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Res. 09966-2010 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 09/06/2010
OutcomeResultado
The unconstitutionality action against Articles 100 and 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law is dismissed, upholding their constitutional validity.Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 100 y 126 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, confirmando su validez constitucional.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber rejects an unconstitutionality action filed by the National Agriculture and Agroindustry Chamber against Articles 100 and 130 (currently 126) of the Wildlife Conservation Law. The plaintiff argued that Article 100 violates the principles of equality, reasonableness, and legality by penalizing the discharge of polluted water without explicitly excepting those with discharge permits, and that its prison penalty is disproportionate. Regarding Article 126, it alleged that joint and several liability for legal entities and economic interest groups violates the presumption of innocence and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness by presuming guilt without a causal link. The Chamber finds that Article 100 respects the principle of legality, clearly describes the prohibited conduct and leaves the criminal judge to assess the existence of permits as a justification that excludes wrongfulness, without requiring the norm to expressly list exceptions. It does not violate equality either, since the differentiation between those who have or lack a permit operates at the judicial application stage. On proportionality, the Chamber recalls that the determination of criminal offenses is the exclusive competence of the legislature. As for Article 126, the Chamber holds that it regulates objective civil liability based on risk, not criminal liability, so the presumption of innocence does not apply. Its extension to economic interest groups aims to prevent corporate fraud and make the 'polluter pays' principle effective, without impeding due process or the right to defense. The action is dismissed.La Sala Constitucional rechaza una acción de inconstitucionalidad presentada por la Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria contra los artículos 100 y 130 (actual 126) de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. El accionante alegaba que el artículo 100 viola los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad y tipicidad al penalizar el vertido de aguas contaminantes sin hacer excepciones explícitas para quienes tienen permisos de vertido, y que su pena de prisión es desproporcionada. Respecto al artículo 126, argumentaba que la responsabilidad solidaria para personas jurídicas y grupos de interés económico viola la presunción de inocencia y los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, al presumir culpabilidad sin nexo causal. La Sala determina que el artículo 100 respeta el principio de tipicidad, describe claramente la conducta prohibida y deja al juez penal valorar la existencia de permisos como causa de justificación que excluye la antijuridicidad, no siendo necesario que la norma los excluya expresamente. Tampoco vulnera la igualdad, pues la diferenciación entre quienes tienen o no permiso opera en la fase de aplicación judicial. Sobre la proporcionalidad, la Sala recuerda que la determinación de tipos penales es competencia exclusiva del legislador. En cuanto al artículo 126, la Sala sostiene que regula responsabilidad civil objetiva por riesgo, no penal, por lo que no aplica el principio de inocencia, y su extensión a los grupos de interés económico busca evitar fraudes corporativos y hacer efectivo el principio 'quien contamina paga', sin impedir el derecho de defensa. Se declara sin lugar la acción.
Key excerptExtracto clave
First, the Chamber concludes that the challenged norm does not violate the principle of legality, according to which both the prohibited conducts and their sanctions must be described precisely and clearly in a legal norm. All elements of the criminal offense are clearly defined: the active subject, the action or verb (…) and the sanction to be applied (…). The fact that the norm does not expressly state that those who have obtained a permit to discharge polluting substances, where applicable according to the relevant regulations, will not be sanctioned, does not make it unconstitutional, since it is precisely the task of the criminal judge to determine in each specific case whether or not a permit to discharge polluting substances into a given body of water, granted by the competent authorities, exists. If it does, the action would be typical but not unlawful, meaning the offense provided for in the norm under review would not be committed. (…) the norm in question provides for another type of liability, derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, provisions that by extension apply to environmental damage (…). The plaintiff’s main argument is that the norm violates the presumption of innocence; however, that principle is not infringed because the challenged provision does not refer to criminal liability. Based on the Principle of Reality and the Piercing of the Corporate Veil, legislation regulating the joint and several civil liability of those legal entities that participate in the activity causing environmental damage, as well as of the natural and legal persons that are part of the same economic interest group as the legal entity related to the harmful event, is admissible.En primer término, la Sala concluye que la norma impugnada no es violatoria del principio de tipicidad, según el cual, tanto las conductas como las sanciones que se atribuyen deben estar descritas en una norma, en forma precisa y clara. Todos los elementos integrantes del tipo penal, están claramente definidos: el sujeto activo, la acción o verbo (…) y la sanción a aplicar (…). El hecho de que la norma no establezca expresamente que no serán sancionados quienes han obtenido un permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes, en los casos en que ello procede según la normativa aplicable, no la torna inconstitucional, pues es precisamente la labor del juez penal determinar en cada caso concreto si existe o no el permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes en determinado cuerpo de agua, conferido por las autoridades competentes, en cuyo caso la acción sería típica, pero no antijurídica, de manera que no se configuraría el delito previsto en la norma de estudio. (…) la norma que se cuestiona contempla otro tipo de responsabilidad, derivada del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, disposiciones que por extensión se aplican al daño ambiental (…). El principal argumento del accionante es que la norma viola el principio de inocencia; sin embargo, tal principio no resulta infringido pues la disposición cuestionada no se refiere a la responsabilidad penal. Con fundamento en el Principio de la Realidad y el Levantamiento de Velo Corporativo, resulta procedente la legislación que regula la responsabilidad civil solidaria de aquellas personas jurídicas que participan en la actividad que genera el daño ambiental, así como de las personas físicas y jurídicas que participan de un mismo grupo de interés económico con esa persona jurídica relacionada con el hecho dañino.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"El hecho de que la norma no establezca expresamente que no serán sancionados quienes han obtenido un permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes, en los casos en que ello procede según la normativa aplicable, no la torna inconstitucional, pues es precisamente la labor del juez penal determinar en cada caso concreto si existe o no el permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes en determinado cuerpo de agua, conferido por las autoridades competentes, en cuyo caso la acción sería típica, pero no antijurídica, de manera que no se configuraría el delito previsto en la norma de estudio."
"The fact that the norm does not expressly state that those who have obtained a permit to discharge polluting substances, in cases where this is applicable under the relevant regulations, will not be sanctioned, does not make it unconstitutional, since it is precisely the task of the criminal judge to determine in each specific case whether or not a permit to discharge polluting substances into a given body of water, granted by the competent authorities, exists. If it does, the action would be typical but not unlawful, meaning the offense provided for in the norm under review would not be committed."
Considerando IV
"El hecho de que la norma no establezca expresamente que no serán sancionados quienes han obtenido un permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes, en los casos en que ello procede según la normativa aplicable, no la torna inconstitucional, pues es precisamente la labor del juez penal determinar en cada caso concreto si existe o no el permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes en determinado cuerpo de agua, conferido por las autoridades competentes, en cuyo caso la acción sería típica, pero no antijurídica, de manera que no se configuraría el delito previsto en la norma de estudio."
Considerando IV
"La norma que se cuestiona contempla otro tipo de responsabilidad, derivada del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, disposiciones que por extensión se aplican al daño ambiental. (...) El principal argumento del accionante es que la norma viola el principio de inocencia; sin embargo, tal principio no resulta infringido pues la disposición cuestionada no se refiere a la responsabilidad penal."
"The norm in question provides for another type of liability, derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, provisions that by extension apply to environmental damage. (...) The plaintiff’s main argument is that the norm violates the presumption of innocence; however, that principle is not infringed because the challenged provision does not refer to criminal liability."
Considerando V.A
"La norma que se cuestiona contempla otro tipo de responsabilidad, derivada del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, disposiciones que por extensión se aplican al daño ambiental. (...) El principal argumento del accionante es que la norma viola el principio de inocencia; sin embargo, tal principio no resulta infringido pues la disposición cuestionada no se refiere a la responsabilidad penal."
Considerando V.A
"Con fundamento en el Principio de la Realidad y el Levantamiento de Velo Corporativo, resulta procedente la legislación que regula la responsabilidad civil solidaria de aquellas personas jurídicas que participan en la actividad que genera el daño ambiental, así como de las personas físicas y jurídicas que participan de un mismo grupo de interés económico con esa persona jurídica relacionada con el hecho dañino."
"Based on the Principle of Reality and the Piercing of the Corporate Veil, legislation regulating the joint and several civil liability of those legal entities that participate in the activity causing environmental damage, as well as of the natural and legal persons that are part of the same economic interest group as the legal entity related to the harmful event, is admissible."
Considerando V.B
"Con fundamento en el Principio de la Realidad y el Levantamiento de Velo Corporativo, resulta procedente la legislación que regula la responsabilidad civil solidaria de aquellas personas jurídicas que participan en la actividad que genera el daño ambiental, así como de las personas físicas y jurídicas que participan de un mismo grupo de interés económico con esa persona jurídica relacionada con el hecho dañino."
Considerando V.B
"La determinación de los tipos penales (conductas estimadas nocivas para la sociedad) y su sanción respectiva es un asunto de política criminal reservado en exclusiva a los legisladores."
"The determination of criminal offenses (conduct deemed harmful to society) and their respective punishment is a matter of criminal policy reserved exclusively to the legislature."
Considerando IV
"La determinación de los tipos penales (conductas estimadas nocivas para la sociedad) y su sanción respectiva es un asunto de política criminal reservado en exclusiva a los legisladores."
Considerando IV
Full documentDocumento completo
**Exp: 09-010348-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010-09966** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-eight minutes on June ninth, two thousand ten.
Action of unconstitutionality brought by Alvaro Saénz Saborío, of legal age, married once, Civil Engineer, resident of San Rafael de Escazú, holder of identity card number 1-500-072, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney without limit of sum of the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, legal entity identification number 3-002-051316; against Articles 100 and 130 (currently 126) of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, No. 7317 and its amendments.
**Whereas:** 1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at nine hours fifty-eight minutes on July tenth, two thousand nine, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 100 and 130 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, No. 7317 and its amendments as of Law No. 8689 of December 2008, be declared. He alleges that said articles infringe the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, specificity (tipicidad), and innocence. The norms are challenged insofar as it is considered that Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre violates the principle of equality, because the norm makes no type of differentiation, placing all persons under the same assumption, without contemplating that some may be in different situations by having permits or authorizations issued by the pertinent authorities to discharge wastewater. He further considers that the challenged norm violates the reasonableness of equality, as it does not treat unequally those who are in a different factual situation, by having permits to discharge wastewater, placing them in a situation of equality with respect to the rest of the persons who do not have such authorizations. In his opinion, the norm is neither necessary nor suitable for the end sought to be satisfied; rather, the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of individuals was chosen, despite the fact that such an end can be achieved through Article 132 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida, which establishes practically the same text as the challenged provision, with the difference that it does not establish a custodial sentence as punishment and contemplates the issue of waste and water treatment systems. He also points out that Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre injures the principle of specificity (tipicidad), because by not providing for any type of exception for the case of those economic agents who previously obtain an authorization for the discharge of contaminating substances, it generates a collision between the typical conduct and the criminal-legal reproach of the action, between specificity and culpability. Thus, persons who have obtained a permit to discharge contaminating waters would act under the internal belief that their action is not penalized, as they are protected by the regulations that authorize the conduct; given the wording of the norm, the conduct would be typical. He affirms that there are many regulatory provisions that permit the discharge of contaminating waters into receiving bodies, respecting, of course, certain permissible limits or parameters, among which are the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, Reglamento de Vertido y Reuso de Aguas Residuales, Decreto Ejecutivo N.33601-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, El Reglamento del Canon Ambiental por Vertidos, Decreto Ejecutivo 34431-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, among others. Due to a faulty legislative technique, the norm lacks the correct normative formulation required for every criminal offense, derived from Article 39 of the Constitution. He cites judgment 2006-9170, in which the Chamber referred to two types of contaminating discharges: one permitted and one prohibited, a distinction that is not respected in the challenged norm, establishing as typical conduct the simple act of "throwing" contaminating waters, wastes, or substances, without considering that some of those supposedly illicit acts could be authorized by prior and specific regulations. Regarding the unconstitutionality of Article 130 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, the plaintiff first alleges that the norm violates the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, since, although the concept of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) exists, applied in branches of law other than criminal law, an attributability of the act and a criminal-legal reproach of a patrimonial nature always subsist within it, derived from a causal link between the subjectively responsible agent and the objectively responsible entity or subject. The challenged norm establishes strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) without a causal link between the agent and the natural or legal person who could well be unrelated to the damage, especially when it states that joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) extends—without establishing greater justification—to "natural or legal persons that make up the same economic interest group as the infringing person." The burden of proof is reversed, since the law presumes a concurrent culpability of the natural or legal person to whom joint and several liability is attributed, which violates the principle of innocence. Regarding the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, he alleges that Article 130 establishes a legal effect that could well be uncaused, in the event that natural or legal persons must be held jointly and severally liable, even if they are completely unrelated to the damage caused. If they manage to prove their innocence and lack of responsibility (intentional or culpable) with respect to the unlawful act carried out by the infringing agent, they should be exempted from the duty to pay damages, as occurs in other cases of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva). Article 130 sanctions everyone equally, constituting an unreasonable and disproportionate norm that establishes joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) violating the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of culpability.
2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he notes that it is an association that protects the corporate or collective interests of the agricultural, farming, and agro-industrial sectors.
3.- By resolution at seven hours and thirty minutes on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Procuraduría General de la República.
4.- The Procuraduría General de la República submits its report and notes that the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria does not have standing to file the present action of unconstitutionality because the challenged articles do not have the characteristic of directly affecting the sphere of action of the entity and its members; this is because the challenged norms seek to hold persons who contaminate national waters criminally and civilly liable, norms that are not intended to injure rights or interests of the members of the plaintiff corporation. The only effect that could derive from the challenged articles for the members of the corporation would be indirect, resulting from non-compliance with the prohibition provided by the legal system against throwing contaminating agents into springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), etc. Thus, with the foregoing, the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria does not have standing to file the present action of unconstitutionality, making it inadmissible. Despite the foregoing, regarding the challenges raised against Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, there exist in the legal system a series of assumptions under which the law authorizes the discharge of contaminating agents into national waters, and the fact that the cited article does not expressly define that the illicit act will not be incurred when under one of the permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste does not constitute a defect in the criminal offense, nor does it cause the effects indicated by the plaintiff. The principle of specificity (tipicidad) requires that criminal norms fully describe the matter of prohibition, and Article 100 does so in a clear, precise, and complete manner, leaving no doubt that "throwing contaminating agents into national waters" is the conduct prohibited by the criminal offense. The permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste into national waters constitute grounds for justification with respect to the matter of prohibition established in Article 100, and grounds for justification are not part of the criminal offense; requiring the criminal offense to expressly except all possible grounds for justification is beyond the scope of the principle of specificity (tipicidad).
Furthermore, there is no breach of the principle of equality because the article does not explicitly provide an exception for the assumption of those who have a permit to discharge contaminating agents. The permissive precepts, even if not expressly provided for in the criminal offense described in Article 100, will always have the effect of neutralizing the specificity (tipicidad) of the conduct, which rules out the illicit act and places those who are under the permissive assumption in a position different from that of those who incurred in the typified conduct and did not have authorization. Nor is it contrary to the principle of proportionality and reasonableness or suitability, since the conduct typified as a crime by Article 100 is the one prohibited in Article 132. The mere prohibition of the conduct made in Article 132 would be absolutely insufficient to protect the legal interest protected by Article 100, firstly because it does not constitute a crime and secondly, because it does not contemplate any penalty for the offender. In accordance with the environmental principle "polluter pays," the cost of pollution must be borne by whoever benefits from it, either by taking the necessary measures to prevent or reduce it, or by repairing its effects once it occurs. The principle has two functions: a precautionary one and a corrective one, which is stipulated in the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The basis of this principle lies in the conceptualization of environmental damage as the affectation of a collective heritage, which natural basic systems represent, as a crime of a social nature because it affects the foundations of society's existence; economic because it attacks the materials and resources indispensable for productive activities; cultural, as it endangers the way of life of communities; and ethical, because it attacks the existence of present and future generations. In practice, there are great difficulties in individualizing and holding liable the causer of the damage caused to the environment and in achieving the effective payment of the corresponding liability for environmental pollution. There is a tendency towards the complexity of the structures in which economic activities are organized, imposed deliberately in some cases, with the specific purpose of evading potential liabilities derived from the execution of risky activities for the environment, structures that hinder the identification of the true person responsible for the environmental damage and making them pay for it. The traditional civil liability system based on the criterion of subjective imputation is limited, which is why the international trend is to create an expanded civil liability system, as well as the recognition of assumptions of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), which allows guaranteeing the polluter pays principle. Article 130 (126) of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre reflects the expansion of the assumptions of civil liability for environmental damage, and therein, with the reform carried out, the joint and several liability (solidaridad) of natural or legal persons that make up the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person is introduced. The challenged norm is a legal provision that pursues the application of the principle already cited. In the initial part of Article 130 (126), it states that legal persons who "have participated in the commission of the illicit acts included in this Law" shall be jointly and severally liable; which implies that the liability provided for would be based on the demonstrated intervention of the legal person in the acts causing the environmental damage and the corresponding harm. That participation of the legal persons, which is established as a prerequisite for liability, links them to the environmental damage, so they are not unrelated to environmental damage, nor is the causal link between the provoking agent (which would be the same legal person) and the damage dispensed with. The final part of the cited article refers to the joint and several liability (solidaridad) of the natural or legal persons that make up the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person, therefore, it is presupposed that the participation of the legal person that is part of the economic interest group has been demonstrated in the commission of the illicit acts generating the environmental damage. The basis of joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) lies in the link existing between the economic interest group and the infringing legal person, as corresponds when dealing with joint and several liability. Belonging to an economic interest group presupposes that the legal persons that make it up maintain significant financial, administrative, or patrimonial relationships among themselves. From the foregoing, it could not be affirmed that the economic interest group is unrelated to the damage caused, by reason of the link existing between it and the legal person participating in the illicit acts generating the environmental damage and the harm for which reparation is sought. In accordance with the foregoing, the Procuraduría does not find reasons to consider that the challenged norm could be contrary to the principle of innocence. Regarding the principle of proportionality and reasonableness, none of the liability assumptions provided for by the challenged article provides for civil liability for a subject unrelated to the damage claimed; in the first case, it concerns the legal person that participated in the commission of the acts causing the environmental damage, and in the second, the economic interest group. The extension of joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) to legal persons who have participated in the commission of illicit acts and to natural and legal persons that make up the same economic interest group as the infringing legal entity, provided for by Article 130 (126), is a provision that is proportional to the objective sought. To guarantee the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the environmental principle "polluter pays," and the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) regulated in the challenged article is adjusted to the objective of holding the true causer of the damage liable and obligating them to compensate accordingly. For the development of the most environmentally risky economic activities, unitary legal persons with limited capital are frequently used, which protect the economic patrimony of the true owners and beneficiaries of the activity; it is important to establish mechanisms such as the one provided for herein that allow pursuing and holding liable both the legal person under whose name the activity is carried out and the economic interest group to which they belong, in order to eliminate the economic motivations for pollution, applying in parallel the imperatives of retributive ethics. Thus, Articles 100 and 130 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre are not contrary to the constitutional principles indicated by the plaintiff.
5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in numbers 206, 207, and 208 of the Boletín Judicial, on October 23, 26, and 27, all in the month of October 2009 (folio 103).
6.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in these proceedings.
Magistrate Pacheco Salazar writes; and, **Considering:** **I.- On the admissibility of the action.** The action of unconstitutionality filed is admissible, by virtue of being directed against provisions of a general nature, and because the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, whose members are producers, entrepreneurs, and entities of the agricultural, farming, agro-industrial, and forestry sectors, has standing to defend in this venue the interests of its members, who could eventually be affected by the challenged norms by virtue of the activities they carry out, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Chamber has specified that through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," the legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity, when acting through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, provided that it involves the challenge of norms or provisions that impact that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the unifying factor of the group — judgment 2006-9170 at sixteen hours thirty-six minutes on June twenty-eighth, two thousand six —.
**II.- Object of the action.** The plaintiff challenges Articles 100 and 130 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. Article 4 of Law 8689, of December 4, 2008, renumbered the law, and Article 130 cited by the plaintiff is now Article 126. The norms state:
Article 100.- "Shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years, provided a more serious crime is not constituted, whoever throws sewage (aguas servidas), black water (aguas negras), sludge (lodos), waste, or any contaminating substance into springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), permanent or non-permanent brooks (arroyos), lakes, lagoons, marshes (marismas) and natural or artificial reservoirs (embalses), estuaries (esteros), peat bogs (turberas), swamps (pantanos), wetlands (humedales), fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas." Article 126.- "Regardless of the personal, civil, or criminal liability that may apply to partners, officers (personeros), or representatives, legal persons that have participated in the commission of the illicit acts included in this Law shall be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general, and must repair them integrally. Likewise, natural or legal persons that make up the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person shall be jointly and severally liable." The plaintiff challenges Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, because in his opinion it infringes the principles of equality, reasonableness and proportionality, and specificity (tipicidad). He challenges Article 130 (current Article 126) for injuring the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and innocence, since it establishes strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) without a causal link between the agent and the natural or legal person, who could be unrelated to the damage, especially as it extends joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria). He considers that the uncaused attributability of joint and several liability violates the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of culpability, which is also applicable in the case of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva).
**III.- On the claims of unconstitutionality against Article 100 of the Ley de Vida Silvestre.** A. On the principle of equality and non-discrimination. This Chamber has recognized on previous occasions that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition that, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differential element argued between both situations to make such a distinction possible, it must not only be real but must also have a legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (in this sense, rulings numbers 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94, and 5061-94). If situations arise in which several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this they receive different treatment without any justifiable reason, it is considered that an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation exists because it is not supported by objective elements. On this point, in judgment number 337-91 at fourteen hours and fifty-six minutes on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one, the Chamber indicated pertinently:
"The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution aims, in part, for the same measure or the same treatment to be given to those who find themselves in identical or reasonably similar situations, as not any difference is valid to establish distinct treatment, because in respect of the reasonableness that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be legitimate cause to establish different treatment." According to the foregoing, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be either identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Furthermore, for differentiation to be constitutionally permissible, it must be reasonable, meaning by this that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional.
B. On the principle of reasonableness and proportionality. This Court, in judgment number 4205-96, of 14:33 hours on August 20, 1996, stated in this regard:
"...However, despite the fact that fundamental rights may be subject to certain restrictions, these are legitimate only when they are necessary to make the validity of democratic and constitutional values possible, so that besides being 'necessary,' 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'opportune,' the restriction must imply the existence of an imperative social need that supports it. In this order of ideas, a distinction must be made between the internal sphere, which refers to the own or essential content of the right—which has been defined as that part of the content without which the right itself loses its peculiarity, or that which makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a specific type—so that restrictions or limits that make its exercise impracticable, hinder it beyond what is reasonable, or strip it of the necessary protection are not permissible; and the external sphere, in which the actions of public authorities and third parties become relevant. Likewise, the legitimacy of restrictions on fundamental rights is ordered by a series of principles that this Court has previously indicated—judgment number 3550-92—, thus for example: 1.- they must be called to satisfy an imperative public interest; 2.- to achieve that public interest, among several options, the one that restricts the protected right to a lesser degree must be chosen; 3.- the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and strictly adjusted to achieving that objective; 4.- the restriction must be socially imperative, and therefore exceptional." An act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community. Suitability, for its part, entails a judgment referring to whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or does not fulfill the purpose of satisfying the detected need. Proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of a markedly greater entity than the benefit intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community. Likewise, it should be noted that such contents must adjust, not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to its sense of justice.
C. On the principle of criminal specificity (tipicidad penal). The principle of criminal specificity (tipicidad penal) is conceptualized as a principle of a constitutional nature, an integral part of due process, derived in turn from the principle of criminal legality and intimately related to legal certainty, since it guarantees to individuals that they cannot be prosecuted criminally for an action that has not been previously defined as a crime in a clear and precise manner, by a norm of legal rank. In this regard, this Court has stated:
"Article 39 of the Political Constitution incorporates the principle of reservation of law, whereby all burdensome acts for citizens, emanating from public authorities, must be agreed upon in a formal law. This principle acquires marked importance in criminal matters, since in the case of crimes and penalties, the law is the sole creative source. In this matter, the content of the Latin aphorism 'nullum crimen, nulla paena, sine praevia lege' is of common acceptance.
II.-- When the constituent, in said Article 39, refers to the term 'crime,' it is referring to a typical, unlawful, and culpable action, to which a penalty has been assigned as a consequence. Of those predicates of the action for it to be constitutive of a crime, specificity and its function of citizen guarantee are of interest now. For a conduct to be constitutive of a crime, it is not enough that it is unlawful—contrary to law—, it is necessary that it be typified, that is, that it be fully described in a norm; this obeys unsuppressible requirements of legal certainty, for as repressive matters involve the greatest intervention in the important legal interests of citizens, to guarantee these against the State, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability; for this, the requirement of prior law, but this requirement is not sufficient without specificity, because a law that said, for example, 'any action contrary to good customs shall be constitutive of a crime,' represents no guarantee for the citizenry, even if it is prior; in this case, it would be the judge's criteria that would come to give the true contours to the conduct to consider it or not constitutive of a crime; by contrast, if the criminal act is coined in a criminal offense, and furthermore, this is closed, the addressee of the norm can easily become aware of its content; thus, for example, simple homicide is fully described in Article 111 of the Penal Code: 'Whoever has caused the death of a person shall be punished with imprisonment from eight to fifteen years.' The guarantee function of criminal law demands that criminal offenses be drafted with the greatest possible clarity, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as exactly as possible. In ruling 1876-90 at sixteen hours today, this Chamber already indicated that the principle of legality requires, so that the citizenry can have knowledge as to whether their actions constitute a crime or not, that criminal norms be structured with precision and clarity." The precision derives from the fact that if criminal definitions (tipos penales) are formulated with very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining which actions are punishable is transferred, as already indicated, to the Judge at the moment of establishing the subsumption of a conduct under a norm, due to the great absorptive power of the legal description, and clarity is transferred to the necessary understanding that citizens must have of the law, so that they may adapt their behavior to the aims of the criminal law.
III.-- Criminal definitions (tipos penales) must be structured basically as a conditional proposition, consisting of a premise (description of the conduct) and a consequence (penalty). In the premise, it must necessarily indicate, at a minimum, who the active subject is—since in specific offenses (delitos propios) the subject meets certain conditions (status as a national, public employee, etc.)—and what the action constituting the infraction is (active verb). Without these two basic elements (there are other accessory elements that may or may not be present in the typical description of the act), it can be assured that no criminal definition (tipo penal) exists.
IV.-- From all of the foregoing, it can be concluded that there is a legislative obligation, in order for the definition of offenses (tipicidad) to constitute a true citizen guarantee, characteristic of a democratic state under the rule of law, to use legislative techniques that allow for the correct definition of the conduct it seeks to repress as a crime. This is because the absolute effectiveness of the principle of legality (principio de reserva), which as already indicated is established in Article 39 of the Constitution, only occurs in cases where the judge's activity is successfully bound to the law, and it is clear that this is, in turn, entirely related to the greater or lesser degree of concreteness and clarity achieved by the legislator. The necessary use of language and its restrictions means that in some cases the same level of precision cannot be achieved. This does not mean, however, that the description presents constitutional problems in relation to the definition of offenses (tipicidad). Establishing the limit of generalization or concreteness required by the principle of legality must be done on a case-by-case basis.
V.-- Problems of legislative technique mean that on some occasions the legislator is obliged, in addition to using terms that are not entirely precise (public tranquility in Article 271 of the Criminal Code) or have great absorptive capacity (artifices or deceptions in Article 216 of the Criminal Code), to relate the norm to other norms, a subject already addressed by this Chamber in Ruling 1876-90 cited above. Both practices can lead to obscurity in the norm and hinder its comprehension, causing, in some cases, friction with the demands entailed by the definition of offenses (tipicidad) as a guarantee, although not necessarily with the Constitution." (Judgment 1990-01877 of sixteen hours two minutes of the nineteenth of December of nineteen ninety).
With what has been stated in this considerando, the arguments of the petitioner will be analyzed.
IV.- Analysis of Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre). A declaration of unconstitutionality is requested for Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which punishes with a "prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years, provided a more serious crime is not constituted," anyone who "discharges wastewater (aguas servidas), sewage (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any polluting substance into springs, rivers, streams, permanent or non-permanent creeks (arroyos), lakes, lagoons, salt marshes (marismas), and natural or artificial reservoirs and impoundments (embalses), estuaries (esteros), peat bogs (turberas), swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt water, into their channels or their respective protection areas." In the first place, the Chamber concludes that the challenged norm does not violate the principle of the definition of offenses (tipicidad), according to which both the conducts and the sanctions attributed must be described in a norm in a precise and clear manner. All the constituent elements of the criminal definition (tipo penal) are clearly defined: the active subject, the action or verb (discharge wastewater (aguas servidas), sewage (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any polluting substance into springs, rivers, streams, permanent or non-permanent creeks (arroyos), lakes, lagoons, salt marshes (marismas), and natural or artificial reservoirs and impoundments (embalses), estuaries (esteros), peat bogs (turberas), swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt water, into their channels or their respective protection areas), and the sanction to apply (prison sentence of one to three years, provided a more serious crime is not constituted). The fact that the norm does not expressly establish that those who have obtained a permit to discharge polluting substances will not be sanctioned, in cases where this is applicable according to the pertinent regulations, does not render it unconstitutional, as it is precisely the task of the criminal judge to determine in each specific case whether or not a permit exists to discharge polluting substances into a specific body of water, granted by the competent authorities. In such a case, the action would be typical but not unlawful, so the crime provided for in the norm under review would not be constituted.
Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law also does not violate the principle of equality, since although evidently those who have obtained permits for the discharge of polluting substances into receiving bodies are not in the same legal situation as those who do not have such administrative authorization, the fact that the norm establishes a general postulate when stating the active subject of the crime does not in any way harm the principle of equality. Thus, the inequality does not have the scope that the petitioner indicates, because, as already analyzed, at the moment of applying the law, it will be the Criminal Judge who must assess, in the specific case, the particular conditions of the person to whom the conduct is attributed, in order to determine whether or not criminal liability exists.
Regarding the alleged violation of the principles of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad), the petitioner's arguments are the same as those used to support the alleged violation of the principle of equality, since he states that the norm violates the reasonableness of equality by not treating unequally persons who are in a different factual situation, because they have permits or authorizations to discharge wastewater, placing them in a position of equality with respect to the rest of the people who do not have such authorizations. Consequently, this allegation must be refuted based on the same reasons already set forth to reject the alleged violation of the principle of equality. As for the lack of necessity and suitability of the norm, which establishes a prison sentence—the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of individuals—despite the fact that the objective sought to be satisfied can be perfectly achieved through numeral 132 (current numeral 128 by virtue of the reform operated by Law 8689 of December 4, 2008) of the same law, it is necessary to point out that this Court has repeatedly stated that the determination of criminal definitions (tipos penales) (conducts deemed harmful to society) and their respective sanction is a matter of criminal policy reserved exclusively for legislators. The Political Constitution itself, in its Article 39, assigns the legislator the exclusive competence to dictate criminal policy, that is, to determine which conducts are criminalized and with what quantum of penalty, when it states that the creation of crimes and penalties is reserved to the law, so that this Chamber can only control that it is enacted in harmony with the constitutional framework. Whether the criminal policy is particularly good or bad is a matter that escapes—as stated—the constitutionally assigned powers of this Court. Thus, if the legislator considered that the conducts described in Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law must be sanctioned with a prison sentence, by virtue of the relevance of the protected legal interest, it has acted in exercise of its constitutionally attributed powers. Consequently, regarding this point, the petitioner's arguments must also be rejected.
V.- Regarding the charges of unconstitutionality against Article 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.
A. Regarding the principle of innocence. In Resolutions 500-90 of 5:00 p.m. on May 15, 1990, and 2063-91 of 10:05 a.m. on October 11, 2001, this Chamber maintained the thesis that, by reason of the provisions of Article 39 of the Political Constitution, regarding the necessary demonstration of guilt in order to attribute criminal liability to a specific person, strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is proscribed in our criminal procedural system—that liability derived from the development of a causal cycle that produces a result subsumable under a criminal definition (tipo penal), but in which there is no relationship of guilt with the subject who originated it. It is not possible, constitutionally and legally speaking, to accept the theory of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), which does apply in other areas but is excluded from application in criminal matters, because in the latter, a relationship of guilt between the act committed and the result of the action must necessarily be demonstrated in order for it to be attributed to the active subject; if the subject cannot be reproached for his action, he cannot be criminally sanctioned. Based on strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva), a penalty can be imposed on the perpetrator of an act even if his behavior cannot be personally reproached; in this case, the decisive factor is the objective cause of the harmful result, without requiring that a relationship of guilt exists between it and the subject's action. Judgment number 01739-92, in relation to the principle of innocence, stated the following:
"Like the previous ones, it derives from Article 39 of the Constitution, insofar as it requires the necessary demonstration of guilt. No person may be considered or treated as guilty until there is a final, conclusive judgment against him, issued in a regular and legal process declaring him as such after that presumption has been destroyed or overcome.
Furthermore, by virtue of the accused's state of innocence, it is not he who must prove his lack of guilt, but the prosecution bodies, with complementary effects such as the impossibility, during the process, of coercing him, and, with even greater reason, of subjecting him to torture or cruel or degrading treatment—expressly proscribed by Article 40 of the Constitution—as well as that his liberty can only be restricted in a precautionary and extraordinary manner to guarantee the aims of the process, that is, to prevent him from evading the action of justice or seriously obstructing the verification of the facts, or to prevent these facts from recurring in certain serious cases—such as in abuses against dependent persons—but never invoking the gravity of the crimes or the evidence that exists against him, precisely because his state of innocence absolutely prohibits considering him, directly or presumptively, guilty (…)" Thus, the principle of innocence implies that the court's conviction regarding the guilt of the accused must overcome any reasonable doubt, so that any existing doubt requires a ruling in his favor. The norm being questioned contemplates another type of liability, derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, provisions that are applied by extension to environmental damage, as enshrined in the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), Articles 98 and 101 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad). This Court has already stated on previous occasions, for example in Judgment No. 2000-1669 of 2:51 p.m. on February 18, 2000, that the subject of liability for environmental damage has been given different treatment, taking into consideration the specific characteristics of the matter in question. The State, to assure itself in some way of compensation for damages caused to the environment, has created a series of norms regulating environmental liability, without losing sight, of course, of the necessary balance that must exist between environmental protection and the development of private activities. In Environmental Law, a different approach to liability has been taken, such that there has been an evolution from a fault-based liability system to one of strict liability for risk (responsabilidad por riesgo), which implies broader coverage, since such liability would arise even without fault on the part of the transgressor, if the activity performed is considered risky, and it assumes that risk with a possible harmful consequence for the environment. This is a new concept of liability where the objective criterion prevails over the subjective, since for it to arise, it is irrelevant whether one acted with fault or not; it is sufficient that the damage was effectively caused for the consequent liability to arise immediately. On many occasions, it is not possible to determine either the guilty party or the legal norm infringed, since in most cases the damage is the product of an omission but certainly causes harm, which must necessarily be subject to indemnification. It is in this context that the content of Article 101 of the Organic Law of the Environment and the norm now being challenged, numeral 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, must be understood. This numeral establishes a liability regime for legal persons that have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts covered by said Law, indicating that they shall be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment, with the consequent obligation to repair them in full, also contemplating the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) with the infringing legal person. The petitioner's main argument is that the norm violates the principle of innocence; however, this principle is not violated because the challenged provision does not refer to criminal liability. It expressly indicates this by stating that the joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general falls on the legal persons that participated in the commission of unlawful acts included in the Wildlife Conservation Law "regardless of the personal, civil, or criminal liability that may befall the partners, officers, or representatives." Consequently, regarding this point, the petitioner is also not correct in his allegations. The fact that this type of liability is extended to natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) also does not harm the principle of innocence, since it is likewise related to the possibility that companies related to the infringing legal entity will answer for the environmental damages caused.
B. About the economic interest group (grupo de interés económico).- The purpose of Article 126 with respect to the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of the economic interest group for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general by the infringing legal person is due to the recent integrationist trend of companies at the national and international levels, which has led to the emergence of new and very diverse forms of business organization in the development of their commercial activities. In environmental law, as in other branches of Law, this situation has required on many occasions the rethinking of some legal institutions, the emergence of new figures to regulate novel situations, and also, in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the advancement and development of relationships, mainly social and economic. Both doctrine and jurisprudence have been giving relevance to the figure of the economic unit (unidad económica) as a way to prevent fraud by these companies to the detriment of the rights of third parties, including the right to environmental protection. Currently, the specific formal legal person that appears as the cause of environmental damage or as the infringer is not as important as the determination of a common economic interest that unites the companies and materializes in the existence of an economic fund with sufficient capacity to jointly and severally attend to the claims made for the civil and/or environmental damages caused. The economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) is characterized by the common interests of several companies that, from a formal point of view, appear as separate entities. Spanish doctrine defines the group of companies as "...the set of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction" (Champaud (1962), p. 195 and A. Plá Rodríguez (1981), p.187, cited by Edurne Terradillos Ormaetxea: Los grupos de Empresas ante la Jurisprudencia Social Española, Tirant lo Blanch, Colección Laboral, Valencia, Spain, 2000, p. 17). In this matter, the principle of the primacy of reality prevails, and it is sufficient to prove the existence of an economic community, a group of legal persons operating jointly, for all to be held liable for the civil and/or environmental damages. In these situations, one must go beyond formal corporate appearances to reach reality and not render nugatory the joint and several liability that exists for the damage caused. The foregoing is so in application of the principle "the polluter pays," which informs environmental matters. The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve this right. Prima facie, to guarantee is to assure and protect the right against some risk or need; to defend is to prohibit, forbid, and impede every activity that threatens the right; and to preserve is an action directed at anticipatorily shielding the right from possible dangers in order to make it endure for future generations. The Chamber admits the possibility of civilly sanctioning those subjects of national and international law that are not materially part of the guaranteeing entity and that act covertly using natural or legal persons operating under their command. It is based on the Legal Principle of Piercing the Corporate Veil (Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo) and the doctrinal figures of the Business Economic Group (Grupo Económico Empresarial) and Financial Holding, that it is now possible to hold liable in court those legal and natural persons who hide the reality of their businesses behind other persons directly or indirectly related to them. This modality fits within the thesis of abuse of legal personality, which consists of the abuse of the immunity from liability that the law grants to partners or hidden owners of the corporate assets, to commit lawful or unlawful acts through the company they control; a shield or impunity that materializes when the entity is used willfully to achieve economic and criminal irresponsibility through fraud and the concealment of reality. Under these elements, piercing the corporate veil (levantamiento del velo social) arises with the use of the corporate regime to take advantage of the benefits or privileges of limited liability, under modalities of fraud, concealment, and bad faith.
Based on the Principle of Reality and Piercing the Corporate Veil (Levantamiento de Velo Corporativo), legislation regulating the joint and several civil liability of those legal persons participating in the activity that generates the environmental damage, as well as of the natural and legal persons participating in the same economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) with that legal person related to the harmful act, is appropriate.
The purpose of legal norms on liability is to guarantee restitution or monetary compensation in the event of a measurable negative impact on a good or an interest. With this approach, if damage is caused to an ecosystem, the recognized damages are equivalent to the cost of the necessary measures to restore the ecosystem and leave it in its previous state, or failing that, the cost of the measures to prevent the ecosystem from deteriorating further.
C. Regarding the principles of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad).
The petitioner states that Article 126 violates the principles of reasonableness (razonabilidad) and proportionality (proporcionalidad) because it establishes a generic postulate, without foreseeing that the legal or natural persons who must be held jointly and severally liable can demonstrate their absolute innocence and lack of liability—whether willful or negligent—with respect to the unlawful act committed by the infringing agent. The arguments are not admissible, for the reasons stated to dismiss the alleged violation of the principle of innocence, and because it must be assumed that, prior to establishing joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general, all the requirements of due process must be met, allowing the legal persons to whom this liability is attributed to exercise their right of defense.
VI.- Conclusion. By virtue of all of the foregoing, and the cited precedents, what is required is to declare that this action has no merit.-
Por tanto:
It is declared that the action has no merit.- Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
SL/oc.- CASE FILE N° 09-010348-0007-CO Telephones: 2295-3696/2295-3697/2295-3698/2295-3700. Fax: 2295-3712.
Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional **Exp: 09-010348-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010-09966** **SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-eight minutes on the ninth of June of two thousand ten.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by Alvaro Saénz Saborío, of legal age, married once, Civil Engineer, resident of San Rafael de Escazú, bearer of identity card number 1-500-072, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of amount of the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, legal entity card number 3-002-051316; against Articles 100 and 130 (currently 126) of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, No. 7317 and its amendments.
**Resultando:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Sala at nine hours and fifty-eight minutes on the tenth of July of two thousand nine, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 100 and 130 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, No. 7317, and its amendments as of Law No. 8689 of December 2008, be declared. He alleges that said articles violate the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, legality (tipicidad), and innocence. The norms are challenged insofar as it is considered that Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre violates the principle of equality, because the norm makes no type of differentiation, placing all persons in the same assumption, without contemplating that some are in different situations by having permits or authorizations issued by the pertinent authorities to discharge wastewater. He also considers that the challenged norm violates the reasonableness of equality, since it does not treat unequally those who are in a different factual situation, by having permits to discharge wastewater, placing them in a situation of equality with respect to the rest of the persons who do not have such authorizations. In his judgment, the norm is neither necessary nor suitable for the purpose it intends to satisfy; instead, the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of persons was chosen, even though that purpose could be achieved through Article 132 of the Ley de Conservación de la Vida, which establishes practically the same text as the questioned provision, with the difference that it does not establish the penalty of deprivation of liberty as punishment and contemplates the issue of waste and water treatment systems. He further points out that Article 100 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre harms the principle of legality (tipicidad), since by not providing for any type of exception in the case of those economic agents who previously obtain an authorization for the discharge of contaminating substances, it generates a collision between the typical conduct and the criminal-legal reproach of the action, between legality (tipicidad) and culpability. Thus, persons who have obtained a permit to discharge contaminated water would act under the internal belief that their action is not punishable, as they are protected by the regulations authorizing the conduct; given the wording of the norm, the conduct would be typical. He states that there are many normative provisions that allow discharging contaminated water into receiving bodies, respecting, of course, certain permissible limits or parameters, among which are the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, the Reglamento de Vertido y Reuso de Aguas Residuales, Decreto Ejecutivo N.33601-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, the Reglamento del Canon Ambiental por Vertidos, Decreto Ejecutivo 34431-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, among others. Due to improper legislative technique, the norm lacks the correct normative formulation required for every criminal type, derived from Article 39 of the Constitution. He cites judgment 2006-9170, in which the Sala referred to two types of contaminating discharges: one permitted and one prohibited, a distinction that is not respected in the questioned norm, establishing as typical conduct the mere act of "throwing" contaminated water, waste, or substances, without considering that some of these supposedly unlawful acts could be authorized by prior and specific regulations. Regarding the unconstitutionality of Article 130 of the Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, the claimant first alleges that the norm violates the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, since although the figure of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) exists, applied in branches of law other than criminal law, there always subsists an attributability of the fact and a criminal-legal reproach of a patrimonial nature, derived from a causal link between the subjectively responsible agent and the entity or subject strictly liable. The challenged norm establishes a strict liability without a causal link between the agent and the physical person or legal entity that could well be unrelated to the damage, especially when it indicates that joint and several liability extends —without establishing greater justification— to "the physical persons or legal entities that form the same economic interest group as the infringing person." The burden of proof is reversed, since the law presumes a concurrent culpability of the physical person or legal entity to whom joint and several liability is attributed, which violates the principle of innocence. Regarding the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, he alleges that Article 130 establishes a legal effect that could well be uncaused, in the event that physical persons or legal entities must respond jointly and severally, even though they are totally unrelated to the damage that occurred. If they succeed in proving their innocence and lack of liability (intentional or culpable) regarding the unlawful act carried out by the infringing agent, they should be exempted from the duty to pay damages, as occurs in other cases of strict liability.
Article 130 sanctions everyone equally, constituting an unreasonable and disproportionate rule that establishes joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) violative of the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of guilt.
**2.-** To substantiate the standing (legitimación) it holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, it points out that it is an association that protects the corporate or collective interests of the agricultural, farming, and agro-industrial sectors.
**3.-** By resolution issued at seven thirty in the morning on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, the action was admitted for processing, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República).
**4.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submits its report and points out that Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria lacks standing (legitimación) to file the present unconstitutionality action because the challenged articles do not directly affect the entity's and its members' sphere of action; this is because the contested rules seek to hold persons who contaminate national waters criminally and civilly liable, norms that are not intended to harm the rights or interests of the plaintiff corporation's members. The only effect that could derive from the impugned articles for the members of the corporation would be indirect, a product of non-compliance with the prohibition provided by the legal system against dumping contaminating agents in springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), etc. In this way, given the foregoing, Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria lacks standing (legitimación) to file the present unconstitutionality action, rendering it inadmissible. Despite the foregoing, regarding the challenges raised against Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), a series of scenarios exist in the legal system under which the law authorizes the discharge of contaminating agents into national waters, and the fact that the cited article does not expressly define that the offense is not committed when acting under one of the permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste does not constitute a defect in the criminal definition (tipo penal), nor does it cause the effects indicated by the plaintiff. The principle of legality (tipicidad) requires that criminal norms fully describe the subject matter of the prohibition, and Article 100 does so in a clear, precise, and complete manner, leaving no doubt that "throwing contaminating agents into national waters" is the conduct prohibited by the criminal definition (tipo penal). The permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste into national waters constitute grounds for justification (causales de justificación) with respect to the prohibited matter established in Article 100, and causes for justification are not part of the criminal definition (tipo penal); requiring the criminal definition to expressly exempt all possible causes for justification is beyond the scope of the principle of legality (tipicidad).
Furthermore, there is no violation of the principle of equality because the article does not explicitly exempt the scenario of those who have a permit to dump contaminating agents. Permissive precepts, even if the criminal definition (tipo penal) described in Article 100 does not expressly provide for it, will always have the effect of neutralizing the typicality of the conduct, which rules out the offense and places those who find themselves under the permissive scenario in a different position from those who engaged in the typified conduct and lacked authorization. Nor is it contrary to the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, or suitability, since the conduct typified as a crime by Article 100 is that which is prohibited in Article 132. The mere prohibition of the conduct in Article 132 would be absolutely insufficient to protect the legal interest (bien jurídico) protected by Article 100, firstly because it does not constitute a crime and secondly, because it does not contemplate any penalty for the offender. In accordance with the environmental principle "polluter pays," the cost of pollution must be borne by whoever benefits from it, either by taking the necessary measures to prevent or reduce it, or by repairing its effects once they have occurred. The principle has two functions: a precautionary one and a corrective one, which is stipulated in the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional). The basis of this principle lies in the conceptualization of environmental harm as damage to a collective heritage, which basic natural systems represent, as a crime of a social nature because it affects the foundations of society's existence; economic because it threatens materials and resources indispensable for productive activities; cultural, in that it endangers the way of life of communities; and ethical, because it threatens the existence of present and future generations. In practice, there are great difficulties in individualizing and holding causers liable for the harm caused to the environment and in achieving effective payment of the corresponding liability for environmental pollution. There is a tendency towards complexity in the structures through which economic activities are organized, imposed premeditatedly in some cases, with the specific purpose of circumventing potential liabilities derived from the execution of environmentally risky activities, structures that hinder the identification of the true party responsible for the environmental harm and making them pay for it. The traditional civil liability system based on the subjective imputation criterion is limited, leading to an international trend to create an amplified civil liability system, as well as the recognition of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) scenarios, which ensures the polluter pays principle. Article 130 (126) of the Wildlife Conservation Law reflects the broadening of civil liability scenarios for environmental harm, and therein, with the reform enacted, the joint and several liability (solidaridad) of the natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person is introduced. The contested norm is a legal provision that seeks the application of the aforementioned principle. In its initial part, Article 130 (126) states that legal persons will be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) if they "have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts encompassed under this Law"; this implies that the liability provided for would be based on the demonstrated intervention of the legal person in the acts causing the environmental harm and the corresponding damages. This participation of the legal persons, which is established as a prerequisite for liability, links them to the environmental harm, so they are not alien to the environmental harm, nor is the causal link between the provoking agent (which would be the legal person itself) and the harm dispensed with. The final part of the cited article refers to the joint and several liability (solidaridad) of the natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person, so it presupposes that the participation of the legal person that is part of the economic interest group in the commission of the unlawful acts generating the environmental harm has been demonstrated. The basis of the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) lies in the existing link between the economic interest group and the infringing legal person, as is appropriate when dealing with joint and several liability (solidaridad). Belonging to an economic interest group presupposes that the legal persons that form it maintain significant financial, administrative, or patrimonial relationships among themselves. From the foregoing, it could not be affirmed that the economic interest group is alien to the harm caused, by reason of the existing link between it and the legal person participating in the unlawful acts generating the environmental harm and the damages whose reparation is sought. According to the above, the Office of the Attorney General finds no reasons to consider that the contested norm could be contrary to the principle of innocence. Regarding the principle of proportionality and reasonableness, none of the liability scenarios provided for by the contested article establishes civil liability for a subject alien to the claimed harm; in the first case, it deals with the legal person that participated in the commission of the acts causing the environmental harm, and in the second, with the economic interest group. The extension of joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) to the legal persons that have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts and to the natural and legal persons that form the same economic interest group as the infringing legal entity, provided for by Article 130 (126), is a provision that is proportional to the objective sought. To guarantee the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the "polluter pays" environmental principle, and the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) regulated in the contested article fits the objective of holding the true causer of the harm liable and obliging them to pay the corresponding compensation. For the development of the most environmentally risky economic activities, single-purpose legal persons with limited capital are frequently used, which protect the economic assets of the true owners and beneficiaries of the activity; it is important to establish mechanisms, such as the one provided for in the article challenged here, that allow pursuing and holding liable both the legal person under whose name the activity is developed, and the economic interest group to which they belong, in order to eliminate the economic motivations for pollution, applying in parallel the imperatives of retributive ethics. In this way, Articles 100 and 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law are not contrary to the constitutional principles indicated by the plaintiff.
**5.-** The notices referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 206, 207, and 208 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on October 23, 26, and 27, all in the month of October, 2009 (folio 103).
**6.-** In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.
Prepared by Magistrate **Pacheco Salazar**; and, **Considering:** **I.- On the admissibility of the action.** The unconstitutionality action filed is admissible, by virtue of being directed against provisions of a general nature, and because Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, whose members are producers, businesspersons, and entities from the agricultural, agro-industrial, and forestry sectors, has standing (legitimación) to defend in this venue the interests of its members, who could eventually be affected by the contested norms by virtue of the activities they carry out, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. In this regard, it is opportune to point out that the Court has specified that through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," the legislator meant to refer to the standing (legitimación) held by a corporate entity, when acting through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, provided it involves the challenging of norms or provisions that impact that core of rights or interests that constitutes the reason for being and the unifying factor of the group - judgment 2006-9170 of three thirty-six in the afternoon on June twenty-eighth, two thousand six-.
**II.- Object of the action.** The plaintiff challenges Articles 100 and 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre). Article 4 of Law 8689, of December 4, 2008, renumbered the law, and Article 130 cited by the plaintiff is now Article 126. The norms state:
***Article 100.-*** "Whoever throws sewage (aguas servidas), black water (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any contaminating substance into springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), permanent or non-permanent creeks (arroyos), lakes, lagoons, natural or artificial swamps (marismas) or reservoirs, estuaries (esteros), peat bogs (turberas), wetlands (pantanos, humedales), fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas, shall be sanctioned with a prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years, provided a more serious crime is not configured" ***Article 126.-*** "Independently of the personal, civil, or criminal liability that may apply to the partners, officers, or representatives, the legal persons that have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts encompassed in this Law shall be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) for the damages and losses caused to wildlife and the environment in general, and must repair them fully. Likewise, the natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group as the infringing legal person shall be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables)." The plaintiff impugns Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law because, in its judgment, it infringes the principles of equality, reasonableness, proportionality, and legality (tipicidad). It challenges Article 130 (current Article 126) for violating the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and innocence, since it establishes strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) without a causal link between the agent and the natural or legal person, who could be alien to the harm, especially by extending joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria). It considers that the uncaused attributability of a joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) violates the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of guilt, which is also applicable in the case of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva).
**III.- Regarding the claims of unconstitutionality against Article 100 of the Wildlife Law (Ley de Vida Silvestre).** **A. On the principle of equality and non-discrimination.** This Court has previously recognized that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition that, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment understandable and justifiable. For the differential element argued between both situations to make such a distinction possible, it must not only be real, but must also have a legal significance of such a nature or magnitude that makes the diverse treatment reasonable and justifiable (in this sense, rulings number 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94, and 5061-94). If situations arise where several subjects find themselves in the same conditions, and despite this they receive diverse treatment without any justifiable reason, an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation is considered to exist because it is not supported by objective elements. On this point, in judgment number 337-91 of two fifty-six in the afternoon on February eighth, nineteen ninety-one, the Court indicated in relevant part:
"The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution intends, in part, that the same measure or the same treatment be given to those who find themselves in identical or reasonably similar situations, any difference not being valid to establish a different treatment, since in respect for the reasonableness that must govern every act, only those relevant differences would be a legitimate cause for establishing a different treatment." According to the foregoing, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be either identical, or reasonably alike, or simply similar. Furthermore, for differentiation to proceed constitutionally, it must be reasonable, meaning by this that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional.
**B. On the principle of reasonableness and proportionality.** This Court, in judgment number 4205-96, of 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996, indicated in this regard:
"...However, despite the fact that fundamental rights can be subject to certain restrictions, these are legitimate only when they are necessary to make the validity of democratic and constitutional values possible, so that in addition to being 'necessary,' 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'opportune,' the restriction must imply the existence of an imperative social need that sustains it. In this regard, a distinction must be made between the internal sphere, which refers to the proper or essential content of the right - which has been defined as that part of the content without which the right itself loses its peculiarity, or that which makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a specific type -, so that restrictions or limits that make its exercise impracticable, make it more difficult than reasonable, or strip it of the necessary protection are not permissible; and the external sphere, in which the actions of public authorities and third parties become relevant. Likewise, the legitimacy of restrictions on fundamental rights is governed by a series of principles that this Court has previously indicated - judgment number 3550-92 -, such as, for example: 1.- they must be aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest; 2.- to achieve that public interest, the option that restricts the protected right the least must be chosen among several; 3.- the restriction must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and adjust strictly to the achievement of that objective; 4.- the restriction must be socially imperative, and therefore exceptional." An act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. Proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained for the community. Likewise, it should be noted that said contents must conform, not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to its sense of justice.
**C.** **On the principle of criminal legality (principio de tipicidad penal).** The principle of criminal legality is conceptualized as a principle of constitutional nature, an integral part of due process, derived in turn from the principle of legality in criminal law and intimately related to legal certainty, inasmuch as it guarantees to individuals that they cannot be criminally prosecuted for an action that has not been previously defined as a crime in a clear and precise manner, by a law. In this regard, this Tribunal has stated:
"Article 39 of the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of reservation of law, by which all acts burdensome to citizens, emanating from public authorities, must be established in a formal law. This principle acquires marked importance in criminal matters, for when dealing with crimes and penalties, the law is the sole creative source. In this matter, the content of the Latin aphorism "nullum crimen, nulla paena, sine praevia lege" is commonly accepted.
II.-- When the constituent refers in the cited Article 39 to the term "crime (delito)", they are referring to a typical, unlawful, and culpable action, for which a penalty has been stipulated as a consequence. Of these predicates of the action for it to constitute a crime, the element of criminal legality (tipicidad) and its function as a citizen guarantee are of interest now. For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not enough that it be unlawful—contrary to law—it must be typified, that is, it must be fully described in a norm; this responds to the irrepressible requirements of legal certainty, since repressive matters being those with the greatest intervention in the important legal rights of citizens, to guarantee them against the State, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability; hence the requirement of a prior law, but this requirement is insufficient without criminal legality (tipicidad), for a law that stated, for example, 'any action contrary to good customs shall constitute a crime,' represents no guarantee for the citizenry, even if it is prior; in this case, it will be the judge's criterion that will define the true contours of the conduct to consider whether or not it constitutes a crime. Conversely, if the criminal act is coined in a definition of the offense (tipo) and furthermore, this is closed, the addressee of the norm can easily ascertain its content; thus, for example, simple homicide is fully described in Article 111 of the Penal Code: 'Whoever has caused the death of a person, shall be punished with imprisonment from eight to fifteen years.' The guarantee function of criminal law requires that the definitions of offenses (tipos) be drafted with the greatest possible clarity, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as exactly as possible. In Ruling 1876-90, delivered at sixteen hours today, this Chamber indicated that the principle of legality requires, so that citizens can have knowledge of whether their actions constitute a crime or not, that criminal norms be structured with precision and clarity. Precision stems from the fact that if criminal offense definitions (tipos penales) are formulated with very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining *which* actions are punishable is transferred, as already indicated, to the Judge at the moment of establishing the subsumption of a conduct into a norm, due to the great absorptive capacity of the legal description; and clarity is required for the necessary comprehension that citizens must have of the law, so that they may thus adapt their behavior to the demands of criminal law.
III.-- Criminal offense definitions (tipos penales) must be structured basically as a conditional proposition, consisting of a presupposition (description of the conduct) and a consequence (penalty); in the former, it must necessarily indicate, at least, who the active subject is, since in special offenses (delitos propios) the subject meets certain conditions (nationality, public employee status, etc.), and what the action constituting the infraction is (active verb); without these two basic elements (there are other accessory elements that may or may not be present in the typical description of the act), it can be assured that there is no criminal offense definition (tipo penal).
IV.-- From all the foregoing, it can be concluded that there exists a legislative obligation, for the purpose of criminal legality (tipicidad) constituting a true citizen guarantee, characteristic of a democratic state of law, to use legislative techniques that allow for the correct typification of the conducts intended to be repressed as crimes, because the absolute efficacy of the principle of reservation, which as already indicated is established in Article 39 of the Constitution, only occurs in cases where it is possible to bind the judge's activity to the law, and it is clear that this, in turn, is entirely related to the greater or lesser degree of specificity and clarity that the legislator achieves. The necessary use of language and its restrictions obliges that in some cases the same level of precision may not be achieved; it cannot therefore be deemed that the description presents constitutional problems in relation to criminal legality (tipicidad); establishing the limit of generalization or specificity required by the principle of legality must be done in each particular case.
V.-- Problems of legislative technique mean that on some occasions the legislator is obliged, in addition to using terms that are not entirely precise (public tranquility in Article 271 of the Penal Code), or terms with great absorptive capacity (artifices or deceptions in Article 216 of the Penal Code), to relate the norm to others, a topic that was already addressed by the Chamber in the aforementioned Ruling 1876-90. Both practices can entail obscurity in the norm and hinder its comprehension, causing in some cases frictions with the requirements that criminal legality (tipicidad) entails as a guarantee, although not necessarily with the Constitution." (Judgment 1990-01877 of sixteen hours and two minutes on December nineteenth, nineteen-ninety).
With what has been indicated in this recital (considerando), the arguments of the petitioner will be analyzed.
**IV.- Analysis of Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.** A declaration of unconstitutionality is requested against Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which punishes with "imprisonment of one (1) to three (3) years, provided a more serious crime is not configured" whoever "*discharges sewage (aguas servidas), blackwater (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any contaminating substance into springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), creeks (arroyos) permanent or non-permanent, lakes, lagoons, marshes and natural or artificial reservoirs, estuaries, peatlands (turberas), swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas.*" First of all, the Chamber concludes that the challenged norm does not violate the principle of criminal legality (principio de tipicidad), according to which both the conducts and the sanctions attributed must be described in a norm, in a precise and clear manner. All the constituent elements of the criminal offense definition (tipo penal) are clearly defined: the active subject, the action or verb (discharging sewage (aguas servidas), blackwater (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any contaminating substance into springs, rivers, streams (quebradas), creeks (arroyos) permanent or non-permanent, lakes, lagoons, marshes and natural or artificial reservoirs, estuaries, peatlands (turberas), swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas), and the penalty to be applied (imprisonment of one to three years, provided a more serious crime is not configured). The fact that the norm does not expressly establish that those who have obtained a permit for discharging contaminating substances, in cases where it is appropriate according to applicable regulations, will not be punished, does not render it unconstitutional, as it is precisely the role of the criminal judge to determine in each specific case whether or not there exists a permit for discharging contaminating substances into a specific body of water, conferred by the competent authorities; in which case, the action would be typical but not unlawful, so the crime provided for in the norm under study would not be configured.
Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law also does not infringe the principle of equality, since although evidently those who have obtained permits for the discharge of contaminating substances into receiving bodies are not in the same legal situation as those who do not have such administrative authorization, the fact that the norm establishes a general postulate, when enunciating the active subject of the crime, in no way injures the principle of equality. Thus, the inequality does not have the scope that the petitioner indicates, because as already analyzed, at the moment of applying the law, it will be the Criminal Judge who must assess, in the specific case, the particular conditions of the person to whom the conduct is attributed, in order to determine whether or not criminal liability exists.
Regarding the alleged infraction of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, the petitioner's arguments are the same ones used to substantiate the supposed infraction of the principle of equality, as they state that the norm violates the reasonableness of equality, because it does not treat differently persons who are in a different factual situation, due to having permits or authorizations to discharge wastewater (aguas residuales), placing them in a position of equality with respect to the rest of the people who do not have such authorizations, so this allegation must be refuted based on the same reasons already set forth to reject the supposed infraction of the principle of equality. As to the lack of necessity and suitability of the norm, which establishes the penalty of imprisonment, which is the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of individuals, despite the fact that the objective sought to be satisfied can perfectly be achieved through Article 132 (current Article 128 by virtue of the reform operated by Law 8689 of December 4, 2008) of the same law, it is necessary to point out that this Tribunal has indicated on repeated occasions that the determination of criminal offense definitions (tipos penales) (conducts deemed harmful to society) and their respective sanction is a matter of criminal policy reserved exclusively to legislators. The Political Constitution itself, in its Article 39, assigns to the legislator the exclusive competence to dictate criminal policy, that is, to determine which conducts are penalized and with what quantum of penalty, when it indicates that the creation of crimes and penalties is reserved to law, so that what this Chamber can control is solely that it is issued in harmony with the constitutional framework. Whether the criminal policy is particularly good or bad is a topic that escapes—as stated—the competencies constitutionally assigned to this Tribunal. Thus, if the legislator deemed that the conducts described in Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law should be punished with imprisonment, by virtue of the relevance of the protected legal right, they have acted in exercise of the constitutionally attributed powers, so that in respect of this point, the petitioner's arguments must also be rejected.
**V.- On the challenges of unconstitutionality against Article 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.** **A. On the principle of innocence.** In resolutions 500-90 of 17:00 hours on May 15, 1990, and 2063-91 of 10:05 hours on October 11, 2001, this Chamber maintained the thesis that, by reason of the provisions of Article 39 of the Political Constitution, regarding the necessary demonstration of guilt (culpabilidad) in order to attribute criminal liability to a specific person, objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) is proscribed in our criminal procedural system—that which arises from the development of a causal chain that produces a result subsumable under a criminal offense definition (tipo penal), but in which there is no relationship of guilt (culpabilidad) with the subject who gave rise to it. It is not possible, constitutionally and legally speaking, to accept the theory of objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva), which does find application in other matters, but which is excluded from application in criminal matters, for in the latter, a relationship of guilt (culpabilidad) between the act committed and the result of the action must necessarily be demonstrated for it to be attributed to the active subject; if the subject's action cannot be reproached, they cannot be criminally punished. Based on objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva), the perpetrator of an act can be punished, even if their behavior cannot be personally reproached; in this case, the decisive factor is the objective cause of the harmful result, without requiring that a relationship of guilt (culpabilidad) exists between the latter and the subject's action. Judgment number 01739-92, regarding the principle of innocence, stated the following:
"Like the previous ones, it derives from Article 39 of the Constitution, insofar as it requires the necessary demonstration of guilt (culpabilidad). No person can be considered or treated as guilty while there is no final conclusive judgment against them, rendered in a regular and legal process that declares them as such after that presumption has been destroyed or overcome.
Moreover, by virtue of the state of innocence of the accused, it is not he who must prove his lack of guilt (culpabilidad), but the accusing bodies, with complementary effects such as the impossibility, during the process, of coercing him and, even more so, of subjecting him to torture or cruel or degrading treatment—expressly proscribed by Article 40 of the Constitution—as well as the fact that his liberty can only be restrictively and extraordinarily limited to guarantee the purposes of the process, that is, to prevent him from evading the action of justice or seriously obstructing the verification of the facts, or to prevent these from recurring in certain serious cases—such as in abuses against dependent persons—but never invoking the gravity of the crimes or the evidence existing against him, precisely because his state of innocence absolutely forbids holding him, directly or presumptively, as guilty (...)" Thus, the principle of innocence implies that the court's conviction regarding the guilt (culpabilidad) of the accused must overcome any reasonable doubt, so that any doubt that exists obliges a ruling in their favor. The norm being questioned contemplates another type of liability, derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, provisions that by extension are applied to environmental damage, as enshrined in the Organic Law of the Environment, Articles 98 and 101 of the Biodiversity Law. This Tribunal has already indicated on previous occasions, for example in Judgment No. 2000-1669 of 14:51 hours on February 18, 2000, that the issue of liability for environmental damage has been treated differently, taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the matter at hand. The State, to somehow ensure compensation for damages caused to the environment, has created a series of norms regulating matters relating to environmental liability, without losing sight, of course, of the necessary balance that must exist between environmental protection and the development of private activities. In Environmental Law, a different approach to liability has been taken, such that it has evolved from a system of fault-based liability (responsabilidad por culpa) to one of risk-based liability (responsabilidad por riesgo), which means greater coverage, as said liability would arise even without fault on the part of the transgressor, if the activity performed is deemed risky and they assume that risk, with a possible harmful consequence for the environment. This is a new concept of liability, where the objective criterion prevails over the subjective one, since for its emergence it is irrelevant whether one acted with fault (culpa) or not; it is enough that the damage was actually caused for the consequent liability to arise immediately. On many occasions, it is not possible to determine either the guilty party or the infringed legal norm, since in most cases the damage is a product of an omission, but it certainly causes harm, which must necessarily be subject to compensation. It is in this context that the content of Article 101 of the Organic Law of the Environment and that of the norm now challenged, Article 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, must be understood, which establishes a liability regime for legal entities that have participated in the commission of the illicit acts included in said Law, indicating that they will be jointly and severally liable for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment, with the consequent obligation to repair them fully, also contemplating the joint and several liability of the individuals or legal entities that form part of the same economic interest group as the infringing legal entity. The petitioner's main argument is that the norm violates the principle of innocence; however, such principle is not infringed because the challenged provision does not refer to criminal liability. It expressly indicates this by noting that the joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general lies with the legal entities that have participated in the commission of illicit acts covered by the Wildlife Conservation Law "independently of the personal, civil, or criminal liability that may fall upon the partners, agents, or representatives," so that regarding this point the petitioner is also not correct in their allegations. The fact that this type of liability is extended to the individuals or legal entities that form part of the same economic interest group also does not harm the principle of innocence, as it concerns equally the possibility that companies related to the infringing legal entity be held liable for the environmental damages caused.
**B. Regarding the economic interest group.—** The purpose of Article 126 with respect to the joint and several liability of the economic interest group for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general by the infringing legal entity is due to the *recent integrationist trend of companies at the national and international level, which has given rise to the appearance of new and very diverse forms of organization of enterprises in the development of their commercial activities*. In environmental law, as in other branches of law, this situation has required, on many occasions, the rethinking of some legal institutes, the emergence of new figures to regulate novel situations; and, also in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the progress and development of mainly social and economic relations. Both doctrine and jurisprudence have been giving relevance to the figure of the economic unit as a way to prevent fraud by these companies to the detriment of third-party rights, including the right to environmental protection. Currently, it is not so important which legal entity formally appears as the cause of environmental damage or which legal entity is the infringer, but rather the determination of a common economic interest that unites the companies and that materializes in the existence of an economic fund with sufficient capacity to jointly and severally address the claims made for the civil and/or environmental damages caused. The economic interest group is characterized by the common interests of several companies that, from a formal point of view, appear as distinct entities. Spanish doctrine defines a group of companies as "*...the set of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction*" (Champaud (1962), p. 195 and A. Plá Rodríguez (1981), p.187, cited by Edurne Terradillos Ormaetxea: Los grupos de Empresas ante la Jurisprudencia Social Española, Tirant lo Blanch, Colección Laboral, Valencia, Spain, 2000, p. 17). In this matter, the principle of the primacy of reality prevails, and it is sufficient that the existence of an economic community is proven, a group of legal entities that operate jointly, so that all may be held liable for civil and/or environmental damages. In these situations, one must go beyond formal corporate appearances to reach reality and not render nugatory the joint and several liability held for the damage caused. The foregoing is so, in application of the principle, "the polluter pays," which informs environmental matters. The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve that right. *Prima facie*, to guarantee is to ensure and protect the right against some risk or need; to defend is to forbid, prohibit, and impede any activity that threatens the right; and to preserve is an action directed at protecting the right beforehand from possible dangers in order to make it endure for future generations. The Chamber admits the possibility of civilly sanctioning those subjects of national and international law who materially do not form part of the guaranteeing subject and who act covertly using individuals or legal entities operating under their command; it is on the basis of the Legal Principle of *Piercing the Corporate Veil* and with the doctrinal figures of the *Business Economic Group* and *Financial Holding*, that it is now possible to hold judicially liable those legal entities and individuals who hide the reality of business dealings under other persons directly or indirectly related to them. This modality fits within the thesis of *abuse of legal personality*, which consists of the abuse of the immunity from liability that the law grants to partners or hidden owners of the corporate assets, to commit lawful or unlawful acts through the company they control; a shield or impunity that materializes when the person is used fraudulently to achieve economic and criminal irresponsibility, through fraud and the concealment of reality.
Under these elements, the <em>piercing of the corporate veil</em> arises with the use of the corporate regime to take advantage of the benefits or privileges of limited liability, under modalities of fraud, concealment, and bad faith.
Based on the Principle of Reality and the Piercing of the Corporate Veil, legislation is appropriate that regulates the joint and several civil liability of those legal entities that participate in the activity generating environmental damage, as well as of the natural and legal persons that participate in the same economic interest group with that legal entity related to the harmful act.
The purpose of legal norms on liability is to guarantee restitution or monetary compensation in the case of a measurable negative impact on an asset or interest. With this approach, if damage is caused to an ecosystem, the recognized damages are equivalent to the cost of the measures necessary to restore the ecosystem and leave it in its previous state, or failing that, the cost of the measures to prevent the ecosystem from deteriorating even further.
**C. On the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The plaintiff points out that article 126 violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, because it establishes a generic postulate, without providing that the legal or natural persons that must be jointly and severally liable can demonstrate their absolute innocence and lack of liability—willful or negligent—with respect to the unlawful act carried out by the offending agent. The arguments are not admissible, for the reasons stated for dismissing the alleged violation of the principle of innocence, and because it must be assumed that, prior to establishing joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general, all the requirements of due process must be met, allowing the legal entities to which this liability is attributed to exercise their right of defense.
**VI.-Conclusion.** By virtue of all the foregoing, and of the precedents cited, what is required is to declare this action without merit.- **Por tanto:** It is declared no grounds for the action.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
SL/oc.- **EXPEDIENTE N° 09-010348-0007-CO** **File: 09-010348-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2010-09966** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-eight minutes on June ninth, two thousand ten.** Action of unconstitutionality brought by Alvaro Sáenz Saborío, of legal age, married once, Civil Engineer, resident of San Rafael de Escazú, holder of identity card number 1-500-072, in his capacity as President with powers of Generalísimo Attorney-in-Fact without limit of sum of the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, legal entity ID number 3-002-051316; against Articles 100 and 130 (currently 126) of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre) No. 7317 and its amendments.
**Whereas:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at nine hours fifty-eight minutes on July tenth, two thousand nine, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Articles 100 and 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre) No. 7317 and its amendments, as of Law No. 8689 of December 2008, be declared. He alleges that said articles violate the principles of equality, proportionality, reasonableness, legality (tipicidad), and presumption of innocence. The norms are challenged insofar as it is considered that Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law violates the principle of equality, because the norm makes no type of differentiation, placing all persons in the same scenario, without contemplating that some are in different situations by having permits or authorizations issued by the pertinent authorities to discharge wastewater (aguas residuales). He further considers that the challenged norm violates the reasonableness of equality, since it does not treat unequally those who are in a different factual scenario, by having permits to discharge wastewater (aguas residuales), placing them in a situation of equality with respect to the rest of the people who do not have such authorizations. In his judgment, the norm is neither necessary nor suitable for the purpose it intends to satisfy, but rather the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of persons was chosen, even though said purpose can be achieved through Article 132 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, which establishes practically the same text as the disputed provision, with the difference that it does not establish a custodial sentence as punishment and contemplates the issue of treatment systems for waste and water. He also points out that Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law injures the principle of legality (tipicidad), because by not foreseeing any type of exception for the case of those economic agents who previously obtain an authorization to discharge polluting substances, it generates a collision between the typical conduct and the criminal legal reproach of the action, between the objective elements of the crime (tipicidad) and culpability. Thus, persons who have obtained a permit for the discharge of polluting waters would act under the internal belief that their action is not punishable, since they are protected by the regulations that authorize the conduct. Given the wording of the norm, the conduct would be typical. He asserts that there are many regulatory provisions that allow discharging polluting waters into receiving bodies, respecting, of course, certain permissible limits or parameters, among which are the Organic Environmental Law, the Regulation for the Discharge and Reuse of Wastewater (Reglamento de Vertido y Reuso de Aguas Residuales), Executive Decree No. 33601-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, the Regulation of the Environmental Canon for Discharges (Reglamento del Canon Ambiental por Vertidos), Executive Decree 34431-MINAE-S of August 9, 2006, among others. Due to improper legislative technique, the norm lacks the correct regulatory formulation required for every criminal offense, derived from Constitutional Article 39. He cites judgment 2006-9170, in which the Chamber referred to two types of polluting discharges: a permitted one and a prohibited one, a distinction that is not respected in the challenged norm, as the simple act of "discharging" waters, waste, or polluting substances is established as typical conduct, without considering that some of those supposedly illicit acts could be authorized by prior and specific regulations. Regarding the unconstitutionality of Article 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, the petitioner first alleges that the norm violates the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 39 of the Political Constitution, because even though the concept of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) exists, applied in other branches of law different from criminal law, there always subsists an attributability of the act and a criminal-legal reproach of a patrimonial nature, derived from a causal link between the subjectively responsible agent and the objectively responsible entity or subject. The challenged norm establishes strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) without a causal link between the agent and the natural or legal person who could well be unrelated to the damage, especially when it indicates that joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) extends - without establishing greater justification - to "the natural or legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) as the offending person." The burden of proof is reversed, since the law presumes a concurrent culpability of the natural or legal person to whom joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) is attributed, which violates the principle of innocence.
Regarding the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, it alleges that Article 130 establishes a legal effect that could well be uncaused, in the event that individuals or legal entities must be held jointly and severally liable, even if they are completely unrelated to the damage that occurred. If they manage to demonstrate their innocence and lack of responsibility (willful misconduct or negligence) with respect to the unlawful act carried out by the offending agent, they should be exempted from the duty to pay damages and losses, as occurs in other cases of strict liability. Article 130 punishes everyone equally, constituting an unreasonable and disproportionate rule that establishes joint and several liability in violation of the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of guilt.
2.- For the purpose of substantiating the standing it holds to bring this action of unconstitutionality, it indicates that it is an association that safeguards the corporate or collective interests of the agricultural, farming, and agro-industrial sectors.
3.- By resolution of seven thirty a.m. on October 13, 2009, the action was admitted for processing, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República).
4.- The Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) submits its report and indicates that the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria lacks standing to file this action of unconstitutionality because the challenged articles do not have the characteristic of directly affecting the sphere of action of the entity and its members; this is because the challenged rules aim to hold persons criminally and civilly liable for contaminating national waters, rules that are not intended to injure the rights or interests of the members of the petitioning corporation. The only effect that could arise from the challenged articles for the members of the corporation would be indirect, resulting from non-compliance with the prohibition established by the legal system against dumping polluting agents into springs, rivers, streams, etc. Thus, based on the foregoing, the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria lacks standing to file this action of unconstitutionality, and therefore it is inadmissible. Notwithstanding the foregoing, regarding the challenges raised against Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre), there are a series of assumptions in the legal system under which the law authorizes the discharge of polluting agents into national waters, and the fact that the cited article does not expressly define that the offense is not incurred when one is operating under one of the permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste does not constitute a defect of the criminal statute, nor does it cause the effects indicated by the petitioner. The principle of specificity (principio de tipicidad) requires that criminal laws fully describe the prohibited matter, and Article 100 does so clearly, precisely, and completely, leaving no doubt that "dumping polluting agents into national waters" is the conduct prohibited by the criminal statute. The permissive precepts contained in the legal system for the discharge of waste into national waters constitute grounds for justification (causales de justificación) regarding the prohibited matter established in Article 100, and the grounds for justification are not part of the criminal statute; requiring the criminal statute to expressly except all possible grounds for justification is beyond the scope of the principle of specificity.
Furthermore, there is no violation of the principle of equality because the article does not explicitly except the situation of those who have a permit to discharge polluting agents. The permissive precepts, even if the criminal statute described in Article 100 does not expressly so provide, will always have the effect of neutralizing the specificity of the conduct, which rules out the offense and places those who fall under the permissive assumption in a position different from that of those who incurred in the specified conduct and did not have authorization. Nor is it contrary to the principle of proportionality and reasonableness or suitability, because the conduct classified as a crime by Article 100 is precisely what is prohibited in Article 132. The mere prohibition of the conduct set forth in Article 132 would be absolutely insufficient to protect the legal right safeguarded by Article 100, first because it does not constitute a crime, and second, because it does not contemplate any penalty for the offender. In accordance with the environmental principle "the polluter pays" (quien contamina paga), the cost of pollution must be borne by whoever benefits from it, either by taking the necessary measures to prevent or reduce it, or by repairing its effects once they occur. The principle has two functions: a precautionary one and a corrective one, which are stipulated in the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente) and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The basis of this principle lies in the conceptualization of environmental damage as an impact on a collective heritage, which is what basic natural systems represent, as a crime of a social nature because it affects the bases of society's existence; economic because it threatens the materials and resources essential for productive activities; cultural, insofar as it endangers the way of life of communities; and ethical, because it threatens the existence of present and future generations. In practice, there are great difficulties in individualizing and holding the causer of the damage caused to the environment liable, and in achieving effective payment of the corresponding liability for environmental pollution. There is a trend towards complexity in the structures in which economic activities are organized, imposed deliberately in some cases, with the specific purpose of evading potential liabilities arising from the execution of activities risky for the environment, structures that hinder the identification of the true party responsible for environmental damage and making them pay for it. The traditional civil liability system based on the criterion of subjective attribution is limited, so the international trend is to create an expanded civil liability system, as well as the recognition of strict liability assumptions, which allows guaranteeing the principle that the polluter pays. Article 130 (126) of the Wildlife Conservation Law reflects the expansion of the assumptions of civil liability for environmental damage, and there, with the reform made, the joint and several liability of the natural or legal persons comprising the same economic interest group as the offending legal entity is introduced. The challenged rule is a legal provision that pursues the application of the aforementioned principle. The initial part of Article 130 (126) states that legal entities that "have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts covered by this Law" shall be jointly and severally liable; this implies that the provided liability would be based on the demonstrated involvement of the legal entity in the acts causing environmental damage and the corresponding losses. This participation of legal entities, established as a prerequisite for liability, links them to the environmental damage, such that they are not unrelated to environmental damage, nor is the causal link between the provoking agent (which would be the legal entity itself) and the damage dispensed with. The final part of the cited article refers to the joint and several liability of the natural or legal persons comprising the same economic interest group as the offending legal entity, thus presupposing that the participation of the legal entity that is part of the economic interest group in the commission of the unlawful acts generating the environmental damage has been demonstrated. The basis for joint and several liability lies in the link existing between the economic interest group and the offending legal entity, as corresponds when dealing with joint and several liability. Belonging to an economic interest group presupposes that the legal entities comprising it maintain significant financial, administrative, or patrimonial relationships amongst themselves. From the foregoing, it cannot be asserted that the economic interest group is unrelated to the damage caused, by reason of the link existing between it and the legal entity participating in the unlawful acts generated from the environmental damage and the losses for which reparation is sought. According to the stated, the Office of the Attorney General finds no reasons to consider that the challenged rule could be contrary to the principle of innocence. With respect to the principle of proportionality and reasonableness, none of the liability assumptions provided for in the challenged article provides for civil liability for a subject unrelated to the claimed damage; in the first case, it concerns the legal entity that participated in the commission of the acts causing the environmental damage, and in the second, the economic interest group. The extension of joint and several liability to legal entities that have participated in the commission of unlawful acts and to natural and legal persons comprising the same economic interest group as the offending legal entity, provided for in Article 130 (126), is a provision that is proportional to the objective sought. To guarantee the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the environmental principle "the polluter pays," and the joint and several liability regulated in the challenged article conforms to the objective of holding the true causer of the damage liable and obligating them to pay the corresponding compensation. For the development of the economic activities most risky for the environment, single-purpose legal entities with limited capital are frequently used, protecting the economic patrimony of the true owners and beneficiaries of the activity. It is important to establish mechanisms, such as the one provided for in the challenged rule here, that allow pursuing and holding liable both the legal entity under whose name the activity is carried out and the economic interest group to which they belong, in order to eliminate the economic motivations for pollution, applying in parallel the imperatives of retributive ethics. Thus, Articles 100 and 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law are not contrary to the constitutional principles indicated by the petitioner.
5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 206, 207, and 208 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on October 23, 26, and 27, all in the month of October 2009 (folio 103).
6.- The procedures have complied with the prescriptions of law.
Drafted by Magistrate Pacheco Salazar; and,
Considering:
I.- On the admissibility of the action. The action of unconstitutionality filed is admissible, by virtue of being directed against provisions of a general nature, and because the Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, whose members are producers, businesspersons, and entities from the farming, agro-industrial, and forestry sectors, has standing to defend in this venue the interests of its members, who could eventually be affected by the challenged rules by virtue of the activities they carry out, a situation contemplated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Chamber has specified that through the expression "interests that concern the community as a whole," the legislator intended to refer to the standing held by a corporate entity when it acts through its representatives, in defense of the rights and interests of the persons that make up its associative base, provided that it concerns the challenging of rules or provisions that affect that core of rights or interests that constitutes the raison d'être and the binding factor of the group - decision 2006-9170 of four thirty-six p.m. on June 28, 2006-.
II.- Purpose of the action. The petitioner challenges Articles 100 and 130 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre). Article 4 of Law 8689, of December 4, 2008, renumbered the law, and Article 130 cited by the petitioner is now Article 126. The rules state:
Article 100.- "Shall be punished with a prison sentence of one (1) to three (3) years, provided a more serious crime is not constituted, whoever dumps wastewater (aguas servidas), sewage (aguas negras), sludge (lodos), waste, or any pollutant substance into springs, rivers, streams, permanent or non-permanent creeks, lakes, lagoons, natural or artificial reservoirs and marshes, estuaries, peat bogs, swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas" Article 126.- "Independently of the personal, civil, or criminal liability that may apply to the partners, agents, or representatives, legal entities that have participated in the commission of the unlawful acts covered by this Law shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages and losses caused to wildlife and the environment in general, and must repair them fully. Likewise, the natural or legal persons comprising the same economic interest group as the offending legal entity shall be jointly and severally liable." The petitioner challenges Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law because, in its judgment, it violates the principles of equality, reasonableness and proportionality, and specificity. It challenges Article 130 (current Article 126) for injuring the principles of proportionality, reasonableness, and innocence, as it establishes strict liability without a causal link between the agent and the natural or legal person, which could be unrelated to the damage, especially insofar as it extends joint and several liability. It considers that the uncaused attributability of joint and several liability violates the principle of innocence and the necessary demonstration of guilt, which is also applicable in the case of strict liability.
III.- On the claims of unconstitutionality against Article 100 of the Wildlife Law.
A. On the principle of equality and non-discrimination. This Chamber has recognized on previous occasions that it is perfectly possible for two subjects or categories of subjects to differ in some essential characteristic or condition that, by its nature, makes a difference in treatment comprehensible and justifiable. For the differential element argued between both situations to make such a distinction possible, it must not only be real, but must also have legal significance of such a nature or magnitude as to make the different treatment reasonable and justifiable (in this sense, votes number 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94, and 5061-94). If situations arise in which several subjects are in the same conditions, and despite this they receive a different treatment without any justifiable reason intervening, it is considered that an unreasonable and discriminatory differentiation exists because it is not supported by objective elements. On this point, in decision number 337-91 of two fifty-six p.m. on February 8, 1991, the Chamber stated, as relevant:
"The principle of equality contained in Article 33 of the Constitution seeks, in part, that the same measure or the same treatment be given to those who find themselves in identical or reasonably similar situations, as not just any difference is valid for establishing a different treatment, since in respect for the reasonableness that should govern every act, only those relevant differences would be a legitimate cause for establishing a different treatment" According to the foregoing, to aspire to equal treatment, the situations must be either identical or reasonably alike or simply similar. Furthermore, for differentiation to be constitutionally proper, it must be reasonable, meaning by this that it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional.
B. On the principle of reasonableness and proportionality. This Tribunal, in decision number 4205-96, of 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996, indicated in this regard:
"...However, despite the fact that fundamental rights may be subject to certain restrictions, these are legitimate only when they are necessary to enable the effectiveness of democratic and constitutional values, such that in addition to being 'necessary,' 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'opportune,' the restriction must imply the existence of an imperative social need that supports it. In this line of thought, one must distinguish between the internal sphere, which refers to the proper or essential content of the right -which has been defined as that part of the content without which the right itself loses its peculiarity, or what makes it recognizable as a right belonging to a specific type-, such that no restrictions or limits are permissible that make its exercise impracticable, hinder it beyond what is reasonable, or strip it of the necessary protection; and the external sphere, in which the action of public authorities and third parties becomes relevant. Likewise, the legitimacy of restrictions on fundamental rights is ordered by a series of principles that this Tribunal has previously indicated -decision number 3550-92-, for example: 1.- they must be aimed at satisfying an imperative public interest; 2.- to achieve that public interest, the option that restricts the protected right to the least extent must be chosen among several options; 3.- the restriction must be proportional to the interest that justifies it and strictly conform to achieving that objective; 4.- the restriction must be socially imperative, and therefore exceptional." An act limiting rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it is necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community. Suitability, in turn, involves a judgment regarding whether or not the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need. Proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of markedly greater magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained from it for the benefit of the community.
Likewise, it must be noted that such content must conform not only to the specific norms or precepts of the Constitution, but also to its sense of justice.
**C. Regarding the principle of criminal legality (principio de tipicidad penal).** The principle of criminal legality is conceptualized as a principle of constitutional nature, an integral part of due process, derived in turn from the principle of criminal legality and intimately related to legal certainty, inasmuch as it guarantees that individuals may not be criminally prosecuted for an action that has not been previously defined as a crime in a clear and precise manner, by a norm of legal rank. In this regard, this Court has stated:
*"Article 39 of the Political Constitution enshrines the principle of legal reservation (principio de reserva del ley) whereby all acts burdensome to citizens, originating from public authorities, must be agreed upon in a formal law. This principle acquires marked importance in criminal matters, since when dealing with crimes and penalties, the law is the sole creative source. In this matter, the content of the Latin aphorism 'nullum crimen, nulla paena, sine praevia lege' is commonly accepted.* *II.-- When the constituent authority refers to the term 'crime' in the cited Article 39, it is referring to a typical, unlawful, and culpable action, to which a penalty has been assigned as a consequence. Of those predicates of the action for it to constitute a crime, the element of criminal legality (tipicidad) and its function as a citizen guarantee is of interest now. For a conduct to constitute a crime, it is not sufficient that it be unlawful—contrary to law—; it is necessary that it be typified, that is, fully described in a norm. This is due to unsuppressible demands of legal certainty, because criminal matters being those involving the greatest intervention in important legal interests of citizens, to guarantee these against the State, it is necessary that they can have full knowledge of which actions they must refrain from committing, under penalty of incurring criminal liability. For this, the requirement of a prior law exists, but this requirement is not sufficient without criminal legality, because a law that stated, for example, 'any action contrary to good customs will constitute a crime,' represents no guarantee for the citizenry, even if it is prior; in this case, it will be the judge's criterion that provides the true contours to the conduct to deem it or not constitutive of a crime. On the other hand, if the criminal act is coined in a type and furthermore this is closed, the addressee of the norm can easily become aware of its content; thus, for example, simple homicide is fully described in Article 111 of the Penal Code: 'Whoever causes the death of a person shall be punished with imprisonment from eight to fifteen years.' The guarantee function of criminal law requires that types be drafted with the greatest possible clarity, so that both their content and their limits can be deduced from the text as accurately as possible. Already in vote 1876-90 of sixteen hours today, this Chamber indicated that the principle of legality requires, so that citizens can have knowledge about whether their actions constitute a crime or not, that criminal norms be structured with precision and clarity. Precision is necessary because if criminal types are formulated with very broad, ambiguous, or general terms, the task of determining which actions are punishable is transferred, as already indicated, to the judge at the moment of establishing the subsumption of conduct to a norm, due to the great absorptive capacity of the legal description; and clarity is necessary for the understanding that citizens must have of the law, so that they may thus adapt their behavior to the pretenses of the criminal law.* *III.-- Criminal types must be basically structured as a conditional proposition, consisting of a presupposition (description of the conduct) and a consequence (penalty). In the first, it must necessarily be indicated, at least, who the active subject is, since in specific crimes they meet certain conditions (status as a national, public employee, etc.), and what the action constituting the infraction is (active verb). Without these two basic elements (there are other accessory elements which may or may not be present in the typical description of the act), it can be assured that no criminal type exists.* *IV.-- From all the foregoing, it can be concluded that a legislative obligation exists, in order for criminal legality to constitute a true citizen guarantee, proper to a democratic State of Law, to use legislative techniques that allow correctly typifying the conducts that it intends to repress as a crime. The absolute efficacy of the principle of legal reservation, which as already indicated is established in Article 39 of the Constitution, occurs only in cases where the judge's activity is successfully linked to the law, and it is clear that this is, in turn, entirely related to the greater or lesser degree of concreteness and clarity achieved by the legislator. The necessary use of language and its restrictions obliges that in some cases the same level of precision cannot be achieved; it cannot be assumed, for that reason, that the description presents constitutional problems in relation to criminal legality. Establishing the limit of generalization or concreteness required by the principle of legality must be done in each particular case.* *V.-- Problems of legislative technique mean that on some occasions the legislator is obliged, besides using terms that are not entirely precise (public tranquility in Article 271 of the Penal Code), or with great absorptive capacity (artifices or deceptions in Article 216 of the Penal Code), to relate the norm to other norms, a topic that was already addressed by the Chamber in the aforementioned vote 1876-90. Both practices can entail obscurity in the norm and hinder its comprehension, causing in some cases friction with the demands entailed by criminal legality as a guarantee, although not necessarily with the Constitution."* (Judgment 1990-01877 of sixteen hours two minutes of the nineteenth of December of nineteen hundred and ninety).
With what has been indicated in this considering, the arguments of the petitioner will be analyzed.
**IV.- Analysis of Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre).** The declaration of unconstitutionality of Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law is requested, which sanctions with "imprisonment from one (1) to three (3) years, provided that a more serious crime is not configured," whoever "*discharges gray water (aguas servidas), sewage (aguas negras), sludge, waste, or any polluting substance into springs (manantiales), rivers, streams (quebradas), permanent or non-permanent brooks (arroyos), lakes, lagoons, marshes (marismas), and natural or artificial reservoirs, estuaries (esteros), peat bogs (turberas), swamps (pantanos), wetlands (humedales), fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas (áreas de protección)*." In the first place, the Chamber concludes that the impugned norm does not violate the principle of criminal legality, according to which both the conduct and the sanctions attributed must be described in a norm, in a precise and clear manner. All the constituent elements of the criminal type are clearly defined: the active subject, the action or verb (discharging gray water, sewage, sludge, waste, or any polluting substance into springs, rivers, streams, permanent or non-permanent brooks, lakes, lagoons, marshes, and natural or artificial reservoirs, estuaries, peat bogs, swamps, wetlands, fresh, brackish, or salt waters, in their channels or in their respective protection areas), and the sanction to be applied (imprisonment from one to three years, provided that a more serious crime is not configured). The fact that the norm does not expressly establish that those who have obtained a permit for the discharge of polluting substances will not be sanctioned, in cases where this proceeds according to applicable regulations, does not render it unconstitutional, because it is precisely the task of the criminal judge to determine in each specific case whether or not a permit exists for the discharge of polluting substances into a determined body of water, granted by the competent authorities, in which case the action would be typical (típica), but not unlawful, so the crime provided for in the norm under study would not be configured.
Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law does not infringe the principle of equality either, since although evidently those who have obtained permits for the discharge of polluting substances into receiving bodies are not in the same legal situation as those who do not have that administrative authorization, the fact that the norm establishes a general postulate, when enunciating the active subject of the crime, does not harm in any way the principle of equality. Thus, the inequality does not have the scopes that the petitioner indicates, because as already analyzed, at the moment of applying the law, it will be the Criminal Judge who must assess in the specific case, the particular conditions of the person to whom the conduct is attributed, in order to determine whether or not criminal responsibility exists.
Regarding the alleged infringement of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the petitioner's arguments are the same ones used to support the supposed infringement of the principle of equality, since he states that the norm violates the reasonableness of equality, because it does not treat unequally persons who are in a diverse factual situation, because they have permits or authorizations to discharge wastewater (aguas residuales), placing them in a position of equality with respect to the rest of the persons who do not have such authorizations; hence, this allegation must be refuted based on the same reasons already set forth to reject the supposed infringement of the principle of equality. Regarding the lack of necessity and suitability of the norm, which establishes imprisonment, which is the most burdensome measure for the legal sphere of individuals, even though the purpose sought to be satisfied can perfectly be achieved from numeral 132 (current numeral 128 by virtue of the reform operated by Law 8689 of December 4, 2008) of the same law, it is necessary to point out that this Court has indicated on repeated occasions that the determination of criminal types (conduct deemed harmful to society) and their respective sanction is a matter of criminal policy reserved exclusively to the legislators. The Political Constitution itself in its Article 39 assigns to the legislator the exclusive competence to dictate criminal policy, that is, to determine which conducts are criminalized and with what quantum of penalty, when it indicates that the creation of crimes and penalties is reserved to the law, so that this Chamber can only control that it is dictated in harmony with the constitutional framework. Whether the criminal policy is particularly good or bad is a topic that escapes—as stated—the competences constitutionally assigned to this Court. Therefore, if the legislator deemed that the conducts described in Article 100 of the Wildlife Conservation Law must be sanctioned with imprisonment, by virtue of the relevance of the protected legal interest, it has acted in exercise of its constitutionally attributed powers; hence, regarding this point too, the petitioner's arguments must be rejected.
**V.- Regarding the reproaches of unconstitutionality against Article 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law.** **A. Regarding the principle of innocence.** In resolutions 500-90 of 17:00 hours on May 15, 1990, and 2063-91 of 10:05 hours on October 11, 2001, this Chamber maintained the thesis that by reason of the provisions of Article 39 of the Political Constitution, regarding the necessary demonstration of guilt (culpabilidad) in order to attribute criminal responsibility to a determined person, objective responsibility (responsabilidad objetiva)—that which derives from the development of a causal cycle that produces a result subsumable in a criminal type, but in which no relationship of guilt exists with the subject who gave rise to it—is proscribed in our criminal procedural system. It is not possible, constitutionally and legally speaking, to accept the theory of objective responsibility, which is indeed applicable in other matters, but which is excluded from application in criminal matters, since in this area a relationship of guilt must necessarily be demonstrated between the act committed and the result of the action, for it to be attributed to the active subject; if the subject cannot be reproached for his action, he cannot be criminally sanctioned. Based on objective responsibility, a penalty can be imposed on the author of an act, even though his behavior cannot be personally reproached to him; in this case, the decisive factor is the objective cause of the harmful result, without requiring that a relationship of guilt exist between the latter and the subject's action. Judgment number 01739-92, regarding the principle of innocence, stated the following:
*"Like the previous ones, it derives from Article 39 of the Constitution, insofar as it requires the necessary demonstration of guilt. No person can be considered or treated as guilty while there is no final conclusive judgment against them, issued in a regular and legal process that declares them as such after that presumption has been destroyed or overcome.* *Furthermore, by virtue of the state of innocence of the accused, it is not he who must prove his lack of guilt, but the organs of the accusation, with complementary effects such as the impossibility, during the process, of coercing him and, with even greater reason, of subjecting him to torture or cruel or degrading treatments—expressly proscribed by Article 40 of the Constitution—as well as that of his freedom only being able to be restricted in a precautionary and extraordinary manner to guarantee the purposes of the process, that is to say, to prevent him from evading the action of justice or seriously obstructing the verification of the facts, or to prevent these facts from repeating in certain serious cases—such as in abuses against dependent persons—; but never invoking the seriousness of the crimes or the evidence existing against him, precisely because his state of innocence absolutely prohibits having him, directly or presumptively, be considered guilty (…)"* Thus, the principle of innocence implies that the court's conviction regarding the guilt of the accused must overcome any reasonable doubt, so that any doubt that exists obliges a ruling in his favor. The norm being questioned contemplates another type of responsibility, derived from Article 1048 of the Civil Code, provisions that by extension are applied to environmental damage, as enshrined in the Environmental Organic Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), Articles 98 and 101 of the Biodiversity Law (Ley de Biodiversidad). This Court has already indicated on previous occasions, for example in Judgment Nº 2000-1669 of 14:51 hours on February 18, 2000, that the topic of responsibility for environmental damage has been given different treatment, taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the matter at hand. The State, to ensure in some way the compensation for damages caused to the environment, has created a series of norms in which what refers to environmental responsibility is regulated, without losing sight, of course, of the necessary balance that must exist between environmental protection and the development of private activities. In Environmental Law, a different approach to responsibility has been taken, such that there has been an evolution from a fault-based responsibility system (responsabilidad por culpa) to one of risk-based responsibility (responsabilidad por riesgo), which means greater coverage, because such responsibility would arise even when no fault of the transgressor exists, if the activity performed is deemed risky and they assume that risk, with a possible harmful consequence for the environment. This is a new concept of responsibility, where the objective criterion prevails over the subjective one, since for its emergence, it is irrelevant whether one acted with fault or not; it is sufficient that the damage was effectively caused, for the consequent responsibility to arise immediately. On many occasions it is not possible to determine either the guilty party or the infringed legal norm, since in most cases the damage is the product of an omission, but it certainly causes harm, which necessarily must be subject to compensation. It is in this context that the content of Article 101 of the Environmental Organic Law and the norm now questioned, numeral 126 of the Wildlife Conservation Law, must be understood. This establishes a regime of responsibility for legal entities (personas jurídicas) that have participated in the commission of the illicit acts covered by that Law, indicating that they will be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment, with the consequent obligation to repair them in full, also contemplating the joint and several liability (responsabilidad solidaria) of the natural persons (personas físicas) or legal entities that form part of the same economic interest group (grupo de interés económico) with the infringing legal entity. The petitioner's main argument is that the norm violates the principle of innocence; however, this principle is not infringed because the questioned provision does not refer to criminal responsibility. It expressly indicates this by stating that joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general falls upon the legal entities that have participated in the commission of illicit acts covered by the Wildlife Conservation Law "independently of the personal, civil, or criminal responsibility that may fall upon the partners, agents, or representatives"; hence, regarding this point the petitioner is also not correct in his allegations. The fact that this type of responsibility is extended to natural persons or legal entities that form part of the same economic interest group does not harm the principle of innocence either, because it relates equally to the possibility that companies related to the infringing legal entity respond for the environmental damages caused.
**B. About the economic interest group.-** The purpose of Article 126 with respect to the joint and several liability of the economic interest group for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general by the infringing legal entity is due to the *recent integrationist trend of companies at a national and international level that has given rise to the appearance of new and very diverse forms of organization of companies in the development of their commercial activity*. In environmental law, as in other branches of Law, this situation has required on many occasions the rethinking of some legal institutes, the emergence of new figures, in order to regulate novel situations; and, also in other cases, the adaptation of existing legal concepts to the advancement and development of relationships, mainly social and economic ones. Both doctrine and jurisprudence have been giving relevance to the figure of the economic unit as a way to prevent fraud by these companies to the detriment of the rights of third parties, including the right to environmental protection. Currently, it is not so important which legal entity formally appears as the cause of environmental damage or which legal entity is the infringer, but rather the determination of a common economic interest that unites the companies and that takes concrete form in the existence of an economic fund with sufficient capacity to jointly and severally attend to the claims formulated for the civil and/or environmental damages caused. The economic interest group is characterized by the common interests of various companies that, from a formal point of view, appear as distinct societies. Spanish doctrine defines the group of companies as "*…the set of apparently autonomous companies but subject to a single economic direction*" (Champaud (1962), p. 195 and A. Plá Rodríguez (1981), p.187, cited by Edurne Terradillos Ormaetxea: Los grupos de Empresas ante la Jurisprudencia Social Española, Tirant lo Blanch, Colección Laboral, Valencia, Spain, 2000, p. 17). On this topic, what prevails is the principle of the primacy of reality, and it is sufficient that the existence of an economic community is proven, a group of legal entities that operate jointly, so that all can be held liable for the civil and/or environmental damages. In these situations, one must go beyond formal corporate appearances, to arrive at reality and not render nugatory the joint and several liability held for the damage caused. The foregoing is so, in application of the principle, "whoever pollutes pays," which informs environmental matters. The Political Constitution establishes that the State must guarantee, defend, and preserve that right.
Prima facie, to guarantee is to assure and protect the right against some risk or necessity, to defend is to forbid, prohibit, and prevent any activity that threatens the right, and to preserve is an action aimed at sheltering the right in advance from possible dangers so as to make it endure for future generations. The Chamber admits the possibility of imposing civil sanctions on those subjects of national and international law who are not materially part of the guaranteeing party and who act covertly using natural or legal persons operating under their command; it is based on the Legal Principle of Piercing the Corporate Veil (Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo) and with the doctrinal concepts of the Business Economic Group (Grupo Económico Empresarial) and Financial Holding (Holding Financiero), that it is now possible to hold liable in court those legal and natural persons who conceal the reality of the transactions behind other persons directly or indirectly related to them. This modality fits within the thesis of abuse of legal personality (abuso de la personalidad jurídica), which consists of the abuse of the immunity from liability that the law grants to hidden partners or owners of the corporate assets in order to commit lawful or unlawful acts through the company they control; a shield or impunity that materializes when the person is used fraudulently to achieve economic and criminal irresponsibility, through fraud and concealment of reality. Under these elements, piercing the corporate veil (levantamiento del velo social) arises with the use of the corporate regime to take advantage of the benefits or privileges of the limitation of liability, under modalities of fraud, concealment, and bad faith.
Based on the Principle of Reality and Piercing the Corporate Veil, legislation that provides for the joint and several civil liability of those legal persons that participate in the activity generating environmental damage is appropriate, as well as that of the natural and legal persons that form part of the same economic interest group with that legal person connected to the harmful act.
The purpose of legal rules on liability is to guarantee restitution or monetary compensation in the case of a measurable negative impact on a good or an interest. Under this approach, if damage is caused to an ecosystem, the recognized damages are equivalent to the cost of the measures necessary to restore the ecosystem and return it to its prior state, or failing that, the cost of measures to prevent the ecosystem from deteriorating even further.
**C. On the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.** The petitioner indicates that Article 126 violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, because it establishes a generic postulate, without providing that the legal or natural persons who must be jointly and severally liable can prove their absolute innocence and lack of responsibility—whether willful (dolosa) or negligent (culposa)—with respect to the unlawful act carried out by the infracting agent. These arguments are not admissible, for the reasons given to dismiss the alleged violation of the principle of innocence, and because it must be assumed that before establishing joint and several liability for the damages caused to wildlife and the environment in general, all the requirements of due process must be met, allowing the legal persons to whom this liability is attributed to exercise their right of defense.
**VI.-Conclusion.** By virtue of everything stated, and of the cited precedents, what is required is to declare this action without merit.- **Por tanto:** The action is declared without merit.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
SL/oc.- **EXPEDIENTE N° 09-010348-0007-CO**
hmendez hmendez 2 0 2010-09-13T14:17:00Z 2010-09-13T14:17:00Z 2 7730 42517 Poder Judicial 354 100 50147 12.00 21 false false false ES-CR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 *090103480007CO* Res. Nº 2010-09966 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y treinta y ocho minutos del nueve de junio del dos mil diez.
Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Alvaro Saénz Saborío, mayor, casado una vez, Ingeniero Civil, vecino de San Rafael de Escazú, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-500-072, en su condición de Presidente con facultades de apoderado Generalísimo sin límite de suma de la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, cédula de persona jurídica 3-002-051316; contra Artículos 100 y 130 (126 actualmente) de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. No. 7317 y sus reformas.
Resultando:
1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las nueve horas cincuenta y ocho minutos del diez de julio de dos mil nueve, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad de Artículos 100 y 130 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. No. 7317 y sus reformas a partir de la Ley No. 8689 de diciembre del 2008. Alega que dichos artículos infringen los principios de igualdad, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad, tipicidad e inocencia. Las normas se impugnan en cuanto se considera que el artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, viola el principio de igualdad, porque la norma no efectúa ningún tipo de diferenciación, colocando a todas las personas en un mismo supuesto, sin contemplar que algunos estén en situaciones distintas al contar con permisos o autorizaciones extendidos por las autoridades pertinentes, para verter aguas residuales. Considera además que la norma impugnada violenta la razonabilidad de igualdad, pues no trata de manera desigual a quienes están en un diverso supuesto fáctico, por contar con permisos para verter aguas residuales, colocándolos en situación de igualdad respecto al resto de personas que no cuentan con tales habilitaciones. A su juicio, la norma no es necesaria ni idónea para el fin que se pretende satisfacer, sino que se optó por la medida más gravosa para la esfera jurídica de las personas, a pesar de que dicho fin se puede lograr a partir del artículo 132 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida, que establece prácticamente el mismo texto que la disposición cuestionada, con la diferencia de que no establece la pena privativa de libertad como castigo y contempla el tema de los sistemas de tratamiento de desechos y aguas. Señala además que el artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre lesiona el principio de tipicidad, pues al no prever ningún tipo de excepción para el caso de aquellos agentes económicos que obtienen previamente una autorización de vertido de sustancias contaminantes, genera una colisión entre la conducta típica y el reproche jurídico penal de la acción, entre la tipicidad y la culpabilidad. Así, las personas que han obtenido un permiso de vertido de aguas contaminantes, actuarían bajo la creencia interna de que su acción no es penada, pues se encuentran amparados a la normativa que autoriza la conducta, dada la redacción de la norma, la conducta sería típica. Afirma que hay muchas disposiciones normativas que permiten verter aguas contaminantes en los cuerpos receptores, respetando, claro está, ciertos límites o parámetros permisibles, entre las cuales están la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, Reglamento de Vertido y Reuso de Aguas Residuales, Decreto Ejecutivo N.33601-MINAE-S del 9 de agosto del 2006, El Reglamento del Canon Ambiental por Vertidos, Decreto Ejecutivo 34431-MINAE-S de 9 de agosto del 2006, entre otros. Por una indebida técnica legislativa, la norma carece de la correcta formulación normativa que se exige para todo tipo penal, derivada del artículo 39 Constitucional. Cita la sentencia 2006-9170, en la que la Sala hizo referencia a dos tipos de vertidos contaminantes: permitido y uno prohibido, distinción que no se respeta en la norma cuestionada, estableciéndose como conducta típica el simple acto de "arrojar" aguas, desechos o sustancias contaminantes, sin tomar en cuenta que algunos de esos actos supuestamente ilícitos podrían estar autorizados por una normativa previa y específica. Sobre la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 130 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, en primer término alega el accionante que la norma viola la presunción de inocencia consagrada en el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política, pues si bien existe la figura de la responsabilidad objetiva, aplicada en otras ramas del derecho diferentes a la penal, en ella siempre subsiste una atribuibilidad del hecho y un reproche jurídico-penal de índole patrimonial, derivado de un nexo causal entre el agente responsable subjetivamente y el ente o sujeto responsable objetivamente. La norma impugnada establece una responsabilidad objetiva sin nexo causal entre el agente y la persona física o jurídica que bien podría ser ajena al daño, en especial cuando señala que la responsabilidad solidaria se extiende -sin establecer mayor justificación- a "las personas físicas o jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico con la persona infractora". La carga de la prueba se invierte, puesto que la ley presume una culpabilidad concurrente de la persona física o jurídica a quien se le atribuye la responsabilidad solidaria, lo cual viola el principio de inocencia. En cuanto a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, alega que el artículo 130 establece un efecto jurídico que bien podría ser incausado, en caso de que las personas físicas o jurídicas deban responder solidariamente, aunque sean totalmente ajenas al daño ocurrido. Si logran demostrar su inocencia y falta de responsabilidad (dolosa o culposa) con respecto al acto antijurídico desarrollado por el agente infractor, debería eximírsele del deber de pagar daños y perjuicios, como sucede en otros casos de responsabilidad objetiva. El artículo 130 sanciona a todos por igual, constituyendo una norma irrazonable y desproporcionada que establece una responsabilidad solidaria violatoria del principio de inocencia y la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad 2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala que se trata de una asociación que tutela intereses corporativos o colectivos de los sectores agrícolas, agropecuario y agroindustrial.
3.- Por resolución de las siete horas y treinta minutos del trece de octubre de dos mil nueve, se le dio curso a la acción, se confiere audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República.
4.- La Procuraduría General de la República rinde su informe y señala que la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria no se encuentra legitimada para interponer la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad por cuanto los artículos cuestionados no poseen la característica de afectar directamente la esfera de acción del ente y de sus integrantes; debido a que las normas cuestionadas lo que persiguen es responsabilizar penal y civilmente a las personas que contaminen las aguas nacionales, normas que no tienen por objeto lesionar derechos ni intereses de los miembros de la corporación accionante. El único efecto que podría derivarse de los artículos impugnados para los miembros de la corporación sería indirecto, producto de incumplimiento de la prohibición prevista por el ordenamiento de arrojar agentes contaminantes en manantiales, ríos, quebradas, etc. De esta forma, con lo anterior la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria no tiene legitimación para interponer la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, por lo que resulta inadmisible. A pesar de lo anterior, en cuanto a los cuestionamientos planteados en contra del artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, en el ordenamiento jurídico existen una serie de supuestos bajo los cuales la ley autoriza el vertido de agentes contaminantes a aguas nacionales y que el citado numeral no defina expresamente que no se incurrirá en el ilícito cuando se está bajo uno de los preceptos permisivos contenidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para el vertido de residuos, no constituye un defecto de tipo penal, ni provoca los efectos que señala el accionante. El principio de tipicidad lo que exige es que las normas penales describan plenamente la materia de prohibición y el numeral 100 lo hace en forma clara, precisa y completa, sin dejar a dudas que "arrojar agentes contaminantes a las aguas nacionales" es la conducta prohibida por el tipo penal. Los preceptos permisivos contenidos en el ordenamiento jurídico para el vertido de residuos en aguas nacionales constituyen causales de justificación respecto a la materia de prohibición establecido en el artículo 100 y las causas de justificación no son parte del tipo penal, exigir al tipo penal que excepcione expresamente todas las posibles causas de justificación está fuera de los alcances del principio de tipicidad.
Por otra parte, no existe quebranto al principio de igualdad porque el artículo no excepciona en forma explícita el supuesto de quienes cuentan con permiso para verter agentes contaminantes. Los preceptos permisivos aunque no lo disponga expresamente el tipo penal descrito en el numeral 100, siempre van a tener el efecto de neutralizar la tipicidad de la conducta, lo que descarta el ilícito y coloca a quienes se encuentre bajo el supuesto permisivo, en una posición distinta a la de quienes incurrieron en la conducta tipificada y no contaban autorización. Tampoco resulta contrario al principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad ni de idoneidad, por cuanto la conducta tipificada como delito por el artículo 100, es la que está prohibida en el 132. La sola prohibición de la conducta efectuada en el numeral 132 resultaría absolutamente insuficiente para tutelar el bien jurídico protegido por el artículo 100, primero porque no constituye delito y segundo, porque no contempla ninguna pena para el infractor. De conformidad al principio ambiental "quien contamina paga" el costo de la contaminación debe ser asumida por quien se beneficia de ella, ya sea tomando las medidas necesarias para impedirla o reducirla, o reparando sus efectos una vez ocurrida. El principio tiene dos funciones: una precautoria y una correctiva, lo cual se encuentra estipulado en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional. La base de este principio está en la conceptualización del daño ambiental como la afectación a un patrimonio colectivo, el que suponen los sistemas naturales básicos, como un delito de carácter social pues afecta las bases de la existencia de la sociedad; económico porque atenta contra las materias y los recursos indispensables para las actividades productivas; cultural, en tanto pone en peligro la forma de vida de las comunidades, y ético, porque atenta contra la existencia de las generaciones presente y futuras. En la práctica existen grandes dificultades para individualizar y responsabilizar al causante del daño ocasionado al ambiente y para lograr el pago efectivo de la correspondiente responsabilidad por la contaminación ambiental. Existe una tendencia a la complejidad de las estructuras en que están organizadas las actividades económicas, impuestas de forma premeditada en algunos casos, con el propósito específico de burlar eventuales responsabilidades derivadas de la ejecución de actividades riesgosas para el ambiente, estructuras que estorban para identificar al verdadero responsable del daño ambiental y hacerlo pagar por ello. El sistema tradicional de responsabilidad civil basado en el criterio de imputación subjetiva resulta limitado, por lo que la tendencia internacional es crear un sistema de responsabilidad civil amplificado, así como el reconocimiento de supuestos de responsabilidad objetiva lo que permite garantizar el principio quien contamina paga. El artículo 130 (126) de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre refleja la ampliación de los supuestos de responsabilidad civil por daño ambiental y allí con la reforma efectuada se introduce la solidaridad de las personas físicas o jurídicas que integran el mismo grupo de interés económico con la persona jurídica infractora. La norma cuestionada es una disposición legal que persigue la aplicación del principio ya citado. En el artículo 130 (126) en su parte inicial expresa que, serán solidariamente responsables las personas jurídicas que "hayan participado en la comisión de los actos ilícitos comprendidos en esta Ley; lo que implica que la responsabilidad prevista estaría fundada en la intervención demostrada de la persona jurídica en los hechos causantes del daño ambiental y los correspondientes perjuicios. Esa participación de las personas jurídicas que se establece como presupuesto de responsabilidad, las vincula con el daño ambiental por lo que no son ajenas a un daño ambiental ni tampoco se prescinde del nexo causalidad entre el agente provocador (que sería la misma persona jurídica) y el daño. En la parte final del citado artículo se refiere a la solidaridad de las personas físicas o jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico con la persona jurídica infractora, por lo que se presupone que ha demostrado la participación de la persona jurídica que es parte del grupo de interés económico, en la comisión de los actos ilícitos generadores del daño ambiental. El fundamento de la responsabilidad solidaria se encuentra en el nexo existente entre el grupo de interés económico y la persona jurídica infractora, como corresponde cuando se trata de solidaridad. La pertenencia a un grupo de interés económico presupone que las personas jurídicas que lo integran, mantienen relaciones financieras, administrativas o patrimoniales significativas entre sí. De lo anterior, no podría afirmarse que el grupo de interés económico es ajeno al daño ocasionado, en razón del vínculo existente entre éste y la persona jurídica participante de los hechos ilícitos generados del daño ambiental y los perjuicios sobre los que se pretende la reparación. De acuerdo con lo expuesto, la Procuraduría no encuentra razones para considerar que la norma cuestionada podría ser contraria al principio de inocencia. Con respecto al principio de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, ninguno de los supuestos de responsabilidad previstos por el artículo cuestionado prevé responsabilidad civil para un sujeto ajeno al daño reclamado, en el primer caso se trata de la persona jurídica que participó de la comisión de los hechos causante del daño ambiental y en segundo, del grupo de interés económico. La extensión de la responsabilidad solidaria a las personas jurídicas que hayan participado en la comisión de los actos ilícitos y a las personas físicas y jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico con la empresa jurídica infractora, prevista por el numerla 130 (126) es una disposición que es proporcional al objetivo buscado. Para garantizar el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, es necesario asegurar la efectividad del principio ambiental "quien contamina paga" y la responsabilidad solidaria regulada en el artículo cuestionado se ajusta al objetivo de responsabilizar al verdadero causante del daño y obligarlo a indemnizar lo correspondiente. Para el desarrollo de las actividades económicas más riesgosas para el ambiente, frecuentemente se utilizan personas jurídicas unitarias con un capital limitado, que protegen el patrimonio económico de los verdaderos dueños y beneficiarios de la actividad, es importante establecer mecanismos como el previsto en el aquí cuestionado que permiten perseguir y responsabilizar tanto a la persona jurídica bajo cuyo nombre se desarrolla la actividad, como al grupo de interés económico al que pertenecen, con el fin de eliminar las motivaciones económicas de la contaminación, aplicando a la par los imperativos de ética retributiva. De esta forma los artículos 100 y 130 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre no son contrarios a los principios constitucionales indicados por el accionante.
5.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 206, 207 y 208 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 23, 26 y 27 todos del mes de octubre de 2009 (folio 103).
6.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta la Magistrada Pacheco Salazar; y,
Considerando:
I.- Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. La acción de inconstitucionalidad planteada resulta admisible, en virtud de dirigirse contra disposiciones de carácter general, y porque la Asociación Cámara Nacional de Agricultura y Agroindustria, cuyos miembros son productores, empresarios y entes de los sectores agropecuario, agroindustrial y forestal, está legitimada para defender en esta sede los intereses de sus miembros, quienes eventualmente podrían ser afectados por las normas cuestionadas en virtud de las actividades que desarrollan, situación contemplada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Al respecto, es oportuno señalar que la Sala ha precisado que a través de la expresión "intereses que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", el legislador quiso referirse a la legitimación que ostenta una entidad corporativa, cuando actúa por intermedio de sus representantes, en defensa de los derechos e intereses de las personas que conforman su base asociativa y siempre y cuando se trate del cuestionamiento de normas o disposiciones que incidan en aquel núcleo de derechos o intereses que constituye la razón de ser y el factor aglutinante de la agrupación -sentencia 2006-9170 de las dieciséis horas treinta y seis minutos del veintiocho de junio del dos mil seis-.
II.- Objeto de la acción. El accionante cuestiona los artículos 100 y 130 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre. El artículo 4 de la Ley 8689, de 4 de diciembre de 2008 corrió la numeración de la ley, y el numeral 130 que cita el accionante es ahora el artículo 126. Las normas señalan:
Artículo 100.- “Será sancionado con pena de prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años, siempre que no se configure un delito de mayor gravedad, quien arroje aguas servidas, aguas negras, lodos, desechos o cualquier sustancia contaminante en manantiales, ríos, quebradas, arroyos permanentes o no permanentes, lagos, lagunas, marismas y embalses naturales o artificiales, esteros, turberas, pantanos, humedales, aguas dulces, salobres o saladas, en sus cauces o en sus respectivas áreas de protección” Artículo 126.- “Independientemente de la responsabilidad personal, civil o penal, que pueda caber sobre los socios, personeros o representantes, las personas jurídicas que hayan participado en la comisión de los actos ilícitos comprendidos en esta Ley, serán solidariamente responsables por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a la vida silvestre y el ambiente en general, y deberán repararlos en forma integral. Igualmente, serán solidariamente responsables las personas físicas o jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico con la persona jurídica infractora.” El accionante impugna el artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, porque a su juicio infringe los principios de igualdad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y tipicidad. Cuestiona el numeral 130 (actual artículo 126) por lesionar los principios de proporcionalidad, razonabilidad e inocencia, ya que establece una responsabilidad objetiva sin nexo causal entre el agente y la persona física o jurídica, que podría ser ajena al daño, especialmente en cuanto extiende la responsabilidad solidaria. Considera que la atribuibilidad incausada de una responsabilidad solidaria viola el principio de inocencia y la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad, la cual, resulta también atendible en el caso de responsabilidad objetiva.
III.- Sobre los reproches de inconstitucionalidad al artículo 100 de la Ley de Vida Silvestre.
A. Sobre el principio de igualdad y no discriminación. Esta Sala ha reconocido en anteriores oportunidades que es perfectamente posible que dos sujetos o categorías de sujetos difieran en alguna característica o condición esencial que, por su naturaleza, haga comprensible y justificable una diferencia de tratamiento. Para que el elemento diferencial argüido entre ambas situaciones haga posible una distinción semejante, no sólo debe ser real, sino que también debe tener una trascendencia jurídica de tal naturaleza o magnitud que haga razonable y justificable el trato diverso (en este sentido los votos números 337-91, 1432-91, 1732-91, 4451-94 y 5061-94). Si se dan situaciones en que varios sujetos se encuentran en las mismas condiciones, y a pesar de ello reciben un tratamiento diverso sin que medie ninguna justificación atendible, se considera que existe una diferenciación irrazonable y discriminatoria por no estar apoyada en elementos objetivos. Sobre este punto, en sentencia número 337-91 de las catorce horas y cincuenta y seis minutos del ocho de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y uno, la Sala indicó en lo conducente:
“El principio de igualdad contenido en el artículo 33 constitucional, pretende en parte, que una misma medida o un mismo trato se dé a quienes se encontraren en situaciones idénticas o razonablemente similares, no siendo válida cualquier diferencia para establecer un trato distinto, pues en respeto de la razonabilidad que debe regir todo acto, sólo aquellas diferencias relevantes serían causa legítima para establecer un trato diferente” Según lo anterior, para aspirar al trato igual, las situaciones deben ser o idénticas o razonablemente parecidas o simplemente similares. Además, la diferenciación para que proceda constitucionalmente, debe ser razonable, entendiendo por esto que debe ser necesaria, idónea y proporcional.
B. Sobre el principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Este Tribunal en la sentencia número 4205-96, de las 14:33 horas del 20 de agosto de 1996, señaló al respecto:
"…Sin embargo, no obstante que los derechos fundamentales pueden estar sujetos a determinadas restricciones, éstas resultan legítimas únicamente cuando son necesarias para hacer posible la vigencia de los valores democráticos y constitucionales, por lo que además de «necesaria», «útil», «razonable» u «oportuna», la restricción debe implicar la existencia de una necesidad social imperiosa que la sustente. En este orden de ideas, debe distinguirse entre el ámbito interno, que se refiere al contenido propio o esencial del derecho -que ha sido definido como aquella parte del contenido sin el cual el derecho mismo pierde su peculiaridad, o lo que hace que sea reconocible como derecho perteneciente a determinado tipo-, de manera que no caben las restricciones o límites que hagan impracticable su ejercicio, lo dificulten más allá de lo razonable o lo despojen de la necesaria protección; y el ámbito externo, en el cual cobra relevancia la actuación de las autoridades públicas y de terceros. Asimismo, la legitimidad de las restricciones a los derechos fundamentales está ordenada a una serie de principios que este Tribunal ha señalado con anterioridad -sentencia número 3550-92-, así por ejemplo: 1.- deben estar llamadas a satisfacer un interés público imperativo; 2.- para alcanzar ese interés público, debe escogerse entre varias opciones aquella que restrinja en menor escala el derecho protegido; 3.- la restricción debe ser proporcionada al interés que la justifica y ajustarse estrictamente al logro de ese objetivo; 4.- la restricción debe ser imperiosa socialmente, y por ende excepcional.” Un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: es necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. Asimismo, debe señalarse que dichos contenidos deben ajustarse, no sólo a las normas o preceptos concretos de la Constitución, sino también a su sentido de justicia.
C. Sobre el principio de tipicidad penal. El principio de tipicidad penal, se conceptúa como un principio de naturaleza constitucional, integrante del debido proceso, derivado a su vez del principio de legalidad penal e íntimamente relacionado con la seguridad jurídica, por cuanto, garantiza a las personas que no podrán ser perseguidas penalmente por una acción que no haya sido previamente definida como delito en forma clara y precisa, por una norma de rango legal. Al respecto, ha señalado este Tribunal:
“El artículo 39 de la Constitución Política recepta el principio de reserva del ley mediante el cual todos los actos gravosos para los ciudadanos, provenientes de autoridades públicas, deben estar acordados en una ley formal. Dicho principio adquiere marcada importancia en materia penal, pues tratándose de delitos y penas, la ley es la única fuente creadora. En esta materia es de común aceptación el contenido del aforismo latino "nullum crimen, nulla paena, sine praevia lege".
II.-- Al hacer referencia el constituyente en el citado artículo 39 al término "delito", se está refiriendo a una acción típica, antijurídica y culpable, a la que se le ha señalado como consecuencia una pena. De esos predicados de la acción para que sea constitutiva de delito, interesa ahora la tipicidad y su función de garantía ciudadana. Para que una conducta sea constitutiva de delito no es suficiente que sea antijurídica -contraria a derecho-, es necesario que esté tipificada, sea que se encuentre plenamente descrita en una norma, esto obedece a exigencia insuprimibles de seguridad jurídica, pues siendo la materia represiva la de mayor intervención en bienes jurídicos importantes de los ciudadanos, para garantizar a éstos frente al Estado, es necesario que puedan tener cabal conocimiento de cuáles son las acciones que debe abstenerse de cometer, so pena de incurrir en responsabilidad criminal, para ello la exigencia de ley previa, pero esta exigencia no resulta suficiente sin la tipicidad, pues una ley que dijera por ejemplo, "será constitutiva de delito cualquier acción contraria a las buenas costumbres", ninguna garantía representa para la ciudadanía, aunque sea previa, en este caso será el criterio del juez el que venga a dar los verdaderos contornos a la conducta para estimarla o no constitutiva de delito, en cambio si el hecho delictivo se acuña en un tipo y además este es cerrado, el destinatario de la norma podrá fácilmente imponerse de su contenido, así, por ejemplo, el homicidio simple se encuentra cabalmente descrito en el artículo 111 del Código Penal: "Quien haya dado muerte a una persona, será penado con prisión de ocho a quince años". La función de garantía de la ley penal exige que los tipos sean redactados con la mayor claridad posible, para que tanto su contenido como sus límites puedan deducirse del texto lo más exactamente posible. Ya en voto 1876-90 de las dieciséis horas de hoy, de esta Sala se indicó que el principio de legalidad exige, para que la ciudadanía pueda tener conocimiento sobre si sus acciones constituyen o no delito, que las normas penales estén estructuradas con precisión y claridad. La precisión obedece a que si los tipos penales se formulan con términos muy amplios, ambiguos o generales, se traslada, según ya se indicó, al Juez, al momento de establecer la subsunción de una conducta a una norma, la tarea de determinar cuáles acciones son punibles, ello por el gran poder de absorción de la descripción legal, y la claridad a la necesaria compresión que los ciudadanos deben tener de la ley, para que así adecuen su comportamiento a las pretensiones de la ley penal.
III.-- Los tipos penales deben estar estructurados básicamente como una proposición condicional, que consta de un presupuesto (descripción de la conducta) y una consecuencia (pena), en la primera debe necesariamente indicarse, al menos, quién es el sujeto activo, pues en los delitos propios reúne determinadas condiciones (carácter de nacional, de empleado público, etc) y cuál es la acción constitutiva de la infracción (verbo activo), sin estos dos elementos básicos (existen otros accesorios que pueden o no estar presentes en el descripción típica del hecho) puede asegurarse que no existe tipo penal.
IV.-- De todo lo anterior puede concluirse en la existencia de una obligación legislativa, a efecto de que la tipicidad se constituya en verdadera garantía ciudadana, propia de un Estado democrático de derecho, de utilizar técnicas legislativas que permitan tipificar correctamente las conductas que pretende reprimir como delito, pues la eficacia absoluta del principio de reserva, que como ya se indicó se encuentra establecido en el artículo 39 de la Constitución, sólo se da en los casos en que se logra vincular la actividad del juez a la ley, y es claro que ello se encuentra a su vez enteramente relacionado con el mayor o menor grado de concreción y claridad que logre el legislador. La necesaria utilización del idioma y sus restricciones obliga a que en algunos casos no pueda lograrse el mismo nivel de precisión, no por ello puede estimarse que la descripción presente problemas constitucionales en relación con la tipicidad, el establecer el límite de generalización o concreción que exige el principio de legalidad, debe hacerse en cada caso particular.
V.-- Problemas de técnica legislativa hacen que en algunas oportunidades el legislador se vea obligado además de utilizar términos no del todo preciso (tranquilidad pública en el artículo 271 del Código Penal), o con gran capacidad de absorción (artificios o engaños en el artículo 216 del Código Penal), a relacionar la norma con otras, tema este que ya fue tratado por la Sala en el voto 1876-90 antes citado. Ambas prácticas pueden conllevar oscuridad a la norma y dificultar su compresión, causando en algunos casos roces con las exigencias que conlleva la tipicidad como garantía, aunque no necesariamente con la Constitución.” (Sentencia 1990-01877 de las dieciséis horas dos minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa).
Con lo indicado en este considerando, se analizarán los argumentos del accionante.
IV.- Análisis del artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre. Se solicita la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, que sanciona con “pena de prisión de uno (1) a tres (3) años, siempre que no se configure un delito de mayor gravedad” a quien “arroje aguas servidas, aguas negras, lodos, desechos o cualquier sustancia contaminante en manantiales, ríos, quebradas, arroyos permanentes o no permanentes, lagos, lagunas, marismas y embalses naturales o artificiales, esteros, turberas, pantanos, humedales, aguas dulces, salobres o saladas, en sus cauces o en sus respectivas áreas de protección”. En primer término, la Sala concluye que la norma impugnada no es violatoria del principio de tipicidad, según el cual, tanto las conductas como las sanciones que se atribuyen deben estar descritas en una norma, en forma precisa y clara. Todos los elementos integrantes del tipo penal, están claramente definidos: el sujeto activo, la acción o verbo (arrojar aguas servidas, aguas negras, lodos, desechos o cualquier sustancia contaminante en manantiales, ríos, quebradas, arroyos permanentes o no permanentes, lagos, lagunas, marismas y embalses naturales o artificiales, esteros, turberas, pantanos, humedales, aguas dulces, salobres o saladas, en sus cauces o en sus respectivas áreas de protección) y la sanción a aplicar (pena de prisión de uno a tres años, siempre que no se configure un delito de mayor gravedad). El hecho de que la norma no establezca expresamente que no serán sancionados quienes han obtenido un permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes, en los casos en que ello procede según la normativa aplicable, no la torna inconstitucional, pues es precisamente la labor del juez penal determinar en cada caso concreto si existe o no el permiso de vertido de sustancias contaminantes en determinado cuerpo de agua, conferido por las autoridades competentes, en cuyo caso la acción sería típica, pero no antijurídica, de manera que no se configuraría el delito previsto en la norma de estudio.
El artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre tampoco infringe el principio de igualdad, ya que aunque evidentemente quienes hayan obtenido permisos para el vertido de sustancias contaminantes en cuerpos receptores no se encuentran en la misma situación jurídica que quienes no tengan esa autorización administrativa, el hecho de que la norma establezca un postulado general, cuando enuncia el sujeto activo del delito, no lesiona en forma alguna el principio de igualdad. Así, la desigualdad no tiene los alcances que el accionante señala, pues como ya se analizó, en el momento de la aplicación de la ley será el Juez Penal quien debe valorar en el caso concreto, las condiciones particulares de la persona a la que se le atribuye la conducta, a fin de determinar si existe o no responsabilidad penal.
En cuanto a la alegada infracción del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, los argumentos del accionante son los mismos que utiliza para fundamentar la supuesta infracción al principio de igualdad, ya que refiere que la norma viola la razonabilidad de igualdad, pues no trata de manera desigual a personas que están en un diverso supuesto fáctico, por contar con permisos o autorizaciones para verter aguas residuales, colocándolos en posición de igualdad respecto al resto de personas que no cuentan con tales habilitaciones, de manera que este alegato debe ser refutado con base en las mismas razones ya expuestas para rechazar la supuesta infracción al principio de igualdad. En cuanto a la falta de necesidad e idoneidad de la norma, que establece la pena de prisión, que es la medida más gravosa para la esfera jurídica de las personas, pese a que ya el cometido que se pretende satisfacer perfectamente se puede lograr a partir del numeral 132 (actual numeral 128 en virtud de la reforma operada por la ley 8689 de 4 de diciembre del 2008) de la misma ley, es preciso señalar que este Tribunal ha señalado en reiteradas ocasiones que la determinación de los tipos penales (conductas estimadas nocivas para la sociedad) y su sanción respectiva es un asunto de política criminal reservado en exclusiva a los legisladores. La propia Constitución Política en su artículo 39 le asigna al legislador la competencia exclusiva para dictar la política criminal, es decir determinar qué conductas se penalizan y con qué quantum de pena, cuando señala que la creación de los delitos y las penas, está reservado a la ley, de modo que esta Sala lo que puede controlar, es únicamente que se dicte en armonía con el marco constitucional. Si la política criminal es particularmente buena o mala, es un tema que escapa -como se dijo-, de las competencias constitucionalmente asignadas a este Tribunal. De manera que si el legislador estimó que las conductas que se describen en el artículo 100 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre deben ser sancionadas con pena de prisión, en virtud de la relevancia del bien jurídico protegido, ha actuado en ejercicio de las atribuciones constitucionalmente atribuidas, de manera que en cuanto a este extremo también deben rechazarse los argumentos del accionante.
V.- Sobre los reproches de inconstitucionalidad al artículo 126 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre.
A. Sobre el principio de inocencia. En resoluciones 500-90 de las 17:00 horas del 15 de mayo de 1990 y 2063-91 de las 10:05 horas del 11 de octubre del 2001, esta Sala mantuvo la tesis de que en razón de lo dispuesto en el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política, en cuanto a la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad a efecto de atribuir responsabilidad penal a una determinada persona, en nuestro sistema procesal penal se encuentra proscrita la responsabilidad objetiva, aquella que deviene del desarrollo de un ciclo causal que produce un resultado subsumible en un tipo penal, pero en el que no existe relación de culpabilidad con el sujeto que le dio origen. No resulta posible constitucional y legalmente hablando, aceptar la teoría de la responsabilidad objetiva, que sí resulta de aplicación en otras materias, pero que se encuentra excluida de aplicación en lo penal, pues en ésta debe demostrarse necesariamente una relación de culpabilidad entre el hecho cometido y el resultado de la acción, para que le sea atribuido al sujeto activo; si al sujeto no se le puede reprochar su actuación, no podrá sancionársele penalmente. Con base en la responsabilidad objetiva, al autor de un hecho se le puede imponer una pena, aunque su comportamiento no le pueda ser reprochado personalmente; en este caso lo decisivo es la causa objetiva del resultado dañoso, sin exigir que entre éste y la acción del sujeto exista relación de culpabilidad. La sentencia número 01739-92, en relación con el principio de inocencia señaló lo siguiente:
“Al igual que los anteriores, se deriva del artículo 39 de la Constitución, en cuanto éste requiere la necesaria demostración de culpabilidad. Ninguna persona puede ser considerada ni tratada como culpable mientras no haya en su contra una sentencia conclusiva firme, dictada en un proceso regular y legal que lo declare como tal después de haberse destruido o superado aquella presunción.
Además en virtud del estado de inocencia del reo, no es él quien debe probar su falta de culpabilidad, sino los órganos de la acusación, con efectos complementarios como la imposibilidad, durante el proceso, de coaccionario y, con mayor razón aun, de someterlo a torturas o tratamientos crueles o degradantes -expresamente proscritos por el artículo 40 de la Constitución-, así como el de que su libertad sólo puede restringirse de manera cautelar y extraordinaria para garantizar los fines del proceso, valga decir, para prevenir que eluda la acción de la justicia o obstaculice gravemente la comprobación de los hechos, o para evitar que éstos se repitan en ciertos casos graves -como en los abusos sobre personas dependientes-; pero nunca invocando la gravedad de los delitos o de las pruebas que existan en su contra, precisamente porque su estado de inocencia veda de modo absoluto el tenerlo, directa o presuntivamente, por culpable (…)” Así, el principio de inocencia implica que la convicción del tribunal respecto de la culpabilidad del imputado debe superar cualquier duda razonable, de manera que cualquier duda que exista obliga a fallar en su favor. La norma que se cuestiona contempla otro tipo de responsabilidad, derivada del artículo 1048 del Código Civil, disposiciones que por extensión se aplican al daño ambiental, tal y como se consagra en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, artículos 98 y 101 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Este Tribunal ha señalado ya en anteriores ocasiones, por ejemplo en la sentencia Nº 2000-1669 de las 14:51 horas del 18 de febrero del 2000, que al tema de la responsabilidad por daño ambiental, se le ha dado un trato diferente, tomando en consideración las características propias de la materia de que se trata. El Estado, para asegurarse de alguna manera el resarcimiento por los daños ocasionados al ambiente, ha creado una serie de normas en las que se regula lo referente a la responsabilidad ambiental, sin perder de vista, eso sí, el necesario equilibrio que ha de existir entre la protección del ambiente y el desarrollo de las actividades de los particulares. En el Derecho Ambiental se ha dado un planteamiento distinto a la responsabilidad, de tal suerte que se ha evolucionado de un sistema de responsabilidad por culpa a uno de responsabilidad por riesgo, lo que significa una mayor cobertura, pues dicha responsabilidad surgiría aún cuando no medie culpa del transgresor, si la actividad desempeñada se estima riesgosa y, asume ese riesgo, con una posible consecuencia dañosa para el ambiente. Se trata de un nuevo concepto de responsabilidad, donde lo que priva es el criterio objetivo sobre el subjetivo, puesto que para su surgimiento, es irrelevante si se actuó o no con culpa; basta con que el daño haya sido efectivamente ocasionado, para que de inmediato surja la consecuente responsabilidad. En muchas ocasiones no es posible determinar, ni al culpable, ni la norma legal infringida, pues en la mayoría de los casos el daño es producto de una omisión, pero ciertamente perjudica, lo que necesariamente debe ser objeto de indemnización. Es en ese contexto que debe entenderse el contenido del artículo 101 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente y el de la norma que ahora se cuestiona, el numeral 126 de la Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, que establece un régimen de responsabilidad para las personas jurídicas que hayan participado en la comisión de los actos ilícitos comprendidos en esa Ley, indicando que serán solidariamente responsables por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a la vida silvestre y al ambiente, con la consecuente obligación de repararlos en forma integral, contemplando además la responsabilidad solidaria de las personas físicas o jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico con la persona jurídica infractora. El principal argumento del accionante es que la norma viola el principio de inocencia; sin embargo, tal principio no resulta infringido pues la disposición cuestionada no se refiere a la responsabilidad penal. Así expresamente lo indica al señalar que la responsabilidad solidaria por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a la vida silvestre y al ambiente en general le cabe a las personas jurídicas que hayan participado en la comisión de actos ilícitos comprendidos en la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre “independientemente de la responsabilidad personal, civil o penal que pueda caber sobre los socios, personeros o representantes”, de manera que en cuanto a este extremo tampoco lleva razón el accionante en sus alegatos. El hecho de que se extienda este tipo de responsabilidad a las personas físicas o jurídicas que integren un mismo grupo de interés económico tampoco lesiona el principio de inocencia, pues se trata igualmente de la posibilidad de que empresas relacionadas con la persona jurídica infractora, respondan por los daños ambientales causados.
B. Acerca del grupo de interés económico.- La finalidad del artículo 126 con respecto a la responsabilidad solidaria del grupo de interés económico por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a la vida silvestre y al ambiente en general por parte de la persona jurídica infractora se debe a la reciente tendencia integracionista de las sociedades a nivel nacional e internacional que ha dado lugar a la aparición de nuevas y muy diversas formas de organización de las empresas en el desarrollo de su giro comercial. En el derecho ambiental, al igual que en las otras ramas del Derecho, esta situación ha exigido en muchas ocasiones, el replanteamiento de algunos institutos jurídicos, el surgimiento de nuevas figuras, para poder regular las situaciones novedosas; y, también en otros casos, la adaptación de los conceptos jurídicos existentes al avance y desarrollo de las relaciones, principalmente sociales y económicas. Tanto la doctrina como la jurisprudencia han venido dando relevancia a la figura de la unidad económica como una forma de evitar fraudes por parte de estas empresas en perjuicio de derechos de terceros, incluido el derecho a la la protección el medio ambiente. Actualmente no tiene tanta importancia cuál persona jurídica aparece formalmente como causante de un daño ambiental o cuál persona jurídica es la infractora, sino la determinación de un interés económico común que une a las empresas y que se concreta en la existencia de un fondo económico con capacidad suficiente para atender en forma solidaria los reclamos formulados por los daños civiles y/o ambientales causados. El grupo de interés económico se caracteriza por los intereses en común de varias empresas que, desde el punto de vista formal, aparecen como sociedades distintas. La doctrina española define al grupo de empresas como “…el conjunto de empresas aparentemente autónomas pero sometidas a una dirección económica única” (Champaud (1962), p. 195 y A. Plá Rodríguez (1981), p.187, citados por Edurne Terradillos Ormaetxea: Los grupos de Empresas ante la Jurisprudencia Social Española, Tirant lo Blanch, Colección Laboral, Valencia, España, 2000, p. 17). En este tema, lo que priva es el principio de la primacía de la realidad y es suficiente con que se pruebe la existencia de una comunidad económica, un grupo de personas jurídicas que operen conjuntamente, para que pueda responsabilizarse, a todos, por los daños civiles y /o ambientales. En estas situaciones, debe irse más allá de las apariencias societarias formales, para llegar a la realidad y no hacer nugatoria la responsabilidad solidaria que se tiene por el daño causado. Lo anterior es así, en aplicación del principio, "quien contamina paga", que informa la materia ambiental. La Constitución Política establece que el Estado debe garantizar, defender y preservar ese derecho. Prima facie garantizar es asegurar y proteger el derecho contra algún riesgo o necesidad, defender es vedar, prohibir e impedir toda actividad que atente contra el derecho, y preservar es una acción dirigida a poner a cubierto anticipadamente el derecho de posibles peligros a efectos de hacerlo perdurar para futuras generaciones. La Sala admite la posibilidad de sancionar civilmente a aquellos sujetos de derecho nacional e internacional que materialmente no forman parte del sujeto garante y que actúan ocultamente utilizando personas físicas o jurídicas que operan bajo su mando; es con fundamento en el Principio Jurídico del Levantamiento del Velo Corporativo y con las figuras doctrinarias del Grupo Económico Empresarial y Holding Financiero, que ahora es posible responsabilizar en sede judicial a aquellas personas jurídicas y físicas que ocultan la realidad de los negocios bajo otras personas relacionadas directa o indirectamente con ellas. Esta modalidad se acomoda en la tesis del abuso de la personalidad jurídica, que consiste en el abuso de la inmunidad de responsabilidad que la ley otorga a socios o propietarios ocultos del patrimonio social, para cometer actos lícitos o ilícitos por medio de la sociedad que controlan; escudo o impunidad que se materializa cuando la persona es utilizada en forma dolosa para lograr una irresponsabilidad económica y penal, mediante el fraude y el ocultamiento de la realidad. Bajo estos elementos, el levantamiento del velo social surge con la utilización del régimen social para aprovechar las ventajas o privilegios de la limitación de su responsabilidad, bajo modalidades de fraude, ocultamiento y mala fe.
Con fundamento en el Principio de la Realidad y el Levantamiento de Velo Corporativo, resulta procedente la legislación que regula la responsabilidad civil solidaria de aquellas personas jurídicas que participan en la actividad que genera el daño ambiental, así como de las personas físicas y jurídicas que participan de un mismo grupo de interés económico con esa persona jurídica relacionada con el hecho dañino.
El propósito de las normas jurídicas sobre responsabilidad es el de garantizar una restitución o compensación monetaria en el caso de un impacto negativo mensurable en un bien o en un interés. Con este enfoque si se causan daños a un ecosistema, los perjuicios reconocidos equivalen al costo de las medidas necesarias para restablecer el ecosistema y dejarlo en su estado anterior, o en su defecto, al costo de las medidas para evitar que el ecosistema se deteriore aun más.
C. Sobre los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.
El accionante señala que el artículo 126 viola los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, porque establece un postulado genérico, sin prever que las personas jurídicas o físicas que deben responder solidariamente puedan demostrar su absoluta inocencia y falta de responsabilidad -dolosa o culposa- con respecto al acto antijurídico desarrollado por el agente infractor. Los argumentos no son de recibo, por las razones que se indicaron para desestimar la alegada infracción al principio de inocencia, y porque debe partirse de que de previo a establecer la responsabilidad solidaria por los daños y perjuicios causados a la vida silvestre y al ambiente en general, debe cumplirse con todas las exigencias del debido proceso, permitiendo que las personas jurídicas a las que se les atribuya esta responsabilidad ejerzan su derecho de defensa.
VI.-Conclusión. En virtud de todo lo expuesto, y de los precedentes citados, lo que se impone es declarar sin lugar la presente acción.-
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar la acción.- Ana Virginia Calzada M.
Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.
Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.
SL/oc.-
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