Appeal against municipal patent tax on agricultural activityApelación contra cobro de patente municipal a actividad agrícola

APPEAL (APELACIÓN) APPELLANT (RECURRENTE): CULANTRO FRESCO DE COSTA RICA CF S.A.

MUNICIPALITY (MUNICIPALIDAD): SIQUIRRES No. 444-2017 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN TERCERA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at fourteen hours twenty-four minutes on the thirty-first of October of two thousand seventeen.

This Tribunal, in its capacity as improper municipal hierarch (jerarca impropio municipal), hears the Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) filed by Nombre105467, of legal age, married, farmer, bearer of identity card number CED82178, resident of Siquirres, Linda Vista, in his capacity as Unlimited General Agent (Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma) of the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., with legal identification number CED82179, AGAINST Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015 of 12 hours 5 minutes on July 27, 2015, of the Municipality of Siquirres.

Judge Giusti Soto writes; WHEREAS (CONSIDERANDO).

I.- Proven facts. The following are relevant for the purposes of this proceeding: 1) That the Revenue Department of the Municipality of Siquirres, through Official Letter number ODR-311-2015, indicated: "this office issues a Resolution to make a prevention (realizar prevención) for not having a lucrative activity license (licencia de actividad lucrativa) to Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. In the same, it indicates the amount to be paid for the fiscal periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 in accordance with Law number 7176 (Folios 16 to 18 of the main file). 2) That dissatisfied with Official Letter number ODR-311-2015, the appellant company files a Motion for Reconsideration with Subsidiary Appeal (Recurso de Revocatoria con Apelación en Subsidio) (Folios 13 to 15 of the main file). 3) That on July 23, 2015, the Revenue Department of the Municipality of Siquirres, through Resolution number ODR-524-2015, rejects the Motion for Reconsideration and elevates the appeal to the Municipal Mayor's Office (Folios 11 to 12 of the main file). 4) That through Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015 dated July 27, 2015, the Municipal Mayor states: "The appeal is rejected as the municipality has acted in accordance with the block of legality (bloque de legalidad), with all collection periods being valid as provided in official letter ODR-0311-2015. This resolution has an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, within a period of 5 business days on grounds of legality." (Folios 07 to 10 of the main file). 5) That by virtue of the notification made on August 4, 2015, the appellant company files, in a timely manner, an Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) against Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015 (Folios 03 to 05 of the main file).

II.- Allegations of the parties. The appellant company confirms that it is not a taxpayer in the Municipality of Siquirres, "...because as established by article 14 of Law 7176, the Municipal Taxes Law of the Canton of Siquirres (Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres), For the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the licensees will pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this Law with the exception of those indicated in article 15, subsection a) which establishes 'Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. From those indicated in its article 15. Only in cases where they are subject to a municipal license'" (sic). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Municipality alleges that by virtue of what is stated in numerals 79 and 83 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), the appellant company must indeed pay the business license tax (impuesto de patente). On this matter, the appellant company states that numeral 83 does not apply in the case under study, "since it refers to the 'business license tax (impuesto de patentes) and the license for the retail sale of liquor are regulated by special law' and, regarding what is provided in article 79, only when what is established in it occurs, that is, the existence of an enabling act (acto habilitante), a situation that, according to the appellant company, was not proven in the appealed resolution." In addition to the above, the Municipality bases its decision on sections 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 31, and 32 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios); however, the appellant company alleges once again that it falls within the provisions of article 14 of Law No. 7176. On the other hand, the Municipality argues that the company is duly registered with the Dirección General de Tributación, so the appellant party again brings to light article 14 of Law No. 7176. The latter, in accordance with numeral 1 in relation to 15, both of Law No. 7176. Regarding the allegation of the Regulatory Law on Existing Exonerations, Derogations, and Exceptions (Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones) No. 7293, the company states the following: "...all subjective tax exemptions provided for in the different laws are repealed as this law refers to exemptions on customs duties, sales taxes, income, territorial consumption, vehicle property taxes with the exceptions stated therein." Finally, the appellant company considers that what was provided by the Municipality regarding the obligation generated by article 18 of the Political Constitution is true; however, it indicates: "...but only when they are obligated by law, because in tax matters, the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley) exists," therefore it also considers article 13 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures to be completely out of context; in other words, it does not agree with this indication made by the Municipality in the challenged resolution.

III.- On the specific case. Prior to the analysis of the specific case, it is important to indicate that in accordance with article 170 of the Political Constitution and numeral 4 of the Municipal Code, the Municipalities have political, administrative, and financial autonomy. In what is relevant, the tax authority is understood as the "... initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, an authority subject to the approval indicated in article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution when applicable..." (See ruling No. 1999-05445 of the Sala Constitucional at 14:30 on July 14, 1999). Based on that constitutionally enshrined attribution, local governments are exclusively responsible for the granting of licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities carried out within their jurisdiction and the respective collection of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) in order to "...cover all those public services that local governments provide for the benefit of the community, which translate into better guarantees of security, hygiene, order, and local ornamentation, which undoubtedly facilitate and allow the exercise of the lucrative commercial activity...". (Opinion of the Attorney General's Office No. C-126-2002). Regarding the business license (licencia) and the business license tax (impuesto de patentes), the Sala Constitucional of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 2197-92 at 14:30 on August 11, 1992, also stated: "Our legislation distinguishes between the license proper, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called the patent (patente). The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is that already traditional in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to cover the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the Municipality; that is, commercial businesses or lucrative activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, are highly benefited by the security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, for which they must contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, it is called a business license tax (impuesto a la actividad lucrativa) or patent (patente), those that tax businesses based on more or less easy-to-determine external characteristics, without there being a single system in this regard...". (In the same sense, see ruling of the Sala Constitucional No. 6362-94 at 15:39 on November 1, 1994). The business license tax (impuesto de patentes) owes its regulation to article 79 of the Municipal Code, which creates a tax on the exercise of any lucrative activity, which requires the respective municipal license, by expressly providing the rule: "ARTICLE 79.- To exercise any lucrative activity, the interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid for the entire time in which the lucrative activity has been exercised or for the time in which the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out." On this legal parameter, it is equally important to mention that each Municipality has its own regulations to clearly regulate the tax, its origin, calculation mechanisms, and collection. In the specific case, the Municipal Taxes Law of the Canton of Siquirres (Law number 7176), provided in its first article, the following: "ARTICLE 1.- Individuals or legal entities that engage in the exercise of lucrative activities in the canton of Siquirres shall be obligated to pay to the Municipality a business license tax (impuesto de patentes) that empowers them to exercise such activities, in accordance with articles 3, 4, and 15 of this law." Based on the rule just transcribed, in order to establish whether the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. is subject to the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal), it is necessary to determine what constitutes and when the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation to pay the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) arises. In accordance with article 31 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Law number 4755), the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation is the factual presupposition established in the law to define the tax and whose realization gives rise to the tax obligation. For its part, article 32 of the same regulatory body establishes that the taxable event (hecho generador) is configured from the moment the material circumstances necessary for the corresponding effects to occur take place, or in legal situations, from the moment they are definitively constituted according to the law. Having analyzed the legal nature of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal), it is clearly evident that the taxable event (hecho generador) that creates the tax obligation to pay the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal) is the development of a lucrative activity. In the case under study, the Municipality of Siquirres, as the entity in charge of granting licenses and the respective collection of the municipal business license tax (impuesto de patente municipal), was able to determine, based on information obtained from the Dirección General de Tributación, that the company is not only registered as a corporation that develops a lucrative activity of growing vegetables and legumes, but also, it is a taxpayer. This cross-checking tool with the records of the central administration, Ministerio de Hacienda, is valid and effective for the purpose of determining, by local councils, possible taxpayers in the canton. Precisely, making use of that control, the Municipality of Siquirres manages to determine that the appellant company does not have a lucrative activity license, for which reason, in accordance with the law, it issued a prevention (previno) for the payment of the amount owed for the fiscal periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Based on the foregoing, the appellant company generates discussion regarding the application of subsection a) of article 14 of the Municipal Taxes Law of the Canton of Siquirres, which indicates: "ARTICLE 14.- For the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the licensees will pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this law, with the exception of those indicated in its article 15. A) Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Only in cases where they are subject to obtaining a municipal license."; For the appellant alleges the following: "...as established by article 14 of Law 7176, the Business License Tax Law of the Municipality of Siquirres (Ley de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Siquirres) for the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the licensees will pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this Law with the exception of those indicated in article 15, subsection a) which establishes 'Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. From those indicated in its article 15'." On this matter, it must be specified that the "literal" transcription of the article provided by the appellant is not sufficient to begin analyzing this first point of the first fact of the Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) filed, as it is necessary to accompany it with a proper foundation, which the appellant company has omitted. Likewise, the appellant alleges that the activity it carries out is not the presupposition of a taxable event (hecho generador); however, the activity deployed by the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., by virtue of all the foregoing, has been determined to be of an agricultural nature and for eminently lucrative purposes. Thus, it is established as proven what type of activity is developed by the company and therefore, it fits within the classification of lucrative activities provided in article 14, subsection a) of the Municipal Taxes Law of the Canton of Siquirres. For this reason, this part of the appeal is rejected. Now, regarding the evidence in cases such as the one at hand, it must be indicated that the competence of this section is limited solely to analyzing the grievances presented and the evidence provided, as is appropriate. Given that in this case, the appellant failed to comply with the evidentiary duty incumbent upon it in Tax matters as provided in the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures, as there is no evidence that suitably proves what is alleged in the appeal. Regarding the burden of proof, numeral 140 in the indicated regulation states: "The burden of proof falls on the Tax Administration regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it falls on the taxpayer regarding the impeding, modifying, or extinguishing facts of the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall correspond to the latter, as the case may be, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute its costs, expenses, liabilities, fiscal credits, exemptions, non-subjection, deductions, and, in general, the fiscal benefits it alleges exist in its favor." (The highlighting is not from the original). From reading the previous article, it is understood that the legal duty regarding the burden of proof corresponded in this case and under the mentioned circumstances to the appellant party, but the records lack evidence regarding the non-existence of the lucrative activity, making it inescapable for this Chamber to reject this part of the appeal. Likewise, the grievances set forth in the second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth arguments of the Appeal are rejected for the reasons set forth below. First, the argument "my company does not understand article 83" is rejected, given that articles 79 and 83, both of the Municipal Code, are applicable, especially numeral 79, previously cited, as the business license tax (impuesto de patente) is regulated therein. For its part, section 83 of the same legal body establishes: "ARTICLE 83.- The business license tax (impuesto de patentes) and the license for the retail sale of liquor shall be regulated by a special law." Although article 83 refers to the tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor, both numerals require a commercial license for the exercise of any lucrative activity. Secondly, it should be noted that article 79 of the Municipal Code is again alluded to by the appellant in the fifth argument. He argues that for the cited numeral to be configured, "there must be an enabling act (acto habilitante) which is that the municipality authorizes the lucrative activity"; however, the appellant did not request the respective license, making it impossible for the Municipality to authorize the lucrative activity of the appellant corporation without its prior request. On the other hand, although the appellant relies on ruling number 2197-92 at fourteen hours thirty minutes on August eleven, nineteen ninety-two, from the Sala Constitucional, it is important to point out that it refers to the primary purpose of charging the business license tax (patente). Furthermore, regarding the "enabling act (acto habilitante)", it is important to clarify that it is not that the lucrative activity is authorized, but that lucrative activity itself is generated, which was proven by the Municipality, so once the existence of the lucrative activity was demonstrated, it proceeded to carry out the provisions of article 79. Thirdly, the argument related to article 18 of the Political Constitution alluded to in the sixth allegation is refuted, as it has been demonstrated that the corporation, by its lucrative activity, is obligated by law to pay the business license tax (patente). With respect to the seventh argument, it should be noted that the appellant does not clearly indicate the grievance caused by the Municipality when it indicates, referring to the Regulatory Law on Existing Exonerations, Derogations, and Exceptions (Law number 7293), that any exoneration must be provided for by law, with which this Chamber agrees. In the same vein, this Section has already stated: "From this point of view, it is not necessary for this Tribunal to deduce, from where the letter of the law does not provide, the existence of a tax exemption not included by the legislator. Doing so would be arriving at conclusions after interpreting several rules, searching within the content of the text of the law for what it has not expressly provided. This would violate the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria) contained in numeral 5 subsection b) of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures, illegally creating an exemption not provided for in the law. It would also transgress article 6 of that same regulatory body, which prohibits filling a legal vacuum by analogy for the creation of exemptions. From this point of view, the grievances expressed by the appellant party are not shared, as this would result in the creation of an exemption not provided for in the Law, through interpretation, which is forbidden to this Tribunal" (see in a similar sense, resolutions number 181-2014 at fourteen hours five minutes on April twenty-third, two thousand fourteen, and 213-2012 at fifteen hours fifteen minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Third Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). In other words, tax exoneration takes place solely and exclusively when such provision is contemplated, expressly, in a rule.

VI.- Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, this Tribunal rejects the appeal filed against Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015, as there is no doubt that the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. carries out a lucrative activity of growing vegetables and legumes and therefore must comply with its derived tax obligations. Consequently, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed is declared without merit and the challenged resolution is confirmed.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO).

The appeal (recurso de apelación) filed is declared without merit and resolution number DA-5-9112-2015 of the Municipal Mayor's Office of Siquirres, of 12 hours 5 minutes on July 27, 2015, is confirmed. The administrative remedy is hereby exhausted.

Juan Luis Giusti Soto Evelyn Solano Ulloa Francisco José Chaves Torres ASUNTO: Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) RECURRENTE: Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A.

MUNICIPALIDAD: Siquirres Drafted by Judge Giusti Soto;

CONSIDERING.

I.—Proven facts. Of relevance for the purposes of this proceeding, the following are established: 1) That the Department of Revenues (Departamento de Rentas) of the Municipality of Siquirres, through Official Letter No. ODR-311-2015, stated: “this office issues a Resolution to give notice for failure to hold a lucrative activity license to Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. The same indicates the amount to be paid for fiscal periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 in accordance with Ley 7176 (Folios 16 through 18 of the main file). 2) That dissatisfied with Official Letter No. ODR-311-2015, the appellant company files a Motion to Reconsider with a Subsidiary Appeal (Revocatoria con Apelación en Subsidio) (Folios 13 through 15 of the main file). 3) That on July 23, 2015, the Department of Revenues of the Municipality of Siquirres denies, through Resolution No. ODR-524-2015, the Motion to Reconsider and forwards the appeal to the Municipal Mayor’s Office (Folios 11 through 12 of the main file). 4) That through Resolution No. DA-5-9112-2015 dated July 27, 2015, the Municipal Mayor states: “The appeal is hereby denied since the municipality has acted in accordance with the block of legality, all collection periods being valid as set forth in official letter ODR-0311-2015. This resolution is subject to appeal before the Administrative Litigation Court, within a period of 5 business days on grounds of legality.” (Folios 07 through 10 of the main file). 5) That by virtue of the notification made on August 4, 2015, the appellant company timely files an Appeal against Resolution No. DA-5-9112-2015 (Folios 03 through 05 of the main file).

II.—Arguments of the parties. The appellant company confirms that it is not a taxpayer in the Municipality of Siquirres, “…since, as established by Article 14 of Ley 7176, the Patent Law of the Municipality of Siquirres, for the lucrative activities listed below, included in the international classification of economic activities, patent holders shall pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this Law, with the exception of those indicated in Article 15, subsection a) which establishes ‘Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Of those indicated in Article 15. Only in cases subject to a municipal license’” (sic). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Municipality argues that by virtue of the provisions of numerals 79 and 83 of the Código Municipal, the appellant company must indeed pay the patent tax. On this point, the appellant company states that numeral 83 does not apply in the case under review, “since it refers to ‘the patent tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor, are regulated by a special law’” and, regarding the provision of Article 79, only when what is established therein occurs, that is, the existence of an enabling act, a situation that, according to the appellant company, was not proven in the appealed resolution. In addition to the foregoing, the Municipality bases its decision on ordinals 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 31, and 32 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios; however, the appellant company once again claims to fall within the provisions of Article 14 of Ley No. 7176. On the other hand, the Municipality argues that the company is duly registered with the Dirección General de Tributación, so the appellant again brings to light Article 14 of Ley No. 7176. The latter, in conjunction with numeral 1 in relation to 15, both of Ley No. 7176. Regarding the argument concerning the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones No. 7293, the company states the following: “…all tax exemptions and subjectivities provided for in the different laws are repealed since this law refers to exemptions from customs, sales, income, territorial consumption, and vehicle property taxes, with the exceptions stated in this law.” Finally, the appellant company considers that what is ordered by the Municipality regarding the obligation generated by Article 18 of the Constitución Política is correct, however, it indicates: “…but only when obligated by law, since in tax matters the principle of legal reservation exists,” for which reason it also deems Article 13 of the Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios to be entirely out of context; in other words, it does not agree with this indication made by the Municipality in the challenged resolution.

III.—Regarding the specific case. Prior to the analysis of the specific case, it is important to indicate that in accordance with Article 170 of the Constitución Política and numeral 4 of the Código Municipal, the Municipalities possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy. In what is relevant, the taxing power is understood as the "...initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, a power subject to the approval indicated in Article 121, subsection 13 of the Constitución Política when applicable..." (See ruling No. 1999-05445 of the Constitutional Chamber of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999). Based on this constitutionally enshrined attribution, local governments are exclusively responsible for the granting of licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities carried out within their jurisdiction and the respective collection of the municipal patent tax for the purpose of “…financing all those public services that local governments provide for the benefit of the community, which translate into better guarantees of security, hygiene, order, and local ornamentation, which undoubtedly facilitate and allow the exercise of the lucrative commercial activity…” (Legal Opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República No. C-126-2002). Regarding the license and the patent tax, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling No. 2197-92 of 2:30 p.m. on August 11, 1992, also stated: “Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called the patent tax. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is the one already traditional in the field of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the Municipality; that is, that commercial businesses or lucrative activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Código Municipal, are highly benefited by the security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, and therefore must contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, patent tax or tax on lucrative activity is called that which taxes businesses based on external characteristics that are more or less easy to determine, without there being a single system in this regard…” (In the same sense, see ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 6362-94 of 3:39 p.m. on November 1, 1994). The patent tax finds its regulation in Article 79 of the Código Municipal, which creates a tax on the exercise of any lucrative activity, which requires the respective municipal license, as the rule expressly provides: “ARTICLE 79.- To exercise any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid during the entire time the lucrative activity has been exercised or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out.” Regarding this legal parameter, it is equally important to mention that each Municipality has its own regulations in order to clearly regulate the tax, its origin, the calculation mechanisms, and collection. In the specific case, the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres (Ley número 7176), provided in its first article, the following: “ARTICLE 1.- Natural or legal persons engaged in the exercise of lucrative activities in the canton of Siquirres shall be obligated to pay the Municipality a patent tax that authorizes them to exercise those activities, in accordance with Articles 3, 4, and 15 of this law.” From the rule just transcribed, in order to establish whether the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. is subject to the municipal patent tax, it is necessary to determine what the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax consists of and when it occurs. In accordance with Article 31 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Ley número 4755), the taxable event of the tax obligation is the factual presupposition established in the law to characterize the tax and whose realization gives rise to the birth of the tax obligation. For its part, Article 32 of the same regulatory body establishes that the taxable event is configured from the moment in which the material circumstances necessary for the corresponding effects to occur take place, or in legal situations, from the moment in which they are definitively constituted according to law. Having analyzed the legal nature of the municipal patent tax, it is clearly evident that the taxable event that creates the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax is the development of a lucrative activity. In the case under review, the Municipality of Siquirres, as the entity in charge of granting licenses and the respective collection of the municipal patent tax, was able to determine, based on information obtained from the Dirección General de Tributación, that the company is not only registered as a corporation that carries out a lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes, but is also a taxpayer. This cross-checking tool with the records of the central administration, Ministry of Finance, is valid and effective for the purposes of determining, by the town councils, possible taxpayers in the canton. Precisely, making use of that control, the Municipality of Siquirres manages to determine that the appellant company does not have a lucrative activity license, therefore, in accordance with the law, it gave it notice to pay the amount owed for fiscal periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Based on the foregoing, the appellant company generates a discussion regarding the application of subsection a) of Article 14 of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres, which states: “ARTICLE 14.- For the lucrative activities listed below, included in the international classification of economic activities, patent holders shall pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this law, with the exception of those indicated in Article 15. A) Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Only in cases where they are subject to obtaining a municipal license.”; because the appellant alleges the following: "...according to what is established by Article 14 of Ley 7176, the Patent Law of the Municipality of Siquirres, for the lucrative activities listed below, included in the international classification of economic activities, patent holders shall pay in accordance with the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of this Law with the exception of those indicated in Article 15, subsection a) establishes ‘Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Of those indicated in Article 15’." On this point, it must be specified that the “literal” transcription of the article carried out by the appellant is not sufficient to proceed with an analysis of this first point of the first fact of the Appeal filed, since it must be accompanied by a due legal grounding, which the appellant company omitted. Likewise, the appellant alleges that the activity it carries out is not a presupposition of a taxable event; however, the activity carried out by the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., by virtue of all of the foregoing, has been able to be determined to be of an agricultural nature and for eminently lucrative purposes. Thus, it is taken as proven what type of activity is carried out by the company and, therefore, it fits within the classification of lucrative activities provided for in Article 14, subsection a) of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres. For this reason, this ground of the appeal is denied. Now then, with regard to evidence in cases such as the one before us, it must be indicated that the competence of this section is limited solely to analyzing the grievances presented and the evidence contributed, as is appropriate. Since in the present case the appellant failed to fulfill the evidentiary duty incumbent upon it in Tax matters according to the provisions of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, as there is no evidence that adequately proves what is alleged in the appeal. Regarding the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), numeral 140 of the indicated regulation states: “The burden of proof falls upon the Tax Administration with respect to the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it falls upon the taxpayer with respect to the facts that impede, modify, or extinguish the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall be incumbent upon the latter, depending on the case, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute its costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions, non-subjections, deductions, and, in general, the tax benefits that it alleges exist in its favor.” (The highlighting is not from the original). From a reading of the foregoing article, it is clear that the legal duty regarding the burden of proof fell, in this case and under the mentioned circumstances, upon the appellant; however, the case file lacks evidence regarding the non-existence of the lucrative activity, making it unavoidable for this Chamber to reject this ground of the appeal. Similarly, the grievances set forth in the second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth arguments of the Appeal are rejected for the reasons set out below. In the first place, the argument “my company does not understand Article 83” is rejected, since Articles 79 and 83, both of the Código Municipal, are applicable, especially numeral 79, previously cited, as the patent tax is regulated therein. For its part, ordinal 83 of the same legal body establishes: “ARTICLE 83.- The patent tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor shall be regulated by a special law.” Although Article 83 refers to the tax and license for the retail sale of liquor, the fact is that both numerals require a commercial license for the exercise of any lucrative activity. In the second place, it should be noted that Article 79 of the Código Municipal is again alluded to by the appellant in the fifth argument. It argues that for the cited numeral to be configured, “there must be an enabling act and it is that the municipality authorizes the lucrative activity”; however, the appellant did not request the respective license, making it impossible for the Municipality to authorize the appellant company’s lucrative activity without its prior request. On the other hand, although the appellant bases its argument on ruling number 2197-92 of two thirty in the afternoon on August eleventh, nineteen ninety-two from the Constitutional Chamber, it is important to point out that the same reviews the primary purpose of the patent tax collection. Furthermore, regarding the “enabling act,” it is important to clarify that it is not that the lucrative activity is authorized, but that a lucrative activity is generated in itself, which was indeed proven by the Municipality; therefore, once the existence of the lucrative activity was demonstrated, it proceeded to carry out the provisions of Article 79. In the third place, the argument related to Article 18 of the Constitución Política, alluded to in the sixth argument, is refuted, inasmuch as it has been demonstrated that the corporation, due to its lucrative activity, is obligated by law to pay the patent tax. Regarding the seventh argument, it should be noted that the appellant does not clearly indicate the grievance caused by the Municipality when it indicates, referring to the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones (Ley número 7293), that every exoneration must be provided for by law, for which reason this Chamber agrees with the Municipality. In the same vein, this Section has already stated: “From this point of view, it is not necessary for this Court to deduce, from what the text of the law does not provide, the existence of a tax exoneration not included by the legislator. That would mean reaching conclusions after interpreting several norms, searching within the content of the law’s text for what it has expressly not provided.

That would violate the principle of tax legality (principio de legalidad tributaria) contained in subsection 5(b) of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, illegally creating an exemption not provided for in the law. It would also transgress Article 6 of that same regulatory body, which prohibits filling a legal vacuum through analogy for the creation of exemptions. From this point of view, the grievances expressed by the appellant are not shared, as that would result in the creation of an exoneration (exoneración) not foreseen in the Law, through interpretation, which is prohibited to this Tribunal” (see in a similar sense, resolutions number 181-2014 of fourteen hours five minutes of twenty-three April two thousand fourteen, and 213-2012 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes of thirty-one May two thousand twelve, both issued by the Third Section of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). In other words, a tax exoneration (exoneración tributaria) takes place only and exclusively when such a provision is expressly contemplated in a rule.

VI.- Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, this Tribunal rejects the appeal filed against Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015, as there is no doubt that the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. engages in a lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes and therefore must comply with its derived tax obligations. Consequently, the appeal filed is declared without merit and the challenged resolution is confirmed.

POR TANTO.

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto y se confirma la resolución número DA-5-9112-2015 de la Alcaldía Municipal de Siquirres, de las 12 horas 5 minutos del 27 de julio de 2015. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.

Juan Luis Giusti Soto Evelyn Solano Ulloa Francisco José Chaves Torres ASUNTO: Recurso de Apelación RECURRENTE: Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A.

MUNICIPALIDAD: Siquirres

The municipal patent tax (impuesto de patentes) owes its regulation to Article 79 of the Código Municipal, which creates a tax on the exercise of any lucrative activity, which requires the respective municipal license, as the rule expressly provides: " ARTICLE 79.- To engage in any lucrative activity, interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which shall be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid throughout the entire time the lucrative activity has been exercised or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out." Regarding this legal parameter, it is equally important to mention that each Municipality has its own regulations to clearly regulate the tax, its origin, the calculation mechanisms, and its collection. In the specific case, the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres (Law number 7176), provided in its first article, the following: "ARTICLE 1.- Individuals or legal entities engaged in the exercise of lucrative activities in the canton of Siquirres shall be obligated to pay the Municipality a patent tax (impuesto de patentes) that enables them to exercise those activities, in accordance with articles 3, 4, and 15 of this law." Based on the rule just transcribed, for the purposes of establishing whether the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. is subject to the municipal patent tax, it is necessary to determine what constitutes the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax and when it occurs. In accordance with Article 31 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Law number 4755), the taxable event of the tax obligation is the factual presupposition established by law to define the tax, the realization of which gives rise to the tax obligation. For its part, Article 32 of the same regulatory body establishes that the taxable event is configured from the moment the material circumstances necessary for the corresponding effects to occur are realized, or in legal situations, from the moment they are definitively constituted according to law. Having analyzed the legal nature of the municipal patent tax, it is clearly evident that the taxable event that creates the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax is the development of a lucrative activity. In the case under study, the Municipality of Siquirres, as the entity responsible for granting licenses and the respective collection of the municipal patent tax, was able to determine, based on information obtained from the Dirección General de Tributación, that the company is not only registered as a corporation engaged in the lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes but is also a taxpayer. This cross-checking tool with the records of the central administration, Ministerio de Hacienda, is valid and effective for the purposes of municipalities determining potential taxpayers in the canton. Precisely by using this control, the Municipality of Siquirres was able to determine that the appellant company does not have a lucrative activity license, and therefore, in accordance with the law, it demanded payment of the amount owed for the fiscal periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Based on the foregoing, the appellant company raises a discussion regarding the application of subsection a) of Article 14 of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres, which states: "ARTICLE 14.- For the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, licensees shall pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this law, with the exception of those indicated in its article 15. A) Agriculture, livestock, silviculture, and fishing. Only in cases where they are subject to obtaining a municipal license."; as the appellant alleges the following: "...according to the provisions of article 14 of Law 7176 of the Patent Tax Law of the Municipality of Siquirres, for the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, licensees shall pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this Law, with the exception of those indicated in article 15, subsection a) establishing 'Agriculture, livestock and silviculture and fishing. Of those indicated in its article 15'." On this particular point, it must be specified that the "literal" transcription of the article made by the appellant is not sufficient to proceed with analyzing this first point of the first fact of the filed Appeal, as it must be accompanied by proper substantiation, which the appellant company omits. Likewise, the appellant alleges that the activity it carries out is not presupposed as a taxable event; however, the activity deployed by the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., by virtue of all the foregoing, has been determined to be agricultural in nature and with eminently lucrative purposes. Thus, it is taken as proven what type of activity is carried out by the company and therefore, it fits within the classification of lucrative activities provided for in Article 14, subsection a) of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres. For this reason, this aspect of the appeal is rejected. Now, regarding the evidence in cases such as the one at hand, it must be noted that the competence of this section is limited solely to analyzing the grievances presented and the evidence provided, as is proper. Given that in this case the appellant failed to comply with the evidentiary duty incumbent upon them in Tax matters as provided in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, there is no evidence that suitably accredits what is alleged in the appeal. Regarding the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), numeral 140 of the indicated regulation states: "The burden of proof falls upon the Tax Administration regarding the constitutive facts of the material tax obligation, while it falls upon the taxpayer regarding the impeditive, modifying, or extinctive facts of the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall be up to the latter, as applicable, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute their costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions, non-subjections, deductions, and, in general, the tax benefits they claim exist in their favor." (The highlighting is not from the original). From the reading of the preceding article, it is understood that the legal duty regarding the evidentiary burden corresponded in this case and under the mentioned circumstances to the appellant party, but the case record lacks evidence regarding the non-existence of the lucrative activity, making it unavoidable for this Chamber to reject this aspect of the appeal. Similarly, the grievances set forth in the second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth arguments of the Appeal are rejected, for the reasons set out below. Firstly, the argument "my company does not understand article 83" is rejected, given that articles 79 and 83, both of the Código Municipal, are applicable, especially numeral 79, cited above, as the patent tax is regulated therein. For its part, ordinal 83 of the same legal body establishes: "ARTICLE 83.- The patent tax and the license for the retail sale of liquors shall be regulated by a special law." Although Article 83 refers to the tax and the license for the retail sale of liquors, the truth is that both numerals require a commercial license for the exercise of any lucrative activity. Secondly, it is worth noting that Article 79 of the Código Municipal is again alluded to by the appellant in the fifth argument. They argue that for the cited numeral to be configured, "there must be an enabling act (acto habilitante) and that is that the municipality authorizes the lucrative activity"; however, the appellant did not request the respective license, making it impossible for the Municipality to authorize the lucrative activity of the appellant company without its prior request. On the other hand, although the appellant bases its argument on judgment number 2197-92 at fourteen hours thirty minutes of August eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, from the Sala Constitucional, it is important to note that the same refers to the primary purpose of patent tax collection. Furthermore, regarding the "enabling act (acto habilitante)", it is important to clarify that it is not that the lucrative activity is authorized, but rather that the lucrative activity itself is generated, which was indeed proven by the Municipality; therefore, once the existence of the lucrative activity was demonstrated, it proceeded to carry out the provisions of Article 79. Thirdly, the argument related to Article 18 of the Constitución Política alluded to in the sixth claim is refuted, as it has been shown that the company, due to its lucrative activity, is obligated by law to pay the patent. Regarding the seventh argument, it should be noted that the appellant does not clearly indicate the grievance caused by the Municipality when the latter points out, with reference to the Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones (Law number 7293), that every exoneration must be provided by law; therefore, this Chamber agrees with the Municipality. In the same vein, this Section has already stated: "From this point of view, it is not necessary for this Tribunal to deduce, where the letter of the law does not provide, the existence of a tax exoneration, not included by the legislator. That would be arriving at conclusions after the interpretation of several norms, seeking within the content of the text of the law what it has not expressly provided. This would violate the principle of tax legality contained in numeral 5, subsection b) of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, by illegally creating an exemption not provided in the law. It would also transgress Article 6 of that same regulatory body, which prohibits filling the legal vacuum by means of analogy for the creation of exemptions. From this point of view, the grievances expressed by the appellant are not shared, as this would result in the creation of an exoneration not provided for in the Law, by interpretative means, which is forbidden to this Tribunal" (see in a similar sense, resolutions number 181-2014 at fourteen hours five minutes of April twenty-third, two thousand fourteen, and 213-2012 at fifteen hours fifteen minutes of May thirty-first, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). In other words, tax exoneration occurs solely and exclusively when such a provision is expressly contemplated in a norm.

**VI.- Conclusion.** For the foregoing reasons, this Tribunal rejects the appeal filed against Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015, as there is not the slightest doubt that the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. carries out a lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes and therefore must comply with its derived tax obligations. Consequently, the appeal filed is declared without merit and the challenged resolution is upheld." The appellant company confirms that it is not a taxpayer in the Municipality of Siquirres, *“…since as established by article 14 of Law 7176, the Patent Law of the Municipality of Siquirres, for the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the patentees shall pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this Law, with the exception of those indicated in article 15, subsection a) which establishes “Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Of those indicated in article 15. Only in cases where they are subject to a municipal license”* (sic). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Municipality argues that by virtue of the provisions of numerals 79 and 83 of the Municipal Code, the appellant company must indeed pay the patent. Regarding this particular, the appellant company states that numeral 83 does not apply in the case under study, *“since it refers to ‘the patent tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor are regulated by special law’”* and, with respect to the provisions of article 79, only when what is established therein occurs, that is, the existence of an enabling act, a situation which, according to the appellant company, was not proven in the appealed resolution. In addition to the foregoing, the Municipality bases its decision on ordinals 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 31, and 32 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure; however, the appellant company alleges once again that it falls within the provisions of article 14 of Law No. 7176. On the other hand, the Municipality argues that the company is duly registered with the Dirección General de Tributación, so the appellant party again brings to light article 14 of Law No. 7176. The latter, in accordance with numeral 1 in relation to 15, both of Law No. 7176. Regarding the argument concerning the Law Regulating Current Exonerations, Derogations, and Exceptions No. 7293, the company states the following: *“…all subjective and tax exemptions provided for in different laws are repealed, since this law refers to exonerations on tariff, sales, income, territorial consumption, and vehicle property taxes, with the exceptions stated in this law.”*. Finally, the appellant company considers that what is stated by the Municipality regarding the obligation generated by article 18 of the Political Constitution is true; however, it indicates: *“…but only when they are obligated by law, as in tax matters the principle of legal reserve exists”*, for which reason it also considers that article 13 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure is completely out of context; in other words, it does not agree with this indication made by the Municipality in the challenged resolution.

**III.-** **On the specific case.** Prior to the analysis of the specific case, it is important to indicate that in accordance with article 170 of the Political Constitution and numeral 4 of the Municipal Code, the Municipalities possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy. In what is relevant, the taxing power is understood as the *"...initiative for the creation, modification, extinction, or exemption of municipal taxes corresponds to these entities, a power subject to the approval indicated in article 121, subsection 13 of the Political Constitution when applicable..."* (See judgment No. 1999-05445 of the Constitutional Chamber of 14:30 on July 14, 1999). Based on this constitutionally enshrined attribution, local governments are exclusively responsible for granting licenses for the exercise of lucrative activities carried out within their jurisdiction and the respective collection of the municipal patent tax (impuesto de patente municipal) for the purpose of *“…defraying all those public services provided by local governments for the benefit of the community, which translate into better guarantees of safety, hygiene, order, and local ornamentation, which undoubtedly facilitate and permit the exercise of lucrative commercial activity…”*. (Opinion of the Procuraduría General de la República No. C-126-2002). On the license and the patent tax, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in judgment No. 2197-92 of 14:30 on August 11, 1992, also stated: *“Our legislation distinguishes between the license itself, which is the administrative act that enables the individual to exercise the respective activity, and the payment of the tax itself, which is called a patent. The main theoretical justification for imposing this type of tax is that which is already traditional in the scope of Municipal Law, which defines it as the imperative need to defray the cost of the public services that the individual receives from the Municipality; that is, commercial businesses or lucrative activities, according to the nomenclature used by our Municipal Code, are highly benefitted by security, order, cleanliness, and municipal activity in general, and therefore must contribute to the Local Government. In doctrine, a patent or tax on lucrative activity is called that which taxes businesses based on external characteristics that are more or less easy to determine, without a single system existing in this regard…”*. (In the same sense, see judgment of the Constitutional Chamber No. 6362-94 of 15:39 on November 1, 1994). The patent tax is regulated by article 79 of the Municipal Code, which creates a tax on the exercise of any lucrative activity, which requires the respective municipal license, as the norm expressly provides: *“ARTICLE 79.- To exercise any lucrative activity, the interested parties must have the respective municipal license, which will be obtained through the payment of a tax. Said tax shall be paid during the entire time the lucrative activity has been exercised or for the time the license has been held, even if the activity has not been carried out”*. Regarding this legal parameter, it is equally important to mention that each Municipality has its own regulations to clearly regulate the tax, its origin, the calculation mechanisms, and collection. In the specific case, the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres (Law number 7176), provided in its first article, the following: *“ARTICLE 1.- Individuals or legal entities engaged in the exercise of lucrative activities in the canton of Siquirres shall be obligated to pay the Municipality a patent tax that authorizes them to exercise those activities, in accordance with articles 3, 4, and 15 of this law.”*. From the norm just transcribed, for the purpose of establishing whether the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. is subject to the municipal patent tax, it is necessary to determine what the taxable event (hecho generador) of the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax consists of and when it occurs. In accordance with article 31 of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure (Law number 4755), the taxable event of the tax obligation is the factual presumption established in the law to classify the tax, the realization of which gives rise to the tax obligation. For its part, article 32 of the same normative body establishes that the taxable event is configured from the moment the material circumstances necessary for the corresponding effects to occur take place, or in legal situations, from the moment they are definitively constituted according to the law. Analyzed the legal nature of the municipal patent tax, it is clearly inferred that the taxable event that creates the tax obligation to pay the municipal patent tax is the development of a lucrative activity. In the case under study, the Municipality of Siquirres, as the entity responsible for granting licenses and the respective collection of the municipal patent tax, was able to determine, based on information obtained from the Dirección General de Tributación, that the company is not only registered as a corporation that develops a lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes, but also, that it is a taxpayer. This cross-referencing tool with the records of the central administration, Ministry of Finance, is valid and effective for the purpose of determining, by the town councils, potential taxpayers in the canton. Precisely, making use of that control, the Municipality of Siquirres managed to determine that the appellant company does not have a lucrative activity license, and therefore, according to the law, it demanded payment of the amount owed for the tax periods 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. From the foregoing, the appellant company generates discussion regarding the application of subsection a) of article 14 of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres, which indicates: *“ARTICLE 14.- For the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the patentees shall pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this law, with the exception of those indicated in its article 15.* A) *Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Only in cases where they are subject to obtaining a municipal license.”*; as the appellant alleges the following: *"...according to what is established by article 14 of Law 7176, the Patent Law of the Municipality of Siquirres, for the lucrative activities indicated below, included in the international classification of economic activities, the patentees shall pay in accordance with the provisions of articles 3 and 4 of this Law with the exception of those indicated in article 15 subsection a) establishes “Agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. Of those indicated in its article 15\".* Regarding this particular, it must be specified that the “literal” transcription of the article made by the appellant is not sufficient to begin analyzing this first point of the first fact of the Appeal filed, as it is necessary to accompany it with a proper legal basis, which the appellant company fails to provide. Likewise, the appellant alleges that the activity it carries out is not a presumption of a taxable event; however, the activity displayed by the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., by virtue of all the foregoing, has been determined to be agricultural in nature and for eminently lucrative purposes. Thus, it is proven what type of activity is developed by the company and therefore, it fits within the classification of lucrative activities provided for in article 14 subsection a) of the Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres. For this reason, this aspect of the appeal is rejected. Now, regarding evidence in cases such as the one before us, it must be indicated that the competence of this section is limited solely to analyzing the grievances presented and the evidence provided, as is appropriate. Given that in this case, the appellant failed to fulfill the evidentiary duty that pertains to it in Tax matters according to the provisions of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure, as there is no evidence that adequately proves what is alleged in the appeal. Regarding the burden of proof, numeral 140 in the indicated regulations states: *“The burden of proof is incumbent upon the Tax Administration regarding the facts constituting the material tax obligation, while it is incumbent upon the taxpayer regarding the facts that prevent, modify, or extinguish the tax obligation. In that sense, it shall correspond to the latter, as the case may be, to demonstrate the facts or acts that constitute their costs, expenses, liabilities, tax credits, exemptions (exenciones), non-subjections (no sujeciones), discounts, and, in general, the tax benefits they allege exist in their favor.\"*. (The highlighting is not from the original). From reading the previous article, it is understood that the legal duty regarding the evidentiary burden corresponded in this case and under the mentioned circumstances to the appellant party; however, the case file lacks evidence regarding the non-existence of the lucrative activity, making it inevitable for this Chamber to reject this aspect of the appeal. Likewise, the grievances set forth in the second, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth arguments of the Appeal are rejected, for the reasons set forth below. Firstly, the argument *“my company does not understand article 83”* is rejected, given that articles 79 and 83, both of the Municipal Code, are applicable, especially numeral 79, previously cited, as the patent tax is regulated therein. For its part, ordinal 83 of the same legal body establishes: *“ARTICLE 83.- The patent tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor shall be regulated by a special law.”*. Even though article 83 refers to the tax and the license for the retail sale of liquor, the truth is that both numerals require a commercial license for the exercise of any lucrative activity. Secondly, it is worth noting that article 79 of the Municipal Code is again alluded to by the appellant in the fifth argument. It argues that for the cited numeral to be configured, *“there must be an enabling act, which is that the municipality authorizes the lucrative activity”*; however, the appellant did not request the respective license, making it impossible for the Municipality to authorize the lucrative activity of the appellant corporation without its prior request. On the other hand, while the appellant bases its argument on judgment number 2197-92 of fourteen hours thirty minutes on August eleven, nineteen ninety-two, of the Constitutional Chamber, it is important to note that this judgment reviews the primary purpose of collecting the patent. Furthermore, regarding the *“enabling act”*, it is important to clarify that it is not that the lucrative activity is authorized, but that lucrative activity itself is generated, which was indeed proven by the Municipality, and therefore, once the existence of the lucrative activity was demonstrated, it proceeded to enforce the provisions of article 79. Thirdly, the argument related to article 18 of the Political Constitution alluded to in the sixth allegation is refuted, because it has been demonstrated that the corporation, due to its lucrative activity, is obligated by law to pay the patent. Regarding the seventh argument, it is worth noting that the appellant does not clearly indicate the grievance caused by the Municipality when it indicates, in reference to the Law Regulating Current Exonerations, Derogations, and Exceptions (Law number 7293), that any exoneration must be provided for by law, with which this Chamber agrees with the Municipality. In the same sense, this Section has already stated: *“From this point of view, it is not necessary for this Court to deduce from the letter of the law what it does not provide for, the existence of a tax exoneration not included by the legislator. Doing so would be arriving at conclusions after the interpretation of several norms, searching within the content of the law’s text for what it has expressly not provided. It would violate the principle of tax legality contained in numeral 5 subsection b) of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedure, illegally creating an exemption not provided for in the law. It would also transgress article 6 of that same normative body, which prohibits filling legal gaps through analogy for the creation of exemptions. From this point of view, the grievances set forth by the appellant are not shared, as it would entail the creation of an exoneration not provided for in the Law, by way of interpretation, which is forbidden to this Court.”* (see in a similar sense, resolutions number 181-2014 of fourteen hours five minutes on April twenty-third, two thousand fourteen, and 213-2012 of fifteen hours fifteen minutes on May thirty-first, two thousand twelve, both issued by the Third Section of the Administrative Litigation Court). In other words, tax exoneration takes place solely and exclusively when such provision is expressly contemplated in a norm.

**VI.- Conclusion.** For the reasons stated, this Court rejects the appeal filed against Resolution number DA-5-9112-2015, as there is not the slightest doubt that the company Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. carries out a lucrative activity of cultivating vegetables and legumes and therefore must comply with its derived tax obligations. Consequently, the appeal filed is declared without merit and the challenged resolution is confirmed.

**POR TANTO.** The appeal filed is declared without merit and resolution number DA-5-9112-2015 of the Alcaldía Municipal de Siquirres, of 12:05 on July 27, 2015, is confirmed.

The administrative channel is deemed exhausted.

**Juan Luis Giusti Soto** **Evelyn Solano Ulloa** **Francisco José Chaves Torres** **EXPEDIENTE: 15-007941-1027-CA** **ASUNTO: Appeal (Recurso de Apelación)** **APPELLANT**: Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. **MUNICIPALITY**: Siquirres

 

10 ASUNTO: APELACIÓN RECURRENTE: CULANTRO FRESCO DE COSTA RICA CF S.A.

MUNICIPALIDAD: SIQUIRRES No. 444-2017 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO, SECCIÓN TERCERA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las catorce horas veinticuatro minutos del treinta y uno de octubre de dos mil diecisiete.

Conoce este Tribunal, en su condición de jerarca impropio municipal, del Recurso de Apelación, interpuesto por Nombre105467 , mayor, casado, agricultor, portador de la cédula de identidad número CED82178, vecino de Siquirres, Linda Vista, en su condición de Apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la empresa Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., con cédula jurídica número CED82179, CONTRA Resolución número DA-5-9112-2015 de las 12 horas 5 minutos del 27 de julio de 2015 de la Municipalidad de Siquirres.

Redacta el Juez Giusti Soto;

CONSIDERANDO.

I.- Hechos probados. De relevancia para efectos del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes: 1) Que el Departamento de Rentas de la Municipalidad de Siquirres mediante Oficio número ODR-311-2015, indicó: “esta oficina dicta Resolución de realizar prevención por no contar con licencia de actividad lucrativa a Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. En la misma, se le indica el monto a pagar por los períodos fiscales 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 y 2014 de conformidad con la Ley número 7176 (Folios 16 al 18 del expediente principal). 2) Que inconforme con el Oficio número ODR-311-2015, la empresa recurrente interpone Recurso de Revocatoria con Apelación en Subsidio (Folios 13 al 15 del expediente principal). 3) Que el día 23 de julio de 2015, el Departamento de Rentas de la Municipalidad de Siquirres rechaza mediante Resolución número ODR-524-2015, el Recurso de Revocatoria y eleva el de apelación ante la Alcaldía Municipal (Folios 11 al 12 del expediente principal). 4) Que mediante Resolución número DA-5-9112-2015 de fecha 27 de julio de 2015, la Alcaldesa Municipal señala: “Se procede a rechazar el recurso ya que el municipio ha actuado conforme al bloque de legalidad, siendo todos los períodos de cobro válidos según lo dispuesto en el oficio ODR-0311-2015. La presente resolución tiene recurso de apelación ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, en el plazo de 5 días hábiles por motivos de legalidad.” (Folios 07 al 10 del expediente principal). 5) Que en virtud de la notificación realizada el 04 de agosto de 2015, la empresa recurrente interpone, en tiempo, Recurso de Apelación contra Resolución número DA-5-9112-2015 (Folios 03 al 05 del expediente principal).

II.- Alegatos de las partes. La empresa recurrente confirma no ser contribuyente en la Municipalidad de Siquirres, “…pues según lo establecido por el articulo 14 de la Ley 7176 de Ley de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Siquirres Por las actividades lucrativas que seguidamente se señalan, comprendidas en la clasificación internacional de actividades económicas de los patentados pagaran conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 3 y 4 de esta Ley con excepción de las señaladas en el articulo 15 inciso a) establece “ Agricultura ganadería y silvicultura y pesca. De las señaladas en su artículo 15. Solo en los casos que estén sujetas a licencia municipal” (sic). No obstante lo anterior, la Municipalidad aduce que en virtud de lo señalado en los numerales 79 y 83 del Código Municipal, la empresa recurrente sí debe pagar patente. Sobre este particular, la empresa recurrente manifiesta que el numeral 83 no aplica en el caso sometido a estudio, “pues se refiere al “impuesto de patentes y la licencia para la venta de licores al menudeo, se regulan por ley especial” y, con respecto a lo dispuesto en el artículo 79, únicamente cuando se dé lo establecido en él, es decir, la existencia de un acto habilitante, situación que según indica la empresa recurrente, no fue comprobada en la resolución recurrida. Aunado a lo anterior, la Municipalidad fundamenta su decisión en los ordinales 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 31 y 32 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, sin embargo, la empresa recurrente alega una vez más, encontrarse dentro de lo dispuesto en el artículo 14 de la Ley No. 7176. Por otro lado, la Municipalidad arguye que la empresa se encuentra debidamente inscrita en la Dirección General de Tributación por lo que la parte recurrente trae nuevamente a la luz, el artículo 14 de la Ley No. 7176. Este último, en concordancia con el numeral 1 en relación con el 15, ambos de la Ley No. 7176. Con respecto al alegato de la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones No. 7293, la empresa manifiesta lo siguiente: “…se derogan todas las exenciones tributaria y subjetivas previstas en las diferentes leyes ya que esta ley se refiere a exoneraciones e los impuestos arancelarios, de ventas, la renta consumo territorial a la propiedad de vehículos con las excepciones que diga esta ley.”. Por último, la empresa recurrente considera que lo dispuesto por la Municipalidad en cuanto a la obligación que genera el artículo 18 de la Constitución Política es cierto, sin embargo, indica: “…pero siempre y cuando estén obligados por ley, pues en materia impositiva existe el principio de reserva de ley”, por lo que también estima el artículo 13 del Código de Normas y Procedimiento Tributarios es totalmente fuera de contexto, en otras palabras, no concuerda con esta indicación hecha por la Municipalidad en la resolución impugnada.

III.- Sobre el caso concreto. Previo al análisis del caso concreto, resulta importante indicar que de conformidad con el artículo 170 de la Constitución Política y el numeral 4 del Código Municipal, las Municipalidades poseen autonomía política, administrativa y financiera. En lo que interesa, la potestad tributaria es entendida como la "...iniciativa para la creación, modificación, extinción o exención de los tributos municipales corresponde a estos entes, potestad sujeta a la aprobación señalada en el artículo 121, inciso 13 de la Constitución Política cuando así corresponda..." (Ver sentencia N°1999-05445 de la Sala Constitucional de las 14:30 del 14 de julio de 1999). Con fundamento en esa atribución consagrada constitucionalmente, a los gobiernos locales les corresponde, en forma exclusiva, el otorgamiento de las licencias para el ejercicio de actividades lucrativas realizadas dentro de su jurisdicción y la recaudación respectiva del impuesto de patente municipal con el fin de “…sufragar todos aquellos servicios públicos que brindan los gobiernos locales en beneficio de la comunidad, mismos que se traducen en mejores garantías de seguridad, higiene, orden y ornato local, las cuales sin duda facilitan y permiten el ejercicio de la actividad comercial lucrativa…”. (Dictamen de la Procuraduría General de la República N° C-126-2002). Sobre la licencia y el impuesto de patentes , la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en la sentencia N° 2197-92 de las 14:30 horas del 11 de agosto de 1992, también manifestó: “Distingue nuestra legislación entre licencia propiamente dicha, que es el acto administrativo que habilita al particular para ejercer la respectiva actividad y el pago de impuesto propiamente dicho, que se denomina con el nombre de patente. La principal justificación teórica para imponer este tipo de tributo, es la ya tradicional en el ámbito del Derecho Municipal, que lo define como la imperiosa necesidad de sufragar el costo de los servicios públicos que el particular recibe de la Municipalidad; es decir, que los negocios comerciales o las actividades lucrativas, según la nomenclatura que utiliza nuestro Código Municipal, se ven altamente beneficiados con la seguridad, el orden el aseo y la actividad municipal en general, por lo que deben contribuir con el Gobierno Local. En doctrina se llama patente o impuesto a la actividad lucrativa, a los que gravan a los negocios sobre la base de caracteres externos más o menos fáciles de determinar, sin que exista un sistema único al respecto…". (En igual sentido, ver sentencia de la Sala constitucional N° 6362-94 de las 15:39 horas del 1 de noviembre de 1994). El impuesto de patentes debe su regulación al artículo 79 del Código Municipal, el cual crea un tributo sobre el ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa, misma que requiere de la respectiva licencia municipal, al disponer expresamente la norma: “ ARTÍCULO 79.- Para ejercer cualquier actividad lucrativa, los interesados deberán contar con licencia municipal respectiva, la cual se obtendrá mediante el pago de un impuesto. Dicho impuesto se pagará durante todo el tiempo en que se haya ejercido la actividad lucrativa o por el tiempo que se haya poseído la licencia, aunque la actividad no se haya realizado” . Sobre este parámetro legal, resulta igualmente importante mencionar que cada Municipalidad cuenta con su propia normativa a efecto de regular con claridad el tributo, su procedencia, los mecanismos de cálculo y la recaudación. En el caso específico, la Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres (Ley número 7176), dispuso en su artículo primero, lo siguiente: “ARTÍCULO 1.- Las personas físicas o jurídicas que se dediquen al ejercicio de actividades lucrativas en el cantón de Siquirres, estarán obligadas a pagar a la Municipalidad un impuesto de patentes que las faculte para ejercer esas actividades, de conformidad con los artículos 3, 4 y 15 de esta ley.”. A partir de la norma recién transcrita, a los efectos de establecer si la empresa Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A. se encuentra sujeta al impuesto de patente municipal, es necesario determinar en qué consiste y cuándo se produce el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria de pagar el impuesto de patente municipal. De conformidad con el artículo 31 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios (Ley número 4755), el hecho generador de la obligación tributaria es el presupuesto de hecho establecido en la ley para tipificar el tributo y cuya realización da origen al nacimiento de la obligación tributaria. Por su parte, el artículo 32 del mismo cuerpo normativo, establece que el hecho generador se configura a partir del momento en que se realicen las circunstancias materiales necesarias para que se produzcan los efectos que correspondan, o en las situaciones jurídicas, desde el momento en que estén definitivamente constituidas de acuerdo a la ley. Analizada la naturaleza jurídica del impuesto de patente municipal, se desprende con claridad que el hecho generador que crea la obligación tributaria de pagar el impuesto de patente municipal es el desarrollo de una actividad lucrativa. En el caso sometido a estudio, la Municipalidad de Siquirres, como entidad encargada del otorgamiento de licencias y el cobro respectivo del impuesto de patente municipal, logró determinar con base en la información que obtuvo de la Dirección General de Tributación, que la empresa no sólo está inscrita como una sociedad que desarrolla una actividad lucrativa de cultivo de hortalizas y legumbres, sino que además, es contribuyente . Esta herramienta de control cruzado con los registros de la administración central, Ministerio de Hacienda, es válida y eficaz a los efectos de determinar, por parte de los ayuntamientos sobre posibles contribuyentes en el cantón. Precisamente, haciendo uso de ese control, la Municipalidad de Siquirres, logra determinar que la empresa recurrente no cuenta con licencia de actividad lucrativa, por lo que, conforme a la ley, le previno el pago del monto adeudado por los perí odos fiscales 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 y 2014. A partir de lo anterior, la empresa recurrente genera la discusión respecto a la aplicación del inciso a) del artículo 14 de la Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres, el cual indica: “ARTÍCULO 14.- Por las actividades lucrativas que seguidamente se señalan, comprendidas en la clasificación internacional de actividades económicas, los patentados pagaran conforme con lo dispuesto en los artículos 3 y 4 de esta ley, con excepción de las señaladas en su artículo 15. A) Agricultura, ganadería, silvicultura y pesca. Solo en los casos en que estén sujetas a la obtención de licencia municipal.”; pues el recurrente alega lo siguiente: "...según lo establecido por el articulo 14 de la Ley 7176 de Ley de Patentes de la Municipalidad de Siquirres por las actividades lucrativas que seguidamente se señalan, comprendidas en la clasificación internacional de actividades económicas de los patentados pagaran conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 3 y 4 de esta Ley con excepción de las señaladas en el articulo 15 inciso a) establece “Agricultura ganadería y silvicultura y pesca. De las señaladas en su artículo 15". Sobre este particular, se debe precisar que la transcripción “literal” del artículo realizada por el recurrente, no es suficiente para entrar a analizar este primer punto del hecho primero del Recurso de Apelación interpuesto, pues es necesario acompañarla con una debida fundamentación , de lo cual es omiso la empresa recurrente. Asimismo, el recurrente alega que la actividad que ejerce no es presupuesto de un hecho generador, sin embargo, la actividad desplegada por la empresa Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., en virtud de todo lo anteriormente expuesto, se ha podido determinar es de carácter agrícola y con fines eminentemente lucrativos. Así las cosas, se tiene como probado que tipo de actividad es la desarrollada por la empresa y por ende, encaja dentro de la clasificación de actividades lucrativas prevista en el artículo 14 inciso a) de la Ley de Impuestos Municipales del Cantón de Siquirres. En razón de ello, se rechaza este extremo del recurso de apelación. Ahora bien, en lo que respecta a la prueba en casos como el que nos ocupa, se debe indicar que la competencia de esta sección se limita únicamente a analizar los agravios presentados y la prueba aportada, tal y como corresponde. Siendo que en la especie la recurrente incumplió con el deber probatorio que le atañe en la materia Tributaria según lo dispuesto en el Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, pues no existe prueba que acredite de manera idónea lo alegado en el recurso. En cuanto a la carga de la prueba, el numeral 140 en la normativa indicada se señala: “La carga de la prueba incumbe a la Administración Tributaria respecto de los hechos constitutivos de la obligación tributaria material, mientras que incumbe al contribuyente respecto de los hechos impeditivos, modificativos o extintivos de la obligación tributaria. En ese sentido, corresponderá a este último, según el caso, demostrar los hechos o actos que configuren sus costos, gastos, pasivos, créditos fiscales, exenciones, no sujeciones, descuentos y, en general, los beneficios fiscales que alega existentes en su favor.". (El resaltado no es del original). De la lectura del anterior artículo, se tiene que el deber legal sobre la carga probatoria le correspondía en este caso y bajo las circunstancias mencionadas a la parte recurrente, mas, los autos adolecen de prueba referente a la inexistencia de la actividad lucrativa, por lo que resulta indefectible para esta Cámara rechazar este extremo del recurso. De igual forma, se rechazan los agravios expuestos en los argumentos segundo, quinto, sexto, séptimo y octavo del Recurso de Apelación, por las razones que de seguido se exponen. En primer término, se rechaza el argumento “mi empresa no comprende el articulo 83”, toda vez que los artículos 79 y 83, ambos del Código Municipal, resultan aplicables, en especial el numeral 79, anteriormente citado, pues en él se encuentra regulado el impuesto de patente. Por su parte, el ordinal 83 del mismo cuerpo legal, establece: “ ARTÍCULO 83.- El impuesto de patentes y la licencia para la venta de licores al menudeo, se regularán por una ley especial.”. Si bien el artículo 83 hace referencia al impuesto y la licencia para la venta de licores al menudeo, lo cierto es que ambos numerales exigen una licencia comercial para el ejercicio de cualquier actividad lucrativa. En segundo lugar, cabe indicar que el artículo 79 del Código Municipal vuelve a ser aludido por el recurrente en el argumento quinto. Arguye que para que se configure el numeral citado, “debe existir un acto habilitante y es que la municipalidad autorice la actividad lucrativa”, sin embargo, el recurrente no solicitó la licencia respectiva por lo que le resultaba imposible a la Municipalidad, autorizar la actividad lucrativa de la sociedad recurrente, sin su previa petición. Por otra parte, si bien la recurrente se fundamenta en sentencia número 2197-92 de las catorce horas treinta minutos del once de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y dos de la Sala Constitucional, es importante señalar que la mism a, hace reseña al fin primordial del cobro de patente. Además, respecto al “acto habilitante” , es importante aclarar que no es que se autorice la actividad lucrativa, sino que se genere actividad lucrativa en sí, la cual sí fue probada por la Municipalidad, por lo que una vez demostrada la existencia de la actividad lucrativa, procedió a realizar lo dispuesto por el artículo 79. En tercer lugar, se refuta el argumento relacionado al artículo 18 de la Constitución Política aludido en el alegato sexto, por cuanto ha quedado demostrado que la sociedad por su actividad lucrativa, está obligada por ley al pago de patente. Con respecto al argumento sétimo, cabe señalar que el recurrente no indica con claridad el agravio ocasionado por la Municipalidad cuando ésta indica, al hacer referencia a la Ley Reguladora de Exoneraciones Vigentes, Derogatorias y Excepciones (Ley número 7293), que toda exoneración debe estar prevista por ley, por lo que esta Cámara coincide con la Municipalidad. En igual sentido, ya esta Sección ha señalado: “Desde este punto de vista, no es menester a este Tribunal, desprender de donde la letra de la ley no dispone, la existencia de una exoneración tributaria, no incluida por el legislador. Sería ello arribar a conclusiones luego de la interpretación de varias normas, buscando dentro del contenido del texto de la ley lo que éste expresamente no ha dispuesto. Ello sería violentar el principio de legalidad tributaria contenido en el numeral 5 inciso b) del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, creando de manera ilegal una exención no dispuesta en la ley. Sería transgredir, también, el artículo 6 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, que prohíbe el llenar el vacío legal mediante la analogía, para la creación de exenciones. Desde este punto de vista, no se comparten los agravios expuestos por la parte apelante, pues ello arrojaría la creación de una exoneración no prevista en la Ley, por vía interpretativa, lo cual está vedado a este Tribunal” (ver en sentido similar, las resoluciones número 181-2014 de las catorce horas cinco minutos del veintitrés de abril del dos mil catorce, y 213-2012 de las quince horas quince minutos del treinta y uno de mayo del dos mil doce, ambas dictadas por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo). En otras palabras, la exoneración tributaria tiene lugar única y exclusivamente, cuando tal disposición se contemple, de manera expresa, en una norma.

VI.- Conclusión. Por lo expuesto, este Tribunal rechaza la apelación interpuesta en contra de la Resolución número DA-5-9112-2015, pues no queda la menor duda que la empresa Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A., realiza una actividad lucrativa de cultivo de hortalizas y legumbres y por ende debe cumplir con sus obligaciones tributarias derivadas. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto y se confirma la resolución impugnada.

POR TANTO.

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto y se confirma la resolución número DA-5-9112-2015 de la Alcaldía Municipal de Siquirres, de las 12 horas 5 minutos del 27 de julio de 2015. Se da por agotada la vía administrativa.

Juan Luis Giusti Soto Evelyn Solano Ulloa Francisco José Chaves Torres ASUNTO: Recurso de Apelación RECURRENTE: Culantro Fresco de Costa Rica CF S.A.

MUNICIPALIDAD: Siquirres