Possessory information denied within Tenorio Volcano National ParkInformación posesoria denegada dentro del Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio

**VOTO N° 391-F-18** **AGRARIAN TRIBUNAL. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ.-** At eight hours and twenty-nine minutes on the tenth of May of two thousand eighteen.- **POSSESSORY INFORMATION PROCEEDING**, filed by [Nombre1], of legal age, married once, separated in fact, cattle rancher, identity card number CED1 - - ; and [Nombre2], of legal age, married once, cattle rancher, identity card number CED2 - - , both residents of Tronadora, Tilarán, Guanacaste. Appearing in the proceeding are the OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC, represented by Susana Fallas Cubero, of legal age, attorney, identity card number CED3 - - - , in her capacity as deputy attorney general; and the INSTITUTE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT, legal identification number CED4 - - - , represented by Carmelina Vargas Hidalgo, of legal age, divorced, attorney, resident of Guachipelín, Escazú, identity card number CED5 - - , in her capacity as general judicial attorney-in-fact. Acting as special judicial attorney-in-fact for the promoters is licensed attorney Enid Álvarez Zúñiga, bar association number twenty-one thousand four hundred fifty-five. Processed before the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia.- **WHEREAS:** 1.- The promoters filed a possessory information proceeding for the purpose of registering in their names at the Public Property Registry the property described as follows: "... Land for pasture and mountain, located in Bijagua ([Dirección1]), Upala (canton thirteen), of the province of Alajuela. Boundaries: NORTH: tributary of the Bijagua River, parcels of the IDA and Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A.; SOUTH: [Nombre3] and the State; EAST: the State; and WEST: [Dirección2] with a frontage thereon of [Dirección3] thirty [Dirección4] eight point seventeen linear meters, partly Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A. and partly agricultural right-of-way easement (servidumbre agrícola de paso) ...". (folio 14, and virtual desktop of the Agrarian Court of Liberia, associated documents, first-instance judgment filed on 03/21/2018 15:28:19).

2.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic appeared in the proceeding under the terms set forth in folios 33 to 35, 51 to 52; in turn, the Institute of Rural Development appeared in the proceeding at folio 58.- 3.- Judge José Francisco Chacón Acuña, of the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Guanacaste, Liberia, by means of judgment number 46-S-2018, at fifteen hours and twenty-eight minutes on the twenty-first of March of the year two thousand eighteen, resolved: "THEREFORE: This POSSESSORY INFORMATION is APPROVED. In view of the situation of the roads running in front of the property registered by means of this information, it shall be affected by the reservations indicated by the General Law of Public Roads, in that the minimum width of highways is twenty meters and of neighborhood roads is fourteen meters. The surface and underground waters existing on the property are of public domain and do not form part of the property. In favor of the described property and against the property that will be cited below there exists a right-of-way easement (servidumbre de paso) with the following characteristics: length: five hundred thirty-nine point thirty linear meters; width: seven linear meters; direction: [Dirección5]; purpose: passage on foot, on horseback, by cart, by vehicle or by any means of locomotion, as well as for piping and electrical lines; appraisal: one thousand colones; dominant tenement: the property to be titled; servient tenement: property of Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A., registered in the Real Property Registry, Province of Alajuela, registration number CED6. Let the PUBLIC PROPERTY REGISTRY proceed to register, free of encumbrances (libre de gravámenes), except for the referred easement (servidumbre) and with the real charges already indicated, without prejudice to third parties with better right, in the name of [Nombre1] and [Nombre2], in common and in equal parts, the property described as follows: Land for pasture and mountain, located in Bijagua ([Dirección1]), Upala (canton [Dirección6]), of the province of Alajuela. Boundaries: NORTH: tributary of the Bijagua River, parcels of the IDA and Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A.; SOUTH: [Nombre3] and the State; EAST: the State; and WEST: [Dirección2] with a frontage thereon of nine hundred thirty-eight point seventeen linear meters, partly Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A. and partly agricultural right-of-way easement (servidumbre agrícola de paso). According to cadastral plan two-two zero one five seven four two-two thousand seventeen, dated the twentieth of November of two thousand seventeen, it measures an extension of five hundred seventy-five thousand zero ninety square meters. On the property, possessory acts have been exercised, complying with the lawful use of the land. The titleholders must maintain the current use of the land, increase the number of paddocks (apartos) based on the existing animal units, convenient feeding and resting periods for pastures, and ensure the planting of ground cover grasses. On the property there exists a high water fragility which the Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers considers does not supply any aqueduct nor is its catchment projected.-." (virtual desktop of the Agrarian Court of Liberia, associated documents, first-instance judgment filed on 03/21/2018 15:28:19).- 4.- Licensed attorney Susana Fallas Cubero, in her capacity as deputy attorney general, filed an appeal with express indication of the reasons for which she refutes the thesis of the Court of first instance, (virtual desktop of the Agrarian Court of Liberia, brief filed on 04/04/2018 03:35:33).

5.- In the processing of the proceeding, the legal requirements have been observed, and the existence of errors or omissions in the ruling capable of causing its nullity is not noted.

Judge ULATE CHACÓN writes, and, **WHEREAS:** I.- The Tribunal shares the relation of facts held as proven, as they have good support in the case record. To the third fact, it must be added that the person who transferred possession to the titleholders, in 1993, [Nombre4], acquired it in turn from [Nombre5], on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale letter notarized (protocolizada) on June 15, 1987 (see deed at folio 50-51).

II.- Unproven facts. Of relevance for the decision in this proceeding, the following are held as not demonstrated: a) the time of possession exercised by [Nombre5], and whether he had it from any previous transferor (no evidence); b) The time of possession of [Nombre6], what the possessory acts consisted of, and to whom he transferred it (no evidence).

III.- The representative of the State, [Nombre7], appealed the ruling alleging the following: 1.) The land intended to be titled is within the Volcán Tenorio National Park, in an area affected since the creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve, by means of Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976. 2.-) The witnesses did not accredit the chain of transferors, they are contradictory and only cite [Nombre6] before the titleholders, so none of the statements coincide with what was indicated in the initial brief, in relation to [Nombre4] and [Nombre5]. The statement of the witnesses is deemed sufficient, who say they have known the land for years but do not specify names of the transferors or details of the measurement of the land or the justification of the possession. 3.- On the other hand, she argues, that what was set forth in the brief of August 23, 2013, regarding the overlapping of plans, was not answered.- III.- Regarding the merits of the matter. First, it must be indicated that the argument of the Judge of first instance is not based on the application of the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, as it refers to a general possession of ten years in its relation of proven facts. Regarding this norm, the following has been indicated: IV.- On the issue of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, and the Natural Heritage of the State, the Tribunal in reiterated resolutions has expressed: "The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in its Article 7, as well as the Forestry Laws have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling (titulación) of said areas has been permitted, which once declared as conservation areas become part of the Forest Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the fulfillment of other more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession (posesión ecológica), and to the criterion of the ecological function of forest property. In reiterated judgments, both of the First Chamber of Cassation and of this same Superior Agrarian Tribunal, the principles that must govern to resolve this type of agro-environmental situations have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutes of agrarian possession (posesión agraria) and ecological possession (posesión ecológica). The same jurisprudence has recognized and developed these institutes, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession (posesión agraria) and, recently, of ecological possession (posesión ecológica) (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest property). The same Jurisprudence has sought to distinguish business property and possession where an activity directed at the cultivation of the forest is exercised, from that where an extractive or merely conservative activity is simply carried out. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of a forest property or possession (without business). Precisely in these cases, the Forestry Law comes to establish a whole legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. In this way, in forest possession, the de facto power is exercised over an asset of forest vocation or mostly destined to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation or, dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In either case, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, on the contrary represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. It also denies the possibility of acquiring possession rights over lands of the national reserves when harmful action against forest resources has been exercised. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forest Law, with particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession as a real right derived from it, or conceived independently, begins to take shape since the Fiscal Code of 1885, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend towards their conservation. Subsequently, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 6, 1939 incorporates said principles. Later, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización in its Article 7 expands the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- VII. The special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second stage opened through better conceived regulations through Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last stage operates with the enactment of the Forestry Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently reformed, by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). In them, various forest property regimes are contained, and they limit the use and enjoyment of the resources by individuals. It is not possible to acquire ownership over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) if it is not demonstrated that the forest resource has been protected. Its constitutional foundation is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institute of forest property and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian possession, it is a property to conserve, and therefore the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.- VIII. Forest possession has had its legal regime in the mentioned Forestry Laws. It falls on a specific good: lands covered with forests or of forest aptitude. The owner or possessor of such goods has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and cannot economically exploit them except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal solution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, that special legal regime and the principles of Forest Law must be applied. The Forestry Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State, to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources. (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude and the country's forests, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's forests and lands of forest aptitude. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (usucapión), the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, reformed by the Forestry Law, established, before its reform: 'Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within a zone declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the titleholder must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession (posesión decenal) with at least ten years prior to the date of effectiveness of the respective law or decree in which the respective protected wilderness area was created. Properties that are outside those areas and that have forests may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and having protected said natural resource, on the understanding that the property must be duly demarcated with fences or lanes.' In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession falls on the natural resource 'forests' or 'lands of forest aptitude,' and the possessory acts must be directed towards their protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would form part of the natural heritage of the state (article 13 of the new Forestry Law), with character of unseizable and inalienable, and their possession shall not cause any right in favor of individuals (article 14 of the new Forestry Law).- IX. The Agrarian Tribunal, had interpreted Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, before being reformed by the new Forestry Law, in the sense of requiring a personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this regard Votes No. 169 at 9:40 a.m. of March 22, 1991 and No. 251 at 2:00 p.m. of April 17, 1991)...". However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forestry Law was challenged as 'unconstitutional' by the titleholder here, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997) declared, in what is relevant, the following: "The action is partially upheld and, consequently, that the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the reform produced by Forestry Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, is unconstitutional, according to which to title lands comprised in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession of ten years prior to the date of effectiveness of the law or decree creating the protected wilderness area is required, and that in these cases possession transmitted by previous possessors is not favored. This judgment is declaratory and has retroactive effects, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...". In such a way that current possessors can take advantage of the transmitted possession...X. Forestry Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, to be able to title lands comprised in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within a protected wilderness area, whatever its management category, the titleholder must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over the decennial possession (posesión decenal), exercised at least ten years prior to the date of effectiveness of the law or decree in which that wilderness area was created." (Bold is ours). That is, the intention of the legislator is that these areas have been kept protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...". (Resolution at 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Vote No. 113). V.- In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the allegations that the appellant now reiterates, regarding the supposed interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Forestry Law. In a case similar to the one before us, it was said: V.- Regarding what was alleged by the appellant that the judge of first instance makes an error in applying Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which he considers was declared unconstitutional so the proceedings should be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional, rather the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making was, in that it did not count the possession exercised by the previous transferors. Hence, with Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias being in force, the promoter must demonstrate decennial possession (posesión decenal) before the declaration of the protected wilderness area as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would also not be applied retroactively as indicated by the appellant, because the ten-year possession period for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements typical of usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). In this sense, it is important to point out what was said by the Constitutional Chamber in this regard in the cited vote: "... Article 7, first paragraph of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias challenged, whose text is prior to the last reform by Forestry Law No.7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of the titling (titulación) of real estate comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. This article states that the titleholder must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession (posesión decenal) with at least ten years prior to the date of effectiveness of the law or decree that created the wilderness area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling (titulación) of real estate that has been affected to the public domain with the declaration of a protected wilderness area, whatever its specificity. Now it is appropriate to determine if according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion (usucapión) and of the possession necessary for usucapion (usucapión), set forth above, the challenged norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire property over real estate, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe the right to property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. First, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify - increase or decrease - the ten-year possession period necessary for usucapion (usucapión), set in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases where one seeks to acquire the ownership of real estate by positive prescription. The extension of the period alleged by the plaintiff as an infringement of the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the good that is intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the affectation of the good to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wilderness area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements of usucapion (usucapión) from materializing if at that moment the right has not been acquired, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) with the conditions established by law have not elapsed. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as titleholder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Recall that goods affected to the public domain, whatever specifications they have, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion (usucapión), if before the affectation occurs, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right were not met. In this sense, the questioned provision, despite apparently regulating a specific case of usucapion (usucapión), does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm also does not occur, because the ten-year possession period for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements typical of usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle - or more rigorous requirement - in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion (usucapión). It simply specifies the form in which those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of a public domain asset (bien demanial) of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the reform to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion (usucapión), which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest." (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 173 at 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003).

V.- Thus, the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion (usucapión) a land covered with forest, which formed part of the national reserves, must demonstrate decennial possession (posesión decenal) (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected area, it being that in this case it concerns the Volcán Tenorio National Park, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve by means of Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, it being that decennial possession (posesión decenal) prior to that date must be demonstrated and that the possessory acts truly consist of the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the titleholders present as proof of their possession, from a documentary point of view, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Nombre4] sells them the possession, of a land of mountain and pasture of a little over fifty-eight hectares. In said deed, reference is made to a decennial possession (posesión decenal) exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Nombre5] (folio 65); in addition, they presented the notarial certification of date certain, at 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale letter signed by [Nombre5], selling to [Nombre4], a plot of land measuring approximately sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It must be noted that, according to the plan originally provided, the portion of pasture was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90), approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered with "mountain", which undoubtedly is due to the affectation (afectación) made since the year 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans presented at the time, it shows that in the soils of categories IV and VII there is pasture (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If the testimonial statements are observed, the witness [Nombre8] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which in some way could coincide with a part of the property. However, the Tribunal is very concerned that it was indicated in the plan, as a piece of information different from reality, that a public road existed, when in reality it was an access through private properties, but even more, it is concerning to observe the aerial photograph (orthophoto, at folio 239), where one can see how the pasture areas have been gradually expanding on the property intended to be titled, which is not a good sign of ecological possession (posesión ecológica), quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the pasture and corral area is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But in addition, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entirety of the property was changed, indicating in all its perimeters that it is "pasture", which cannot favor, in any way, the "animus" of exercise of a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the representative of the State, in official communication of July 17, 2017, brought this circumstance to the Court's attention. Hence, the titleholder had to correct and present a fourth plan. To all this, is added the fact that none of the witnesses really make a coherent relation regarding the possessory chain. Despite all of them claiming to know the property since 1960, this is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take as given, the existence of an agro-environmental possession ten years before the creation of the Reserve, as an effective possession had to be demonstrated, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers, and the first transmission that is documented is the one that existed as of the year 1984, which would send us back to ten years prior, i.e., to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; the person who transferred possession to the titleholders, in 1993, [Nombre4], acquired in turn from [Nombre5], on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale letter notarized (protocolizada) on June 15, 1987 (see deed at folio 50-51). See that [Nombre9] first mentioned that the owner was [Nombre6], and later says that [Nombre10], that there were fruit trees, oranges and lemons, and that the property was dedicated to cattle maintenance, and that later Mr. [Nombre10] sold to the titleholders. That is, he does not refer to [Nombre4] or [Nombre5]. Much less to other possessory acts. Witness [Nombre11] also speaks of [Nombre6], saying that about twenty years ago the promoters acquired the property, but he does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Nombre12] also speaks of [Nombre6], says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember and that twenty years ago the promoters acquired it. Thus, it is not possible to truly determine from whom [Nombre5] acquired it, and in the sale that he made in 1984 to [Nombre4], there is no mention (folio 51) of time of possession, nor from whom he acquired. In the judicial recognition (reconocimiento judicial) record, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. Mention is made of the existence of paddocks (apartos), cattle, and the rest of protected forest, but stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are also not indicated. From all of the foregoing, it is clear that there are evident contradictions from the witnesses.

All of the foregoing leads the Court to believe that none of the three witnesses truly knows the property sought to be titled, or if they did know it, they stopped visiting it long ago, since the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is currently observed. On the other hand, this Court must indicate that, according to the report from the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are important for the reserve of the existing water resource, especially because it presents high water fragility, and they therefore recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140).

VI.- For greater abundance, this Court cites the precedent of the First Division of Cassation, No. 51-95, through which several possessors claimed possessory rights over the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve (Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste), and in whose judgment it stated: "XVI. The creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve is part of our country's ecological history. It is a response from the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It aimed from ancient times to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. And to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the 1969 Forest Law (Ley Forestal de 1969) and was created by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, private possessors in those areas were to be indemnified for their property and improvements, as they could not carry out agricultural activities to the detriment of forest resources. To compensate that situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decree No. 8473-A of April 24, 1978 established the possibility of relocating them on farms of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización). Many of them were relocated, but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within a zone declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Nombre13], [Nombre14], [Nombre15], [Nombre16], and [Nombre17]. Their claims, consequently, are receivable. This results from a free assessment of evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And this was correctly assessed by the Court according to numeral 54 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria). The remaining possessors were either relocated, or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is inherent to the ecosystem." (First Division of Cassation, No. 51 at 3:15 p.m. on May 26, 1995).

VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, as the provisions of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) have not been met, the appropriate course is to REVOKE the judgment and dismiss these proceedings of Possessory Information (Información Posesoria). By virtue of the opposition of the State, as it is considered part of the State's Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the corresponding plenary action, if they so choose, to assert their rights.

POR TANTO:

The judgment is REVOKED and these proceedings of Possessory Information are dismissed. By virtue of the opposition of the State, as it is considered part of the State's Forest Heritage, the interested parties must resort to the corresponding plenary action, if they so choose, to assert their rights.

13 of January 6, 1939, incorporates these principles. Subsequently, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, in its Article 7, expands the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- **VII.** The special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second is opened through a better-conceived regulation via Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). These laws contain various forest property regimes and limit the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire title over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) without demonstrating that the forest resource has been protected. Its constitutional basis is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institution of forest property and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian property; it is property for conservation, and therefore, the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.- **VIII.** Forest possession has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forest Laws. It falls upon a specific asset: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude (aptitud forestal). The owner or possessor of such assets has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and cannot exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal resolution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, this special legal regime and the principles of Forestry Law must be applied. The Forest Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's **forest resources (recursos forestales)**, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All **forest aptitude lands (terrenos de aptitud forestal)** and **forests (bosques)** of the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The **forest regime (régimen forestal)** is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's **forests and forest aptitude lands (bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal)**. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion, the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, amended by the Forest Law, established, before its reform: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, **the claimant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree creating the respective wilderness area.** Farms that are outside these areas and that **have forests**, may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and **having protected said natural resource**, on the understanding that the property must be properly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "forest aptitude lands," and the possessory acts must be aimed at their protection and conservation. Only if that is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of such possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the natural heritage of the state (Article 13 of the new Forest Law), with the character of unseizable and inalienable, and their possession will not cause any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forest Law).- **IX.** The Agrarian Tribunal had interpreted Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, before being amended by the new Forest Law, in the sense of requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this sense Votes No. 169 of 9 hours 40 minutes of March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 14 hours of April 17, 1991)...". However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forest Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the claimant herein, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Vote No. 4587-97 (published in the Judicial Bulletin No. 188 of October 1, 1997) declared, in what is relevant, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, it is unconstitutional the interpretation of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment produced by the Ley Forestal No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, according to which, to title lands comprised in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected wilderness area, and which does not favor in these cases possession transmitted by previous possessors. This judgment is declaratory and has retroactive effects, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...". So that current possessors can take advantage of transmitted possession... **X.** The Ley Forestal No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in order to be able to title lands comprised in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within a protected wilderness area, whatever its management category, **the claimant must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over the decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree in which that wilderness area was created.**" (The bold is ours). That is, the legislator's intention is that these areas have been maintained protected, conserved throughout this entire time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...". (Resolution of 14:50 hours of February 20, 1998, which corresponds to Vote No. 113).

**V.-** In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the arguments that the appellant now reiterates, regarding the alleged interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Forest Law. In a case similar to the one at hand, it was said: **V.-** Regarding what was alleged by the appellant concerning that the trial judge makes an error by applying Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings should be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional, but rather it was the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making, in that the possession exercised by previous transferors was not counted. Hence, with Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias being in force, the promoter must demonstrate decennial possession before the declaration of the protected wilderness area as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in vote No. 4587-97 (published in Judicial Bulletin No. 188 of October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would not be applied retroactively either, as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of the possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. In this sense, it is important to note what the Constitutional Chamber stated in this regard in the cited vote “… Article 7, first paragraph, of the challenged Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is prior to the last amendment by Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of the titling of real estate comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the claimant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wilderness area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling of a real estate property that has been affected to the public domain by the declaration of a protected wilderness area, whatever its specificity. It is now necessary to determine if, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion and the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth above, the questioned norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over real estate, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe upon the right to property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. First of all, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for usucapion, set in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which one intends to acquire ownership of real estate by adverse possession. The extension of the period that the claimant alleges as an infringement of the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the asset intended to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the affectation of the asset to the public domain occurs. That is, the declaration of a protected wilderness area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and prevents the requirements of usucapion from materializing if by that moment the right has not been acquired, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion have not elapsed with the conditions established by law. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts on the object of possession and its condition of exercise as holder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. It should be remembered that assets affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion if, before the affectation occurred, the conditions necessary for acquiring the right were not met. In this sense, the questioned provision, despite apparently regulating a specific case of usucapion, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm does not occur either, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Civil Code and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of the possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. That is, the norm does not come to establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion. It simply specifies the way in which those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of a demanial asset of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion, which could have worsened the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest. (Agrarian Tribunal, No. 173 of 16:29 hours of March 31, 2003).

**V.-** So that the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion a land covered by forest, which formed part of the national reserves, must demonstrate **decennial possession (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation** of the Protected Area, being that in this case it concerns the Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, which is affected to the public domain since the creation of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste by Decree No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, being that a decennial possession prior to that date should be demonstrated and that the possessory acts consist, truly, in the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the claimants present as proof of their possession, from a documentary point of view, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Nombre4] sells them the possession, of a mountain and pasture land of a little over fifty-eight hectares. In said deed, reference is made to a decennial possession exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Nombre5] (folio 65); in addition, the notarial certification of a fixed date was presented, of 10 hours of June 15, 1987, of the private sale agreement signed by [Nombre5], selling to [Nombre4], a plot of land measuring more or less sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It must be noted that, according to the originally submitted plan, the portion of pasture was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90), approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered by "mountain", which undoubtedly responds to the affectation carried out since 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans presented at the time, being that on category IV and VII soils there is pasture (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If the testimonial statements are observed, the witness [Nombre8] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which in some way could coincide with a part of the property. However, the Tribunal is very concerned that it was indicated on the plan, as a fact differing from reality, that a public road existed, when in reality it was an access through private farms, but even more so, it is concerning to observe the aerial photograph (orthophoto, from folio 239), where it is observed how, gradually, the pasture area on the farm intended to be titled has been expanding, which is not a good sign of ecological possession, quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the pasture and corral area is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But in addition, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entirety of the property was changed, indicating on all its perimeters that it is "pasture", which cannot favor, in any way, the "animus" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the representative of the State, in an official communication of July 17, 2017, made that circumstance known to the Court. Hence, the claimant had to correct and present a fourth plan. To all this is added the fact that none of the witnesses really make a coherent account regarding the possessory chain. Even though all claim to have known the farm since 1960, that is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of an agro-environmental possession ten years before the creation of the Reserve, since an effective possession had to be demonstrated, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers, and the first transmission that is documented is the one that existed as of 1984, which would take us back ten years earlier, that is, to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; whoever transmitted the possession to the claimants in 1993, [Nombre4], acquired in turn from [Nombre5], on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale agreement and protocolized on June 15, 1987 (see deed of folio 50-51). Note that [Nombre9] first mentioned that the owner was [Nombre6], and then says [Nombre10], that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that the property was dedicated to maintaining cattle, and that subsequently Mr. [Nombre10] sold to the claimants. That is, he does not refer to [Nombre4] or to [Nombre5]. Much less to other possessory acts. The witness [Nombre11] also speaks of [Nombre6], saying that about twenty years ago the promoters acquired the property, but does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Nombre12] also speaks of [Nombre6], says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember and that twenty years ago the promoters acquired it. So it is not possible to determine, really, from whom [Nombre5] acquired, and in the sale that he makes in 1984 to [Nombre4], nothing is said (folio 51) about the time of possession, nor from whom he acquired. In the judicial site inspection report, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. There is talk of the existence of cattle handling facilities, cattle, and the rest of protected forest, but stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are not indicated either. From all the above, it follows that there are evident contradictions by the witnesses. All the foregoing leads the Tribunal to think that none of the three witnesses really knows the property intended to be titled, or if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, since the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is observed today. On the other hand, it must be indicated by this Tribunal that according to the report of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are important for the reserve of the existing water resource, especially because it presents a high hydrological fragility, so they recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters, and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140).

VI.- Furthermore, this Tribunal cites the precedent of the First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51-95, through which various possessors claimed possessory rights over the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste, and in whose judgment it stated: "***XVI.** **The creation of the Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response of the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It aimed, since long ago, to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. And to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the 1969 Forest Law and was created by Decreto Nº 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, private possessors in said areas were to be compensated for their property and improvements, since they could not carry out agricultural activities to the detriment of forest resources**. To compensate for that situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decreto Nº 8473-A of April 24, 1978, established the possibility of relocating them on farms of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Many of them were relocated but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within a zone declared inalienable. Some actors demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Nombre13], [Nombre14], [Nombre15], [Nombre16], and [Nombre17]. Their claims, consequently, are admissible.* This results from a free assessment of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And this was correctly appreciated by the Court in accordance with numeral 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. The remaining possessors were either relocated, or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is inherent to the ecosystem.</span><span>\" (Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51 of 15:15 hours on May 26, 1995).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, since the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones posesorias are not fulfilled, it is appropriate to REVOKE the judgment and dismiss these possessory information (Información Posesoria) proceedings. By virtue of the State's opposition, considering it to be part of the Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, the interested parties must resort to the corresponding declaratory proceeding, should they see fit, to assert their rights. </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">POR TANTO:</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">The judgment is</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial\"> REVOKED and these possessory information (Información Posesoria) proceedings are dismissed. By virtue of the State's opposition, considering it to be part of the Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, the interested parties must resort to the corresponding declaratory proceeding, should they see fit, to assert their rights.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:5.1pt; margin-bottom:5.1pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:10pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt\"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"width:36pt; 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padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:12pt\">*RYRQ3TKKF3Q61*</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt\">RYRQ3TKKF3Q61</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt\">[Name20]</span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style=\"font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt\">- JUDGE/A</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"width:156pt; padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:156pt; padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"width:156pt; padding-right:3.25pt; padding-left:3.25pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt\">&#xa0;</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:23.25pt\"><span style=\"font-size:10pt\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt\"><span>EXP: EXPN1</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; text-align:center; border-bottom:0.75pt solid #000000; font-size:8pt\"><span>II Circuito Judicial San José, [Address7] ,</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, [Address8]</span><span style=\"-aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span>de Goicoechea frente al parqueo del Hospital Hotel La Católica Teléfonos: [Phone1]. Fax: [Phone2] ó [Phone3].</span> "III.- As to the merits of the case. First, it must be noted that the argument of the first-instance Judge is not based on the application of the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, since it refers to general possession of ten years in its statement of proven facts. Regarding this rule, the following has been indicated: IV.- On the subject of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, and the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), the Tribunal, in reiterated decisions, has stated: “The Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in its Article 7, as well as the Forestry Laws, have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling of such areas has been permitted, which, once declared conservation areas, become part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), compliance with other more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession, and to the criterion of the ecological function of forest property. In reiterated rulings, both from the Sala Primera de Casación and from this very Tribunal Superior Agrario, the principles that must govern the resolution of this type of agro-environmental situations have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutes of agrarian possession and ecological possession. The jurisprudence itself has recognized and developed these institutes, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession and, recently, of ecological possession (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest property). The same Jurisprudence has sought to distinguish business property and possession where an activity directed at forest cultivation is carried out, from that where merely an extractive activity or a purely conservationist one is performed. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of forest property or possession (without a business). It is precisely in these cases where the Ley Forestal establishes an entire legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. Thus, in forest possession, the de facto power is exercised over an asset of forest vocation or mostly intended to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation or, alternatively, dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In either case, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but rather represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. Moreover, it denies the possibility of acquiring possession rights over lands of national reserves when harmful action against forest resources has been exercised. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a Forest Law, with particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession as a real right derived from it, or conceived independently, began to take shape from the Código Fiscal of 1885, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporated said principles. Then, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización in its Article 7 expanded the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- VII. The special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35 [sic], 1969. The second was opened through better-conceived legislation via Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was later declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of the Ley Forestal No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Ley No. 7575 of February 13, 1996 (published in supplement 21 of La Gaceta No. 72 of Tuesday, April 16, 1996). In them, various regimes of forest property are contained, and they limit the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire title over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) if one does not demonstrate having protected the forest resource. Its constitutional foundation is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institute of forest property and possession is protected. This is not equal to civil or agrarian property; it is a property for conservation, and therefore the possessory acts carried out therein must have that purpose.- VIII. Forest possession has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forestry Laws. It falls upon a specific asset: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude. The owner or possessor of such assets has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and cannot exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal resolution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession, this special legal regime and the principles of Forest Law must be applied. The Ley Forestal establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's forest resources, according to the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All lands of forest aptitude and the country’s forests, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The forest regime is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other rules that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country’s forests and lands of forest aptitude. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (adverse possession), the exercise of forest possession is required. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, amended by the Ley Forestal, established, before its amendment: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within a zone declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree that created the respective protected area. Properties that are outside these areas and have forests may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten or more years and having protected said natural resource, on the understanding that the property must be properly demarcated with fences or lanes." In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be aimed at their protection and conservation. Only if this is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of said possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the State Natural Heritage (Article 13 of the new Ley Forestal), with unseizable and inalienable character, and their possession will not create any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Ley Forestal).- IX. The Tribunal Agrario had interpreted Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, before being amended by the new Ley Forestal, in the sense of requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See, in this sense, Votos No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)..." However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley Forestal was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the applicant here, and the Sala Constitucional, in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997) declared, in what is relevant, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, it is unconstitutional the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the amendment produced by the Ley Forestal No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, according to which to title lands comprised in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required with ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree creating the protected area, and that in these cases possession transmitted by previous possessors does not benefit. This ruling is declaratory and has retroactive effects, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith..." Thus, current possessors can take advantage of transmitted possession... X. The Ley Forestal No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, in order to be able to title lands comprised in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is comprised within a protected area, whatever its management category, the title applicant must demonstrate being the holder of the legal rights over decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created that protected area." (Our emphasis). That is, the legislator's intention is that these areas have been kept protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas..." (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Voto No. 113). V.- In more recent cases, the Tribunal has rejected the arguments that the appellant now reiterates, regarding the alleged interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Ley Forestal. In a case similar to the one at hand, it was stated: V.- Regarding what was alleged by the appellant that the first-instance judge made an error when applying Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which he considers was declared unconstitutional and therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Tribunal considers he is not correct because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional; rather, it was the interpretation that the Tribunal had been making insofar as the possession exercised by previous transferors was not counted. Hence, since ordinal 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is in force, the promoter must demonstrate decennial possession before the declaration of the protected area, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional in Voto No. 4587-97 (published in Boletín Judicial No. 188 dated October 1, 1997). It is important to mention that the law would not be applied retroactively either, as indicated by the appellant, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Código Civil and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. In this sense, it is important to note what was said by the Sala Constitucional in this regard in the cited Voto: "...The challenged first paragraph of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text predates the latest amendment by Ley Forestal No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling real property comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the protected area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling a real property that has been affected to the public domain by the declaration of a protected area, whatever its specificity. It is now necessary to determine if, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged rule, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion and the possession necessary for usucapion, set forth above, the questioned rule regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over real property, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe upon the right to property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. In the first place, it must be noted that the questioned article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year possession period necessary for usucapion, fixed in Article 860 of the Código Civil for the generality of cases in which one seeks to acquire ownership of real property by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the plaintiff alleges as infringing the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the asset to be titled (public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion must elapse before the asset is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected area prevents possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes the concretization of the requirements for usucapion if, at that moment, the right has not been acquired, i.e., the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion with the conditions established by law have not elapsed. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as a titleholder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Remember that assets affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion if, before the affectation occurred, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right were not met. In this sense, the questioned provision, although it apparently regulates a specific case of usucapion, does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Código Civil for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the rule also does not occur, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion is established in the Código Civil and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion that are also defined in the general regulations, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion. That is, the rule does not come to establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion. It simply specifies the way in which those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of a demanial asset of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the amendment to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion, which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest." (Tribunal Agrario, No. 173 of 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003). V.- Thus, the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion a forest-covered land that formed part of the national reserves must demonstrate decennial possession (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected Area, it being that in this case it concerns the Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste through Decreto No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, with it being necessary to demonstrate decennial possession prior to that date and that the possessory acts truly consist of the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the title applicants present as proof of their possession, from the documentary point of view, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Nombre1] sells them the possession of a mountainous and pasture land of slightly more than fifty-eight hectares.

In said deed, reference is made to a ten-year possession (posesión decenal) exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Nombre2] (folio 65); in addition, he submitted the notarial certification of fixed date, as of 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale agreement signed by [Nombre2], selling to [Nombre1], a plot of land measuring approximately sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It should be noted that, according to the originally submitted plan, the portion of pasture was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90); approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered by "montaña" (forest), which undoubtedly stems from the declaration of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste as a protected area since 1976. Despite this, one of the plans they submitted at the time indicates the existence of pasture on Category IV and VII soils (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If the testimonial statements are examined, witness [Nombre3] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which could somehow coincide with a part of the property. However, the Court is very concerned that the plan indicated, as a fact distinct from reality, the existence of a public road, when in reality it was access through private farms; but even more concerning is observing the aerial photograph (orthophoto, folio 239), where one can see how the pasture area on the farm sought to be titled has been gradually expanding, which is not a good sign of an ecological possession (posesión ecológica); quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the pasture and corral area is expanded, and the forest area is restricted. Furthermore, a third plan was submitted, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the nature of the entire property was changed, indicating on all its perimeters that it is "pasture," which cannot favor, in any way, the "animus" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the State's representative, in an official communication dated July 17, 2017, brought this circumstance to the Court's attention. Hence, the applicant had to correct this and submit a fourth plan. To all of this is added the fact that none of the witnesses actually provides a coherent account regarding the possessory chain. Although all claim to have known the farm since 1960, that is not sufficient to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of an agro-environmental possession (posesión agroambiental) ten years before the creation of the Reserve, since effective possession had to be demonstrated, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers; and the first transfer that is documented is that which existed as of 1984, which would refer us back ten years prior, i.e., to 1976. The public documents submitted speak of at least two transfers: the person who transferred possession to the title applicants in 1993, [Nombre1], acquired it in turn from [Nombre2], on May 14, 1984, by private sale agreement, notarized on June 15, 1987 (see deed at folios 50-51). Note that [Nombre4] first mentioned that the owner was [Nombre5], and then says [Nombre6]; that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that they dedicated the property to cattle maintenance, and that subsequently Mr. [Nombre6] sold to the title applicants. That is, he does not refer to [Nombre1] or to [Nombre2]. Much less to other possessory acts. Witness [Nombre7] also speaks of [Nombre5], saying that the applicants acquired the property about twenty years ago, but he does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and possessory acts. Finally, [Nombre8] also speaks of [Nombre5], states that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember, and that the applicants acquired it twenty years ago. In such a way that it is not possible to determine, actually, from whom [Nombre2] acquired it, and in the sale he made in 1984 to [Nombre1], nothing is said (folio 51) about the time of possession, nor from whom he acquired it. In the judicial site inspection report, nothing is said about fruit trees, to which one of the witnesses referred, nor about the existence of a dwelling house. The existence of paddocks (apartos), cattle, and the rest of protected forest is mentioned, but stable and continuous possessory acts in that sense are not indicated either. From all the foregoing, it follows that there are evident contradictions among the witnesses. All of the above leads the Court to believe that none of the three witnesses truly knows the property sought to be titled, or that if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, since the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is observed today. On the other hand, this Court must point out that, according to the report of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are important for the reserve of the existing water resources, especially because they present high water fragility, so they recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140). VI.- For the sake of further argument, this Court cites the precedent of the Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51-95, through which several possessors claimed possessory rights over the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste, and in which judgment it stated: "XVI. The creation of the Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response by the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It sought from long ago to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and to bequeath it to future generations. It was born under the validity of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) of 1969 and was created by Decreto Nº 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, the private possessors in said areas had to be compensated for their property and improvements, because they could not carry out agricultural activities to the detriment of forest resources. To compensate for this situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decreto Nº 8473-A of April 24, 1978 established the possibility of relocating them in farms belonging to the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Many of them were relocated, but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within an area declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Nombre9], [Nombre10], [Nombre11], [Nombre12], and [Nombre13]. Their claims, consequently, are admissible. This results from a free evaluation of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And this was correctly appreciated by the Court in accordance with numeral 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law. The remaining possessors were either relocated or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is proper to the ecosystem." (Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51 of 15:15 on May 26, 1995). VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, since the provisions of Article 7 of the Law of Possessory Informations (Ley de Informaciones Posesorias) are not fulfilled, the appropriate course is to REVOKE the judgment and reject these proceedings of Possessory Information. By virtue of the State's opposition, considering it to be part of the State's Forest Patrimony (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the corresponding plenary proceeding, if they deem it appropriate to assert their rights." Regarding this rule, the following has been stated: **IV.-** On the subject of the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias and the State's Natural Heritage, the Court has repeatedly held: “Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, as well as the Forestry Laws, have sought to protect forest resources from human action, subjecting them to various forms of forest management. Although the titling of such areas has been permitted, which, once declared conservation areas, become part of the State's Forest Heritage, compliance with other more qualified requirements is demanded. This leads us directly to the concept of ecological possession (posesión ecológica) and the criterion of the ecological function of forest property. In reiterated rulings, both from the First Chamber of Cassation and from this Superior Agrarian Court, the principles that must govern to resolve this type of agro-environmental situations have been established. Our country has been a pioneer in the construction of the institutes of agrarian possession and ecological possession (posesión ecológica). The same jurisprudence has recognized and developed these institutes, as well as the life cycle of agrarian possession and, recently, of ecological possession (posesión ecológica) (within the broader criterion of the ecological function of forest property). The same Jurisprudence has sought to distinguish business property and possession, where an activity directed at forest cultivation is carried out, from that where merely an extractive or purely conservative activity is performed. In these latter cases, one would be in the presence of forest property or possession (posesión forestal) (without a business). It is precisely in these cases where the Forestry Law establishes an entire legal regime for the protection of forest resources, sometimes subjecting the owner obligatorily to the forest regime and in other cases voluntarily. In this way, **in forest possession (posesión forestal)** the de facto power is exercised over a property of forest vocation or mostly destined to protect forest resources, without a view to its exploitation or, dedicating it to the simple extraction of timber species, through management plans to achieve the natural regeneration of the forest. In either case, there would be no development of a plant or animal biological cycle, nor would man assume any risk. That is why the law does not protect, but rather represses, possession through which the forest resources of protected areas are destroyed. It also denies the possibility of acquiring possession rights over lands of the national reserves when harmful action has been exercised against the forest resources. Today, part of the agrarian doctrine affirms the existence of a **Forestry Law (Derecho forestal)**, with particularities of an organic and complete system, where the institutes of forest property and possession occupy an important place. In Costa Rica, forest property, and also forest possession (posesión forestal) as a real right derived from it, or conceived independently, began to take shape since the Fiscal Code of 1885, which establishes an entire chapter regarding forests whose regulations tend toward their conservation. Subsequently, the Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 of January 6, 1939, incorporated these principles. Then, the Ley de Tierras y Colonización in its Article 7 expanded the national reserves for the protection of such resources.- **VII.** The special legislation regarding the protection of forest property and possession has three stages in our country. The first stage of forest property is framed by Law No. 4465 of November 35, 1969. The second was opened through a better-conceived regulation through Law No. 7032 of April 7, 1986, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional. The last operates with the enactment of the Forestry Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, recently amended by Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996. In them, various regimes of forest property are contained, and it limits the use and exploitation of resources by private individuals. It is not possible to acquire title over lands with forest cover (cobertura boscosa) if the protection of the forest resource has not been demonstrated. Its constitutional foundation is found in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Constitution. Through limitations of social interest, the institute of forest property and possession is protected. This is not the same as civil or agrarian property; it is a property for conservation, and therefore the possessory acts carried out on it must have that purpose.- **VIII.** Forest possession (posesión forestal) has had its legal regime in the aforementioned Forestry Laws. It falls upon a specific good: lands covered by forests or of forest aptitude. The owner or possessor of such goods has the obligation to conserve the forest resources and cannot exploit them economically except under the restrictions or limitations imposed by law. For the legal solution of conflicts arising from the exercise of forest possession (posesión forestal), that special legal regime and the principles of Forestry Law must be applied. The Forestry Law establishes as an essential function and priority of the State to ensure the protection, conservation, exploitation, industrialization, administration, and promotion of the country's **forest resources**, in accordance with the principle of rational use of renewable natural resources (Article 1). All **lands of forest aptitude** and **the forests** of the country, whether state-owned or reduced to private domain, are subject to the purposes of the law. The **forest regime** is the set of provisions, among others, of a legal, economic, and technical nature, established by the law, its regulations, and other norms, that regulate the conservation, renewal, exploitation, and development of the country's **forests and lands of forest aptitude**. Therefore, to acquire forest property by usucapion (usucapión), the exercise of forest possession (posesión forestal) is required. Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, amended by the Forestry Law, established, before its reform: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is included within a zone declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone, **the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the respective law or decree that created the respective wild area.** Farms that are outside these areas and that **have forests**, may only be titled if the promoter demonstrates having possessed them for ten years or more and **having protected said natural resource**, on the understanding that the property must be duly bounded with fences or tracks." In other terms, the de facto power in forest possession (posesión forestal) falls upon the natural resource "forests" or "lands of forest aptitude," and the possessory acts must be aimed at its protection and conservation. Only if that is demonstrated could lands be acquired or registered in favor of such possessors. Otherwise, they would become part of the state's natural heritage (Article 13 of the new Forestry Law), with an unseizable and inalienable character, and their possession will not cause any right in favor of private individuals (Article 14 of the new Forestry Law).- **IX.** The Agrarian Court had interpreted Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, before being amended by the new Forestry Law, in the sense of requiring personal possession, exercised ten years prior to the creation of the forest reserve or protected area (See in this sense Rulings No. 169 of 9:40 a.m. on March 22, 1991, and No. 251 of 2:00 p.m. on April 17, 1991)...". However, that interpretation of Article 7 of the Forestry Law was challenged as "unconstitutional" by the title applicant here, and the Constitutional Chamber, in Ruling No. 4587-97, declared, in what is of interest, the following: "The action is partially granted and, consequently, that the interpretation of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias No. 139 of July 14, 1941, whose text corresponds to the reform produced by Forestry Law No. 7174 of June 28, 1990, is unconstitutional, according to which, to title lands included in national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, or protective zones, personal possession is required ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the protected wild area, and which does not favor in these cases the possession transmitted by previous possessors. This judgment is declaratory and its effects retroactive, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith...". Such that current possessors can take advantage of the transmitted possession... **X.** Forestry Law No. 7575 also maintained the restrictions in the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, to be able to title lands included in protected areas. In this regard, the current numeral provides: "Article 7.- When the property to which the information refers is included within a protected wild area, whatever its management category, **the title applicant must demonstrate being the holder of legal rights over the decennial possession, exercised at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created said wild area.**"(The bold is ours). That is, the legislator's intention is that these areas have been maintained protected, conserved during all this time, even before the creation of the Reserves and protected areas...". (Resolution of 2:50 p.m. on February 20, 1998, corresponding to Ruling No. 113). **V.-** In more recent cases, the Court has rejected the arguments that the appellant now reiterates, regarding the supposed interpretation or retroactive application of Article 7 of the Forestry Law. In a case similar to the one at hand, it was stated: **V.-** Regarding what was alleged by the appellant that the lower court judge makes an error in applying Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, which he considers was declared unconstitutional, and therefore the proceedings must be analyzed in light of the provisions of Article 1 of said Law, this Court considers he is not correct because the cited Article 7 was not declared unconstitutional; rather, what was declared unconstitutional was the interpretation that the Court had been making in that the possession exercised by previous transferors was not counted. Hence, since Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias is in force, the promoter must demonstrate a decennial possession prior to the declaration of the protected wild area as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 4587-97. It is important to mention that the law is also not being applied retroactively as the appellant indicates, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulation, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). In that sense, it is important to note what was said by the Constitutional Chamber in this regard in the cited ruling: “…The challenged first paragraph of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is prior to the last reform by Forestry Law No. 7575 of February 13, 1996, regulates the case of titling real estate comprised within an area declared a national park, biological reserve, forest reserve, or protective zone. That article states that the title applicant must demonstrate having exercised decennial possession at least ten years prior to the effective date of the law or decree that created the wild area. The questioned provision regulates the case of titling a real estate property that has been affected to the public domain with the declaration of a protected wild area, whatever its specificity. It is now appropriate to determine whether, according to the hypothesis contemplated by the challenged norm, in light of the doctrinal and jurisprudential criteria that inform the institutes of usucapion (usucapión) and the possession necessary for usucapion (usucapión) set forth above, the challenged norm regulates a special type of possession necessary to acquire ownership over real estate, which imposes specific requirements that may infringe the right of property or the principle of non-retroactivity of the law to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, regulated in the Constitution. First of all, it must be noted that the challenged article does not modify—increase or decrease—the ten-year period of possession necessary for usucapion (usucapión), fixed in Article 860 of the Civil Code for the generality of cases in which it is intended to acquire the ownership of real estate by positive prescription. The extension of the period that the plaintiff alleges as infringing the right to property does not occur, because given the nature of the good to be titled (a public thing), the period of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) must elapse before the property is affected to the public domain. That is, the declaration of a protected wild area prevents the possession subsequent to the affectation from counting, and impedes the requirements of usucapion (usucapión) from being completed if at that time the right has not been acquired, that is, the ten years of possession suitable for usucapion (usucapión) with the conditions established by law have not elapsed. The foregoing is only the natural result of applying the concepts regarding the object of possession and its condition of exercise as a titleholder, necessary for possession ad usucapionem. Remember that goods affected to the public domain, whatever their specifications, are not susceptible to acquisition by usucapion (usucapión), if the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the right were not present before the affectation occurred. In this sense, the questioned provision, despite apparently regulating a specific case of usucapion (usucapión), does not create a regime with requirements different from those established in the Civil Code for the generality of cases. In this sense, the alleged retroactive effect of the norm also does not occur, because the ten-year period of possession for usucapion (usucapión) is established in the Civil Code, and the questioned provision simply highlights certain elements inherent to usucapion (usucapión) that are also defined in the general regulation, such as: the object of possession and the conditions under which it must be exercised to be suitable for usucapion (usucapión). That is, the norm does not establish any different principle—or more rigorous requirement—in relation to the application of the general rules of usucapion (usucapión). It simply specifies how those rules must be applied, which coincides with a logical result given the condition of a public domain good of the object to be titled. Hence, it is not considered that the reform to Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, whose text is challenged, introduced a different regime in relation to the requirements of usucapion (usucapión), which could have aggravated the situation of persons who were exercising possession ad usucapionem on lands that were declared of public interest. (Agrarian Court, No. 173 of 4:29 p.m. on March 31, 2003).

**V.-** Such that the possessor who intends to acquire by usucapion (usucapión) a land covered by forest, which formed part of the national reserves, must demonstrate decennial possession (posesión decenal) (original or transmitted), and having conserved the forest resource, at least ten years before the creation of the Protected Area, being that in this case it concerns the Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, which has been affected to the public domain since the creation of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste by Decreto No. 5836-A of March 16, 1976, being that a decennial possession prior to that date must be demonstrated and that the possessory acts consist, truly, in the protection of the forest resource. In the present case, the title applicants present as proof of their possession, from a documentary point of view, deed No. 136 of August 11, 1993, by which [Nombre4] sells them the possession of a mountain and pasture land of a little over fifty-eight hectares. In said deed, reference is made to a decennial possession exercised by him and his previous transferor, [Nombre5] (folio 65); moreover, he presented the notarized certification of fixed date, of 10:00 a.m. on June 15, 1987, of the private sale purchase agreement signed by [Nombre5], selling to [Nombre4], a lot of land measuring more or less sixty manzanas (folios 50 and 51). It must be noted that according to the originally submitted plan, the portion of pastureland was smaller (see Plan A-878231-90), approximately 70% (39.40 hectares) of the land is covered by "mountain," which undoubtedly is due to the affectation carried out since 1976 of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Despite this, in one of the plans they presented at the time, being that in soil categories IV and VII there is pastureland (4.67 and 6.50 hectares respectively). If the testimonial statements are observed, the witness [Nombre8] indicates that the approximate area measures thirty hectares and is mixed, which in some way could coincide with a part of the property. However, the Court is very concerned that it was indicated in the plan, as data different from reality, that a public road existed, when in reality it was an access through private farms, but even more so, it is concerning to observe the aerial photograph (orthophoto, from folio 239), where one observes how, gradually, the area of pasturelands has been expanding on the farm intended to be titled, which is not a good sign of ecological possession (posesión ecológica); quite the contrary, there has been an invasion of the territory of the National Park. See how in the 2013 plan (folio 240), the area of pastureland and corral is widened, and the mountain area is restricted. But in addition, a third plan was presented, namely Number A-1954148-2017, in which the entire property's nature was changed, indicating in all its perimeters that it is "pastureland," which cannot favor, in any way, the "animus" of exercising a possession that must be ecological. Hence, the State's representative, in official communication of July 17, 2017, pointed out that circumstance to the Court. Hence, the title applicant had to correct and present a fourth plan. To all this, is added the fact that none of the witnesses really make a coherent account regarding the possessory chain. Although all affirm knowing the farm since 1960, that is not enough to demonstrate, or worse, to take for granted, the existence of an agro-environmental possession ten years before the creation of the Reserve, as an effective possession had to be demonstrated, at least since 1967, as well as the chain of transfers, and the first transmission that is documented is the one that existed from the year 1984, which would refer us back ten years earlier, i.e., to 1976. The public documents presented speak of at least two transmissions; the person who transmitted the possession to the title applicants in 1993, [Nombre4], acquired it in turn from [Nombre5], on May 14, 1984, by means of a private sale purchase agreement and notarized on June 15, 1987 (see deed on folio 50-51). Note that [Nombre9] first mentioned that the owner was [Nombre6], and later says [Nombre10], that there were fruit trees, oranges, and lemons, and that the property was dedicated to cattle raising, and that subsequently Mr. [Nombre10] sold to the title applicants.

That is to say, it does not refer to [Nombre4] nor to [Nombre5]. Much less to other possessory acts. The witness [Nombre11] also speaks of [Nombre6], saying that about twenty years ago the promoters acquired the property, but he does not remember who sold it to them. There is also an absence of a possessory chain and of possessory acts. Finally, [Nombre12] also speaks of [Nombre6], says that he transferred it to another person whose name he does not remember and that the promoters acquired it twenty years ago. Thus, it is not possible to determine, really, from whom [Nombre5] acquired it, and in the sale he made in 1984 to [Nombre4], there is no mention (folio 51) of time of possession, nor from whom he acquired it. The judicial inspection report says nothing about fruit trees, which one of the witnesses referred to, nor about the existence of a dwelling. It speaks of the existence of paddocks, cattle, and the remainder of protected forest, but it also does not indicate stable and continuous possessory acts in that regard. From all the foregoing, it is clear that there are evident contradictions among the witnesses. All of the above leads the Tribunal to think that none of the three witnesses really knows the property sought to be titled, or if they knew it, they stopped visiting it a long time ago, as the description they give of the property does not correspond to what is observed today. Furthermore, this Tribunal must indicate that, according to the report of the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, these territories are important for the reservation of the existing water resources (recurso hídrico), especially because they present high water fragility, for which reason they recommend rigorously respecting and protecting the waters, and their recharge and protection zones (see folios 139 and 140).

VI.- Furthermore, this Tribunal cites the precedent of the First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51-95, through which several possessors claimed possessory rights over the Cordillera Volcánica de Guancaste Forest Reserve, and in whose judgment it stated: "XVI. The creation of the Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste Forest Reserve is part of the ecological history of our country. It is a response by the Costa Rican legislator to the conservation of natural resources. It sought from long ago to guarantee a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. And to bequeath it to future generations. It was created under the validity of the Ley Forestal of 1969 and was established by Decreto Nº 5836-A of March 16, 1976. With its creation, private possessors in said areas had to be compensated for their property and improvements, as they could not carry out agricultural activities to the detriment of forest resources. To compensate for that situation, and not leave many possessors unprotected, Decreto Nº 8473-A of April 24, 1978, established the possibility of relocating them to farms of the Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Many of them were relocated but others continued possessing within the Forest Reserve. That is, they possessed within a zone declared inalienable. Some plaintiffs demonstrated the exercise of agrarian possession without being relocated. Among them are [Nombre13], [Nombre14], [Nombre15], [Nombre16], and [Nombre17]. Their claims, consequently, are receivable. This results from a free assessment of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. And this was correctly appreciated by the Tribunal in accordance with numeral 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. The remaining possessors were either relocated, or did not demonstrate the exercise of effective and intentional possessory acts aimed at conserving the forest. Their lands were totally and practically covered by natural forests whose conservation is inherent to the ecosystem." (First Chamber of Cassation, No. 51 at 3:15 p.m., May 26, 1995).

VI.- By virtue of all the foregoing, as the provisions of Article 7 of the Ley de Informaciones Posesorias have not been fulfilled, it is appropriate to REVOKE the judgment and reject the present Possessory Information proceedings. By virtue of the State's opposition, as it is considered part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the appropriate declaratory proceeding, if they so wish, to assert their rights.

POR TANTO:

The judgment is REVOKED and the present Possessory Information proceedings are rejected. By virtue of the State's opposition, as it is considered part of the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), the interested parties must resort to the appropriate declaratory proceeding, if they so wish, to assert their rights.

VOTO N° 391-F-18 TRIBUNAL AGRARIO. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ.- A las ocho horas y veintinueve minutos del diez de mayo de dos mil dieciocho.- PROCESO DE INFORMACIÓN POSESORIA, promovida por [Nombre1] , mayor, casado una vez separado de hecho, ganadero, cédula de identidad CED1 - - ; y [Nombre2] , mayor, casado una vez, ganadero, cédula de identidad CED2 - - , ambos vecinos de Tronadora, Tilarán, Guanacaste. Intervienen en el proceso, la PROCURADURÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA, representada por Susana Fallas Cubero, mayor, abogada, cédula de identidad CED3 - - - , en su condición de procuradora adjunta; y el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, cédula jurídica número CED4 - - - , representado Carmelina Vargas Hidalgo, mayor, divorciada, abogada, vecina de Guachipelín, Escazú, cédula de identidad CED5 - - , en su condición de apoderada general judicial. Actúa como apoderada especial judicial de los promoventes la licenciada Enid Álvarez Zúñiga, colegiada veintiún mil cuatrocientos cincuenta y cinco. Tramitado ante el Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Liberia.-

RESULTANDO:

1.- Los promoventes interpusieron proceso de información posesoria con el fin que se inscriba a sus nombres en el Registro Público de la Propiedad la finca que se describe así:"... Terreno de potrero y montaña, situado en Bijagua ([Dirección1] ), Upala (cantón trece), de la provincia de Alajuela. Linderos: NORTE: afluente del Río Bijagua, parcelas del IDA y Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A.; SUR: [Nombre3] y El Estado; ESTE: El Estado; y OESTE: [Dirección2] con un frente a ella de [Dirección3] treinta [Dirección4] ocho punto diecisiete metros lineales, en parte Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A. y en parte Servidumbre agrícola de paso...".( folio 14, y escritorio virtual del Juzgado Agrario de Liberia, documentos asociados, sentencia de primer instancia incorporada el 21/03/2018 15:28:19).

2.- La Procuraduría General de la República se apersonó al proceso en los términos que corren a folio 33 a 35, 51 a 52; a su vez el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural se apersono al proceso a folio 58.- 3.- El juez José Francisco Chacón Acuña, del Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de Guanacaste, Liberia, mediante sentencia número 46-S-2018, de las quince horas y veintiocho minutos del veintiuno de marzo del año dos mil dieciocho, resolvió: “POR TANTO: Se APRUEBA esta INFORMACIÓN POSESORIA. En vista de la situación de los caminos que corren frente a la finca inscrita mediante esta información, ésta quedará afectada por las reservas que indica la Ley General de Caminos Públicos, en cuanto a que el ancho mínimo de las carreteras es de veinte metros y de los caminos vecinales de catorce metros. Las aguas superficiales y subterráneas existentes en el inmueble son de dominio público y no forman parte de la finca. A favor de la finca descrita y en contra del inmueble que más adelante se citará existe una servidumbre de paso con las siguientes características: largo: quinientos treinta y nueve punto treinta metros lineales; ancho: siete metros lineales; dirección: [Dirección5]; fin: paso a pie, a caballo, en carreta, en vehículo o en cualquier medio de locomoción, así como de cañería y de líneas eléctricas; estimación: mil colones; fundo dominante: el inmueble a titular; fundo sirviente: finca de Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A., inscrita al Registro Inmobiliario, Provincia de Alajuela, matrícula CED6 . Proceda el REGISTRO PÚBLICO INMOBILIARIO a inscribir, libre de gravámenes, salvo la servidumbre referida y con las cargas reales ya señaladas, sin perjuicio de terceros de mejor derecho, a nombre de [Nombre1] y [Nombre2] , en común y por partes iguales , el inmueble que se describe así: Terreno de potrero y montaña, situado en Bijagua ([Dirección1] ), Upala (cantón [Dirección6]), de la provincia de Alajuela. Linderos: NORTE: afluente del Río Bijagua, parcelas del IDA y Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A.; SUR: [Nombre3] y El Estado; ESTE: El Estado; y OESTE: [Dirección2] con un frente a ella de novecientos treinta y ocho punto diecisiete metros lineales, en parte Ganadera Entre Volcanes S.A. y en parte Servidumbre agrícola de paso. Según plano catastrado dos-dos cero uno cinco siete cuatro dos-dos mil diecisiete , de fecha veinte de noviembre de dos mil diecisiete , mide de extensión quinientos setenta y cinco mil cero noventa metros cuadrados. En el inmueble se han ejercido los actos posesorios, cumpliendo con el uso conforme del suelo. Deben las personas titulantes mantener el uso actual de la tierra, aumentar el número de apartos en función de las unidades animales existentes, períodos de alimentación y reposo convenientes de las pasturas y procurar la siembra de pastos de piso. En el inmueble existe una alta fragilidad hídrica que el Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados considera no abastece a acueducto alguno ni está proyectada su captación.-." (escritorio virtual del Juzgado Agrario de Liberia, documentos asociados, sentencia de primer instancia incorporada el 21/03/2018 15:28:19).- 4.- La licenciada Susana Fallas Cubero, en su condición de procuradora adjunta, formuló recurso de apelación con indicación expresa de las razones por las cuales refuta la tesis del Juzgado de instancia, (escritorio virtual del Juzgado Agrario de Liberia, escrito incorporado el 04/04/2018 03:35:33).

5. En la substanciación del proceso se ha observado las prescripciones legales, y no se notan la existencia de errores u omisiones en el fallo capaces de producir su nulidad.

Redacta el juez ULATE CHACÓN, y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- El Tribunal comparte la relación de hechos tenidos por acreditados, por tener buen sustento en los autos. Al hecho tercero deberá agregarse que, quien le trasmitió la posesión a los titulantes, en 1993, [Nombre4] , adquirió a su vez de [Nombre5] , el 14 de mayo de 1984, mediante carta de venta privada y protocolizada el 15 de junio de 1987 (ver escritura de folio 50-51).

II.- Hechos indemostrados. De relevancia para la decisión de este proceso se tiene como no demostrado, a) el tiempo de posesión que ejerciera [Nombre5] , y si éste la hubo de algún transmitente anterior (no hay prueba); b) El tiempo de posesión de [Nombre6] , en qué consistieron los actos posesorios y a quién se la trasmitió (no hay prueba).

III.- La representante del Estado, [Nombre7] , apeló el fallo aduciendo lo siguiente: 1.) El terreno que se pretende titular está dentro del Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, en un área afectada desde la creación de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste, mediante Decreto No. 5836-A del 16 de marzo de 1976. 2.-) Los testigos no acreditaron la cadena de trasmitentes, son contradictorios y solo citan a [Nombre6] antes de los titulantes, por lo que ninguna de las manifestaciones coinciden con lo indicado en el escrito inicial, en relación con [Nombre4] y [Nombre5] . Se tiene como suficiente la declaración de los testigos, que dicen tener años de conocer el terreno pero no precisan nombres de los transmitentes o detalles de la medida del terreno o la justificación de la posesión. 3.- Por otra parte, aduce, que no se respondió lo expuesto en memorial del 23 de agosto del 2013, en cuanto a la sobreposición de planos.- III.- En cuanto al fondo del asunto. En primer lugar, debe indicarse que el argumento del Juez de primera instancia no se basa en la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, pues se refiere a una posesión general de diez años en su relación de hechos probados. Sobre esta norma se ha indicado lo siguiente: IV.- Sobre al tema de la interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, y el Patrimonio Natural del Estado el Tribunal en reiteradas resoluciones ha expresado: “La Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, en su artículo 7, así como las Leyes Forestales han procurado proteger los recursos forestales de la acción humana, sometiéndolos a diversas formas de manejo forestal. Aunque se ha permitido la titulación de dichas áreas, que ya declaradas como áreas de conservación pasan a formar parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, se exige el cumplimiento de otros requisitos más calificados. Eso nos conduce, directamente al concepto de posesión ecológica, y al criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal. En reiteradas sentencias, tanto de la Sala Primera de Casación, como del mismo Tribunal Superior Agrario, se han establecido los principios que deben regir para resolver éste tipo de situaciones agro-ambientales. Nuestro país ha sido pionero en la construcción de los institutos de la posesión agraria y la posesión ecológica. La misma jurisprudencia ha reconocido y desarrollado estos institutos, así como el ciclo de vida de la posesión agraria y, recientemente de la posesión ecológica (dentro del más amplio criterio de la función ecológica de la propiedad forestal). La misma Jurisprudencia ha querido distinguir la propiedad y posesión empresarial donde se ejercita una actividad dirigida al cultivo del bosque, de aquella donde simplemente se realiza una actividad extractiva o bien, meramente conservativa. En estos últimos casos se estaría en presencia de una propiedad o posesión forestal (sin empresa). Precisamente es en estos casos donde la Ley Forestal viene a establecer todo un régimen jurídico para la protección de los recursos forestales, sometiendo algunas veces al propietario en forma obligatoria al régimen forestal y en otros casos en forma voluntaria. De esa forma, en la posesión forestal el poder de hecho se ejerce sobre un bien de vocación forestal o en su mayor parte destinado a proteger los recursos forestales, sin miras a su explotación o bien, dedicándolo a la simple extracción de especies maderables, a través de planes de manejo para lograr la regeneración natural del bosque. En uno y otro caso no existiría el desarrollo de un ciclo biológico vegetal o animal, ni asumiría el hombre ningún riesgo. Es por eso que la ley no tutela, al contrario reprime, la posesión a través de la cual se destruyan los recursos forestales de áreas protegidas. Además niega la posibilidad de adquirir derechos de posesión sobre tierras de las reservas nacionales cuando se ha ejercido una acción dañina en contra de los recursos forestales. Hoy, parte de la doctrina agrarista afirma la existencia de un Derecho forestal, con particularidades de sistema orgánico y completo, donde ocupan un lugar importante los institutos de la propiedad y posesión forestal. En Costa Rica la propiedad forestal, y también la posesión forestal como derecho real derivado de aquella, o bien concebido en forma independiente, se comienza a perfilar desde el Código Fiscal de 1885, que establece todo un capítulo en cuanto a bosques cuyas regulaciones tienden a su conservación. Posteriormente la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos No. 13 del 6 de enero de 1939 incorpora dichos principios. Luego la Ley de Tierras y Colonización en su artículo 7 amplía las reservas nacionales para la protección de tales recursos.- VII. La legislación especial en cuanto a la tutela de la propiedad y posesión forestales tiene tres etapas en nuestro país. La primera etapa de la propiedad forestal se enmarca con la Ley No. 4465 del 35 de noviembre de 1969. La segunda se abre a través de una normativa mejor concebida a través de la Ley No. 7032 del 7 de abril de 1986, la cual fue posteriormente declarada inconstitucional. La última opera con la promulgación de la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, reformada recientemente, por Ley No. 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996 (publicada en el alcance 21 de La Gaceta No. 72 del martes 16 de abril de 1996). En ellas, se contienen diversos regímenes de propiedad forestal, y limita el uso y aprovechamiento de los recursos por los particulares. No es posible adquirir la titularidad sobre terrenos con cobertura boscosa si no se demuestra haber protegido el recurso forestal. Su fundamento constitucional se encuentra en el párrafo segundo del artículo 45 de la Constitución. A través de limitaciones de interés social se protege el instituto de la propiedad y la posesión forestal. Esta no es igual a la civil, ni a la agraria, se trata de una propiedad para conservar, y por tanto los actos posesorios que en ella se realicen deben tener esa finalidad.- VIII. La posesión forestal ha tenido su régimen jurídico en las Leyes Forestales mencionadas. Recae sobre un bien específico: los terrenos cubiertos de bosques o de aptitud forestal. El propietario o poseedor de tales bienes tiene la obligación de conservar los recursos forestales y no los puede aprovechar económicamente sino bajo las restricciones o limitaciones impuestas por la ley. Para la solución jurídica de conflictos que nazcan del ejercicio de la posesión forestal, se debe aplicar ese régimen jurídico especial y los principios del Derecho forestal. La Ley Forestal establece como función esencial y prioridad del Estado, velar por la protección, la conservación, el aprovechamiento, la industrialización, la administración y el fomento de los recursos forestales del país, de acuerdo con el principio de uso racional de los recursos naturales renovables.(Artículo 1). Todos los terrenos de aptitud forestal y los bosques del país, ya sea estatales o que estén reducidos a dominio particular, quedan sometidos a los fines de la ley. El régimen forestal es el conjunto de disposiciones, entre otras, de carácter jurídico, económico y técnico, establecidas por la ley, su reglamento y demás normas, que regulen la conservación, la renovación, el aprovechamiento y el desarrollo de los bosques y terrenos de aptitud forestal del país. Por ello, para adquirir la propiedad forestal por usucapión, se requiere el ejercicio de la posesión forestal. El artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones posesorias, reformado por la Ley Forestal, establecía, antes de su reforma: "Artículo 7.- Cuando el inmueble a que se refiere la información esté comprendido dentro de una zona declarada parque nacional, reserva biológico, reserva forestal o zona protectora, el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la respectiva ley o decreto en que se creó la respectiva área silvestre. Las fincas que estén fuera de esas áreas y que tengan bosques, solo podrán ser tituladas si el promovente demuestra haberlas poseído por diez años o más y haber protegido dicho recurso natural, en el entendido de que el inmueble tendrá que estar debidamente deslindado con cercas o carriles." En otros términos, el poder de hecho en la posesión forestal recae sobre el recurso natural "bosques" o "terrenos de aptitud forestal", y los actos posesorios deben ir encaminados a su protección y conservación. Sólo si se demuestra eso podría adquirirse o inscribirse terrenos a favor de dichos poseedores. De lo contrario, quedarían formando parte del patrimonio natural del estado (artículo 13 de la nueva Ley Forestal), con carácter inembargable e inalienable, y su posesión no causará ningún derecho a favor de los particulares (artículo 14 de la nueva Ley Forestal).- IX. El Tribunal Agrario, había interpretado el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, antes de ser reformado por la nueva Ley Forestal, en el sentido de exigir una posesión personal, ejercida con diez años de antelación a la creación de la reserva forestal o área protegida (Véase en tal sentido los Votos No. 169 de las 9 horas 40 minutos del 22 de marzo de 1991 y No. 251 de las 14 horas del 17 de abril de 1991)...". Sin embargo, esa interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley Forestal, fue cuestionada de "inconstitucional", por la aquí titulante, y la Sala Constitucional, en Voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997) declaró, en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: "Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción y, en consecuencia, que es inconstitucional la interpretación del artículo 7 de la Ley de informaciones Posesorias No. 139 del 14 de julio de 1941, cuyo texto corresponde a la reforma producida por la Ley Forestal No. 7174 del 28 de junio de 1990, de acuerdo con la cual para titular terrenos comprendidos en parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, reservas forestales o zonas protectoras, se requiere posesión personal con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto que crea el área silvestre protegida, y que no favorece en estos casos la posesión transmitida por anteriores poseedores. Esta sentencia es declarativa y sus efectos retroactivos, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe...". De manera tal que los poseedores actuales pueden aprovechar la posesión trasmitida...X. La Ley Forestal No. 7575, también mantuvo las restricciones en la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, para poder titular terrenos comprendidos en áreas protegidas. Al respecto dispone el actual numeral: "Artículo 7.-Cuando el inmueble al que se refiera la información esté comprendido dentro de un área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su categoría de manejo, el titulante deberá demostrar ser titular de los derechos legales sobre la posesión decenal, ejercida por lo menos con diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o decreto en que se creó esa área silvestre."(La negrita es nuestra). Es decir, la intención del legislador es que esas áreas se hayan mantenido protegidas, conservadas durante todo este tipo, incluso antes de la creación de las Reservas y áreas protegidas...". (Resolución de las 14:50 horas del 20 de febrero de 1998 que responde al Voto No. 113). V.- En casos más recientes, el Tribunal ha rechazado los alegatos que ahora reitera el apelante, sobre la supuesta interpretación o aplicación retroactiva del artículo 7 de la Ley Forestal. En un caso similar al que nos ocupa se dijo: V.- En cuanto a lo alegado por el recurrente respecto a que el juzgador de instancia comete un error al aplicar el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, el cual considera fue declarado inconstitucional por lo que debe analizarse las diligencias a la luz de lo dispuesto por el artículo 1 de dicha Ley, considera este Tribunal no lleva razón pues el artículo 7 citado no fue declarado inconstitucional, sino lo fue la interpretación que venía haciendo el Tribunal en cuanto no se contabilizaba la posesión ejercida por los anteriores transmitentes. De ahí, al estar vigente el ordinal 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, debe el promovente demostrar una posesión decenal antes de la declaratoria del área silvestre protegida según lo indicó la Sala Constitucional en el voto No. 4587-97 (publicado en el Boletín Judicial No. 188 de fecha 1 de octubre de 1997). Es importante mencionar que tampoco se estaría aplicando retroactivamente la ley como lo indica el recurrente, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. En ese sentido es importante señalar lo dicho por la Sala Constitucional al respecto en el voto citado “…El artículo 7 párrafo primero de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias impugnado, cuyo texto es anterior a la última reforma por Ley Forestal No.7575 de 13 de febrero de 1996, regula el caso de la titulación de bienes inmuebles comprendidos dentro de un área declarada parque nacional, reserva biológica, reserva forestal o zona protectora. Señala ese artículo que el titulante tendrá que demostrar haber ejercido la posesión decenal con por lo menos diez años de antelación a la fecha de vigencia de la ley o el decreto que creó el área silvestre. La disposición cuestionada regula el caso de titulación de un bien inmueble que ha sido afectado al dominio público con la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida, cualquiera que sea su especificidad. Corresponde ahora determinar si de acuerdo con la hipótesis que contempla la norma impugnada, a la luz de los criterios doctrinarios y jurisprudenciales que informan los institutos de la usucapión y de la posesión necesaria para usucapir, expuestos anteriormente, la norma cuestionada regula un tipo especial de posesión necesaria para adquirir la propiedad sobre los bienes inmuebles, que impone requisitos específicos que pueden infringir el derecho de propiedad o el principio de irretroactividad de la ley en perjuicio de derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, regulados en la Constitución. En primer término, debe señalarse que el artículo cuestionado no modifica -aumenta o disminuye- el plazo de diez años de posesión necesario para usucapir, fijado en el artículo 860 del Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos en que se pretende adquirir la propiedad de los bienes inmuebles por prescripción positiva. La ampliación del plazo que alega el accionante como infractor del derecho a la propiedad no se produce, porque dada la naturaleza del bien que se pretende titular (cosa pública), el plazo de posesión apta para la usucapión debe transcurrir antes de que se produzca la afectación del bien al dominio público. Es decir, la declaratoria de área silvestre protegida evita que cuente la posesión posterior a la afectación, e impide concretar los requisitos de la usucapión si a ese momento no se ha adquirido el derecho, o sea, no han transcurrido los diez años de posesión apta para usucapir con las condiciones que establece la ley. Lo anterior es únicamente el resultado natural de aplicar los conceptos sobre el objeto de la posesión y su condición de ejercicio en calidad de titular, necesarios para la posesión ad usucapionem. Recuérdese que los bienes afectados al dominio público, tengan las especificaciones que tengan, no son susceptibles de adquisición por usucapión, si antes de producirse la afectación no se dieron las condiciones necesarias para la adquisición del derecho. En ese sentido, la disposición cuestionada, a pesar de que en apariencia regula un caso específico de usucapión, no crea un régimen con requisitos diferentes a los establecidos en el Código Civil para la generalidad de los casos. En ese sentido, tampoco se produce el alegado efecto retroactivo de la norma, porque el plazo de diez años de posesión para usucapir se encuentra establecido en el Código Civil y la disposición cuestionada simplemente destaca ciertos elementos propios de la usucapión que también están definidos en la normativa general, como son: el objeto de la posesión y las condiciones en que ésta se debe ejercer para ser apta para la usucapión. Es decir, la norma no viene a establecer ningún principio diferente -o requisito más riguroso- en relación con la aplicación de las reglas generales de la usucapión. Simplemente especifica la forma en que deben aplicarse esas reglas, lo que coincide con un resultado lógico dada la condición de bien demanial del objeto a titular. De ahí que no se considere que la reforma al artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones Posesorias, cuyo texto se impugna, haya introducido un régimen diferente en relación con los requisitos de la usucapión, que haya podido agravar la situación de personas que se encontraban ejerciendo posesión ad usucapionem en terrenos que fueron declarados de interés público. (Tribunal Agrario, No. 173 de las 16:29 horas del 31 de marzo del 2003).

V.- De manera que el poseedor que pretenda adquirir por usucapión un terreno cubierto de bosque, que formaba parte de las reservas nacionales, deberá demostrar la posesión decenal (originaria o trasmitida), y haber conservado el recurso forestal, al menos diez años antes de la creación del área Protegida, siendo que en este caso se trata del Parque Nacional Volcán Tenorio, que está afectado al dominio público desde la creación de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste mediante Decreto No. 5836-A del 16 de marzo de 1976, siendo que debería de demostrarse una posesión decenal anterior a esa fecha y que los actos posesorios consistan, verdaderamente, en la protección del recurso forestal. En el presente caso, los titulantes presentan como prueba de su posesión, desde el punto de vista documental, la escritura No. 136 del 11 de agosto de 1993, por la cual [Nombre4] les vende la posesión, de un terreno de montaña y pasto de poco más de cincuenta y ocho hectáreas. En dicha escritura se hace referencia a una posesión decenal ejercida por él y su anterior trasmitente, [Nombre5] (folio 65); además, presentó la razón notarial de fecha cierta, de las 10 horas del 15 de junio de 1987, de la carta venta privada suscrita por [Nombre5] , vendiéndole a [Nombre4] , un lote de terreno que mide más o menos sesenta manzanas (folios 50 y 51). Debe hacerse notar, que según el plano originalmente aportado, la porción de potrero era menor (ver Plano A-878231-90), aproximadamente el 70 % (39.40 hectáreas) del terreno está cubierto de "montaña", lo que sin duda alguna obedece a la afectación que se realizó desde el año 1976 de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste. Pese a ello, en uno de los planos que presentaron en su momento, siendo que en los suelos categorías IV y VII existe potrero (4,67 y 6,50 hectáreas respectivamente). Si se observan las declaraciones testimoniales, el testigo [Nombre8] , indica que el área aproximada mide treinta hectáreas y es mixta, lo que de alguna manera podía coincidir con una parte del inmueble. Sin embargo, al Tribunal le preocupa mucho que se haya indicado en el plano, como un dato distinto de la realidad, que existiera calle pública, cuando en realidad era un acceso por fincas privadas, pero más aún, es preocupante observar la fotografía aérea (ortofoto, de folio 239), donde se observa cómo, paulatinamente, se ha ido ampliando el área de repastos, en la finca que se pretende titular, lo que no es buen signo de una posesión ecológica, todo lo contrario, ha existido una invasión al territorio del Parque Nacional. Véase cómo en el plano del 2013 (folio 240), se ensancha el área de potrero y corral, y se restringe el área de montaña. Pero además, se presentó un el tercer plano, a saber el Número A-1954148-2017, en donde se le cambió a la totalidad del inmueble su naturaleza, indicando en todos sus perímetros que se trata de "potrero", lo cual no puede favorecer, en modo alguno, el "animus" de ejercicio de una posesión que debe ser ecológica. De ahí que el representante del Estado, en oficio del 17 de julio del 2017, hizo ver esa circunstancia al Juzgado. De ahí que el titulante debió corregir y presentar un cuarto plano. A todo eso, se suma el hecho de que ninguno de los testigos, realmente hacen una relación coherente respecto la cadena posesoria. Pese a que todos afirman conocer la finca desde 1960, eso no es suficiente para demostrar, o peor, dar por sentada, la existencia de una posesión agroambiental diez años antes de la creación de la Reserva, pues debía demostrarse una posesión efectiva, al menos desde 1967, así como la cadena de traspasos, y la primera transmisión que se encuentra documentada es la que existiera a partir del año 1984, que nos reenviaría a diez años anteriores, sea a 1976. Los documentos públicos presentados hablan de al menos dos transmisiones; quien le trasmitió la posesión a los titulantes, en 1993, [Nombre4] , adquirió a su vez de [Nombre5] , el 14 de mayo de 1984, mediante carta de venta privada y protocolizada el 15 de junio de 1987 (ver escritura de folio 50-51). Véase que [Nombre9] , primero mencionó que el dueño era [Nombre6] , y después dice que [Nombre10] , que habían árboles frutales, naranjas y limones, y que la propiedad la dedicaban al mantenimiento de ganado, y que posteriormente el señor [Nombre10] vendió a los titulantes. Es decir, no se refiere a [Nombre4] ni a [Nombre5] . Mucho menos a otros actos posesorios. El testigo [Nombre11] , también habla de [Nombre6] , diciendo que hace como veinte años los promoventes adquirieron la propiedad, pero no recuerda quién les vendió. Hay también una ausencia de cadena posesoria y de actos posesorios. Finalmente, [Nombre12] habla también de [Nombre6] , dice que él le traspasó a otra persona que no recuerda el nombre y que hace veinte años los promoventes adquirieron. De modo tal que no es posible determinar, realmente, de quién adquirió [Nombre5] , y en la venta que éste hace en 1984 a [Nombre4] , no se habla (folio 51) de tiempo de posesión, ni de quién adquirió. En el acta de reconocimiento judicial no se dice nada sobre árboles frutales, a los que se refirió uno de los testigos, y tampoco a la existencia de una casa de habitación. Se habla de la existencia de apartos, ganado, y el resto de bosque protegido, pero tampoco se indican los actos posesorios estables y continuos en ese sentido. De todo lo anterior se desprende que existen contracciones evidentes de los testigos. Todo lo anterior hace pensar al Tribunal que ninguno de los tres testigos realmente conoce la propiedad que se pretende titular, o si la conocieron dejaron de visitarla hace mucho tiempo, pues la descripción que dan del inmueble no corresponde a lo que se observa en la actualidad. Por otra parte, debe indicarse por parte de este Tribunal, que según el informe del Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, estos territorios son de importancia para la reserva del recurso hídrico existente, sobre todo porque presenta una alta fragilidad hídrica, por lo que recomiendan respetar y proteger rigurosamente las aguas, y sus zonas de recarga y protección (ver folios 139 y 140).

VI.- A mayor abundamiento, este Tribunal cita el antecedente de la Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51-95, mediante el cual varios poseedores reclamaron derechos posesorios sobre al Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica de Guancaste, y en cuya sentencia señaló: "XVI. La creación de la Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica de Guanacaste es parte de la historia ecológica de nuestro país. Es una respuesta del legislador costarricense a la conservación de los recursos naturales. Pretendió desde antaño garantizar el ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Y heredárselo a las futuras generaciones. Nació bajo la vigencia de la Ley Forestal de 1969 y fue creada por Decreto Nº 5836-A del 16 de marzo de 1976. Con su creación los particulares poseedores en dichas áreas debían ser indemnizados en su propiedad y mejoras, pues no podían realizar actividades agrarias en detrimento de los recursos forestales. Para compensar esa situación, y no dejar desprotegidos a muchos poseedores, el Decreto Nº 8473-A del 24 de abril de 1978 estableció la posibilidad de reubicarlos en fincas del Instituto de Tierras y Colonización. Muchos de ellos fueron reubicados pero otros continuaron poseyendo dentro de la Reserva Forestal. Es decir poseían dentro de una zona declarada inalienable. Algunos actores demostraron el ejercicio de la posesión agraria sin ser reubicados. Dentro de ellos están [Nombre13] , [Nombre14] , [Nombre15] , [Nombre16] y [Nombre17] . Sus pretensiones, en consecuencia, son de recibo. Ello resulta de una libre valoración de la prueba, tanto testimonial como documental. Y ésta apreciada correctamente por el Tribunal conforme al numeral 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Los restantes poseedores, o fueron reubicados, o no demostraron el ejercicio de actos posesorios efectivos e intencionales tendientes a conservar el bosque. Sus terrenos estaban total y prácticamente cubiertos por bosques naturales cuya conservación es propia del ecosistema." (Sala Primera de Casación, No. 51 de las 15:15 horas del 26 de mayo de 1995).

VI.- En virtud de todo lo anterior, al no cumplirse lo dispuesto en el artículo 7 de la Ley de Informaciones posesorias, lo procedente es REVOCAR la sentencia y rechazar las presentes diligencias de Información Posesoria. En virtud de la oposición del Estado, al considerarse que es parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, deberán los interesados acudir a la vía declarativa correspondiente, si a bien lo tienen a hacer valer sus derechos.

POR TANTO:

Se REVOCA la sentencia y se rechazan las presentes diligencias de Información Posesoria. En virtud de la oposición del Estado, al considerarse que es parte del Patrimonio Forestal del Estado, deberán los interesados acudir a la vía declarativa correspondiente, si a bien lo tienen, a hacer valer sus derechos.

*S2Y1TC8QSY061* [Nombre18] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *QGXRGI6VJAA61* [Nombre19] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *RYRQ3TKKF3Q61* [Nombre20] - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A