asunto de puro derecho.

4.- El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Sexta, integrada por la jueza Cynthia Abarca Gómez y los jueces Christian Hess Araya, José Paulino Hernández Gutiérrez, en sentencia no. 194-2014-VI de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 28 de noviembre de 2014, resolvió: “Se rechazan las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva formuladas por el ente demandado. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho únicamente en cuanto a la improcedencia del pago del daño moral, intereses e indexación reclamados. En lo demás se rechaza. En consecuencia, se acoge parcialmente la demanda formulada por la actora en los siguientes términos, entendiéndose por denegada en lo que no se señale de manera expresa: 1) Se declara la nulidad absoluta de las siguientes conductas formales administrativas: a) El acto final No. G-0394-2013, dictado a las nueve horas del veintiuno de febrero del dos mil trece. b) La resolución G-1424-2013, de las nueve horas del trece de junio del dos mil trece. c) El acuerdo adoptado por la Junta Directiva del ICT en sesión ordinaria No. 5810, artículo 5, inciso VII, celebrada el trece de agosto del dos mil trece. 2) Por conexidad, se declara la nulidad absoluta del oficio SJD-364-2013, del dieciséis de de (sic) agosto del dos mil trece. 3) Esta declaración de nulidad absoluta tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de los actos anulados, todo sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. 4) Se ordena al Instituto Costarricense de Turismo eliminar del expediente personal de la accionante cualquier registro material o jurídico de la sanción que aquí ha sido anulada. 5) Se resuelve este asunto sin especial condena en costas.” 5.- El representante del ente demandado formula recurso de casación indicando las razones en que se apoya para refutar la tesis del Tribunal.

6.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal se han observado las prescripciones de ley. Participa en la decisión de este asunto la magistrada suplente Aragón Cambronero.

Redacta la Magistrada Aragón Cambronero

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Según los hechos de la demanda, mediante resolución no. PAD-003-JFL-2012 del 20 de agosto de 2012, notificada el día 29 de ese mes y año, se inició procedimiento disciplinario contra la señora Nombre167738 , funcionaria del Instituto Costarricense de Turismo (en lo sucesivo ICT o Instituto). Se le imputó un supuesto incumplimiento de deberes, por haber tenido conocimiento y no informar a su superior que uno de sus compañeros de trabajo, con ocasión de un evento denominado “Vuelta al Lago Arenal”, decidió llevarse el vehículo oficial que conducía a la casa de un familiar y pernoctar allí –no en el hotel designado para la gira de trabajo-. La Gerencia General del Instituto, mediante resolución no. G-0394-2013 del 21 de febrero de 2013, dispuso imponer a la funcionaria una sanción de amonestación escrita. Ésta planteó recursos de reposición y apelación. Ambas impugnaciones fueron desestimadas, siendo que por resolución SJD-364-2013 del 16 de agosto de 2013, la Junta Directiva del ICT dio por agotada la vía administrativa. Nombre69778 demandó al Instituto pretendiendo que en sentencia: 1) Se declare la nulidad de la sanción impuesta; 2) Se ordene al demandado eliminar del expediente personal de la actora la referencia a esa sanción; 3) Se condene al pago del daño moral, estimado en la suma de ¢500.000,00; 4) Se reconozcan los respectivos intereses e indexación; 5) Se impongan al demandado ambas costas del proceso. El ICT contestó negativamente y opuso las excepciones de demanda defectuosa –desistida en audiencia preliminar-, falta de derecho y de legitimación en sus dos modalidades. El Tribunal rechazó esta última defensa y acogió parcialmente la de falta de derecho respecto del daño moral –que se denegó en su totalidad-, intereses e indexación. Declaró la demanda parcialmente con lugar; anuló la sanción impuesta a la actora, ordenó su eliminación del expediente personal de la funcionaria y exoneró al demandado de ambas costas. Inconforme con lo resuelto, la representación del Instituto formula recurso de casación.

II.- De previo al análisis de los agravios planteados por el casacionista, conviene recordar que su calificación jurídica le corresponde con exclusividad a este Órgano colegiado, para lo cual se acude al fondo y verdadera naturaleza del alegato. Es claro que el análisis en cuestión será procedente siempre que dentro de la calificación que corresponda, los cargos aducidos satisfagan los requisitos que impone la normativa procesal para su estudio de fondo. Así, por la forma como ha sido expuestos en la presente impugnación, los motivos serán recalificados y agrupados conforme a su correcta naturaleza (en este caso sustantiva), a efectos de realizar un estudio adecuado de los aspectos que mediante este recurso se solicita revisar. En la única censura, dentro de la cual se subsumen el único cargo procesal y ambos sustantivos, el casacionista reprocha lo que a su juicio implica una total incerteza respecto del cuerpo jurídico aplicable al instituto de la prescripción, cuando se trate de faltas cometidas en perjuicio de la hacienda pública y la normativa de control interno y anticorrupción. Discrepa de la tesis del Tribunal en tanto, para un mismo caso, aplicó dos normas diferentes relativas a la prescripción, sean los artículos 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República (en adelante LOCGR) y 603 del Código de Trabajo. Aduce, en la especie, a la actora se le atribuye un incumplimiento de las normas de control interno y del deber de probidad, por cuanto supuestamente inobservó su obligación de vigilancia respecto de los bienes institucionales que están bajo su responsabilidad. En esa virtud, enfatiza, el único plazo prescriptivo que resulta aplicable al caso concreto es el 71 de la LOCGR. Estima conculcado ese ordinal por cuanto, a su juicio, no existe justificación para que, según las diferentes etapas del procedimiento disciplinario, se apliquen distintos plazos prescriptivos. Una posición en ese sentido, acusa, significa contrariar la técnica de la interpretación normativa e ignorar el espíritu del legislador al promulgar la LOCGR. Así, asevera, el plazo contenido en ese numeral se interrumpe con efectos continuados hasta el dictado del acto final, sin que resulte procedente la aplicación del cardinal 603 del Código de Trabajo en ninguna etapa procedimental. Consecuencia de lo expuesto, también acusa quebranto de los artículos 11 y 49 de la Carta Magna, y del principio de seguridad jurídica.

III.- Del plazo prescriptivo aplicable al caso concreto. Antes de la promulgación de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, la norma general aplicable en materia disciplinaria de empleo público, y en particular en temas de prescripción, fue el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, por remisión expresa del cardinal 51 del Estatuto del Servicio Civil (en el caso de los funcionarios amparados por ese régimen), el cual dispone: “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria”. Con la entrada en vigencia de la LOCGR (Ley no. 7428 del 7 de setiembre de 1994), el legislador, en función de la necesidad de asegurar un mayor y mejor control de la Hacienda, así como de responsabilizar a quienes incurrieran en un mal manejo de ella, estableció un régimen disciplinario diferenciado para los servidores de la Hacienda Pública, particularmente en lo atinente a la prescripción. El ordinal 71 de esa ley disponía: “La responsabilidad disciplinaria del servidor de la Hacienda Pública prescribirá en el plazo de dos años, contados a partir del conocimiento comprobado de la falta por parte del órgano competente, para iniciar el respectivo procedimiento sancionatorio. Para estos efectos, quedan reformados, respecto de los funcionarios o de los servidores públicos, el artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo y cualesquiera otras disposiciones jurídicas que se le opongan. La comprobación del conocimiento de la falta podrá efectuarse por cualquier medio de prueba, con el valor que esta tenga, de acuerdo con la Ley General de la Administración Pública y, supletoriamente, de acuerdo con el derecho común. Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente, para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar prescribir la responsabilidad del infractor, sin causa justificada”. De esa forma, el régimen de responsabilidad previsto en la norma y su respectivo plazo prescriptivo se definió en torno al concepto de “servidor de la Hacienda Pública”, entendido éste en términos generales como aquél en cuya órbita funcional se incluye la competencia en el manejo y disposición de fondos públicos, sea desde el punto de vista contable o jurídico. El precepto de cita fue reformado por el artículo 45 inciso a) de la Ley General de Control Interno, Ley no. 8292 de 31 de julio de 2002. En la actualidad, el cardinal 71 de la LOCGR dispone: “Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. // La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo. // Cuando el autor de la falta sea el jerarca, el plazo empezará a correr a partir de la fecha en que él termine su relación de servicio con el ente, la empresa o el órgano respectivo. // Se reputará como falta grave del funcionario competente para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, el no darle inicio a este oportunamente o el dejar que la responsabilidad del infractor prescriba, sin causa justificada”. En virtud de esa reforma, no sólo se aumentó el plazo de prescripción de 2 a 5 años, sino también se eliminó el concepto de “servidor de la Hacienda Pública”. Es decir, se pasó de un régimen subjetivo, en el cual se valoraban las especiales condiciones del servidor (funcionario o no de la Hacienda Pública), a uno objetivo, donde el plazo prescriptivo aplicable al funcionario público (en el sentido del numeral 111 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública) se define no sólo por su carácter de tal, sino por la naturaleza misma de la conducta que se estima constitutiva de falta. Esto es, si la falta intimada rebasa la responsabilidad disciplinaria simple y se encasilla dentro de las infracciones previstas en la LOCGR, o bien en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superior. Se trata entonces de un régimen particular, que establece reglas especiales de prescripción, las cuales se sobreponen al régimen general aplicable en materia de empleo público (teoría de los preceptos 44 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, Ley 8422; 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno, Ley 8292; y 71 de la LOCGR, Ley 7428). Ahora bien, de conformidad con los numerales 2, 3 y 38 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, 8 y 39 de la Ley General de Control Interno, es claro que la falta endilgada a la actora se rige por el plazo prescriptivo contemplado en la LOCGR. A Nombre69778 se le intimó por supuestos usos indebidos de vehículos institucionales, y por aparentemente conocer y omitir informar de manera oportuna al superior que uno de sus compañeros de trabajo, durante una gira, condujo el vehículo oficial a un sitio no autorizado –la casa de un familiar- y lo hizo pernoctar ahí durante dos noches, exponiéndolo a riesgos innecesarios. Tales hechos, a juicio de las autoridades disciplinarias del ICT, constituyeron un incumplimiento de deberes por parte de la funcionaria en su calidad de “Enlace” entre las Oficinas Regionales y Centrales del Instituto, y como Ejecutiva de Turismo 2 del Proceso de Oficinas Regionales y Macroproceso Gestión Turística (ver resoluciones PAD-003-JFL-2012 de folios 28 a 37 del expediente administrativo, G-0394-2013 de folios 91 a 101 del expediente administrativo y SJD-364-2013 de folios 133 a 136 del expediente administrativo). Con independencia de si, en cuanto al fondo, los hechos narrados son o no constitutivos de falta –tema sobre el cual no se emitirá pronunciamiento por la forma como se resolverá-, lo cierto es que la señora Nombre167738 fue intimada, en su carácter de servidora pública, por la supuesta violación al deber de probidad y sistemas de control interno en cuanto a la custodia y utilización de recursos públicos, concretamente de vehículos institucionales. Infracción que se infiere de los principios y normas contenidos en la LOCGR, Ley Contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito, Ley General de Control Interno, Reglamento Autónomo de Trabajo del ICT, Código de Ética de los Funcionarios del Instituto, y Reglamento de Control y Uso de los Vehículos Propiedad del ICT. Es por lo anterior que, en el caso concreto, las conductas atribuidas a la actora se enmarcan dentro del régimen especial al que se ha hecho referencia y, en consecuencia, el plazo de prescripción que debe actuarse en el sub-examine es el dispuesto por el canon 71 de la LOCGR.

IV.- Sobre la prescripción en el caso concreto. Establecido el plazo prescriptivo aplicable a la falta endilgada a doña Nombre167738, procede entonces determinar si en la especie operó esa figura. Valga aclarar que, en su demanda, la actora exclusivamente invoca cumplida la prescripción al momento del dictado del acto final y por ese motivo reclama la nulidad de la sanción, de ahí que el control casacional se circunscribirá a ese tema en particular. Sobre ese punto, conviene traer a colación lo resuelto por el Tribunal: “Como se observa, el reproche de la accionante se dirige al límite máximo temporal con que cuenta el titular de la potestad correctiva para dictar el acto final y adoptar la sanción, una vez que el expediente ha sido sometido a su conocimiento por el órgano director. (…), en oficio PAD-003-JFL-2012, de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 9 de noviembre de 2012, el órgano director recomendó a la Gerencia General que se tramitara lo pertinente ante la Junta Directiva a efectos de comunicar a las partes la suspensión del dictado del acto final, con el objeto de no incurrir en la causal de prescripción regulada en el artículo 603 del CT (folio 90 del expediente administrativo). El Tribunal estima que, a partir del momento en que ese informe de recomendaciones fue comunicado, el expediente quedó listo para el dictado del acto final por parte del órgano decisor, en este caso, el Gerente General del ICT, lo cual –como ya se explicó– debía producirse antes del mes siguiente. No consta la fecha precisa en la que la recomendación vertida por el órgano instructor llegó al despacho del jerarca mencionado (hecho no probado 1); no obstante, lo cierto es que la resolución de este último (en la que dispone la amonestación escrita a la actora) no fue dictada sino hasta el 21 de febrero de 2013 (hecho probado 8), es decir tres meses después de que el asunto estuviera listo para el fallo; y fue comunicada a la demandante hasta el primero de marzo de ese mismo año. A diferencia de la tesis que esboza el ente demandado, somos del criterio que, en este caso, el plazo con el que contaba el jerarca para dictar el acto sancionatorio era el ordinario de un mes y no el especial de cinco años que establece el numeral 71 de la Ley No. 7428. Debe tenerse presente que, aunque estemos frente a materia de hacienda pública, el plazo de cinco años que regula esa norma es el de la prescripción para el ejercicio inicial de la potestad sancionatoria, es decir, para que el jerarca determine si abre o no el procedimiento disciplinario (…) Pero esa no es la prescripción que se alega en este caso. Aquí se reprocha la prescripción del plazo establecido para acordar la sanción, una vez que el expediente está listo para ser fallado. Y, como ya explicamos, ese plazo es de un mes y se deriva del numeral 603 del CT (…)”. Discrepa este Tribunal de Casación de esas consideraciones, por los motivos que de seguido se exponen. Según se indica expresamente en el artículo 71 de la LOCGR, lo que en él se regula es la prescripción de la responsabilidad del funcionario, sujeta a un plazo quinquenal, o lo que es lo mismo para efectos prácticos, la prescripción de la falta disciplinaria. No define, como lo entiende el Tribunal, el plazo máximo con que cuenta la Administración para ejercer su potestad correctiva, entiéndase para la apertura formal del procedimiento disciplinario (materializada con la notificación del traslado de cargos al interesado). Es cierto que habrá casos particulares donde ese ejercicio inicial se torne determinante a los efectos de verificar el cumplimiento del plazo fatal, mas no es el caso, pues tal y como se indicó supra, la prescripción alegada por la accionante se constriñe al plazo transcurrido entre el momento en que el procedimiento estuvo listo para el dictado del acto final y la respectiva comunicación a la interesada. Considera este Tribunal de Casación, los efectos de la norma no se agotan en ese acto formal de apertura de la causa disciplinaria, precisamente porque los alcances de ese precepto no recaen sobre el procedimiento en sí, sino sobre la falta misma, pues es la que está sujeta a fenecimiento por prescripción negativa. Nótese que el ordinal de comentario expresamente establece que la prescripción se interrumpirá por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento, con efectos continuados durante su desarrollo y hasta el dictado del acto final. Ello significa que, ocurrida la intimación de cargos al funcionario investigado, el plazo prescriptivo comienza a correr de nuevo, es decir, el quinquenio reinicia su cómputo hacia futuro, sin que el lapso transcurrido antes de esa actuación procedimental pueda ser considerado. Tal disposición además resulta conteste con la doctrina de los artículos 340.3) y 341 de la LGAP, precepto este último que establece: “La caducidad del procedimiento no producirá por sí sola la caducidad o prescripción de las acciones del particular, pero los procedimientos caducados no interrumpirán el plazo de tal caducidad o prescripción” (el énfasis es suplido). A partir de esa norma, interpretada a contrario sensu, se colige que los procedimientos en curso sí tienen la virtud de interrumpir la prescripción durante su tramitación, hasta tanto se adopte el acto final. De manera que, a la luz de la literalidad del ordinal 71 de la LOCGR y del sentido técnico de las palabras que empleó el legislador al promulgarlo, no sea dable interpretar que sus efectos se limitan al acto formal de apertura del procedimiento como lo entiende el Tribunal y, consecuencia de ello, surja una especie de vacío normativo que obligue a acudir al método de integración, en orden a echar mano de otros cuerpos legales para aplicar distintos plazos prescriptivos según las diferentes etapas procedimentales. Se reitera, el sentido de ese numeral no es el de imponer un límite temporal al ejercicio inicial de la potestad correctiva de la Administración, sino de regular la prescripción de la responsabilidad del funcionario, cuyo acaecimiento habrá de ser valorado según los supuestos contemplados en esa norma. Entonces, en el caso concreto, no cabe integrar el Código de Trabajo y actuar el plazo contemplado en su numeral 603 para determinar si al momento del dictado del acto final sancionatorio había operado o no la prescripción. Ese examen debe realizarse a partir del canon 71 de la LOCGR, no sólo por la naturaleza de la falta intimada para la cual hay regulación especial, analizada en el Considerando III, sino además por lo ya expuesto en torno a la correcta interpretación de los alcances de ese numeral. Así las cosas, siendo que el auto de apertura del procedimiento -y consecuente intimación de cargos- (resolución PAD-003-JFL-2012 del 20 de agosto de 2012) fue notificado a la funcionaria el 29 de agosto de 2012, se entiende interrumpida la prescripción con efectos continuados hasta el dictado del acto final, adoptado en sesión ordinaria de Junta Directiva del ICT no. Placa18560, artículo 5, inciso VII, celebrada el 13 de agosto de 2013, y notificado a la actora mediante oficio SJD-364-2013 del día 16 de ese mes y año. Por consiguiente, en la especie, no operó la prescripción de la falta atribuida a la actora y la sanción acordada es válida. En el subjúdice el Tribunal consideró nula la sanción porque el acto final mediante el cual se acordó fue dictado más de un mes después de que el asunto quedó listo para fallo, es decir, desde que el órgano instructor puso en conocimiento del jerarca su informe de recomendaciones. Pero, como se dijo, ese análisis se originó en la interpretación que del artículo 71 de la LOCGR realizó el Tribunal de instancia, la cual ha sido desvirtuada en esta sede. Lo cierto es que durante el iter procedimental, luego de la intimación de cargos, la prescripción se ha mantenido interrumpida de forma continuada hasta el dictado del acto final, de manera que carece de interés el abordaje que realizó el Tribunal en torno al tiempo que tardó el jerarca en acordar la sanción después de ser impuesto del contenido del informe del órgano instructor. En consonancia con lo señalado, al verificarse las infracciones normativas acusadas, deberá acogerse el reparo formulado, con las consecuencias que se dirán.

V.- En mérito de lo expuesto, procederá acoger el recurso, y anular la sentencia recurrida en cuanto declaró absolutamente nulas la sanción de amonestación y conductas formales conexas, por encontrarse fenecidas por prescripción negativa. Se anulará también en cuanto ordenó al Instituto eliminar del expediente personal de la accionante cualquier registro material o jurídico de la sanción impuesta. Por la forma cómo se resuelve, se reenviará el expediente al Tribunal de origen, para que proceda a examinar las restantes alegaciones esgrimidas por la accionante como fundamento de su pretensión anulatoria.

POR TANTO

Se declara con lugar el recurso de casación. Se anula la sentencia recurrida en cuanto a la declaratoria de nulidad absoluta de la sanción y conductas formales conexas, por razones de fenecimiento por prescripción negativa; también en el tanto ordenó al demandado eliminar la sanción del expediente personal de la actora. Reenvíese el expediente al Tribunal de origen, quien deberá resolver los restantes alegatos de nulidad planteados en la demanda.

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