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Res. 06355-2024 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I · 23/09/2024
OutcomeResultado
The Court ordered the Municipality of Puntarenas to pay the property’s current value up to CRC 14,300,000, accept transfer of its title, and pay CRC 5,000,000 for emotional harm plus costs, while denying loss-of-opportunity damages, interest, and inflation adjustment.El Tribunal condenó a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas a pagar el valor actual del inmueble, hasta ₡14.300.000, recibir su traspaso y pagar ₡5.000.000 por daño moral y ambas costas, pero rechazó la pérdida del chance, los intereses y la indexación.
SummaryResumen
The Court partially granted the claim against the Municipality of Puntarenas because it initially issued a municipal siting approval for a residence and automotive repair shop, inducing the claimant to purchase the property, but denied the same use after the purchase because 72% of the parcel lay within the Laguna Bonilla palustrine wetland. Although the land was outside the formally delimited boundaries of a protected wildlife area, its inclusion in the wetland prevented the intended development. The Court awarded property damages equal to the parcel’s current value, capped at CRC 14,300,000, subject to transferring title to the Municipality. It also awarded CRC 5,000,000 for subjective emotional harm, based on the frustration, sadness, and anger reasonably caused by the municipality’s contradictory decisions. The Court rejected the claimed loss of opportunity to open the repair shop, as well as interest and inflation adjustment, treating them as lost profits unavailable under Article 194 of the General Public Administration Law. The Municipality was also ordered to pay both categories of litigation costs.El Tribunal declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda contra la Municipalidad de Puntarenas por haber otorgado inicialmente una resolución municipal de ubicación para vivienda y taller automotriz que indujo al actor a comprar un inmueble y, después de la adquisición, denegar el mismo uso porque el 72 % de la propiedad se encontraba dentro del humedal palustrino Laguna Bonilla. Aunque el terreno estaba fuera de los límites de un área silvestre protegida formalmente delimitada, su afectación por el humedal impedía el aprovechamiento proyectado. El Tribunal reconoció un daño patrimonial equivalente al valor actual del inmueble, con un máximo de ₡14.300.000, condicionado al traspaso registral de la propiedad a la Municipalidad. También concedió ₡5.000.000 por daño moral subjetivo, dadas la frustración, tristeza y enojo razonablemente ocasionados. Rechazó la pérdida de oportunidad de abrir el taller, los intereses y la indexación por considerarlos lucro cesante no indemnizable bajo el artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y condenó al municipio al pago de ambas costas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
This Court finds that, wholly independently of whether the claimant demonstrated what activity he performs or for whom, or whether he purchased the property in question by investing savings accumulated over a long period—matters for which, in any event, he offered no evidence—application of the rules of human experience makes it clear to this Court that, as would be expected of any person based on the facts deemed proven, because the claimant purchased the property on the understanding that he could use it to build a residence and/or an automotive repair shop, and because that activity was first authorized but then denied by the defendant Municipality after he acquired title to the property, he suffered subjective emotional harm consisting essentially of frustration arising from the plan for which he purchased the property, as well as at least anger and sadness. The claim brought by Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz against the Municipality of Puntarenas is partially granted. The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the current value of the property he presently owns, registered in the National Registry, Real Property Section, under real-property folio No. 25466-000. That value shall be determined during the judgment-enforcement phase, but the amount paid may not exceed fourteen million three hundred thousand colones. The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the exact sum of five million colones as compensation for subjective emotional harm.Estima este Tribunal, que con absoluta independencia de si quien demanda demostró en qué actividad trabaja y/o para quién, así como y si, la adquisición del inmueble en cuestión la realizó invirtiendo ahorros que acumuló por un largo período de tiempo -aspectos respecto de los que, en todo caso no ofreció prueba alguna- recurriendo a las reglas de la experiencia humana, resulta claro para esta Cámara que en efecto, al menos debió como es esperable en cualquier persona sobre la base de los hechos tenidos por demostrados, que con causa en que el aquí actor compró el inmueble de interés, sobre la base de que podría hacer uso del mismo para construir una casa de habitación y/o, un taller mecánico, al serle primero autorizada dicha actividad y luego de adquirido el dominio sobre el bien inmueble de interés, denegada la misma por la Municipalidad aquí accionada, sufrió un daño de corte moral subjetivo constituido por sentimientos, en lo medular, de frustración como derivación del plan que se planteó para adquirir el inmueble, y al menos, enojo y tristeza. Se declara con lugar parcial la demanda incoada por el señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz en contra de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz del valor actual del inmueble que hoy es de su titularidad en dominio identificado con el inscrito en el Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, con la Matrícula de folio Real N° 25466-000, mismo que habrá de ser determinado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, sin que, la suma a pagar pueda exceder el importe de catorce millones trescientos mil colones. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz de la suma de cinco millones de colones exactos a título de daño moral subjetivo.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión."
"The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and normal operations when they cause special harm to an individual's rights because of the small proportion of persons affected or the exceptional severity of the injury."
Considerando VI, cita del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública
"La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión."
Considerando VI, cita del artículo 194 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública
"El lucro cesante comprende este extremo por lo que por improcedente, se rechaza."
"Lost profits encompass this claim; therefore, it is denied as legally unavailable."
Considerando VI.3
"El lucro cesante comprende este extremo por lo que por improcedente, se rechaza."
Considerando VI.3
"El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad."
"The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall be time-barred after four years, counted from the event giving rise to liability."
Considerando VII
"El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad."
Considerando VII
"La parte vencida en la presente causa lo ha sido la Municipalidad de Puntarenas, sin que en criterio de este Tribunal haya mediado circunstancia o presupuesto alguno que justifique exonerarle de dicha condenatoria."
"The losing party in this case was the Municipality of Puntarenas, and in this Court's view no circumstance or condition exists that would justify exempting it from the award of costs."
Considerando VIII
"La parte vencida en la presente causa lo ha sido la Municipalidad de Puntarenas, sin que en criterio de este Tribunal haya mediado circunstancia o presupuesto alguno que justifique exonerarle de dicha condenatoria."
Considerando VIII
Full documentDocumento completo
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CASE FILE:
PROCEEDING:
ORDINARY PROCEEDING PLAINTIFF:
LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ DEFENDANT:
MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS N° 2024006355 ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL COURT OF THE TREASURY, FIRST SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at ventidos horas con cinco minutos del ventitres de Setiembre del dos mil venticuatro.- Ordinary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) brought by Mr. LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ, identity card N° 6-0412-0553, against the MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS, represented by its Mayor, Ms. Noelia Solórzano Cedeño, identity card N° 1-0859-0547. Appearing as special counsel for judicial proceedings (apoderados especiales judiciales) are Ms. Adriana Alfaro Rojas, identity card N° 2-0647-0898, for the plaintiff; and Ms. Yorleny Villagas Ovares, identity card N° 6-0275-0254, for the defendant Municipality.- BACKGROUND:
Judge Felipe Córdoba Ramírez authors the opinion, and the decision is unanimous.-
CONSIDERING
I.Regarding the evidence offered for the Court’s better determination (prueba para mejor resolver) during the preliminary hearing. According to the text of the minutes prepared at the time, during the preliminary hearing the defendant Municipality’s representative requested the admission, as evidence for the Court’s better determination, of testimony from the person identified as Mr. Mauricio Gutiérrez Villafuerte, a municipal official and engineer by profession, so that he could address the reports issued by “MINAET.” The plaintiff, in turn, requested testimony concerning all the facts from the persons identified as Ms. María Lorena Muñoz Gómez, Ms. Cindy Moreno Umaña, and Mr. Carlos Rodrigo Badilla Muñoz. In this regard, it bears recalling that, as concerns evidence for the Court’s better determination, although it is correct that the currently effective text of the Code of Civil Procedure omitted regulation of this mechanism, Article 41.3 provides for the admissibility of evidence on the Court’s own motion (prueba de oficio), which, of course, could lead to the admission of this type of evidence at a party’s request.
In any event, we consider that it must be noted that, in either case, evidence for the Court’s better determination, like evidence ordered on the Court’s own motion, is evidence belonging to the Judge rather than the parties, even if they offer it; likewise, its rejection would not, through any rational automatism, cause denial of the right of defense (indefensión) and, consequently, a material defect arising from such denial. (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N° 547-F-2002 de las 16:00 hrs. del 12 de julio de 2002; N° 29-1995 de las 15:30 hrs. del 22 de febrero de 1995; N° 290-F-S1-2009 de las 10:30 hrs. del 20 de marzo de 2009). Furthermore, whether or not to order evidence of this kind entails a limitation upon the Judge, in the sense that this mechanism must not be used to fulfill the procedural duty that rests solely upon a plaintiff or defendant to offer evidence supporting that party’s position at the appropriate procedural stage.
(Sentencia de la Sala Primera N° 001439-F-S1-2014 de las 09:25 horas del 07 de noviembre de 2014). Accordingly, in seeking the substantive truth (verdad real), the Judge may not order evidence for the Court’s better determination when doing so would inevitably replace the ordinary defense mechanisms available to those bound by the legal-procedural relationship and required to prove their claims by virtue of their position within that procedural relationship, lest the Judge violate other procedural principles of equal rank or hierarchy that must remain in balance. Except in exceedingly rare and exceptional circumstances that must be duly substantiated and reasoned, as well as supported by overriding interests—particularly in matters involving qualified public interests or public interests accorded heightened protection because of their importance—the contrary approach could readily lead to questions about whether the Judge’s conduct complies with the duty to remain objective and impartial while maintaining procedural balance between the parties.
It would also constitute impermissible assistance to a party that, through negligence, carelessness, or an intent to obtain an improper procedural advantage by abusing and/or making antisocial use of its right, failed properly and/or timely to exercise its right and duty to present evidence and then seeks through that mechanism to cure a procedural omission that it alone was responsible for preventing when it should have done so. (See Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code and the ruling of the First Chamber in judgment N° 794-2006 de las 03:35 hrs. del 20 de octubre de 2006, which states, insofar as relevant: “... Furthermore, it must be noted that it is inappropriate to attempt to reopen the debate by offering evidence that should have been submitted and presented at the corresponding procedural stage. Granting this request would allow the parties to cure their omissions concerning evidence that they could have offered at the proper time but did not.
Nor is it possible to permit expansion of the testimony of two witnesses, because that would likewise remedy their lack of diligence.”). In light of all the foregoing, because this Court considers the evidence unnecessary for deciding the merits of this matter on the terms stated below, the evidence requested by both parties is denied in its entirety.-
To that end, the principal objective established was ‘to strengthen the conservation and sustainable use of genetic, natural, and cultural heritage through land-use and marine planning based on coordinated participation that ensures respect for, exercise of, and enjoyment of human rights.’ Along these lines, and specifically in the field of wetland protection and conservation, all assessments point to a series of challenges requiring environmental policies to be coordinated anew in order to guarantee the wetlands’ ecological structure and functioning while responsibly enhancing the benefits derived from their sustainable use.” (Emphasis not in the original.) Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the Ministry of Environment and Energy is the governing authority for environmental matters and has jurisdiction to delimit wetland protection zones (zonas de protección) for the purpose of preventing their pollution and ensuring their preservation.
In this regard, Article 42 of the Organic Law on the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) provides: “ARTICLE 42.- Delimitation of protected zones: The Ministry of Environment and Energy, in coordination with the competent institutions, may delimit protection zones for certain marine and coastal areas and wetlands, which shall be subject to planning and management plans in order to prevent and combat the pollution or degradation of these ecosystems.” Along these lines, the Ministry of Environment and Energy also has jurisdiction, through environmental impact studies (estudios de impacto ambiental), to determine the feasibility of carrying out construction in areas near wetlands, as established in Articles 42 and 44 of this same Law. Nevertheless, in this particular case, on 13 de junio 2019, SINAC certified through official letter SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-CERT-042-2019 that my property lies outside the boundaries of any Protected Wildlife Area (Área de Silvestre Protegida), but not outside those of a wetland, because, according to official letter SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-VC-060-2019 of 5 de junio 2019, 72% of the property lies within the boundaries of the Humedal Palustrino Laguna Bonilla, which is a conservation area; therefore, no type of construction may be undertaken without directly affecting the wetland.
In addition, Article 45 of this body of law establishes a legal prohibition against carrying out works intended to alter or degrade the wetland. It provides in this regard: “ARTICLE 45.- Prohibition: Activities intended to interrupt the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems are prohibited, including the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or inland waters, drainage, drying, filling, or any other alteration that causes the degradation and elimination of such ecosystems. Regarding the wetland protection regime (régimen de protección), the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled in decisions 16938-11 and 14288-09. 2- Regarding the liability of the Administration for lawful and unlawful conduct: The Public Administration is liable for all damages and losses caused in connection with the administrative acts (actos administrativos) it issues, except when any of the grounds exempting it from administrative liability, established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), applies, namely: force majeure, fault of the injured party, and the act of a third party.
Regarding unlawful conduct, Articles 191 and 192 of the same body of law provide: “Article 191.- The Administration shall compensate for any damage caused to the individual rights (derechos subjetivos) of others by misconduct committed by its officials while performing their official duties or in connection therewith, using the opportunities or means afforded by those duties, even when such misconduct is committed for purposes, activities, or acts unrelated to that mission.” “Article 192.- The Administration shall also be liable under the foregoing conditions when it extinguishes or limits individual rights by unlawfully exercising its powers for that purpose.” This means that any administrative act issued contrary to the legal system and served upon the governed person (administrado), thereby causing injury to that person’s personal and property interests, must be duly remedied by the Administration.
To identify the existence of administrative liability for unlawful conduct, liability must be analyzed in each specific case. In the present case, the unlawful conduct was embodied in the issuance of administrative decision MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 by the Municipality’s Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control, approving a land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) for a period of one year to construct a house and an automotive repair shop within the conservation area known as LAGUNA BONILLA sector 2, without taking into account that, since 2013, the Municipality had been informed by SINAC, through official letter SINAC ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, received on 9 de mayo del 2013 by the Directorate of Urban Development and Control of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, of the boundaries that must be protected in this area, which stated as follows: “Regarding the existence of a protection zone in the wetland, I hereby inform you that, according to certification SINAC-GASP-394-10, which is attached, the Humedal Laguna Bonilla is currently classified as a palustrine wetland (humedal Palustrino) affected by anthropogenic activities.
Therefore, pursuant to Article 33, subsection c, Ley Forestal 7575 of 5 de febrero del 96 and opinion C-110-2004 of the Procuraduría General de la República concerning the applicability of protection areas (áreas de protección) to wetland ecosystems of the type known as a lagoon, the 50-meter protection area for natural lakes and reservoirs applies only to lacustrine wetlands (humedales lacustrinos) and not to palustrine wetlands, as in this case. For that reason, and in accordance with said certification, it is recommended that a 10- to 15-meter protection zone be maintained around this wetland.” This caused me to make the mistake of purchasing land unsuitable for construction because it lies within the boundaries of this lagoon. In this regard, it must be recalled that three legal requirements must be met for the Administration to incur liability: an administrative act or conduct generated by the Public Administration, in this case the Municipalidad de Puntarenas—that is, decision MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, granting me the use permit in the following terms: “For the reasons set forth above, this Department hereby informs you that the Municipal Location Approval for Construction of a Residence and Automotive Repair Shop is granted.
This document shall remain valid for one year.” (Emphasis not in the original.) The second legal requirement derives from identifying the affected parties, meaning that it must be possible to identify the person or persons directly harmed. In my case, the harm arose because I purchased land on which I wished to construct a house and an automotive repair shop. Before purchasing the land for my intended purpose, however, I investigated and learned that a previous person interested in purchasing the property had applied for land-use authorization (uso de suelo), which was approved, as may be verified in official letter PUC-RES-429-08-2015 issued in 2015 by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas. This prompted me to purchase the land because, in theory, there was no impediment to construction. The harm was compounded when, before becoming the owner, I initiated municipal proceedings to apply for land-use authorization, which was granted to me in official letter MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 2016.
I subsequently acquired the land but, due to various circumstances, was unable to build that same year. In 2017, I applied again for land-use authorization, but on that occasion my application was denied in official letter RES-820-10-2017 of 2017, by which time I was the registered owner. In this regard, pursuant to Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, the harm must be actual, quantifiable, and attributable to an identifiable person in order for the governed person to be entitled to bring a claim. In this specific case, as stated above, the harm arises from the financial investment I made to purchase this land without knowing that it lay within the protected boundaries of the Humedal Laguna Bonilla. According to the deed of sale (escritura de compraventa), the land cost ?7.500.000,00 colones, in addition to the fact that I am unable to construct my house and automotive repair shop as originally requested from the Municipality.
This plainly demonstrates serious harm because I own land that I cannot use: according to certification SINAC-ACOPACOSREO- CERT-042-2019, issued by the Regional Director of SINAC, 72% (182 m2) of all the land I purchased must be protected because it lies within the protected boundaries, meaning that only 28% of the land remains buildable, which makes it impossible for me to construct my house and automotive repair shop in that space.
The third legal requirement is the causal nexus (nexo causal), that is, the relationship existing among the administrative conduct, the person or group of persons affected, and the severity of the damage caused. For all legal purposes, a causal nexus is established in this case, since it was on the basis of the land-use authorization (habilitación de uso de suelo) granted by the Municipality that I purchased this property to build my house and an automotive repair shop where I could work as a mechanic, which is what I studied; and to date I cannot carry out any of my projects, nor can I conduct any activity on that property because it is a conservation area, gravely affecting my life plans and my assets, since if the Municipality had denied me the permit from the outset, I would have purchased another property where construction was possible. WITH REGARD TO LAWFUL CONDUCT, there is also an applicable administrative liability regime (régimen de responsabilidad administrativa), established in Article 194 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), whenever such acts cause serious harm to the governed party (administrado).
In this regard, this article provides: “Article 194: 1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and normal operation when they cause special harm to the rights of the governed party, due to the small proportion of persons affected or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In such case, compensation shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits (lucro cesante). 3. The State shall be liable for damages directly caused by a Law that are special in accordance with this article.” Specifically, the harm caused by lawful conduct occurred when, in the year 2017, I again submitted an application for a land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) to the Municipalidad de Puntarenas to cover (sic) the property, and the same Engineering Unit that had approved the permit the previous year denied it on this occasion, informing me that this area is a wetland (humedal) area and cannot be built upon.
In this regard, Resolution MP-PUCRES- 820-10-2017 of the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department stated as follows: “ZONING: According to the Cadastral Plan, this property is located in District 1 PUNTARENAS, which does not have the Regulatory Plan for the City of Puntarenas (Zoning Regulations and Map), duly approved by the Municipalidad de Puntarenas; however, there is an impediment to authorizing the requested use or activity, which is DENIED because it is located within La Laguna Bonilla sector 2. (…) SPECIAL ZONES: At the site selected for this activity, there are no reserves of any kind, airports, or significant historical sites. Approval of this activity is subject to compliance with the applicable regulations in effect when this certificate is issued and to any possible nuisance being completely confined within the property. For the foregoing reasons, this department informs you that the Municipal Siting Resolution for the Construction of a Dwelling and Automotive Repair Shop is DENIED.
This document shall remain valid for one year.” (Underlining does not appear in the original). (Evidence number 3). Although this resolution is consistent with Costa Rica’s regulatory framework for wetland protection, the fact remains that this denial by the Administration also causes me serious, direct harm to my property right because, although I have property registered in my name, I cannot use it because most of it lies within the protected boundary, as stated by SINAC. As is evident, the harm caused here is entirely legitimate and does not affect public order, morality, or good customs; therefore, it likewise cannot fall within the grounds for exclusion set forth in Article 195 of the General Law of Public Administration. Similarly, an analysis of liability shows that all three requirements necessary to establish administrative liability on the part of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, arising from Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 of the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department, are met, as follows: 1.
Identification of the person being harmed: In this case, I am the only person affected by this wetland-protection measure, since my property directly adjoins it and the protection zone covers 72% of the entire property; accordingly, the impact is not on the public at large but on me personally, causing me extremely serious harm by preventing me from building my home and the automotive repair shop in which to practice my profession as a mechanic. 2. Administrative Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 of the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, which denies the land-use permit that would allow me to build my house and the automotive repair shop in which to practice my profession. 3. The causal nexus between the Municipality’s administrative resolution and the legal impossibility of carrying out construction work on the property I acquired, having mistakenly believed that it was a suitable place for construction based on what the Municipalidad de Puntarenas informed me at the time.
Although the administrative act (acto administrativo) is lawful, the fact remains that it nevertheless causes me serious harm, for which compensation is sought without this entailing harm to the environment or the wetland. Regarding the inapplicability of the exclusions from administrative liability (excluyentes de responsabilidad administrativa) established in Article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be stated that they do not apply, based on the following analysis: 1. Force Majeure (Fuerza Mayor): Force majeure is defined by legal scholarship as a foreseeable but unavoidable natural event. It is an occurrence outside the sphere of action of the obligated public entity that is unforeseeable or, if foreseeable, unavoidable. In the present case, it is important to define the concept of a palustrine wetland (humedal palustrino), understood as an “ecosystem that contains water almost permanently, such as marshes, swamps, and bogs,” and which, according to SINAC, requires observance of a setback (límite de retiro) constituting a protective buffer of 10 to 15 meters.
In the present case, although the Humedal Laguna Bonilla is not located within the property I acquired, the setback must be observed because it is an environmentally vulnerable protected area. This clarification is important because the fact that the property cannot be used for construction cannot be characterized as a natural event, since the wetland’s protective boundaries are established by human beings. Accordingly, this exemption from liability (eximente de responsabilidad) is not established. 2. Fault of the Victim (Culpa de la Víctima): Fault of the victim is a form of self-liability (autorresponsabilidad), by reason of which the respective Public Administration is exempt from liability, since the governed party exclusively caused the unlawful injury (lesión antijurídica) within that party’s pecuniary or non-pecuniary sphere by committing a subjective fault consisting of intent or negligence, in the forms of carelessness, recklessness, or lack of skill.
This ground for exemption from liability is likewise not established because I purchased the property only after obtaining authorization for the land-use permit approved by the Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Moreover, SINAC had defined the wetland boundaries since the year 2013 and had duly communicated them to the Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Therefore, if the Municipality had known of the protective boundaries for the preceding three years, it should have denied the land-use permit on that basis so that I would have been informed and could have considered whether I would still purchase the property under those circumstances, although logically I would not have purchased it because I could not build there. 3. Act of a Third Party (Hecho de un Tercero): An act of a third party is established when the unlawful injury is attributable to another legal person other than a public entity, such as another private party (natural or legal person).
For this purpose, a third party is understood as any person other than the parties to the proceeding or the liability relationship. That person’s act causing the damage, when foreseeable and unavoidable, is an occurrence extraneous to the enterprise’s organization that serves to exempt it from liability on the same grounds as ordinary force majeure. In this case, the exemption based on an act of a third party likewise cannot be asserted, because the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC) defined the protective boundaries of the Humedal Laguna Bonilla in the year 2013 and formally notified the Municipality of those restrictions; therefore, the Municipality cannot claim that it was unaware of those boundaries. 3- Regarding objective and subjective emotional distress damages (daño moral objetivo y subjetivo) and loss of opportunity (pérdida del chance): In Judgment 112, at fourteen hours and fifteen minutes on fifteen July nineteen ninety-two, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice set forth the requirements for establishing damage and the corresponding compensation, stating that: “VI.
Not every form of damage gives rise to an obligation to compensate. For that purpose, the following characteristics must essentially be present for it to constitute ‘compensable damage’ (daño resarcible): A) It must be certain, real, and actual, rather than merely contingent or hypothetical; it cannot be founded on presumed or conjectural events. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with present occurrence, since compensation is admissible for certain but future damage. Similarly, future damage should not be confused with lost profits or consequential loss, since the former refers to damage arising as a necessary consequence of the event causing or generating the damage; that is, its repercussions have not materialized when the proceeding is initiated. With regard to the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this is a matter solely within the subjective purview of the injured party; however, the law cannot entertain claims based on insignificant harm arising from excessive sensitivity.
I purchased this property with my savings and with the hope of building an automotive repair shop, because I studied mechanics and would like to pursue it as my occupation; however, because it is impossible to build on that property, my dream has been frustrated.
I currently work as a Security Officer, since I must do this work until my situation is resolved, because it is not merely a matter of repairing cars; I must build a place that meets the necessary requirements to perform the work efficiently. Logically, this situation affects my emotional well-being, since I have spent several years trying to find a solution with the Municipalidad and have been unable to get them to listen to me. I understand that the Municipalidad must comply with the legal standard regarding the protection buffer (margen de protección) of the protected-area boundaries (límites de protección), because this is an environmental matter, but it is also unfair for me to bear responsibility for the purchase of the land when the Municipalidad had known since 2013 that it was required to safeguard these boundaries when granting the permit and, despite this, issued an administrative act (acto administrativo) contrary to the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico), which led me into error by granting me a land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) when this was not legally possible.
In view of the foregoing, I request that the Court grant me the possibility of having the Municipalidad de Puntarenas compensate me for this emotional harm (daño emocional), which I estimate at ?10.000.000,00 (ten million colones). Furthermore, with respect to pecuniary damage (daño patrimonial), this arose from the purchase of land that, according to the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, was suitable for construction at that time, but which, only one year later, the Municipalidad de Puntarenas deemed unsuitable for construction because it was located within the protection buffers of Laguna Bonilla. Logically, if, when arranging to purchase the land, I had known of that legal restriction, I would never have purchased land in that location, because now it is as though I did not own it: I cannot build my house, I cannot build my auto repair shop, and, in general terms, I can engage in practically no activity there, since, as SETENA certified in 2019, the wetland protection area (área de protección del humedal) covers 72% of the entire lot I purchased.
In other words, it is practically impossible to use it, and this restriction—which the Municipalidad had known about since 2013—clearly causes me extremely serious harm that must be compensated by the Municipalidad de Puntarenas. This compensation is based on the deed of sale (escritura de compraventa) for the sum of ?7.500.00,00 colones, which was the land’s original cost. Nevertheless, the Court is also asked to consider the fact that the Municipalidad assessed the property’s value in 2018 at ?14.300.000,00 colones. Loss of Chance or Opportunity to Build a Home and My Auto Repair Shop: In Costa Rica, Article 41 of our Constitution states that “(…) everyone shall obtain redress for injuries or damage suffered to their person, property, or moral interests (…)”. It is clear that the rule at the pinnacle of our legal system attaches decisive importance to the right to redress or compensation in our country.
Loss of chance (pérdida del chance) is a concept that has been developing in contentious-administrative law (materia de Contencioso Admirativo) in recent years in Costa Rica. Regarding its meaning, legal scholar Marcelo Lopez Meza defines it as follows: “It encompasses all cases in which the affected person could have obtained an advantage, realized a gain or benefit, or avoided a loss, but those results were prevented by the unlawful act (hecho antijurídico) of a third party, thereby creating uncertainty as to whether the beneficial result would have occurred and giving rise to an expectation or probability of a pecuniary advantage.” (López Mesa, Marcelo. (2008). “Medical Civil Liability and Loss of a Chance of Recovery.” In Journal of the Law of Damages. Publisher, Rubinzal-Culzoni. Buenos Aires: Argentina. p.8.) In this regard, Juan Manuel Prévot and Rubén Alberto Chaia also define it as follows: “Loss of a chance may be defined as the credible opportunity to obtain an advantage or prevent a loss, or as the possibility of a probable future benefit forming part of the affected person’s capacity to act and in whose favor that hope exists.” (Juan Manuel Prévot, and Rubén Alberto Chaia, (2007).
Loss of a Chance of Recovery. 1st ed. Buenos Aires: Argentina, Editorial Astrea. p.45.) This doctrine has the following characteristics: certain damage (daño cierto), personal damage (daño personal), continuing damage (daño subsistente), and a causal relationship (relación de causalidad) between the harmful conduct and the damage. Doctor Roberto Garita Navarro, in his essay The Frustrated Chance in Recent Precedents of the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction: Commentary on Judgment 66-2013-VI of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, states the following: “Recognition that a frustrated chance may be compensable under administrative liability (responsabilidad administrativa) initially encounters the barrier posed by the view that mere expectations are not compensable because they do not constitute actual damage. This position stems from the traditional tendency to maintain that administrative liability arises only when a person’s subjective right (derecho subjetivo) has been harmed.” In addition, Article 191 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública provides: “The Administration shall redress all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by the wrongful acts (faltas) of its public servants committed during the performance of their official duties or in connection therewith, using the opportunities or means afforded by those duties, even when such conduct is undertaken for purposes, activities, or acts unrelated to that mission.” In this specific case, the loss of chance consists of my frustration at being unable to complete the project to build a house and an auto repair shop, which was the primary reason for purchasing the land, and this has caused me serious harm, since I have had to set aside my personal and professional aspirations because the land-use permit was denied.
I understand that my land is located in a protected area (zona de protección) known as Laguna Bonilla and that the Municipalidad acted willfully by approving my land-use permit in 2016 and subsequently denying it in 2017, even though the wetland’s protected-area boundaries remained the same from one year to the next, since, in 2013, through official letter SINAC ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación informed the Municipalidad of the boundaries and distances it was required to safeguard for the wetland’s protection. Recently, in 2019, through a certification that I requested from SINAC pursuant to official letter SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-CERT-042-2019, I learned that 72% of my property lies within the boundaries of Humedal Paulastrino Laguna Bonilla, a fact that, as stated above, the Municipalidad had already known since 2013. The compensation requested herein is not an unfounded request, since I undertook proceedings before various institutional units to obtain the corresponding permits that would guarantee the construction of the home and auto repair shop.
In this regard, I identify the following official letters and documents: MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, MP-PUCRES-820-10-2017, DVOP-DI-DV-PV-2017-5521, the sale agreement (contrato de compraventa), and my academic credentials in mechanics. In view of these considerations, I request that I be awarded compensation in the amount of 10.000.000 colones (ten million colones). LAW. I base these proceedings on Articles 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 197 et seq. of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; Article 2, subsection b), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo; and Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente."-
III.Proven facts (hechos probados). The following are relevant to the resolution of this matter:
IV.Unproven facts (hechos no probados): The following is deemed an unproven fact relevant to the resolution of this proceeding and as an accurate reflection of the evidence in the record after its evaluation: SOLE FACT: The value of the real property acquired by the plaintiff herein. (The absence of supporting evidence (elementos de convicción) in that regard).-
V.On the non-contractual civil liability regime of the Public Administration. Whenever the parties to litigation are faced with determining the potential patrimonial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) of the Public Administration, if the legal relationship (relación jurídica) linking the administered party (administrado) to the respondent Administration does not arise from the existence of a contractual instrument, the dispute concerns what is known as non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual). Accordingly, as an introduction for the purposes of this instrument, it is necessary to refer to the elements that, under legal doctrine and case law, make a finding of liability such as that sought herein legally viable. Within the regime known as non-contractual civil liability, two types are distinguished: subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva), established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, and strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), governed by Article 9 of the Political Constitution, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, and Article 190 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration.
As regards the subjective liability regime, Article 199 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes the liability of public servants (servidores públicos) toward third parties in proven cases of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of their duties or in connection with their fulfillment. As such, subjective liability is based exclusively on an examination of the agent’s state of mind concerning the existence of at least “negligence” (culpa), if not willful misconduct, unlike the strict liability regime, under which liability is determined irrespective of the existence of such subjective elements. Under subjective liability, a person is liable because that person is at fault, either because the person sought or intended to cause the harm, or because the person acted recklessly or negligently. Consistent with the foregoing, a public servant’s liability toward third parties falls within the subjective liability regime; consequently, determining liability will in all cases require establishing negligence or willful misconduct in the state of mind of the Administration’s public servant or agent, without prejudice to the remaining elements that must also be present—namely, the existence of harm and a causal nexus (nexo causal) between that harm and the conduct undertaken—for liability to be imputed.
By contrast, unlike subjective liability, the Public Administration’s strict liability arises without any need to prove willful misconduct or negligence by the agent who caused the harm; it is sufficient, however, to establish the existence of “risk” (riesgo) for such liability to arise. The concepts of unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) and culpability (culpabilidad) therefore do not apply, and the principle of reversal of the burden of proof (inversión de la carga de la prueba) applies for the injured party’s benefit. For these purposes, the Public Administration alleged to have caused the claimed loss and damage must compensate for them if its conduct actually and effectively caused them, unless it proves an exonerating ground (causal exonerativa). Thus, four elements must be present, namely: a) An injury (lesión), consisting of unlawful patrimonial losses that the person suffering them has no duty to bear; b) Administrative conduct (conducta administrativa) connected with the occurrence of the alleged harm; b) A causal nexus, consisting of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the alleged act (administrative conduct) and the harm caused; and c) The absence of the grounds of justification (causas de justificación) referred to above, since their existence may legally sever the connection between the loss caused and the Public Administration’s conduct, such that the harmful effect cannot be imputed to it, thereby breaking the causal nexus upon the occurrence of an exonerating circumstance such as force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim (culpa de la víctima), or the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero).
The patrimonial liability regime of the State and its institutions provided for in Articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution and Article 190 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration is therefore essentially strict in nature; for it to arise, it is sufficient that there be compensable harm (daño indemnizable), administrative conduct, and a causal nexus between them. It must be understood that liability may be attributed to the Public Administration under this type of strict criterion, unlike the situation of its public servants, for whom a subjective criterion of attribution must additionally be applied. Furthermore, having identified the criteria under which the liability of the Public Administration and/or its agents or public servants may properly be determined, it is important to note that there is also a distinction between the imputation criteria (criterios de imputación) applicable to establishing or determining such liability depending on whether the Administration’s activity is lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal.
Quoting Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo from his work Tratado de Derecho Administrativo II, Responsabilidad Administrativa, p. 39: “Under the no-fault liability or special-sacrifice system, liability for lawful conduct or normal operation, the decisive criterion for the existence of liability on the part of public administrations is a breach of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens and the resulting special harm (a small proportion of affected persons) and abnormal harm (the exceptionally severe nature of the injury), or the theory of risk in cases of accidental harm caused by a public administration in performing the function assigned to it by the legal system. In the system of liability for service failure—unlawful conduct or abnormal operation—the criterion of imputation is precisely that indeterminate legal concept (concepto jurídico indeterminado) of ‘service failure’ (falta de servicio) and the unnamed or atypical constitutional right of administered parties to receive efficient and effective public services.” In liability for unlawful or abnormal conduct, understood as conduct that opposes, infringes, or violates the legal system considered as a whole, including written and unwritten rules, the victim bears the burden of proof and has the duty to demonstrate, through the methods and evidentiary means permitted by the legal system, the service failure, its abnormal operation, or the unlawfulness of the administrative action.
With respect to liability for lawful conduct, it has been established that even conduct undertaken in compliance with the legal system may give rise to liability on the part of the Administration under criteria such as those discussed above. In cases of strict liability, the Administration’s defense would consist of proving the occurrence of one of the grounds that break the causal nexus specified in Article 190, paragraph 1, of the General Law of Public Administration, namely, as stated above, force majeure, the act of a third party, or the act of the victim. In decision Nº 000584-F-2005, issued at 10:40 hrs. on August 11, 2005, the First Chamber of our Supreme Court of Justice stated the following, also regarding strict liability: “...the Administration shall be liable whenever its normal or abnormal operation causes harm that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or non-patrimonial, irrespective of the victim’s subjective legal position and the entitlement or status of authority held, provided, of course, that the indispensable requirement of a causal nexus is satisfied.
(...) Both the essential prerequisites and the burden of proof acquire, for example, a new dimension that frees the affected party not only from substantive constraints but also from procedural ones and places the Administration under the obligation to rebut the allegations and facts attributed to it. In any event, the strict nature of the Administration’s non-contractual civil liability was clearly defined in judgment N° 132 of this Chamber, issued at 15:00 hrs. on August 14, 1991, concerning an event occurring after the General Law of Public Administration entered into force, in which it stated: ‘VI. Our General Law of Public Administration Nº 6227 (...), as noted in judgment Nº 81 of this Chamber from 1984 when resolving the controversy regarding its entry into force, incorporated in Title Seven of Book One the most modern principles founded on the most authoritative legal doctrine and case law concerning the Administration’s non-contractual liability, thereby establishing the State’s direct liability without any need to prove beforehand that the harm resulted from the fault of the public official or the Administration, and requiring, for compensation to be appropriate, that the harm suffered be actual, assessable, and individualizable with respect to a person or group—Article 196—.
(...) It also exhaustively establishes force majeure, fault of the victim, and the act of a third party as grounds exempting the Administration from that liability, with the Administration bearing the burden of proving their existence, (...)’” (Emphasis not in the original). Specifically, concerning the potential liability of an entity such as the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social in connection with the provision of the health services under its responsibility, the First Chamber of the Court also stated as follows in its Voto Nº 7, issued at 14:20 hrs. on January 13, 1995: “(...) It is this theory of strict liability that requires the risk created to cause compensable harm to the administered party, (...). V)- To establish the liability of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the causal nexus between the harm caused to the plaintiff and the actions of that entity—that is, between the challenged act and the harmful event—must be recognized.
(...) The causal relationship between the event (the activity consisting of providing medical services to him) and the effect (...) is clear, unavoidable, and strictly attributable to the respondent institution. There is no need to consider whether or not the patient was hypersensitive to the prescribed medication, but only—as the expert stated (...)—that a risk was created which, as an exception to the ordinary resistance of organisms, caused harm to the patient, and the patient has no reason to bear it without—at least—being compensated for it. In summary, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, through its hospitals, created the risk, causing harm to the patient who is now the plaintiff, and consequently, on the basis of the aforementioned theory of risk, it must be held liable for its actions.” (Emphasis not in the original). Consequently, and consistently with all the foregoing, from a procedural standpoint the claimant must first prove that harm or loss occurred and then that it is connected by a causal nexus to administrative conduct, whereas the respondent Administration—only if the judicial action brought against it succeeds in establishing the foregoing—must prove that, despite all this, some form of exemption from liability (eximente de responsabilidad) arose that supports a finding that the causal nexus was “broken,” severing the connection between that administrative conduct and the occurrence of the harmful effect claimed in each case, thereby eliminating the basis for imputing the alleged patrimonial liability and rendering the claim inadmissible.-
VI.Regarding the subject matter of the proceeding (objeto del proceso), in conjunction with the theory of the case (teoría del caso) presented by the plaintiff. To make the following discussion as clear and orderly as possible, this Court considers it important to refer to the subject matter of the proceeding, understood as the relief sought in the judgment. In this regard, we must indicate that this proceeding is equivalent to what legal doctrine recognizes as a civil proceeding against the Public Treasury (civil de hacienda), insofar as the plaintiff’s representative seeks to have the defendant Municipality ordered to pay damages and/or losses on the basis of conduct characterized as either unlawful or, as applicable, lawful. Regarding this issue—namely, the basis for attributing the liability being claimed—we must make several preliminary clarifications. In summary, the plaintiff seeks an award in the judgment of exclusively compensatory monetary relief, alleging that, before acquiring ownership of a property, its decision was influenced by the fact that the defendant Municipality provided it with information concerning the property at issue which, it assumed, would allow it to carry out there the activity it intended to pursue following the acquisition, namely, its use as a residence and/or mechanical workshop.
Furthermore, as a basis for the relief sought, although at one level of its argument the plaintiff also attributes such liability to the defendant Municipality’s engagement in unlawful conduct, that conduct was identified by the plaintiff’s own representative—as this Judicial Authority understands it—as consisting of those acts whereby, after the plaintiff was informed that a particular use of the real property it intended to acquire was consistent with its desired use, it was informed otherwise after acquiring ownership of the property. Accordingly, a claim for annulment (pretensión de corte anulatorio)—necessarily preceded by a declaration that the challenged action was adopted in violation of the legal system—does not form part of the subject matter of this proceeding. Therefore, this Court shall issue no ruling concerning this issue, namely, the unlawfulness of any administrative conduct serving as the basis for attributing the administrative financial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial administrativa) being claimed.
In this respect, the parties may consult the settled case law issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, including, solely by way of example, its Voto N° 002333-F-S1-2020, issued at 11:12 hrs. on 17 de setiembre de 2020, in relation to N° 000301-F-2007 of 11:15 hrs. on 26 de abril del 2007. Under those decisions, the relief sought in a judicial proceeding constitutes the limit on the matters regarding which the Judicial Authority may or may not rule in its judgment. With that preliminary clarification, we shall issue no ruling concerning the alleged unlawfulness serving as the basis for attributing the claimed financial liability of the Public Administration (responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública), understood as whether or not the Municipal entity’s actions in the particular case were inconsistent with the legal system—again, we emphasize—simply because no claim for annulment forms part of the subject matter of this case.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s representative argued and petitioned on the basis of attributing financial liability to the Public Administration arising from lawful conduct, which, as we shall see below, is warranted only on the terms to be stated.-
VII.Regarding the partial merits of the complaint (procedencia parcial de la demanda). As a result of a comprehensive analysis and assessment of the evidence in the record deemed relevant and material, this Court finds that, in this particular case, the complaint must be declared partially meritorious, based entirely on the following considerations.-
Finally, challenging this last decision, the plaintiff herein filed the ordinary motions for reconsideration (revocatoria) and, in the alternative, appeal (apelación en subsidio). The motion for reconsideration was denied, essentially on the following grounds: “This motion for reconsideration is denied because, although the municipal location approvals for the specified proposed works were granted by official letters N° PUC-RES-429-08-2015 dated 17/08/2015, issued to Nancy Melissa Blanco Rojas, and N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 dated 11/10/2016, issued to Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, for the property recorded under cadastral plan (Plano catastrado) N° P-253316-1992 and registered under real-property folio (Folio Real) N° 25466-000, the latter two official letters—N° MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dated 31/10/2017, issued to Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, and official letter N° MP-DPUC-RES-094-02-2018 dated 05/02/2018, also issued to that same person, concerning the same property and location cited above—were denied because the Real Property Valuation and Cadastre Department (Departamento de Valoración Catastro-Bienes inmuebles) confirmed that this property lies within the Laguna Bonilla polygon; that is, it lies within Laguna Bonilla, Sector N° 2.
This is based on the technical study prepared by SINAC-MINAE pursuant to official letter ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, as well as other subsequent decisions issued by SINAC concerning the site known as Laguna Bonilla.” The appeal, meanwhile, has not been decided as of this date. (The emphasis and underlining do not appear in the original. Undisputed fact, considered together with images 40 through 45 of the court case file (expediente judicial) and the document identified as official letter N° MP-DPUC-OF-017-02-2018 dated 21 de febrero del 2018, by which the aforementioned motion for reconsideration was denied by the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, appearing at folios 81 and 82 of the administrative record (expediente administrativo), in a total of 2 folios). This Court confirms, reinforces, and reiterates that, before purchasing the property, the plaintiff herein was told that it could be used as a residence and mechanical workshop, but was later told that it could not, based on information concerning the property that had been available to the authority—and that it had been legally obligated to consider—since much earlier, namely, since 2013.
In conclusion, this panel of judges finds it absolutely clear and proven as a fact that the plaintiff herein purchased the property at issue on the understanding that he could use it to build a residence and/or a mechanical workshop, because that activity was first authorized and then, after he acquired title to the property at issue, denied by the respondent Municipalidad; and that he consequently sustained subjective non-pecuniary harm (daño moral subjetivo), consisting essentially of feelings of frustration stemming from the plan he had made in purchasing the property and, at a minimum, anger and sadness. (The rules of human experience (reglas de la experiencia humana)).—
As a corollary to the foregoing, in observance of the provisions of Article 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), which reads as follows: “The case law and precedents of the constitutional jurisdiction (jurisdicción constitucional) are binding erga omnes, except upon itself,” regardless of whether the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) is declaratory in nature, it must be understood as an act creating vested rights (acto generador de derechos subjetivos). If the Administration considers that, when issued, it was substantially inconsistent with the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico), and it granted vested rights to the regulated party (administrado), it may be reversed by the Public Administration only through the legal mechanisms established in the legal system, whether pursuant to Article 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) and/or, we would add, through judicial proceedings for annulment of a favorable administrative act (proceso jurisdiccional de lesividad).
It must further be noted that making the effectiveness of this type of act subject to a specified term is prohibited by the legal system, including constitutional law, based on the scope of the principle of non-retroactivity (principio de irretroactividad), which encompasses the possible disregard of the principle of the inviolability of an administration’s own acts that create vested rights (principio de intangibilidad de actos propios generadores de derechos subjetivos), as defined by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia).-
3.1. On the financial liability of the Public Administration arising from the adoption of lawful conduct. For these purposes, we consider it relevant to cite the following portion of the Constitutional Chamber’s decision in Voto N° 2009-013606, issued at 14:57 hrs. on 26 de agoto del 2009: “IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. (...). The principle of administrative liability (responsabilidad administrativa) of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas) (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents the imposition upon governed persons (administrados) of a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they have no duty to bear, and by the principle of social solidarity (solidaridad social) (Article 74), according to which, if the administrative function is exercised and carried out for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more governed persons and unjustly borne by them.
(…) V.- ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY IN THE SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC STATE GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF LAW. The liability of public administrations for the exercise of the administrative function forms part, as we found in the preceding whereas clause (considerando), of their constitutional conception. It is a key and essential component of the social and democratic state governed by the rule of law, given the purposes served by a system of administrative liability. In general, the basic function of administrative liability is to remedy or compensate for unlawful injuries caused to a governed person (victim or injured party), in that person’s financial or non-financial sphere, by a public entity in the exercise of the administrative function. One of its classic and traditional purposes is to serve as a safeguard or guarantee for the substantive legal interests of governed persons that are harmed by a public entity in the exercise of its powers or in the provision of public services expressly assigned by the Constitution or by law.
Administrative liability, together with the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa) (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), are key components of a Constitutional State for the defense of governed persons against the formal and substantive prerogatives and privileges that the Constitution itself grants public entities so that they may fulfill their mandates. This purpose requires the constitutional principle of administrative liability to be strengthened and emphasized through an expansive rather than restrictive interpretation; likewise, when developing administrative liability systems, the legislature must conform to the constitutional standard of strict and direct administrative liability and is prohibited from establishing administrative conduct that is exempt or immune from such liability or from impairing the fundamental rights to compensation and to the proper functioning of public services held by all governed persons.” The enactment of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) remedied the legal void that had prevented claims seeking to hold the State liable from being brought before the courts.
Article 1° of that Law provides that the Administration (understood broadly as the State and other public entities) shall be liable for all damage caused by its lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal operation, except in cases of force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. The provision introduces the concept of strict liability of the State (responsabilidad objetiva del Estado), that is, liability that does not examine an official’s conduct with respect to culpability, but instead bases liability solely on a finding that damage occurred and that it was caused by the Administration’s activity. This is the approach followed by Article 190 of the Law of Public Administration (Ley de la Administración Pública). Strict liability therefore arises without any need to prove intent or fault on the part of the person who caused the damage; the existence of risk is sufficient to give rise to it. Consequently, three essential requirements must be met:
Hence, hypothetical gains, lost profits (lucro cesante), and subjective elements that could affect the valuation of the restricted right are not compensable. Article 195 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) clearly provides that “… Neither the State nor the Administration shall be liable, even if they cause special damage under the foregoing terms, when the injured interest is not legitimate or is contrary to public order (orden público), morality, or good customs, even if that interest was not expressly prohibited before or at the time of the harmful event…”. Thus, public order constitutes a ground exempting the Administration from liability. In judgment 3173-93, this Court sought to define the limits of that inherently indeterminate concept and stated: “II.- The fundamental rights (derechos fundamentales) of each person must coexist with each and every fundamental right of others; therefore, for the sake of coexistence, it is often necessary to restrict the exercise of those rights and freedoms, although only to the precise extent necessary for other persons to enjoy them under equal conditions.
However, the principle of the coexistence of public freedoms (libertades públicas)—the rights of third parties—is not the only legitimate basis for imposing limitations upon them; the concepts of ‘morality,’ understood as the body of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, the violation of which gravely offends its members generally, and ‘public order’ also operate as factors justifying limitations on fundamental rights.” (The underlining and result are not in the original). That said, the General Administration Law provides, insofar as relevant, as follows: “Article 190.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for all damage caused by its lawful or unlawful, normal or abnormal operation, except in cases of force majeure (fuerza mayor), fault of the victim (culpa de la víctima), or an act of a third party (hecho de un tercero). / 2. The Administration shall be liable pursuant to this article even when it cannot be held liable under the following sections of this Chapter; however, liability for a lawful act (acto lícito) or normal operation (funcionamiento normal) shall arise only under the terms of the following Third Section.” (The emphasis is not in the original).
The third section referred to in the article transcribed above provides as follows: “Article 194.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and normal operation when they cause special damage to the rights of the governed person (administrado), due to the small proportion of persons affected or the exceptional severity of the injury. 2. In such cases, compensation (indemnización) shall cover the value of the damage at the time of payment, but not lost profits. 3. The State shall be liable for damage directly caused by a law when such damage is special within the meaning of this article.” “Article 195.- Neither the State nor the Administration shall be liable, even if they cause special damage under the foregoing terms, when the injured interest is not legitimate or is contrary to public order, morality, or good customs, even if that interest was not expressly prohibited before or at the time of the harmful event.” Accordingly: The legal system (ordenamiento jurídico) permits compensation to be obtained even on the basis—which, as will be seen, is the situation in the present case—that the administrative conduct (conducta administrativa) constituting the cause or proximate cause of the damage or harmful effect is lawful, that is, adopted in accordance with the legal system, provided that certain conditions are met, namely, that the governed person is affected in a special manner, that is, in a qualified or heightened manner because that person forms part of a “small proportion of persons affected” and/or that, as applicable, the “severity” of that impact may be classified as exceptional in degree—which we understand to refer to the severity with which the injury to the legal interest (bien jurídico) concerned is suffered; provided, however, that lost profits are not covered, because this is compensation solely for the sacrifice imposed under these circumstances in the interest of the public good or common welfare, meaning that compensation in such cases is not full compensation.- 3.2.- On liability for lawful conduct (responsabilidad por conducta lícita) arising from the administrative acts (actos administrativos) adopted by the defendant Municipality.
We must return to the facts deemed proven (hechos que se han tenido como probados) in these proceedings to state that, at a first level of analysis, under the terms of official letter N° ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013 dated 30 de abril del 2013 from the Oficina Sub Regional Esparza, Orotina, of the Área de Conservación Pacífico Central of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, addressed to the Dirección de Desarrollo y Control Urbano of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas and received by it that same year, that Municipality was informed through said office, insofar as relevant, of the details of the boundaries and of any protection zone (zona de protección) in the area of the wetland (humedal) known as “Laguna Bonilla,” after a technical and scientific team composed of personnel from OSREO, ACOPAC, and Comisión Nacional de Humedales made the corresponding determination and prepared a polygon identifying the wetland in question (which was provided to the defendant Municipality herein “in hard copy and digital form”), with the warning that, pursuant to Article 33(c) of Ley Forestal 7575 of 5 de febrero del 96 and the applicability of Protection Areas (Áreas de Protección) to lagoon-type wetland ecosystems, it was recommended that a protection zone of 10 to 15 meters be observed around this wetland.
(Undisputed fact, in conjunction with the documentary evidence (prueba documental) appearing in images 22 through 25 of the court record (expediente judicial)). The plaintiff herein, being interested in acquiring title (dominio) to real property located within the territory in which the defendant Municipality exercises its authority as a Local Government, before deciding to “purchase it,” asked the defendant Municipality to specify the permitted use (uso permitido) of the property to be acquired, specifically whether it could be used as a dwelling and for the operation of an automotive repair shop. In response, under the terms of resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016, said municipal entity informed the plaintiff herein as follows, insofar as relevant: “... For the reasons set forth above, this department informs you that the Municipal Siting Resolution (Resolución Municipal de Ubicación) for the Construction of a Dwelling and Automotive Repair Shop is hereby granted.
This document shall remain valid for one year.” (Undisputed fact, in conjunction with images 28 and 29 of the court record, and folios 07 and 08, 56 and 57, all from the administrative record (expediente administrativo)). Two points must be made based on the foregoing. First, through this administrative act—which, as defined by the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, has the legal nature of an act creating subjective rights (acto generador de derechos subjetivos)—if it were subsequently determined that it had been issued contrary to the legal system (ordenamiento jurídico), the Municipal Administration was required to observe the principle that it may not revoke its own acts of this kind (principio de inderogabilidad de actos propios de la especie), without prejudice to the administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) or judicial avenue (vía jurisdiccional) prescribed for its legal annulment (supresión jurídica).
Second, the Municipality unlawfully subjected the validity of that act to a time limit, in flagrant disregard of the case law (jurisprudencia) of the aforementioned Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, regardless of whether there had been any change in the applicable land-use regulations (regulación urbanística vigente) or any natural event altering the conditions of the property, all in accordance with the regulation of the municipal zoning (zonificación municipal) applicable to the matter. Regarding this latter aspect, this Court must clarify that, although the analysis to be undertaken will proceed from the applicability of the financial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) of the defendant Public Administration on the basis of attributing to it the adoption of lawful conduct, resorting to principles of justice and equity, as well as to Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code, the former of which reads: “Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith”; and the latter of which states: “The law does not protect the abuse of rights or their antisocial exercise.
Any act or omission under a contract that, because of its author’s intent, its purpose, or the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits on the exercise of a right, causing harm to a third party or to the other contracting party, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures preventing the continuation of the abuse”; this judicial Authority will give no effect to the administrative act at issue insofar as it subjected its effects to a period of validity. In this regard, it is sufficient to state that the manner in which the defendant Municipality acted conflicted with and directly disregarded Article 13 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, based on the Judgment (Voto) issued by the Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia identified as N° 4336 at 14:24 hrs. on 04 de junio de 1999, which we cited earlier in this judgment and in which the high Court of constitutional review stated, insofar as relevant: “A land-use certificate (certificado de uso del suelo) that has been validly issued is not subject to a validity period unless and until the Master Plan (Plan Director) is amended.” (Underlining and emphasis not in the original).
Consequently, regardless of whether the validity and/or nullity of that act is at issue in this litigation, solely in this respect the provision establishing its period of validity will not be applied by this Court, lest doing so protect an abuse or antisocial exercise of a right, if the Municipal Administration considered it proper to limit the temporal effects of its action in the manner that it did—with or without legal grounds—because, assuming that the Public Administration holds rights or, as applicable, sovereign powers (potestades de imperio), permitting this would at least clearly constitute an abuse of rights. We therefore reiterate that we find no inconsistency in the reasoning applied by this Panel of Judges. Another consequence of the foregoing is that any argument advanced by the municipal representative in these proceedings based on the assertion that the validity of this administrative act was set at one year, within which, according to that representative, the plaintiff should have applied for a building permit (licencia de construcción), is unavailing and futile.
Continuing, it must also be stated that the issuance of this administrative act creating subjective rights (according to the opinion of the Sala Constitucional) undoubtedly created in the applicant a legitimate expectation (real expectativa) that the property whose use had been the subject of the inquiry could subsequently be used as a dwelling and/or an automotive repair shop. It was within this factual context that these proceedings established that, before the plaintiff herein decided to purchase the property in question, it was on the basis of the content and scope of the defendant Municipality’s determination in resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 that he decided to complete its purchase, in view of his intended use of it as a dwelling and automotive repair shop. Thus, he subsequently purchased the property, as it was also established that, following the issuance of the administrative act in question and under the terms of public deed (escritura pública) N° 126, executed before the Notarial Office of the person identified in the corresponding certified copy as Notary Public Pablo Fernando Ramos Vargas, on 09 de noviembre del 2016 the plaintiff herein purchased for ¢7.500.000,°° (seven million five hundred thousand colones exactly) from the company known as Inversiones Jojo Sociedad Anónima, whose representative stated that the amount had been received in full satisfaction, the property described as follows: “property registered in ownership, Puntarenas Registry District, real-property folio registration number twenty-five thousand four hundred sixty-six, zero zero zero, consisting of pastureland, located in District one Puntarenas, Canton one, Puntarenas, Province of Puntarenas.
Boundaries: to the north, Carretera Alberto Echandía (sic), with the Ferrocarril al Pacífico in between, with frontage of eleven meters; to the south and east, José Ángel Retana fallas; to the west, Estate of [Nombre 001]. Measuring two hundred seventy-four square meters and ninety-eight square decimeters. Cadastral plan (plano catastrado) number P-zero zero two five three one six - one thousand nine hundred ninety-two,” free of encumbrances and annotations. (Images 54 through 56 of the court record). The corresponding certified copy of the deed referred to in the preceding proven fact was registered with the Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, on 21 de noviembre del 2016, and from that time onward the plaintiff herein became the registered titleholder (titular registral) of the property. (Image 56 of the court record, in relation to folio 78 of the administrative record, as well as folios 85 and 86 of the administrative record).
Regarding the incidents of ownership (atributos del dominio), it is sufficient to state, insofar as relevant, that Article 264 of the Civil Code provides: “Title or absolute ownership over a thing encompasses the following rights: 1º.- Possession; 2º.- Usufruct; 3º.- Transformation and transfer; 4º.- Defense and exclusion; and 5º.- Restitution and compensation.” (Emphasis not in the original). Now, wholly irrespective of whether it occurred within one year after the defendant Municipality issued resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016, through which the plaintiff herein was informed that the property in question could indeed be used as a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop, after purchasing it he again submitted a request to the defendant Municipality to the same effect—that is, asking whether the property in question could be used as a dwelling and automotive repair shop.
This time, however, that request received an entirely contrary response through Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017, issued by the Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo on 31 de octubre del 2017, which denied the request on the ground that, based on information the Municipality had possessed since 2013, the property is located within “Laguna Bonilla, sector 2.” (Undisputed fact, in relation to images 30 and 31 of the court record and folios 65 and 66 of the administrative record).
The plaintiff herein acquired by purchase the immovable property at issue, insofar as relevant, on the basis of information provided to him directly by the defendant Municipality through resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016, and the expectation arising therefrom gave the plaintiff herein certainty or, at least, legal certainty that he could subsequently build a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop at the site in question. Once again, in response to a request he submitted to the defendant Municipality, this time through official communication N° MP-DPUC-094-02-2018 of 05 de febrero del 2018, issued by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the defendant Municipality, he was informed as follows: “With regard to your request for a Municipal Site-Approval Resolution for the construction of a dwelling and automotive repair shop on the property to be identified, I hereby advise you of the conditions affecting the site selected for this activity with respect to: Zoning: According to the cadastral survey plan (plano catastrado), the parcel is located in District 1° Puntarenas, which has no Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) for the city of Puntarenas; however, there is an impediment to authorizing the proposed use or activity, which is DENIED because it is within Laguna Bonilla, Sector 2, according to the review conducted by the Cadastral Department.” (Emphasis not in the original.
See images 36 and 37 of the judicial case file, in relation to pages 05 and 06 of the administrative record). The defendant Municipality thus took the plaintiff herein by surprise: before he purchased the property at issue, it had formally informed him that its use as a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop was permitted, but after he had purchased it, it informed him that such use was not permitted on that property. Moreover, under the case law issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, already analyzed above, the legal prerequisite for issuing official communication N° MP-DPUC-094-02-2018 of 05 de febrero del 2018—which disregarded or tacitly revoked the earlier official communication N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016, on the basis of which the plaintiff herein purchased the property at issue—was an administrative proceeding (procedimiento administrativo) or judicial action seeking a declaration of nullity of an administrative act (acto administrativo) that had created an individual right (derecho subjetivo); no such proceeding or action occurred.
Notwithstanding all of this, what is clear, given that both acts—and particularly the act identified as N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016—remain valid and, consequently, effective, is that the latter act deprived of substance the intent expressed by the plaintiff herein, in the exercise of the principle of freedom of contract (autonomía de la voluntad), to purchase the property in question. He was therefore clearly induced into error, as will be explained below. Continuing with the facts deemed proven in this case, the plaintiff herein filed the ordinary remedies of reconsideration (revocatoria) and, in the alternative, appeal (apelación en subsidio) against the latter resolution. The motion for reconsideration was denied, essentially on the following grounds: “This motion for reconsideration is denied because, although municipal site-approval resolutions were granted for the proposed works by official communications N° PUC-RES-429-08-2015 dated 17/08/2015, issued in the name of Nancy Melissa Blanco Rojas, and N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 dated 11/10/2016, issued in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, concerning the property recorded under cadastral survey plan N° P-253316-1992 and registered under Real Property Folio (Folio Real) N° 25466-000, the two subsequent official communications—N° MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dated 31/10/2017, issued in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, and N° MP-DPUC-RES-094-02-2018 dated 05/02/2018, also issued in the name of that same person and concerning the same property and location cited above—were denied because the Real Property Valuation and Cadastral Department confirmed that this property is located within the Laguna Bonilla polygon; that is, it is within Laguna Bonilla, Sector N° 2.
This is based on the technical study prepared by SINAC-MINAE pursuant to official communication ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, as well as other subsequent resolutions issued by SINAC concerning the site known as Laguna Bonilla.” The appeal, meanwhile, has not been decided as of this date. (Undisputed fact, considered together with images 40 through 45 of the judicial case file and the document identified as official communication N° MP-DPUC-OF-017-02-2018 of 21 de febrero del 2018, by which the aforementioned motion for reconsideration was denied by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, appearing at pages 81 and 82 of the administrative record in a two-page copy). The defendant Public Administration’s admission is thereby confirmed, or reinforced, insofar as it first informed the plaintiff herein that use of the property as a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop was permitted, but later ruled on the same request in the opposite manner on the basis of information it had possessed since 2013—that is, information known to it before the plaintiff herein submitted his first request in this regard and on the basis of which he proceeded to purchase the property in question.
The harm caused to the plaintiff herein is readily apparent; suffice it to say that the defendant Municipality induced him into both an error of fact (error de hecho) regarding the property he purchased and an error of law (error de derecho), by informing him that a particular use of the property was permitted and later ruling otherwise. Although the seller of the property has not participated in this case, it is nevertheless worth recalling, merely as additional support, that Article 1015 of the Civil Code provides: “A contract in which consent is given under error is voidable: 1º.- When the error concerns the type of act or contract being entered into. 2º.- When the error concerns the identity of the specific thing at issue, or its substance or essential quality.” (Emphasis not in the original). Applying a rational logical process based on hypothetical elimination, the following question must therefore be answered: if, in resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of 11 de octubre del 2016, the defendant Municipality had informed the plaintiff herein that the use of the immovable property in question could not be authorized for a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop, would the plaintiff nevertheless have purchased it?
The logical and necessary answer is no, because he personally and directly inquired, before purchasing it, whether those activities were permitted at the site. This has led this Court to determine that, regardless of whether the plaintiff was in a position to build within the surface area at issue in order to conduct those activities, what matters is that he decided, in the exercise of his freedom of contract, to purchase the property for that purpose after the Municipal Authority had assured him at the time that those activities could indeed be conducted. His decision rested on a factual and legal basis that ultimately proved false when the Municipality, relying on information it had already known since 2013, informed him that such use was not permitted at that specific location because of its legal status as a wetland (humedal). This Court finds it clear that, as a consequence of the defendant municipal corporation’s actions, the intent of the plaintiff herein was vitiated (vicio en la voluntad) by errors of fact and law concerning the identity and legal nature of the property he purchased, and that, had the defendant properly informed him of those matters when it should have done so, he would not have decided to purchase it.
Finally, all the requirements for partially granting the claim asserted herein for monetary compensation (pretensión de corte indemnizatoria patrimonial) are present in this case. First, there is harm consisting of the payment of money to purchase immovable property after the plaintiff herein had been assured, as a matter of legal certainty, that he could use it as a dwelling and/or automotive repair shop; after he acquired ownership of the property, he was informed otherwise, thereby frustrating the purpose of a purchase made in reliance on the legal certainty originally provided by the Municipality to the plaintiff herein. Had he known this information when he originally requested it, he would not have made the purchase. All of the foregoing occurred through the issuance of administrative acts that were undoubtedly the cause of the harmful effect, which consisted of the sum of money paid to the seller to acquire the immovable property whose use the Municipality had assured the plaintiff herein he could lawfully make, when that information was false.
The existence of harm and its causal connection (nexo causal) to formal administrative conduct attributable to the defendant Municipality are thus established. Finally, with respect to the defendant Municipality’s financial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial) in this specific case arising from lawful formal administrative conduct, the following requirements under Article 194 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública are also satisfied, insofar as the contents of the administrative acts analyzed influenced the plaintiff herein in the exercise of his freedom of contract, inducing him into errors of fact and law concerning the property he purchased. His investment constitutes compensable harm (daño indemnizable) caused by lawful conduct on the part of the defendant Municipality because the harm impaired his right to choose whether to purchase: a) in a special manner, given the exceptional nature of the harm, which in this case was caused—solely for purposes of this analysis—by the investment made to acquire ownership of property that he could not use for the purpose motivating its acquisition, based on the information provided by the defendant Municipality itself; and b) to a small number of affected persons, because the acts producing the harmful effect were directed solely at his sphere of individual rights.
Accordingly, the Municipalidad de Puntarenas is ordered to pay for the harm caused to the plaintiff herein that bears a causal connection to the administrative acts analyzed herein, solely on the terms set forth below.-
VIII.Regarding the claims for damages. The claimant seeks the following relief in the judgment: 2. Order the Municipalidad de Puntarenas to pay ¢10.000.000,°° colones for subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo). 3. Order the Municipalidad de Puntarenas to pay 14.000.000,00 colones for pecuniary damage (daño patrimonial), equivalent to the value of the land acquired. 4. Order the Municipalidad de Puntarenas to pay ¢10.000.000,°° colones for loss of opportunity (pérdida del chance), arising from the inability to open the automobile repair shop. 5. Grant indexation (indexación) of the amounts awarded, as well as interest accrued until actual payment. 6. Order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings."
VII.On the defenses (excepciones). The representative of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas raised, in defense of that entity, the defenses of lack of legal entitlement (falta de derecho), limitation (prescripción), and expiration (caducidad), and also requested that the complaint be dismissed in all respects and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both categories of costs (ambas costas). The defense of expiration is denied. It is sufficient to inform the municipal representative that, pursuant to article 39.1.a of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, this defense applies to judicial actions brought in this jurisdiction seeking annulment of formal conduct adopted by the defendant Public Administration, which is unrelated to the subject matter of these proceedings. Regarding the defense of limitation, article 41, read in conjunction with article 198 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, provides: “The right to claim compensation from the Administration shall become time-barred after four years, calculated from the event giving rise to liability.” In the present case, the event giving rise to the liability claimed was identified as the issuance of N° Resolución MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 by the Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo on 31 de octubre del 2017.
Because these judicial proceedings commenced in 2019 and the order admitting the action was served on the defendant Municipality on 15 de octubre del 2019, as shown by the corresponding certificate of service, a period exceeding the aforementioned four years has not elapsed; the defense must therefore be denied. (Image 60, in relation to image 67, both from the judicial case file (expediente judicial)). Finally, with respect to the defense of lack of legal entitlement, the parties being bound by this Court’s analysis of the merits of the present case, it was determined that the plaintiff is entitled to part of the relief requested. The defense is therefore partially sustained and must be understood as denied with respect to everything expressly awarded.-
VIII.On costs (costas). Pursuant to numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural costs and attorneys’ fees (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of having lost. The losing party in the present case is the Municipalidad de Puntarenas, and, in this Court’s judgment, no circumstance or basis exists that would justify exempting it from that award under subsections a) and b) of the referenced article or under article 194 of the same legal code. Accordingly, the Municipality is ordered to pay both categories of costs in favor of the plaintiff herein. The amount of the costs shall be determined by the competent Judge during the judgment-enforcement phase (fase de ejecución de sentencia), upon application by the prevailing party.-
POR TANTO
The evidence offered by both parties for the Court’s further consideration (prueba para mejor resolver) is rejected. The defenses of limitation and expiration are denied. The defense of lack of legal entitlement is partially sustained and must be understood as denied with respect to everything expressly awarded. The complaint filed by Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz against the Municipalidad de Puntarenas is partially granted. The Municipalidad de Puntarenas is ordered to pay Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the current value of the real property that he presently owns, recorded in the Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, under real-property folio registration (Matrícula de folio Real) N° 25466-000, which value shall be determined during the judgment-enforcement phase, provided that the amount payable may not exceed fourteen million three hundred thousand colones. As a necessary logical consequence of the foregoing, the Registro Nacional is ordered to register the transfer of title (traspaso del dominio) to the real property described below in the name of the Municipalidad de Puntarenas: real property in the Puntarenas registration district, located in Provincia: Puntarenas, Cantón primero: Puntarenas; Distrito Primero: Puntarenas, real-property folio registration number 25466, right 000, described in cadastral plan (plano catastrado) number P-0025316-1992, with an area of two hundred seventy-four square meters and ninety-eight square decimeters and the following boundaries: North: Carretera Alberto Echandía (sic), with the Ferrocarril al Pacífico in between, with a frontage of eleven meters; South: José Ángel Retana Fallas; East: José Ángel Retana Fallas; West: Estate of [Nombre 001], free of encumbrances and annotations.
Furthermore, also as a consequence of the foregoing, any charge or tax that must be paid to obtain registration of this transaction shall be paid by the Municipalidad de Puntarenas. The Municipalidad de Puntarenas is ordered to pay Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the exact sum of five million colones as subjective emotional distress damages (daño moral subjetivo). The defendant Municipality is ordered to pay to the Treasury, where applicable under the legal system, any cost associated with transferring title to the real property in question (including stamps and taxes, which, if applicable, must be calculated on the basis of the property’s value as determined under the terms of this judgment during the judgment-enforcement phase). The Municipalidad de Puntarenas is ordered to pay both categories of costs in favor of the plaintiff herein. The amount of the costs shall be determined by the competent Judicial Authority during the judgment-enforcement phase.- Let notice be given (Notifíquese).- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Reporting Judge (Juez Ponente).- Judith Reyes Castillo, Judge.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Judge.- - Verification Code (Código Verificador) - ????????????????
FELIPE ALBERTO CORDOBA RAMIREZ, DECIDING JUDGE JUDITH REYES CASTILLO, DECIDING JUDGE ELIAS BALTODANO GOMEZ, DECIDING JUDGE Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, across from Café Dorado. Telephone numbers: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: [email protected]
EV Generación de Machote: F:\Gestion-Judicial\Servidor de Archivos\Modelos\Contencioso\TCRESOL016.dpj ????????????????
CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:
LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ DEMANDADO/A:
MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS N° 2024006355 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN PRIMERA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las ventidos horas con cinco minutos del ventitres de Setiembre del dos mil venticuatro.- Proceso de conocimiento incoado por el señor LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ, cédula de identidad N° 6-0412-0553, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS, representada por su señora Alcaldesa, señora Noelia Solórzano Cedeño, cédula de identidad N° 1-0859-0547. Intervienen en condición de apoderados especiales judiciales, por la parte actora la señora Adriana Alfaro Rojas, cédula de identidad N° 2-0647-0898; y por la Municipalidad demandada, la señora Yorleny Villagas Ovares, cédula de identidad N° 6-0275-0254.-
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Juzgador Felipe Córdoba Ramírez y se resuelve por unanimidad.-
CONSIDERANDO
I.Sobre la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver durante la celebración de la audiencia preliminar. Según obra en el texto de la minuta levantada en su momento, durante la celebración de la audiencia preliminar la representación de la Municipalidad demandada solicitó que se admitiese como prueba para mejor resolver, el testimonio de quien identificó como el señor Mauricio Gutiérrez Villafuerte, funcionario Municipal, ingeniero de profesión, para que hiciere referencia a los informes dictados por el "MINAET", mientras que la parte actora, para que se refiriesen a todos los hechos, la declaración de quienes identificó, como las señoras María Lorena Muñoz Gómez y Cindy Moreno Umaña, tanto como del señor Carlos Rodrigo Badilla Muñoz. Sobre el particular, no está por demás recordar que en cuanto a la prueba para mejor resolver, conforme el actualmente vigente texto del Código Procesal Civil, si bien es correcto afirmar que se omitió regular este instituto, en su artículo 41.3. se prevé la admisibilidad de prueba de oficio, que claro está, a requerimiento de parte podría conducir a la admisibilidad de este tipo de prueba.
Luego y de todas formas, estimamos que ha de observarse que en uno u otro caso, la prueba para mejor proveer como lo es la ordenada de oficio, es prueba del Juez, no así de las partes pese a que la ofrezcan, tanto como que, su rechazo no habría de producir por suerte de automatismo racional, indefensión y en consecuencia, un vicio sustancial por indefensión. (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N° 547-F-2002 de las 16:00 hrs. del 12 de julio de 2002; N° 29-1995 de las 15:30 hrs. del 22 de febrero de 1995; N° 290-F-S1-2009 de las 10:30 hrs. del 20 de marzo de 2009). Por otro lado, el ordenar o no prueba de este tipo supone algún límite impuesto el Juzgador, en el entendido de que por este medio no se ha de suplir el deber procesal que sólo incumbe a quien demanda o es demandado en el sentido de que es su deber ofrecer la prueba de su interés en el momento procesal oportuno. (Sentencia de la Sala Primera N° 001439-F-S1-2014 de las 09:25 horas del 07 de noviembre de 2014).
No puede en consecuencia el Juez en su búsqueda de la verdad real, so pena de vulnerar otros principios igual rango o jerarquía procesal que deben de encontrarse en equilibrio, ordenar prueba para mejor proveer cuando de ello se derive inevitablemente una sustitución de los mecanismos ordinarios de defensa con que cuentan quienes se encuentran vinculados en la relación jurídico procesal y mandados a probar por virtud de su situación dentro de tal relación procesal. Lo contrario salvo en contadísimas y excepcionales circunstancias que habrían de encontrarse debidamente acreditadas y razonadas, así como amparadas en intereses superiores particularmente en asuntos en los que medien intereses públicos calificados o reforzados por su importancia, conllevaría fácilmente a cuestionamientos sobre el ajuste de la actuación del juez con el deber de observar objetividad e imparcialidad en mantenimiento del equilibrio procesal entre las partes, pero también importaría un patrocinio inadmisible en favor de quien no habiendo usado en forma debida y/o en tiempo su derecho y deber de probar por negligencia, descuido o una intención de obtener una ventaja procesal indebida en uso abusivo y/o antisocial de su derecho, pretende por esa vía subsanar una omisión procesal que es exclusivamente resorte suyo evitar cuando debió serlo, en este sentido.
(Ver artículos 21 y 22 del Código Civil y el fallo de la Sala Primera en su sentencia N° 794-2006 de las 03:35 hrs. del 20 de octubre de 2006, que reza así en lo conducente: "... Por otra parte, es menester indicar que no es oportuno intentar mediante el ofrecimiento de probanzas que debieron aportarse y evacuarse en la etapa procesal correspondiente, abrir de nuevo el debate. Darle cabida a esta petición significaría que las partes estén en la posibilidad de subsanar sus omisiones respecto de la prueba que pudieron haber ofrecido en su oportunidad y no lo hicieron. Por otro lado, tampoco resulta posible acceder a ampliar la declaración de dos testigos, porque de igual forma sería enmendar su incuria"). Dicho todo lo anterior, por estimar este Tribunal que por innecesaria para resolver por el fondo el presente asunto en los términos que se dirán, se rechaza integralmente la prueba solicitada por ambas partes.-
II.Sobre los alegatos formulados por las partes. Alegaron las partes vinculadas en la relación jurídica procesal, lo que sigue:
III.Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente asunto se tienen los siguientes:
IV.Hechos no probados: De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso y por resultar fiel reflejo de la prueba que obra en autos una vez valorada la misma, se tiene como hechos no probados: ÚNICO: El valor del inmueble adquirido en propiedad por el aquí actor. (La ausencia de elementos de convicción al respecto).-
V.Sobre el régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la administración pública. Siempre que nos encontremos en torno con las partes en litigio ante la determinación de una eventual responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública, si la relación jurídica que vincula al administrado con la administración accionada no emerge con ocasión de la existencia de un instrumento contractual, se tiene que la discusión gira al rededor de lo que se conoce como responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por lo que resulta necesario a modo de introducción a los efectos de este instrumento, hacer referencia a los elementos que en doctrina y jurisprudencia suponen potable un reproche de responsabilidad como el que aquí se peticiona. Dentro del régimen de la llamada responsabilidad civil extracontractual, se distinguen dos tipos, la subjetiva, establecida en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil y la objetiva normada en el numeral 9 de la Constitución Política, el artículo 1048 del Código Civil y el numeral 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
En lo que toca al régimen de responsabilidad subjetiva, el artículo 199 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece la responsabilidad de los servidores públicos ante terceros en caso comprobado de dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de sus deberes o con ocasión su cumplimiento. Como tal, la responsabilidad subjetiva se funda exclusivamente en un estudio en el ámbito del ánimo del agente respecto de la existencia de al menos, "culpa", sino "dolo", a diferencia de lo que ocurre con el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva, en orden al cual, la responsabilidad se determina con independencia de la existencia de tales elementos subjetivos. En la responsabilidad subjetiva se responde porque se es culpable, bien porque se ha buscado o querido la producción del daño, o bien porque se ha obrado de forma imprudente o negligente. En observancia con lo anterior, la responsabilidad del servidor ante terceros lo es en el ámbito del régimen de responsabilidad subjetiva, consecuentemente con lo cual, se requerirá para todos los efectos de la determinación de la existencia de culpa o dolo en el ánimo del servidor o agente de la Administración, sin perjuicio del resto de elementos que deben concurrir, como lo son la existencia del daño y el nexo causal entre aquel y la conducta desplegada, para que opere el reproche de imputación de responsabilidad.
Por otra parte, el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva de la administración pública, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con la responsabilidad subjetiva, ésta se genera sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del agente causante del daño, bastando con la acreditación eso sí, de la existencia del "riesgo" para generarla, razón por la cual no operan las nociones de antijuridicidad y culpabilidad, por lo tanto, se aplica el principio de inversión de la carga de la prueba en beneficio del lesionado. A los efectos, la presunta Administración Pública causante de tales daños y perjuicios reclamados debe resarcirlos si efectiva y eficazmente su conducta los generó, salvo que demuestre alguna causal exonerativa. De este modo, se requiere de la concurrencia de cuatro elementos, a saber: a) Una lesión, que consiste en los perjuicios patrimoniales antijurídicos, porque el que los padece no tiene el deber de soportarlos; b) Una conducta administrativa en relación con la cual se encuentre vinculada la producción del daño reprochado; b) Un nexo causal, conformado por la existencia de una relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho (conducta administrativa) que se imputa y el daño producido; y c) Que no existan las causas de justificación a que hicimos referencia atrás, siendo que la existencia de las mismas puede desvincular jurídicamente el perjuicio producido con la conducta de la administración pública de modo que el efecto dañoso no sea imputable, rompiendo el nexo de causalidad al acontecer una situación eximente como la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero.
El régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado y sus instituciones previsto en los artículos 9, y 41 de la Constitución Política, y 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es entonces de naturaleza esencialmente objetiva, por lo que para nacer basta con que exista un daño indemnizable, una conducta administrativa y un nexo causal entre ambas. Debe tenerse que es bajo este tipo de criterio objetivo que resulta posible atribuir responsabilidad a la Administración Pública, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con sus servidores, para los cuales debe de usarse un criterio de atribución además, subjetivo. De otra parte, determinados los criterios bajo los que es procedente determinar la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública y/o de sus agentes o servidores públicos, nos interesa señalar que a la vez, existe una diferencia en cuanto a los criterios de imputación que operan para el establecimiento o determinación de dicha responsabilidad en caso de encontrarnos ante actividad lícita o ilícita, normal o anormal de la Administración.
Citando al Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, de su Obra Tratado de Derecho Administrativo II, Responsabilidad Administrativa, pág. 39, se tiene que: “En el sistema de responsabilidad sin falta o por sacrificio especial, responsabilidad por conducta lícita o funcionamiento normal, el criterio determinante para que exista responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas es el quebranto del principio de igualdad en el sometimiento de las cargas públicas y el consiguiente daño especial (pequeña proporción de afectados) y anormal (excepcionalidad intensa de la lesión) o la teoría del riesgo para la hipótesis de los daños accidentales causados por una administración pública en el cumplimiento de la función asignada por el ordenamiento jurídico. Tratándose del sistema de responsabilidad por falta de servicio,-conducta ilícita o funcionamiento anormal,- el criterio de imputación lo constituye, precisamente, ese concepto jurídico indeterminado de “falta de servicio” y el derecho constitucional innominado o atípico de los administrados a que les presten servicios públicos eficientes y eficaces.”.
En la responsabilidad por conducta ilícita o anormal, entendida como aquella que se opone, infringe o violenta el ordenamiento jurídico entendido globalmente como las normas escritas y no escritas, la carga de la prueba corresponde a la víctima, quien corre con el deber de demostrar mediante las formas, los medios probatorios que permite el ordenamiento jurídico, la falta del servicio, su funcionamiento anormal, o la ilicitud en el actuar administrativo. En la responsabilidad por conducta lícita, se ha establecido que aun tratándose de conductas desplegadas con apego al ordenamiento jurídico, las mismas son susceptibles de atribuir responsabilidad en la Administración bajo criterios como los relacionados supra. En los casos de responsabilidad objetiva, la defensa de la Administración radicaría en la demostración de haber mediado alguna de las causales que rompen el nexo de causalidad que indica el numeral 190, párrafo 1 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, ya sea como se indicó supra, la fuerza mayor, le hecho de un tercero o hecho de la propia víctima.
Nuestra Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en resolución Nº 000584-F-2005, de las 10:40 hrs. del 11 de agosto del 2005, indicó, y siempre en relación con la responsabilidad objetiva lo siguiente: "...habrá responsabilidad de la Administración siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva y la titularidad o condición de poder que ostente, cumpliendo claro está, con el presupuesto imprescindible del nexo causal. (...) Tanto los presupuestos esenciales como la carga de la prueba, adquieren por ejemplo un nuevo matiz, que libera al afectado no solo de amarras sustanciales sino también procesales, y coloca a la Administración en la obligada descarga frente a los cargos y hechos que se le imputan. En todo caso, el carácter objetivo de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración, fue definida con claridad en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 132 de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 1991, para un hecho posterior a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en la que dijo: "VI.
Nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública Nº 6227 (...), conforme lo señala la sentencia de esta Sala Nº 81 del año 1984, al resolver la polémica sobre su vigencia, en el Título Sétimo del Libro Primero, recogió los principios más modernos fundados en la doctrina y jurisprudencia más autorizada, sobre la responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración, para establecer así la responsabilidad directa del Estado sin necesidad de probar previamente que el daño se produjo por culpa del funcionario o de la Administración, exigiendo para la procedencia de la indemnización que el daño sufrido sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo -artículo 196-. (...) Además establece, en forma taxativa, como causas eximentes de esa responsabilidad, la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero, correspondiéndole a la Administración acreditar su existencia, (...)" (El resaltado no es del original).
En lo particular, referente a la eventual responsabilidad de una entidad como la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social asociada a la prestación de los servicios de salud que se encuentran bajo su cargo, la Sala Primera de la Corte en su Voto Nº 7 de las 14:20 hrs. del 13 de enero de 1995, también ha indicado como sigue: "(...) Es esta teoría de responsabilidad objetiva la que requiere que con el riesgo creado se ocasione un daño al administrado susceptible de indemnización, (…). V)- Para restablecer la responsabilidad de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social ha de reconocerse el nexo causal entre el daño provocado al actor y la actuación de dicha entidad, o sea, entre el acto impugnado y el evento lesivo. (...) La relación causal entre el hecho (actividad que consistió en prestarle servicios médicos) y el efecto (…) es clara, ineludible y referible estrictamente a la institución demandada.
No amerita hacer reparo en que el paciente fuera o no hipersensible al medicamento indicado, sino solamente -como lo afirmó el perito (…)- que se creó un riesgo que, como excepción a la resistencia común de los organismos- provocó un daño en el paciente y éste no tiene por qué soportarlo sin -al menos- ser indemnizado por ello. En síntesis, el riesgo lo creó la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a través de sus hospitales, ocasionando daño al paciente hoy actor y, en consecuencia, con fundamento en la ya mencionada teoría del riesgo, debe responsabilizársele por su actuación. (El resaltado no es del original). En consecuencia y de manera concordante con todo lo anterior, a la parte que demanda corresponde desde el punto de vista procesal demostrar primero, la ocurrencia de un daño o perjuicio, y luego, que este se encuentre vinculado en nexo causal con una conducta administrativa, mientras que a la Administración demandada y sólo de llevar éxito la acción judicial incoada en su contra en lo anterior, acreditar que ha mediado con todo y ello, una suerte de eximente de responsabilidad que permita afirmar que tal nexo de causalidad que " rompe", desvinculando tal conducta administrativa con la producción del efecto dañoso que se reclama en cada caso, con lo que se suprime la base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial endosada conduciendo ello a la improcedencia del reclamo.-
VI.Sobre el objeto del proceso, en asocio con la teoría del caso planteada por la parte actora. Con el propósito de que la exposición que se dirá, resulte lo más clara y ordenada posible, este Tribunal estima importante hacer referencia al objeto del proceso entendido como lo que se pretende sea concedido en sentencia, para lo cual habremos de indicar que el presente guarda identidad con un proceso judicial de los conocidos en doctrina como civil de hacienda, en la medida que, sobre la base, ya de lo que la representación del actor identificó como conducta ilícita o en su caso lícita, se condene a la Municipalidad demandada al pago de daños y/o, perjuicios. Sobre este tema, sea, la base de imputación de la responsabilidad que se reclama, habremos de hacer algunas precisiones de entrada. La parte actora en síntesis, pretende que en sentencia le sean otorgados extremos exclusivamente de corte patrimonial indemnizatorio, alegando que, previo a adquirir un inmueble en propiedad, tal decisión se vio incidida por el hecho de que la Municipalidad demandada le suministró información sobre el bien de la especie, que supuso, le habría de permitir desarrollar en él la actividad que era su intención desplegar a partir del tal adquisición, cual era su uso como casa de habitación y/o, como taller mecánico.
Luego y como derivación de lo que se pretende, pese a que en algún nivel argumentativo además, se invoca como base de imputación de tal responsabilidad el despliegue por parte de la Municipalidad demandada de una conducta ilícita, que la misma representación de la parte actora identificó según lo extrae esta Autoridad Judicial, como aquellos actos al tenor del o los cuales, luego de informársele que un uso determinado el bien inmueble a adquirir, era conforme al deseado, luego de adquirido en propiedad el mismo se le informó lo contrario. Así las cosas, una pretensión de corte anulatorio y claro está, precedida de la declaración de su adopción en disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico no forma parte del objeto del presente proceso, por lo que, sobre este aspecto, a saber, la ilicitud de alguna conducta administrativa base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial administrativa que se reclama, ningún pronunciamiento habrá de hacer este Tribunal, para lo que, las partes podrán consultar jurisprudencia reiterada emanada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro de la que sólo a título de ejemplo, habrá de citarse su Voto N° 002333-F-S1-2020 dictado al ser las 11:12 hrs. del 17 de setiembre de 2020, en relación con el N° 000301-F-2007 de las 11:15 hrs. del 26 de abril del 2007, fallos en los términos de los cuales, se determina que lo pretendido en el proceso judicial sea concedido en sentencia, constituye límite a la Autoridad judicial sobre lo que de hacer pronunciamientos o no en sentencia.
Dicho lo anterior y de entrada, sobre la ilicitud planteada como base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública que se reclama, entendida como el desajuste o no de lo actuado por la entidad Municipal en el caso concreto -se insiste- no habremos de hacer pronunciamiento alguno, simplemente porque no es objeto en la presente causa pretensión de corte anulatoria alguna. Con todo y ello, la representación de la parte actora argumentó y peticionó sobre la base de la imputación de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración pública a partir del despliegue de una conducta lícita, lo que resultará como veremos adelante procedente, sólo en los términos que se dirán.-
VII.Sobre la procedencia parcial de la demanda. Como resultado de un análisis integral en valoración de la prueba que obra en autos en lo que se ha estimado relevante y conducente, este Tribunal es del criterio de que en el caso concreto, se impone declarar la procedencia parcial de la demanda, todo en función de las siguientes consideraciones.-
3.1. Sobre la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública derivada de la adopción de una conducta lícita. Estimamos relevante hacer cita a estos efectos, de lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en parte, en su Voto N° 2009-013606 dictado al ser las 14:57 hrs. del 26 de agoto del 2009: “IV.- PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISRATIVA. (...). El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos.
(…) V.- CARÁCTER ESENCIAL DEL PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA EN EL ESTADO SOCIAL Y DEMOCRÁTICO DE DERECHO. La responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas por el ejercicio de la función administrativa forma parte, como lo hemos constatado en el considerando anterior, de la concepción constitucional de éstas. Es una pieza clave y esencial del Estado social y democrático de Derecho, dados los fines a los que propende un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa. De modo general, la responsabilidad administrativa tiene por función básica la reparación o resarcimiento de las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a un administrado (víctima o damnificado) en su esfera patrimonial o extrapatrimonial por un ente público en el ejercicio de la función administrativa. Uno de sus fines clásicos y tradicionales es servir de control o garantía para las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados que sean lesionadas por un ente público en el ejercicio de sus competencias o en la prestación de los servicios públicos expresamente asignados por la Constitución o la ley.
La responsabilidad administrativa junto con la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), son las piezas claves de un Estado Constitucional para la defensa de los administrados frente a las prerrogativas y privilegios formales y materiales con que la propia Constitución provee a los entes públicos para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos. Esta finalidad determina que el principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa debe ser fortalecido y acentuado mediante una interpretación extensiva y no restrictiva, de la misma forma el legislador al desarrollar los sistemas de responsabilidad administrativa debe adecuarse al parámetro constitucional de una responsabilidad administrativa objetiva y directa, estándole vedado establecer conductas administrativas exentas o inmunes a éste y menoscabando los derechos fundamentales resarcitorio y al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos de los que son titulares todos los administrados”.
La promulgación de la Ley General de la Administración Pública solventó el vacío jurídico que existía para poder demandar responsabilidad al Estado en sede jurisdiccional. El artículo 1° de dicha Ley dispone que la Administración (entendida en un sentido amplio como Estado y los demás entes públicos) responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. La norma introduce el concepto de responsabilidad objetiva del Estado, es decir, aquella que no examina la actuación del funcionario en cuanto a los extremos de su culpabilidad sino que hace descansar la responsabilidad en la mera constatación del daño y que el mismo se haya producido por la actividad de la Administración. Esta es la línea que sigue el artículo 190 de la Ley de la Administración Pública. La responsabilidad objetiva se produce entonces, sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del causante del daño; basta el riesgo para generarla. En consecuencia, para su acaecimiento se requiere de tres requisitos esenciales:
VIII.Sobre los extremos indemnizatorios. Pretende quien demanda que en sentencia se le conceda lo siguiente: 2. Condenar a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de ¢10.000.000,°° colones por daño moral subjetivo. 3. Se condene a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de 14.000.000,00 de colones por concepto de daño patrimonial, equivalente al valor del terreno adquirido. 4. Se condene a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas del pago de ¢10.000.000,°° colones por la pérdida del chance, derivada de la imposibilidad de abrir el taller mecánico. 5. Que se conceda la indexación sobre los montos otorgados, así como los intereses generados hasta el efectivo pago. 6. Se condene al demandado al pago de las costas del presente proceso".
VII.Sobre las excepciones. La representación de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas interpuso en defensa de dicha entidad las excepciones de falta de derecho, prescripción, caducidad, y además se solicitó que se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos y se condene al actor al pago de ambas costas. Sobre la excepción de caducidad, se rechaza, bastando con indicar a la representación municipal, que la misma, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 39.1.a del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo opera respecto de las acciones judiciales que en esta sede se dirijan a la nulidad de una conducta formal adoptada por la Administración Pública accionada, lo que resulta ser ajeno al objeto del presente proceso. En torno a la excepción de prescripción, conforme lo dispuesto en el artículo 41, en relación con el 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública: "El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad".
En el presente caso el hecho generador de la responsabilidad que se reclama se encontró identificado por el dictado con el N° Resolución MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dictada por el Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo el 31 de octubre del 2017, por lo que, siendo que este proceso judicial data en su inicio del año 2019 y que la resolución que le dio curso a la acción se le notificó a la Municipalidad demandada el día 15 de octubre del 2019 conforme el acta de notificación respectiva, no se ha computado un plazo que supere los cuatro años mencionados, lo que impone el rechazo de la excepción. (La imagen 60, en relación con la 67, ambas del expediente judicial). Finalmente, respecto de la excepción de falta de derecho, debiéndose atener las partes al análisis realizado por este Tribunal en atención al presente caso por el fondo, se determinó que quien demanda ostenta derecho para acceder a lo peticionado, pero en parte, por lo que dicha excepción se acoge, debiéndose entender rechazada en todo lo no expresamente concedido.-
VIII.Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La parte vencida en la presente causa lo ha sido la Municipalidad de Puntarenas, sin que en criterio de este Tribunal haya mediado circunstancia o presupuesto alguno que justifique exonerarle de dicha condenatoria al amparo de sus incisos a) y b), del artículo relacionado, tanto como al amparo del artículo 194 del mismo cuerpo legal. En consecuencia, se condena a dicho municipio al pago de ambas costas en favor del aquí actor. Lo correspondiente a las costas en cuanto a su importe se habrá de definir por el Juez competente en la fase de ejecución de sentencia a ruego de la parte vencedora.-
POR TANTO
Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver por ambas partes. Se rechazan las excepciones de prescripción y caducidad. Se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho, debiéndose entender rechazada en todo lo expresamente concedido. Se declara con lugar parcial la demanda incoada por el señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz en contra de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz del valor actual del inmueble que hoy es de su titularidad en dominio identificado con el inscrito en el Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, con la Matrícula de folio Real N° 25466-000, mismo que habrá de ser determinado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, sin que, la suma a pagar pueda exceder el importe de catorce millones trescientos mil colones. Como consecuencia lógica necesaria de lo anterior, se ordena al Registro Nacional inscribir traspaso del dominio del inmueble que se describe a continuación, en nombre de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas: inmueble del partido de Puntarenas situado en Provincia: Puntarenas, Cantón primero: Puntarenas; Distrito Primero: Puntarenas, matrícula de folio real número 25466, derecho 000, descrito en el plano catastrado número P-0025316-1992, con una cabida de doscientos setenta y cuatro metros con noventa y ocho decímetros cuadrados de superficie y con los siguientes linderos: Norte: Carretera Alberto Echandía (sic) en medio con el Ferrocarril al Pacífico con un frente de once metros; Sur: José Ángel Retana Fallas; Este: José Ángel Retana Fallas; Oeste: Sucesión de [Nombre 001], libre de gravámenes y anotaciones.
Además y también en consecuencia de lo anterior, cualquier cargo o impuesto que se requiera ser sufragado para lograr la inscripción registral de este movimiento deberá ser sufragado por la Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz de la suma de cinco millones de colones exactos a título de daño moral subjetivo. Se condena a la Municipalidad demandada al pago en favor del fisco de proceder conforme el ordenamiento jurídico, de cualquier costo asociado al traspaso de la titularidad del dominio del bien inmueble en cuestión (lo que incluye timbres e impuestos que deberán ser calculados de proceder, sobre la base del valor del inmueble determinado en los términos de la presente sentencia, en la fase de ejecución de sentencia). Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de ambas costas en favor del aquí actor.
Lo correspondiente a las costas habrá de ser determinado por la Autoridad Judicial competente en la fase de ejecución de sentencia.- Notifíquese.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Juez Ponente.- Judith Reyes Castillo, Jueza.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Juez.- ????????????????
Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: [email protected]
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