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Res. 06355-2024 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I · 23/09/2024
OutcomeResultado
The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay the current value of the property (up to ¢14,300,000), ¢5,000,000 for subjective moral damage, and to accept transfer of the land; loss of chance, indexation and interest claims are denied.Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas a pagar el valor actual del inmueble (hasta ¢14.300.000), ¢5.000.000 por daño moral subjetivo, y a recibir el traspaso del terreno; se rechazan pérdida de chance, indexación e intereses.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Court partially granted the claim of a plaintiff who bought a property trusting a land-use certificate issued by the Municipality of Puntarenas authorizing a residence and mechanic workshop. Later, the municipality denied the use because the land lies within the Laguna Bonilla wetland – information it had known since 2013. The court found that the municipality's conduct, even if lawful, caused a special compensable injury: the plaintiff was misled into buying, and the denial caused subjective moral damage. The municipality was ordered to pay the current value of the property (up to ¢14,300,000) and ¢5,000,000 for moral damage, with the property being transferred to the municipality to avoid unjust enrichment. Claims for loss of chance, indexation, and interest were rejected as they constitute lost profits not recoverable for lawful-conduct liability.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resolvió parcialmente a favor del actor, quien compró un inmueble confiando en un certificado de uso de suelo expedido por la Municipalidad de Puntarenas que autorizaba vivienda y taller mecánico. Posteriormente, la misma municipalidad le denegó el uso por ubicarse el terreno dentro del Humedal Laguna Bonilla, información que conocía desde 2013. El tribunal determinó que la conducta municipal, aunque lícita, causó un daño especial indemnizable: el actor fue inducido a error al comprar, y al denegarse el permiso sufrió daño moral subjetivo. Se condenó a la municipalidad a pagar el valor actual del inmueble (hasta ¢14.300.000) y ¢5.000.000 por daño moral, ordenándose el traspaso del terreno a su nombre para evitar enriquecimiento ilícito. Se rechazaron la pérdida de chance, indexación e intereses por corresponder a lucro cesante, no cubierto en responsabilidad por conducta lícita.
Key excerptExtracto clave
“VII. [...] This Tribunal confirms, reinforces and reiterates that, having been told before purchasing the property that it could be used as a family dwelling and mechanical workshop, and then being told that it could not, based on information about this property that was available to the municipality and which it had a legal duty to observe since much earlier, since 2013. In conclusion, for this Panel of judges, it has been made absolutely clear as a proven fact that it was because the plaintiff bought the property in question — on the basis that it could be used to build a dwelling and/or a mechanical workshop, first being authorized for such activity and then, after acquiring ownership, being denied by the municipality — that he suffered subjective moral damage consisting of feelings, essentially, of frustration derived from the plan he made to acquire the property, and at least, anger and sadness. (The rules of human experience).-”“VII. [...] Se confirma, refuerza y lo reitera este Tribunal, que una vez que se le indicó previo a comprar el inmueble al aquí actor, que este podría ser usado como casa de habitación y taller mecánico, luego se le dijo que no, a partir de información sobre este bien que se encontró a su disposición y deber jurídico de observar desde mucho antes, desde el año 2013. En conclusión, para esta Cámara de juzgadores, ha quedado absolutamente claro como hecho demostrado, que fue con causa en que el aquí actor compró el inmueble de interés, sobre la base de que podría hacer uso del mismo para construir una casa de habitación y/o, un taller mecánico, al serle primero autorizada dicha actividad y luego de adquirido el dominio sobre el bien inmueble de interés, denegada la misma por la Municipalidad aquí accionada, que sufrió un daño de corte moral subjetivo constituido por sentimientos, en lo medular, de frustración como derivación del plan que se planteó para adquirir el inmueble, y al menos, enojo y tristeza. (Las reglas de la experiencia humana).-”
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"“El certificado de uso del suelo que se expide válidamente, no está sometido a validez temporal, mientras el Plan Director no sea modificado" (Sentencia No. 04336-99 de la Sala Constitucional).”"
"“The land-use certificate validly issued is not subject to a time limit as long as the Master Plan is not amended" (Constitutional Chamber Ruling No. 04336-99).”"
Considerando VII.2
"“El certificado de uso del suelo que se expide válidamente, no está sometido a validez temporal, mientras el Plan Director no sea modificado" (Sentencia No. 04336-99 de la Sala Constitucional).”"
Considerando VII.2
"“El artículo 194.- 1. La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión. 2. En este caso la indemnización deberá cubrir el valor de los daños al momento de su pago, pero no el lucro cesante.”"
"“Article 194.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal operation when they cause damage to the rights of the administeree in a special way, by the small proportion of those affected or by the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case compensation shall cover the value of the damages at the time of payment, but not lost profits.”"
Considerando V
"“El artículo 194.- 1. La Administración será responsable por sus actos lícitos y por su funcionamiento normal cuando los mismos causen daño a los derechos del administrado en forma especial, por la pequeña proporción de afectados o por la intensidad excepcional de la lesión. 2. En este caso la indemnización deberá cubrir el valor de los daños al momento de su pago, pero no el lucro cesante.”"
Considerando V
"“... no puede en consecuencia el Juez en su búsqueda de la verdad real, so pena de vulnerar otros principios igual rango o jerarquía procesal que deben de encontrarse en equilibrio, ordenar prueba para mejor proveer cuando de ello se derive inevitablemente una sustitución de los mecanismos ordinarios de defensa...”"
"“... the Judge, in his search for the material truth, cannot consequently – under penalty of violating other principles of equal procedural rank or hierarchy which must be kept in equilibrium – order proof for a better resolution when it inevitably results in a substitution of the ordinary defense mechanisms...”"
Considerando I
"“... no puede en consecuencia el Juez en su búsqueda de la verdad real, so pena de vulnerar otros principios igual rango o jerarquía procesal que deben de encontrarse en equilibrio, ordenar prueba para mejor proveer cuando de ello se derive inevitablemente una sustitución de los mecanismos ordinarios de defensa...”"
Considerando I
"“Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz del valor actual del inmueble (...) mismo que habrá de ser determinado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, sin que, la suma a pagar pueda exceder el importe de catorce millones trescientos mil colones.”"
"“The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay to Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the current value of the property (...) which shall be determined during the execution-of-judgment phase, with the understanding that the amount to be paid may not exceed fourteen million three hundred thousand colones.”"
Por tanto
"“Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz del valor actual del inmueble (...) mismo que habrá de ser determinado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, sin que, la suma a pagar pueda exceder el importe de catorce millones trescientos mil colones.”"
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, Section I Date of Resolution: September 23, 2024 at 22:05 Docket No.: 19-006331-1027-CA Type of matter: Proceeding on the merits Judgment with protected data, in accordance with current regulations Content of Interest: Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: Contentious-Administrative Procedural Law Topic: Evidence for better resolution in contentious-administrative matters Subtopics: Discretionary power of the judge and impossibility of remedying the parties' omissions. "I. [...] Consequently, the Judge, in his search for the real truth, under penalty of violating other principles of equal procedural rank or hierarchy that must be in balance, cannot order evidence for better provision when doing so inevitably results in a substitution of the ordinary mechanisms of defense available to those who are bound in the procedural legal relationship and ordered to prove by virtue of their situation within such procedural relationship.
To do otherwise, except in very few and exceptional circumstances that would have to be duly accredited and reasoned, as well as supported by superior interests, particularly in matters involving qualified or reinforced public interests due to their importance, would easily lead to questions about the adjustment of the judge's actions to the duty to observe objectivity and impartiality in maintaining the procedural balance between the parties, but would also entail an inadmissible sponsorship in favor of one who, not having used his right and duty to prove in a proper and/or timely manner due to negligence, carelessness, or an intention to obtain an undue procedural advantage in abusive and/or antisocial use of his right, seeks by that means to rectify a procedural omission that was exclusively his own to avoid when it should have been, in this sense. [...]" ... See more Citations of Legislation and Doctrine Related Judgments Content of Interest: Type of content: Majority vote Branch of Law: Administrative Law Topic: Civil liability of the Administration Subtopics: Patrimonial liability arising from a lawful act of the defendant municipality.
Purchase of property to build a dwelling house and mechanical workshop in a case where the land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) is authorized and then denied. Analysis of the regime of extra-contractual civil liability of the public administration. Nature and scope of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo). Topic: Extra-contractual civil liability Subtopics: Patrimonial liability arising from a lawful act of the defendant municipality. Purchase of property to build a dwelling house and mechanical workshop in a case where the land-use permit is authorized and then denied. Analysis of the regime of extra-contractual civil liability of the public administration. Nature and scope of the land-use certificate. Topic: Land-use certification Subtopics: Patrimonial liability arising from a lawful act of the defendant municipality. Purchase of property to build a dwelling house and mechanical workshop in a case where the land-use permit is authorized and then denied.
Nature and scope of the land-use certificate. Topic: Land use Subtopics: Patrimonial liability arising from a lawful act of the defendant municipality. Purchase of property to build a dwelling house and mechanical workshop in a case where the land-use permit is authorized and then denied. Nature and scope of the land-use certificate. "VII. [...] This Tribunal confirms, reinforces, and reiterates, that once the plaintiff was told prior to purchasing the property that it could be used as a dwelling house and mechanical workshop, he was later told no, based on information about this property that was at his disposal and his legal duty to observe long before, since the year 2013. In conclusion, for this Chamber of judges, it has become absolutely clear as a demonstrated fact, that it was because the plaintiff here bought the property in question, on the basis that he could use it to build a dwelling house and/or a mechanical workshop, the said activity first being authorized to him and then, after acquiring ownership (dominio) of the real property in question, the same being denied by the Municipality sued here, he suffered a subjective moral injury (daño de corte moral subjetivo) constituted by feelings, at its core, of frustration as a derivation of the plan he conceived to acquire the property, and at least, anger and sadness.
(The rules of human experience).- [...]" ... See more Citations of Legislation and Doctrine Related Judgments EV Template Generation: F:\Gestion-Judicial\File Server\Models\Contencioso\TCRESOL016.dpj ????????????????
DOCKET NO.:
PROCEEDING:
PROCEEDING ON THE MERITS PLAINTIFF:
LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ DEFENDANT:
MUNICIPALITY OF PUNTARENAS No. 2024006355 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, FIRST SECTION, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at twenty-two hours and five minutes on the twenty-third of September of two thousand twenty-four.- Proceeding on the merits initiated by Mr. LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ, identity card No. 6-0412-0553, against the MUNICIPALITY OF PUNTARENAS, represented by its Mayor, Mrs. Noelia Solórzano Cedeño, identity card No. 1-0859-0547. Acting as special judicial representatives (apoderados especiales judiciales) are, for the plaintiff, Mrs. Adriana Alfaro Rojas, identity card No. 2-0647-0898; and for the defendant Municipality, Mrs. Yorleny Villagas Ovares, identity card No. 6-0275-0254.-
WHEREAS:
Judge Felipe Córdoba Ramírez drafts and it is resolved unanimously.-
WHEREAS
I.Regarding the evidence offered for better resolution during the holding of the preliminary hearing. According to what is recorded in the minutes drawn up at the time, during the holding of the preliminary hearing, the representative of the defendant Municipality requested that the testimony of whom she identified as Mr. Mauricio Gutiérrez Villafuerte, a Municipal official, an engineer by profession, be admitted as evidence for better resolution, so that he might refer to the reports issued by the "MINAET", while the plaintiff requested, so that they might refer to all the facts, the statements of those he identified as Mrs. María Lorena Muñoz Gómez and Mrs. Cindy Moreno Umaña, as well as Mr. Carlos Rodrigo Badilla Muñoz. On this particular point, it is worth recalling that regarding evidence for better resolution, according to the currently valid text of the Civil Procedure Code, while it is correct to state that this legal instrument was omitted, its article 41.3 provides for the admissibility of evidence ex officio, which of course, at the request of a party could lead to the admissibility of this type of evidence.
Then, and in any case, we consider that it must be observed that in either case, evidence for better provision, like evidence ordered ex officio, is the Judge's evidence, not that of the parties even if they offer it, just as its rejection would not, by any sort of rational automatism, produce defenselessness and consequently, a substantial defect due to defenselessness. (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice No. 547-F-2002 at 4:00 p.m. on July 12, 2002; No. 29-1995 at 3:30 p.m. on February 22, 1995; No. 290-F-S1-2009 at 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 2009). Furthermore, ordering or not ordering evidence of this type entails some limit imposed on the Judge, in the understanding that this means must not be used to remedy the procedural duty that only falls upon whoever sues or is sued, in the sense that it is their duty to offer the evidence of their interest at the opportune procedural moment.
(Judgment of the First Chamber No. 001439-F-S1-2014 at 09:25 hours on November 7, 2014). Consequently, the Judge, in his search for the real truth, under penalty of violating other principles of equal procedural rank or hierarchy that must be in balance, cannot order evidence for better provision when doing so inevitably results in a substitution of the ordinary mechanisms of defense available to those who are bound in the procedural legal relationship and ordered to prove by virtue of their situation within such procedural relationship. To do otherwise, except in very few and exceptional circumstances that would have to be duly accredited and reasoned, as well as supported by superior interests, particularly in matters involving qualified or reinforced public interests due to their importance, would easily lead to questions about the adjustment of the judge's actions to the duty to observe objectivity and impartiality in maintaining the procedural balance between the parties, but would also entail an inadmissible sponsorship in favor of one who, not having used his right and duty to prove in a proper and/or timely manner due to negligence, carelessness, or an intention to obtain an undue procedural advantage in abusive and/or antisocial use of his right, seeks by that means to rectify a procedural omission that was exclusively his own to avoid when it should have been, in this sense.
(See articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code and the ruling of the First Chamber in its judgment No. 794-2006 at 03:35 hours on October 20, 2006, which reads as follows in the relevant part: "... On the other hand, it is necessary to indicate that it is not opportune to try, through the offering of evidence that should have been provided and evaluated in the corresponding procedural stage, to reopen the debate. Giving room to this petition would mean that the parties are in a position to remedy their omissions regarding evidence they could have offered at the time and did not do so. Furthermore, it is also not possible to agree to extend the statements of two witnesses, because it would equally be to amend their negligence."). Having said all the foregoing, because this Tribunal deems that it is unnecessary for resolving the merits of this matter in the terms that will be stated, the evidence requested by both parties is rejected in its entirety.-
Moreover, it is important to emphasize the fact that the governing body in environmental matters is the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía) and it is the entity with the authority to demarcate the protection zones of wetlands, with the objective of preventing their contamination and ensuring their preservation. In this regard, the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), in its article 42, establishes: "ARTICLE 42.- Delimitation of protected zones: The Ministry of Environment and Energy, in coordination with the competent institutions, may demarcate protection zones for certain marine, coastal, and wetland areas, which shall be subject to management and handling plans, in order to prevent and combat the pollution or degradation of these ecosystems". In this line of thought, the Ministry of Environment and Energy also has the authority, through environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental), over the viability of carrying out constructions in areas near wetlands, as established in articles 42 and 44 of this same Law.
However, in this particular case, on June 13, 2019, SINAC certified through official communication SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-CERT-042-2019 that my property is located outside the boundaries of any Protected Wilderness Area (Área de Silvestre Protegida), but not so for a wetland, since according to official communication SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-VC-060-2019 of June 5, 2019, the property is 72% within the boundaries of the Palustrine Wetland Laguna Bonilla (Humedal Palustrino Laguna Bonilla), which is a conservation area, meaning no type of construction can be carried out without directly affecting the wetland. Added to this, article 45 of this regulatory body establishes a legal impossibility to carry out works aimed at altering or deteriorating the wetland. In this regard, it indicates: "ARTICLE 45.- Prohibition: Activities aimed at interrupting the natural cycles of wetland ecosystems are prohibited, such as the construction of dikes that prevent the flow of marine or continental waters, drainage, desiccation, filling, or any other alteration that causes the deterioration and elimination of such ecosystems.
Regarding the protection regime for wetlands, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has pronounced itself in rulings Votos 16938-11 and 14288-09. 2- Regarding the Administration's liability for lawful and unlawful conduct: The Public Administration is responsible for all damages and losses caused on the occasion of the administrative acts it issues, except when any of the grounds for exemption from administrative liability, established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), are present, namely: force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party. Regarding unlawful conduct, articles 191 and 192 of the same regulatory body indicate: "Article 191.- The Administration must repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even when it is for purposes, activities, or acts foreign to said mission." "Article 192.- The Administration shall also be liable under the previous conditions when it suppresses or limits subjective rights by illegally using its powers to do so." This means that every administrative act issued contrary to the legal system and which has been notified to the administered party, causing injury to their personal and patrimonial interests, must find corresponding reparation from the Administration.
To identify the existence of administrative liability for unlawful conduct, an analysis of liability must be carried out in each specific case. In the present case, the unlawful conduct is materialized through the issuance of administrative resolution MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, issued by the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipality, approving a land-use permit (permiso de uso de suelo) for a period of one year to build a house and a mechanical workshop within the conservation area called LAGUNA BONILLA sector 2, without taking into consideration that since 2013, the Municipality was informed by SINAC according to official communication SINAC ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013 with a receipt date of May 9, 2013, by the Directorate of Urban Development and Control of the Municipality of Puntarenas, of the boundaries that must be protected in this area, indicating the following: "In relation to the existence of a protection zone in the wetland, I inform you that according to certification SINAC-GASP-394-10, which is attached, the Laguna Bonilla wetland currently corresponds to a Palustrine wetland, affected by anthropogenic activities.
Therefore, according to article 33 subsection c of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) 7575 of February 5, '96, and pronouncement C-110-2004 of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) referring to the applicability of protection areas with respect to wetland ecosystems of the type called Laguna, the 50-meter protection area for natural lakes and reservoirs only applies to lacustrine wetlands and not to palustrine wetlands, as is the case. It is due to this, and according to said certification, that it is recommended to respect a protection zone of 10 to 15 meters in this wetland." Causing me to make the mistake of buying land that is not suitable for construction, because it is located within the boundaries of this lagoon. In this sense, it should be remembered that for the Administration's liability to be established, three legal conditions must concur, which are: An Administrative Act or conduct generated by the Public Administration, in this case the Municipality of Puntarenas, that is, resolution MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, granting me the use permit in the following terms: "For the reasons stated above; this department informs you that you are granted the Municipal Location Resolution for Housing Construction and Automotive Workshop (Resolución Municipal de Ubicación para Construcción de Vivienda y Taller Automotriz).
This document is valid for one year." (The underlining is not from the original). The second legal condition derives from the individualization of the affected subjects, meaning it must be possible to identify who has been directly caused the damage. In my case, the damage occurs because I bought a piece of land on which I wanted to build a house and a mechanical workshop, but before buying the said land for the purpose I desired, I investigated that a previous party interested in buying the property had requested the land use, which was approved as can be verified in official communication PUC-RES-429-08-2015 from the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipality of Puntarenas from the year 2015, which motivated me to buy the land, since in theory there was no impediment to building. The damage is aggravated when, before becoming the owner, I begin the municipal process to request the land use, which is granted to me in official communication MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of the year 2016; subsequently, I acquire the land, and due to various circumstances, I was unable to build that same year, and by 2017, I again make the land use request, but on this occasion the request is rejected according to official communication RES-820-10-2017 of the year 2017, being on this occasion the registered owner.
In this sense, the damage must be effective, evaluable, and individualizable, in accordance with article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, so that it can be susceptible to a claim by the Administered party. In the specific case, as has been indicated in the preceding lines, the damage stems from the economic investment made by me to buy this land, without knowing that it was within the protection boundaries of the Laguna Bonilla Wetland (Humedal Laguna Bonilla). The land, according to the purchase-sale deed, has a cost of ?7,500,000.00 colones, in addition to the impossibility of being able to build my house and the mechanical workshop, as initially requested from the Municipality, which clearly shows serious damage, as I have a piece of land that I cannot use, since according to certification SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-CERT-042-2019, issued by the Regional Director at SINAC, of the total land I bought, 72% (182 m2) must be protected because it is within the protection margins, meaning that only 28% of that land remains buildable, which makes it impossible for me to build my house and mechanical workshop in that space.
The third legal condition is the causal nexus, that is, the relationship that exists between the administrative conduct, the person or group of affected persons, and the severity of the damage caused, establishing for all legal purposes the causal nexus in this case, since it is based on the land-use authorization granted by the Municipality that I bought this land to build my house and a mechanical workshop where I could develop as a mechanic, which is what I studied for, and today I cannot carry out any of my projects, nor can I carry out any activity on that land for being a conservation area, severely affecting my life projects and my patrimony, because if the Municipality had denied the permit from the beginning, I would have bought another piece of land where construction was indeed possible. REGARDING LAWFUL CONDUCT, there is also an applicable administrative liability regime, established starting from article 194 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, provided that these acts cause serious damage to the administered party.
In this regard, this article states: "Article 194: 1. The Administration shall be responsible for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of those affected or due to the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, compensation must cover the value of the damages at the time of its payment, but not lost profits (lucro cesante). 3. The State shall be responsible for damages directly caused by a Law, which are special in accordance with this article." Specifically, the damage due to lawful conduct occurs when, in 2017, I again presented the land-use permit application to the Municipality of Puntarenas to cover (sic) the land, and the same Engineering Unit that the previous year had approved the permit, this time rejects it, indicating that this zone is a wetland zone and is not susceptible to being built upon.
In this regard, Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 from the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department indicated the following: "ZONING: It is a land located according to the Cadastral Plan (Plano Catastrado) in District 1 PUNTARENAS; which does not have the Regulatory Plan for the City of Puntarenas (Plan Regulador para la Ciudad de Puntarenas); according to (Zoning Regulation and Plan), duly approved by the Municipality of Puntarenas; however, there is an inconvenience in authorizing your requested use or activity REJECTED for being within La Laguna Bonilla sector 2. (…) SPECIAL ZONES: In the site chosen for this activity, there is no type of reserve, nor airports, nor important historical sites. The conformity of this activity is subject to compliance with the provisions of the corresponding regulations in force at the time of granting this certificate, and to the condition that any possible nuisance be completely confined within the property.
For the reasons stated above; this department informs you that the Municipal Location Resolution for Housing Construction and Automotive Workshop is REJECTED. This document is valid for one year." (The underlining is not from the original). (Evidence number 3). While it is true that this resolution conforms to the regulatory framework for wetland protection that exists in Costa Rica, the truth is that this refusal by the Administration also causes me direct, serious damage to my property right, since, although I have a piece of land registered in my name, I cannot use it by virtue of the fact that it is, for the most part, within the protection boundary, as indicated by SINAC. As is evident, the damage generated here is completely legitimate, and does not affect public order, morality, or good customs, so it also could not be framed within the exclusionary conditions of article 195 of the General Law of Public Administration.
In the same vein, if the liability analysis is performed, the three necessary conditions are present to determine the existence of administrative liability on the part of the Municipality of Puntarenas, derived from Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 from the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department, as indicated below: 1. Identification of the person to whom the damage is being caused: In this case, the only one affected by this wetland protection provision is me, since my property directly borders it and the protection zone reaches 72% of the total land, so the affectation is not to the community but to me particularly, causing me extremely serious damage by not being able to build my dwelling house and the mechanical workshop to exercise my profession as a mechanic. 2. The administrative resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 from the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipality of Puntarenas, which denies the land-use permit, so that I can build my house and the mechanical workshop to exercise my profession. 3.
The causal nexus existing between the administrative resolution of the Municipality and the legal impossibility of being able to carry out construction works on the land I acquired, having made the mistake of believing it was a suitable place to build according to what the Municipality of Puntarenas indicated to me at the time. While it is true that the administrative act is in accordance with the law, the truth is that it equally causes me serious damage, so it is requested that it be compensated, without this implying damage to the environment and the wetland. Regarding the inapplicability of the grounds for exemption from administrative liability, established in article 190 of the General Law of Public Administration, it must be stated that they are inadmissible in accordance with the following analysis: 1. Force Majeure: Force majeure is defined by doctrine as a foreseeable but inevitable natural event.
It is an event that is outside the circle of action of the obligated public entity, which is not foreseeable or, if it is, is inevitable. In the present case, it is important to establish the concept of a palustrine wetland, understood as an "ecosystem that contains water almost permanently, such as marshes, swamps, and bogs" and which, according to what was indicated by SINAC, must respect a withdrawal boundary, as a protection margin of 10 to 15 meters. In the present case, while it is true that the Laguna Bonilla Wetland is not found within the land I acquired, the truth is that the withdrawal boundary must be respected, as it is a vulnerable zone of environmental protection. This clarification is important because we cannot say that it is a fact of nature that the land cannot be used for construction, since the wetland protection boundaries are established by man. By virtue of the foregoing, this exemption from liability is not established. 2.
Fault of the Victim: The fault of the victim is a form of self-responsibility, which is why the respective Public Administration is exempt from liability, since the administered party exclusively determined the unlawful injury to their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere, having incurred a subjective fault which may be willful misconduct (dolo) or negligence (culpa), in its manifestations of neglect, imprudence, or lack of skill. This condition for exemption from liability is also not established by virtue of the fact that I bought the land after having the land-use permit authorization, approved by the Municipality of Puntarenas. In addition, the wetland boundaries were defined by SINAC since 2013 and were duly communicated to the Municipality of Puntarenas, so if the Municipality had known about the protection boundaries three years prior, the appropriate action would have been to deny the land-use permit under this argument, so that I would have been informed and could analyze whether, even in that scenario, I would buy the land, although logically I would not have bought it, since I would not be able to build there. 3.
The Act of a Third Party: The act of a third party is established when the unlawful injury is attributable to another subject of law different from a public entity, such as could be another individual (natural or legal person). A third party is understood, for this effect, as any person other than the parties in the trial or in the liability relationship. Their act causing the damage, insofar as it is foreseeable and inevitable, is an event foreign to the organization's enterprise, which serves to exempt from liability on the same grounds as ordinary force majeure. In this case, the existence of the exemption for the act of a third party could also not be alleged, since the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC), since 2013, defined what the protection boundaries of the Laguna Bonilla Wetland are and formally communicated these limitations to the Municipality, so the Municipality could not allege ignorance of these boundaries. 3- Regarding objective and subjective moral damage and loss of chance: In judgment 112, fourteen hours fifteen minutes of July fifteen, nineteen ninety-two, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice established the requirements to establish the damage and the corresponding compensation: "VI.
Not just any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For that purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to constitute a 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. The damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with actuality, as the reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profits (lucro cesante) or loss, as the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project when the process begins. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of unique, subjective concern for the injured party, though the law cannot concern itself with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility.
I bought this land with my savings and with the hope of being able to build a mechanical workshop, since I studied mechanics and I would like to dedicate myself to that; however, by virtue of the impossibility of building on that land, my dream has been frustrated. Currently, I work as a Security Officer, since I must work in this until my situation is resolved, because it is not just about fixing cars, but rather one must build a place that meets the necessary requirements to be able to carry out the work efficiently; logically this situation affects my state of mind, since I have been trying to find a solution with the Municipality for several years and I have not been able to get them to listen to me. I understand that the Municipality must comply with what the regulation establishes, regarding the protection margin of the protection boundaries because it is an environmental issue, but it is also not fair that I must assume the responsibility for the purchase of the land, if the Municipality had known since 2013 that it had to observe these boundaries when granting the permit, and despite that, it issued an administrative act contrary to the legal system, which induced me into error, by giving me a land-use permit without this being legally possible.
By virtue of the foregoing, I request the Court grant me the possibility that the Municipality of Puntarenas compensate this emotional damage, which I estimate in the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (ten million colones). On the other hand, regarding the patrimonial damage; this is generated by the purchase of a piece of land that, according to the Municipality of Puntarenas, was at that time suitable for construction, but which just one year later, the Municipality of Puntarenas considers not susceptible to construction because the land is within the protection margins of Laguna Bonilla. Logically, if at the time of carrying out the land purchase process, I had been aware of that legal limitation, I would never have bought the land in that place, because now it is as if I did not have it; I cannot build my house, I cannot build my mechanical workshop, and in general terms, I cannot carry out practically any activity, since, as certified by SETENA in 2019, the wetland protection area covers 72% of the total lot I bought, meaning it is practically impossible to use it, so evidently this limitation (which the Municipality knew about since 2013) causes me extremely serious damage that must be compensated by the Municipality of Puntarenas.
This compensation is based on the purchase-sale deed for the sum of ?7,500,000.00 colones, which was what the land initially cost. However, the Court is also asked to assess the fact that the Municipality estimated the property's value for the year 2018, at the sum of ?14,300,000.00 colones. Loss of Chance (Pérdida del Chance) or opportunity to build a dwelling and my mechanical workshop: In Costa Rica, our Magna Carta in article 41 states that "(…) all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they may have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)". It is evident that the norm at the apex of our legal system gives decisive importance to the right to reparation or compensation in our country. The loss of chance (pérdida del chance) is a concept that has been developing in Administrative Litigation matters in recent years in Costa Rica. Regarding its concept, the legal scholar Marcelo Lopez Mesa defines it as: "it encompasses all those cases in which the affected subject could have realized a profit, obtained a gain or benefit, or avoided a loss, results that were prevented by the unlawful act of a third party, thereby generating the uncertainty of knowing whether the beneficial effect would have occurred or not, creating an expectation, a probability of patrimonial advantage." (López Mesa, Marcelo.
(2008). "Responsabilidad Civil Médica y Pérdida da Chance de Curación". In Revista de Derecho de Daños. Editorial, Rubinzal-Culzoni. Buenos Aires: Argentina. p.8.) Also in this regard, Juan Manuel Prévot and Rubén Alberto Chaia define it as: "The loss of a chance can be defined as the plausible opportunity to achieve an advantage or prevent a loss, or else, as the possibility of a probable, future benefit, which integrates the faculties of action of the subject in whose favor the hope exists." (Juan Manuel Prévot, y Rubén Alberto Chaia, (2007). Pérdida de chance de curación. 1 ed. Buenos Aires: Argentina, Editorial Astrea. p.45.) This figure has the following characteristics: certain damage, personal damage, subsisting damage, and a causal relationship between the harmful conduct and the damage. Doctor Roberto Garita Navarro, in his essay El chance frustrado en los precedentes recientes de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa.
Comentarios al fallo 66-2013-VI del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo mentions the following: "The recognition of the compensability of the frustrated chance in administrative liability has as an initial barrier the consideration that simple expectations are not compensable, because they do not constitute effective damages. Such a position starts from the traditional tendency that maintains that administrative liability only emerges when damage to a subjective right of the person has been generated." Furthermore, the General Law of Public Administration in article 191 establishes: "The Administration must repair all damage caused to the subjective rights of others by faults of its servants committed during the performance of the duties of the position or on the occasion thereof, using the opportunities or means it offers, even when it is for purposes, activities, or acts foreign to said mission." In the specific case, the loss of chance is established by my frustration at not realizing the project to build a house and mechanical workshop, which is the main reason for buying the land, causing me serious damage, since I have had to set aside my personal and professional aspirations by virtue of the denial of the land-use permit.
I understand that my land is in a protection zone called Laguna Bonilla and that the Municipality acted with willful misconduct (dolosamente) by approving my land-use permit in the year 2016 and subsequently rejecting it in the year 2017, the same wetland protection boundaries existing between one year and the next, since since the year 2013 through official communication SINAC ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, the National System of Conservation Areas informed the Municipality of the boundaries and distances it had to safeguard for the protection of the wetland. Recently, in the year 2019, through certification I requested from SINAC according to official communication SINAC-ACOPAC-OSREO-CERT-042-2019, I find out that my property is 72% within the boundaries of the Palustrine Wetland Laguna Bonilla (Humedal Paulastrino Laguna Bonilla), something that the Municipality was already aware of, as I indicated previously since the year 2013.
This compensation being requested is not an unfounded request, since I carried out procedures in different institutional units in order to obtain the corresponding permits that would guarantee me the construction of the dwelling and the mechanical workshop; in this regard, I indicate the following official communications: MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017, DVOP-DI-DV-PV-2017-5521, purchase-sale contract, and mechanical studies certificates. By virtue of these considerations, I request to be granted compensation for an economic sum of 10,000,000 colones (ten million colones). LAW. I base the present process on articles 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 197, and following of the General Law of Public Administration, article 2 subsection b) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente)."
Time passed and no construction was made on the real property. Said situation not being the responsibility of my client." In the section of the brief contesting the lawsuit, the municipal representation listed articles from various regulatory bodies, without arguing anything that would allow this Court to understand how, in its opinion, each of the invoked rules would be applicable to the specific case. The exceptions of lack of right, statute of limitations (prescripción) (I. 71), and expiration (caducidad) (I. 72) were filed as preliminary objections, and it was also requested that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs.-
III.Proven facts. The following are relevant for the resolution of this matter:
IV.Unproven facts: Relevant for the resolution of the present process and as a faithful reflection of the evidence in the record once it has been assessed, the following are considered unproven facts: SOLE: The value of the property acquired in ownership by the plaintiff herein. (The absence of elements of conviction in this regard).-
V.On the regime of non-contractual civil liability of the public administration. Whenever we are dealing with parties in litigation regarding the determination of a potential patrimonial liability of the Public Administration, if the legal relationship linking the administered party with the defendant administration does not arise from the existence of a contractual instrument, the discussion revolves around what is known as non-contractual civil liability (responsabilidad civil extracontractual). Therefore, by way of introduction for the purposes of this instrument, it is necessary to refer to the elements that, in doctrine and case law, make a reproach of liability such as that requested here feasible. Within the regime of so-called non-contractual civil liability, two types are distinguished: subjective liability (responsabilidad subjetiva), established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, and objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva), governed by Article 9 of the Political Constitution, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, and Article 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública).
Regarding the subjective liability regime, Article 199 of the General Law of Public Administration establishes the liability of public servants towards third parties in proven cases of willful misconduct (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the performance of their duties or on the occasion of their fulfillment. As such, subjective liability is based exclusively on a study of the agent's state of mind regarding the existence of at least "negligence (culpa)", if not "willful misconduct (dolo)", unlike what occurs with the objective liability regime, under which liability is determined independently of the existence of such subjective elements. Under subjective liability, one is liable because one is culpable, either because the production of the damage was sought or intended, or because one acted recklessly or negligently. In observance of the foregoing, the liability of the servant to third parties falls within the scope of the subjective liability regime, consequently requiring, for all purposes of determining the existence of negligence or willful misconduct in the mind of the Administration's servant or agent, without prejudice to the other elements that must concur, such as the existence of the damage and the causal link (nexo causal) between that damage and the conduct displayed, for the reproach of attribution of liability to operate.
On the other hand, under the regime of objective liability of the public administration, unlike what happens with subjective liability, it is generated without the need to prove willful misconduct or negligence on the part of the agent causing the damage, with the accreditation, however, of the existence of "risk" being sufficient to generate it. For this reason, the notions of unlawfulness (antijuridicidad) and culpability do not operate; therefore, the principle of reversal of the burden of proof (principio de inversión de la carga de la prueba) applies for the benefit of the injured party. To this end, the alleged Public Administration causing such claimed damages (daños y perjuicios) must compensate them if its conduct effectively and efficiently generated them, unless it demonstrates some exonerating cause. Thus, the concurrence of four elements is required, namely: a) An injury (lesión), consisting of unlawful patrimonial losses (perjuicios patrimoniales antijurídicos), because the one suffering them has no duty to bear them; b) An administrative conduct to which the production of the alleged damage is linked; c) A causal link, consisting of the existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act attributed (administrative conduct) and the damage produced; and d) That there are no causes of justification (causas de justificación) to which we referred earlier, as their existence can legally disconnect the loss produced from the conduct of the public administration so that the harmful effect is not attributable, breaking the causal nexus when an exonerating situation such as force majeure (fuerza mayor), the victim's own fault (culpa de la víctima), or the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero) occurs.
The regime of patrimonial liability of the State and its institutions, provided for in Articles 9 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, is therefore essentially objective in nature. Thus, for it to arise, it is sufficient that there is an indemnifiable damage, an administrative conduct, and a causal link between both. It must be understood that it is under this type of objective criterion that liability can be attributed to the Public Administration, unlike what happens with its servants, for whom an additional, subjective criterion of attribution must be used. Furthermore, once the criteria under which it is appropriate to determine the liability of the Public Administration and/or its agents or public servants are determined, we are interested in pointing out that there is also a difference regarding the attribution criteria that operate for establishing or determining said liability in the event that we are dealing with licit or illicit, normal or abnormal activity of the Administration.
Citing Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, from his Work "Treatise on Administrative Law II, Administrative Liability" (Tratado de Derecho Administrativo II, Responsabilidad Administrativa), p. 39, it is established that: "In the system of liability without fault or for special sacrifice (sacrificio especial), liability for licit conduct or normal operation, the decisive criterion for the existence of liability of public administrations is the violation of the principle of equality in the bearing of public burdens and the consequent special damage (pequeña proporción de afectados) and abnormal damage (excepcionalidad intensa de la lesión) or the theory of risk for the hypothesis of accidental damages caused by a public administration in fulfilling the function assigned by the legal system. In the case of the system of liability for lack of service (falta de servicio) - illicit conduct or abnormal operation - the attribution criterion is, precisely, that indeterminate legal concept of 'lack of service' and the unnamed or atypical constitutional right of administered parties to receive efficient and effective public services." In liability for illicit or abnormal conduct, understood as that which opposes, infringes, or violates the legal system understood globally as written and unwritten norms, the burden of proof falls on the victim, who bears the duty to demonstrate, through the forms and evidentiary means permitted by the legal system, the lack of service, its abnormal operation, or the unlawfulness of the administrative action.
In liability for licit conduct, it has been established that even when behaviors are carried out in compliance with the legal system, they are susceptible to attributing liability to the Administration under criteria such as those mentioned supra. In cases of objective liability, the Administration's defense would lie in demonstrating that one of the causes that break the causal link indicated in Article 190, paragraph 1 of the General Law of Public Administration has intervened, whether, as indicated supra, force majeure, the act of a third party, or the act of the victim themselves. Our First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in Ruling No. 000584-F-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, stated, always in relation to objective liability, the following: "... there will be liability of the Administration provided that its normal or abnormal operation causes a damage that the victim has no duty to bear, whether patrimonial or extra-patrimonial, regardless of their subjective legal situation and the ownership or condition of power they hold, complying, of course, with the essential prerequisite of the causal link.
(...) Both the essential prerequisites and the burden of proof acquire, for example, a new nuance, which frees the affected party not only from substantial but also from procedural ties, and places the Administration in the obligatory task of rebuttal against the charges and facts attributed to it. In any case, the objective nature of the non-contractual civil liability of the Administration was clearly defined in the ruling of this Chamber No. 132 at 3:00 p.m. on August 14, 1991, for an act subsequent to the entry into force of the General Law of Public Administration, in which it stated: 'VI. Our General Law of Public Administration No. 6227 (...), as indicated by this Chamber's ruling No. 81 of 1984, when resolving the controversy over its validity, in the Seventh Title of the First Book, compiled the most modern principles based on the most authoritative doctrine and case law on the non-contractual liability of the Administration, thus establishing the direct liability of the State without the need to previously prove that the damage was caused by fault (culpa) of the official or the Administration, requiring for the indemnification to be appropriate that the damage suffered be effective, evaluable, and individualizable in relation to a person or group -Article 196-.
(...) It also establishes, exhaustively, as exonerating causes of that liability, force majeure, the victim's own fault, and the act of a third party, with the Administration bearing the burden of proving their existence, (...)'" (Highlighting is not from the original). In particular, regarding the potential liability of an entity such as the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) associated with the provision of health services under its charge, the First Chamber of the Court, in its Ruling No. 7 at 2:20 p.m. on January 13, 1995, has also indicated as follows: "(...) It is this theory of objective liability that requires that the created risk cause damage to the administered party that is susceptible to indemnification, (…). V)- To re-establish the liability of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, the causal link between the damage caused to the plaintiff and the action of said entity must be recognized, that is, between the contested act and the harmful event.
(...) The causal relationship between the act (the activity which consisted of providing medical services) and the effect (…) is clear, inescapable, and strictly referable to the defendant institution. It is not appropriate to object that the patient was or was not hypersensitive to the indicated medication, but only -as the expert stated (…)- that a risk was created which, as an exception to the common resistance of organisms, caused damage to the patient and he has no reason to bear it without -at least- being compensated for it. In summary, the risk was created by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, through its hospitals, causing damage to the patient, the current plaintiff, and, consequently, based on the aforementioned theory of risk, it must be held responsible for its action." (Highlighting is not from the original). Consequently, and in accordance with all the foregoing, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff, from a procedural standpoint, to first demonstrate the occurrence of damage or loss, and then that this is linked in a causal nexus to an administrative conduct.
Meanwhile, the defendant Administration, and only if the judicial action filed against it succeeds in the foregoing, must prove that, despite everything, some type of exonerating circumstance from liability has intervened, allowing it to affirm that such causal nexus is "broken", disconnecting that administrative conduct from the production of the harmful effect claimed in each case, thereby eliminating the basis of attribution for the patrimonial liability endorsed, leading to the rejection of the claim.-
VI.On the object of the process, in association with the theory of the case presented by the plaintiff. In order for the exposition that follows to be as clear and orderly as possible, this Court deems it important to refer to the object of the process, understood as what is sought to be granted in the judgment, for which we must indicate that this case is identical to a judicial process known in doctrine as a civil treasury case (civil de hacienda), insofar as, based on what the plaintiff's representative identified as illicit or alternatively licit conduct, the defendant Municipality is to be ordered to pay damages and/or losses (daños y/o perjuicios). On this subject, that is, the basis of attribution for the liability claimed, we must make some clarifications at the outset. In summary, the plaintiff seeks in this judgment to be granted exclusively patrimonial indemnification remedies, alleging that, prior to acquiring a property in ownership, this decision was influenced by the fact that the defendant Municipality provided him with information about the property in question, which he assumed would allow him to develop the activity he intended to carry out upon such acquisition, namely, its use as a dwelling and/or as a mechanical workshop.
Subsequently, and as a derivation of what is sought, although at some argumentative level the carrying out of illicit conduct by the defendant Municipality is also invoked as a basis for attributing such liability, which the plaintiff's own representative identified, as this Judicial Authority gathers, as those acts by virtue of which, after being informed that a specific use of the property to be acquired was consistent with the desired use, after acquiring ownership of it, he was informed otherwise. Thus, a claim for annulment, clearly preceded by a declaration that its adoption was not in conformity with the legal system, does not form part of the object of this process. Therefore, on this aspect, namely the unlawfulness of any administrative conduct serving as a basis for the attribution of administrative patrimonial liability being claimed, this Court shall make no pronouncement. To this end, the parties may consult reiterated case law emanating from the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, from which, by way of example only, its Ruling No. 002333-F-S1-2020, issued at 11:12 a.m. on September 17, 2020, must be cited, in relation to Ruling No. 000301-F-2007 at 11:15 a.m. on April 26, 2007, rulings under the terms of which it is determined that what is sought in the judicial process to be granted in the judgment constitutes a limit on the Judicial Authority regarding what to make pronouncements on, or not, in the judgment.
Having said the above, and at the outset, regarding the unlawfulness raised as a basis for attributing the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration being claimed, understood as whether or not the Municipal entity's actions in the specific case were in conformity - it is reiterated - we shall make no pronouncement whatsoever, simply because no claim for annulment is the object of this cause. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's representative argued and petitioned based on attributing patrimonial liability to the public Administration from the carrying out of licit conduct, which, as we shall see below, will be appropriate, only under the terms to be stated.-
VII.On the partial approval of the lawsuit. As a result of a comprehensive analysis in assessing the evidence in the record that has been deemed relevant and appropriate, this Court is of the opinion that, in this specific case, the partial approval of the lawsuit must be decreed, all based on the following considerations.-
"Regarding the existence of a protection zone in the wetland, I inform you that according to certification SINAC-GASP-349-10, which is attached, the Bonilla wetland currently corresponds to a palustrine wetland, affected by anthropogenic activities. Therefore, pursuant to Article 33, subsection c, of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal) 7575 of February 5, 1996, and the applicability of Protection Areas with respect to lagoon-type wetland ecosystems, the 50-meter protection area for lakes and natural reservoirs only applies to lacustrine wetlands and not to palustrine wetlands, as is the case. It is for this reason and in accordance with said certification, that it is recommended to respect a protection zone of 10 to 15 meters in this wetland." (Highlighting and underlining not in the original). Subsequently and consequently, as of 2013, the defendant Municipality had the necessary documentation that determined from that time, through a map with coordinates preceded by the preparation of a polygon that identified the wetland called "Laguna Bonilla," detailing its limits and the existence of protection zones in the sector of that wetland and its protection radius.
The foregoing being so, in the terms of the public deed identified as No. 126, formalized before the Notary who, in the respective testimony, was identified as Notary Public Pablo Fernando Ramos Vargas, on November 9, 2016, the plaintiff herein purchased for the sum of ₡7,500,000.00 (seven million five hundred thousand exact colones) from the company called Inversiones Jojo Sociedad Anónima, money which its representative stated having received to satisfaction, the property that was described as follows: "registered property, Party of Puntarenas, real folio registration number twenty-five thousand four hundred sixty-six, zero zero zero, which is pasture land in nature, located in District one Puntarenas, Canton one, Puntarenas, of the Province of Puntarenas. Bordered on the north: Alberto Echandía (sic) Highway, with the Pacific Railroad in between, with a frontage of eleven meters, South and East: José Ángel Retana faults; West: Succession of [Name 001].
It measures two hundred seventy-four meters with ninety-eight square decimeters. Cadastral plan number P-zero zero two five three one six - one thousand nine hundred ninety-two," free of liens and annotations. (The text of the testimony of the mentioned public deed appears at images 54 through 56 of the judicial file). Subsequently, the respective testimony of the deed related in the previously proven fact identified as 2), was registered in the National Registry, Real Property Section, on November 21, 2016 (image 56 of the judicial file containing the corresponding stamp affixed by the respective registrar), a moment from which the property of interest became registered domain of the plaintiff herein. On the other hand, and this is of fundamental importance, prior to the plaintiff herein making the decision to purchase the related property, he requested the defendant Municipality to indicate the permitted use of the property to be acquired, based on whether its use as a dwelling house and to develop activity in the operation of a mechanical workshop was permitted, to which said municipal entity, in the terms of resolution identified as No. MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, responded as follows, in what is relevant: "...
For the reasons stated above; this department informs you that the Municipal Location Resolution for the Construction of Housing and Automotive Workshop is granted. This document is valid for one year." (Highlighting and underlining not in the original. Uncontroverted fact, in association with images 28 and 29 of the judicial file, and folios 07 and 08, 56 and 57, all of the administrative file). Subsequently, and having the plaintiff herein such information formally provided by the municipal entity in the stated terms, this Court has concluded as a proven fact based on the rules of the most simple rational logic and experience, that he required such information directly from the Municipality prior to purchasing, undoubtedly because his decision to purchase was conditioned, in its subjective effects within the framework of the principle of autonomy of will, on the ability to indeed give the property to be acquired the desired use as a dwelling house and mechanical workshop in the future; therefore, it must also be admitted that it was on the basis of the content and scope of what was ordered by the defendant Municipality in resolution identified as No. MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016, that he decided to carry out the purchase based on the intended purpose or use he wished to give the property in question.
Subsequently, the plaintiff herein again formulated a request to the defendant Municipality in the same sense, namely, to indicate whether the use of the property of interest as a dwelling house and mechanical workshop was permitted, to which, by Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 issued by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control on October 31, 2017, said request was now rejected, on the grounds that it was determined that the property is located within the "Laguna Bonilla," sector 2, in the following terms: "ZONING: It is a lot located according to the Cadastral Plan in District 1 PUNTARENAS; which does not have the Regulatory Plan for the City of Puntarenas; according to (Regulation and Zoning Plan), duly approved by the Municipality of Puntarenas; however, there is an objection to authorizing the requested use or activity, REJECTED because it is within La Laguna Bonilla sector 2.
(...). SPECIAL ZONES: In the site chosen for this activity, there is no type of reserve, nor airports, nor important historical sites. The conformity of this activity is subject to compliance with the provisions of the corresponding regulations in force at the time of granting this certificate, and to any possible nuisance being completely confined within the property." (Uncontroverted fact, in relation to images 30 and 31 of the judicial file, folios 65 and 66 of the administrative file). We must pause to indicate that, consequently, as we noted earlier, if according to the content of the official communication from the Esparza-Orotina Sub-Regional Office, of the Central Pacific Conservation Area of the National System of Conservation Areas identified as No. ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013 dated April 30, 2013, the limits and protection radius of the Laguna Bonilla wetland, including, because no other conclusion can be reached, its "sector 2," were or came to the knowledge of the defendant Municipality since that year (2013), the information or authorized use in relation to the use of this property in question, by resolution identified as No. MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, for the construction of housing and an automotive workshop, did not correspond either to the information the defendant Municipality already possessed in this regard, or to the legal regime that conditioned the use of that property, in the case of one whose surface overlapped with a wetland.
In other words, this administrative act was issued absolutely in non-conformity with the legal system, both in factual-material terms and in legal terms, with the clear effects derived therefrom affecting the plaintiff herein, in the exercise of his autonomy of will, in his purchase decision—a decision which, in this line of thought, with absolute clarity, was influenced by an error of fact regarding the object of acquisition, and an error of law. This was reinforced by the fact that, also subsequently, again in response to a request made by the plaintiff herein to the defendant Municipality, now in the terms of the official communication identified as No. MP-DPUC-094-02-2018 of February 5, 2018, issued by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the defendant Municipality, he was informed as follows: "In relation to your request for a Municipal Location Resolution for the construction of a dwelling and a mechanical workshop located on the property to be mentioned, I am writing to inform you (sic) of the conditions in which the site chosen for this activity finds itself regarding: Zoning: It is a lot located according to the cadastral plan in District 1 Puntarenas; which does not have a Regulatory Plan for the city of Puntarenas; however, there is an objection to authorizing your use or activity, REJECTED because it is within Laguna Bonilla, Sector 2, according to the review made in the Cadastre." (Highlighting not in the original.
See the documentation at images 36 and 37 of the judicial file, in relation to folios 05 and 06 of the administrative file). Finally, against this last resolution, the plaintiff herein filed the ordinary remedies of revocation and appeal in subsidy, of which the revocation was rejected, based in essence on the following: "The rejection of this revocation appeal is due to the fact that although the municipal location resolutions were granted for the indicated works to be carried out, through official communications No. PUC-RES-429-08-2015 dated 08/17/2015 in the name of Nancy Melissa Blanco Rojas and No. MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 dated 10/11/2016, in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, located on the property with Cadastral Plan No. P-253316-1992 and registered with Real Folio No. 25466-000; these last two official communications, No. MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dated 10/31/2017 in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz and official communication No. MP-DPUC-RES-094-02-2018 dated 02/05/2018, also in the name of this same person, on the same property and in the same aforementioned place, were indeed rejected because before the Cadastre-Valuation-Real Property Department, it was confirmed that this property is located within the Laguna Bonilla polygon; that is, it is within Laguna Bonilla, Sector No. 2.
This according to the technical study prepared by SINAC-MINAE in accordance with official communication ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, and also other subsequent resolutions that SINAC has made at the site known as Laguna Bonilla"; while the appeal, to this date, has not been resolved. (Highlighting and underlining not in the original. Uncontroverted fact, in association with images 40 through 45 of the judicial file and the document identified as official communication No. MP-DPUC-OF-017-02-2018 of February 21, 2018, by which the mentioned revocation appeal was rejected by the Department of Urban Planning and Construction Control of the Municipality of Puntarenas, appearing at folios 81 and 82 of the administrative file, consisting of 2 folios). This Court confirms, reinforces, and reiterates that once the plaintiff herein was told, prior to purchasing the property, that it could be used as a dwelling house and mechanical workshop, he was later told no, based on information about this property that was at its disposal and a legal duty to observe since long before, since the year 2013.
In conclusion, for this Panel of judges, it has become absolutely clear as a proven fact that it was because the plaintiff herein purchased the property of interest on the basis that he could use it to build a dwelling house and/or a mechanical workshop, having first been authorized for said activity and then, after acquiring ownership of the property of interest, denied the same by the defendant Municipality, that he suffered a subjective moral damage consisting of feelings, in essence, of frustration derived from the plan he envisioned to acquire the property, and at least, anger and sadness. (The rules of human experience).-
3.1. On the patrimonial liability of the Public Administration derived from the adoption of lawful conduct. We consider it relevant to cite, for these purposes, what was stated in part by the Constitutional Chamber in its Ruling No. 2009-013606, issued at 14:57 hrs. on August 26, 2009: "IV.- CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY. (...). The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which, if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered parties and unjustly suffered by them.
(...) V.- ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY IN THE SOCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW. The liability of public administrations for the exercise of the administrative function forms part, as we have verified in the preceding recital, of the constitutional conception of these. It is a key and essential piece of the social and democratic Rule of Law, given the ends to which a regime of administrative liability tends. In general, the basic function of administrative liability is the reparation or compensation for unlawful injuries caused to an administered party (victim or injured party) in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere by a public entity in the exercise of the administrative function. One of its classic and traditional purposes is to serve as a control or guarantee for the substantial legal situations of administered parties that are injured by a public entity in the exercise of its competencies or in the provision of public services expressly assigned by the Constitution or the law.
Administrative liability together with the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (Article 49 of the Political Constitution), are the key pieces of a Constitutional State for the defense of administered parties against the formal and material prerogatives and privileges that the Constitution itself provides to public entities for the fulfillment of their tasks. This purpose determines that the constitutional principle of administrative liability must be strengthened and accentuated through an extensive and not restrictive interpretation; likewise, the legislator, when developing the systems of administrative liability, must adapt to the constitutional parameter of objective and direct administrative liability, being forbidden from establishing administrative conduct that is exempt or immune to this, thereby undermining the fundamental compensatory rights and the right to the proper functioning of public services held by all administered parties." The enactment of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) resolved the legal vacuum that existed to be able to claim liability against the State in a judicial venue.
Article 1 of said Law provides that the Administration (understood in a broad sense as the State and other public entities) shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. The norm introduces the concept of objective State liability, that is, that which does not examine the conduct of the official regarding the extremes of their culpability but rather bases liability on the mere verification of the damage and that it was produced by the activity of the Administration. This is the line followed by Article 190 of the Law on Public Administration. Objective liability occurs, then, without the need to prove the intent or fault of the party causing the damage; the risk itself is sufficient to generate it. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are necessary: 1) Injury or existence of an unlawful damage, which consists of unlawful patrimonial effects, insofar as the person suffering them has no duty to bear them.
Those justifying causes must be provided for in the legal system itself, such that their application is a typical consequence of that normative set (e.g., tax collection, preservation of morality and good customs, article 195 of the General Law). Additionally, this damage must have the characteristics of being effective, economically assessable, and individualizable. By effective, it must be understood that the damage is certain, and not merely eventual or possible. It is also necessary that it can be valued in economic terms, for the purpose of equitably setting the amount of compensation. Finally, it must be individualizable, which implies that it is specific to a person or group of persons; that is, the damage must be singular and not constitute a common burden that all individuals must bear. The regulation contained in the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) concerning the scenarios in which compensation for damage is appropriate distinguishes two issues: whether we are facing unlawful or abnormal activity of the Administration (articles 190, 191, and 192) or lawful or normal activity.
Normally, unlawfulness is related to the breach of legal system rules applicable to the Administration, while abnormality refers to an examination of its material activity or service provision. In this scenario, a transgression of the legal system has occurred, which means that the claim for the injury suffered includes not only the damage as such but also the corresponding loss (in relation to article 10.3 of the Law Regulating the Jurisdiction (Ley Reguladora de la Jurisdicción)). The Royal Spanish Academy defines the term damage (daño) as "detriment, loss, impairment, pain, or discomfort" and lost profit (lucro cesante) as the "[Profit foregone as a consequence of the non-fulfillment of an obligation, the breach of a duty, or a legitimate patrimonial sacrifice]." On the other hand, we have liability for lawful conduct and normal functioning, which presupposes a specific assessment of the injury caused by the Administration's actions.
Liability for lawful conduct is an exception to the rule, which is liability for unlawful conduct of the Administration. This scenario involves legal actions by the Administration that nevertheless cause impairment to the administered party's legal sphere. It is said that if the Administration, acting legitimately, affects the right of an individual which is also legitimate, the principle of equality before public burdens obliges its compensation. In this scenario, the damage is qualified as "special," either due to the "small proportion of affected parties" or "because of the exceptional intensity of the injury" (article 194 of the General Law). The basis for this concept was explained in the Legislative Assembly by the D.O.O. in the following terms: "This arises from the principle we explained yesterday of the so-called public law compensation, for a lawful act or normal functioning of the Administration.
But here it is clearly established under what conditions this compensation will be admitted, only when those affected by the normal functioning or the lawful act are very few or the injury inflicted is exceptionally serious. Extraordinary or abnormal in relation to the members of the rest of the community. (...) We say that when it comes to very few, or to a very intense grievance or damage, this compensation should be applied. We must recognize that this has a certain margin of indeterminacy. How many are few and how many are many? This is something that will fundamentally be left to judicial appreciation. When the injury inflicted is very intense or extraordinary or abnormal, this is something that will be left to the judge's appreciation. But in reality, it is a risk, and we believe that all laws run it. The second paragraph simply states the following, when the doctrine of this type of liability holds the following principle: When an administered party's property is damaged by a lawful act or normal functioning, the Administration must restore the owner to the prior state regarding that property, not to the financial status they would have had if the property had not suffered the damage, because it is considered that this is a liability that is a sanction, (...), but rather an act of justice to compensate a citizen for the sacrifice they made for the benefit of the community.
So, with the same spirit of solidarity, a loss of their losses is imposed on the citizen, albeit limited, in the sense that lost profit (lucro cesante) cannot be claimed. The doctrine usually formulates this rule by saying: the damage to the injured property is compensated, the damage caused to the owner is not compensated. It may be that the damage to the injured property is less than that caused to the owner. When the owner, as a consequence of the injury, has foregone certain profits. In that case, it is not compensated. (...) In these cases, the State acts in an act of social solidarity and justice with the individual..." (QUIROS CORONADO, R., General Public Administration Act, Concorded and Annotated with the Legislative Debate and Constitutional Jurisprudence (Ley General de la Administración Pública, Concordada y Anotada con el Debate Legislativo y la Jurisprudencia Constitucional), S.J., Aselex S.A., 1996, p. 295).
This exposition amply explains the reasons why it was considered appropriate that in scenarios of lawful or normal conduct, only the damage should be compensated, not the lost profit (lucro cesante), i.e., the profit foregone due to the activity carried out by the Administration. In the opinion of this Court, such arguments remain valid to date. The individual whom the Administration must compensate by virtue of damage caused by unlawful or abnormal conduct is not in the same situation as the one who must be compensated for lawful or normal conduct. While this latter scenario is justified by the principle of equality before public burdens, according to which the individual does not have to exclusively bear the damage generated by legitimate conduct, this does not mean that they must also be compensated for the profits foregone. In such scenarios, the remedy must be limited to the objective value of the right sacrificed and the direct damages that occur as a consequence of the State's action.
Hence, hypothetical profits, lost profit (lucro cesante), and subjective elements that could influence the valuation of the limited right are not compensable. Article 195 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) clearly establishes that "... Neither the State nor the Administration shall be liable, even if they cause special damage in the foregoing terms, when the injured interest is not legitimate or is contrary to public policy, morality, or good customs, even if said interest was not expressly prohibited before or at the time of the harmful act...". We thus see how public policy constitutes an exonerating cause for the Administration's liability. In ruling 3173-93, this Court endeavored to specify the limits of that concept, inherently indeterminate as it is, and stated: "II.- The fundamental rights of each person must coexist with each and every one of the fundamental rights of others; therefore, for the sake of coexistence, it is often necessary to curtail the exercise of those rights and freedoms, even if only to the precise and necessary extent for others to enjoy them under equal conditions.
However, the principle of the coexistence of public freedoms—the right of third parties—is not the only just source for imposing limitations on them; the concepts of 'morality,' conceived as the set of fundamental principles and beliefs prevailing in society, the violation of which seriously offends the generality of its members, and 'public policy,' also act as justifying factors for limitations on fundamental rights." The underlining and highlighting are not from the original). Having said the foregoing, the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública) provides, in relevant part, that: "Article 190.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, save for force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. / 2. The Administration shall be liable in accordance with this article, even when it cannot be held liable under the following sections of this Chapter, but the liability for a lawful act or normal functioning shall only arise under the terms of the following Third Section." (The highlighting is not from the original).
In the third section referred to in the article we have transcribed, the following is provided: "Article 194.- 1. The Administration shall be liable for its lawful acts and for its normal functioning when they cause damage to the rights of the administered party in a special manner, due to the small proportion of affected parties or the exceptional intensity of the injury. 2. In this case, the compensation must cover the value of the damages at the time of their payment, but not lost profit (lucro cesante). 3. The State shall be liable for damages caused directly by a law, which are special in accordance with this article." "Article 195.- Neither the State nor the Administration shall be liable, even if they cause special damage in the foregoing terms, when the injured interest is not legitimate or is contrary to public policy, morality, or good customs, even if said interest was not expressly prohibited before or at the time of the harmful act." Thus: The legal system allows access to compensation, even on the basis—as will be seen, which is the one that mediates in the present case—that the administrative conduct that is the efficient cause or origin of the damage or harmful effect is lawful, that is, adopted in conformity with the legal system, provided that certain requirements are met, namely, that such impact affects the administered party in a special way, i.e., qualified or reinforced by the fact that they form part of a "small proportion of affected parties" and/or, as applicable, that the "intensity" of such impact can be qualified as exceptional in degree—we understand—to the intensity with which the injury to the legal right in question is suffered; yet, without covering lost profit (lucro cesante) because it concerns compensation for the sacrifice made under these circumstances for the public good or common welfare, nothing more, so that the compensation in these cases is not full.- 3.2.- Regarding liability for lawful conduct derived from administrative acts adopted by the defendant Municipality.
We must return to the facts that have been taken as proven in the present case to indicate that, at a first level of analysis, in the terms of the official letter from the Esparza, Orotina Sub Regional Office, of the Central Pacific Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Pacífico Central) of the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC) identified as N° ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013 dated April 30, 2013, addressed to the Directorate of Urban Development and Control of the Municipality of Puntarenas, received by the latter in that same year, said Municipality was informed through that office, in relevant part, of the detail of the limits and the existence of a protection zone in the sector of the wetland (humedal) called "Laguna Bonilla," once a technical and scientific team composed of officials from the OSREO, ACOPAC, and the National Wetlands Commission (Comisión Nacional de Humedales) defined the same, a polygon prepared by them identifying the wetland (humedal) of interest (which was attached to the defendant Municipality here "in paper and digitally," with the warning that, according to article 33, subsection c) of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) 7575 of February 5, 1996, and the applicability of Protection Areas with respect to wetland ecosystems of the type called Laguna, it was recommended to respect a protection zone of 10 to 15 meters in this wetland (humedal)." (Uncontested fact, in conjunction with the documentary evidence found in images 22 to 25 of the judicial file).
That the plaintiff here, interested in acquiring ownership of a real property located within the territory where the defendant Municipality exercises its competencies as Local Government, prior to making the decision to "buy it," requested the defendant Municipality to indicate the permitted use for the property to be acquired, based on whether its use as a dwelling house and for carrying out an auto repair shop business was permitted, in response to which said municipal entity, in the terms of resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, replied to the plaintiff here as follows, in relevant part: "... For the reasons stated above; this department informs you that the Municipal Location Resolution for the Construction of a Dwelling and Auto Repair Shop is granted. This document is valid for one year." (Uncontested fact, in conjunction with images 28 and 29 of the judicial file, and folios 07 and 08, 56 and 57, all from the administrative file).
Two things must be asserted from the foregoing: first, that through this administrative act issued, according to how the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice has defined it, with the character, regarding its legal nature, of an act generating subjective rights (for which, should it later be determined that its issuance was in non-conformity with the legal system, the Municipal Administration had to observe the principle of non-derogability of its own acts of this kind, without prejudice to the administrative procedure or jurisdictional avenue provided for its legal suppression); and second, that it illegitimately subjected the validity of such act, in gross non-observance of the jurisprudence of the related Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice, to a deadline, whether or not any variation had occurred in the applicable urban regulations or an event of nature that changed the conditions of the property, all in accordance with the regularization of the municipal zoning applicable to the matter.
On this last aspect, this Court must clarify that even though the analysis to be addressed will start from the appropriateness of the patrimonial liability of the defendant Public Administration based on the imputation basis of the adoption of lawful conduct, resorting to principles of justice and equity, as well as to the provisions of the numerals of the Civil Code, 21 which reads as follows: "Rights must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of good faith"; and 22, which reads as follows: "The law does not protect the abuse of rights or the antisocial exercise thereof. Every act or omission in a contract, which, by the intention of its author, by its purpose, or by the circumstances in which it is carried out, manifestly exceeds the normal limits of the exercise of a right, causing damage to a third party or to the counterparty, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and to the adoption of judicial or administrative measures that prevent the persistence of the abuse"; this judicial Authority shall not recognize any effectiveness to the administrative act of interest in what subjected its effects to a period of validity, for which it will suffice to say, given the manner in which the defendant Municipality acted in this regard, that it entered into collusion and frontal non-observance of the provisions of numeral 13 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), based on the Ruling issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice identified as N° 4336 at 2:24 p.m. on June 4, 1999, which we already cited earlier in this judgment, according to which the high Court of Constitutional control indicated, in relevant part, that: "The land-use certificate issued validly is not subject to temporal validity, as long as the Master Plan is not modified." (The underlining and highlighting are not from the original).
Consequently, whether or not the validity and/or nullity of such act is the subject of this present litigation, solely in this respect what it provided regarding a period of validity shall not be applied by this Court, lest it thereby condones an abusive or antisocial use of the right, if the Municipal Administration deemed it appropriate to limit the effects of its action in terms of temporality in the manner it did—without legal basis or not—as at least an abuse of right would be clear if it were admitted that the Public Administration is the holder of rights, or as applicable, of powers of authority, whereupon we insist, we see no inconsistency in the reasoning applied by this Chamber of Judges. Another consequence of the foregoing is that any argument put forward by the municipal representation in the present case based on the assertion that the validity period of this administrative act was set at one year, within which, it said, a construction license had to be requested, is irrelevant and futile.
Continuing, it must also be noted that from the issuance of this administrative act generating subjective rights (according to the opinion of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)), a real expectation was undoubtedly generated in its applicant that the property consulted regarding its use could later be destined for use as a dwelling house and/or as an auto repair shop. It is in this context, given on the factual level, that it was determined in the present case that prior to the decision adopted by the plaintiff here to buy the property of interest, it was based on the content and scope of what was provided by the defendant Municipality in resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 that he decided to materialize its purchase, based on the purpose or use he desired to give it as a dwelling house and auto repair shop; and so it was that he subsequently bought this property, as it was also demonstrated that after the issuance of the administrative act in question, and in the terms of public deed N° 126, executed before the Notary Public identified in the respective testimony as Notary Public Pablo Fernando Ramos Vargas, on November 9, 2016, the plaintiff here bought for the sum of ₡7,500,000.00 (seven million five hundred thousand exact colones) from the company called Inversiones Jojo Sociedad Anónima, whose representative stated they had received to their satisfaction, the property described as follows: "farm registered in ownership, District of Puntarenas, real folio registration number twenty-five thousand four hundred sixty-six, zero zero zero, which is pasture land in nature, located in District One Puntarenas, Canton One, Puntarenas, of the Province of Puntarenas.
Boundaries on the north: Carretera Alberto Echandía (sic) with the Ferrocarril al Pacífico in between, with a frontage of eleven meters, South and East: José Ángel Retana fallas; West: Sucesión de [Name 001]. It measures two hundred seventy-four meters and ninety-eight square decimeters. Cadastral map number P-zero zero two five three one six - nineteen ninety-two", free of liens and annotations. (Images 54 to 56 of the judicial file). The respective testimony of the deed related in the previous proven fact was registered in the National Registry, Real Property Section, on November 21, 2016, the plaintiff here being the registered owner of said property from that moment onwards. (Image 56 of the judicial file, in relation to folio 78 of the administrative file, as well as 85 and 86 of the administrative file). Regarding the attributes of ownership, it suffices to indicate, in relevant part, that according to the Civil Code in its article 264: "The ownership or absolute property over a thing comprises the rights: 1st.- Of possession; 2nd.- Of usufruct; 3rd.- Of transformation and alienation; 4th.- Of defense and exclusion; and 5th.- Of restitution and compensation." (The highlighting is not from the original).
Now then, completely regardless of whether within one year or not after the issuance by the defendant Municipality of resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, by which the plaintiff here was informed that the property in question could indeed be used as a dwelling house and/or auto repair shop, after the purchase he made of it, he again filed a request with the defendant Municipality in an identical sense, i.e., to be informed whether the property of interest was permitted for use as a dwelling house and auto repair shop, in response to which, now, said request was addressed in a completely contrary sense by Resolution MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 issued by the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department on October 31, 2017, by which said request was rejected based on the determination, based on information the Municipality had possessed since 2013, that the property is located within the "Laguna Bonilla", sector 2".
(Uncontested fact, in relation to images 30 and 31 of the judicial file, folios 65 and 66 of the administrative file). Having the plaintiff here acquired by purchase the property of interest, in relevant part, based on the information directly provided to him by the defendant Municipality through resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, and the expectation derived therefrom that generated certainty or, at least legal certainty in the plaintiff here that at the site of interest he could build a dwelling and/or auto repair shop subsequently, again in response to a request made by him before the defendant Municipality, now in the terms of official letter N° MP-DPUC-094-02-2018 of February 5, 2018, issued by the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the defendant Municipality, he was informed as follows: "Regarding your request for a Municipal Location Resolution for the construction of a dwelling and auto repair shop located in the aforementioned property, I hereby inform you (sic) of the conditions of the site chosen for this activity regarding: Zoning: It is a terrain located according to the cadastral map in District 1 Puntarenas; which does not have a Zoning Plan for the city of Puntarenas; however, there is an inconvenience in authorizing your use or activity REJECTED because it is within the Laguna Bonilla, Sector 2, according to the review conducted in the Cadastre." (The highlighting is not from the original.
See images 36 and 37 of the judicial file, in relation to folios 05 and 06 of the administrative file). The defendant Municipality thus surprised the plaintiff here, after formally informing him before he bought the property of interest that its use as a dwelling house and/or auto repair shop was permitted, then informing him after he had bought it that on said property, such use was not permitted, quite apart from the fact that, according to the jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) of the Supreme Court of Justice which we have already analyzed above, as a legal requirement for the official letter N° MP-DPUC-094-02-2018 of February 5, 2018, to have been able to be adopted—by which the previous official letter issued as N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, on the basis of which the plaintiff here bought the property of interest, was tacitly disavowed or suppressed—no administrative procedure or judicial action aimed at declaring the nullity of an administrative act generating a subjective right took place.
All this notwithstanding, what is clear is, assuming that both acts, but particularly the one identified as N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, maintains its validity and consequently its effectiveness, the fact is that based on the provisions of this latter act, the will of the plaintiff here, exercised under the principle, pardon the redundancy, of autonomy of will, directed at buying the property in question, was emptied of content, by which he was clearly induced into error, in the terms that will be explained below. Continuing with the facts that in this case have been taken as proven, against this last resolution, the plaintiff here filed the ordinary remedies of reconsideration and subsidiary appeal, of which the reconsideration was rejected, based in essence on the following: "The rejection of this remedy of reconsideration is because, although the municipal location resolutions for the works to be carried out indicated were granted, through official letters N° PUC-RES-429-08-2015 dated 08/17/2015 in the name of Nancy Melissa Blanco Rojas and N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 dated 10/11/2016, in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz, located on the property with Cadastral Map N° P-253316-1992 and registered under Real Folio N° 25466-000; these last two official letters, N° MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dated 10/31/2017 in the name of Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz and official letter N° MP-DPUC-RES-094-02-2018, dated 02/05/2018, also in the name of this same person, for the same property and in the same place cited above, were indeed rejected because before the Department of Valuation Cadastre-Real Property, it was confirmed that this property is located within the Laguna Bonilla polygon; that is, it is within the Laguna Bonilla, Sector N° 2.
This according to the technical study conducted by SINAC-MINAE according to official letter ACOPAC-OSREO-531-2013, and in addition to other subsequent resolutions made by SINAC at the site known as Laguna Bonilla"; while regarding the appeal, to this date it has not been resolved. (Uncontested fact, in conjunction with images 40 to 45 of the judicial file and the document identified as official letter N° MP-DPUC-OF-017-02-2018 of February 21, 2018, by which the mentioned reconsideration remedy was rejected by the Urban Planning and Construction Control Department of the Municipality of Puntarenas, which appears at folios 81 and 82 of the administrative file, consisting of 2 folios). The defendant Public Administration is reinforced or confesses, in the sense that, notwithstanding first informing the plaintiff here that the use of the property as a dwelling house and/or auto repair shop was permitted, it later resolved the same request in the opposite sense based on information it had possessed since 2013, that is, information it was aware of prior to the first request made in this regard by the plaintiff here and on the basis of which he proceeded to buy the property in question.
The damage generated to the plaintiff here is obvious, for which it will suffice to say that the defendant Municipality induced him into error, both of fact regarding the property he bought, and of law concurrently, by informing him that a certain use of it was permitted and then resolving the contrary. Without the seller of this property having intervened in the present case, it is not superfluous, simply for greater abundance of reasoning, to recall that the Civil Code establishes in its numeral 1015 that: "A contract consented to by error is voidable: 1st.- When it concerns the kind of act or contract being entered into. 2nd.- When it concerns the identity of the specific thing in question, or its substance or essential quality." (The highlighting is not from the original).
Based on a logical-rational process founded on hypothetical suppression, then, the following question must be answered: if the defendant Municipality, in the terms of resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-698-10-2016 of October 11, 2016, had informed the plaintiff here that the use of the property in question could not be authorized for housing and/or for a mechanic workshop, would the plaintiff have purchased it regardless? The logical and necessary answer is no, because he himself directly inquired before buying whether those activities were permitted on the site or not. This has led this Court to establish that whether or not the plaintiff was in a position to build on the surface area of interest to develop those activities, the relevant point is that it was with the certainty the Municipal Authority provided at the time—that these activities could be carried out—that he decided, in the exercise of his free will (autonomía de la voluntad), to buy, based on a factual and legal basis that ultimately turned out to be false.
The Municipality later informed him, based on information it had known since 2013, that such use was not permitted in that specific location, given its legal nature as a wetland. For this Court, it is clear that as a result of the actions of the defendant municipal corporation, a defect was caused in the will of the plaintiff here, due to an error of fact and of law regarding the identity and legal nature of the property he bought. Furthermore, if the Municipality had correctly informed the plaintiff when it should have, he would not have made the decision to purchase it. Finally, all the prerequisites that make a claim like the one partially filed, of a patrimonial compensatory nature, are present in this case. First, because there is the existence of a damage identified as the payment of a sum of money for the purchase of a property, regarding which the plaintiff here had been assured, for the purpose of legal certainty, that he could use it as a dwelling and/or mechanic workshop.
After acquiring ownership of the property, he was informed otherwise, thus frustrating the reason for a purchase that was built on the legal certainty that the Municipality originally provided to the plaintiff here, with information that, had he known it at the time he originally requested it, would have led him not to buy. All of the foregoing was through the adoption of administrative acts that undoubtedly are and were the cause of the harmful effect, which is or was constituted by the sum of money paid to the seller for the acquisition of the property regarding which the Municipality at the time gave the plaintiff here certainty of the use he could legitimately give it, this information being false. Thus, the existence of a damage and its causal link with a formal administrative conduct attributable to the defendant Municipality is determined.
Finally, regarding the patrimonial liability of the defendant Municipality in this specific case for the deployment of lawful formal administrative conduct, pursuant to Article 194 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), the following prerequisites also concur insofar as the tenor of the administrative acts analyzed conditioned the plaintiff's free will (autonomía de la voluntad), inducing him into an error of fact and of law regarding the property he bought. The investment he made constitutes an indemnifiable damage caused by lawful conduct deployed by the defendant Municipality because the damage was produced in violation of his right to choose to buy, a) in a special manner, given the exceptionality of the damage, in this case caused—only for the purposes of this analysis—by the investment made to acquire ownership of the property for which the use that motivated its acquisition could not be given, based on the information provided by the defendant Municipality itself, and b) by the small proportion of people affected, because the acts generating the harmful effect were only directed at his sphere of subjective rights. Consequently, the Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay the damages caused to the plaintiff here, produced in a causal link with the administrative acts analyzed here, only in the terms that follow.-
VIII.On the indemnification items. The plaintiff seeks to be granted the following in the judgment: 2. Order the Municipality of Puntarenas to pay ¢10,000,000.00 colones for subjective moral damages. 3. Order the Municipality of Puntarenas to pay 14,000,000.00 colones for patrimonial damages, equivalent to the value of the acquired land. 4. Order the Municipality of Puntarenas to pay ¢10,000,000.00 colones for the lost chance (pérdida del chance), derived from the impossibility of opening the mechanic workshop. 5. Grant the indexation (indexación) on the awarded amounts, as well as the interest generated until effective payment. 6. Order the defendant to pay the costs of this proceeding."
VII.On the exceptions. The representation of the Municipality of Puntarenas filed in defense of said entity the exceptions of lack of right, prescription, expiration, and also requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its items and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs. Regarding the exception of expiration, it is rejected. Suffice it to indicate to the municipal representation that, according to the provisions of Article 39.1.a of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it operates with respect to judicial actions filed in this venue aimed at the nullity of a formal conduct adopted by the defendant Public Administration, which is alien to the object of this proceeding. Regarding the exception of prescription, pursuant to Article 41, in relation to Article 198 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública): "The right to claim indemnification from the Administration shall prescribe in four years, counted from the event that motivates the liability." In this case, the generating event of the liability claimed was identified by Resolution N° MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 issued by the Departament of Urban Planning and Construction Control on October 31, 2017.
Therefore, given that this judicial proceeding began in 2019 and that the resolution that allowed the action to proceed was notified to the defendant Municipality on October 15, 2019, according to the respective notification record, a period exceeding the mentioned four years has not been computed, which necessitates the rejection of the exception. (Image 60, in relation to 67, both from the judicial file). Finally, regarding the exception of lack of right, the parties must abide by the analysis carried out by this Court regarding the merits of this case; it was determined that the plaintiff has the right to access what was petitioned, but only in part, therefore said exception is accepted, and it must be understood as rejected in everything not expressly granted.-
VIII.On the costs. In accordance with Article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. The losing party in this case has been the Municipality of Puntarenas, without it being the criterion of this Court that any circumstance or prerequisite existed to justify exonerating it from said order under subsections a) and b) of the related article, or under Article 194 of the same legal body. Consequently, said municipality is ordered to pay both costs in favor of the plaintiff here. The corresponding amount of the costs shall be defined by the competent Judge in the sentence execution phase at the request of the prevailing party.-
POR TANTO
The evidence offered for better resolution by both parties is rejected. The exceptions of prescription and expiration are rejected. The exception of lack of right is partially accepted, and must be understood as rejected in everything expressly granted. The lawsuit filed by Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz against the Municipality of Puntarenas is partially granted. The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay in favor of Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the current value of the property of which he is today the owner in title, identified as that inscribed in the Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, with the Folio Real Matrícula N° 25466-000. This value shall be determined in the sentence execution phase, without the sum to be paid being able to exceed the amount of fourteen million three hundred thousand colones. As a necessary logical consequence of the foregoing, the Registro Nacional is ordered to register the transfer of ownership of the property described below, in the name of the Municipality of Puntarenas: property of the Puntarenas district located in Province: Puntarenas, First Canton: Puntarenas; First District: Puntarenas, folio real number 25466, right 000, described in cadastral map number P-0025316-1992, with an area of two hundred seventy-four meters and ninety-eight square decimeters and with the following boundaries: North: Alberto Echandía (sic) Highway with the Pacific Railroad in between, with a frontage of eleven meters; South: José Ángel Retana Fallas; East: José Ángel Retana Fallas; West: Succession of [Nombre 001], free of encumbrances and annotations.
Furthermore, and also as a consequence of the foregoing, any charge or tax required to be paid to achieve the registry inscription of this movement must be paid by the Municipality of Puntarenas. The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay in favor of Mr. Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz the sum of exactly five million colones for subjective moral damages. The defendant Municipality is ordered to pay in favor of the public treasury, proceeding according to the legal system, any cost associated with the transfer of the ownership title of the property in question (which includes stamps and taxes that must be calculated, when applicable, based on the value of the property determined in the terms of this judgment, in the sentence execution phase). The Municipality of Puntarenas is ordered to pay both costs in favor of the plaintiff here. The corresponding costs shall be determined by the competent Judicial Authority in the sentence execution phase.- Notify.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Presiding Judge.- Judith Reyes Castillo, Judge.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Judge.- ????????????????
FELIPE ALBERTO CORDOBA RAMIREZ, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE JUDITH REYES CASTILLO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE ELIAS BALTODANO GOMEZ, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: [email protected] Classification prepared by CENTRO DE INFORMACIÓN JURISPRUDENCIAL of the Poder Judicial. Its reproduction and/or distribution for profit is prohibited.
It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 09-02-2026 17:34:42.
Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección I Sentencia con datos protegidos, de conformidad con la normativa vigente Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Procesal Contencioso Administrativo Tema: Prueba para mejor resolver en materia contencioso administrativa Subtemas:
Facultad discrecional del juzgador e imposibilidad de suplir omisiones de las partes.
"I. [...] No puede en consecuencia el Juez en su búsqueda de la verdad real, so pena de vulnerar otros principios igual rango o jerarquía procesal que deben de encontrarse en equilibrio, ordenar prueba para mejor proveer cuando de ello se derive inevitablemente una sustitución de los mecanismos ordinarios de defensa con que cuentan quienes se encuentran vinculados en la relación jurídico procesal y mandados a probar por virtud de su situación dentro de tal relación procesal. Lo contrario salvo en contadísimas y excepcionales circunstancias que habrían de encontrarse debidamente acreditadas y razonadas, así como amparadas en intereses superiores particularmente en asuntos en los que medien intereses públicos calificados o reforzados por su importancia, conllevaría fácilmente a cuestionamientos sobre el ajuste de la actuación del juez con el deber de observar objetividad e imparcialidad en mantenimiento del equilibrio procesal entre las partes, pero también importaría un patrocinio inadmisible en favor de quien no habiendo usado en forma debida y/o en tiempo su derecho y deber de probar por negligencia, descuido o una intención de obtener una ventaja procesal indebida en uso abusivo y/o antisocial de su derecho, pretende por esa vía subsanar una omisión procesal que es exclusivamente resorte suyo evitar cuando debió serlo, en este sentido. [...]" ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas Contenido de Interés:
Tipo de contenido: Voto de mayoría Rama del Derecho: Derecho Administrativo Tema: Responsabilidad civil de la Administración Subtemas:
Responsabilidad patrimonial derivada de una conducta lícita de la municipalidad demandada. Compra de propiedad para construir una casa de habitación y taller mecánico en caso donde se autoriza y luego se deniega el permiso de uso de suelo. Análisis sobre el régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la administración pública. Naturaleza y alcances del certificado de uso de suelo.
Tema: Responsabilidad civil extracontractual Subtemas:
Responsabilidad patrimonial derivada de una conducta lícita de la municipalidad demandada. Compra de propiedad para construir una casa de habitación y taller mecánico en caso donde se autoriza y luego se deniega el permiso de uso de suelo. Análisis sobre el régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la administración pública. Naturaleza y alcances del certificado de uso de suelo.
Tema: Certificación de uso de suelo Subtemas:
Responsabilidad patrimonial derivada de una conducta lícita de la municipalidad demandada. Compra de propiedad para construir una casa de habitación y taller mecánico en caso donde se autoriza y luego se deniega el permiso de uso de suelo. Naturaleza y alcances del certificado de uso de suelo.
Tema: Uso del suelo Subtemas:
Responsabilidad patrimonial derivada de una conducta lícita de la municipalidad demandada. Compra de propiedad para construir una casa de habitación y taller mecánico en caso donde se autoriza y luego se deniega el permiso de uso de suelo. Naturaleza y alcances del certificado de uso de suelo.
"VII. [...] Se confirma, refuerza y lo reitera este Tribunal, que una vez que se le indicó previo a comprar el inmueble al aquí actor, que este podría ser usado como casa de habitación y taller mecánico, luego se le dijo que no, a partir de información sobre este bien que se encontró a su disposición y deber jurídico de observar desde mucho antes, desde el año 2013. En conclusión, para esta Cámara de juzgadores, ha quedado absolutamente claro como hecho demostrado, que fue con causa en que el aquí actor compró el inmueble de interés, sobre la base de que podría hacer uso del mismo para construir una casa de habitación y/o, un taller mecánico, al serle primero autorizada dicha actividad y luego de adquirido el dominio sobre el bien inmueble de interés, denegada la misma por la Municipalidad aquí accionada, que sufrió un daño de corte moral subjetivo constituido por sentimientos, en lo medular, de frustración como derivación del plan que se planteó para adquirir el inmueble, y al menos, enojo y tristeza. (Las reglas de la experiencia humana).- [...]" ... Ver más Citas de Legislación y Doctrina Sentencias Relacionadas EV Generación de Machote: F:\Gestion-Judicial\Servidor de Archivos\Modelos\Contencioso\TCRESOL016.dpj ????????????????
CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:
LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ DEMANDADO/A:
MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS N° 2024006355 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN PRIMERA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las ventidos horas con cinco minutos del ventitres de Setiembre del dos mil venticuatro.- Proceso de conocimiento incoado por el señor LEANDRO ARTURO BADILLA MUÑOZ, cédula de identidad N° 6-0412-0553, contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE PUNTARENAS, representada por su señora Alcaldesa, señora Noelia Solórzano Cedeño, cédula de identidad N° 1-0859-0547. Intervienen en condición de apoderados especiales judiciales, por la parte actora la señora Adriana Alfaro Rojas, cédula de identidad N° 2-0647-0898; y por la Municipalidad demandada, la señora Yorleny Villagas Ovares, cédula de identidad N° 6-0275-0254.-
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el Juzgador Felipe Córdoba Ramírez y se resuelve por unanimidad.-
CONSIDERANDO
I.Sobre la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver durante la celebración de la audiencia preliminar. Según obra en el texto de la minuta levantada en su momento, durante la celebración de la audiencia preliminar la representación de la Municipalidad demandada solicitó que se admitiese como prueba para mejor resolver, el testimonio de quien identificó como el señor Mauricio Gutiérrez Villafuerte, funcionario Municipal, ingeniero de profesión, para que hiciere referencia a los informes dictados por el "MINAET", mientras que la parte actora, para que se refiriesen a todos los hechos, la declaración de quienes identificó, como las señoras María Lorena Muñoz Gómez y Cindy Moreno Umaña, tanto como del señor Carlos Rodrigo Badilla Muñoz. Sobre el particular, no está por demás recordar que en cuanto a la prueba para mejor resolver, conforme el actualmente vigente texto del Código Procesal Civil, si bien es correcto afirmar que se omitió regular este instituto, en su artículo 41.3. se prevé la admisibilidad de prueba de oficio, que claro está, a requerimiento de parte podría conducir a la admisibilidad de este tipo de prueba.
Luego y de todas formas, estimamos que ha de observarse que en uno u otro caso, la prueba para mejor proveer como lo es la ordenada de oficio, es prueba del Juez, no así de las partes pese a que la ofrezcan, tanto como que, su rechazo no habría de producir por suerte de automatismo racional, indefensión y en consecuencia, un vicio sustancial por indefensión. (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia N° 547-F-2002 de las 16:00 hrs. del 12 de julio de 2002; N° 29-1995 de las 15:30 hrs. del 22 de febrero de 1995; N° 290-F-S1-2009 de las 10:30 hrs. del 20 de marzo de 2009). Por otro lado, el ordenar o no prueba de este tipo supone algún límite impuesto el Juzgador, en el entendido de que por este medio no se ha de suplir el deber procesal que sólo incumbe a quien demanda o es demandado en el sentido de que es su deber ofrecer la prueba de su interés en el momento procesal oportuno. (Sentencia de la Sala Primera N° 001439-F-S1-2014 de las 09:25 horas del 07 de noviembre de 2014).
No puede en consecuencia el Juez en su búsqueda de la verdad real, so pena de vulnerar otros principios igual rango o jerarquía procesal que deben de encontrarse en equilibrio, ordenar prueba para mejor proveer cuando de ello se derive inevitablemente una sustitución de los mecanismos ordinarios de defensa con que cuentan quienes se encuentran vinculados en la relación jurídico procesal y mandados a probar por virtud de su situación dentro de tal relación procesal. Lo contrario salvo en contadísimas y excepcionales circunstancias que habrían de encontrarse debidamente acreditadas y razonadas, así como amparadas en intereses superiores particularmente en asuntos en los que medien intereses públicos calificados o reforzados por su importancia, conllevaría fácilmente a cuestionamientos sobre el ajuste de la actuación del juez con el deber de observar objetividad e imparcialidad en mantenimiento del equilibrio procesal entre las partes, pero también importaría un patrocinio inadmisible en favor de quien no habiendo usado en forma debida y/o en tiempo su derecho y deber de probar por negligencia, descuido o una intención de obtener una ventaja procesal indebida en uso abusivo y/o antisocial de su derecho, pretende por esa vía subsanar una omisión procesal que es exclusivamente resorte suyo evitar cuando debió serlo, en este sentido.
(Ver artículos 21 y 22 del Código Civil y el fallo de la Sala Primera en su sentencia N° 794-2006 de las 03:35 hrs. del 20 de octubre de 2006, que reza así en lo conducente: "... Por otra parte, es menester indicar que no es oportuno intentar mediante el ofrecimiento de probanzas que debieron aportarse y evacuarse en la etapa procesal correspondiente, abrir de nuevo el debate. Darle cabida a esta petición significaría que las partes estén en la posibilidad de subsanar sus omisiones respecto de la prueba que pudieron haber ofrecido en su oportunidad y no lo hicieron. Por otro lado, tampoco resulta posible acceder a ampliar la declaración de dos testigos, porque de igual forma sería enmendar su incuria"). Dicho todo lo anterior, por estimar este Tribunal que por innecesaria para resolver por el fondo el presente asunto en los términos que se dirán, se rechaza integralmente la prueba solicitada por ambas partes.-
II.Sobre los alegatos formulados por las partes. Alegaron las partes vinculadas en la relación jurídica procesal, lo que sigue:
III.Hechos probados. De relevancia para la resolución del presente asunto se tienen los siguientes:
IV.Hechos no probados: De relevancia para la resolución del presente proceso y por resultar fiel reflejo de la prueba que obra en autos una vez valorada la misma, se tiene como hechos no probados: ÚNICO: El valor del inmueble adquirido en propiedad por el aquí actor. (La ausencia de elementos de convicción al respecto).-
V.Sobre el régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la administración pública. Siempre que nos encontremos en torno con las partes en litigio ante la determinación de una eventual responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública, si la relación jurídica que vincula al administrado con la administración accionada no emerge con ocasión de la existencia de un instrumento contractual, se tiene que la discusión gira al rededor de lo que se conoce como responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por lo que resulta necesario a modo de introducción a los efectos de este instrumento, hacer referencia a los elementos que en doctrina y jurisprudencia suponen potable un reproche de responsabilidad como el que aquí se peticiona. Dentro del régimen de la llamada responsabilidad civil extracontractual, se distinguen dos tipos, la subjetiva, establecida en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil y la objetiva normada en el numeral 9 de la Constitución Política, el artículo 1048 del Código Civil y el numeral 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
En lo que toca al régimen de responsabilidad subjetiva, el artículo 199 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública establece la responsabilidad de los servidores públicos ante terceros en caso comprobado de dolo o culpa grave en el desempeño de sus deberes o con ocasión su cumplimiento. Como tal, la responsabilidad subjetiva se funda exclusivamente en un estudio en el ámbito del ánimo del agente respecto de la existencia de al menos, "culpa", sino "dolo", a diferencia de lo que ocurre con el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva, en orden al cual, la responsabilidad se determina con independencia de la existencia de tales elementos subjetivos. En la responsabilidad subjetiva se responde porque se es culpable, bien porque se ha buscado o querido la producción del daño, o bien porque se ha obrado de forma imprudente o negligente. En observancia con lo anterior, la responsabilidad del servidor ante terceros lo es en el ámbito del régimen de responsabilidad subjetiva, consecuentemente con lo cual, se requerirá para todos los efectos de la determinación de la existencia de culpa o dolo en el ánimo del servidor o agente de la Administración, sin perjuicio del resto de elementos que deben concurrir, como lo son la existencia del daño y el nexo causal entre aquel y la conducta desplegada, para que opere el reproche de imputación de responsabilidad.
Por otra parte, el régimen de responsabilidad objetiva de la administración pública, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con la responsabilidad subjetiva, ésta se genera sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del agente causante del daño, bastando con la acreditación eso sí, de la existencia del "riesgo" para generarla, razón por la cual no operan las nociones de antijuridicidad y culpabilidad, por lo tanto, se aplica el principio de inversión de la carga de la prueba en beneficio del lesionado. A los efectos, la presunta Administración Pública causante de tales daños y perjuicios reclamados debe resarcirlos si efectiva y eficazmente su conducta los generó, salvo que demuestre alguna causal exonerativa. De este modo, se requiere de la concurrencia de cuatro elementos, a saber: a) Una lesión, que consiste en los perjuicios patrimoniales antijurídicos, porque el que los padece no tiene el deber de soportarlos; b) Una conducta administrativa en relación con la cual se encuentre vinculada la producción del daño reprochado; b) Un nexo causal, conformado por la existencia de una relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho (conducta administrativa) que se imputa y el daño producido; y c) Que no existan las causas de justificación a que hicimos referencia atrás, siendo que la existencia de las mismas puede desvincular jurídicamente el perjuicio producido con la conducta de la administración pública de modo que el efecto dañoso no sea imputable, rompiendo el nexo de causalidad al acontecer una situación eximente como la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero.
El régimen de responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado y sus instituciones previsto en los artículos 9, y 41 de la Constitución Política, y 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es entonces de naturaleza esencialmente objetiva, por lo que para nacer basta con que exista un daño indemnizable, una conducta administrativa y un nexo causal entre ambas. Debe tenerse que es bajo este tipo de criterio objetivo que resulta posible atribuir responsabilidad a la Administración Pública, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con sus servidores, para los cuales debe de usarse un criterio de atribución además, subjetivo. De otra parte, determinados los criterios bajo los que es procedente determinar la responsabilidad de la Administración Pública y/o de sus agentes o servidores públicos, nos interesa señalar que a la vez, existe una diferencia en cuanto a los criterios de imputación que operan para el establecimiento o determinación de dicha responsabilidad en caso de encontrarnos ante actividad lícita o ilícita, normal o anormal de la Administración.
Citando al Dr. Ernesto Jinesta Lobo, de su Obra Tratado de Derecho Administrativo II, Responsabilidad Administrativa, pág. 39, se tiene que: “En el sistema de responsabilidad sin falta o por sacrificio especial, responsabilidad por conducta lícita o funcionamiento normal, el criterio determinante para que exista responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas es el quebranto del principio de igualdad en el sometimiento de las cargas públicas y el consiguiente daño especial (pequeña proporción de afectados) y anormal (excepcionalidad intensa de la lesión) o la teoría del riesgo para la hipótesis de los daños accidentales causados por una administración pública en el cumplimiento de la función asignada por el ordenamiento jurídico. Tratándose del sistema de responsabilidad por falta de servicio,-conducta ilícita o funcionamiento anormal,- el criterio de imputación lo constituye, precisamente, ese concepto jurídico indeterminado de “falta de servicio” y el derecho constitucional innominado o atípico de los administrados a que les presten servicios públicos eficientes y eficaces.”.
En la responsabilidad por conducta ilícita o anormal, entendida como aquella que se opone, infringe o violenta el ordenamiento jurídico entendido globalmente como las normas escritas y no escritas, la carga de la prueba corresponde a la víctima, quien corre con el deber de demostrar mediante las formas, los medios probatorios que permite el ordenamiento jurídico, la falta del servicio, su funcionamiento anormal, o la ilicitud en el actuar administrativo. En la responsabilidad por conducta lícita, se ha establecido que aun tratándose de conductas desplegadas con apego al ordenamiento jurídico, las mismas son susceptibles de atribuir responsabilidad en la Administración bajo criterios como los relacionados supra. En los casos de responsabilidad objetiva, la defensa de la Administración radicaría en la demostración de haber mediado alguna de las causales que rompen el nexo de causalidad que indica el numeral 190, párrafo 1 de la Ley General de Administración Pública, ya sea como se indicó supra, la fuerza mayor, le hecho de un tercero o hecho de la propia víctima.
Nuestra Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en resolución Nº 000584-F-2005, de las 10:40 hrs. del 11 de agosto del 2005, indicó, y siempre en relación con la responsabilidad objetiva lo siguiente: "...habrá responsabilidad de la Administración siempre que su funcionamiento normal o anormal, cause un daño que la víctima no tenga el deber de soportar, ya sea patrimonial o extrapatrimonial, con independencia de su situación jurídica subjetiva y la titularidad o condición de poder que ostente, cumpliendo claro está, con el presupuesto imprescindible del nexo causal. (...) Tanto los presupuestos esenciales como la carga de la prueba, adquieren por ejemplo un nuevo matiz, que libera al afectado no solo de amarras sustanciales sino también procesales, y coloca a la Administración en la obligada descarga frente a los cargos y hechos que se le imputan. En todo caso, el carácter objetivo de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual de la Administración, fue definida con claridad en la sentencia de esta Sala N° 132 de las 15 horas del 14 de agosto de 1991, para un hecho posterior a la entrada en vigencia de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en la que dijo: "VI.
Nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública Nº 6227 (...), conforme lo señala la sentencia de esta Sala Nº 81 del año 1984, al resolver la polémica sobre su vigencia, en el Título Sétimo del Libro Primero, recogió los principios más modernos fundados en la doctrina y jurisprudencia más autorizada, sobre la responsabilidad extracontractual de la Administración, para establecer así la responsabilidad directa del Estado sin necesidad de probar previamente que el daño se produjo por culpa del funcionario o de la Administración, exigiendo para la procedencia de la indemnización que el daño sufrido sea efectivo, evaluable e individualizable en relación con una persona o grupo -artículo 196-. (...) Además establece, en forma taxativa, como causas eximentes de esa responsabilidad, la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero, correspondiéndole a la Administración acreditar su existencia, (...)" (El resaltado no es del original).
En lo particular, referente a la eventual responsabilidad de una entidad como la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social asociada a la prestación de los servicios de salud que se encuentran bajo su cargo, la Sala Primera de la Corte en su Voto Nº 7 de las 14:20 hrs. del 13 de enero de 1995, también ha indicado como sigue: "(...) Es esta teoría de responsabilidad objetiva la que requiere que con el riesgo creado se ocasione un daño al administrado susceptible de indemnización, (…). V)- Para restablecer la responsabilidad de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social ha de reconocerse el nexo causal entre el daño provocado al actor y la actuación de dicha entidad, o sea, entre el acto impugnado y el evento lesivo. (...) La relación causal entre el hecho (actividad que consistió en prestarle servicios médicos) y el efecto (…) es clara, ineludible y referible estrictamente a la institución demandada.
No amerita hacer reparo en que el paciente fuera o no hipersensible al medicamento indicado, sino solamente -como lo afirmó el perito (…)- que se creó un riesgo que, como excepción a la resistencia común de los organismos- provocó un daño en el paciente y éste no tiene por qué soportarlo sin -al menos- ser indemnizado por ello. En síntesis, el riesgo lo creó la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, a través de sus hospitales, ocasionando daño al paciente hoy actor y, en consecuencia, con fundamento en la ya mencionada teoría del riesgo, debe responsabilizársele por su actuación. (El resaltado no es del original). En consecuencia y de manera concordante con todo lo anterior, a la parte que demanda corresponde desde el punto de vista procesal demostrar primero, la ocurrencia de un daño o perjuicio, y luego, que este se encuentre vinculado en nexo causal con una conducta administrativa, mientras que a la Administración demandada y sólo de llevar éxito la acción judicial incoada en su contra en lo anterior, acreditar que ha mediado con todo y ello, una suerte de eximente de responsabilidad que permita afirmar que tal nexo de causalidad que " rompe", desvinculando tal conducta administrativa con la producción del efecto dañoso que se reclama en cada caso, con lo que se suprime la base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial endosada conduciendo ello a la improcedencia del reclamo.-
VI.Sobre el objeto del proceso, en asocio con la teoría del caso planteada por la parte actora. Con el propósito de que la exposición que se dirá, resulte lo más clara y ordenada posible, este Tribunal estima importante hacer referencia al objeto del proceso entendido como lo que se pretende sea concedido en sentencia, para lo cual habremos de indicar que el presente guarda identidad con un proceso judicial de los conocidos en doctrina como civil de hacienda, en la medida que, sobre la base, ya de lo que la representación del actor identificó como conducta ilícita o en su caso lícita, se condene a la Municipalidad demandada al pago de daños y/o, perjuicios. Sobre este tema, sea, la base de imputación de la responsabilidad que se reclama, habremos de hacer algunas precisiones de entrada. La parte actora en síntesis, pretende que en sentencia le sean otorgados extremos exclusivamente de corte patrimonial indemnizatorio, alegando que, previo a adquirir un inmueble en propiedad, tal decisión se vio incidida por el hecho de que la Municipalidad demandada le suministró información sobre el bien de la especie, que supuso, le habría de permitir desarrollar en él la actividad que era su intención desplegar a partir del tal adquisición, cual era su uso como casa de habitación y/o, como taller mecánico.
Luego y como derivación de lo que se pretende, pese a que en algún nivel argumentativo además, se invoca como base de imputación de tal responsabilidad el despliegue por parte de la Municipalidad demandada de una conducta ilícita, que la misma representación de la parte actora identificó según lo extrae esta Autoridad Judicial, como aquellos actos al tenor del o los cuales, luego de informársele que un uso determinado el bien inmueble a adquirir, era conforme al deseado, luego de adquirido en propiedad el mismo se le informó lo contrario. Así las cosas, una pretensión de corte anulatorio y claro está, precedida de la declaración de su adopción en disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico no forma parte del objeto del presente proceso, por lo que, sobre este aspecto, a saber, la ilicitud de alguna conducta administrativa base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial administrativa que se reclama, ningún pronunciamiento habrá de hacer este Tribunal, para lo que, las partes podrán consultar jurisprudencia reiterada emanada de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, dentro de la que sólo a título de ejemplo, habrá de citarse su Voto N° 002333-F-S1-2020 dictado al ser las 11:12 hrs. del 17 de setiembre de 2020, en relación con el N° 000301-F-2007 de las 11:15 hrs. del 26 de abril del 2007, fallos en los términos de los cuales, se determina que lo pretendido en el proceso judicial sea concedido en sentencia, constituye límite a la Autoridad judicial sobre lo que de hacer pronunciamientos o no en sentencia.
Dicho lo anterior y de entrada, sobre la ilicitud planteada como base de imputación de la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública que se reclama, entendida como el desajuste o no de lo actuado por la entidad Municipal en el caso concreto -se insiste- no habremos de hacer pronunciamiento alguno, simplemente porque no es objeto en la presente causa pretensión de corte anulatoria alguna. Con todo y ello, la representación de la parte actora argumentó y peticionó sobre la base de la imputación de responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración pública a partir del despliegue de una conducta lícita, lo que resultará como veremos adelante procedente, sólo en los términos que se dirán.-
VII.Sobre la procedencia parcial de la demanda. Como resultado de un análisis integral en valoración de la prueba que obra en autos en lo que se ha estimado relevante y conducente, este Tribunal es del criterio de que en el caso concreto, se impone declarar la procedencia parcial de la demanda, todo en función de las siguientes consideraciones.-
3.1. Sobre la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración Pública derivada de la adopción de una conducta lícita. Estimamos relevante hacer cita a estos efectos, de lo señalado por la Sala Constitucional en parte, en su Voto N° 2009-013606 dictado al ser las 14:57 hrs. del 26 de agoto del 2009: “IV.- PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISRATIVA. (...). El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos.
(…) V.- CARÁCTER ESENCIAL DEL PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA EN EL ESTADO SOCIAL Y DEMOCRÁTICO DE DERECHO. La responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas por el ejercicio de la función administrativa forma parte, como lo hemos constatado en el considerando anterior, de la concepción constitucional de éstas. Es una pieza clave y esencial del Estado social y democrático de Derecho, dados los fines a los que propende un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa. De modo general, la responsabilidad administrativa tiene por función básica la reparación o resarcimiento de las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a un administrado (víctima o damnificado) en su esfera patrimonial o extrapatrimonial por un ente público en el ejercicio de la función administrativa. Uno de sus fines clásicos y tradicionales es servir de control o garantía para las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de los administrados que sean lesionadas por un ente público en el ejercicio de sus competencias o en la prestación de los servicios públicos expresamente asignados por la Constitución o la ley.
La responsabilidad administrativa junto con la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (artículo 49 de la Constitución Política), son las piezas claves de un Estado Constitucional para la defensa de los administrados frente a las prerrogativas y privilegios formales y materiales con que la propia Constitución provee a los entes públicos para el cumplimiento de sus cometidos. Esta finalidad determina que el principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa debe ser fortalecido y acentuado mediante una interpretación extensiva y no restrictiva, de la misma forma el legislador al desarrollar los sistemas de responsabilidad administrativa debe adecuarse al parámetro constitucional de una responsabilidad administrativa objetiva y directa, estándole vedado establecer conductas administrativas exentas o inmunes a éste y menoscabando los derechos fundamentales resarcitorio y al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos de los que son titulares todos los administrados”.
La promulgación de la Ley General de la Administración Pública solventó el vacío jurídico que existía para poder demandar responsabilidad al Estado en sede jurisdiccional. El artículo 1° de dicha Ley dispone que la Administración (entendida en un sentido amplio como Estado y los demás entes públicos) responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. La norma introduce el concepto de responsabilidad objetiva del Estado, es decir, aquella que no examina la actuación del funcionario en cuanto a los extremos de su culpabilidad sino que hace descansar la responsabilidad en la mera constatación del daño y que el mismo se haya producido por la actividad de la Administración. Esta es la línea que sigue el artículo 190 de la Ley de la Administración Pública. La responsabilidad objetiva se produce entonces, sin que sea necesario demostrar el dolo o la culpa del causante del daño; basta el riesgo para generarla. En consecuencia, para su acaecimiento se requiere de tres requisitos esenciales:
VIII.Sobre los extremos indemnizatorios. Pretende quien demanda que en sentencia se le conceda lo siguiente: 2. Condenar a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de ¢10.000.000,°° colones por daño moral subjetivo. 3. Se condene a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de 14.000.000,00 de colones por concepto de daño patrimonial, equivalente al valor del terreno adquirido. 4. Se condene a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas del pago de ¢10.000.000,°° colones por la pérdida del chance, derivada de la imposibilidad de abrir el taller mecánico. 5. Que se conceda la indexación sobre los montos otorgados, así como los intereses generados hasta el efectivo pago. 6. Se condene al demandado al pago de las costas del presente proceso".
VII.Sobre las excepciones. La representación de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas interpuso en defensa de dicha entidad las excepciones de falta de derecho, prescripción, caducidad, y además se solicitó que se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos y se condene al actor al pago de ambas costas. Sobre la excepción de caducidad, se rechaza, bastando con indicar a la representación municipal, que la misma, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 39.1.a del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo opera respecto de las acciones judiciales que en esta sede se dirijan a la nulidad de una conducta formal adoptada por la Administración Pública accionada, lo que resulta ser ajeno al objeto del presente proceso. En torno a la excepción de prescripción, conforme lo dispuesto en el artículo 41, en relación con el 198 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública: "El derecho de reclamar la indemnización a la Administración prescribirá en cuatro años, contados a partir del hecho que motiva la responsabilidad".
En el presente caso el hecho generador de la responsabilidad que se reclama se encontró identificado por el dictado con el N° Resolución MP-PUC-RES-820-10-2017 dictada por el Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Control Constructivo el 31 de octubre del 2017, por lo que, siendo que este proceso judicial data en su inicio del año 2019 y que la resolución que le dio curso a la acción se le notificó a la Municipalidad demandada el día 15 de octubre del 2019 conforme el acta de notificación respectiva, no se ha computado un plazo que supere los cuatro años mencionados, lo que impone el rechazo de la excepción. (La imagen 60, en relación con la 67, ambas del expediente judicial). Finalmente, respecto de la excepción de falta de derecho, debiéndose atener las partes al análisis realizado por este Tribunal en atención al presente caso por el fondo, se determinó que quien demanda ostenta derecho para acceder a lo peticionado, pero en parte, por lo que dicha excepción se acoge, debiéndose entender rechazada en todo lo no expresamente concedido.-
VIII.Sobre las costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La parte vencida en la presente causa lo ha sido la Municipalidad de Puntarenas, sin que en criterio de este Tribunal haya mediado circunstancia o presupuesto alguno que justifique exonerarle de dicha condenatoria al amparo de sus incisos a) y b), del artículo relacionado, tanto como al amparo del artículo 194 del mismo cuerpo legal. En consecuencia, se condena a dicho municipio al pago de ambas costas en favor del aquí actor. Lo correspondiente a las costas en cuanto a su importe se habrá de definir por el Juez competente en la fase de ejecución de sentencia a ruego de la parte vencedora.-
POR TANTO
Se rechaza la prueba ofrecida para mejor resolver por ambas partes. Se rechazan las excepciones de prescripción y caducidad. Se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho, debiéndose entender rechazada en todo lo expresamente concedido. Se declara con lugar parcial la demanda incoada por el señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz en contra de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz del valor actual del inmueble que hoy es de su titularidad en dominio identificado con el inscrito en el Registro Nacional, Sección de Bienes Inmuebles, con la Matrícula de folio Real N° 25466-000, mismo que habrá de ser determinado en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, sin que, la suma a pagar pueda exceder el importe de catorce millones trescientos mil colones. Como consecuencia lógica necesaria de lo anterior, se ordena al Registro Nacional inscribir traspaso del dominio del inmueble que se describe a continuación, en nombre de la Municipalidad de Puntarenas: inmueble del partido de Puntarenas situado en Provincia: Puntarenas, Cantón primero: Puntarenas; Distrito Primero: Puntarenas, matrícula de folio real número 25466, derecho 000, descrito en el plano catastrado número P-0025316-1992, con una cabida de doscientos setenta y cuatro metros con noventa y ocho decímetros cuadrados de superficie y con los siguientes linderos: Norte: Carretera Alberto Echandía (sic) en medio con el Ferrocarril al Pacífico con un frente de once metros; Sur: José Ángel Retana Fallas; Este: José Ángel Retana Fallas; Oeste: Sucesión de [Nombre 001], libre de gravámenes y anotaciones.
Además y también en consecuencia de lo anterior, cualquier cargo o impuesto que se requiera ser sufragado para lograr la inscripción registral de este movimiento deberá ser sufragado por la Municipalidad de Puntarenas. Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago en favor del señor Leandro Arturo Badilla Muñoz de la suma de cinco millones de colones exactos a título de daño moral subjetivo. Se condena a la Municipalidad demandada al pago en favor del fisco de proceder conforme el ordenamiento jurídico, de cualquier costo asociado al traspaso de la titularidad del dominio del bien inmueble en cuestión (lo que incluye timbres e impuestos que deberán ser calculados de proceder, sobre la base del valor del inmueble determinado en los términos de la presente sentencia, en la fase de ejecución de sentencia). Se condena a la Municipalidad de Puntarenas al pago de ambas costas en favor del aquí actor.
Lo correspondiente a las costas habrá de ser determinado por la Autoridad Judicial competente en la fase de ejecución de sentencia.- Notifíquese.- Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Juez Ponente.- Judith Reyes Castillo, Jueza.- Elías Baltodano Gómez, Juez.- ????????????????
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