Appeal of acquittal for attempted homicide — inapplicability of self-defense and upholding of civil actionApelación de absolución por tentativa de homicidio — improcedencia de legítima defensa y acogida de la acción civil

**EXPEDIENTE**: 20-000063-0219-PE **ACCUSED**: [Name 001] **VICTIM**: [Name 002] **CRIME**: ATTEMPTED SIMPLE HOMICIDE **Res**: 2025-484 **Exp**: 20-000063-0219-PE Criminal Appeals Court of Cartago, First Section. At fourteen hundred hours on the thirtieth of September of two thousand twenty-five.

Criminal case 20-000063-0219-PE against [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, identification number [Value 001], born on January 16, 1973, married, son of [Name 003] and [Name 004], resident of [...], for the crime of ATTEMPTED SIMPLE HOMICIDE to the detriment of [Name 002]. The Court is composed of Judges Susana Wittmann Stengel, Maureen Sancho González, and Judge Christian Fernández Mora. Appearing before the appellate court were Licenciada Rebeca Moya Valverde, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and Licenciada Marisel Arias Valverde, representative of the Victim's Civil Defense Office, only.

**WHEREAS:**

I.- That by means of judgment number 143-2025, at seven thirty-seven hours on the fourteenth of March of two thousand twenty-five, the CRIMINAL TRIAL COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE, PÉREZ ZELEDÓN, resolved: "THEREFORE: In accordance with the foregoing, articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 8 and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 1, 11, 24, 28, 30, 45, 111 of the Criminal Code; 1, 6, 8, 9, 142, 111 to 113, 265 to 270, 341 to 366 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Court resolves: TO ACQUIT the accused [Name 001] of all penalty and responsibility, regarding a crime of Attempted Simple Homicide, which the Public Prosecutor's Office had been attributing to him, to the detriment of [Name 002]. It is ordered to lift any precautionary measure weighing on the accused by reason of this case. The filed Civil Action for Damages is declared without merit. Resolved without special condemnation in costs, the civil plaintiff [Name 002], represented by the Victim's Civil Defense Office, is exempted from payment of costs; otherwise, the expenses of the process are borne by the State. Once this judgment becomes final, the definitive archiving of the case is ordered. NOTIFY BY READING. MARÍA JOSÉ ZAMORA CASTILLO, JOSÉ LUIS CAMBRONERO DELGADO, CARLOS ADOLFO CALDERÓN BOGANTES. Judges of the Trial Court of Pérez Zeledón." (sic)

II.- That against the aforementioned ruling, Licenciada Rebeca Moya Valverde, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, and Licenciada Marisel Arias Valverde, representative of the Victim's Civil Defense Office, filed appeals.

III.- By means of a resolution at 07:06 hours on April 22, 2025, the Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone (criminal division) summoned the parties regarding the filed appeal.

IV.- Having carried out the legal deliberation, pursuant to the provisions of numeral 465 of the Criminal Procedure Code, this chamber considered the questions raised in the appeal.

V.- In the proceedings, the formalities and prescriptions of the law have been observed.

Drafted by Appellate Sentencing Judge Wittmann Stengel; **CONSIDERING:** I.- Admissibility. Against judgment number 143-2025, at seven thirty-seven hours on the fourteenth of March of two thousand twenty-five, issued by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Pérez Zeledón, in which the accused [Name 001] was acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of attempted simple homicide, the prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde and the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Marisel Arias Valverde, filed an appeal against the criminal judgment. From the preliminary review, it was determined that these briefs were filed within the time limit established by law (cf. the electronic file, within the context of the Trial Court, in briefs, dated 04/21/2025), as provided for by article 460 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and they comply with the admissibility requirements regulated by articles 458 and 459 of that normative body, which allows for their examination under the terms of article 8.2.h of the American Convention on Human Rights, and therefore it is admitted for study and resolution on the merits.

II.- Appeal by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In her first ground, the appellant alleges "Disagreement with the determination of the facts, erroneous intellectual and/or analytical reasoning due to violation of the rules of sound criticism in accordance with articles 142, 363, and 459 of the current Criminal Procedure Code." The appellant points out her disagreement with the acquittal granted in favor of the accused [Name 001], since, although the trial court, in its reasoning, explains that the facts were considered proven, it decided not to accept the prosecution's thesis, stating that the evidence yielded two versions that it found viable and credible with respect to the modal aspects of the accusation, and thus, being unable to disprove either of them, it considered that the doubt must favor the accused person by applying the universal principle of in dubio pro reo. The petitioner does not share this position, considering that the judges should have evaluated the different elements of evidence in light of the rules of sound criticism. She details in her claim that the panel of judges considered it proven that the suspect attacked the complainant, that he used a knife, that he wounded him on his arms and back, but that, despite this, they erroneously state that it could not be determined whether an unlawful aggression by the victim against the accused actually existed or not, which would have caused the defendant's attack by way of self-defense (legítima defensa). She considers that the lower court could not establish a doubt that hinged on the justification of the accused's actions; in other words, that it could only be established whether his conduct was justified or not and whether there was an excess in the defense. Furthermore, she objects that the trial court bases its doubt on the fact that the victim stated that he filed the complaint because he was told that the accused had denounced him, which is not an element that justifies the decision. The appellant also objects that the a quo indicated that credibility could not be given to either version, when from the reading of the resolution, what is extracted is that credibility is given to the defendant for having declared that he was a victim of several robberies and stated that his conduct was to defend himself, while it was not weighed whether the victim truly committed any criminal act, since even though he is detained for a crime of violation of the Ley de Psicotrópicos, this does not constitute a reason to detract from the value of his declaration. The statement given by the accused inverted the burden of proof, which implied that he should have provided some evidence proving at least one of the robberies to justify the unlawful aggression, an aggression that would have been categorically ruled out anyway because it would be "taking justice into one's own hands" by using a work tool, especially since the accused did not observe that the victim or his brother were carrying any weapon. In addition, the appellant states that the defendant said he felt threatened, but he himself indicated that he told them "I caught you by surprise," "I caught you red-handed," and that he did not intend to kill, but that he did thrust at the victim aimed at vital areas, even though he failed to strike him due to the defensive action taken by the victim. Based on the foregoing, the appellant considers that the judgment presents a defect of contradictory and incoherent reasoning that affects the victim's right to obtain a just ruling and limits the participation of the prosecutorial body. In her second ground, the appellant establishes her "Disagreement with the assessment of the evidence due to violation of the rules of rational sound criticism, by simple referral to documentary and expert evidence without reflection of contents, in accordance with articles 142, 184, 363, and 459 of the Criminal Procedure Code." She objects that the a quo did not carry out a concatenated analysis of all the evidentiary clues, which would have allowed it to establish that there were elements of evidence supporting the victim's version, such as the photographic sequence carried out by officials of the Judicial Investigation Agency that accounts for the injuries he presented and that allowed his complaint to be confirmed, as well as the medical-legal report 2022-266 from the Medical Legal Unit and the certification from the Hospital Escalante Pradilla, which, although they were included within the summary of evidence, were not analyzed, neglecting to assess whether these other elements could help elucidate either of the two versions. The defendant's version was easily discardable, because, although he indicated that he only intended to give the victim a "punishment," the injuries were directed toward his vital areas, such as his torso and head, and it was the victim who managed to avoid the lethal outcome by putting his arms up as a defensive action. Based on these aspects, the appellant adds that, if a more thorough analysis had been conducted, the possibility of applying the crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) could not have been established either, as the trial court also proposed, given that the accused ended his unlawful aggression due to the intervention of a third party, as narrated by the victim, which was dismissed by the a quo without taking into account aspects inherent to the testimony. Another aspect objected to by the appellant is that the court analyzed the victim's declaration in a rigorous manner, overlooking the fact that almost five years have passed since the events occurred, and therefore the person may have deteriorated memories, without this implying a false declaration, as the trial court, in some way, attempted to make it seem. For the reasons stated, and due to her disagreement with the decision, the petitioner requests the annulment of the appealed judgment and that a retrial be ordered.

III.Appeal filed by the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office. The appellant raises a single ground, which she titles "lack of reasoning. Violation of the rules of sound criticism and the principle of reasonable assessment of evidence." She claims that despite the fact that from the evidence received at the debate, important evidentiary clues can be obtained, which, when concatenated together, yielded the sole conclusion that the defendant's intention was to end the victim's life by using a machete-type bladed weapon that he carried in one of his hands, the sentencing court erroneously concluded that self-defense (legítima defensa) could have occurred. As aspects that she considers should have been taken into account to establish the accused's responsibility, she cites the following: that the victim narrated that it was the accused who lunged at him and wounded him with the machete on his hands; that if the photographs provided by the Judicial Investigation Agency are observed, it can be determined that the injuries the victim sustained were clearly defensive and a product of the movements he had to make to avoid being hit in his head, where the machete blows were directed; that the injuries sustained by the victim were assessed by the medical-legal expert and shown by him at trial; that from the victim's account, he made no reference to any situation generating any conflict prior to the moment of the aggression; that the expert reports incorporated into the debate were not assessed in conjunction with the testimonial evidence. To the above, the appellant adds that the trial court did not carry out any factual, legal, or logical-intellectual assessment of the premises of civil liability and only indicated that the civil action for damages was declared without merit as it was accessory to the criminal process. For the foregoing reasons, not sharing the decision, the appellant requests that judgment number 143-2025, issued by the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Pérez Zeledón, be annulled and a remand be ordered for a new substantiation of the case.

IV.- Regarding the claims raised by the appellants: In order to conduct a detailed review of the appealed judgment and the various topics alleged, it has been deemed necessary to structure this resolution as follows: i) Facts as charged by the Public Prosecutor's Office: I- The Public Prosecutor's Office charged the following facts: "The Public Prosecutor's Office charged the following facts: 1. On the twenty-first day of June of the year two thousand twenty, at approximately five o'clock in the afternoon, the victim [Name 002] was in the locality of [...], on the road to the Finca of [Name 003] (father of the accused), on public thoroughfare, at which moment the accused [Name 001] appeared, who, fully aware of the unlawful nature of his actions and with the intent to kill the victim [Name 002], approached him using a machete-type knife that he was carrying in his hands as a weapon, and attacked him, launching several thrusts that struck the victim's body, specifically on the right forearm, left forearm, immediately afterwards the victim tried to flee the site by walking backward, but lost his balance and fell to the ground, which the accused [Name 001] took advantage of to continue attacking the victim [Name 002], launching thrusts at him with the machete-type knife, with the aim of ending his life, which struck him on his right arm and on his back, in the right suprascapular region, all while the accused [Name 001] was loudly saying to the victim 'you see, you son of a bitch?, this is how I wanted to catch you'; nevertheless, the accused did not achieve his objective of killing the victim, because a brother of the accused, named [Name 007], intervened and asked the accused not to continue cutting him, thereby preventing the accused from continuing to assault him, and immediately afterward he left the place." ii) Regarding the possible application of a grounds for justification in the accused's conduct. The appellants question the incorrect assessment of the evidence made by the lower court, by considering that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was or was not protected by the possibility of legitimately defending himself against an aggression committed by the victim against him, for lacking support in the evidentiary body. Upon reviewing the case file, this Chamber determines that said position established by the a quo contravenes what the various pieces of evidence show. Among the aspects to be considered are the following: 1) According to the factual framework established by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the events did not occur on the accused's property but rather "one kilometer after the School, on the road to the Finca of [Name 003] (father of the accused) on public thoroughfare," and it was established that, at that place, the accused was present, who was the person carrying a machete and intercepted the victim, inflicting several wounds upon him and threatening to end his life. It is worth clarifying that during the debate, the victim declared that he did not know if the path he was walking along was a public thoroughfare or not, stating that "it is a road that goes to their farm and other farms, the events took place on the road," while the accused, in his investigative statement, maintained that it was a path on a farm that he takes care of, which does not allow for accreditation that the events took place on the defendant's property so as to sustain that the victim's presence at the location revealed, in and of itself, a criminal intent, especially since he was accompanied by the defendant's brother, this last aspect being undisputed. 2) To determine whether it was possible or not to confirm, or whether it could at least be possible, that the suspect acted under the protection of a grounds for justification, one must necessarily review the context in which the events occurred, and in this regard, it is noted that the accused, during the debate, reported that on previous occasions, the victim had entered his property and taken extremely valuable belongings from his family and neighbors, and, furthermore, that this person had a drug problem, as did his brother, [Name 007]. Regarding the day of the event specifically, the accused reports that he was going up towards his home when he heard the footsteps of the victim and another person, who turned out to be his brother [Name 007], and he stated that they were always going after the family's tools, that he knows the gait of a person who is going to break in to rob, and therefore he intercepted them and asked what they were doing there, to which his brother [Name 007] replied that they had come to steal and that whoever interfered would be "pinned down." The suspect specified that, although "they were not carrying weapons that day, ... neither of them pulled out a knife," he was upset by that phrase about being pinned down, thinking that he wasn't "a piece of cheese," and, therefore, what he did was "boil with rage" and he took the machete he was carrying, with which he launched several machete blows at the victim, blows which, according to him, he only delivered as a form of "punishment," but that his intention "was not to mince him up." For his part, the victim related that he had consumed alcohol, that he was with a brother of the accused named [Name 007], and the latter told him to go to his father's place "to get some money," that he invited him to continue drinking, and when they were going along a stone path, through the coffee plantation, at a certain moment, [Name 007] went ahead and met up with [Name 001], whom at first he did not see well and then he could see that it was this person, and when they met, the latter "lunged at him with a machete" and told him that "that's how he wanted to catch him," that he told him "easy," but despite that, the latter attacked him with the machete on his hands (pointing to his arms and the upper left side of his back). In addition, the victim said: "[Name 007] took off running and I with him, I crossed a creek, the man told me you saved yourself because I was going to kill you, I reached the car passed out and they took me to the hospital." From the above, it emerges that it was the accused who carried out an armed attack, and that he did not provide convincing data showing that, on that day, he had been unlawfully attacked, given that he acknowledged that his brother and the complainant were not carrying weapons, that he saw no knife, and if one listens to the recording of his declaration at trial, at a certain moment (03-13-2025, 5:52), he states that they were not carrying any object (referring to them not carrying any goods they had stolen, nor did he observe them trying to take any). He also explains that on previous occasions, highly valuable goods had been stolen from him, for which neither the prosecutorial body nor the technical or material defense included any evidence in this regard in the case file to accredit those alleged antecedents. In this way, upon conducting a comprehensive review of the challenged judgment, it is denoted that mention was made in it of the versions given by the victim and the accused, but a more detailed analysis of all the evidence regarding the topic of self-defense (legítima defensa) was omitted, which, had it been done, could have denoted several circumstances, among them, that the fact that the victim may have committed several robberies previously on the accused's property did not give the latter the right, on the day of the event, to take justice into his own hands, since, in that case, he should have alerted the respective police authorities. In this regard, article 28 of the Criminal Code allows for the application of the figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) when the person acts in defense of his person or rights, or those of another, under these assumptions: "acts in defense of the person or rights, his own or another's, provided that the following circumstances concur: a) Unlawful aggression; and b) Reasonable necessity of the defense employed to repel or prevent the aggression. It shall be understood that this grounds for justification applies for anyone who executes violent acts against the unknown individual who, without any right and with danger to the inhabitants or occupants of the building or its dependencies, is found within them, whatever the damage caused to the intruder." Now, assuming it might be true that the victim had on other occasions stolen the suspect's belongings, although this was not conclusively demonstrated during the debate, nor was it conclusively confirmed that on that day he was committing a criminal act when he was intercepted by the accused, as he was walking along a path near the defendant's property, the reality is that, in light of Costa Rican laws, people cannot take justice into their own hands for past events; rather, in a State governed by the rule of law, one must turn to the judicial system to make the respective requests. The figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) is a grounds for justification established by law to protect life, the integrity of persons, or property, which applies when there is unlawful aggression and, moreover, this defense must be rational and necessary, and for it to apply, a real, actual, or imminent attack against one's own rights or those of a third party is required. In this case, the defendant indicated that his brother [Name 007] told him: "we came to steal everything, whoever interferes we'll pin down," but he accepts that he did not see them armed and that his reaction was out of rage. From the above, it is also denoted that if the accused received some type of threat, it was without much substance; in other words, from the defendant's own statement, it cannot be extracted that the victim made any manifestation of a future, serious, grave harm that generated fear in him, because when he refers to what his brother (not the victim) said to him regarding that "whoever interfered would be pinned down," he did not indicate having felt intimidated but rather angered, hence the aggressive reaction not towards the one who had said that, but towards the victim, that is, he discriminated as to which of the individuals to direct his anger towards and channeled it towards the victim. These details were not analyzed by the a quo, nor were they contrasted with the victim's version, who explained how he was attacked by the accused with a machete and that the accused directed it at his body on several occasions when he at no time threatened or tried to attack him. Due to the foregoing, it is evident that a typical case of self-defense (legítima defensa) did not occur, given that if the defendant suspected that the victim intended to steal his property, he should have alerted the respective authorities, and therefore it was inadmissible to settle a conflict with one's own hands when institutions and the corresponding legal channels exist to resolve these types of situations. Thus, to determine whether one was facing a case of self-defense (legítima defensa), it was necessary to prove an unlawful, direct, and imminent aggression by the victim towards the accused, and whether the necessity of the defense, if such existed, was reasonable and adequate to repel the aggression, since it was important that the conduct committed by the defendant did not become a reprisal, because the law only protects the necessary defense against an unjust aggression, not vengeance, and therefore it is improper for the case at hand to have established as a possibility the concurrence of a grounds for justification of self-defense (legítima defensa) in the accused's conduct. iii) Regarding the classification of the facts as a crime of minor bodily harm: Another aspect that must be mentioned is that the court, when acquitting, made mention that the facts could constitute the crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) due to the temporary disability the victim suffered, a topic on which the appellants disagree, warning that, to attribute the commission of the crime of simple homicide in the degree of attempt to a person, it is not necessarily required that the injuries endangered the person's life, but rather what is important is to prove the animus necandi, which is not necessarily derived from the forensic expert report but from the context of what happened. However, the a quo explains in its resolution that, even if the application of the figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) were ruled out, from the modal circumstances charged by the prosecutorial body, a crime of simple homicide in the degree of attempt is not proven, but rather that of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves), a criterion that this Chamber shares, as will be anticipated, based on the following arguments: the victim [Name 002], when testifying at trial, ruled out that the accused's aggression towards him ceased due to the intervention of the accused's brother named [Name 007]. Thus, in the judgment, expressions made by the victim were recorded that allow one to conclude that if the accused's intention had been homicidal, nothing would have prevented him from carrying out such conduct, as is evident from the following excerpt: "I don't know why he stopped throwing machete blows at me, he had calmed down a bit; it was the hand of God that he stopped swinging the machete at me." Secondly, from the analysis of the victim's declaration, it is established without any doubt that, if the accused had had the intention of ending the victim's life, he had every possibility to do so, and that there was no external cause independent of his will that prevented him, not only because of what has just been mentioned, but also because the victim was intoxicated, and after the two strikes the accused managed to deliver to his arms, the victim fell seated on the ground, leaving the accused standing with a machete in hand, therefore in a position of complete advantage over the victim, with the accused deciding to launch a third strike towards his back, and not towards a vital organ such as the neck or head, and furthermore he did not perform this action with the sharp edge of the machete; all of which allows for discarding homicidal intent in the accused's action. Regarding this, the victim was clear in declaring: ...I was very tipsy...; ...I was drunk, intoxicated; The wound on my back was not much, it felt not like these ones, like a glancing blow, somewhat sideways; I had drunk too much before, I don't even know how much, but actually quite a lot, I had woken up on the street, I stopped drinking when I was heading home; I fell seated. It was the hand of God that he stopped swinging the machete at me. From the factual dynamics described, this Chamber agrees that homicidal intent must be ruled out, not only because the medical-legal report 2022-0000266, dated April 21, 2022, in which the victim [Name 002] was assessed, did not determine that any of the inflicted injuries had endangered his life—having concluded that "based on the objective elements of judgment available at this time, it is considered that the documented injuries warrant a temporary disability of seven (7) days in total and that the evaluated individual evolved without functional sequelae related to them"—but also because the victim himself indicated that at the time of the events he was "dying of a hangover," that he had drunk too much, that he had even woken up on the street, and therefore, if the suspect had wanted to end his life, he could have done so, as the victim had no possibility of defending himself. He also clarified that, during the last machete blow, he fell, since he slipped, meaning he was defenseless, and it was there that he indicated he does not know why the suspect stopped throwing machete blows at him, which reflects that despite how upset the accused was, he allowed him to get up and leave, and therefore the animus necandi in the accused's conduct was ruled out. This assertion also finds support in what was stated by the defendant himself, who, although he accepted what happened, categorically denied that his intention was to end the victim's life, but rather to protect his property, as the trial court set forth when taking his statements into account, as reflected in the following segment: "...I grab the machete that I carry in the forest as an important work and defense tool." It is true that I told him that was how I wanted to catch him, of course red-handed, I didn't want to kill him, I didn't aim for his head; I only threw those three machete blows at him, it was just a punishment, it wasn't to make mincemeat out of him.” It is for this reason that, as the commission of a crime of simple homicide in the attempt stage was not proven, but rather that of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) (given that the effects resulting from the accused's actions only caused injuries incapacitating for seven days), as the trial court correctly points out, these acts are amply prescribed, taking into consideration ordinal numbers 31 to 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and 125 of the Criminal Code (Código Penal), which is the provision regulating the offense of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves), and which is applicable to this matter, given that the aggrieved party suffered an incapacity of 7 days to perform his usual work, as this provision establishes a criminal penalty “of three to one year of imprisonment for anyone who causes damage to another's body or health, resulting in incapacity for their usual occupation for more than five days and up to one month.” Thus, to confirm that the statute of limitations has indeed run, it must be taken into account that the date of commission of the acts is June 21, 2020. As they are classified as a crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) and in accordance with the maximum penalty that could be imposed, the maximum statute of limitations period is three years. However, this is interrupted and the reduced period of half the term is counted, in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 33 of the cited legal body, from the first interrupting act, which, in this case, was the investigative statement taken from the accused on July 3, 2020 (f. 79), and from there, one and a half years (18 months) must be counted, a term that expired on January 3, 2022. However, during that period, no act occurred that interrupted or suspended the statute of limitations. Thus, the next interrupting act was the scheduling of the preliminary hearing, which dates from October 25, 2022 (f. 196), which implies that by that time, the statute of limitations period had already run. Consequently, it was not possible to issue a conviction against the defendant [Name 001] for the crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves), therefore the trial court is correct in so establishing and, accordingly, despite what was stated in the second section, the criminal claims of the appellants must be dismissed. iv) Regarding the civil action filed. From the foregoing, it is determined that with respect to the injuries suffered by the victim at the hands of the accused and for which a temporary incapacity of 7 days to perform his usual work was determined, there was no major discussion, given that even the accused himself accepted that he inflicted them on the victim as a form of “punishment,” due to the multiple robberies of which he and his family had been victims. However, despite this proof, the trial court erroneously dismissed the civil action for damages, stating, contradictorily, that no causal link was determined between the acts and the result, “between the action of the accused and the injuries of the victim” and that it is required “not only that a criminal wrong arises, but also that a harmful result to a third party occurs, that it is attributable to the subject, and that a causal relationship exists between one and the other,” having doubts only about whether the defendant's action was in self-defense and considering that the minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) was prescribed. However, from the analysis above, self-defense and the presence of a simple homicide in the attempt stage have been ruled out, so the rejection of the civil action constitutes an error, because, even if the acts are prescribed in criminal matters, this does not prevent the civil action from being upheld, since rather, the rule provided in Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) establishes that: “The Criminal Court must rule on the merits of the civil action for damages validly exercised, even when an acquittal or a definitive dismissal has been ordered in the trial phase.” It is worth noting that, although the criminal action prescribed, the civil one did not, as it is governed by the ten-year period provided in Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and, in any case, neither during the debate, nor in the appeal, nor with the summons to the parties, was it alleged that the civil action was prescribed. In this way, regarding the civil action, from a comprehensive reading of the appealed judgment, it follows that the accused, acting willfully, injured the victim in various parts of his body (an aspect not contested by either party), resulting, according to the medical-legal opinion, in an incapacity of 7 days, which allowed the affected party [Name 002] to file a claim for damages, represented by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), against the defendant and civil defendant [Name 001], for the injuries he caused him, which proves the existence of a causal nexus between the defendant's actions and these consequences, which constitute a compensable damage under the terms of Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Furthermore, Mr. [Name 002], as the direct victim, had the right to bring this action against [Name 001], for the latter's criminal conduct, protected by Article 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and the aforementioned civil provision, as well as the Rules in force of the 1941 Criminal Code. The defense, in its closing arguments, referred to the possibility that the defendant may have acted under the figure of self-defense, which has already been ruled out, and when referring to the civil action (28:30), it only requested its dismissal without raising any objection to the amounts requested by the lawyer from the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) or to any aspect concerning the civil action for damages. Hence, for reasons of procedural economy and in observance of the principle of party disposition inherent to this matter, this Chamber, by majority (judges Wittmann Stengel and Sancho González), in accordance with what has been proven, deems that the civil action for damages filed by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) must be upheld. Based on the foregoing, the civil claim is granted and the civil defendant [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: i) For temporary incapacity, the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES EXACTLY (¢74,340.00), as a result of being incapacitated to perform his usual work for seven days, according to the medical-legal opinion provided to the case file (mentioned in the third section). ii) For moral damages, the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (¢1,000,000.00), given that the victim referred in the debate to the impact that the events have had on his daily life, because, as a result of the wounds he suffered, his sisters and his mother had to help him, since he could not fend for himself, that when he was assaulted he felt anger because he could not defend himself and that even his hand was left without strength to perform any kind of work, which has affected him in carrying out his usual work. iii) For costs, in accordance with the Attorneys' Professional Services Fee Schedule (Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía) No. 41457-JP, in force since February 1, 2019, Articles 16 subsection a) and 42, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (¢214,868.00) is granted. This sum is obtained from the amount granted for compensatory items and in application of the general rate set in the cited decree. iv) The foregoing items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (¢1,289,208), an amount that the civil defendant must pay within a period of fifteen business days from the finality of this ruling, depositing the corresponding amount into the account of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público); otherwise, it shall accrue legal interest until its effective payment. It is important to add that the conviction establishes only the interest that will run from the finality of the judgment and not indexation, given that by granting the civil action, the aim is to repair the damage and it has not been proven by the interested party that there exists a monetary obligation already defined or specific that must be brought to present value, that is, we are not in the presence of a deteriorated debt that has already been liquidated, therefore, at this time, simultaneous condemnation to interest and indexation is not appropriate. In this regard, this Chamber, with a different composition, in its resolution number 294-2019, dated July 5, 2019, at 10:17 a.m., based on jurisprudence issued by the First Chamber (Sala Primera), whose criterion is shared, explained the following: “IV. … It should be added that, in any case, indexation could not be upheld when the payment of legal interest is ordered (an aspect to be revisited below, in the following Considering clause), which is what occurs in the present matter. For disclosure purposes and for greater abundance, it is advisable to transcribe in extenso what the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia) has recently decided on the subject: \"V.- Important for the resolution of the objection, the following clarifications regarding indexation and interest should be made. Money is a unit of measurement of the economic value of goods and services. It constitutes a monetary unit of payment and, as such, is subject to changes generated by economic factors, such as inflation or devaluation. Thus, for example, someone who receives a loan today to return the money within two years, received an amount that can be exchanged for other goods and services at their current prices. If, as a consequence of inflation, prices rose, it means that after two years the debtor would deliver the same number of monetary units, but with a lower economic value than the one lent, because the capacity and power of disposal with that amount will be less than it was at the time the loan was granted. The classic theory of nominalism, in which 'a colón equals a colón, a dollar is always equal to a dollar,' that is, a monetary unit is always equal to itself, does not generate equivalence in obligations affected by the aforementioned economic phenomena. Under that theory, monetary units are legally presumed stable, which is not typical of the current era. A debt today will not have the same value after some time, precisely because money is dependent on economic changes in the market. It cannot be overlooked that the nominal payment of an obligation does not necessarily take into account monetary depreciation, which translates, concretely, into the loss of real exchange value or purchasing power of money, as a consequence of increased inflation or the general level of prices. In this context, if the quantum of the obligation is not readjusted, the creditor is exposed to being paid a nominal sum that does not correspond to the real value of the obligation. To solve this problem, several precedents of this Chamber (Sala) have held that interest serves to compensate the opportunity cost that had to be borne by the person who did not receive the money due during the period of non-compliance and, for its part, indexation serves as a mechanism to readjust the loss of currency value due to inflation. Thus, it has been said that both extremes are not mutually exclusive, since the updating of a monetary sum does not except the recognition of damages. Likewise, a distinction has been made between legal and net interest, to recognize this latter extreme in sums that have been indexed. (See, among others, rulings No. 1315 of 10:56 a.m. on December 7, 2016, No. 835 of 9:25 a.m. on August 11, 2016, No. 1282 of 9:05 a.m. on October 11, 2012, No. 902 of 9:55 a.m. on July 31, 2012, No. 1384 of 8:55 a.m. on November 10, 2011, No. 1053 of 1:55 p.m. on October 8, 2011, No. 557 of 10:10 a.m. on May 6, 2010 and No. 1053 of 1:55 p.m. on October 8, 2009). However, after profound and conscientious reflection, the conviction is reached that the payment of interest (legal or conventional) constitutes a compensatory and indexation measure simultaneously, insofar as it adjusts the mismatches in the value of money over time, as well as the effects due to the unavailability thereof. The legislator regulated two ways of calculating interest in the absence of agreement between parties: Article 1163 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) for civil obligations and 497 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio) for commercial ones. In the first, the interest will be equal to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit for the currency in question. In the second, it will be calculated based on the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for operations in national currency and the prime rate for operations in US dollars. In both cases, the parameter for their calculation is governed by the yield that financial institutions provide to their savers. The objective of these types of rates is to counteract the effects of inflation on saved money, so that the deposited sum is compensated and updated and, in turn, grants a return to the saver. In summary, it is a composite rate: it covers indexation and utility simultaneously. Conventional interest runs the same fate, insofar as the agreed rate is higher than the referenced legal rates. Thus, whenever there is a monetary obligation with payment of interest, it is not possible to index the sum, since their joint payment would imply settling monetary devaluation twice. In that sense, the interest rate, composed of the cost of money and inflation, is aimed at compensating the creditor for the damage, represented by the depreciation of the currency (loss of its real value), and the loss, consisting of the profit forgone by not being able to make lucrative use of the capital. This thesis had already been previously sustained by this Deciding Body (see, among others, rulings No. 313 of 3:30 p.m. on April 17, 2002, as well as No. 49 of 3:00 p.m. on May 19, 1995). In such rulings it was indicated that 'default in the payment of an obligation of this nature (referring to monetary obligations) generates the recognition in favor of the creditor of interest as a civil fruit that ceases to be received due to the lack of availability of the capital, that is, the interest rate constitutes an important means aimed at procuring the least possible damage to the assets of the person who has been deprived of what belongs to them, since one of its basic components, apart from the profit for the use of the capital, is the inflation rate [...]'. According to the foregoing, the interest rate constitutes a mechanism for monetary correction of the debt, since the inflationary component is embedded in its calculation. With this, the loss caused by the depreciation of the currency is compensated or indexed. With the entry into force of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA), by the normative provision inserted in Article 123, it was established that when a person is ordered to fulfill a monetary obligation, directly or by equivalent, a ruling must be included on the updating of that sum, in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date the obligation becomes due and its extinction by effective payment. For purposes of updating purchasing power, the legislator set as a parameter for its calculation the consumer price index, issued by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos). This indicator measures the variation of prices in the Costa Rican basic basket over a given period; that is, with it, inflation is quantified. The cited numeral 123 aims to compensate the creditor for inflationary impacts, which is why it imposes on the Judge a ruling on the updating of the granted sum. However, as explained supra, when a monetary obligation carries with it the payment of interest, as a rule it can be indicated that this covers that required updating, insofar as interest, by constituting the price of money, becomes the remuneration or consideration thereof, which is why the interest rate (whether set by the parties themselves or by Law) covers that inflationary component, in addition to the opportunity cost and unavailability of the money. Nevertheless, this rule admits exceptions, such as when hyperinflationary processes or cycles occur, where the legal or conventional interest could not have foreseen that unexpected process. This is not the case\" First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), resolution 000378-F-S1-2018, of 2:05 p.m. on April 26, 2018.” From the foregoing, it follows that it is inappropriate to grant indexation when the payment of legal interest is ordered, as in this matter (from the finality of the judgment), since said interest, in some way, allows for that required updating of the value of money and, furthermore, in this matter, no problem of an inflationary nature due to the passage of time is being challenged. Consequently, the appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is dismissed, and the challenge filed by the lawyer from the Victim's Civil Office (Oficina Civil de la Víctima) is partially upheld, regarding the civil aspects, and the matter is resolved based on the applicable law, ordering the civil defendant to pay the civil claimant the amounts specified above and, from the finality of the ruling, the corresponding legal interest until its effective payment. In what has not been modified by this venue, the appealed judgment remains unchanged. Let it be notified.

V.- Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Fernández Mora: In this matter, I must record my dissent with the majority regarding the decision to grant the appeal brought by the representation of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), despite having determined the statute of limitations of the criminal action, since from my perspective, the civil action also prescribed jointly with the criminal one, as provided by current legislation. Article 871 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states: \"Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe along with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise\". Therefore, as the crime has prescribed, by express decision of the legislator, the right to claim civil compensation on the part of the victim also prescribed, so it is not possible to interpret that, in this case, the statute of limitations for the civil action ran independently of the criminal action. I consider that, as this rule has not been repealed and is rather fully in force, as I have been repeatedly indicating in, among others, rulings from this office numbers 247-2023 of 2:00 p.m. on June 29, 2023, 254-2021 of 2:02 p.m. on April 29, 2021, 125-2021 of 10:18 a.m. on February 26, 2021, 93-2021 of 10:33 a.m. on February 12, 2021 and 540-2020 of 10:46 a.m. on September 11, 2020, this provision must be applied ex officio as it is a matter of public policy (orden público), since it regulates civil liability derived from a crime or quasi-crime, which makes it a matter not subject to party disposition. Thus, as the criminal action is time-barred, it must also be deemed that the civil action derived from said criminal conduct is also time-barred, therefore the acquittal ordered in the judgment must also be confirmed.

THEREFORE:

1.- The appeals against the judgment brought by prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde, in her capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), and lawyer Marisel Arias Valverde of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), are admitted for review on the merits. 2.- The challenge filed by the representative of the prosecuting body is dismissed. 3.- The appeal filed by the lawyer for the civil claimant [Name 002] is partially granted, and consequently, the appealed judgment is revoked, and the civil defendant [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: i) For temporary incapacity, the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES EXACTLY (¢74,340.00). ii) For moral damages, the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (¢1,000,000.00). iii) For costs, in accordance with the Attorneys' Professional Services Fee Schedule (Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía) No. 41457-JP, in force since February 1, 2019, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (¢214,868.00). iv) The foregoing items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (¢1,289,208), an amount that the civil defendant must pay within a period of fifteen business days from the finality of this ruling, depositing the corresponding amount into the account of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público); otherwise, it shall accrue legal interest until its effective payment. On this point, Judge Fernández Mora dissents. Let it be notified. – ????????????????

SUSANA WITTMANN STENGEL - JUDGE/DECIDER ???????????????

CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA - JUDGE/DECIDER ????????????????

MAUREEN REBECA SANCHO GONZALEZ - JUDGE/DECIDER Cartago Judicial Circuit Telephones: 2551-2713 or 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355.

Email: [email protected] IMPUTADA: [Nombre 001] OFENDIDO: [Nombre 002] DELITO: TENTATIVA DE HOMICIDIO SIMPLE Res: 2025-484 **Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, Sección Primera.** At fourteen hours on the thirtieth of September of two thousand twenty-five.

Criminal case **20-000063-0219-PE** brought against **[Nombre 001]** , of legal age, Costa Rican, identification card [Valor 001], born on the 16th of January of 1973, married, son of [Nombre 003] and [Nombre 004], resident of [...], for the crime of **ATTEMPTED SIMPLE HOMICIDE (TENTATIVA DE HOMICIDIO SIMPLE)** to the detriment of **[Nombre 002]** . The Tribunal is composed of Judges **Susana Wittmann Stengel** , **Maureen Sancho González** and Judge **Christian Fernández Mora** . Appearing before the appeals court were Attorney **Rebeca Moya Valverde** , representing the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), as well as Attorney **Marisel Arias Valverde** , representing the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), only.

**WHEREAS (RESULTANDO):**

**I.-** That by judgment number **143-2025** of *seven hours thirty-seven minutes on the fourteenth of March of two thousand twenty-five*, the **TRIBUNAL PENAL DEL PRIMER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE LA ZONA SUR, PÉREZ ZELEDÓN** : "***THEREFORE (POR TANTO)** :* *In accordance with the foregoing, Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution; 8 and 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights; 1, 11, 24, 28, 30, 45, 111 of the Penal Code; 1, 6, 8, 9, 142, 111 to 113, 265 to 270, 341 to 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Tribunal decides: **TO ACQUIT** the accused* **[Nombre 001]** , *of all penalty and responsibility, regarding a crime of* ***Attempted Simple Homicide*** *, which had been attributed by the Public Prosecutor's Office, to the detriment of* **[Nombre 002]** . *It is ordered that any precautionary measure weighing upon the accused by reason of this cause be lifted. The filed Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) is declared without merit. It is resolved without special condemnation on costs, the civil plaintiff [Nombre 002], represented by the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, is exempted from the payment of costs; the remaining procedural costs are to be borne by the State. Once this judgment is final, the definitive archiving of the case is ordered. NOTIFY BY READING. MARÍA JOSÉ ZAMORA CASTILLO, JOSÉ LUIS CAMBRONERO DELGADO, CARLOS ADOLFO CALDERÓN BOGANTES. Judges of the Trial Court of Pérez Zeledón.*" (sic)

**II.-** That against the indicated ruling, Attorney **Rebeca Moya Valverde** , representing the Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as Attorney **Marisel Arias Valverde** , representing the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim, filed appeals.

</p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">III.-</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> By resolution issued at 07:06 hours on 22 April 2025, the Trial Court (Tribunal) of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone (criminal matters) summoned the parties regarding the appeal filed.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">IV.-</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> Having conducted the legally required deliberation, as set forth in article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal), this chamber considered the issues raised in the appeal.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="width: 36pt; display: inline-block;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">V.-</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> The procedures have observed the formalities and prescriptions of law.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 35.5pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">Authored by the Appeals Judge for Sentencing </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">Wittmann Stengel</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">;</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-align: center; line-height: 150%; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">CONSIDERING:</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; text-indent: 36pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">I.- Admissibility</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">. Against judgment number 143-2025 of seven hours thirty-seven minutes on fourteen March two thousand twenty-five, issued by the Trial Court (Tribunal Penal) of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Pérez Zeledón, in which the accused [Nombre 001] was acquitted of all penalty and liability for the crime of attempted simple homicide (tentativa de homicidio simple), the prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde and the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), Marisel Arias Valverde, filed an appeal of the criminal sentence (recurso de apelación de sentencia penal). From the preliminary review, it was determined that these briefs were filed within the time period established by law (cf. the electronic case file (expediente electrónico), within the context of the Trial Court, in writings, on the date 21/04/2025), as provided in article 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and comply with the admissibility prerequisites regulated by articles 458 and 459 of said normative body, which allows for their hearing in the terms of article 8.2h of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos), and therefore they are admitted for study and a decision on the merits.</span></p> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 9.9pt; text-indent: 36pt; text-align: justify; line-height: 150%; widows: 2; orphans: 2; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">II.- Appeal (Recurso de apelación) of the representative of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público). </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">In the </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; vertical-align: sub;">first ground</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">, the appellant alleges “</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">Disagreement with the determination of the facts, erroneous intellective and/or analytical reasoning for violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) in accordance with articles 142, 363 and 459 of the current Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal)</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">”. The appellant points out her disagreement with the acquittal (absolutoria) issued in favor of the defendant [Nombre 001] since, although the trial court in its reasoning explains that the facts were deemed proven, it decided not to accept the prosecution's thesis, by stating that the evidence yielded two versions that they found viable and credible regarding the modal aspects of the accusation (acusación), and therefore, being unable to disprove either of them, they considered that the doubt must favor the accused person by applying the universal principle of </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">in dubio pro reo</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">. The movant does not share this position, considering that the judges should have assessed the different elements of evidence in light of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). She details in her claim that the judging panel deemed it proven that the accused attacked the complainant, that he used a knife, that he wounded him on his arms and his back, but that, despite this, they wrongly state that it could not be determined whether an unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima) by the victim toward the accused actually existed that caused the defendant's attack by way of legitimate defense (legítima defensa). She considers that the lower court (tribunal de instancia) could not establish a doubt that hinged on the justification of the defendant's actions, in other words, that the only thing that could be established was whether his actions were justified or not and whether there was an excess in the defense. On the other hand, she criticizes that the trial court (tribunal de mérito) bases the doubt on the fact that the victim stated he filed the complaint because he was told the accused had filed a complaint against him, which is not an element that justifies the decision. The appellant also objects that the </span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">a quo</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;"> indicated that no credibility could be given to either of the two versions, when from a reading of the ruling, what is extracted is that credibility is given to the defendant for having declared that he was the victim of several robberies and stated that his actions were to defend himself, when it was not weighed whether the aggrieved party actually committed any criminal act, for although he is detained for a crime of violation of the Psychotropic Substances Law (Ley de Psicotrópicos), this does not constitute a reason to diminish the value of his statement. The statement given by the defendant inverted the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), which implied that he should have provided some evidence that accredited at least one of the robberies to justify the unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima), which in any case would have been ruled out because it would be “</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">taking the law into one's own hands</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">” by using a work tool, especially since the accused did not observe that the victim or his brother were carrying any weapon. Furthermore, the appellant states that the defendant said he felt threatened, but he himself indicated that he told them “</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">I caught them by surprise</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">”, “</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-style: italic; vertical-align: sub;">I caught them red-handed</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">” and that he did not aim to kill, but that he did direct thrusts (estocadas) at the victim aimed at vital areas, although he failed to strike him due to the defensive action the latter took. For the reasons stated, the challenger considers that the judgment presents a defect of contradictory and incoherent reasoning that affects the victim's right to obtain a fair ruling and limits the participation of the prosecutorial body (órgano fiscal).</span></p> In their **second ground**, the appellant states their "Disagreement with the evidentiary assessment for violation of the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), through simple reference to the documentary and expert evidence without reflecting contents, in accordance with articles 142, 184, 363 and 459 of the Código Procesal Penal." They reproach that the lower court (a quo) did not conduct a concatenated analysis of all the indications, which would have allowed them to establish that there were elements of proof supporting the victim's version, such as the photographic sequence carried out by officials of the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) that accounts for the injuries the victim presented and which allowed for confirmation of their complaint, as well as the medical-legal report (dictamen médico legal) 2022-266 from the Medical Legal Unit (Unidad Médico Legal) and the certification from the Hospital Escalante Pradilla, which, although included within the summary of evidence, were not analyzed, leaving aside whether these other elements could help elucidate one of the two versions. The defendant's version was easily discardable, since, although he indicated that he only intended to give a "punishment" to the victim, the injuries were directed towards the victim's vital areas, such as their torso and head, and it was the affected person who managed to avoid the lethal result, by interposing their arms as a defensive action. To the above aspects, the challenger adds that, if a more thorough analysis had been performed, it would also not have been possible to establish the possibility of applying the crime of minor injuries (lesiones leves), as the deciding court also proposed, because the accused ended his illegitimate aggression due to the intervention of a third party, according to what was narrated by the affected person, which was discarded by the lower court (a quo) without considering specific aspects of the testimony. Another aspect objected to by the appellant is that the court analyzed the victim's statement (declaración del agraviado) in a rigorous manner, disregarding the fact that almost five years have passed since the events occurred, and therefore the person may have deteriorated memories, without this implying a false statement (declaración falsa), as the trial court somehow tried to make it seem. For the foregoing reasons and due to disagreement with the decision, the petitioner requests the annulment of the appealed judgment and that a retrial (juicio de reenvío) be ordered.

**III. Appeal filed by the attorney from the Civil Defense Office of the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima).** The appellant brings a single ground titled "lack of proper reasoning (falta de fundamentación). Violation of the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica) and the principle of reasonable evidentiary assessment." They claim that, although from the evidence received in the debate, important indications can be obtained that, when concatenated, provided the sole conclusion that the plaintiff's intention was to end the victim's life, through the use of a bladed weapon, a machete-type, that he carried in one of his hands, the sentencing court erroneously concluded that a self-defense (legítima defensa) situation could have arisen. As aspects they believe should have been considered to establish the liability of the accused, they cite the following: that the victim narrated that it was the accused who threw himself on top of him and struck him with the machete on his hands; that if one observes the photographs that were provided by the Judicial Investigation Organization (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), it can be determined that the injuries (lesiones) the victim presented were clearly defensive and the result of the movements they had to make to avoid being struck on the head, where the machete blows were aimed; that the injuries (lesiones) the victim presented were assessed by the medical examiner (médico legal) and shown by him at trial; that from the affected person's account, he did not refer to any situation generating a prior conflict before the moment of the aggression; that the expert reports incorporated into the debate were not evaluated in conjunction with the testimonial evidence. The appellant adds that the trial court performed no factual, legal, or logical-intellectual assessment of the assumptions of civil liability and merely indicated that the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) was declared without merit because it is accessory to the criminal process. For the foregoing reasons, not agreeing with the decision, the challenger requests that judgment number 143-2025 issued by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de Zona Sur), Pérez Zeledón, be annulled and that a retrial (reenvío) be ordered for a new proceeding.

**IV.- Regarding the claims filed by the appellants:** In order to conduct a detailed review of the appealed judgment and the various topics alleged, it has been deemed necessary to structure this resolution as follows: **i) Facts accused by the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público):** I- The Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) accused the following facts: "The Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) accused the following facts: *1.

On June twenty-first, two thousand twenty, at approximately five o'clock in the evening, the victim [Nombre 002] was in the locality of [...] at the farm of [Nombre 003] (father of the accused) on a public road, at which moment the accused [Nombre 001] appeared, who, aware of the unlawful nature of his acts, with the intent to cause the death of the victim [Nombre 002], approached him using as a weapon a machete-type knife that he carried in his hands, attacked him by launching several thrusts that impacted the victim's body, specifically on the right forearm and left forearm; immediately thereafter, the victim tried to flee the site by walking backward, but lost his balance and fell to the ground, which the accused [Nombre 001] took advantage of to continue attacking the victim [Nombre 002], launching thrusts with the machete-type knife, in order to end his life, which impacted his right arm and his back, right suprascapular region, all while the accused [Nombre 001] shouted aloud to the victim, "See, you son of a bitch? That's how I wanted to get you"; however, the accused did not achieve his objective of killing the victim, because a brother of the accused, named [Nombre 007], intervened and asked the defendant not to keep cutting him, which prevented the accused from continuing to assault him, and he then left the place." ii) Regarding the possible application of a defense (causal de justificación) to the actions of the defendant. The appellants challenge the incorrect assessment of the evidence carried out by the trial court when it found that there was reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant was protected by the possibility of defending himself legitimately against an aggression carried out by the victim against him, as it has no support in the evidentiary record. Upon reviewing the case file, this Chamber determines that said position established by the a quo contradicts what the various pieces of evidence show. Among the aspects that must be considered are the following: 1) According to the factual framework established by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the events did not take place on the accused's property but rather "one kilometer past the School, on the road to the farm of [Nombre 003] (father of the defendant) on a public road," and it was established that, in that place, was the accused, who was the person armed with a machete and who intercepted the victim and inflicted several wounds on him while threatening to end his life. It is worth clarifying that in the trial, the victim stated that he did not know whether the road he was traveling on was a public road, stating that "it is a road that goes to their farm and other farms, the events take place on the road," while the accused, in his investigative statement, maintained that it was a path on a farm that he looks after, which does not allow accrediting that the events took place on the defendant's property, such as to sustain that the victim's presence at the site revealed, in and of itself, a criminal intent, especially since he was accompanied by the brother of the accused, this last aspect being uncontroverted. 2) To determine whether it was possible or not to confirm, or at least that it could be that the accused acted under the protection of a defense (causa de justificación), the context in which the events occurred must necessarily be reviewed, and in that regard, it is noted that the accused, in the trial, reported that on previous occasions the victim had entered his property and carried away extremely valuable belongings of his family and neighbors and, moreover, that this person had a drug problem, as did his brother [Nombre 007]. Regarding the day of the incident itself, the defendant reports that he was going up toward his dwelling when he heard the footsteps of the victim and another person, who turned out to be his brother [Nombre 007], and he stated that they were always coming for the family's tools, that he knows the gait of a person who is going to break in to steal, so he intercepted them and asked what they were doing there, to which his brother [Nombre 007] replied that they had come to rob and that whoever interfered, they were going to "squash." The accused specified that, although "they were not carrying weapons that day, ... no one took out a knife," he was bothered by that phrase about being squashed, thinking that he was not "a piece of cheese" and, because of that, what he did was "boil with rage" and he took the machete he was carrying, with which he launched several machete blows at the victim which, according to his account, he only did as a form of "punishment," but that his intention "was not to make mincemeat out of him." For his part, the injured party related that he had consumed liquor, that he was with a brother of the accused named [Name 007] and the latter told him to go to his dad's "to get some money (a traer una plata)", that he was inviting him to continue drinking and when they were going along a stone path, through the coffee plantation, at a certain moment, [Name 007] went ahead and encountered [Name 001], whom at first he did not see clearly and later he could see that it was this person and when they met, the latter "lunged at him with a machete (tiró con un machete)" and told him "that's how I wanted to catch you (así quería agarrarlo)", that he told him "calm down (tranquilo)", but despite that, he macheted him on the hands (pointing to his arms and the upper left side of his back). Furthermore, the injured party said: "[Name 007] ran out and I with him, I crossed a stream, the man told me you saved yourself because I was going to kill you, I reached the car unconscious and they took me to the hospital". From the foregoing, it is clear that the one who carried out an armed attack was the accused and that he did not provide conclusive evidence to show that, on that day, he had been unlawfully aggressed, given that he acknowledged that his brother and the complainant were not carrying weapons, that he did not see any knife and if one listens to the recording of his statement at trial, at a certain moment (13-03-2025, 5:52), he states that they were not carrying any object (referring to the fact that they were not carrying any property they had stolen, nor did he observe them trying to take any). He also explains that on previous occasions, very valuable property had been stolen from him, regarding which neither the prosecution nor the technical or material defense included any evidence in that regard in the case file to substantiate those alleged prior incidents. In this way, upon conducting a comprehensive review of the challenged judgment, it is noted that it mentioned the versions given by the victim and the accused, but a more detailed analysis of all the evidence regarding the topic of legitimate defense (legítima defensa) was omitted, which, had it been done, could have revealed several circumstances, among them, that the fact that the aggrieved party might have committed several prior robberies on the accused's property did not give the latter the right on the day of the incident to take justice into his own hands, since in that case, he should have alerted the respective police authorities. In this regard, article 28 of the Penal Code allows the application of the concept of legitimate defense (legítima defensa) when the person acts in defense of the person or of their own or another's rights under these assumptions: "acts in defense of the person or rights, their own or another's, provided the following circumstances concur: a) Unlawful aggression (Agresión ilegítima); and b) Reasonable necessity of the defense employed to repel and prevent the aggression. It will be understood that this justification defense applies to that person who executes violent acts against the stranger who, without any right and with danger to the inhabitants or occupants of the building or its dependencies, finds themselves within them, whatever the harm caused to the intruder." Now, starting from the possibility that it could be true that the victim on other occasions had stolen his belongings from the accused, although this was not conclusively demonstrated in the debate, nor was it robustly confirmed that on that day he was committing a criminal act when he was intercepted by the accused, since he was traveling along a path near the defendant's property, the truth is that, in light of Costa Rican laws, people cannot take justice into their own hands for past events but rather, in a State governed by the rule of law (Estado de derecho), one must resort to the judicial system to make the respective requests. The concept of legitimate defense (legítima defensa) is a justification defense established by law to protect life, the integrity of persons, or property, which is applied when there is an unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima) and, furthermore, this defense must be rational and necessary, and for it to apply, it is required that there be a real, current, or imminent attack against one's own or a third party's rights. In this case, the defendant indicated that his brother [Name 007] told him: "we came to steal everything, whoever gets involved we will crush (prensar)", but he accepts that he did not see them armed and that his reaction was out of anger. From the foregoing, it is also evident that if the accused received any type of threat, it was without significant substance; in other words, from the defendant's own statement it cannot be inferred that the victim made a declaration to him of a future, serious, grave harm that would generate fear for him, because when he refers to what his brother (not the victim) told him regarding that "whoever got involved they were going to crush (prensar)", he did not state that he felt intimidated but rather angry, hence the aggressive reaction not toward the one who had said that to him but toward the aggrieved party, that is, he discriminated as to which person he would direct his anger and channeled it toward the victim.

These details were not analyzed by the a quo, nor were they countered with the version of the victim, who explained how he was attacked by the accused with a machete and that the accused directed it at his body several times when he at no time threatened or tried to assault him. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that this was not a typical case of self-defense (legítima defensa), given that if the accused suspected that the offended party intended to steal his property, he should have alerted the relevant authorities, meaning it was inadmissible to settle a conflict by taking the law into his own hands when institutions and the corresponding legal channels exist to resolve this type of situation. Thus, to determine whether a case of self-defense (legítima defensa) was at hand, an unlawful, direct, and imminent aggression by the offended party toward the accused had to be proven, and whether the need for the defense, if such existed, was reasonable and adequate to repel the aggression, since it was important that the conduct carried out by the accused did not become retaliation, because the law only protects the necessary defense against an unjust aggression, not vengeance, therefore it is inappropriate in the case at hand to have established as a possibility the concurrence of a justification (causa de justificación) of self-defense (legítima defensa) in the actions of the defendant.

• iii)Regarding the classification of the facts as a crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves): Another aspect that must be mentioned is that the court, when acquitting, mentioned that the facts could constitute the crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves) due to the temporary disability suffered by the offended party, a topic with which the appellants disagree, warning that, to attribute the commission of the crime of simple homicide in the attempt stage to a person, it is not necessarily required that the bodily harm have endangered the person's life, but rather what is important is that the animus necandi be proven, which does not necessarily derive from the forensic expertise but from the context of what happened. Now, the a quo explains in its resolution that, even if the application of the figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) were discarded, the modal circumstances accused by the prosecuting body do not prove a crime of simple homicide in the attempt stage but rather that of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves), a criterion that this Chamber shares, as set forth below, based on the following arguments: the victim [Name 002], when testifying at trial, ruled out that the defendant's aggression toward him had ceased due to the intervention of the accused's brother named [Name 007]. Thus, the judgment recorded expressions made by the affected party that allow for the conclusion that if the defendant's intention had been homicidal, nothing prevented him from being able to execute such conduct, as can be inferred from the following excerpt: "I don't know why he stopped throwing machete blows at me, he had calmed down a bit; it was the hand of God that he stopped hacking at me with the machete. Secondly, from the analysis of the offended party's statement, it is established without any doubt that, if the accused had had the intention of ending the injured party's life, he had every possibility to do so, and there was no cause independent of his will that prevented him, not only because of what has just been mentioned, but also because the victim was in a state of drunkenness, and after the two blows the accused managed to deliver to his arms, the offended party fell seated on the ground, leaving the accused standing with a machete in his hand, thus in a position of complete advantage over the offended party, with the accused deciding to launch a third blow toward his back, and not toward a vital organ such as the neck or head, and furthermore this action was not done with the edge of the machete; all of which allows the homicidal intention in the accused's action to be discarded, regarding which the offended party was clear in testifying: ...I was going very drunk...; ...I was drunk, loaded; The wound on the back was not much, it felt not like these, like beveled, like from the side; I had drunk too much before, I don't even know how much, but really a lot, I had dawned on the street, I stopped drinking when I came home; I fell seated. It was the hand of God that he stopped hacking at me with the machete." From the factual dynamics described, this Chamber agrees that the homicidal intention must be discarded, not only because the medical-legal report 2022-0000266 dated April 21, 2022, in which the injured party [Name 002] was assessed, did not determine that any of the bodily harm suffered by the victim put his life in danger — concluding that "based on the objective elements of judgment available at this time, it is considered that the documented bodily harm warrants a temporary disability of seven (7) days in total and that the evaluated party evolved without functional sequelae in relation to the same" —, but also because the offended party himself indicated that at the time of the facts he was "dying of a hangover," that he had drunk too much, that he had even dawned on the street, so if the accused had wanted to end his life he could have done so, as he had no possibility of defending himself.

He also clarified that, in the last machete blow, he fell, because he slipped, meaning that he was defenseless and it was at that point where he indicated he does not know why the accused stopped throwing machete blows at him, which reflects that despite how upset the accused was, he allowed him to get up and leave, thus discarding the *animus necandi* (intent to kill) in the defendant's actions. This statement also finds support in what was stated by the accused himself, who although he accepted what happened, categorically denied that his intention was to end the victim's life, but rather to protect his property, as the trial court set out when taking his statements into account, as reflected in the following segment: “...I grab the machete that I carry in the forest as an important tool for work and defense. It is true that I told him that is how I wanted to catch him, of course red-handed, I did not want to kill him, I did not aim for his head; I only threw those three machete blows, it was just a punishment, it was not to make mincemeat of him.” This is why, since the commission of an attempted simple homicide was not proven, but rather that of minor injuries (lesiones leves) (given that the effects resulting from the accused's actions only caused injuries incapacitating him for seven days), as the sentencing court correctly points out, these acts are amply time-barred (prescritos), taking into consideration provisions 31 to 33 of the Código Procesal Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure) and 125 of the Código Penal (Penal Code), the norm that regulates the type of minor injuries, which is applicable to this matter, given that the aggrieved party suffered an incapacity of 7 days to carry out his usual tasks, since this norm establishes a criminal penalty of “three to one year of prison for anyone who causes harm to another's body or health, which determines an incapacity for their habitual occupations for more than five days and up to one month”. Thus, to confirm that the statute of limitations (prescripción) has effectively run, it must be taken into account that the date of commission of the acts is June 21, 2020. Upon being classified as a crime of minor injuries and according to the maximum penalty that could possibly be imposed, the maximum statute of limitations period is three years. However, this is interrupted and the period is reduced by half, in accordance with the provisions of provision 33 of the cited legal code, starting from the first interrupting act, which, in this case, was the questioning (indagatoria) of the accused on July 3, 2020 (f. 79), and from that point a period of one and a half years (18 months) must be counted, a term that expired on January 3, 2022. However, during that lapse, no act that interrupted or suspended the statute of limitations occurred. Thus, the next interrupting act was the scheduling of the preliminary hearing, which dates from October 25, 2022 (f. 196), which implies that by that time the statute of limitations period had already run. Consequently, it was not possible to issue a conviction against the defendant [Name 001] for the crime of minor injuries, therefore the sentencing court is correct in so establishing and, thus, despite what was said in section two, the criminal claims of the appellants must be dismissed.

• iv)Regarding the civil action (acción civil) filed. From the foregoing, it is determined that regarding the injuries suffered by the victim at the hands of the accused and for which a temporary incapacity of 7 days to carry out his usual tasks was determined, there was no major discussion, given that the accused himself even accepted that he inflicted them upon the victim as a "punishment," due to the multiple robberies of which he and his family had been victims. However, despite this proof, the trial court erroneously dismissed the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria), indicating, contradictorily, that the causal link between the acts and the result was not determined, "between the action of the accused and the injuries of the victim," and that it is required "not only that a criminal injustice arises, but also a harmful result to a third party, that it is attributable to the subject, and that a causal relationship exists between one and the other," having doubts solely as to whether the defendant's action was in self-defense (legítima defensa) and because it considered that the minor injuries were time-barred.

However, from the analysis of the preceding lines, self-defense (legítima defensa) has been ruled out and we are in the presence of a simple homicide in the degree of attempt, therefore the rejection of the civil action (acción civil) constitutes an error, because, although the facts are time-barred (prescritos) in criminal matters, this does not prevent the action from being upheld, since the rule set forth in Article 40 of the Código Procesal Penal establishes that: "The Criminal Trial Court must rule on the merits of the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) validly exercised, even if a judgment of acquittal or definitive dismissal has been issued in the trial phase." It is worth noting that, although the criminal action prescribed, the civil action did not, as it is governed by the ten-year period provided for in Article 868 of the Código Civil and, in any case, neither in the debate, nor in the appeal, nor with the summons to the parties, was it alleged that the civil action was time-barred. Thus, with respect to the civil action, upon a comprehensive reading of the appealed judgment, it is evident that the accused, acting with intent (dolosamente), injured the victim in various parts of his body (an aspect that was not objected to by any of the parties), and according to the legal medical report (dictamen médico legal), he resulted with an incapacity of 7 days, which allowed the affected party [Name 002] to file a claim for damages, represented by the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), against the accused and civil defendant [Name 001], for the injuries he caused him, which proves the existence of a causal link (nexo causal) between the accused's actions and these consequences, which constitute a compensable damage (daño indemnizable) under the terms of Article 1045 of the Código Civil. Furthermore, Mr. [Name 002], as the direct victim, had the right to bring this action against [Name 001], for the latter's criminal conduct, protected by Article 41 of the Constitución Política and the aforementioned civil norm, as well as the Rules in force of the Código Penal of 1941. The defense, in its concluding arguments, referred to the possibility that the accused could have acted under the figure of self-defense (legítima defensa), which has already been ruled out, and when referring to the civil action (28:30), it only stated that it be rejected without making any objection to the amounts requested by the lawyer from the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) or to any aspect concerning the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria). Hence, for reasons of procedural economy (economía procesal) and in observance of the principle of party disposition (principio dispositivo) specific to this matter, this Chamber, by majority (Judge Wittmann Stengel and Judge Sancho González), in accordance with what has been proven, finds that the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) filed by the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) must be upheld. By reason of the foregoing, the civil claim is declared granted and the civil defendant [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: i) For temporary incapacity, the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES EXACT (₡74,340.00), as he was incapacitated from performing his usual work for seven days, according to the legal medical report (dictamen médico legal) that was provided to the case file (mentioned in section three). ii) For moral damages (daño moral), the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (₡1,000,000.00), given that the victim referred in the debate to the impact that what happened has had on his daily life, because, due to the wounds he suffered, his sisters and his mother had to help him, since he could not fend for himself, that when he was attacked he felt anger because he could not defend himself and that his hand was even left without strength to perform any type of work, which has affected him in carrying out his usual tasks. iii) For costs (costas), in accordance with the Tariff of Fees for Professional Legal Services No. 41457-JP, in effect since February 1, 2019, Articles 16 subsection a) and 42, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (₡214,868.00) is granted. This sum is obtained from the amount granted for compensatory items and in application of the general rate set in the cited decree. iv) The preceding items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (₡1,289,208), an amount that the civil defendant must pay within fifteen business days of the finality of this resolution, depositing the corresponding amount into the account of the Office of the Civil Defense of the Victim (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) of the Ministerio Público; otherwise, it will accrue legal interest until its effective payment. It is important to add that the judgment establishes only the interest that will run from the finality of the judgment and not indexation (indexación), given that by upholding the civil action the aim is to repair the damage and it has not been proven by the interested party that a defined or specific monetary obligation exists that must be brought to present value; that is, we are not in the presence of a deteriorated debt that has already been liquidated, therefore, a simultaneous judgment for interest and indexation is not appropriate at this time.

In this regard, this Chamber, with a different composition, in its resolution number 294-2019, dated July 5, 2019, at 10:17 a.m., relying on jurisprudence issued by the First Chamber, whose criterion is shared, explained the following: "IV. … It should be added that, in any case, indexation (indexación) could not be granted when the payment of legal interest is ordered (an aspect to which we will return below, in the following Considerando), which is what occurs in the present matter. It is appropriate, for dissemination purposes and for greater clarification, to transcribe in extenso what the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has recently resolved on the subject: 'V.- For the resolution of the objection, it is pertinent to make the following clarifications regarding indexation and interest. Money is a unit of measurement of the economic value of goods and services. It constitutes a monetary unit of payment and, as such, is subject to changes generated by economic factors, such as inflation or devaluation. Thus, for example, a person who receives a loan today to return the money in two years, received an amount that can be exchanged for other goods and services at their current prices. If, as a consequence of inflation, prices rose, it means that in two years the debtor would deliver the same number of monetary units, but with an economic value lower than the one lent, because the capacity and power of disposal with such amount will be less than what it had at the time the loan was granted. The classical theory of nominalism, in which "a colón equals a colón, a dollar is always equal to a dollar", that is, a monetary unit is always equal to itself, does not generate equivalence in the obligations affected by said economic phenomena. With that theory, monetary units are legally presumed to be stable, which is not typical in the current era. A debt today will not have the same value in the future, precisely because money is dependent on market economic changes. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the nominal payment of an obligation does not necessarily take into account monetary depreciation, which translates, concretely, into the loss of the real exchange value or purchasing power of money, as a consequence of the increase in inflation or the general price level. In this context, if the quantum of the obligation is not readjusted, the creditor is exposed to being paid a nominal sum that does not correspond to the real value of the obligation. To solve this problem, in several precedents of this Chamber it has been held that interest serves to compensate the opportunity cost that had to be borne by the person who did not receive the money owed during the period of non-performance, and, for its part, indexation serves as a mechanism to readjust the loss of the currency's value due to inflation. Thus, it has been said that both extremes are not mutually exclusive, since the updating of a sum of money does not exempt the recognition of damages. Likewise, a distinction has been made between legal interest (interés legal) and net interest (interés neto), to recognize this latter extreme in sums that have been indexed. (Consult, among others, votes No. 1315 of 10:56 a.m. on December 7, 2016, No. 835 of 9:25 a.m. on August 11, 2016, No. 1282 of 9:05 a.m. on October 11, 2012, No. 902 of 9:55 a.m. on July 31, 2012, No. 1384 of 8:55 a.m. on November 10, 2011, No. 1053 of 1:55 p.m. on October 8, 2011, No. 557 of 10:10 a.m. on May 6, 2010, and No. 1053 of 1:55 p.m. on October 8, 2009). However, after a deep and thorough reflection, we reach the conviction that the payment of interest (legal or conventional) constitutes a compensatory and indexation measure at the same time, as it adjusts the mismatches in the value of money over the passage of time, as well as the effects due to its unavailability. The legislator regulated two ways of calculating interest in the absence of an agreement between parties: Article 1163 of the Civil Code for civil obligations and Article 497 of the Code of Commerce for commercial ones. In the first, the interest shall be equal to the rate paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month certificates of deposit for the currency in question. In the second, it shall be calculated based on the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva) of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for operations in national currency, and the prime rate for operations in U.S. dollars. In both cases, the parameter for its calculation is governed by the yield that financial entities provide to their savers. The objective of these types of rates is to counteract the effects of inflation on saved money, in such a way that the deposited sum is compensated and updated, and, in turn, provides a return to the saver. In synthesis, it is a composite rate: it covers indexation and profit at the same time. Conventional interest runs the same fate, as long as the agreed rate is higher than the aforementioned legal ones. Thus, whenever there is a monetary obligation with the payment of interest, it is not possible to index the sum, since their joint payment would imply resolving monetary devaluation twice. In that sense, the interest rate, composed of the cost of money and inflation, is aimed at compensating the creditor for the damage, represented by the depreciation of the currency (loss of its real value), and the loss of profit, consisting of the earnings not received by not profitably using the capital. This thesis had already been previously held by this Deciding Body (see, among others, rulings No. 313 of 3:30 p.m. on April 17, 2002, as well as No. 49 of 3:00 p.m. on May 19, 1995).

In those rulings, it was indicated that "default (mora) in the payment of an obligation of this nature (referring to monetary obligations) generates, in favor of the creditor, the recognition of interest as civil fruits (fruto civil) that they cease to receive due to the lack of availability of the capital; that is, the interest rate constitutes an important means of seeking the least possible damage to the assets of one who has been deprived of what belongs to them, since one of its basic components, apart from the utility for the use of capital, is the inflation rate [...]". According to the foregoing, the interest rate constitutes a mechanism for monetary correction of the debt, since the inflationary component is immersed in its calculation. This compensates or indexes the loss caused by the depreciation of the currency. With the entry into force of the CPCA, by the regulatory provision inserted in Article 123, it was established that when a person is ordered to fulfill a monetary obligation, directly or by equivalent, the ruling must include a pronouncement on the updating of said sum, in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date the obligation became due and the date of its extinction by effective payment. For purposes of updating the purchasing power, the legislator set the consumer price index, issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, as the parameter for its calculation. This indicator measures the variation in prices of the basic Costa Rican basket in a determined period of time; that is, it quantifies inflation. The aforementioned Article 123 aims to compensate the creditor for inflationary impacts, which is why it imposes on the Judge a pronouncement on the updating of the sum granted. Now, as explained above, when a monetary obligation entails the payment of interest, as a rule it can be indicated that such interest covers that required updating, insofar as it, by configuring the price of money, becomes the remuneration or consideration for it, which is why the interest rate (whether set by the parties themselves or by Law) covers that inflationary component, in addition to the opportunity cost and unavailability of the money. However, such a rule admits exceptions, such as when hyperinflationary processes or cycles occur, where the legal or conventional interest could not have foreseen that unexpected process. This is not the case." Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolution 000378-F-S1-2018, at 2:05 p.m. on April 26, 2018.

From the foregoing, it follows that it is inappropriate to grant indexation when the payment of legal interest is ordered, as in this matter (as of the finality of the judgment), since said interest, in some manner, allows for that required updating of the value of money, and, in addition, in this matter, no inflationary problem due to the passage of time is being addressed. Consequently, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the representative of the Ministerio Público is declared without merit, and the appeal brief filed by the attorney from the Oficina Civil de la Víctima is partially granted, regarding the civil claims, and the matter is resolved based on the applicable law, ordering the civil defendant to pay the civil plaintiff the amounts specified above and, as of the finality of the judgment, the corresponding legal interest until its effective payment. In what is not modified by this court, the appealed judgment remains unaltered. Notify.

V.- Partially dissenting vote of Judge Fernández Mora: In this matter, I must express my dissent with the majority regarding the decision to grant the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the representation of the Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, despite having determined the extinction of criminal action by the statute of limitations, since from my perspective, the civil action also expired jointly with the criminal one, as provided by current legislation. Article 871 of the Civil Code states that: "Civil actions arising from a felony or quasi-felony expire together with the felony or quasi-felony from which they arise." Therefore, since the crime expired due to the statute of limitations, by express decision of the legislator, the right to claim civil compensation by the offended party also expired, so it is not possible to interpret that, in this case, the expiration of the civil action ran independently of the criminal action. I believe that, as this norm is not repealed and is rather fully in force, as I have been repeatedly indicating, among others, in rulings of this office numbers 247-2023 at 2:00 p.m. on June 29, 2023, 254-2021 at 2:02 p.m. on April 29, 2021, 125-2021 at 10:18 a.m. on February 26, 2021, 93-2021 at 10:33 a.m. on February 12, 2021, and 540-2020 at 10:46 a.m. on September 11, 2020, said provision must be applied ex officio because it is a matter of public order, since it regulates civil liability derived from a felony or quasi-felony, which makes it unavailable matter. In this way, since the criminal action is expired, it must also be considered that the civil action derived from said criminal conduct is also expired, so the acquittal issued in the judgment must also be confirmed.

POR TANTO:

1.- The appeals (recursos de apelación) of the judgment filed by prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde, in her capacity as representative of the Ministerio Público, and attorney Marisel Arias Valverde of the Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima are admitted for review on the merits. 2.- The appeal brief filed by the representative of the prosecutorial body is declared without merit. 3.- The appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the attorney for the civil plaintiff [Name 002] is partially granted, and consequently the appealed judgment is reversed, and the civil defendant [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following items: i) For temporary disability, the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES EXACT (¢74,340.00). ii) For non-material damage (daño moral), the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (¢1,000,000.00).

• iii)For costs, in accordance with the Fee Schedule for Professional Legal Services No. 41457-JP, effective since February 1, 2019, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (₡214,868.00). iv) The foregoing items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (₡1,289,208), which the civil defendant must pay within fifteen business days from the finality of this resolution, depositing the corresponding amount into the account of the Victim's Civil Defense Office of the Public Ministry; otherwise, it shall accrue legal interest until its effective payment. Regarding this point, Judge Fernández Mora dissents. Notify. –

Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355.

**IV.-** [...] Thus, upon conducting a comprehensive review of the challenged judgment, it is noted that the judgment mentioned the versions given by the victim and the accused, but it omitted a more detailed analysis of all the evidence regarding the issue of self-defense (legítima defensa), which, had it been done, could have denoted several circumstances, among them, that the fact that the aggrieved party may have committed several prior robberies on the accused's property did not give the latter the right to take justice into his own hands on the day of the event, since in that case, he should have alerted the respective police authorities. In this regard, Article 28 of the Penal Code (Código Penal) allows for the application of the concept of self-defense (legítima defensa) when a person acts in defense of their person or rights, or those of others, under the following conditions: *"acts in defense of the person or rights, their own or those of others, provided that the following circumstances concur: a) Unlawful aggression (Agresión ilegítima); and b) Reasonable necessity of the defense employed to repel and prevent the aggression. This cause of justification shall be understood to apply to one who commits violent acts against a stranger who, without any right and with danger to the inhabitants or occupants of the building or its dependencies, is found inside them, regardless of the harm caused to the intruder."* Now then, assuming it could be true that the victim on other occasions had stolen his belongings from the accused, although this was not conclusively proven in the trial, nor was it forcefully confirmed that on that day he was committing a criminal act when he was intercepted by the accused, since he was traveling along a path near the property of the accused, the fact is that, in light of Costa Rican laws, individuals cannot take justice into their own hands for past events; rather, in a State governed by the rule of law, one must turn to the judicial system to make the respective claims.

"[...] iii) Regarding the classification of the facts as a crime of minor bodily harm (lesiones leves): Another aspect that must be mentioned is that the court, when acquitting, mentioned that the facts could constitute the crime of minor bodily harm due to the temporary disability suffered by the victim, a point on which the appellants disagree, noting that, to attribute the crime of attempted simple homicide (homicidio simple en estado de tentativa) to a person, it is not necessarily required that the bodily harm have endangered the person's life, but rather the important thing is to prove the animus necandi, which does not necessarily derive from the forensic report but from the context of what happened. Now then, the a quo explains in its resolution that, even if the application of self-defense (legítima defensa) were ruled out, from the modal circumstances charged by the prosecuting authority, a crime of attempted simple homicide is not proven, but rather that of minor bodily harm, a criterion that this Chamber shares as will be seen below, based on the following arguments: the victim [Name 002], when testifying at trial, ruled out that the aggression of the accused towards his person had ceased because of the intervention of the accused's brother named [Name 007]." Thus, in the ruling, expressions made by the affected party were recorded that allow the conclusion that if the accused's intention had been homicidal, nothing would have prevented him from having carried out such conduct, as can be deduced from the following excerpt: [...]" [...] V.- Partially dissenting vote of Judge Fernández Mora: In this matter, I must record my dissent from the majority regarding the decision to grant the appeal filed by the representation of the Victim's Civil Defense Office, despite the prescription (prescripción) of the criminal action having been determined, since from my perspective, the civil action also expired jointly with the criminal action, as provided by current legislation. Article 871 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) states that: "Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime prescribe together with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise." Therefore, since the crime has prescribed, by express decision of the legislator, the right of the victim to claim civil compensation also prescribed, such that it is not possible to interpret that, in this case, the statute of limitations for the civil action ran independently from the criminal action.[...]"

RESULTANDO:

I.- That by judgment number 143-2025 of seven thirty-seven hours on March fourteenth, two thousand twenty-five, the CRIMINAL COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE, PÉREZ ZELEDÓN: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 8 y 9 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 1, 11, 24, 28, 30, 45, 111 del Código Penal; 1, 6, 8, 9, 142, 111 a 113, 265 a 270, 341 a 366 del Código Procesal Penal, this Court decides: ACQUIT [Nombre 001] of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of Attempted Simple Homicide (Tentativa de Homicidio Simple), which the Public Prosecutor's Office had been attributing to him, to the detriment of [Nombre 002]. Any precautionary measure (medida cautelar) weighing on the accused by reason of this cause is ordered lifted. The Civil Action for Damages (Acción Civil Resarcitoria) filed is declared without merit. It is resolved without special condemnation in costs, the civil plaintiff (actor civil) [Nombre 002], represented by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima), is exempted from the payment of costs; the remaining costs of the process are to be borne by the State. Once this judgment is final, the definitive archiving of the case is ordered. NOTIFÍQUESE MEDIANTE LECTURA. MARÍA JOSÉ ZAMORA CASTILLO, JOSÉ LUIS CAMBRONERO DELGADO, CARLOS ADOLFO CALDERÓN BOGANTES. Judges of the Trial Court of Pérez Zeledón." (sic)

II.- That against the indicated ruling, attorney Rebeca Moya Valverde, representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as attorney Marisel Arias Valverde, representative of the Victim's Civil Defense Office, filed appeals.

III.- By resolution of 07:06 hours on April 22, 2025, the Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone (criminal) summoned the parties regarding the filed appeal.

IV.- Having conducted the legal deliberation, as provided in numeral 465 of the Código Procesal Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure), this chamber considered the questions raised in the appeal.

V.- The procedures have observed the formalities and prescriptions of law.

Drafted by the Appeal Judge of Sentence Wittmann Stengel;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Admissibility. Against judgment number 143-2025 of seven thirty-seven hours on March fourteenth, two thousand twenty-five, issued by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Pérez Zeledón, in which the accused [Nombre 001] was acquitted of all penalty and responsibility for the crime of attempted simple homicide, prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde and the attorney for the Victim's Civil Defense Office, Marisel Arias Valverde, filed an appeal of the criminal sentence (recurso de apelación de sentencia penal). Upon preliminary review, it was determined that said briefs were filed within the deadline established by law (cf. the electronic file, in the context of the Trial Court, in writings, on 04/21/2025), as provided in article 460 of the Código Procesal Penal and they comply with the admissibility prerequisites regulated by articles 458 and 459 of said normative body, which allows their examination in the terms of article 8.2h of the Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, therefore they are admitted for study and resolution on the merits.

II.- Appeal filed by the representative of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In the first ground, the appellant alleges "Inconformity with the determination of facts, erroneous intellectual and/or analytical reasoning (fundamentación intelectiva y/o analítica) in violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) in accordance with articles 142, 363 and 459 of the current Código Procesal Penal." The appellant indicates her disagreement with the acquittal issued in favor of the defendant [Nombre 001] because, although the trial court (tribunal de sentencia) in its reasoning (fundamentación) explains that the facts were held as proven, it decided not to accept the prosecutor's thesis, by affirming that the evidence yielded two versions that they deemed viable and credible regarding the modal aspects of the accusation (acusación), so unable to disprove either of these, they estimated that the doubt must favor the accused by applying the universal principle of in dubio pro reo.

The petitioner does not share this position, considering that the adjudicators should have assessed the different items of evidence in light of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica). She details in her claim that the trial panel took as proven that the accused attacked the complainant, that he used a knife, that he wounded him on his arms and back, but that, despite this, they erroneously state that it could not be determined whether an unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima) by the victim against the accused actually occurred that would have caused the defendant's attack by way of self-defense (legítima defensa). She considers that the trial court could not establish a doubt that hinged on the justification of the accused's actions; in other words, that it could only be established whether his actions were justified or not and whether there was an excess in defense. Furthermore, she criticizes that the trial court (tribunal de mérito) bases the doubt on the fact that the victim stated he filed the complaint because he was told the accused had filed one against him, which is not an element that justifies the decision. She also objects that the lower court (a quo) indicated that no credibility could be given to either of the two versions, when from a reading of the decision what is extracted is that credibility is given to the defendant for having declared that he was the victim of several robberies and stated that his actions were to defend himself, without weighing whether the victim actually committed any criminal act, since even though he is detained for a crime of violating the Ley de Psicotrópicos, this does not constitute a reason to diminish the value of his statement. The statement given by the defendant inverted the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), which implied that he had to provide some evidence proving at least one of the robberies to justify the unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima), which would have been ruled out in any case because it would be “taking the law into one's own hands” by using a work tool, especially since the accused did not observe that the victim or his brother were carrying any weapon. Additionally, the appellant states that the defendant said he felt threatened, but he himself indicated that he said “I caught them by surprise” (“los agarré sorprendidos”), “I caught them red-handed” (“los agarré con las manitas en la masa”) and that he did not aim to kill, but that he did lunge at the victim with thrusts aimed at vital areas, although he failed to hit him due to the defensive action the victim took. Based on the foregoing, the challenger considers that the judgment presents a defect in reasoning (vicio de fundamentación) that is contradictory and incoherent, affecting the victim's right to obtain a just ruling and limiting the participation of the prosecutorial body (órgano fiscal). In her second ground, the appellant sets out her “Disagreement with the assessment of evidence due to violation of the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), by simple reference to documentary and expert evidence without reflection of contents, in accordance with articles 142, 184, 363 and 459 of the Código Procesal Penal.” She criticizes that the lower court (a quo) did not carry out a concatenated analysis of all the indicators (indicios), which would have allowed it to establish that there were items of evidence supporting the victim's version, such as the photographic sequence carried out by officials of the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) showing the injuries he had and which allowed confirmation of his complaint, as well as the medical-legal opinion (dictamen médico legal) 2022-266 from the Unidad Médico Legal and the certification from Hospital Escalante Pradilla, which although they were included within the summary of evidence, were not analyzed, leaving aside whether these other elements could help elucidate one of the two versions. The defendant's version was easily discardable, since, although he indicated that he only intended to give the victim a “punishment,” the injuries were directed at the latter's vital areas, such as his torso and his head, and it was the affected party who managed to avoid the fatal outcome by interposing his arms as a defensive action. To the foregoing aspects, the challenger adds that, if a greater analysis had been carried out, the possibility of applying the crime of minor injuries (lesiones leves) could not have been established either, as the deciding court also proposed, since the accused ended his unlawful aggression (agresión ilegítima) due to the intervention of a third party, as the affected party narrated, which was dismissed by the lower court (a quo) without considering aspects specific to the testimony. Another aspect objected to by the appellant is that the court analyzed the victim's statement rigorously, disregarding the fact that nearly five years have passed since the events occurred, so the person may have deteriorated memories, without this implying a false statement, as the trial court somehow attempted to make it seem. Based on the foregoing and because she disagrees with the decision, the petitioner requests the nullity of the appealed judgment and that a retrial (juicio de reenvío) be ordered.

III.Appeal filed by the attorney from the Civil Defense Office for Victims (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima). The appellant files a single ground titled “lack of reasoning (fundamentación). Violation of the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) and the principle of reasonable assessment of evidence.” She claims that despite the fact that from the evidence received at the hearing, important indicators (indicios) can be obtained, which taken together provided the sole conclusion that the defendant's intention was to end the victim's life through the use of a bladed weapon, a machete type, that he carried in one of his hands, the sentencing court erroneously concluded that a self-defense (legítima defensa) could have occurred.

As aspects it believes should have been taken into consideration to establish the responsibility of the accused, it cites the following: that the victim (ofendido) narrated that it was the accused who threw himself on him and macheted his hands; that if the photographs provided by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial) are observed, it can be determined that the injuries presented by the victim were clearly defensive and the product of the movements he had to make to avoid being struck on the head, where the machete blows were aimed; that the injuries presented by the aggrieved party were assessed by the forensic doctor (médico legal) and shown by him at trial; that from the account of the affected party, he made no reference to any situation generating any conflict prior to the moment of the aggression; that the expert opinions incorporated into the debate were not assessed together with the testimonial evidence. To the above, the appellant adds that the trial court did not perform any factual, legal, or logical-intellectual assessment of the prerequisites of civil liability and only indicated that the civil action for damages (acción civil resarcitoria) was dismissed as it is accessory to the criminal proceeding. For the foregoing, not sharing what was resolved, the challenger requests that judgment number 143-2025 issued by the Criminal Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Southern Zone, Pérez Zeledón (Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de Zona Sur, Pérez Zeledón) be annulled and that a remand (reenvío) be ordered for a new proceeding.

IV.- Regarding the claims filed by the appellants: To carry out a detailed review of the appealed judgment and the different topics alleged, it has been deemed necessary to structure this resolution as follows: i) Facts charged by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público): I- The Public Prosecutor's Office charged the following facts: “The Public Prosecutor's Office charged the following facts: 1. On the twenty-first day of June of the year two thousand twenty, at approximately five o'clock in the afternoon, the victim [Name 002], was in the locality of the [...] to the Farm of [Name 003] (father of the accused) on a public road (vía pública), at which time the accused [Name 001] appeared, who, knowing the illicit nature of his acts, with the intention of killing the victim [Name 002], approached him using as a weapon a machete-type knife that he carried in his hands, attacked him by launching several thrusts that impacted the body of the victim, specifically on the right forearm, left forearm, immediately after the victim tried to flee the site by walking backwards, but lost his balance and fell to the ground, which the accused [Name 001] took advantage of to continue attacking the victim [Name 002] by launching thrusts with the machete-type knife, in order to end his life, which impacted his right arm, and on the back, right suprascapular region, all while the accused [Name 001] was loudly saying to the victim "do you see, you son of a bitch?, that's how I wanted to catch him; however, the accused did not achieve his objective of killing the victim, because a brother of the accused named [Name 007] intervened, and asked the defendant not to continue cutting him, thereby preventing the accused from continuing to attack him and immediately after he left the place.” ii) Regarding the possible application of a justification defense (causa de justificación) in the actions of the defendant. The appellants question the incorrect assessment of the evidence carried out by the Trial Court, by considering that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused was or was not protected by the possibility of defending himself legitimately against an aggression carried out by the victim against him, as it lacked support in the evidentiary record. Upon reviewing the case file, this Chamber determines that said position established by the a quo contradicts what the different pieces of evidence show. Among the aspects that must be considered are the following: 1) According to the factual framework established by the Public Prosecutor's Office, the events did not occur on the accused's property but “a kilometer after the School, on the road to the Farm of [Name 003] (father of the defendant) on a public road” and it was established that, at that place, the accused was present, who was the person who was armed with a machete and confronted the victim and inflicted several wounds on him with the threat of ending his life. It is worth clarifying that in the debate the victim declared that he did not know if the road he was traveling on was a public road or not, by stating that “it is a street that goes to their farm and other farms, the events occur on the street,” while the accused, in his investigative statement (declaración indagatoria), maintained that it was a road on a farm that he takes care of, which does not allow proving that the events occurred on the accused's property so as to maintain that the victim's presence at the place revealed in itself a criminal intention, especially since he was accompanied by the defendant's brother, this last aspect being uncontested. 2) To determine whether or not it was possible to confirm, or that at least it could be that the accused acted protected by a justification defense, it is necessary to review the context in which the events occurred and in this regard, the accused, in the debate, reported that on previous occasions the victim had entered his property and had taken extremely valuable belongings from his family and neighbors and, furthermore, that this person had a drug problem as did his brother [Name 007].

Specifically regarding the day of the event, the accused reports that he was going up to his home when he heard the footsteps of the victim and another person, who turned out to be his brother [Name 007], and he stated that they were always after the family's tools, that he knows the gait of a person who is going to break in to steal, so he intercepted them and asked them what they were doing there, to which his brother [Name 007] replied that they had come to steal and that whoever interfered, they were going to “press.” The accused specified that, although “they were not carrying weapons that day, ... no one pulled out a knife,” he was bothered by that phrase about them going to press him, thinking that it was as if he “were a cheese,” and, because of that, what he did was “boil with rage” and he took the machete he was carrying and struck the victim with several machete blows which, according to his account, he only did as a form of “punishment,” but that his intention “was not to make mincemeat of him.” For his part, the victim related that he had consumed alcohol, that he was with a brother of the accused named [Name 007] and he told him to go to his father's “to get some money,” that he was inviting him to continue drinking and when they were going along a stone path, through the coffee plantation, at a certain moment, [Name 007] went ahead and ran into [Name 001], whom he initially did not see well and later was able to see that it was this person, and when they met, this person “swung at him with a machete” and told him “that's how he wanted to catch him,” that he told him “take it easy,” but despite that, he macheted him on the hands (pointing to his arms and the upper left side of his back). Furthermore, the victim said: “[Name 007] came out running and I with him, I crossed a stream, the man told me you saved yourself because I was going to kill you, I arrived at the car unconscious and they took me to the hospital.” From the foregoing, it can be deduced that it was the accused who carried out an armed attack and that he did not provide compelling evidence to show that, on that day, he had been unlawfully attacked, given that he acknowledged that his brother and the complainant were not carrying weapons, that he did not see any knife, and if the recording of his statement at trial is heard, at a certain moment (13-03-2025, 5:52), he states that they were not carrying any object (referring to them not carrying any property they had removed, nor did he observe them trying to take any). He also explains that on previous occasions, very valuable property had been removed from him, for which neither the prosecutorial body nor the technical or material defense included any proof in that regard in the case file to accredit those alleged antecedents. In this way, upon conducting a comprehensive review of the appealed judgment, it is evident that the versions given by the victim and the accused were mentioned, but a more detailed analysis of all the evidence regarding the topic of self-defense (legítima defensa) was omitted, which if it had been done, could have revealed several circumstances, among them, that the fact that the aggrieved party may have committed several previous thefts on the accused's property did not give the latter the right to, on the day of the event, take justice into his own hands, since in that case, he should have alerted the respective police authorities. In this regard, Article 28 of the Penal Code allows for the application of the figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) when a person acts in defense of the person or of their own or another's rights under these assumptions: “acts in defense of the person or rights, their own or another's, provided that the following circumstances concur: a) Unlawful aggression; and b) Reasonable necessity of the defense employed to repel or prevent the aggression. It shall be understood that this defense (justificación) applies for that person who executes violent acts against a strange individual who, without any right and with danger to the inhabitants or occupants of the building or its dependencies, is found within them, regardless of the damage caused to the intruder.” Now, starting from the premise that it could be true that the victim had on other occasions stolen belongings from the accused, although this was not conclusively demonstrated in the debate, nor was it forcefully confirmed that on that day he was committing a criminal act when he was intercepted by the accused, since he was traveling along a path near the defendant's property, the truth is that, in light of Costa Rican laws, individuals cannot take justice into their own hands for past events; rather, in a rule-of-law state, one must turn to the judicial system to make the respective requests.

The figure of self-defense (legítima defensa) is a cause of justification established by law to protect life, the integrity of persons, or property, which applies when there is an unlawful aggression and, furthermore, this defense must be rational and necessary, and for it to apply, it requires that there be a real, actual, or imminent attack against one's own rights or those of a third party. In this case, the defendant (encartado) indicated that his brother [Nombre 007] told him: “we came to steal everything, whoever gets involved we'll crush,” but he accepts that he did not see them armed and that his reaction was out of anger. From the above, it is also shown that the accused, if he did receive some type of threat, it was without significant substance; in other words, from the defendant's own statement it cannot be inferred that the victim (ofendido) made a declaration of a future, serious, grave harm that generated fear in him, because when he refers to what his brother (not the victim) told him regarding “whoever got involved they were going to crush,” he did not indicate having felt intimidated but rather angry, hence the aggressive reaction not towards the one who had said that but towards the aggrieved party (agraviado), that is to say, he discriminated regarding which person to direct his anger towards and channeled it toward the victim. These details were not analyzed by the lower court (a quo), nor were they contrasted with the victim's version, who explained how he was attacked by the accused with a machete and that the accused lunged it at his body several times when he, at no time, threatened or tried to attack him. Due to the foregoing, it is evident that a typical case of self-defense did not occur, given that if the defendant suspected that the victim intended to steal his property, he should have alerted the relevant authorities; it was therefore inadmissible to settle a conflict by taking the law into one's own hands when institutions and the corresponding legal avenues exist to resolve such situations. Thus, to determine if it was a case of self-defense, an unlawful, direct, and imminent aggression by the victim towards the accused had to be proven, and whether the need for defense, if such existed, was reasonable and adequate to repel the aggression, since it was important that the conduct carried out by the accused (encausado) did not become retaliation, because the law only protects necessary defense against an unjust aggression, not vengeance, making it inappropriate for the case at hand to have established the concurrence of a cause of justification of self-defense in the defendant's (imputado) actions as a possibility.

**iii) Regarding the classification of the facts as a crime of minor injuries (lesiones leves)**: Another aspect that must be mentioned is that the trial court, when acquitting, mentioned that the facts could constitute the crime of minor injuries due to the temporary disability suffered by the victim, a topic on which the appellants disagree, noting that, to attribute the commission of the crime of simple homicide in the stage of attempt (tentativa) to a person, it is not necessarily required that the injuries put the person's life at risk; rather, what is important is that the *animus necandi* be proven, which does not necessarily derive from the forensic expertise but from the context of what happened. Now then, the lower court explains in its resolution that, even if the application of the figure of self-defense was discarded, from the modal circumstances charged by the prosecuting authority, a crime of simple homicide in the stage of attempt is not proven, but rather that of minor injuries, a criterion which this Chamber shares, as is advanced, based on the following arguments: the victim [Nombre 002], when testifying at trial, ruled out that the defendant's aggression towards his person ceased due to the intervention of the accused's brother named [Nombre 007]. Thus, the judgment recorded expressions made by the affected party that allow concluding that if the defendant's intention had been homicidal, nothing would have prevented him from executing such conduct, as is extracted from the following excerpt: “I don't know why he stopped swinging machete blows at me, he had calmed down a bit; it was the hand of God that he stopped slashing the machete at me. Secondly, from the analysis of the victim's statement, it is established without any doubt that, if the accused had had the intention of ending the aggrieved party's life, he had every possibility to do so, and that there was no cause independent of his will that prevented him, not only because of what has just been mentioned, but also because the victim was in a state of drunkenness, and after the two impacts that the accused managed to inflict on his arms, the victim fell seated on the ground, leaving the accused standing with a machete in his hand, thus in a position of complete advantage over the victim, with the accused deciding to throw a third impact towards his back, and not toward a vital organ such as the neck or head, and furthermore, he did not perform this action with the cutting edge of the machete; all of which allows discarding the homicidal intention in the accused's action, regarding which the victim was clear in declaring: ...I was going very drunk...; ...I was drunk, drunk; The wound on the back was not much, it felt not like these, like beveled, like from the side; I had drunk too much before, I don't know how much, but really a lot, I had woken up on the street, I stopped drinking when I headed home; I fell seated. It was the hand of God that he stopped slashing the machete at me.” From the factual dynamics outlined, this Chamber agrees that the homicidal intent must be ruled out, not only because the medical-legal report 2022-0000266 dated April 21, 2022, in which the victim [Nombre 002] was assessed, did not determine that any of the injuries suffered by the victim had endangered his life — upon concluding that "based on the objective elements of judgment available at this time, it is considered that the documented injuries merit a temporary incapacity of seven (7) days in total and that the evaluated person evolved without functional sequelae in relation to them" — but also because the victim himself stated that at the time of the events he was "dying of a hangover (estaba muriendo de goma)," that he had drunk too much, that he had even woken up on the street, so that if the accused had wanted to end his life he could have done so, given that he had no possibility of defending himself. He also clarified that, with the last machete blow, he fell because he slipped, meaning he was defenseless, and it was then that he stated he did not know why the accused stopped striking him with the machete, which reflects that despite how upset the accused was, he allowed him to get up and leave, so the *animus necandi* in the accused's actions was ruled out. This assertion also finds support in the statements of the accused himself, who although he accepted what happened, categorically denied that his intention was to end the victim's life, but rather to protect his property, as the trial court set forth when taking his statements into account, as reflected in the following segment: "...I grab the machete that I carry in the forest as an important work and defense tool. It's true that I told him that's how I wanted to catch him, of course, red-handed, I didn't want to kill him, I didn't strike at his head; I only delivered those three machete blows, it was just a punishment, it wasn't to make mincemeat of him." It is for this reason that, since the commission of the crime of simple homicide in the attempt stage was not proven, but rather that of minor injuries (leves) (given that the effects resulting from the accused's actions only caused incapacitating injuries for seven days), as the trial court correctly points out, these acts are more than amply time-barred (prescritos), taking into consideration articles 31 to 33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) and 125 of the Penal Code (Código Penal), a rule that regulates the type of minor injuries (lesiones leves), which is applicable to this matter, given that the victim suffered a 7-day incapacity to carry out his usual tasks, since this provides a criminal penalty "of three to one year of imprisonment for anyone who causes another person damage to the body or health that results in incapacity for their usual occupations for more than five days and up to one month." Thus, to confirm that the statute of limitations (prescripción) has indeed operated, it must be taken into account that the date of commission of the acts dates back to June 21, 2020. Upon being classified as a crime of minor injuries (lesiones leves) and according to the maximum penalty that could be imposed, the maximum statute of limitations (prescripción) period is three years. However, this is interrupted and the reduced period is counted by half, in accordance with the provisions of article 33 of the cited legal body, starting from the first interrupting act which, in this case, was the preliminary investigation (indagatoria) of the accused on July 3, 2020 (f. 79), and from there, one and a half years (18 months) must be counted, a term that expired on January 3, 2022. However, during that period, no act occurred that interrupted or suspended the statute of limitations (prescripción). In this manner, the next interrupting act was the scheduling of the preliminary hearing, which dates back to October 25, 2022 (f. 196), which implies that by that time the statute of limitations (prescripción) period had already run. Consequently, it was not possible to issue a conviction against the accused [Nombre 001] for the crime of minor injuries (lesiones leves), so the sentencing court is correct in so establishing and therefore, despite what was stated in section two, the criminal claims of the appellants must be dismissed.

• iv)Regarding the civil action (acción civil) filed. From the foregoing, it is determined that with respect to the injuries suffered by the victim at the hands of the accused and for which a temporary incapacity of 7 days to carry out his usual tasks was determined, there was no major discussion, given that even the accused himself accepted that he inflicted them on the victim as a "punishment," due to the multiple robberies of which he and his family had been victims.

However, despite that accreditation, the trial court erroneously dismissed the civil action for damages, indicating, contradictorily, that no causal link was determined between the acts and the result, "between the action of the accused and the injuries to the victim" and that it is required "not only that a criminal wrong arises, but also a harmful result to a third party, that it be attributable to the subject and that a causal relationship exists between one and the other," having doubts solely about whether the accused's action was in self-defense and considering that the minor injuries were time-barred. Nevertheless, from what was analyzed above, self-defense has been ruled out and we are in the presence of a simple homicide in the degree of attempt, so the dismissal of the civil action constitutes an error, because, although the acts are time-barred in criminal matters, this does not prevent the civil action from being upheld, since rather the rule set forth in Article 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Procesal Penal) establishes that: "The Criminal Court must rule on the merits of the validly brought civil action for damages, even if a judgment of acquittal or a definitive dismissal has been issued at the trial stage." It is worth noting that, although the criminal action expired by the statute of limitations, the civil action did not, since it is governed by the ten-year period provided for in Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) and, in any case, neither at the hearing, nor in the appeal, nor with the summons to the parties, was it alleged that the civil action was time-barred. Thus, with respect to the civil action, upon performing an integral reading of the appealed judgment, it is clear that the accused, acting willfully, injured the victim in various parts of his body (an aspect that was not objected to by any of the parties), so according to the medical-legal opinion, he resulted with an incapacity of 7 days, which allowed the affected party [Nombre 002] to file a claim for damages, represented by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), against the accused and civil defendant [Nombre 001], for the injuries the latter caused him, which accredits the existence of a causal link between the accused's conduct and these consequences, which constitute compensable damage under the terms of Article 1045 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Furthermore, Mr. [Nombre 002], as the direct victim, had the right to bring this action against [Nombre 001], due to the latter's criminal conduct, grounded in Article 41 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) and the aforementioned civil norm, as well as the Rules in force under the 1941 Penal Code (Código Penal). The defense, in its closing arguments, referred to the possibility that the accused may have acted under the figure of self-defense, which has already been ruled out, and when referring to the civil action (28:30), only requested that it be dismissed, without making any type of objection to the amounts requested by the attorney from the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) nor to any aspect concerning the civil action for damages. Hence, for reasons of procedural economy and in observation of the principle of party disposition inherent in this matter, this Chamber, by majority (Judges Wittmann Stengel and Sancho González), in accordance with what has been accredited, deems that the civil action for damages brought by the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) must be upheld. By reason of the foregoing, the civil claim is declared with merit and the civil defendant [Nombre 001] is ordered to pay the following items: i) For temporary disability, the sum of EXACTLY SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES (₡74,340.00), having been incapacitated from performing his habitual work for seven days, according to the medical-legal opinion that was submitted to the record (mentioned in section three). ii) For moral damages, the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (₡1,000,000.00), given that the victim referenced in the hearing the impact that the incident has had on his daily life, because, as a result of the wounds he suffered, his sisters and his mother had to help him, since he could not fend for himself, that when he was assaulted he felt rage because he could not defend himself, and that his hand was even left without strength to perform any type of work, which has affected him in carrying out his habitual tasks. iii) For costs, in accordance with the Tariff of Fees for Professional Legal Services No. 41457-JP (Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía N° 41457-JP), effective as of February 1, 2019, Articles 16 subsection a) and 42, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (₡214,868.00) is awarded. This sum is obtained from the amount awarded for compensatory items and in application of the general rate established in the cited decree. iv) The foregoing items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHT-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (₡1,289,208), an amount that the civil defendant must pay within fifteen business days from the finality of this resolution, depositing the corresponding amount in the account of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público); otherwise, it shall accrue legal interest until its effective payment.

It is important to add that the judgment establishes only the interest that will run from the moment the sentence becomes final, and not indexation (indexación), given that when the civil action is granted, the aim is to repair the damage and it has not been proven by the interested party that there exists a monetary obligation already defined or specific that must be brought to present value; that is, we are not in the presence of a deteriorated debt that has already been liquidated, and therefore a simultaneous judgment for interest and indexation (indexación) is not appropriate at this time. In this regard, this Chamber, with a different composition, in its resolution number 294-2019, dated July 5, 2019, at 10:17 a.m., supported by jurisprudence issued by the First Chamber, whose criterion is shared, explained the following: “IV. … It should be added that, in any case, indexation (indexación) could not be granted when the payment of legal interest is ordered (an aspect which will be revisited below, in the following Considerando), which is what happens in the present matter. For informational purposes and for greater abundance, it is convenient to transcribe in extenso what the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has recently resolved on the subject: 'V.- For the resolution of the objection, it is important to make the following precisions regarding indexation (indexación) and interest. Money is a unit of measure of the economic value of goods and services. It constitutes a monetary unit of payment and, as such, is subject to changes generated by economic factors, such as inflation or devaluation. Thus, for example, someone who receives a loan today to return the money within two years, received an amount that can be exchanged for other goods and services at their current prices. If, as a consequence of inflation, prices rose, it means that in two years the debtor would deliver the same number of monetary units, but with an economic value lower than that lent, because the capacity and power of disposal with such amount would be less than it had at the time the loan was granted. The classical theory of nominalism, in which "a colón equals a colón, a dollar is always equal to a dollar," that is, a monetary unit is always equal to itself, does not generate equivalence in the benefits affected by said economic phenomena. With that theory, monetary units are legally presumed stable, which is not typical in the current era. A debt of today will not have the same value after a time, precisely because money is dependent on the economic changes of the market. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the nominal payment of an obligation does not necessarily take into account monetary depreciation, which translates, concretely, into the loss of the real exchange value or purchasing power of money, as a consequence of the increase in inflation or the general price level. In this context, if the quantum of the obligation is not readjusted, the creditor is exposed to being paid a nominal sum that does not correspond to the real value of the obligation. To provide a solution to this problem, in several precedents of this Chamber it has been held that interest serves to compensate the opportunity cost that had to be borne by whoever did not receive the money owed during the period of non-compliance, and, for its part, indexation (indexación) serves as a mechanism to readjust the loss of the value of the currency due to inflation. Thus, it has been said that both extremes are not mutually exclusive, since the updating of a sum of money does not exclude the recognition of damages. Likewise, a distinction has been made between legal and net interest, to recognize this latter extreme in sums that have been indexed. (See, among others, votes No. 1315 of 10 hours 56 minutes of December 7, 2016, No. 835 of 9 hours 25 minutes of August 11, 2016, No. 1282 of 9 hours 5 minutes of October 11, 2012, No. 902 of 9 hours 55 minutes of July 31, 2012, No. 1384 of 8 hours 55 minutes of November 10, 2011, No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes of October 8, 2011, No. 557 of 10 hours 10 minutes of May 6, 2010 and No. 1053 of 13 hours 55 minutes of October 8, 2009). However, after deep and conscientious reflection, one arrives at the conviction that the payment of interest (legal or conventional) constitutes a compensatory and indexing measure at the same time, insofar as it adjusts the mismatches in the value of money due to the passage of time, as well as the effects caused by its unavailability. The legislator regulated two ways of calculating interest in the absence of an agreement between the parties: Article 1163 of the Civil Code for civil obligations and 497 of the Commercial Code for commercial ones. In the first, the interest shall be equal to that paid by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for six-month term certificates of deposit for the currency in question. In the second, it shall be calculated based on the basic passive rate of the Banco Central de Costa Rica for operations in national currency and the prime rate for operations in US dollars. In both cases, the parameter for its calculation is governed by the yield that financial institutions provide to their savers. The objective of this type of rate is to counteract the effects of inflation on saved money, so that the deposited sum is compensated and updated and, in turn, grants a return to the saver. In synthesis, it is a composite rate: it covers indexation (indexación) and utility at the same time. Conventional interest suffers the same fate, insofar as the agreed rate is higher than the referred legal ones. In this way, whenever there is a monetary obligation with payment of interest, it is not possible to index the sum, since their joint payment would imply settling monetary devaluation twice." In that sense, the interest rate, composed of the cost of money and inflation, is aimed at compensating the creditor for the damage, represented by the depreciation of the currency (loss of its real value), and the harm, consisting of the lost profit from not being able to lucratively use the capital. This thesis had already been previously upheld by this Deciding Body (see, among others, rulings No. 313 of 15 hours 30 minutes on April 17, 2002, as well as No. 49 of 15 hours on May 19, 1995). In such votes, it was indicated that "delay (mora) in the payment of an obligation of this nature (referring to monetary obligations) generates the recognition in favor of the creditor of interest as civil fruits (fruto civil) that they cease to receive due to the lack of availability of the capital, that is, the interest rate constitutes an important means aimed at procuring the least possible damage to the assets of the person who has been deprived of what belongs to them, since one of its basic components, apart from the utility for the use of capital, is the inflation rate [...]". According to the foregoing, the interest rate constitutes a mechanism for monetary correction of the debt, since the inflationary component is immersed in its calculation. This compensates for or indexes the loss caused by the depreciation of the currency. With the entry into force of the CPCA, through the normative provision inserted in Article 123, it was established that when ordering the fulfillment of a monetary obligation, directly or by equivalent, a pronouncement on the updating of said sum must be included, in order to compensate for the variation in purchasing power occurring during the period between the date the obligation became enforceable and its extinction by effective payment. For the purpose of updating purchasing power, the legislator set the consumer price index (índice de precios al consumidor), issued by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos), as a parameter for its calculation. This indicator measures the variation of the prices of the Costa Rican basic basket in a determined period of time; that is, it quantifies inflation. The cited numeral 123 aims to compensate the creditor for inflationary impacts, which is why it imposes on the Judge a pronouncement on the updating of the granted sum. However, as explained above, when a monetary obligation entails the payment of interest, as a general rule it can be indicated that such interest covers that required updating, insofar as these, by configuring the price of money, become the remuneration or consideration for it, which is why the interest rate (whether set by the parties themselves or by Law) covers that inflationary component, in addition to the opportunity cost and unavailability of the money. However, such a rule admits exceptions, such as when hyperinflationary processes or cycles occur, where the legal or conventional interest could not foresee that unexpected process. This is not the case." First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia), resolution 000378-F-S1-2018, of 14:05 hours on April 26, 2018.

From the foregoing, it follows that it is improper to grant indexation when the payment of legal interest is ordered, as in this matter (from the finality of the judgment), since said interest, in some way, allows for that required updating of the value of money and, furthermore, in this matter, no inflationary problem is being challenged due to the passage of time. Consequently, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed by the representative of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) is dismissed without merit, and the appeal brief filed by the attorney of the Victim's Civil Office (Oficina Civil de la Víctima) is partially granted with respect to the civil claims, and the matter is resolved based on the applicable law, ordering the civil defendant to pay the civil plaintiff the amounts specified above and, from the finality of the judgment, the corresponding legal interest until its effective payment. In matters not modified by this court, the appealed judgment remains unaltered. Notify.

V.- Partially dissenting vote (Voto parcialmente salvado) of Judge Fernández Mora: In this matter, I must record my dissent with the majority regarding the decision to grant the appeal filed by the representation of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima), even though the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the criminal action was determined, since from my perspective, the civil action also prescribed jointly with the criminal action, as provided by current legislation. Article 871 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) indicates that: "Civil actions arising from a crime or quasi-crime are prescribed along with the crime or quasi-crime from which they arise." Therefore, when the crime prescribed, by express decision of the legislator, the right to claim civil compensation by the offended party also prescribed, and thus it is not possible to interpret that, in this case, the statute of limitations for the civil action ran independently of the criminal action. I consider that, as this norm is not repealed and rather is fully in force, as I have been reiterating, among others, in votes from this office numbers 247-2023 of 14:00 hours on June 29, 2023, 254-2021 of 14:02 hours on April 29, 2021, 125-2021 of 10:18 hours on February 26, 2021, 93-2021 of 10:33 hours on February 12, 2021, and 540-2020 of 10:46 hours on September 11, 2020, said provision must be applied ex officio because it is a matter of public order (orden público), since it regulates civil liability derived from a crime or quasi-crime, which makes it a non-waivable matter. Consequently, since the criminal action is prescribed, it must also be deemed that the civil action derived from said criminal conduct is also prescribed, and therefore the acquittal issued in the judgment must also be confirmed.

POR TANTO:

1.- The appeals (recursos de apelación de sentencia) filed by prosecutor Rebeca Moya Valverde, in her capacity as representative of the Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), and attorney Marisel Arias Valverde of the Victim's Civil Defense Office (Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima) are admitted for consideration on the merits. 2.- The appeal brief filed by the representative of the prosecutorial body is dismissed without merit.

3.- The appeal filed by the attorney for the civil claimant [Name 002] is partially granted, and consequently the appealed judgment is revoked and the civil defendant [Name 001] is ordered to pay the following amounts: i) For temporary disability, the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY COLONES EXACTLY (₡74,340.00). ii) For moral damages (daño moral), the amount of ONE MILLION COLONES (₡1,000,000.00). iii) For costs, in accordance with the Fee Schedule for Professional Legal Services No. 41457-JP, in effect since February 1, 2019, the amount of TWO HUNDRED FOURTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT COLONES (₡214,868.00). iv) The foregoing items total ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHT COLONES (₡1,289,208), an amount that the civil defendant must pay within fifteen business days from the finality of this ruling by depositing the corresponding amount into the account of the Victim's Civil Defense Office of the Public Ministry; otherwise, it shall accrue legal interest until its effective payment. On this point, Judge Fernández Mora dissents. Notifíquese.

</span><span style="font-family: Verdana; font-size: 8pt; font-weight: bold; letter-spacing: -0.15pt; vertical-align: sub; color: #0d0d0d;">&ndash;</span></p> <table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0"> <tbody> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> </td> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><img style="-aw-left-pos: 0pt; -aw-rel-hpos: column; -aw-rel-vpos: paragraph; -aw-top-pos: 0pt; -aw-wrap-type: inline;" src="" alt="" width="200" height="65" /><br /><span style="font-family: 'WASP 39 L'; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">????????????????</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">PZY478DBOUMW61</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">SUSANA WITTMANN STENGEL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p> </td> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 8pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><img style="-aw-left-pos: 0pt; -aw-rel-hpos: column; -aw-rel-vpos: paragraph; -aw-top-pos: 0pt; -aw-wrap-type: inline;" src="" alt="" width="200" height="65" /><br /><span style="font-family: 'WASP 39 L'; font-size: 8pt; vertical-align: sub;">???????????????</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">LPTM8UH2VOQ61</span><br /><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub;">CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A</span></p> </td> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 8pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-size: 5.33pt; vertical-align: sub; -aw-import: ignore;">&nbsp;</span></p> </td> <td style="padding-right: 5.4pt; padding-left: 5.4pt; vertical-align: top;"> <p style="margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt; font-size: 12pt; background-color: #ffffff;"><img style="-aw-left-pos: 0pt; -aw-rel-hpos: column; -aw-rel-vpos: paragraph; -aw-top-pos: 0pt; -aw-wrap-type: inline;" src="

Documento PJEDITOR 1 ????????????????

IMPUTADA: [Nombre 001] OFENDIDO: [Nombre 002] DELITO: TENTATIVA DE HOMICIDIO SIMPLE Res: 2025-484 Tribunal de Apelación de Sentencia Penal de Cartago, Sección Primera. A las catorce horas del treinta de setiembre del dos mil veinticinco.

Causa penal 20-000063-0219-PE seguida contra [Nombre 001], mayor, costarricense, cédula [Valor 001], nacido el día 16 de enero de 1973, casado, hijo de [Nombre 003] y [Nombre 004], vecino de [...], por el delito de TENTATIVA DE HOMICIDIO SIMPLE en perjuicio de [Nombre 002]. Integran el Tribunal las juezas Susana Wittmann Stengel, Maureen Sancho González y el juez Christian Fernández Mora. Se apersonó en sede de apelación la Licenciada Rebeca Moya Valverde, representante del Ministerio Público, así como la Licenciada Marisel Arias Valverde representante de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, únicamente.

RESULTANDO:

I.- Que mediante la sentencia número 143-2025 de las siete horas treinta y siete minutos del catorce de marzo de dos mil veinticinco, el TRIBUNAL PENAL DEL PRIMER CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE LA ZONA SUR, PÉREZ ZELEDÓN: "POR TANTO: De conformidad con lo expuesto, artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política; 8 y 9 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 1, 11, 24, 28, 30, 45, 111 del Código Penal; 1, 6, 8, 9, 142, 111 a 113, 265 a 270, 341 a 366 del Código Procesal Penal, este Tribunal resuelve: ABSOLVER de toda pena y responsabilidad al acusado [Nombre 001], en cuanto a un delito de Tentativa de Homicidio Simple, que le venía atribuyendo el Ministerio Público, en perjuicio de [Nombre 002]. Se ordena levantar cualquier medida cautelar que pese sobre el acusado en razón de esta causa. Se declara sin lugar la Acción Civil Resarcitoria incoada. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas, se exime del pago de costas al actor civil [Nombre 002], representado por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la V íctima; en lo demás son los gastos del proceso a cargo del Estado. Una vez firme esta sentencia se ordena el archivo definitivo de la causa. NOTIFÍQUESE MEDIANTE LECTURA.MARÍA JOSÉ ZAMORA CASTILLO, JOSÉ LUIS CAMBRONERO DELGADO, CARLOS ADOLFO CALDERÓN BOGANTES. Jueces del Tribunal Juicio de Pérez Zeledón." (sic)

II.- Que contra el fallo indicado, la licenciada Rebeca Moya Valverde, representante del Ministerio Público, así como la licenciada Marisel Arias Valverde, representante de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, interpusieron recursos de apelación.

III.- Mediante resolución de las 07:06 horas del 22 de abril de 2025, el Tribunal del I Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur (penal), emplazó a las partes acerca del recurso de apelación interpuesto.

IV.- Realizada la deliberación de ley, según lo dispuesto en el numeral 465 del Código Procesal Penal, esta cámara se planteó las cuestiones formuladas en el recurso.

V.- En los procedimientos se han observado las formalidades y prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Jueza de Apelación de Sentencia Wittmann Stengel;

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- Admisibilidad. Contra la sentencia número 143-2025 de las siete horas treinta y siete minutos del catorce de marzo de dos mil veinticinco, dictada por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de la Zona Sur, Pérez Zeledón, en la que se absolvió de toda pena y responsabilidad al acusado [Nombre 001] por el delito de tentativa de homicidio simple, la fiscal Rebeca Moya Valverde y la abogada de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, Marisel Arias Valverde, interpusieron recurso de apelación de sentencia penal. De la revisión preliminar, se determinó que dichos libelos se presentaron dentro del plazo establecido por ley (cfr. el expediente electrónico, en el contexto del Tribunal de Juicio, en escritos, en fecha 21/04/2025), según lo dispone el artículo 460 del Código Procesal Penal y cumplen con los presupuestos de admisibilidad regulados por los artículos 458 y 459 de dicho cuerpo normativo, lo cual permite su conocimiento en los términos del artículo 8.2h de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, por lo que se admite para su estudio y resolución de fondo.

II.- Recurso de apelación de la representante del Ministerio Público. En el primer motivo, la recurrente alega “Inconformidad con la determinación de los hechos, errónea fundamentación intelectiva y/o analítica por violación a las reglas de la sana crítica conformidad con los artículos 142, 363 y 459 del Código Procesal Penal vigente”. Apunta la apelante su desacuerdo con la absolutoria dictada a favor del imputado [Nombre 001] ya que, aunque el tribunal de sentencia en su fundamentación explica que los hechos se tuvieron por demostrados, dispuso no acoger la tesis de la fiscalía, al afirmar que las probanzas arrojaban dos versiones que les resultaron viables y creíbles respecto de los aspectos modales de la acusación, por lo que al no poder desvirtuar alguna de estas, estimaron que la duda debe favorecer a la persona acusada al aplicar el principio universal de in dubio pro reo. Esta posición no la comparte la gestionante, al considerar que las personas juzgadoras debieron valorar, a la luz de las reglas de la sana crítica, los diferentes elementos de prueba. Detalla en su reclamo que el panel enjuiciador tuvo por demostrado que el sindicado acometió contra el denunciante, que utilizó un cuchillo, que lo hirió en sus brazos y en su espalda, pero que, a pesar de ello, equivocadamente afirman que no se pudo determinar si efectivamente existió o no una agresión ilegítima del ofendido hacia el acusado que ocasionara el ataque del encausado a manera de legítima defensa. Considera que el tribunal de instancia no podía fijar una duda que pendiera de la justificación de las acciones del imputado, en otras palabras, que solo se podía establecer si el actuar de este fue justificado o no y si se dio un exceso en la defensa. Por otro lado, reprocha que el tribunal de mérito sustenta la duda en que la víctima refirió que interpuso la denuncia porque le dijeron que el acusado lo había denunciado, lo cual no es un elemento que justifique lo resuelto. También se objeta que el a quo indicó que no se le podía dar credibilidad a ninguna de las dos versiones, cuando de la lectura de la resolución lo que se extrae es que se da credibilidad al encausado por haber declarado que fue víctima de varios robos y externó que su actuar fue para defenderse, cuando no se ponderó si el agraviado realmente cometió algún acto delictivo, pues aunque se encuentre detenido por un delito de infracción a la Ley de Psicotrópicos, no constituye esta una razón para restarle valor a su declaración. La afirmación dada por el imputado invertía la carga de la prueba, lo que implicaba que este debía aportar alguna probanza que acreditase al menos alguno de los robos para justificar la agresión ilegítima, que de todas maneras hubiera quedado descartada porque sería “tomar la justicia por sus propias manos” al usar una herramienta de trabajo, máxime que el acusado no observó que el ofendido ni su hermano portaran algún arma. Además, expresa la recurrente que el encausado dijo que se sentía amenazado, pero él mismo indicó que les dijo “los agarré sorprendidos”, “los agarré con las manitas en la masa” y que él no tiró a matar, pero que sí le lanzó estocadas a la víctima dirigidas a áreas vitales, aunque no lograra impactarlo debido a la acción defensiva que hizo esta. Por lo expuesto, estima la impugnante que la sentencia presenta un vicio de fundamentación contradictoria e incoherente que afecta el derecho del ofendido a obtener un fallo justo y que limita la participación del órgano fiscal. En su segundo motivo, la recurrente establece su “Inconformidad con la valoración de la prueba por violación a las reglas de la sana crítica racional, por simple remisión a la prueba documental y pericial sin reflejo de contenidos, de conformidad con los artículos 142, 184, 363 y 459 del Código Procesal Penal”. Reprocha que el a quo no realizó un análisis concatenado de todos los indicios, el cual le hubiera permitido establecer que había elementos de prueba que respaldaban la versión del agraviado, como la secuencia fotográfica que llevaron a cabo funcionarios del Organismo de Investigación Judicial que da cuenta de las lesiones que presentaba este y que permitían confirmar su denuncia, al igual que el dictamen médico legal 2022-266 de la Unidad Médico Legal y la certificación del Hospital Escalante Pradilla, los cuales aunque fueron incluidos dentro del sumario de prueba, no fueron analizados, dejando de lado si estos otros elementos podían ayudar a dilucidar alguna de las dos versiones. La del encausado era fácilmente descartable, ya que, aunque este indicó que solo pretendía darle un “castigo” al ofendido, las lesiones fueron dirigidas hacia áreas vitales de este, como el torso y su cabeza y fue el afectado el que logró evitar el resultado muerte, al interponer sus brazos como acción defensiva. De los anteriores aspectos, adiciona la impugnante que, si se hubiera realizado un mayor análisis, tampoco se hubiera podido establecer la posibilidad de la aplicación del delito de lesiones leves, como también lo planteó el tribunal resolutor, ya que el acusado finalizó su agresión ilegítima por la intervención de un tercero, según lo narró el afectado, lo cual fue descartado por el a quo sin tomar en cuenta aspectos propios del testimonio. Otro aspecto objetado por la apelante es que el tribunal analizó la declaración del agraviado de forma rigurosa, dejando de lado que desde que sucedieron los hechos ya han transcurrido casi cinco años, por lo que la persona puede tener recuerdos deteriorados, sin que ello implique una declaración falsa, como pretendió hacerlo ver, de alguna manera, el tribunal de juicio. Por lo apuntado y por estar en desacuerdo con lo resuelto, la gestionante solicita la nulidad de la sentencia recurrida y el que se ordene un juicio de reenvío.

III.Recurso de apelación interpuesto por la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. Interpone la recurrente un único motivo que titula “falta de fundamentación. Violación a las reglas de la sana crítica y al principio de valoración razonable de la prueba”. Reclama que a pesar de que de la prueba recibida en el debate se pueden obtener indicios importantes, que concatenados entre sí brindaban como única conclusión que la intención del demandado era acabar con la vida del ofendido, mediante la utilización de un arma blanca tipo machete que portaba en una de sus manos, se concluyó de manera errónea por el tribunal sentenciador que podría haberse dado una legítima defensa. Como aspectos que estima que debieron ser tomados en consideración para establecer la responsabilidad del imputado cita los siguientes: que el ofendido narró que fue el acusado quien se le tiró encima y lo macheteó por las manos; que si se observan las fotografías que fueron aportadas por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, se puede determinar que las lesiones que presentó la víctima fueron claramente defensivas y producto de los movimientos que tuvo que realizar para evitar ser impactada en su cabeza hacia donde iban dirigidos los machetazos; que las lesiones que presentó el agraviado fueron valoradas por el médico legal y mostradas por este en el juicio; que del relato del afectado, este no hizo referencia a alguna situación generadora de algún conflicto previo al momento de la agresión; que no se valoraron las pericias incorporadas al debate en conjunto con la prueba testimonial. A lo anterior, suma la apelante que el tribunal de juicio no realizó ninguna valoración fáctica, jurídica, lógica-intelectiva de los presupuestos de responsabilidad civil y solo indicó que se declaraba sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria por ser accesoria al proceso penal. Por lo expuesto, al no compartir lo resuelto, solicita la impugnante que se anule la sentencia número 143-2025 emitida por el Tribunal Penal del Primer Circuito Judicial de Zona Sur, Pérez Zeledón y se ordene el reenvío para una nueva sustanciación.

IV.- Acerca de los reclamos interpuestos por las apelantes: Para realizar una revisión detallada de la sentencia recurrida y de los diferentes tópicos alegados, se ha considerado necesario estructurar esta resolución de la siguiente manera: i) Hechos acusados por el Ministerio Público: I- El Ministerio Público acusó los siguientes hechos: “El Ministerio Público acusó los siguientes hechos: 1. El día veintiuno de junio del año dos mil veinte, al ser aproximadamente las diecisiete horas, el ofendido [Nombre 002], se encontraba en la localidad de la [...] a la Finca de [Nombre 003] (padre del imputado) sobre vía pública, momento en el cual se presentó el acusado [Nombre 001], quien a sabiendas del carácter ilícito de sus actos, con la intención de darle muerte al ofendido [Nombre 002], se acercó a éste utilizando como arma un cuchillo tipo machete que portaba en sus manos, acometió en su contra lanzándole varias estocadas que impactaron en el cuerpo del ofendido, específicamente en el antebrazo derecho, antebrazo izquierdo, acto seguido ofendido trató de huir del sitio caminando hacia atrás, pero perdió el equilibrio y cayó al suelo, lo cual aprovechó el acusado [Nombre 001], para continuar acometiendo contra el ofendido [Nombre 002] lanzándole estocadas con el cuchillo tipo machete, con el fin de acabar con su vida, las cuales impactaron en su brazo derecho, y en la espalda, región supraescapular derecha, todo ello mientras el acusado [Nombre 001] le manifestaba de viva voz al ofendido "¿ves hijueputa?, así era como quería agarrarlo; no obstante el acusado no logró su cometido de darle muerte a la víctima, por cuanto intervino un hermano del acusado de nombre [Nombre 007], y le pidió al imputado que no lo siguiera cortando, con lo cual evitó que el acusado continuara agrediéndolo y de seguido se fue del lugar.” ii) Acerca de la posible aplicación de una causal de justificación en el actuar del imputado. Cuestionan las recurrentes la incorrecta valoración de la prueba que realizó el Tribunal de instancia, al estimar que existía una duda razonable acerca de si el encartado lo amparaba o no la posibilidad de defenderse legítimamente ante una agresión realizada por el ofendido en su contra, por no tener sustento en el elenco probatorio. Al revisar los autos, esta Cámara determina que dicha posición establecida por el a quo contraviene lo que arrojan las diferentes probanzas. Entre los aspectos que se deben considerar están los siguientes: 1) Según el marco fáctico establecido por el Ministerio Público, los hechos no se dieron en la propiedad del acusado sino “a un kilómetro después de la Escuela, camino a la Finca de [Nombre 003] (padre del imputado) sobre vía pública” y se estableció que, en ese lugar, se encontraba el acusado, quien era la persona que se encontraba armada con un machete y le salió al paso al ofendido y le infligió varias heridas con la amenaza de acabar con su vida. Valga aclarar que en el debate el ofendido declaró que no sabía si el camino por el que iba transitando era vía pública o no, al externar que “es una calle que va a la finca de ellos y otras fincas más, los hechos se dan en la calle”, mientras que el acusado, en su declaración indagatoria, sostuvo que era un camino de una finca que él cuida, lo que no permite acreditar que los eventos se hayan dado en la propiedad del encartado como para sostener que la presencia del ofendido en el lugar revelara por sí misma, una intención delictiva, máxime que se hacía acompañar del hermano del justiciable, aspecto este último no controvertido. 2) Para determinar si era posible o no confirmar, o que al menos pudiese ser que el sindicado actuara amparado bajo una causa de justificación, necesariamente, se debe revisar el contexto en que se dieron los hechos y al respecto se tiene que el acusado, en el debate, informó que en ocasiones anteriores el ofendido había ingresado a su propiedad y se había llevado pertenencias sumamente valiosas de su familia y vecinos y, además, que esta persona tenía un problema por drogas al igual que su hermano [Nombre 007]. Propiamente acerca del día del suceso, informa el imputado, que él iba subiendo hacia su vivienda cuando escuchó los pasos del ofendido y de otra persona, que resultó ser su hermano [Nombre 007] y refirió que ellos siempre iban por las herramientas de la familia, que él conoce el andar de una persona que va a meterse a robar, por lo que les salió al paso y les preguntó qué estaban haciendo ahí, a lo que su hermano [Nombre 007] le respondió que habían venido a robar y que al que se metiera, lo iban a “prensar”. El sindicado especificó que, aunque “ellos no llevaban armas ese día, … ninguno sacó cuchillo”, le molestó esa frase de que lo fueran a prensar, al pensar que ni que él “fuera un queso” y, por ello, lo que hizo fue “hervir en cólera” y tomó el machete que portaba con el cual le lanzó varios machetazos al ofendido que, según su decir, solo lo hizo como una forma de “castigo”, pero que su intención “no era para hacerlo picadillo”. Por su parte, el afectado relató que él había ingerido licor, que estaba con un hermano del acusado que se llama [Nombre 007] y este le dijo que fueran donde su papá “a traer una plata”, que él lo invitaba para seguir ingiriendo y cuando iban por un camino de piedra, por el cafetal, en determinado momento, [Nombre 007] se fue adelante y se encontró con [Nombre 001], a quien al principio no lo visualizó bien y después pudo ver que era esta persona y cuando se encontraron, este le “tiró con un machete” y le dijo que “así quería agarrarlo”, que él le dijo “tranquilo”, pero a pesar de eso, lo macheteó en las manos (señalando los brazos y el lado superior izquierdo de la espalda). Además, el afectado dijo: “[Nombre 007] salió corriendo y yo con él, pasé una quebrada, el señor me dijo te salvaste porque te iba a matar, llegué al carro desmayado y me llevaron al hospital”. De lo señalado, se desprende que quien realizó un ataque a mano armada fue el imputado y que este no suministró datos contundentes que evidenciaran que, ese día, hubiese sido agredido ilegítimamente, dado que reconoció que su hermano y el denunciante no portaban armas, que no vio ningún cuchillo y si se escucha la grabación de su declaración en el juicio, en determinado momento (13-03-2025, 5:52), refiere que no llevaban objeto alguno (haciendo referencia a que no llevaban ningún bien que hubiesen sustraído, ni los observó tratando de tomar alguno). También, explica que ya en ocasiones anteriores le habían sido sustraídos bienes muy valiosos, de los cuales ni el órgano fiscal ni la defensa técnica o material incluyó alguna probanza en ese sentido a los autos para acreditar esos antecedentes alegados. De esta manera, al realizar una revisión integral del fallo impugnado, se denota que en este se hizo mención a las versiones dadas por el ofendido y el acusado, pero se omitió la realización de un análisis más detallado de todas las probanzas acerca del tópico de la legítima defensa, que de haberlo hecho, se podrían haber denotado varias circunstancias, entre estas, que el hecho de que el agraviado pudiese haber cometido varios robos con anterioridad en la propiedad del acusado, no le daba derecho a este último a que el día del suceso tomara la justicia por sus propias manos, pues en ese caso, debió alertar a las autoridades policiales respectivas. Al respecto, el artículo 28 del Código Penal, permite aplicar la figura de la legítima defensa cuando la persona obra en defensa de la persona o de derechos propios o ajenos bajo estos supuestos: “obra en defensa de la persona o derechos, propios o ajenos, siempre que concurran las siguientes circunstancias: a) Agresión ilegítima; y b) Necesidad razonable de la defensa planteada para repeler e impedir la agresión. Se entenderá que concurre esta causal de justificación para aquél que ejecutare actos violentos contra el individuo extraño que, sin derecho alguno y con peligro para los habitantes u ocupantes de la edificación o de sus dependencias, se hallare dentro de ellas, cualquiera que sea el daño causado al intruso.” Ahora bien, partiendo de que pudiese ser cierto que el ofendido en otras ocasiones le haya sustraído sus pertenencias al sindicado, aunque esto no quedó demostrado fehacientemente en el debate, ni tampoco se confirmó contundentemente que ese día estuviese cometiendo un hecho delictivo cuando fue interceptado por el acusado, pues iba transitando por un camino cercano a la propiedad del encartado, lo cierto es que, a la luz de las leyes costarricenses, las personas no pueden tomar la justicia en sus manos por eventos pasados sino que, en un Estado de derecho, se debe acudir al sistema judicial para realizar los requerimientos respectivos. La figura de la legítima defensa es una causa de justificación establecida por la ley para proteger la vida, la integridad de las personas o los bienes, que se aplica cuando se da una agresión ilegítima y, además, esta defensa debe ser racional y necesaria y para que aplique, se requiere que se dé un ataque real, actual o inminente contra los derechos propios o de un tercero. En este caso, el encartado indicó que su hermano [Nombre 007] le manifestó: “vinimos a robarnos todo, el que se meta lo prensamos”, pero acepta que no los vio armados y que su reacción fue por cólera. De lo anterior, también se denota que el acusado si es que recibió algún tipo de amenaza, esta fue sin mayor contenido, en otras palabras, del dicho del propio encartado no se extrae que el ofendido le hiciera una manifestación de un mal futuro, serio, grave, que le generara temor pues cuando alude a lo que le dijo su hermano (no el ofendido) en cuanto a que “a quien se metiera lo iban a prensar” no indicó haberse sentido intimidado sino enojado, de ahí la reacción agresiva no hacia quien le había dicho eso sino al agraviado, entiéndase, discriminó respecto a cuál de las personas dirigía su enfado y lo canalizó hacia el ofendido. Estos pormenores, no fueron analizados por el a quo ni tampoco se contrarrestó con la versión de la víctima, quien explicó cómo fue atacado por el acusado con un machete y que este se lo dirigió en varios momentos hacia su cuerpo cuando él en ningún momento lo amenazó ni intentó agredirlo. Debido a lo expuesto, resulta evidente que no se dio un caso típico de legítima defensa, dado que si el encartado sospechaba que el ofendido pretendía sustraer sus bienes debió alertar a las autoridades respectivas, por lo que resultaba inadmisible dirimir un conflicto por mano propia existiendo instituciones y las vías legales correspondientes para resolver este tipo de situaciones. Así, para determinar si se estaba ante un caso de legítima defensa debió acreditarse una agresión ilegítima, directa e inminente por parte del ofendido hacia el acusado y si la necesidad de la defensa, de existir tal, fue razonable y adecuada para repeler la agresión, ya que resultaba importante que la conducta realizada por el encausado no se convirtiera en una represalia, debido a que la ley solo ampara la defensa necesaria contra una agresión injusta, no la venganza, por lo que resulta improcedente para el caso de interés el haberse establecido como una posibilidad la concurrencia de una causa de justificación de legítima defensa en el actuar del imputado. iii) Acerca de la calificación de los hechos como un delito de lesiones leves: Otro aspecto que se debe mencionar es que el tribunal al absolver hizo mención de que los hechos podían constituir el delito de lesiones leves por la incapacidad temporal que sufrió el ofendido, tópico del cual discrepan las recurrentes, advirtiendo que, para atribuirle la comisión a una persona del delito de homicidio simple en estado de tentativa, no se requiere necesariamente que las lesiones hayan puesto en riesgo la vida de la persona, sino que lo importante es que se acredite el animus necandi, que no necesariamente se deriva de la pericia forense sino del contexto de lo sucedido. Ahora bien, explica el a quo en su resolución que, aunque se descartase la aplicación de la figura de la legítima defensa, de las circunstancias modales acusadas por el órgano fiscal no se acredita un delito de homicidio simple en estado de tentativa sino el de lesiones leves, criterio que esta Cámara comparte como se adelanta, con base en los siguientes argumentos: la víctima [Nombre 002] al declarar en el juicio descartó que la agresión del imputado hacia su persona haya cesado por la intervención del hermano del acusado llamado [Nombre 007]. Así, en el fallo se consignaron expresiones realizadas por el afectado que permiten concluir que si la intención del imputado hubiera sido homicida, nada impedía que pudiera haber ejecutado tal conducta, como se desprende del siguiente extracto: “No sé por qué dejó de tirarme machetazos, se había calmado un poco; fue mano de Dios que dejó de volarme machete. En segundo lugar, del análisis de la declaración del ofendido se establece sin duda alguna que, si el acusado hubiese tenido la intención de acabar con la vida del agraviado, tenía todas las posibilidades para realizarlo, y que no existió ninguna causa independiente a su voluntad que se lo impidiera, no solo por lo que se acaba de mencionar, sino además porque la víctima estaba en estado de ebriedad, y luego de los dos impactos que logró proporcionarle el acusado en los brazos, el ofendido cayó sentado sobre el suelo, quedando el acusado de pie con un machete en la mano, por ende en una posición de completa ventaja sobre el ofendido, decidiendo el acusado lanzarle un tercer impacto hacia la espalda, y no hacia un órgano vital como el cuello o la cabeza, y además esta acción no la hizo con el filo del machete; todo lo cual permite descartar la intención homicida en la acción del acusado, sobre ello el ofendido fue claro en declarar: ...yo iba muy borrachillo...; ...estaba yo ebrio, tomado; La herida de la espalda no fue mucho, se sentía no como éstas, como chaflaneado, como de medio lado; Yo antes había tomado demasiado, no se ni cuánto, pero en realidad bastante, había amanecido en la calle, dejé de tomar cuando me vine para la casa; Yo caí sentado. Fue mano de Dios que dejó de volarme machete”. De la dinámica fáctica reseñada, esta Cámara coincide en que debe descartarse la intención homicida, no solo porque el dictamen médico legal 2022-0000266 de data 21 de abril de 2022, en el que se valoró al agraviado [Nombre 002], no se determinó que algunas de las lesiones que sufrió la víctima haya puesto pues en peligro su vida — al concluirse que “con base en los elementos objetivos de juicio con los que se cuenta en este momento, se considera que las lesiones documentadas ameritan una incapacidad temporal de siete (7) días en total y que el evaluado evolucionó sin secuelas funcionales en relación con las mismas” —, sino porque el ofendido mismo indicó que para el momento de los hechos él se “estaba muriendo de goma”, que había tomado demasiado, que incluso había amanecido en la calle, por lo que si el sindicado hubiese querido acabar con su vida lo podría haber hecho, por tener ninguna posibilidad para defenderse. También aclaró que, en el último machetazo, él se cayó, dado que se resbaló, es decir que estaba indefenso y ahí fue donde indicó que no sabe por qué el sindicado dejó de tirarle machetazos, lo que refleja que a pesar de lo molesto que estaba el acusado, este le permitió levantarse e irse, por lo quedó descartado el animus necandi en el actuar del imputado. Esta afirmación también encuentra sustento en lo manifestado por el propio encausado, quien aunque aceptó lo sucedido, negó categóricamente que su intención fuese acabar con la vida de la víctima, sino proteger sus bienes, como lo expuso el tribunal de juicio al tomar en cuenta sus afirmaciones, como se refleja del siguiente segmento: “...agarro el machete que lo ando yo en el bosque como herramienta importante de trabajo y defensa. Es cierto que le dije que así era como quería agarrarlo, claro con las manitas en la masa, no quería matarlo, no le tiré a la cabeza; Solo le lancé esos tres machetazos, era solamente un castigo, no era para hacerlo picadillo.” Es por esto que, al no acreditarse la comisión de un delito de homicidio simple en estado de tentativa sino el de lesiones leves (dado que las afectaciones producto del actuar del acusado tan solo causaron lesiones incapacitantes por siete días), como bien lo apunta el tribunal de sentencia estos hechos se encuentran sobradamente prescritos, al tomar en consideración los ordinales 31 a 33 del Código Procesal Penal y 125 del Código Penal, norma que regula el tipo de lesiones leves, el cual es aplicable a este asunto, dado que el agraviado sufrió una incapacidad de 7 días para realizar sus labores habituales, ya que este dispone una sanción penal “de tres a un año de prisión a quien causare a otro un daño en el cuerpo o la salud, que determine incapacidad para su ocupaciones habituales por más de cinco días y hasta por un mes”. Así, para confirmar que efectivamente ha operado la prescripción, debe tomarse en cuenta que la fecha de comisión de los hechos data del 21 junio de 2020. Al ser calificados como un delito de lesiones leves y de acuerdo con la pena máxima que se podría llegar a imponer, el plazo máximo de prescripción es de tres años. Sin embargo, esta se interrumpe y se contabiliza el plazo reducido a la mitad, de conformidad con lo estipulado en el ordinal 33 del cuerpo legal citado, a partir del primer acto interruptor que, en este caso, fue la indagatoria realizada al acusado en fecha 03 de julio de 2020 (f. 79) y a partir de ahí debe contabilizarse un año y medio (18 meses), término que se cumplió el 03 de enero de 2022. Sin embargo, durante ese lapso no se dio ningún acto que interrumpiera o suspendiera la prescripción. De este modo, el siguiente acto interruptor fue el señalamiento a audiencia preliminar, el cual data del 25 de octubre de 2022 (f. 196), lo que implica que para ese momento ya había operado el plazo de la prescripción. Por consiguiente, no era posible dictar una sentencia condenatoria en contra del imputado [Nombre 001] por el delito de lesiones leves, por lo cual lleva razón el tribunal sentenciador al así establecerlo y por ende, pese a lo dicho en el acápite segundo, deben declararse sin lugar las pretensiones penales de las recurrentes. iv) Acerca de la acción civil interpuesta. De lo expuesto, se determina que en lo que respecta a las lesiones que sufrió el ofendido a manos del acusado y por las cuales se determinó una incapacidad temporal de 7 días para realizar sus labores habituales, no imperó mayor discusión, dado que incluso el propio encausado aceptó que se las propinó a la víctima a modo de “castigo”, debido a los múltiples robos que habían sido víctimas él y su familia. Sin embargo, a pesar de dicha acreditación, el tribunal de juicio, de manera errada, declaró sin lugar la acción civil resarcitoria indicando, de manera contradictoria, que no se determinó la existencia causal entre los hechos y el resultado, ”entre la acción del acusado y las lesiones del ofendido” y que se requiere “no solo que surja un injusto penal, sino además un resultado dañoso a un tercero, que el mismo sea imputable al sujeto y que exista una relación causal entre uno y otro” al tener dudas únicamente acerca de que la acción del imputado haya sido en legítima defensa y por considerar que las lesiones leves se encontraban prescritas. Sin embargo, de lo analizado líneas atrás, ha quedado descartada la legítima defensa y que se esté en presencia de un homicidio simple en estado de tentativa, por lo que el rechazo de la acción civil constituye un yerro, debido a que, aunque los hechos estén prescritos en materia penal, ello no obsta que se pueda acoger la misma, pues más bien la regla dispuesta en el artículo 40 del Código Procesal Penal establece que: “El Tribunal Penal deberá pronunciarse sobre el fondo de la acción civil resarcitoria válidamente ejercida, aún y cuando se haya dictado sentencia absolutoria o de sobreseimiento definitivo en la fase de juicio”. Valga apuntar que, aunque la acción penal prescribió, la civil no, pues esta se rige por el plazo decenal previsto en el artículo 868 del Código Civil y, en todo caso, ni en el debate, ni en el recurso de apelación ni con el emplazamiento a las partes, se alegó que la acción civil estuviese prescrita. De esta manera, en lo que respecta a la acción civil, al realizar una lectura integral de la sentencia recurrida, se desprende que el acusado actuando dolosamente, lesionó al ofendido en varias partes de su cuerpo (aspecto que no fue objetado por ninguna de las partes), por lo que según el dictamen médico legal resultó con una incapacidad de 7 días, lo que le permitió al afectado [Nombre 002] interponer una demanda indemnizatoria, representado por la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, en contra del imputado y demandado civil [Nombre 001], por las lesiones que este le ocasionó, lo que acredita la existencia de un nexo causal entre el actuar del imputado y estas consecuencias, que constituyen un daño indemnizable en los términos del artículo 1045 del Código Civil. Además, el señor [Nombre 002] como ofendido directo tenía derecho a plantear esta acción en contra de [Nombre 001], por el proceder delictivo de este último, amparado al artículo 41 de la Constitución Política y la norma civil antes citada, así como en las Reglas vigentes del Código Penal de 1941. La defensa, en sus alegatos conclusivos hizo referencia a que el imputado pudo haber actuado bajo la figura de la legítima defensa, lo cual ya fue descartado y al referirse a la acción civil (28:30), solo indicó que se rechazara esta sin realizar ningún tipo de objeción a los montos solicitados por la abogada de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima ni a algún aspecto concerniente a la acción civil resarcitoria. De ahí que, por economía procesal y en observancia del principio dispositivo propio de esta materia, esta Cámara, por mayoría (juezas Wittmann Stengel y Sancho González), de acuerdo con lo acreditado, estima que se debe acoger la acción civil resarcitoria interpuesta por la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. En razón de lo indicado, se declara con lugar la demanda civil y se condena al demandado civil [Nombre 001] al pago de los siguientes rubros: i) Por incapacidad temporal, la suma de SETENTA Y CUATRO MIL TRESCIENTOS CUARENTA COLONES EXACTOS (¢74.340.00), al resultar incapacitado para realizar sus labores habituales por siete días, de acuerdo al dictamen médico legal que fue aportado a los autos (mencionado en el acápite tercero). ii) Por daño moral, el monto de UN MILLÓN DE COLONES (¢1.000.000.00), dado que la víctima hizo referencia en el debate la afectación que le ha implicado en su diario vivir lo sucedido, debido que, a causa de las heridas que sufrió, sus hermanas y su mamá tuvieron que ayudarlo, dado que no podía valerse por sí mismo, que cuando fue agredido sintió ira porque no pudo defenderse y que incluso la mano le quedó sin fuerza para realizar cualquier tipo de trabajo, lo que le ha afectado para realizar sus labores habituales. iii) Por costas, de conformidad con el Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía N° 41457-JP, vigente desde el 1 de febrero de 2019, artículos 16 inciso a) y 42, se otorga el monto de DOSCIENTOS CATORCE MIL OCHOCIENTOS SESENTA Y OCHO COLONES (¢214.868.00). Esta suma es obtenida del monto otorgado por rubros indemnizatorios y en aplicación de la tarifa general fijada en el decreto citado. iv) Los anteriores rubros suman un total de UN MILLÓN DOSCIENTOS OCHENTA Y NUEVE MIL DOSCIENTOS OCHO COLONES (¢1.289.208), monto que deberá pagar el demandado civil en el plazo de quince días hábiles a partir de la firmeza de esta resolución depositando el monto correspondiente en la cuenta de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público, caso contrario, devengará los intereses de ley hasta su efectivo pago. Resulta importante adicionar que se establece por la condena solo los intereses que correrán a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia y no la indexación, dado que al declararse con lugar la acción civil se busca reparar el daño y no se sido acreditado por la parte interesada que exista una obligación dineraria ya definida o específica que deba ser traída a valor presente, es decir, no se está en presencia de una deuda desmejorada que ya fuera liquidada, por lo que no procede, en estos momentos, la condena simultánea por intereses y por indexación. Al respecto, esta Cámara, con una integración diferente, en su resolución número 294-2019, de fecha 5 de julio de 2019, de las 10:17 horas, amparada a jurisprudencia emitida por la Sala Primera, cuyo criterio se comparte, explicó lo siguiente: “IV. … Cabe agregar que, en todo caso, no podría acogerse la indexación cuando se dispone (aspecto sobre el cual se volverá líneas abajo, en el siguiente Considerando) el pago de intereses legales, que es lo que sucede en el presente asunto. Conviene, por efectos divulgativos y para mayor abundamiento, transcribir in extenso lo que ha resuelto recientemente la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia sobre el tema: "V.- De importancia para la resolución del reparo conviene realizar las siguientes precisiones respecto a la indexación e intereses. El dinero es una unidad de medida del valor económico de bienes y servicios. Constituye una unidad monetaria de pago y, en ese tanto, está sujeto a cambios generados por factores económicos, tales como la inflación o la devaluación. Así, por ejemplo, quien recibe un préstamo hoy para devolver el dinero dentro de dos años, recibió un monto que puede intercambiar por otros bienes y servicios a sus precios actuales. Si como consecuencia de la inflación, los precios subieron, significa que a los dos años el deudor entregaría el mismo número de unidades monetarias, pero con un valor económico inferior al prestado, porque la capacidad y poder de disposición con tal cantidad será menor al que tenía al momento de otorgarse el préstamo. La clásica teoría del nominalismo, en la cual “un colón equivale a un colón, un dólar es siempre igual a un dólar”, es decir, una unidad monetaria es siempre igual a sí misma, no genera equivalencia en las prestaciones afectas a los fenómenos económicos dichos. Con esa teoría las unidades monetarias se presumen legalmente estables, lo cual no es propio en época actual. Una deuda de hoy, no tendrá el mismo valor dentro de un tiempo, precisamente porque el dinero es dependiente de los cambios económicos del mercado. No se puede perder de vista que el pago nominal de una obligación no necesariamente toma en cuenta la depreciación monetaria, que se traduce, concretamente, en la pérdida de valor real de cambio o poder adquisitivo del dinero, como consecuencia del incremento de la inflación o del nivel general de precios. En esta tesitura, si no se reajusta el quantum de la obligación, el acreedor se expone a que se le pague una suma nominal que no corresponde al valor real de la obligación. Para dar solución a ese problema, en varios precedentes de esta Sala se ha sostenido que los intereses sirven para compensar el costo de oportunidad que tuvo que soportar quien no recibió el dinero debido durante el plazo del incumplimiento y, por su parte, la indexación funge como mecanismo para reajustar la pérdida del valor de la moneda por la inflación. Así, se ha dicho que ambos extremos no son excluyentes, pues la actualización de una suma de dinero no exceptúa el reconocimiento de los daños y perjuicios. Asimismo, se ha hecho la distinción entre interés legal y neto, para reconocer este último extremo en sumas que han sido indexadas. (Consúltense, entre otros, los votos No. 1315 de las 10 horas 56 minutos del 7 de diciembre de 2016, No. 835 de las 9 horas 25 minutos del 11 de agosto de 2016, No. 1282 de las 9 horas 5 minutos del 11 de octubre de 2012, No. 902 de las 9 horas 55 minutos del 31 de julio de 2012, No. 1384 de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 10 de noviembre de 2011, No. 1053 de las 13 horas 55 minutos del 8 de octubre de 2011, No. 557 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 6 de mayo de 2010 y No. 1053 de las 13 horas 55 minutos del 8 de octubre de 2009). Empero, luego de una profunda y concienzuda reflexión, se llega al convencimiento de que el pago de intereses (legales o convencionales) constituye una medida compensatoria e indexatoria a la vez, en tanto ajusta los desacoples en el valor del dinero por el paso del tiempo, así como las afectaciones por la indisponibilidad de aquél. El legislador reguló dos formas de calcular el interés a falta de convenio entre partes: El artículo 1163 del Código Civil para obligaciones civiles y el 497 del Código de Comercio para mercantiles. En el primero, el interés será igual al que pague el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por los certificados de depósito a seis meses plazo para la moneda de que se trate. En el segundo, se calculará con base en la tasa básica pasiva del Banco Central de Costa Rica para operaciones en moneda nacional y a la tasa prime rate para operaciones en dólares americanos. En ambos casos, el parámetro para su cálculo se rige por el rendimiento que facilitan las entidades financieras a sus ahorrantes. El objetivo de este tipo de tasas es contrarrestar los efectos de la inflación en el dinero ahorrado, de manera tal que la suma depositada se vea compensada y actualizada y, a su vez, le otorgue un rendimiento al ahorrante. En síntesis, se trata de una tasa compuesta: cubre indexación y utilidad a la vez. Igual suerte corren los convencionales, en el tanto la tasa pactada sea superior a los legales referidos. De esta forma, siempre que exista una obligación dineraria con pago de intereses no es posible indexar la suma, pues su pago conjunto implicaría solventar por partida doble la devaluación monetaria. En ese sentido, la tasa de interés, integrada por el costo del dinero y la inflación, se orienta a resarcirle al acreedor el daño, representado por la depreciación de la moneda (pérdida de su valor real), y el perjuicio, consistente en la ganancia dejada de percibir al no disponer lucrativamente del capital. Esta tesis ya había sido sostenida anteriormente por este Órgano Decisor (ver, entre otros, los fallos No. 313 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 17 de abril de 2002, así como el No. 49 de las 15 horas del 19 de mayo de 1995). En tales votos se indicó que “la mora en el pago de una obligación de esta naturaleza (refiriéndose a las obligaciones dinerarias) genera el reconocimiento a favor del acreedor de los intereses a título de fruto civil que deja de percibir ante la falta de disponibilidad del capital, es decir, la tasa de interés constituye un medio importante tendiente a procurar el menor daño posible en el patrimonio de quien se ha visto privado de lo que le pertenece, puesto que, uno de sus componentes básicos, aparte de la utilidad por el uso del capital, es la tasa de inflación […]”. Según lo anterior, la tasa de interés configura un mecanismo de corrección monetaria de la deuda, puesto que en su cálculo se halla inmerso el componente inflacionario. Con esto se compensa o indexa la pérdida provocada por la depreciación de la moneda. Con la entrada en vigencia del CPCA, por la disposición normativa inserta en el artículo 123, se estableció que cuando se condene al cumplimiento de una obligación dineraria, directamente o por equivalente, se deberá incluir pronunciamiento sobre la actualización de dicha suma, a fin de compensar la variación en el poder adquisitivo ocurrida durante el lapso que media entre la fecha de exigibilidad de la obligación y la de su extinción por pago efectivo. A efectos de actualizar el poder adquisitivo, el legislador fijó como parámetro para su cálculo el índice de precios al consumidor, emitido por el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos. Este indicador mide la variación de los precios de la canasta básica costarricense en un periodo de tiempo determinado; es decir, con este se cuantifica la inflación. El numeral 123 citado pretende compensar al acreedor de los impactos inflacionarios, razón por la cual impone al Juzgador pronunciamiento sobre la actualización de la suma concedida. Ahora bien, como se explicó supra, cuando una obligación dineraria trae consigo el pago de intereses, como regla se puede indicar que con tales se cubre esa actualización requerida, en tanto estos, al configurar el precio del dinero, devienen en la retribución o contraprestación de aquél, razón por la cual la tasa de interés (sea la fijada por las mismas partes o por la Ley) cubre ese componente inflacionario, además del costo de oportunidad e indisponibilidad del dinero. No obstante, tal regla admite excepciones, como cuando se presentan procesos o ciclos hiperinflacionarios, donde el interés legal o convencional no han podido prever ese inesperado proceso. Este no es el caso" Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, resolución 000378-F-S1-2018, de las 14:05 horas del 26 de abril de 2018.” De lo expuesto, deviene en que resulta improcedente acoger la indexación cuando se dispone el pago de intereses legales, como en este asunto (a partir de la firmeza de la sentencia), ya que dichos intereses, de alguna manera, permiten esa actualización requerida del valor del dinero y, además, en este asunto, no se está atacando algún problema de índole inflacionaria por el transcurso del tiempo. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la representante del Ministerio Público y se acoge parcialmente, el libelo impugnatorio interpuesto por la abogada de la Oficina Civil de la Víctima, en cuanto a los extremos civiles y se resuelve el asunto con base en la ley aplicable, condenándose al demandado civil a pagar al actor civil los montos antes especificados y, a partir de la firmeza del fallo, los intereses legales correspondientes hasta su efectivo pago. En lo no modificado por esta sede, la sentencia recurrida permanece incólume. Notifíquese.

V.- Voto parcialmente salvado del juez Fernández Mora: En este asunto, debo dejar plasmado mi disenso con la mayoría en cuanto a la decisión de declarar con lugar el recurso de apelación incoado por la representación de la Oficina de la Defensa Civil de la Víctima, pese a haberse determinado la prescripción de la acción penal, pues desde mi perspectiva, la acción civil también prescribió conjuntamente con la penal, tal como lo dispone la legislación vigente. El artículo 871 del Código Civil, señala que: "Las acciones civiles procedentes de delito o cuasidelito se prescriben junto con el delito o cuasidelito de que proceden". Por ello, al haber prescrito el delito, por decisión expresa del legislador, también prescribió el derecho a reclamar indemnización civil por parte del ofendido, por lo que no es posible interpretar que, en este caso, la prescripción de la acción civil corriera de forma independiente a la acción penal. Estimo que, como esta norma no se encuentra derogada y más bien encontrarse plenamente vigente, según lo he venido indicando de manera reiterada entre otros, en los votos de este despacho números 247-2023 de las 14:00 horas del 29 de junio de 2023, 254-2021 de las 14:02 horas del 29 de abril de 2021, 125-2021 de las 10:18 horas del 26 de febrero de 2021, 93-2021 de las 10:33 horas del 12 de febrero de 2021 y 540-2020 de las 10:46 horas del 11 de septiembre de 2020, dicha disposición debe aplicarse oficiosamente por ser de orden público, ya que regula la responsabilidad civil derivada de delito o cuasidelito, lo que la hace materia indisponible. De esta forma, al encontrarse prescrita la acción penal también debe estimarse que la acción civil derivada de dicha conducta delictiva también se encuentra prescrita, por lo que la absolutoria dictada en sentencia debe también confirmarse.

POR TANTO:

1.-Se admiten para su estudio de fondo los recursos de apelación de sentencia incoados por la fiscal Rebeca Moya Valverde, en su condición de representante del Ministerio Público y la abogada Marisel Arias Valverde de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima. 2.- Se declara sin lugar el libelo impugnatorio interpuesto por la representante del órgano fiscal. 3.- Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso de apelación interpuesto por la abogada del actor civil [Nombre 002] y en consecuencia se revoca la sentencia venida en alzada y se condena al demandado civil [Nombre 001] al pago de los siguientes rubros: i) Por incapacidad temporal, la suma de SETENTA Y CUATRO MIL TRESCIENTOS CUARENTA COLONES EXACTOS (¢74.340.00).). ii) Por daño moral, el monto de UN MILLÓN DE COLONES (¢1.000.000.00). iii) Por costas, de conformidad con el Arancel de honorarios por servicios profesionales de abogacía N° 41457-JP, vigente desde el 1 de febrero de 2019, el monto de DOSCIENTOS CATORCE MIL OCHOCIENTOS SESENTA Y OCHO COLONES (¢214.868.00). iv) Los anteriores rubros suman un total de UN MILLÓN DOSCIENTOS OCHENTA Y NUEVE MIL DOSCIENTOS OCHO COLONES (¢1.289.208), monto que deberá pagar el demandado civil en el plazo de quince días hábiles a partir de la firmeza de esta resolución depositando el monto correspondiente en la cuenta de la Oficina de Defensa Civil de la Víctima del Ministerio Público, caso contrario, devengará los intereses de ley hasta su efectivo pago. En cuanto a este extremo, el juez Fernández Mora salva su voto. Notifíquese. – ????????????????

SUSANA WITTMANN STENGEL - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ???????????????

CHRISTIAN FERNANDEZ MORA - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A ????????????????

MAUREEN REBECA SANCHO GONZALEZ - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A Circuito Judicial de Cartago Teléfonos: 2551-2713 ó 2553-0340. Fax: 2551-2355. Correo electrónico: [email protected]