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Res. 00145-2021 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 29/10/2021
OutcomeResultado
The Court partially annulled the former IDA titling decision and, as connected acts, the parcel’s segregation, transfer, and registry entry, maintained the environmental interim measures until final judgment, and denied FONAFIFO’s third-party action.El Tribunal anuló parcialmente el acuerdo de titulación del antiguo IDA y, por conexidad, la segregación, el traspaso y el asiento registral de la finca, mantuvo las medidas cautelares ambientales hasta la firmeza y rechazó la tercería de FONAFIFO.
SummaryResumen
The Court partially upheld INDER’s lesividad action against the Association of Organizations of the Talamanca-Caribbean Biological Corridor. With declaratory and retroactive effect, it partially annulled the former IDA Board decision authorizing title to a 183,488.35-square-meter parcel from the BIRF 2764 titling project in favor of the Association. As connected legal acts, it also annulled the portion of the public deed segregating and transferring that parcel and the parcel’s entire National Registry entry, while preserving rights acquired in good faith. The Court dismissed the remaining legally unfounded claims and denied FONAFIFO’s third-party action asserting its own claims. It further kept the interim measures in force until the judgment became final. Those measures required protection of the forest, vegetation cover, natural regeneration, ecosystems, and other natural resources on the property and prohibited land-use change. Although the Association and FONAFIFO did not prevail, the Court imposed no costs because each had sufficient grounds to litigate.El Tribunal declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda de lesividad promovida por el INDER contra la Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca-Caribe. Anuló parcialmente, con efectos declarativos y retroactivos, el acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del antiguo IDA que había autorizado titular a favor de la Asociación una parcela de 183.488,35 m² del proyecto BIRF 2764. Por conexidad, anuló la parte de la escritura pública mediante la cual se segregó y traspasó esa parcela y la totalidad de su asiento registral, con reserva de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe. El Tribunal desestimó las restantes pretensiones improcedentes y declaró sin lugar la tercería de FONAFIFO. Asimismo, mantuvo hasta la firmeza de la sentencia las medidas cautelares que protegían el bosque, la cobertura vegetal, la regeneración natural y los demás recursos del inmueble, además de impedir el cambio de uso del suelo. Las partes vencidas fueron exoneradas del pago de costas por tener motivo suficiente para litigar.
Key excerptExtracto clave
A) THE LESIVIDAD ACTION filed by the RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (INDER) against the ASSOCIATION OF ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TALAMANCA-CARIBBEAN BIOLOGICAL CORRIDOR IS PARTIALLY UPHELD. Consequently, the Court unanimously declares: 1) The partial absolute nullity of Decision No. 161, adopted under Article 161 of Ordinary Session No. 023-2004 of the Board of Directors of the former Agrarian Development Institute (IDA), now the Rural Development Institute (INDER), held on June 21, 2004, exclusively insofar as it ordered the titling in favor of the Association of Organizations of the Talamanca-Caribbean Biological Corridor of Dirección16846 from the BIRF 2764 titling project, measuring 183,488.35 m2 and identified by cadastral plan No. L-645227-2000, which currently corresponds to the Limón property recorded under registration number Placa25891. Under Article 171 of the General Public Administration Law, in relation to Articles 39(2) and 131 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, this declaration has declaratory and retroactive effects as of the date of the invalidated acts, except for rights acquired in good faith. The remaining claims not covered by the foregoing ruling are dismissed as legally unfounded.A) SE DECLARA PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR la demanda de lesividad incoada por el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), contra la ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBE. En consecuencia, por unanimidad, se declara: 1) La nulidad absoluta parcial del acuerdo número 161, adoptado en el Artículo 161 de la sesión ordinaria número 023-2004 de la Junta Directiva del entonces Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), llevada a cabo el día 21 de junio de 2004, exclusivamente, en tanto se dispuso allí la titulación a favor de la Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe, de la Dirección16846 del proyecto de titulación BIRF 2764, con una cabida de 183,488.35 m2 y plano catastrado n° L-645227-2000, que se corresponde actualmente con la finca del Partido de Limón con número de matrícula Placa25891. De conformidad con el artículo 171 de la LGAP en relación a los numerales 39 inciso 2) y 131 del CPCA, esta declaratoria tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de los actos invalidados, salvo derechos adquiridos de buena fe. El resto de pretensiones no incluidas en el anterior pronunciamiento, se desestiman por resultar jurídicamente improcedentes.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Evitar cualquier acción que vaya a afectar materialmente los bienes que se encuentran en el bosque y demás recursos naturales, cubrir no solamente lo que corresponde al área forestal sino en general los ecosistemas, previniendo cualquier deterioro y ciertamente con la imposibilidad de realizar un cambio en el uso del suelo."
"Avoid any action that could materially affect the assets located in the forest and other natural resources, protecting not only the forest area but ecosystems generally, preventing any deterioration, and expressly prohibiting any change in land use."
Considerando XIII
"Evitar cualquier acción que vaya a afectar materialmente los bienes que se encuentran en el bosque y demás recursos naturales, cubrir no solamente lo que corresponde al área forestal sino en general los ecosistemas, previniendo cualquier deterioro y ciertamente con la imposibilidad de realizar un cambio en el uso del suelo."
Considerando XIII
"Se exonera a las partes vencidas del pago de las costas."
"The nonprevailing parties are exempted from payment of costs."
Por tanto
"Se exonera a las partes vencidas del pago de las costas."
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
Res N° 145-2021â•?VI 10 hours 29-Oct-2021 - Judgment.docx TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Main: 2545-00-03 Fax: 2545-00-33 Email ...01 CASE FILE:13-005325-1027-CAPROCEEDING:ORDINARY PROCEEDING AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONPLAINTIFF:INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURALDEFENDANT:ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBETHIRD PARTIES:FONDO NACIONAL DE FINANCIAMIENTO FORESTALINTERVENORS:THE STATE AND SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓNDECISION N.º 145-2021 – VI TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA - SIXTH SECTIONSECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, at ten hours on the twenty-ninth of October, two thousand twenty-one. - Proceeding for a declaration of injury to the public interest (proceso de lesividad) instituted by INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), represented by Nombre114598 and Nombre137818, as special judicial attorneys-in-fact (f. 04 of the scanned court file), against ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBE, legal entity identification number CED109044, represented by Nombre137819, as President and general attorney-in-fact with unlimited authority as to amount (according to the registry certification submitted to the record on 17 February 2020), as well as Nombre137820 and Rosa Bustillos Lemaire, the latter two as special judicial attorneys-in-fact (f. 179 of the scanned court file).
Participating in this proceeding as supporting intervenors (coadyuvantes activos) are: THE STATE, represented by Nombre137822´, in the capacity of State Attorney, and the SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, represented by Nombre140101 Nombre140102, as special judicial attorney-in-fact (power of attorney received by the Court on 27 May 2019); and, as an interested third party (tercero interesado), FONDO NACIONAL DE FINANCIAMIENTO FORESTAL, represented by Nombre137824, as general judicial attorney-in-fact, and Nombre137825, as special judicial attorney-in-fact (ff. 400 and 412 of the scanned court file).- WHEREAS: I.- PRELIMINARY MATTERS, DELIBERATION, AND VOTE.- This decision is issued in accordance with the formalities established in Ley N° 9342, Código Procesal Civil, and the Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial, approved by Corte Plena in Article XXXI of session N° 22-13, held on 20 May 2013.
The judgment is adopted unanimously following the corresponding deliberation; reporting Judge Aguilar Méndez was responsible for drafting the decision, with the concurring votes of Judges Fernández Brenes and Abarca Gómez.- II.- EVIDENCE FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER). – During the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) held on 09 July 2015 (see the recording of the hearing beginning at 14:02:20 hours), the defendant, the State, and FONAFIFO—the latter two as ancillary parties (partes accesorias)—made a series of evidentiary proffers that, confusingly, were variously characterized by the parties and by the Case-Management Judge himself as evidence for further consideration, an incidental submission of new documents (incidente de documentos nuevos), untimely evidence (prueba extemporánea), and so forth. Given the importance of evidentiary matters in judicial proceedings, this approach could undoubtedly lead to future claims of violations of the rights of defense and due process.
Likewise, in response to the clarifications requested by this Tribunal in the decision issued at 14:10 hours on 19 July 2019, the representative of Nombre28548 submitted, in the brief dated 08 November of that year, a document concerning the iniquito of payment for environmental services contract number LM-01-222-0063-2011, without specifying the capacity in which it was proffered. In view of the foregoing, before ruling on those proffers, this Chamber must provide the following conceptual clarifications. At the outset, it should be recalled that, broadly speaking, the evidentiary process (iter probatorio) consists of four stages or phases within administrative judicial proceedings under Ley N° 8508, Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA). First is the proffer or introduction of evidence (ofrecimiento o introducción de la prueba), referring to the authorization provided by procedural law for the parties or even the judicial authorities to incorporate various items of evidence at the proper procedural time or opportunity.
Next is the admissibility phase (fase de admisibilidad), in which the Judge, whether the Case-Management Judge or the Adjudicating Judge, determines that the evidence is lawful, relevant, and useful in relation to the grounds and subject matter of the proceeding and authorizes its use, without distinction, by any of the parties or the judicial bodies. With respect to the body of admitted evidence, or evidentiary record (comunidad probatoria), the judicial authority proceeds to the next stage: its taking or receipt (evacuación o recepción), whether or not through a supplemental hearing (audiencia complementaria)—an oral trial or evidentiary hearing—depending on what is necessary in light of the evidentiary source concerned. It should be borne in mind that, by design, administrative and public-finance civil proceedings provide for various circumstances in which such a hearing is dispensed with (Art. 69 and 98.2 CPCA), among other reasons because the evidentiary source makes the proceeding unnecessary.
Finally, there is the evaluation of evidence (valoración de la prueba), which may be described briefly—because it is not relevant to the present decision—as the phase in which the judicial body, in accordance with the rules of evidentiary reasoning established by the legal system, validly derives information regarding the facts constituting the cause of action (causa petitum) and, therefore, also regarding the subject matter of the dispute. As a result of that rational exercise, the judicial authority constructs a factual hypothesis—lists of proven and unproven facts—and assigns it the status of legal certainty, or judicial truth (verdad judicial). On the basis of those facts and the legal rules applicable to them as factual predicates, it then develops legal reasoning—of greater or lesser complexity—by which it may grant or dismiss the action after verifying its substantive prerequisites, namely standing (legitimación), current interest (interés actual), and legal entitlement (Derecho).
In view of the discussions held in this regard during the preliminary hearing, it is also very important to clarify certain core aspects of the first phase, namely the proffer or introduction of evidence. At this stage, the legal system establishes a period during the proceeding in which either the parties or the Judge are authorized to introduce various items of evidence into the dispute, in accordance with the allocation of burdens of proof designed by the legislature for administrative judicial proceedings. Thus, evidence may be proffered or introduced by the parties: a) ordinarily, in the complaint and answer, counterclaim or cross-claim and the answer thereto (Art. 58 and 64 CPCA), at the reply hearing (audiencia de réplica) (Art. 70 CPCA), upon the filing of a third-party claim asserting independent relief (tercería con pretensiones propias) and the answer thereto (Art. 15.1.a CPCA), or upon the filing of a supporting intervention (coadyuvancia) and the answer thereto (Art. 13 CPCA); and b) extraordinarily, in two categories of circumstances: i.- where the complaint is amended, whether solely with respect to the grounds for relief—new facts—and/or together with the subject matter—adjustment or expansion of the relief sought—as well as, pursuant to the guarantees of procedural equality and adversarial process, in the corresponding amended answer to which the responding parties would be entitled (Art. 46, 50, 54.2, 55.3, 68.1, 68.2, 90.2 and 95 CPCA); and ii.- where documentary evidence (prueba de fuente documental), without being connected to an amendment of the complaint or answer, concerns the circumstances provided for in subsection 1) of Article 50 CPCA.
In this latter situation, this Tribunal has developed a series of precedents distinguishing between untimely documents submitted before or during the preliminary hearing and those submitted after that judicial proceeding has concluded, as follows: “… As may be observed, the provision [Art. 50 CPCA] treats evidence submitted before completion of the preliminary hearing differently from evidence proffered after that phase. The admissibility of the former is determined in the judgment. This Chamber considers, however, that this does not prevent the parties, once the item of evidence has been submitted, from using it in presenting their arguments; otherwise, if the evidence could not be used because it had not yet been admitted, the principles of adversarial process and substantive defense would be violated. Accordingly, in circumstances where that provision applies, the evidence must be deemed incorporated into the proceedings and may be used or referenced by the parties as part of the theory of the case they present to the Tribunal.
The latter evidence may not be considered evidence submitted by a party, but only evidence for further consideration, and its admission is therefore within the Judge’s discretion. The difference is substantial in procedural terms because, if the Judge fails to rule on evidence proffered by a party, this may give rise to defects reviewable in cassation proceedings (sede casacional), whereas, with respect to evidence proffered or requested for further consideration, the judicial body’s failure to issue an express ruling creates no nullity, and failure to act upon such a request gives rise to a presumption that it was denied….” (Judgments N° 117-2014-VI at 10:45 hours on 05 August and 146-2014-VI at 11:00 hours on 22 September, both from 2014, and 46-2020-VI at 15:30 hours on 16 April 2020. Emphasis not in the original.) Furthermore, the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo provides for two distinct means by which items of evidence may be introduced or incorporated into the proceeding sua sponte (de oficio), that is, at the initiative of the judicial bodies themselves.
They are: a) the situation provided for in Article 93.3 CPCA, which authorizes the Case-Management Judge to introduce evidence not proffered by the parties “…[i]f it is indispensable or manifestly useful for ascertaining the actual truth of the disputed facts…”; and b) the situation under Article 110 in conjunction with Articles 82 and 148 CPCA, which grant the Adjudicating Tribunal broad authority to incorporate evidence “…[i]f, during deliberation, the Tribunal considers it absolutely necessary to receive new evidence or expand upon the evidence already incorporated…,” that is, when ruling on the merits of the dispute, the judicial Chamber considers such evidence appropriate, suitable, and necessary to ascertain the truth of the facts. Both evidentiary initiatives depend entirely on the Tribunal rather than on the parties; accordingly, the judicial body is responsible for proposing the evidence and examining its relevance, even where the evidence is brought into the record through the procedural activity of the participants in the proceeding.
Given its ex officio nature and, therefore, the risk it may pose to procedural equality, the right of defense, and the principle of impartiality, the authority to take evidentiary initiative ex officio (iniciativa probatoria oficiosa) is not unlimited; on the contrary, it is restricted by various criteria: i) It must be exercised once the appropriate procedural stages for the parties to offer evidence (prueba) have concluded (whether ordinary or extraordinary, as referred to above); ii) In order to include this type of evidentiary material in the body of evidence (comunidad probatoria), the Court must first grant the parties a prior hearing so that they may address it within a reasonable period, thereby safeguarding their right of defense (Art. Placa25667 ); and iii) Its purpose is limited to allowing the adjudicator to clarify any uncertainties that may arise after weighing the evidence submitted by the parties; accordingly, it may not be used to remedy or replace the litigants’ due diligence or to correct deficiencies in their defense techniques (cf. judgments of Sala Primera n.° 1489-F-S1-2017 at 09:45 hours on 30 de noviembre de 2017, 813-F-S1-11 at 8:10 hours on 7 de julio de 2011, 213-F-S1-2008 at 8:20 hours on 25 de marzo de 2008, 334-F-S1-2012 at 09:20 hours on 08 de marzo de 2012, 547-F-2002 at 16:00 hours on 12 de julio de 2002, among others).
In this regard, it is reiterated that this type of evidence is the exclusive prerogative of the trial court and that the mere offering of such evidence does not make its admission mandatory; on the contrary, the adjudicator is not even required to rule on its admissibility, such that the absence of a ruling thereon entails its rejection, and failure to rule causes no prejudice whatsoever. For this purpose, we refer to judgment N° 46-2020-VI of this Section, issued at 15:50 hours on 16 de abril de 2020. –
III.CONTINUED.- Having clarified the foregoing, we may now rule on the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary hearing on 09 de julio de 2015 and that submitted by Nombre28548 on 08 de noviembre de 2019, as follows:
IV.SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING AND ARGUMENTS OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES.- The complaint giving rise to this proceeding was filed by INDER on 09 de agosto de 2013 (f. 112 of the scanned judicial case file), and its subject matter, as established at the preliminary hearing, consists of the following claims: “…RELIEF SOUGHT: We request that the judgment declare:
1. That the present complaint be deemed filed. 2. That, because it is harmful to the public interest, the resolution adopted by the Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in Article 161 of session 023-04, dated 21 de junio del 2004, be annulled solely insofar as it concerns the titling of property Nombre140103, real-property folio No. Placa25891, in favor of ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO TALAMANCA-CARIBE, corresponding to Cadastral Plan L-0645227-2000. 3. By reason of its connection thereto, that public deed number 47, executed at 10:00 hours before notaries RANDY ANTHONY GORDON CRUICKSHANK Y EDUARDO NEWTON CRUICKSHANK SMITH, acting under the former’s notarial protocol and appearing on the reverse of folio 42 of volume 5 of that protocol, issued by Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, be annulled solely insofar as it concerns the titling of the property [sic] in Partido de Limón, real-property folio No. Placa25891, in favor of ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO TALAMANCA-CARIBE, corresponding to Cadastral Plan L-0645227-2000. 4.
By reason of its connection thereto, that the registration entry for the property registered under the Real-Property Folio system in Partido de Limón, Real-Property Folio Registration number Placa25891, issued by Registro Nacional, be annulled. 5. By reason of its connection thereto, that any registration arising from the registration of the property registered [sic] in Registro Nacional, Provincia de Limón, Real-Property Folio Registration number Placa25891, be annulled. 6. That the defendant [sic] be ordered to pay both categories of costs in this proceeding…”. In this case, the plaintiff seeks the annulment of the resolution of the Junta Directiva of the former Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario through which the property in Partido de Limón, registration Placa25890° , with cadastral plan number L-0645227-2000, was titled in favor of the defendant Asociación, as well as the other legal acts through which the transfer of the property was implemented and formalized.
It bases this action for a declaration of harm to the public interest (acción de lesividad) on its view that the titling of the property in question, carried out and implemented through the challenged acts, was conducted without compliance with legal and regulatory requirements governing the administrative titling procedure, namely: a) the certification issued by SINAC and submitted by the defendant in the proceeding established that the property formed part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado, even though Article 10 of Reglamento para la Titulación de Tierras en Reservas Nacionales excluded such lands; and b) the record does not show that a conforming land-use study (estudio de uso conforme de suelos) was submitted as required by Reglamento a la Ley de Uso de Suelos number 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT, particularly Article 58 thereof. It considers that this circumstance violates prohibitory provisions, including Articles 13, 14, 15, 33, and 34 of Ley Forestal, as well as the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment under Article 50 of Constitución Política, such that the act is absolutely null and void (absolutamente nulo).
In response to these claims, the defendant—although it does not expressly characterize it as such—essentially raises a lack-of-legal-basis defense, because it contends that the titling complied, in good faith, with what IDA required of it at the time; consequently, if any applicable requirements were not fulfilled, this was not the responsibility of the Asociación, because the oversight function belonged to the Administration, which, despite the certification issued by MINAE, nevertheless recommended that the parcel be titled. Thus, it considers that, although there may have been a failure to meet certain requirements, this would have been “…at the level of the analysis of the titling procedure itself, but not with respect to whether titling was appropriate in the specific case of property registration Placa25890. ...”. In its view, this is because those lands do not form part of Patrimonio Natural del Estado, since they had been held by good-faith possessors (poseedores de buena fe) for many years before the legislation declaring them inalienable was enacted, namely Ley Forestal 4465 de 1969 and Ley de Tierras y Colonización N.º 2825 de 1961; therefore, what INDER asserted in the complaint is false.
In that regard, it states that the property was acquired by the Asociacio´n through a sale by Mr. Nombre140104, who in turn had purchased it from Mr. Nombre140105, who arrived in the community of Gandoca around the year 1950 and was one of the town’s founders. It adds that the Asociacio´n made the purchase in 1993 through public deed (escritura pu´blica) number 49-2, executed before notaries Nombre140106 and Nombre14854, both surnamed Nombre140107 and Andre´s Arias Victory, in which Mr. Nombre140104 transferred to it accumulated possession (posesio´n acumulada) of more than 20 years. It notes that although agricultural practices were carried out on the property during that time and part of the forest was conserved, thanks to the care provided by the Asociacio´n, the property is now entirely forested. It argues that the possession transferred to it constituted a “cause for exception” (“causa de excepción”), already provided for in Article 11 of Ley N.º 2825 de 1961, and that although the certifications issued at the time by MINAE did not take those rights into account, those rights did not thereby cease to exist.
Lastly, with respect to the active supporting parties (partes coadyuvantes activas), namely both the State’s representative and SINAC, they essentially argue the same thing: that the property at issue, which had been titled in favor of the Asociacio´n de Organizaciones del Corredor Biolo´gico de Talamanca-Caribe, constitutes a public-domain asset (bien demanial) forming part of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) category and is therefore not susceptible to private appropriation, in this case through the land-titling system administered by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural; accordingly, in their opinion, the action for annulment of an injurious administrative act (accio´n de lesividad) brought by that entity should be granted in order to safeguard the protection of those assets.-
V.PROVEN FACTS.- Of importance to the issuance of this decision, the following facts are deemed duly established in accordance with the rules of sound judicial assessment (sana cri´tica), whether because they appear as such or may be inferred from the evidence submitted in the case file and admitted during the preliminary hearing, or because the parties have accepted them as such:
10 de setiembre del 2002, I hereby request that I be granted a public deed [sic] to my property, which is located in Gandoca, district of Sixaola, canton of Talamanca, province of Limón, and is described as follows: registered cadastral plan (plano catastrado) N° L- seiscientos cuarenta y cinco mil doscientos veintisiete-dos mil, with an area of dieciocho hectáreas tres mil cuatrocientos ochenta y ocho metros cuadrados con treinta y cinco decímetros cuadrados; it has no direct road frontage, but rather an established right-of-way easement (servidumbre constituida de paso) measuring ciento veintiséis metros con setenta y ocho decímetros in length by tres metros in width. I acquired said property from Mr. Nombre140104, identification number CED110340° -, on trece de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres; he is of legal age, a Costa Rican national, and a resident of Talamanca, and I attach a copy of the deed.
I estimate the value of this property at approximately ¢ 2.000.000 colones […] As instructed [sic], I also submit the original registered cadastral plan, a copy of my identity card, a copy of the legal-entity identification card and a certificate of legal representation for the entity I represent, a certification issued by MINAE stating that my property does not affect the State Natural Heritage; and a sworn declaration before a Notary Public stating that my property is not [sic] registered in the Public Registry; that I have no judicial or extrajudicial dispute concerning this land; that through this application I do not seek to evade the consequences of probate proceedings; and that the property has been possessed for twenty years (including my predecessor’s possession) quietly, publicly [sic], peacefully, interruptedly, and under claim of ownership [sic]…” (folios 22 and 23 of the certified copy of the administrative case file. Emphasis not in the original);
by the O icina de Atencio´n al Usuario of the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservacio´n of the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energi´a, which states as follows: - (p. 27 of the certified copy of the administrative record); 4.- By agreement number 161, adopted under Article 161 of ordinary session number 023-2004 of the Junta Directiva of the former Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), held on June 21, 2004, that collegiate body ordered the following regarding the application submitted by the defendant Association: “…1-In compliance with Institutional policies and upon the recommendation of the TALAMANCA regional office pursuant to official letter OSTA-72-2004, the approval of the Dirección Regional de HUETAR ATLANTICA pursuant to official letter DRHA-257-2004, and the review by the Coordinador Agrario Regional of the requirements for the land-titling procedure (trámite de titulación), and in accordance with the Junta Directiva Agreement described in Article XXI, Session 065-00 of September 11, 2000, and all requirements established by the regulations governing the titling of land in national reserves, published in the official gazette La Gaceta no. 173 of September 10, 2002, having been met, pursuant to the Ley de Tierras y Colonización no. 2825 of October 14, 1961, and the ley de creación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario no. 6735 of March 29, 1982, authorization is granted to subdivide and transfer the 3 parcel lots described below, so that the corresponding supplementary ownership title (título supletorio de dominio) may be issued.
NAMEIDENTIFICATION NUMBERPARCELAREACADASTRAL PLANTRANSFER VALUETOPOG.INSPECTIONNOTICETOTAL[…]ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO TALAMANCA CARIBE3-002- 1824139-A-2001183,488.35L-645227-2000C17,134.00C9,000.00C26,134.00[…]…” (Emphasis not in the original) Said act was confirmed and finally approved by agreement no. 02, adopted under article two of ordinary session number 024-04 on June 28, 2004 (certification issued by Nombre140108 in his capacity as Secretario General of IDA at 11:00 a.m. on January 22, 2009, appearing at pages 47 through 50 of the scanned judicial record); 5.- By public deed number 47, executed at 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2004, before notaries Randy Anthony Gordon Cruickshank and Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith, in the former’s protocol number 5, Mr. Marco Aurelio Bolan~os Vi´quez, representing IDA, proceeded to subdivide several lots from the property owned by it, Partido de Limo´n, registration number Placa26809, corresponding to the BIRF 2764 land-titling project.
Among those subdivisions, parcel Dirección16847 is listed and described as having an area of 183,488.35 m2, under cadastral plan no. L-645227-2000, and was sold in that same act to the Asociacio´n de Organizaciones del Corredor Biolo´gico Talamanca Caribe (certified registry copy appearing at pages 66 through 73 of the scanned judicial record); 6.- On October 26, 2004, the property in Partido de Limo´n, registration number Placa25891 and plan number L-6452272000, consisting of the real property corresponding to parcel Dirección16847 of the BIRF 2764 land-titling project, was registered in the name of the defendant Association. Title to said property has remained unchanged through the date of this judgment (registry certifications bearing consecutive numbers 2411137 and 3739332, dated January 20, 2009, and July 08, 2013, appearing at pages 59 through 65, 86, and 87 of the scanned judicial record, and a search conducted today in the Registro Nacional’s public database, available on that institution’s website); 7.- By official letter no. FOE-PGAA-0578 / 8734 dated August 27, 2008, the Divisio´n de Fiscalizacio´n Operativa y Evaluativa of the Contralori´a General de la Repu´blica (CGR) transmitted to Carlos Bolan~os Ce´spedes, Presidente of the Junta Directiva of the former IDA, report number DFOE-PGAA-20-2008, entitled “…results of the study on the titling of land in national reserves located on lands belonging to the Patrimonio Natural del Estado…”.
In that report, acting in its capacity as the supreme oversight body of the Hacienda Pu´blica, CGR ordered that institution’s Junta Directiva to: a) “…Carry out the administrative proceedings and legal actions appropriate before the competent authorities so that proceedings may be initiated to recover the lands titled by IDA that belong to the Patrimonio Natural del Estado and correspond to the 15 cases detailed in this document…,” and b) “…Order a comprehensive analysis of the titles granted by IDA that were not part of the sample analyzed by this Contraloría General in this study, in order to identify instances in which titles were granted over lands belonging to the Patrimonio Natural del Estado and, where appropriate, carry out the procedures to recover those lands…” (pages 08 through 21 of the scanned judicial record); 8.- By Agreement N° 5 under Article Five of ordinary session no. 011-2013 of the Junta Directiva of INDER, held on March 18, 2013, and based on official letter A- PE-304-2013, signed by Nombre140109 in her capacity as legal adviser to that entity’s Presidencia Ejecutiva, a declaration that a series of land titles were injurious to the public interest (declaratoria de lesividad a los intereses pu´blicos) was issued; these included the title granted by agreement number 161 of ordinary session number 023-04 of June 21, 2004, in favor of the defendant herein. The agreement in question states—as relevant to this case—as follows:
Thus, the operative part established the following: “… POR TANTO: In accordance with Article 34, subsection 2, of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Articles 176 et seq. of the Ley General de Administración Pública, Ley de Tierras y Colonización and Ley de Creación del IDA, it is ordered: 1) To declare injurious to the public interest (lesivo a los intereses públicos) the administrative acts issued through resolutions […] 161 of Ordinary Session 023-04, held on 21 de junio de 2004 […] adopted by the Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which gave rise to the property titles recorded in the Registro de la Propiedad under the Limón Registry District, real-property folio registration numbers […] Placa25891 in favor of the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe […] because they were granted to the detriment of the State’s natural heritage (patrimonio natural del Estado)...” (f. 100 a 111 of the scanned court record.
Emphasis not in the original); 9.- On 09 de agosto de 2013, this Court received the present judicial review action seeking a declaration of injuriousness (demanda contencioso administrativa de lesividad), filed by the representative of INDER (as recorded in the scanned court record of the present case); and 10.- On 06 de setiembre de 2019, Jorge Mario Rodríguez Zúñiga, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal, and Nombre137819, in the capacity of President, vested with the powers of a general attorney-in-fact without limitation as to amount (apoderada generalísima sin límite de suma) of the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe, executed a document entitled “Termination Agreement for the Environmental Services Payment Contract. Water Resource Protection Activity. Contract number LM-01-222-0063-2011.” According to that document, both parties agreed as follows: “…
FIRST: To terminate Pago de Servicios Ambientales Contract Number LM-01-222-0063-2011, executed on 24 de mayo de 2011, without liability for the parties, recognizing the payments made to date by virtue of the environmental services provided by the forest and waiving the outstanding effects thereof. SECOND: Effective as of its execution…” (Emphasis not in the original. Document uploaded to the electronic court record on 08 de noviembre de 2019).-
VI.UNPROVEN FACTS (HECHOS NO PROBADOS).- For purposes of this judgment, the following facts are deemed unproven, either because the parties failed to satisfy their burdens of proof (cargas probatorias), or because the Court found no suitable evidence that, under the rules of sound judicial assessment (sana crítica), would allow them to be established: 1.- Compliance with the requirements necessary for titling the property corresponding to the Limón Registry District property with registration number Placa25891, cadastral plan (plano catastrado) number Placa26810, parcel 9-A-2001 of the BIRF 2764 titling project; 2.- That possession of the property corresponding to parcel 9-A-2001 of the BIRF 2764 titling project, with cadastral plan number Placa26810, had begun around 1950 by Nombre140105 and was subsequently transferred in favor of Nombre140104; and 3.- That the property corresponding to the Limón Registry District property with registration number Placa25891, cadastral plan number Placa26810, parcel 9-A-2001 of the BIRF 2764 titling project, was outside the areas included within the State’s natural heritage.-
VII.ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FONDO NACIONAL DE FINANCIAMIENTO FORESTAL (FONAFIFO).- At the State’s request, by Order No. 2506-2014 issued at 09:45 on 03 de octubre de 2014, the Case Management Judge determined that FONAFIFO should be admitted as an interested third party (tercero interesado), based on the following justification: “…3.-With respect to the participation of Nombre28548, given that a contract does in fact exist between it and the defendant, and that, moreover, through the provisional measure (medida cautelar) ordered by the higher court, the defendants were instructed to submit a report to the Court, and given that said fund has instrumental legal personality (personería instrumental), which grants it procedural capacity to appear in these proceedings as an interested third party pursuant to Article 15, and not, as stated by the Procurator, pursuant to subsection 2 of Article 12 of the Código Procesal Contencioso….” (f. 379 of the scanned court record.
Emphasis not in the original). After FONAFIFO was personally served, that personified agency (órgano persona) proceeded to file a pleading asserting its own claims (pretensiones propias) against the defendant Asociación on 21 de octubre next, in the following terms: “…RELIEF REQUESTED (PETITORIA): In accordance with the arguments presented and with the provisions of Article 15 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, we respectfully request that, should the claims of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural concerning cancellation of the title in favor of the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico De Talamanca Caribe be granted, the following also be ordered: 1. Termination of environmental services payment contract number LM-01-222-0063-2011, executed between the Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal and the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico de Talamanca Caribe. 2.
Compel the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico de Talamanca Caribe to reimburse the payments made as environmental services payments under contract LM-01-222-0063-2011. 3. Order the defendant to pay costs...” (Emphasis not in the original. See f. 384, 386, 392 a 398 and 402 of the scanned court record). Because, in its decision issued at 14:10 on 19 de julio de 2019, this Court identified, among other matters, a series of defects in the procedural treatment given to that third-party intervention (tercería), the record was remanded to the Case Management Area so that a series of corrections could be made, consisting of the following: “… One: Whether Nombre28548 is actually an interested third party (Art. 15.1.b CPCA—without claims), a third party asserting its own claims (Art. 15.1.a CPCA—equivalent to a plaintiff as such), or even a necessary co-defendant (litisconsorte pasivo), as provided in Art. 12.2 and 12.3 CPCA, because it is an agency with instrumental legal personality that has derived favorable legal positions from the conduct at issue in these proceedings.
Two: Whether Nombre28548’s assertion of claims is in fact made under Article 15.1.a CPCA or constitutes a counterclaim (contrademanda), and, under either possibility, to assess the implications of any possible acquiescence (allanamiento) in this matter. Three: Whether, because it is a personified agency bringing an action against a private party, it has legal capacity, whether its representation has been duly established, and whether the pleading in which the claims are asserted must satisfy the admissibility requirements of Articles 58 and 61 CPCA. Four: What its claims specifically consist of and what their scope is. Five: Whether this is a third party asserting its own claims or a counterclaim, the corresponding period for response (emplazamiento) must be granted in order to guarantee due process and the defendant’s right of defense…”. In turn, by order issued at 15:51 on 04 de noviembre de 2019, the Case Management Judge referred these matters to the representative of Nombre28548.
However, in a filing received by the Court on 08 de noviembre de 2019, that representative informed the Court that its “… joinder as an interested third party occurred because the Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe had an active environmental services payment contract identified by number LM-01222-0063 concerning the property registered as Placa25891 in the Limón Registry District. As of this date, and by mutual agreement, the aforementioned contractual relationship has been terminated; therefore, my client no longer has a current interest in continuing in these judicial proceedings, and I accordingly respectfully request that the Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal be excluded therefrom…” (Emphasis not in the original). Accordingly, because current interest (interés actual) is indeed a substantive prerequisite (presupuesto material) that must be verified even by the Court on its own motion in the judgment, and consists—in summary—of the possibility that the judgment will have a real-world effect, whether by altering or preserving a particular legal situation; that is, the actual possibility of providing judicial protection to the claimant so that the judgment proves useful to the holder of the subjective right or legitimate interest affected by the subject matter of the proceedings.
The foregoing therefore entails a duty on the Judge to assess the “usefulness” of that ruling in light of the claim asserted and the factual circumstances on which the action is based (cause of action [causa de pedir]), comparing the effects of the requested judicial decision with the benefit or advantage that such a ruling would provide to the claimant. Thus, there is no current interest if, even if the relief requested were granted, the judgment would not have the capacity to produce any beneficial effect on the claimant’s legal situation, in which case the ruling would be futile. This lack of interest may not only exist originally when the action is filed, but may also arise subsequently if the usefulness of the ruling ceases because of new factual or legal circumstances affecting the need for judicial protection. Consequently, as with all other substantive prerequisites, the interest must remain current throughout the proceedings (See the judgments of the Sala Primera number 465-2009 issued at 10:40 on 07 de mayo de 2009, 900-F-S1-2011 issued at 09:15 on 11 de agosto de 2011, among others).
In the present case, after reviewing the statements made by Nombre28548 and based on the document admitted as evidence to assist the Court in reaching its decision (prueba para mejor resolver), it has been established that the reason giving rise to its joinder in the litigation has indeed subsequently ceased to exist, since the environmental services contract at issue ceased to have effect by the contracting parties’ own volition. It follows that any claim in that regard would serve no useful purpose; therefore, the subsequent lack of current interest (falta de interés actual sobreviniente) in the third-party intervention asserting its own claims, previously brought by that personified agency, must be declared by the Court on its own motion, as is hereby ordered.-
VIII.ON THE PREREQUISITES FOR AN ACTION SEEKING A DECLARATION OF INJURIOUSNESS (PRESUPUESTOS DE LA LESIVIDAD).- Because the subject matter of this dispute is an examination of the validity, by way of an action seeking a declaration of injuriousness (vía lesividad), of an administrative act conferring a benefit (acto administrativo de contenido favorable), it is necessary to establish briefly whether the various prerequisites imposed by the legal system for bringing proceedings seeking a declaration of injuriousness (proceso de lesividad) have been satisfied, since the absence of any one of these elements would preclude and make it impossible to grant the relief sought in the complaint. It should be noted that the analysis of these prerequisites is undertaken by the adjudicator on the Court’s own motion, because they are essential elements of the action, thereby requiring an examination of the subjective, objective, procedural, and temporal conditions that must necessarily be satisfied in order to assert the action for annulment (acción anulatoria) at the core of these matters. With regard to the subjective aspect, standing to sue (legitimación activa) is granted to the administrative authority that issued the challenged act, whereas the party with standing to be sued (legitimado pasivo) is the recipient of the effects of the conduct—that is, the party obtaining its benefits.
It should be noted in this regard that, because an action for annulment of an administrative act declared harmful to public interests (acción de lesividad) constitutes a safeguard for the private party, and because the highest authority of the Administration that issued the conduct is the only public authority empowered to assess the extent of the harm to public interests arising from the challenged conduct, the administrative bodies responsible for conducting the public entity’s judicial defense are strictly bound by the declaratory act and therefore lack sufficient jurisdiction to establish or modify its scope. With respect to the objective aspect, the action for annulment constitutes a mechanism for the legal elimination of individual administrative acts having favorable content that are substantially inconsistent with the legal system (articles 128, 158 and 183.3 LGAP, Ley N° 6227). Along these lines, the Administration must declare that conduct harmful to public interests, which must be established through a series of internal administrative actions that cannot be deferred if the action is to be filed.
Indeed, procedurally, the power to declare formal conduct of this kind harmful is discretionary, because there is no statutory mandate directing the Administration to seek, through an action for annulment, the nullity of every administrative act that is inconsistent with the legal system. On the contrary, articles 183.3 LGAP and 34 CPCA authorize the highest-ranking authority of the respective Public Administration to decide whether to judicially challenge the favorable act, it being understood that only “…When the Administration itself, as the issuer of an act declaring rights, seeks its annulment…”—that is, once it has decided to institute the annulment action—must it proceed to determine whether that formal conduct is harmful to public interests; for this purpose, it may rely on an underlying legal and technical opinion supporting that determination. Unlike other mechanisms for eliminating public conduct (such as ex officio nullity (nulidad oficiosa) provided for in article 173 LGAP), it does not require a hearing for the third party, but only internal actions within the Administration intended to verify the existence of an express manifestation of administrative intent, issued by its highest authority, to seek elimination of the act.
It is in the judicial proceeding that the third party may present its defense arguments; therefore, the absence of its participation in the administrative phase for the declaration that the act is harmful does not in any way impair its right to due process or administrative procedure. When the act emanates from the State (see art. 1 Ley General), that is, from the Central Administration, the action may be filed only by the Procuraduría General de la República (section 16 of Ley No. 8508), following an internal declaration that the act is harmful and a request from the highest authority detailing the grounds for that determination. When it emanates from a public entity, the rules governing judicial representation are those established in section 17 of that same code. With respect to the temporal dimension, and pursuant to the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, two consecutive periods are established, each lasting one year.
During the first, the Administration has a period of one year, calculated from the business day following issuance of the act (not its notification), to declare in administrative proceedings that the act is harmful to public interests. Excluded from this first limit are cases in which the Administration seeks to eliminate acts having successive effects (continuous or indefinite) that it also considers to be affected by defects of absolute nullity (vicios de nulidad absoluta), in which case the internal declaration may be issued for as long as those effects persist. In that situation, the aforementioned one-year period begins to run (dies a quo) when those effects cease; however, any judgment ordering nullity shall do so solely for the future annulment and inapplicability of the challenged conduct. Article 34.1 CPCA therefore provides: “…The maximum period for doing so [issuing the administrative declaration that the act is harmful] shall be one year, calculated from the day following the day on which it was issued, except where the act contains defects of absolute nullity, in which case that declaration may be issued for as long as its effects persist...” (Emphasis not in the original).
The second of the two aforementioned one-year periods is the limitation period (caducidad) for bringing the judicial action for nullity before this jurisdiction, pursuant to article 39.1.e CPCA, which states as follows: “…Article 39.- 1) The maximum period for instituting the proceeding shall be one year, calculated: […] e) In the case of an action for annulment of an act declared harmful, from the day following the date on which the act declaring it harmful becomes final…” (Emphasis not in the original). Lastly, we consider it necessary to add that various sources of administrative law have established several exceptions to this time limit; at present, this Court has identified at least the following exceptions: actions concerning the protection of the public domain, environmental protection, and tax matters, the latter being inapplicable to this proceeding.-
The record shows that this case seeks nullity of the administrative act granting title (titulación) to parcel 9-A-2001 of titling project BIRF 2764, corresponding to the property in the Partido de Limón with registration number Placa25891 and survey-plan number Placa26810, whose recipient was the defendant Asociación, as well as a series of acts and conduct connected with and dependent upon that grant of title. Specifically, it concerns Agreement number 161 of the Board of Directors of the then IDA, adopted in Article 161 of ordinary session number 023-2004, held on 21 de junio de 2004, confirmed and definitively approved through Agreement n° 02 of Article 02 of ordinary session number 024-04, adopted on 28 de junio de ese mismo año. That administrative conduct was declared harmful to public interests by Agreement N° 5 of Article Five of ordinary session n° 011-2013, held on 18 de marzo de 2013 by the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, the public entity that assumed the powers of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario pursuant to the institutional transformation ordered by Ley N.º 9036 de 11 de mayo de 2012.
Of particular relevance is article 14, which provides as follows: “...The Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) is hereby transformed into the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (Inder), as an autonomous institution governed by public law, with legal personality, its own assets, and administrative independence […] As of the publication of this law, every statutory, regulatory, or administrative provision referring to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) shall be read as referring to the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (Inder)…” (Emphasis not in the original). The foregoing complies with sections 10.5 and 34.1 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, insofar as the acts in question were issued at the time by that same public entity, following the declaration that the act was harmful by its highest-ranking authority. Moreover, the action was brought by INDER against the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico de Talamanca-Caribe because the latter is the (legal) person in whose favor the beneficial effects of the act arose; consequently, no deficiency is apparent in terms of the parties (ámbito subjetivo), whether claimant or defendant.
Nor is any irregularity apparent with respect to the procedural element because, as we reiterate, the record contains the aforementioned declaration that the act was harmful, together with the legal and technical analyses on which the administrative authority based its decision to resort to this form of ex officio elimination of favorable conduct. Furthermore, the acts sought to be annulled undoubtedly have a favorable effect for the defendant herein because they granted it enjoyment of an immovable-property right over a parcel having an area of 183,488.35 m2. It is clear that, irrespective of its validity, this act has a beneficial effect for the defendant because it directly grants it a patrimonial asset. Therefore, in order to uphold the doctrine that an Administration’s own acts are inviolable (intangibilidad de actos propios), which derives from section 34 of the Constitución Política, elimination of the act on grounds of absolute invalidity must follow the procedural avenues established by the Legal System for that purpose, which in this case is the action for annulment of an act declared harmful.
Accordingly, we find that the objective requirement has been fully satisfied. Finally, with regard to the temporal element, because the administrative act granting title whose nullity is sought was issued in 2004 and its declaration as harmful was not issued until 2013, it is first necessary to determine whether this case falls within one of the exceptions to the rules governing this preliminary issue (cuestión prejudicial). For that reason, we shall next examine this aspect of the action on the merits and then analyze whether this requirement for the action for annulment of an act declared harmful has been satisfied.-
Fundamentally, this action for annulment of an act declared harmful seeks to determine whether the grant of title to parcel 9-A-2001 of titling project BIRF 2764, corresponding to the property in the Partido de Limón with registration number Placa25891 and survey-plan number Placa26810, carried out through Agreement number 161 of the Board of Directors of the then IDA, adopted in Article 161 of ordinary session number 023-2004 of 21 de junio de 2004, was performed in accordance with the law. In this regard, the Court finds that, following a proper review of the record, it has been established that the action for annulment of an act declared harmful must indeed be granted, for the reasons detailed below: - First, as INDER contends, when the administrative conduct was adopted, two prerequisites necessary for it to be carried out were not satisfied. First—and this is expressly acknowledged by the defendant Asociación—there was a failure to comply with articles 58, 60 and 61 of the Reglamento a la Ley de Uso de Suelos, Decreto Ejecutivo número 29375-MAG-MINAE-S-HACIENDA-MOPT, originally published in the official gazette La Gaceta n.º 57 de 21 de marzo de 2001.
Nevertheless, although that Regulation has undergone several amendments, the cited provisions remain intact, such that both on the date when the titling procedure (procedimiento de titulación) was carried out and at present, the following is provided: “… Article 58.- In every possessory title proceeding (información posesoria), or proceeding filed before the IDA or the Courts of Justice for the purpose of recording property in the Public Property Registry, the interested party, in addition to the requirements imposed by the generally applicable regulations, must demonstrate, through an adequate soil study (estudio de suelos), that possession has been exercised in compliance with the appropriate land use (uso conforme del suelo) for the activity conducted, in accordance with the approved methodology, and by implementing the best management practices using the best available technology, in compliance with Articles 3, 6, 12, 13, 19, 26, 27, 41, 43 and 64 of Ley Nº 7779 and this Regulation […] Article 60.- The IDA must have soil studies, at least at the semi-detailed level and in coordination with the MAG, prior to any purchase of properties, parceling (parcelación), award, titling, or leasing, with greater emphasis on the titling of lands located in national reserves pursuant to law 7599 of 29 de abril de 1996.
Article 61.- Under no circumstances may the IDA acquire, award, or title lands that do not qualify for agricultural purposes according to the soil study…” (Emphasis not in the original). It is important to emphasize here, therefore, that this is not merely an administrative-procedure requirement, as portrayed by counsel for the defendant Association, because it even imposes a restriction on the authority of the former IDA, now INDER, to title lands, whether or not they are in national reserves, if the soil study finds that the properties are incompatible with agricultural use. In other words, not only is there a defect in the procedure and in the grounds for the act (motivo del acto), but, moreover, without that mandatory and binding technical opinion (dictamen técnico), the Administration could not validly exercise its authority. Second, we indeed consider this to be an unlawful alienation of the public domain (dominio público), a circumstance that is, in itself, also sufficiently serious to give rise to the absolute nullity (nulidad absoluta) of the titling act.
In this regard, after assessing the evidence entered into the case file, as well as the arguments developed by the parties, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to disprove the public-domain status (naturaleza dominical) of the real property titled through the challenged conduct, since the certification issued by MINAE (official letter number SINAC-DS-OFAU-1834-2003) and submitted by the defendant Association itself in the administrative titling procedure (a digital excerpt of which may be seen in proven fact No. 03) allows us to conclude decisively that the parcel in question does indeed have that legal status, precisely as maintained by INDER and the supporting co-parties (coadyuvantes activos); moreover, the evidentiary record contains no elements permitting a contrary determination that would rebut the rebuttable presumption (presunción iuris tantum) arising from the certification.
This may be corroborated, on the one hand, by the documents incorporated into the judicial case file which, in principle, correspond to those submitted during the administrative titling procedure and in which we can identify the following elements:
The Case Management Judge ruled as follows: “…with respect to the other evidence, they are indeed correct, um, all of them, uh, the third party, um, the supporting intervenor (coadyuvante), the interested third party (tercero interesado), and, um… and the representation of INDER, in that no evidence or documentation was in fact submitted with, um, the answer to the complaint (contestación de la demanda); however, they must also take into account that the pages which, um, the plaintiff [referring to the Asociación] requests be incorporated have already been admitted as evidence common to the parties (prueba en común), so in that regard it would have no effect to state that the plaintiff [referring to the Asociación], um, did not submit evidence, because in fact it is merely citing pages from INDER itself that were previously admitted, and in that regard they would constitute evidence common to the parties, and this Court would admit them…” (see recording of the hearing of 09 de julio de 2015 from 14:41:58 to 14:42:42.
Emphasis added. Transcription is verbatim). Furthermore, with respect to the untimely documentary evidence (prueba documental extemporánea) admitted in this judgment and offered at that time during the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar), namely, the official letters from Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservacio´n n° SINAC-ACLAC-DR-277 of 24 de julio and SINAC-DE-574 of 20 marzo, both dated an~o 2014, which appear at pages 445 to 447 of the scanned court record (expediente judicial), that evidence is likewise not suitable for discrediting the certification that the property belongs to the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) (official letter number SINAC-DS-OFAU-1834-2003), first, because the defendant did not file a counterclaim for annulment (contrademanda de nulidad) against the State that would have allowed that administrative act (acto administrativo) to be removed from the legal system (ordenamiento juri´dico), and it therefore has no useful effect on the dispute (litis); moreover, the most that may be inferred from those documents is a possible challenge to the methodology used by SINAC in preparing it, but without discrediting its conclusions. Official letter SINAC-ACLAC-DR-277 states, insofar as relevant:
Certainly, the conclusions of the certification (certificación) could have been discredited, given its nature as an iuris tantum presumption; however, since there is no other evidence that would have made this possible, it cannot be asserted that possession existed prior to the incorporation into the public domain (demanialización) of the property in question. As for the other official communication submitted in this regard, No. SINAC-DE-574, consisting of a document attached to the preceding one, it merely sets forth instructions issued at the time by the Executive Directorate of SINAC to the Conservation Areas regarding how to prepare certifications classifying land in relation to the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), without providing any relevant information to establish that the property titled in favor of the defendant Association does not form part of that public-domain regime (régimen demanial).
Lastly, we must recall that the only evidence offered in the answer to the complaint was testimonial evidence, and it was rejected by the Processing Judge during the preliminary hearing (see recording of the hearing dated 09 de julio de 2015, beginning at 14:50:10). In view of the foregoing, we find that the titling act does indeed violate the legal system, precisely in the terms already articulated in other precedents of this Section, it being understood that the public-domain status (demanialidad) of these assets, in accordance with the doctrine derived from provisions 261 and 262 of the Civil Code, together with the special rules governing the Natural Heritage of the State, renders them “…ultimately, inalienable, not subject to acquisitive prescription, and nontransferable. Hence, their titling, or the granting of rights to dispose of them, in favor of private persons, undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the regulatory regime governing this category of ownership.
This means that any act of disposition involving this type of public property would conflict with administrative legality, a defect characteristic of a serious flaw that results in the absolute nullity of such enabling administrative actions…” (Judgment No. 134-2021-VI of 07:30 on 13 de octubre de 2021. Emphasis not in the original).
Third, having reviewed the record and determined that the case at bar does indeed fall under one of the exceptional circumstances permitting the time limitation for bringing an annulment action (acción anulatoria) to be overcome, this preliminary requirement must therefore be deemed satisfied. Although the administrative titling act was issued in 2004 and its declaration of injury to the public interest (declaratoria de lesividad) was not issued until 2013, the fact remains that an action to recover or protect public-domain property, pursued through an action for injury to the public interest (demanda de lesividad), is not subject to a limitations period, not only because of the application of the general rule that this type of property is not subject to prescription, but also because Article 34.2 of the CPCA expressly so provides: “… An action for injury to the public interest concerning the protection of public-domain property shall not be subject to a time limit…” (Emphasis not in the original).
By virtue of the foregoing, we find not only that the various requirements for bringing this proceeding for injury to the public interest (proceso de lesividad) have been fully satisfied, but also that, in this specific case, the defects identified by INDER in its annulment action have been established. Accordingly, the proper course under the law is to grant that action, as is hereby ordered. In view of this circumstance, this Chamber considers the arguments and evidence submitted by the supporting parties on the plaintiff’s side (coadyuvantes activos) unnecessary; we shall therefore expressly refrain from analyzing them, since doing so would serve no purpose in resolving the dispute.
XI.REGARDING THE NULLITIES HEREBY DECLARED.- In these proceedings, INDER’s representative has not only brought an action seeking annulment of its own acts, as is typical of an action for injury to the public interest, but has also asserted a series of claims of nullity based on their connection to or derivation from the challenged act. Specifically, it has requested the annulment of the administrative act by which title to the property in the Limón Registry District, registration Placa25890°, cadastral plan number L-0645227-2000, was granted to the defendant Association (claim No. 2), as well as the other legal acts through which the transfer of the property was carried out and formalized, together with its registration in the
Public Registry (claims No. 3 and 4). Accordingly, as a consequence of the matters set forth in the preceding Recitals (Considerandos), and given that “…[a]n action for injury to the public interest concerning the protection of public-domain property shall not be subject to a time limit…” (Art. 34.2 CPCA), those claims must be granted in full, and the following is therefore ordered:
XII.REGARDING CLAIM NUMBER FIVE.- In its complaint, the plaintiff asserted a fifth claim, which reads as follows: “…5. On grounds of connection, that any registration deriving from the registration of the property registered [sic] in the National Registry, Province of Limón, Real Folio, registration number Placa25891, be annulled….” Upon review of the registry entry for the property in question, the National Registry’s public database shows that, as of the date of this judgment, the property is subject to the following notices and encumbrances (anotaciones y gravámenes):
As can be seen, three annotations appear in the registry entry (asiento registral): the first concerns the restrictions under which the property (finca) was created when it was titled by the former IDA; the second set consists of restrictions that, regardless of the reason for their imposition, have been expired since May 24, 2016; and finally, there is the annotation ordered by this Tribunal as a provisional measure (medida cautelar). Consequently, and based on the same considerations set forth ut supra concerning the supervening lack of current interest (falta de interés actual sobreviniente) regarding the third-party claim asserting independent relief (tercería con pretensiones propias) filed by Nombre28548, this Chamber finds that it must declare, sua sponte, a lack of current interest with respect to this part of the complaint, since, as previously stated, such a ruling would confer no tangible benefit on the plaintiff’s legal sphere, not only because there is currently no valid annotation asserting any third party’s right, but also because the annulment of the registry entry ordered herein would ipso iure eliminate the remaining annotations as well. -
XIII.REGARDING THE PROVISIONAL MEASURE- Regarding the provisional measures ordered in favor of the plaintiff through provisional-measure rulings N° 2676-2013 at 09:40 hours on December 10, 2013, issued by the Case Processing Division of this Tribunal (p. 151 of the scanned judicial file), and N° 273-2014-II at 15:29 hours on July 08, 2014, issued by the Second Section of the Administrative and Tax Civil Court of Appeals, it is hereby ordered that they remain in effect until this judgment becomes final, at which time they shall be deemed lifted without the need for any subsequent ruling so declaring. For clarity in this judgment, the contents of those provisional measures are summarized here: 1) Annotation of the complaint in the margin of the registry entry for the property in the Province of Limón under registration number Placa25891 (provisional-measure ruling n.º 2676-2013 of the Case Processing Division of this Tribunal); and 2) The defendant Association’s duty to “...refrain from engaging in conduct that could directly affect the State’s natural heritage, specifically including the following obligations (reiterating the fourth clause of the contract with FONANIFO): Protect the forest, vegetation cover (cobertura vegetal), and the regeneration processes within the area covered by the contract and, therefore, refrain from cutting down trees or any other type of vegetation; retain a duly licensed forestry manager (regente forestal) responsible for technical implementation throughout the term of the contract; prevent and control forest fires; prevent and control illegal hunting and the illegal extraction of other forest products; refrain from agricultural or livestock activities; refrain from cutting and extracting timber products; refrain from any activity that alters the natural behavior of the area to be protected; notify MINAET of any alteration or contingency causing changes in the protected area; allow MINAET and FONAFIFO personnel responsible for oversight access to the area subject to the PCA, facilitating their work; assign to the Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal the environmental services generated by its forest; and comply with any written technical recommendation issued by MINAET or the forestry manager.
The defendant must keep the area free of trespassers and take all necessary steps to protect the property, whether personally or by notifying the MINAET authorities whenever necessary; avoid any action that could materially affect the assets located in the forest and other natural resources; protect not only the forest area but ecosystems generally, preventing any deterioration and, certainly, without the possibility of carrying out a land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo). Every three months from today, a communication or report concerning the condition of the property must be prepared and submitted to the judicial file...” (Ruling N° 273-2014-II of the Second Section of the Court of Appeals).-
XIV.REGARDING COSTS.- Pursuant to section 193 of the CPCA, litigation costs and attorney fees (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party solely by virtue of having lost. Exemption from such an award is available only when, in the Tribunal’s judgment, there was sufficient cause to litigate or when the judgment is rendered on the basis of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, the Tribunal finds that, regarding the action for annulment of a favorable administrative act (demanda de lesividad), although the defendant Association has been unsuccessful, it had sufficient cause to litigate because it held an act declaring rights that INDER was required to seek to have annulled before this jurisdiction. This Section reaches the same conclusion regarding FONAFIFO’s assertion of independent claims, precisely because it was defending public funds that had been invested under the Pago de Servicios Ambientales contract that it had entered into at the time with the defendant Association. We therefore find that the proceeding must conclude without any special award of costs against either unsuccessful party.-
THEREFORE
The untimely documentary evidence consisting of official communications from the Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservación n° SINAC-ACLAC-DR-277 of July 24 and SINAC-DE-574 of March 20, both dated 2014, offered by the defendant Association, as well as the document concerning the termination of Pago de Servicios Ambientales contract number LM-01-222-0063-2011, is admitted. The remaining untimely documents offered as evidence by FONAFIFO, the State, and the defendant Association are rejected. - Sua sponte, a lack of current interest is declared regarding the third-party claim asserting independent relief filed at the time by Nombre28548, as well as regarding claim number 5 of the action for annulment of a favorable administrative act. The defense of lack of legal entitlement (falta de Derecho) raised by the defendant Association is rejected. Consequently: A) THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF A FAVORABLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACT filed by the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER) against the ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBE IS GRANTED IN PART.
Accordingly, it is unanimously declared: 1) Agreement number 161, adopted under Article 161 of ordinary session number 023-2004 of the Board of Directors of the former Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA), now Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), held on June 21, 2004, is partially absolutely null and void, exclusively insofar as it ordered that Dirección16846 of the BIRF 2764 titling project, having an area of 183,488.35 m2 and registered survey plan (plano catastrado) n° L-645227-2000, currently corresponding to the property in the Province of Limón under registration number Placa25891, be titled in favor of the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe; and 2) Because the plaintiff so requested and given their connection with the annulled formal act, pursuant to Article 122(k) of the CPCA, the legal acts cited below shall also be annulled on the following terms: a) Public deed number 47, executed at 10:00 hours on July 27, 2004, before notaries Randy Anthony Gordon Cruickshank and Eduardo Newton Cruickshank Smith, acting under the former’s protocol number 5, is partially annulled, specifically with respect to the segregation (segregación) and conveyance of parcel 9-A-2001, having an area of 183,488.35 m2 and registered survey plan n° Placa26810, made in favor of the Asociación de Organizaciones del Corredor Biológico Talamanca Caribe and currently corresponding to the property in the Province of Limón under registration number Placa25891; and b) The entry registering in the Registro Nacional the property in the Province of Limón under registration number Placa25891, plan number L-645227-2000, corresponding to parcel 9-A-2001 of the BIRF 2764 titling project, is annulled in its entirety.
Pursuant to Article 171 of the LGAP in relation to sections 39(2) and 131 of the CPCA, this declaration has declaratory and retroactive effect as of the date of the invalidated acts, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith.- The remaining claims not covered by the foregoing ruling are dismissed as legally inadmissible.- The provisional measures ordered through rulings N° 26762013 at 09:40 hours on December 10, 2013, issued by the Case Processing Division of this Tribunal, and N° 2732014-II at 15:29 hours on July 08, 2014, issued by the Second Section of the Administrative and Tax Civil Court of Appeals, shall remain in effect until this judgment becomes final, at which time they shall be deemed lifted without the need for any subsequent ruling so declaring.- B) THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM ASSERTING INDEPENDENT RELIEF filed by the FONDO NACIONAL DE FINANCIAMIENTO FORESTAL against the ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA- CARIBE IS DENIED.- The unsuccessful parties are exempted from the payment of costs.- Let notice be served.- Daniel Aguilar Méndez Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Cynthia Abarca Gómez 1
Res N° 145-2021â•?VI 10 horas 29-Oct-2021 - Sentencia.docx TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Central: 2545-00-03 Fax: 2545-00-33 Correo Electrónico ...01 TRIBUNAL DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA - SECCIÓN SEXTASEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Goicoechea, a las diez horas del veintinueve de de octubre dos mil veintiuno. - Proceso de lesividad establecido por INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), representado por Nombre114598 y Nombre137818 , en calidad de apoderados especiales judiciales (f. 04 del expediente judicial escaneado), contra la ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBE, ce´dula juri´dica nu´mero CED109044, representada por Nombre137819 , en calidad de Presidente con cara´cter de apoderada generali´sima sin li´mite de suma (segu´n certi icacio´n registral aportada a los autos el di´a 17 de febrero de 2020, asi´ como Nombre137820 y Rosa Bustillos Lemaire, e´stas u´ltimas en calidad de apoderadas especiales judiciales (f. 179 del expediente judicial escaneado).
Participan de este proceso, en condicio´n de coadyuvantes activos: EL ESTADO, representado por Nombre137822´ , en su calidad de Procurador y el SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ÁREAS DE CONSERVACIÓN, representado por Nombre140101 Nombre140102 , en calidad de apoderada especial judicial (poder recibido en el Despacho el di´a 27 de mayo de 2019) y en condicio´n de tercero interesado, el FONDO NACIONAL DE FINANCIAMIENTO FORESTAL, representado por Nombre137824 , en condicio´n de apoderada general judicial y Nombre137825 , como apoderada especial judicial (f. 400 y 412 del expediente judicial escaneado).- CONSIDERANDO: I.- ASPECTOS PRELIMINARES, DELIBERACIÓN Y VOTO.- Se emite esta resolucio´n segu´n las formalidades establecidas en la Ley N° 9342, Co´digo Procesal Civil y el Reglamento sobre Expediente Judicial Electro´nico ante el Poder Judicial, aprobado por Corte Plena en el arti´culo XXXI de la sesio´n N° 22-13, celebrada el 20 de mayo de 2013.
El fallo se adopta por unanimidad, una vez realizada la respectiva deliberación, con la redacción de la resolución a cargo del informante, juzgador Aguilar Méndez y con el voto concurrente de las personas juzgadoras Fernández Brenes y Abarca Gómez.- II.- PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER. – Durante la realizacio´n de la audiencia preliminar efectuada en fecha 09 de julio de 2015 (ver grabacio´n de la audiencia a partir de las 14:02:20 horas), tanto la parte demandada, como el Estado y el FONAFIFO, e´stos u´ltimos como partes accesorias, realizaron una serie de ofrecimientos de prueba que, de manera confusa fueron cali icados por las partes y por el propio Juzgador de Tra´mite, de manera indistinta como prueba para mejor resolver, incidente de documentos nuevos, prueba extempora´nea, etc., abordaje que sin duda, dada la relevancia que comporta el tema probatorio para un proceso judicial, puede desencadenar en futuros reclamos de vulneracio´n a los derechos de defensa y debido proceso.
Asimismo y con motivo de las aclaraciones solicitadas por este Tribunal en resolucio´n de las 14:10 horas del 19 de julio de 2019, la representacio´n del Nombre28548 aporto´, en su escrito de 08 de noviembre de ese an~o, un documento relativo al iniquito del contrato de pago por servicios ambientales nu´mero LM-01-222-0063-2011, sin indicar la condicio´n de ese ofrecimiento. Ahora bien, en atencio´n a lo antes dicho, esta Ca´mara antes de pronunciarse sobre esos ofrecimientos, debe llevar a cabo las siguientes aclaraciones conceptuales. De entrada, debemos recordar que el iter probatorio se compone a grandes rasgos, de cuatro etapas o fases dentro del proceso contencioso administrativo conforme la Ley N° 8508, Co´digo Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), en primer te´rmino, tenemos el ofrecimiento o introducción de la prueba, referido a la habilitacio´n que hace el ordenamiento procesal para que las partes o, inclusive, las autoridades judiciales puedan incorporar diversos elementos de prueba (momento procesal oportuno u oportunidad procesal).
Luego, tendri´amos la fase de admisibilidad en la que el Juzgador, sea de Tra´mite o Decisor, determina que la prueba resulta legi´tima, pertinente y u´til en relacio´n con la causa y objeto del proceso, autoriza su uso indistinto por cualquiera de las partes o los o´rganos jurisdiccionales. Respecto del conjunto de prueba admitida o comunidad probatoria, la autoridad judicial procede con la siguiente etapa: su evacuación o recepción, sea o no mediante la realizacio´n de una audiencia complementaria (audiencia de juicio oral o de recepcio´n de prueba), segu´n sea necesario acorde con la fuente probatoria de la que se trate. Te´ngase en mente que por el disen~o del proceso contencioso administrativo y civil de hacienda, se preve´n diversas hipo´tesis en la que e´sta se suprime (Art. 69 y 98.2 CPCA), entre otros motivos, porque la fuente de prueba permite prescindir de dicha diligencia. Finalmente, tenemos la valoración de la prueba, sobre la cual, podemos decir de una manera sumaria -por no ser de relevancia para lo que se decide-, que es la fase en la que el o´rgano jurisdiccional, conforme las reglas de razonamiento probatorio que provee el ordenamiento juri´dico, extrae, va´lidamente, informacio´n sobre los hechos que constituyen la causa petitum y por tanto, tambie´n, acerca del objeto de la litis.
Como resultado de ese ejercicio racional, la autoridad jurisdiccional procede a construir una hipo´tesis fa´ctica (elencos de hechos probados y no probados) a la cual dota de un estatus de certeza legal (verdad judicial), de modo que con estos y las normas juri´dicas que resulten aplicables a partir de los mismos (a manera de presupuestos de hecho), elabora entonces un razonamiento juri´dico -ma´s o menos complejo- con el que poder estimar o desestimar la accio´n, comprobando sus presupuestos materiales, a saber: legitimacio´n, intere´s actual y Derecho. Ahora bien, por ser de intere´s en vista de las discusiones que, al respecto, se tuvieron durante la audiencia preliminar, en cuanto a la primera fase, esto es, la de ofrecimiento o introducción de la prueba, resulta muy importante aclarar, adicionalmente, algunos aspectos medulares de e´sta. En esta etapa, el ordenamiento juri´dico establece un peri´odo en el proceso, en el que se autoriza, sea a las partes o a la persona Juzgadora, a introducir diversos elementos de prueba en la litis, conforme el balance de cargas probatorias que el legislador disen~o´ para el proceso de lo contencioso administrativo.
Asi´ tenemos que se puede ofrecer o introducir prueba por las partes: a) ordinariamente, en la demanda y su contestacio´n, contrademanda o reconvencio´n y su contestacio´n (Art. 58 y 64 CPCA), en la audiencia de re´plica (Art. 70 CPCA), en la interposicio´n de una terceri´a con pretensiones propias y su contestacio´n (Art. 15.1.a CPCA) o bien, con la presentacio´n de una coadyuvancia y su contestacio´n (Art. 13 CPCA), y b) extraordinariamente, en dos clases de supuestos: i.- Trata´ndose de hipo´tesis de ampliacio´n de la demanda, sea en relacio´n exclusiva con la causa de pedir (hechos nuevos) y/o en conjunto con el objeto (ajuste o ampliacio´n de pretensiones), asi´ como -conforme las garanti´as de igualdad procesal y contradictorio-, en la respectiva ampliacio´n a la contestacio´n a la cual las partes accionadas tendri´an derecho (Art. 46, 50, 54.2, 55.3, 68.1, 68.2, 90.2 y 95 CPCA), y ii.- Trata´ndose de prueba de fuente documental que, sin estar ligada a una ampliacio´n de la demanda o la contestacio´n, re iera a las hipo´tesis previstas en el inciso
De esta manera, en la parte dispositiva se establecio´ lo siguiente: “… POR TANTO: De conformidad con el artículo 34 inciso 2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, Artículos 176 y siguientes de la Ley General de Administración Pública, Ley de Tierras y Colonización y Ley de Creación del IDA, se ordena
Ciertamente, podri´a haberse desacreditado las conclusiones de la certi icacio´n dado su cara´cter de presuncio´n iuris tantum, sin embargo, como no se cuenta con alguna otra prueba que asi´ lo hubiera permitido, no es posible entrar a aseverar la existencia de una posesio´n anterior a la demanializacio´n del inmueble en cuestio´n. Por su parte, del otro o icio aportado en ese sentido, el n° SINAC-DE-574, consistente en un documento adjunto al anterior, en e´l so´lo se detallan instrucciones giradas en su momento por la Direccio´n Ejecutiva del SINAC a las Areas de Conservacio´n, respecto de co´mo realizar las certi icaciones de clasi icacio´n de terrenos respecto del Patrimonio Natural del Estado, sin que se aporte ninguna informacio´n de relevancia a in de acreditar que el fundo titulado a favor de la Asociacio´n demandada no forma parte de dicho re´gimen demanial. Por u´ltimo, debemos recordar que la u´nica prueba ofrecida en la contestacio´n de la demanda fue de cara´cter testimonial y la misma fue rechazada durante la audiencia preliminar por parte del Juez Tramitador (ve´ase grabacio´n de la audiencia de fecha 09 de julio de 2015, a partir de las 14:50:10 horas).
En atencio´n a lo anterior, denotamos que efectivamente el acto de titulacio´n infringe el ordenamiento juri´dico, precisamente, en los te´rminos que ya han sen~alado otros precedentes de esta Seccio´n, en el entendido de que la demanialidad de estos bienes, a tono con la doctrina que deriva de los ca´nones 261 y 262 del Co´digo Civil, junto con las normas especiales que rigen el Patrimonio Natural del Estado, hace que estos resulten “…en de initiva, inalienables, imprescriptibles e intransferibles. De ahí que su titulación, o bien, el otorgamiento de derechos de disposición de aquellos, a favor de personas particulares, supone, sin duda, un quebranto al régimen normativo de esta categoría de dominio. Esto supone, que cualquier acto de disposición sobre este tipo de cosas públicas, mostraría un antagonismo a la legalidad administrativa, patología que es propia de in vicio grave, que lleva a la nulidad absoluta de ese tipo de conductas administrativas habilitantes…” (Sentencia N° 134-2021-VI de las 07:30 horas del 13 de octubre de 2021.
Resaltado no es del original). En tercer lugar y una vez analizados los autos y determinado que, en efecto, nos encontramos en el sub iúdice en una de las hipo´tesis de excepcio´n, que permite romper la limitacio´n temporal para el ejercicio de la accio´n anulatoria, es necesario dar entonces por cumplido este requisito prejudicial, toda vez que aunque el acto administrativo de titulacio´n fue emitido en el an~o 2004 y, si bien, su declaratoria de lesividad se emitio´ hasta el an~o 2013, lo cierto del caso es que la accio´n de recuperacio´n o tutela del dominio pu´blico ejercida a trave´s de una demanda de lesividad, no esta´ sujeta a plazo, no so´lo por la aplicacio´n de la cla´usula general de imprescriptibilidad de este tipo de bienes, sino porque expresamente lo establece el arti´culo 34.2 CPCA: “… La lesividad referente a la tutela de bienes del dominio público no estará sujeta a plazo…” (Resaltado no es del original).
En virtud de lo expuesto, estimamos entonces no so´lo que se satisfacen a cabalidad, los distintos presupuestos requeridos para formular este proceso de lesividad, sino que adema´s se han comprobado en el caso concreto, los vicios apuntados por el INDER en su accio´n anulatoria, de modo que lo corresponde en Derecho es acoger la misma, como en efecto se ordena. En vista de dicha circunstancia, considera esta Ca´mara que los elementos argumentativos y de prueba aportados por los coadyuvantes activos, resultari´an entonces innecesarios, por lo que omitiremos expresamente su ana´lisis, toda vez que dicha labor resulta fu´til para la resolucio´n de la litis. XI.- SOBRE LAS NULIDADES QUE SE DECLARAN.- En el presente proceso, la representacio´n del INDER no so´lo ha derivado una accio´n anulatoria de sus actos propios, como es ti´pico de una demanda de lesividad, sino que adema´s, ha an~adido una serie de nulidades por conexidad o derivacio´n del acto impugnado, a saber, ha pedido anular el acto administrativo en el que se titulo´ a favor de la Asociacio´n demandada la inca del Partido de Limo´n, matri´cula Placa25890° , con plano catastrado nu´mero L-0645227-2000 (pretensio´n n° 2), asi´ como los dema´s actos juri´dicos a trave´s de los cuales se ejecuto´ y formalizo´ el traspaso del inmueble, asi´ como su inscripcio´n en el Registro Pu´blico (pretensiones N° 3 y 4).
Asi´ las cosas, como derivacio´n de lo expuesto en los Considerandos precedentes y en atencio´n a que “…[l]a lesividad referente a la tutela de bienes del dominio público no estará sujeta a plazo…” (Art. 34.2 CPCA), entonces, dichas pretensiones deben acogerse plenamente y en consecuencia, se dispone lo siguiente:
Como se puede apreciar, constan tres anotaciones en el asiento registral, la primera, re iere a las limitaciones con las que fue creada la inca al momento en que fue titulada por parte del entonces IDA, las segundas son limitaciones que independientemente del motivo que las origino´ se encuentran vencidas desde el 24 de mayo de 2016 y inalmente, la anotacio´n que como medida cautelar decreto´ este Tribunal. Por consiguiente y con base en las mismas consideraciones que fueron expuestas ut supra sobre la falta de intere´s actual sobreviniente respecto de la terceri´a con pretensiones propias de Nombre28548, estima esta Ca´mara que debe declararse de o icio, una falta de intere´s actual en relacio´n con este extremo de la demanda, ya que como se a irmo´ anteriormente dicho pronunciamiento no operari´a ninguna ventaja tangible a la esfera juri´dica de la parte actora, no so´lo porque a la fecha no existe anotacio´n vigente que haga valer derecho alguno de una tercera persona, sino que adema´s con la anulacio´n del asiento registral que aqui´ se ordena, tambie´n quedari´an eliminadas ipso iure las restantes anotaciones. - XIII.- EN RELACIÓN CON LA MEDIDA CAUTELAR- En relacio´n con las medidas cautelares dictadas a favor de la parte actora por medio de resoluciones cautelares N° 2676-2013 de las 09:40 horas 10 de diciembre de 2013, del Area de Tra´mite de este Tribunal (f. 151 del expediente judicial escaneado), y N° 273-2014-II de las 15:29 horas del 08 de julio de 2014, de la Seccio´n Segunda del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, se ordena entonces mantener la vigencia de las mismas hasta tanto esta sentencia adquiera irmeza, instante a partir del cual debera´ tenerse por levantada sin necesidad de resolucio´n alguna que asi´ lo declare con posterioridad.
Para efecto de claridad de esta sentencia, se resume aqui´ el contenido de dichas medidas cautelares: 1) La anotacio´n de la demanda al margen de la inca del Partido de Limo´n matri´cula nu´mero Placa25891 (resolucio´n cautelar n.º 2676-2013 del Area de Tra´mite de este Tribunal); y 2) El deber de la Asociacio´n demandada de “...abstenerse de realizar conductas que puedan afectar directamente el patrimonio natural del Estado, y que en particular se desglosarían de la siguiente manera (reiterando la cláusula cuarta del contrato con FONANIFO): Proteger el bosque, cobertura vegetal, así como los procesos de regeneración del área comprendida en el contrato, por ende no cortar árboles o cualquier otro tipo de vegetación, contar con un regente forestal debidamente colegiado responsable de la ejecución técnica durante la vigencia del contrato, prevenir y controlar los incendios forestales, prevenir y controlar la cacería ilegal y· 'extracción ilegal de otros. productos del bosque, no desarrollar actividades agrícolas o ganaderas, no efectuar acciones de corta y extracción de productos maderables, no realizar ninguna actividad que altere el comportamiento natural del área a proteger, comunicar al MINAET cualquier alteración o contingencia que ocasione cambios en el área protegida, permitir el acceso al personal del MINAET, FONAFIFO, encargado del control al lugar del área sujeta al PCA, facilitando su labor, ceder al Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal los servicios ambientales generados por su bosque, acatar cualquier recomendación técnica emitida por el MINAET o el regente en forma escrita.
Debe mantener el accionado libre de invasores el área, realizar todas las acciones necesarias para proteger el inmueble ya sea en forma personal o bien comunicando a las autoridades del MINAET cuando así sea necesario, evitar cualquier acción que vaya a afectar materialmente los bienes que se encuentran en el bosque y demás recursos naturales, cubrir no solamente lo que corresponde al área forestal sino en general los ecosistemas, previniendo cualquier deterioro y ciertamente con la imposibilidad de realizar un cambio en el uso del suelo. Deberá cada tres meses a partir del día de hoy hacerse una comunicación o informe en relación con la condición del inmueble, la que se aportará al expediente judicial...” (Resolucio´n de la Seccio´n Segunda del Tribunal de Apelaciones N° 273-2014-II).- XIV.- SOBRE LAS COSTAS.- De conformidad con el numeral 193 del CPCA, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el solo hecho de serlo.
La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo su iciente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, el Tribunal es del criterio de que, en relacio´n con la demanda de lesividad, si bien la Asociacio´n accionada ha resultado perdidosa, contaba con su iciente motivo para litigar, toda vez que teni´a un acto declaratorio de derechos que el INDER ha tenido que venir anular a esta jurisdiccio´n. En igual sentido, se entiende de parte de esta Seccio´n respecto de la deduccio´n de pretensiones propias por parte del FONAFIFO, en razo´n precisamente de la defensa de los fondos pu´blicos que habi´an sido invertidos como parte del contrato de pago de servicios ambientales que, en su momento, suscribio´ con la Asociacio´n demandada. Por ello, estimamos que el proceso debe terminar sin especial sin especial condenatoria en costas para ambas partes vencidas.- POR TANTO Se admite como prueba documental extempora´nea los o icios del Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservacio´n n° SINAC-ACLAC-DR-277 de 24 de julio y SINAC-DE-574 de 20 marzo, ambas fechas del an~o 2014, ofrecidos por la Asociacio´n demandada, asi´ como el documento relativo al iniquito del contrato de pago por servicios ambientales nu´mero LM-01-222-0063-2011.
Se rechazan los restantes documentos extempora´neos ofrecidos como prueba por parte de FONAFIFO, el Estado y la Asociacio´n Demandada. - De o icio, se declara una falta de intere´s actual en relacio´n con la terceri´a con pretensiones propias incoada en su momento por Nombre28548, asi´ como respecto de la pretensio´n nu´mero 5 de la demanda de lesividad. Se rechaza la falta de Derecho opuesta por la Asociacio´n demandada. Por consiguiente: A) SE DECLARA PARCIALMENTE CON LUGAR la demanda de lesividad incoada por el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL (INDER), contra la ASOCIACIÓN DE ORGANIZACIONES DEL CORREDOR BIOLÓGICO DE TALAMANCA-CARIBE. En consecuencia, por unanimidad, se declara:
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