Comptroller General's authority to audit ARESEP's tariff-setting methodologiesCompetencia de la Contraloría General para fiscalizar metodologías tarifarias de ARESEP

**FILE:** **PROCEEDING:** DECLARATORY JUDGMENT **PLAINTIFF:** REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC SERVICES **DEFENDANT:** COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC **N° 2024004630** **CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY TRIBUNAL, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SECTION V, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA,** at eleven hours and fifty-two minutes on the eighteenth of July, two thousand twenty-four.- A declaratory judgment proceeding brought by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (ARESEP), represented by its Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, Víctor Barquero Rojas, identification number 111910985, bar card 19692; against the Comptroller General of the Republic (CGR), represented by Jesús González Hidalgo, identification number 204970783, bar card 11240, and the State, on whose behalf the Procuradora Amanda Grosser Jiménez, identification number 112560237, bar card 20777, is currently acting. The Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) intervenes as an interested third party, through its Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact Marys Palacios Carrillo, identification number 800790189, bar card 12630, and María López Alvarado, identification number 107860831, bar card 24708.

**WHEREAS** I.- By a written submission filed before the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal on February 11, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact of ARESEP, Luis Daniel Chacón Solórzano, identification number 205560559, and Henry Payne Castro, identification number 108850781, filed a declaratory judgment complaint against the CGR, and based on the alleged facts and legal arguments raised, they requested that in judgment: "1. That the complaint filed by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services against the Comptroller General of the Republic be declared with merit, and that the judgment declare the absolute nullity of Report N° DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 of September 16, 2019, prepared by the Environmental and Energy Services Audit Area of the Operational and Evaluative Audit Division (DFOE), of the administrative ruling R-DFOE-AE-0003-2019, of 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019, and of the final act of the Comptroller General of the Republic R-DC-10-2020 (N° 02120DC-0041) of 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020, for being non-conforming with the legal system, by virtue of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, and consequently, that the mandatory compliance provisions contained therein and directed against our represented party, specifically the Energy Superintendent, the Regulador General, and the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, be rendered without any effect from their issuance, by provision of Article 171 of the General Public Administration Law and Article 131, subsection 1) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. Furthermore, concomitantly, we request that the judgment declare the absolute nullity—due to their relation and connection—of the official letters: DFOE-SD-0976, DFOE-AE-0570 (17839) of December 11, 2018, DFOE AE-0414 (official letter N° 13720) of September 16, 2019, DFOE-AE-0361 (official letter N° 11083) of June 26, 2019, DFOE-AE-0085, DFOE-SD-0307 (official letter N° 02740), DFOE-SD-0309 (official letter N° 02754), N° 04878 (DC-0097), DFOE-SD-0729 (official letter N° 05786), DFOE-AE-0329, DFOE-SD-1577 (official letter N° 12873), DFOE-AE-0331, DFOE-SD-1587 (official letter N° 1298), of April 2, 2020, as well as all those related and similar ones that are exclusively related against ARESEP, which served as the basis and foundation for the issuance of the cited Report N° DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and the final act R-DC-010-2020 (N° 02110 DC-0041 of 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020), and that your Authority determines in judgment. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 164.2 of the General Public Administration Law and Article 131, subsection 3) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. 2. That the Comptroller General of the Republic be ordered to pay the costs of this action, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which shall be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase. 3. That the Comptroller General of the Republic be ordered to pay the damages caused to ARESEP, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which shall be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase. 4. That the judgment order the heads of the Comptroller General of the Republic to immediately initiate the appropriate internal procedures to determine the pecuniary and/or disciplinary liability of the officials of the audit body who participated in the actions or omissions that led to the incurrence of the acts contrary to legality that are requested to be annulled herein" (images 2 to 111 of the judicial file).

II.- In a resolution at 09:41 a.m. on May 5, 2021, the proceeding was deemed established and its transfer was granted to the CGR, as well as to the State (image 125 to 127).

III.- On July 8, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of ICE, in its capacity as an interested third party, answered the complaint in the negative and presented the defense of lack of right (images 135 to 179 of the judicial file).

IV.- In a written submission dated July 9, 2021, the representation of the CGR answered the complaint in the negative and raised the exception of lack of right (images 180 to 215 of the judicial file).

V.- By written submission of July 15, 2021, the representation of the State answered the complaint in the negative and formulated the defenses of lack of passive standing to be sued (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right (images 225 to 294 of the judicial file).

VI.- In Resolution N° 501-2022-T, of 08:00 a.m. on March 29, 2022, Judge Roberto Brenes Chinchilla rejected the joinders (coadyuvancias) raised by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S.A., Molinos de Viento del Arenal S.A., as well as by Aeroenergía S.A. (images 510 to 516 of the judicial file).

VII.- On March 30, 2022, the preliminary hearing was held. In said procedural act, Claim N° 3 of the complaint was clarified, to the effect that the damages refer to: "damage to the institutional image, the questioning of the quality, expertise, credibility, and technical rigor of the work performed by the Regulatory Authority for Public Services and the professional technical capacity of the officials who developed, approved, and applied those tariff methodologies analyzed in the report," and the evaluation and admission of the evidence offered by the parties was carried out (images 531 to 535d of the judicial file).

VIII.- In Resolution N° 134-2022-I at 3:58 p.m. on April 25, 2022, the First Section of the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Appeals Tribunal flatly rejected the appeal filed by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S.A. against the interlocutory judgment N° 501-2022-T, of 08:00 a.m. on March 29, 2022, which had rejected the active joinder of said company (images 546 and 547 of the judicial file).

IX.- The public oral trial hearing was held on June 20, 2024. In that act, the expert witness testimony admitted during the preliminary hearing was received. At the request of the parties, the Court granted five business days for the purpose of rendering written conclusions, and the matter was declared complex (the foregoing is recorded in the minutes of said procedural act, visible in images 653 to 658 of the judicial file, as well as in the recording of the hearing that is in digital format).

X.- This judgment is rendered unanimously, within the statutory period. No defects capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed. Judge Álvarez Molina, Judge Giusti Soto, and Judge Sánchez Navarro, who drafts, concur with the vote.

**CONSIDERING** I.- PROVEN FACTS: The following facts are deemed duly accredited as important for resolving this matter:

1. According to the Special Character Audit Report on the Process Established by ICE and ARESEP for the Concession of Private Generation and Purchase of Electricity (Informe de Auditoría de Carácter Especial Acerca del Proceso Instaurado por el ICE y la ARESEP para la Concesión de la Generación y Compra de Energía Eléctrica a Privados) N° DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, dated September 16, 2019, prepared by the Environmental and Energy Services Audit Area, Operational and Evaluative Audit Division of the CGR, this review and verification process had the objective and scope to "(...) determine the reasonableness of the process and criteria applied by ICE and ARESEP to grant concessions for private generation and purchase of electricity, in its elements of project eligibility and selection, control in their execution, and establishment of energy purchase tariffs, which ensures compliance with the relevant regulations. (...) it comprises the analysis of the actions, processes, procedures, and regulations for the concession of private generation and purchase of electricity to private generators, regarding contracts related to wind and hydro sources that are in commercial operation. (...) The analysis period covered from 2008 to 2018, which was extended to May 31, 2019, to consider the estimated effects of the tariff set for renewed contracts" (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], corresponding to page 07 of the cited Report).

2. According to Audit Report N° DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, referenced in the immediately preceding fact, the findings are as follows: "2.1. Weaknesses were determined related to three methodologies defined by ARESEP to set electricity purchase tariffs for private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: Methodology for setting tariffs for existing private generators (Ley n°. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, Resolution n°. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for Renewed Contracts); Reference tariff methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, Resolution n°. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Hydroelectric Plant Contracts), and Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants, Resolution n°. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Wind Plant Contracts). 2.2. Furthermore, misapplications of these methodologies were identified in the last three tariff settings for BOO contracts: renewed in 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants in 2016, 2017, and 2018; and for new wind plants in 2015, 2017, and 2018. (...) The Methodology for Renewed Contracts allows the application of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants, as long as a specific tariff model does not exist. This is despite the fact that these are generation plants with differences in technology, investment costs, operating costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of service at cost (servicio al costo) which determines the tariff methodologies and formulas; according to which tariffs must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and the effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with Articles 3, subsection b) and 31 b) of Ley n°. 7593, in conjunction with Article 4, subsection 2) of Decreto Ejecutivo n°. 29232-MP, Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, which states that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set the tariffs for public services, in observance of said principle. (...) 2.15. Thus, the aforementioned weaknesses are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a tariff methodology for private generators with wind plants that renew electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, so that the tariff is consistent with the operating costs, investment, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. Furthermore, it originates from the fact that the analysis for developing the methodologies lost sight of the implication in the tariff of calculating the age factor (factor de antigüedad) on a date different from the other variables and, in the individual plant factor (Fpi), not using the maximum contracted plant capacity by ICE to the private generator and the actual operating times. 2.16. In this sense, the tariff power is a power-duty, meaning that ARESEP has a power in its area of competence and must exercise it (Sala Constitucional, Resolución n°. 6326-2000). This power includes defining the elements that must be considered for faithful compliance with Articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set tariffs that express the elements that, in accordance with the legal system and technique, allow their concordance with the principle of service at cost. Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of tariffs that reflect the real costs of service provision, but at the same time are not excessive or unfair for the user (Procuraduría General de la República, Dictamen n°. C-329-2002 and Opinión Jurídica n°. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is consistent with Acuerdo n° 03-34-2016, ARESEP Institutional Strategic Plan 2017-2022, approved by its Board of Directors on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulation instruments based on regulatory and public policy principles that incorporate criteria of quality (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social welfare. In addition, objective 4 focuses on strengthening an innovative and effective organization oriented towards excellence and the fulfillment of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the tariff adjustment methodologies for the purchase of energy from private generators under the BOO modality, at the time of executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the 2017, 2018, and 2019 tariff settings for renewed contracts, as well as for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 reference tariffs for new hydroelectric plants, and the 2015, 2017, and 2018 tariffs for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The tariff proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 regarding the aforementioned settings were subject to modifications resulting from 25 oppositions and joinders by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory Authority. These modifications were due to: useful life calculations and use of installed capacity data that do not correspond to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose registration and reference was deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology requiring it. (...) 2.24. On the other hand, it was determined that the tariffs relating to energy purchase from renewed BOO contracts and the reference tariffs set for energy purchase from new BOO contracts for wind and hydroelectric plants in the tariff settings for the period 2015 to 2019 were established without adherence to the methodologies; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical quantity of data was not used for calculating the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of tariffs set for: a) renewed contracts in 2017 and 2018, b) wind in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric for 2016, 2017, and 2018. These tariff methodologies establish that when it is not possible to have a 5-year historical series, the shortest one shall be used, but with the same scope for all variables; however, in these tariff settings, the shortest was used for one variable and longer-period tariff series for the rest. 2.26. Second, the tariff set in 2017 for renewed contracts, Resolución n°. RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated an exponential growth of operating costs, since these were divided by the age factor, whose value represents the equivalent remaining useful life of the plants. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in force at that time, and results in the setting of a higher tariff. 2.27. Third, the tariffs applied in 2017 and 2018 were set by including data from generation plants that operated for less than 10 months in the year, to calculate the individual plant factor (Fpi), despite the fact that the Methodology for Renewed Contracts states in Article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the tariff setting of January 10, 2017, the age factor was calculated as of December 31, 2015, despite the fact that Article 3.5.4. of the Methodology for Renewed Contracts establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately prior to the moment in which the set tariff was calculated, that is, December 31, 2016. This situation also occurred in the tariff setting of January 12, 2018. Furthermore, in this last tariff setting, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, the correct one being August 2017; this caused an increase in operating costs. 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of the renewed contract tariffs set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind plants about: operating costs, age factor, and plant factor, and also, investment costs in 2019. The foregoing, despite the fact that the Methodology for Renewed Contracts (Articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that first, the tariff is defined with the information and calculation method of hydroelectric plants, and then the result is also used for the purchase of energy generated from other sources. 2.30. As an example, the estimated effect of including wind plant operating cost data in the tariff settings increased these costs. This means going from USD 179.43 established by the Regulatory Authority to an estimated USD 166.00 by the Comptroller General, per installed KW in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference tariffs set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, to calculate the average investment cost, the CR-Parismina plant of 8MW was grouped into the group with an installed capacity of 8.1 MW to 12 MW, when it should have been placed in the group of 4.1 MW to 8 MW. The foregoing does not adhere to what is established in the section "Unit Investment Amount (Monto de la inversión unitaria) (M)" of the Methodology for New Hydroelectric Plants, which defines five groups of plants by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference tariffs for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, were included for calculating the sales expectation variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with what is established in Article iv, Sales Expectations (Expectativas de venta) of the Methodology for New Wind Plants, insofar as it is appropriate to consider the national plants of private generators" (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], corresponding to pages 11 to 15 of the cited Report).

3. According to Audit Report N° DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, aforementioned, "(...) the weaknesses of the methodologies defined by ARESEP and their misapplications have led to tariff settings that exceed the principle of service at cost, as well as a normal benefit or profit for the provider. In this regard, in renewed energy purchase contracts, it is estimated that this situation has resulted in additional disbursements for ICE of approximately USD 24.00 million, between 2017 and May 2019. The foregoing not only harms the public funds administered by this Institute, but also the final consumers, since these disbursements necessarily form part of the electric bill" (image 26 of the administrative file in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], corresponding to page 24 of the cited Report).

4. In response to the findings indicated in Audit Report N° DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, the CGR ordered: to the Regulador General of the Regulatory Authority: "4.4. Elaborate the proposals for modification of: a) Articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Ley N° 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), Resolución n°. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) paragraph Sales Expectation (E) of the Reference Tariff Methodology for New Private Hydroelectric Generation Plants, Resolución n.° RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) Article iv of the Model for Determining Reference Tariffs for New Private Wind Generation Plants, Resolución n.° RJD-163-2011 and its amendments; d) add the norms establishing the use of real operating time in the calculation of the plant factor, in the Reference Tariff Methodology for New Private Hydroelectric Generation Plants and the Model for Determining Reference Tariffs for New Private Wind Generation Plants. Send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence (...) 4.5. Elaborate the proposal for a tariff-setting methodology for private wind generators that renew electricity purchase contracts with ICE. Send the proposal to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence." Regarding the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, it indicated: "4.6. Resolve on the modification proposals sent by the Regulador General relating to the Methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, that the Regulador General sends. 4.7. Resolve on the proposed tariff-setting methodology for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, that the Regulador General sends. (...) Resolve on the proposed actions to compensate the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019." Regarding the Energy Superintendent (Intendente de Energía) of ARESEP: "4.9. Adjust the current tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through Resoluciones n.° RE-0008-IE-2019, n.° RIE-057-2018, and n.° RE-0079-2018, so that the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, relating to: a) profitability on capital contributions, and b) use of wind plant information, are corrected. Send to the Comptroller General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019." And to the Regulador General, as well as to the Energy Superintendent of ARESEP: "4.10. Determine the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 until the last date on which the tariff was applied, due to misapplications of the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Ley n.° 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, Resolución n.° RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. In addition, propose actions to compensate the determined amounts and send them to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence" (images 26 to 28 of the administrative file in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], corresponding to pages 24 to 26 of the cited Report).

5. On the occasion of the appeal for reversal with a subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) filed by ARESEP in official letter OF-0783-RG-2019, on September 19, 2019, against Audit Report DFOE-AE-00009-2019, the Environmental and Energy Services Area, Operational and Evaluative Audit Division of the Comptroller General of the Republic issued Resolución R-DFOE-AE-00003-2019, at 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019. In this act, it was resolved: "I) DECLARE PARTIALLY WITH MERIT the appeal for reversal (...) only in the following: 1. That the provision contained in paragraph 4.9 of the reference report be read as follows: 'Adjust the tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through Resoluciones n.° RE-0008-IE-2019, RIE-057-2018, and RE-0079-2018, or those issued in their place prior to the notification of this report, so that the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, relating to the following: a) profitability on capital contributions, and b) use of wind plant information, are not incurred. Send to the Comptroller General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019.' Furthermore, some of the figures contained in the report were replaced. 2. (see in order the office of the appeal and the act that resolves it in images 32 to 74 and 75 to 112 of the administrative file in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019]).

6. In Resolución N° R-DC-010-2020, at 08:00 on February 13, 2020, the Comptroller General of the Republic declared without merit the subsidiary appeal filed by ARESEP against DFOE-AE-00009-2019 (thus recorded in folder 00208_00221 [OT-775-2019]).

7. Prior to the CGR issuing the Audit Report, ICE presented a series of oppositions before ARESEP: "demonstrating that there is a need to separate the methodology according to technology (hydro and wind), for estimating energy purchase tariffs, otherwise the overcost is transferred to the final customer and an undue recognition is given to private wind plant generators. Likewise, it has been raised before ARESEP that the date associated with the calculation of the age factor should be December 31 of the same year in which the tariff-setting process begins (...) The foregoing because the more recent the date used to calculate the age factor of the plants, the lower this value tends to be, resulting in a reduction of the tariff to be paid to private generators. In this same sense, it has also been requested, as recorded in official letter 0610-135-2018 of December 3, 2018, to consider, among other aspects, incorporating as part of the changes in the tariff-setting methodologies the use of contracted capacity, as a more objective reference in calculating the real energy sales expectations to ICE." The review and inclusion of more precise information in the calculation has been a request from ICE to ARESEP" (as has been repeatedly stated by ICE's representation, in the response to the lawsuit, as well as in the response provided to the preliminary injunction (medida cautelar ante causam) filed by ARESEP; and in the copy of the documentation in which these actions are recorded, which is visible at images 157 to 180 of the file corresponding to the preliminary injunction contained in the judicial file, and CD 4 proof of ICE's response, Prueba 10.0510-1794-2010 of December 10, 2010; Prueba 11.510-144-2012, which is a motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal filed by ICE against resolution 750-RCR-2012 of 10:45 a.m. on January 9, 2012; Prueba 12, official communication 0610-128-2018, of November 22, 2018, consisting of ICE's opposition to the proposal for the annual application of the tariff-setting methodology for private generators (Ley 7200) that sign a new energy purchase and sale contract with ICE; Prueba 13.0610-135-2018 of March 12, 2018, in which ICE raises a series of requests for improvements to the private generator methodologies; Prueba 14, which is a motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal against resolution RIE-001-2018 of January 12, 2018; Prueba 17-257-401-2016, of December 16, 2016, which is an action for annulment against the decision of ARESEP's Board of Directors to suspend the application of RDJ-017-2016, through Board of Directors Agreement N° 06-07-027-2016; Prueba 18.0257-591-2017 of November 10, 2017, which is a motion for annulment and reconsideration with subsidiary appeal against resolution RIE-110-2017). \n\r\n\nII.- FACTS NOT PROVEN: \n\r\n\n1. That the challenged acts imposed on ARESEP the discretionary elements for determining the methodologies for setting tariffs for the supply of electrical energy by private generators (there is no proof in this regard). \n\r\n\nIII.- PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES: PLAINTIFF: ARESEP's representation requests the annulment of the CGR report N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, based on the following arguments: 1. Lack of competence and absence of technical expertise on the part of the CGR in areas that are exclusive to ARESEP, concerning the preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models. 2. In matters of preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models, ARESEP is not subject to oversight by the CGR, such that conduct related to the exercise of these powers is subject only to jurisdictional control. 3. The challenged acts constitute an arbitrary invasion of the exclusive and excluding powers granted by law to ARESEP. 4. Exercise of co-administration by the CGR, by ordering ARESEP to apply and modify tariff models and methodologies, as well as to recover amounts overpaid by ICE. 5. Violation of the principle of legality by the CGR, by carrying out a fiscal oversight procedure for which it is not authorized. 6. A lack of competence to annul, modify, and disregard the tariff models applied by ARESEP within the framework of purchasing electrical energy from private entities. It expressly indicates that the purpose of this proceeding is to elucidate an alleged invasion of ARESEP's competence by the CGR, through the issuance of N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, and notes: "Under this delimitation, it is necessary to keep in mind that ARESEP did not bring this proceeding for the purpose of questioning the techniques or technical criteria on which the binding orders given by the CGR to my client are based, or whether they are technically correct or incorrect, nor is the legality or the parameters of ARESEP's tariff methodologies or its tariff setting being discussed in this proceeding (or whether the age factor (factor de antigüedad) / operation costs (costos de explotación) / or the plant capacity factor (factor de planta) was applied correctly or incorrectly), that is not the purpose of the proceeding. The purpose of the proceeding revolves around an inter-administrative conflict of jurisdictions, it lies in determining whether there is an EXPRESS LEGAL AUTHORIZATION for the CGR to issue this type of binding provisions to ARESEP, in which the manner in which it must exercise the exclusive and excluding powers for which it was created is delimited, in accordance with Article 188 of the Political Constitution, and Ley N°7593" (the emphasis in bold and underline is supplied). DEFENDANT: The CGR, as well as the representation of the State and ICE, are in agreement in indicating that the challenged conduct does not constitute an invasion of ARESEP's powers by the CGR. They indicate that it concerns the preparation of an audit report that falls within the framework of the powers conferred by the legal system upon the Oversight Body in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública). They maintain that the weaknesses in the tariff-setting methodologies, as well as their non-application in ICE's purchase of electrical energy from private entities, make it evident that in determining the tariffs, the principles of legality, efficiency, and service at cost were disregarded, which resulted in the payments made by ICE being higher, and the cost of the public electricity supply service being more elevated for the final consumer. They maintain that the active Administration was not substituted, and that on the contrary, in exercising the oversight power, the plaintiff was urged to comply with the principles and rules pertaining to the process of setting public service tariffs, as well as the provisions issued by ARESEP itself and its Board of Directors. The Special Judicial Representative also noted that her client had previously warned ARESEP regarding the disregard of the legal system in relation to the setting of tariffs that were subsequently reviewed by the CGR. All representations formulated the defense of lack of right, and the State also raised the objection of lack of standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam). \n\r\n\nIII.- ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE CGR AND THE SPECIFIC CASE: Demanding accountability from the Public Administration for its management constitutes a fundamental right of citizens, the oversight of which, in matters of Public Finance, the constituent assembly decided to entrust to an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly. Therefore, "... what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism by which society can evaluate how the public resources it has entrusted to its officials have been administered. Oversight is exercised, therefore, on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, over which mere administrative interest cannot prevail, according to Article 113 of our Ley General de la Administración Pública" (Higher Oversight of Public Finance as a guarantee for the inhabitants. Ronald Hidalgo Cuadra. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas N°90. 1999); and whose purpose is to guarantee the general interest in terms of the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds -Article 11 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República N°7428 of September 7, 1994-. At the time of issuing this judgment, according to the provisions of Articles 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, and of Articles 1 and 4 of the aforementioned Ley N°7428, that function of oversight of the Public Finance and governance of the oversight system, exercised, as already indicated, on behalf of the citizens of this country, falls upon the CGR, an organ to which the Constitution and the law confer very broad powers of oversight precisely through the concept of Public Finance established in Article 183 of the Constitution, reiterated in Article 1 of Ley N°7428, which establishes: "Article 1.- Legal Nature and General Attribution. The Contraloría General de la República is a fundamental constitutional organ of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of the Public Finance and governing body of the oversight system contemplated in this law"; and whose broad scope we find defined in Article 8 of the same regulatory body: "Article 8.- Public Finance shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to collect, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds and the administrative and financial legal rules relating to the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds. With respect to non-state public entities, companies with minority public sector participation, or private entities, only those resources that they administer or dispose of, for any reason, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or made available to them, through a law or budget allocation, by the Branches of Government, their dependencies and auxiliary organs, the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks shall form part of the Public Finance. Resources of origin different from those indicated do not form part of the Public Finance; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations that govern them. Public assets shall be the universe constituted by public funds and liabilities borne by the subjects comprising the Public Finance. Subjects comprising the Public Finance shall be the State and other public entities or organs, state or otherwise, and public companies, as well as Private Law subjects, insofar as they administer or hold in custody public funds for any reason, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph", and further on, in Article 9, it is established that public funds are: "the resources, securities, assets, and rights owned by the State, organs, companies, or public entities". From the transcribed rules it is gathered that the legislator established a broad definition, both of the object and of the subjects regarding which the CGR has the power to exercise its oversight function. Thus, regarding the object, the control comprises the Public Finance, which, according to the terms of the aforementioned Article 8, is constituted by "public funds, the powers to collect, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds and the administrative and financial legal rules relating to the budget process, public procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds." And regarding the passive subject, Article 4 of Ley N°7428 is clear in stating that the competence of the Oversight Body encompasses all the entities and organs that make up the Public Finance, without prejudice to the optional competence regarding the subjects listed in subsections a) through e) of the cited article, and in the cases described therein. On this matter, the Procuraduría General de la República, in Legal Opinion N°OJ-101-2002 of July 5, 2002, stated: "The oversight system of the Public Finance is a coherent whole of constitutional basis. Based on the obligation of controlling the Public Finance enshrined in Article 183 of the Political Constitution, an oversight system has been established that filters throughout the Public Administration and encompasses both the heads of public entities, companies, or organs and the internal audits of the respective administrations" (the emphasis in bold and underline is supplied). Along these lines, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has ruled repeatedly: "VII. (...) The National Constituent Assembly, upon creating the Contraloría General de la República as an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly, conferred upon it the task of oversight and supervision of the Public Finance -Article 183 of the Political Constitution-, insofar as it is responsible for verifying the correct use of public funds, which must be understood in the terms previously indicated by this Constitutional Court: 'From reading Articles 183 and following of the Political Constitution, it is possible to conclude that the Contraloría General de la República has, in relation to public funds, a function of higher, legal and financial oversight, which cannot be seen as limited to an automatic action of simple «approval», since that would imply a substantial reduction of its constitutional powers'; 'The Contraloría General de la República, as its Ley Orgánica emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994) is an organ of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Finance and the direction of the oversight system regulated in said Law'; 'The normative basis of this special competence derives from the provisions of the cited Article 183 of the Constitution, and which the Law has developed, both in the first Ley Orgánica of this institution -number 1253 of December 23, 1950-, which in its Articles 2 and 3 subsection k) conferred upon this institution the special competence to exercise oversight functions in the management of public funds...', 'XX. OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. In every administrative organization there must exist a control system or means of oversight of that activity, which endows it with a set of guarantees of legitimacy and verification of appropriateness and legality, while achieving efficiency and morality in its functioning. In this way, for the fulfillment of each of the objectives of administrative acts, the exercise of the corresponding means of control or oversight is required; some of them are expressly provided for in law, and others arise implicitly from some essential constitutional precept, as occurs with the control exercised by the Contraloría General de la República over the activity of public procurement. The most qualified doctrine indicates that the control or oversight carried out in the Public Administration can be classified from three fundamental points of view: a) regarding the moment or time in which it is carried out in relation to the act or behavior, which takes on a preventive or repressive character, as the case may be; which can also present itself in three different ways: prior control ("a priori"), which actually functions as an authorization for the act or contract and acts as a condition for validity, so that when the act submitted to examination is not in accordance with what is due, suspension or substitution applies, as the case may be; subsequent control (a posteriori), which is actually an approval of what has been done by the Administration, and constitutes a requirement for the effectiveness of the act; and concomitant control, which is verified throughout the process, as a true oversight of the actions of public entities, constituting requirements for validity and effectiveness at the same time; b) regarding the initiative of the control, whether it is upon petition by a party (recursos) or carried out ex officio (vigilancia); and c) regarding the objective sought with the control or oversight, whether it is of legitimacy or legality, if it seeks to prevent or repress the violation of legal norms, or of appropriateness, insofar as it examines the convenience or merit of what has been done. XXI. (...) The Contraloría General de la República is a constitutional auxiliary organ of the Legislative Assembly, with express powers for the oversight and supervision of public finance -Article 183 of the Political Constitution-, which is responsible for verifying the correct use of public funds, which materializes in a control of legality in the financial administration of the State and its institutions -including the municipalities-, a task that it performs with absolute independence and objectivity, while, in principle, control of discretionary power does not apply, but only that of legality, when examining the conformity of what has been done with the legal system, not the dictates or intention of the Administration. In summary, this control is reduced to verifying compliance with the applicable legal prerequisites, disregarding any allusion to questions of policy or mere convenience or appropriateness in the controlled administration, as well as the efficiency and profitability of the financial administration; of course, as long as the convenience or inappropriateness does not exceed the limits beyond which it would become illegality in accordance with the normally recognized criteria regarding the limits of discretionary power. In general terms, this control mechanism always contains a logical ingredient, which is the verification of the conformity of the act or activity with a normative pattern of conduct, and a consequent measure, which constitutes a true act of will, directed at allowing or preventing the effects of the controlled activity, depending on whether they are correct or contrary to law (the emphasis in bold and underline is supplied) (Respectively, Constitutional Chamber, N° 2340-94, of 3:00 p.m. on May 28, 1994; N°00998-1998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 15, 1998; N°05445-1999 of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999). Now, in accordance with the theory of the case raised by the plaintiff, the powers attributed by the legal system to the CGR were exceeded by the latter when issuing Audit Report N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, since, as it sets forth, it invaded its exclusive and excluding competence in the area of tariff setting. In effect, in accordance with Articles 1 and 5 of the Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos N° 7593 of August 9, 1996, the setting of prices and tariffs for public services defined in Article 5 of said regulatory body is a function of ARESEP, and according to what that rule establishes, the electrical energy supply service is one of those it is responsible for regulating. Likewise, as provided in Article 1 of Ley N° 7593, said entity is an autonomous institution, with its own legal personality and assets, and with administrative independence, in the terms of Article 188 of the Political Constitution. Now, it is evident that this autonomy enjoyed by ARESEP does not exclude it from the duty to observe the principles and norms to which the Public Administration is subject. Thus, although the regulatory body is competent to set the tariffs of the public services indicated by the Law itself, its actions must respond to the cardinal principles governing their setting and, by the will of the constituent assembly, to oversight by the comptroller body to ensure that these are established in observance of those maxims that must necessarily be met when establishing a tariff, insofar as they form part of the Public Finance, because they constitute public funds -Article 183 of the Political Constitution and 1, 4, 8, and 9 of Ley N"7428; as well as because their determination affects the interests and property rights of consumers. Therefore, to the extent that an entity or organ comprises the Public Finance, in the terms provided in Article 8 of the Law, it is understood that it is subject to the competence of the Contraloría General de la República and consequently is a passive subject of its oversight powers. For the Tribunal, it is clear that what is being discussed is an integral part of the Public Finance insofar as the cost of a public service is an income received by its provider, and that in this case, ICE must pay the private electrical generators, and therefore the nature of those funds is public. Now, this oversight power does not entail the substitution of the powers of the entity or organ examined, which retains its discretionary powers over those elements of the administrative act that have that condition. This Organ considers that in this case we are not facing a violation of ARESEP's administrative autonomy, because the legal bond existing between it and the CGR does not occur between active administrations, as might occur between the regulatory body and ICE, or regarding a ministerial portfolio. The Contraloría is here acting in its typical oversight function, as a non-active administration, in exercise of its constitutional and legal powers as a supervisor of the Public Finance, which is not incompatible with the autonomy enjoyed by ARESEP, nor does it per se imply an invasion of its discretionary powers regarding the formation of the determinative act. What has occurred here is a control of legality in the area of tariff setting, without going so far as to substitute the active administration. Note that in the oversight report, challenged in this venue only regarding its formal element, insofar as the plaintiff delimited that the examination of this matter must be carried out solely in relation to the competence of the organ that issued the challenged act, and not regarding its substantial elements, the CGR notes among its findings: "... weaknesses related to three methodologies defined by ARESEP to set the tariffs for purchasing electrical energy from private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: Tariff-setting methodology for existing private generators (Ley n°. 7200) that sign a new energy purchase and sale contract with ICE, resolution n°. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for renewed contracts); Reference tariff methodology for new hydroelectric private generation plants, resolution n°. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for new hydroelectric plant contracts), and Model for determining reference tariffs for new wind-powered private generation plants, resolution n°. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for new wind plant contracts). 2.2. Furthermore, non-applications of these methodologies were identified in the last three tariff settings for BOO contracts: renewed ones in 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants in 2016, 2017, and 2018; and for new wind plants in 2015, 2017, and 2018. (...) The Methodology for renewed contracts allows the application of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants, for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind-powered plants, as long as a specific tariff model does not exist. This, despite the fact that they are generation plants with differences in terms of technology, investment costs, operating costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of service at cost that determines tariff methodologies and formulas; according to which tariffs must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and the effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with Articles 3 subsection b) and 31 b) of Ley n°.7593, in conjunction with Article 4 subsection 2) of Decreto Ejecutivo n°. 29232-MP, Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, which states that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set public service tariffs, in observance of said principle. (...) 2.15. Thus, the weaknesses mentioned above are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a tariff methodology for private generators with wind-powered plants that renew energy purchase and sale contracts with ICE, so that the tariff is consistent with the operating costs, investment, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. Furthermore, it originates from the fact that the analysis for developing the methodologies lost sight of the implication in the tariff of calculating the age factor on a different date with respect to the other variables and, in the individual plant capacity factor (Fpi), not using the maximum plant capacity contracted by ICE from the private generator and actual operating times. 2.16. In this sense, the tariff-setting power is a power-duty, so that ARESEP has a power in its area of competence and must exercise it (Constitutional Chamber, resolution n°.6326-2000). That power includes defining the elements that must be considered to faithfully comply with Articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set tariffs that express the elements that, according to the legal system and best practices, allow their alignment with the principle of service at cost. Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of tariffs that reflect the real costs of service provision, but at the same time are not excessive or unjust for the user (Procuraduría General de la República, opinion n°.C-329-2002 and legal opinion n°. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is consistent with agreement n°03-34-2016, ARESEP's 2017-2022 Institutional Strategic Plan, approved by its Board of Directors on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulatory instruments based on regulatory principles and public policies that incorporate quality criteria (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social welfare. Furthermore, objective 4 focuses on strengthening an innovative and effective organization oriented toward excellence and the fulfillment of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the tariff adjustment methodologies for purchasing energy from private generators under the BOO modality, at the time of executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the 2017, 2018, and 2019 tariff settings for renewed contracts, as well as for the reference tariffs of 2016, 2017, and 2018 for new hydroelectric plants, and of 2015, 2017, and 2018 for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The tariff proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 related to the aforementioned settings were subject to modifications resulting from 25 oppositions and coadjuvancies by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory authority. These modifications were due to: useful life calculations and use of installed capacity data that do not correspond to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose recording and reference was deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology requiring it. (...) 2.24. On the other hand, it was determined that the tariffs relating to the purchase of energy from renewed BOO contracts and the reference tariffs set for the purchase of energy from new BOO contracts for wind-powered and hydroelectric plants in the tariff settings of the period 2015 to 2019 were established without adhering to the methodologies; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical amount of data was not used for the calculation of the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of the tariffs set for: a) renewed contracts in 2017 and 2018, b) wind-powered in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric for 2016, 2017, and 2018. These tariff methodologies establish that when it is not possible to have a 5-year historical series, the shorter one shall be used, but with the same scope for all variables; however, in these tariff settings, the shorter one was used for one variable and for the rest, tariff series of longer periods. 2.26. Second, the tariff set in 2017 for renewed contracts, resolution n°.RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated exponential growth in operating costs (costos de explotación), as these were divided by the age factor (factor de antigüedad), whose value represents the equivalent remaining useful life of the plants. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in effect at that time, and results in the setting of a higher tariff. 2.27. Third, the tariffs applied in 2017 and 2018 were set including data from generation plants that operated for less than 10 months in the year, to calculate the individual plant capacity factor (Fpi): despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts states in Article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the tariff setting of January 10, 2017, the age factor (factor de antigüedad) was calculated as of December 31, 2015, despite the fact that Article 3.5.4. of the methodology for renewed contracts establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately prior to the time at which the set tariff was calculated, that is, December 31, 2016.

This situation also arose in the rate-setting of January 12, 2018. Furthermore, in this last rate-setting, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, when the correct one would have been that of August 2017; this caused an increase in operating costs (costos de explotación). 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of rates for renewed contracts set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind power plants regarding: operating costs, age factor (factor de antigüedad), and plant factor (factor de planta), and additionally, investment costs in 2019. This occurred despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts (articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that the rate is first defined using the information and calculation method for hydroelectric plants, and the result is then also used for the purchase of energy generated from different sources. 2.30. By way of example, the estimated effect of including operating cost data from wind power plants in the rate-settings increased these costs. This implies going from USD 179.43, as established by the Regulatory Authority, to USD 166.00 estimated by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), per installed KW in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference rates set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, for the calculation of the average investment cost, the CR-Parismina plant, with a capacity of 8MW, was grouped into the category with an installed capacity of 8.1MW to 12MW, when it should have been placed in the 4.1MW to 8MW group. The foregoing does not comply with the provisions of the Unit Investment Amount (M) section of the Methodology for new hydroelectric plants, which defines five groups of plants by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference rates for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, was included for the calculation of the sales expectation variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with the provisions of article iv, Sales Expectations, of the Methodology for new wind plants, which states that national plants of private generators must be considered. As can be seen, in Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, the Oversight Body (Órgano Contralor) merely points out weaknesses in the methodologies for setting the purchase rates for electricity from private generators, as well as the non-application of the rate-setting methodologies, which relate to the implementation of the rate set based on hydroelectric plant information for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants; the use of historical series in a manner different from that established in the methodologies; the setting of rates that, according to the report, caused the rate set in 2017 to have "an exponential growth in operating costs, because these were divided by the age factor, whose value represents the remaining useful life equivalent of the plants. This operation using the age factor is not part of the formula that was in effect at that time, and results in the setting of a higher rate"; rates applied by including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, even though the methodology indicated that the data should correspond to plants with a longer operating period; and incorrectly applied age factors. These findings are clearly linked to the regulatory body's non-observance of the principles governing rate-setting, compliance with which is not subject to the exercise of its discretionary powers, as these are maxims originating in the Political Constitution and the law. Moreover, they constitute non-applications of the methodologies established by ARESEP itself, from which it follows that, contrary to what ARESEP indicated in its complaint, we are not dealing with the exercise of a discretionary power, insofar as the methodologies authorized by the Board of Directors itself constitute a regulated act, the application of which is mandatory. Then, when the auditor refers to methodological weaknesses, it does so in relation to principles of mandatory compliance — non-discretionary — in rate-setting, and by establishing methodological non-applications, it also suggests that these entail not only the non-observance of the Board of Directors' own provisions regarding the establishment of rates, but that this conduct also implied the neglect of those essential maxims or postulates that must govern the determinative act, for the purpose of efficient use of public funds and the protection of the patrimonial rights and interests of consumers. It is necessary to point out that, pursuant to article 16 of the General Law of Public Administration, ARESEP is subject to the "unequivocal rules of science and technology." In the specific case, the CGR found that the methodological weaknesses and non-applications in which, according to the audit report, ARESEP incurred, increased the amounts that ICE had to pay to private electricity generators, which in turn affected the sums paid by users of the public electricity supply service. It noted that among the principles of the Law of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services is the principle of cost-of-service (servicio al costo), defined by numeral 3 of the indicated Law: "Article 3.- Definitions. For the purposes of this law, the following concepts are defined: (...) b) Cost-of-service: principle that determines the form of setting rates and prices for public services, such that only the costs necessary to provide the service are considered, which allow for competitive remuneration and guarantee the adequate development of the activity, in accordance with the provisions of article 31". This principle constitutes a parameter that must serve to set public service rates, so that only the costs necessary for the provision of the service are contemplated. The foregoing implies that in each case, a technical study must be conducted, excluding expenses and investments that are not necessary for the efficient provision of the service. This is aimed at consumer protection, as safeguarding their legitimate interests and economic rights is one of the purposes of the regulatory function, as inferred from article 46 of the Political Constitution by providing: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they form for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters." Then, the findings derived from the audit refer to essential elements in rate-setting (principle of cost-of-service), established in the legal system or by ARESEP itself, which, according to the Oversight Body, were disregarded. Thus, the audit carried out by the CGR, which concludes with report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, is nothing more than a manifestation of the exercise of its audit powers and, therefore, of the protection of the general interest, in this case related to the rate-setting process, so that it adheres to the rules of science and technology, as well as to the postulates established by the legal system for its determination. The plaintiff states that the CGR invaded its competence, because beyond reporting on the weaknesses and methodological non-applications, it imposed a series of obligations, even indicating the deadlines within which those actions were to be carried out. On this point, without prejudice to whether or not those provisions imply a substitution of the active administration, which will be examined further on, it must be stated that according to article 4 of Law No. 7428, "(...) The criteria issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic, within the scope of its competence, shall be binding for the passive subjects subject to its control or audit.", which is further and more broadly stated in numeral 12 of said Law: "Article 12.- Governing body of the Framework. The Comptroller General of the Republic is the governing body of the higher control and audit framework contemplated in this Law. The provisions, norms, policies, and directives it issues, within the scope of its competence, are of mandatory compliance and shall prevail over any other opposing provisions of the passive subjects. The Comptroller General of the Republic shall also issue the instructions and orders directed to the passive subjects that are necessary for the full exercise of its control and audit functions. The Comptroller General of the Republic shall also have the power to determine, among the entities, bodies, or persons subject to its control, which must provide mandatory collaboration, as well as the framework and the timing within which this shall be carried out, and the reasonable set of technical, human, and material means to be employed." In this vein, the Tribunal understands that the Oversight Body has the power to issue norms, policies, and directives necessary for the correct use of public resources, and the criteria it issues are of mandatory compliance. It follows, then, that if the legislator granted those powers to the CGR, their exercise does not imply, per se, a substitution of the active administration, which must be assessed in each case, without losing sight of what was indicated previously, in the sense that the existing legal relationship between the Oversight Body and the passive subject of the audit is not between two active administrations, but rather occurs between a subject that does have that nature, and one whose function and powers are of auditing over the efficient exercise, and adherence to legality, of the former. In the case under examination, on the occasion of the findings made by the CGR in its function of vigilance over the Public Treasury, and specifically, as an integral part thereof, over public funds, the challenged act ordered a series of actions that had to be observed, in some cases by the General Regulator, and in others by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. Specifically, it was ordered: to the General Regulator of the Regulatory Authority: "4.4. Prepare the proposed modifications to: a) articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Methodology for Setting Rates for Existing Private Generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolution No. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) the Sales Expectation (E) paragraph of the Reference Rate-setting Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) article iv of the Model for determining reference rates for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 and its amendments; d) add the norms establishing the use of real operating time in the calculation of the plant factor, in the Reference Rate-setting Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants and the Model for determining reference rates for new private wind generation plants. Send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence (...) 4.5. Prepare the proposed methodology for setting rates for private wind generators that renew electricity purchase contracts with ICE. Send the proposal to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence." Regarding the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services, it indicated: "4.6. Resolve the proposed modifications sent by the General Regulator relating to the Methodology for setting rates for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE. 4.7. Resolve the proposed methodology for setting rates for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, sent by the General Regulator. (...) Resolve the proposed actions to compensate the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018 and 2019." Regarding the Energy Superintendent of ARESEP: "4.9. Adjust the current rates for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, No. RIE-057-2018, and No. RE-0079-2018, so as to correct the methodological non-applications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, relating to: a) return on capital contributions, and b) use of information from wind plants. Send to the Comptroller General certification accrediting the publication of the new rate-settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019." And to the General Regulator, as well as the Energy Superintendent of ARESEP: "4.10. Determine the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 up to the last date on which the rate was applied, due to non-applications of the Methodology for Setting Rates for Existing Private Generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, resolution No. RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. Furthermore, propose the actions that allow for the recovery of the determined amounts and send them to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence." As can be seen, what was ordered by the CGR to ARESEP is, in general terms, for it to prepare proposals within the methodology for setting rates for new and existing private generators, and under the different energy generation modalities, based on the premise of the report's findings that the rates did not respect the principle of cost-of-service. Thus, what was ordered by the auditor is aimed at ensuring compliance with the principles, norms, and technical rules that must be observed in determining rates, but in no way does it substitute the Administration concerned, in this case, the regulatory body, for not only did the CGR not proceed to establish the rates, but furthermore, its conduct is limited to indicating to the plaintiff the postulates that must necessarily be contained in the elements of the act of their determination, a principle which, moreover, has not been established by the CGR, but is contained in the legal system and in the methodologies and precepts issued by the plaintiff's Board of Directors, and whose compliance is not discretionary, leaving to ARESEP the configuration of those elements that do have that nature. In this way, the issued orders are for ARESEP, when establishing and applying the rate-setting methodologies, to comply with the legal system, so that the regulated elements of that determinative act conform to the constitutional and legal precepts governing the regulatory matter. Finally, it is necessary to indicate that, according to the evidence in the case file, as well as the statements of the witness Erick Alvarado Muñoz, ARESEP was informed of each and every one of the actions that entailed the audit process, was granted a hearing for observations, which were evaluated and taken into account insofar as deemed appropriate, for the adoption of the final act by the CGR. Corollary: Under article 183 of the Political Constitution, the CGR has the nature of an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly for controlling or supervising the Public Treasury, with absolute independence in the exercise of its powers. This implies the audit, supervision, and control of all the elements that make up the Public Treasury, according to the terms established in the legal system and specifically in article 8 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, which, as we have seen, comprises public funds. The rates that ICE pays to private electricity generators precisely have that nature of public funds; therefore, the determination of those rates in accordance with the postulates established by the legal system, as well as the rules of science and technology, falls within the scope of the CGR's powers, which, through this oversight function, protects the general interest regarding not only the efficient use of resources, but also that the amounts paid by final consumers of public services address their economic interests and rights. Therefore, the plaintiff is incorrect when it states that, regarding the preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to rate-setting models, ARESEP is not subject to the CGR's audit, because those rates are paid by ICE with public funds, which are part of the Public Treasury, such that their determination is indeed subject to the examination of the oversight body. Thus, the challenged acts—No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and related acts, which refer to the recourse action filed by the plaintiff against the final act—do not constitute an arbitrary invasion of the powers granted by law to ARESEP, since what the CGR ordered was based on the finding of methodological non-applications established by ARESEP itself, as well as the non-observance of regulated elements of the rate-setting act, such as the principle of cost-of-service; and the orders issued do not compel the application of a specific rate-setting methodology, but rather the preparation of methodological proposals or modifications, while adhering to the maxims that the plaintiff must observe in carrying out its regulatory function. It follows that this is not a case of co-administration, as at no time has the CGR substituted the powers of the regulatory body regarding the setting of the rates that ICE must pay to private electricity generators, merely limiting itself to pointing out to ARESEP specific situations in which it must comply with the parameters of legality and efficiency, and even avoid continuing omissions, as is the case with rates related to electricity generation using wind technology. It must be noted that in the CGR's actions, the principle of legality has also not been violated; on the contrary, it has exercised the powers conferred upon it by the legal system, and which, as powers-duties, it was obliged to carry out, at the risk of incurring in a neglect and omission of compliance with the powers attributed to it. The principle of legality has also not been violated by the CGR by carrying out an audit procedure for which it is not authorized, as it clearly does possess the powers conferred by the legal system to perform the audit challenged here. Finally, it is necessary to point out that the Tribunal considers the plaintiff is incorrect when it suggests that this is an inter-administrative jurisdictional conflict, because as already indicated, we are dealing in this case with the exercise of the oversight function by an oversight body, and an active administration, where one and the other are not on the same plane, such that, as it is not a relationship between active administrations, the Comptroller's Office being a non-active, oversight, and supervisory administration of the Public Treasury, which, in exercising its own powers, does not threaten the autonomy with which ARESEP is endowed, nor does it invade its jurisdictional sphere, but rather limits itself to determining the regularity of the plaintiff's actions, comparing them with regulated elements of its conduct established in the legal system. On this point, it is necessary to reiterate that even though some of the plaintiff's initial allegations refer to aspects related to the substantial elements of the challenged acts, as well as to the administrative audit procedure, and that the ICE representation argued in its moment that it had warned ARESEP about the questions later raised by the CGR in its audit action, which has effectively been proven, and that the admitted testimonial evidence was to support the opinion rendered by the Oversight Body from a technical point of view, this Tribunal will not proceed to assess those elements, as the plaintiff herself limited the scope of this matter to the determination of one of the formal elements of the challenged conduct, namely: the CGR's competence to audit the methodologies for setting rates for the purchase of electricity from private generators by ICE. Finally, the Tribunal considers that, as the jurisdictional usurpation alleged by the plaintiff has not occurred, there are no elements that would allow an inference of the existence of responsibility on the part of the CGR in relation to the damages claimed by the plaintiff. We reiterate what was stated at the beginning, that: "what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism by which society can evaluate how the public resources it has entrusted to its officials have been administered. Therefore, auditing is conducted on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, over which mere administrative interest cannot prevail, according to numeral 113 of our General Law of Public Administration" (Emphasis added). The general interest, in ensuring that rate-setting is carried out in accordance with the postulates that inform this type of conduct, and that in this way public funds are used more efficiently and the patrimonial interests of consumers are protected, is what must prevail in this case, and this is achieved in part through the exercise of control and supervision carried out by the oversight body, without prejudice, moreover, to the fact that, as recorded in the case file, some of the findings of the control process were warned at the time by ICE.

IV.- EXCEPTIONS: The State's representation raised the defense of lack of active and passive standing (legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva). In this regard, it states that the plaintiff has not raised any claim related to any conduct by the State, which, it affirms, is a party to this proceeding only by virtue of the provisions of article 12, subsection 5) of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure. The Tribunal considers that the defense formulated by the State's representation must be accepted, as the State had no participation in the challenged conduct whose annulment is sought, and the plaintiff has also not raised any claim against it. It is resolved sua sponte that both ARESEP and the CGR have active and passive standing, as the passive and active subjects of the challenged oversight conduct; and also, that a current interest persists, since the competence challenged here has not yet been resolved. Regarding the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), pursuant to what was stated in the preceding recital (considerando), this decision-making body concludes that ARESEP is indeed a passive subject of audit by the CGR, not only regarding the functions it develops for the purpose of enabling the exercise of its powers, but also in relation to its substantive function, when determining the methodologies for setting public service rates, because these rates, as public funds, form part of the Public Treasury, and therefore the exercise of the powers related to their determination is subject to the supervision of the CGR, without this implying the existence of a co-administration. Consequently, the appropriate course is to accept the defense of lack of right and to declare the complaint dismissed in all its aspects.

V.- COSTS: In accordance with numeral 193 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. Dispensation from this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this panel finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the regulation and to break the postulate of condemning the losing party. Therefore, ARESEP is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) The defense of lack of active and passive standing raised by the State is accepted, and solely with respect to the State. The defense of lack of right is accepted, and the complaint of the Regulatory Authority of Public Services against the State, the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the latter acting as an interested third party, is declared dismissed. Both sets of costs are to be borne by the plaintiff.

Ileana Isabel Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Juan Luis Giusti Soto ???????????????

ILEANA ISABEL SANCHEZ NAVARRO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE JUAN LUIS GIUSTI SOTO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE MARIANELLA DEL CARMEN ALVAREZ MOLINA, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, across from Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006.

EMAIL: [email protected] EV Machote Generation: F:\Gestion-Judicial\Servidor de Archivos\Modelos\Contencioso\TCRESOL016.dpj | **EXPEDIENT:** | **20-001022-1027-CA - 2** | | **PROCEEDING:** | **KNOWLEDGE** | | **PLAINTIFF:** | **AUTORIDAD REGULADORA DE LOS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS** | | **DEFENDANT:** | **CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA** | **No. 2024004630** **TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SECTION V, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at eleven hours and fifty-two minutes on the eighteenth of July of two thousand twenty-four.-** Knowledge proceeding filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), represented by its Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, Víctor Barquero Rojas, identity card 111910985, bar number 19692; against the Contraloría General de la República (CGR), on whose behalf Jesús González Hidalgo intervenes, identity card 204970783, bar number 11240, and the State, in whose name the Procuradora Amanda Grosser Jiménez ultimately acts, identity card 112560237, bar number 20777. The Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) intervenes as an interested third party, through its Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact Marys Palacios Carrillo, identity card 800790189, bar number 12630, and María López Alvarado, identity card 107860831, bar number 24708.

**RESULTANDO** I.- By a pleading filed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda on February 11, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact of ARESEP, Luis Daniel Chacón Solórzano, identity card 205560559, and Henry Payne Castro, identity card 108850781, filed a knowledge complaint against the CGR, and based on the facts alleged and the legal arguments raised, they requested that in the judgment: *"1. That the complaint filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos against the Contraloría General de la República be declared with merit, and that in the judgment, the absolute nullity be declared of Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 of September 16, 2019, prepared by the Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales de Energía of the División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa (DFOE), of administrative resolution R-DFOE-AE-0003-2019, at 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019, and of the definitive act of the Contraloría General de la República R-DC-10-2020 (No. 02120DC-0041) at 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020, for being non-conforming with the juridical order, by virtue of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, and consequently, they be left without any effect from their issuance, by provision of Article 171 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Article 131, subsection 1) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the mandatory compliance provisions contained therein and directed against our represented entity, specifically to the Intendente de Energía, the Regulador General, and the Junta Directiva of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Furthermore, concomitantly, we request that in the judgment, the absolute nullity be declared -due to their relation and connectedness- of the official letters: DFOE-SD-0976, DFOE-AE-0570 (17839) of December 11, 2018, DEFOE AE-0414 (official letter No. 13720) of September 16, 2019, DFOE-AE-0361 (official letter No. 11083) of June 26, 2019, DFOE-AE-0085, DFOE-SD-0307 (official letter No. 02740), DFOE-SD-0309 (official letter No. 02754), No. 04878 (DC-0097), DFOE-SD-0729 (official letter No. 05786), DFOE-AE-0329, DFOE-SD-1577 (official letter No. 12873), DFOE-AE-0331, DFOE-SD-1587 (official letter No. 1298), of April 2, 2020, as well as all those related and similar ones that are found exclusively against Aresep, which served as the basis and foundation for the issuance of the cited Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and the definitive act R-DC-010-2020 (No. 02110 DC-0041 at 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020), and that your Authority determines in judgment. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 164.2 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Article 131, subsection 3) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. 2. That the Contraloría General de la República be ordered to pay the costs of this action, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which will be liquidated in the judgment enforcement phase. 3. That the Contraloría General de la República be ordered to pay the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to Aresep, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which will be liquidated in the judgment enforcement. 4. That in the judgment, the heads of the Contraloría General de la República be ordered to immediately initiate the internal proceedings of merit, in order to establish the pecuniary and/or disciplinary responsibility of the officials of the controlling entity who participated in the actions or omissions that led to incurring in the acts contrary to law whose annulment is requested here"* (images 2 to 111 of the judicial file).

**II.-** By resolution at 09:41 a.m. on May 5, 2021, the proceeding was deemed established and its transfer was granted to the CGR, as well as to the State (images 125 to 127).

**III.-** On July 8, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of the ICE negatively answered the complaint, in its capacity as an interested third party, and raised the defense of lack of right (images 135 to 179 of the judicial file).

**IV.-** In a pleading dated July 9, 2021, the representation of the CGR negatively answered the complaint and raised the exception of lack of right (images 180 to 215 of the judicial file).

**V.-** Through a pleading dated July 15, 2021, the representation of the State negatively answered the complaint and formulated the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of right (images 225 to 294 of the judicial file).

**VI.-** In resolution No. 501-2022-T, at 8:00 a.m. on March 29, 2022, Judge Roberto Brenes Chinchilla rejected the coadjuvancies raised by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S. A., Molinos de Viento del Arenal S.A., as well as by Aeroenergía S.A. (images 510 to 516 of the judicial file).

**VII.-** On March 30, 2022, the preliminary hearing was held. In said procedural act, Claim No. 3 of the complaint was clarified, in the sense that the damages refer to: *"damage to the institutional image, the questioning of the quality, expertise, credibility, and technical rigor of the work performed by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, and the professional technical capacity of the officials who prepared, approved, and applied those tariff methodologies analyzed in the report"*, and the evaluation and admission of the evidence offered by the parties was carried out (images 531 to 535d of the judicial file).

**VIII.-** In resolution No. 134-2022-I at 3:58 p.m. on April 25, 2022, the Sección Primera of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, summarily rejected the appeal filed by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S.A., against the interlocutory judgment No. 501-2022-T, at 8:00 a.m. on March 29, 2022, which had rejected the active coadjuvancy of said company (images 546 and 547 of the judicial file).

**IX.-** The oral and public trial hearing was held on June 20, 2024. In that act, the expert witness testimony admitted during the preliminary hearing was received. At the request of the parties, the Tribunal granted five business days for the purpose of rendering written conclusions, and the matter was declared complex (the foregoing is recorded in the minutes of the referred procedural act, visible at images 653 to 658 of the judicial file, as well as in the recording of the hearing that is in digital format).

**X.-** This judgment is issued unanimously, within the legal timeframe. No defects capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed. The vote is concurred by Judge Álvarez Molina, Judge Giusti Soto, and Judge Sánchez Navarro, who serves as the drafter.

**CONSIDERANDO** **I.- PROVEN FACTS:** For the importance of resolving this matter, the following facts are deemed duly accredited:

1. That according to the Special Character Audit Report on the Process Established by ICE and ARESEP for the Concession of Electricity Generation and Purchase from Private Entities No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, prepared by the Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa of the CGR, said review and verification process had as its objective and scope *"(...) to determine the reasonableness of the process and criteria applied by ICE and ARESEP to concession the generation and purchase of electrical energy from private entities, in its elements of eligibility and project selection, control in their execution, and establishment of energy purchase tariffs, ensuring compliance with the pertinent regulations. (...) it comprises the analysis of the actions, processes, procedures, and regulations for the concession of generation and purchase of electrical energy from private generators, regarding contracts related to wind and hydraulic sources that are in commercial operation. (...) The period of analysis spanned from 2008 to 2018, which was extended to May 31, 2019, to consider the estimated effects of the tariff set for renewed contracts"* (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file that is in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and which corresponds to page 07 of the cited Report).

2. That according to Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, referred to in the immediately preceding fact, the findings found are the following: *"2.1. Weaknesses were determined related to three methodologies defined by ARESEP to set the tariffs for the purchase of electrical energy from private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Ley No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, resolution No. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for Renewed Contracts); Reference Tariff Methodology for New Private Hydroelectric Generation Plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Hydroelectric Plant Contracts); and Model for Determining Reference Tariffs for New Private Wind Generation Plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Wind Plant Contracts). 2.2. Additionally, non-applications of these methodologies were identified in the last three tariff fixations for BOO contracts: renewed ones for 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants for 2016, 2017, and 2018; and for new wind plants for 2015, 2017, and 2018.* (...) The Methodology for renewed contracts permits the application of the rate set based on information from hydroelectric plants for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants, as long as a specific rate model does not exist. This, despite the fact that these are generation plants with differences in technology, investment costs, operation costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of service at cost, which is determinant for rate methodologies and formulas; according to this principle, rates must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with articles 3 subsection b) and 31 b) of Law No. 7593, in concordance with article 4 subsection 2) of Executive Decree No. 29232-MP, Regulation to the Law Regulating Public Services, which indicates that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set the rates of public services, with observance of said principle. (...) 2.15. It is thus how the aforementioned weaknesses are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a rate methodology for private generators with wind plants that renew their energy purchase and sale contracts with ICE, so that the rate is consistent with the exploitation costs, investment costs, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. Furthermore, it originates from the fact that the analysis for the elaboration of the methodologies lost sight of the implication in the rate of calculating the age factor on a date different from the other variables, and in the individual plant factor (Fpi), not using the maximum plant capacity contracted by ICE to the private generator and the real operation times. 2.16. In this sense, the rate-setting power is a power-duty, so that ARESEP has a power in matters of its competence and must exercise it (Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 6326-2000). This power comprises defining the elements that must be considered to faithfully comply with articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set rates that express the elements which, according to the legal system and technical standards, allow their concordance with the principle of service at cost. Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of rates that reflect the real costs of providing the service, but at the same time are not excessive or unjust for the user (Attorney General's Office, opinion No. C-329-2002 and legal opinion No. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is consistent with agreement No. 03-34-2016 Institutional Strategic Plan of ARESEP 2017-2022, approved by its Board of Directors on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulation instruments based on regulation principles and public policies that incorporate criteria of quality (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social well-being. Additionally, objective 4 is centered on strengthening an innovative and efficient organization oriented toward excellence and the achievement of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the rate adjustment methodologies for the purchase of energy from private generators under the BOO modality, when executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the rate-setting for 2017, 2018, and 2019 for renewed contracts, as well as for the reference rates of 2016, 2017, and 2018 for new hydroelectric plants, and of 2015, 2017, and 2018 for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The rate proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 relative to the aforementioned settings were subject to modifications as a result of 25 oppositions and joinders by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory Authority. These modifications occurred due to: useful life calculations and use of installed capacity data that do not correspond to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose registration and reference was deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology requiring it. (...) 2.24. On the other hand, it was determined that the rates related to the purchase of energy from renewed BOO contracts and the reference rates set for the purchase of energy from new BOO contracts for wind and hydroelectric plants in the rate-setting exercises for the period 2015 to 2019 were established without adherence to the methodologies; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical amount of data was not used for the calculation of the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of the rates set for: a) renewed contracts in 2017 and 2018, b) wind plants in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric plants for 2016, 2017, and 2018. These rate methodologies establish that when it is not possible to count on a historical series of 5 years, the shorter one shall be used, but with equal scope for all variables; however, in these rate settings the shorter series was used for one variable and for the rest, rate series from longer periods were used. 2.26. Second, the rate set in 2017 for renewed contracts, resolution No. RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated exponential growth of exploitation costs, as these were divided by the age factor, whose value represents the equivalent of the plants' remaining useful life. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in force at that moment, and results in the setting of a higher rate. 2.27. Third, the rates applied in 2017 and 2018 were set by including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, to calculate the individual plant factor (Fpi): despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts indicates in article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the rate-setting of January 10, 2017, the age factor was calculated as of December 31, 2015, despite the fact that article 3.5.4 of the methodology for renewed contracts establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately prior to the moment in which the set rate was calculated, that is, December 31, 2016. This situation also occurred in the rate-setting of January 12, 2018. Additionally, in this last rate-setting, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, when the correct one was August 2017; this caused an increase in exploitation costs. 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of the rates for renewed contracts set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind plants regarding: exploitation costs, age factor, and plant factor, and additionally, investment costs in 2019. The foregoing, despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts (articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that the rate is first defined with the information and calculation method of hydroelectric plants, and then the result is also used for the purchase of energy generated with different sources. 2.30. By way of example, the estimated effect of including exploitation cost data from wind plants in the rate settings is that these costs increased. This implies going from USD 179.43 established by the Regulatory Authority to USD 166.00 estimated by the Comptroller General's Office, per KW installed in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference rates set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, to calculate the average investment cost, the CR-Parismina plant of 8MW was grouped in the group with installed capacity of 8.1MW to 12MW, when it should have been placed in the group of 4.1MW to 8MW. The foregoing does not adhere to what is established in the section Unit Investment Amount (M) of the Methodology for new hydroelectric plants, which defines five groups of plants by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference rates for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, were included for the calculation of the sales expectations variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with what is established in article iv Sales Expectations of the Methodology for new wind plants, regarding that it corresponds to consider national plants of private generators" (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and which corresponds to pages 11 to 15 of the cited Report).

3. That according to Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, previously referenced, "(...) the weaknesses of the methodologies defined by ARESEP and their misapplications have led to rate settings that exceed the principle of service at cost, as well as a normal benefit or profit for the provider. In this regard, in the renewed energy purchase contracts, it is estimated that said situation has implied additional expenditures for ICE close to USD 24.00 million, between the year 2017 and May 2019. The foregoing not only harms the public funds that this Institute administers, but also the final consumers, since these expenditures necessarily form part of the electric bill" (image 26 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and which corresponds to page 24 of the cited Report).

4. That in response to the findings indicated in Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, the CGR ordered: to the Regulador General of the Autoridad Reguladora: "4.4.

Prepare the proposed modifications to: a) articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Tariff-Setting Methodology for Existing Private Generators (Ley 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolution No. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) the Sales Expectation (E) paragraph of the reference tariff methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) article iv of the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 and its amendments; d) add the rules establishing the use of real operation time in the calculation of the plant factor, in the reference tariff methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants and the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants. Send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for matters within its purview (...) 4.5. Prepare the proposed tariff-setting methodology for private wind generators that renew energy purchase contracts with the ICE. Send the proposal to the Board of Directors for matters within its purview." Regarding the Board of Directors of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, it indicated: "4.6. Resolve the proposed modifications referred by the Regulador General concerning the tariff-setting methodology for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with the ICE. 4.7. Resolve the proposal for a tariff-setting methodology for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with the ICE, referred by the Regulador General. (...) Resolve the proposal for actions to compensate the excess amounts paid by the ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019." Regarding the Intendente de Energía of the ARESEP: "4.9. Adjust the current tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, No. RIE-057-2018, and No. RE-0079-2018, so as to correct the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, concerning: a) profitability over capital contributions, and b) use of wind plant information. Send to the Contraloría General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019." And to the Regulador General, as well as the Intendente de Energía of the ARESEP: 4.10. Determine the excess amounts paid by the ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 until the last date the tariff was applied, due to misapplications of the Tariff-Setting Methodology for Existing Private Generators (Ley No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the ICE, resolution No. RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. Furthermore, propose actions to compensate the determined amounts and send them to the Board of Directors for matters within its purview" (images 26 to 28 of the administrative record found in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and corresponding to pages 24 to 26 of the aforementioned Report).

5. That on the occasion of the appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal filed by the ARESEP in official communication OF-0783-RG-2019, on September 19, 2019, against audit report DFOE-AE-00009-2019, the Área de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa of the Contraloría General de la República issued resolution R-DFOE-AE-00003-2019, at 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019. This act resolved: "I) PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal for reversal (...) solely in the following: 1. That the provision contained in paragraph 4.9 of the reference report shall read as follows: 'Adjust the tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, RIE-057-2018, and RE-0079-2018, or those that may have been issued in their place prior to the notification of this report, so as not to incur the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, concerning the following: a) profitability over capital contributions, and b) use of wind plant information. Send to the Contraloría General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019'." Furthermore, some of the figures in the figures contained in the report were replaced. 2. (see, in their respective order, the appeal document and the act resolving it at images 32 to 74 and 75 to 112 of the administrative record found in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019]).

6. That in resolution No. R-DC-010-2020, at 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020, the Contraloría General de la República declared unfounded the appeal filed by the ARESEP against DFOE-AE-00009-2019 (as recorded in folder 00208_00221 [OT-775-2019]).

7. That prior to the CGR issuing the Audit Report, the ICE presented a series of objections before the Aresep: "demonstrating the need for a separation of the methodology according to technology (hydro and wind), for the estimation of energy purchase tariffs, otherwise the extra cost is transferred to the final customer and an undue benefit is granted to private generators of wind plants. Likewise, it has been raised before the ARESEP that the date associated with the calculation of the obsolescence factor should be December 31 of the same year in which the tariff-setting process begins (...) The foregoing because the more recent the date used for calculating the plants' obsolescence factor, the lower said value tends to be, resulting in a reduction of the tariff payable to private generators. In this same vein, consideration has also been requested, as recorded in official communication 0610-135-2018 of December 3, 2018, among other aspects, to incorporate as part of the changes in the tariff-setting methodologies, the use of contracted capacity, as a more objective reference in the calculation of real expectations for energy sales to the ICE. The review and inclusion of more precise information in the calculation has been a request from the ICE to the ARESEP" (this has been repeatedly stated by the ICE's representation, in the response to the lawsuit, as well as in the response provided to the preliminary injunction request filed by the ARESEP; and in the copy of the documentation containing these proceedings, which is visible at images 157 to 180 of the file corresponding to the preliminary injunction found in the judicial record, and CD 4 proof of the ICE's response, Prueba 10.0510-1794-2010 of December 10, 2010; prueba 11.510-144-2012, which is an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal filed by the ICE against resolution 750-RCR-2012 of 10:45 a.m. on January 9, 2012; prueba 12, official communication 0610-128-2018, of November 22, 2018, consisting of the ICE's objection to the proposal for the annual application of the tariff-setting methodology for private generators (Ley 7200) that sign a new energy purchase and sale contract with the ICE; prueba 13.0610-135-2018 of March 12, 2018, in which the ICE raises a series of requests to improve the methodologies for private generators; prueba 14, which is an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal against resolution RIE-001-2018 of January 12, 2018; prueba 17-257-401-2016, of December 16, 2016, which is a nullity proceeding against the decision of the Board of Directors of the ARESEP to suspend the application of RDJ-017-2016, through Board of Directors Agreement No. 06-07-027-2016; prueba 18.0257-591-2017 of November 10, 2017, which is an appeal for nullity and reversal with subsidiary appeal against resolution RIE-110-2017).

**II.- FACTS NOT PROVEN:** 1. That the contested acts imposed upon the ARESEP the discretionary elements for determining the methodologies for setting tariffs for the supply of electricity by private generators (no evidence exists in this regard).

**III.- PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES:** **PLAINTIFF:** The representation of the ARESEP requests the annulment of CGR report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, based on the following arguments: 1. Lack of competence and absence of technical expertise of the CGR in areas that are exclusive to the ARESEP, concerning the preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models. 2. In matters of preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models, the ARESEP is not subject to oversight by the CGR, such that conduct related to the exercise of these powers is solely subject to judicial review. 3. The contested acts constitute an arbitrary invasion of the exclusive and excluding powers granted by law to the ARESEP. 4. Exercise of co-administration by the CGR, by ordering the ARESEP to apply and modify tariff models and methodologies, as well as to recover excess sums paid by the ICE. 5. Violation of the principle of legality by the CGR, by carrying out an oversight procedure for which it is not authorized. 6. An absence of competence to annul, modify, and disregard the tariff models applied by the ARESEP within the framework of purchasing electricity from private parties. It expressly indicates that the purpose of this process is to elucidate an alleged invasion of the ARESEP's competence by the CGR, by issuing No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, and notes: ***"Under this delimitation, it is necessary to keep in mind that Aresep did not file this process for the purpose of questioning the techniques or technical criteria on which the binding orders given by the CGR to my represented entity are based, nor whether they are technically correct or incorrect, and neither is the legality or the parameters of the ARESEP's tariff methodologies or their tariff setting being discussed in this process (or whether the obsolescence factor / operating costs / or plant factor was applied correctly or incorrectly), that is not the purpose of the process. The purpose of the process revolves around an inter-administrative conflict of powers, it lies in determining whether there is an EXPRESS LEGAL AUTHORIZATION for the CGR to issue this type of binding provisions to Aresep, which delimit the manner in which it must exercise the exclusive and excluding powers for which it was created, in accordance with Article 188 of the Constitución Política, and Ley No. 7593"*** (the bold and underlined highlighting is supplied). **DEFENDANT:** Both the CGR, as well as the representation of the State and the ICE, are consistent in stating that the contested conduct does not constitute an invasion of the ARESEP's powers by the CGR. They indicate that it involves the preparation of an audit report within the framework of powers granted to the Contraloría Organs by the legal system in matters of Public Finance. They maintain that the weaknesses in the tariff-setting methodologies, as well as their misapplication in the purchase of electricity from private parties by the ICE, demonstrate that the principles of legality, efficiency, and cost-of-service were disregarded in the determination of tariffs, which led to the payments made by the ICE being higher, and the cost of the public electricity supply service being higher for the end consumer. They maintain that the active Administration was not substituted, and that, on the contrary, in the exercise of oversight powers, the plaintiff was urged to comply with the principles and rules pertaining to the process of setting tariffs for public services, as well as the provisions issued by the ARESEP itself and its Board of Directors. The Special Judicial Agent also noted that her represented entity had previously warned the ARESEP regarding the non-observance of the legal framework in relation to the setting of tariffs that were subsequently reviewed by the CGR.

All the representations raised the defense of lack of right, and the State also raised the exception of lack of standing (legitimación ad causam).<span style="-aw-import: spaces;"> </span> **III.- ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE CGR AND THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Demanding accountability from the Public Administration regarding its management constitutes a fundamental right of citizens, the oversight of which, in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), the constituent power decided to entrust to an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly. Subsequently, *"... what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism through which society can evaluate how the public resources it has entrusted to its officials have been administered. Oversight is therefore exercised on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, which cannot be superseded by mere administrative interest, according to numeral 113 of our General Law of Public Administration"* (Superior Oversight of Public Finance as a Guarantee for Inhabitants. Ronald Hidalgo Cuadra. Journal of Legal Sciences No. 90. 1999); and which has the purpose of guaranteeing the general interest regarding the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds - Article 11 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic No. 7428 of September 7, 1994. At the time this judgment is issued, according to precepts 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, and numerals 1 and 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 7428, this function of overseeing Public Finance and directing the oversight system, exercised, as already indicated, on behalf of the citizens of this country, falls upon the CGR, an entity to which the Constitution and the law grant extremely broad oversight powers precisely through the concept of Public Finance established in Constitutional Article 183, reiterated in Article 1 of Law No. 7428, which establishes: *"Article 1.- Legal Nature and General Attribution. The Comptroller General of the Republic is a fundamental constitutional organ of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of Public Finance and director of the oversight system contemplated by this law"*; and whose broad scope we find defined in Article 8 of the same regulatory body: *"Article 8.- Public Finance shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the administrative and financial legal norms relating to the budget process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds. Regarding non-state public entities, corporations with minority public sector participation, or private entities, only the resources they administer or dispose of, by any title, to achieve their purposes and that have been transferred or placed at their disposal, through a regulation or budget item, by the Powers of the State, their dependencies and auxiliary organs, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks, shall form part of Public Finance. Resources of origin other than those indicated do not integrate Public Finance; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations that govern them. The public patrimony shall be the universe constituted by public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the subjects comprising Public Finance. The subjects comprising Public Finance shall be the State and the other public entities or organs, whether state or not, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, insofar as they administer or guard public funds by any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph"*, and further on, in Article 9, it is established that public funds are: *"the resources, values, assets, and rights owned by the State, organs, enterprises, or public entities."* From the transcribed norms, it is inferred that the legislator established a broad definition, both of the object and of the subjects over which the CGR has the power to exercise its oversight function. Thus, regarding the object, control encompasses Public Finance, which, according to the terms of Article 8 cited above, is constituted by "*public funds, the powers to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds and the administrative and financial legal norms relating to the budget process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds.*" **And regarding the passive subject, Article 4 of Law No. 7428 is clear in stating that the jurisdiction of the Comptroller Organ covers the totality of the entities and organs that comprise Public Finance**, without prejudice to the optional jurisdiction regarding the subjects listed in subsections a) to e) of the cited numeral, and in the situations described therein. On this matter, the General Attorney's Office of the Republic, in Legal Opinion No. OJ-101-2002, of July 5, 2002, stated: *"The oversight system for Public Finance is a coherent whole of constitutional basis. Based on the obligation to control Public Finance enshrined in Article 183 of the Political Constitution,* **a oversight system has been established that permeates the entire length and breadth of the Public Administration and that encompasses both the heads of public entities, enterprises, or organs and the internal audit offices of the respective administrations***"* (the bold and underline emphasis are supplied). Along these lines, the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly pronounced: *"VII. (...) The National Constituent Assembly, upon creating the Comptroller General of the Republic as an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly, conferred upon it the task of oversight and vigilance of Public Finance - Article 183 of the Political Constitution -, insofar as it is responsible for verifying the correct use of public funds, which must be understood in the terms already indicated previously by this Constitutional Court: "From the reading of Articles 183 and following of the Political Constitution, it is possible to conclude that the Comptroller General of the Republic has, in relation to public funds, a function of superior, legal, and financial oversight, which cannot be limited to an automatic action of mere 'approval', since that would imply a substantial diminution of its constitutional powers"; "The Comptroller General of the Republic, as its Organic Law emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September seven, nineteen ninety-four) is an organ of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of Public Finance and the direction of the oversight system regulated in the cited Law"; "The normative foundation of this special jurisdiction derives from the provisions of the cited Constitutional Article 183, and which the Law has developed, both in the first Organic Law of this institution - number 1253 of December twenty-three, nineteen fifty -, which in its articles 2 and 3 subsection k) conferred upon this institution the special jurisdiction to exercise vigilance functions in the management of public funds...", "XX.- OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.* **In every administrative organization,** *there must exist a system of control or means of oversight of that activity, which endows it with a set of guarantees of legitimacy and verification of timeliness and legality, while achieving the efficiency and morality of its functioning. In this way, for the fulfillment of each of the objectives of administrative acts, the exercise of the corresponding means of control or oversight is required; some of them are expressly provided for in the law and others arise implicitly from some essential precept of a constitutional nature, as occurs with the control exercised by the Comptroller General of the Republic over administrative procurement activity. The most qualified doctrine indicates that the control or oversight carried out in the Public Administration can be classified from three fundamental points of view: a) regarding the moment or time in which it is carried out in relation to the act or behavior, which takes on a preventive or repressive character, as the case may be; which can also present itself in three different ways: prior control ("a priori"), which actually functions as an authorization for the act or contract and acts as a condition of validity, so that when the act submitted for examination is not in accordance with what is due, the suspension or substitution proceeds, as the case may be; subsequent control ("a posteriori"), which is actually an approval of what the Administration has done, and constitutes a requirement for the effectiveness of the act; and concomitant control, which is verified throughout the entire process, as a true oversight of the actions of public entities, constituting requirements of validity and effectiveness at the same time; b) regarding the initiative of the control, whether it is at the request of a party (recursos) or acts ex officio (vigilance); and c) regarding the object that is intended to be achieved with the control or oversight, whether it is of legitimacy or legality, if it aims to prevent or repress the violation of legal norms, or of timeliness, insofar as it examines the convenience or merit of what has been done.* XXI.— (...) The Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is a constitutional auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly, with express powers to oversee and monitor the public treasury (hacienda pública)—article 183 of the Political Constitution—which is responsible for verifying the correct use of public funds, which takes the form of a legality control over the financial administration of the State and its institutions—including municipalities—a task it performs with absolute independence and objectivity, since, in principle, there is no room for the control of discretionary powers, but only for legality control, by examining the conformity of what has been done with the legal system, not the dictates or intention of the Administration. In summary, this control is reduced to the verification of compliance with applicable legality prerequisites, disregarding any reference to policy issues or mere convenience or opportunity in the controlled administration, as well as the efficiency and profitability of the financial administration; of course, provided the inconvenience or inopportuneness does not exceed the limits beyond which it would become illegality in accordance with normally recognized criteria regarding the limits of discretionary power. In general terms, this control mechanism always contains a logical component, which is the verification of the conformity of the act or activity with a normative standard of conduct, and a consequent measure, which constitutes a true act of will, aimed at permitting or preventing the effects of the controlled activity, depending on whether they are correct or contrary to law (bold and underlining added) (In order, Constitutional Chamber, No. 2340-94, of 3:00 p.m. on May 28, 1994; No. 00998-1998 of 11:30 a.m. on February 15, 1998; No. 05445-1999 of 2:30 p.m. on July 14, 1999). Now, according to the theory of the case put forward by the plaintiff, the powers conferred by the legal system upon the CGR were exceeded by the latter when it issued Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, since, as it explains, it invaded its exclusive and exclusionary competence in the matter of rate-setting. Indeed, in accordance with numerals 1 and 5 of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services Law (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) No. 7593 of August 9, 1996, the setting of prices and rates for public services defined in Article 5 of said regulatory body is a function of ARESEP, and according to what said norm establishes, the electric energy supply service is one of those it is responsible for regulating. Likewise, as provided in Article 1 of Law No. 7593, said entity is an autonomous institution, with its own legal personality and assets, and administrative independence, in the terms of Article 188 of the Political Constitution. Now, it is evident that this autonomy enjoyed by ARESEP does not exclude it from the duty to observe the principles and norms to which the Public Administration is subject. Thus, although the regulatory entity is competent for setting the rates of the public services indicated by the Law itself, its actions must respond to the cardinal principles governing their setting, and by the will of the constituent power, to the oversight by the comptroller entity to ensure that these are established in observance of those maxims which must necessarily be complied with when establishing a rate, since these form part of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), because they constitute public funds—Article 183 of the Political Constitution and Articles 1, 4, 8, and 9 of Law No. 7428; as well as because their determination affects the interests and patrimonial rights of consumers. Hence, insofar as an entity or body forms part of the Public Treasury, in the terms set forth in Article 8 of the Law, it is understood to be subject to the competence of the Comptroller General of the Republic and consequently is a passive subject of its oversight powers. For the Tribunal, it is clear that what is discussed is an integral part of the Public Treasury insofar as the cost of a public service is an income received by its provider, and in this case, ICE must pay the private electricity generators, and therefore the nature of those funds is public. Now, this oversight power does not entail the substitution of the competences of the examined entity or body, which retains its discretionary powers over those elements of the administrative act having that condition. This Body considers that in this case we are not facing a violation of the administrative autonomy of ARESEP, because the legal bond existing between it and the CGR does not occur between active administrations, as could be the case between the regulatory entity and ICE, or with respect to a ministerial portfolio. The Comptroller's Office here is acting in its typical oversight function, as a non-active administration, in exercise of its constitutional and legal competences as guardian of the Public Treasury, which is not incompatible with the autonomy enjoyed by ARESEP, nor does it per se imply an invasion of its discretionary powers regarding the formation of the determinative act. What has occurred here is a legality control in the matter of rate-setting, without going so far as to substitute the active administration. Note that in the oversight report, challenged in this venue solely regarding its formal element, as it was delimited by the plaintiff that the examination of this matter must be conducted solely in relation to the competence of the body that issued the challenged act, and not as to its substantial elements, the CGR points out among its findings: "...weaknesses related to three methodologies defined by ARESEP to set the purchase rates for electric energy from private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: Rate-setting methodology for existing private generators (Law No. 7200) signing a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, Resolution No. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010 and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for Renewed Contracts); Reference rate methodology for new private hydroelectric power generation plants, Resolution No. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011 and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Hydroelectric Plant Contracts), and Model for the determination of reference rates for new private wind power generation plants, Resolution No. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011 and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for New Wind Plant Contracts). 2.2. Furthermore, non-applications of these methodologies were identified in the last three rate settings for BOO contracts: renewed for 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants for 2016, 2017, and 2018, and for new wind plants for 2015, 2017, and 2018. (...) The Methodology for Renewed Contracts admits the application of the rate set based on information from hydroelectric plants, for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants, provided no specific rate model exists. This, despite the fact that these are generation plants with differences in technology, investment costs, operating costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of cost-of-service (servicio al costo), which is determinative of the methodologies and rate formulas; according to which rates must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with Articles 3, subsection b) and 31 b) of Law No. 7593, in concordance with Article 4, subsection 2) of Executive Decree No. 29232-MP, Regulation to the Regulatory Law for Public Services (Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), which indicates that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set rates for public services, observing said principle. (...) 2.15. It is thus how the aforementioned weaknesses are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a rate methodology for private generators with wind plants that renew electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, so that the rate is congruent with the operating costs, investment, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. In addition, it originates from the fact that the analysis for developing the methodologies lost sight of the implication on the rate of calculating the age factor (factor de antigüedad) on a date different from the other variables, and in the individual plant factor (factor de planta individual, Fpi), not using the maximum plant capacity contracted by ICE from the private generator and the actual operating times. 2.16. In this sense, the rate-setting power is a power-duty, so ARESEP has a power in its area of competence and must exercise it (Constitutional Chamber, Resolution No. 6326-2000). That power includes defining the elements that must be considered to faithfully comply with Articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set rates that express the elements which, according to the legal system and the technical standards, allow their concordance with the principle of cost-of-service (servicio al costo). Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of rates that reflect the real costs of service provision, but at the same time are not excessive or unjust for the user (Attorney General's Office, Opinion No. C-329-2002 and Legal Opinion No. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is consistent with Agreement No. 03-34-2016 ARESEP Institutional Strategic Plan 2017-2022, approved by its Board of Directors on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulatory instruments based on regulatory principles and public policies that incorporate criteria of quality (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social welfare. Furthermore, objective 4 focuses on strengthening an innovative and effective organization oriented towards excellence and the fulfillment of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the rate adjustment methodologies for the purchase of energy from private generators under the BOO modality, at the time of executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the rate settings for 2017, 2018, and 2019 for renewed contracts, as well as for the reference rates of 2016, 2017, and 2018 for new hydroelectric plants, and of 2015, 2017, and 2018 for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The rate proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 regarding the aforementioned settings were subject to modifications resulting from 25 oppositions and joinders by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory Authority. These modifications occurred due to: calculations of useful life and use of installed capacity data not corresponding to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose recording and reference was deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology so requiring. (...) 2.24.

On the other hand, it was determined that the tariffs related to the purchase of energy from renewed BOO contracts and the reference tariffs set for the purchase of energy from new BOO contracts for wind and hydroelectric plants, in the tariff settings for the period 2015 to 2019, were established without adherence to the methodologies; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical amount of data was not used for calculating the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of tariffs set for: a) contracts renewed in 2017 and 2018, b) wind plants in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric plants for 2016, 2017, and 2018. These tariff methodologies establish that when a 5-year historical series is not available, a shorter one shall be used, but with the same scope for all variables; however, in these tariff settings, the shorter series was used for one variable and longer tariff series were used for the rest. 2.26. Second, the tariff set in 2017 for renewed contracts, resolution no. RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated exponential growth in operating costs (costos de explotación), as these were divided by the obsolescence factor (factor de antigüedad), whose value represents the remaining useful life equivalent of the plants. This operation of the obsolescence factor is not part of the formula that was in effect at that time, and results in the setting of a higher tariff. 2.27. Third, the tariffs applied in 2017 and 2018 were set by including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, to calculate the individual plant factor (Fpi): even though the Methodology for renewed contracts indicates in Article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the tariff setting of January 10, 2017, the obsolescence factor was calculated as of December 31, 2015, even though Article 3.5.4 of the methodology for renewed contracts establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately prior to the moment in which the set tariff is calculated, that is, December 31, 2016. This situation also occurred in the tariff setting of January 12, 2018. Furthermore, in this last tariff setting, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, when the correct rate was that of August 2017; this caused the increase in operating costs. 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of tariffs for renewed contracts set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind plants regarding: operating costs, obsolescence factor, and plant factor, and additionally, investment costs (costos de inversión) in 2019. The foregoing, despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts (Articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that the tariff is first defined with the information and calculation method for hydroelectric plants, and then the result is also used for the purchase of energy generated from different sources. 2.30. For example, the estimated effect of including operating cost data from wind plants in tariff settings increased these costs. This means going from USD 179.43 established by the Regulating Authority to USD 166.00 estimated by the Contraloría General, per installed KW in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference tariffs set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, for the calculation of the average investment cost, the CR-Parismina plant of 8MW was grouped in the group with installed capacity of 8.1 MW to 12 MW, when it should have been placed in the group of 4.1MW to 8MW. The foregoing does not adhere to what is established in the section Unit Investment Amount (M) of the Methodology for new hydroelectric plants, which defines five groups of plants by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference tariffs for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, was included for the calculation of the sales expectation variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with what is established in Article iv Sales Expectations of the Methodology for new wind plants, regarding that it is appropriate to consider the national plants of private generators." As can be seen, in Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, the Oversight Body merely points out weaknesses in the methodologies for setting tariffs for the purchase of electrical energy from private generators, as well as the non-application of tariff methodologies, which relate to the implementation of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants; to the use of historical series in a manner different from what is established in the methodologies; to the setting of tariffs that, according to the report, generated in the tariff set in 2017 "an exponential growth in operating costs, as these were divided by the obsolescence factor, whose value represents the remaining useful life equivalent of the plants. This operation of the obsolescence factor is not part of the formula that was in effect at that time, and results in the setting of a higher tariff"; tariffs applied including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, even though the methodology indicated that the data should correspond to plants with a longer operating period; and incorrectly applied obsolescence factors. These findings are clearly linked to the regulatory body's disregard for the principles governing tariff setting, compliance with which is not subject to the exercise of its discretionary powers, as they are maxims originating from the Political Constitution and the law, but also constitute non-application of the methodologies established by ARESEP itself, from which it follows that, contrary to what it indicated in its complaint, we are not facing the exercise of a discretionary power, insofar as the methodologies authorized by the Board of Directors itself constitute a regulated act, the application of which is mandatory. Then, when the auditor refers to methodological weaknesses, it does so in relation to principles of mandatory observance—not discretionary—in tariff setting, and by establishing methodological non-applications, it also suggests that these entail not only the disregard for the Board of Directors' own provisions regarding tariff establishment, but that this conduct also implied the neglect of those essential maxims or postulates that must govern the determinative act, for the purpose of efficient use of public funds and the protection of consumers' economic rights and interests. It is necessary to point out that, pursuant to Article 16 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública), ARESEP is subject to the "univocal rules of science and technique". In the specific case, the CGR found that the methodological weaknesses and non-applications that, according to the audit report, ARESEP incurred, increased the amounts that ICE had to pay to private electrical generators, which in turn affected the sums paid by users of the public electricity supply service. It indicated that among the principles of the Law of the Public Services Regulatory Authority (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos) is the cost-of-service principle (principio de servicio al costo), defined by numeral 3 of the indicated Law: "Article 3.- Definitions. For the purposes of this law, the following concepts are defined: (...) b) Cost of service: principle that determines the way to set tariffs and prices for public services, so that they contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service, allowing a competitive return and guaranteeing the adequate development of the activity, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31". This principle constitutes a parameter that must serve to set tariffs for public services, so that only the costs that are necessary for the provision of the service are contemplated. The foregoing implies that in each case, a technical study must be carried out, in which expenses and investments that are not necessary for the efficient provision of the service are excluded. This is with a view to consumer protection, insofar as safeguarding their legitimate interests and economic rights is one of the purposes of the regulatory function, as inferred from Article 46 of the Political Constitution when it provides: "Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they establish for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters." Consequently, the findings arising from the audit refer to essential elements in tariff setting (cost-of-service principle), provided for in the legal system or by ARESEP itself, which, according to the Oversight Body, were disregarded. Thus, the oversight carried out by the CGR, concluding with No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, is nothing more than a manifestation of the exercise of its oversight powers and therefore of protection of the general interest, in this case related to the tariff-setting process, so that it adheres to the rules of science and technique, as well as to the postulates that the legal order has established for its determination. The plaintiff indicates that the CGR invaded its competence, because beyond reporting on methodological weaknesses and non-applications, it imposed a series of obligations on it, even indicating the deadlines within which those conducts should be carried out. At this point, without prejudice to whether those provisions imply a substitution of the active administration, which will be seen later, it must be noted that according to Article 4 of Law No. 7428, "(...) The criteria issued by the Contraloría General de la República, within the scope of its competence, shall be binding for the passive subjects subject to its control or oversight.", which is also set out more broadly in numeral 12 of said Law: "Article 12.- Governing Body of the System. The Contraloría General de la República is the governing body of the superior control and oversight system, contemplated in this Law. The provisions, rules, policies, and directives that it issues, within the scope of its competence, are of mandatory observance and shall prevail over any other provisions of the passive subjects that oppose them. The Contraloría General de la República shall also issue the instructions and orders directed to the passive subjects, which are necessary for the full exercise of its control and oversight functions. The Contraloría General de la República shall also have the power to determine among the entities, bodies, or persons subject to its control, which must provide mandatory collaboration, as well as the framework and the opportunity within which this will be carried out and the reasonable set of technical, human, and material means they must employ." In this vein, the Court understands that the Oversight Body has the power to dictate rules, policies, and directives necessary for the correct use of public resources, and the criteria it issues are of mandatory observance. It follows then, that if the legislator granted these powers to the CGR, their exercise does not imply, per se, a substitution of the active administration, which must be assessed in each case, and without losing sight of what was previously noted in the sense that the legal relationship existing between the Oversight Body and the passive subject of oversight is not between two active administrations, but rather occurs between a subject that does have that nature, and one whose function and powers are for oversight over the efficient and law-abiding exercise of the former. In the case under examination, on the occasion of the findings made by the CGR in its function of vigilance over the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), and specifically, as an integral part thereof, over public funds, a series of conducts that must be observed were ordered in the challenged act, in some cases by the General Regulator, and in others by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. Specifically, it was ordered: to the General Regulator of the Regulatory Authority: "4.4.

Draft the proposed modifications to: a) articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase and sale contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolution No. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) the Expected Sale (Expectativa de venta) (E) paragraph of the reference tariff Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) article iv of the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind power generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 and its amendments, d) add the rules establishing the use of real operation time in the calculation of the plant factor (factor de planta), in the reference tariff Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants and the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind power generation plants. Send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for what falls within its purview (...) 4.5. Draft the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private wind power generators that renew energy purchase contracts with ICE. Send the proposal to the Board of Directors for what falls within its purview." Regarding the Board of Directors of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, it indicated: "4.6. Resolve on the proposed modifications sent by the Regulador General concerning the Methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase and sale contracts with ICE, sent by the Regulador General. 4.7. Resolve on the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase and sale contracts with ICE, sent by the Regulador General. (...) Resolve on the proposed actions to compensate the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018 and 2019". Regarding the Intendente de Energía of ARESEP: "4.9. Adjust the tariffs in force for the purchase of electric energy from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, No. RIE-057-2018 and No. RE-0079-2018, to correct the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, relating to: a) return on capital contributions (rentabilidad sobre los aportes de capital), and b) use of information from wind power plants. Send the Contraloría General certified proof accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019". And to the Regulador General, as well as the Intendente de Energía of ARESEP: 4.10. Determine the amounts overpaid by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 until the last date the tariff was applied, due to misapplications of the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase and sale contract with ICE, resolution No. RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. Furthermore, propose the actions that would allow for the compensation of the determined amounts and send them to the Board of Directors for what falls within its purview." As can be seen, what was ordered by the CGR to ARESEP is, in general terms, for it to draft proposals within the methodology for setting tariffs for new and existing private generators, and under the different modalities of energy generation, under the premise of the report's findings, in the sense that the tariffs did not respect the principle of service at cost. Thus, what was ordered by the oversight body is so that the principles, norms, and technical rules that must be observed in determining tariffs are complied with, but in no way does it substitute the concerned Administration, in this case, the regulatory body, because not only did the CGR not proceed to establish the tariffs, but also, its conduct is limited to indicating to the plaintiff the postulates that must necessarily be contained in the elements of the act of their determination, a principle that, moreover, has not been established by the CGR, but is contained in the legal system and in the methodologies and precepts issued by the plaintiff's Board of Directors, and whose compliance is not discretionary, leaving to ARESEP the configuration of those elements that are of that nature. Thus, the orders issued are for ARESEP, when establishing and applying the tariff determination methodologies, to comply with the legal system, so that the regulated elements of that determinative act conform to the constitutional and legal precepts governing regulatory matters.

Finally, it is necessary to indicate that, according to the evidence in the case file, as well as the statements of witness Erick Alvarado Muñoz, ARESEP was made aware of each and every action involved in the oversight process, was granted a hearing for observations, which were evaluated and taken into account as deemed appropriate, for the adoption of the final act by the CGR. Corollary: Under Article 183 of the Political Constitution, the CGR has the nature of an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly for controlling or monitoring the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), with absolute independence in the exercise of its powers. This implies the oversight, supervision, and control of all elements comprising the Public Treasury, according to the terms established in the legal system and specifically in Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Contraloría General de la República No. 7428, which, as we have seen, includes public funds. The tariffs paid by ICE to private electricity generators precisely have this nature of public funds; therefore, the determination of these tariffs in accordance with the postulates established by the legal system, as well as the rules of science and technique, falls within the scope of competencies of the CGR, which, through this oversight function, protects the general interest in order not only for the efficient use of resources, but also so that the amounts paid by final consumers of public services address their economic interests and rights. Therefore, the plaintiff is not correct in arguing that in matters of drafting, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models, ARESEP is not subject to the oversight of the CGR, because these tariffs are paid by ICE with public funds, which are part of the Public Treasury, so their determination is subject to examination by the controlling body. Thus, the challenged acts —No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and related ones, which refer to the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the final act— do not constitute an arbitrary invasion of the powers granted by law to ARESEP, because what was ordered by the CGR is based on the finding of methodological misapplications established by ARESEP itself, as well as the non-observance of regulated elements of the tariff-setting act, such as the principle of service at cost; and the orders issued do not compel the application of a specific tariff methodology, but rather the drafting of methodological proposals or modifications, while complying with the maxims that the plaintiff must observe in carrying out its regulatory function. It follows that this is not a case of joint administration (coadministración), as the CGR has at no time substituted the competencies of the regulatory body regarding the setting of tariffs that ICE must pay to private electricity generators, limiting itself to indicating to ARESEP specific situations in which it must comply with the parameters of legality and efficiency, and even cease incurring omissions, as is the case with tariffs related to electricity generation using wind technology. It is necessary to point out that in the actions of the CGR, the principle of legality has not been violated either; on the contrary, it has exercised the powers conferred upon it by the legal system, and which, as duties-powers, it was obliged to exercise, at the risk of incurring inattention to and omission of compliance with the competencies attributed to it. The principle of legality has not been violated by the CGR either, by carrying out an oversight procedure for which it is not authorized, as it is clear that it does have the powers conferred by the legal system to carry out the oversight questioned here. Finally, it is necessary to point out that the Court considers that the plaintiff is incorrect in pointing out that this is an inter-administrative conflict of competencies, because, as already indicated, in this case we are faced with the exercise of the oversight function by a controlling body and an active administration, where both are not on the same level, so that, as it is not a relationship between active administrations —because the Contraloría is a non-active administration, overseeing and monitoring the Public Treasury, which, in the exercise of its own competencies, does not undermine the autonomy vested in ARESEP, nor does it invade its sphere of competence— it restricts itself to determining the regularity of the plaintiff's actions, comparing them with regulated elements, established in the legal system, of its conduct. At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that although some of the plaintiff's initial arguments refer to aspects related to the substantial elements of the challenged acts, as well as the administrative oversight procedure, and that the representation of ICE argued at the time that it had warned ARESEP about the questions later raised by the CGR in its oversight action, which has indeed been proven, and that the admitted testimonial evidence was to support the criteria issued by the Oversight Body from a technical point of view, this Court will not proceed to evaluate those elements, because the plaintiff itself limited the scope of this matter to the determination of one of the formal elements of the challenged conduct, namely: the competence of the CGR to carry out oversight concerning the methodologies for setting tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators by ICE.

Finally, the Court considers that, as the usurpation of competence alleged by the plaintiff did not occur, there are no elements that would allow an inference of the existence of liability on the part of the CGR, in relation to the damages alleged by the plaintiff. The point made at the beginning is reiterated: "what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism by which society can evaluate how the public resources entrusted to its officials have been administered. Oversight is therefore carried out on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, over which mere administrative interest cannot prevail, according to numeral 113 of our General Law of Public Administration" (Underlining is supplied). The general interest in ensuring that tariff determination is carried out in accordance with the postulates that inform this type of conduct, and in this way that public funds are used more efficiently and the economic interests of consumers are protected, is what must prevail in this case, and this is achieved in part through the exercise of control and monitoring carried out by the oversight body, without prejudice, moreover, that as recorded in the case file, some of the findings of the control process were warned about at the time by ICE.

IV.- EXCEPTIONS: The State's representation presented the defense of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva). In this regard, it points out that the plaintiff has not raised any claim related to any conduct by the State, which, it affirms, is a party in this proceeding only by virtue of Article 12, subsection 5) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. The Court considers that the defense formulated by the state representation must be accepted, because the State had no participation in the challenged conduct whose annulment is sought, and nor has the plaintiff raised any claim against it. It is resolved ex officio that both ARESEP and the CGR have active and passive standing, as the passive and active subjects of the challenged oversight conduct; as well as that a current interest persists, because the competence questioned here has not yet been elucidated. Regarding the exception of lack of right (falta de derecho), based on what is indicated in the preceding recital, this Deciding Body concludes that ARESEP is indeed subject to oversight by the CGR, not only regarding the functions it carries out to enable the exercise of its competencies, but also in relation to its substantive function, when determining the methodologies for setting tariffs for public services, because those tariffs, as public funds, form part of the Public Treasury, and therefore the exercise of competencies related to their determination is subject to the oversight of the CGR, without this implying the existence of joint administration. Consequently, the appropriate course is to accept the defense of lack of right and declare the lawsuit without merit in all its aspects.

V.- COSTS: In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Exemption from this sanction is only viable when, in the Court's judgment, there is sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the regulations and break the principle of sanctioning the losing party. Therefore, ARESEP is ordered to pay both costs of this action.

POR TANTO

The defense of lack of active and passive standing presented by the State is accepted, and solely with respect to it. The defense of lack of right is accepted, and the lawsuit filed by the Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos against the State, the Contraloría General de la República, and the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, the latter acting as an interested third party, is declared without merit. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiff.

Ileana Isabel Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Juan Luis Giusti Soto

Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599.

CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A :

AUTHORITY REGULATING PUBLIC SERVICES DEMANDADO/A :

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC No. 2024004630 ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TAX COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SECTION V, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at eleven hours and fifty-two minutes on the eighteenth of July, two thousand twenty-four.- A proceeding of cognition (proceso de conocimiento) filed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, ARESEP), represented by its Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact, Víctor Barquero Rojas, identity card number 111910985, bar number 19692; against the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República, CGR), on whose behalf Jesús González Hidalgo, identity card number 204970783, bar number 11240 appears, and the State, in whose name the Procuradora Amanda Grosser Jiménez, identity card number 112560237, bar number 20777, ultimately acts. The Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE) intervenes as an interested third party, through its Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact Marys Palacios Carrillo, identity card number 800790189, bar number 12630 and María López Alvarado, identity card number 107860831, bar number 24708.

WHEREAS

I.- By writ filed before the Administrative and Civil Tax Court on February 11, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorneys-in-Fact of ARESEP, Luis Daniel Chacón Solórzano, identity card number 205560559 and Henry Payne Castro, identity card number 108850781, filed a cognition demand (demanda de conocimiento) against the CGR, and based on the alleged facts and legal arguments raised, they requested that in the judgment: "1. That the lawsuit filed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority against the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic be declared with merit, and that the judgment declares the absolute nullity of Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 of September 16, 2019, issued by the Environmental Energy Services Audit Area of the Operational and Evaluative Audit Division (DFOE), of administrative resolution (sic) R-DFOE-AE-0003-2019, of 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019, and of the definitive act of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic R-DC-10-2020 (No. 02120DC-0041) of 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020, for being inconsistent with the legal system, by virtue of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code, and consequently, that they be rendered without any effect from their issuance, by provision of Article 171 of the General Public Administration Law and Article 131, subsection 1) of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code, the mandatory compliance provisions contained therein and directed against our represented entity, specifically to the Energy Intendant, the General Regulator, and the Board of Directors of the Public Services Regulatory Authority. Additionally, concomitantly, we request that the judgment declares the absolute nullity -due to their relation and connection-, of the official letters: DFOE-SD-0976, DFOE-AE-0570 (17839) of December 11, 2018, DEFOE AE-0414 (official letter No. 13720) of September 16, 2019, DFOE-AE-0361 (official letter No. 11083) of June 26, 2019, DFOE-AE-0085, DFOE-SD-0307 (official letter No. 02740), DFOE-SD-0309 (official letter No. 02754), No. 04878 (DC-0097), DFOE-SD-0729 (official letter No. 05786), DFOE-AE-0329, DFOE-SD-1577 (official letter No. 12873), DFOE-AE-0331, DFOE-SD-1587 (official letter No. 1298), of April 2, 2020, as well as all those connected and related that are directed exclusively against ARESEP, which served as the basis and foundation for the issuance of the cited report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and the definitive act R-DC-010-2020 (No. 02110 DC-0041 of 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020), and that Your Authority determines in the judgment. The foregoing, in accordance with the provisions of Article 164.2 of the General Public Administration Law and Article 131, subsection 3) of the Administrative Contentious Procedural Code. 2. That the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic be ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which shall be settled in the judgment enforcement phase. 3. That the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic be ordered to pay the damages caused to ARESEP, net interest, and indexation until effective payment, which shall be settled in the judgment enforcement phase. 4.

That in the judgment, the heads of the Contraloría General de la República be ordered to immediately initiate the pertinent internal procedures, in order to establish the pecuniary and/or disciplinary liability of the officials of the oversight body who participated in the actions or omissions that led to incurring in the acts contrary to legality that are sought to be annulled herein (images 2 to 111 of the judicial file).

**II.-** In a resolution at 09:41 hours on May 5, 2021, the proceeding was established and its transfer was granted to the CGR, as well as to the State (image 125 to 127).

**III.-** On July 8, 2021, the Special Judicial Attorney of ICE answered the complaint negatively, in its capacity as an interested third party, and presented the defense of lack of right (images 135 to 179 of the judicial file).

**IV.-** In a written submission dated July 9, 2021, the representation of the CGR answered the complaint negatively and raised the defense of lack of right (images 180 to 215 of the judicial file).

**V.-** By means of a written submission of July 15, 2021, the State representation answered the complaint negatively and formulated the defenses of lack of passive *legitimatio ad causam* and lack of right (images 225 to 294 of the judicial file).

**VI.-** In resolution No. 501-2022-T, at 08:00 hours on March 29, 2022, Judge Roberto Brenes Chinchilla rejected the joinders filed by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S. A., Molinos de Viento del Arenal S.A., as well as by Aeroenergía S.A. (images 510 to 516 of the judicial file).

**VII.-** On March 30, 2022, the preliminary hearing was held. In said procedural act, claim No. 3 of the complaint was clarified, in the sense that the damages refer to: "damage to institutional image, the questioning of the quality, expertise, credibility, and technical rigor of the work performed by the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos and the professional technical capacity of the officials who prepared, approved, and applied those tariff methodologies analyzed in the report," and the evaluation and admission of the evidence offered by the parties was carried out (images 531 to 535d of the judicial file).

**VIII.-** In resolution No. 134-2022-I at 15:58 hours on April 25, 2022, the First Section of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, flatly rejected the appeal filed by Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S.A., against the interlocutory judgment No. 501-2022-T, at 08:00 hours on March 29, 2022, which had rejected the active joinder of said company (images 546 and 547 of the judicial file).

**IX.-** The oral and public trial hearing was held on June 20, 2024. In that act, the expert witness testimony admitted during the preliminary hearing was received. At the request of the parties, the Court granted five business days for the purpose of submitting written conclusions and declared the matter complex (the foregoing is recorded in the minutes of the referred procedural act, visible at images 653 to 658 of the judicial file, as well as in the recording of the hearing that is contained in digital format).

**X.-** This judgment is issued unanimously, within the legal deadline. No defects capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed. Judge Álvarez Molina, Judge Giusti Soto, and Judge Sánchez Navarro, who drafts, concur with the vote.

**CONSIDERANDO** **I.- PROVEN FACTS:** Of importance for resolving this matter, the following facts are considered duly accredited:

1. That according to the Special Character Audit Report on the Process Instituted by ICE and ARESEP for the Concession of Generation and Purchase of Electric Energy from Private Parties No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, dated September 16, 2019, conducted by the Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa of the CGR, said review and verification process had as its objective and scope "(...) to determine the reasonableness of the process and criteria applied by ICE and ARESEP to concession the generation and purchase of electric energy from private parties, in its elements of eligibility and project selection, control in their execution, and establishment of energy purchase tariffs, that ensure compliance with the relevant regulations. (...) it comprises the analysis of the actions, processes, procedures, and regulations for the concession of generation and purchase of electric energy from private generators, regarding contracts related to wind and hydroelectric sources that are in commercial operation. (...) The analysis period ran from 2008 to 2018, which was extended to May 31, 2019 to consider the estimated effects of the tariff set for renewed contracts" (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019), and which corresponds to page 07 of the cited Report).

2. That according to Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, dated September 16, 2019, referred to in the immediately preceding fact, the findings are the following: "2.1. Weaknesses were determined related to three methodologies defined by ARESEP for setting purchase tariffs for electric energy from private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: Tariff-setting methodology for existing private generators (Ley No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, resolution No. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for renewed contracts); Reference tariff methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for new hydroelectric plant contracts), and Model for the determination of reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011, and its amendments (hereinafter Methodology for new wind plant contracts). 2.2. In addition, misapplications of these methodologies were identified in the last three tariff fixations for BOO contracts: renewed in 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants in 2016, 2017, and 2018, and for new wind plants in 2015, 2017, and 2018. (...) The Methodology for renewed contracts allows the application of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants, for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind, as long as a specific tariff model does not exist. This, despite the fact that these are generation plants with differences in terms of technology, investment costs, operation costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of cost-of-service basis determining methodologies and tariff formulas; according to which tariffs must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with Articles 3 subsection b) and 31 b) of Ley No. 7593, in concordance with Article 4 subsection 2) of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 29232-MP, Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, which indicates that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set tariffs for public services, in observance of said principle. (...) 2.15. Thus, the aforementioned weaknesses are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a tariff methodology for private generators with wind plants that renew electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, so that the tariff is consistent with the operating costs, investment, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. Furthermore, it originates from the fact that sight was lost in the analysis for the preparation of the methodologies of the implication in the tariff of calculating the age factor at a date different from the other variables, and in the individual plant factor (Fpi), not using the maximum plant capacity contracted by ICE from the private generator and the real operation times. 2.16. In this sense, the tariff power is a power-duty, so that ARESEP has a power in a matter of its competence and must exercise it (Sala Constitucional, resolution No. 6326-2000). That power comprises defining the elements that must be considered to give faithful compliance to Articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set tariffs that express the elements that, according to the legal system and technique, allow their concordance with the principle of cost-of-service basis. Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of tariffs that reflect the real costs of the service provision, but at the same time that are not excessive or unfair for the user (Procuraduría General de la República, opinion No. C-329-2002 and legal opinion No. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is consistent with agreement No. 03-34-2016 Plan Estratégico Institucional of ARESEP 2017-2022, approved by its Junta Directiva on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulatory instruments based on regulatory principles and public policies that incorporate quality criteria (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social welfare. Furthermore, objective 4 focuses on strengthening an innovative and effective organization oriented towards excellence and the fulfillment of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the tariff adjustment methodologies for the purchase of energy from private generators under the BOO modality, when executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the tariff fixation of 2017, 2018, and 2019 for renewed contracts, as well as for the reference tariffs of 2016, 2017, and 2018 for new hydroelectric plants, and of 2015, 2017, and 2018 for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The tariff proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 relating to the fixations cited above were subject to modifications as a result of 25 oppositions and joinders by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory Authority. These modifications occurred due to: useful life calculations and use of installed capacity data that do not correspond to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose registration and reference were deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology requiring it. (...) 2.24. On the other hand, it was determined that the tariffs related to energy purchase from renewed BOO contracts and the reference tariffs set for energy purchase from new BOO contracts for wind and hydroelectric plants in the tariff fixations for the period 2015 to 2019 were established without adherence to the methodologies; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical amount of data was not used for the calculation of the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of the tariffs set for: a) renewed contracts in 2017 and 2018, b) wind in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric for 2016, 2017, and 2018.

These tariff methodologies establish that when a 5-year historical series is not available, the shorter one shall be used, but with the same scope for all variables; however, in these tariff fixations, the shorter series was used for one variable and tariff series from longer periods were used for the rest. 2.26. Second, the tariff set in 2017 for renewed contracts, resolution No. RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated exponential growth in operating costs (costos de explotación), as these were divided by the age factor (factor de antigüedad), whose value represents the equivalent remaining useful life of the plants. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in force at that time, and results in the setting of a higher tariff. 2.27. Third, the tariffs applied in 2017 and 2018 were set including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, in order to calculate the individual plant factor (Fpi): even though the Methodology for renewed contracts indicates in Article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the tariff fixation of January 10, 2017, the age factor was calculated as of December 31, 2015, even though Article 3.5.4. of the methodology for renewed contracts establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately prior to the moment in which the set tariff was calculated, that is, December 31, 2016. This situation also occurred in the tariff fixation of January 12, 2018. Furthermore, in this last tariff fixation, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, when the correct one was that of August 2017; this caused an increase in operating costs. 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of the tariffs for renewed contracts set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind plants (plantas eólicas) regarding: operating costs, age factor, and plant factor, and additionally, investment costs (costos de inversión) in 2019. The foregoing, despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts (Articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that the tariff is first defined with the information and calculation method for hydroelectric plants, and then the result is also used for the purchase of energy generated from other sources. 2.30. By way of example, the estimated effect of including operating cost data from wind plants in the tariff fixations increased these costs. This implies going from USD 179.43, as established by the Regulatory Authority, to USD 166.00 estimated by the Office of the Comptroller General, per installed KW in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference tariffs set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, for the calculation of the average investment cost (costo promedio de inversión), the CR-Parismina plant of 8MW was grouped in the group with installed capacity from 8.1 MW to 12 MW, when it should have been placed in the group from 4.1MW to 8MW. The foregoing does not comply with the provisions of the Unit Investment Amount (Monto de la inversión unitaria, M) section of the Methodology for new hydroelectric plants, which defines five groups of plants by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference tariffs for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, was included for the calculation of the sales expectation variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with the provisions of Article IV Sales Expectations of the Methodology for new wind plants, regarding the fact that national plants of private generators should be considered" (images 09 to 17 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and corresponding to pages 11 to 15 of the cited Report).

3. That according to Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, previously referenced, "(...) the weaknesses of the methodologies defined by ARESEP and their misapplications have led to tariff fixations that exceed the principle of service at cost, as well as a normal profit or utility for the provider. In this regard, in the renewed energy purchase contracts, it is estimated that such a situation has implied additional disbursements close to USD 24.00 million for the ICE, between the year 2017 and May 2019. The foregoing not only harms the public funds administered by this Institute, but also the final consumers, since these disbursements necessarily form part of the electricity bill" (image 26 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and corresponding to page 24 of the cited Report).

4. That in response to the findings indicated in Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, of September 16, 2019, the CGR ordered: to the Regulador General of the Autoridad Reguladora: "4.4. Prepare the proposed modifications to: a) Articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Methodology for Setting Tariffs for Existing Private Generators (Ley N°7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolution No. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) Sales Expectation (E) paragraph of the reference tariff methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) Article iv of the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 and its amendments, d) add the rules establishing the use of real operation time in the calculation of the plant factor, in the reference tariff methodology for new new private hydroelectric generation plants and the Model for determining reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants. Send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence (...) 4.5. Prepare the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private wind generators that renew energy purchase contracts with the ICE. Send the proposal to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence." Regarding the Board of Directors of the Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, it stated: "4.6. Resolve on the proposed modifications referred to them by the Regulador General related to the Methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with the ICE, that the Regulador General refers to them. 4.7. Resolve on the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with the ICE, that the Regulador General refers to them. (...) Resolve on the proposed actions to compensate the amounts overpaid by the ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019." Regarding the Intendente de Energía of ARESEP: "4.9. Adjust the current tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, No. RIE-057-2018- and No. RE-0079-2018, so as to correct the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, related to: a) profitability on capital contributions, and b) use of information from wind plants. Send to the Office of the Comptroller General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff fixations in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019." And to the Regulador General, as well as to the Intendente de Energía of ARESEP: 4.10. "Determine the amounts overpaid by the ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 until the last date on which the tariff was applied, due to misapplications of the Methodology for setting tariffs for existing private generators (Ley No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the ICE, resolution No. RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. Furthermore, propose the actions that will allow compensating the determined amounts and refer them to the Board of Directors for matters within its competence" (images 26 to 28 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], and corresponding to pages 24 to 26 of the cited Report).

5. That on the occasion of the motion for reconsideration with subsidiary appeal filed by ARESEP in official communication OF-0783-RG-2019, on September 19, 2019, against audit report DFOE-AE-00009-2019, the Área de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa of the Contraloría General de la República issued resolution R-DFOE-AE-00003-2019, at 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 2019. In this act, it was resolved: "I) TO DECLARE PARTIALLY WITH MERIT the motion for reconsideration (...) solely in the following: 1. That the provision contained in paragraph 4.9 of the referenced report be read as follows: 'Adjust the tariffs for the purchase of electricity from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, RIE-057-2018 and RE-0079-2018, or those that may have been issued in their place prior to the notification of this report, so as to not incur in the methodological misapplications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, related to the following: a) profitability on capital contributions, and b) use of information from wind plants. Send to the Office of the Comptroller General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff fixations in the official gazette La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019'." Furthermore, some of the figures in the tables contained in the report were replaced. 2. (see in their order the official communication of the motion and the act resolving it at images 32 to 74 and 75 to 112 of the administrative file contained in digital format, identified as 00001_00131[OT-775-2019]).

6. That in resolution No. R-DC-010-2020, at 8:00 a.m. on February 13, 2020, the Contraloría General de la República declared without merit the appeal filed by ARESEP against DFOE-AE-00009-2019 (so stated in folder 00208_00221 [OT-775-2019]).

7. That prior to the CGR issuing the Audit Report, the ICE presented a series of objections before ARESEP: "demonstrating that there is a need to separate the methodology according to the technology (hydro and wind), for the estimation of tariffs for the purchase of energy, otherwise the overcost is transferred to the final client and there is an undue recognition to private generators of wind plants." Likewise, it has been proposed before ARESEP that the date associated with the calculation of the age factor (factor de antigüedad) be December 31 of the same year in which the rate-setting process begins (...) The foregoing because the more recent the date used for the calculation of the age factor (factor de antigüedad) of the plants, the lower that value tends to be, resulting in a reduction of the rate to be paid to private generators. In this same vein, it has also been requested, as recorded in official communication 0610-135-2018 of December 3, 2018, that consideration be given, among other aspects, to incorporating as part of the changes in the rate-setting methodologies, the use of contracted capacity as a more objective reference in the calculation of the real expectations of energy sales to ICE. The review and inclusion of more precise information in the calculation has been a request from ICE to ARESEP" (as has been repeatedly stated by ICE's representation, in the response to the lawsuit, as well as in the response provided to the pre-trial precautionary measure (medida cautelar ante causam) that was filed by ARESEP; and in the copy of the documentation in which those proceedings are recorded, which is visible at images 157 to 180 of the file corresponding to the precautionary measure that is in the judicial case file, and CD 4 evidence response from ICE, Evidence 10.0510-1794-2010 of December 10, 2010; evidence 11.510-144-2012, which is an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) filed by ICE against resolution 750-RCR-2012 of 10:45 a.m. on January 9, 2012; evidence 12, official communication 0610-128-2018, of November 22, 2018, consisting of ICE's opposition to the proposal for the annual application of the rate-setting methodology for private generators (Ley 7200) that sign a new energy purchase and sale contract with ICE; evidence 13.0610-135-2018 of March 12, 2018, in which ICE raises a series of requests for improvement to the methodologies for private generators; evidence 14, which is an appeal for reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against resolution RIE-001-2018 of January 12, 2018; evidence 17-257-401-2016, of December 16, 2016, which is a nullity proceeding (gestión de nulidad) against the decision of the Board of Directors of ARESEP to suspend the application of RDJ-017-2016, by means of Board of Directors Agreement No. 06-07-027-2016; evidence 18.0257-591-2017 of November 10, 2017, which is an appeal for nullity and reversal with subsidiary appeal (recurso de nulidad y de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio) against resolution RIE-110-2017).

**II.- UNPROVEN FACTS:** 1. That the contested acts imposed on ARESEP discretionary elements for the determination of the methodologies for setting rates for the supply of electrical energy by private generators (there is no evidence in this regard).

**III.- ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:** **PLAINTIFF:** The representation of ARESEP requests the nullity of CGR report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, based on the following arguments: 1. Lack of competence and absence of technical expertise of the CGR in areas that are exclusive to ARESEP, concerning the preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to rate models. 2. In matters of preparation, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to rate models, ARESEP is not subject to the oversight of the CGR, such that conduct related to the exercise of these powers is only subject to jurisdictional control. 3. The contested acts constitute an arbitrary invasion of the exclusive and excluding powers granted by law to ARESEP. 4. Exercise of co-administration (coadministración) by the CGR, by ordering ARESEP to apply and modify rate models and methodologies, as well as to recover the sums overpaid by ICE. 5. Violation of the principle of legality by the CGR, by carrying out an oversight procedure for which it is not authorized. 6. A lack of competence to annul, modify, and disregard the rate models applied by ARESEP within the framework of purchasing electrical energy from private parties. It expressly indicates that the purpose of this process is to elucidate an alleged invasion of ARESEP's competence by the CGR, by issuing report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, and points out: ***"Under this delimitation, it is necessary to bear in mind that Aresep did not file this process with the purpose of questioning the techniques or the technical criteria on which the binding orders given by the CGR to my client are based, or whether they are technically correct or incorrect, and neither is this process discussing the legality or the parameters of ARESEP's rate methodologies or its rate-setting (or whether the age factor / the operating costs / or the plant factor (factor de planta) was applied correctly or incorrectly), that is not the purpose of the process. The purpose of the process revolves around an inter-administrative conflict of competences, it lies in determining whether there is an EXPRESS LEGAL AUTHORIZATION for the CGR to issue this type of binding provisions to Aresep, in which the way in which it must exercise the exclusive and excluding powers for which it was created is delimited, in accordance with article 188 of the Political Constitution, and Law No. 7593"*** (the bold and underlined emphasis are supplied). **DEFENDANT:** Both the CGR, as well as the representation of the State and of ICE, agree in indicating that the contested conduct does not constitute an invasion of ARESEP's powers by the CGR. They indicate that it involves the preparation of an audit report that falls within the framework of powers that the legal system confers on the Oversight Body in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública). They maintain that the weaknesses in the rate-setting methodologies, as well as their non-application by ICE in the purchase of electrical energy from private parties, show that in the determination of the rates, the principles of legality, efficiency, and service at cost were disregarded, which led to the payments made by ICE being higher, and the cost of the public service of energy supply being higher for the end consumer. They maintain that the active Administration was not substituted, and that on the contrary, in the exercise of the oversight power, the plaintiff was urged to comply with the principles and rules pertaining to the process of setting rates for public services, as well as the provisions issued by ARESEP itself and its Board of Directors. The Special Judicial Representative also noted that her client had previously warned ARESEP regarding the disregard of the legal system in relation to the setting of rates that were subsequently reviewed by the CGR. All representations formulated the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho), and the State also raised the exception of lack of standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam).

**III.- ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE CGR AND THE SPECIFIC CASE:** Requiring the Public Administration to account for its management constitutes a fundamental right of citizens, the oversight of which, in matters of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), the constituent power decided to entrust to an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly. Consequently, *"... what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism through which society can evaluate how the public resources it has entrusted to its officials have been managed. Oversight is therefore exercised on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, over which the mere administrative interest cannot prevail, according to numeral 113 of our General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)"* (Superior Oversight of Public Finance as a guarantee for the inhabitants. Ronald Hidalgo Cuadra. Journal of Legal Sciences No. 90. 1999); and which has the purpose of guaranteeing the general interest regarding the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the handling of public funds -article 11 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) No. 7428 of September 7, 1994-. At the time of issuing this judgment, according to precepts 183 and 184 of the Political Constitution, and numerales 1 and 4 of the aforementioned Law No. 7428, this function of oversight of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública) and of governing body in the oversight system, exercised, as already indicated, on behalf of the citizens of this country, falls on the CGR, a body to which the Fundamental Charter and the law confer extremely broad oversight powers precisely through the concept of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública) established in constitutional article 183, reiterated in article 1 of Law No. 7428, which establishes: *"Article 1.- Legal Nature and General Attribution. The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) is a fundamental constitutional body of the State, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly in the superior control of Public Finance and governing body of the oversight system contemplated in this law"*; and whose broad scope is defined in article 8 of the same regulatory body: *"Article 8.- Public Finance shall be constituted by the public funds, the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds and the administrative and financial legal norms relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds. Regarding non-state public entities, corporations with minority public sector participation, or private entities, only those resources they administer or dispose of, by any title, to achieve their purposes that have been transferred or placed at their disposal, by means of a norm or budget line item, by the Branches of Government, their dependencies and auxiliary bodies, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the decentralized administration, state universities, municipalities, and state banks shall form part of the Public Finance. Resources of an origin other than those indicated do not form part of the Public Finance; consequently, the legal regime applicable to those entities is that contained in the Laws that created them or the special regulations that govern them. The public wealth (patrimonio público) shall be the universe constituted by the public funds and the liabilities chargeable to the subjects comprising the Public Finance. Subjects comprising the Public Finance shall be the State and the other public entities or bodies, state or otherwise, and public enterprises, as well as subjects of Private Law, insofar as they administer or hold in custody public funds by any title, with the exceptions established in the preceding paragraph"*, and further on, in article 9, it is established that public funds are: *"the resources, values, goods, and rights owned by the State, bodies, enterprises, or public entities."* From the transcribed norms, it is inferred that the legislator established a broad definition, both of the object and of the subjects over which the CGR has the power to exercise its oversight function. Thus, regarding the object, control comprises Public Finance (Hacienda Pública), which, according to the terms of article 8 cited above, is constituted by "*the public funds, the powers to receive, administer, hold in custody, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds and the administrative and financial legal norms relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility for public funds.*" ***And regarding the passive subject, article 4 of Law No. 7428 is clear in indicating that the competence of the Oversight Body covers the entirety of the entities and bodies that comprise the Public Finance***, without prejudice to the optional competence regarding the subjects listed in subsections a) to e) of the cited numeral, and in the cases described therein. In this regard, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in Legal Opinion No. OJ-101-2002, of July 5, 2002, stated: *"The oversight system of Public Finance (Hacienda Pública) is a coherent whole of constitutional basis. From the obligation of control of Public Finance enshrined in article 183 of the Political Constitution,* ***an oversight system has been established that filters throughout the entire Public Administration and that encompasses both the heads of public entities, enterprises, or bodies as well as the internal audits of the respective administrations****"* (the bold and underlined emphasis are supplied). In this line, the Constitutional Chamber has repeatedly stated: *"VII.-* The National Constituent Assembly, upon creating the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) as an auxiliary institution of the Legislative Assembly, conferred upon it the task of oversight (fiscalización) and vigilance of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública)—Article 183 of the Political Constitution—insofar as it is responsible for verifying the correct use of public funds, which must be understood in the terms previously indicated by this Constitutional Court: "From a reading of Articles 183 and following of the Political Constitution, it is possible to conclude that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic has, in relation to public funds, a function of superior, legal, and financial oversight that cannot be seen limited to an automatic action of simple 'approval,' since that would imply a substantial diminution of its constitutional powers"; "The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, as its Organic Law emphasizes (Law No. 7428 of September 7, 1994), is an organ of constitutional relevance, auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, whose general function is the superior control of the Public Treasury and the direction of the oversight system regulated in said Law"; "The normative foundation of this special competence derives from the provisions of the aforementioned Article 183 of the Constitution, which the Law has developed, both in the first Organic Law of this institution—number 1253 of December 23, 1950—which in its Articles 2 and 3 subsection k) conferred upon this institution the special competence to exercise vigilance functions in the handling of public funds...", "XX.—OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. In every administrative organization, there must exist a control system or means of oversight of that activity, which endows it with a set of guarantees of legitimacy and verification of timeliness and legality, while simultaneously achieving the efficiency and morality of its functioning. In this way, for the fulfillment of each of the objectives of administrative acts, the exercise of the corresponding means of control or oversight is required; some of them are expressly provided for in the law and others arise implicitly from some essential constitutional precept, as occurs with the control exercised by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic over the activity of administrative contracting. The most qualified doctrine indicates that the control or oversight carried out in the Public Administration can be classified from three fundamental points of view: a) regarding the moment or time in which it is carried out in relation to the act or behavior, which takes on a preventive or repressive character, as the case may be; which can also present itself in three different ways: prior control ("a priori"), which actually functions as an authorization for the act or contract and acts as a condition of validity, so that when the act submitted for examination is not in accordance with what is due, the suspension or substitution, as the case may be, proceeds; posterior control ("a posteriori"), which is actually an approval of what the Administration has done, and constitutes a requirement for the effectiveness of the act; and concomitant control, which is verified throughout the entire process, as a true oversight of the actions of public entities, constituting requirements of validity and effectiveness at the same time; b) regarding the initiative of the control, whether it is at the request of a party (appeals) or an ex officio action (vigilance); and c) regarding the objective sought with the control or oversight, whether it is of legitimacy or legality, whether it seeks to prevent or repress the violation of legal norms, or of timeliness, insofar as it examines the appropriateness or merit of what was done. XXI.—(...) The Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic is a constitutional organ auxiliary to the Legislative Assembly, with express competence for the oversight and vigilance of the public treasury—Article 183 of the Political Constitution—to which corresponds the verification of the correct use of public funds, which materializes as a control of legality in the financial administration of the State and its institutions—including municipalities—a task it performs with absolute independence and objectivity, insofar as control of discretionary authority is not, in principle, admissible, but solely control of legality, by examining the conformity of what was done with the legal order, not the dictates or intention of the Administration. In summary, this control is reduced to the verification of compliance with the applicable preconditions of legality, regardless of any allusion to questions of policy or mere appropriateness or timeliness in the controlled administration, as well as the efficiency and profitability of the financial administration; of course, as long as the appropriateness or inappropriateness does not exceed the limits beyond which it would become illegality in accordance with the normally recognized criteria regarding the limits of discretionary authority. In general terms, this control mechanism always contains a logical ingredient, which is the verification of the conformity of the act or activity with a normative pattern of conduct, and a consequent measure, which constitutes a true act of will, directed at allowing or preventing the effects of the controlled activity, depending on whether they are correct or contrary to the law." (the bold and underlined emphasis are supplied) (In order, Constitutional Chamber, No. 2340-94, 3:00 PM, May 28, 1994; No. 00998-1998, 11:30 AM, February 15, 1998; No. 05445-1999, 2:30 PM, July 14, 1999).

Now, according to the theory of the case presented by the plaintiff, the powers attributed by the legal order to the CGR were exceeded by it when it issued Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and its related acts, given that, as it argues, it invaded its exclusive and exclusionary competence in the matter of setting rates. Indeed, in accordance with numerals 1 and 5 of the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services (Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos) No. 7593 of August 9, 1996, the setting of prices and rates for public services defined in Article 5 of said normative body is a function of the ARESEP, and according to what said norm establishes, the electric power supply service is one of those it is responsible for regulating. Likewise, as provided in Article 1 of Law No. 7593, said entity is an autonomous institution, with its own legal personality and assets, and with administrative independence, under the terms of Article 188 of the Political Constitution. Now, it is evident that this autonomy enjoyed by the ARESEP does not exclude it from the duty to observe the principles and norms to which the Public Administration is subject. In this way, although the regulatory entity is competent for setting the rates of public services indicated to it by the Law itself, its actions must respond to the cardinal principles that govern their setting, and by the will of the constituent power, to oversight by the comptroller entity so that these are established in observance of those maxims that must necessarily be fulfilled when establishing a rate, insofar as they form part of the Public Treasury, as they constitute public funds—Article 183 of the Political Constitution and 1, 4, 8, and 9 of Law No. 7428; as well as because their determination affects the interests and patrimonial rights of consumers. Hence, to the extent that an entity or organ is part of the Public Treasury, under the terms provided in Article 8 of the Law, it is understood to be subject to the competence of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic and, consequently, is a passive subject of its oversight powers. For this Court, it is clear that what is discussed is an integral part of the Public Treasury insofar as the cost of a public service is income received by its provider, and that in this case, the ICE must pay private electricity generators, and therefore the nature of those funds is public. Now, that oversight power does not entail the substitution of the powers of the examined entity or organ, which retains its discretionary powers over those elements of the administrative act that have that condition. This Organ considers that in this case we are not faced with a violation of the administrative autonomy of the ARESEP, because the existing legal relationship between it and the CGR does not occur between active administrations, as could occur between the regulatory entity and the ICE, or with respect to some ministerial portfolio. The Office of the Comptroller here is acting in its typical oversight function, as a non-active administration, in exercise of its constitutional and legal powers as guardian of the Public Treasury, which is not incompatible with the autonomy enjoyed by the ARESEP, nor does it imply per se an invasion of its discretionary powers regarding the formation of the determinative act. What has occurred here is a control of legality in the matter of rate setting, without going so far as to substitute the active administration. Note that in the oversight report, challenged in this venue solely regarding its formal element, insofar as the plaintiff defined that the examination of this matter must be carried out solely in relation to the competence of the organ that issued the challenged act, and not regarding its substantive elements, the CGR indicates among its findings: "...weaknesses related to three methodologies defined by the ARESEP for setting the rates for the purchase of electric power from private generators under the BOO modality. These methodologies are: Methodology for setting rates for existing private generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the ICE, resolution No. RJD-009 of May 7, 2010, and its reforms (hereinafter Methodology for renewed contracts); Reference rate methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 of August 10, 2011, and its reforms (hereinafter Methodology for contracts for new hydroelectric plants), and Model for the determination of reference rates for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 of November 30, 2011, and its reforms (hereinafter Methodology for contracts for new wind plants). 2.2.

Furthermore, misapplications of these methodologies were identified in the last three tariff settings for BOO contracts: renewed in 2017, 2018, and 2019; for new hydroelectric plants in 2016, 2017, and 2018; and for new wind plants in 2015, 2017, and 2018. (...) The Methodology for renewed contracts allows the application of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants to the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants, as long as a specific tariff model does not exist. This is despite the fact that these are generation plants with differences in terms of technology, investment costs, operating costs, and useful life. 2.5. The foregoing is contrary to the principle of service at cost (servicio al costo) that determines the methodologies and tariff formulas; according to which tariffs must contemplate only the costs necessary to provide the service and effective cost schemes. This, in accordance with articles 3 subsection b) and 31 b) of Law No. 7593, in conjunction with article 4 subsection 2) of Executive Decree No. 29232-MP, Regulation to the Law Regulating Public Services (Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos), which states that it is the function and obligation of ARESEP to set public service tariffs, observing said principle. (...) 2.15. Thus, the previously mentioned weaknesses are attributed to the fact that ARESEP has not developed a tariff methodology for private generators with wind plants that renew energy purchase and sale contracts with ICE, so that the tariff is consistent with the operating costs, investment, sales expectations, and useful life of said plants. Furthermore, it originates from the fact that the analysis for the elaboration of the methodologies lost sight of the implication on the tariff of calculating the age factor (factor de antigüedad) on a different date with respect to the other variables, and in the individual plant factor (Fpi), of not using the maximum plant capacity contracted by ICE to the private generator and the actual operating times. 2.16. In this sense, the tariff power is a power-duty, meaning that ARESEP has a power in matters of its competence and must exercise it (Constitutional Chamber, resolution No. 6326-2000). That power includes defining the elements that must be considered to faithfully comply with articles 3 and 31 of the ARESEP Law, as well as establishing methodologies to set tariffs that express the elements which, according to the legal system and technique, allow their concordance with the principle of service at cost. Thus, the methodology must incentivize the setting of tariffs that reflect the real costs of providing the service, but at the same time are not excessive or unfair for the user (Attorney General's Office, opinion No. C-329-2002 and legal opinion No. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. The foregoing is congruent with agreement No. 03-34-2016 ARESEP Institutional Strategic Plan 2017-2022, approved by its Board of Directors on June 23, 2016, whose strategic objective 3 focuses on designing, updating, and implementing regulation instruments based on regulation principles and public policies that incorporate quality criteria (access, quantity, timeliness, continuity, and reliability), costs, equity, and social welfare. In addition, objective 4 focuses on strengthening an innovative and effective organization oriented towards excellence and the fulfillment of strategic goals, seeking the lowest cost for providers and users of regulated public services. (...) 2.20. It was determined that ARESEP did not correctly apply the tariff adjustment methodologies for the purchase of energy from private generators under the BOO modality, when executing the respective calculations. The foregoing occurred in the tariff setting of 2017, 2018, and 2019 for renewed contracts, as well as for the reference tariffs of 2016, 2017, and 2018 for new hydroelectric plants, and of 2015, 2017, and 2018 for new wind plants. (...) 2.22. The tariff proposals made by ARESEP between 2015 and 2019 concerning the aforementioned settings were subject to modifications resulting from 25 oppositions and joinders by ICE and private generators, and 10 ex officio corrections made by the Regulatory Authority. These modifications occurred due to: useful life calculations and use of installed capacity data that do not correspond to the plants, use of an incorrect exchange rate, outdated data or data whose record and reference was deficient, as well as data included or excluded without the methodology requiring it. (...) 2.24. On the other hand, it was determined that the tariffs related to the purchase of energy from renewed BOO contracts and the reference tariffs set for the purchase of energy from new BOO contracts for wind and hydroelectric plants were established without adherence to the methodologies, in the tariff settings of the 2015 to 2019 period; this, as indicated below. 2.25. First, the same historical quantity of data was not used for the calculation of the variables that make up the reality of capital contributions, in the case of the tariffs set for: a) renewed contracts in 2017 and 2018, b) wind plants in 2015 and 2017, and c) new hydroelectric plants for 2016, 2017, and 2018. These tariff methodologies establish that when it is not possible to have a historical series of 5 years, the shorter one will be used, but with the same scope for all variables; however, in these tariff settings, the shorter one was used for one variable and tariff series from longer periods were used for the rest. 2.26. Second, the tariff set in 2017 for renewed contracts, resolution No. RIE-110-2017, was established based on a formula that generated an exponential growth in operating costs, since these were divided by the age factor, whose value represents the equivalent remaining useful life of the plants. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in force at that time, and results in setting a higher tariff. 2.27. Third, the tariffs applied in 2017 and 2018 were set including data from generation plants that operated for less than 10 months in the year, to calculate the individual plant factor (factor de planta individual, Fpi): despite the fact that the Renewed Contracts Methodology indicates in article 3.4.3 that plants that have operated for a period equal to or greater than 10 months must be used. (...) 2.28. Fourth, in the tariff setting of January 10, 2017, the age factor was calculated as of December 31, 2015, despite the fact that article 3.5.4. of the renewed contracts methodology establishes that it must be as of December 31 of the year immediately preceding the moment in which the set tariff was calculated, that is, December 31, 2016. This situation also occurred in the tariff setting of January 12, 2018. Furthermore, in this last tariff setting, the exchange rate corresponding to August 2016 was used, when the correct one was that of August 2017; this caused an increase in operating costs. 2.29. Fifth, the calculation of the tariffs for renewed contracts set in 2018 and 2019 used information from wind plants regarding: operating costs, age factor, and plant factor, and additionally, investment costs in 2019. The foregoing, despite the fact that the Methodology for renewed contracts (articles 1 and 3.1) establishes that the tariff is first defined with the information and calculation method of hydroelectric plants, and then the result is also used for the purchase of energy generated from different sources. 2.30. By way of example, the estimated effect of including operating cost data from wind plants in the tariff settings increased these costs. This implies going from USD 179.43 established by the Regulatory Authority to USD 166.00 estimated by the Comptroller General's Office, per installed KW in 2018, and from USD 155.67 to USD 120.66 in 2019. 2.31. Sixth, in the reference tariffs set for new hydroelectric contracts in 2016 and 2017, for the calculation of the average investment cost, the CR-Parismina plant of 8MW was grouped in the group with installed capacity of 8.1MW to 12MW, when it should have been placed in the group of 4.1MW to 8MW. The foregoing does not adhere to what is established in the Unit Investment Amount section of the Methodology for new hydroelectric plants, which defines five plant groups by installed capacity. 2.32. Seventh, in the reference tariffs for new wind contracts set in 2017, it was identified that information from the Tejona and Valle Central plants, which belong to public companies, was included for the calculation of the sales expectations variables. The foregoing is not in accordance with what is established in article iv Sales Expectations of the Methodology for new wind plants, regarding that it corresponds to consider the national plants of private generators." As can be seen, in Audit Report No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, the Comptroller Body points out weaknesses in the methodologies for setting the tariffs for purchasing electrical energy from private generators, as well as misapplications of the tariff methodologies, which relate to the implementation of the tariff set based on information from hydroelectric plants for the purchase of energy from plants other than these, such as wind plants; the use of historical series in a manner different from what is established in the methodologies; the setting of tariffs that, according to the report, generated in the 2017 tariff "an exponential growth in operating costs, since these were divided by the age factor, whose value represents the equivalent remaining useful life of the plants. This operation of the age factor is not part of the formula that was in force at that time, and results in setting a higher tariff"; tariffs applied including data from generation plants that operated less than 10 months in the year, even when the methodology indicated that the data should correspond to plants with a longer period of operation; and incorrectly applied age factors. These findings are clearly linked to the non-observance by the regulatory body of the principles governing tariff setting, whose compliance is not subject to the exercise of its discretionary powers, since these are maxims that originate in the Political Constitution and in the law, but also constitute misapplications of the methodologies provided by ARESEP itself, from which it follows that, contrary to what it stated in its claim, we are not faced with the exercise of a discretionary power, as the methodologies authorized by the Board of Directors itself constitute a regulated act, whose application is mandatory.

Later, when the auditor refers to methodological weaknesses, it does so in relation to the principles of mandatory observance—not discretionary—in tariff setting, and when establishing methodological non-applications, it also suggests that these entail not only the disregard of the Board of Directors' own provisions regarding tariff setting, but also that this conduct implied the neglect of those essential maxims or postulates that must govern the determinative act, for the purpose of efficient use of public funds and the protection of the rights and economic interests of consumers. It should be noted that, under Article 16 of the General Law on Public Administration, ARESEP is subject to the *"univocal rules of science and technique"*. In the specific case, the CGR found that the methodological weaknesses and non-applications in which, according to the audit report, ARESEP incurred, raised the amounts that ICE had to pay to private electricity generators, which in turn affected the sums paid by the users of the public electricity supply service. It noted that among the principles of the Law of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services is the principle of service at cost (servicio al costo), defined in numeral 3 of said Law: *"Article 3.- Definitions. For the purposes of this law, the following concepts are defined: (...) b) Service at cost: the principle that determines how to set the tariffs and prices of public services, so that only the costs necessary to provide the service are considered, allowing for a competitive return and guaranteeing the adequate development of the activity, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31"*. This principle constitutes a parameter that must be used to set public service tariffs, so that only the costs necessary for the provision of the service are considered. The foregoing implies that in each case, a technical study must be carried out, in which expenses and investments that are not necessary for the efficient provision of the service are excluded. This is with a view to consumer protection, as safeguarding their legitimate interests and economic rights is one of the purposes of the regulatory function, as inferred from Article 46 of the Political Constitution when it states: *"Consumers and users have the right to the protection of their health, environment, safety, and economic interests; to receive adequate and truthful information; to freedom of choice, and to equitable treatment. The State shall support the organizations they create for the defense of their rights. The law shall regulate these matters."* Then, the findings arising from the audit refer to essential elements in tariff setting (principle of service at cost), provided for in the legal system or by ARESEP itself, which according to the Oversight Body, were disregarded. Thus, the audit carried out by the CGR, which concludes with No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, is merely a manifestation of the exercise of its audit powers and, therefore, of safeguarding the general interest, in this case related to the tariff-setting process, so that it adheres to the rules of science and technique, as well as to the postulates established by the legal system for their determination. The plaintiff argues that the CGR invaded its competence, because beyond reporting methodological weaknesses and non-applications, it imposed a series of obligations, even indicating the deadlines within which those actions had to be carried out. On this point, without prejudice to whether those provisions imply a substitution of the active administration, as will be seen later, it must be stated that in accordance with Article 4 of Law No. 7428, *" (...) The criteria issued by the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República), within the scope of its competence, shall be binding on the passive subjects subject to its control or audit."*, which is further elaborated in numeral 12 of said Law: *"Article 12.- Governing Body of the System. The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) is the governing body of the superior control and audit system contemplated in this Law. The provisions, rules, policies, and directives it issues, within the scope of its competence, are of mandatory observance and shall prevail over any other provisions of the passive subjects that oppose them. The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) shall also issue the instructions and orders directed to the passive subjects that are necessary for the complete exercise of its control and audit functions. The Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) shall also have the power to determine which entities, bodies, or persons subject to its control must provide it with mandatory collaboration, as well as the framework and timing within which this shall be carried out and the reasonable set of technical, human, and material means they must employ"*.

In this vein, the Court understands that the Oversight Body has the power to issue rules, policies, and directives necessary for the correct use of public resources, and the criteria it issues are of mandatory observance. It follows, then, that if the legislator granted those powers to the CGR, their exercise does not, per se, imply a substitution of the active administration, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and without losing sight of what was previously noted in the sense that the legal relationship existing between the Oversight Body and the passive subject of the audit is not between two active administrations; rather, it occurs between a subject that does have that nature, and one whose function and powers are to audit the other's efficient and law-abiding exercise. In the case under examination, following the findings made by the CGR in its oversight function of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), and specifically, as an integral part of it, of public funds, the challenged act ordered a series of actions that had to be observed, in some cases by the Regulator General, and in others by the Board of Directors of ARESEP. Specifically, it ordered: to the Regulator General of the Regulatory Authority: *"4.4. To prepare proposals for the modification of: a) articles 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 of the Tariff-Setting Methodology (Metodología de Fijación de tarifas) for Existing Private Generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity (ICE), resolution No. RDJ-009 and its amendments; b) paragraph Sale Expectation (E) of the reference tariff Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants, resolution No. RJD-152-2011 and its amendments; c) article iv of the Model for the determination of reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants, resolution No. RJD-163-2011 and its amendments, d) to add rules that establish the use of real operating time in the calculation of the plant factor, in the reference tariff Methodology for new private hydroelectric generation plants and the Model for the determination of reference tariffs for new private wind generation plants. To send the proposed modifications to the Board of Directors for what is within its competence (...) 4.5. To prepare the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private wind generators that renew electricity purchase contracts with ICE. To send the proposal to the Board of Directors for what is within its competence."* Regarding the Board of Directors of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services, it stated: *"4.6. To resolve on the proposals for modification sent by the Regulator General regarding the Tariff-Setting Methodology for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, sent by the Regulator General. 4.7. To resolve on the proposed methodology for setting tariffs for private generators using wind sources, for the renewal of electricity purchase-sale contracts with ICE, sent by the Regulator General. (...) To resolve on the proposal for actions to compensate for the overpaid amounts by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019"*.

Regarding the Energy Superintendent (Intendente de Energía) of ARESEP: *"4.9. To adjust the current tariffs for the purchase of electrical energy from private generators, issued through resolutions No. RE-0008-IE-2019, No. RIE-057-2018- and No. RE-0079-2018, so as to correct the methodological non-applications indicated in paragraphs 2.25 and 2.29 of this report, relating to: a) return on capital contributions, and b) use of information from wind plants. To send to the Office of the Comptroller General a certification accrediting the publication of the new tariff settings in the official newspaper La Gaceta, no later than October 30, 2019"*. And to the Regulator General, as well as the Energy Superintendent of ARESEP: *4.10. To determine the overpaid amounts by ICE to private generators with renewed contracts, in the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 up to the last date on which the tariff was applied, due to non-applications of the Tariff-Setting Methodology for existing private generators (Law No. 7200) that sign a new electricity purchase-sale contract with ICE, resolution No. RJD-009-2010 and its amendments. Furthermore, to propose the actions that allow for the recovery of the determined amounts and send them to the Board of Directors for what is within its competence"*.

As can be seen, what was ordered by the CGR to ARESEP is, in general terms, for it to prepare proposals on the methodology for setting tariffs for new and existing private generators, and under the different energy generation modalities, based on the premise of the report's findings, to the effect that the tariffs did not respect the principle of service at cost. Thus, what the auditor ordered is aimed at ensuring compliance with the principles, rules, and technical standards that must be observed in the determination of tariffs, but in no way does it substitute the Administration concerned, in this case, the regulatory body, because not only did the CGR not proceed to set the tariffs, but also its conduct is limited to indicating to the plaintiff the postulates that must necessarily be contained in the elements of the act of their determination, a principle moreover that was not established by the CGR, but is contained in the legal system and in the very methodologies and precepts issued by the Board of Directors of the plaintiff, and whose compliance is not discretionary in nature, leaving to ARESEP the configuration of those elements that do have that nature. In this way, the orders issued are for ARESEP, when establishing and applying tariff determination methodologies, to comply with the legal system, so that the regulated elements of that determinative act conform to the constitutional and legal precepts governing regulatory matters.

Finally, it is necessary to state that, according to the evidence on record, as well as the statements of witness Erick Alvarado Muñoz, ARESEP was made aware of each and every action that led to the audit process, it was granted a hearing for observations, which were evaluated and taken into account as deemed appropriate, for the adoption of the final act by the CGR.

**Corollary:** Under Article 183 of the Political Constitution, the CGR has the nature of an auxiliary body of the Legislative Assembly for controlling and overseeing the Public Treasury, with absolute independence in the exercise of its powers. This implies the audit, supervision, and control of all the elements that make up the Public Treasury, according to the terms established in the legal system and specifically in Article 8 of the Organic Law of the Office of the Comptroller General (Contraloría General de la República) No. 7428, which, as we have seen, includes public funds. The tariffs that ICE pays to private electricity generators precisely have that nature of public funds; therefore, the determination of those tariffs in accordance with the postulates provided by the legal system, as well as the rules of science and technique, falls within the scope of competence of the CGR, which, through this oversight function, safeguards the general interest with a view not only to the efficient use of resources but also to ensuring that the amounts paid by final consumers of public services serve their interests and economic rights.

Then, the plaintiff is not correct in arguing that in matters of elaboration, approval, modification, and application of methodologies applicable to tariff models, ARESEP is not subject to the audit of the CGR, because those tariffs are paid by ICE with public funds, which are part of the Public Treasury, so their determination is indeed subject to review by the oversight body.

Thus, the challenged acts—No. DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 and related ones, which refer to the appeal action filed by the plaintiff against the final act—do not constitute an arbitrary invasion of the powers granted by law to ARESEP, because what the CGR ordered has as antecedents the finding of methodological non-applications established by ARESEP itself, as well as the disregard of regulated elements of the tariff-setting act, such as the principle of service at cost; and the orders issued do not compel the application of a specific tariff methodology, but rather the preparation of methodological proposals or modifications, abiding, however, by the maxims that the plaintiff must observe in carrying out its regulatory function. It follows that this is not a co-administration, as at no time has the CGR substituted the powers of the regulatory body regarding the setting of the tariffs that ICE must pay to private electrical energy generators, limiting itself to indicating to ARESEP specific situations in which it must comply with the parameters of legality and efficiency, and even cease to incur omissions, as is the case with tariffs related to electrical energy generation using wind technology. It is necessary to note that the CGR's actions have not violated the principle of legality, either; on the contrary, it has exercised the powers conferred upon it by the legal system, and which, as powers-duties, it was obligated to carry out, at the risk of incurring a neglect and omission of compliance with the competencies that have been attributed to it. Nor has the principle of legality been violated by the CGR in carrying out an audit procedure for which it is not authorized, because it is clear that it does have the powers conferred upon it by the legal system to carry out the audit questioned here.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that the Court believes the plaintiff is not correct when it states that this is an inter-administrative conflict of competencies, because as already indicated, in this case we are faced with the exercise of the audit function by an oversight body, and an active administration, where one and the other are not on the same level, so that, as it is not a relationship between active administrations—since the Office of the Comptroller is a non-active, auditing, and overseeing administration of the Public Treasury, which in the exercise of its own competencies does not threaten the autonomy with which ARESEP is endowed, nor does it invade its sphere of competence—it confines itself to determining the regularity of the plaintiff's actions, by comparing them with regulated elements, laid down in the legal system, of its conduct.

At this point, it is necessary to reiterate that although some of the initial allegations of the plaintiff refer to aspects related to the substantive elements of the challenged acts, as well as to the administrative oversight procedure, and that the representation of ICE alleged at the time that it had warned ARESEP about the questions that CGR later raised in its oversight action, which has indeed been proven, and that the admitted testimonial evidence was for the purpose of supporting the criterion issued by the Oversight Body from a technical point of view, this Tribunal will not proceed to assess those elements, because the plaintiff herself limited the scope of this matter to the determination of one of the formal elements of the challenged conduct, namely: the competence of the CGR to carry out oversight of the tariff-setting methodologies for the purchase of electric energy from private generators by ICE. Finally, the Tribunal considers that, since the usurpation of competence alleged by the plaintiff did not occur, there are no elements that would allow inferring the existence of liability on the part of the CGR in relation to the damages claimed by the plaintiff. We reiterate what was indicated at the beginning, in the sense that: "<span style="font-style: italic;">what is at stake is the functioning of a mechanism through which society can evaluate how the public resources entrusted to its officials have been administered. Oversight is carried out, therefore, on behalf of the citizen and in the name of a general interest, </span><span style="font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; text-decoration: underline;">over which the mere administrative interest cannot prevail,</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> according to numeral 113 of our General Public Administration Law</span> (Underlining supplied)." The general interest in ensuring that tariff determination is carried out in accordance with the postulates that govern this type of conduct, and thereby that public funds are used more efficiently and the patrimonial interests of consumers are protected, is what must prevail in this case, and this is achieved in part through the exercise of control and supervision carried out by the oversight body, without prejudice, moreover, to the fact that, as is on record, some of the findings of the control process were warned of at the time by ICE.

**IV.- DEFENSES:** The representation of the State filed the defense of lack of active and passive capacity to be a party (legitimación ad causam). In this regard, it points out that the plaintiff has not raised any claim related to any conduct of the State, which, it affirms, is a party in this process, solely by virtue of Article 12, subsection 5) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. The Tribunal considers that the defense formulated by the state representation must be upheld, since the State had no participation in the challenged conduct whose nullity is sought, and neither has the plaintiff raised any claim against it. It is decided ex officio that both ARESEP and CGR have active and passive capacity to be a party, as the passive and active subjects of the challenged oversight conduct; and that the current interest persists, since the competence questioned here has not yet been clarified. Regarding the defense of lack of right, in light of what is indicated in the preceding recital, this Deciding Body concludes that ARESEP is indeed a passive subject of oversight by the CGR, not only regarding the functions it develops to make the exercise of its competencies possible, but also in relation to its substantive function, when determining the methodologies for setting tariffs for public services, because those tariffs, as public funds, form part of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), and therefore the exercise of competencies related to their determination is subject to the supervision of the CGR, without this implying the existence of co-administration. Consequently, the appropriate course of action is to uphold the defense of lack of right and to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety.

**V.- COSTS:** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the very fact of being so. Exemption from this penalty is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the regulation and break the principle of penalizing the losing party. Therefore, ARESEP is ordered to pay both costs of this action.

**THEREFORE** The defense of lack of active and passive capacity to be a party filed by the State is upheld, and solely with respect to the State. The defense of lack of right is upheld, and the lawsuit filed by the Public Services Regulatory Authority against the State, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, and the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, the latter acting as an interested third party, is dismissed. Both costs are charged to the plaintiff.

Ileana Isabel Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Juan Luis Giusti Soto

Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, in front of Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: [email protected]

EV Generación de Machote: F:\Gestion-Judicial\Servidor de Archivos\Modelos\Contencioso\TCRESOL016.dpj ????????????????

CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:

AUTORIDAD REGULADORA DE LOS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS DEMANDADO/A:

CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA N° 2024004630 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SECCIÓN V, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las once horas con cincuenta y dos minutos del dieciocho de Julio del dos mil venticuatro.- Proceso de conocimiento planteado por la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos (ARESEP), representada por su Apoderado Especial Judicial, Víctor Barquero Rojas, cédula de identidad 111910985, carné 19692; contra la Contraloría General de la República (CGR), por quien interviene Jesús González Hidalgo, cédula de identidad 204970783, carné 11240 y el Estado, en cuyo nombre actúa últimamente la Procuradora Amanda Grosser Jiménez, cédula de identidad 112560237, carné 20777. Interviene como tercero interesado el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), por medio de sus Apoderadas Especiales Judiciales Marys Palacios Carrillo, cédula de identidad 800790189, carné 12630 y María López Alvarado, cédula de identidad 107860831, carné 24708.

RESULTANDO

I.- Por escrito presentado ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda el 11 de febrero de 2021, los Apoderados Especiales Judiciales de la ARESEP, Luis Daniel Chacón Solórzano, cédula de identidad 205560559 y Henry Payne Castro, cédula de identidad 108850781, presentaron demanda de conocimiento contra la CGR, y con fundamento en los hechos alegados, y argumentos de derecho planteados, solicitaron que en sentencia: "1. Que se declare con lugar la demanda interpuesta por la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, contra la Contraloría General de la República, y que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta del Informe N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 de 16 de setiembre de 2019, realizado por el Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales de Energía de la División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa (DFOE), de la resolución administrativas (sic) R-DFOE-AE-0003-2019, de las 13:00 horas de 28 de octubre de 2019, y del acto definitivo de la Contraloría General de la República R-DC-10-2020 (N°02120DC-0041) de las 8:00 horas del 13 de febrero de 2020, por encontrarse disconformes con el ordenamiento jurídico, ello en virtud del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, y en consecuencia, se dejen sin efecto alguno desde su emisión, por disposición del artículo 171 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y artículo 131 inciso 1) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las disposiciones de acatamiento obligatorio ahí contenidas y dirigidas contra nuestra representada, propiamente al Intendente de Energía, al Regulador General y a la Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos. Además, de manera concomitante, solicitamos que en sentencia se declare la nulidad absoluta -por su relación y conexidad-, de los oficios: DFOE-SD-0976, DFOE-AE-0570 (17839) del 11 de diciembre de 2018, DEFOE AE-0414 (oficio N°13720) del 16 de setiembre de 2019, DFOE-AE-0361 (oficio N°11083) del 26 de junio de 2019, DFOE-AE-0085, DFOE-SD-0307 (oficio N°02740), DFOE-SD-0309 (oficio N°02754), N° 04878 (DC-0097), DFOE-SD-0729 (oficio N°.05786), DFOE-AE-0329, DFOE-SD-1577 (oficio N°12873), DFOE-AE-0331, DFOE-SD-1587 (oficio N°1298), de 2 de abril de 2020, así como todos aquellos conexos y afines que se encuentren relacionados exclusivamente contra la Aresep, que hayan servido de base y fundamento para la emisión de citado informe N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 y el acto definitivo R-DC-010-2020 (N°02110 DC-0041 de las 8:00 horas del 13 de febrero de 2020, y que su Autoridad determine en sentencia. Lo anterior, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 164.2 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y artículo 131 inciso 3) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. 2. Que se condene a la Contraloría General de la República, al pago de ambas costas de esta acción, intereses netos e indexación hasta el efectivo pago, lo cual se liquidará en la fase de ejecución de sentencia. 3. Que se condene a la Contraloría General de la República, al pago de los daños y perjuicios provocados a la Aresep, intereses netos e indexación hasta el efectivo pago, los cuales se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia. 4. Que en sentencia se le ordene a los jerarcas de la Contraloría General de la República, que inicien de manera inmediata los procedimientos internos de mérito, a fin de establecer la responsabilidad pecuniaria y/o disciplinaria de los funcionarios del ente contralor que participaron en las acciones u omisiones que llevaron a incurrir en los actos contrarios a legalidad que aquí se solicita anular" (imágenes 2 a 111 del expediente judicial).

II.- En resolución de las 09:41 horas del 05 de mayo de 2021, se tuvo por establecido el proceso y confirió su traslado a la CGR, así como al Estado (imagen 125 a 127).

III.- El 08 de julio de 2021, la Apoderada Especial Judicial del ICE, contestó negativamente la demanda, en su condición de tercero interesado y presentó la defensa de falta de derecho (imágenes 135 a 179 del expediente judicial).

IV.- En escrito con fecha de 09 de julio de 2021, la representación de la CGR contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho (imágenes 180 a 215 del expediente judicial).

V.- Mediante escrito de 15 de julio de 2021, la representación del Estado contestó negativamente la demanda y formuló las defensas de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y falta de derecho (imágenes (225 a 294 del expediente judicial).

VI.- En resolución de N°501-2022-T, de las 08:00 horas del 29 de marzo de 2022, el Juez Roberto Brenes Chinchilla rechazó las coadyuvancias planteadas por Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S. A., Molinos de Viento del Arenal S.A. así como por Aeroenergía S.A.(imágenes 510 a 516 del expediente judicial).

VII.- El 30 de marzo de 2022 fue realizada la audiencia preliminar. En dicho acto procesal fue aclarada la pretensión N°3 de la demanda, en el sentido de que los de daños se refieren a: "daño a la imagen institucional, el cuestionamiento de la calidad, experticia, credibilidad y rigurosidad técnica del trabajo que realiza la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos y capacidad técnica profesional de los funcionarios que elaboraron, aprobaron y aplicaron esas metodologías tarifarias analizadas en el informe", y se realizó la valoración y admisión de la prueba ofrecida por las partes (imágenes 531 a 535d el expediente judicial).

VIII.- En resolución N°134-2022-I de las 15:58 horas del 25 de abril de 2022, la Sección Primera del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, rechazó de plano el recurso de apelación planteado por Hidroeléctrica Río Lajas S.A., contra el auto sentencia N°501-2022-T, de las 08:00 horas del 29 de marzo de 2022, que había rechazado la coadyuvancia activa de dicha empresa (imágenes 546 y 547 del expediente judicial).

IX.- La audiencia de juicio oral y público fue llevada a cabo el 20 de junio del 2024. En ese acto fue recibida la prueba testimonial pericial admitida durante la audiencia preliminar. A gestión de las partes el Tribunal otorgó cinco días hábiles con la finalidad de que rindieran conclusiones escritas y se declaró el asunto complejo (lo anterior consta en la minuta del referido acto procesal, visible a imágenes 653 a 658 del expediente judicial, así como en la grabación de la audiencia que consta en formato digital).

X.- Se dicta esta sentencia por unanimidad, dentro del plazo de ley. No se observan vicios capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Concurren con el voto la Jueza Álvarez Molina, el Juez Giusti Soto y la Jueza Sánchez Navarro, quien redacta.

CONSIDERANDO

I.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para resolver este asunto, se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes hechos:

1. Que según el Informe de Auditoría de Carácter Especial Acerca del Proceso Instaurado por el ICE y la ARESEP para la Concesión de la Generación y Compra de Energía Eléctrica a Privados N°DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, de 16 de setiembre de 2019, realizado por el Área de Fiscalización de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa de la CGR, dicho proceso de revisión y verificación tuvo como objetivo y alcance "(...) determinar la razonabilidad del proceso y criterios aplicados por el ICE y la ARESEP para concesonar la generación y compra de energía eléctrica a privados, en sus elementos de elegibilidad y selección de proyectos, control en su ejecución y establecimiento de tarifas de compra de la energía, que asegure el cumplimiento de la normativa atinente. (...) comprende el análisis de las acciones, procesos, procedimientos y regulaciones para la concesión de la generación y compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados, en cuanto a contratos relacionados con fuentes eólicas e hidráulicas que se encuentran en operación comercial. (...) El período de análisis comprendió del 2008 al 2018, el cual se amplió al 31 de mayo de 2019 para considerar los efectos estimados de la tarifa fijada para contratos renovados" (imágenes 09 a 17 del expediente administrativo que consta en formato digital, identificado como 00001_00131[OT-775-2019), y que corresponde a la página 07 del Informe citado).

2. Que según el Informe de Auditoría N°DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, de 16 de setiembre de 2019, referido en el hecho inmediato anterior, los hallazgos encontrados son los siguientes: "2.1. Se determinaron debilidades relacionadas con tres metodologías definidas por la ARESEP para fijar las tarifas de compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados bajo la modalidad BOO. Estas metodologías son: Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados existentes (Ley n°. 7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, resolución n°. RJD-009 del 7 de mayo de 2010 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos renovados); Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas, resolución n°. RJD-152-2011 del 10 de agosto de 2011 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos de plantas hidroeléctricas) nuevas, y Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas, resolución n°. RJD-163-2011 del 30 de noviembre de 2011 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos de plantas eólicas nuevas). 2.2. Además se identificaron desaplicaciones de estas metodologías en las últimas tres fijaciones tarifarias para contratos BOO: renovados del 2017, 2018, y 2019; para plantas hidroeléctricas nuevas del 2016, 2017 y 2018, y para plantas eólicas nuevas del 2015, 2017, y 2018. (...) La Metodología para contratos renovados admite la aplicación de la tarifa fijada con base en la información de plantas hidroeléctricas, para la compra de energía proveniente de plantas distintas a éstas como las eólicas, en el tanto no exista un modelo tarifario específico. Esto, pese a que se trata de plantas de generación con diferencias en cuanto a la tecnología, costos de inversión, costos de operación y vida útil. 2.5. Lo anterior, es contrario al principio de servicio al costo determinante de las metodologías y fórmulas tarifarias; según el cual las tarifas deben contemplar únicamente los costos necesarios para prestar el servicio y los esquemas de costos efectivos. Esto, de conformidad con los artículos 3 inciso b) y 31 b) de la Ley n°.7593, en concordancia con el artículo 4 inciso 2) del Decreto Ejecutivo n°. 29232-MP, Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, el cual señala que es función y obligación de la ARESEP fijar las tarifas de los servicios públicos, con observancia de dicho principio. (...) 2.15. Es así como, las debilidades antes mencionadas se atribuyen a que la ARESEP no ha desarrollado una metodología tarifaria para generadores privados con plantas eólicas que renuevan los contratos de compra venta de energía eléctrica con el ICE, para que la tarifa sea congruente con los costos de explotación, inversión, expectativas de venta y vida útil de dichas plantas. Además, se origina en que se perdió de vista en el análisis para la elaboración de las metodologías, la implicación en la tarifa de calcular el factor de antigüedad a una fecha distinta con respecto a las demás variables y en el factor de planta individual (Fpi), no utilizar la capacidad de planta máxima contratada por el ICE al generador privado y los tiempos reales de operación. 2.16. En este sentido, la potestad tarifaria es un poder-deber, de modo que la ARESEP tiene una potestad en materia de su competencia y debe ejercerla (Sala Constitucional, resolución n°.6326-2000). Esa potestad comprende el definir los elementos que deben ser considerados para dar fiel cumplimiento a los artículos 3 y 31 de la Ley de la ARESEP, así como establecer metodologías para fijar las tarifas que expresen los elementos que de acuerdo con el ordenamiento y la técnica, permitan su concordancia con el principio de servicio al costo. Así, la metodología debe incentivar la fijación de tarifas que reflejen los costos reales de la prestación del servicio, pero al mismo tiempo que no sean excesivos o injustos para el usuario (Procuraduría General de la República, dictamen n°.C-329-2002 y opinión jurídica n°. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. Lo anterior, es congruente con el acuerdo n°03-34-2016 Plan Estratégico Institucional de ARESEP 2017-2022, aprobado por su Junta Directiva el 23 de junio de 2016, cuyo objetivo estratégico 3 se enfoca en diseñar, actualizar e implementar instrumentos de regulación basados en principios de regulación y de políticas públicas que incorporen criterios de calidad (acceso, cantidad, oportunidad, continuidad y confiabilidad), costos, equidad y bienestar social. Además, el objetivo 4 se centra en fortalecer una organización innovadora y eficaz orientada a la excelencia y al cumplimiento de las metas estratégicas, procurando el menor costo para prestadores y usuarios de los servicios públicos regulados. (...) 2.20. Se determinó que la ARESEP no aplicó correctamente las metodologías de ajuste tarifario para la compra de energía a generadores privados bajo la modalidad de BOO, al momento de ejecutar los cálculos respectivos. Lo anterior, se presentó en la fijación tarifaria del 2017, 2018, y 2019 para los contratos renovados, así como, para las tarifas de referencia del 2016, 2017 y 2018 para plantas hidroeléctricas nuevas, y del 2015, 2017 y 2018 para plantas eólicas nuevas. (...) 2.22. Las propuestas tarifarias efectuadas por la ARESEP entre el 2015 y el 2019 relativas a las fijaciones antes citadas, fueron objeto de modificaciones producto de 25 oposiciones y coadyuvancias por parte del ICE y generadores privados, y 10 correcciones de oficio efectuadas por la Autoridad reguladora. Estas modificaciones se dieron por: cálculos de vida útil y uso de datos de capacidad instalada que no corresponden a las plantas, utilización de un tipo de cambio incorrecto, datos desactualizados o cuyo registro y referencia resultó deficiente, así como datos incluidos o excluidos sin que así lo requiera la metodología. (...) 2.24. Por otra parte, se determinó que fueron establecidas sin apego a las metodologías, las tarifas relativas a compra de energía de los contratos BOO renovados y las de referencia fijadas para la compra de energía de contratos BOO nuevos para plantas eólicas e hidroeléctricas en las fijaciones tarifarias del período 2015 a 2019; esto, según se indica de seguido. 2.25. Primero no fue utilizada la misma cantidad histórica de datos para el cálculo de las variables que conforman la realidad sobre los aportes de capital, en el caso de las tarifas fijadas para: a) contratos renovados en 2017 y 2018, b) eólicos en 2015 y 2017 y c) hidroeléctricos nuevos para 2016, 2017 y 2018. Estas metodologías tarifarias establecen que cuando no sea posible contar con una serie histórica de 5 años, se utilizará la menor, pero con igual alcance para todas las variables; sin embargo, en estas fijaciones tarifarias se usó la menor para una variable y para el resto series tarifarias de períodos mayores. 2.26. Segundo, la tarifa fijada en el 2017 para los contratos renovados, resolución n°.RIE-110-2017, se estableció con base en una fórmula que generó un crecimiento exponencial de los costos de explotación, pues estos fueron divididos entre el factor de antigüedad, cuyo valor representa el equivalente de vida útil remanente de las plantas. esta operación del factor de antigüedad no forma parte de la fórmula que estaba vigente en ese momento, y resulta en la fijación de una tarifa mayor. 2.27. Tercero, las tarifas aplicadas en el 2017 y 2018 se fijaron incluyendo datos de plantas de generación que operaron menos de 10 meses en el año, para efectuar el cálculo del factor de planta individual (Fpi): a pesar de que la Metodología de contratos renovados señala en el artículo 3.4.3 que deben utilizarse plantas que hayan operado un período igual o superior a 10 meses. (...) 2.28. Cuarto, en la fijación tarifaria del 10 de enero de 2017 se calculó el factor de antigüedad al 31 de diciembre de 2015, a pesar de que el artículo 3.5.4. de la metodología de contratos renovados, establece que debe ser al 31 de diciembre del año inmediato anterior al momento en el cual se calculó la tarifa fijada, o sea el 31 de diciembre de 2016. Esta situación también se presentó en la fijación tarifaria del 12 de enero de 2018. Además, en esta última fijación tarifaria se utilizó el tipo de cambio correspondiente a agosto de 2016, siendo lo correcto el de agosto de 2017; esto ocasionó el incremento en los costos de explotación. 2.29. Quinto, el cálculo de las tarifas de contratos renovados fijadas en el 2018 y 2019 utilizó información de plantas eólicas acerca de: costos de explotación, factor de antigüedad y factor de planta, y además, costos de inversión en el 2019. Lo anterior, a pesar de que la Metodología de contratos renovados (artículos 1 y 3.1) establece que primero se define la tarifa con la información y método de cálculo de plantas hidroeléctricas, y luego el resultado también se usa para la compra de energía generada con fuentes distintas. 2.30. A manera de ejemplo, se tiene que el efecto estimado de la inclusión de datos de costos de explotación de plantas eólicas en las fijaciones tarifarias incrementó estos costos. Esto, implica pasar de USD 179,43 que estableció la Autoridad Reguladora a USD 166,00 estimado por la Contraloría General, por cada KW instalado en el 2018, y de USD 155,67 a USD 120,66 en el 2019. 2.31. Sexto, en las tarifas de referencia fijadas para los contratos hidroeléctricos nuevos en 2016 y 2017, para el cálculo del costo promedio de inversión, se agrupó la planta CR-Parismina de 8MW en el grupo con capacidad instalada de 8, 1MW a 12 MW, cuando correspondía ubicarla en el grupo de 4,1MW a 8MW. Lo anterior no se apega a lo establecido en la sección Monto de la inversión unitaria (M) de la Metodología de hidroeléctricas nuevas que define cinco grupos de plantas de por capacidad instalada. 2.32. Sétimo, en las tarifas de referencia para contratos eólicos nuevos fijadas en el 2017, se identificó que información de las plantas Tejona y Valle Central, que pertenecen a empresas públicas, fueron incluidas para el cálculo de las variables de las expectativas de venta. Lo anterior, no es acorde con lo establecido en el artículo iv Expectativas de venta de la Metodología de eólicos nuevos, en cuanto a que corresponde considerar las plantas nacionales de generadores privados" (imágenes 09 a 17 del expediente administrativo que consta en formato digital, identificado como 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], y que corresponde a las páginas 11 a 15 del Informe citado).

3. Que según el Informe de Auditoría N°DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, de 16 de setiembre de 2019, anteriormente referido, "(...) las debilidades de las metodologías definidas por la ARESEP y sus desaplicaciones, han propiciado fijaciones tarifarias que rebasan el principio de servicio al costo, así como un normal beneficio o utilidad para el prestatario. Al respecto, en los contratos de compra de energía renovados se estima que dicha situación le ha implicado al ICE erogaciones adicionales cercanas a los USD 24,00 millones, entre el año 2017 y mayo de 2019. Lo anterior, no solo perjudica los fondos públicos que administra este Instituto, sino también a los consumidores finales, pues necesariamente esas erogaciones forman parte de la factura eléctrica" (imagen 26 del expediente administrativo que consta en formato digital, identificado como 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], y que corresponde a la página 24 del Informe citado).

4. Que en atención a los hallazgos señalados en el Informe de Auditoría N°DFOE-AE-IF-0009-2019, de 16 de setiembre de 2019, la CGR dispuso: al Regulador General de la Autoridad Reguladora: "4.4. Elaborar las propuestas de modificación de: a) artículos 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 de la Metodología de Fijación de tarifas para Generadores Privados Existentes (Ley N°7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolución n°.RDJ-009 y sus reformas; b párrafo Expectativa de venta (E) de la Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas, resolución n.° RJD-152-2011 y sus reformas; c) artículo iv del Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas, resolución n.° RJD-163-2011 y sus reformas, d) adicionar las normas que establezcan el uso del tiempo real de operación en el cálculo del factor de planta, en la Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas nuevas y el Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas. Enviar a la Junta Directiva las modificaciones propuestas para lo de su competencia (...) 4.5. Elaborar la propuesta de metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados eólicos que renueven contratos de compra de energía eléctrica con el ICE. Enviar la propuesta a la Junta Directiva para lo de su competencia." En cuanto a la Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, indicó: "4.6. Resolver acerca de las propuestas de modificación que les remita el Regulador General relativas a la Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados que utilizan fuentes eólicas, para la renovación de contratos de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, que le remita el Regulador General. 4.7. Resolver acerca de la propuesta de metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados que utilizan fuentes eólicas, para la renovación de contratos de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, que le remita el regulador General. (...) Resolver acerca de la propuesta de acciones para resarcir los montos pagados de más por el ICE a los generadores privados con contratos renovados, en los años 2017, 2018 y 2019". Respecto del Intendente dde Energía de la ARESEP: "4.9. Ajustar las tarifas vigentes para la compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados, emitidas mediante las resoluciones n.°RE-0008-IE-2019, n.°RIE-057-2018- y n.°RE-0079-2018, de forma que se corrijan las desaplicaciones metodológicas indicadas en párrafos 2.25 y 2.29 de este informe, relativos a: a) rentabilidad sobre los aportes de capital, y b) uso de información de plantas eólicas. Remitir a la Contraloría General certificación que acredite la publicación de las nuevas fijación tarifarias en el diario oficial La Gaceta, a más tardar el 30 de octubre de 2019". Y al regulador General, así como al Intendente de Energía de la ARESEP: 4.10. Determinar los montos pagados de más por el ICE a los generadores privados con contratos renovados, en los años 2017, 2018, y 2019 hasta la última fecha en que la tarifa haya sido aplicada, debido a desaplicaciones de la Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados existentes (Ley n.°7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, resolución n.°RJD-009-2010 y sus reformas. Además, proponer las acciones que permitan resarcir los montos determinadas y remitirlas a la Junta Directiva para lo de su competencia" (imágenes 26 a 28 del expediente administrativo que consta en formato digital, identificado como 00001_00131[OT-775-2019], y que corresponde a las páginas 24 a 26 del Informe citado).

5. Que con ocasión del recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio planteada por la ARESEP en oficio OF-0783-RG-2019, el 19 de septiembre de 2019, contra el informe de auditoría DFOE-AE-00009-2019, el Área de Servicios Ambientales y de Energía, División de Fiscalización Operativa y Evaluativa de la Contraloría General de la República emitió la resolución R-DFOE-AE-00003-2019, de las 13:00 horas del 28 de octubre de 2019. En este acto se resolvió:"I) DECLARAR PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR el recurso de revocatoria (...) únicamente en lo siguiente: 1. Que la disposición contenida en el párrafo 4.9 del informe de referencia se lea de la siguiente manera: "Ajustar las tarifas para la compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados, emitidas mediante resoluciones n.°RE-0008-IE-2019. RIE-057-2018 y RE-0079-2018, o las que en su lugar se hayan emitido previo a la notificación de este informe, de forma que no se incurra en las desaplicaciones metodológicas indicadas en los párrafos 2.25 y 2.29 de este informe, relativas a lo siguiente: a) rentabilidad sobre los aportes de capital, y b) uso de información de plantas eólicas. Remitir a la Contraloría General certificación que acredite la publicación de las nuevas fijaciones tarifarias en el diario oficial La Gaceta, a más tardar el 30 de octubre de 2019". Además, se sustituyeron algunas de las cifras de las figuras contenidas en el informe. 2. (ver por su orden el oficio del recurso y el acto que lo resuelve a imágenes 32 a 74 y 75 a 112 del expediente administrativo que consta en formato digital, identificado como 00001_00131[OT-775-2019]).

6. Que en resolución N°R-DC-010-2020, de las 08:00 del 13 de febrero del 2020, la Contraloría General de la República declaró sin lugar el recurso de apelación formulado por la ARESEP contra DFOE-AE-00009-2019 (así consta en la carpeta 00208_00221 [OT-775-2019].

7. Que con antelación a que la CGR emitiera el Informe de Auditoría, el ICE presentó una serie de oposiciones ante la Aresep: "evidenciando que existe la necesidad de hacer una separación de la metodología según la tecnología (hidro y eólica), para la estimación de las tarifas por compra de energía, de lo contrario se transfiere el sobre costo al cliente final y un reconocimiento indebido a los generadores privados de plantas eólicas. Asimismo, se ha planteado ante la ARESEP que la fecha asociada al cálculo del factor de antigüedad sea el 31 de diciembre del mismo año en que se inicia el proceso de fijación de tarifas (...) Lo anterior por cuanto entre más reciente sea la fecha utilizada para el cálculo del factor de antigüedad de las plantas, dicho valor tiende a ser menor y se produce como resultado una reducción de la tarifa a pagar a los generadores privados. En este mismo sentido, también se ha solicitado, según consta en el oficio 0610-135-2018 del 3 de diciembre de 2018, la consideración, entre otros aspectos, de incorporar como parte de los cambios en las metodologías de fijación de tarifas, la utilización de la capacidad contratada, como referencia más objetiva en el cálculo de las expectativas reales de venta de energía al ICE. La revisión e inclusión de información más precisas en el cálculo ha sido una solicitud del ICE a la ARESEP" (así lo ha manifestado de forma reiterada la representación del ICE, en la contestación de la demanda, así como en la respuesta brindada a la medida cautelar ante causam que fue planteada por la ARESEP; y en la copia de la documentación en el que constan esas gestiones, lo cual está visible a imágenes 157 a 180 del legajo correspondiente a la medida cautelar que consta en el expediente judicial, y CD 4 prueba contestación del ICE, Prueba 10.0510-1794-2010 de 10 de diciembre de 2010; prueba 11.510-144-2012, que es recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio planteada por el ICE contra la resolución 750-RCR-2012 de las 10:45 horas de 09 de enero de 2012; prueba 12, oficio 0610-128-2018, de 22 de noviembre de 2018, que consiste en la oposición del Ice a la propuesta de aplicación anual de la metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados (ley 7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra y venta de energía con el ICE; prueba 13.0610-135-2018 de 12 de marzo de 2018, en el cual el ICE plantea una serie de solicitudes de mejora las metodologías de generadores privados; prueba 14, que es recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución RIE-001-2018 de 12 de enero de 2018; prueba 17-257-401-2016, de 16 de diciembre de 2016, que es una gestión de nulidad contra la decisión de la Junta Directiva de la ARESEP de suspender la aplicación de RDJ-017-2016, mediante acuerdo de Junta Directiva N° 06-07-027-2016; prueba 18.0257-591-2017 de 10 de noviembre de 2017, que es recurso de nulidad y de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra la resolución RIE-110-2017).

II.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS:

1. Que los actos impugnados impusieron a la ARESEP, los elementos discrecionales para la determinación de las metodologías de la fijación de tarifas del suministro de energía eléctrica por parte de generadores privados (no existe prueba al respecto).

III.- ALEGATOS DE LAS PARTES: ACTORA: La representación de la ARESEP, solicita la nulidad del informe de la CGR N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 y sus actos conexos, con fundamento en los siguientes argumentos: 1. Falta de competencia y ausencia de experticia técnica de la CGR en ámbitos que son exclusivos de la ARESEP, concernientes a la elaboración, aprobación, modificación y aplicación de metodologías aplicables a los modelos tarifarios. 2. En materia de elaboración, aprobación, modificación y aplicación de metodologías aplicables a modelos tarifarios, la ARESEP, no está sujeta a la fiscalización de la CGR, de modo que las conductas relacionadas con el ejercicio de estas competencias únicamente está sujeto al control jurisdiccional. 3. Los actos impugnados constituyen una invasión arbitraria de las competencias exclusivas y excluyentes otorgadas por ley a la ARESEP. 4. Ejercicio de coadministración por parte de la CGR, al ordenar a la ARESEP la aplicación y modificación de modelos y metodologías tarifarias, así como la recuperación de las sumas pagadas de más por el ICE. 5. Violación del principio de legalidad por parte de la CGR, al llevar a cabo un procedimiento de fiscalización para el cual no se encuentra autorizada. 6. Una ausencia de de competencia para anular, modificar y desconocer los modelos tarifarios aplicados por la ARESEP en el marco de la compra de energía eléctrica a sujetos privados. Indica de forma expresa que el objeto de este proceso es dilucidar una supuesta invasión de la competencia de la ARESEP por parte de la CGR, al emitir el N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 y sus actos conexos, y apunta: "Bajo esta delimitación, es necesario tener presente que, la Aresep, no presentó este proceso con la finalidad de cuestionar las técnicas o los criterios técnicos en los que se sustentan las órdenes vinculantes dadas por la CGR a mi representada, o si las mismas son técnicamente correctas o incorrectas, y tampoco se está discutiendo en este proceso la legalidad o los parámetros de las metodologías tarifarias de la ARESEP o de su fijación de tarifas (o si se aplicó bien o mal el factor de antigüedad / los costos de explotación / o el factor de planta), ese no es el objeto del proceso. El objeto del proceso gira en torno a un conflicto de competencias interadministrativo, radica en determinar si existe una HABILITACIÓN LEGAL EXPRESA para que la CGR emita este tipo de disposiciones vinculantes a la Aresep, en las que se delimita la forma en que debe realizar el ejercicio de las competencias exclusivas y excluyentes para las que fue creada, de conformidad al artículo 188 de la Constitución Política, y la Ley N°7593" (el destacado en negrita subrayado, son suplidos). DEMANDADA: Tanto la CGR, así como la representación del Estado y del ICE son contestes en indicar que la conducta impugnada no constituye una invasión de las competencias de la ARESEP por parte de la CGR. Indican que se trata de la elaboración de un informe de auditoría que se encuentra dentro del marco de potestades que el ordenamiento confiere al Órgano Contralor en materia de Hacienda Pública. Sostienen que las debilidades en las metodologías de fijación tarifaria, así como su desaplicación en la compra de energía eléctrica a sujetos privado por parte del ICE, evidencian que en la determinación de las tarifas se inobservaron los principios de legalidad, eficiencia y servicio al costo, lo cual conllevó que los pagos realizados por el ICE fueran mayores, y que el costo del servicio público de suministro de energía resultara más elevado para el consumidor final. Sostienen que no se sustituyó a la Administración activa, y que por el contrario, en el ejercicio de la potestad fiscalizadora, se conminó a la demandante a cumplir los principios y normas atinentes al proceso de fijación de tarifas de servicios públicos, así como las disposiciones dictadas por la propia ARESEP y su Junta Directiva. La Apoderada Especial Judicial, señaló además, que su representada ya había advertido con antelación a la ARESEP, respecto de la inobservancia del ordenamiento jurídico en relación con la fijación de las tarifas que posteriormente fueron revisadas por la CGR. Todas las representaciones formularon la defensa de falta de derecho, y el Estado, planteó además, la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam.

III.- SOBRE LA COMPETENCIA DE LA CGR Y EL CASO CONCRETO: El exigir cuentas a la Administración Pública sobre su gestión constituye un derecho fundamental de las personas ciudadanas, cuya fiscalización, en materia de Hacienda Pública, el constituyente decidió hacerla recaer en una institución auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa. Luego, "... lo que está de por medio es el funcionamiento de un mecanismo por el cuál la sociedad pueda evaluar cómo se han administrado los recursos públicos que ha confiado a sus funcionarios. Se fiscaliza, por tanto, en representación del ciudadano y en nombre de un interés general, al cual no puede sobreponerse el mero interés administrativo, según el numeral 113 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública" (La Fscalización Superior de la Hacienda Pública como garantía de los habitantes. Ronald Hidalgo Cuadra. Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas N°90. 1999); y que tiene la finalidad de garantizar el interés general en orden a la legalidad y la eficiencia de los controles internos y el manejo de los fondos públicos -artículo 11 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República N°7428 de 07 de setiembre de 1994-. Al momento de dictarse esta sentencia, a tenor de los preceptos 183 y 184 de la Constitución Política, y de los numerales 1 y 4 de la Ley N°7428 anteriormente referida, esa función de vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública y de rectoría en el sistema de fiscalización, ejercida, según ya se indicó, en representación de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas de este país, recae, sobre la CGR, órgano a la cual, la Carta Fundamental y la ley, le confiere amplísimas potestades de vigilancia precisamente a través del concepto de Hacienda Pública establecido en el artículo 183 constitucional, reiterado en el artículo 1 de la Ley N°7428, que establece: "Artículo 1.- Naturaleza Jurídica y Atribución General. La Contraloría General de la República es un órgano constitucional fundamental del Estado, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa en el control superior de la Hacienda Pública y rector del sistema de fiscalización que contempla esta ley"; y cuyos amplios alcances los encontramos definidos en el artículo 8 del mismo cuerpo normativo: "Artículo 8.- Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas administrativas y financieras relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los fondos públicos. Respecto a los entes públicos no estatales, las sociedades con participación minoritaria del sector público o las entidades privadas, únicamente formarán parte de la Hacienda Pública los recursos que administren o dispongan, por cualquier título, para conseguir sus fines y que hayan sido transferidos o puestos a su disposición, mediante norma o partida presupuestaria, por los Poderes del Estado, sus dependencias y órganos auxiliares, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, la administración descentralizada, las universidades estatales, las municipalidades y los bancos del Estado. Los recursos de origen distinto de los indicados no integran la Hacienda Pública; en consecuencia, el régimen jurídico aplicable a esas entidades es el contenido en las Leyes que las crearon o los ordenamientos especiales que las regulan. El patrimonio público será el universo constituido por los fondos públicos y los pasivos a cargo de los sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública. Serán sujetos componentes de la Hacienda Pública, el Estado y los demás entes u órganos públicos, estatales o no, y las empresas públicas, así como los sujetos de Derecho Privado, en cuanto administren o custodien fondos públicos por cualquier título, con las salvedades establecidas en el párrafo anterior", y más adelante, en artículo 9, se establece que los fondos públicos son: "los recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos". De las normas transcritas se colige que el legislador estableció una definición vasta, tanto del objeto, como de los sujetos respecto de los cuales la CGR tiene la potestad de ejercer su función fiscalizadora. Así, en cuanto al objeto, el control comprende la Hacienda Pública, la cual, según los términos del artículo 8 anteriormente citado, está constituida por "los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas administrativas y financieras relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los fondos públicos." Y respecto del sujeto pasivo, el artículo 4 de la Ley N°7428, es claro al señalar que la competencia del Órgano Contralor abarca a la totalidad de los entes y órganos que integren la Hacienda Pública, sin perjuicio de la competencia facultativa respecto de los sujetos enunciados en los incisos a) a e) del citado numeral, y en los supuestos que allí se describen. Sobre el particular, la Procuraduría General de la República, en la Opinión Jurídica N°OJ-101-2002, de 05 de julio de 2002 indicó: "El sistema de fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública es un todo coherente de base constitucional. A partir de la obligación de control de la Hacienda Pública consagrada en el artículo 183 de la Constitución Política se ha establecido un sistema de fiscalización que se filtra a lo largo y ancho de la Administración Pública y que abarca tanto a los jerarcas de los entes, empresas u órganos públicos como a las auditorías internas de las respectivas administraciones" (el destacado en negrita y subrayado son suplidos). En esta línea, se ha pronunciado de forma reiterada la Sala Constitucional: "VII. (...) La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, al crear la Contraloría General de la República como una institución auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa, le confirió la tarea de la fizcalización y vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública -artículo 183 de la Constitución Política-, en cuanto le corresponde verificar la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos, lo que debe entenderse en los términos ya señalados con anterioridad por este Tribunal Constitucional: “De la lectura de los artículos 183 y siguientes de la Constitución Política, es posible concluir que la Contraloría General de la República, tiene en relación con los fondos públicos, una función de fiscalización superior, jurídica y financiera, que no puede verse limitada a una actuación automática de simple «aprobación», puesto que ello implicaría una disminución sustancial de sus competencias constitucionales”; “La Contraloría General de la República, como su Ley Orgánica remarca (Ley No. 7428 de siete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro) es un órgano de relevancia constitucional, auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa, cuya función general es el control superior de la Hacienda Pública y la dirección del sistema de fiscalización regulado en la citada Ley”; "El fundamento normativo de esta competencia especial deriva de lo dispuesto en el citado artículo 183 constitucional, y que la Ley ha desarrollado, tanto en la primera Ley Orgánica de esta institución -número 1253 de veintitrés de diciembre de mil novecientos cincuenta-, que en sus artículos 2 y 3 inciso k) le confirió a esta institución la especial competencia para ejercer funciones de vigilancia en el manejo de los fondos públicos...", "XX.- DE LOS PRINCIPIOS GENERALES EN RELACIÓN CON EL CONTROL Y FISCALIZACIÓN EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA. En toda organización administrativa debe existir un sistema de control o medios de fiscalización de esa actividad, lo que la dota de un conjunto de garantías de legitimación y de verificación de oportunidad y legalidad, a la vez que logra la eficiencia y moralidad de su funcionamiento. De esta manera, para el cumplimiento de cada uno de los objetivos de los actos administrativos, se requiere el ejercicio del correspondiente medio de control o fiscalización; algunos de ellos están previstos expresamente en la ley y otros, surgen en forma implícita de algún precepto esencial de tipo constitucional, como sucede con el control que ejerce la Contraloría General de la República con la actividad de la contratación administrativa. La doctrina más calificada señala que el control o fiscalización que se realice en la Administración Pública puede ser clasificado desde tres puntos de vista fundamentales: a) en cuanto al momento o tiempo en que se realiza con relación al acto o comportamiento, lo que reviste carácter preventivo o represivo, según sea el caso; el cual, también, puede presentarse de tres maneras diferentes: el control anterior ("a priori"), que en realidad funciona a modo de autorización para el acto o contrato y actúa como condicionante de validez, de manera que cuando el acto sometido al examen no sea conforme a lo debido, proceda, según sea el caso, la suspensión o sustitución; el control posterior ("a posteriori"), que es en realidad una aprobación de lo actuado por la Administración, y constituye un requisito de eficacia del acto; y el control concomitante, que se verifica en todo el proceso, a modo de una verdadera fiscalización de la actuación de los entes públicos, constituyéndose en requisitos de validez y eficacia al mismo tiempo; b) en cuanto a la iniciativa del control, si es a petición de parte (recursos) o actuación de oficio (vigilancia); y c) en cuanto al objeto que se pretenda lograr con el control o fiscalización, si es de legitimidad o legalidad, si se pretende impedir o reprimir la violación de normas legales, o de oportunidad, en cuanto examina la conveniencia o mérito de lo actuado. XXI.- (...) La Contraloría General de la República es un órgano constitucional auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa, con competencia expresas para la fiscalización y vigilancia de la hacienda pública -artículo 183 de la Constitución Política-, a la que le corresponde la verificación de la correcta utilización de los fondos públicos, lo que se concreta en un control de la legalidad en la administración financiera del Estado y sus instituciones -incluyendo a las municipalidades-, labor que desempeña con absoluta independencia y objetividad, en tanto no cabe, en principio, el control de discrecionalidad, sino únicamente el de legalidad, al examinarse la conformidad de lo actuado con el ordenamiento jurídico, no el dictado ni intención de la Administración. En síntesis, este control se reduce a la verificación del cumplimiento de los presupuestos de legalidad aplicables, con prescindencia de toda alusión a las cuestiones de política o de mera conveniencia u oportunidad en la administración controlada, así como de la eficiencia y rentabilidad de la administración financiera; desde luego, mientras la conveniencia o inoportunidad no rebasen los límites más allá de los cuales se convertiría en ilegalidad de conformidad con los criterios normalmente reconocidos respecto de los límites de la discrecionalidad. En términos generales, este mecanismo de control contiene siempre un ingrediente lógico, que es la verificación de la conformidad del acto o actividad con un patrón normativo de conducta, y una medida consecuente, que constituye un verdadero acto de voluntad, dirigido a permitir o impedir los efectos de la actividad controlada, según que sean correctos o contrarios a derecho (el destacado en negrita y subrayado son suplidos) (Por su orden, Sala Constitucional, N° 2340-94, de 15:00 del 28 de mayo de 1994; N°00998-1998 de las 11:30 de 15 de febrero de 1998; N°05445-1999 de las 14:30 horas del 14 de julio de 1999). Ahora bien, de acuerdo con la teoría del caso planteada por la parte actora, las competencias atribuidas por el ordenamiento jurídico a la CGR, fueron sobrepasadas por ésta al emitir el Informe de Auditoría N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 y sus actos conexos, por cuanto, según expone, invadió su competencia exclusiva y excluyente en materia de fijación de tarifas. En efecto, de conformidad con los numerales 1 y 5 de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos N° 7593 de 09 de agosto de 1996, la fijación de los precios y tarifas de los servicios públicos definidos en el artículo 5 de dicho cuerpo normativo, es una función de la ARESEP, y de acuerdo con lo que dicha norma establece, el servicio de suministro de energía eléctrica, es uno de los que le corresponde regular. Asimismo, según se dispone en el artículo 1 de la Ley N° 7593, dicho ente es una institución autónoma, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propios, y con independencia administrativa, en los términos del artículo 188 de la Constitución Política. Ahora bien, resulta evidente que esa autonomía de la cual goza la ARESEP, no la excluye del deber de observar los principios y normas a los cuales se encuentra sometida la Administración Pública. De esta forma, si bien el ente regulador es el competente para la fijación de las tarifas de los servicios públicos que le señala la propia Ley, su accionar debe responder a los principios cardinales que rigen su fijación, y por voluntad del constituyente, a la fiscalización por parte del ente contralor en orden a que éstas se establezcan en observancia a esas máximas que necesariamente deben cumplirse al establecer una tarifa, en tanto éstas forman parte de la Hacienda Pública, por constituir fondos públicos -artículo 183 de la Constitución Política y 1, 4, 8 y 9 de la Ley N"7428; así como porque su determinación incide en los intereses y derechos patrimoniales de los consumidores. Luego, en la medida en que un ente u órgano integre la Hacienda Pública, en los términos dispuestos en el artículo 8 de la Ley, se entiende que está sujeto a la competencia de la Contraloría General de la República y en consecuencia es sujeto pasivo de sus potestades de fiscalización. Para el Tribunal, resulta claro que lo discutido es parte integral de la Hacienda Pública en el tanto el costo de un servicio público es un ingreso que percibe su prestatario, y que en este caso, el ICE debe pagar a los generadores eléctricos privados, y por ende la naturaleza de esos fondos es pública. Ahora bien, esa potestad fiscalizadora no conlleva la sustitución de las competencias del ente u órgano examinado, el cual conserva sus potestades discrecionales sobre aquellos elementos del acto administrativo que tienen esa condición. Considera este Órgano, que en este caso no nos encontramos ante una violación a la autonomía administrativa de la ARESEP, porque el vínculo jurídico existente entre ésta y la CGR no ocurre entre administraciones activas, como podría darse entre el ente regulador y el ICE, o bien respecto de alguna cartera ministerial. La Contraloría, aquí está actuando en su típica función fiscalizadora, como administración no activa, en ejercicio de sus competencias constitucionales y legales como vigilante de la Hacienda Pública, lo cual no es incompatible con la autonomía de la que goza la ARESEP, ni implica per se una invasión de sus potestades discrecionales respecto de la conformación del acto de determinativo. Aquí lo que ha ocurrido es un control de la legalidad en materia de la fijación de las tarifas, sin llegar a sustituir a la administración activa. Nótese que en el informe de fiscalización, cuestionado en esta sede únicamente respecto de su elemento formal, en cuanto se delimitó por parte de la demandante que el examen de este asunto debe realizarse únicamente en relación con la competencia del órgano que emitió el acto impugnado, más no sobre sus elementos sustanciales, la CGR, señala entre sus hallazgos: "...debilidades relacionadas con tres metodologías definidas por la ARESEP para fijar las tarifas de compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados bajo la modalidad BOO. Estas metodologías son: Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados existentes (Ley n°. 7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, resolución n°. RJD-009 del 7 de mayo de 2010 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos renovados); Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas, resolución n°. RJD-152-2011 del 10 de agosto de 2011 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos de plantas hidroeléctricas) nuevas, y Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas, resolución n°. RJD-163-2011 del 30 de noviembre de 2011 y sus reformas (en adelante Metodología para contratos de plantas eólicas nuevas). 2.2. Además se identificaron desaplicaciones de estas metodologías en las últimas tres fijaciones tarifarias para contratos BOO: renovados del 2017, 2018, y 2019; para plantas hidroeléctricas nuevas del 2016, 2017 y 2018, y para plantas eólicas nuevas del 2015, 2017, y 2018. (...) La Metodología para contratos renovados admite la aplicación de la tarifa fijada con base en la información de plantas hidroeléctricas, para la compra de energía proveniente de plantas distintas a éstas como las eólicas, en el tanto no exista un modelo tarifario específico. Esto, pese a que se trata de plantas de generación con diferencias en cuanto a la tecnología, costos de inversión, costos de operación y vida útil. 2.5. Lo anterior, es contrario al principio de servicio al costo determinante de las metodologías y fórmulas tarifarias; según el cual las tarifas deben contemplar únicamente los costos necesarios para prestar el servicio y los esquemas de costos efectivos. Esto, de conformidad con los artículos 3 inciso b) y 31 b) de la Ley n°.7593, en concordancia con el artículo 4 inciso 2) del Decreto Ejecutivo n°. 29232-MP, Reglamento a la Ley Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, el cual señala que es función y obligación de la ARESEP fijar las tarifas de los servicios públicos, con observancia de dicho principio. (...) 2.15. Es así como, las debilidades antes mencionadas se atribuyen a que la ARESEP no ha desarrollado una metodología tarifaria para generadores privados con plantas eólicas que renuevan los contratos de compra venta de energía eléctrica con el ICE, para que la tarifa sea congruente con los costos de explotación, inversión, expectativas de venta y vida útil de dichas plantas. Además, se origina en que se perdió de vista en el análisis para la elaboración de las metodologías, la implicación en la tarifa de calcular el factor de antigüedad a una fecha distinta con respecto a las demás variables y en el factor de planta individual (Fpi), no utilizar la capacidad de planta máxima contratada por el ICE al generador privado y los tiempos reales de operación. 2.16. En este sentido, la potestad tarifaria es un poder-deber, de modo que la ARESEP tiene una potestad en materia de su competencia y debe ejercerla (Sala Constitucional, resolución n°.6326-2000). Esa potestad comprende el definir los elementos que deben ser considerados para dar fiel cumplimiento a los artículos 3 y 31 de la Ley de la ARESEP, así como establecer metodologías para fijar las tarifas que expresen los elementos que de acuerdo con el ordenamiento y la técnica, permitan su concordancia con el principio de servicio al costo. Así, la metodología debe incentivar la fijación de tarifas que reflejen los costos reales de la prestación del servicio, pero al mismo tiempo que no sean excesivos o injustos para el usuario (Procuraduría General de la República, dictamen n°.C-329-2002 y opinión jurídica n°. OJ-137-2017). 2.17. Lo anterior, es congruente con el acuerdo n°03-34-2016 Plan Estratégico Institucional de ARESEP 2017-2022, aprobado por su Junta Directiva el 23 de junio de 2016, cuyo objetivo estratégico 3 se enfoca en diseñar, actualizar e implementar instrumentos de regulación basados en principios de regulación y de políticas públicas que incorporen criterios de calidad (acceso, cantidad, oportunidad, continuidad y confiabilidad), costos, equidad y bienestar social. Además, el objetivo 4 se centra en fortalecer una organización innovadora y eficaz orientada a la excelencia y al cumplimiento de las metas estratégicas, procurando el menor costo para prestadores y usuarios de los servicios públicos regulados. (...) 2.20. Se determinó que la ARESEP no aplicó correctamente las metodologías de ajuste tarifario para la compra de energía a generadores privados bajo la modalidad de BOO, al momento de ejecutar los cálculos respectivos. Lo anterior, se presentó en la fijación tarifaria del 2017, 2018, y 2019 para los contratos renovados, así como, para las tarifas de referencia del 2016, 2017 y 2018 para plantas hidroeléctricas nuevas, y del 2015, 2017 y 2018 para plantas eólicas nuevas. (...) 2.22. Las propuestas tarifarias efectuadas por la ARESEP entre el 2015 y el 2019 relativas a las fijaciones antes citadas, fueron objeto de modificaciones producto de 25 oposiciones y coadyuvancias por parte del ICE y generadores privados, y 10 correcciones de oficio efectuadas por la Autoridad reguladora. Estas modificaciones se dieron por: cálculos de vida útil y uso de datos de capacidad instalada que no corresponden a las plantas, utilización de un tipo de cambio incorrecto, datos desactualizados o cuyo registro y referencia resultó deficiente, así como datos incluidos o excluidos sin que así lo requiera la metodología. (...) 2.24. Por otra parte, se determinó que fueron establecidas sin apego a las metodologías, las tarifas relativas a compra de energía de los contratos BOO renovados y las de referencia fijadas para la compra de energía de contratos BOO nuevos para plantas eólicas e hidroeléctricas en las fijaciones tarifarias del período 2015 a 2019; esto, según se indica de seguido. 2.25. Primero no fue utilizada la misma cantidad histórica de datos para el cálculo de las variables que conforman la realidad sobre los aportes de capital, en el caso de las tarifas fijadas para: a) contratos renovados en 2017 y 2018, b) eólicos en 2015 y 2017 y c) hidroeléctricos nuevos para 2016, 2017 y 2018. Estas metodologías tarifarias establecen que cuando no sea posible contar con una serie histórica de 5 años, se utilizará la menor, pero con igual alcance para todas las variables; sin embargo, en estas fijaciones tarifarias se usó la menor para una variable y para el resto series tarifarias de períodos mayores. 2.26. Segundo, la tarifa fijada en el 2017 para los contratos renovados, resolución n°.RIE-110-2017, se estableció con base en una fórmula que generó un crecimiento exponencial de los costos de explotación, pues estos fueron divididos entre el factor de antigüedad, cuyo valor representa el equivalente de vida útil remanente de las plantas. esta operación del factor de antigüedad no forma parte de la fórmula que estaba vigente en ese momento, y resulta en la fijación de una tarifa mayor. 2.27. Tercero, las tarifas aplicadas en el 2017 y 2018 se fijaron incluyendo datos de plantas de generación que operaron menos de 10 meses en el año, para efectuar el cálculo del factor de planta individual (Fpi): a pesar de que la Metodología de contratos renovados señala en el artículo 3.4.3 que deben utilizarse plantas que hayan operado un período igual o superior a 10 meses. (...) 2.28. Cuarto, en la fijación tarifaria del 10 de enero de 2017 se calculó el factor de antigüedad al 31 de diciembre de 2015, a pesar de que el artículo 3.5.4. de la metodología de contratos renovados, establece que debe ser al 31 de diciembre del año inmediato anterior al momento en el cual se calculó la tarifa fijada, o sea el 31 de diciembre de 2016. Esta situación también se presentó en la fijación tarifaria del 12 de enero de 2018. Además, en esta última fijación tarifaria se utilizó el tipo de cambio correspondiente a agosto de 2016, siendo lo correcto el de agosto de 2017; esto ocasionó el incremento en los costos de explotación. 2.29. Quinto, el cálculo de las tarifas de contratos renovados fijadas en el 2018 y 2019 utilizó información de plantas eólicas acerca de: costos de explotación, factor de antigüedad y factor de planta, y además, costos de inversión en el 2019. Lo anterior, a pesar de que la Metodología de contratos renovados (artículos 1 y 3.1) establece que primero se define la tarifa con la información y método de cálculo de plantas hidroeléctricas, y luego el resultado también se usa para la compra de energía generada con fuentes distintas. 2.30. A manera de ejemplo, se tiene que el efecto estimado de la inclusión de datos de costos de explotación de plantas eólicas en las fijaciones tarifarias incrementó estos costos. Esto, implica pasar de USD 179,43 que estableció la Autoridad Reguladora a USD 166,00 estimado por la Contraloría General, por cada KW instalado en el 2018, y de USD 155,67 a USD 120,66 en el 2019. 2.31. Sexto, en las tarifas de referencia fijadas para los contratos hidroeléctricos nuevos en 2016 y 2017, para el cálculo del costo promedio de inversión, se agrupó la planta CR-Parismina de 8MW en el grupo con capacidad instalada de 8, 1MW a 12 MW, cuando correspondía ubicarla en el grupo de 4,1MW a 8MW. Lo anterior no se apega a lo establecido en la sección Monto de la inversión unitaria (M) de la Metodología de hidroeléctricas nuevas que define cinco grupos de plantas de por capacidad instalada. 2.32. Sétimo, en las tarifas de referencia para contratos eólicos nuevos fijadas en el 2017, se identificó que información de las plantas Tejona y Valle Central, que pertenecen a empresas públicas, fueron incluidas para el cálculo de las variables de las expectativas de venta. Lo anterior, no es acorde con lo establecido en el artículo iv Expectativas de venta de la Metodología de eólicos nuevos, en cuanto a que corresponde considerar las plantas nacionales de generadores privados". Como puede verse, en el Informe de Auditoría N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, el Órgano Contralor lo que hace es señalar debilidades en las metodologías para fijar las tarifas de compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados, así como desaplicación de las metodologías tarifarias, que tienen que ver con la implementación de la tarifa fijada con base en la información de plantas hidroeléctricas, para la compra de energía proveniente de plantas distintas a éstas como las eólicas; con el empleo de series históricas de forma distinta a lo establecido en las metodológícas; con fijación de tarifas que según el informe generaron la tarifa fijada en el 2017 "un crecimiento exponencial de los costos de explotación, pues estos fueron divididos entre el factor de antigüedad, cuyo valor representa el equivalente de vida útil remanente de las plantas. esta operación del factor de antigüedad no forma parte de la fórmula que estaba vigente en ese momento, y resulta en la fijación de una tarifa mayor"; tarifas aplicadas incluyendo datos de plantas de generación que operaron menos de 10 meses en el año, aún y cuando la metodología indicaba que los datos debía corresponder a plantas con un período mayor de operación; y factores de antigüedad mal aplicados. Estos hallazgos, claramente están vinculados con la inobservancia por parte del ente regulador de los principios que rigen la fijación de las tarifas, cuyo cumplimiento no está sujeto al ejercicio de sus potestades discrecionales, pues se trata de máximas que tiene su origen en la Constitución Política y en la ley, pero además, constituyen desaplicaciones de las metodologías dispuestas por la propia ARESEP, de lo cual se sigue que, contrario a lo indicado por ésta en su demanda, no nos encontramos ante el ejercicio de una potestad discrecional, en tanto las metodologías autorizadas por la propia Junta Directiva constituyen un acto reglado, cuya aplicación resulta obligatoria. Luego, cuando el fiscalizador refiere debilidades metodológicas, lo hace en relación con los principios de obligado acatamiento -no discrecional-, en la fijación de tarifas, y al establecer desaplicaciones metodológicas, también sugiere que éstas conllevan no solamente la inobservancia de las propias disposiciones de la Junta Directiva respecto del establecimiento de las tarifas, sino que esa conducta implicó también la desatención de esas máximas o postulados esenciales que deben regir el acto determinativo, con la finalidad de una eficiente utilización de los fondos públicos y de la protección de los derechos e intereses patrimoniales de los consumidores. Es preciso señalar que, a tenor del artículo 16 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, la ARESEP, está sujeta a las "reglas unívocas de la ciencia y de la técnica". En el caso concreto, la CGR encontró que las debilidades y desaplicaciones metodológicas en las que, de acuerdo con el informe de auditoría incurrió la ARESEP, elevaron los montos que el ICE tuvo que cancelar a los generadores eléctricos privados, lo cual a su vez incidió en las sumas pagadas por los usuarios del servicio público de suministro de energía eléctrica. Señaló que dentro de los principios de la Ley de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos, se encuentra el principio de servicio al costo, definido por el numeral 3 de la Ley indicada: "Artículo 3.- Definiciones. Para efectos de esta ley, se definen los siguientes conceptos: (...) b) Servicio al costo: principio que determina la forma de fijar las tarifas y los precios de los servicios públicos, de manera que se contemplen únicamente los costos necesarios para prestar el servicio, que permitan una retribución competitiva y garanticen el adecuado desarrollo de la actividad, de acuerdo con lo que establece el artículo 31". Este principio constituye un parámetro que debe servir para fijar las tarifas de los servicios públicos, de modo que se contemplen únicamente los costos que resulten necesarios para la prestación del servicio. Lo anterior implica que en cada caso, debe realizarse un estudio técnico, en el cual se excluyen los gastos y las inversiones que no resulten necesarios para la prestación eficiente del servicio. Ello con miras a la protección del consumidor, en tanto el resguardo de sus intereses legítimos y derechos de orden económico, es una de las finalidades de la función regulatoria, tal y como se infiere del artículo 46 de la Constitución Política al disponer: "Los consumidores y usuarios tienen derecho a la protección de su salud, ambiente, seguridad e intereses económicos; a recibir información adecuada y veraz; a la libertad de elección, y a un trato equitativo. El Estado apoyará los organismos que ellos constituyan para la defensa de sus derechos. La ley regulará esas materias." Luego, los hallazgos que se desprenden de la auditoría, refieren a elementos esenciales en la fijación de tarifaria (principio de servicio al costo), dispuestos en el ordenamiento jurídico o por la propia ARESEP, que de acuerdo con el Órgano Contralor, fueron desatendidos. De esta forma, la fiscalización realizada por la CGR, y que concluye con el N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019, no es más que una manifestación del ejercicio de sus competencias de fiscalización y por ende de tutela del interés general, en este caso relacionado con el proceso de fijación de tarifas, de modo que éste atienda a las reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica, así como a los postulados que ha establecido el ordenamiento para su determinación. La demandante señala que la CGR invadió su competencia, porque más allá de informar sobre las debilidades y desaplicaciones metodológicas, le impuso una serie de obligaciones, señalando incluso, los plazos en los que esas conductas debían realizarse. En este punto, sin perjuicio de que más adelante se verá si esas disposiciones implican o no una sustitución de la administración activa, debe indicarse que de acuerdo con el artículo 4 de la Ley N°7428, " (...) Los criterios que emita la Contraloría General de la República, en el ámbito de su competencia, serán vinculantes para los sujetos pasivos sometidos a su control o fiscalización.", lo cual queda plasmado además con mayor amplitud en el numeral 12 de dicha Ley: "Artículo 12.- Órgano rector del Ordenamiento. La Contraloría General de la República es el órgano rector del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, contemplado en esta Ley. Las disposiciones, normas, políticas y directrices que ella dicte, dentro del ámbito de su competencia, son de acatamiento obligatorio y prevalecerán sobre cualesquiera otras disposiciones de los sujetos pasivos que se le opongan. La Contraloría General de la República dictará, también, las instrucciones y órdenes dirigidas a los sujetos pasivos, que resulten necesarias para el cabal ejercicio de sus funciones de control y fiscalización. La Contraloría General de la República tendrá, también, la facultad de determinar entre los entes, órganos o personas sujetas a su control, cuáles deberán darle obligada colaboración, así como el marco y la oportunidad, dentro de los cuales se realizará esta y el conjunto razonable de medios técnicos, humanos y materiales que deberán emplear". En este orden de ideas, el Tribunal entiende que el Órgano Contralor tiene facultades para dictar normas, políticas y directrices necesarias para el uso correcto de los recursos públicos, y los criterios que emita resultan de acatamiento obligatorio. Se sigue entonces, que si el legislador otorgó esas potestades a la CGR, su ejercicio no implica, per se, una sustitución de la administración activa, lo cual habrá de valorarse en cada caso, y sin perder de vista lo señalado anteriormente en el sentido de que el vínculo jurídico existente entre el Órgano contralor y el sujeto pasivo de la fiscalización, no es entre dos administraciones activas, sino que éste ocurre entre un sujeto que sí tiene esa naturaleza, y uno cuya función y potestades son de fiscalización sobre el ejercicio eficiente, y apegado a la legalidad de aquél. En el caso bajo examen, con ocasión de los hallazgos encontrados por la CGR en su función de vigilancia de la Hacienda Pública, y concretamente, como parte integrante de ésta, de los fondos públicos, se dispuso en el acto impugnado, una serie de conductas que debían observar, en algunos casos el Regulador General, y en otros la Junta Directiva de la ARESEP. Concretamente se ordenó: al Regulador General de la Autoridad Reguladora: "4.4. Elaborar las propuestas de modificación de: a) artículos 1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.4 de la Metodología de Fijación de tarifas para Generadores Privados Existentes (Ley N°7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE), resolución n°.RDJ-009 y sus reformas; b párrafo Expectativa de venta (E) de la Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas, resolución n.° RJD-152-2011 y sus reformas; c) artículo iv del Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas, resolución n.° RJD-163-2011 y sus reformas, d) adicionar las normas que establezcan el uso del tiempo real de operación en el cálculo del factor de planta, en la Metodología tarifaria de referencia para plantas de generación privada hidroeléctricas nuevas nuevas y el Modelo para la determinación de tarifas de referencia para plantas de generación privada eólicas nuevas. Enviar a la Junta Directiva las modificaciones propuestas para lo de su competencia (...) 4.5. Elaborar la propuesta de metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados eólicos que renueven contratos de compra de energía eléctrica con el ICE. Enviar la propuesta a la Junta Directiva para lo de su competencia."En cuanto a la Junta Directiva de la Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, indicó: "4.6. Resolver acerca de las propuestas de modificación que les remita el Regulador General relativas a la Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados que utilizan fuentes eólicas, para la renovación de contratos de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, que le remita el Regulador General. 4.7. Resolver acerca de la propuesta de metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados que utilizan fuentes eólicas, para la renovación de contratos de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, que le remita el regulador General. (...) Resolver acerca de la propuesta de acciones para resarcir los montos pagados de más por el ICE a los generadores privados con contratos renovados, en los años 2017, 2018 y 2019". Respecto del Intendente de Energía de la ARESEP: "4.9. Ajustar las tarifas vigentes para la compra de energía eléctrica a generadores privados, emitidas mediante las resoluciones n.°RE-0008-IE-2019, n.°RIE-057-2018- y n.°RE-0079-2018, de forma que se corrijan las desaplicaciones metodológicas indicadas en párrafos 2.25 y 2.29 de este informe, relativos a: a) rentabilidad sobre los aportes de capital, y b) uso de información de plantas eólicas. Remitir a la Contraloría General certificación que acredite la publicación de las nuevas fijación tarifarias en el diario oficial La Gaceta, a más tardar el 30 de octubre de 2019". Y al regulador General, así como al Intendente de Energía de la ARESEP: 4.10. Determinar los montos pagados de más por el ICE a los generadores privados con contratos renovados, en los años 2017, 2018, y 2019 hasta la última fecha en que la tarifa haya sido aplicada, debido a desaplicaciones de la Metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados existentes (Ley n.°7200) que firmen un nuevo contrato de compra venta de electricidad con el ICE, resolución n.°RJD-009-2010 y sus reformas. Además, proponer las acciones que permitan resarcir los montos determinadas y remitirlas a la Junta Directiva para lo de su competencia". Como puede verse, lo ordenado por la CGR a la ARESEP, es, en términos generales, para que ésta elabore propuestas en la metodología de fijación de tarifas para generadores privados nuevos y existentes, y bajo las diferentes modalidades de generación de energía, bajo la premisa de los hallazgos del informe, en el sentido de que las tarifas no respetaron el principio de servicio al costo. Así, lo dispuesto por el fiscalizador es en orden a que se cumplan los principios, normas y reglas técnicas que deben observarse en la determinación de las tarifas, pero en modo alguno se sustituye a la Administración concernida, en este caso, al ente regulador, pues no solamente no procedió la CGR a establecer las tarifas, sino que además, su conducta se limita a indicar a la accionante los postulados que necesariamente deben estar contenidos en los elementos del acto de su determinación, principio que además, no han sido dispuestos por la CGR, sino que están contenidos en el ordenamiento jurídico y en las propias metodologías y preceptos emitidos por la Junta Directiva de la demandante, y cuyo cumplimiento no es de carácter discrecional, dejando a la ARESEP, la configuración de aquellos elementos que sí tienen esa naturaleza. De este modo, las órdenes emitidas son para que la ARESEP, al establecer y aplicar las metodologías de determinación tarifaria, cumpla con el ordenamiento jurídico, de forma que los elementos reglados de ese acto determinativo se ajuste a los preceptos de orden constitucional y legal que rigen la materia regulatoria. Finalmente, es menester indicar, que de acuerdo a la prueba que obra en autos, así como las manifestaciones del testigo Erick Alvarado Muñoz, la ARESEP fue puesta en conocimiento de todos y cada una de las actuaciones que conllevaron el proceso de fiscalización, se le brindó audiencia para observaciones, las cuales fueron valoradas y tomadas en cuenta en lo que se estimó procedente, para la adopción del acto final por parte de la CGR. Corolario: Al amparo del artículo 183 de la Constitución Política, la CGR tiene la naturaleza de órgano auxiliar de la Asamblea Legislativa para controlar o vigilar la Hacienda Pública, con absoluta independencia en el ejercicio de sus potestades. Ello implica la fiscalización, supervisión y control de la totalidad de los elementos que componen la Hacienda Pública, según los términos establecidos en el ordenamiento jurídico y concretamente en el artículo 8 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República N°7428, que como vimos comprende a los fondos públicos. Las tarifas que paga el ICE a los generadores privados de energía eléctrica, precisamente tienen esa naturaleza de fondos públicos, por ende la determinación de esas tarifas con arreglo a los postulados que dispone el ordenamiento jurídico, así como a las reglas de la ciencia y de la técnica, se encuentran dentro del ámbito de competencias de la CGR, la cual, a través de esa función de vigilancia, tutela el interés general en orden, no solamente a la utilización eficiente de los recursos, sino además a que los montos que pagan los consumidores finales de los servicios públicos atiendan a sus intereses y derechos económicos. Luego, no lleva razón la demandante cuando señala que en materia de elaboración, aprobación, modificación y aplicación de metodologías aplicables a modelos tarifarios, la ARESEP, no está sujeta a la fiscalización de la CGR, pues esas tarifas son pagadas por el ICE con fondos públicos, los cuales son parte de la Hacienda Pública, de modo que su determinación sí está sujeta al examen del órgano contralor. Así, los actos impugnados -N°DFOE-AE-IF-00009-2019 y conexos, los cuales refieren a la acción recursiva ejercida por la demandante contra el acto final-, no constituyen una invasión arbitraria de las competencias otorgadas por ley a la ARESEP, por cuanto lo dispuesto por la CGR tiene como antecedentes el hallazgo de desaplicaciones metodológicas dispuestas por la propia ARESEP, así como la inobservancia de elementos reglados del acto de fijación de tarifas, tales como el principio de servicio al costo; y las órdenes giradas no obligan a la aplicación de una metodología tarifaria determinada, sino a la elaboración de propuestas metodológicas o modificaciones, pero, acatando las máximas que deben observar la actora en la realización de su función reguladora. Se sigue que no se trata de una coadministración, en tanto en ningún momento la CGR ha sustituido las competencias del ente regulador respecto de la fijación de las tarifas que debe pagar el ICE a los generadores privados de energía eléctrica, limitándose a indicar a la ARESEP, situaciones puntuales en las que debe cumplir con los parámetros de legalidad y eficiencia, e incluso dejar de incurrir en omisiones, como es el caso de las tarifas relacionadas con la generación de energía eléctrica utilizando la tecnología eólica. Es menester señalar en el accionar de la CGR, no se ha violentado tampoco el principio de legalidad, y por el contrario, ésta ha ejercido las potestades que le confiere el ordenamiento jurídico, y que como poderes-deberes, estaba obligada a realizar, a riesgo de incurrir en una desatención y omisión de cumplimiento de las competencias que le han sido atribuidas. No se ha violentado tampoco el principio de legalidad por parte de la CGR, al llevar a cabo un procedimiento de fiscalización para el cual no se encuentra autorizada, pues es claro que sí cuenta con las potestades que le confiere el ordenamiento jurídico para realizar la fiscalización aquí cuestionada. Finalmente es preciso señalar que el Tribunal estima que no lleva razón la parte actora cuando apunta que el presente es un conflicto de competencias interadministrativo, pues como ya se ha indicado, en la especie nos encontramos ante el ejercicio de la función fiscalizadora por parte de un órgano contralor, y una administración activa, en donde uno y otra no se encuentra en el mismo plano, de modo que, al no tratarse de una relación entre administraciones activas, pues la Contraloría es una administración no activa, fiscalizadora y vigilante de la Hacienda Pública, que en el ejercicio de las competencias que le son propias, no atenta contra la autonomía de la que está dotada la ARESEP, ni se invaden su esfera competencial, ciñéndose, a determinar la regularidad de la actuación de la demandante, confrontándola con elementos reglados, dispuestos en el ordenamiento, de su conducta. En este punto, es preciso reiterar que a pesar de que algunos de los alegatos iniciales de la demandante refieren a aspectos relacionados con los elementos sustanciales de los actos impugnados, así como al procedimiento administrativo de fiscalización, y que la representación del ICE alegó en su momento que había advertido a la ARESEP sobre los cuestionamientos que posteriormente realizó la CGR en su acción de fiscalización, lo cual efectivamente ha sido acreditado, y que la prueba testimonial admitida, lo fue para sustentar el criterio vertido por el Órgano contralor desde el punto de vista técnico, éste Tribunal no entrará a valorar esos elementos, por cuanto la propia accionante limitó el conocimiento de este asunto, a la determinación de uno de los elementos formales de la conducta impugnada, a saber: la competencia de la CGR para realizar la fiscalización sobre las metodologías de fijación de tarifas para la compra de energía eléctrica a los generadores privados por parte del ICE. Finalmente, el Tribunal estima, que al no presentarse la usurpación competencial aducida por la parte actora, no existen elementos que permitan inferir la existencia de responsabilidad de la CGR, en relación con los daños alegados por la demandante. Se insiste en lo indicado al inicio en el sentido de que: "lo que está de por medio es el funcionamiento de un mecanismo por el cuál la sociedad pueda evaluar cómo se han administrado los recursos públicos que ha confiado a sus funcionarios. Se fiscaliza, por tanto, en representación del ciudadano y en nombre de un interés general, al cual no puede sobreponerse el mero interés administrativo, según el numeral 113 de nuestra Ley General de la Administración Pública" (El subrayado es suplido). El interés general en orden a que la determinación tarifaria se realice de conformidad con los postulados que informan este tipo de conducta, y de este modo se utilicen de forma más eficiente los fondos públicos, y se protejan los intereses patrimoniales de los consumidores, es el que debe privar en este caso, y ello se alcanza en parte a través del ejercicio del control y vigilancia que lleva a cabo el órgano fiscalizador, sin perjuicio además, de que como consta en autos, algunos de los hallazgos del proceso de control, fueron advertidos en su momento por el ICE.

IV.- EXCEPCIONES: La representación del Estado presentó la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva. Al respecto señala que la demandante no ha planteado ninguna pretensión relacionada con alguna conducta del Estado, el cual, afirma, es parte en este proceso, únicamente por lo dispuesto en el artículo 12 inciso 5) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. El Tribunal estima que la defensa formulada por la representación estatal debe acogerse, pues el Estado no tuvo ninguna participación en la conducta impugnada y cuya nulidad se pretende, y tampoco la actora ha planteado alguna pretensión en su contra. Oficiosamente se resuelve que tanto la ARESEP como la CGR se encuentran legitimados activa y pasivamente, en cuanto sujetos pasivo y activo de la conducta fiscalizadora impugnada; así como que, persiste el interés actual, pues la competencia que aquí se cuestiona, no ha sido dilucidada aún. En cuanto a la excepción de falta de derecho, a tenor de lo indicado en el considerando que antecede, este Órgano decisor concluye que la ARESEP sí es sujeto pasivo de fiscalización por parte de la CGR, no solamente respecto de las funciones que desarrolla con la finalidad de que le resulte posible el ejercicio de sus competencias, sino además, en relación con su función sustantiva, al determinar las metodologías para la fijación de tarifas de los servicios públicos, pues esas tarifas, en tanto fondos públicos, forman parte de la Hacienda Pública, y por lo tanto el ejercicio de las competencias relacionadas con su determinación está sujeto a la vigilancia de la CGR, sin que ello implique la existencia de una coadministración. En consecuencia, lo procedente será acoger la defensa de falta de derecho y declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.

V.- COSTAS: De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, este órgano colegiado no encuentra motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido. Por ende, se imponen a la ARESEP el pago de ambas costas de esta acción.

POR TANTO

Se acoge la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam activa y pasiva presentada por el Estado y únicamente respecto de éste. Se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho y se declara sin lugar la demanda de la Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos contra el Estado, la Contraloría General de la República y el Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, este último actuando como tercero interesado. Son ambas costas a cargo de la parte actora.

Ileana Isabel Sánchez Navarro Marianella Álvarez Molina Juan Luis Giusti Soto ???????????????

Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: [email protected]