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Res. 00055-2022 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección IV · 30/05/2022
OutcomeResultado
The plot titling is denied because it forms part of the State Natural Heritage, but INDER is ordered to pay for improvements and accretions made in good faith by the plaintiffs.Se deniega la titulación de la parcela por ser Patrimonio Natural del Estado, pero se ordena al INDER pagar las mejoras y accesiones realizadas de buena fe por los actores.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Litigation Tribunal, Section IV, decided a lawsuit filed by a farming couple against INDER, the State, and SINAC. The plaintiffs sought title to plot No. 74-A-4 in the Cubujuquí Rural Settlement, and alternatively, compensation for improvements and damages. The Court partially granted the claim. It found that 98% of the plot lies within the Cordillera Volcánica Central Forest Reserve, created in 1975, thus forming part of the State Natural Heritage (PNE) and legally untransferable to private individuals due to its inalienable and imprescriptible nature under Articles 13 and 14 of the Forestry Law. However, the plaintiffs were found to have possessed the land in good faith since 2000, carrying out agricultural activities and building improvements, without being informed of the reserve overlap until September 2018. Consequently, INDER was ordered to pay for necessary improvements and accretions (buildings and crops), to be determined in execution proceedings, with retention rights until payment. Moral damages and eviction-related losses were rejected, as was INDER's statute of limitations defense.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección IV, resolvió una demanda de conocimiento presentada por un matrimonio de agricultores contra el INDER, el Estado y el SINAC. Los actores pretendían que se les adjudicara la parcela No. 74-A-4 del Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí, en Horquetas de Sarapiquí, y subsidiariamente el pago de mejoras y daños. El Tribunal declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda. Determinó que el 98% de la parcela se ubica dentro de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central, creada en 1975, por lo que forma parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado (PNE) y es jurídicamente imposible titularla a particulares debido a su carácter inalienable e imprescriptible según los artículos 13 y 14 de la Ley Forestal. Sin embargo, se acreditó que los actores poseyeron el inmueble de buena fe desde el año 2000, realizando actividad agraria y construyendo mejoras, sin que el INDER les hubiera informado sobre la afectación de la reserva hasta septiembre de 2018. En consecuencia, se condenó al INDER a pagar las mejoras necesarias y accesiones (edificaciones y cultivos), a liquidar en ejecución de sentencia, con derecho de retención hasta su pago efectivo. Se rechazaron las pretensiones de daño moral y perjuicios por desalojo, así como la excepción de prescripción opuesta por el INDER.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Thus, according to the proven facts and those referenced here, it is clear that although since 1975 the "Cordillera Volcánica Central Forest Reserve" was created, and ITCO acquired the Heredia Party farm No. 4-57748-000 to establish the Cubujuquí Rural Settlement and distribute parcels to farmers, it was not until August 20, 2015, that SINAC, by official letter Placa19617, informed INDER that the land described in cadastral plan No. H-1107776-2006 was located within the Cordillera Volcánica Central Forest Reserve. This information was reiterated in official letter SINAC-ACC-D-1131-2020 of July 17, 2020, from the Central Conservation Area Directorate of SINAC. And finally, the plaintiffs were notified of this situation by INDER on September 28, 2018, via official letter OTHO-758-2018. Therefore, the plaintiffs became certain of the geographic situation of plot No. 74-A-4 only on September 28, 2018, despite having acquired it in 2000. The plot was acquired with the hope that it would be titled to them by INDER because it was within the Cubujuquí Rural Settlement Project. Consequently, for this Court, the acquisition and possession exercised by the plaintiffs over said property was in good faith...De esta forma, conforme a lo hechos acreditados y aquí referenciados, es claro que si bien desde el año de 1975 se creó la "Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central", y el ITCO adquirió la finca del Partido de Heredia No. 4-57748-000 con el fin de crear el Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí en Horquetas de Sarapiquí y entregar parcelas a campesinos; no fue sino hasta el día 20 de agosto de 2015, que el SINAC por oficio Placa19617, le indicó al INDER que el terreno descrito en el plano catastrado No. H-1107776-2006 se encontraba dentro de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central. Información que fue reiterada en el oficio SINAC-ACC-D-1131-2020 del 17 de julio de 2020, por parte de la Dirección del Área de Conservación Central del SINAC. Y finalmente a los actores se les notificó de dicha situación por parte del INDER mediante oficio OTHO-758-2018 del 28 de setiembre de 2018. De manera que los actores tuvieron certeza la situación geográfica de la parcela No. 74-A-4 hasta el día 28 de setiembre de 2018, a pesar que su adquisición se dio desde el año 2000. Parcela que fue adquirida con la esperanza de que les fuera titulada por parte del INDER por encontrarse dentro del Proyecto Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí. Así las cosas, para este Tribunal la adquisición y posesión que ejercieron los actores sobre dicho inmueble se hizo de buena fe...
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio natural del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible."
"The forest lands and forests that constitute the natural heritage of the State, detailed in the previous article, shall be unseizable and inalienable; their possession by private individuals shall not give rise to any right in their favor and the State's action to recover these lands is imprescriptible."
Considerando VI, reproducción del artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal
"Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio natural del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible."
Considerando VI, reproducción del artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal
"En el presente asunto es claro que no hay conducta imputable ni al Estado ni al SINAC en lo actuado y cuestionado por los actores. Conducta que fue propia del INDER en el ejercicio de sus competencias..."
"In the present matter, it is clear that there is no conduct attributable to either the State or SINAC in what was done and challenged by the plaintiffs. The conduct was solely that of INDER in the exercise of its powers..."
Considerando VII sobre excepciones
"En el presente asunto es claro que no hay conducta imputable ni al Estado ni al SINAC en lo actuado y cuestionado por los actores. Conducta que fue propia del INDER en el ejercicio de sus competencias..."
Considerando VII sobre excepciones
Full documentDocumento completo
TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA Main Line 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Email ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A Address218( ) CASE FILE: 20-0002884-1027-CA PROCEEDING: PLENARY PROCEEDING PLAINTIFFS: Nombre111167 AND Nombre23709 DEFENDANTS: INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, THE STATE, AND SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN No. 055-2022-IV FOURTH SECTION OF THE TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Address01, at seven thirty in the morning on treinta de mayo de dos mil veintidós.
Plenary proceeding (proceso de conocimiento) filed by Mr. Nombre111167, who is of legal age, married, a cattle rancher, identification card No. CED87830, and Mrs. Nombre23709, who is of legal age, married, retired, identification card number CED87831, both residents of Horquetas de Sarapiquí, Asentamiento Cubujuquí, against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, hereinafter INDER, represented by attorney Natanael José Barrantes Azofeifa, bar card 19857; THE STATE, represented by attorney Rosario León Yannarella; and the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, hereinafter SINAC, represented by attorney Guillermo Corrales Cordero, bar card CED87832. Attorney Julissa Rodríguez Rojas, bar card 22668, appears as special litigation counsel (apoderada especial judicial) for the plaintiffs.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
I.By a written submission received on 11 de junio de 2020 and corrected on 18 de ese mismo mes y año, counsel for the plaintiffs filed suit against INDER, and the relief sought was specified at the preliminary hearing held on 11 de noviembre de 2020 as follows: “...1. That the property at issue in this proceeding be awarded to us and that we be granted the corresponding public deed (Escritura Pública), as has been done for other awardees and their properties in the same Asentamiento. In the alternative, should the aforementioned property not be awarded in our names, we request payment for each and every accession (accesión) and improvement (mejora) we have made to the property during the period in which we possessed it in good faith, with the care of prudent heads of household, which possession, as we have demonstrated, has been exercised as owners. 2. That the defendant be ordered to pay compensation for the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) caused to us.
We likewise request that the defendant be ordered to pay compensation for any future damages and losses arising from the consequences of a potential eviction, which we shall quantify in the corresponding judgment-enforcement proceeding (proceso de ejecución de sentencia). 3. That the defendant be ordered to pay both categories of litigation costs (Ambas Costas Procesales) incurred in this case. 4. That the defendant be ordered to (Sic) compensate us for the subjective emotional distress (daño moral subjetivo) it has caused us....” The subjective emotional distress was specified in their complaint. (See image 278 of the court case file and the electronic recording of the Preliminary Hearing).
II.By order issued at 09:56 on 19 de junio de 2020, the Court, on its own motion, joined the State and SINAC as parties and served all parties involved in the legal-procedural relationship (relación jurídico procesal). (See images 287 through 290 of the digital court case file).
III.After service within the statutory period, INDER’s counsel opposed the complaint and raised the defenses (excepciones) of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of standing to sue and be sued (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and failure to state a legal right (falta de derecho). SINAC’s counsel likewise opposed the complaint and raised the defenses of lack of standing and failure to state a legal right. Finally, counsel for the State also opposed the complaint and raised the defense of failure to state a legal right. (See images 483 through 579, 772 through 788, and 798 through 814 of the digital court case file).
IV.The Preliminary Hearing was held on 11 de noviembre de 2020, with the parties’ representatives in attendance. The relief sought was defined in the terms set forth in the first procedural-background paragraph of this judgment. The statute-of-limitations defense was reserved for determination in the judgment. The disputed and undisputed facts relevant to resolving the case were identified, and the documentary evidence and testimony of Nombre111168, Nombre111169, Carlos Nelson Salazar Chacón, and Didier Rodríguez Salazar were admitted. (Images 1109 through 1113 of the court case file. Electronic recording of the aforementioned Hearing).
V.The Oral and Public Trial commenced at 8:30 on 11 de mayo de 2022. During the trial, opening arguments were heard, the testimony of Nombre111168, Nombre111169, Carlos Nelson Salazar Chacón, and Didier Rodríguez Salazar was received, and the parties then presented their closing arguments. (Compact-disc recording of the Supplemental Hearing).
VI.This judgment is issued following deliberation by the members of the Court, within the fifteen-day period established in article 111.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo—this matter having been declared complex—and no grounds capable of invalidating the proceedings have been found.
Judge Salas Leitón authors the judgment, with Judges Reyes Castillo and Baltodano Gómez voting in favor.
CONSIDERATIONS:
At the preliminary hearing held on 11 de noviembre de 2020, counsel for the plaintiffs offered, as evidence ordered for better adjudication (prueba para mejor resolver), a copy of the survey plan (plano) appearing in image 1094 of the digital court case file and a photograph of the visitor-control logs maintained by INDER in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, on which this Court reserved its ruling. (See images 300 through 482 of the digital court case file). Regarding the admissibility of evidence ordered for better adjudication, it must be noted that the settled case law of the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia holds that rejection of such evidence does not deprive the parties of a defense and that the Court’s decision to admit or reject it is not subject to appeal. Among other judgments, the relevant portion of Vote No. 547-F-2002, issued at 16:00 on 12 de julio de 2002, is transcribed below, in which that Chamber stated: “(…) IV.- Numerous precedents of this Chamber, in referring to evidence ordered for better adjudication, have held that such evidence belongs to the judge, not to the parties.
Consequently, the decision to obtain it is discretionary with the adjudicative body, which may dispense with it without issuing any ruling. Therefore, the absence of a ruling on such evidence—precisely because the evidentiary stage, during which the parties must prove the facts establishing their rights as required by the rules governing the burden of proof (carga de la prueba), has concluded and become procedurally closed (precluida)—means that it is exclusively for the adjudicator to determine whether new evidence necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute should be added to the record. Among many others, the following decisions may be consulted: 59, issued at 15:20 on 31 de mayo de 1996; 23, issued at 14:20 on 4 de marzo de 1992; 34, issued at 10:45 on 28 de mayo de 1993; and 83, issued at 14:40 on 22 de diciembre de 1993. (…)” In this specific case, the Court finds that the evidence offered as evidence ordered for better adjudication is relevant and therefore admits it.
II.PROVEN FACTS.- The following facts relevant to the resolution of this dispute (litis) are deemed duly established:
74-A-4 Volume I and 122 of the digital judicial case file).
Because the record is devoid of evidence, the following are deemed unproven:
In summary, and without prejudice to the verbatim content of their arguments, which have been reviewed in their entirety by this Court, each party alleges, insofar as relevant, what is set forth below in this section:
Consistent with the foregoing, constitutional case law has clearly established that the special protection provided by the legal system for public-domain property (bienes de dominio público) applies to the natural heritage of the Nation (patrimonio natural de la Nación), taking into account that such heritage helps safeguard the fundamental rights of inhabitants to a better quality of life, within the context of the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, as provided for in domestic law and the international instruments ratified by the country. In judgment number 2003-03840 at 14:02 hours on 02 de mayo del 2003, the same Chamber stated: (…) Accordingly, it is clear that the Costa Rican legal system affords special and heightened protection to property dedicated to public use or enjoyment and subjects such protection to even greater safeguards when regulating public environmental property.
The foregoing means that, if the overlap alleged by the plaintiff occurred in the Land-Use Plan (Plan Regulador) for the Playa Platanares Coastal Zone and the Preciosa-Platanares Mixed-Category National Wildlife Refuge, the Land-Use Plan would be contrary—at least insofar as it concerns regulation of the portion of the Refuge—to the rule arising from articles 121 subsection 14 and 89 of the Political Constitution, because a regulatory act would be removing a portion of public-domain property from public use (desafectando). (…) (The underlining does not appear in the original. In this regard, see also judgment number 05266-2009 at 12:24 hours on 27 de marzo del 2009). Thus, the Political Constitution and the Law emphasize that protecting natural resources is an appropriate means of safeguarding and improving the inhabitants’ quality of life, classifying them as public-domain property of the Nation (bienes demaniales de la Nación), and for that reason—like public-domain property generally—they are inalienable, not subject to acquisition by prescription, and not subject to attachment.
Along the same lines, through the enactment of Ley Forestal number 7575 of 13 de febrero de 1995 and other legislative instruments in which our legal system developed the provisions of the Political Constitution and instruments of international law for the protection and safeguarding of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), the inviolability of protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) was established. Such is the case of the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of Ley Forestal, which state: ARTICLE 13.—Establishment and administration. The natural heritage of the State shall consist of the forests and forest lands (terrenos forestales) within national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its name, and properties belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other Public Administration bodies, except for real property securing credit transactions with the National Banking System that becomes part of its assets (…).
ARTICLE 14.—Nonattachable and inalienable status of the natural heritage. The forest lands and forests constituting the natural heritage of the State, as specified in the preceding article, shall not be subject to attachment or alienation; possession thereof by private parties shall create no right in their favor, and the State’s action to recover title (acción reivindicatoria) to such lands shall not be subject to prescription. Consequently, they may not be registered in the Public Registry through possessory information proceedings (información posesoria), and both their invasion and occupation shall be punished in accordance with this Law. The Constitutional Chamber’s case law has established that the Natural Heritage of the State consists of two major components: on the one hand, Protected Wild Areas, regardless of their management category, declared by Law or Executive Decree, understood to include forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments, pursuant to articles 1, 2, and 3 subsection i) of Ley Forestal; 32 of Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; 22, 28, and 58 of Ley de Biodiversidad; 3 subsections d) and f) of Ley del Servicio de Parques Nacionales; and 3, 7, 17, and 82 subsections a) and b) of Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre; and, on the other hand, the Natural Heritage of the State consisting of all other forests and forest lands or lands suitable for forestry (terrenos de aptitud forestal) belonging to the State and public institutions (article 13 of Ley Forestal), which are immediately subject to legal dedication (afectación legal).
With respect to the foregoing components of the Natural Heritage, in judgment number 2003-03840 at 14:02 hours on 02 de mayo del 2003, the Constitutional Chamber stated: (…) According to the classification established by environmental legislation, the forestry or natural heritage of the State consists of forest reserves, biological reserves, protective zones, wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments (article 32 of Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, number 7554, of dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco). (…) Accordingly, it is clear that the Costa Rican legal system affords special and heightened protection to property dedicated to public use or enjoyment and subjects such protection to even greater safeguards when regulating public environmental property (…) (In this regard, see also judgment number 05266-2009 at 12:24 hours on 27 de marzo del 2009). As can be seen, protected wild areas are incorporated into the natural heritage of the Nation regardless of their management category, whether national parks, biological reserves, forest reserves, national wildlife refuges, protective zones, natural monuments, or natural wetlands; this is also enshrined in articles 35 and 38 of Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, in which the legislature generally regulated the purposes for establishing, administering, and monitoring Protected Wild Areas.
Likewise, when lands covered by any of the specified management categories are under the administration and/or protection of a public entity, they automatically become part of the Natural Heritage of the State, as provided in articles 13 and 14 of Ley Forestal. Therefore, their appropriation, use, or enjoyment by private parties, whether gratuitously or for consideration, is not permissible; they cannot be lost by prescription or acquired by adverse possession (usucapión); their designated purpose cannot legally be changed; and their use or possession by third parties shall create no right in their favor. In Voto No. 2988-99, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that private parties are legally precluded from possessing or acquiring public-domain property by adverse possession: “When property is incorporated into the public-domain regime, it acquires a series of essential characteristics, including inalienability, immunity from prescription, and immunity from attachment.
By reason of these characteristics, such property cannot be expropriated, since expropriation would entail its alienation and it is inalienable. Likewise, adverse possession is not a means of acquiring it; inalienable things, being outside private commerce, cannot be possessed by private parties and therefore are not subject to prescription so long as they retain that status or the public-use purpose to which they are dedicated.” (Voto No. 2988-99) “The public domain consists of property that, by the legislature’s express will, has the special purpose of serving the community and the public interest.—This is known as State-domain property (bienes dominicales), public-domain property, public things, or public property, which does not belong individually to private parties, is intended for public use, and is subject to a special legal regime outside private commerce.—That is, it is dedicated by its very nature and purpose.—Consequently, such property belongs to the State in the broadest sense of the term, is dedicated to the service it provides, which is invariably essential by express provision of law.—Its defining characteristics are that it is inalienable, not subject to prescription or attachment, cannot be mortgaged or encumbered under civil law, and administrative action takes the place of possessory injunctions (interdictos) for recovering control.—Because it is outside private commerce, such property cannot be possessed, although a right of use may be acquired, but not a property right.” (Voto No. 2306-91, a precedent repeatedly cited before this jurisdiction).
Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber has referred to public-domain property as inalienable and not subject to prescription: “It is clear that, because they are public-domain property, they cannot be possessed, much less can ownership of them be acquired, as explained by the typical characteristics of such property: inalienability, immunity from prescription, and immunity from attachment.” (Voto No. 454- 2006). “It bears emphasizing that public-domain property is inalienable and not subject to prescription, and that its occupation cannot create any right in favor of the occupant, regardless of how long such occupation has continued.” (Voto No. 18836-2014). “Regarding the attributes of public-domain property: Title to public-domain property is held by the State in its capacity as administrator, and it must therefore be understood as property belonging to the ‘Nation’ and forming part of the public patrimony; because of its special legal nature, it has the following attributes: it is not subject to prescription, meaning that the passage of time cannot give rise to ownership of it, or even mere possession—in other words, it cannot be acquired through adverse possession—nor can it be lost by prescription…; and it is inalienable, meaning that it is outside private commerce and therefore cannot be alienated, sold, or acquired, whether gratuitously or for consideration, either by private parties or by the State, so that it is excluded from commerce among [sic] persons and is subject to a special, heightened legal regime.
Moreover, its use and exploitation are subject to the police power (poder de policía), because, as property that cannot be possessed, much less owned, its use and exploitation are possible only through duly authorized acts, whether by concession or use permit, granted by the competent authority, and under the Public Administration’s ongoing supervision. It therefore encompasses real property having a nature and legal regime virtually opposite to private property, as derived from article 45 of the Constitution.” (Voto No. 3113-2009). “Lands constituting National Reserves that contain forests are considered State Patrimony, in their status as Public Domain (Demanio Público), which entails the principles of immunity from prescription, inalienability, and immunity from attachment.” Within the State Forestry Patrimony (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado), private parties are denied the right of possession (Tribunal Agrario N° 332 de las 16 hrs. 20 mts. del 7 de julio del 2000 y nota al voto 49 de las 13 hrs. del 31 de enero del 2002).
The First Chamber referred to the immunity of the public domain from prescription as follows: “(…) possession exercised by private parties creates no property right whatsoever, regardless of the length of time for which it has been exercised (…)” (judgment No.
No. 7 at 15 hours 5 minutes on 20 de enero de 1993, Considerando IV) and the Sala Constitucional also ruled on possession by private parties of public-domain property (bienes de dominio público o demaniales) having inalienable characteristics: “...If, at the time the property was designated as such, the claimant did not have ten years of prior legally effective possession, the claimant cannot assert an acquired property right, because adverse possession (usucapión) had not vested before the lands were placed within the public domain. It is wholly improper to ‘grant title to private persons who have been occupying public property over which they cannot exercise any act of possession or acquire any right, because, as public-domain property, it is not subject to adverse possession and is inalienable.’” (Sentencia constitucional No. 18836-2014). Furthermore, under the current Ley Forestal, N° 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996, the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), among other things, includes the forests and forestlands of national reserves, as well as those on properties belonging to autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration, except those securing credit transactions with the Sistema Bancario Nacional that enter into its assets.
Where appropriate, the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, which is entrusted with their administration, must, through the Procuraduría, register the real property in the Registro Público de la Propiedad as individual properties in the name of the State (artículo 13). The forestlands and forests described above are not subject to attachment and are inalienable, and the State’s action for recovery of property (acción reivindicatoria) is not subject to limitation. Possession by private parties creates no right in their favor, nor may they obtain title to or register such property in their names in the Registro (artículo 14). The Sala Constitucional, in sentencia número 07294-98 de 13 de octubre de 1998, held that: “It must not be forgotten that, ultimately, both Ley N° 4465—now repealed—and Decreto N° 17023-MAG merely implement the content of artículo 50 constitucional; therefore, even though the immediate legislation serving as the basis for the decree has been replaced by other legislation, the decree remains in force both because it was promulgated under the legislation in effect at the time and because its ultimate basis lies in the cited constitutional article.” …
Second, in view of the foregoing, the establishment of a protected wild area (área silvestre protegida) by decree cannot result in a violation of the principle governing such areas, because it is not the decree but rather provisions also having the force of law—which, moreover, implement a constitutional principle—that establish it. …Having said that, it is clear that the legal rule contained in sentencia número 2004-08928 de 18 de agosto de 2004 is the one explained above: namely, that it is legally possible, by decree, to establish protected wild areas that include lands allocated by statute to a purpose, designation, and public use different from those under the legal regime of the area being established. … the establishment of a protected wild area by administrative act (acto administrativo) entails the inapplicability of any legislation, including legislation specific to the geographical area concerned, that conflicts with the legislation governing the protected wild area, since application of the latter entails compliance with the constitutional duty set forth in numeral 50…The same must be said regarding ley número 7915 de 21 de setiembre de 1999, which partially amended ley número 5582…” Therefore, the property comprising the State Natural Heritage possesses the characteristics inherent to public-domain property: immunity from adverse possession, inalienability, and immunity from attachment.
Based on all the foregoing, I request that the action filed be dismissed, with both sets of costs imposed on the plaintiff, together with the interest accrued thereon until payment in full. 4) Counsel for INDER also rejected the allegations of the complaint and the parties’ claims, reiterating the responses submitted by counsel for the State and SINAC. In summary, counsel stated that INDER has never recognized any right, not even a possessory right, of the plaintiffs over parcel 74-A-4. The INDER Board of Directors, in artículo 37 de la sesión ordinaria No. 22 del 26 de agosto de 2019, denied the application submitted because the land forms part of the State Natural Heritage (PNE), and their possession of the property is instead unlawful because the property has formed part of Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central since 1975, belonged to the State and was transferred to INDER in 1976, and was registered in the name of INDER in 1986.
This is because the land described in cadastral survey plan (plano catastrado) No. Placa19619 forms part of property No. 57748-000, and because that parcel forms part of Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and therefore of the PNE, it is legally impossible to register title to it in the names of private parties under artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal; the proper course is instead to transfer the property to MINAE-SINAC, which is responsible for its administration. INDER thus cannot grant title to parcels forming part of the State Natural Heritage, and in this case the lands to which the plaintiffs request title have formed part of Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central since 1975. That Reserve included lands belonging to the State and INDER since 1976; consequently, under artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal, they were automatically incorporated into the State Natural Heritage.
Furthermore, artículos 14 y 58.a de la Ley Forestal y 8 de la Ley ITCO penalized any form of possession of such property; consequently, the claim for compensation for improvements (indemnización de mejoras) would likewise be unfounded because, upon being incorporated into the PNE, the property acquired the characteristics inherent to such property, namely, immunity from adverse possession, immunity from attachment, and inalienability. Accordingly, any possession of such property creates no right whatsoever, whether to title or possession, because the plaintiffs have failed to establish lawful possession, either original or derivative, of the property: 1) For at least 10 years before the issuance of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 4961 publicado en La Gaceta No. 130 del 11 de julio de 1975 and No. 3586, also from 1975. 2) For at least 10 years before it became the property of the State or ITCO, because Ley Forestal No. 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969—which already governed matters relating to the State Natural Heritage—provided in artículo 18 that the PNE consisted of Reservas Forestales, Parques Nacionales, Viveros Forestales del Estado, Zonas Protectoras and Reservas Biológicas.
Furthermore, artículo 19 allocated to the purposes of that law all forests and forestlands located on: a) Lands regarded as natural reserves. b) Rural properties within the private domain of the State, as currently provided by Ley 7575 and its amendments. In view of that legal framework, INDER is legally unable to grant property titles—as the plaintiffs seek—within Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central. The Procuraduría expressed the same view in Opinión Jurídica No. OJ-064-02 del 30 de abril de 2002. The Sala Constitucional, for its part, stated in voto No. 3905-1993 that if, for reasons of public interest, it has the authority to limit the attributes of private property, it has all the more authority to do so with respect to lands owned by INDER. Under artículo 14 de la Ley Forestal, INDER is prohibited from granting private parties title to lands forming part of the State Natural Heritage.
Regarding the claim for title, counsel stated that it is unfounded because: 1) By D.E. No. 6236-G publicado en la Gaceta No. 156 del 17 de agosto de 1976, the State expropriated the property of Sociedad Cubujuquí Ltda., registered in the Registro Público at Tomo 1792, Folio 128, Asiento 2 del partido de Heredia No. Placa19616, and subsequently transferred it to INDER; accordingly, the portions of that property constituting PNE became subject by operation of law to artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Forestal No. 7575 and its amendments. 2) The plaintiffs stated that they acquired the property in 2000, which was after the creation of the reserve; they therefore already knew that the property acquired formed part of the PNE and could not be appropriated by private parties. Nor is the requested compensation for possessory rights and improvements warranted, because artículos 13, 14, 15 y 58.a) de la Ley Forestal y 8 de la Ley del ITCO and their amendments penalize any form of possession of the PNE.
INDER’s counsel raised the statute of limitations defense, stating that the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central was created in 1975 and that the State pursued an expropriation (expropiación) of property No. H-57748-000; nevertheless, this action was not filed until 2019, that is, more than 40 years after the property was expropriated, and therefore, pursuant to Article 868 of the Civil Code (C.C.), the right to bring the claim is time-barred. Furthermore, the plaintiffs acquired an alleged possessory right (derecho de posesión) in 2000, that is, 19 years before the action was filed. In addition, Article 198 of the LGAP establishes a four-year period for this type of claim. In the present case, we find it established that in 2000 the plaintiffs acquired from Mr. Nombre111170 the property located in the Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí, in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, for the sum of 15 million colones, and that it was described in cadastral plan (plano catastrado) No. 1107776-2006.
It was also established that this property forms part of property No. 57748 of the Heredia registry district (Partido de Heredia), which was expropriated at the request of ITCO pursuant to Executive Decree No. 6235-G, published in La Gaceta No. 156 of August 17, 1976. It was likewise established that on August 05, 2015, the plaintiffs submitted an application for titling (titularización) of that property to the INDER Subregional Office in Horquetas de Sarapiquí and, for that purpose, submitted Cadastral Plan No. Placa19619. In connection with that application, by official letter OSH-669-2015 of August 07, 2015, the INDER Subregional Office in Horquetas asked the Head of the Área Cordillera Volcánica Central whether the tract (predio) located in Cubujuquí, according to cadastral plan No. 1107776-2006, was located within the protected wild areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) administered by MINAET, or whether it formed part of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado).
By official letter Placa19617 of August 20, 2015, that Office replied that the parcel (parcela) identified by plan No. H-1107776-2006, located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas, lies within the protected wild areas administered by MINAE, in this case forming part of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and, consequently, part of the State Natural Heritage. It was also established that it was not until official letter OTHO-758-2018 of September 28, 2018, that the INDER Territorial Office in Horquetas officially informed the plaintiffs of the property’s status with respect to the Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica Central, and that the INDER Board of Directors, in Article 37 of Ordinary Session 22, held on August 26, 2019, definitively denied the application for title (solicitud de titulación) to that parcel for that reason. In view of that situation, the plaintiffs instituted proceedings before this Jurisdiction on June 11, 2020, requesting that the judgment: 1) Award them the parcel identified by INDER as No. 74-A-4. 2) Alternatively, compensate them for their rights and the improvements made to the property, as well as for subjective non-pecuniary harm (daño moral subjetivo), the losses and damages (daños y perjuicios) caused, and those that might be caused by a possible eviction (desalojo).
Thus, the relief sought (pretensiones) requests that the judgment order affirmative conduct and, in the alternative, compensation, based on INDER’s formal administrative action embodied in the resolution adopted by its Board of Directors denying the plaintiffs’ application, which was issued on August 26, 2019. Accordingly, because the plaintiffs filed an ordinary action on June 11, 2020, their right to claim the stated monetary compensation (indemnización patrimonial) is not time-barred, since the period between August 26, 2019, and June 11, 2020, did not exceed the period established in Article 198 of the LGAP; therefore, the statute of limitations defense is denied.
Based on the literal wording of the arguments presented by the parties, which were reviewed in their entirety by this Court, the present matter was analyzed in light of the alleged facts and the admitted evidence. In this regard, the plaintiffs filed a claim stating that, in 1973, Mr. Nombre111168 took possession of a property of approximately 80 hectares located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí. They stated that Mr. Nombre111168 subsequently sold part of that property to a man whom they identified only as Nombre111171, asserting that he sold it to Mr. Nombre84914, who in turn sold it to Mr. Nombre111170. They alleged that, in this manner, a right of possession (derecho de posesión) was exercised over the original 80-hectare property and its subsequent subdivisions (segregaciones) for more than 40 years. They stated that, in 1999, their principals entered into negotiations with Mr.
Nombre111170 to acquire his right of possession over the real property described in survey plan (plano) H-1107776-2006, which has an area of approximately 8 hectares, ---at a time when that real property already formed part of Asentamiento Cubujuquí, identified by INDER as parcel No. Placa19621---. This circumstance was established by the sketch prepared in 1978 by officials of what was then ITCO. They stated that, in 2000, on the advice of an INDER official, their principals acquired that parcel and initiated proceedings before that institution seeking to obtain title to it; however, in Article 37 of ordinary session No. 22 of 26 August 2019, the INDER Board of Directors ruled that their application was legally inadmissible because approximately 90% of the land was located within Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and therefore constituted State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado, PNE) under the authority of MINAE-SINAC.
Accordingly, they requested that the judgment order INDER to grant them title to the aforementioned parcel or, alternatively, order payment to them for the fixtures and improvements (accesiones y mejoras) that they introduced to the property in good faith during the time they possessed it under a claim of ownership (a título de dueños). They thus brought their claim on the basis of possession exercised in good faith over the parcel identified by INDER as No. 74-A-4, located in Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí. They asserted that this possession dates back to the time Mr. Nombre111168 entered the area, continued until Mr. Nombre111170 transferred it to them, and exceeds 40 years. They requested that the judgment order INDER to issue them the public deed (escritura pública) for the real property or, alternatively, pay them for the fixtures and improvements that they introduced to the property in good faith during the time they possessed it under a claim of ownership.
The defendants, for their part, oppose issuance of the public deed for the aforementioned parcel, arguing that INDER’s decision denying the public deed is consistent with the legal system because more than 90% of the real property lies within Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and therefore forms part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado. In this regard, the case law of the Sala Constitucional has established that Patrimonio Natural del Estado comprises two important components: on the one hand, Protected Wildlife Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), regardless of their management category, declared by statute or executive decree, understood to include forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments, pursuant to the regulations set forth in Articles 1, 2, and 3(i) of the Ley Forestal; Article 32 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; Articles 22, 28, and 58 of the Ley de Biodiversidad; Article 3(d) and (f) of the Ley del Servicio de Parques Nacionales; and Articles 3, 7, 17, and 82(a) and (b) of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre; and, on the other hand, Patrimonio Natural del Estado, which consists of all other forests and forest lands or lands suitable for forestry belonging to the State and public institutions (Article 13 of the Ley Forestal), which are subject to an immediate statutory designation (afectación legal).
Regarding the alternative claim (that, if issuance of the deed is not appropriate, they be compensated for all fixtures and improvements), the defendants argued that no such compensation is due because the occupation concerns real property forming part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado, and such mere occupation creates no right whatsoever. Opinion of the Chamber: As stated above, the purpose of the present claim is to obtain a judgment: 1. Awarding the plaintiffs the parcel located in Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí, identified as No. 74-A-4, and consequently its public deed. 2. Ordering that, if the parcel cannot be awarded to them, they be paid for the fixtures and improvements introduced to the property during the period in which they possessed it in good faith. 3. Ordering payment for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused to them by any eventual eviction and for the subjective non-pecuniary harm (daño moral subjetivo) suffered.
Accordingly, this Chamber will analyze each of these claims in turn, based on the facts deemed established and in light of the applicable legal system. A) Regarding the application for title to the real property: Upon review, the decision of the INDER Board of Directors in Article 37 of ordinary session No. 22 of 26 August 2019 (which has not been challenged in the present claim) was consistent with the law, because the following has been established: i) In protection of the environment, the Costa Rican State granted special protection to the State Forest Heritage (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) in Articles 18, 19, and 28 of "Ley Forestal" No. 4465 of 25 November 1969. Article 18 provided: “The State Forest Heritage consists of the National Reserves, Forest Reserves, National Parks, State Forest Nurseries, Protective Zones, and Biological Reserves.” Article 19 provided: “All forests and forest lands located on the following are hereby designated for the purposes of this statute: a) lands regarded as National Reserves; and b) privately owned rural properties belonging to the State, municipalities, and autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions.” That statute was amended by Law No. 7174, "Ley Forestal", of 28 June 1990, Article 32 of which provided: “The State forest heritage consists of all forests and forest lands within national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its name, and properties belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and all other bodies of the Public Administration.” Article 33, in turn, provided: “The forest lands and forests constituting the State forest heritage, as detailed in the preceding article, shall be immune from attachment and inalienable; their possession by private parties shall create no right in their favor, and the State’s action for recovery of possession (acción reivindicatoria) of such lands shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.
Consequently, they may not be registered in the Registro Público through possessory title proceedings (información posesoria); their invasion and occupation shall be punished in accordance with this statute, and lands suitable for forestry shall be automatically incorporated into the State forest heritage.” Finally, "Ley Forestal" No. 7575 of 16 March 1996 (which amended the preceding statutes) provided in Article 13: “Establishment and administration. The State natural heritage shall consist of the forests and forest lands within national reserves, areas declared inalienable, properties registered in its name, and properties belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and all other bodies of the Public Administration, except real properties securing lending transactions with the Sistema Bancario Nacional that become part of its assets. The Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía shall administer the heritage.
Where appropriate, acting through the Procuraduría General de la República, it shall register the lands in the Registro Público de la Propiedad as individually identified properties owned by the State. Non-governmental organizations that acquire real property containing forest or suitable for forestry, using funds from donations or the public treasury obtained in the name of the State, shall transfer such property into the State’s name.” Article 14 provided: “Immunity from attachment and inalienability of the natural heritage. The forest lands and forests constituting the State natural heritage, as detailed in the preceding article, shall be immune from attachment and inalienable; their possession by private parties shall create no right in their favor, and the State’s action for recovery of possession of such lands shall not be subject to any statute of limitations. Consequently, they may not be registered in the Registro Público through possessory title proceedings, and both their invasion and their occupation shall be punished in accordance with this statute.” Thus, since 1969, the legislation protecting the State Forest Heritage has included among such assets lands suitable for forestry that belong to the central State and its decentralized institutions, including INDER. ii) In furtherance of environmental protection, through Executive Decree No. 4961, published in La Gaceta No. 130 of 11 July 1975 and amended by Decree No. 5386 of 28 October 1975, the Costa Rican State created "Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central", Article 1 of which stated: “The Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica Central is hereby established, comprising the territory located within the following boundaries (according to IGN topographic maps at a scale of 1:50000: Río Cuarto 3347 II, Poás 3346 I, Barva 346 II, Abra 3345 I, Río Sucio Placa19614, Guápiles 3446 IV, Carrillo Placa19615, Istarú 3445 IV, Guácimo 3446 I, Bonilla 3446 II, Tucurrique 3445 I).” Article 3, in turn, provided: “The national reserves located within the foregoing boundaries are declared inalienable.” Article 4 provided: “The Procuraduría General de la República shall register the State lands within this Reserve in the Registro Público as an individually identified property of the National Heritage.” Article 7 provided: “Properties registered in the Registro Público and properties protected by ten-year possession (posesión decenal) and located within the boundaries of the reserve shall automatically become subject to the Forestry Regime (Régimen Forestal).” Finally, Article 8 provided: “Properties not covered by the preceding article shall become part of the State forest heritage following completion of the legal procedures.” iii) At the request of what was then ITCO (now INDER), through Decree No. 6236-G, published in La Gaceta No. 156 of 17 August 1976, the Executive Branch expropriated from Sociedad Cubujuquí Ltda. the property registered in the Registro Público under Volume 1792, Folio 128, Entry 2, Heredia district property No. 57748, for the purpose of providing an agrarian solution and awarding parcels to farmers under the project known as "Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí", located in Horquetas de Sarapiquí. iv) In 2000, the plaintiffs acquired from Mr.
Nombre111170 the real property described in plan No. H-1107776-2006 and identified by INDER as parcel No. 74-A-4, located in Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí. During the title proceedings (diligencias de titulación), the INDER Subregional Office in Horquetas, through official letter OSH-669-2015 of 07 August 2015, asked the Head Office of Área Cordillera Volcánica Central whether the parcel located in Cubujuquí, according to registered cadastral plan (plano catastrado) No. 1107776-2006, was located within wildlife protected areas administered by MINAET, or whether it formed part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
For its part, the Head Office of the Área Cordillera Volcánica Central responded to the request by official letter Placa19617 dated 20 de agosto de 2015, indicating that, pursuant to Articles 13, 14, and 15 of Ley Forestal No. 7575, as amended, and official letter Placa19618 dated 20 de agosto de 2015, prepared by Engineer Juan Alexis Jiménez Cerdas concerning the field inspection (visita de campo), the parcel depicted in survey plan No. H-1107776-2006, located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas, lies within the protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) administered by MINAE and, in this case, forms part of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and therefore of the Patrimonio Natural del Estado. For its part, the Directorate of the Área de Conservación Central of SINAC, by official letter SINAC-ACC-D-1131-2020 dated 17 de julio de 2020, specified that, according to official letters OS-1336 and OS-1338 concerning registered survey plan (plano catastrado) H-1107776-2006, 98% of the property described therein lies within the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central.
It has thus been established beyond any doubt that 98% of the land described in registered survey plan No. H-1107776-2006, corresponding to parcel No. 74-A-4 of the Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí in Horquetas de Sarapiquí, lies within the boundaries of the Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central. This circumstance makes it legally impossible to grant the claimants a public deed (escritura pública) to that property because, as the property forms part of the aforementioned reserve, the land belongs to it by operation of law and cannot be titled in the names of private individuals. It is clearly subject to the inherent characteristics of such properties: they are not subject to acquisitive prescription (prescripción positiva), and they are unseizable and inalienable. Along these lines, further guidance may be found in judgments Nos. 1070-F-S1-2010, 1088-F-S1-2011, and 1675-F-51-2012 issued by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as judgments Nos. 17659-2008, 21258-2010, and 16938-2011 of the Constitutional Chamber, among many others.
In those judgments, those judicial bodies held that private individuals may not exercise any form of possession or ownership over the Patrimonio Natural del Estado, as part of the public domain (dominio público). It further follows that ownership cannot be acquired through adverse possession (usucapión) or acquisitive prescription, even if the individuals concerned had occupied such land for more than ten years, much less may an administrative authority award it to a private individual. Accordingly, the claim for title is inadmissible. B) Regarding the request for recognition of improvements and accessions (mejoras y accesiones): Based on the facts established, we have:
The Civil Code develops this distinction in Article 332, as it classifies necessary improvements (mejoras necesarias) as those expenses indispensable for preserving the thing, and useful improvements (mejoras útiles) as those that increase its market value (in this regard, Judgment No. 13 at 10:00 a.m. on January 29, 1993, and No. 68 at 2:40 p.m. on June 30, 1998.) With respect to such improvements, there are substantial differences depending on whether the possessor acts in good faith or bad faith. In accordance with the provisions of Article 328 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 330 thereof, a possessor against whom recovery is ordered is entitled to recognition of both useful and necessary improvements; by virtue thereof, and until actual payment is made, the possessor shall have a right of retention (derecho de retención) over both types when possession was held in good faith, and only over necessary improvements when possession was held in bad faith.
Moreover, luxury or purely ornamental improvements may be removed by the good-faith possessor (ius tollendi), provided that such action does not cause deterioration to the property and that the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they would have after removal..." (Sala Primera No. 233 of April 14, 2005). Thus, in accordance with Articles 328, 330, and 332 of the Civil Code, a good-faith possessor against whom recovery is ordered is entitled to recognition of both useful and necessary improvements. Regarding “accession” (accesión), that Chamber stated in the cited decision: “...IX.-With respect to the doctrine of accession, the relevant form for present purposes is that established for immovable property, specifically as it pertains to construction on another person’s land. When a person has built, planted, or sown on another person’s land, the Civil Code establishes a distinction based on whether the construction was undertaken without the owner’s consent (Article 508) or with the owner’s ‘knowledge and acquiescence’ (Article 509).
Where consent was not given, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the building or planting by compensating the value of the materials and labor, excluding from payment the increase in the property’s value; however, the owner may also choose to demand the removal or destruction of what was incorporated and payment of the resulting damages, except where a person built, sowed, or planted in good faith, in which case destruction is not permissible and the property owner has the option of reimbursing the value of the materials and labor or paying an amount equal to or greater than the value acquired by the property (Article 508). Conversely, if the work was performed with the owner’s ‘knowledge and acquiescence,’ the owner may acquire ownership of the planting or building by paying its value if it is advantageous to do so, but may also choos (Sic) to establish co-ownership (copropiedad) between both parties, with their respective shares determined according to each party’s contributions (Article 509).
This collegiate body has established that where the owner expressly consents to the incorporation of things into the owner’s property, there is no accession, because accession constitutes an original method of acquiring ownership rights, and the situation is instead contractual in nature, giving rise to reciprocal rights and obligations. Although things are incorporated into the property, the determination of ownership will depend on the parties’ intent and, where no such intent is expressly stated, on the rules governing obligations (Articles 627 et seq.), the general principles of law, and equity (Articles 4 and 11 of the Civil Code, respectively). (On this matter, Judgment No. 751 at 10:20 a.m. on October 6, 2000.) (Sala Primera No. 233 of April 14, 2005). In the case under review, this Chamber considers that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and built and established an agricultural activity with the knowledge and acquiescence of INDER, since both they and INDER’s own officials were unaware that the land described in Cadastral Plan No. H- 1107776-2007 and identified by INDER as Parcel No. 74-A-4 formed part of Reserva Forestal Cadena Volcánica Central.
It was also established that INDER did not become certain of that circumstance until SINAC, through official letter Placa19617 of August 20, 2015, informed INDER that the land described in cadastral plan No. Placa19619 was located within Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central. This information was reiterated in official letter SINAC-ACC-D-1131-2020 of July 17, 2020, by the Dirección del Área de Conservación Central del SINAC. Finally, the plaintiffs were not notified of that circumstance by INDER until September 28, 2018, through official letter OTHO-758-2018. Thus, in the Chamber’s opinion, between 2000 and September 27, 2018, the plaintiffs understood that the parcel identified as No. 74-A-4 did not form part of the aforementioned Forest Reserve and, therefore, did not act in bad faith. On the contrary, it was established that, according to the land-use compliance certificate, the activity was conducted in accordance with the provisions applicable to INDER-owned parcels in Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí.
Now, regarding the improvements (useful and necessary) and the concept of accession to immovable property (accesión inmobiliaria), the Chamber distinguished between improvements and accessions in the same decision as follows: “...As to the remaining investments, they consist of buildings, fruit-tree crops, and additions to another person’s immovable property, which were made without the owner’s consent (Article 508 of the Civil Code) and to which the plaintiff has expressed opposition (claim No. 4 of the complaint, folio 100). From this perspective, these investments made by Mr. .... and his family (as established in proven fact No. 5 of the trial court’s judgment) benefit the possession he has exercised over the disputed property and the activity he conducts there, but they cannot be associated with preserving the immovable property. Nor may they be regarded as useful improvements, because, for them to be classified as such, it would have had to be demonstrated that the additions were made to preexisting property.
Indeed, improvements are regulated differently and have a different legal meaning from new plantings or structures made by a person on another’s land; the two concepts must therefore be distinguished. Improvements are governed by the principle of appurtenance (principio de accesoriedad), insofar as they are made to expand, modify, or repair a preexisting thing. Thus, with respect to land used for agricultural production, the replacement, increase, modification, or enhancement of preexisting plants or crops, as well as repairs to the infrastructure used for agricultural activity, among other things, could be regarded as improvements. By contrast, new buildings, structures, or permanent crops (fruit trees) established on another person’s land where no works of that nature previously existed—or where any existing works were entirely separate from the new ones—cannot be considered improvements in the legal sense of the term, even if they ‘improve the property.’ Accordingly, in such matters, the doctrine of accession to immovable property applies.
(This approach is followed in Judgments No. 1 at 2:55 p.m. on January 6, 1993, No. 65 at 2:40 p.m. on August 17, 1994, and No. 4 at 2:45 p.m. on January 28, 1998). In keeping with this line of reasoning, this Chamber stated in Judgment No. 37 at 2:55 p.m. on April 10, 1996: ‘Under sound legal doctrine, buildings erected on land cannot be deemed improvements. Improvements consist of additions, repairs, or beneficial changes to preexisting property, regarding which reimbursement may be sought upon return of the property when the owner has not held possession, depending on whether the possessors acted in good or bad faith. Payment for improvements is governed by Articles 328 through 332 of the Civil Code and may be ordered in cases where there is no accession through planting or construction on another person’s land. Where accession occurs, the applicable rules shall be those established in Articles 508 and 509, as appropriate.’ In accordance with the cited precedents, the buildings, permanent crops, and other contributions made by the appellant Nombre111172 within the property at issue cannot simply be regarded as additions, repairs, or beneficial changes to property that existed before he took possession, since the record does not establish that the disputed property contained plantings that were subsequently improved—an element that, in accordance with the foregoing, is essential for such investments to be classified as improvements.
It follows that the rules governing improvements are inapplicable to this case; instead, the rules governing accession to immovable property apply.” (Sala Primera No. 233 of April 14, 2005). (Emphasis added). In accordance with the cited decision, each case involving a claim of this kind must therefore be analyzed to determine whether it concerns improvements (useful and necessary) under Articles 328 through 332 of the Civil Code or accession to immovable property under Articles 508 and 509 of the same body of law. In the case under review, the Jefatura de Estudios Agroeconómicos y Avalúos established in its “Land Titling Inspection Certificate” (“Certificado de Inspección para Titulación de Tierras”), issued by Agricultural Engineer Luis Dionisio García Giró, License CIA-5525, dated April 12, 2018, under consecutive receipt number 18015801, that Parcel No. 74-4-A, farmed by Mr. Nombre111167, had maintained 100% COMPLIANT LAND USE (USO CONFORME DEL SUELO) for the activity conducted there, according to the approved methodology.
The certificate stated that the property contains a 1/2-hectare heart-of-palm plantation in good phytosanitary condition, 36 mts2 of plantains, an 80 mts2 dwelling in good condition, and another measuring 140mts2 in good or fair condition. Pastureland with grass, 8 cows, one horse, 40 birds, for household consumption of milk and breeding, a corral, shed, stable, etc. (See folios 13 through 28 of the administrative titling file for Parcel No. Placa19621). Accordingly, the possession was agricultural in nature, as were the work performed and structures erected by the plaintiffs, whose status as improvements or additions governed by the doctrine of accession must be determined. Thus, the improvements made by the plaintiffs consist of the establishment of pastures or the clearing of those already existing when they entered the property in 2000. The accessions, in turn, consist of the plantings, structures, stables, and livestock breeding—that is, works established and developed by the plaintiffs after they entered the property.
Accordingly, pursuant to Articles 328 and 330 of the Civil Code, the indicated necessary improvements must be recognized by the landowner, and the plaintiffs, as the persons who performed such work, are entitled to a right of retention up to the value thereof. The aforementioned accessions must be recognized in accordance with Article 509 of the Civil Code. This is because, as indicated, it was established that the plaintiffs had occupied Parcel No. Placa19621, located in Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí, since 2000; that this parcel forms part of INDER’s property registered in the Heredia Registry District under No. Placa19623; and that the plaintiffs, with INDER’s knowledge and acquiescence, conducted an agricultural activity there and erected the structures identified in the “Land-Use Compliance Certificate” (“Certificado de Uso Conforme de Suelo”) issued by Agricultural Engineer Luis Dionisio García Giró, License CIA-5525, dated 12 de abril de 2018, with incoming consecutive number 18015801, without any bad faith on his part, for which reason they must be compensated in accordance with the valuation established during the judgment-enforcement proceedings (proceso de ejecución de sentencia).
Accordingly, having established the validity of the plaintiffs’ right, INDER must pay them for their investment in the land corresponding to parcel No. 74-A-4, with respect to the following necessary improvements (mejoras necesarias): establishment of pastures or clearing of existing pastures. They must likewise be compensated for accessions (accesiones), consisting of buildings and crops, in accordance with the valuation conducted during enforcement of this judgment, with a right of retention (derecho de retención) over them. It must be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 48 of Ley INDER No. 9036, that institution is required to pay for useful and necessary improvements (mejoras útiles y necesarias) and accessions made in good faith. It bears repeating that, in this case, it was established that, at ITCO’s request, the Executive Branch expropriated from Cubujuquí S.A. the property registered in Heredia under No. 4-57748-000, located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí, in 1976, by means of Decreto No. 156 del 17 de agosto de 1976; that Mr.
Nombre111168 had already been occupying part of that property since 1972; and that, ultimately, part of that property was acquired in 2000 by the plaintiffs herein, who entered the landholding (fundo) on that date and established an agricultural activity consistent with the land use (uso de suelo), as stated in the “Land-Titling Inspection Certificate” (“Certificado de Inspección para Titulación de Tierras”) issued by Agricultural Engineer Luis Dionisio García Giró, License CIA-5525, dated 12 de abril de 2018, with incoming consecutive number 18015801. Likewise, on 18 de setiembre de 2018, Technician Josué Gabriel Rojas Corrales inspected parcel 74-A-4 and signed the “Titling Form” (“Ficha de Titulación”), in which he recommended titling the property identified as the parcel, with cadastral plan No. H-1107776-2006 and an area of 7ha6841.22mts2, in the plaintiffs’ names. The parcel forms part of the property registered in Heredia under No. 4-57748-00 in INDER’s name, and he calculated the transfer price at 2,052.423,65 colones.
In the section entitled “PARTY DECLARATION” (“DECLARACIÓN DE PARTE”), the plaintiffs accepted the transfer of the aforementioned property in their favor under the terms of Ley No. 2825, No. 7142, and No. 9036. Thus, recognition of useful and necessary improvements and accessions is required by the regulations referenced above, but is also warranted on equitable grounds, since the record further shows that INDER did not officially notify the plaintiffs of the boundary situation between parcel 74-A-4 and Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central until 28 de setiembre de 2018, by official letter OTHO-758-2018. It was therefore established that the plaintiffs have exercised possessory acts (actos posesorios) over the aforementioned parcel in good faith; part of the parcel contains permanent crops and another part is pastureland. The crops consist of hearts of palm and plantains. There are 8 cows, one horse, 40 chickens, 2 residential houses, one corral, and one stable.
The boundaries are clearly marked: to the east, by dead posts with 6 strands of barbed wire; to the south, by dead posts with 4 strands of barbed wire; to the north, by dead posts with 5 strands of barbed wire; and to the west, likewise by dead posts with 5 strands of barbed wire. All this information appears in the administrative case file at folios 13 through 28. Nor is there any record that INDER ever demanded that the plaintiffs relinquish possession of parcel No. 74-A-4. Accordingly, recognition and payment of the necessary improvements and accessions follows from the fact that INDER always respected the plaintiffs’ exercise of possession over the aforementioned parcel. Subsequently, INDER plainly sought to clarify the boundaries with Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central when, by official letter OSH-669-2015 del 07 de agosto de 2015, INDER’s Subregional Office in Horquetas asked the Head Office of Área Cordillera Volcánica Central whether the property located in Cubujuquí, according to cadastral plan No. 1107776-2006, was situated within the protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) administered by MINAET-SINAC or formed part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
By official letter Placa19617 del 20 de agosto de 2015, the Head Office of Área Cordillera Volcánica Central of SINAC responded to the request, indicating that the parcel shown on plan No. H-1107776-2006, located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas, lies within the protected wilderness areas administered by MINAE, forming part in this case of Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central and, consequently, part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado. It was not until official letter OTHO-755-2018 del 28 de setiembre de 2018 that Oficina de Desarrollo Territorial de Horquetas asked the Head Office of SINAC-MINAE de Sarapiquí to have that institution demarcate the specified land; by official letter SINAC-ACAHN-JSS-023-2019 del 29 de enero de 2019, it was advised that the request had to be submitted to the office of Parque Nacional Braulio Carrillo. Thus, although Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central was created in 1975 and the expropriation of the property registered in Heredia under No. 4-57748-000, located in Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí, occurred in 1976 by means of Decreto No. 156 del 17 de agosto de 1976, it was not until 28 de setiembre de 2018 that INDER formally requested demarcation of the land described in plan H-1107776-2006 in relation to the aforementioned forest reserve.
It follows from the foregoing that, as indicated, the plaintiffs must be compensated for the improvements and accessions, which must be quantified and assessed during the judgment-enforcement phase because the record lacks the necessary elements to do so at this stage. As to the present or future damages claimed in the event of an eviction, that claim is denied because such damages are encompassed by the relief granted by the Court when it upheld the alternative claim (pretensión subsidiaria) for the reasons explained above. Finally, the claim for subjective non-pecuniary harm (daño moral subjetivo) is also denied, since the fact that other residents of the area were granted title is attributable to their properties possibly not forming part of the forest reserve. Moreover, none of the cases involving the plaintiffs’ neighbors is at issue in these proceedings, and the reasons why title was or was not granted in those cases are therefore unknown.
The plaintiffs must also bear in mind that they acquired a possessory right (derecho de posesión) from Mr. Nombre111170, not bare ownership (nuda propiedad), and that consolidation of the ownership right (derecho de propiedad) over parcel 74-A-4 required titling by INDER, which could not occur for an objective reason: approximately 98% of the property did in fact fall within the forest reserve. Thus, what they held with respect to that landholding was an expectation, not a duly consolidated property right (derecho real). This does not preclude recognition of the improvements and accessions made to the landholding, but it does preclude the subjective non-pecuniary harm claimed. Finally, pursuant to the Constitutional Chamber’s decision No. 1963-2012 del 15 de febrero de 2012, once this judgment becomes final and the improvements and accessions have been paid for, steps must be taken to evict the occupants from the property described in cadastral plan No. H-1107776-2006, exclusively as to the portion of land forming part of “Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central,” administered by SINAC of Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones (MINAET). MINAET and SINAC must also prepare the necessary signs identifying the property as Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
The representatives of SINAC and the State raised in their defense the defenses of lack of passive standing on the merits (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) and lack of legal entitlement (falta de derecho), which must be sustained in light of what the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice has stated: “In other words, the procedural mandate requires only that both the body possessing legal personality and the State or entity to which it belongs be joined in the judicial proceeding. It then falls to the judge, in accordance with the substantive rules, to determine whether the challenged act, conduct, or inaction was or was not carried out under such legal personality, thereby establishing whether it is the body that must answer from its own assets, or whether the entity or the State must be assigned the duty to provide reparation.” (Decision No. 1360-F-S1-2010 of diez horas veinticinco minutos del once de noviembre del dos mil diez.
To the same effect, Judgment No. 883-F-S1-2011 of nueve horas cinco minutos del veintiocho de julio del dos mil once). “(...) if it is determined that the challenged act constitutes the exercise of an authority belonging solely and exclusively to the so-called ‘body-person’ (órgano-persona), the logical and natural consequence is that a lack of legal entitlement must be declared with respect to the entity to which it is attached. In this regard, it is important to note that granting legal personality to an entity or body has the immediate consequence of making it the ultimate and sole locus to which the effects of its acts or omissions are attributable.” (Decision No. 1360-F-S1-2010 of diez horas veinticinco minutos del once de noviembre de dos mil diez). In the present matter, it is clear that neither the State nor SINAC is responsible for the conduct undertaken and challenged by the plaintiffs.
That conduct was solely that of INDER in the exercise of its powers, for which it must answer individually. The representative of INDER raised the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva), and lack of legal entitlement. Regarding the statute-of-limitations defense, this Court ruled in recital V (considerando V). As to the defense of lack of standing, it must be noted that standing constitutes the capacity or qualification to be a party to a specific proceeding as a defendant, depending on the conditions prescribed for that purpose by procedural law in relation to the claim asserted. Standing arises either from the legal-administrative relationship (relación jurídico-administrativa) established between the plaintiff and the Administration, or from the law, according to what the law has established in that regard.
There are two types of standing in a proceeding: standing on the merits (ad causam) and procedural capacity (ad procesum). The former (ad causam) concerns determining whether the person filing the action legally possesses a right that may be claimed; that is, the party with standing is the person who, under substantive law, has a particular legal relationship with the subject matter of the proceeding, namely the claim. The latter (ad procesum) concerns a procedural issue; in other words, whether the person appearing has the legal capacity to act or, if acting on behalf of another, has the appropriate type of legal representation in accordance with our laws. In the present case, it was established that the plaintiffs acquired parcel No. 74-A-4 in el año 2000, located in the Asentamiento Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí, and in el año 2015 submitted an application to INDER for titling (titularización).
That application was denied for the reasons stated. Thus, a legal-administrative relationship arose between the plaintiffs and INDER, and the plaintiffs therefore have active standing to bring the action, while INDER has passive standing to be sued; accordingly, that defense is rejected. Finally, with respect to the defense of lack of legal entitlement, returning to what our First Chamber has stated, proof of the facts is essential, as a fundamental component thereof, because the determination made in that section will establish whether the legal grounds for the relief sought exist. Because the plaintiffs’ rights have been partially established, the proper course is to sustain that defense in part.
Article 193 of the CPCA provides that procedural costs and attorney’s fees (costas procesales y personales) shall be imposed on the unsuccessful party solely by virtue of having lost, a ruling that must be made even sua sponte, pursuant to that same provision, in conjunction with section 119.2 ibídem. Exemption from this award is permissible only: a) when, in the Court’s judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when judgment is entered on the basis of evidence of which the opposing party was unaware; or c) when excessive pleading (plus petitio) occurs, that is, when the difference between the relief claimed and that ultimately obtained is fifteen percent (151/2) or more, unless the grounds of the complaint were expressly deemed provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (section 194 ibídem). In this case, this Collegiate Court finds that none of the stated exceptions permitting departure from the principle of imposing costs on the unsuccessful party applies; accordingly, INDER must be ordered to pay both categories of costs in this Proceeding.
The amount thereof shall be determined during the Judgment Enforcement Stage (Etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia) upon application by the prevailing party. Insofar as the action was brought against the State and SINAC, the matter is resolved without a specific award of costs, because both parties were joined sua sponte by the Case-Management Judge (Juez Tramitador).
THEREFORE:
The evidence submitted to assist the Court in reaching its decision (prueba para mejor resolver) is admitted. The statute-of-limitations defense is rejected. Insofar as the action was brought against the State and SINAC, the defenses of lack of passive standing on the merits and Lack of Legal Entitlement are sustained. Consequently, the action filed against both represented parties is dismissed. With respect to INDER, the defense of lack of passive standing is rejected and the defense of Lack of Legal Entitlement is partially sustained; consequently, the action against that entity is partially granted and is deemed denied as to all relief not expressly granted, as follows: i) INDER is ordered to pay the plaintiffs for the improvements and fixtures (mejoras y accesiones) made to parcel No. Placa19621, which shall be assessed and valued during enforcement of the judgment (ejecución de sentencia), and over which the plaintiffs shall have a right of retention (derecho de retención) until payment is made in full. ii) INDER is ordered to pay the plaintiffs both categories of costs in this Proceeding.
The amount thereof shall be determined during the Judgment Enforcement Stage upon application by the prevailing party. iii) Insofar as the action was brought against the State and SINAC, the matter is resolved without a specific award of costs. NOTICE SHALL BE GIVEN. José Iván Salas Leitón. Judith Reyes Castillo. Elías Baltodano Gómez. Judges.
*GLXZQYY8BWC61* JOSE IVAN SALAS LEITON - DECIDING JUDGE *JKZAIGDBXP061* JUDITH REYES CASTILLO - DECIDING JUDGE *T0HQ1D47WQLI61* ELIAS BALTODANO GOMEZ - DECIDING JUDGE
TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A Dirección218( ) PROCESO: CONOCIMIENTO ACTORES: Nombre111167 Y Nombre23709 DEMANDADO: EL INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, EL ESTADO Y EL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN Nº 055-2022-IV SECCIÓN CUARTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , a las siete horas con treinta minutos del treinta de mayo de dos mil veintidós.
Proceso de Conocimiento interpuesto por el señor Nombre111167 , quien es mayor, casado, ganadero, cédula No. CED87830 y la señora Nombre23709 quien es mayor, casada, pensionada, con cédula de identidad número CED87831, ambos vecinos de Horquetas de Sarapiquí, Asentamiento Cubujuquí contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL en adelante el INDER, representando por el Licenciado Natanael José Barrantes Azofeifa, carné 19857, EL ESTADO representado por la Licenciada Rosario León Yannarella y el SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN en adelante el SINAC representado por el Licenciado Guillermo Corrales Cordero, carné CED87832. Interviene como apoderada especial judicial de los actores la Licenciada Julissa Rodríguez Rojas, carné 22668.
RESULTANDO:
I.Por escrito recibido el día 11 de junio de 2020 y subsanado el día 18 de ese mismo mes y año, la representación de los actores presentó demanda en contra el INDER cuyas pretensiones fueron precisadas en la audiencia preliminar realizada el día 11 de noviembre de 2020 de la siguiente manera: "...1. Que sea adjudicado a nuestro nombre el bien objeto del presente proceso y nos otorguen la Escritura Pública del mismo, así como ha sido posible con otros adjudicatarios y sus bienes en el mismo Asentamiento. De manera subsidiaria, solicitamos en caso de no ser adjudicada a nuestro nombre la finca en mención, se nos cancelen todas y cada una de las accesiones y mejoras que hemos introducido al bien durante el tiempo que lo hemos poseído de buena fe, como buenos padres de familia, posesión que como hemos venido demostrando, lo ha sido a título de dueños. 2. Que se condene la parte demandada al pago de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a nuestras personas.
Así mismo, solicito se condene a la parte demandada al pago de los daños y perjuicios que se causen en el futuro producto de las consecuencias de un eventual desalojo y los cuales estaremos liquidando en proceso de ejecución de sentencia que corresponda. 3. Que se condene a la parte demandada al pago de Ambas Costas Procesales de la presente causa. 4. Que se condene a la parte demandada al (Sic) pagarnos el daño moral subjetivo que nos ha causado...". Daño moral subjetivo que fue precisado en su demanda. (Ver imagen 278 del expediente judicial y respaldo electrónico de la Audiencia Preliminar).
II.Por resolución de 09:56 horas del 19 de junio de 2020, de oficio se integró por parte del Tribunal al Estado y al SINAC y se dio traslado a todas las partes vinculadas en la relación jurídico procesal. (Ver imágenes de la 287 a la 290 del expediente digital judicial).
III.Conferido el traslado de ley, la representación del INDER contestó negativamente la demanda y en su defensa opuso las excepciones de prescripción, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho. Por su parte la representación del SINAC también rechazó la demanda y opuso las defensas de falta de legitimación y falta de derecho. Finalmente la representación estatal, también rechazó la demanda y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. (Ver imágenes de la 483 a la 579, de la 772 a la 788 y de la 798 a la 814 del expediente digital judicial).
IV.La Audiencia Preliminar se llevó en fecha 11 de noviembre de 2020, con asistencia de los representantes de las partes. La pretensión se definió en los términos del primer resultando de este fallo. Se reservó la excepción de prescripción para ser conocida en sentencia. Se determinaron los hechos controvertidos y no controvertidos de relevancia para la resolución del caso y se admitió la prueba documental y testimonial de los señores Nombre111168 , Nombre111169 , Carlos Nelson Salazar Chacón y Didier Rodríguez Salazar. (Imágenes de la 1109 a la 1113 del expediente judicial. Respaldo electrónico de la referida Audiencia).
V.El Juicio Oral y Público se llevó a cabo a partir de las 8:30 horas del 11 de mayo de 2022, mismo en el cual se recibió el alegato de apertura, se evacuó la prueba testimonial de los señores Nombre111168 , Nombre111169 , Carlos Nelson Salazar Chacón y Didier Rodríguez Salazar y finalmente las partes rindieron sus conclusiones. (Respaldo disco compacto de la Audiencia Complementaria).
VI.Se dicta esta sentencia, previa deliberación de los integrantes del Tribunal, dentro del plazo de quince días establecido en el artículo 111.1 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo -al haberse declarado complejo el presente asunto-, sin que se observen causales capaces de invalidar lo actuado.
Redacta el Juez Salas Leitón, con el voto afirmativo de los juzgadores Reyes Castillo y Baltodano Gómez.
CONSIDERANDO:
En la audiencia preliminar celebrada el día 11 de noviembre de 2020, la representante de la parte actora ofreció a título de prueba para mejor resolver copia del plano visible a imagen 1094 del expediente digital judicial y fotografía de los libros de control de visitas al INDER en Horquetas de Sarapiquí la cual fue reservada a este Tribunal. (Ver imágenes de la 300 a la 482 del expediente digital judicial). En cuanto a la admisibilidad de la prueba para mejor resolver, se debe indicar que es criterio reiterado de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, que su rechazo no produce la indefensión de las partes, y su admisión o rechazo por parte del Tribunal carece de recurso. Entre otras sentencias, se transcribe en lo que interesa el Voto N° 547-F-2002 de las 16 horas del 12 de julio de 2002, en el cual esa Sala indicó: “(…) IV.- Múltiples precedentes de esta Sala, refiriéndose a la prueba para mejor resolver, han señalado que esta es prueba del juez, y no de las partes.
En consecuencia, la decisión de recabarla es facultativa del órgano jurisdiccional, y puede prescindirse de ella sin necesidad de resolución alguna. Ergo, la omisión de pronunciamiento a su respecto, precisamente porque ha sido rebasada la etapa probatoria, en la cual deben las partes demostrar los hechos constitutivos de su derecho, según lo imponen las normas sobre la carga de la prueba y precluida aquella etapa, será facultad exclusiva del juzgador, determinar si deben allegarse a los autos nuevas probanzas necesarias para la correcta decisión del litigio. Pueden consultarse, entre muchas otras las siguientes resoluciones; 59 de las 15:20 horas del 31 de mayo de 1996, 23 de las 14:20 horas del 4 de marzo de 1992, 34 de las 10:45 horas del 28 de mayo de 1993 y 83 de las 14:40 horas del 22 de diciembre de 1993. (…)”. En el caso concreto, el Tribunal estima que la prueba ofrecida en condición de prueba para mejor posee pertinencia, razón por la cual se admite.
II.HECHOS PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de la presente litis, se tienen como debidamente acreditados los siguientes:
Por encontrase ayuno de prueba los autos, se tiene por indemostrado:
En síntesis y sin perjuicio de la literalidad de sus argumentaciones, las cuales han sido estudiadas en su totalidad por este Tribunal, cada una de las partes alegan lo que seguidamente se detalla en este apartado en lo que interesa:
La representación del INDER opuso en su defensa la excepción de prescripción indicando que la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central se creó desde el año de 1975 y el Estado gestionó una expropiación sobre la finca No. H-57748-000, no obstante la presente demanda se planteó hasta el año 2019, es decir, más de 40 años de que el inmueble fue expropiado, por lo que conforme a lo establecido en el artículo 868 del C.C. el derecho a reclamar está prescrito. Aunado a que los actores adquirieron un supuesto derecho de posesión en el año 2000, es decir 19 años antes de que se interpusiera la demanda. Además que el artículo 198 de la LGAP establece un plazo de 4 años para este tipo de reclamaciones. En el presente caso tenemos por acreditado que los actores adquirieron en el año 2000 del señor Nombre111170 el inmueble ubicado en el Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí ubicado en Horquetas de Sarapiquí, por la suma de 15 millones de colones y que fue descrito en el plano catastrado No. 1107776-2006.
También quedó acreditado que ese inmueble es parte de la finca del Partido de Heredia No. 57748, expropiada a solicitud del ITCO conforme al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 6235-G, publicado en la Gaceta No. 156 del 17 de agosto de 1976. Luego, también se tuvo por acreditado que los actores presentaron solicitud de titularización de dicho inmueble ante la Oficina Subregional del INDER en Horquetas de Sarapiquí el día 05 de agosto de 2015 y para los efectos aportaron el Plano Catastrado No. Placa19619. Que en razón de dicha solicitud, la Oficina Subregional del INDER en Horquetas, por oficio OSH-669-2015 del 07 de agosto de 2015, le consultó a la Jefatura del Área Cordillera Volcánica Central si el predio ubicado en Cubujuquí, según plano catastrado No. 1107776-2006 se ubicaba o no dentro de las áreas silvestres protegidas y administradas por el MINAET, o si forman parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado y esa Jefatura por oficio Placa19617 del 20 de agosto de 2015 contestó que la parcela con plano No. H-1107776-2006, ubicado en Cubujuquí de Horquetas, se encuentra dentro de las áreas silvestres protegidas y administradas por el MINAE formando parte en este caso de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central y por ende parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
También quedó acreditado que fue hasta por oficio OTHO-758-2018 del 28 de setiembre de 2018 que la Oficina Territorial del INDER en Horquetas, les comunicó oficialmente a los actores la situación del inmueble con respecto a la Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica Central, y la Junta Directiva del INDER en su artículo 37 de la Sesión Ordinaria 22, celebrada el día 26 de agosto de 2019, rechazó en definitiva la solicitud de titulación de dicha parcela por ese motivo. Ante esa situación los actores plantearon proceso ante esta Jurisdicción el día 11 de junio de 2020, solicitando que en sentencia: 1) Les sea adjudicada la parcela identificada por el INDER como la No. 74-A-4. 2) En su defecto se les cancele las acciones y mejoras introducidas en el fundo, así como el pago del daño moral subjetivo y los daños y perjuicios causados y los que se le llegaren a causar con un eventual desalojo.
De manera que del elenco de pretensiones están referenciadas a que en sentencia se ordene conductas de hacer y subsidiariamente indemnizatorias, por actividad formal del INDER contenida en el acuerdo tomado por su Junta Directiva en el que rechazó la solicitud planteada por los actores cuya fecha de emisión los es el 26 de agosto de 2019. Así, siendo que los actores presentaron el día 11 de junio de 2020 demanda ordinaria su derecho a reclamar la indemnización patrimonial señalada no se encuentra prescrita, pues entre el 26 de agosto del 2019 y el 11 de junio de 2020 no superó el plazo señalado en el artículo 198 de la LGAP por lo que la excepción de prescripción se rechaza.
Sobre la base de la literalidad de las argumentaciones brindadas por las partes, las cuales fueron estudiadas en su totalidad por este Tribunal, se procedió al análisis del presente asunto y con base en los hechos alegados y la prueba acreditada. Al respecto tenemos que los actores plantearon demanda indicando que el señor Nombre111168 entró en el año 1973 en posesión de una finca de alrededor de 80 hectáreas ubicada en la localidad de Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí. Que posteriormente el señor Nombre111168 vendió parte de dicha finca al señor que identificaron únicamente como Nombre111171 , asegurando que este vendió al señor Nombre84914 , y este al señor Nombre111170 . Que de esa forma sobre la finca original de 80 hectáreas y sus posteriores segregaciones, se ejerció un derecho de posesión de más de 40 años. Señaló que sus representados entraron en el año de 1999 en una negociación con el señor Nombre111170 , para adquirir su derecho de posesión sobre el inmueble descrito en el plano H-1107776-2006, el cual tiene una cabida de aproximadamente 8 hectáreas, ---cuando dicho inmueble ya formaba parte del Asentamiento Cubujuquí identificada por el INDER como la parcela No. Placa19621---.
Situación que se acreditó con el croquis confeccionado en el año de 1978 por personeros en ese entonces del ITCO. Manifestó que en el año 2000 sus representados por consejo de un personero del INDER adquirieron dicha parcela e iniciaron ante esa institución gestiones tendentes a lograr su titularización, sin embargo la Junta Directiva del INDER resolvió en su artículo 37 de la sesión ordinaria No. 22 del 26 de agosto de 2019 que su solicitud resultaba legalmente improcedente en virtud de que alrededor de un 90% del terreno se ubicaba dentro de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central y por ende PNE bajo tutela del MINAE-SINAC, y por tanto solicitaron que en sentencia se ordene al INDER a titularles la citada parcela o en su defecto se ordene que se les cancele las accesiones y mejoras que de buena fe, le introdujeron al bien durante el tiempo que lo han poseído a título de dueños.
De esta forma plantearon su demanda, sobre la base de un posesión ejercida de buena fe sobre la parcela identificada por el INDER No. 74-A-4 ubicada en el Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí. Posesión que se arrastra desde que el señor Nombre111168 ingresó a la zona, hasta la que les traspasó el señor Nombre111170 y que indicaron supera los 40 años. Solicitaron que en sentencia se ordene al INDER a que se les otorgue la escritura pública sobre el inmueble o en su defecto se les cancele las accesiones y mejoras que de buena fe, le introdujeron al bien durante el tiempo que lo han poseído a título de dueños. Por su parte, las accionadas se oponen a que se les otorgue la escritura pública de la citada parcela, indicando que lo resuelto por el INDER al denegar la escritura pública se ajusta al ordenamiento jurídico toda vez que el inmueble se encuentra en más de un 90% dentro del área de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central y por ende Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
Y que en tal sentido la jurisprudencial de la Sala Constitucional ha establecido que el Patrimonio Natural del Estado lo integran dos importantes componentes: por un lado las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas (cualquier sea su categoría de manejo) declaradas por Ley o Decreto Ejecutivo; entendiéndose como tales las reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, refugios nacionales de vida silvestre, humedales y monumentos naturales, según la regulación prevista en los artículos 1, 2, 3 inciso i) de la Ley Forestal; 32 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente; 22, 28 y 58 de la Ley de Biodiversidad; 3 incisos d) y f) de la Ley del Servicio de Parques Nacionales; 3, 7, 17, 82 incisos a) y b) de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre y por otro; el Patrimonio Natural del Estado que está conformado por los demás bosques y terrenos forestales o de aptitud forestal perteneciente al Estado e instituciones públicas (artículo 13 de la Ley Forestal), los cuales tienen una afectación legal inmediata.
Sobre la pretensión subsidiaria (que en caso de que no proceda el otorgamiento de la escritura se les indemnice todas las accesiones y mejoras) indicaron que no les corresponde por cuanto la ocupación lo es sobre un inmueble que forma parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado y esa mera ocupación no le genera derecho alguno. Criterio de la Cámara: Tal y como se indicó supra, el objeto de la presente demanda lo es para que en sentencia: 1. Se le adjudique a los actores la parcela ubicada en el Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí identificada como la No. 74-A-4 y en ese tanto su escritura pública. 2. Que en caso de que no se les pueda adjudicar dicha parcela se les cancele las accesiones y mejoras que han introducido al bien durante el tiempo que lo han poseído de buena fe. 3. Que se les cancele los daños y perjuicios que se les cause ante un eventual desalojo y el daño moral subjetivo causado.
En razón de lo anterior esta Cámara analizará en su orden cada una de dichas pretensiones de acuerdo a los hechos que se han tenido por acreditados de cara al ordenamiento jurídico aplicable. A) Sobre la solicitud de titulación del inmueble: Analizado lo resuelto por la Junta Directiva del INDER en el artículo 37 de la sesión ordinaria No. 22 del 26 de agosto de 2019 (lo cual no ha sido cuestionado en la presente demanda) se ajustó a derecho pues se ha tenido por acreditado que: i) El Estado Costarricense en tutela del medio ambiente, otorgó en los artículos 18, 19 y 28 de la "Ley Forestal" No. 4465 del 25 de noviembre de 1969, una protección especial sobre el Patrimonio Forestal del Estado. Su artículo 18 dispuso: "El Patrimonio Forestal del Estado está constituido por las Reservas Nacionales, Reservas Forestales, Parques Nacionales, Viveros Forestales del Estado, las Zonas Protectoras y Reservas Biológicas." Su artículo 19: "Quedan afectados a los fines de la presente ley, todos los bosques y terrenos forestales situados en: a) Las tierras consideradas como Reservas Nacionales; y b) Las fincas rurales del dominio privado del Estado, las pertenecientes a municipalidades e instituciones autónomas y semiautónomas." Dicha Ley fue reformada por la Ley No. 7174 "Ley Forestal" del 28 de junio de 1990, y en su artículo 32 se dispuso: "El patrimonio forestal del Estado está constituido por todos los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a las municipalidades, a las instituciones autónomas y a los demás organismos de la Administración Pública.".
Por su parte el articulo 33) "Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio forestal del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no son susceptibles de inscripción en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria; su invasión y ocupación serán sancionadas conforme con lo dispuesto en esta ley de aptitud forestal, quedarán automáticamente incorporados al patrimonio forestal del Estado." Finalmente la "Ley Forestal" No. 7575 del 16 de marzo de 1996, (Que reformó las anteriores) dispuso en su artículo 13): "Constitución y administración. El patrimonio natural del Estado estará constituido por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias con el Sistema Bancario Nacional e ingresen a formar parte de su patrimonio.
El Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía administrará el patrimonio. Cuando proceda, por medio de la Procuraduría General de la República, inscribirá los terrenos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad como fincas individualizadas de propiedad del Estado. Las organizaciones no gubernamentales que adquieran bienes inmuebles con bosque o de aptitud forestal, con fondos provenientes de donaciones o del erario, que se hayan obtenido a nombre del Estado, deberán traspasarlos a nombre de este." Y el artículo 14): "Condición inembargable e inalienable del patrimonio natural. Los terrenos forestales y bosques que constituyen el patrimonio natural del Estado, detallados en el artículo anterior, serán inembargables e inalienables; su posesión por los particulares no causará derecho alguno a su favor y la acción reivindicatoria del Estado por estos terrenos es imprescriptible. En consecuencia, no pueden inscribirse en el Registro Público mediante información posesoria y tanto la invasión como la ocupación de ellos será sancionada conforme a lo dispuesto en esta ley." De esta forma, la normativa que tutela el Patrimonio Forestal del Estado desde el año de 1969 incluyó dentro de dichos bienes, los terrenos de aptitud forestal que pertenezcan al Estado central y a sus instituciones descentralizadas, como lo es el INDER. ii) El Estado costarricense en aras de la protección al medio ambiente, mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 4961 publicado en La Gaceta No. 130 del 11 de julio de 1975, reformado por el Decreto No. 5386 del 28 de octubre de 1975, creó la "Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central", indicándose en su artículo 1: "Establécese la Reserva Forestal de la Cordillera Volcánica Central que comprende el territorio ubicado dentro de la siguiente demarcación (según mapas topográficos 1:50000 IGN : Río Cuarto 3347 II, Poás 3346 I, Barva 346 II, Abra 3345 I, Río Sucio Placa19614, Guápiles 3446 IV, Carrillo Placa19615, Istarú 3445 IV, Guácimo 3446 I, Bonilla 3446 II, Tucurrique 3445 I)." Por su parte el artículo 3: "Se declaran inalienables las reservas nacionales que se encuentran dentro de la anterior delimitación." El artículo 4: "La Procuraduría General de la República, hará inscribir los terrenos del Estado de esta Reserva en el Registro Público, como finca individualizada del Patrimonio Nacional." Su artículo 7: "Las fincas inscritas en el Registro Público y las amparadas por la posesión decenal, establecidas dentro de los límites de la reserva quedan automáticamente sometidas al Régimen Forestal." Finalmente su artículo 8: "Las fincas no comprendidas en el artículo anterior formarán parte del patrimonio forestal del Estado, previos los trámites legales." iii) A solicitud del entonces ITCO (hoy INDER) el Poder Ejecutivo por Decreto No. 6236-G publicado en la Gaceta No. 156 del 17 de agosto de 1976 expropió a la Sociedad Cubujuquí Ltda., la propiedad inscrita en el Registro Público al Tomo 1792, Folio 128, Asiento 2 del partido de Heredia No. 57748 con el fin de generar una solución agraria y otorgar parcelas a agricultores en el proyecto denominado "Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí" ubicado en Horquetas de Sarapiquí. iv) Que los señores actores adquirieron del señor Nombre111170 en el año 2000 el inmueble descrito en el plano No. H-1107776-2006, e identificado por el INDER como la parcela No. 74-A-4 ubicada en el Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí y que dentro de las diligencias de titulación, la Oficina Subregional del INDER en Horquetas, por oficio OSH-669-2015 del 07 de agosto de 2015, le consultó a la Jefatura del Área Cordillera Volcánica Central si el predio ubicado en Cubujuquí, según plano catastrado No. 1107776-2006 se ubica o no dentro de las áreas silvestres protegidas y administradas por el MINAET, o si forman parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado.
Por su parte la Jefatura del Área Cordillera Volcánica Central, respondió lo solicitado mediante oficio Placa19617 del 20 de agosto de 2015; en el que indicó que en apego a lo dispuesto en los artículos 13, 14, y 15 de la Ley Forestal No. 7575 y sus reformas y al oficio Placa19618 del 20 de agosto de 2015, elaborado por el Ing. Juan Alexis Jiménez Cerdas, el cual se refiere a la visita de campo; la parcela con plano No. H-1107776-2006, ubicado en Cubujuquí de Horquetas, se encuentra dentro de las áreas silvestres protegidas y administradas por el MINAE formando parte en este caso de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central y por ende parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado. Por su parte la Dirección del Área de Conservación Central del SINAC mediante oficio SINAC-ACC-D-1131-2020 del 17 de julio de 2020, especificó que según los oficios OS-1336 y OS-1338, referidos al plano catastrado H-1107776-2006, el inmueble ahí descrito se ubica en un 98% dentro de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central.
De esta manera ha quedado acreditado más allá de toda duda que el terreno que se describe en el plano catastrado No. H-1107776-2006, que se corresponde con la parcela del Asentamiento Campesino Cubujuquí en Horquetas de Sarapiquí identificada como la No. 74-A-4 se ubica en un 98% dentro de los linderos de la Reserva Forestal Cordillera Volcánica Central. Dicha situación hace imposible legalmente que se le pueda otorgar escritura pública sobre dicho inmueble, pues al formar parte dicho inmueble de la citada reserva, el terreno forma parte de pleno derecho de ella, no pudiendo ser titulado a nombre de particulares, pues es claro que están afectos a las características propias de estos inmuebles, a saber, ser bienes sobre los que no opera la prescripción positiva, son inembargables e inalienables. En esta línea, se puede profundizar en las sentencias emitidas por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Nos. 1070-F-S1-2010, 1088-F-S1-2011 y 1675-F-51-2012, así como sentencias de la Sala Constitucional Nos. 17659-2008, 21258-2010 y 16938-2011, entre otras muchas, en las que esas instancias judiciales, han señalado que sobre el Patrimonio Natural del Estado, como parte de los bienes de dominio público, no es posible que los particulares ejerzan algún tipo de posesión o propiedad, de lo que deriva además, que tampoco es viable el adquirir la propiedad por usucapión o prescripción positiva, aunque hubieran estado por más de diez años en tales terrenos, y mucho menos que una Administración las pueda adjudicar a favor de un particular. En razón de ello la pretensión de titulación resulta improcedente. B) Sobre la solicitud de reconocimiento de las mejoras y accesiones: De acuerdo a lo que se acreditó, tenemos:
Las representaciones del SINAC y el Estado opusieron en su defensa las excepciones de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y falta de derecho, las cuales deben acogerse a la luz de lo que ha indicado la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia cuando ha señalado: "Dicho de otro modo, el mandato procesal ordena únicamente que se incorpore a la discusión judicial tanto al órgano con personalidad como al Estado u ente al que pertenece. Corresponde luego al juez o jueza, con arreglo a las normas sustantivas, determinar si el acto, conducta o indolencia cuestionados se desarrolló o no bajo personalidad estableciendo de este modo, si es el órgano el que debe responder con su propio peculio, o si es el ente o el Estado a quien debe atribuirse el deber de reparar." (Resolución No. 1360-F-S1-2010 de las diez horas veinticinco minutos del once de noviembre del dos mil diez. En el mismo sentido, la Sentencia No. 883-F-S1-2011 de las nueve horas cinco minutos del veintiocho de julio del dos mil once).
"(...) si se determina que el acto impugnado constituye el ejercicio de una competencia propia y exclusiva del denominada "órgano-persona", como consecuencia lógica y natural lo procedente es declarar una falta de derecho respecto del ente al cual está adscrito. En este sentido, es importante indicar que el otorgamiento de personalidad jurídica a un ente u órgano tiene como consecuencia inmediata el constituirlos en un centro último y único de imputación de los efectos de sus actuaciones u omisiones." (Resolución No. 1360-F-S1-2010 de las diez horas veinticinco minutos del once de noviembre de dos mil diez). En el presente asunto es claro que no hay conducta imputable ni al Estado ni al SINAC en lo actuado y cuestionado por los actores. Conducta que fue proia del INDER en el ejercicio de sus competencias y por las cuales debe responder de forma indivudual. La representación del INDER opuso la excepción de prescripción, falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho.
Respecto a la excepción de prescripción este Tribunal se manifestó en el considerando V. Sobre la excepción de falta de legitimación, debe advertirse que la legitimación constituye la capacidad, la aptitud para ser parte de un proceso concreto, como parte pasiva, dependiendo de las condiciones que para tal efecto, la ley procesal preceptúa con relación a la pretensión que se plantea. Ahora, la legitimación deviene ya sea de la relación jurídico-administrativa establecida entre el actor y la Administración, o bien de la ley, de acuerdo a la que ella haya establecido al respecto. Y es que en un proceso existen dos tipos de legitimación, para la causa (ad causam) y para el proceso (ad procesum). La primera (ad causam) versa en verificar si la persona que interpone la demanda tiene jurídicamente hablando un derecho que reclamar, es decir; la parte legitimada es aquella persona que al tenor del derecho de fondo tiene una determinada relación-jurídica con el objeto del proceso, sea la pretensión.
La segunda (ad procesum) consiste en una cuestión procesal, en otras palabras, si quien se apersona tiene capacidad de actuar conforme a la ley o si actúa por otro con el tipo de representación legal adecuada ajustada a nuestra normativa. En el presente caso se tuvo por acreditado que los actores adquirieron la parcela No. 74-A-4 en el año 2000 ubicada en el Asentamiento Cubujuquí de Horquetas de Sarapiquí y plantearon en el año 2015 una solicitud ante el INDER de titularización. Solicitud que les fue denegada por las razones que se indicaron. De esta forma entre los actores y el INDER se generó una relación jurídica administrativa y por ello los actores están legitimados activamente para accionar y el INDER para ser accionado, razón por la cual se rechaza dicha excepción. Finalmente, en cuanto a la excepción de falta de derecho, retomando lo dicho por nuestra Sala Primera, es menester la demostración de los hechos, como parte fundamental de ello, porque de lo que en ese acápite se determina, se podrá desprender si existen o no las bases legales para lo pretendido. Habiéndose acreditado derechos parciales de los actores, lo procedente es acoger la indicada excepción de manera parcial.
El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable: a) cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar; b) cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas que desconociera la parte contraria; o bien, c) cuando se incurra en plus petitio, esto es, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento (151/2) o más, a no ser que las bases de la demanda sean expresamente consideradas provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos (ordinal 194 ibídem). En la especie, no encuentra este Órgano Colegiado que estemos frente a alguna de las excepciones dichas que permita quebrar el postulado de imposición de costas al vencido, y en ese tanto, lo procedente es condenar al INDER al pago de ambas costas de este Proceso. Quantum de las mismas que se determinará en la Etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia a ruego de la parte vencedora. En lo que la demanda se dirigió contra el Estado y el SINAC, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas, pues ambas partes fueron integradas de oficio por parte del Juez Tramitador.
POR TANTO:
Se admite la prueba para mejor resolver. Se rechaza la excepción de prescripción del derecho. En lo que la demanda se dirigió contra el Estado y el SINAC, se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y Falta de Derecho. Con ocasión de lo cual, la demanda interpuesta contra ambas representaciones se declara sin lugar. En lo que atañe al INDER se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva y se acoge de forma parcial la excepción de Falta de Derecho y en consecuencia, se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda contra dicho ente, entendiéndose denegada en lo no expresamente concedido, así: i) Se condena al INDER a pagar a los actores las mejoras y accesiones realizadas en la parcela No. Placa19621, las cuales serán liquidadas y estimadas en ejecución de sentencia y sobre las cuales tendrán los actores derecho de retención hasta su efectivo pago. ii) Se condena al INDER a pagar a los actores ambas costas de este Proceso. Quantum de las mismas que se determinará en Etapa de Ejecución de Sentencia a instancia de la parte vencedora. iii) En lo que la demanda se dirigió contra el Estado y el SINAC, se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas. NOTIFÍQUESE. José Iván Salas Leitón. Judith Reyes Castillo. Elías Baltodano Gómez. Jueces.
*GLXZQYY8BWC61* JOSE IVAN SALAS LEITON - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *JKZAIGDBXP061* JUDITH REYES CASTILLO - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A *T0HQ1D47WQLI61* ELIAS BALTODANO GOMEZ - JUEZ/A DECISOR/A
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