Constitutionality of relaxing emission limits for biomass boilersConstitucionalidad de la relajación de límites de emisión de calderas con biomasa

*140086410007CO* Res. No. 005616-2015 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and three minutes on the twenty-second of April, two thousand fifteen.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDITA ALFARO BOZA, GLORIANA CHAVARRIA SOLIS, MELANY SZYFER CASTILLO, REBECA CHAVES RODRIGUEZ, holders of identity card numbers 2-0365-0227, 2-0701-0309, 1-1565-0461, 1-1485-0400, and 1-1539-0855, respectively, against the Reform to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants, Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, a reform published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012.

Whereas:

1.- By a document received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours and thirty-four minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand fourteen, the plaintiffs request that the unconstitutionality of the Reform to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants, Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, a reform published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012, be declared. They allege that incorporating said phrase into the Regulation increases the possibility of contaminating by allowing, for those boilers installed before March 26, 2007, an emission with a maximum limit of 220 mg/m3. They add that the Regulation –Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS-, published in 2011, established a series of parameters to reduce air contamination; but the following year, through Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, the requirements were lowered and more contamination is allowed for boilers installed before March 26, 2007. They consider that, with this reform to the Regulation, the principal obligation to protect health, the environment, and life is breached. Likewise, they express that the principle of progressivity is violated, since the level of environmental protection already achieved must be respected and, under no circumstances, diminished; the Executive Branch cannot lower the standards if it had already conducted studies over several periods or years, as was indicated in 2011 in recital (considerando) 5 of the Decree. They add that the reform to the Regulation also produces a violation of the principle of objectification, since a maximum of 220 mg/m3 is allowed for boilers installed before May 26, 2007, without providing any scientific reasoning that is recorded in the Regulation or in its recitals (considerandos). They consider that the maximum limits should not be determined according to an installation date, but by category.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they indicate that they are supported by diffuse interests, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

3.- By a ruling issued at nine hours forty minutes on June tenth, two thousand fourteen, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).

4.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic rendered its report. It indicates that in this action of unconstitutionality, the phrase "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 g/m3 (TPN)", contained in subsection A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, is challenged; this is a reform introduced by Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET. It states that the purpose of the action of unconstitutionality is to determine whether the challenged norm, by excluding boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the application of the limits set in Executive Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, and allowing them to emit a maximum emission level of 220 mg/m3 (TPN), is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principles contained in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that the petitioners have standing to bring said action, in accordance with Article 50 of the Constitution and the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since the existence of a diffuse interest is invoked to claim the infringement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. It indicates that the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, in its Article 7, established emission limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3 for large, medium, and small boilers and furnaces, without differentiating whether they were new or existing furnaces or boilers. It states that through Executive Decree 37301 of March 22, 2012, subsection A.3) of Article 7 of said Regulation was modified. It shows that said modification was adopted by virtue of the request proposed by "the country's sugar sector," aimed at maintaining the concentrations permitted before the publication of Executive Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, based on technical studies. It states that the regulation in force prior to the enactment of the cited decree was the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Boilers, which established maximum permitted emission limits for boilers using biomass fuels. It adds that for new boilers using that type of fuel, it set the limits at 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, depending on their size. It argues that for existing boilers, it set an emission limit of 220 mg/Nm3, and granted a five-year period, which expired on March 26, 2007, for them to adjust to the new established emission limits. It claims that the issue raised obliges an analysis of whether the decision to exclude boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for the emission of suspended particles established in Executive Decree 36551, is inconsistent with the state duty to protect and safeguard the environment established in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that this must be analyzed based on the principles of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection. It states that, according to the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, it cannot be understood in absolute terms, since a reduction of a certain level of protection is possible if there is technical and scientific support guaranteeing that no relevant lack of environmental protection occurs, provided that the parameters of proportionality and reasonableness are satisfied. It states that the modification of regulations challenged in this action of unconstitutionality reduces the level of protection and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification supporting it. It reveals that we are facing a reform that worsens the emission levels of atmospheric contaminants originating from boilers, with respect to the limits achieved up until the modification published on September 24, 2012. It explains that in the decree it is clear that the sole focus of the modification is centered on establishing conditions of competitiveness that contribute to the development of economic activity in the country, and therefore the environmental variable or the health of individuals was not analyzed. It states that it is a decision that implies a worsening of the level of protection, with the additional problem that the decree lacks technical and scientific information allowing a determination of the extent to which this exemption may give rise to a reduction in the level of protection. It affirms that from ruling 18702-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber, on the principle of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection, the following is extracted: "The principle stands as a substantive guarantee of rights, in this case, of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by virtue of which the State is obliged not to adopt measures, policies, or approve legal norms that worsen, without reasonable and proportionate justification, the situation of the rights achieved up to now." It maintains that the reform introduced, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for more than four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where levels of protection are diminished. It argues that the reform adopted in September 2012 is an unjustified worsening of the emission limits established for all existing boilers even before the entry into force of Executive Decree No. 36551. It pronounces that once the five-year period provided for in the Regulation had expired, all boilers became subject to the limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, according to their size. It affirms that with what was originally provided in Executive Decree No. 30222, the intention was to set a provisional or transitory parameter (a 5-year period), and with the challenged reform, this acquired a permanent character. It notes that the reform is of general application, meaning that the regression in terms of the required emission levels applies to all boilers existing as of March 26, 2007, and not only to those used by the country's sugar sector in its production activity. It adds that if the Chamber decides to declare the unconstitutionality, "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 mg/m3 (TPN)", introduced by the Executive Decree. It agrees that the provision in point C.2) of Article 7 should be analyzed, which is equally contrary to the evolutionary interpretation in the protection of the environment, which does not admit a regression to the detriment. It claims that as stated in recital (considerando) 5 of the decree, "the country's sugar sector" also requested that the reference oxygen levels for data reporting be reviewed. It indicates that this translated into the unjustified reduction of the protection that had been established in the previous Executive Decree, since, without any technical reasoning being provided, it was decided to change the reference level from 5% oxygen for all boilers to 10% for boilers using biomass fuels, therefore, there is more possibility of diluting the emissions and contaminating more. It emphasizes that since there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in the reference oxygen levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to the health of individuals or to the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle that establishes the state duty of its protection and safeguard, as indicated in rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber. Therefore, it considers that the reform to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, introduced by Executive Decree 37301, is unconstitutional, as is the reform to point C.2) of Article 7 of Executive Decree 36551.

5.- Mr. Edgar E. Gutiérrez Ezpeleta, in his capacity as Minister of Environment and Energy, responds to the granted hearing, stating that through official communication Memo 12 of April 13, 2012, signed by the former Minister of Health and addressed to the former Minister of Environment and Energy, official communication DRS-IC-004-2012 is forwarded for the signature process, corresponding to the proposed Executive Decree for the Reform to the Regulation. He informs that on April 20, 2012, it was forwarded to the Legal Advisory Directorate for the corresponding review. He adds that through official communication DAJ-619-2012, signed by the Director of Legal Advisory, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management is requested to endorse the draft Decree DRS-IC-004-2012, on the Reform to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces. He highlights that through official communication DIGECA-454-2012, the Environmental Quality Management Directorate referred to the draft decree DRS-IC-004-2012/Ministry of Health "Reform to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants." He shows that in said opinion, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends "the inclusion of a transitory provision where the renewal of boilers is promoted, such that those that have exceeded their useful life (approximately 20 years) can be gradually replaced by more efficient technologies. The timeframe, of course, must be evaluated within the Commission and consulted with the productive sectors." He emphasizes that said report from the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends that the established limits be reported in mass flow, given that it is a clearer measure of the load of contaminants emitted by a specific source over a period of time, and not as the technical position presented by the sugar cane and oil palm sector, which is based on international standards for the emission of particles from boilers, due to the fact that the technologies used for steam production in sugar mills are highly varied. He notes that through official communication DIGECA-642-2012, addressed to the Vice-Minister, it was indicated that it remained necessary to incorporate a transitory provision in the regulation, where the renewal of old boilers that present difficulties in complying with the emission limits established in Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS is promoted. He claims that, in that sense, the text of the transitory provision had to consider that air quality for the population would gradually improve, and the following transitory provision was proposed, suggesting a five-year period be established for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, to conform to the maximum limits established in the table. He highlights that the issuance of the reform to Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS is the result of the joint work of representatives from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, MINAE, UCCAEP, the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, the College of Chemists, the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry, and the UCR. He maintains that in the coordination meetings of the Emissions Commission, he indicated that a request for review had been sent by the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry regarding the emission limits for the sugar sector proposed in the Regulation, accompanied by a supporting technical document. He claims that it was agreed to modify the emission limit, taking into account the period that had been granted by the Regulation in force at that time, but maintaining the reference oxygen percentage, in order to standardize the calculation. He warns that when reviewing the reform to the Executive Decree, published in La Gaceta 184 of September 29, 2012, it is clear that the transitory provision proposed by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management was not included in the terms proposed. He requests that the constitutionality of the norm be assessed, given that the technical observations indicated by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management were not incorporated.

6.- Having been omitted in due time, by a ruling issued at nine hours eight minutes on February twelfth, two thousand fifteen, the Investigating Magistrate granted a hearing to the Ministry of Health regarding the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez and others, against the reformed Article 7 A.3), of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants Originating from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces (Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET of March 22, 2012).

7.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his condition as Acting Minister of Health, responds to the granted hearing, stating the criteria provided by the Director and Acting Head of the Health Services Standardization Unit in Human Environment, of the Directorate for the Protection of the Human Environment, of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that Article 7°, section A), sub-section three of Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, refers specifically to boilers that use biomass as fuel in indirect-type boilers and furnaces, and not to all boilers. This version of the norm replaces Decree 30222-S-MINAE of 2002, with which sanitary regulation for indirect-type furnaces was incorporated for the first time, an aspect that was previously unregulated by any other body of the Costa Rican State. Contrary to the plaintiffs' criterion, the principle of progressivity in the level of environmental protection is not contravened; rather, it is being extended. Decree 36511-S-MINAE-MTSS, published on June 29, 2011, intended to ignore the distinction between "New" and "Existing" boilers, as they were differentiated in Decree 30222-S-MINAE, and to regulate all of them as if they were "New". It ignored that in Decree 30222-S-MINAE, section A.3, referring to biomass boilers, a five-year period was granted, starting from its enactment, for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to achieve emitting particles at concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3. On this last aspect, the biomass boiler operators alerted the Administration, and the Administration corrected the material error, maintaining the same criterion of 220 mg/Nm3 from Decree 30222-S-MINAE, when the modification was published, through Decree 37301-S-MTSS-MINAE. Therefore, this adjustment does not reduce the level of environmental protection either; rather, it maintains the same level that had been established since 2002. Based on the cited report, it is considered that it is the State's obligation, and primarily that of the Ministry of Health, to protect the health of individuals, the environment, and life in general; therefore, based on these principles, it is clarified that the levels established in the norm under discussion do not reduce the level of environmental protection; likewise, it does not violate the principle of progressivity, since indirect-type furnaces were regulated for the first time in the country in 2002, meaning this constitutes progress in environmental matters and not a setback, and therefore Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET adequately ensures the observance and compliance with norms and public policies regarding environmental protection matters.

8.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 116, 117, and 118 of the Judicial Bulletin, of June 18, 19, and 20, 2014.

9.- By a document filed on June 24, 2014, Roberto Vega Arias, in his capacity as general judicial representative (apoderado general judicial) of the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA), appears in this case file and requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant. He states that LAICA has among its public duties that of ensuring the optimal development and stability of the national sugar agroindustry, seeking the satisfaction of the interests it regulates, promotes, and defends. He indicates that regarding its procedural standing, LAICA represents the corporate interests of the nation's cane and sugar sectors, thus finding the procedural standing required to promote and participate in administrative or judicial actions in defense of its constituents. He indicates that based on the aforementioned legitimate interest, the Chamber has accepted LAICA's participation as a coadjuvant in other matters of special interest and relevance for the cane-sugar sector of Costa Rica. He maintains that this action of unconstitutionality, besides expressly alluding to the sector that LAICA represents and defends, is directed against a norm that directly affects the country's sugar mills (ingenios azucareros), as they are industries that operate with boilers fueled by biomass. He warns that if the challenged phrase were eliminated, said industries could not operate, putting at risk the production of sugar, molasses (mieles), and alcohol, as well as the livelihood of thousands of cane producers and their families. He states that on June 8, 2010, LAICA sent the Technical Committee on Emission Standards the sector's position regarding the draft Regulation, where it requested that the emission limit for suspended particles in combustion gases for sugarcane bagasse boilers remain at 220 mg/NM3 and that the O2 reference be at least 10%, by virtue of this being the typical value for the combustion of high-moisture cellulosic materials. He warns that LAICA carried out a complete technical analysis to justify its request. He adds that LAICA conveyed its position through the Cámara de Agricultura y Agroindustria. He accuses that the lawyer from the Directorate of Health Regulation, through official communication DRS-348-10, indicated to the Committee members that the modifications approved by them could not be incorporated into the regulation, given that it was already in the process of being signed by the Minister and that the public consultation process had already been concluded. He considers this was done improperly and unduly, as the lawyer gave preeminence to a formal aspect over a substantive agreement with technical support. He informs that through official communication DRS-UN-392-08-2010, the Standardization Unit informed them that the modification request to the proposed Regulation was rejected, which they insisted had already been approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards. He shows that through official communication DE-030-2009/2010, LAICA brought to the attention of the Minister of Health and the Minister of MINAET the serious risk that the enactment of said regulation posed for the agroindustry. He highlights that on July 20, 2011, Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS was enacted in La Gaceta, but did not include the observations that LAICA had timely submitted and which were approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards in its Session No. 116, mistakenly leaving the emission limit for suspended particles in combustion gases for category A) boilers that use biomass as fuel at 120 mg/Nm3 and with an oxygen reference of 5%, a parameter that from a technical point of view, no mill (ingenio) in Costa Rica can meet. He considers that through official communication P078-2011, a hearing was requested before the Emission Standards Committee to explain the reasons why the parameters established in the Executive Decree were not technically viable for boilers and furnaces that use biomass fuels. He notes that through official communication DRS-UN-920-11, the Directorate of Health Regulation asked the CNAA to submit the modification request for the Decree in writing to the Office of the Minister of Health. He shows that on January 18, 2012, a meeting was held at the Ministry of Agriculture, where an agreement was reached to modify the Decree, accepting the observations made through the CNAA. He informs that through the review and approval process of the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Environment, on September 24, 2012, Executive Decree 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS was published in La Gaceta, which reformed Article 7 of Decree 36551, to correct the original error pointed out by LAICA. He adds that the original wording of Article 7 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS established an emission limit of 120 mg/Nm3 with a 5% oxygen reference for category A) boilers using biomass fuel, which collided with the principles of proportionality and legal reasonableness. He argues that Article 7 did not meet technical reasonableness, given that no scientific studies existed to support the emission parameters originally defined for category A) boilers using biomass fuel, parameters that are impossible for the country's industries to meet. He states that it was precisely from the analysis conducted in LAICA's official communication DE-022-2009/2010 that the Technical Committee on Emission Standards, in its Session No. 116 on June 24, 2010, approved the request for it to be incorporated into the draft regulation that was about to be issued, a modification that was not incorporated, for the unreasonable reason that the lawyer from the Directorate of Health Regulation, on a mere formality, considered that since the consultation period for the regulatory proposal had expired, no further modifications could be made. He highlights that there are no technical studies justifying said modification of that magnitude for the case of boilers operating with biomass fuels. He adds that the studies referred to in recital (considerando) 5 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE, which are so vehemently emphasized in the action of unconstitutionality, do not indicate that they were from industrial and agricultural activities, as the plaintiffs maliciously and without any support express. He notes that the only thing recital (considerando) 5 of the Decree expresses is that occasional reports from boilers were taken into account, without specifying what type, information from laboratories with test data and quality data from RECOPE, which gives a clear impression that said studies referred to furnaces and boilers that operate with fossil fuels and not biomass fuels. He states that it is demonstrated with the evidence provided that it was technically unviable for industries with already-installed boilers operating with biomass fuels to move from 220 to 120 mg/Nm3 as the emission limit for particles, with an excess oxygen reference of just 5%. He adds that the boilers operating in the mills (ingenios) have certain important characteristics: 1. They operate with biomass, generated by the sector itself, meaning the boilers are self-sufficient and run on clean, renewable energy. 2. They operate seasonally. 3. They have alternative uses, such as the parallel generation of electricity. 4. They are located outside the GAM and do not use fossil fuels. He informs that it was unreasonable and disproportionate that the permitted emission limits for boilers and furnaces using fossil fuels were much higher than the limits for boilers and furnaces using biomass. He indicates that Article 7 of the questioned norm establishes limits of 550, 200, and 420 mg/Nm3 for boilers and furnaces using bunker fuel, diesel, and heating oil (gasóleo), while for boilers using biomass, the limit was 120 mg/Nm3, highlighting the lack of technical reasonableness in the norm. He warns that said norm allowed the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using more contaminating products, which by nature produce less suspended particulate matter, to be much higher than the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using a clean and renewable product, such as biomass. He claims that the aim is to expose the lack of suitability of the norm in its original wording, where there existed technical unreasonableness and the disproportions they generate. He warns that it is even more serious that the questioned Decree was issued departing from the technical criterion of the Emission Standards Committee. He indicates that the administrative act was enacted departing from the expert technical criterion, without any scientific justification whatsoever. He shows that the administrative act must be duly reasoned, as this constitutes a formal element of the General Law of Public Administration, in its Article 136 c.

It emphasizes that the technical basis is indispensable for the proper reasoning of the administrative act, which demonstrates the lack of technical reasonableness that the regulation possessed and accentuates the need to correct it. It considers that, as a discretionary act, the regulation is subject to the limits imposed by the univocal rules of science and technique, as well as the elementary principles of justice, logic, and convenience, and the rights of the administered party. It highlights that, in this case, it has been demonstrated that the technical justification provided in official communication DE-022-2009/2010, which was approved by the Emission Standards Committee, showed that the parameters originally established in the Executive Decree were impossible for sugar industries using biomass fuel in their boilers to comply with, which evidenced the unreasonableness. It maintains that the original setting of these parameters was so unreasonable and arbitrary that, contradictorily, in the case of furnaces using biomass fuel, an oxygen reference of 10% was established, but not for boilers using the same type of fuel. It accuses that the original wording in Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE violated articles 16, 158.4, and 160 of the LGAP. It adds that the fact that there are no technical studies supporting the parameters originally defined in article 7 of Decree 36551-S-MINAE, based on the real possibility of compliance for industries with boilers using biomass fuel, constituted a defect affecting the factual and technical background that served as the basis for issuing the Decree. It adds that article 7 of the Decree was null due to a defect in the content of the act. It accuses that none of the country's sugar engineers could technically comply with the parameters arbitrarily defined in article 7 of the Decree; the content was impossible, therefore, absolutely null. It shows that the interpretation made by the lawyer from the Directorate of Health Regulation, which served as support for rejecting the modifications, gave absolute predominance to form over substance, thus violating the principle of informality, as indicated in article 224 of the LGAP, and thereby violating articles 361 and 362 of the same legal body. It adds that, at that time, the reform project was simply a draft and nothing prevented making the modifications. It alleges that LAICA, as a public entity entrusted by Law to guarantee the stability of the agro-industry, was never expressly consulted on the scope of this regulatory modification. It warns that the important thing is that the error was corrected with the enactment of decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, which reformed article 7 of the previous Decree. It highlights that the principle of progressivity was not violated, as what was carried out was the correction of a technical error in the original wording of the regulation. It adds Constitutional Chamber vote 11088-2013, which indicates: "Now, in order for it to be pointed out that a violation of the principle of progressivity and non-regression exists, it is required that a fundamental right has been recognized and that it be limited or restricted without any reasonable justification." It expresses that the principle of objectivization is not violated, but rather that the lack of objectivization lay in the original wording of article 7 of Decree No. 36551, because there is no technical-scientific support that justified a reduction in the particulate emission limit. Therefore, articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution are not violated, given that the particulate emission limits are maintained at the same levels that were in force before the enactment of Decree 36551-S-MINAE. It requests that this action of unconstitutionality be rejected on its merits, maintaining the validity of the contested phrase.

10.- Through briefs filed, the following appear in this case file and request to be considered passive coadjuvants: Central Azucarera Tempisque S.A, Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial, Azucarera el Viejo S.A, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Puntarenas, Ingenio Quebrada Azul Ltda., Ingenio Costa Rica, Ingenio Taboga S.A, and Ingenio Cutres S.A. They state that they support, in all respects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). They maintain that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a regulation that directly affects the sugar mills that were already operating in the country before the aforementioned reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fed by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. They add that the issue under discussion is of special interest and singular relevance to the Costa Rican sugar agro-industry, because if the contested phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of complying with the new proposed parameters, putting the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica at risk, as well as the livelihood of thousands of cane producers and their families; this would generate serious social and economic consequences. They emphasize that for the sugar mills, there is an evident current and own, legitimate interest in intervening in this process and ensuring the safeguarding of the contested phrase. They request that the action of unconstitutionality filed be rejected and that the claimant be ordered to pay both sets of costs.

11.- Through a brief filed, the Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña appears in this case file, requesting to be considered a passive coadjuvant. It states that it supports, in all respects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). It indicates that FEDECAÑA is a non-profit association that has procedural standing in this process because it must defend the rights of cane producers derived from the law and Regulation, work for the harmonious development of cane agriculture, achieve representative participation in LAICA from the different agro-industrial zones dedicated to this crop and those who practice it, and appoint or replace the principal and alternate members of the cane sector. It considers that FEDECAÑA protects a corporate interest that concerns the community and, thereby, conforms to the provisions of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. It mentions that what legitimizes it to file its coadjuvancy is its character as a corporate entity, characterized by the representation and defense of a core of interests belonging to the members of a specific community or common activity. It maintains that there is a current and own interest, as indicated by article 275 of the General Public Administration Law and article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. It maintains that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a regulation that directly affects the sugar mills that were already operating in the country before the aforementioned reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fed by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. It adds that the issue under discussion is of special interest and singular relevance to the Costa Rican sugar agro-industry, because if the contested phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of complying with the new proposed parameters, putting the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica at risk, as well as the livelihood of thousands of cane producers and their families; this would generate serious social and economic consequences. It emphasizes that for the sugar mills, there is an evident current and own, legitimate interest in intervening in this process and ensuring the safeguarding of the contested phrase. They request that the action of unconstitutionality filed be rejected and that the claimant be ordered to pay both sets of costs.

12.- By resolution at eleven thirty-five hours on July fifteen, two thousand fourteen, the presiding judge of the Constitutional Chamber, Gilbert Armijo Sancho, accepted the following coadjuvancy proceedings: Asociación Cámara de Productores Caña de Azúcar Puntarenas, Asociación Cámara de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña, Azucarera El Viejo S.A., Central Azucarera Tempisque S. A., Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial y de Servicios Múltiplés el General R.L., Ingenio Costa Rica S.A., Ingenio Cutres S.A., Ingenio Quebrada Azul Limitada, Ingenio Taboga S. A., and Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar. It is resolved to consider them as coadjuvants with the warning that, as they are not a principal party to the process, they will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment; that is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjuvant directly and immediately, nor does res judicata affect them, nor do the immediate effects of the execution of the judgment reach them, because through coadjuvancy, the jurisdictional authority cannot be compelled to issue a resolution in their favor, as they were not a principal party in the process, although what can affect them, but not due to their condition as coadjuvant but rather like anyone else, is the erga omnes effect of the pronouncement. A judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the act; it is in the prior proceeding where this can be recognized.

13.- The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 of the same law, considering this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

14.- The prescribed legal procedures have been observed in these proceedings.

Judge Castillo Víquez writes; and,

Considering:

I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the regulation there is no individual or direct harm, when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. The text in question provides that it is appropriate when "due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct harm." Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "diffuse interests" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually outlined by this Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment No. 3750-93 of this tribunal at fifteen hours on July thirty, nineteen ninety-three:

"… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons or personalized groups result from them, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole. It concerns, therefore, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the sets found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests share a dual nature, as they are at once collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity." In synthesis, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier "diffuse," such as: the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, as they refer, in principle, to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; environmental damage does not only affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but harms or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest that concerns all inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber goes no further than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible, in any way, to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights.

II.- Standing in this case.- In the case before us, the petition filed in this action of unconstitutionality is for the annulment of Executive Decree 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, which reforms article 7, subsection A, sub-subsection 3 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, because, to that extent, it replaces the maximum limits with others that are less rigorous [up to 220mg/m3 (TPN)], which they allege is contrary to the principles of objectivization of environmental law and non-regression of human rights. The standing of the claimants is premised on diffuse interests for the protection of the environment, which is why standing does not necessarily rest on a specific holder, but it is possible to identify a plurality of undetermined but determinable individuals who share that same interest; therefore, the existence of a prior matter, serving as a reasonable means to protect the injured right, is not required, but the action can be promoted directly.

III.- Object of the challenge. The action of unconstitutionality requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 37301, insofar as it reforms article 7, subsection A, sub-subsection 3 of Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which is the Regulation on Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants from Boilers and Indirect-Fired Furnaces. The provision establishes the following:

(*) For boilers: they are classified according to Executive Decree No. 26789-MTSS: Regulation for Boilers, published in La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998, and its reforms. For boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 mg/m3 (TPN).

For indirect-fired furnaces, they are classified according to article 1, subsection B) of this regulation.” (What is highlighted in the regulation is what is challenged by the claimants). The grounds for the challenge lie in that the reform introduced by the Executive Branch disrespects the principles of progressivity of environmental law and the principle of objectivization, breached by the reform because, according to the claimants, the maximum emission limits for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, were relaxed to 220 mg/m3 (TPN), without technical studies that served to increase the emission limits; that is, they allege there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation.

IV.- On the merits. Before resolving the present action of unconstitutionality, it is pertinent to outline the historical development of regulations on particle emissions into the environment, which, through Executive Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, called the Regulation on Emission of Atmospheric Contaminants from Boilers, began to regulate the maximum emission values for those industrial, commercial, and service establishments that had processes or activities including the operation of boilers (art. 1). The mentioned regulation regulated, among other things, total suspended particulates emitted by liquid fossil fuels in boilers, solid fossil fuels in boilers, and biomass fuels in boilers. Similarly, the limits for emissions of Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides were regulated. This Regulation established the following maximums:

(*) According to Executive Decree No. 26789-MTSS, Regulation for Boilers, La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998.

(**) A period of five years is granted, from the enactment of this Regulation, for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to emit suspended particulates in concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3.

For the five-year period, the Generating Entity must submit a program to the DPAH, along with its first Operational Report, clearly indicating the schedule to be followed in order to conform to the established standards.

As can be seen from the above, the regulation treated boilers with a different criterion based on their age or new installation, in order to treat existing and operating ones differently. The validity of these rules is maintained until the enactment of the new regulation designed to increase the requirements enacted previously. Executive Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE was in force for ten years, from March 26, 2002, and was repealed by Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 140 of July 20, 2011, which came into effect six months later, beginning in 2012. One of the characteristics is, precisely, that it reiterates the position of establishing maximum emission limits for establishments whose processes or activities include the operation of boilers, and adds, indirect-fired furnaces, classified in different tables, for the former as well as for the latter. It is additionally important to highlight that this Executive Decree, indeed, regulated the use of biomass as fuel in boilers when it also incorporated indirect-fired furnaces, according to the following table:

“[…]

A.3) Use of biomass as fuel in boilers and indirect-fired furnaces.

(*) For boilers, they are classified according to Executive Decree No. 26789-MTSS: Regulation for Boilers, La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998, and its reforms.

For indirect-fired furnaces, they are classified according to article 1, subsection B) of this regulation.

• B)Sulfur Dioxide […]” (The highlighting in the regulation is not from the original).

As can be seen from the above, two things occur: the inclusion—for the first time—of indirect-fired furnaces in the measurement and their equivalence with those boilers regulated in Executive Decree No. 30222. Furthermore, the differentiated treatment for existing equipment is eliminated from the regulation, reducing the maximum limits and, consequently, their possible eradication. Thus, the State, by attempting to standardize all agro-industrial equipment, in essence forces the transition of technologies, with which it intends to compel companies to make a leap, although conducive to the protection of the environment and human health, presumably supported by technique and science, even before the entry into force of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, to establish a single degree of measurement, but turning its back on a reality of the agro-industry. For all these reasons, Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET was issued, which reforms Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, to establish the following table:

(*) For boilers, they are classified according to Executive Decree No. 26789-MTSS: Regulation for Boilers, published in La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998, and its reforms. For boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220mg/m3 (TPN).

For indirect-fired furnaces, they are classified according to article 1, subsection B) of this regulation.” (sic)

The claim of the claimants lies in this last point highlighted in bold, which the passive coadjuvants to the action defend, given that they affirm that the contested reform was not only supported by the studies provided by the agro-industrialists, but it was provided even before the enactment of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS.

In order to complete all the elements for resolving this matter, an audience was granted to the Ministry of Health, as the governing body in the matter and a party to the Executive Decrees under discussion, having been omitted in due course, so that, based on all the foregoing, it proceeds to resolve the action of unconstitutionality, in accordance with the arguments presented by the claimants, Ministries, and passive coadjuvants, to resolve them as follows:

A.- The principle of objectivization. Regarding this issue, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2006-17126, established the following with respect to this principle:

“4.- On the objectivization of environmental protection: which, as this Tribunal pointed out in judgment number 14293-2005 at fourteen hours fifty-two minutes on October nineteenth, two thousand five, is a principle that in no way can be confused with the previous one [precautionary principle], as, derived from the provisions of articles 16 and 160 of the General Public Administration Law, it translates into the need to accredit with technical studies the decision-making in this matter, both in relation to acts and to provisions of a general nature—both legal and regulatory—from which the requirement of 'linkage to science and technique' derives, thereby conditioning the discretion of the Administration in this matter. So that, in consideration of the results derived from those technical studies—such as environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental)—if an objective technical criterion is evidenced denoting the probability of evident damage to the environment, natural resources, or human health, it is then obligatory to discard the proposed project, work, or activity; and in the case of a 'reasonable doubt,' it is obligatory to make decisions in favor of the environment (pro-natura principle), which may translate into the adoption of both compensatory and precautionary measures, in order to adequately protect the environment” (the text in brackets is not from the original).

The claimants state that the measures adopted in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS were based on the operational reports of boilers received by the Ministry of Health, information from accredited laboratories from the periods 2006-2009, and other data (Considering 5 of the Decree). In the case before us, the authorities mention two factors that are reflected in the change of regulations and subsequent reform: on one hand, indirect-fired furnaces had not been regulated, and the ignorance of new and existing equipment. The claimants maintain in the action of unconstitutionality that, despite the existence of technical and scientific studies, Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET unjustifiably reduced the minimum emission requirements for the agro-industry. Now, the analyses mentioned in the decree were collected by the generating entities themselves in accordance with article 6 of Regulation 30222, which were carried out by authorized laboratories under Law No. 6038, and however, this Chamber observes that, although the system used serves to maintain a series of controls, these conclusions were only issued regarding boilers, without referring to, as this Chamber understands it, a specialty of them, because it is not clear what the applicable technical studies would be for companies that could be regulated for the first time with indirect-fired furnaces, which is the crux of the constitutionality question.

To this issue, it must be added that, although the common element of both, a boiler or an indirect-fired furnace, is that they operate based on the use of the heat or energy produced by the combustion of hydrocarbon or biomass materials, with the emission of residues into the environment, it is clear that Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS exceeds its scope over Executive Decree No. 30222. A comparative study between the definition of a boiler regulated in the regulations with Regulation No.

30222 reveals the meaning of:

“Boiler (Caldera): Any closed vessel in which, for any purpose other than domestic cooking of food, water is heated or steam, generally water, is generated to be used outside of it, at a pressure greater than atmospheric pressure. Superheaters, reheaters, economizers, or other pressure parts connected directly to the boiler without the intervention of valves shall be considered as part of the boiler.” There is no difference between this definition and the one given in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, since by simply eliminating the word “Any…”, the regulation remains the same, which shows that the technical and scientific criteria for control over boilers would be the same under the validity of both decrees, but it is different or distinguishes itself from the definition of the indirect-fired heater. Thus, “Indirect-fired heater (Horno de tipo indirecto): Heater in which the material to be heated is not in direct contact with the products of combustion, for example: heating heaters in oil refineries, thermal fluid heaters, industrial water heaters, indirect-fired dryers, and steam generators.” Precisely, when this Court granted a hearing to the Ministry of Health, it stated that indirect-fired heaters had escaped the regulation of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE, which meant that progress in the matter had been made rather than a regression, as it is attempted to be implied. It does not escape the Court's understanding that a boiler or indirect-fired heater will produce particulate matter (partículas en suspensión) that must be measured, with the use of different fuels, whether as a boiler or indirect-fired heater, but it merits a different analysis than that proposed by the plaintiffs, one that falls outside the mechanisms available to the constitutional jurisdiction itself. For example, it could be questioned whether the indirect-fired heater has, by definition, a series of attachments that must also be evaluated, as is noted with the effect of gas scrubbers. Regarding the other factor mentioned above, the lack of differentiated treatment between new and existing equipment, it constitutes an argument that is closely related to the principle of progressivity, which also requires that regulatory advances not be disconnected from the impacts they may generate on all affected sectors.

B.- The principle of progressivity of human rights.- The Constitutional Chamber recently heard a legislative consultation related to the Bill for the “Release and Titling of the Border Zone between the Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Panama,” legislative file number 16657, in which it was held, through resolution No. 2014-018836 at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on November 18, two thousand fourteen, that:

“In accordance with the principle of non-regression, regulations and jurisprudence in environmental matters should not be revised if this implies a retreat in relation to the level of protection already achieved. This prevents the suppression of protectionist regulations or the reduction of their requirements due to interests contrary to them that do not prove to be legally superior to the public environmental interest, since in most cases, these regressions in environmental protection result in irreversible or difficult-to-repair environmental damage. Thus, the already achieved environmental protection standards shall not be affected, nor shall current regulations be repealed or modified if this produces a decrease, impairment, or any other form of negative impact on the current level of environmental protection. In this matter, the path is forward, never backward.” This criterion, in the context it is taken, appears to be absolute, but it cannot be interpreted that way, because, by its very nature, it must also be relativized to certain conditions that serve as either a precursor or a brake, as the Chamber indeed recognizes later in the judgment. Therefore, it must be recognized that there are limits to the principle, especially when it collides with others of a constitutional nature. Thus, the legislative procedure was devoid of technical and scientific studies supporting the legislative measure being promoted in the Legislative Branch, a reflection of one of the essential principles of environmental law, which is the principle of objectification. For this reason, after citing judgment No. 2006-17126 transcribed above, the Chamber reaches the following conclusion:

“In the case of the consulted bill, the total absence of prior technical studies determining the consequences that the release of the southern border strip could have on the State's Natural Heritage constitutes a clear threat to the environment, since this could allow the indiscriminate felling of forests and the disappearance of flora and fauna species, without any objective data to confirm or rule it out” (see judgment No. 2014-018836).

Certainly, the principle of progressivity of human rights drives their protection forward by the State, seeking their development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achievements made and impose rationality on the exploitation, use of natural resources, and the production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualness, as it does not operate without the support and logistics of the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where, although the balance normally tilts towards gradual progress, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social gains is not absolute in this field either; it has—for example—those limits, even recognized by international human rights bodies when they admit—in limited cases—the possibility that they can be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a judgment of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Comptroller's Office”) vs. Peru, stated regarding the progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that:

“… a duty emerges—albeit conditioned—of non-regression, which should not always be understood as a prohibition of measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that ‘deliberately regressive measures in this area will require the most careful consideration and must be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of the full use of the maximum resources available to [the State].’ Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission has considered that to evaluate whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention, it is necessary to ‘determine if it is justified by reasons of sufficient weight.’ For all the foregoing, it can be affirmed that regressivity is justiciable when dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights.” That is, although the thesis of international bodies conceives, in a limited way, the possibility of modifying or retreating on economic, social, and cultural rights in a restrictive manner, there must be a social and public interest. The reform, in effect, returns the operation of certain boilers to a previous situation (taking into account, for the first time by the Ministry of Health, indirect-fired heaters), so as not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies for the environmental burden generated by their productive activity. Hence, the transfer of a general principle of human rights to the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (non-regression) cannot be demanded in this case; it is only plausible as long as it obtains the backing of the technical and scientific criteria that armor the administrative decision, which, in effect, were produced and sufficiently demonstrated—in the administration's judgment—to uphold the challenged reform.

But likewise, a decision to maintain the environmental measure also requires these criteria, thus preventing the Administration's decisions from being arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious, since, on one side, for, or on the other, against, there are interests and rights involved in these decisions, sometimes in confrontation more than others, which requires the need for them to be calibrated for the benefit of society, without breaking environmental expectations, because, prima facie, it requires a certain security to maintain the different linkages whose incidence is especially social, affecting workers, as well as the supply of sugars to the population or to other industrial sectors. The principle of non-regression in environmental law can be expressed, then, as the impediment that a measure established by public authorities be contrary to an environmental achievement, such as the attainment of an environmental objective, and, therefore, its sacrifice is not permissible when it is not supported by technical and scientific studies. It is truly a principle that prevents the rollback of social gains, but their modification will depend on the seriousness, substantiation, and solidity of the studies that gave rise to them, or even on the variation of the circumstances that gave rise to them, so that, when the conditions that gave birth to them change, the effects they have in reality must also change. Hence, to reform environmental measures, the administration requires their verification through technical and scientific criteria. A clear example of all this is Article 38 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente.

C.- The principle of technical reasonableness. LAICA, in its extensive brief, alleges that the Decreto Ejecutivo is impossible to implement for the sugar sector, argues against the regulation regarding contradictions between the treatment of fossil fuels and biomass fuels, the difference in exercising controls with different oxygen levels in boilers, indirect-fired heaters versus heaters using biomass fuels, without further clarification. That the studies referred to in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAE do not specify which ones were considered, on what type of boilers, the type of tests reported, and RECOPE’s quality data; rather, it seems more apparent that the Decree's references were given in a context of equipment using fossil fuels. It also alleges other legal violations, including numerals 16, 158, 160, 361.1, 240, and 241 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. To resolve the foregoing, it is necessary to turn to constitutional jurisprudence itself, when it has indicated the components of the principles of reasonableness, namely: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, considering that:

"... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective pursued by the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the contested state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the individual; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the rule be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be 'enforceable' against the individual. (...) (Judgment of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June twelfth, nineteen ninety-eight).

Thus, a rights-limiting act is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—by adopting a measure of differentiation. That is, if such action is not taken, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, with some of them possibly fulfilling the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. Meanwhile, proportionality sends us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater entity than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two analyzed objects” (see judgment No. 08858-98 of this Chamber). (...)

For this Court, it is clear that the suitability of the measure is in dispute in this case (reform through Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET), which also requires the analysis of the technical and scientific reports that supported it, since, as the cooperating party indicates, during its enactment, the technical criteria aimed at incorporating the aforementioned modification. Therefore, in LAICA’s joinder brief, it points out that prior to the enactment of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, an analysis with technical criteria was submitted by official letter DE-022-2009/2010 of June 8, 2010, explaining the reasons why the proposed levels for the industry were not appropriate. Thus, opposition arose to the levels established in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551, grounds that were received by the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards, but even so, the collection of signatures for that regulation continued, even though there were signs that the provisions could not be applied to them, because from a technical standpoint, no sugar mill in Costa Rica could meet those parameters.

In addition to this, the CNAA also joined LAICA’s objections, so even though an attempt was made to address those complaints (by the Minister of Health through official letter DM-3293-2010 of September 6, 2010), they were unsuccessful. Subsequently, the formulated objections were taken up again, when through official letter DRS-UN-920-11 of November 23, 2011, the Directorate of Health Regulation sent to the CNAA and the Office of the Minister of Health to reform Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which, after a high-level and mid-level management meeting of the Ministries with various affected associations and chambers, it was decided to proceed with the aforementioned reform.

The cooperating parties refer to an error that was timely noticed by LAICA and the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards. The technical criteria are transcribed in LAICA’s joinder brief, which, as evidenced by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, in considerandos 5 and 6, the request for review was submitted based on the respective attestations and the Executive Branch’s acceptance of the arguments outlined in the technical study. If the State's objective is to increase environmental protection as a fundamental right, it is not constitutionally lawful for it to ignore other economic and social rights, because in carrying out such a mandate it must seek a balance among the rights involved in the decision, but in an informed manner. In this way, the foregoing would lead the Court to question whether there was solidity in the acceptance of the scientific elements provided by the interested guild, which is not appropriate to analyze in the unconstitutionality action, whose discussion must be reserved to aspects of pure law, since entering into the evaluation of technical aspects, such as the classification of boilers, indirect-fired heaters, and their method of measurement, would exceed the purpose of the constitutional process and would lead to the analysis of technical criteria that could only be done in an ordinary proceeding or in the administrative litigation jurisdiction. For the Chamber, it is clear that the discussion is open in a more plenary jurisdiction.

V.- Conclusion. Therefore, the action is declared without merit. Justices Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and declare the action meritorious in all its extremes.-

Por tanto:

The action is declared without merit. Justices Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and declare the action meritorious in all its extremes.- Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Justices Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent and declare the action meritorious in all its extremes, drafted by the latter.

For the reasons we express below, we consider that the present action should be declared meritorious in all its extremes, and not dismissed, as the majority opinion does.

The reform of Article 7, subsection A, sub-paragraph 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS “Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto,” through Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, certainly represents a weakening of the maximum emission limits for boilers installed before March 26, 2007 to 220 mg/m3 (STP), establishing others that are less rigorous. All in contravention of the principles of objectification of environmental law and non-regression of human rights. It is furthermore observed that there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation.

As this Chamber has said about the principle of progressivity of human rights, this drives the progressive protection of the State, seeking its development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achievements made and impose rationality on the exploitation, use of natural resources, and the production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualness, as it does not operate without the support and logistics of the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where, although the balance normally tilts towards gradual progress, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social gains is not absolute in this field either; it has—for example—those limits, even recognized by international human rights bodies when they admit—in limited cases—the possibility that they can be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a judgment of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Comptroller's Office”) vs. Peru, stated regarding the progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that:

“… a duty emerges—albeit conditioned—of non-regression, which should not always be understood as a prohibition of measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that ‘deliberately regressive measures in this area will require the most careful consideration and must be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of the full use of the maximum resources available to [the State].’ Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission has considered that to evaluate whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention, it is necessary to ‘determine if it is justified by reasons of sufficient weight.’ For all the foregoing, it can be affirmed that regressivity is justiciable when dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights.” Applying the foregoing to this case, the reasons of sufficient weight for the relaxation of boiler emission limits are nowhere to be found here. As is correctly noted in the majority opinion, the reform, in effect, returns the operation of certain boilers to a previous situation (taking into account, for the first time by the Ministry of Health, indirect-fired heaters), so as not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies for the environmental burden generated by their productive activity. Thus, to make this regression possible, the backing of the technical and scientific criteria that armor the administrative decision must have been imperatively obtained. However, that is precisely what we miss; we do not find technical and scientific backing. The fact that the majority opinion indicates that these criteria were produced and sufficiently demonstrated in the judgment of the administration seems insufficient to us; the Administration should have fully justified these criteria in the decree’s own statement of reasons. This leads to the fact that in this case, an exception was made (relaxation of emission limits) without having a well-founded, duly justified technical criterion.

In the same vein as expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República in its report, we consider then that the decision to exclude boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for the emission of particulate matter (partículas de suspensión) established in Decreto Ejecutivo 36551, is inconsistent with the state duty of protection and guardianship of the environment established in Article 50 of the Constitution. The modification of regulations challenged in this unconstitutionality action decreases the level of guardianship and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification to support it. The reform is clearly a worsening of the level of guardianship, with the additional problem that the decree lacks technical and scientific information to determine to what extent this exemption may lead to a decrease in the level of protection. Therefore, the introduced reform, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for over four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where the levels of protection decrease. So, since there is no scientific and technical certainty that the increase in the reference levels of oxygen for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to people’s health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle that establishes the state duty of its guardianship and protection, as indicated by judgments 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber.

Even in his report, the Minister of Environment and Energy requests an evaluation of the constitutionality of the regulation, given that the technical observations made by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management were not incorporated. This strengthens the finding of unconstitutionality, because it reiterates the lack of technical criteria, as there is no criterion from the specialized body.

In conclusion, as there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in the reference levels of oxygen for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to people’s health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional for violating the right to environment and health, ignoring the state duty of its guardianship and protection, as indicated by judgments 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber.

We estimate that the reform to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, introduced by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301, is unconstitutional, as is the reform to point C.2) of Article 7 of Decreto Ejecutivo 36551.

Gilbert Armijo Sancho Fernando Cruz Castro Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann Neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6 **Exp: 14-008641-0007-CO** **Res. Nº 005616-2015** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and three minutes on the twenty-second of April of two thousand fifteen.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDITA ALFARO BOZA, GLORIANA CHAVARRIA SOLIS, MELANY SZYFER CASTILLO, REBECA CHAVES RODRIGUEZ, holders of identity card numbers 2-0365-0227, 2-0701-0309, 1-1565-0461, 1-1485-0400, and 1-1539-0855, respectively, against the Reform of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, a reform published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours and thirty-four minutes on the thirtieth of May of two thousand fourteen, the petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of the Reform of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, a reform published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012, be declared. They allege that the incorporation of said phrase into the Regulation increases the potential for pollution by allowing those boilers installed before March 26, 2007, an emission with a maximum limit of 220 mg/m3. They add that the Regulation –Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS–, published in 2011, established a series of parameters to reduce air pollution; but the following year, through Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, the requirements were lowered and more pollution is permitted for boilers installed before March 26, 2007. They consider that this reform to the Regulation fails to comply with the primary obligation to protect health, the environment, and life. Likewise, they state that the principle of progressivity is violated, insofar as the level of environmental protection already achieved must be respected and, under no circumstance, diminished; the Executive Branch cannot lower the standards if it had already conducted studies over several periods or years, as indicated in 2011 in recital (considerando) 5 of the Decree. They add that the reform to the Regulation also produces a violation of the principle of objectification, since a maximum of 220 mg/m3 is permitted for boilers installed before May 26, 2007, without providing any scientific reasoning contained in the Regulation or in its recitals (considerandos). They consider that maximum limits should not be determined based on an installation date, but rather by category.

**2.-** In order to substantiate their standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they state that they are supported by diffuse interests, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

**3.-** By a resolution at nine hours and forty minutes on the tenth of June of two thousand fourteen, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).

**4.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report.

It states that in this action of unconstitutionality, the phrase "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 g/m3 (TPN)" is challenged, contained in subsection A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulations on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, which is a reform introduced by Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET. It expresses that the object of the action of unconstitutionality is to determine whether the challenged norm, by excluding boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the application of the limits set in Executive Decree No. 36551 of April 27, 2011, and allowing them to emit a maximum emission level of 220 mg/m3 (TPN), is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principles contained in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that the petitioners are legitimized to file such an action, in accordance with Article 50 of the Constitution and the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since the existence of a diffuse interest is invoked to claim the infringement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. It points out that the Regulations on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, in its Article 7, established emission limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3 for large, medium, and small boilers and furnaces, without differentiating whether they were new or existing furnaces or boilers. It states that by Executive Decree No. 37301 of March 22, 2012, subsection A.3) of Article 7 of said Regulations was modified. It shows that said modification was adopted by virtue of the request proposed by "the country's sugar sector," aimed at maintaining the permitted concentrations from before the publication of Executive Decree No. 36551 of April 27, 2011, based on technical studies. It expresses that the regulation in force prior to the enactment of the cited decree was the Regulations on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers, which established maximum permitted emission limits for boilers using biomass fuels. It adds that for new boilers using that type of fuel, it set the limits at 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, depending on their size. It argues that for existing boilers, it set an emission limit of 220 mg/Nm3, and a five-year period was granted, which expired on March 26, 2007, for them to adjust to the new established emission limits. It alleges that the issue raised requires analyzing whether the decision to exclude boilers from before March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for particulate matter emissions established in Executive Decree No. 36551, is inconsistent with the State's duty of environmental protection and guardianship established in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that an analysis must be carried out based on the principles of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection. It expresses that, according to the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, it cannot be understood in absolute terms, since a decrease in a certain level of protection is possible if there is technical and scientific support that guarantees that a relevant lack of environmental protection does not occur, provided that the parameters of proportionality and reasonableness are met. It states that the regulatory modification challenged in this action of unconstitutionality decreases the level of protection and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification to support it. It expresses that this is a reform that worsens the emission levels of atmospheric pollutants from boilers, compared to the limits achieved up until before the modification published on September 24, 2012. It exposes that in the decree, it is clear that the sole focus of the modification is centered on establishing competitiveness conditions that contribute to the development of economic activity in the country, so the environmental variable or people's health was not analyzed. It states that it is a decision that implies a worsening of the level of protection, with the additional problem that the decree lacks technical and scientific information that allows determining to what extent this exemption could give rise to a decrease in the level of protection. It affirms that from ruling 18702-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), on the principle of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection, the following is extracted: "The principle stands as a substantive guarantee of rights, in this case, of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by virtue of which the State is obliged not to adopt measures, policies, nor approve legal norms that worsen, without reasonable and proportional justification, the situation of the rights achieved up to now." It maintains that the reform introduced, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for more than four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where protection levels are diminished. It argues that the reform adopted in September 2012 is an unjustified worsening of the emission limits established for all existing boilers, even from before the entry into force of Executive Decree No. 36551. It pronounces that once the five-year period provided for in the Regulations expired, all boilers became subject to the limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, according to their size. It affirms that with what was originally dictated in Executive Decree No. 30222, the intent was to set a provisional or transitory parameter (5-year period), and with the challenged reform, this acquired a permanent character. It notes that the reform is of general application, meaning that the regression regarding the required emission levels applies to all boilers existing as of March 26, 2007, and not only to those used by the country's sugar sector in its production activity. It adds that if the Chamber decides to declare the unconstitutionality, "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 mg/m3 (TPN)," introduced by the Executive Decree. It agrees that the provision in point C.2) of Article 7 should be analyzed, which is equally contrary to the evolutionary interpretation in environmental protection, which does not admit a regression to the detriment of the environment. It alleges that, as in Considerando 5 of the decree, "the country's sugar sector" also requested that the oxygen reference levels for data reporting be reviewed. It points out that this resulted in the unjustified reduction of the protection that had been established in the previous Executive Decree, since, without technical reasoning, it was ordered to change the reference level from 5% oxygen for all boilers to 10% for boilers using biomass fuels, thus creating more possibility to dilute emissions and pollute more. It emphasizes that since there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in the oxygen reference levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to people's health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle that establishes the State's duty of guardianship and protection, as indicated in rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber. Therefore, it considers that the reform to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulations on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces, introduced by Executive Decree No. 37301, is unconstitutional, as is the reform to point C.2) of Article 7 of Executive Decree No. 36551.

5.- Mr. Edgar E. Gutiérrez Ezpeleta, in his capacity as Minister of Environment and Energy, answers the granted hearing, stating that through official letter Memo 12 of April 13, 2012, signed by the former Minister of Health and addressed to the former Minister of Environment and Energy, official letter DRS-IC-004-2012 is forwarded for the signature process, corresponding to the proposal of the Executive Decree for the Reform of the Regulations. He reports that on April 20, 2012, it was forwarded to the Legal Advisory Directorate for the corresponding review. He adds that through official letter DAJ-619-2012, signed by the Director of Legal Advisory, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management is requested to grant approval to the draft Decree DRS-IC-004-2012, on the Reform to the Regulations on the emission of atmospheric pollutants from indirect-type boilers and furnaces. He highlights that through official letter DIGECA-454-2012, the Environmental Management Directorate referred to the draft decree DRS-IC-004-2012/Ministry of Health "Reform to the Regulations on the emission of atmospheric pollutants." He shows that, in said opinion, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends "the inclusion of a transitory provision promoting the renewal of boilers so that those that have exceeded their useful life (approximately 20 years) can be gradually replaced by more efficient technologies. The timeframe, of course, must be assessed within the Commission and consulted with the productive sectors." He emphasizes that said report from the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends that the established limits be reported in mass flow, given that it is a clearer measure of the pollutant load emitted by a specific source over a period of time, and not as the technical position presented by the sugarcane and oil palm sector, which is based on international standards for particulate emissions from boilers, because the technologies used for steam production in sugar mills are highly varied. He notes that through official letter DIGECA-642-2012, addressed to the Vice-Minister, she is informed that it remained necessary to incorporate a transitory provision in the regulation, promoting the renewal of old boilers that have difficulties complying with the emission limits established in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS. He alleges that, in that sense, the text of the transitory provision should consider that air quality for the population would gradually improve, and the following transitory provision was proposed, suggesting a period of five years be established for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, to adjust to the maximum limits established in the table. He highlights that the issuance of the reform to Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS is the result of the joint work of representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor, MINAE, UCCAEP, the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Colegio de Ingenios Químicos y Profesionales Afines), the College of Chemists (Colegio de Químicos), the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry (Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria), and the UCR. He maintains that in the coordination meetings of the Emissions Commission, it was indicated that a request for review had been sent by the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry, concerning the emission limits for the sugar sector proposed in the Regulations, accompanied by the supporting technical document. He alleges that it was agreed to modify the emission limit taking into account the period that had been granted by the Regulations in force at that time, but maintaining the reference oxygen percentage, in order to standardize the calculation. He warns that upon reviewing the reform to the Executive Decree, published in La Gaceta 184 of September 29, 2012, it is clear that the transitory provision proposed by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management was not left in the terms presented. He requests that the constitutionality of the norm be assessed, given that the technical observations indicated by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management were not incorporated.

6.- Having been omitted at the time, by resolution at nine hours and eight minutes on February twelfth, two thousand fifteen, the instructing magistrate granted a hearing to the Ministry of Health regarding the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez and others, against the reformed Article 7 A.3), of the Regulations on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Indirect-Type Boilers and Furnaces (Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET of March 22, 2012).

7.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his capacity as Acting Minister of Health, answers the granted hearing, stating the criteria expressed by the Director and Acting Head of the Normalization Unit of Health Services in the Human Environment (Unidad de Normalización de Servicios de Salud en Ambiente Humano), of the Directorate of Protection of the Human Environment, of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that the third sub-paragraph of subsection A) of Article 7 of Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, refers specifically to boilers using biomass as fuel in indirect-type boilers and furnaces, and not to all boilers. This version of the norm replaces Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE of 2002, with which sanitary regulation for indirect-type furnaces was incorporated for the first time, an aspect that was previously not regulated by any other Costa Rican State body. Contrary to the petitioners' criterion, the principle of progressivity in the level of environmental protection is not contravened, but is being extended. Decree No. 36511-S-MINAE-MTSS, published on June 29, 2011, sought to disregard the separation between "New" and "Existing" boilers, as they were differentiated in Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, and to regulate all as if they were "New." It disregarded that in Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, section A.3, regarding biomass boilers, a five-year period is granted from enactment for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to reach particulate emissions at concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3. On this last aspect, biomass boiler operators alerted the Administration, and the Administration corrected the material error, and the same criterion of 220 mg/Nm3 from Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE was maintained when the modification was published through Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAE. Therefore, this adjustment also does not diminish the level of environmental protection but maintains the same level that had been set since 2002. Based on the cited report, it is considered that it is the obligation of the State, and mainly of the Ministry of Health, to protect people's health, the environment, and life in general, for which, based on these principles, it is clarified that the levels established in the norm under discussion do not diminish the level of environmental protection, nor do they violate the principle of progressivity, since indirect-type furnaces were regulated for the first time in the country in 2002, which constitutes an advance in environmental matters and not a setback, for which Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET adequately ensures the observance and compliance of public norms and policies regarding environmental protection matters.

8.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 116, 117, and 118 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of the days June 18, 19, and 20, 2014.

9.- By brief filed on June 24, 2014, Roberto Vega Arias, in his capacity as general judicial representative of the Agricultural Industrial League of Sugarcane (Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar, LAICA), appears in this file and requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant. He states that LAICA has among its public duties to ensure the optimal development and stability of the national sugar agro-industry, seeking the satisfaction of the interests it regulates, promotes, and defends. He indicates that regarding its procedural legitimacy, LAICA represents corporate interests of the nation's sugarcane and sugar sectors, thus finding the required procedural legitimacy to promote and participate in administrative or judicial actions in defense of those it represents. He indicates that based on said legitimate interest, the Chamber has accepted LAICA's participation as a coadjuvant in other matters of special interest and significance for the sugarcane-sugar sector of Costa Rica. He maintains that this action of unconstitutionality, besides expressly alluding to the sector that LAICA represents and defends, is directed against a norm that directly affects the country's sugar mills, as they are industries operating boilers fueled by biomass. He warns that if the challenged phrase were eliminated, said industries could not operate, putting the production of sugar, molasses, and alcohol at risk, as well as the livelihood of thousands of sugarcane producers and their families. He expresses that on June 8, 2010, LAICA conveyed to the Technical Committee on Emission Standards (Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones) the sector's position regarding the draft Regulations, where it was requested that the particulate emission limit in combustion gases for sugarcane bagasse boilers remain at 220 mg/NM3 and that the O2 reference be at least 10%, because this is the typical value for the combustion of high-moisture cellulosic materials. He warns that LAICA conducted a full technical analysis to justify its request. He adds that LAICA conveyed its position through the Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry. He claims that the lawyer from the Health Regulation Directorate, through official letter DRS-348-10, indicated to the Committee members that the modifications they had approved could not be incorporated into the regulation, given that it was already in the signature process for the Minister and that the public consultation process had been concluded. He deems that this was done improperly and unduly, since the lawyer gave preeminence to a formal aspect over a substantive agreement with technical support. He reports that through official letter DRS-UN-392-08-2010, the Normalization Unit informed them that the request for modification to the proposed Regulations was rejected, which they insisted had already been approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards. He shows that through official letter DE-030-2009/2010, LAICA brought to the attention of the Minister of Health and the Minister of MINAET, the serious risk that the enactment of said regulation posed to the agro-industry. He highlights that on July 20, 2011, Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS was enacted in La Gaceta, which did not include the observations that LAICA had timely submitted and that were approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards in its Session No. 116, leaving by error the particulate emission limit in combustion gases for category A) boilers using biomass as fuel at 120 mg/Nm3 and with an oxygen reference of 5%, a parameter that, from a technical point of view, no mill in Costa Rica can meet. He deems that through official letter P078-2011, a hearing was requested before the Committee on Emission Standards, to explain the reasons why the parameters established in the Executive Decree were not technically viable for boilers and furnaces using biomass fuels. He notes that through official letter DRS-UN-920-11, the Health Regulation Directorate requested the CNAA to send the request for modification of the Decree in writing to the Office of the Minister of Health. He shows that on January 18, 2012, a meeting was held at the Ministry of Agriculture, where an agreement was reached to modify the Decree, accepting the observations made through the CNAA. He reports that through the review and approval process of the Ministry of Health, Labor, Environment, on September 24, 2012, in La Gaceta, Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS was published, which reformed Article 7 of Decree No. 36551, to correct the original error, pointed out by LAICA. He adds that the original wording of Article 7 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS established an emission limit of 120 mg/Nm3 with an oxygen reference of 5% for category A) boilers using biomass fuel, where the principles of proportionality and legal reasonableness were collided with. He maintains that Article 7 did not comply with technical reasonableness, given that there are no scientific studies that served as support for the emission parameters originally defined for category A) boilers using biomass fuel, parameters that are impossible for the country's industries to meet. He expresses that it was precisely from the analysis carried out in LAICA's official letter DE-022-2009/2010 that the Technical Committee on Emission Standards, in its Session No. 116 of June 24, 2010, approved the request, so that it could be incorporated into the draft regulation that was about to be issued, a modification that was not incorporated, for the unreasonable reason that the lawyer from the Health Regulation Directorate, based on a mere formality, considered that the consultation period for the regulatory proposal having expired, it was not possible to make further modifications. He highlights that there are no technical studies that justified that modification of such magnitude for the case of boilers operating with biomass fuels. He adds that the studies referred to in Considerando 5 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE, which are so vehemently emphasized in the action of unconstitutionality, do not indicate that they were from industrial and agricultural activities, as maliciously and without any basis, the petitioners state. He notes that the only thing Considerando 5 of the Decree expresses is that occasional boiler reports were taken into account, without specifying what type, information from laboratories with tests and quality data from RECOPE, which gives a clear impression that said studies referred to furnaces and boilers operating with fossil fuels and not biomass. He states that it is demonstrated with the evidence provided, that it was not technically viable for industries with already installed boilers operating with biomass fuels to move the particulate emission limit from 220 to 120 mg/Nm3 and with an excess oxygen reference of just 5%. He adds that the boilers operating in the mills have certain important characteristics: 1. They operate with biomass, generated by the sector itself, meaning the boilers are self-sufficient, operating on clean, renewable energy. 2. They are for temporary operation. 3. They have alternative uses, such as the parallel generation of electricity. 4. Located outside the GAM and do not use fossil fuels. He reports that it was unreasonable and disproportionate that the permitted emission limits for boilers and furnaces using fossil fuels were much higher than the limits for boilers and furnaces using biomass. He indicates that Article 7 of the questioned norm establishes limits of 550, 200, and 420 mg/Nm3 for boilers and furnaces using bunker fuel, diesel, and gas oil, while for boilers using biomass, the limit was 120 mg/Nm3, which highlights the lack of technical reasonableness of the norm. He warns that said norm allowed the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using more polluting products, which by nature produce less particulate matter in suspension, to be much higher than the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using a clean and renewable product, such as biomass. He alleges that the intention is to expose the lack of suitability of the norm in its original wording, where there was technical unreasonableness and the disproportions it generates. He warns that it is even more serious that the questioned Decree was issued deviating from the technical criteria of the Committee on Emission Standards. They indicate that the administrative act was enacted deviating from the expert technical criteria, without any type of scientific justification. He shows that the administrative act must be duly motivated, as this constitutes a formal element of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP), in its Article 136 c. He emphasizes that the technical foundation is indispensable for proper motivation of the administrative act, which evidences the lack of technical reasonableness of the norm and accentuates the need to correct it. He deems that as a discretionary act, the regulation is subject to the limits imposed by the unequivocal rules of science and technique, as well as the elementary rules of justice, logic, and convenience, and the rights of the administered party. He highlights that in the case, it is demonstrated that the technical justification made in official letter DE-022-2009/2010, which was approved by the Committee on Emission Standards, showed that the parameters originally set in the Executive Decree were impossible to meet for sugar industries using biomass fuel in their boilers, which evidenced the unreasonableness. He maintains that the original setting of these parameters was so unreasonable and arbitrary that, contradictorily, in the case of furnaces using biomass fuel, an oxygen reference of 10% was set, but not so in the case of boilers using the same type of fuel. He claims that the original wording in Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE violated Articles 16, 158.4, and 160 of the LGAP. He adds that the fact that there are no technical studies to support the parameters originally defined in Article 7 of Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE, regarding the real possibility of compliance for industries with boilers using biomass fuel, constituted a defect affecting the factual and technical background that served as the basis for the issuance of the Decree. He adds that Article 7 of the Decree was null and void for having a defect in the content of the act. He claims that none of the country's sugar mills could technically comply with the parameters arbitrarily defined in Article 7 of the Decree; the content was impossible, therefore, absolutely null. He shows that the interpretation made by the lawyer from the Health Regulation Directorate, which served as support for rejecting the modifications, gave absolute predominance to form over substance, thus violating the principle of informality, as indicated in Article 224 of the LGAP, and thus infringing ordinals 361 and 362 of the same legal body. He adds that, at that time, the reform project was simply a draft and nothing prevented making the modifications. He alleges that LAICA, as a public entity entrusted by Law to guarantee the stability of the agro-industry, was never expressly consulted on the scope of this regulatory modification. He warns that the important thing is that the error was corrected with the enactment of Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, which reformed Article 7 of the previous Decree.

It emphasizes that the principle of progressivity was not violated, since what was done was the correction of a technical error in the original drafting of the regulation. It adds that vote 11088-2013 of the Constitutional Chamber indicates: "Now, in order to assert that there is an injury to the principle of progressivity and non-regressivity, it is required that a fundamental right had been recognized and that it is limited or restricted without any reasonable justification." It states that the principle of objectification is not violated, but rather that the lack of objectification fell upon the original drafting of Article 7 of Decree No. 36551, because there is no technical-scientific basis that justified a reduction in the emission limit for particulates. Therefore, Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution are not violated, since the particulate emission limits are maintained at the same levels that were in force before the enactment of Decree 36551-S-MINAE. It requests that this action of unconstitutionality be rejected on the merits, maintaining the validity of the challenged phrase.

**10.-** Through briefs filed, the following parties appear in this case file and request to be recognized as passive coadjutors: Central Azucarera Tempisque S.A., Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial, Azucarera el Viejo S.A., Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Puntarenas, Ingenio Quebrada Azul Ltda., Ingenio Costa Rica, Ingenio Taboga S.A., and Ingenio Cutres S.A. They state that they support, in all its aspects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). They maintain that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a norm that directly affects the sugar mills that were already operating in the country before the aforementioned reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fueled by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. They add that the issue under discussion is of special interest and singular relevance to the Costa Rican sugar agroindustry, because if the challenged phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of complying with the new proposed parameters, putting at risk the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica, as well as the livelihood of thousands of cane producers and their families, and this would generate serious social and economic consequences. They highlight that for the sugar mills, there is an evident, current, and own, legitimate interest to intervene in this process and ensure the safeguarding of the challenged phrase. They request that the action of unconstitutionality filed be rejected and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both sets of costs.

**11.-** Through a brief filed, the Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña appears in this case file, requesting to be recognized as a passive coadjutor. It states that it supports, in all its aspects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). It indicates that FEDECAÑA is a non-profit association, which has procedural standing in this process, because it must defend the rights of cane producers derived from the law and Regulations, work for the harmonious development of cane agriculture, achieve representative participation in LAICA from the different agroindustrial zones dedicated to this crop and by those who practice it, and appoint or replace the owner and alternate members of the cane sector. It believes that FEDECAÑA protects a corporate interest, which concerns the community and, thereby, conforms to what is prescribed by the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. It mentions that what legitimizes it to file its coadjuvant role is its character as a corporate entity, characterized by the representation and defense of a core of interests belonging to the members of a specific community or common activity. It maintains that there is a current and own interest, as indicated by Article 275 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and Article 83 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. It maintains that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a norm that directly affects the sugar mills that were already operating in the country before the aforementioned reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fueled by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. It adds that the issue under discussion is of special interest and singular relevance to the Costa Rican sugar agroindustry, because if the challenged phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of complying with the new proposed parameters, putting at risk the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica, as well as the livelihood of thousands of cane producers and their families, and this would generate serious social and economic consequences. It highlights that for the sugar mills, there is an evident, current, and own, legitimate interest to intervene in this process and ensure the safeguarding of the challenged phrase. They request that the action of unconstitutionality filed be rejected and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both sets of costs.

**12.-** By resolution at eleven thirty-five hours on July fifteenth, two thousand fourteen, the Presiding Magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, Gilbert Armijo Sancho, accepted the following coadjuvant petitions: Asociación Cámara de Productores Caña de Azúcar Puntarenas, Asociación Cámara de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña, Azucarera El Viejo S.A., Central Azucarera Tempisque S. A., Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial y de Servicios Múltiplés el General R.L., Ingenio Costa Rica S.A., Ingenio Cutres S.A., Ingenio Quebrada Azul Limitada, Ingenio Taboga S. A., and Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar. It is resolved to recognize them as coadjutors with the warning that, as they are not a principal party to the process, they will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment, that is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjutor directly and immediately, nor does res judicata affect them, nor do the immediate effects of the judgment's execution reach them, since through the coadjuvant role, the jurisdictional authority cannot be obligated to issue a resolution in their favor because they were not a principal party in the process. What can affect them, but not because of their condition as coadjutant but like anyone else, is the erga omnes effect of the ruling. The judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the act itself; it is in the prior trial where this can be recognized.

**13.-** The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution to be sufficiently founded on evident principles and norms, as well as on the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

**14.-** In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.

Drafted by **Magistrate Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considering:** **I.- On admissibility.** Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, demanding the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury, when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. The text in question provides that it proceeds when "*by the nature of the matter, there is no individual nor direct injury*". Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "*diffuse interests*" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment No. 3750-93 of this tribunal at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"*… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, specific persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an injury, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that it concerns the equal interests of the groups found in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective—because they are common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity*." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united around a certain social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is found dispersed, diluted (*diffuse*) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualifier of "diffuse," such as: the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer, in principle, to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; environmental damage does not merely affect the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but injures or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Presupuesto de la República is an interest that concerns all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is no more than a simple description inherent in its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible, in any way, to come to the understanding that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights.

**II.- Standing in the case.-** In the case before us, the petition brought in this action of unconstitutionality is for the annulment of Executive Decree 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, which reforms Article 7°, subsection A, sub-item 3 of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, because, to that extent, it replaces the maximum limits with others that are less rigorous [of up to 220mg/m3 (TPN)], which they allege is contrary to the principles of objectification of environmental law and of non-regression of human rights. The standing of the plaintiffs is premised on diffuse interests for the protection of the environment, which is why standing does not necessarily fall on a single owner, but it is possible to identify a plurality of undetermined but determinable individuals who share that same interest; therefore, the existence of a prior matter, which serves as a reasonable means to protect the injured right, is not required, but rather the action can be directly promoted.

**III.- Object of the challenge.** The action of unconstitutionality requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 37301, insofar as it reforms Article 7°, subsection A, sub-item 3 of Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which is the Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto. The provision establishes the following:

(*) For boilers: they are classified according to Executive Decree No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, published in *La Gaceta* No. 65 of April 2, 1998, and its amendments. **For boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 mg/m3 (TPN).** For indirect-type furnaces, they are classified according to Article 1°, subsection B) of this regulation".

(The highlighted part of the norm is what is challenged by the plaintiffs). The grounds for the challenge lie in the fact that the reform introduced by the Executive Branch disrespects the principles of progressivity of environmental law and the principle of objectification, breached by the reform because, according to the plaintiffs, the emission maximums for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, were relaxed to 220 mg/m3 (TPN), without technical studies that served to increase the emission limits, that is, they allege there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation.

**IV.- On the merits.** Before resolving this action of unconstitutionality, it is pertinent to outline the historical development of the regulations on particulate emissions into the environment, which, through Executive Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, denominated Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas, began to regulate the maximum emission values for those industrial, commercial, and service establishments that had processes or activities that included the operation of boilers (art.

1°). The aforementioned regulation governed, among other things, the total suspended particles emitted by liquid fossil fuels in boilers, solid fossil fuels in boilers, and biomass fuels in boilers. Likewise, it regulated the emission limits for Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides. This Regulation established the following as maximums:

(*) According to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS, Reglamento de Calderas, La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998.

(**) A period of five years is granted, from the enactment of this Regulation, for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to emit suspended particles at concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3.

For the five-year period, the Generating Entity must submit a program to the DPAH, together with its first Operational Report, clearly indicating the schedule to be followed in order to comply with the established standards.

As seen from the foregoing, the standard regulated boilers with a different criterion based on their age or recent installation, in order to treat those existing and in operation differently. These rules remained in force until the enactment of the new regulation designed to increase the requirements previously enacted. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE was in effect for ten years, from March 26, 2002, and was repealed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 140 of July 20, 2011, which came into force six months later, beginning in 2012. One of its characteristics is, precisely, that it reiterates the position of establishing maximum emission limits for establishments whose processes or activities include the operation of boilers, and adds, indirect-type furnaces classified in different tables, for the former as well as for the latter. It is additionally worth highlighting that this Decreto Ejecutivo, in effect, regulated the use of biomass as fuel in boilers when it also incorporated **indirect-type furnaces**, according to the following table:

“[…]

A.3) Use of biomass as fuel in boilers **and indirect-type furnaces**.

(*) For boilers, they are classified according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, *La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998* and its amendments.

For **indirect-type furnaces**, they are classified according to Article 1, subsection B) of this regulation.

• B)Sulfur Dioxide […]” (The highlighting of the standard is not from the original).

As seen from the foregoing, two things occur: the inclusion – for the first time – of indirect-type furnaces in the measurement and their equivalence with those boilers, regulated in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222. Furthermore, the differentiated treatment for existing equipment is eliminated from the standard, reducing the maximum limits and, consequently, their possible eradication. Then, the State, by attempting to standardize all agro-industrial equipment, essentially forces a technological transition, with which it intends to compel companies to make a leap, although favorable for the protection of the environment and human health, presumably supported by technique and science, even before Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, came into force, to establish a single degree of measurement, but turning its back on the reality of the agro-industry. For all these reasons, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET was issued, which amends Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, to establish the following table:

(*) For boilers, they are classified according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, published in *La Gaceta No. 65 of April 2, 1998* and its amendments.

For boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit remains at 220mg/m3 (TPN).

For indirect-type furnaces, they are classified according to Article 1, subsection B) of this regulation." (sic)

Regarding this last point highlighted in bold, lies the claim of the plaintiffs, and which the passive coadjuvants of the action defend, given that they affirm that the challenged reform was not only supported by the studies provided by the agro-industrialists, it was provided even before the promulgation of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS.

In order to complete all the elements to resolve this matter, as it was omitted at the time, an audience was granted to the Ministry of Health, as the governing body in the matter and a party to the Executive Decrees under discussion, so that, based on all of the foregoing, it proceeds to resolve the action of unconstitutionality, in accordance with the arguments presented by the plaintiffs, Ministries, and passive coadjuvants, to resolve them as follows:

**A.- The principle of objectivization (principio de objetivación)**. Regarding this issue, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2006-17126, established, regarding this principle, the following:

"**4.- *Of the objectivization of environmental protection (tutela ambiental)* ** : which, as this Court pointed out in judgment number *14293-2005* , from fourteen hundred fifty-two hours on October nineteenth, two thousand five, *is a principle that in no way can be confused with the previous [precautionary principle], insofar as, derived from the provisions of Articles 16 and 160 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, it **translates into the** **need to support decision-making in this area with technical studies, both in relation to acts and provisions of a general nature –both legal and regulatory–** , from which the requirement of " **linkage to science and technique** " is derived, thereby conditioning the Administration's discretion in this area. So that, in light of the results derived from those technical studies –such as environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental)–, if an objective technical criterion is evidenced that denotes the probability of evident damage to the environment, natural resources, or human health, it is mandatory to reject the proposed project, work, or activity; and in the event of a "*reasonable doubt*" it is mandatory to make decisions in favor of the environment (pro-natura principle), which can translate into the adoption of both compensatory and precautionary measures, in order to adequately protect the environment" (what is written in brackets is not from the original).

The plaintiffs state that the measures adopted in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS were based on boiler operational reports received by the Ministry of Health, and information from accredited laboratories for the periods 2006-2009, and other data (Considering 5° of the Decree). In the case before us, the authorities mention two factors that are reflected in the change of regulations, and subsequent reform; on one hand, indirect-type furnaces had not been regulated, and the lack of distinction made between new and existing equipment. The plaintiffs maintain in the action of unconstitutionality that, despite the existence of technical and scientific studies, Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET unjustifiably decreased the minimum emission requirements for the agro-industry. However, the analyses mentioned in the decree were collected by the generating entities themselves in accordance with Article 6° of Regulation 30222, which were carried out by authorized laboratories under Law No. 6038, and nevertheless, this Chamber observes that, although the system used serves to carry out a series of controls, these conclusions were only issued on boilers, without referring, in this Chamber's understanding, to a specialty of them, because it is not clear what would be the applicable technical studies for companies that could be regulated for the first time with indirect-type furnaces, which is the crux of the constitutionality challenge.

To this issue, it must be added that, although the common element of both, a boiler or an indirect-type furnace, is that they operate using the heat or energy produced by the combustion of hydrocarbon or biomass materials, with the emission of waste into the environment, it is clear that Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS exceeds the scope of Executive Decree No. 30222. A comparative study between the definition of the boiler regulated in the regulation with Regulation No. 30222 reveals the meaning of:

"**Boiler (Caldera)**: Any closed vessel in which, for any purpose, except domestic cooking of food, water is heated or steam is generated, generally from water, to be used outside it, at a pressure greater than atmospheric pressure. Superheaters, reheaters, economizers, or other pressure parts, connected directly to the boiler, without the intervention of valves, shall be considered as part of the boiler." There is no difference between this definition and the one given in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, since, by simply eliminating the word "*Any...*", the standard remains the same, which shows that the technical and scientific criterion for control over boilers would be the same under both decrees, but it is different from or distinguishes itself from the definition of an indirect-type furnace. Thus, "**Indirect-type furnace (Horno de tipo indirecto):** Furnace in which the material to be heated is not in direct contact with the combustion products, for example: heating furnaces in petroleum refineries, thermal fluid heaters, industrial water heaters, indirect-type dryers, and steam generators." Precisely, when this Court granted the audience to the Ministry of Health, it stated that indirect-type furnaces had escaped the regulation of Executive Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, which meant that an advance was made in the matter, not a regression, as is attempted to be implied. It does not escape the Court's understanding that a boiler or an indirect-type furnace will produce suspended particles that must be measured, using the different fuels, whether as a boiler or an indirect-type furnace, but it merits a different analysis than the one proposed by the plaintiffs, which is beyond the mechanisms available to the constitutional jurisdiction itself. For example, it could be questioned that the indirect-type furnace has, by definition, a series of attachments that must also be evaluated, as noted with the effect of gas scrubbers (lavadores de gases). Regarding the other factor mentioned above, the lack of differentiated treatment between equipment, new and existing, constitutes an argument that is closely related to the principle of progressivity (principio de progresividad), which also requires that regulatory advances not be disconnected from the impacts they may generate on all affected sectors.

**B.- The principle of progressivity of human rights (principio de progresividad de los derechos humanos).-** The Constitutional Chamber recently heard a legislative consultation related to the Bill for the "*Disaffectation and Titling of the Border Zone between the Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Panama*", legislative file number 16657, in which it was held, through resolution No. 2014-018836 at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on November eighteenth, two thousand fourteen, that:

"In accordance with the principle of non-regression (principio de no regresividad), regulations and jurisprudence on environmental matters should not be reviewed if this means regressing in relation to the level of protection previously achieved in the matter. This prevents the suppression of protectionist regulations or the reduction of their requirements due to interests contrary to them that do not prove to be legally superior to the environmental public interest, since in most cases, these regressions in environmental protection result in irreversible or difficult-to-repair environmental damage. In such a way that the environmental protection standards already achieved shall not be affected, nor shall current regulations be repealed or modified if this produces a decrease, impairment, or any other form of negative impact on the current level of environmental protection. In this matter, the path is forward, never backward." Such a criterion, in the context in which it is taken, seems absolute, but it cannot be interpreted that way, because, by its very nature, it must also be relativized to certain conditions that serve it, either as a precursor or a brake, as the Chamber indeed recognizes later in the judgment. Therefore, it must be recognized that there are limits to the principle, especially when it collides with others of a constitutional nature. Thus, the legislative procedure was devoid of technical and scientific studies to support the legislative measure being promoted in the Legislative Branch, reflecting one of the essential principles of environmental law, which is the principle of objectivization. For this reason, the Chamber, after citing judgment No. 2006-17126 transcribed above, reaches the following conclusion:

"In the case of the consulted project, the total absence of prior technical studies to determine the consequences that the disaffectation of the intended southern border strip could have on the State's Natural Heritage constitutes a clear threat to the environment, since this could allow indiscriminate logging of forests and the disappearance of flora and fauna species, without any objective data to confirm or rule it out" (see judgment No. 2014-018836).

Certainly, the principle of progressivity of human rights drives the State to protect these rights moving forward, in pursuit of their development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achievements made and impose rationality in the exploitation, use of natural resources, and in the production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualness, because it does not operate without support and logistics from the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where, although the scale normally tips towards gradual advance, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social achievements is also not absolute in this field; it has -for example- those limits, even recognized by international human rights bodies when they admit –in limited cases– the possibility that they can be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a judgment of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. ("Discharged and Retired Employees of the Comptroller's Office") vs. Peru, has stated regarding the Progressive Development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that:

"… a duty is derived – albeit conditional – of non-regression, which should not always be understood as a prohibition of measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that 'deliberately re[gressive] measures in this respect will require the most careful consideration and must be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of making full use of the maximum of the resources available to [the State]'. Similarly, the Inter-American Commission has considered that to evaluate whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention, it will be necessary to 'determine if it is justified by reasons of sufficient weight'. For all the foregoing, it is possible to affirm that regressivity is justiciable when dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights." That is to say, although the thesis of international bodies limitedly conceives the possibility of modifying or regressing in economic, social, and cultural rights in a restrictive manner, there must be a social and public interest. The reform, in effect, returns the operation of certain boilers to a previous situation (taking into account, according to the Ministry of Health, for the first time, indirect-type furnaces), in order not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies, due to the environmental burden generated by their productive work. Hence, the transfer of a general principle of human rights to the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (non-regressivity) cannot be demanded in this case; it is only plausible as long as it obtains the support of the technical and scientific criteria that armor the administrative decision, which, in effect, were produced and sufficiently demonstrated - in the administration's judgment - to sustain the challenged reform.

But equally, a decision to maintain the environmental measure also requires these criteria, thus preventing the Administration's decisions from being arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious, because, on one side, in favor, or on the other, against, there are interests and rights involved in these decisions, sometimes in confrontation more than others, which requires the need for them to be calibrated for the benefit of society, without breaking with environmental expectations, because, *prima facie*, it requires a certain security to maintain the various linkages whose incidence is especially social, of the workers, as well as in the supply of sugars to the population or to other industrialists. The principle of non-regressivity (no regresividad) in environmental law can be expressed, then, as the impediment that a measure established by public authorities be contrary to an environmental achievement, such as the attainment of an environmental objective, and, therefore, its sacrifice is not appropriate when it is not supported by technical and scientific studies. It is truly a principle that prevents the rollback of social achievements, but its modification will depend on the seriousness, foundation, and solidity of the studies that gave it origin, or even, on the variation of the circumstances that gave it origin, so that, when the conditions that see it arise change, the effects they have in reality must also change. Hence, to reform environmental measures, the administration requires their verification through technical and scientific criteria. A clear example of all this is Article 38 of the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente.

**C.- The principle of technical reasonableness (principio de la razonabilidad técnica)**. LAICA alleges, in its respective brief, that the Executive Decree is impossible to comply with for the sugar sector; it argues against the regulation the contradictions between the treatment of fossil fuels and biomass fuels, the difference in exercising controls with different oxygen levels in boilers, indirect-type furnaces versus furnaces using biomass fuels, without further clarification. That the studies referred to in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE do not specify which ones were taken into account, on what type of boilers, the type of tests that were reported, and the quality data of RECOPE; rather, it is more apparent that the Decree's references were made in a context of equipment based on fossil fuels. It also alleges other legal breaches, among them, numerals 16, 158, 160, 361.1, 240, and 241 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. To resolve the foregoing, it is necessary to resort to constitutional jurisprudence itself, when it has indicated the components of the principles of reasonableness, namely those of: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, considering that:

"*... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective pursued with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such an objective, the competent authority must choose the one that affects the legal sphere of the person the least; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it is not 'demandable' from the individual.(...) (Judgment of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June twelfth, nineteen ninety-eight).* Thus, a limitative act of rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community -or of a specific group- by adopting a differentiating measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, implies a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that there may be other mechanisms that better solve the existing need, some of which could fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of an entity markedly superior to the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed" (see judgment No. 08858-98 of this Chamber). (...)

For this Court, it is clear that the suitability of the measure is under discussion in this case (reform via Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET), which also requires the analysis of the technical and scientific reports that supported it, because, as the coadjuvant indicates, during its promulgation, the technical criteria pointed towards incorporating the mentioned modification. Therefore, in LAICA's coadjuvancy brief, it points out that prior to the promulgation of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, an analysis with technical criteria of the reasons why the proposed levels for the industry were not feasible was submitted by official communication DE-022-2009/2010 of June 8, 2010. Thus, opposition was produced to the levels established in Executive Decree No. 36551, the foundations of which were received by the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards (Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión), but even so, the collection of signatures for that regulation continued, even though there were signs that the provisions could not be applied to them, because from a technical point of view, no sugar mill (ingenio) in Costa Rica could comply with those parameters. To the above, the CNAA also joined LAICA's objections, so that even though it was desired to address those claims (by the Minister of Health via official communication DM-3293-2010 of September 6, 2010), they were unsuccessful. Subsequently, the formulated objections were taken up again, when by official communication DRS-UN-920-11 of November 23, 2011, the Health Regulation Directorate (Dirección de Regulación de la Salud) referred to the CNAA to the Office of the Minister of Health to reform Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which after a high-level meeting of Ministry heads and middle management with different affected associations and chambers, it was decided to proceed with the mentioned reform.

The coadjuvants refer to an error that was warned in due time by LAICA and the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards. The technical criteria are transcribed in LAICA's coadjuvancy brief, which, as evidenced by Executive Decree 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, in considering clauses 5° and 6°, have the request for review submitted based on the respective attestations and the acceptance by the Executive Branch of the arguments outlined in the technical study. If the State's objective is to increase environmental protection as a fundamental right, it is not constitutionally lawful to ignore other economic and social rights, because in carrying out such a mandate, it must seek a balance among the rights involved in the decision, but in an informed manner. In this way, the foregoing would lead the Court to question whether there was solidity in the acceptance of the scientific elements contributed by the interested guild, which is not appropriate to analyze in the action of unconstitutionality, whose discussion must be reserved for aspects of pure law, because entering to assess technical aspects, such as the classification of boilers, indirect-type furnaces, and their measurement method, would exceed the purpose of the constitutional process and would lead to the analysis of technical criteria that could only be done in an ordinary process or one within the knowledge of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. For the Chamber, it is clear that the discussion is open in a more plenary jurisdiction.

**V.- Conclusion.** For the reasons stated, the action is declared without merit.

Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and would uphold the action in all its aspects.- </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p align=center style='text-align:center'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size: 14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Therefore:</span></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The action is dismissed. Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and would uphold the action in all its aspects.- </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN'>Gilbert Armijo S.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; mso-ansi-language:EN'>President</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Ernesto Jinesta L.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Fernando Cruz C.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Fernando Castillo V.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Paul Rueda L.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Nancy Hernández L.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Luis Fdo. Salazar A.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height: 150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Exp. 14-008641</span></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><b><u><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height: 150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent and would uphold the action in all its aspects, authored by the latter. </span></u></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>For the reasons we express below, we consider that this action should be upheld in all its aspects, and not dismissed, as the majority opinion does.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>The amendment to Article 7, subsection A, sub-item 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS “Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto”, by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, certainly entails a weakening of the maximum emission limits for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, to 220 mg/m3 (TPN), establishing others that are less rigorous. All in contravention of the principles of objectification of environmental law and non-regression of human rights. It is also observed that there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>As this Chamber has stated regarding the principle of progressivity of human rights, it drives the progressive protection of the State, in pursuit of their development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achievements made and impose rationality on the exploitation, use of natural resources, and production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualness, as it does not operate without support and logistics from the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where, although the balance normally tilts towards gradual progress, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social achievements is also not absolute in this field; it has—for example—those limits, even recognized by international human rights bodies when they admit—in limited cases—the possibility that they can be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) v. Peru, stated regarding the Progressive Development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that: </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 34.0pt;line-height:150%'><i><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height: 150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>“… a duty—albeit conditional—of non-regressivity emerges, which should not always be understood as a prohibition on measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that ‘deliberately regressive measures in this area will require the most careful consideration and must be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of the full use of the maximum resources available to [the State]’. Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission has considered that to evaluate whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention, one must ‘determine if it is justified by sufficiently weighty reasons’. For all the foregoing, it is possible to affirm that regressivity is justiciable when it comes to economic, social, and cultural rights.”</span></i><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Applying the foregoing to this case, the sufficiently weighty reasons for the relaxation of boiler emission limits are nowhere to be found. As is rightly noted in the majority opinion, the reform indeed returns the operation of certain boilers to a previous situation (taking into account indirect-type furnaces, for the first time, by the Ministry of Health), in order not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies, due to the environmental burden generated by their productive work. Hence, to make such regression possible, it was imperative to obtain the backing of technical and scientific criteria that shield the administrative decision. However, that is precisely what we miss; we do not find technical and scientific backing. The fact that the majority opinion indicates that those criteria were produced and sufficiently demonstrated in the administration's view seems insufficient to us; the Administration should have fully justified said criteria in the decree's own statement of reasons. Which leads to the fact that in this case, an exception (relaxation of emission limits) was incurred without having a founded and duly justified technical criterion. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>In the same vein as expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República in its report, we therefore consider that the decision to exclude boilers predating March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for the emission of suspended particles established in Decreto Ejecutivo 36551, is inconsistent with the state duty of environmental protection and guardianship established in Article 50 of the Constitution. The modification of the regulation challenged in this unconstitutionality action decreases the level of protection and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification to support it. The reform is clearly a worsening of the level of protection, with the additional problem that the decree lacks technical and scientific information to determine to what extent this exemption may lead to a decrease in the level of protection. Therefore, the reform introduced, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for over four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where the levels of protection decrease. Thus, as there is no scientific and technical certainty that the increase in the reference oxygen levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to human health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle establishing the state duty of its guardianship and protection, as indicated in rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Sala Constitucional. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Even in his report, the Minister of Environment and Energy requested an assessment of the constitutionality of the regulation, since the technical observations noted by the Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental were not incorporated<i>. </i>This fact strengthens the unconstitutionality, because it reiterates the lack of technical criteria, as there is no criterion from the specialized body. </span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>In conclusion, as there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in the reference oxygen levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to human health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional for infringing the right to the environment and to health, ignoring the state duty of its guardianship and protection, as indicated in rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Sala Constitucional.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;text-indent:34.0pt;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt; line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>We consider that the reform to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, introduced by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301, is unconstitutional, as is the reform to point C.2) of Article 7 of Decreto Ejecutivo 36551.</span><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language: EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p align=center style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt; margin-left:0cm;text-align:center;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Gilbert Armijo Sancho &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Fernando Cruz Castro</span></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p align=center style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt; margin-left:0cm;text-align:center;line-height:150%'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:150%;mso-ansi-language:EN'>Magistrate&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Magistrate</span></b><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p style='margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:10.0pt;margin-left: 0cm;line-height:150%'><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <p><span lang=EN style='mso-ansi-language:EN'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal align=right style='text-align:right'><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'>EXPEDIENTE N° </span></b><b><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language: EN'>14-008641-0007-CO </span></b><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> <p class=MsoNormal><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p> <div style='border:none;border-top:solid #010101 1.0pt;mso-border-top-alt:solid #010101 .75pt; padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 0cm'> <div style='margin-top:1.0pt'> <p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><span lang=EN style='font-size:8.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";color:#010101; mso-ansi-language:EN'>Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6</span><span lang=EN style='mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN'><o:p></o:p></span></p> </div> </div> </div> </body> </html> Published in La Gaceta 140 of 20-07-2011.

**Exp:** 14-008641-0007-CO **Res. No. 005616-2015** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and three minutes on the twenty-second of April of two thousand fifteen.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDITA ALFARO BOZA, GLORIANA CHAVARRIA SOLIS, MELANY SZYFER CASTILLO, REBECA CHAVES RODRIGUEZ, holders of identity card numbers 2-0365-0227, 2-0701-0309, 1-1565-0461, 1-1485-0400, and 1-1539-0855, respectively, against the Amendment to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, amendment published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012.

**Whereas:** 1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours and thirty-four minutes on May thirtieth, two thousand fourteen, the plaintiffs request that the unconstitutionality of the Amendment to the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, amendment published in Supplement No. 137 to La Gaceta No. 184 of September 24, 2012, be declared. They allege that the incorporation of said phrase into the Regulation increases the possibility of polluting by allowing, for those boilers installed before March 26, 2007, an emission with a maximum limit of 220 mg/m3. They add that the Regulation –Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS-, published in 2011, established a series of parameters to reduce air pollution; but the following year, by Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, the requirements were lowered and more pollution is allowed for boilers installed before March 26, 2007. They consider that, with this amendment to the Regulation, the primary obligation to protect health, the environment, and life is breached. Likewise, they state that the principle of progressivity is violated, since the level of environmental protection already achieved must be respected and, under no circumstances, diminished; the Executive Branch cannot lower the standards if it had already conducted studies over several periods or years, as indicated in 2011 in considering clause 5 of the Decree. They add that the amendment to the Regulation also produces a violation of the principle of objectification, since a maximum of 220 mg/m3 is permitted for boilers installed before May 26, 2007, without a scientific rationale appearing in the Regulation or its considering clauses. They consider that the maximum limits should not be determined based on an installation date, but by category.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they state that they are supported by diffuse interests (intereses difusos), in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

3.- By resolution issued at nine hours forty minutes on June tenth, two thousand fourteen, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).

4.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report. It indicates that this action of unconstitutionality challenges the phrase, "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 g/m3 (TPN)," contained in section A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, which is a reform introduced by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET. It states that the object of the action of unconstitutionality is to determine whether the challenged rule, by excluding boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the application of the limits set in Executive Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, and allowing them to emit a maximum of 220 mg/m3 (TPN), is unconstitutional for violating the constitutional principles contained in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that the petitioners are legitimized to file said action, in accordance with Article 50 of the Constitution and the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, given that the existence of a diffuse interest is invoked to claim the infringement of the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. It indicates that the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, in its Article 7, established emission limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3 for large, medium, and small boilers and furnaces, without differentiating whether they were new or existing furnaces or boilers. It states that by means of Executive Decree 37301 of March 22, 2012, section A.3) of Article 7 of said Regulation was modified. It shows that said modification was adopted by virtue of the request proposed by "the country's sugar sector," aimed at maintaining the concentrations permitted before the publication of Executive Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, based on technical studies. It states that the regulation in force prior to the enactment of the cited decree was the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers, which established maximum permitted emission limits for boilers using biomass fuels. It adds that for new boilers using that type of fuel, it set the limits at 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, depending on their size. It argues that for existing boilers, it set an emission limit of 220 mg/Nm3, and granted them a five-year period, which expired on March 26, 2007, to adjust to the new established emission limits. It claims that the issue raised requires an analysis of whether the decision to exclude boilers installed before March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for the emission of particulate matter established in Executive Decree 36551, is inconsistent with the state duty of environmental protection and guardianship established in Article 50 of the Constitution. It adds that the analysis must be based on the principles of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection. It states that, according to the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, it cannot be understood in absolute terms, since a decrease in a certain level of protection is possible if there is technical and scientific support guaranteeing that no significant environmental detriment occurs, provided that the parameters of proportionality and reasonableness are satisfied. It states that the regulatory modification challenged in this action of unconstitutionality decreases the level of protection and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification to support it. It expresses that this is a reform that worsens the emission levels of atmospheric pollutants from boilers, relative to the limits achieved before the modification published on September 24, 2012. It states that the decree makes it clear that the sole focus of the modification is centered on establishing competitiveness conditions that contribute to the development of economic activity in the country, and therefore the environmental or human health variable was not analyzed. It declares that it is a decision that implies a worsening of the level of protection, with the additional problem that the decree lacks technical and scientific information to determine to what extent this exemption could lead to a decrease in the level of protection. It affirms that from ruling 18702-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), regarding the principle of progressivity and non-regression of environmental protection, the following is extracted: "The principle stands as a substantive guarantee of rights, in this case, the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by virtue of which the State is obligated not to adopt measures, policies, nor approve legal norms that worsen, without reasonable and proportionate justification, the situation of the rights achieved thus far." It maintains that the reform introduced, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for more than four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where the levels of protection decrease. It argues that the reform adopted in September 2012 is an unjustified worsening of the emission limits established for all existing boilers even before the entry into force of Executive Decree N 36551. It pronounces that once the five-year period stipulated in the Regulation expired, all boilers became subject to the limits of 120, 150, and 175 mg/Nm3, depending on their size. It affirms that with what was originally dictated in Executive Decree N 30222, the intent was to set a provisional or transitional parameter (a 5-year period); with the challenged reform, this acquired a permanent character. It notes that the reform is of general application, meaning that the regression in the required emission levels applies to all boilers existing as of March 26, 2007, and not only to those used by the country's sugar sector in its production activity. It adds that if the Chamber decides to declare the unconstitutionality, "for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit is maintained at 220 mg/m3 (TPN)," introduced by the Executive Decree. It agrees that the provision in point C.2) of Article 7 should be analyzed, as it is equally contrary to the evolutionary interpretation in environmental protection, which does not admit a regression to the detriment. It claims that, as stated in Considerando 5 of the decree, "the country's sugar sector" also requested that the oxygen reference levels for data reporting be reviewed. It indicates that this resulted in the unjustified reduction of the protection that had been established in the previous Executive Decree, because, without any technical reasoning, it was ordered to change the reference level from 5% oxygen for all boilers to 10% for boilers using biomass fuels, therefore, there is more possibility of diluting the emissions and polluting more. It emphasizes that since there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in oxygen reference levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to human health or the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle establishing the state duty of its guardianship and protection, as indicated by rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Constitutional Chamber. Therefore, it considers the reform to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces, introduced by Executive Decree 37301, to be unconstitutional, as well as the reform to point C.2) of Article 7 of Executive Decree 36551.

5.- Mr. Edgar E. Gutiérrez Ezpeleta, in his capacity as Minister of Environment and Energy, responds to the hearing granted, stating that by means of official memo 12 of April 13, 2012, signed by the former Minister of Health and addressed to the former Minister of Environment and Energy, the document DRS-IC-004-2012 is forwarded for the signature process, corresponding to the proposal for an Executive Decree to Reform the Regulation. He reports that on April 20, 2012, it was forwarded to the Directorate of Legal Advisory (Dirección de Asesoría Jurídica) for the corresponding review. He adds that by means of official memo DAJ-619-2012, signed by the Director of Legal Advisory, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management (Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental) is asked to endorse the draft Decree DRS-IC-004-2012, on the Reform to the Regulation on the emission of atmospheric pollutants from boilers and indirect-type furnaces. He highlights that by means of official memo DIGECA-454-2012, the Directorate of Environmental Management (Dirección de Gestión Ambiental) referred to the draft decree DRS-IC-004-2012/Ministry of Health "Reform to the Regulation on the emission of atmospheric pollutants." He shows that, in said opinion, the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends "the inclusion of a transitional provision to promote the renewal of boilers so that those that have exceeded their useful life (approximately 20 years) can be gradually replaced by more efficient technologies. The timeframe, of course, must be assessed within the Commission and consulted with the productive sectors." He emphasizes that said report from the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management recommends that the established limits be reported in mass flow, given that it is a clearer measure of the pollutant load emitted by a specific source over a period of time, and not as the technical position presented by the sugarcane and oil palm sector, which is based on international standards for boiler particle emissions, because the technologies used for steam production in sugar mills are highly varied. He notes that by means of official memo DIGECA-642-2012, addressed to the Vice Minister, it was indicated that it was still necessary to incorporate a transitional provision in the regulation to promote the renewal of old boilers that have difficulties complying with the emission limits established in Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS. He claims that, in that sense, the text of the transitional provision should consider that air quality for the population would gradually improve, and the following transitional provision was proposed, suggesting a five-year period be established for boilers installed before March 26, 2007, to conform to the maximum limits established in the table. He highlights that the issuance of the reform to Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS is the result of the joint work of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor, MINAE, UCCAEP, the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals, the College of Chemists, the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry (Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria), and the University of Costa Rica (UCR). He maintains that in the coordination meetings of the Emissions Commission, it was indicated that a review request had been sent from the National Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry regarding the emission limits for the sugar sector proposed in the Regulation, accompanied by a supporting technical document. He claims that it was agreed to modify the emission limit taking into account the timeframe that had been granted by the Regulation in force at that time, but maintaining the reference oxygen percentage, in order to standardize the calculation. He warns that upon reviewing the reform to the Executive Decree, published in Gazette 184 of September 29, 2012, it is clear that the transitional provision proposed by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management did not remain in the terms proposed. He requests that the constitutionality of the rule be assessed, given that the technical observations indicated by the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management were not incorporated.

6.- Due to an omission at the time, by resolution issued at nine hours eight minutes on February twelfth, two thousand fifteen, the instructing magistrate granted a hearing to the Ministry of Health regarding the action of unconstitutionality filed by Mr. Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez and others, against the reformed Article 7 A.3) of the Regulation on the Emission of Atmospheric Pollutants from Boilers and Indirect-Type Furnaces (Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET of March 22, 2012).

7.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his condition as Acting Minister of Health, responds to the hearing granted, stating the criteria provided by the Director and Acting Head of the Unit for Standardization of Health Services in the Human Environment (Unidad de Normalización de Servicios de Salud en Ambiente Humano) of the Directorate of Protection of the Human Environment (Dirección de Protección al Ambiente Humano) of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that Article 7, subsection A), third sub-section of Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, refers specifically to boilers that use biomass as fuel in indirect-type boilers and furnaces, and not to all boilers. This version of the rule replaces Decree 30222-S-MINAE of the year 2002, with which, for the first time, health regulation for indirect-type furnaces was incorporated, an aspect that was not previously regulated by any other body of the Costa Rican State. Contrary to the petitioners' criteria, the principle of progressivity in the level of environmental protection is not contravened, but rather is being extended. Decree 36511-S-MINAE-MTSS, published on June 29, 2011, sought to disregard the separation between "New" and "Existing" boilers, as these were differentiated in Decree 30222-S-MINAE, and to regulate all of them as if they were "New." It disregarded that in Decree 30222-S-MINAE, section A.3, referring to biomass boilers, a five-year period is granted, starting from the enactment, for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to achieve particle emissions at concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3. Regarding this last aspect, the biomass boiler operators alerted the Administration, and the Administration corrected the material error, and the same criterion of 220 mg/Nm3 from Decree 30222-S-MINAE was maintained when the modification was published, via 37301-S-MTSS-MINAE. Therefore, this adjustment also does not decrease the level of environmental protection, but rather maintains the same level that had been set since 2002. Based on the cited report, it is considered the duty of the State, and primarily of the Ministry of Health, to protect the health of people, the environment, and life in general, therefore, based on these principles, it is clarified that the levels established in the rule under discussion do not decrease the level of environmental protection, nor do they violate the principle of progressivity, since indirect-type furnaces were regulated for the first time in the country in the year 2002, which constitutes an advance in environmental matters and not a setback. Consequently, Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET adequately ensures the observance and compliance with norms and public policies regarding environmental protection matters.

8.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in issues 116, 117, and 118 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on the days of June 18, 19, and 20, 2014.

9.- By brief filed on June 24, 2014, Roberto Vega Arias, in his condition as general judicial proxy of the Agricultural Industrial League of Sugarcane (Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar, LAICA), appears in this file and requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant (coadyuvante pasivo). He states that LAICA has among its public duties the task of ensuring the optimal development and stability of the national sugar agroindustry, seeking the satisfaction of the interests it regulates, promotes, and defends. He indicates that regarding its procedural standing, LAICA represents the corporate interests of the nation's sugarcane and sugar sectors, therefore it has the required procedural standing to promote and participate in administrative or judicial actions in defense of its constituents. He indicates that based on the referred legitimate interest, the Chamber has accepted LAICA's participation as a coadjuvant in other matters of special interest and concern for the sugarcane-sugar sector of Costa Rica. He maintains that this action of unconstitutionality, besides expressly alluding to the sector that LAICA represents and defends, is directed against a rule that directly affects the country's sugar mills, as they are industries that operate with biomass-fed boilers. He warns that if the challenged phrase were eliminated, those industries would not be able to operate, putting at risk the production of sugar, honeys, and alcohol, as well as the livelihood of thousands of sugarcane producers and their families. He states that on June 8, 2010, LAICA sent the Technical Committee on Emission Standards (Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones) the sector's position regarding the draft Regulation, requesting that the particle emission limit in combustion gases for sugarcane bagasse boilers remain at 220 mg/NM3 and that the O2 reference be at least 10%, given that this is the typical value for the combustion of high-humidity cellulosic materials. He warns that LAICA carried out a complete technical analysis to justify its request. He adds that LAICA submitted its position through the Chamber of Agriculture and Agroindustry. He accuses that the lawyer from the Directorate of Health Regulation (Dirección de Regulación de Salud), by official memo DRS-348-10, indicated to the Committee members that the modifications approved by them could not be incorporated into the regulation, given that it was already awaiting the Minister's signature and that the public consultation process had been concluded. He considers that this was done improperly and unduly, since the lawyer gave preeminence to a formal aspect over a substantive agreement with technical support. He reports that by official memo DRS-UN-392-08-2010, the Standardization Unit (Unidad de Normalización) informed them that the modification request to the proposed Regulation was rejected, which they insisted had already been approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards. He shows that by official memo DE-030-2009/2010, LAICA pointed out to the Minister of Health and the Minister of MINAET the serious risk that the enactment of said regulation represented for the agroindustry. He highlights that on July 20, 2011, Executive Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS was enacted in the Gazette, which did not include the observations that LAICA had timely submitted and that were approved by the Technical Committee on Emission Standards in its session No. 116, leaving by mistake the particle emission limit in combustion gases for category A) boilers that use biomass as fuel, at 120 mg/Nm3 and with an oxygen reference of 5%, a parameter that, from a technical point of view, no sugar mill in Costa Rica can meet. He considers that by official memo P078-2011, a hearing was requested before the Committee on Emission Standards to explain the reasons why the parameters established in the Executive Decree were not technically feasible for boilers and furnaces that use biomass fuels. He notes that by official memo DRS-UN-920-11, the Directorate of Health Regulation asked the CNAA to send in writing to the Office of the Minister of Health the modification request for the Decree. He shows that on January 18, 2012, a meeting was held at the Ministry of Agriculture, where an agreement was reached to modify the Decree, accepting the observations made through the CNAA. He reports that through the review and approval process of the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Environment, on September 24, 2012, Executive Decree 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS was published in The Gazette, which reformed Article 7 of Decree 36551 to correct the original error pointed out by LAICA. He adds that the original wording of Article 7 of Executive Decree Nº36551-S-MINAET-MTSS established an emission limit of 120 mg/Nm3 with an oxygen reference of 5% for category A) boilers that use biomass fuel, which collided with the principles of proportionality and legal reasonableness. He maintains that Article 7 did not meet technical reasonableness, given that no scientific studies existed to support the emission parameters originally defined for category A) boilers that use biomass fuel, parameters that are impossible for the country's industries to meet. He states that it was precisely based on the analysis carried out in LAICA's official memo DE-022-2009/2010 that the Technical Committee on Emission Standards, in its session No. 116 of June 24, 2010, approved the request to be incorporated into the draft regulation that was about to be issued, a modification that was not incorporated for the unreasonable reason that the lawyer from the Directorate of Health Regulation, for a mere formality, considered that since the consultation period for the regulatory proposal had expired, it was not possible to make further modifications. He highlights that there are no technical studies that justified a modification of that magnitude for boilers operating on biomass fuels. He adds that the studies referred to in Considerando 5 of Executive Decree Nº 36551-S-MINAE, which are so vehemently emphasized in the action of unconstitutionality, do not indicate that they were from industrial and agricultural activities, as maliciously and without any basis stated by the petitioners. He notes that the only thing Considerando 5 of the Decree expresses is that occasional boiler reports were taken into account, without specifying of what type, information from laboratories with quality tests and data from RECOPE, which gives a clear impression that said studies referred to furnaces and boilers that operate with fossil fuels and not biomass. He states that it is demonstrated with the evidence provided that it was not technically feasible for industries with already installed boilers that operate on biomass fuels to move from 220 to 120 mg/Nm3 for the particle emission limit and with an excess oxygen reference of just 5%. He adds that the boilers operating in the sugar mills have certain important characteristics: 1. They operate on biomass, generated by the sector itself, meaning the boilers are self-sufficient, operating on renewable and clean energy. 2. They are seasonal in operation. 3. They have alternative uses, such as the parallel generation of electricity. 4. They are located outside the Greater Metropolitan Area (GAM) and do not use fossil fuels. He reports that it was unreasonable and disproportionate that the permitted emission limits for boilers and furnaces using fossil fuels were much higher than the limits for boilers and furnaces using biomass. He indicates that Article 7 of the challenged rule establishes limits of 550, 200, and 420 mg/Nm3 for boilers and furnaces using bunker fuel, diesel, and gas oil, while for boilers using biomass, the limit was 120 mg/Nm3. This highlights the lack of technical reasonableness of the rule. He warns that said rule allowed the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using more polluting products, which by nature produce less suspended particulate matter, to be much higher than the emission limits for boilers and furnaces using a clean and renewable product, such as biomass. He claims that the intent is to expose the lack of suitability of the rule in its original wording, where there was technical unreasonableness and resulting disproportions. He warns that it is even more serious that the challenged Decree was issued departing from the technical criteria of the Committee on Emission Standards. They indicate that the administrative act was enacted departing from the expert technical criteria, without there being any type of scientific justification. He shows that the administrative act must be duly reasoned, as this constitutes a formal element of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in its Article 136 c. He emphasizes that the technical basis is indispensable for a proper reasoning of the administrative act, which demonstrates the lack of technical reasonableness of the rule and accentuates the need to correct it. He considers that as a discretionary act, the regulation is subject to the limits imposed by the univocal rules of science and technique, as well as the elemental principles of justice, logic, and convenience, and the rights of the administered party. He highlights that in this case, it is demonstrated by the technical justification made in official memo DE-022-2009/2010, which was approved by the Committee on Emission Standards, that the parameters originally set in the Executive Decree were impossible to meet for the sugar industries that use biomass fuel in their boilers, which evidenced the unreasonableness. He maintains that the original setting of these parameters was so unreasonable and arbitrary that, contradictorily, in the case of furnaces using biomass fuel, an oxygen reference of 10% was set, but not for boilers using the same type of fuel. He accuses that the original wording in Decree Nº36551-S-MINAE violated Articles 16, 158.4, and 160 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP).

It adds that the fact that there are no technical studies supporting the parameters originally defined in Article 7 of Decree 36551-S-MINAE, based on the real possibility of compliance for industries with boilers using biomass fuel, constituted a defect that affected the factual and technical background that served as the basis for issuing the Decree. It adds that Article 7 of the Decree was null due to a defect in the content of the act. It alleges that none of the country's sugar engineers could technically comply with the parameters arbitrarily defined in Article 7 of the Decree; the content was impossible, therefore, absolutely null. It shows that the interpretation made by the lawyer from the Health Regulation Directorate, which served as support to reject the modifications, gave absolute predominance to form over substance, thus violating the principle of informality, as stated in Article 224 of the LGAP, and thus violating articles 361 and 362 of the same legal body. It adds that, at that time, the reform project was simply a draft and nothing prevented the modifications from being made. It claims that LAICA, as a public entity mandated by Law to guarantee the stability of the agro-industry, was never expressly consulted on the scope of this regulatory modification. It warns that the important thing is that the error was corrected with the enactment of Decree No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, which reformed Article 7 of the previous Decree. It emphasizes that the principle of progressivity was not violated, since what was done was the correction of a technical error in the original drafting of the regulation. It adds vote 11088-2013 of the Constitutional Chamber which indicates: "However, for it to be pointed out that there is an injury to the principle of progressivity and non-regressivity, it is required that a fundamental right had been recognized and that it is limited or restricted without any reasonable justification." It expresses that the principle of objectivation is not violated, but rather that the lack of objectivation fell upon the original drafting of Article 7 of Decree No. 36551, because there is no technical-scientific support justifying a reduction in the particle emission limit. Therefore, Articles 21 and 50 of the Constitution are not violated, since the particulate emission limits are maintained at the same levels that were in force before the enactment of Decree 36551-S-MINAE. It requests that this action of unconstitutionality be rejected on the merits, maintaining the validity of the contested phrase.

**10.-** By writs filed, Central Azucarera Tempisque S.A, Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial, Azucarera el Viejo S.A, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Puntarenas, Ingenio Quebrada Azul Ltda., Ingenio Costa Rica, Ingenio Taboga S.A, and Ingenio Cutres S.A. appear in this case file (expediente) and request that they be considered passive coadjuvants. They state that they support, in all their aspects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). They maintain that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a regulation that directly affects the sugar mills (ingenios azucareros) that were already operating in the country before the referred reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fueled by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. They add that the issue under discussion has special interest and singular relevance for the Costa Rican sugar agro-industry, because if the contested phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of being able to comply with the newly proposed parameters, putting at risk the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica, as well as the livelihood of thousands of sugarcane growers, and their families; this would generate grave social and economic consequences. They emphasize that for the sugar mills there is an evident current and own, legitimate interest to intervene in this process and ensure the safeguarding of the contested phrase. They request that the unconstitutionality action filed be rejected and that the claimant be ordered to pay both costs.

**11.-** By writ filed, the Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña appears in this case file, requesting that they be considered passive coadjuvants. It states that it supports, in all their aspects, the arguments put forth and invoked by the Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). It indicates that FEDECAÑA is a non-profit association, which in this process has procedural standing (legitimación procesal), because they must defend the rights of sugarcane growers, derived from the law and Regulation, work for the harmonious development of sugarcane agriculture, achieve representative participation in LAICA from the different agro-industrial zones dedicated to this crop and from those who practice it, and appoint or substitute the proprietary and alternate members of the sugarcane sector. It considers that FEDECAÑA safeguards a corporate interest, which concerns the collectivity and, thereby, conforms to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. It mentions that what legitimates it to file its coadjuvancy is its character as a corporate entity, characterized by the representation and defense of a core of interests belonging to the members of a specific collectivity or common activity. It maintains that there is a current and own interest, as indicated by Article 275 of the General Public Administration Law and Article 83 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. It maintains that the action of unconstitutionality is directed against a regulation that directly affects the sugar mills (ingenios azucareros) that were already operating in the country before the referred reform, as they are industries that operate with boilers fueled by biomass, which is a clean and renewable energy source. It adds that the issue under discussion has special interest and singular relevance for the Costa Rican sugar agro-industry, because if the contested phrase were eliminated, they simply could not operate, given the impossibility of being able to comply with the newly proposed parameters, putting at risk the production of sugars, molasses, and alcohol in Costa Rica, as well as the livelihood of thousands of sugarcane growers, and their families; this would generate grave social and economic consequences. It emphasizes that for the sugar mills there is an evident current and own, legitimate interest to intervene in this process and ensure the safeguarding of the contested phrase. They request that the unconstitutionality action filed be rejected and that the claimant be ordered to pay both costs.

**12.-** By resolution at eleven thirty-five hours on July fifteenth, two thousand fourteen, the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Chamber, Gilbert Armijo Sancho, accepted the following coadjuvancy requests: Asociación Cámara de Productores Caña de Azúcar Puntarenas, Asociación Cámara de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña, Azucarera El Viejo S.A., Central Azucarera Tempisque S. A., Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial y de Servicios Múltiplés el General R.L., Ingenio Costa Rica S.A., Ingenio Cutres S.A., Ingenio Quebrada Azul Limitada, Ingenio Taboga S. A., and Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar. It is resolved to consider them as coadjuvants with the warning that, not being a main party to the process, they will not be directly harmed or benefited by the judgment, that is, the efficacy of the judgment does not reach the coadjuvant directly and immediately, nor does it affect them with res judicata (cosa juzgada), nor do the immediate effects of execution of the judgment reach them, since through coadjuvancy the jurisdictional authority cannot be compelled to issue a resolution in their favor, for not having been a main party in the process. What can affect them, however, not due to their condition as coadjuvant but like anyone else, is the erga omnes effect of the pronouncement. The judgment in constitutional matters does not particularly benefit anyone, not even the act; this can be recognized in the prior judgment.

**13.-** The hearing set forth in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

**14.-** The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by **Judge Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considering:** **I.- On admissibility.** Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the regulation there is no individual or direct injury, when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the collectivity as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. The text in question provides that it proceeds when "*by the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct injury*". Secondly, the possibility of appearing in defense of "*diffuse interests*" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in Judgment No. 3750-93 of this Tribunal at fifteen thirty hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"*… Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already said - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that compared to them, determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, are identified, whose standing (legitimación) would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that these are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are at once collective - because they are common to a generality - and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity*." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, but united by a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a particular personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is dispersed, diluted (*diffuse*) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the designation of "diffuse", such as: the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer, in principle, to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not only affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather injures or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest that concerns all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber does not go beyond a simple description inherent to its obligation - as a jurisdictional body - of limiting itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible, in any way, to conclude that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights.

**II.- Standing (Legitimación) in the case.-** In the case at hand, the petition filed in this action of unconstitutionality is for the annulment of Decree 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, which reforms Article 7, subsection A, sub-subsection 3 of Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, because, to that extent, it replaces the maximum limits with other less rigorous ones [of up to 220mg/m3 (TPN)], which they allege is contrary to the principles of objectivation of environmental law and non-regression of human rights. The standing of the plaintiffs is premised on diffuse interests for the protection of the environment, which is why standing does not necessarily fall upon a single titleholder, but rather it is possible to identify a plurality of non-determined but determinable individuals who share that same interest, and therefore, the existence of a prior matter, serving as a reasonable means to protect the injured right, is not required; rather, the action can be pursued directly.

**III.- Object of the challenge.** The action of unconstitutionality requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Decree No. 37301, insofar as it reforms Article 7, subsection A, sub-subsection 3 of Decree 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which is the Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto. The provision establishes the following:

(*) Para calderas: se clasifican de acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, published in *La Gaceta* No. 65 of April 2, 1998 and its amendments. **Para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo del 2007 el límite máximo de emisión permitido se mantiene en 220 mg/m3 (TPN).** Para hornos de tipo indirecto se clasifican según el artículo 1°, inciso B) de este reglamento”.

(What is highlighted in the regulation is what is challenged by the plaintiffs). The grounds for the challenge reside in that the reform introduced by the Executive Branch disrespects the principles of progressivity of environmental law and the principle of objectivation, breached by the reform because, according to the plaintiffs, the maximum emission limits for boilers (calderas) installed before March 26, 2007 were relaxed to 220 mg/m3 (TPN), without technical studies that served to increase the emission limits, that is, they allege that there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation.

**IV.- On the merits.** Before resolving this action of unconstitutionality, it is pertinent to review the historical development of the regulations on particle emissions into the environment, which, through Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, called Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas, began regulating the maximum emission values for those industrial, commercial, and service establishments that had processes or activities including the operation of boilers (Art.

1°). Among other things, the aforementioned regulation governed total suspended particles (partículas totales en suspensión) emitted by liquid fossil fuels in boilers (calderas), solid fossil fuels in boilers, and biomass fuels in boilers. Similarly, it regulated the emission limits for Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxides. This Regulation established the following as maximums:

(*) De acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS, Reglamento de Calderas, La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998.

(**) A five-year period is granted, starting from the promulgation of this Regulation, for all existing boilers (large, medium, and small) to emit suspended particles in concentrations less than or equal to 220 mg/Nm3.

For the five-year period, the Generating Entity must submit a program to the DPAH, together with its first Operational Report, clearly indicating the schedule to be followed in order to comply with the established standards.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the regulation governed boilers with a different criterion according to their age or recent installation, with the aim of treating existing and operating ones differently. These rules remain in effect until the promulgation of new regulations designed to increase the requirements previously enacted. Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE was in force for ten years, from March 26, 2002, and was repealed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, published in La Gaceta No. 140 of July 20, 2011, which came into effect six months later, beginning in 2012. One of its characteristics is, precisely, that it reiterates the position of establishing maximum emission limits for establishments whose processes or activities include the operation of boilers, and it adds, indirect-type furnaces (hornos de tipo indirecto) classified in different tables, for the former as well as for the latter. It is additionally interesting to highlight that this Decreto Ejecutivo, in effect, regulated the use of biomass as fuel in boilers when it also incorporated **indirect-type furnaces**, according to the following table:

“[…]

A.3) Use of biomass as fuel in boilers **and indirect-type furnaces**.

(*) For boilers they are classified according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, *La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998* and its amendments.

For **indirect-type furnaces** they are classified according to Article 1°, subsection B) of this regulation.

• B)Sulfur Dioxide […]” (The highlighting in the regulation is not from the original).

As can be seen from the foregoing, two things occur: the inclusion – for the first time – of indirect-type furnaces in the measurement and their equalization with those boilers regulated in Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222. Furthermore, the differentiated treatment for existing equipment is eliminated from the regulation, reducing the maximum limits and, consequently, their possible eradication. So, the State, by attempting to standardize all agro-industrial equipment, essentially forces a technology transition, with which it intends to compel companies to take a leap, however favorable for the protection of the environment and human health, presumably supported by technique and science, even before Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, came into effect, to establish a single measurement degree, but turning its back on the reality of the agro-industry. For all these reasons, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET was issued, which reforms Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS of April 27, 2011, to establish the following table:

(*) For boilers they are classified according to Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, published in *La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998* and its amendments.

For boilers installed before March 26, 2007, the maximum permitted emission limit remains at 220 mg/m³ (TPN).

For indirect-type furnaces, they are classified according to Article 1, subsection B) of this regulation." (sic)

Regarding this last point highlighted in bold, lies the claim of the plaintiffs, and which the passive coadjuvants of the action defend, given that they affirm that the challenged reform was not only supported by the studies provided by the agro-industrialists, but was also provided even before the promulgation of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS.

In order to complete all the elements to resolve this matter, due to having been omitted at the time, a hearing was granted to the Ministry of Health, as the governing body on the subject and a party to the Executive Decrees under discussion, so that, based on all the foregoing, it proceeds to resolve the unconstitutionality action, in accordance with the arguments presented by the plaintiffs, Ministries, and passive coadjuvants, to resolve them as follows:

**A.- The principle of objectification (principio de objetivación)**. Regarding this topic, this Chamber, through ruling No. 2006-17126, established the following concerning this principle:

“**4.- <u>On the objectification of environmental protection (tutela ambiental)</u>** : which, as this Court pointed out in ruling number 14293-2005 , at fourteen fifty-two hours on October nineteenth, two thousand five, is a principle that in no way can be confused with the previous one [precautionary principle], insofar as, derived from the provisions of Articles 16 and 160 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), it ***translates into the*** **need to accredit decision-making in this matter with technical studies, both in relation to acts and provisions of a general nature –both legal and regulatory–** , from which derives the requirement of "**linkage to science and technique**", with which the Administration's discretion in this matter is conditioned. So that, in light of the results derived from those technical studies –such as environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental)–, if an objective technical criterion is evidenced that denotes the probability of evident damage to the environment, natural resources, or human health, it is obligatory to reject the proposed project, work, or activity; and in the case of a "*reasonable doubt*", it is obligatory to make decisions in favor of the environment (pro-natura principle), which can translate into the adoption of both compensatory and precautionary measures, in order to adequately protect the environment" (what is written in brackets is not from the original).

The plaintiffs argue that the measures adopted in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS were based on the operational reports of boilers received by the Ministry of Health, and information from accredited laboratories from the periods 2006-2009, and other data (Considering 5 of the Decree). In the case at hand, the authorities mention two factors that are reflected with the change of the regulations, and subsequent reform: on one hand, indirect-type furnaces had not been regulated, and the disregard that was made regarding new and existing equipment. The plaintiffs maintain in the unconstitutionality action that, despite the existence of technical and scientific studies, Executive Decree No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET unjustifiably decreased the minimum emission requirements for the agro-industry. Now, the analyses mentioned in the decree were collected by the generating entities themselves in accordance with Article 6 of Regulation 30222, which were carried out by laboratories authorized under Law No. 6038, and however, this Chamber observes that, although the system used serves to maintain a series of controls, these conclusions were only issued regarding boilers, without referring to, as this Chamber understands it, a specialty of them, because it is not clear which would be the applicable technical studies for the companies that could be regulated for the first time with indirect-type furnaces, which is the crux of the constitutionality challenge.

To this issue, it must be added that, although the common element of both, boiler or indirect-type furnace, is that they operate by harnessing the heat or energy produced by the combustion of hydrocarbon or biomass materials, with emission of waste into the environment, it is clear that Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS exceeds the scope of Executive Decree No. 30222. A comparative study between the definition of the boiler regulated in the regulations with Regulation No. 30222 reveals the meaning of:

“**Boiler (Caldera)**: Any closed vessel in which, for any purpose, except domestic cooking of food, water is heated or steam, generally water, is generated, to be used outside of it, at a pressure greater than atmospheric pressure. Superheaters, reheaters, economizers, or other pressure parts, connected directly to the boiler, without the intervention of valves, shall be considered as part of the boiler.” There is no difference between this definition and the one given in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, since, by simply eliminating the word "*Any…*", the rule remains the same, which evidences that the technical and scientific control criterion over boilers would be the same with the effectiveness of both decrees, but it is different or makes the difference with the definition of the indirect-type furnace. Thus, “**Indirect-type furnace (Horno de tipo indirecto):** Furnace in which the material to be heated is not in direct contact with the products of combustion, for example: heating furnaces in petroleum refineries, thermal fluid heaters, industrial water heaters, indirect-type dryers, and steam generators.” Precisely, upon granting the Ministry of Health a hearing, this Court states that indirect-type furnaces had escaped the regulation of Executive Decree No. 30222-S-MINAE, whereby, rather, there was an advance in the matter and not a regression, as is intended to be understood. It does not escape the Court's understanding that a boiler or indirect-type furnace will produce suspended particles that must be measured, with the use of different fuels, whether as a boiler or indirect-type furnace, but it merits a different analysis than that proposed by the plaintiffs, which escapes the mechanisms that the constitutional jurisdiction itself possesses. For example, it could be questioned that the indirect-type furnace has, by definition, a series of attachments that must also be evaluated, as noted with the effect of gas scrubbers. Regarding the other factor mentioned above, the lack of a differentiated treatment between new and existing equipment, it constitutes an argument that is closely related to the principle of progressivity (principio de progresividad), which also requires that regulatory advances not be disconnected from the impacts they may generate on all affected sectors.

**B.- The principle of progressivity of human rights.-** The Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) recently heard a legislative consultation related to the Bill of "*Disaffection and Titling of the Border Zone between the Republic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Panama*", legislative file number 16657, in which it was held, through resolution No. 2014-018836 at sixteen hours and twenty minutes on November eighteenth, two thousand fourteen, that:

“In accordance with the principle of non-regression (principio de no regresividad), the regulations and jurisprudence in environmental matters should not be reviewed if this entails a regression in relation to the level of protection that had already been achieved in the matter. With this, the suppression of protectionist regulations or the reduction of their requirements due to interests contrary to them that do not prove to be legally superior to the public environmental interest is avoided, since in the majority of cases, those regressions in environmental protection result in irreversible environmental damage or damage that is difficult to repair. So much so, that the already achieved environmental protection standards should not be affected, nor should current regulations be repealed or modified if this produces a decrease, impairment, or any other form of negative impact on the current level of environmental protection. In this matter, the path is forward, never backward.” Such a criterion, in the context taken, seems absolute, but it cannot be interpreted in that way, because, by its own nature, it must also be relativized to certain conditions that serve it, either as a precursor or a brake, as indeed the Chamber recognizes later in the ruling. Therefore, it must be recognized that there are limits to the principle, especially when it clashes with others of a constitutional nature. Thus, the legislative procedure was devoid of technical and scientific studies to support the legislative measure being promoted in the Legislative Branch (Poder Legislativo), reflecting one of the essential principles of environmental law, which is the principle of objectification. Therefore, the Chamber, after citing ruling No. 2006-17126 transcribed above, reaches the following conclusion:

“In the case of the consulted bill, the total absence of prior technical studies that determine the consequences that the disaffection of the southern border strip could have on the State's Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado) constitutes a clear threat to the environment, since with it, indiscriminate logging of forests and the disappearance of species of flora and fauna could be permitted, without any objective data that confirms or dismisses it” (see ruling No. 2014-018836).

Certainly, the principle of progressivity of human rights promotes their forward-looking protection by the State, in pursuit of their development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achieved advances and impose rationality in the exploitation, use of natural resources, and in the production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualness, since it does not operate without support and logistics from the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where although the scale normally tilts towards gradual advancement, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social conquests is also not absolute in this field; it has -for example- those limits, even recognized by international human rights organizations when they admit –in limited cases– the possibility that they may be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), in a ruling of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Comptroller’s Office”) vs. Peru, has indicated regarding the progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that:

“… a duty follows – albeit conditioned – of non-regression, which should not always be understood as a prohibition of measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that “deliberately regressive measures in this aspect require the most careful consideration and must be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of the full use of the maximum of [the State's] available resources”. Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission (Comisión Interamericana) has considered that to evaluate whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention (Convención Americana), it shall be necessary to “determine whether it is justified by reasons of sufficient weight”. For all the foregoing, it is fitting to affirm that regressivity is justiciable when it concerns economic, social, and cultural rights.” That is to say, although the thesis of international organizations conceives, in a limited way, the possibility of modifying or regressing in economic, social, and cultural rights in a restrictive manner, there must be a social and public interest. The reform, in effect, returns the functioning of certain boilers to a previous situation (taking into account the Ministry of Health, for the first time, indirect-type furnaces), so as not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies, due to the environmental burden generated by their productive work. Hence, the transfer of a general principle of human rights to the fundamental right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (non-regression), cannot be demanded in this case; it is only plausible as long as it obtains the backing of the technical and scientific criteria that armor the administrative decision, those which, in effect, were produced and sufficiently demonstrated -in the judgment of the administration- to sustain the challenged reform.

But equally, a decision to maintain the environmental measure also requires these criteria, thus preventing the Administration's decisions from being arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious, because, on one side, in favor, or on the other, against, there are interests and rights that are involved in these decisions, sometimes in confrontation more than others, requiring the need for them to be calibrated for the benefit of society, without breaking with environmental expectations, because, *prima facie*, it requires a certain security, to maintain the different chains whose incidence is especially social, of the workers, as well as in the supply of sugars to the population or to other industrialists. The principle of non-regression of environmental law can be expressed, then, as the impediment that a measure established by public authorities be contrary to an environmental conquest, such as the achievement of an environmental objective, and, therefore, its sacrifice is not appropriate when it is not supported by technical and scientific studies. It is really a principle that prevents the regression of social conquests, but its modification will depend on the seriousness, substantiation, and solidity of the studies that gave them origin, or even, on the variation of the circumstances that gave them origin, so that, when the conditions that give birth to it are modified, the effects they have in reality must also change. Hence, to reform environmental measures, the administration requires their verification through technical and scientific criteria. A clear example of all this is Article 38 of the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente).

**C.- The principle of technical reasonableness.** LAICA alleges, in its extensive brief, that the Executive Decree is impossible to comply with for the sugar sector, it argues against the regulation the contradictions between the treatment of fossil fuels and biomass fuels, the difference in exercising controls with different oxygen levels in boilers, indirect-type furnaces of furnaces that use biomass fuels, without further clarification. That the studies referenced in Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAE do not specify which ones were taken into account, on what type of boilers, the type of tests that were reported, and the quality data of RECOPE; rather, it is more apparent that the references in the Decree were given in a context of those equipment based on fossil fuels. It further alleges other legal violations, including numerals 16, 158, 160, 361.1, 240, and 241 of the General Law of Public Administration. To resolve the foregoing, it is necessary to resort to constitutional jurisprudence itself, when it has indicated the components of the principles of reasonableness, namely those of: legitimacy (legitimidad), suitability (idoneidad), necessity (necesidad), and proportionality (proporcionalidad) in the strict sense, considering that:

"*... Legitimacy refers to the fact that the objective sought with the challenged act or provision must not be, at least, legally prohibited; suitability indicates that the questioned state measure must be apt to effectively achieve the intended objective; necessity means that among several measures equally apt to achieve such objective, the competent authority must choose the one that least affects the legal sphere of the person; and proportionality in the strict sense provides that apart from the requirement that the norm be apt and necessary, what is ordered by it must not be out of proportion with respect to the intended objective, that is, it must not be "demandable" to the individual.(...) (Ruling of this Chamber number 03933-98, at nine hours fifty-nine minutes on June twelfth, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight).*" Thus, a limiting act of rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary (necesario), suitable (idóneo), and proportional (proporcional). The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community -or of a specific group- through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if such action is not taken, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or does not fulfill the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that there may be other mechanisms that better solve the existing need, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second departs from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed” (see ruling No. 08858-98 of this Chamber). (...)

For this Court, it is clear that the suitability of the measure is under discussion in this case (reform via Executive Decree No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET), which also requires the analysis of the technical and scientific reports that supported it, because, as the coadjuvant indicates, during its promulgation the technical criteria pointed towards incorporating the aforementioned modification. Therefore, in LAICA's coadjuvancy brief, it points out that prior to the promulgation of Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, an analysis with technical criteria of the reasons why the proposed levels for the industry were not appropriate was submitted via official letter DE-022-2009/2010 of June 8, 2010. Thus, opposition to the levels established in Executive Decree No. 36551 was produced, whose foundations were received by the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards (Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión), but even so, the collection of signatures for that regulation continued, even though there were signs that the provisions could not be applied to them, because from a technical point of view, no sugar mill (ingenio) in Costa Rica could comply with those parameters. To the above, the CNAA also joined LAICA's objections, so that even when there was an attempt to address those complaints (by the Minister of Health through official letter DM-3293-2010 of September 6, 2010), they were unsuccessful. Subsequently, the objections formulated were retaken, when through official letter DRS-UN-920-11 of November 23, 2011, the Directorate of Health Regulation (Dirección de Regulación de la Salud) referred the matter to the CNAA at the Office of the Minister of Health to reform Executive Decree No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, which after a high-level and mid-level meeting of the Ministry officials with different affected associations and chambers, it was decided to proceed with the aforementioned reform.

The coadjuvants refer to an error that was warned in due course by LAICA and the Technical Committee on Emission and Immission Standards. The technical criteria are transcribed in LAICA's coadjuvancy writ, which, as evidenced from Executive Decree 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, in Considering 5 and 6, have the review request presented based on the respective attestations and the acceptance by the Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) of the arguments outlined in the technical study. If the State's objective is to increase environmental protection as a fundamental right, it is not constitutionally lawful for it to ignore other economic and social rights, because in carrying out such a mandate it must seek a balance between the rights involved in the decision, but in an informed manner. In this way, the foregoing would lead the Court to question whether there was solidity in the acceptance of the scientific elements provided by the interested guild, which is not appropriate to analyze in an unconstitutionality action, whose discussion must be reserved for aspects of pure law, since evaluating technical aspects, such as the classification of boilers, indirect-type furnaces, and their method of measurement, would surpass the purpose of the constitutional process and would lead to the analysis of technical criteria that could only be done in an ordinary process or one of knowledge within the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. For the Chamber, it is clear that the discussion is open in a more plenary jurisdiction.

**V.- Conclusion.** For the foregoing reasons, the action is declared without merit.

The magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and would grant the action in its entirety.- **Por tanto:** The action is dismissed. The magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent, and would grant the action in its entirety.- Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

**Exp. 14-008641** **The magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro dissent and would grant the action in its entirety, with the opinion drafted by the latter.** For the reasons we express below, we consider that this action should be granted in its entirety, and not dismissed, as the majority opinion does.

The amendment to Article 7, subsection A, sub-item 3 of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS “Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto”, by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, certainly entails a weakening of the maximum emission limits for boilers (calderas) installed before March 26, 2007, up to 220 mg/m3 (TPN), establishing others that are less rigorous. All in contravention of the principles of objectification of environmental law and of non-regression of human rights. It is further observed that there are no studies to support the reversal of the regulation.

As this Chamber has stated regarding the principle of progressivity of human rights, it drives the progressive protection of the State, in pursuit of their development, especially economic, social, and cultural rights, whose recognition is made through international instruments and national legislation, in order to guarantee stability to the achievements made and impose rationality in the exploitation and use of natural resources and in the production of goods, which must be accompanied by a certain gradualism, since it does not operate without support and logistics from the State, through resources and policies, often imposed unilaterally against the will of individuals, especially if the established measure is reasonable and proportional to the rights involved. But one of the most important elements is its gradual increase so as not to affect other individual and social rights. The principles of environmental law serve to integrate and systematize this legal branch with the other branches of Law, where although the balance normally leans towards gradual advancement, it demands a balanced exercise guided by technical and scientific studies. The principle of non-regression of social achievements is not absolute in this field either; it has —for example— those limits, even recognized by international human rights bodies when they admit —in limited cases— the possibility that they can be modified, restricted, and even suppressed. On this point, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in a judgment of June 1, 2009, in the case of Acevedo et al. (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) vs. Perú, has indicated regarding the progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights, that:

*“… a duty — albeit conditioned — of non-regression emerges, which should not always be understood as a prohibition of measures that restrict the exercise of a right. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has noted that ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and in the context of the full use of the maximum of [the State’s] available resources.’ Along the same lines, the Inter-American Commission has considered that to assess whether a regressive measure is compatible with the American Convention, it must be ‘determined whether it is justified by reasons of sufficient weight.’ For all the foregoing, it is fair to state that regressivity is justiciable when economic, social, and cultural rights are at issue.”* Applying the foregoing to this case, we do not find where the reasons of sufficient weight are for the relaxation of the emission limits for boilers (calderas). As is well stated in the majority vote, the reform effectively returns the operation of certain boilers (calderas) to a prior situation (with the Ministry of Health considering, for the first time, indirect-type furnaces (hornos de tipo indirecto)), so as not to impose a greater sacrifice on companies, due to the environmental burden generated by their productive work. Hence, to make such regression possible, it was imperative to obtain the backing of technical and scientific criteria that armor the administrative decision. However, that is precisely what we find lacking; we do not find technical and scientific backing. The fact that the majority vote indicates that those criteria were produced and sufficiently demonstrated in the administration’s judgment seems insufficient to us; the Administration should have fully justified those criteria in the decree’s own recitals. Which leads to the conclusion that in this case, an exception (relaxation of emission limits) was incurred without having a founded and duly justified technical criterion.

In the same sense as expressed by the Procuraduría General de la República in its report, we therefore consider that the decision to exclude boilers (calderas) installed before March 26, 2007, from the maximum limits for the emission of particulate matter established in Decreto Ejecutivo 36551, is inconsistent with the State duty of protection and stewardship of the environment established in Article 50 of the Constitution. The modification of regulations challenged in this acción de inconstitucionalidad diminishes the level of protection (tutela) and violates the principle of non-regression in environmental matters, due to a lack of technical and scientific justification to support it. The reform is clearly a worsening of the level of protection (tutela), with the additional problem that the decree lacks the technical and scientific information needed to determine to what extent this exemption could lead to a decrease in the level of protection. Therefore, the introduced reform, adopting emission limits that worsen the levels that were in force for more than four years, violates the principle of non-regression, and constitutes a disproportionate and irrational measure, where levels of protection are reduced. Thus, since there is no scientific and technical certainty that the increase in oxygen reference levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to people's health or to the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional in light of the principle that establishes the State's duty of stewardship and protection, as indicated by rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Sala Constitucional.

Even in his report, the Minister of Environment and Energy requested an assessment of the constitutionality of the rule, given that the technical observations made by the Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental were not incorporated. This fact strengthens the unconstitutionality, because it reiterates the lack of technical criteria, as there is no criterion from the specialized body.

In conclusion, since there is no scientific and technical certainty that this increase in oxygen reference levels for data reporting does not imply a greater risk to people's health or to the environment, this provision would be unconstitutional for violating the right to the environment and to health, ignoring the State duty of their stewardship and protection, as indicated by rulings 6322-2003 and 7294-1998 of the Sala Constitucional.

We consider that the amendment to point A.3) of Article 7 of the Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, introduced by Decreto Ejecutivo 37301, is unconstitutional, as is the amendment to point C.2) of Article 7 of Decreto Ejecutivo 36551.

**Gilbert Armijo Sancho Fernando Cruz Castro** **Magistrado Magistrado**

*140086410007CO* Res. Nº 005616-2015 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas tres minutos del veintidós de abril del dos mil quince.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDITA ALFARO BOZA, GLORIANA CHAVARRIA SOLIS, MELANY SZYFER CASTILLO, REBECA CHAVES RODRIGUEZ, portadores de las cédulas de identidad números 2-0365-0227, 2-0701-0309, 1-1565-0461, 1-1485-0400, y 1-1539-0855, respectivamente, contra la Reforma al Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos, provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, reforma publicada en el Alcance No. 137 a La Gaceta No. 184 del 24 de septiembre de 2012.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las trece horas con treinta y cuatro minutos del treinta de mayo de 2014, los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de la Reforma al Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos, provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET, reforma publicada en el Alcance No. 137 a La Gaceta No. 184 del 24 de septiembre de 2012. Alegan que la incorporación de dicha frase al Reglamento acrecienta la posibilidad de contaminar al permitir, a aquellas calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo del 2007, una emisión con un límite máximo de 220 mg/m3. Añaden que el Reglamento –Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS-, publicado en el año 2011, establecía una serie de parámetros para disminuir la contaminación del aire; pero al año siguiente, por el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, se disminuyeron las exigencias y se permite más contaminación para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007. Estiman que, con esa reforma al Reglamento, se incumple con la principal obligación de proteger la salud, el ambiente y la vida. Asimismo, expresan que, se violenta el principio de progresividad, por cuanto el nivel de protección ambiental ya alcanzado debe ser respetado y, bajo ninguna circunstancia, disminuido; el Poder Ejecutivo no puede bajar los estándares si ya había hecho los estudios durante varios períodos o años, tal y como se señaló en el 2011 en el considerando 5 del Decreto. Agregan que la reforma al Reglamento también produce una violación al principio de objetivación, ya que se permite un máximo de 220 mg/m3 a las calderas instaladas antes del 26 de mayo de 2007, sin hacerse un razonamiento científico que conste en el Reglamento o en sus considerandos. Consideran que los límites máximos no deben determinarse según una fecha de instalación, sino por categoría.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señalan que le asisten los intereses difusos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

3.- Por resolución de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del diez de junio del dos mil catorce, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE).

4.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe. Señala que en está acción de inconstitucionalidad se impugna la frase, “para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo del 2007 el límite máximo de emisión permitido se mantiene en 220 g/m3 (TPN)”, contenida en el apartado A.3) del artículo 7 del Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos en Tipo Indirecto, que es una reforma introducida mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo N 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET. Expresa que el objeto de la acción de inconstitucionalidad es determinar si la norma impugnada, al excluir de la aplicación de los límites fijados en el Decreto Ejecutivo 36551 del 27 de abril de 2011, a las calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007, y permitir que éstas emitan un máximo de emisiones de 220 mg/m3 (TPN), es inconstitucional por violar los principios constitucionales contenidos en el artículo 50 de la Constitución. Agrega que los recurrentes están legitimados para interponer dicha acción, de conformidad con el artículo 50 de la Constitución y el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que se invoca la existencia del interés difuso para reclamar la afectación del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. Señala que el Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto, en su artículo 7º, establecía como límites de emisión 120, 150 y 175 mg/Nm3 para calderas y hornos grandes, medianos y pequeños, sin diferenciar, si se trataba de hornos o calderas nuevas o existentes. Manifiesta que mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo 37301 del 22 de marzo de 2012 se modificó el apartado A.3) del artículo 7 de dicho Reglamento. Muestra que dicha modificación se adoptó en virtud de la solicitud propuesta por “el sector azucarero del país”, tendente a que se mantuviera las concentraciones permitidas antes de la publicación del decreto ejecutivo 36551 del 27 de abril de 2011, basada en estudios técnicos. promulgación del citado decreto, era el Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas, el cual establecía unos límites máximos de emisiones permitidas para calderas que utilizan combustibles biomásicos. Añade que para las calderas nuevas que utilizaran ese tipo de combustible, fijaba los límites en 120, 150 y 175 mg/Nm3, dependiendo de su tamaño. Aduce que para las calderas existentes fijaba un límite de emisiones de 220 mg/Nm3, y se les otorgaba un plazo de cinco años, que venció el 26 de marzo de 2007, para que se ajustaran a los nuevos límites de emisiones establecidos. Alega que el tema planteado obliga a analizar si la decisión de excluir a las calderas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007 de los límites máximos para la emisión de partículas de suspensión establecidas en el decreto ejecutivo 36551, es disconforme con el deber estatal de protección y tutela del ambiente establecido en el artículo 50 de la Constitución. Añade que se debe analizar basándose en los principios de progresividad y no regresión de la protección ambiental. Expresa que, según el principio de no regresión en materia ambiental, no puede entenderse en términos absolutos, ya que una disminución de un determinado nivel de tutela es posible sí hay sustento técnico y científico que garantice que no se produzca una desprotección relevante del ambiente, siempre que se satisfagan los parámetros de proporcionalidad y de razonabilidad. Manifiesta que la modificación de normativa que se impugna en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, disminuye el nivel de tutela y es violatoria del principio de no regresión en materia ambiental, por falta de justificación técnica y científica que la respalde. Exterioriza que se está frente a una reforma que empeora los niveles de emisión de contaminantes atmosféricos provenientes de calderas, respecto a los límites alcanzados hasta antes de la modificación publicada el 24 de septiembre de 2012. Expone que en el decreto queda claro que el único enfoque de la modificación, se centra en el establecimiento de condiciones de competitividad que contribuyan en el desarrollo de la actividad económica en el país, por lo que no se analizó la variable ambiental o salud de las personas. Enuncia que es una decisión que implica una desmejora del nivel de tutela, con el problema adicional de que el decreto carece de información técnica y científica que permita determinar hasta qué punto esta exoneración puede dar lugar a una disminución en el nivel de protección. Afirma que de la sentencia 18702-2010 de la Sala Constitucional, sobre el principio de progresividad y no regresión de la protección ambiental, se extrae lo siguiente: “El principio se erige como garantía sustantiva de los derechos, en este caso, del derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, en virtud del cual el Estado se ve obligado a no adoptar medidas, políticas, ni aprobar normas jurídicas que empeoren, sin justificación razonable y proporcionada, la situación de los derechos alcanzada hasta ahora”. Sostiene que la reforma introducida, adoptando límites de emisiones que desmejoran los niveles que durante más de cuatro años estuvieron vigentes, es violatoria del principio de no regresión, y constituye una medida desproporcionada e irracional, donde disminuyen los niveles de protección. Aduce que la reforma adoptada en septiembre de 2012, es una desmejora injustificada a los límites de emisiones establecidas para todas las calderas existentes aún desde antes de la entrada en vigencia del Decreto Ejecutivo N 36551. Pronuncia que una vez vencido el plazo de los cinco años previstos en el Reglamento, todas las calderas quedaron sujetas a los límites de 120, 150 y 175 mg/Nm3, según fuera su tamaño. Afirma que con lo originalmente dictado en el decreto ejecutivo N 30222, se quiso fijar un parámetro provisional o transitorio (período de 5 años), con la reforma impugnada, éste adquirió un carácter permanente. Acota que la reforma es de aplicación general, es decir, que la regresión en cuanto a los niveles de emisión exigidos aplica para todas las calderas existentes al 26 de marzo de 2007, y no únicamente para aquellas que son empleadas por el sector azucarero del país en su actividad de producción. Añade que si la Sala decide declarar la inconstitucionalidad, “para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007 el límite máximo de emisión permitido se mantiene en 220 mg/m3 (TPN)”, introducida por el Decreto Ejecutivo. Conviene en que se analice lo dispuesto en el punto C.2) del artículo 7, que resulta igualmente contrario a la interpretación evolutiva en la tutela del ambiente, que no admite una regresión en perjuicio. Alega que como en el considerando 5 del decreto, “el sector azucarero del país”, también solicitó que se revisaran los niveles de referencia de oxígeno para el reporte de los datos. Señala que esto se tradujo en la reducción injustificada de la protección que se había establecido en el Decreto Ejecutivo anterior, pues, sin que mediara un razonamiento técnico, se dispuso pasar el nivel de referencia, de un 5% de oxígeno para todas las calderas, a un 10% para calderas que empleen combustibles biomásicos, por ende, hay más posibilidad de diluir las emisiones y contaminar más. Recalca que al no haber certeza científica y técnica de que este aumento en los niveles de referencia de oxígeno para el reporte de los datos, y no implique un mayor riesgo para la salud de las personas o para el ambiente, está disposición sería inconstitucional frente al principio que establece el deber estatal de su tutela y protección, así lo indican las sentencias 6322-2003 y 7294-1998 de la Sala Constitucional. Por ende, estima que la reforma al punto A.3) del artículo 7 del Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, introducida por el Decreto Ejecutivo 37301, es inconstitucional, al igual que la reforma al punto C.2) del artículo 7º del Decreto Ejecutivo 36551.

5.- El señor Edgar E. Gutiérrez Ezpeleta en su carácter de ministro de Ambiente y Energía, contesta la audiencia concedida, manifestando que mediante oficio Memo 12 del 13 de abril de 2012, sucrito por la anterior ministra de Salud y dirigido al anterior ministro de Ambiente y Energía, se traslada para trámite de firma el oficio DRS-IC-004-2012, correspondiente a propuesta de Decreto Ejecutivo de Reforma al Reglamento. Informa que el 20 de abril de 2012, se traslada a la Dirección de Asesoría Jurídica para la correspondiente revisión. Añade que mediante oficio DAJ-619-2012, suscrito por la Directora de Asesoría Jurídica, se solicita a la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, otorgar el aval al borrador de Decreto DRS-IC-004-2012, sobre la Reforma al Reglamento sobre emisión de contaminantes atmosféricos provenientes de calderas y hornos de tipo indirecto. Destaca que mediante oficio DIGECA-454-2012, la Dirección de Gestión Ambiental, se refirió al borrador de decreto DRS-IC-004-2012/Ministerio de Salud “Reforma al Reglamento sobre emisión de contaminantes atmosféricos”. Muestra que, en dicha opinión, la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, recomienda “la inclusión de un transitorio donde se propicie la renovación de las calderas de manera tal que aquellas que han sobrepasado su vida útil (aproximadamente 20 años) puedan irse sustituyendo por tecnologías más eficientes. El plazo, por supuesto, debe ser valorado dentro de la Comisión y consultado con los sectores productivos”. Recalca que dicho informe de la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental recomienda que los límites establecidos se reporten en flujo másico, dado que es una medida más clara de la carga de contaminantes que se emiten por una fuente específica en un período de tiempo, y no como la posición técnica presentada por el sector de la caña de azúcar y la palma aceitera, que se basa en estándares internacionales para emisión de partículas de calderas, debido a que las tecnologías utilizadas para la producción de vapor en los ingenios azucareros son muy variados. Acota que mediante oficio DIGECA-642-2012, dirigido a la viceministra, se le indica que seguía siendo necesario que se incorporara un transitorio en la regulación, donde se propicie la renovación de las calderas antiguas que presentan dificultades de cumplir con los límites de emisión establecidas en el Decreto Ejecutivo 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS. Alega que, en ese sentido, el texto del transitorio debía considerar que de manera paulatina se mejorará la calidad del aire que respira la población, y se propuso la siguiente disposición transitoria, donde sugirió que se estableciera un plazo de cinco años para que las calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007, se acomodaran a los límites máximos establecidos en la tabla. Destaca que la emisión de la reforma al Decreto Ejecutivo 36551-S-MINAE-MTSS, es el resultado del trabajo conjunto de representantes del Ministerio de Salud, Ministerio de Trabajo, MINAE, UCCAEP, Colegio de Ingenios Químicos y Profesionales Afines, el Colegio de Químicos, la Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria y la UCR. Sostiene que en las reuniones de coordinación de la Comisión de Emisiones, indicó que se les había enviado solicitud de revisión de la Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, sobre los límites de emisión del sector azucarero propuestos en el Reglamento y acompañada del documento técnico de sustento. Alega que se acordó modificar el límite de emisión tomando en cuenta el plazo que había sido otorgado por el Reglamento vigente en ese entonces, pero manteniendo el porcentaje de oxígeno de referencia, con el fin de estandarizar el cálculo. Advierte que a la hora de revisar la reforma al Decreto Ejecutivo, publicado en la Gaceta 184 del 29 de septiembre de 2012, queda claro que el transitorio propuesto por la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, no quedó en los términos planteados. Solicita valorar la constitucionalidad de la norma, toda vez que las observaciones técnicas señaladas por la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, no fueron incorporadas.

6.- Por haberse omitido en su oportunidad, por resolución de las nueve horas ocho minutos del doce de febrero del dos mil quince, el magistrado instructor otorgó audiencia al Ministerio de Salud sobre la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por el señor Alvaro Sagot Rodríguez y otros, contra el artículo 7 A.3), reformado, del Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET del 22 de marzo de 2012).

7.- El señor Fernando Llorca Castro, en su condición de Ministro a.í. de Salud contesta la audiencia concedida, manifestando los criterios vertidos por el Director y Jefe a.í. de la Unidad de Normalización de Servicios de Salud en Ambiente Humano, de la Dirección de Protección al Ambiente Humano, del Ministerio de Salud, en el que manifiestan que el artículo 7°, inciso A), sub-inciso tercero del Decreto 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, se refiere específicamente a las calderas que utilicen biomasa como combustible en calderas y hornos de tipo indirecto, y no a la totalidad de las calderas. Esta versión de la norma sustituye el Decreto 30222-S-MINAE del año 2002, con él se incorporó, por primera vez, la regulación sanitaria para los hornos de tipo indirecto, aspecto que anteriormente no se encontraba regulado por ningún otro órgano del Estado costarricense. Contrario al criterio de los accionantes, no se contraviene el principio de progresividad en el nivel de protección ambiental, sino que se está extendiendo. El Decreto 36511-S-MINAE-MTSS, publicado el 29 de junio del 2011, pretendió desconocer la separación entre las calderas “Nuevas” y “Existentes”, como se diferenciaron éstas en el Decreto 30222-S-MINAE, y normar todas como si fueran “Nuevas”. Se desconoció que en el Decreto 30222-S-MINAE, sección A.3, referente a calderas de biomasa, se otorga un plazo de cinco años, a partir de la promulgación para que todas las calderas existentes (grandes, medianas y pequeñas), lleguen a emitir partículas en concentraciones menores o iguales a 220 mg/Nm3. Sobre este último aspecto, alertaron los operadores de calderas de biomasa, y la Administración corrigió el error material, y se mantuvo el mismo criterio de 220 mg/Nm3 del Decreto 30222-S-MINAE, cuando se publicó la modificación, mediante 37301-S-MTSS-MINAE. Por lo tanto, tampoco con este ajuste se disminuye el nivel de protección ambiental, sino que se mantiene el mismo que se había fijado desde el 2002. Con fundamento en el informe de cita, se considera que es obligación del Estado y principalmente del Ministerio de Salud, proteger la salud de las personas, el ambiente y la vida en general, por lo cual, basado en estos principios, se aclara que los niveles establecidos en la norma en discusión no disminuyen el nivel de protección del ambiente, asimismo no violenta el principio de progresividad, ya que los hornos de tipo indirecto fueron regulados por primera vez en el país en el año 2002, por lo cual esto constituye un avance en materia ambiental y no un retraso, por lo cual el Decreto No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, vela adecuadamente por la observancia y cumplimiento de las normas y políticas públicas, en cuanto a materia de protección ambiental.

8.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 116, 117 y 118 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 18, 19 y 20 de junio de 2014.

9.- Por escrito presentado el 24 de junio de 2014, Roberto Vega Arias, en su condición de apoderado general judicial de la Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA), se apersona a este expediente y solicita que se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo. Manifiesta que LAICA tiene dentro de sus cometidos públicos el velar por el desarrollo óptimo y la estabilidad de la agroindustria azucarera nacional, procurando la satisfacción de los intereses que regula, promueve y defiende. Indica que sobre su legitimación procesal, LAICA representa intereses corporativos de los sectores cañero y azucarero de la Nación, por lo que encuentra legitimación procesal requerida para promover y participar de acciones administrativas o judiciales en defensa de sus representados. Indica que con base en el referido interés legítimo, la Sala ha aceptado la participación de LAICA como coadyudante en otros asuntos de especial interés e injerencia para el sector cañero-azucarero de Costa Rica. Sostiene que esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, además de aludir expresamente al sector que LAICA representa y defiende, se dirige contra una norma que afecta directamente los ingenios azucareros del país, por ser industrias que operan con calderas alimentadas por biomasa. Advierte que de eliminarse la frase impugnada, dichas industrias no podrían operar, poniéndose en riesgo la producción de azúcar, mieles y alcohol, así como el sustento de miles de productores de caña y sus familias. Expresa que el 8 de junio de 2010, LAICA hizo llegar al Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones la posición del sector, con respecto al borrador del Reglamento, donde se solicitó que el límite de emisión de partículas en los gases de combustión para calderas de bagazo de caña permanezca en 220 mg/NM3 y que la referencia del O2 sea al menos del 10%, en virtud de que ese es el valor típico de la combustión de materiales celufósicos de alta humedad. Advierte que LAICA realizó todo un análisis técnico para justificar su petición. Añade que LAICA hizo llegar su posición por medio de la Cámara de Agricultura y Agroindustria. Acusa que la abogada de la Dirección de Regulación de Salud, mediante oficio DRS-348-10, le indicó a los miembros del Comité que las modificaciones, por ellos aprobadas, no podían ser incorporadas al reglamento, dado que éste ya se encontraba en firmas de la ministra y que ya se había dado por finalizado el proceso de consulta pública. Estima que fue realizado de forma impropia e indebidamente, ya que la abogada le dio preeminencia a un aspecto formal, sobre un acuerdo de fondo con sustento técnico. Informa que por oficio DRS-UN-392-08-2010 la Unidad de Normalización les comunicó que se rechazaba la solicitud de modificación a la propuesta de Reglamento, la cual ellos insistieron que ya había sido aprobada por el Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisión. Muestra que mediante oficio DE-030-2009/2010, LAICA les hizo ver a la ministra de Salud y al ministro del MINAET, el grave riesgo que representaba para la agroindustria la promulgación de dicho reglamento. Destaca que el 20 de julio de 2011, promulgó en la Gaceta, el Decreto Ejecutivo 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, donde no incluyó las observaciones que oportunamente había remitido LAICA y que fueron aprobadas por el Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones en su sesión Nº116, dejando por un error el límite de emisión de partículas en los gases de combustión para calderas categoría A) que usan biomasa como combustible, en 120 mg/Nm3 y con una referencia de oxígeno del 5%, parámetro que desde el punto de vista técnico, ningún ingenio en Costa Rica puede cumplir. Estima que mediante oficio P078-2011, se solicitó audiencia ante el Comité de Normas de Emisión, para exponer las razones por las cuales los parámetros establecidos en el Decreto Ejecutivo, no eran técnicamente viables para calderas y hornos que utilizan combustible biomásicos. Acota que mediante oficio DRS-UN-920-11, la Dirección de Regulación de Salud le solicitó a la CNAA enviar por escrito ante el Despacho de la Ministra de Salud, la solicitud de modificación del Decreto. Muestra que el 18 de enero de 2012, se realizó una reunión el Ministerio de Agricultura, donde se llegó al acuerdo de modificar el Decreto, acogiendo las observaciones realizadas por medio de la CNAA. Informa que por medio del proceso de revisión y aprobación del Ministerio de Salud, Trabajo, Ambiente, el 24 de septiembre de 2012, en La Gaceta se publicó el Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, que reformó el artículo 7º del Decreto 36551, para corregir el error original, advertido por LAICA. Agrega que la redacción original del artículo 7 del Decreto Ejecutivo Nº36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, establecía un límite de emisión de 120 mg/Nm3 con una referencia de oxígeno del 5% para calderas categoría A) que utilizan combustible biomásico, donde se colisionaba los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad jurídica. Sostiene que el artículo 7º no cumplía con la razonabilidad técnica, dado que no existen estudios científicos que sirvieran de sustento a los parámetros de emisión que se definieron originalmente para las calderas categoría A), que utilizan combustible biomásico, parámetros que son imposibles de cumplir para las industrias del país. Expresa que, fue precisamente a partir del análisis realizado en el oficio DE-022-2009/2010 de LAICA, por lo que el Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones, en su sesión Nº 116 del 24 de junio de 2010, aprobó la petición, para que fuese incorporada al borrador del reglamento que estaba por emitirse, modificación que no fue incorporada, por el irrazonable motivo de que la abogada de la Dirección de Regulación de la Salud, por un mera formalidad, consideró que al haber vencido el plazo de consultas de la propuesta reglamentaria, no era posible efectuar más modificaciones. Destaca que no existen estudios técnicos que justificaran dicha modificación de esa magnitud para el caso de las calderas que funcionaran con combustibles biomásicos. Agrega que a los estudios que se refiere el considerando 5 del Decreto Ejecutivo Nº 36551-S-MINAE que, con tanta vehemencia, se recalca en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, no indican que hubiesen sido de actividades industriales y agrícolas como maliciosamente y sin ningún sustento lo expresan los accionantes. Acota que lo único que expresa el considerando 5 del Decreto, es que se tomaron en cuenta reportes ocasionales de calderas, sin especificar de qué tipo, información proveniente de laboratorios con pruebas y datos de calidad de RECOPE, lo que da una clara impresión que dichos estudios se referían a hornos y calderas que funcionan con combustibles fósiles y no biomásicos. Manifiesta que queda demostrado con la prueba aportada, que técnicamente no era viable para las industrias con calderas ya instaladas que funcionan con combustibles biomásicos, pasar de 220 a 120 mg/Nm3 el límite de emisiones de partículas y con la referencia de exceso de oxígeno de apenas un 5%. Añade que las calderas que operan en los ingenios tienen ciertas características importantes: 1. Funcionan con biomasa, generada por el mismo sector, es decir, que las calderas son autosuficientes, que trabajan a partir de energía renovable y limpia. 2. Son de operación temporal. 3. Tienen usos alternativos, como es la generación paralela de electricidad. 4. Ubicadas fuera de la GAM y no usan combustibles fósiles. Informa que era irrazonable y desproporcionado que, los límites de emisiones permitidas para calderas y hornos que emplean combustibles fósiles, fuesen mucho más altos que los límites para calderas y hornos que emplean biomasa. Indica que el artículo 7º de la norma cuestionada establece límites de 550, 200 y 420 mg/Nm3 para las calderas y hornos que emplean búnker, diésel y gasóleo, mientras que para las calderas que usan biomasa, el límite era de de 120 mg/Nm3, esto pone en evidencia la falta de razonabilidad técnica que tenía la norma. Advierte que dicha norma permitía que los límites de emisiones para calderas y hornos que emplean productos más contaminantes y que por naturaleza producen menos particulado en suspensión, fuesen mucho mayores que los límites de emisiones para calderas y hornos que emplean un producto limpio y renovable, como lo es la biomasa. Alega que se quiere poner al descubierto la falta de idoneidad que tenía la norma en su redacción original, donde había irrazonabilidad técnica y desproporciones que generan. Advierte que es aún más grave que el Decreto cuestionado se hubiese emitido apartándose del criterio técnico del Comité de Normas de Emisión. Indican que el acto administrativo se promulgó apartándose del criterio técnico experto, sin que existiera ningún tipo de justificación científica. Muestra que el acto administrativo debe estar debidamente motivado, ya que esto constituye un elemento formal de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en su artículo 136 c. Recalca que el fundamento técnico resulta indispensable para una debida motivación del acto administrativo, lo que evidencia falta de razonabilidad técnica que tenía la norma y acentúa la necesidad de corregirla. Estima que como acto discrecional que es, el reglamento se encuentra sujeto a los límites que imponen las reglas unívocas de la ciencia y de la técnica, así como los elementales de justicia, lógica y conveniencia y a los derechos del administrado. Destaca que en el caso, está demostrado que la justificación técnica que se hizo en el oficio DE-022-2009/2010, que fue aprobado por el Comité de Normas de Emisión que los parámetros fijados originalmente en el Decreto Ejecutivo, eran imposibles de cumplir para las industrias azucareras que utilizan en sus calderas combustible biomásico, lo cual evidenciaba la irrazonabilidad. Sostiene que era tan irrazonable y arbitraria la fijación que se hizo originalmente de estos parámetros, que contradictoriamente en el caso de los hornos que empleen combustible biomásico, sí se fijó una referencia de oxígeno del 10% y no así en el caso de las calderas que hacen uso del mismo tipo de combustible. Acusa que la redacción original en el Decreto Nº36551-S-MINAE, violaba los artículos 16, 158.4 y 160 de la LGAP. Añade que el hecho que no existan estudios técnicos que respalden los parámetros que se definieron originalmente en el artículo 7 del Decreto 36551-S-MINAE, en función de la posibilidad real de cumplimiento para las industrias con calderas que utilizan combustible biomásico, constituía un vicio que afectaba el antecedente de hecho y técnico que sirvió de base para la emisión del Decreto. Añade que el artículo 7º del Decreto, era nulo por tener un vicio en el contenido del acto. Acusa que ninguno de los ingenieros azucareros del país podía cumplir técnicamente con los parámetros definidos arbitrariamente en el artículo 7º del Decreto, el contenido era imposible, por ende, absolutamente nulo. Muestra que la interpretación que hizo la abogada de la Dirección de Regulación de la Salud, y que sirvió de sustento para rechazar las modificaciones, daba una predominancia absoluta a la forma sobre el fondo, violando así el principio de informalismo, así indicado en el artículo 224 de la LGAP y así vulnerando los ordinales 361 y 362 del mismo cuerpo legal. Añade que, en aquel momento, el proyecto de reforma era simplemente un borrador y nada impedía hacer las modificaciones. Alega que LAICA, como ente público encomendado por Ley para garantizar la estabilidad de la agroindustria, nunca fue expresamente consultada sobre los alcances de está modificación reglamentaria. Advierte que lo importante es que el error fue corregido con la promulgación del decreto Nº37301-S-MINAET-MTSS, que reformó el artículo 7º del Decreto anterior. Destaca que no se violentó el principio de progresividad, ya lo que se realizó fue la corrección de un error técnico en la redacción original de la norma. Añade el voto 11088-2013 de la Sala Constitucional que indica: “Ahora bien, para que pueda señalarse que exista una lesión al principio de progresividad y no regresividad, se requiere que exista un derecho fundamental que se hubiera reconocido y que el mismo sea limitado o restringido sin justificación razonable alguna”. Expresa que no se violenta el principio de objetivación, mas bien que la falta de objetivación, recaía en la redacción original del artículo 7º del Decreto Nº36551, debido a que no existe sustento técnico-científico que justificara una reducción en el límite de emisiones de partículas. Por ende, no se violentan los artículos 21 y 50 de la Constitución, toda vez que se mantienen los límites de emisiones de particular en los mismos niveles que estaban vigentes antes de la promulgación del Decreto 36551-S-MINAE. Solicita se rechace por el fondo la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, manteniendo la vigencia de la frase impugnada.

10.- Por escritos presentados se apersonan a este expediente y solicitan que se les tenga como coadyudantes pasivos, a la Central Azucarera Tempisque S.A, Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial, Azucarera el Viejo S.A, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Productores de Caña de Puntarenas, Ingenio Quebrada Azul Ltda., Ingenio Costa Rica, Ingenio Taboga S.A y Ingenio Cutres S.A. Manifiestan que apoyan, en todos sus extremos, los argumentos esgrimidos e invocados por la Liga Agrícola Insdustrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). Sostienen que la acción de inconstitucionalidad se dirige contra una norma que afecta directamente a los ingenios azucareros que ya operaban en el país antes de la referida reforma, por ser industrias que funcionan con calderas alimentadas por biomasa, que es una fuente limpia y renovable de energía. Añaden que el tema en discusión tiene un especial interés y una singular relevancia, para la agroindustria azucarera costarricense, debido a que al eliminarse la frase impugnada, simplemente no podrían operar, ante la imposibilidad de poder cumplir con los nuevos parámetros propuestos, poniéndose en riesgo la producción de azúcares, mieles y alcohol en Costa Rica, así como el sustento de los miles de productores de caña, y sus familias, esto generaría graves consecuencias sociales y económicas. Destacan que para los ingenios azucareros existe un evidente interés actual y propio, legítimo para intervenir en este proceso y velar por el resguardo de la frase impugnada. Solicitan se rechace la acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada y se condene al accionante al pago de ambas costas.

11.- Por escrito presentado se apersona a este expediente la Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña, solicitando que se les tenga como coadyuvantes pasivos. Manifiesta que apoya, en todos sus extremos, los argumentos esgrimidos e invocados por la Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar (LAICA). Indica que FEDECAÑA es una asociación sin fines de lucro, que en este proceso tiene legitimación procesal, debido a que deben defender los derechos de los productores de caña, derivados de la ley y Reglamento, trabajar por el armonioso desarrollo de la agricultura de la caña, lograr una participación representativa en LAICA, de las diferentes zonas agroindustriales, dedicadas a este cultivo y de quienes lo practican y nombrar o sustituir a los miembros propietarios y suplentes del sector cañero. Estima que FEDECAÑA tutela un interés corporativo, que atañe a la colectividad y, con ello, se conforma con lo preceptuado por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Constitucional. Menciona que lo que legitima a interponer su coadyudancia, es su carácter de entidad corporativa, caracterizada por la representación y defensa de un núcleo de intereses pertenecientes a los miembros de determinada colectividad o actividad común. Sostiene que existe un interés actual y propio, así lo indica el artículo 275 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y el 83 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Sostiene que la acción de inconstitucionalidad se dirige contra una norma que afecta directamente a los ingenios azucareros que ya operaban en el país antes de la referida reforma, por ser industrias que funcionan con calderas alimentadas por biomasa, que es una fuente limpia y renovable de energía. Añade que el tema en discusión tiene un especial interés y una singular relevancia, para la agroindustria azucarera costarricense, debido a que al eliminarse la frase impugnada, simplemente no podrían operar, ante la imposibilidad de poder cumplir con los nuevos parámetros propuestos, poniéndose en riesgo la producción de azúcares, mieles y alcohol en Costa Rica, así como el sustento de los miles de productores de caña, y sus familias, esto generaría graves consecuencias sociales y económicas. Destaca que para los ingenios azucareros existe un evidente interés actual y propio, legítimo para intervenir en este proceso y velar por el resguardo de la frase impugnada. Solicitan se rechace la acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada y se condene al accionante al pago de ambas costas.

12.- Por resolución de las once horas treinta y cinco minutos del quince de julio de dos mil catorce, el magistrado presidente de la Sala Constitucional, Gilbert Armijo Sancho, aceptó las siguientes gestiones de coadyuvancia: Asociación Cámara de Productores Caña de Azúcar Puntarenas, Asociación Cámara de Caña de Guanacaste, Asociación Cámara de Caña de la Zona Sur, Asociación Cámara de Caña de San Carlos, Asociación Cámara de Caña del Atlántico, Asociación Cámara Productores de Caña del Pacífico, Asociación Federación de Cámaras de Productores de Caña, Azucarera El Viejo S.A., Central Azucarera Tempisque S. A., Cooperativa Agrícola Industrial y de Servicios Múltiplés el General R.L., Ingenio Costa Rica S.A., Ingenio Cutres S.A., Ingenio Quebrada Azul Limitada, Ingenio Taboga S. A., y Liga Agrícola Industrial de la Caña de Azúcar. Se resuelve tenerlos como coadyuvantes con la advertencia de que al no ser parte principal del proceso, no resultaran directamente perjudicados o beneficiados por la sentencia, es decir, la eficacia de la sentencia no alcanza al coadyuvante de manera directa e inmediata, ni le afecta cosa juzgada, no le alcanzan tampoco los efectos inmediatos de ejecución de la sentencia, pues a través de la coadyuvancia no se podrá obligar a la autoridad jurisdiccional a dictar una resolución a su favor, por no haber sido parte principal en el proceso, lo que si puede afectarle, pero no por su condición de coadyuvante, sino como a cualquiera, es el efecto erga omnes del pronunciamiento. La sentencia en materia constitucional, no beneficia particularmente a nadie, ni siquiera al acto; es en el juicio previo donde esto puede ser reconocido.

13.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículo 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

14.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez ; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa, cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el procurador General de la República, el contralor General de la República, el fiscal General de la República o el defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. Dispone el texto en cuestión que procede cuando "por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual ni directa". En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos"; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal No. 3750-93 de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres:

"… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter".

En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como: el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros. Al respecto, deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren, en principio, a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés que atañe a todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación -como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda, de ninguna manera, llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales.

II.- Legitimación en el caso.- En el caso que nos ocupa, la petitoria incoada en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad es para que se anule el Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, que reforma el artículo 7° inciso A sub-inciso 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, porque, en ese tanto, suprime los limites máximos por otros menos rigurosos [de hasta 220mg/m3 (TPN)], lo cual alegan es contrario a los principios de objetivación del derecho ambiental y de no-regresión de los derechos humanos. La legitimación de los accionantes tiene como presupuesto los intereses difusos para la protección al ambiente, motivo por el cual la legitimación no recae necesariamente en un titular, sino es posible identificar una pluralidad de individuos no determinados pero determinables que comparten ese mismo interés, por lo que, no se requiere de la existencia de un asunto previo, que sirva de medio razonable para amparar el derecho lesionado, sino que puede promover la acción de forma directa.

III.- Objeto de la impugnación. La acción de inconstitucionalidad pide la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301, en cuanto reforma el artículo 7° inciso A sub-inciso 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, que es el Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto. La disposición establece lo siguiente:

GRANDES MEDIANOS PEQUEÑOS Categoría (*) A B C, D 120 150 175 (*) Para calderas: se clasifican de acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, publicado en La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas. Para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo del 2007 el límite máximo de emisión permitido se mantiene en 220 mg/m3 (TPN).

Para hornos de tipo indirecto se clasifican según el artículo 1°, inciso B) de este reglamento”.

(Lo resaltado de la norma es lo cuestionado por los accionantes). Los motivos de la impugnación residen en que la reforma introducida por el Poder Ejecutivo, irrespeta los principios de progresividad del derecho ambiental y el principio de objetivación, incumplidos por la reforma porque, según los accionantes, se relajaron los máximos de emisión para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007 hasta 220 mg/m3 (TPN), sin estudios técnicos que sirvieran para aumentar los límites de las emisiones, es decir, alegan que no hay estudios para sustentar la reversión de la normativa.

IV.- Sobre el fondo. Antes de resolver la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, resulta pertinente reseñar el desarrollo histórico de las regulaciones sobre emisiones de partículas al ambiente, las que, mediante el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE, denominado Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas, empezó a regular los valores máximos de emisión para aquellos establecimientos industriales, comerciales y de servicios, que contaran con procesos o actividades que incluyeran la operación de calderas (art. 1°). En el reglamento mencionado se regularon, entre otras cosas, las partículas totales en suspensión emitidas por los combustibles fósiles líquidos en calderas, los combustibles fósiles sólidos en calderas, los combustibles biomásicos en calderas. De igual forma se regularon los límites de las emisiones de Dióxido de Azufre y Óxidos de Nitrógeno. En este Reglamento es estableció como máximos lo siguiente:

GRANDES MEDIANOS PEQUEÑOS Categoría (*) A B C, D Existentes (**) 220 220 220 Nuevas 120 150 175 (*) De acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS, Reglamento de Calderas, La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998.

(**) Se otorga un plazo de cinco años, a partir de la promulgación de este Reglamento, para que todas las calderas existentes (grandes, medianas y pequeñas) emitan partículas en suspensión en concentraciones menores o iguales a 220 mg/Nm3.

Para el plazo de cinco años, el Ente Generador debe presentar un programa a la DPAH, junto con su primer Reporte Operacional, donde se indique claramente el cronograma que se seguirá con el fin de ajustarse a las normas establecidas.

Como se ve de lo anterior, la norma reguló las calderas con un criterio distinto según su antigüedad o de su recién instalación, con el fin de tratar distinto aquellas existentes y en operación. La vigencia de estas reglas se mantiene hasta la promulgación de la nueva normativa diseñada a aumentar las exigencias promulgadas con anterioridad. El Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE estuvo vigente por diez años, desde el 26 de marzo de 2002 y fue derogado por el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, publicado a La Gaceta No. 140 del 20 de julio del 2011, que entró en vigencia seis meses después, iniciando el año 2012. Una de las características es, precisamente, que reitera la posición de establecer límites máximos de emisión a los establecimientos cuyos procesos o actividades incluyan la operación de calderas, y agrega, los hornos de tipo indirecto clasificados en tablas distintas, para las primeras como para las segundas. Interesa, adicionalmente resaltar que este Decreto Ejecutivo, en efecto, reguló la utilización de la biomasa como combustible en calderas cuando además incorporó los hornos de tipo indirecto, según la siguiente tabla:

“[…]

A.3) Utilización de biomasa como combustible en calderas y hornos de tipo indirecto.

GRANDES MEDIANOS PEQUEÑOS CATEGORÍA (*) A B C, D 120 150 175 (*) Para calderas se clasifican de acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas.

Para hornos de tipo indirecto se clasifican según el artículo 1°, inciso B) de este reglamento.

• B)Dióxido de Azufre […]” (Lo resaltado de la norma no es del original).

Como se ve de lo anterior, ocurren dos cosas, la inclusión –por primera vez- de los hornos de tipo indirecto en la medición y su equiparación con aquellas calderas, reguladas en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222. Además, se elimina de la norma, el tratamiento diferenciado para los equipos existentes, reduciendo los límites máximos y, en consecuencia, su posible erradicación. Entonces, el Estado, al intentar estandarizar todos los equipos de la agroindustria, en el fondo obliga a la transición de tecnologías, con las que se pretende obligar a las empresas a dar un salto, aunque propicio para la protección del ambiente y de la salud humana, presuntamente respaldado por la técnica y la ciencia, incluso aun antes de entrar en vigencia el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS del 27 de abril de 2011, para establecer un único grado de medición, pero de espaldas a una realidad de la agro-industria. Por todo ello, se dictó el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, que reforma el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS del 27 de abril de 2011, para establecer la siguiente tabla:

GRANDES MEDIANOS PEQUEÑOS CATEGORÍA (*) A B C, D 120 150 175 (*) Para calderas se clasifican de acuerdo al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 26789-MTSS: Reglamento de Calderas, publicado en La Gaceta No. 65 del 2 de abril de 1998 y sus reformas. Para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo del 2007 el límite máximo de emisión permitido se mantiene en 220mg/m3 (TPN).

Para hornos de tipo indirecto se clasifican según el artículo 1°, inciso B) de este reglamento.” (sic)

Sobre este último punto resaltado en negrita, radica el reclamo de los accionantes, y que, los coadyuvantes pasivos de la acción defienden, dado que afirman que la reforma impugnada no solo fue sustentada en los estudios aportados por los agro-industriales, fue aportada incluso antes de la promulgación del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS.

Con el fin de completar todos los elementos para resolver este asunto, por haberse omitido en su oportunidad, se otorgó audiencia al Ministerio de Salud, como el órgano rector en la materia y parte de los Decretos Ejecutivos en discusión, de manera que, con base en todo lo expuesto, procede a resolver la acción de inconstitucionalidad, de conformidad con los argumentos presentados por los accionantes, Ministerios y coadyuvantes pasivos, para resolverlos de la siguiente manera:

A.- El principio de objetivación. En cuanto a este tema, esta Sala por sentencia No. 2006-17126 estableció, respecto de este principio, lo siguiente:

“4.- De la objetivación de la tutela ambiental : el cual, tal y como lo señaló este Tribunal en sentencia número 14293-2005 , de las catorce horas cincuenta y dos horas del diecinueve de octubre del dos mil cinco, es un principio que en modo alguno puede confundirse con el anterior [principio precautorio], en tanto, como derivado de lo dispuesto en los artículos 16 y 160 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se traduce en la necesidad de acreditar con estudios técnicos la toma de decisiones en esta materia, tanto en relación con actos como de las disposiciones de carácter general –tanto legales como reglamentarias–, de donde se deriva la exigencia de la "vinculación a la ciencia y a la técnica", con lo cual, se condiciona la discrecionalidad de la Administración en esta materia. De manera que en atención a los resultados que se deriven de esos estudios técnicos –tales como los estudios de impacto ambiental–, si se evidencia un criterio técnico objetivo que denote la probabilidad de un evidente daño al ambiente, los recursos naturales o a la salud de las personas, es que resulta obligado desechar el proyecto, obra o actividad propuestas; y en caso de una "duda razonable" resulta obligado tomar decisiones en pro del ambiente (principio pro-natura), que puede traducirse en la adopción, tanto de medidas compensatorias como precautorias, a fin de proteger de la manera adecuada el ambiente” (lo escrito en corchetas no es del original).

Los accionantes refieren que las medidas adoptadas en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS se fundamentaron en los reportes operacionales de calderas recibidos por el Ministerio de Salud, e información proveniente de laboratorios acreditados de los períodos 2006-2009, y otros datos (Considerando 5° del Decreto). En el caso que nos ocupa, las autoridades mencionan dos factores que se reflejan con el cambio de las regulaciones, y posterior reforma, por un lado, no se habían regulado los hornos de tipo indirecto, y el desconocimiento que se hizo de los equipos nuevos y existentes. Los accionantes sostienen en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, que a pesar de la existencia de estudios técnicos y científicos, el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET disminuyó injustificadamente las exigencias de emisiones mínimas para la agro-industria. Ahora bien, los análisis mencionados en el decreto fueron recolectados por los propios entes generadores conforme al artículo 6° del Reglamento 30222, que eran realizados por los laboratorios autorizados bajo la Ley No. 6038, y sin embargo, observa esta Sala que, si bien el sistema utilizado sirve para llevar una serie de controles, estas conclusiones solo se emitieron sobre las calderas, sin referirse, a lo que entiende esta Sala, a una especialidad de ellas, porque no está claro cuáles serían los estudios técnicos aplicables para las empresas que podrían venirse a regular por primera vez con los hornos de tipo indirecto, que es el meollo del cuestionamiento de constitucionalidad.

A este tema se debe agregar que, aunque el elemento común de ambos, caldera u horno de tipo indirecto, es que funcionan a partir del aprovechamiento del calor o la energía que produce la combustión de materiales hidrocarburados o biomásicos, con emisión de residuos hacia el ambiente, es claro que el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS supera sus alcances al Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222. Un estudio comparativo entre la definición de la caldera regulada en la normativa con el Reglamento No. 30222 revela el significado de:

“Caldera: Todo recipiente cerrado en el cual, para cualquier fin, excepto el cocimiento doméstico de alimentos, se calienta agua o se genera vapor, generalmente de agua, para ser usado fuera de él, a una presión mayor que la presión atmosférica. Los supercalentadores, recalentadores, economizadores, u otras partes a presión, conectadas directamente a la caldera, sin intervención de válvulas, serán consideradas como parte de la caldera”.

No hay diferencia entre esta definición con la dada en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, pues, con solo eliminar la palabra “Todo…”, la norma se mantiene igual, lo que evidencia que el criterio técnico y científico de control sobre las calderas sería la misma con la vigencia de ambos decretos, pero es distinta o hace la diferencia con la definición del horno de tipo indirecto. Así, “Horno de tipo indirecto: Horno en el cual el material a calentar no está en contacto directo con los productos de combustión, por ejemplo: hornos de calentamiento en refinería de petróleo, calentadores de fluido térmico, calentadores de agua industrial, secadores de tipo indirecto y generadores de vapor”.

Precisamente, al concederle este Tribunal la audiencia al Ministerio de Salud, manifiesta que los hornos de tipo indirecto habían escapado de la regulación del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 30222-S-MINAE, con lo cual, más bien, se dio un avance en la materia y no un retroceso, como se quiere dar a entender. No escapa al entendimiento del Tribunal que caldera u horno de tipo indirecto, producirán partículas en suspensión que deben medirse, con el uso de los distintos combustibles, sea como caldera u horno de tipo indirecto, pero amerita un análisis diferente al planteado por los accionantes, que escapa a los mecanismos que tiene la propia jurisdicción constitucional. Por ejemplo, podría cuestionarse que el horno de tipo indirecto tiene, por definición, una serie de aditamentos que deben también ser evaluados, como se advierte con el efecto de los lavadores de gases. Sobre el otro factor arriba mencionado, de la falta de un tratamiento diferenciado entre los equipos, nuevos como existentes, constituye un argumento que está estrechamente relacionado al principio de progresividad, que también exige que los avances regulatorios no estén desligados de los impactos que pueda generar en todos los sectores afectados.

B.- El principio de progresividad de los derechos humanos.- La Sala Constitucional, recientemente, conoció de una consulta legislativa que tenía relación con el Proyecto de Ley de “Desafectación y titulación de la zona fronteriza entre la República de Costa Rica y la República de Panamá", expediente legislativo número 16657, en el cual se sostuvo, mediante la resolución No. 2014-018836 de las dieciséis horas y veinte minutos del dieciocho de noviembre de dos mil catorce, que:

“De conformidad con el principio de no regresividad, la normativa y la jurisprudencia en materia ambiental, no debe ser revisada, si con ello se retrocede en relación con el nivel de protección que ya se había alcanzado en la materia. Con esto, se evita la supresión de la normativa proteccionista o la reducción de sus exigencias por intereses contrarios a ella que no demuestren ser jurídicamente superiores al interés público ambiental, pues en la mayoría de las veces, esas regresiones en la protección al ambiente, tienen como consecuencia daños ambientales irreversibles o de difícil reparación. De modo tal, que no se ha de afectar los estándares de protección ambiental ya alcanzados, ni derogar o modificar la normativa vigente si con ello se produce una disminución, menoscabo o cualquier otra forma de afectación negativa al nivel actual de protección del ambiente. En esta materia, el camino es hacia adelante, nunca hacia atrás”.

Tal criterio, en el contexto que se toma, parece ser absoluto, pero no puede interpretarse de ese modo, porque, por su propia naturaleza, también debe ser relativizado a ciertas condiciones que le sirven, o de precursor o freno, como en efecto la Sala reconoce posteriormente en la sentencia. Por ello, debe reconocerse que existen límites al principio, especialmente cuando se topa con otros de naturaleza constitucional. Así, el procedimiento legislativo estaba ayuno de estudios técnicos y científicos que respaldaran la medida legislativa que se impulsaba en el Poder Legislativo, reflejo de uno de los principios esenciales del derecho ambiental, como es el principio de objetivación. Por ello, la Sala luego de citar la sentencia No. 2006-17126 arriba transcrita llega a la siguiente conclusión:

“En el caso del proyecto consultado, la total ausencia de estudios técnicos previos que determinen las consecuencias que sobre el Patrimonio Natural del Estado podría tener la desafectación de la franja fronteriza sur que se pretende, constituye una clara amenaza al medio ambiente, ya que con ello se podría estar permitiendo la tala indiscriminada de bosques y la desaparición de especies de flora y fauna, sin que exista ningún dato objetivo que lo confirme o la descarte” (véase la sentencia No. 2014-018836).

Ciertamente, el principio de progresividad de los derechos humanos impulsa la protección de éstos hacia adelante por parte del Estado, en procura de su desarrollo, especialmente los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, cuyo reconocimiento se hace por medio de instrumentos internacionales y la legislación nacional, con el fin de garantizar estabilidad a los alcances logrados e imponer racionalidad en la explotación, utilización de los recursos naturales y en la producción de bienes, las que deben venir acompañados de cierta gradualidad, pues no opera sin un apoyo y logística del Estado, mediante recursos y políticas, muchas veces impuestas unilateralmente contra la voluntad de los particulares, especialmente si la medida establecida es razonable y proporcional a los derechos involucrados. Pero uno de los elementos más importantes, es su incremento gradual para no afectar otros derechos individuales y sociales. Los principios del derecho ambiental sirven para integrar y sistematizar esta rama jurídica con las demás ramas del Derecho, donde si bien la balanza normalmente se inclina hacia el avance gradual demanda un ejercicio equilibrado con la guía de los estudios técnicos y científicos. El principio de no-regresión de las conquistas sociales tampoco es absoluto en este campo, tiene -por ejemplo- esos límites, incluso reconocidos por los organismos internacionales de derechos humanos cuando admiten –en limitados casos- la posibilidad de que pueden modificarse, restringirse y hasta suprimirse. Sobre este punto, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en sentencia del 1 de junio de 2009, en el caso Acevedo y otros (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) vs. Perú ha señalado respecto del Desarrollo progresivo de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, que:

“… se desprende un deber – si bien condicionado – de no-regresividad, que no siempre deberá ser entendido como una prohibición de medidas que restrinjan el ejercicio de un derecho. Al respecto, el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas ha señalado que “las medidas de carácter deliberadamente re[gresivo] en este aspecto requerirán la consideración más cuidadosa y deberán justificarse plenamente por referencia a la totalidad de los derechos previstos en el Pacto [Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales] y en el contexto del aprovechamiento pleno del máximo de los recursos de que [el Estado] disponga”. En la misma línea, la Comisión Interamericana ha considerado que para evaluar si una medida regresiva es compatible con la Convención Americana, se deberá “determinar si se encuentra justificada por razones de suficiente peso”. Por todo lo expuesto, cabe afirmar que la regresividad resulta justiciable cuando de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales se trate.” Es decir, si bien la tesis de los organismos internacionales concibe limitadamente la posibilidad de modificar o retroceder en los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales de manera restrictiva, debe haber un interés social y público. La reforma, en efecto regresa el funcionamiento de ciertas calderas a una situación anterior (tomando en cuenta el Ministerio de Salud, por primera vez, a los hornos de tipo indirecto), para no imponer un mayor sacrificio a las empresas, por la carga ambiental que genera su labor productiva. De ahí que el traslado de un principio general de los derechos humanos al derecho fundamental a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (no regresividad), no puede exigirse en este caso; solo es plausible siempre y cuando obtenga el respaldo de los criterios técnicos y científicos que acorazan la decisión administrativa, los que, en efecto, fueron producidos y demostrados suficientemente -a criterio de la administración- para sostener la reforma impugnada.

Pero de igual forma, una decisión para mantener la medida ambiental, también requiere de estos criterios, evitando así que las decisiones de la Administración sean arbitrarias, antojadizas o caprichosas, pues, de un lado, a favor, o del otro, en contra, hay intereses y derechos que se involucran en estas decisiones, algunas veces en confrontación unas más que otras, lo que requiere la necesidad que se calibren en beneficio de la sociedad, sin romper con las expectativas ambientales, porque, prima facie, requiere de cierta seguridad, para mantener los diferentes encadenamientos cuya incidencia, es especialmente social, de los trabajadores, así como en el abastecimiento de azúcares a la población o a los otros industriales. El principio de la no regresividad del derecho ambiental lo podemos expresar, entonces, como el impedimento de que una medida establecida por las autoridades públicas sea contrario a una conquista ambiental, como la consecución de un objetivo ambiental y, por ende, no es procedente su sacrificio cuando no esté sustentado en los estudios técnicos y científicos. Es realmente un principio que impide el retroceso de las conquistas sociales, pero dependerá para modificarlas de la seriedad, fundamentación y solidez de los estudios que le dieron origen, o incluso, por la variación de las circunstancias que le dieron origen, de modo que, al modificarse las condiciones que la ven nacer, los efectos que tienen en la realidad deben también cambiar. De ahí que para reformar las medidas ambientales, la administración requiere de su constatación mediante los criterios técnicos y científicos. Un ejemplo claro de todo ello es el artículo 38 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente.

C.- El principio de la razonabilidad técnica. Alega LAICA, en su sendo escrito, que el Decreto Ejecutivo es de imposible cumplimiento para el sector azucarero, argumenta contra el reglamento las contradicciones entre el tratamiento de combustibles fósiles y los biomásicos, la diferencia para ejercer los controles con niveles de oxígeno diferentes en las calderas, hornos de tipo indirecto de los hornos que emplean combustibles biomásicos, sin mayor aclaración. Que los estudios a que hace referencia el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAE no especifica cuáles son los que se tomaron en cuenta, sobre qué tipo de calderas, el tipo de pruebas que se reportaron, y los datos de calidad de RECOPE; más bien es más aparente que las referencias del Decreto se dieron en un contexto de aquellos equipos a base de combustibles fósiles. Alega, además, otros quebrantamientos legales, entre ellos, los numerales 16, 158, 160, 361.1, 240 y 241 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Para resolver lo anterior, es necesario acudir a la propia jurisprudencia constitucional, cuando ha señalado los componentes de los principios de razonabilidad, sea los de: legitimidad, idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, considerando que:

"... La legitimidad se refiere a que el objetivo pretendido con el acto o disposición impugnado no debe estar, al menos, legalmente prohibido; la idoneidad indica que la medida estatal cuestionada debe ser apta para alcanzar efectivamente el objetivo pretendido; la necesidad significa que entre varias medidas igualmente aptas para alcanzar tal objetivo, debe la autoridad competente elegir aquella que afecte lo menos posible la esfera jurídica de la persona; y la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto dispone que aparte del requisito de que la norma sea apta y necesaria, lo ordenado por ella no debe estar fuera de proporción con respecto al objetivo pretendido, o sea, no le sea "exigible" al individuo.(...) (Sentencia de esta Sala número 03933-98, de las nueve horas cincuenta y nueve minutos del doce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho).

Así, un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: es necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad -o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los dos últimos elementos, podría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que el segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados” (véase sentencia No. 08858-98 de esta Sala). (...)

Para este Tribunal, es claro que la idoneidad de la medida está en discusión en este caso (reforma mediante Decreto Ejecutivo No. 37031-S-MTSS-MINAET), lo que requiere, además, del análisis de los informes técnicos y científicos que le dieron sustento, pues, como lo indica el coadyuvante, durante su promulgación los criterios técnicos apuntaban a incorporar la mencionada modificación. Por ello, en el escrito de coadyuvancia de LAICA señala que de previo a la promulgación del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, se presentó por oficio DE-022-2009/2010 del 8 de junio de 2010 un análisis con criterios técnicos de las razones por las cuales los niveles propuestos para la industria no eran procedentes. Así, se produjo la oposición a los niveles establecidos en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551, cuyos fundamentos fueron de recibo por el Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión, pero aún así, se continuó con la recolección de firmas de esa normativa, aun existiendo señales de que las disposiciones no podían serles aplicadas, porque desde el punto de vista técnico, ningún ingenio de Costa Rica podía cumplir con esos parámetros. A lo anterior, a la CNAA también se unió a las objeciones de LAICA, de manera que aun cuando se quiso atender esos reclamos (por parte de la Ministra de Salud por oficio DM-3293-2010 del 6 de septiembre de 2010), los mismos fueron infructuosos. Posteriormente, fueron retomados las objeciones formuladas, cuando por oficio DRS-UN-920-11 de 23 de noviembre de 2011, la Dirección de Regulación de la Salud remite a la CNAA al Despacho de la ministra de Salud para reformar el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS, lo que después de una reunión de alto nivel y de medios mandos de los Ministerio con diferentes asociaciones y cámaras afectadas, se decidió proceder a la mencionada reforma.

Refieren los coadyuvantes a un error que fue advertido en su oportunidad por LAICA y el Comité Técnico de Normas de Emisiones e Inmisiones. Los criterios técnicos están transcritos en el libelo de coadyuvancia de LAICA, los que, como se evidencia del Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTSS-MINAET, en los considerandos 5° y 6° tienen por presentada la solicitud de revisión con base en los respectivos atestados y la aceptación por parte del Poder Ejecutivo de los argumentos esbozados en el estudio técnico. Si el objetivo del Estado es aumentar la protección del ambiente como un derecho fundamental, no le es lícito constitucionalmente ignorar otros derechos económicos y sociales, porque al llevar a cabo tal mandato debe procurar un equilibrio entre los derechos involucrados en la decisión, pero de manera informada. De esta manera, lo anterior llevaría al Tribunal a cuestionar si hubo solidez en la aceptación de los elementos científicos aportados por el gremio interesado, lo que no es procedente analizar en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, cuya discusión debe reservarse a aspectos de puro derecho, pues entrar a valorar aspectos técnicos, como la clasificación de las calderas, hornos de tipo indirecto y su forma de medición, sobrepasaría el propósito del proceso constitucional y llevaría al análisis de los criterios técnicos que solo se podría hacer en un proceso ordinario o de conocimiento de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativo. Para la Sala, es claro que la discusión está abierta en una jurisdicción más plenaria.

V.- Conclusión. Por lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar la acción. Los magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro salvan el voto, y declaran con lugar la acción en todos sus extremos.-

Por tanto:

Se declara sin lugar la acción. Los magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro salvan el voto, y declaran con lugar la acción en todos sus extremos.- Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Los magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro salvan el voto y declaran con lugar la acción en todos sus extremos, con redacción del segundo.

Por las razones que expresamos a continuación, consideramos que la presente acción debe ser declarada con lugar en todos sus extremos, y no ser desestimada, como lo hace el criterio de mayoría.

La reforma al artículo 7° inciso A sub-inciso 3 del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 36551-S-MINAET-MTSS “Reglamento sobre Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos de Tipo Indirecto”, por parte del Decreto Ejecutivo 37301-S-MTS-MINAET, supone ciertamente un debilitamiento de los límites máximos de emisión para calderas instaladas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007 hasta 220 mg/m3 (TPN), instaurando otros menos rigurosos. Todo en contravención de los principios de objetivación del derecho ambiental y de no-regresión de los derechos humanos. Se observa por demás que no hay estudios para sustentar la reversión de la normativa.

Conforme lo ha dicho esta Sala sobre el principio de progresividad de los derechos humanos, este impulsa la protección progresiva del Estado, en procura de su desarrollo, especialmente los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, cuyo reconocimiento se hace por medio de instrumentos internacionales y la legislación nacional, con el fin de garantizar estabilidad a los alcances logrados e imponer racionalidad en la bienes, las que deben venir acompañados de cierta gradualidad, pues no opera sin un apoyo y logística del Estado, mediante recursos y políticas, muchas veces impuestas unilateralmente contra la voluntad de los particulares, especialmente si la medida establecida es razonable y proporcional a los derechos involucrados. Pero uno de los elementos más importantes, es su incremento gradual para no afectar otros derechos individuales y sociales. Los principios del derecho ambiental sirven para integrar y sistematizar esta rama jurídica con las demás ramas del Derecho, donde si bien la balanza normalmente se inclina hacia el avance gradual demanda un ejercicio equilibrado con la guía de los estudios técnicos y científicos. El principio de no-regresión de las conquistas sociales tampoco es absoluto en este campo, tiene -por ejemplo- esos límites, incluso reconocidos por los organismos internacionales de derechos humanos cuando admiten –en limitados casos- la posibilidad de que pueden modificarse, restringirse y hasta suprimirse. Sobre este punto, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en sentencia del 1 de junio de 2009, en el caso Acevedo y otros (“Cesantes y Jubilados de la Contraloría”) vs. Perú ha señalado respecto del Desarrollo progresivo de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales, que:

“… se desprende un deber – si bien condicionado – de no-regresividad, que no siempre deberá ser entendido como una prohibición de medidas que restrinjan el ejercicio de un derecho. Al respecto, el Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales de las Naciones Unidas ha señalado que “las medidas de carácter deliberadamente re[gresivo] en este aspecto requerirán la consideración más cuidadosa y deberán justificarse plenamente por referencia a la totalidad de los derechos previstos en el Pacto [Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales] y en el contexto del aprovechamiento pleno del máximo de los recursos de que [el Estado] disponga”. En la misma línea, la Comisión Interamericana ha considerado que para evaluar si una medida regresiva es compatible con la Convención Americana, se deberá “determinar si se encuentra justificada por razones de suficiente peso”. Por todo lo expuesto, cabe afirmar que la regresividad resulta justiciable cuando de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales se trate.” Aplicando lo dicho a este caso, aquí no se encuentran a dónde están las razones de suficiente peso para la relajación de los límites de emisión de calderas. Como bien se señala en el voto de mayoría, la reforma, en efecto regresa el funcionamiento de ciertas calderas a una situación anterior (tomando en cuenta el Ministerio de Salud, por primera vez, a los hornos de tipo indirecto), para no imponer un mayor sacrificio a las empresas, por la carga ambiental que genera su labor productiva. De ahí que para hacer posible dicha regresión, debía imperativamente obtenerse el respaldo de los criterios técnicos y científicos que acorazan la decisión administrativa. Sin embargo, eso es justamente lo que echamos de menos, no encontramos un respaldo técnico y científico. El hecho de que el voto de mayoría indique que esos criterios fueron producidos y demostrados suficientemente a criterio de la administración, nos parece insuficiente; la Administración debió justificar plenamente dichos criterios en la propia fundamentación del decreto. Lo cual lleva a que en este caso, se incurrió en una excepción (relajamiento de límites de emisión) sin tener criterio técnico fundado y debidamente justificado.

En el mismo sentido en que lo expresa la Procuraduría General de la República en su informe, consideramos entonces que, la decisión de excluir a las calderas antes del 26 de marzo de 2007 de los límites máximos para la emisión de partículas de suspensión establecidas en el decreto ejecutivo 36551, es disconforme con el deber estatal de protección y tutela del ambiente establecido en el artículo 50 de la Constitución. La modificación de normativa que se impugna en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, disminuye el nivel de tutela y es violatoria del principio de no regresión en materia ambiental, por falta de justificación técnica y científica que la respalde. La reforma es claramente una desmejora del nivel de tutela, con el problema adicional de que el decreto carece de información técnica y científica que permita determinar hasta qué punto esta exoneración puede dar lugar a una disminución en el nivel de protección. Por lo tanto, la reforma introducida, adoptando límites de emisiones que desmejoran los niveles que durante más de cuatro años estuvieron vigentes, es violatoria del principio de no regresión, y constituye una medida desproporcionada e irracional, donde disminuyen los niveles de protección. Así que, al no haber certeza científica y técnica que el aumento en los niveles de referencia de oxígeno para el reporte de los datos, y no implique un mayor riesgo para la salud de las personas o para el ambiente, está disposición sería inconstitucional frente al principio que establece el deber estatal de su tutela y protección, así lo indican las sentencias 6322-2003 y 7294-1998 de la Sala Constitucional.

Incluso en su informe, el Ministro de Ambiente y Energía solicita valorar la constitucionalidad de la norma, toda vez que las observaciones técnicas señaladas por la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, no fueron incorporadas. Este dato fortalece la inconstitucionalidad, porque reitera la falta de criterios técnicos, pues no hay criterio del órgano especializado.

En conclusión, al no haber certeza científica y técnica de que este aumento en los niveles de referencia de oxígeno para el reporte de los datos, no implican un mayor riesgo para la salud de las personas o para el ambiente, está disposición sería inconstitucional por conculcar el derecho al ambiente y a la salud, ignorando el deber estatal de su tutela y protección, tal como lo indican las sentencias 6322-2003 y 7294-1998 de la Sala Constitucional.

Estimamos que la reforma al punto A.3) del artículo 7 del Reglamento sobre la Emisión de Contaminantes Atmosféricos Provenientes de Calderas y Hornos Tipo Indirecto, introducida por el Decreto Ejecutivo 37301, es inconstitucional, al igual que la reforma al punto C.2) del artículo 7º del Decreto Ejecutivo 36551.

Gilbert Armijo Sancho Fernando Cruz Castro Magistrado Magistrado 2295-3712. Dirección electrónica: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6