Res. 13584-2007 Sala Constitucional — Constitutional Challenge to Precautionary Measures for Older Adults

OutcomeResultado

Summarily dismissedRechazada de plano

The Constitutional Chamber summarily dismisses the constitutional challenge since the plaintiff failed to prove a uniform jurisprudential line of the Family Court warranting constitutional review.La Sala Constitucional rechaza de plano la acción de inconstitucionalidad al no demostrarse una línea jurisprudencial uniforme del Tribunal de Familia que amerite un control de constitucionalidad.

SummaryResumen

The Constitutional Chamber reviewed a constitutional challenge against the Family Court's case law, which, according to the plaintiff, requires two prerequisites not provided in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Law 7935) to impose precautionary protective measures: a kinship bond and a power relationship between the older adult and the alleged aggressor. The plaintiff argued these additional requirements violate the right to effective judicial protection and the special protection granted by the Constitution (Article 51) and Law 7935 to this vulnerable group. The Chamber analyzed the submitted rulings and more recent Family Court decisions, concluding there is no uniform jurisprudential line warranting a constitutionality review. It summarily dismissed the action, noting the constitutional jurisdiction is not an appellate instance for ordinary judgments. Nonetheless, it emphasized the importance of special protection for older adults, stating that the referral to the Domestic Violence Law is only for procedural purposes, and the substantive protection stems from Law 7935, which aims to guarantee a dignified life against any harm to their integrity.La Sala Constitucional conoce una acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta contra la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia, que según el accionante exige dos requisitos no previstos en el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor (Ley 7935) para imponer medidas cautelares de protección: la existencia de un vínculo de parentesco y una relación de poder entre el adulto mayor y el presunto agresor. El accionante argumenta que estos requisitos adicionales violan el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva y la protección especial que la Constitución Política (artículo 51) y la Ley 7935 otorgan a este sector vulnerable. La Sala analiza las resoluciones aportadas y las más recientes del Tribunal de Familia, y concluye que no existe una línea jurisprudencial uniforme que amerite un examen de constitucionalidad. Rechaza de plano la acción, indicando que la jurisdicción constitucional no es una instancia de revisión de sentencias ordinarias. No obstante, reitera la importancia de la protección especial del adulto mayor, señalando que la remisión a la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica es únicamente para efectos procesales, y que la tutela sustantiva deriva de la Ley 7935, cuyo fin es garantizar una vida digna frente a cualquier menoscabo de su integridad.

Key excerptExtracto clave

In the Chamber's opinion, the resolutions provided by the plaintiff, together with the judgments offered by the Family Court and the Attorney General's Office, lead to the conclusion that they do not constitute a uniform jurisprudential line that supports the plaintiff's claim in a way that merits a constitutionality review by this jurisdiction, since the alleged unconstitutionality regarding the necessity of a kinship relationship for the application of the Domestic Violence Law is not observed in all the provided resolutions. Indeed, the challenged provision refers to the domestic violence law only for procedural purposes, because to constitute a case of domestic violence, the legal foundation for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults, whose sole purpose is to guarantee older adults equal opportunities and a dignified life in all areas, protecting them against anyone who seeks to impair their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity.A criterio de la Sala y las resoluciones aportadas por el accionante, aunadas a las sentencias ofrecidas por el Tribunal de Familia, así como por la Procuraduría General, arriba a la conclusión que éstas no configuran una línea jurisprudencial uniforme que sustente el alegato del accionante de forma que amerite un análisis de constitucionalidad por parte de esta jurisdicción, toda vez que la inconstitucionalidad acusada en el sentido de que es necesaria una relación de parentesco para la aplicación de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica no se aprecia en todas las resoluciones aportadas. Efectivamente la disposición cuestionada remite a la ley de violencia doméstica únicamente para efectos procesales, pues para configurar un caso de violencia doméstica, el fundamento legal de esta protección no deriva de una ley de esa naturaleza, sino de la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, cuyo único fin es garantizar a las personas adultas mayores, igualdad de oportunidades y una vida digna en todos los ámbitos, protegiéndolas contra todo aquel que pretenda el menoscabo de su integridad física, sexual, psicológica o patrimonial.

Pull quotesCitas destacadas

"la disposición cuestionada remite a la ley de violencia doméstica únicamente para efectos procesales, pues para configurar un caso de violencia doméstica, el fundamento legal de esta protección no deriva de una ley de esa naturaleza, sino de la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor"

"the challenged provision refers to the domestic violence law only for procedural purposes, because to constitute a case of domestic violence, the legal foundation for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults"

Considerando III

"la disposición cuestionada remite a la ley de violencia doméstica únicamente para efectos procesales, pues para configurar un caso de violencia doméstica, el fundamento legal de esta protección no deriva de una ley de esa naturaleza, sino de la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor"

Considerando III

"ésta Sala ha reconocido como objeto del control de constitucionalidad, en los casos en que una determinada tendencia de los tribunales de justicia resulte contraria al bloque de legitimidad constitucional, y únicamente cuando se demuestre efectiva reiteración de un criterio jurídico"

"this Chamber has recognized as the object of constitutionality control, in cases where a certain trend of the courts is contrary to the constitutional legitimacy block, and only when effective reiteration of a legal criterion is demonstrated"

Considerando II

"ésta Sala ha reconocido como objeto del control de constitucionalidad, en los casos en que una determinada tendencia de los tribunales de justicia resulte contraria al bloque de legitimidad constitucional, y únicamente cuando se demuestre efectiva reiteración de un criterio jurídico"

Considerando II

"No obstante lo anterior, este Tribunal considera conveniente reiterar la importancia de la tutela de este sector de la población según lo dispone el párrafo final del artículo 51 de la Constitución Política"

"Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court deems it appropriate to reiterate the importance of protecting this sector of the population as provided by the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution"

Considerando III

"No obstante lo anterior, este Tribunal considera conveniente reiterar la importancia de la tutela de este sector de la población según lo dispone el párrafo final del artículo 51 de la Constitución Política"

Considerando III

Full documentDocumento completo

* 070065140007CO * Res: No. 2007-013584 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and fifteen minutes on the nineteenth of September, two thousand seven.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by HERMES JIMENEZ MADRIZ, of legal age, married, resident of Alajuela, bearer of identity card number 3-191-1209, seeking to have the jurisprudence of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) declared unconstitutional regarding access of the older adult to precautionary justice. Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel also participated in the proceeding on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and the President of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia).

Resultando:

1By a filing received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eleven hours forty minutes on the fourteenth of May, two thousand seven, the petitioner requests that the reiterated judicial interpretation of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding the conditions for the application of protection measures in accordance with Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), Law 7935, be declared unconstitutional. The petitioner states that the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) has interpreted that a kinship relationship between the alleged aggressor and the older adult is required for the application of protection measures. Likewise, he states that the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) has established that a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the victim is required for the imposition of protection measures, whereas in the petitioner's opinion, the mere presence of violence implies the existence of a power relationship.This has resulted in the denial of the right to effective judicial protection for older adults who seek protection based on the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor), No. 7935, if there is no kinship relationship between the reporting older adult and the aggressor, a relationship that Law No. 7935 does not require in any of its provisions. He considers that sending the Older Adult to the contraventional or criminal route is unacceptable because these are repressive routes, and the justice to which the older adult seeks access is protective justice (justicia tutelar).
2In order to substantiate his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he indicates that it derives from the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), given that there is a pending appeal filed before the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) against the judgment of the Domestic Violence Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela issued in case file No. 07-000824-9649-VD, brought by the petitioner, which lifted the requested protection measures due to the absence of kinship, an appeal that is pending resolution.
3By resolution at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on the twenty-second of May, two thousand seven, the petitioner was warned to comply with formal requirements, a warning that was met as verified by the note on folio 37 of the case file.
4By resolution at fifteen hours forty minutes on the twenty-ninth of May, two thousand seven (visible on folio 43 of the case file), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia).
5The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) rendered its report, visible on folios 48 to 74. It recommends dismissing the action of unconstitutionality filed, based on the following reasons. Regarding the challenge to jurisprudence, the P.G.R. states that the Chamber has followed a restrictive criterion regarding the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality based on the aforementioned circumstance, in order to prevent individuals from seeking and obtaining, through this route, the unconstitutionality not only of the interpretation of the aforementioned norms in general, but also of the specific jurisdictional resolution, an area exempt from constitutional control by express provision of Articles 10 of the Political Constitution and 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)" (Constitutional Chamber, resolution 2001-00252 at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the tenth of January, two thousand one, underline from the original).Hence, an action of unconstitutionality against jurisprudence is only appropriate when there is reiteration of a legal criterion contained in two or more resolutions. Hence, it can be affirmed that jurisprudence can only be spoken of when several pronouncements on the same point exist and provided they are coincident. In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), jurisprudence is the reiteration of a legal criterion that allows interpreting, informing, and integrating the legal system. Eduardo Ortiz defines it as the "set of unwritten rules of conduct extracted, by generalization, from existing rulings on a specific matter... Jurisprudence, therefore, has a general scope, like the law, and is formed by the set of general principles, with a life and permanence of their own compared to the ruling, contained in the decisions of the courts." Regarding the second condition questioned by the petitioner, that is, the existence of a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the older adult, the P.G.R. considers that a generalized criterion on the need for that power relationship can indeed be extracted from the submitted judgments.The first two cited judgments mention very tangentially the possible existence of a dependency relationship as a condition for applying the measures established in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), while the third submitted judgment emphatically establishes that there must exist a "de facto or de jure power situation" on the part of the aggressor and a "special state of vulnerability" in the older adult, which allows concluding that there is a criterion reiterated by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding the need for that dependency or power relationship. Along this same line of thought, it is appropriate to point out that from the analysis conducted by this Attorney General's Office, at least two more resolutions from the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) have been found, numbers 1274-04 at nine hours ten minutes on the twenty-seventh of July, two thousand four and 1509-2005 at fourteen hours fifty minutes on the fifth of October, two thousand five, in which the criterion expressed in resolution number 1521-2003 provided by the petitioner is reiterated.Based on the foregoing, in this representation's opinion, the action of unconstitutionality against the jurisprudence of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) is admissible only with respect to the existence of a power or dependency relationship between the victim and the alleged aggressor and not regarding the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties. As to the merits, Article 51 of the Political Constitution establishes the State's duty to provide special protection to older adults. In a similar vein, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), in its Article 17, establishes the duty of States to provide special protection to older adults. The special protection for older adults is based on the need for Society and the State to ensure the physical, emotional, and social integrity of persons who, for various reasons, are considered vulnerable.Indeed, the constitutional article includes a group of persons to whom the Constituent Assembly decided to grant special protection precisely because they are vulnerable groups, namely, children, mothers, older adults, and incapacitated persons. On the other hand, the right to special protection for older adults constitutes a fundamental right of a programmatic nature. The previous distinction has been adopted by most Constitutional Courts, especially for the purpose of evaluating State actions aimed at fulfilling the protection established in their respective constitutions. Thus, the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court has recognized the existence of these benefits chargeable to the State, particularly regarding the protection of rights such as life and personal integrity. For the case under study, it is important to highlight how German jurisprudence has resolved the issue of conflicts between various fundamental rights and the protection demanded from the State."The Court warns that this protection may conflict with other constitutionally protected interests... in which case the legislator is called upon, in the first place, to resolve said conflict 'by weighing the opposing fundamental values according to the measure of the constitutional order and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In order to carry out this weighing, the legislator has a margin of appreciation that the Court must respect, which does not mean that just any legislative decision is valid'" (Doménech Pascual, Gabriel, Op. Cit., p. 79). The same position has been assumed by the Constitutional Chamber in our country, which has pointed out the existence of a series of fundamental rights of a programmatic nature that fall within the development of a Social State of Law in which the State takes an active attitude towards certain social situations, rights among which the special protection established in Article 51 of the Constitution has been included.(Constitutional Chamber, resolution number 2006-2268 at eight hours fifty-nine minutes on the twenty-fourth of February, two thousand six). From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Political Constitution contains a mandate to public authorities to establish protection mechanisms for certain sectors of society that may be vulnerable to the actions of third parties. Such mechanisms must be legally designed, for which the legislator has discretion in their definition, although it must weigh the establishment of these mechanisms against the existence of other fundamental rights, in light of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, in such a way that their establishment does not imply a disproportionate restriction of the rights of third parties. Regarding protection measures, the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica), Law 7856, establishes the possibility of imposing protection measures in favor of the alleged victims, with a view to safeguarding the physical, emotional, and patrimonial integrity of the affected person.As the petitioner states, by provision of Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), the protection measures and the procedures for imposing them are applicable in cases of violence against older adults. It is therefore necessary, prior to analyzing the alleged defects of unconstitutionality, to examine the legal nature of protection measures, as well as the purpose for which they have been designed. The Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica) regulates "the application of the necessary protection measures to guarantee the life, integrity, and dignity of the victims of domestic violence," and applies to "mothers, children, persons sixty years of age or older, and disabled persons," as well as victims of violence arising in partner relationships (Article 1 Law 7856). The Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality of the protection measures adopted within the framework of this regulation, stating that they constitute genuine precautionary measures in the form of acts limiting fundamental rights that find their justification in the superior value of protecting the groups to whom said regulation is directed (Constitutional Chamber, resolution number 057-1997 at fifteen hours twelve minutes on the seventh of January, 1997; in the same sense, it is also possible to see resolutions number 2896-1996 at nine hours thirty-six minutes on the fourteenth of June, nineteen ninety-six; 2897-1996 at nine hours thirty-nine minutes on the fourteenth of June, nineteen ninety-six; 2966-1996 at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the eighteenth of June, nineteen ninety-six; 2899-1996 at nine hours forty-five minutes on the fourteenth of June, nineteen ninety-six and 3045-1996 at eleven hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-first of June, nineteen ninety-six, all from the Constitutional Chamber).Along this same line of thought, the Chamber has stated that: "... the questioned measures, as well as the nature of the latter, do not have a punitive character, whether criminal or disciplinary, because they do not seek to establish any responsibility on the part of the accused in relation to the examined facts. - On the contrary, it is the setting of protection measures in favor of certain persons who at a certain moment find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their protection by state bodies meritorious. (...) It is clear then that it is constitutionally possible for the legislator to impose, among others, this type of prohibitory acts 'of a provisional nature' that restrict in fact the enjoyment of some fundamental rights of the person denounced for domestic violence, as long as this is done in order to ensure respect for other constitutional values, such as, in this case, the physical integrity of the victims and their dignity as human beings. -..." (resolution number 7160-1998 at fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on the seventh of October, 1998, underline is not from the original).As indicated above, the protection measures and the procedure for their imposition are applicable in cases of violence against older adults, not only because they form a group included within the initial protection of the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica), but also because of the possibility provided in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) that these measures also apply in cases of violence against the elderly, as defined in Article 1 of that same regulatory text. These two articles were incorporated into the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor) during the legislative discussion; however, no comment or justification for their inclusion within said regulatory text can be extracted from the legislative record. Notwithstanding the provision, in the P.G.R.'s opinion, it is clear that the legislator's intention was to extend the protection already given by the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica) to older adults, establishing the possibility of applying such measures in cases of violence according to the definition contained in the law itself, but through the same mechanisms provided for domestic violence.The P.G.R. expresses doubts regarding the existence of a reiterated criterion of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) establishing the existence of a family relationship as a requirement for the imposition of protection measures, since, as was seen, the submitted resolutions do not allow extracting a generalized criterion, and the difference between their dates raises doubt as to the position actually assumed by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is its opinion that the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) does not establish the existence of a kinship relationship between the alleged aggressor and the victim as a requirement for imposing protection measures. Two reasons justify this conclusion. The first has to do with the literal interpretation of Article 57 of Law 7935, an interpretation that must necessarily be made in harmony with the definition of violence that said law contains.Thus, the definition of violence against older adults does not include the existence of a kinship relationship as necessary, as this requirement was completely omitted. In accordance with the doctrine informing Article 10 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), norms must be interpreted "according to the proper meaning of their words." In that sense, by not including the existence of a kinship relationship within this concept of violence against older adults, it must be concluded that this requirement was not demanded by the legislator for the application of these precautionary measures. The other reason for this thesis is historical and relates to the inclusion of older adults within the protection contained in the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica). This Law establishes the possibility for older adults to request protection measures. Upon the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), the possibility for the elderly to request the same protection measures against the violence they suffer is incorporated, but in accordance with the definition of violence established by said law.Note that both the current Article 57 and the definition of violence contained in Law 7935 were incorporated in the same motion to the normative text, which reinforces the thesis of the direct relationship between the definition of violence against older adults and the possibility of imposing protection measures. Based on the foregoing, it is clear to the Attorney General's Office that the legislator's intention was not to subject older adults to the procedures of the domestic violence law (since at the time of the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), older adults were already included within the scope of protection of the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica)), but rather the intention was to extend the protection of that social group to forms of violence that do not exclusively involve kinship relationships. Under this understanding, it is concluded that the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) does not require the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties as a condition for applying protection measures.Now, this legal position is also present in at least one of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) resolutions provided by the petitioner. Thus, the jurisdictional body, in resolution number 1521-2003, states that "the reference made by the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor), number 7935 of October 19, 1999, to the Law Against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica) does not imply a kinship relationship." Therefore, regarding this aspect, this Attorney General's Office considers that no violation of the fundamental right of older adults to special protection or to effective judicial protection has occurred. The petitioner challenges the jurisprudence of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) that requires, as a condition for applying protection measures, the existence of a power or dependency relationship between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, considering that this interpretation is not present in the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), meaning additional requirements are imposed on that population to obtain the judicial protection they require.The P.G.R. does not share the argument presented. The special protection granted to older adults is based on the premise that this group may find themselves in a special situation of vulnerability, which justifies differentiated treatment compared to the general population. Thus, the Constituent Assembly orders the legislator to design the mechanisms that, in its judgment, allow for adequate protection of older adults. These mechanisms can be preventive or repressive, but the decision of which mechanism to use is part of legislative discretion. Therefore, as a first conclusion, it considers that Article 51 of the Political Constitution does not impose an obligation on the legislator to establish preventive and not repressive mechanisms in all cases where an older adult's interests are affected, as the petitioner seeks to claim, since such a decision is a matter for the legislator, given the programmatic nature of these obligations.Following this same argumentative line, it was indicated above that when choosing the protection mechanisms, the legislator must weigh the rights of third parties that could be affected by the establishment of the measures, so that the adopted procedures are reasonable and proportional to the harm caused to these other rights that also merit constitutional protection. Thus, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has admitted that the protection measures agreed upon within the framework of the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica) constitute prohibitory acts that negatively affect the rights of third parties who are forced to comply with the imposed obligations. However, the existence of these precautionary measures has been constitutionally justified, insofar as this Constitutional Court has interpreted that it concerns "the setting of protection measures in favor of certain persons who at a certain moment find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their protection by state bodies meritorious." That is, not any harm to the interests of that group can give rise to special protection through these precautionary measures, but rather that which originates in a factual situation of weakness, occurring when a power relationship exists between the older adult and the alleged aggressor that causes dependency, whether economic or emotional, of the victim on the aggressor, de facto placing the former in a situation of vulnerability and weakness vis-à-vis the latter.It is within this framework that the judge must analyze the protection measures contained in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), so in the P.G.R.'s opinion, the interpretation given by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) is consistent, not only with the text of the law, but also with the Law of the Constitution, according to the preceding analysis. Indeed, the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) holds that not just any violence can lead to the imposition of a protection measure, considering that to order precautionary measures, "there must exist in the relationship 'a de facto or de jure power situation' on the part of the aggressor and 'a special state of vulnerability' of the victim, because it is also not a matter of establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age with respect to others." Indeed, it has been pointed out that protection measures are justified insofar as there is a party in a state of special vulnerability, and this objective condition is what justifies differentiated treatment for older adults compared to the rest of the population.If the objective condition for making the differentiation in treatment disappears, it must be considered that the reasonableness and proportionality in the difference of treatment also disappear. In accordance with the foregoing, in this representation's opinion, the interpretation of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) does not violate the principle of effective judicial protection, since it is part of legislative discretion to design the appropriate mechanisms to provide protection to older adults, and in the present case, the legislator's decision has been to establish protection mechanisms as precautionary measures, the application of which occurs within the framework of power or dependency relationships. Based on the above, the P.G.R. recommends that the Constitutional Chamber declare inadmissible the action of unconstitutionality against the jurisprudence of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) that requires the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties, since a uniform legal criterion does not exist in the decisions of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) permitting the conclusion that this is the reiterated jurisprudence of that jurisdictional body. As to the merits, the Attorney General's Office recommends that the Constitutional Court dismiss the action filed, since the constitutional violations alleged by the petitioner are not apparent.
6Oscar Corrales Valverde, in his capacity as Coordinating Judge of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia), rendered his report visible on folio 75. He states that with the approval by several countries of international legal instruments such as the Convention of Belém do Pará, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations Organization on November 20, 1989, plus the constitutional precepts existing since the enactment of the Political Constitution in 1949 regarding protection of the family and persons in a greater state of vulnerability, Costa Rica was obligated to legislate on the matter. Laws were thus enacted such as Law No. 7586 of April 10, 1996, Law Against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica) and later Law No. 7935, called Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor) of October 25, 1999.A new interpretation of the rights of persons assaulted in the family sphere was generated. The laws grant direct protection against imminent and current aggressions against the physical, psychological, patrimonial, and sexual integrity of victims through precautionary measures, without prejudging the substantive rights of the persons involved in the conflicts. Judges were instructed then on these topics, emphasizing aspects such as the power relationship, learned helplessness, and the cycle of violence, among others. Law No. 7935, Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) of October 25, 1999, was born as another instrument of protection for a vulnerable sector of society, older adults, who required a regulation tailored to their needs. Within this context, the initial interpretation given by the competent courts was guided by the desire to avoid and neutralize the cited pathologies of abuse of power, learned helplessness, and cycle of violence.Given that Article 57 of the cited Law does not indicate against whom the norm can be applied, it is difficult to distinguish where the law does not. The law's omission led to the interpretation that the provided protection was clearly in favor of that sector of the population, but since the passive subject (alleged aggressor) is not established, when referring to the Law Against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica), it began to be applied comprehensively. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law Against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la violencia doméstica) and the increase in the number and variety of cases subjected to protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for Older Adults (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) refers to the Law Against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica) solely for procedural purposes and for the application of precautionary measures, without the other conditions needing to be taken into consideration.The most recent resolutions of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) start from this new vision, which better suits the purposes of Law No. 7935. The criteria expressed in the resolutions cited in the action of unconstitutionality must be understood within an evolutionary process that the judges have followed; they are neither erroneous nor unconstitutional if analyzed in light of the moment in which they were issued. They constitute a demonstration of the interest of the judges competent in the matter in evolving in the study and analysis of the application of law.

In support of his statements, the Coordinator of the Family Court provides several judgments that reflect its current jurisprudence, namely, vote 06-00631 issued in case file 06-110024-300-VD, in which the first-instance resolution was revoked and the lifting of the measures ordered against the older adult was ordered, as well as the restitution of the older adult to his home; vote 1509-05 issued in case file 05-000765-650-VD in which, besides granting the protection measures, an exhortation was made to the National Commission for the Older Adult (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor) to investigate and follow up on the known situation; 23-06, issued in case file 05-001625-767-VD in which, lacking clear elements or indications, the protection of the older adult was maintained due to the existence of doubt about the situation; vote 1660-06, issued in case file 06-000402-696-VD, in which it is emphasized that older adults are a population group in vulnerable conditions that merits state protection; vote 154-07 issued in case file 06-110727-631-VD, in which it was ordered to maintain the protection and the EBAIS (Health Care Center) was commissioned to carry out special follow-up for that older adult; vote 485-07 issued in case file 06-001060-672-VD, in which special measures were ordered in favor of an older adult, a foreigner, who lives alone and without family in Costa Rica. In this last case, as in some of the others cited, no kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination relationship exists, and nevertheless, the requested protection has been granted.

7The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in issues 109, 110, and 111 of June 7, 8, and 11, 2007 (folio 47).
8The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, upon deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.
9The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.Regarding admissibility. The legitimacy of the petitioner derives from the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, insofar as there is an appeal pending resolution before the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José under case file 07-000824-0649-VD, in which the interpretation questioned here is being discussed, because the Family Court left without effect the protection measures requested in his favor, since he has no kinship relationship, nor a power relationship with the alleged aggressor. From this point of view, the Chamber deems that the action is a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured, since, if it were to proceed, it would have a direct impact on the matter pending resolution before the Family Court.

II.Now, the unconstitutionality action is filed against jurisprudence of the Family Court, which, in the petitioner's opinion, establishes two requirements for the imposition of precautionary measures in protection of the older adult: a.- The existence of a kinship bond between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, and, b. A power relationship also between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, requirements that he believes are not set forth in Article 57 of the Integral Law for the Older Adult Person (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) and that limit his fundamental rights. This Court has been particularly cautious when admitting unconstitutionality actions filed against the jurisprudence of the courts because, although it is true that Article 10 of the Political Constitution and Article 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction exclude jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch from constitutional control, Article 3 of the latter establishes with crystal clarity that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the confrontation of the text of the questioned norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with the constitutional norms and principles.

Regarding the admissibility of the action, when dealing with the questioned jurisprudence of other Courts, in judgment No. 1997-4587 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of August fifth, nineteen ninety-seven, this Chamber considered:

"In this regard, it must be noted that the Chamber, as a general rule, has admitted unconstitutionality actions filed against the jurisdictional interpretation of norms, when it concerns the reiterated criterion of judicial bodies, because if the action against what was decided by a jurisdictional body in a specific case were admitted, it would be interpreting the provisions of Article 3, in contradiction with what is regulated in Article 74, both of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which indicates that the unconstitutionality action does not lie against the jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch. This has been stated by the Chamber in numerous resolutions, from which the relevant part of the following is transcribed:

“In this regard, the petitioners must bear in mind that it is jurisprudence that this Chamber has recognized as an object of constitutional control, in cases where a certain trend of the courts of justice is contrary to the block of constitutional legitimacy, and only when an effective reiteration of a legal criterion issued by jurisdictional authorities is demonstrated, through a plurality of judgments, as an unwritten source of the legal system of precedents, in the resolution of all or at least a representative number of the cases assigned to judges within the scope of their competence, can it be said that there is jurisprudence in that sense, as this Court previously indicated by judgment number 6489-93, of ten hours twenty-four minutes of December ninth, nineteen ninety-three, in its Considering III:

“... When Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates that the Political Constitution will be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation that public authorities make of laws with constitutional norms and principles, what it allows is to examine the constitutionality of jurisprudence, that is, of reiterated judicial pronouncements, for the purpose of having them apply in ongoing, unresolved matters. It does not allow, as the petitioner intends, for the first and second instance rulings to be reviewed so that a certain judicial interpretation is not applied in the Cassation Chamber; because this would be tantamount to turning the Constitutional Chamber into one more instance of review of judgments." (judgment No. 1995-5981 of 15:51 hours of November 7, 1995)" It is important to note for the purposes of this judgment that the imposition of precautionary measures in matters of domestic violence lacks an appeal in cassation, making it impossible to find pronouncements from the Second Chamber.

Therefore, it is the pronouncements of the Superior Family Court that constitute jurisprudential doctrine, warranting the admission of the action in that sense as well (see judgment No. 2005-6224). Now, the petitioner provides four resolutions from the Family Court of San José: Resolution number 483-2000 of nine hours twenty minutes of May tenth, two thousand, in which the Court indicated: “… In conclusion, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica), with respect to a subject who has no type of kinship nor dependency towards the applicant, but who apparently verbally aggresses him, casting doubt on his honesty and professional decorum. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the appellant must resort to the corresponding avenue to assert his rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, with the understanding that the protection provided by the Integral Law for the Older Adult Person can only be requested before a Family Court or that which must hear by Ministry of Law, under the assumptions established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las personas discapacitadas), understanding even that, also the servants who care for disabled or older adult persons, may be subject to a process of protection measures, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a dependency relationship… ” ; in Resolution number 225-2001 of eight hours forty minutes of February fifth, two thousand one, the same line as the previous judgment was followed: “…

It is clear then, that any type of aggression that is classified as a crime must be heard by a Criminal Judge, while domestic aggression, that is, that referring to a sphere of familiarity and/or emotional dependency due to the existence of kinship, must be heard by a Family Judge without prejudice to the facts being debated in a criminal process if applicable. In the present matter, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to subjects who have no type of kinship nor dependency towards the alleged victims. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the interested parties must resort to the corresponding avenue to assert their rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, with the understanding that the protection provided by the Integral Law for the Older Adult Person can only be requested before a Family Court or that which must hear by Ministry of Law, under the assumptions established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons, understanding even that, also the servants who care for disabled or older adult persons, may be subject to a process of protection measures, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a dependency relationship…” ; 3.

In resolution number 1769-2003 of fourteen hours of December third, two thousand three, it was stated: “ It must be noted that the reference is to “protection measures” and “procedures,” not to other conditions such as kinship, since it is a special guardianship for the older adult in any setting. Article 2 of the Integral Law for the older adult person, defines what "violence against older adult persons" represents: “Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult person, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity”. But it is evident, from the system posed by the special law of guardianship for the older adult person, that a "de facto or de jure situation of power" on the part of the aggressor and a "special state of vulnerability" of the victim must mediate in the relationship, because it is also not about establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age over others.

It is evident that a conflict exists between the parties referring to assets of a succession, however, what the first-instance judge points out is true in the sense that there is no "verticality relationship between the parties, there is no emotional or economic dependency," an aspect that is equivalent to the aforementioned conditions of the de facto or de jure situation of power and the special state of vulnerability. ”; and in the last one, Resolution number 215-2006 of nine hours twenty minutes of March first, two thousand six: “In this regard, it should be pointed out that precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case, besides lacking kinship, is what determines the inadmissibility of the petition, not for the reasons given by the first-instance body, but because the conditions for the protection provided in the Law against Domestic Violence to be applicable are not met in the species.

See that the applicant herself indicates it, they do not reside in the same place, as this is rather the cause of the conflict, no kinship unites them, and consequently there is no abuse of power that must be protected, without prejudice to the actions that may be initiated based on the Law for the Protection of the Older Adult Person (Ley de Protección al Adulto Mayor)… ”. In the first two judgments, the Family Court expressly indicates that it is necessary for a kinship and a power relationship to exist between the parties; the third is based on the necessary power relationship, and the fourth is somewhat ambiguous in the application of the Law against Domestic Violence. However, it should be noted that it does refer to the fact that it is "...precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case besides lacking kinship,… what determines the inadmissibility of the petition…". It would seem to be inferred from the reading of the judgment that the Court considered the possibility of the power relationship for the application of the Law.

The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General), for its part, points out that also by means of judgments No. 1274-04 of nine hours ten minutes of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four, and 1509-2005 of fourteen hours fifty minutes of October fifth, two thousand five, the Family Court reiterated the criterion regarding a necessary power relationship, but not regarding kinship. Notwithstanding the above, the Jurisdictional Body, in its appearance in this case file, indicated that although the criterion of the Court has been as described in the judgments provided, such criterion has been evolving with the new legal instruments. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against domestic violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Integral Law for the Older Adult Person refers to the Law against Domestic Violence for the application of precautionary measures, without the other conditions required for ordinary domestic violence cases (power relationship, kinship) having to be taken into consideration.

In its most recent resolutions, among which are referred to votes 631-06, 1509-05, 23-06, 1660-06, 485-07, this new vision is assumed, such that in some of these cases, no kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination relationship exists, and nevertheless, the requested protection has been granted. In the Chamber's opinion, the resolutions provided by the petitioner, together with the judgments offered by the Family Court, as well as by the Attorney General's Office, lead to the conclusion that these do not constitute a uniform jurisprudential line that supports the petitioner's allegation in a way that merits a constitutionality analysis by this jurisdiction, since the alleged unconstitutionality, to the effect that a kinship relationship is necessary for the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, is not appreciated in all the resolutions provided. The Family Court adds more recent resolutions, in which the protection of the older adult is safeguarded under conditions that the petitioner finds lacking and fears will not be considered by that Court when resolving his appeal, without attending to a relationship of kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination.

Faced with the above, the Chamber considers that the proper course is to reject the present action, since the necessary condition that must exist to invoke the unconstitutionality of a jurisprudential line has not been demonstrated; moreover, this jurisdiction does not constitute another instance of review of the judgments of ordinary courts, as is intended in this case.

III.Notwithstanding the above, this Court considers it convenient to reiterate the importance of the protection of this sector of the population as provided in the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution when it establishes:

"Similarly, the mother, the child, the elderly, and the destitute sick shall have the right to that protection." It is evident, according to the transcribed norm, the dual duty that the Costa Rican State has: a) On the one hand, it must produce an adequate normative framework to provide special protection for those groups of people, which constitutes a true fundamental right, and b) Respect and enforce respect for such rights through the corresponding administrative agencies and courts of justice. From the concept of the Social State of Law, it is possible to derive obligations for the public authorities, precisely for the sake of seeking the greatest well-being of "all the inhabitants of the country," among which, the Constitution's Law specially designates children, mothers, the elderly, and destitute persons. The Social State enshrined in our Political Constitution develops in its normative content a relevant and mandatory state intervention in social matters in favor of those special sectors of the population that, due to their condition, require it; such is the case –undoubtedly– of the elderly, or persons of the third age, or older adult persons.

Until a few years ago, there was no regulation aimed at adequately guaranteeing the special protection and state guardianship that the older adult of our country requires; however, on October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Integral Law for the older adult person, number 7935, which aims to:

"a) Guarantee older adult persons equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all spheres.

b)Guarantee the active participation of older adult persons in the formulation and application of policies that affect them.
c)Promote the permanence of older adult persons in their family and community nucleus.
d)Favor forms of organization and participation of older adult persons that allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.
e)Promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adult persons by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of the programs and services intended for this population.
f)Guarantee the social protection and security of older adult persons." However, it cannot and should not be intended that this regulation exhausts the guardianship and special protection by the State of the fundamental rights of older adults, because it is precisely from the legal framework that this jurisprudential development by the judiciary, of obligation and respect, must occur. The regulation is only an introductory framework that provides that "an older adult person must be considered any person sixty-five years of age or older." Likewise, it aims, among other things, at comprehensive care for this group, defined in the law as the satisfaction of the physical, material, biological, emotional, social, labor, productive, and spiritual needs of older adult persons. To facilitate a full and healthy old age, their habits, functional abilities, and preferences shall be considered. Due to this, and given the vulnerability of this sector of the population, its protection against the violence they suffer is also provided, meaning by this "any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult person, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity.

Older adult persons have the right to have their physical, psychological, and moral integrity respected, a right that also includes the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values." To this end, this very law provides the mechanism for protecting such rights, a clear example of which is Article 57, the legal interpretation of which is the one being challenged in this action. This norm provides:

“ARTICLE 57.- Protection measures To prevent physical, psychological, patrimonial, or sexual violence against older adult persons, the protection measures and the procedures ordered in the Law against domestic violence, No. 7586, of April 10, 1996, shall be applied. Those legitimated to request them are, especially, the representatives of public and private institutions in charge of care programs for the older adult person, as well as any person who knows of these abuses.” Indeed, the questioned provision refers to the domestic violence law only for procedural effects, because to configure a case of domestic violence, the legal basis for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Integral Law for the older adult person, whose sole purpose is to guarantee older adult persons equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all spheres, protecting them against anyone who intends the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity.

IV.The summary process of the protection measures regulated in the Law against Domestic Violence has been endorsed by this Court, attending to the vulnerability of the protected sectors in accordance with Article 51 of the Political Constitution. A programmatic norm that establishes the obligation of the State to provide special protection to the family as the natural element and essential foundation of society, as well as to mothers, children, the elderly, and the destitute sick. In such terms, not only this law but also the Integral Law for the Older Adult Person is a manifestation of compliance with that constitutional directive, the spirit of which permeates its entire content. Guaranteed within it are the rights to life, to health, and to physical integrity, as established in our Magna Carta and by International Human Rights Law. It is thus that this Constitutional Right is violated not only when one of the members of a family nucleus, abusing their physical strength or their position of authority, inflicts physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial abuse on one or several of its members, but when other persons harm in some way an older adult, whose vulnerability is inherent.- For the sake of their protection, respect, and integrity, the legislator considered it opportune to provide adult victims of violence with an agile and timely procedure that would immediately guarantee compliance with the mentioned constitutional postulates, referring solely for the purposes of applying protection measures to the Law against domestic violence.

V.Conclusion. Despite all of the above, this action must be rejected, as indicated in considering II, insofar as the resolutions provided by the petitioner cannot be considered a jurisprudential line of the Family Court that merits a constitutionality analysis by this Chamber. Consequently, the action must be summarily rejected.

Therefore:

The action is summarily rejected.

Luis Fernando Solano C. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and fifteen minutes of the nineteenth of September of two thousand seven.

Unconstitutionality action brought by HERMES JIMENEZ MADRIZ, of legal age, married, resident of Alajuela, bearer of identity card number 3-191-1209, seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of case law of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding access of the older adult to precautionary justice. Also participating in the proceeding were Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, representing the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), and the Presiding Judge of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia).

Whereas:

1By a written submission received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eleven hours and forty minutes on the fourteenth of May of two thousand seven, the petitioner requests that the reiterated judicial interpretation by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding the prerequisites for the application of protective measures in accordance with Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), Law 7935, be declared unconstitutional. The petitioner points out that the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) has interpreted that the application of protective measures requires the existence of a kinship bond between the alleged aggressor and the older adult. Likewise, he points out that the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) has established that the imposition of protective measures requires a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the victim, whereas in the petitioner's opinion, the mere presence of violence implies the existence of a power relationship.This has resulted in the denial of the right to effective judicial protection for older adults who seek protection based on the provisions of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, No. 7935, if there is no kinship bond between the reporting older adult and the aggressor, a bond that Law No. 7935 does not require in any of its provisions. He considers that sending the Older Adult to the contraventional or criminal route is inadmissible since these are repressive channels, and the justice the older adult seeks to access is protective.
2For the purpose of substantiating the standing (legitimación) he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he indicates that it derives from the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), as there is a pending appeal filed before the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) against the judgment of the Domestic Violence Court of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (Juzgado de Violencia Doméstica del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela), issued in case file No. 07-000824-9649-VD brought by the petitioner, which lifted the requested protective measures due to the absence of kinship, an appeal that remains pending resolution.
3By a resolution issued at fourteen hours and twenty-five minutes on the twenty-second of May of two thousand seven, the petitioner was warned to fulfill procedural requirements, a warning that was satisfied as verified by the record visible on folio 37 of the case file.
4By a resolution issued at fifteen hours and forty minutes on the twenty-ninth of May of two thousand seven (visible on folio 43 of the case file), the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia).
5The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) rendered its report, visible on folios 48 to 74. It recommends dismissing the unconstitutionality action brought, based on the following reasons. Regarding the challenge of case law (jurisprudencia), the P.G.R. points out that the Chamber has followed a restrictive criterion concerning the admissibility of an unconstitutionality action based on the discussed circumstance, in order to prevent individuals from using this route to request and obtain the unconstitutionality, not only of the interpretation of the referenced norms in general, but also of the specific jurisdictional ruling, a sphere exempt from constitutional control by express provision of Articles 10 of the Political Constitution and 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional)" (Constitutional Chamber, resolution 2001-00252 at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the tenth of January of two thousand one, underlining in the original).Hence, the unconstitutionality action against case law (jurisprudencia) is only admissible when there is reiteration of a legal criterion contained in two or more resolutions. Consequently, it can be affirmed that only when there are various pronouncements on the same point and provided they are coincident can one speak of case law (jurisprudencia). Pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code, case law (jurisprudencia) is the reiteration of a legal criterion that allows interpreting, informing, and integrating the legal system. Eduardo Ortiz defines it as the “set of unwritten rules of conduct extracted, by generalization, from existing judgments on a specific matter… Case law (jurisprudencia), therefore, has general scope, like the law, and is formed by the set of general principles, with a life and permanence of their own distinct from the judgment, contained in the decisions of the courts.” Regarding the second prerequisite challenged by the petitioner, i.e., the existence of a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the older adult, the P.G.R. considers that from the judgments provided, a generalized criterion regarding the need for such a power relationship can indeed be extracted.The first two cited judgments mention very tangentially the possible existence of a dependency relationship as a prerequisite for applying the measures established in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), while the third judgment provided does emphatically establish that there must be a “situation of de facto or de jure power” on the part of the aggressor and a “special state of vulnerability” in the older adult, which allows concluding that there does exist a criterion reiterated by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding the need for that dependency or power relationship. Along this same line of thought, it is pertinent to note that from the analysis carried out by this Office of the Attorney General, at least two more resolutions from the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) have been found, numbers 1274-04 at nine hours ten minutes on the twenty-seventh of July of two thousand four and 1509-2005 at fourteen hours fifty minutes on the fifth of October of two thousand five, in which the criterion expressed in resolution number 1521-2003 provided by the appellant is reiterated.Based on the foregoing, in the opinion of this representation, the unconstitutionality action against the case law (jurisprudencia) of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) is admissible only concerning the existence of a power or dependency relationship between the victim and the alleged aggressor, and not regarding the existence of a kinship bond between the parties. As to the merits, Article 51 of the Political Constitution establishes the State's duty to provide special protection to older adults. In a similar sense, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), in its Article 17, establishes the duty of States to provide special protection to older adults. The special protection for older adults is grounded in the need for Society and the State to ensure the physical, emotional, and social integrity of persons considered vulnerable for various reasons.Indeed, the constitutional article includes a group of persons whom the Constituent Assembly decided to grant special protection precisely because they are vulnerable groups, namely, children, mothers, older adults, and incapacitated persons. On the other hand, the right to special protection for older adults constitutes a fundamental right of a programmatic nature (prestacional). The preceding distinction has been embraced by the majority of Constitutional Courts, particularly for the purpose of evaluating State actions aimed at fulfilling the protection established in their respective constitutions. Thus, the case law (jurisprudencia) of the German Federal Constitutional Court has recognized the existence of these benefits chargeable to the State, especially in relation to the protection of rights such as life and personal integrity. For the case under study, it is relevant to highlight how German case law (jurisprudencia) has resolved the issue of conflicts between various fundamental rights and the protection demanded of the State.“The Court warns that this protection may come into conflict with other constitutionally-ranked interests… in which case the legislator is the first called upon to resolve said conflict by ‘weighing the opposing fundamental values according to the measure of the constitutional order and in accordance with the principle of proportionality.’ In order to carry out this weighing, the legislator has a margin of appreciation that the Court must respect, which does not mean that any legislative decision is valid” (Doménech Pascual, Gabriel, Op. Cit., p. 79). The same position has been assumed by the Constitutional Chamber in our country, which has pointed out the existence of a series of fundamental rights of a programmatic nature (prestacional) that fall within the framework of a Social State of Law in which the State takes an active stance against certain social situations; rights among which the special protection established in Article 51 of the Political Constitution has been included.(Constitutional Chamber, resolution number 2006-2268 at eight hours fifty-nine minutes on the twenty-fourth of February of two thousand six). From what has been presented so far, it is concluded that the Political Constitution contains a mandate to public authorities to establish protection mechanisms for certain sectors of society that may be vulnerable to the actions of third parties. These mechanisms must be designed legally, for which the legislator has discretion in their definition, while having to balance the establishment of these mechanisms against the existence of other fundamental rights, in light of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, such that the establishment of the former does not entail a disproportionate restriction of the rights of third parties. Regarding protective measures, the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica), Law 7856, establishes the possibility of imposing protective measures in favor of the alleged victims, aimed at safeguarding the physical, emotional, and patrimonial integrity of the affected person.As the petitioner notes, by provision of Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), the protective measures and the procedures for imposing them are applicable in cases of violence against older adults. It is therefore necessary, prior to analyzing the alleged unconstitutionality defects, to examine the legal nature of the protective measures, as well as the purpose for which they have been designed. The Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica) regulates “the application of the protective measures necessary to guarantee the life, integrity, and dignity of the victims of domestic violence,” and it is applicable to “mothers, children, persons sixty years or older, and disabled persons,” as well as to victims of violence arising in partner relationships (Article 1 Law 7856). The Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality of protective measures adopted within the framework of this regulation, stating that they constitute genuine precautionary measures in the form of acts limiting fundamental rights that find their justification in the higher value represented by the protection of the groups to which said regulation is directed (Constitutional Chamber, resolution number 057-1997 at fifteen hours twelve minutes on the seventh of January of 1997; in the same vein, see also resolutions number 2896-1996 at nine hours thirty-six minutes on the fourteenth of June of nineteen ninety-six; 2897-1996 at nine hours thirty-nine minutes on the fourteenth of June of nineteen ninety-six; 2966-1996 at fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on the eighteenth of June of nineteen ninety-six; 2899-1996 at nine hours forty-five minutes on the fourteenth of June of nineteen ninety-six; and 3045-1996 at eleven hours twenty-one minutes on the twenty-first of June of nineteen ninety-six, all from the Constitutional Chamber).Along this same line of thought, the Chamber has indicated that: “… the measures in question, as well as their nature, do not have a sanctioning character, whether of a criminal or disciplinary nature, because they do not seek to establish any liability on the part of the accused in relation to the facts examined.- On the contrary, they concern the establishment of protective measures in favor of certain persons who at a given moment find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their safeguarding by state bodies meritorious. (…) It is clear, then, that it is constitutionally possible for the legislator to impose, among others, this type of ‘provisional’ prohibitive acts that in fact restrict the enjoyment of some fundamental rights of the person reported for domestic violence, provided that this is done with the aim of upholding other constitutional values such as, in this case, the physical integrity of the victims and their dignity as human beings.-…” (resolution number 7160-1998 at fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on the seventh of October of 1998, underlining is not from the original).As indicated above, the protective measures and the procedure for their imposition are applicable in cases of violence against older adults, not only because they are a group included within the initial protection of the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica), but also due to the possibility provided for in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) that these measures also be applied in cases of violence against the elderly, as defined in Article 1 of that same normative body. These two articles were incorporated into the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor) during the legislative discussion; however, from the legislative file, no comment or justification for their inclusion within that normative body can be extracted. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the P.G.R.'s opinion, it is clear that the legislator's intent was to expand the protection already provided by the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica) to older adults, establishing the possibility of applying such measures in cases of violence according to the definition contained in the law itself, but through the same mechanisms provided for domestic violence.The P.G.R. expresses doubts regarding the existence of a reiterated criterion of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) establishing the existence of a family relationship as a requirement for the imposition of protective measures, since, as seen, the resolutions provided do not allow extracting a generalized criterion, and the difference in dates casts doubt on the position actually assumed by the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is its opinion that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) does not establish the existence of a kinship bond between the alleged aggressor and the victim as a requirement for the imposition of protective measures. Two reasons justify that conclusion. The first has to do with the literal interpretation carried out of Article 57 of Law 7935, an interpretation that must necessarily be made in harmony with the definition of violence that law contains.Thus, the definition of violence against older adults does not include the existence of a kinship bond as necessary, because this requirement was entirely omitted. According to the doctrine that informs Article 10 of the Civil Code, norms must be interpreted “according to the ordinary meaning of their words.” In that sense, by not including the existence of a kinship bond within this concept of violence against older adults, it must be concluded that this requirement was not demanded by the legislator for the application of those precautionary measures. The other reason supporting this thesis is of a historical nature and relates to the inclusion of older adults within the protection contained in the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica). This Law establishes the possibility that protective measures may be requested by older adults. Upon the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), the possibility was incorporated that the elderly could request the same protective measures against the violence they suffer, but in accordance with the definition of violence that said law establishes.Note that both the current Article 57 and the definition of violence contained in Law 7935 were incorporated in the same motion to the normative text, which reinforces the thesis of the direct relationship between the definition of violence against older adults and the possibility of imposing protective measures. From the foregoing, it is clear to the Office of the Attorney General that the legislator's intent was not to subject older adults to the domestic violence law procedures (since at the time of the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, older adults were already included within the scope of protection of the Domestic Violence Law), but rather the intent was to expand the protection of that social group to forms of violence that do not solely imply kinship relationships. Under this understanding, it is concluded that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) does not require the existence of a kinship bond between the parties as a prerequisite for the application of protective measures.Now then, this legal position is also present in at least one of the resolutions of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) that was provided by the petitioner. Thus, the jurisdictional body, in resolution number 1521-2003, states that “the referral that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, number 7935 of October 19, 1999, makes to the Law against Domestic Violence does not imply a kinship relationship,” so regarding this aspect, this Office of the Attorney General considers that there has been no violation of the fundamental right of older adults to special protection, nor to effective judicial protection. The petitioner challenges the case law (jurisprudencia) of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) that requires, as a prerequisite for the application of protective measures, the existence of a power or dependency relationship between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, considering that this interpretation is not present in the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), thus imposing additional requirements on that population to obtain the judicial protection they need.The P.G.R. does not share the argument presented. The special protection granted to the older adult is based on the premise that this group may find itself in a special situation of vulnerability, which justifies differentiated treatment in relation to the average person. Thus, the constituent power orders the legislator to design the mechanisms that, in its judgment, allow for adequate protection of older adults.

These mechanisms may be preventive or repressive, but the decision of which mechanism should be used is part of legislative discretion. Therefore, as a first conclusion, it considers that no obligation is derived from Article 51 of the Political Constitution for the legislator to establish preventive and not repressive mechanisms in all cases where the interests of an older adult are affected, as the claimant seeks to argue, since such a decision is a matter for the legislator, given the programmatic nature of these obligations. Following this same line of argument, it was indicated earlier that when choosing protection mechanisms, the legislator must weigh the rights of third parties that could be affected by the establishment of the measures, so that the adopted procedures are reasonable and proportional to the injury caused to these other rights that also deserve constitutional protection.

In this way, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has admitted that the protection measures agreed upon within the framework of the Domestic Violence Law constitute prohibitive acts that negatively affect the rights of third parties who are obliged to comply with the imposed duties. Nonetheless, the existence of these precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) has been constitutionally justified, insofar as this Constitutional Court has interpreted that "the setting of protection measures in favor of certain persons who at a given moment find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their safeguarding by state organs meritorious." That is, not just any injury to the interests of that group can give rise to special protection through these precautionary measures, but rather that which originates in a factual situation of weakness, which occurs when between the older adult and the alleged aggressor there exists a power relationship that gives rise to dependence, whether economic or emotional, of the victim on the aggressor, effectively placing the former in a situation of vulnerability and weakness vis-à-vis the latter.

It is within this framework that the judge must analyze the protection measures contained in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor), and therefore, in the opinion of the P.G.R., the interpretation given by the Family Court is consistent, not only with the text of the law, but also with Constitutional Law, according to the preceding analysis. Indeed, the Family Court maintains that not just any violence can give rise to the imposition of a protection measure, considering that in order to order precautionary measures, "there must be in the relationship 'a situation of power in fact or in law,' on the part of the aggressor, and 'a special state of vulnerability' of the victim, because it is not about establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age over others." Indeed, it has been pointed out that protection measures are justified insofar as there is a party in a state of special vulnerability, and it is that objective condition that justifies differentiated treatment for older adults in relation to the rest of the population.

If the objective condition for making the differentiation in treatment disappears, it must be considered that the reasonableness and proportionality in the difference of treatment also disappear. In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of this representation, the interpretation of the Family Court does not violate the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), since it is part of the legislative discretion to design the appropriate mechanisms to provide protection to older adults, and in the present case the legislator's decision has been to establish protection mechanisms as precautionary measures, whose application occurs within the framework of power or dependency relationships. Based on the above, the P.G.R. recommends that the Constitutional Chamber declare inadmissible the action of unconstitutionality against the jurisprudence of the Family Court that requires the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties, since there is no uniform legal criterion in the decisions of the Family Court that allows reaching the conclusion that one is faced with the reiterated jurisprudence of that jurisdictional body.

On the merits, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) recommends that the Constitutional Court declare the filed action without merit, since the constitutional injuries alleged by the claimant are not observed.

6Licenciado Oscar Corrales Valverde, in his capacity as Coordinating Judge of the Family Court, submitted his report visible on folio 75. He states that with the approval by several countries of international legal instruments such as the Belém do Pará Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations Organization on November 20, 1989, plus the existing constitutional precepts since the enactment of the Political Constitution in 1949 regarding the protection of the family and persons in a state of greater vulnerability, Costa Rica was obliged to legislate on the matter. Thus, laws such as Law No. 7586 of April 10, 1996, Law against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica), and subsequently Law No. 7935, called Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) of October 25, 1999, were enacted.A new interpretation of the rights of persons attacked in the family sphere is generated. The laws grant direct protection against imminent and current aggressions against the physical, psychological, patrimonial, and sexual integrity of the victims through precautionary measures, without prejudging the substantive rights of the persons involved in the conflicts. The judges were then instructed on these topics, with emphasis being given to aspects such as the power relationship, learned helplessness, and the cycle of violence, among others. Law No. 7935, Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult of October 25, 1999, was born as another instrument of protection for a vulnerable sector of society, older adults, who required a regulation adjusted to their needs. Within this context, the initial interpretation given by the competent courts was guided by the desire to avoid and neutralize the cited pathologies of abuse of power, learned helplessness, and cycle of violence.Given that Article 57 of the cited Law does not indicate against whom the norm can be applied, it is difficult to distinguish where the law does not. The law's omission led to the interpretation that the protection provided was clearly in favor of that sector of the population, but since the passive subject (alleged aggressor) is not established, by referring to the Law against Domestic Violence, the latter began to be applied in an integral manner. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against Domestic Violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult refers to the Law against Domestic Violence only for procedural effects and for the application of precautionary measures, without having to take into consideration the other presuppositions. The most recent resolutions of the Family Court are based on this new vision, which is better suited to the purposes of Law No. 7935.The criteria set forth in the resolutions cited in the action of unconstitutionality must be understood within an evolutionary process that the judges have followed; they are not erroneous or unconstitutional if analyzed in light of the moment they were issued. They constitute a demonstration of the interest of the competent judges in the matter in evolving in the study and analysis of the application of the law. In support of his statements, the Coordinator of the Family Court provides several judgments that reflect its current jurisprudence, namely, Voto 06-00631 issued in expediente 06-110024-300-VD, in which the first-instance resolution was revoked and the measures decreed against the older adult were ordered lifted and the restitution of the older adult to their home was ordered; Voto 1509-05 issued in expediente 05-000765-650-VD in which, in addition to granting protection measures, an exhortation was made to the National Commission for the Older Adult (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor) to investigate and follow up on the known situation; 23-06, issued in expediente 05-001625-767-VD in which, without having clear elements or indications, the protection for the older adult was maintained because of doubt about the situation; Voto 1660-06, issued in expediente 06-000402-696-VD, in which it is emphasized that older adults are a population group in conditions of vulnerability that warrants state protection; Voto 154-07 issued in expediente 06-110727-631-VD, in which it was ordered to maintain protection and the EBAIS (Health Care Center) was commissioned to carry out special follow-up for that older adult; Voto 485-07 issued in expediente 06-001060-672-VD, in which special measures were dictated in favor of an older adult, a foreigner, who lives alone and without family in Costa Rica. In this last case, as in some of the others cited, there is no kinship relationship, verticality, dependency, or subordination, and yet, the requested protection has been granted.
7The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in issues 109, 110, and 111 of June 7, 8, and 11, 2007 (folio 47).
8The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently founded on evident principles and norms, as well as on the jurisprudence of this Court.
9The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the procedures.

Drafted by Magistrate Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.On admissibility. The claimant's standing comes from the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, as there is an appeal (recurso de apelación) pending resolution before the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José under expediente 07-000824-0649-VD, in which the interpretation challenged here is discussed, because the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) left without effect the protection measures requested in his favor, since he has no kinship relationship, nor a power relationship with the alleged aggressor. From this point of view, the Chamber considers that the action is a reasonable means of protecting the right that is considered injured, since if it were to proceed, it would have a direct impact on the matter that is pending resolution before the Family Court.

II.Now, the action of unconstitutionality is filed against the jurisprudence of the Family Court, which in the claimant's opinion establishes two requirements for the imposition of precautionary measures in protection of the older adult: a.- The existence of a kinship bond between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, and b.- A power relationship also between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, requirements that he considers are not provided in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult and that limit his fundamental rights. This Court has been particularly cautious in admitting actions of unconstitutionality filed against the jurisprudence of the courts, because although it is true that Article 10 of the Political Constitution and Article 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction exclude jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch from constitutional control, Article 3 of the latter establishes with crystal clarity that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the confrontation of the text of the challenged norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with constitutional norms and principles.

Regarding the admissibility of the action, in the case of the challenged jurisprudence of other Tribunals, in judgment No. 1997-4587 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of August five, nineteen ninety-seven, this Chamber considered:

"In this regard, it should be noted that the Chamber, as a general rule, has admitted actions of unconstitutionality filed against the jurisdictional interpretation of norms, when it concerns the reiterated criterion of judicial organs, because if the action were admitted against what was decided by a jurisdictional organ in a specific case, it would be interpreting the provisions of Article 3, in contradiction with what is regulated in Article 74, both of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which indicates that an action of unconstitutionality does not lie against the jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch. This has been set forth by the Chamber in numerous resolutions, of which the relevant part of the following is transcribed:

"In this regard, the claimants must bear in mind that it is the jurisprudence that this Chamber has recognized as an object of constitutional control, in cases where a certain tendency of the courts of justice proves contrary to the bloc of constitutional legality, and only when effective reiteration of a legal criterion emanating from jurisdictional authorities is demonstrated, through a plurality of judgments, as an unwritten source of the system of precedents, in the resolution of all or at least a representative number of the cases assigned to the judges within the scope of their competence, is it possible to speak of the existence of jurisprudence in that sense, as this Court previously indicated in judgment number 6489-93, of ten hours twenty-four minutes of December nine, nineteen ninety-three, in its Considering III:

"... When Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation that public authorities make of the laws with constitutional norms and principles, what it allows is the examination of the constitutionality of jurisprudence, that is, of reiterated judicial pronouncements, for the purpose of asserting them in pending, unresolved matters. It does not allow, as the claimant intends, the review of lower and appellate court rulings, so that a specific judicial interpretation is not applied in the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación); because this would be equivalent to converting the Constitutional Chamber into another instance of review of judgments." (judgment No. 1995-5981 of 15:51 hours of November 7, 1995)" It is important to point out for the purposes of this judgment that the imposition of precautionary measures in matters of domestic violence lacks a cassation appeal (recurso de casación), making it impossible to find pronouncements from the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda).

Therefore, it is the pronouncements of the Superior Family Court that constitute jurisprudential doctrine, which merits admitting the action also in that sense (see judgment No. 2005-6224). Now, the claimant provides four resolutions of the Family Court of San José: Resolution number 483-2000 of nine hours twenty minutes of May ten, two thousand, in which the Court indicated: "… In conclusion, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to a subject who has no type of kinship or dependency towards the applicant, but who apparently attacks him verbally, putting his honesty and professional decorum in doubt. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the appellant must resort to the corresponding avenue to assert his rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, on the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult can only be requested before a Family Court or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the cases established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las personas discapacitadas), understanding even that, the servants who care for disabled or older adult persons, can also be subject to a process of protection measures, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a relationship of dependency…" ; in Resolution number 225-2001 of eight hours forty minutes of February five, two thousand one, the same line as the previous judgment was followed: "…

It is clear then, that any type of aggression that is classified as a crime must be heard by a Criminal Judge, while domestic aggression, that is, that referred to an environment of familiarity and/or emotional dependency due to the existence of kinship must be heard by a Family Judge without prejudice to the facts being debated in a criminal process if applicable. In the present matter, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to subjects who have no type of kinship or dependency towards the alleged victims. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the interested parties must resort to the corresponding avenue to assert their rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, on the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult can only be requested before a Family Court or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the cases established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, understanding even that, the servants who care for disabled or older adult persons, can also be subject to a process of protection measures, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a relationship of dependency…" ; 3.

In resolution number 1769-2003 of fourteen hours of December three, two thousand three, it was stated: " It should be noted that the referral is to "the protection measures" and to the "procedures" not to other presuppositions such as kinship, since it is a special protection for the older adult in any sphere. Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the older adult, defines what represents "violence against older adults: 'Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, that produces, as a consequence, the undermining of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity.' But it is evident, from the system proposed by the special law of protection for the older adult, that there must be in the relationship 'a situation of power in fact or in law' on the part of the aggressor and 'a special state of vulnerability' of the victim, because it is not about establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age over others.

It is evident that among the intervenors there is a conflict referring to assets of an estate, however, what the first-instance judge points out is true in the sense that there is no "relationship of verticality between the parties, there is no emotional or economic dependency," an aspect that is equivalent to the mentioned presuppositions of the situation of power in fact or in law and of the special state of vulnerability." ; and in the last one, Resolution number 215-2006 of nine hours twenty minutes of March one, two thousand six: "In this regard, it should be noted that precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case, in addition to lacking kinship, is what determines the inadmissibility of the proceeding (gestión), not for the reasons given by the first-instance organ, but because the presuppositions for the protection provided in the Law against Domestic Violence to be applicable are not met in the case.

See that the same applicant indicates it, they do not reside in the same place, as this is rather the cause of the conflict, no kinship unites them, and consequently there is no abuse of power that should be protected, without prejudice to the actions that may be promoted based on the Law for the Protection of the Older Adult… ". In the first two judgments, the Family Court expressly indicates that it is necessary for there to be a kinship and power relationship between the parties; the third is based on the necessary power relationship, and the fourth is somewhat ambiguous in the application of the Domestic Violence Law. However, it should be noted that it does refer to the fact that it is "…precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case, in addition to lacking kinship,… which determines the inadmissibility of the proceeding…". It would seem to emerge from the reading of the judgment that the Court considered, for the application of the Law, the possibility of the power relationship.

The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General), for its part, points out that also through judgments No. 1274-04 of nine hours ten minutes of July twenty-seven, two thousand four, and 1509-2005 of fourteen hours fifty minutes of October five, two thousand five, the Family Court reiterated the criterion regarding a necessary power relationship, but not regarding kinship. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Jurisdictional Organ, in its appearance in this expediente, pointed out that even though the Court's criterion has been that described in the provided judgments, this criterion has been evolving with the new legal instruments. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against Domestic Violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult refers to the Law against Domestic Violence for the application of precautionary measures, without having to take into consideration the other presuppositions required for ordinary domestic violence cases (power relationship, kinship).

In its most recent resolutions, among which are cited Votos 631-06, 1509-05, 23-06, 1660-06, 485-07, this new vision is adopted, and in some of these cases, there is no kinship relationship, verticality, dependency, or subordination, and yet, the requested protection has been granted. In the opinion of the Chamber, and the resolutions provided by the claimant, together with the judgments offered by the Family Court, as well as by the Attorney General's Office, lead to the conclusion that these do not configure a uniform jurisprudential line that supports the claimant's allegation in a way that merits a constitutional analysis by this jurisdiction, since the unconstitutionality alleged in the sense that a kinship relationship is necessary for the application of the Domestic Violence Law is not observed in all the provided resolutions. The Family Court adds more recent resolutions, in which the protection of the older adult is safeguarded under the presuppositions that the claimant misses and fears will not be considered by that Court when resolving his appeal, without addressing a kinship relationship, verticality, dependency, or subordination.

Faced with the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the appropriate course is to reject the present action, since the necessary presupposition that must exist to invoke the unconstitutionality of a jurisprudential line has not been demonstrated; furthermore, this jurisdiction does not constitute another instance of review of the judgments of the ordinary courts, as is intended in this case.

III.Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court considers it appropriate to reiterate the importance of the protection of this sector of the population as provided in the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution when it establishes:

"Similarly, the mother, the child, the elderly person, and the destitute sick person shall have the right to that protection." It is evident, according to the transcribed norm, the dual duty that the Costa Rican State has: a) On one hand, it must produce an adequate normative framework in order to provide special protection for these groups of people, which constitutes a true fundamental right, and b) Respect and enforce respect, through the corresponding administrative dependencies and courts of justice, such rights.

From the concept of the Social State of Law, it is possible to derive obligations for public authorities, precisely for the sake of seeking the greatest well-being of "all the inhabitants of the country," among whom Constitutional Law specifically points to children, mothers, the elderly, and persons in need. The Social State enshrined in our Political Constitution develops in its normative content a relevant and mandatory state intervention in social matters in favor of those special sectors of the population that, by their condition, so require; such is the case—without a doubt—of the elderly, or persons of the third age, or older adults. Until a few years ago, there was no regulation aimed at adequately guaranteeing the special protection and state guardianship that the older adult in our country requires; however, on October 19, 1999, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, number 7935, which intends to:

"a) Guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas.

b)Guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of policies that affect them.
c)Promote the permanence of older adults in their family and community nucleus.
d)Foster forms of organization and participation of older adults, which allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.
e)Promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of programs and services intended for this population.
f)Guarantee the protection and social security of older adults." However, it cannot and should not be intended for that regulation to exhaust the guardianship and special protection by the State of the fundamental rights of adults, since it is precisely from the legal framework that this jurisprudential development by the judiciary of mandatory compliance and respect must occur. The regulation is only an introductory framework that provides that "an older adult shall be considered any person sixty-five years of age or older." Likewise, it intends, among other things, comprehensive care for this group, defined in the law as the satisfaction of the physical, material, biological, emotional, social, labor, productive, and spiritual needs of older adults. To facilitate a full and healthy old age, their habits, functional capacities, and preferences shall be considered. For this reason, and given the vulnerability of this sector of the population, its protection from the violence they suffer is also provided for, this being understood as "any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, which produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or property integrity.

Older adults have the right to have their physical, psychological, and moral integrity respected, a right that also includes the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values." For this, this same law provides the mechanism for the protection of said rights, a clear example of which is Article 57, whose legal interpretation is the one being challenged in this action. This rule provides:

"ARTICLE 57.- Protection Measures To prevent physical, psychological, property, or sexual violence against older adults, the protection measures and procedures ordered in the Law against Domestic Violence, No. 7586, of April 10, 1996, shall be applied.

They shall be entitled to request them, especially the representatives of public and private institutions in charge of the care programs for the older adult, as well as any person who knows of these abuses." Indeed, the questioned provision refers to the domestic violence law only for procedural purposes, since to constitute a case of domestic violence, the legal basis for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, whose sole purpose is to guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas, protecting them against anyone who seeks the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or property integrity.

IV.The summary process of the protection measures regulated in the Law against Domestic Violence has been endorsed by this Court, considering the vulnerability of the protected sectors in accordance with Article 51 of the Political Constitution. A programmatic rule that establishes the State's obligation to give special protection to the family as the natural element and essential foundation of society, as well as to mothers, children, the elderly, and the helpless sick. In such terms, not only this law but also the Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, is a manifestation of the fulfillment of that constitutional directive, whose spirit permeates its entire content. In it, the right to life, health, and physical integrity is guaranteed, as established in our Magna Carta and by International Human Rights Law. It is thus that this Constitutional Right is violated not only when one of the members of a family nucleus, abusing their physical strength or their position of authority, inflicts physical, sexual, psychological, or property vexations on one or more of its members, but when other persons harm in some way an older adult, whose vulnerability is inherent.- For the sake of their protection, respect, and integrity, it is that the legislator considered it opportune to provide adult victims of violence with an agile and timely procedure, which would guarantee them immediately the fulfillment of the aforementioned constitutional postulates, referring only for the purposes of the application of protection measures to the Law against Domestic Violence.

V.Conclusion. Despite all of the above, this action must be rejected, as indicated in considerando II, insofar as the resolutions provided by the plaintiff cannot be considered a jurisprudential line of the Family Court that merits a constitutionality analysis by this Chamber. Consequently, it is appropriate to reject the action outright.

Por tanto:

The action is rejected outright.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Horacio González Q.

a power relationship also between the older adult and the alleged aggressor, requirements that, he believes, are not set forth in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult and that limit his fundamental rights. This Court has been particularly cautious in admitting unconstitutionality actions filed against the case law of the courts, because although it is true that Article 10 of the Political Constitution and Article 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction exclude the jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch from constitutional review, Article 3 of the latter establishes with meridian clarity that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the comparison of the text of the challenged norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with constitutional norms and principles. Regarding the admissibility of the action, when dealing with the challenged case law of other Courts, in judgment No. 1997-4587 of fifteen hours forty- five minutes of August fifth, nineteen ninety-seven, this Chamber considered: <o:p></o:p> "In this regard, it should be noted that the Chamber, as a general rule, has admitted unconstitutionality actions filed against the jurisdictional interpretation of norms, when it concerns the reiterated criteria of judicial bodies, because if the action were admitted against what was resolved by a jurisdictional body in a specific case, it would be interpreting the provisions of Article 3, in contradiction with what is regulated in Article 74, both of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which states that an unconstitutionality action is not applicable against the jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch.

This has been stated by the Chamber in numerous resolutions from which the relevant part is transcribed below: <o:p></o:p> "In this regard, the claimants must take into account that, it is the case law that this Chamber has recognized as the object of constitutional review, in cases where a specific trend of the courts of justice proves contrary to the block of constitutional legitimacy, and only when effective reiteration of a legal criterion issued by the jurisdictional authorities is demonstrated, through a plurality of judgments, as a non-written source of the system of precedents, in the resolution of all or at least a representative number of cases assigned to judges within their competence, can it be said that case law exists in that sense, as this Court previously indicated in judgment number 6489-93, of ten hours twenty-four minutes of December ninth, nineteen ninety-three, in its Considering III: <o:p></o:p> "...

When Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation that public authorities make of the laws with constitutional norms and principles, what it allows is the examination of the constitutionality of the case law, that is, of reiterated judicial pronouncements, for the purpose of enforcing them in matters in progress not yet resolved. It does not allow, as the claimant intends, for the judgments of the first and second instance to be reviewed, so that a specific judicial interpretation is not applied in the Court of Cassation; because this would be equivalent to turning the Constitutional Chamber into one more instance for the review of judgments."(judgment No. 1995-5981 of 15:51 hours of November 7, 1995)" <o:p></o:p> It is important to note for the purposes of this judgment that the imposition of precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) in matters of domestic violence lacks a cassation appeal, making it impossible to find pronouncements from the Second Chamber. Therefore, the pronouncements of the Superior Family Court are what constitute jurisprudential doctrine, which merits admitting the action also in that sense (see judgment No. 2005-6224).

Now then, the claimant provides four resolutions of the Family Court of San José: Resolution number 483-2000 of nine hours twenty minutes of May tenth, two thousand, in which the Court indicated: "… In conclusion, the applicant requests the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to a subject who has no type of kinship or dependency relationship with the applicant, but who apparently attacks him verbally, calling into question his honesty and professional decorum. Evidently, the family jurisdiction is not competent to hear this matter, so the appellant must resort to the corresponding legal avenue to enforce his rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional proceeding, with the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult can only be requested before a Family Court or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the cases established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Equal Opportunities Law for persons with disabilities, understanding even that, also the servants who care for persons with disabilities or older adults, can be subject to a protective measures proceeding, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a dependency relationship… " ; in Resolution number 225-2001 of eight hours forty minutes of February fifth, two thousand one, the same line as the previous judgment was followed: "… It is clear then, that any type of aggression that is classified as a crime must be heard by a Criminal Judge, while domestic aggression, that is, that referring to a sphere of familiarity and/or emotional dependency due to the existence of kinship must be heard by a Family Judge, without prejudice to the facts being debated in a criminal proceeding if applicable.

In the present matter, the applicant requests the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to subjects who have no type of kinship or dependency relationship with the alleged victims. Evidently, the family jurisdiction is not competent to hear this matter, so the interested parties must resort to the corresponding legal avenue to enforce their rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional proceeding, with the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult can only be requested before a Family Court or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the cases established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Equal Opportunities Law for persons with disabilities, understanding even that, also the servants who care for persons with disabilities or older adults, can be subject to a protective measures proceeding, precisely because their work consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a dependency relationship…" ; 3.

In resolution number 1769-2003 of fourteen hours of December third, two thousand three, it was stated: " It should be noted that the referral is to "protective measures" and to "procedures" and not to other preconditions such as kinship, since it is a special guardianship for the older adult in any sphere. Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the older adult defines what constitutes "violence against older adults: "Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or financial integrity." But it is evident, from the system proposed by the special law for guardianship of the older adult, that a relationship must involve "a de facto or de jure power situation" by the aggressor and "a special state of vulnerability" of the victim, because neither is it a matter of establishing a situation of preeminence in all social relationships, for a person over sixty-five years of age with respect to others.

It is evident that between the intervenors there is a conflict regarding assets of an estate, however, what the first instance judge indicates is true, in the sense that there is no "vertical relationship between the parties, there is no emotional or economic dependency," an aspect that is equivalent to the aforementioned preconditions of the de facto or de jure power situation and the special state of vulnerability. "; and in the last one, Resolution number 215-2006 of nine hours twenty minutes of March first, two thousand six: "In this regard, it should be noted that precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case, in addition to lacking kinship, is what determines the inadmissibility of the proceeding, not for the reasons given by the first instance body, but because the preconditions for the protection provided for in the Law against Domestic Violence to be applicable are not met in this case. See that the applicant herself indicates it, they do not reside in the same place, indeed this is the cause of the conflict, no kinship unites them and consequently there is no abuse of power that must be protected, without prejudice to the actions that may be brought based on the Law for the Protection of the Older Adult… ".\r\nIn the first two judgments, the Family Court expressly indicates that it is necessary for there to be a kinship and power relationship between the parties; the third is based on the necessary power relationship, and the fourth is somewhat ambiguous in the application of the Domestic Violence Law. However, it should be noted that it does refer to the fact that it is "…precisely the absence of a power relationship in this case, in addition to lacking kinship,… what determines the inadmissibility of the proceeding…". It seems to be inferred from a reading of the judgment that the Court considered, for the application of the Law, the possibility of the power relationship. The Office of the Attorney General, for its part, points out that also through judgments No. 1274-04 of nine hours ten minutes of July twenty-seventh, two thousand four, and 1509-2005 of fourteen hours fifty minutes of October fifth, two thousand five, the Family Court reiterated the criterion regarding a necessary power relationship, but not regarding kinship.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Jurisdictional Body, in its appearance in this file, indicated that even though the criterion of the Court has been that described in the judgments provided, such a criterion has evolved with the new legal instruments. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against domestic violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult refers to the Law against Domestic Violence for the application of precautionary measures (medidas cautelares), without taking into consideration the other preconditions required for ordinary cases of domestic violence (power relationship, kinship). In its most recent resolutions, among which votes 631-06, 1509-05, 23-06, 1660-06, 485-07 are cited, this new vision is the starting point, as in some of these cases, there is no kinship relationship, verticality, dependency, or subordination, and yet the requested protection has been granted.

In the criteria of the Chamber, the resolutions provided by the claimant, together with the judgments offered by the Family Court, as well as by the Office of the Attorney General, lead to the conclusion that these do not constitute a uniform jurisprudential line that supports the claimant's allegation in a way that merits a constitutionality analysis by this jurisdiction, since the alleged unconstitutionality in the sense that a kinship relationship is necessary for the application of the Domestic Violence Law is not observed in all the resolutions provided. The Family Court adds more recent resolutions, in which the protection of the older adult is safeguarded under the preconditions that the claimant misses and fears will not be considered by that Court when resolving his appeal, without attending to a kinship relationship, verticality, dependency, or subordination. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that the appropriate course is to dismiss the present action, since the necessary precondition that must exist to invoke the unconstitutionality of a jurisprudential line has not been demonstrated; furthermore, this jurisdiction does not constitute one more instance of review of the judgments of the ordinary courts, as is intended in this case. <o:p></o:p> III.- Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court considers it appropriate to reiterate the importance of the guardianship of this sector of the population as provided by the final paragraph of Article 51 of the Political Constitution when it establishes: <o:p></o:p> "Equally entitled to that protection shall be the mother, the child, the elderly, and the destitute invalid." <o:p></o:p> It is evident according to the transcribed norm, the dual duty that the Costa Rican State has: a) On the one hand, it must produce an adequate normative framework in order to provide special protection for those groups of people, which constitutes a true fundamental right; and b) Respect and ensure respect, through the corresponding administrative agencies and courts of justice, for such rights.

From the concept of the Social Rule of Law, it is possible to derive obligations for public authorities, precisely in the pursuit of the greatest well-being of "all the inhabitants of the country," among which, the Constitution specifically points to children, mothers, the elderly, and destitute persons. The Social State enshrined in our Political Constitution develops in its normative content a relevant and obligatory state intervention in social matters in favor of those special sectors of the population that, by their condition, so require; such is the case – without a doubt – of the elderly, or persons of the third age, or older adults. Until a few years ago, there was no legal framework aimed at adequately guaranteeing the special protection and state guardianship that the older adult of our country requires; however, on October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Comprehensive Law for the older adult, number 7935, with which it is intended: <o:p></o:p> "a) Guarantee older adults, equality of opportunity and a dignified life in all spheres. <o:p></o:p> b) Guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of the policies that affect them. <o:p></o:p> c) Promote the permanence of older adults in their family and community nucleus. <o:p></o:p> d) Foster forms of organization and participation of older adults, that allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population. <o:p></o:p> e) Promote comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of the programs and services intended for this population. <o:p></o:p> f) Guarantee the protection and social security of older adults." <o:p></o:p> However, it cannot and should not be expected that this legal framework exhausts the guardianship and special protection by the State of the fundamental rights of adults, since it is precisely from the legal framework that this jurisprudential development must be carried out by the judiciary, which is binding and must be respected.

The legal framework is only an introductory framework that provides that "the older adult must be considered any person of sixty-five years or older." Likewise, it intends, among other things, comprehensive care for this group, defined in the law as the satisfaction of the physical, material, biological, emotional, social, labor, productive, and spiritual needs of older adults. To facilitate a full and healthy old age for them, their habits, functional capacities, and preferences shall be considered. For this reason, and given the vulnerability of this sector of the population, their protection against the violence they suffer is also provided for, understanding this as "any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or financial integrity. Older adults have the right to have their physical, psychological, and moral integrity respected, a right that also includes the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values." For this purpose, this same law provides the mechanism for the protection of said rights, a clear example of which is Article 57, whose legal interpretation is the one being challenged in this action.

This norm provides: <o:p></o:p> "ARTICLE 57.- Protective measures (medidas de protección) <o:p></o:p> To prevent physical, psychological, financial, or sexual violence <o:p></o:p> against older adults, the protective measures (medidas de protección) <o:p></o:p> and procedures ordered in the Law against domestic <o:p></o:p> violence, No. 7586, of April 10, 1996, shall be applied.

The following shall be entitled to <o:p></o:p> request them, in particular the representatives of public <o:p></o:p> and private institutions responsible for the care programs for the older <o:p></o:p> adult, as well as any person aware of these abuses." <o:p></o:p> Indeed, the challenged provision refers to the domestic violence law solely for procedural purposes, because to constitute a case of domestic violence, the legal basis for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Comprehensive Law for the older adult, whose sole purpose is to guarantee older adults equality of opportunity and a life of dignity in all spheres, protecting them against anyone who intends the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or financial integrity. <o:p></o:p> IV.- The summary proceeding for protective measures regulated in the Law against Domestic Violence has been endorsed by this Court, in consideration of the vulnerability of the sectors under protection in accordance with Article 51 of the Political Constitution.

A programmatic norm that establishes the obligation of the State to provide special protection to the family as the natural element and essential foundation of society, as well as to mothers, children, the elderly, and the destitute invalid. In such terms, not only this law but the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult is a manifestation of compliance with that constitutional directive, whose spirit permeates its entire content. In it are guaranteed the right to life, to health, and to physical integrity, as established in our Constitution and by International Human Rights Law. It is thus that this Constitutional Right is violated not only when one of the members of a family nucleus, abusing their physical force or their position of authority, inflicts physical, sexual, psychological, or financial abuse on one or more of its members, but also when other persons injure in some way an older adult, whose vulnerability is inherent.

In the interest of their protection, respect, and integrity, is that the legislator considered it opportune to provide adult victims of violence with an agile and timely proceeding, that would immediately guarantee them compliance with the aforementioned constitutional postulates, referring only for the purposes of the application of protective measures to the Law against domestic violence. <o:p></o:p> V.- Conclusion. Despite all of the foregoing, this action must be dismissed, as indicated in considering II, insofar as the resolutions provided by the claimant cannot be considered a jurisprudential line of the Family Court that merits a constitutionality analysis by this Chamber.

Therefore, the action must be summarily dismissed."

Considering:

1By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at eleven hours forty minutes on May fourteenth, two thousand seven, the petitioner requests that the reiterated judicial interpretation of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) regarding the prerequisites for the application of protection measures in accordance with Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor), Law 7935, be declared unconstitutional. The petitioner argues that the Family Court has interpreted that the application of protection measures requires the existence of a kinship relationship between the alleged aggressor and the elderly adult. Likewise, he indicates that the Family Court has established that imposing protection measures requires a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the victim, and in the petitioner's opinion, the mere presence of violence implies the existence of a power relationship.This has resulted in the denial of the right to effective judicial protection for elderly adults who seek protection based on the provisions of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, No. 7935, if there is no kinship relationship between the reporting elderly adult and the aggressor, a relationship that Law No. 7935 does not require in any of its provisions. He considers that referring the Elderly Adult to the contraventional or criminal route is not acceptable because these are repressive avenues, and the justice the elderly adult seeks to access is protective.
2In order to substantiate his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he indicates that it derives from the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since there is a pending appeal filed before the Family Court against the judgment of the Domestic Violence Court (Juzgado de Violencia Doméstica) of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela rendered in case file No. 07-000824-9649-VD brought by the petitioner, which lifted the protection measures requested due to the absence of kinship, an appeal that is pending resolution.
3By a resolution issued at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on May twenty-second, two thousand seven, the petitioner was ordered to fulfill certain formal requirements, an order that was complied with as verified by the record on file at page 37 of the case file.
4By a resolution issued at fifteen hours forty minutes on May twenty-ninth, two thousand seven (visible at page 43 of the case file), the action was admitted, and a hearing was granted to the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General de la República) and the Family Court.
5The Office of the Attorney General submitted its report, visible at pages 48 to 74. It recommends that the action of unconstitutionality filed be declared without merit based on the following reasons. Regarding the challenge to jurisprudence (jurisprudencia), the P.G.R. points out that the Chamber has followed a restrictive criterion regarding the admissibility of the action of unconstitutionality based on the circumstance in question, with the aim of preventing individuals from requesting and obtaining the unconstitutionality, not only of the interpretation of the referred norms in general, but also of the specific jurisdictional resolution, a sphere exempt from constitutional control by express provision of Article 10 of the Political Constitution and Article 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction" (Sala Constitucional, resolution 2001-00252 of fourteen hours and fifty-four minutes on January tenth, two thousand one, the underlining is from the original).Hence, an action of unconstitutionality against jurisprudence is only admissible when there is a reiteration of a legal criterion contained in two or more resolutions. Thus, it can be affirmed that one can only speak of jurisprudence when various pronouncements exist on the same point and on the condition that they are coincident. In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code, jurisprudence is the reiteration of a legal criterion that allows interpreting, informing, and integrating the legal system. Eduardo Ortiz defines it as the "set of unwritten rules of conduct extracted, by generalization, from existing decisions on a given matter... Jurisprudence, therefore, has general scope, like the law, and is formed by the set of general principles, with life and permanence of their own compared to the ruling, contained in the decisions of the courts". As for the second prerequisite questioned by the petitioner, that is, the existence of a power relationship between the alleged aggressor and the elderly adult, the P.G.R. considers that a general criterion on the need for this power relationship to exist can be extracted from the judgments provided.The first two cited judgments mention very tangentially the possible existence of a dependency relationship as a prerequisite for the application of the measures established in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, while the third provided judgment emphatically establishes that there must be a "de facto or de jure power situation" by the aggressor and a "special state of vulnerability" in the elderly adult, which allows concluding that there is a reiterated criterion by the Family Court regarding the need for this dependency or power relationship. Along this same line of thought, it is appropriate to point out that from the analysis carried out by this Attorney General's Office, at least two more resolutions from the Family Court have been found, numbers 1274-04 of nine hours ten minutes on July twenty-seventh, two thousand four, and 1509-2005 of fourteen hours fifty minutes on October fifth, two thousand five, in which the criterion expressed in resolution number 1521-2003 provided by the appellant is reiterated.Based on the foregoing, in this representation's opinion, the action of unconstitutionality against the jurisprudence of the Family Court is admissible only with respect to the existence of a power or dependency relationship between the victim and the alleged aggressor, and not regarding the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties. As for the substance, Article 51 of the Political Constitution establishes the State's duty to provide special protection to the elderly. In a similar vein, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), in its Article 17, establishes the duty of the States to provide special protection to elderly adults. The special protection for elderly adults is based on the need for Society and the State to ensure the physical, emotional, and social integrity of persons who are considered vulnerable for various reasons.Indeed, the constitutional article includes a group of persons whom the Constituent Power decided to grant special protection precisely because they are vulnerable groups, namely, children, mothers, the elderly, and the incapacitated. Furthermore, the right to special protection for the elderly constitutes a fundamental right of a programmatic/prestational type. This distinction has been adopted by the majority of Constitutional Courts, especially for the purpose of evaluating the actions of States aimed at complying with the protection established in their respective constitutions. Thus, the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court has recognized the existence of these benefits to be provided by the State, particularly regarding the protection of rights such as life and personal integrity. For the case under study, it is pertinent to highlight the way in which German jurisprudence has resolved the issue of conflicts between different fundamental rights and the protection required of the State."The Court warns that this protection can conflict with other constitutionally protected legal interests... in which case the legislator is called upon first to resolve said conflict 'by weighing the opposing fundamental values according to the standard of the constitutional order and in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In order to carry out this balancing, the legislator has a margin of appreciation that the Court must respect, which does not mean that any legislative decision is valid'" (Doménech Pascual, Gabriel, Op. Cit., page 79). The same position has been assumed by the Sala Constitucional in our country, which has pointed out the existence of a series of fundamental rights of a programmatic nature that are framed within the development of a Social State of Law in which the State takes an active stance in the face of certain social situations, rights among which the special protection established in Article 51 of the Political Constitution has been included.(Sala Constitucional, resolution number 2006-2268 of eight hours fifty-nine minutes on February twenty-fourth, two thousand six). From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Political Constitution contains a mandate to public authorities to establish protection mechanisms for certain sectors of society that may be vulnerable to the actions of third parties. These mechanisms must be legally designed, for which the legislator has discretion in their definition, but must, however, weigh the establishment of these mechanisms against the existence of other fundamental rights, in light of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, so that the establishment of the former does not imply a disproportionate restriction of the rights of third parties. Regarding protection measures, the Domestic Violence Law (Ley de Violencia Doméstica), Law 7856, establishes the possibility of imposing protection measures in favor of the alleged victims, with a view to safeguarding the physical, emotional, and patrimonial integrity of the affected person.As the petitioner points out, by provision of Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, the protection measures and the procedures for imposing them are applicable in cases of violence against the elderly. It is therefore necessary, before analyzing the claimed defects of unconstitutionality, to examine the legal nature of the protection measures, as well as the purpose for which they have been designed. The Domestic Violence Law regulates "the application of protection measures necessary to guarantee the life, integrity, and dignity of victims of domestic violence," and is applicable to "mothers, children, persons sixty years of age or older, and disabled persons," as well as to victims of violence arising in partner relationships (Article 1, Law 7856). The Constitutional Court has analyzed the constitutionality of the protection measures adopted within the framework of this regulation, indicating that they constitute genuine precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) in the form of acts limiting fundamental rights that find their justification in the superior value that the protection of the groups to whom this regulation is directed entails (Sala Constitucional, resolution number 057-1997 of fifteen hours twelve minutes on January seventh, nineteen ninety-seven; in the same vein, see also resolutions number 2896-1996 of nine hours thirty-six minutes on June fourteenth, nineteen ninety-six; 2897-1996 of nine hours thirty-nine minutes on June fourteenth, nineteen ninety-six; 2966-1996 of fourteen hours fifty-four minutes on June eighteenth, nineteen ninety-six; 2899-1996 of nine hours forty-five minutes on June fourteenth, nineteen ninety-six; and 3045-1996 of eleven hours twenty-one minutes on June twenty-first, nineteen ninety-six, all from the Sala Constitucional).Along this same line of thought, the Chamber has stated that: "... the questioned measures, as well as the nature of the latter, do not have a sanctioning character, whether criminal or disciplinary, because they do not aim to establish any responsibility on the part of the accused in relation to the examined facts. On the contrary, it involves the establishment of protection measures in favor of certain persons who, at a certain moment, find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their safeguarding by state organs meritorious. (...) It is clear then that it is constitutionally possible for the legislator to impose, among others, this type of prohibitive acts 'of a provisional nature' that in fact restrict the enjoyment of some fundamental rights of the person reported for domestic violence, provided this is done in order to enforce other constitutional values such as, in this case, the physical integrity of the victims and their dignity as human beings.-..." (resolution number 7160-1998 of fifteen hours fifty-one minutes on October seventh, nineteen ninety-eight, the underlining is not from the original).As indicated above, the protection measures and the procedure for their imposition are applicable in cases of violence against the elderly, not only because they are a group included within the initial protection of the Domestic Violence Law, but also because of the possibility contemplated in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person that these measures also apply in cases of violence against the elderly, as defined by Article 1 of that same regulatory body. These two articles were incorporated into the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person during the legislative discussion; however, no comment or justification for their inclusion within said regulatory body can be extracted from the legislative file. Notwithstanding the provisions, in the P.G.R.'s opinion, it is clear that the legislator's intention was to expand the protection already provided by the Domestic Violence Law to elderly adults, establishing the possibility of applying such measures in cases of violence according to the definition contained in the law itself, but through the same mechanisms provided for domestic violence.The P.G.R. expresses doubts regarding the existence of a reiterated criterion by the Family Court establishing the existence of a family relationship as a requirement for imposing protection measures, since, as seen, the resolutions provided do not allow for extracting a general criterion, and the difference in dates raises doubts about the position actually assumed by the Family Court. Nonetheless, it is its opinion that the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person does not establish the existence of a kinship relationship between the alleged aggressor and the victim as a requirement for the imposition of protection measures. Two reasons justify this conclusion. The first has to do with the literal interpretation given to Article 57 of Law 7935, an interpretation that necessarily must be made in harmony with the definition of violence contained in that law. In this way, the definition of violence against the elderly does not include the existence of a kinship relationship as necessary, as this requirement was completely omitted.In accordance with the doctrine underlying Article 10 of the Civil Code, norms must be interpreted "according to the proper meaning of their words." In this sense, by not including the existence of a kinship relationship within this concept of violence against the elderly, it must be concluded that this requirement was not demanded by the legislator for the application of these precautionary measures. The other reason for this thesis is of a historical nature and relates to the inclusion of the elderly within the protection contained in the Domestic Violence Law. This Law establishes the possibility for elderly adults to request protection measures. With the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, the possibility was incorporated for the elderly to request the same protection measures against the violence they suffer, but in accordance with the definition of violence established by that law.Note that both the current Article 57 and the definition of violence contained in Law 7935 were incorporated in the same motion to the normative text, which reinforces the thesis of the direct relationship between the definition of violence against the elderly and the possibility of imposing protection measures. Based on the foregoing, it is clear to the Attorney General's Office that the legislator's intention was not to subject the elderly to the procedures of the domestic violence law (since at the time of the enactment of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, elderly adults were already incorporated within the scope of protection of the Domestic Violence Law), but rather the intention was to expand the protection of that social group to forms of violence that do not necessarily imply kinship relationships. Under this understanding, it is concluded that the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person does not require the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties as a prerequisite for the application of protection measures. Now, this legal position is also present in at least one of the resolutions of the Family Court that was provided by the petitioner.

Thus, the jurisdictional body in resolution number 1521-2003, states that “the remission that the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor), number 7935 of October 19, 1999, makes to the Law against Domestic Violence (Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica) does not imply a kinship relationship.”, therefore, regarding this aspect, this Procuraduría considers that there has been no violation of the fundamental right of elderly persons to special protection, nor to effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). The claimant rises up against the jurisprudence of the Family Court (Tribunal de Familia) that requires, as a prerequisite for the application of protective measures, the existence of a relationship of power or dependency between the elderly person and the alleged aggressor, considering that this interpretation is not present in the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, so additional requirements are imposed on that population to obtain the judicial protection they require.

The P.G.R. does not share the argument presented. The special protection granted to the elderly person starts from the premise that this group may find itself in a special situation of vulnerability, which justifies differentiated treatment in relation to the common person. Thus, the constituent orders the legislator to design the mechanisms that, in their judgment, allow adequate protection for the elderly. These mechanisms can be preventive or repressive, but the decision of which mechanism to use is part of legislative discretion. Therefore, as a first conclusion, it is considered that a duty is not derived from Article 51 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) for the legislator to, in all cases where the interests of an elderly person are affected, establish preventive and not repressive mechanisms as the claimant tries to make it seem, since such a decision is a matter for the legislator, in attention to the prestational nature of these obligations.

Following this same line of argument, it was indicated above that when choosing the protection mechanisms, the legislator must weigh the rights of third parties that could be affected by the establishment of the measures, so that the adopted procedures are reasonable and proportional to the injury caused to these other rights that also deserve constitutional protection. In this way, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) has admitted that the protective measures agreed upon within the framework of the Law of Domestic Violence, constitute prohibitive acts that negatively affect the rights of the third parties who are forced to comply with the imposed obligations. However, the existence of these precautionary measures has been constitutionally justified, insofar as that Constitutional Court has interpreted that “the setting of protective measures in favor of certain persons who at a certain moment find themselves in a factual situation of weakness that makes their safeguarding by state bodies meritorious”.

That is, not just any injury to the interests of that group can give rise to special protection through these precautionary measures, but rather that which originates in a factual situation of weakness, which occurs when between the elderly person and the alleged aggressor there exists a relationship of power that causes dependency, whether economic or emotional, of the victim upon the aggressor, effectively placing the former in a situation of vulnerability and weakness vis-à-vis the latter. It is under this framework that the judge must analyze the protective measures contained in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person, for which reason in the judgment of the P.G.R. the interpretation given by the Family Court is in accordance, not only with the text of the law, but also with the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución), according to the preceding analysis.

Indeed, the Family Court maintains that not just any violence can give rise to the imposition of a protective measure, considering that to order the precautionary measures “there must mediate in the relationship 'a situation of power de facto or de jure', on the part of the aggressor and 'a special state of vulnerability' of the victim, because it is also not about establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age over others.” Indeed, it has been pointed out that protective measures are justified insofar as there exists a party in a state of special vulnerability, and that this objective condition is what justifies differentiated treatment for the elderly in relation to the rest of the population. If the objective condition for making the differentiation of treatment disappears, it must be considered that the reasonableness and proportionality in the difference of treatment also disappear.

In accordance with the foregoing, in the opinion of this representation the interpretation of the Family Court does not violate the principle of effective judicial protection, given that it is part of legislative discretion to design the adequate mechanisms to provide protection to the elderly, and in the present case the legislator's decision has been to establish protection mechanisms as precautionary measures, whose application occurs within the framework of relationships of power or dependency. Based on the above, the P.G.R. recommends that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) declare inadmissible the action of unconstitutionality against the jurisprudence of the Family Court that requires the existence of a kinship relationship between the parties, since there is no uniform legal criterion in the decisions of the Family Court that allows reaching the conclusion that one is facing the reiterated jurisprudence of that jurisdictional body. As to the merits, the Procuraduría recommends that the Constitutional Court declare the filed action without merit, given that the constitutional injuries the claimant accuses are not appreciated.

6Licenciado Oscar Corrales Valverde, in his capacity as Coordinating Judge of the Family Court, rendered his report visible at folio 75. He states that with the approval by several countries of international law legal instruments such as the Belém do Pará Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by the United Nations Organization on November 20, 1989, plus the constitutional precepts existing since the enactment of the Political Constitution in 1949 regarding protection of the family and of persons in a state of greater vulnerability, Costa Rica was obligated to legislate on the matter. Laws were thus enacted such as Law No. 7586 of April 10, 1996, Law against Domestic Violence, and subsequently Law No. 7935, called Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person of October 25, 1999. A new interpretation of the law of persons assaulted in the family sphere is generated.The laws grant direct protection against imminent and current aggressions against the physical, psychological, patrimonial, and sexual integrity of the victims through precautionary measures, without prejudging the substantive rights of the persons involved in the conflicts. The judges were then instructed on these topics, with emphasis given to aspects such as the relationship of power, learned helplessness, and the cycle of violence, among others. Law No. 7935, Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor) of October 25, 1999, was born as another instrument of protection for a vulnerable sector of society, the elderly, who required a regulation adjusted to their needs. Within this context, the initial interpretation given by the competent courts was guided by the desire to avoid and neutralize the cited pathologies of abuse of power, learned helplessness, and cycle of violence.Given that Article 57 of the cited Law does not specify against whom the norm can be applied, it is difficult to distinguish where the law does not. The omission of the law led to interpreting that the protection provided was clearly in favor of that sector of the population, but since the passive subject (alleged aggressor) is not established, by remitting to the Law against Domestic Violence, the latter began to be applied integrally. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against Domestic Violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person remits to the Law against Domestic Violence only for procedural effects and for the application of precautionary measures, without the other prerequisites having to be taken into consideration. The most recent resolutions of the Family Court start from this new vision, which is better suited to the purposes of Law No. 7935.The criteria expressed in the resolutions cited in the action of unconstitutionality must be understood within an evolutionary process that the judges have followed; they are not erroneous or unconstitutional if analyzed in light of the moment in which they were issued. They constitute a demonstration of the interest of the judges competent in the matter in evolving in the study and analysis of the application of the law. In support of his statements, the Coordinator of the Family Court provides several rulings that reflect its current jurisprudence, namely, voto 06-00631 issued in expediente 06-110024-300-VD, in which the first instance resolution was revoked and it was ordered to lift the measures decreed against the elderly person and the restitution of the elderly person to their home was ordered; voto 1509-05 issued in expediente 05-000765-650-VD in which, in addition to granting the protective measures, an exhortation was made to the National Commission for the Elderly Person (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor) to investigate and follow up on the known situation; 23-06, issued in expediente 05-001625-767-VD in which, without having clear elements or indications, the protection of the elderly person was maintained due to doubt about the situation; voto 1660-06, issued in expediente 06-000402-696-VD, in which it is emphasized that the elderly are a population group in conditions of vulnerability that merits state protection; voto 154-07 issued in expediente 06-110727-631-VD, in which it was ordered to maintain the protection and the EBAIS (Healthcare Center) was commissioned to carry out a special follow-up for that elderly person; voto 485-07 issued in expediente 06-001060-672-VD, in which special measures were decreed in favor of an elderly person, a foreigner, who lives alone and without family in Costa Rica. In this last case, as in some of the others cited, there is no relationship of kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination, and nevertheless, the requested protection has been granted.
7The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 109, 110, and 111 on June 7, 8, and 11, 2007 (folio 47).
8The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently founded on evident principles and norms, as well as on the jurisprudence of this Court.
9The prescriptions of law have been fulfilled in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Calzada Miranda; and,

Considering:

I.Regarding admissibility. The claimant's standing comes from the first paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, insofar as there is an appeal (recurso de apelación) pending resolution before the Family Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José under expediente 07-000824-0649-VD, in which the interpretation questioned here is discussed, since the Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) left without effect the protective measures requested in his favor, given that he has no kinship relationship, nor a relationship of power with the alleged aggressor. From this point of view, the Chamber considers that the action is a reasonable means of protecting the right that is considered injured, since if it were to proceed, it would have a direct impact on the matter that is pending resolution before the Family Court.

II.Now then, the action of unconstitutionality is filed against jurisprudence of the Family Court, which in the claimant's judgment establishes two requirements for the imposition of precautionary measures for the protection of the elderly person: a.- The existence of a kinship bond between the elderly person and the alleged aggressor, and, b. A relationship of power also between the elderly person and the alleged aggressor, requirements that he considers are not provided for in Article 57 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) and that limit his fundamental rights. This Court has been particularly cautious when admitting actions of unconstitutionality filed against the jurisprudence of the courts, because although it is true that Article 10 of the Political Constitution and Article 74 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction exclude jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch (Poder Judicial) from constitutional control, Article 3 of the latter clearly establishes that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the comparison of the text of the questioned norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with the constitutional norms and principles.

Regarding the admissibility of the action, in the case of the questioned jurisprudence of other Courts, in judgment No. 1997-4587 of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of August 5, 1997, this Chamber considered:

"In this regard, it must be indicated that the Chamber, as a general rule, has admitted the actions of unconstitutionality filed against the jurisdictional interpretation of norms, when it concerns the reiterated criterion of the judicial bodies, because if the action against what was resolved by a jurisdictional body in a specific case were to be admitted, the provisions in Article 3 would be interpreted in contradiction with what is regulated in Article 74, both of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, which indicates that the action of unconstitutionality does not apply against jurisdictional acts of the Judicial Branch. This has been set forth by the Chamber in numerous resolutions, from which the relevant part of the following is transcribed:" "In this regard, the claimants must bear in mind that it is jurisprudence that this Chamber has recognized as the object of constitutional control, in cases where a specific trend of the courts of justice proves contrary to the block of constitutional legitimacy, and only when an effective reiteration of a legal criterion issued by jurisdictional authorities is demonstrated, through a plurality of judgments, as an unwritten source of the ordering of precedents, in the resolution of all or at least a representative number of the cases assigned to judges within the scope of their competence, can it be said that a jurisprudence exists in that sense, as this Court previously indicated by judgment number 6489-93, of ten hours twenty-four minutes of December 9, 1993, in its Considering III:" "...

When Article 3 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction indicates that the Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the interpretation made by public authorities of the laws with the constitutional norms and principles, what it allows is to examine the constitutionality of jurisprudence, that is, of reiterated judicial pronouncements, for the purpose of enforcing them in pending matters not yet resolved. It does not allow, as the claimant intends, for the first and second instance rulings to be reviewed, so that a specific judicial interpretation is not applied in the Court of Cassation (Sala de Casación); because this would be tantamount to turning the Constitutional Chamber into an additional instance for reviewing judgments." (judgment No. 1995-5981 of 15:51 hours of November 7, 1995)" It is important to point out for the purposes of this judgment that the imposition of precautionary measures in matters of domestic violence lacks a cassation appeal (recurso de casación), making it impossible to find pronouncements from the Second Chamber (Sala Segunda).

Therefore, it is the pronouncements of the Superior Family Court that constitute jurisprudential doctrine, for which reason it is proper to admit the action also in that sense (see judgment No. 2005-6224). Now then, the claimant provides four resolutions of the Family Court of San José: Resolution number 483-2000 of nine hours twenty minutes of May 10, 2000, in which the Court indicated: "… In conclusion, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to a subject who has no type of kinship or dependency towards the applicant, but who apparently verbally aggresses him, calling his honesty and professional decorum into question. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the appellant must resort to the corresponding legal channel to assert his rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, on the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor) can only be requested before a Family Court (Juzgado de Familia) or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the situations established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons (Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las personas discapacitadas), understanding even that, the servers who care for disabled or elderly persons may also be the subject of a process of protective measures, precisely because their job consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a relationship of dependency…" ; in Resolution number 225-2001 of eight hours forty minutes of February 5, 2001, the same line of the previous judgment was followed: "…

It is clear then, that any type of aggression that is classified as a crime must be heard by a Criminal Judge, while domestic aggression, that is, that referring to a sphere of familiarity and/or emotional dependency due to the existence of kinship must be heard by a Family Judge without prejudice to the facts being debated in a criminal process if applicable. In the present matter, the applicant requires the application of the Law against Domestic Violence, with respect to subjects who bear no type of kinship or dependency towards the alleged victims. Evidently, it is not the family jurisdiction that is competent to hear this matter, so the interested parties must resort to the corresponding legal channel to assert their rights, whether through a criminal, civil, or constitutional process, on the understanding that the protection provided by the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person can only be requested before a Family Court or the one that must hear it by Ministry of Law, in the situations established in the Law against Domestic Violence and the Law of Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons, understanding even that, the servers who care for disabled or elderly persons may also be the subject of a process of protective measures, precisely because their job consists of ensuring the care and integrity of those persons within a relationship of dependency…" ; 3.

In resolution number 1769-2003 of fourteen hours of December 3, 2003, it was stated: "It must be noted that the remission is to 'the protective measures' and to the 'procedures' not to other prerequisites such as kinship, because it concerns a special protection for the elderly person in any sphere. Article 2 of the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor) defines what 'violence against elderly persons' represents: 'Any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an elderly person, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity'. But it is evident, from the system proposed by the special law of protection for the elderly person, that 'a situation of power de facto or de jure' must mediate in the relationship on the part of the aggressor and 'a special state of vulnerability' of the victim, because it is also not about establishing a situation of prevalence in all social relationships, of a person over sixty-five years of age over others.

It is evident that among the parties there is a conflict referring to assets of a succession, however, what the first instance judge points out is true in the sense that there is no 'vertical relationship between the parties, there is no emotional or economic dependency', an aspect that is equivalent to the mentioned prerequisites of the situation of power de facto or de jure and the special state of vulnerability."; and in the last one, Resolution number 215-2006 of nine hours twenty minutes of March 1, 2006: "In this regard, it must be pointed out that precisely the absence of a relationship of power in this case, in addition to lacking kinship, is what determines the inadmissibility of the request, not for the reasons given by the first instance body, but because the prerequisites for the protection provided for in the Law against Domestic Violence to be applicable are not met in the species.

See that the applicant herself indicates it, they do not reside in the same place, as this is rather the cause of the conflict, no kinship unites them and consequently there is no abuse of power that must be protected, without prejudice to the actions that may be filed based on the Law for the Protection of the Elderly Person (Ley de Protección al Adulto Mayor)… ". In the first two judgments, the Family Court expressly indicates that it is necessary for there to be a kinship and power relationship between the parties; the third is based on the necessary relationship of power and the fourth is somewhat ambiguous in the application of the Law of Domestic Violence. However, it must be pointed out that it does refer to it being "…precisely the absence of a relationship of power in this case, in addition to lacking kinship,… what determines the inadmissibility of the request…". It would seem to be deduced from the reading of the judgment that the Court considered the possibility of the power relationship for the application of the Law.

The Procuraduría General, for its part, points out that also through judgments No. 1274-04 of nine hours ten minutes of July 27, 2004, and 1509-2005 of fourteen hours fifty minutes of October 5, 2005, the Family Court reiterated the criterion regarding a necessary relationship of power, but not regarding kinship. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Jurisdictional Body, in its appearance in this expediente, pointed out that despite the fact that the Court's criterion has been as described in the judgments provided, such criterion has been evolving with the new legal instruments. Currently, with the systematic use of the Law against Domestic Violence and the increase in the number and variety of cases submitted for protection, it is understood that the Comprehensive Law for the Elderly Person (Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor) remits to the Law against Domestic Violence for the application of precautionary measures, without the other prerequisites required for ordinary domestic violence cases having to be taken into consideration (relationship of power, kinship).

In its most recent resolutions, among which are referenced Votos 631-06, 1509-05, 23-06, 1660-06, 485-07, they start from this new vision, and in some of these cases, there is no relationship of kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination, and nevertheless, the requested protection has been granted. In the judgment of the Chamber, the resolutions provided by the claimant, coupled with the judgments offered by the Family Court, as well as by the Procuraduría General, lead to the conclusion that these do not constitute a uniform jurisprudential line that supports the claimant's allegation in a way that merits a constitutionality analysis by this jurisdiction, given that the accused unconstitutionality, in the sense that a kinship relationship is necessary for the application of the Law of Domestic Violence, is not seen in all the resolutions provided. The Family Court adds more recent resolutions, in which the protection of the elderly person is safeguarded under the prerequisites that the claimant misses and fears will not be considered by that Court when resolving his appeal (recurso de apelación), without attending to a relationship of kinship, verticality, dependency, or subordination.

Faced with the above, the Chamber considers that the proper course is to reject the present action, given that the necessary prerequisite that must exist to invoke the unconstitutionality of a jurisprudential line has not been demonstrated, and furthermore, this jurisdiction does not constitute an additional instance for reviewing the judgments of the ordinary courts, as is intended in this case.

*"Likewise, the mother, the child, the elderly person and the helpless sick person shall have the right to that protection."* It is evident, according to the transcribed norm, the dual duty that the Costa Rican State has: a) On one hand, it must produce an adequate regulatory framework in order to provide special protection for those groups of people, which constitutes a true fundamental right, and b) Respect and enforce, through the corresponding administrative dependencies and courts of justice, such rights. Starting from the concept of the Social State of Law, it is possible to derive obligations for public authorities, precisely for the sake of seeking the greatest well-being of "all the inhabitants of the country", among whom the Constitution's Law points in a special way to children, mothers, the elderly person, and helpless persons. The Social State enshrined in our Political Constitution develops in its normative content a relevant and obligatory state intervention in social matters in favor of those special sectors of the population that, due to their condition, so require; such is the case –without a doubt– of the elderly, or persons of the third age, or older adults.

Until a few years ago, there was no legislation aimed at adequately guaranteeing the special protection and state guardianship required by the older adult in our country; however, on October nineteenth, nineteen ninety-nine, the Legislative Assembly enacted the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, number 7935, which aims to:

*"a) Guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas.* *b) Guarantee the active participation of older adults in the formulation and application of policies that affect them.* *c) Promote the permanence of older adults in their family and community nucleus.* *d) Foster forms of organization and participation of older adults, which allow the country to take advantage of the experience and knowledge of this population.* *e) Promote the comprehensive and inter-institutional care of older adults by public and private entities, and ensure the proper functioning of programs and services intended for this population.* *f) Guarantee the protection and social security of older adults."* However, it cannot and should not be intended that this legislation exhausts the guardianship and special protection by the State of the fundamental rights of adults, since it is precisely from the legal framework that this jurisprudential development of obligatory nature and respect must be given by the judiciary.

The legislation is only an introductory framework that provides that "the older adult must be considered any person sixty-five years of age or older." Likewise, it aims, among other things, for comprehensive care of this group, defined in the law as the satisfaction of the physical, material, biological, emotional, social, labor, productive, and spiritual needs of older adults. To facilitate a full and healthy old age, their habits, functional capacities, and preferences shall be considered. Because of this, and given the vulnerability of this sector of the population, its protection against the violence they suffer is also provided, understanding this as "any action or omission, direct or indirect, exercised against an older adult, that produces, as a consequence, the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity. Older adults have the right to have their physical, psychological, and moral integrity respected, a right that also includes the protection of their image, autonomy, thought, dignity, and values." To this end, this same law provides the mechanism for the protection of said rights, a clear example of which is Article 57, whose legal interpretation is what is being challenged in this action. This norm provides:

*"ARTICLE 57.- Protection measures* *To prevent physical, psychological, patrimonial, or sexual violence* *against older adults, the measures of* *protection and the procedures ordered in the Law against* *domestic violence, No. 7586, of April 10, 1996, shall be applied.* *They shall be entitled to* *request them, especially the representatives of public institutions* *and private institutions in charge of care programs for the older* *adult, as well as any person who knows of these abuses."* Indeed, the questioned provision refers to the domestic violence law only for procedural effects, since to configure a case of domestic violence, the legal basis for this protection does not derive from a law of that nature, but from the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult, whose sole purpose is to guarantee older adults equality of opportunities and a dignified life in all areas, protecting them against anyone who intends the impairment of their physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial integrity.

IV.The summary process of the protection measures regulated in the Law against Domestic Violence has been endorsed by this Court, taking into account the vulnerability of the protection sectors in accordance with Article 51 of the Political Constitution. A programmatic norm that establishes the State's obligation to give special protection to the family as the natural element and essential foundation of society, as well as to mothers, children, the elderly, and the helpless sick. In such terms, not only this law but the Comprehensive Law for the Older Adult is a manifestation of the fulfillment of that constitutional directive, whose spirit permeates all its content. In it, the right to life, to health, and to physical integrity are guaranteed, as established in our Fundamental Charter and by International Human Rights Law. It is thus that this Right of the Constitution is violated not only when one of the members of a family nucleus, abusing their physical strength or their position of authority, inflicts physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial vexations on one or several of its members, but when other persons harm in some way an older adult, whose vulnerability is inherent.

For the sake of their protection, respect, and integrity, the legislator considered it appropriate to provide adult victims of violence with an agile and timely procedure that would immediately guarantee them the fulfillment of the aforementioned constitutional postulates, referring only for the purposes of the application of protection measures to the Law against domestic violence.

V.Conclusion. Despite all of the above, this action must be rejected, as indicated in Considerando II, insofar as the resolutions provided by the plaintiff cannot be considered a jurisprudential line of the Family Court that merits a constitutional analysis by this Chamber. Consequently, it is appropriate to summarily dismiss the action.

Por tanto:

The action is summarily dismissed.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Horacio González Q.

* 070065140007CO * * 070065140007CO * Res: Nº 2007-013584 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y quince minutos del diecinueve de septiembre del dos mil siete.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por HERMES JIMENEZ MADRIZ, mayor, casado, vecino de Alajuela, portador de la cédula de identidad número 3-191-1209 para que se declare inconstitucional jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia relativa al acceso de la persona adulta mayor a la justicia cautelar. Intervino también en el proceso Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel en representación de la Procuraduría General de la República y el Presidente del Tribunal de Familia.

Resultando:

1Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las once horas cuarenta minutos del catorce de mayo del dos mil siete, el accionante solicita que se declare inconstitucional la interpretación judicial reiterada del Tribunal de Familia sobre los presupuestos para la aplicación de las medidas de protección de conformidad con lo señalado por el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor, Ley 7935. Señala el accionante que el Tribunal de Familia ha interpretado que para la aplicación de las medidas de protección se requiere de la existencia de un vínculo de parentesco entre el presunto agresor y el adulto mayor. Asimismo, señala que el Tribunal de Familia ha establecido que para la imposición de las medidas de protección se requiere de una relación de poder entre el presunto agresor y la víctima, siendo que en criterio del accionante, la sola presencia de violencia importa la existencia de una relación de poder.Ello ha provocado que se niegue el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva a los adultos mayores que acuden en busca de protección con fundamento en lo dispuesto en la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, N° 7935, si entre el adulto denunciante y el agresor no hay un vínculo de parentesco, vínculo que la Ley N° 7935 no exige en ninguna de sus normas. Estima que enviar al Adulto Mayor a la vía contravencional o penal, no es de recibo pues se trata de vías represivas y la justicia a la cual el adulto mayor pretende acceder es la tutelar.
2A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala que proviene de lo dispuesto en el párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, pues existe pendiente de resolver un recurso de apelación interpuesto ante el Tribunal de Familia contra la sentencia del Juzgado de Violencia Doméstica del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela dictada en el expediente N° 07-000824-9649- VD promovido por el accionante, que levantó las medidas de protección solicitadas ante la ausencia de parentesco, recurso que se encuentra pendiente de resolver.
3Por resolución de las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del veintidós de mayo del dos mil siete se previno al accionante el cumplimiento de requisitos de forma, prevención que fue cumplida según se comprueba con la constancia visible a folio 37 del expediente.
4Por resolución de las quince horas cuarenta minutos del veintinueve de mayo del dos mil siete (visible a folio 43 del Procuraduría General de la República y al Tribunal de Familia.
5La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe visible a folios 48 a 74. Recomienda declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta con fundamento en las siguientes razones. En relación con la impugnación de jurisprudencia, la P.G.R. señala que la Sala ha seguido un criterio restrictivo en cuanto a la admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad con base en la comentada circunstancia, con el objeto de impedir que por esa vía los particulares soliciten y obtengan la inconstitucionalidad, ya no de la interpretación de las referidas normas en general, sino también de la resolución de carácter jurisdiccional concreta, ámbito exento del control de constitucionalidad por disposición Jurisdicción Constitucional" (Sala Constitucional, resolución 2001-00252 de las catorce horas con cincuenta y cuatro minutos del diez de enero del dos mil uno, el subrayado es del original ).De ahí que la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra la jurisprudencia únicamente resulta procedente cuando exista reiteración de un criterio jurídico contenido en dos o más resoluciones. De ahí que se pueda afirmar que sólo cuando existen diversos pronunciamientos sobre el mismo punto y a condición de que sean coincidentes puede hablarse de jurisprudencia. De conformidad con el artículo 9 del Código Civil, jurisprudencia es la reiteración de un criterio jurídico que permite interpretar, informar e integrar el ordenamiento jurídico. Eduardo Ortiz la define como el “conjunto de reglas de conducta no escritas y extraídas, por generalización, de los fallos existentes sobre una materia determinada… La jurisprudencia, por ello tiene alcance general, como la ley, y está formada por el conjunto de principios generales, con vida y permanencia propia frente al fallo, contenidos en las decisiones de los tribunales”.En cuanto al segundo presupuesto cuestionado por el accionante, es decir, la existencia de una relación de poder entre el presunto agresor y la persona adulta mayor, la P.G.R. estima que de las sentencias aportadas si se puede extraer un criterio generalizado sobre la necesidad de que exista esa relación de poder. Las dos primeras sentencias citadas mencionan muy tangencialmente la posible existencia de una relación de dependencia como presupuesto para la aplicación de las medidas establecidas en el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor, en el tanto que la tercera sentencia aportada sí establece enfáticamente que deberá existir una “situación de poder de hecho o de derecho” por parte del agresor y un “estado especial de vulnerabilidad ” en la persona adulta mayor, lo que permite concluir que si existe un criterio reiterado por el Tribunal de Familia en cuanto a la necesidad de esa relación de dependencia o poder.Bajo esta misma línea de pensamiento, es oportuno señalar que del análisis realizado por esta Procuraduría se han encontrado al menos dos resoluciones más del Tribunal de Familia, las número 1274-04 de las nueve horas diez minutos del veintisiete de julio del dos mil cuatro y la 1509-2005 de las catorce horas cincuenta minutos del cinco de octubre del dos mil cinco, en las que se reitera el criterio externado en la resolución número 1521-2003 aportada por el recurrente. A partir de lo expuesto, en criterio de esta representación la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia resulta admisible únicamente en lo que respecta a la existencia de una relación de poder o dependencia entre la víctima y el presunto agresor y no respecto de la existencia de un vínculo de parentesco entre las partes. En cuanto al fondo, el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política establece el deber del Estado de brindar protección especial a los adultos mayores.En sentido similar, el Protocolo adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (Protocolo de San Salvador), en su artículo 17 establece el deber de los Estados de proporcionar protección especial a las personas adultas mayores. La protección especial a las personas adultas mayores encuentra su fundamento en la necesidad de que la Sociedad y el Estado aseguren la integridad física, emocional y social de las personas que por diversos motivos se consideran vulnerables. En efecto, el artículo constitucional incluye un grupo de personas a quien el Constituyente decidió otorgar una protección especial precisamente por tratarse de grupos vulnerables, a saber, los niños, las madres, los adultos mayores y los incapaces. Por otra parte, el derecho a la protección especial de los adultos mayores constituye un derecho fundamental del tipo prestacional.La distinción anterior ha sido recogida por la mayoría de los Tribunales Constitucionales, sobre todo a efectos de evaluar las acciones de los Estados tendentes a cumplir con la protección establecida en sus respectivas constituciones. De esta manera, la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán ha reconocido la existencia de estas prestaciones a cargo del Estado sobre todo en atención a la protección de derechos como la vida y la integridad personal. Para el caso bajo estudio, interesa resaltar la forma en que ha resuelto la jurisprudencia alemana el tema de los conflictos entre los diversos derechos fundamentales y la protección que se exige al Estado. “El Tribunal advierte que esa protección puede entrar en conflicto con otros bienes de rango constitucional… en cuyo caso el legislador es el llamado en primer lugar a resolver dicho conflicto “ponderando los valores fundamentales contrapuestos según la medida del ordenamiento constitucional y de acuerdo con el principio de proporcionalidad.A fin de efectuar esa ponderación, al legislador le corresponde un margen de apreciación que el Tribunal debe respetar, lo que no significa que cualquier decisión legislativa valga ” (Doménech Pascual, Gabriel, Op. Cit., pag. 79). La misma posición ha sido asumida por la Sala Constitucional en nuestro país, que ha señalado la existencia de una serie de derechos fundamentales de naturaleza prestacional que se enmarcan dentro del desarrollo de un Estado Social de Derecho en el cual el Estado toma una actitud activa frente a ciertas situaciones sociales, derechos dentro de los que se ha incluido la protección especial establecida en el artículo 51 de la Carta Política. (Sala Constitucional, resolución número 2006-2268 de las ocho horas con cincuenta y nueve minutos del veinticuatro de febrero del dos mil seis). De lo hasta aquí expuesto, se concluye que la Constitución Política contiene un mandato a las autoridades públicas para establecer mecanismos de protección a ciertos sectores de la sociedad que pueden ser vulnerables frente a los acciones de terceros.Dichos mecanismos deben ser diseñados legalmente, para lo cual el legislador cuenta con discrecionalidad en su definición, debiendo eso sí, sopesar el establecimiento de estos mecanismos con la existencia de otros derechos fundamentales, a la luz del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de forma tal que el establecimiento de aquellos no implique una restricción desproporcionada de los derechos de terceros. En cuanto a las medidas de protección, la Ley de Violencia Doméstica, Ley 7856, establece la posibilidad de que se impongan medidas de protección a favor de las presuntas víctimas, con miras a resguardar la integridad física, emocional y patrimonial del afectado. Como lo señala el accionante, por disposición del artículo 57 de la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor, las medidas de protección y los procedimientos para imponerlas resultan de aplicación en casos de violencia contra los adultos mayores.Es preciso entonces, de previo a analizar los vicios de inconstitucionalidad reclamados, la naturaleza jurídica que las medidas de protección, así como la finalidad para la cual han sido diseñadas. La Ley de Violencia Doméstica regula “la aplicación de las medidas de protección necesarias para garantizar la vida, integridad y dignidad de las víctimas de la violencia doméstica”, y resulta de aplicación a las “madres, niños, personas de sesenta años o más y personas discapacitadas”, así como en las víctimas de la violencia surgida en las relaciones de pareja (artículo 1 Ley 7856). El Tribunal Constitucional ha analizado la constitucionalidad de las medidas de protección adoptadas en el marco de esta normativa, señalando que constituyen verdaderas medidas cautelares en forma de actos limitativos de derechos fundamentales que encuentran su justificación en el valor superior que importa la protección de los grupos a quienes se dirige dicha normativa (Sala Constitucional, resolución número 057-1997 de las quince horas doce minutos del siete de enero de 1997, en el mismo sentido, es posible ver además las resoluciones número 2896-1996 de las nueve horas treinta y seis minutos del catorce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis; 2897-1996 de las nueve horas treinta y nueve minutos del catorce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis; 2966-1996 de las catorce horas cincuenta y cuatro minutos del dieciocho de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis; 2899-1996 de las nueve horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del catorce de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis y 3045-1996 de las once horas veintiún minutos del veintiuno de junio de mil novecientos noventa y seis, todas de la Sala Constitucional).Bajo esta misma línea de pensamiento, la Sala ha señalado que: “… las medidas cuestionadas, así como la naturaleza de éstas últimas, no tienen carácter sancionatorio, ya sea de índole penal, o disciplinario, porque no pretenden sentar responsabilidad alguna por parte del acusado en relación con los hechos examinados.- Se trata por el contrario de la fijación de medidas de protección a favor de ciertas personas que en cierto momento se encuentran en una situación fáctica de debilidad que hace meritorio su resguardo por parte de los órganos estatales. (…) Es claro entonces que es constitucionalmente posible para el legislador imponer, entre otros, este tipo de actos prohibitivos "de carácter provisional" que restringen de hecho el disfrute de algunos derechos fundamentales del denunciado por violencia doméstica, siempre y cuando esto se haga con el fin de hacer respetar otros valores constitucionales como resulta serlo en este caso la integridad física de las víctimas y su dignidad de seres humanos.-…” (resolución número 7160-1998 de las quince horas cincuenta y un minutos del siete de octubre de 1998, el subrayado no es del original).Como se indicó atrás, las medidas de protección y el procedimiento para su imposición resultan de aplicación en los casos de violencia contra los adultos mayores, ya no sólo por ser un grupo incluido dentro de la protección inicial de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica, sino además por la posibilidad que contempla el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor de que estas medidas también se apliquen en los casos de violencia contra los ancianos, tal y como la define el artículo 1 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. Estos dos artículos fueron incorporados a la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor durante la discusión legislativa, no obstante, del inclusión dentro de dicho cuerpo normativo. No obstante lo dispuesto, en criterio de la P.G.R. es claro que la intención del legislador fue la de ampliar la protección dada ya por la Ley de Violencia Doméstica a las personas adultas mayores, estableciendo la posibilidad de aplicar tales medidas en los casos de violencia según la definición contenida en la propia ley, pero a través de los mismos mecanismos dispuestos para la violencia doméstica.La P.G.R. expresa dudas en torno a la existencia de un criterio reiterado del Tribunal de Familia en el que se establezca como requisito para la imposición de las medidas de protección, la existencia de una relación familiar, pues como se vió las resoluciones aportadas no permiten extraer un criterio generalizado y la diferencia entre las fechas hace dudar sobre cuál es la posición realmente asumida por el Tribunal de Familia. No obstante lo expuesto, es su criterio que la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor no establece como un requisito para la imposición de las medidas de protección, la existencia de una relación de parentesco entre el presunto agresor y la víctima. Dos razones justifican esa conclusión. La primera tiene que ver con la interpretación literal que se realiza del artículo 57 de la Ley 7935, interpretación que necesariamente debe hacerse en armonía con la definición de violencia que esa ley contiene.De esta manera, dentro de la definición de violencia contra los adultos mayores no se incluye como necesaria la existencia de una relación de parentesco, pues este requisito se omitió totalmente. De conformidad con la doctrina que informa el artículo 10 del Código Civil, las normas deben interpretarse “según el sentido propio de sus palabras”. En ese sentido, al no incluirse dentro de este concepto de violencia contra los adultos mayores la existencia de una relación de parentesco, debe concluirse que ese requisito no fue exigido por el legislador para la aplicación de esas medidas cautelares. La otra razón que esa tesis es de orden histórico y tiene que ver con la inclusión de los adultos mayores dentro de la protección contenida en la Ley de Violencia Doméstica. Esta Ley establece la posibilidad de que las medidas de protección sean solicitadas por adultos mayores. Al promulgarse la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor, se incorpora la posibilidad de que los ancianos puedan solicitar las mismas medidas de protección contra la violencia que sufran, pero de conformidad con la definición de violencia que dicha ley establece.Nótese que tanto el actual artículo 57 como la definición de violencia contenidos en la Ley 7935 fueron incorporados en la misma moción al texto normativo, lo que refuerza la tesis de la relación directa entre la definición de violencia contra los adultos mayores y la posibilidad e imponer medidas de protección. A partir de lo expuesto, es claro para la Procuraduría que la intención del legislador no fue someter a los adultos mayores a los procedimientos de la ley de violencia doméstica, (pues al momento de la promulgación de la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor, las personas adultas mayores ya estaban incorporadas dentro del ámbito de protección de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica), sino que la intención fue ampliar la protección de ese grupo social a formas de violencia que no impliquen únicamente relaciones de parentesco. Bajo esta inteligencia, se concluye que la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor no exige como un presupuesto para la aplicación de medidas de protección la existencia de una relación de parentesco entre las partes.Ahora bien, esa posición jurídica también se encuentra presente al menos en una de las resoluciones del Tribunal de Familia que fue aportada por el accionante. Así, el órgano jurisdiccional en la resolución número 1521-2003, señala que “la remisión que hace la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, número 7935 del 19 de octubre de 1999, a la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica no implica una relación de parentesco.”, por lo que en cuanto a este aspecto, considera esta Procuraduría que no ha existido ninguna violación al derecho fundamental de los adultos mayores a la protección especial, ni a la tutela judicial efectiva. El accionante se alza contra la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia que exige como un presupuesto para la aplicación de las medidas de protección, la existencia de una relación de poder o dependencia entre el adulto mayor y el presunto agresor, considerando que esta interpretación no está presente en la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor, por lo que se imponen requisitos adicionales a esa población para obtener la tutela judicial que requieren.La P.G.R.no comparte el argumento expuesto. La protección especial otorgada al adulto mayor parte de la premisa de que dicho grupo puede encontrarse en una situación especial de vulnerabilidad, lo que justifica un trato diferenciado en relación con el común de las personas. Así, el constituyente le ordena al legislador diseñar los mecanismos que en su criterio permitan una adecuada protección a los adultos mayores. Estos mecanismos pueden ser preventivos o represivos, pero la decisión de cuál mecanismo debe utilizarse es parte de la discrecionalidad legislativa. Por lo que, como primera conclusión, estima que no se deriva del artículo 51 de la Constitución Política una obligación al legislador para que, en todos los casos en que se afecten los intereses de un adulto mayor, se establezcan mecanismos preventivos y no represivos como pretende hacerlo ver el accionante, ya que tal decisión, es materia propia del legislador, en atención al carácter prestacional de estas obligaciones.Siguiendo esta misma línea argumentativa, se indicó líneas atrás que al escoger los mecanismos de protección, el legislador debe sopesar los derechos de los terceros que podrían verse afectados por el establecimiento de las medidas, de forma que los procedimientos adoptados sean razonables y proporcionados con la lesión ocasionada a estos otros derechos que también merecen protección constitucional. De esta manera, la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional ha admitido que las medidas de protección acordadas en el marco de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica, constituyen actos prohibitivos que afectan negativamente los derechos de los terceros que se ven obligados a cumplir con las obligaciones impuestas. No obstante, se ha justificado constitucionalmente la existencia de estas medidas cautelares, en el tanto ese Tribunal Constitucional ha interpretado que “ la fijación de medidas de protección a favor de ciertas personas que en cierto momento se encuentran en una situación fáctica de debilidad que hace meritorio su resguardo por parte de los órganos estatales”.Es decir, no es cualquier lesión a los intereses de ese grupo la que puede dar lugar a la protección especial a través de estas medidas cautelares, sino aquella que se origina en una situación fáctica de debilidad, que ocurre cuando entre el adulto mayor y el presunto agresor existe una relación de poder que origina dependencia, sea económica o emocional, del agredido para con el agresor, poniendo de hecho al primero en una situación de vulnerabilidad y debilidad frente al segundo. Es bajo este marco que el juzgador debe analizar las medidas de protección contenidas en el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor, por lo que en criterio de la P.G.R. la interpretación dada por el Tribunal de Familia resulta acorde, no sólo con el texto de la ley, sino también con el Derecho de la Constitución, según el análisis que antecede. En efecto, el Tribunal de Familia sostiene que no es cualquier violencia la que puede dar lugar a la imposición de una medida de protección, considerando que para ordenar las medidas cautelares “debe mediar en la relación " una situación de poder de hecho o de derecho", por parte del agresor y "un estado especial de vulnerabilidad" de la víctima, porque tampoco se trata de establecer una situación de prevalencia en todas las relaciones sociales, de una persona mayor de sesenta y cinco años respecto de las demás.” En efecto, se ha señalado que las medidas de protección se justifican en el tanto exista una parte en estado de especial vulnerabilidad, siendo que esa condición objetiva es la que justifica un trato diferenciado a los adultos mayores en relación con el resto de la población.Si la condición objetiva para realizar la diferenciación de trato desaparece, se debe considerar que también desaparece la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en la diferencia de trato. De conformidad con lo expuesto, en criterio de esa representación la interpretación del Tribunal de Familia no violenta el principio de tutela judicial efectiva, toda vez que es parte de la discrecionalidad legislativa el diseñar los mecanismos adecuados para brindar protección a los adultos mayores, siendo que en el presente caso la decisión del legislador ha sido establecer mecanismos de protección como medidas cautelares, cuya aplicación se da en el marco de relaciones de poder o dependencia. A partir de lo anterior, la P.G.R. recomienda a la Sala Constitucional declarar inadmisible la acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia que requiere de la existencia de una relación de parentesco entre las partes, toda vez que no existe un criterio jurídico uniforme en las decisiones del Tribunal de Familia que permita llegar a la conclusión de que se está frente a la jurisprudencia reiterada de ese órgano jurisdiccional. En cuanto al fondo, la Procuraduría recomienda al Tribunal Constitucional declarar sin lugar la acción interpuesta, toda vez que no se aprecian las lesiones constitucionales que acusa el accionante.
6El licenciado Oscar Corrales Valverde, en su condición de Juez Coordinador del Tribunal de Familia rindió su informe visible a folio 75. Manifiesta que con la aprobación por parte de varios países de instrumentos jurídicos de derecho internacional como la Convención de Belem Do Pará, la Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la Mujer, adoptada por la Organización de Naciones Unidas el veinte de noviembre de 1989, más los preceptos constitucionales existentes desde la promulgación de la Constitución Política en 1949 en materia de protección a la familia y a las personas en estado de mayor vulnerabilidad, Costa Rica se vio obligada a legislar sobre la materia. Se promulgaron así leyes como la Ley N° 7586 de 10 de abril de 1996, Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica y posteriormente la Ley N° 7935, denominada Ley Integral para la personal adulta mayor de 25 de octubre de 1999.Se genera una nueva interpretación del derecho de las personas agredidas en el ámbito familiar. Las leyes otorgan protección directa ante agresiones inminentes y actuales contra la integridad física, sicológica, patrimonial y sexual de las víctimas a través de medidas cautelares, sin prejuzgar sobre los derechos sustantivos de las personas involucradas en los conflictos. Los jueces fueron instruidos entonces en estos temas, dándose énfasis a aspectos como la relación de poder, la invalidez aprendida y el círculo de violencia entre otros. La Ley N° 7935, Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor de 25 de octubre de 1999 nació como otro instrumento de protección a un sector vulnerable de la sociedad, los adultos mayores, que requerían de una regulación ajustada a sus necesidades. Dentro de este contexto, la interpretación inicial que han dado los tribunales competentes estuvo orientada por el deseo de evitar y neutralizar las patologías citadas de abuso de poder, invalidez aprendida y círculo de violencia.Dado que el artículo 57 de la citada Ley no señala contra quienes se puede aplicar la norma, resulta difícil distinguir donde la ley no lo hace. La omisión de la ley conducía a interpretar que la protección prevista era claramente a favor de ese sector de la población, pero como no se establece el sujeto pasivo (presunto agresor), al remitir a la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica, se empezó aplicar ésta de manera integral. Actualmente, con la utilización sistemática de la Ley contra la violencia doméstica y el incremento en el número y variedad de los casos sometidos a protección, se entiende que la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor remite a la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica únicamente para efectos procesales y para la aplicación de las medidas cautelares, sin que deban tomarse en consideración los demás presupuestos. Las resoluciones más recientes del Tribunal de Familia, parten de esa nueva visión, la cual se adecua mejor a los fines de la Ley N° 7935.Los criterios vertidos en las resoluciones citadas en la acción de inconstitucionalidad deben entenderse dentro de un proceso evolutivo que han seguido los jueces; no son errados ni inconstitucionales si se analizan a la luz del momento en que fueron dictados. Constituyen una demostración del interés de los jueces competentes en la materia por evolucionar en el estudio y análisis de la aplicación del derecho. En respaldo de sus manifestaciones, el Coordinador del Tribunal de Familia aporta varias sentencias que reflejan la actual jurisprudencia de éste, a saber, voto 06-00631 dictado en el expediente 06-110024-300-VD, en el cual se revocó la resolución de primera instancia y se ordenó levantar las medidas decretadas en contra del adulto mayor y se ordenó la restitución del adulto mayor a su hogar; voto 1509-05 dictada en el protección se hizo una excitativa a la Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor para que investigara y diera seguimiento a la situación conocida; 23-06, dictada en el expediente 05-001625-767-VD en el cual, sin contar con elementos ni indicios claros, se mantuvo la protección al adulto mayor en razón de existir duda sobre la situación; voto 1660-06, dictado en el expediente 06-000402-696-VD, en el cual se enfatiza que los adultos mayores son un grupo poblacional en condiciones de vulnerabilidad que amerita la protección estatal; voto 154-07 dictado en el expediente 06-110727-631-VD, en el cual se ordenó mantener la protección y se comisionó al EBAIS (Centro Asistencial) para que llevara un seguimiento especial para ese adulto mayor; voto 485-07 dictado en el expediente 06-001060-672-VD, en el cual se dictaron medidas especiales a favor de un adulto mayor, extranjero, que vive solo y sin familia en Costa Rica. En este último caso, como en algunos de los otros citados, no existe relación de parentesco, verticalidad, dependencia o subordinación y sin embargo, se ha otorgado la protección solicitada.
7Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 109, 110 y 111 de los días 7, 8 y 11 de junio de 2007 (folio 47).
8Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibidem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.
9En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta la Magistrada Calzada Miranda; y,

Considerando:

I.Sobre la admisibilidad. La legitimación del accionante proviene del párrafo primero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en tanto existe un recurso de apelación pendiente de resolver ante el Tribunal de Familia del Primer Circuito Judicial de San José según expediente 07-000824-0649-VD, en el que se discute la interpretación aquí cuestionada, por cuanto el Juzgado de Familia dejó sin efecto las medidas de protección solicitadas en su favor, toda vez que no tiene relación de parentesco, ni relación de poder con el presunto agresor. Desde este punto de vista la Sala estima que la acción es medio razonable de amparar el derecho que se considera lesionado, pues de resultar procedente, tendría incidencia directa en el asunto que está pendiente de resolución ante el Tribunal de Familia.

II.Ahora bien, la acción de inconstitucionalidad se interpone contra jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Familia, que a juicio del accionante establece dos requisitos para la imposición de las medidas cautelares en protección del adulto mayor: a.- La existencia de un vínculo de parentesco entre el adulto mayor y el presunto agresor, y, b. Una relación de poder también entre el adulto mayor y el presunto agresor, requisitos que estima, no están dispuestos en el artículo 57 de la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor y que limitan sus derechos fundamentales. Este Tribunal ha sido particularmente cauteloso al admitir acciones de inconstitucionalidad interpuestas contra jurisprudencia de los tribunales, porque si bien es cierto el artículo 10 de la Constitución Política y el 74 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional excluyen del control de constitucionalidad los actos jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial, el artículo 3º de esta última, establece con claridad meridiana que se tendrá por infringida la Constitución Política cuando ello resulte de la confrontación del texto de la norma o acto cuestionado, de sus efectos, o de su interpretación o aplicación por las autoridades públicas, con las normas y principios constitucionales.

En cuanto a la admisibilidad de la acción, entratándose de la jurisprudencia cuestionada de otros Tribunales, en sentencia No. 1997-4587 de las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del cinco de agosto de mil novecientos noventa y siete esta Sala consideró:

"Al respecto, debe indicarse que la Sala, por regla general, ha admitido las acciones de inconstitucionalidad planteadas contra la interpretación jurisdiccional de las normas, cuando se trata del criterio reiterado de los órganos judiciales, porque si se admitiera la acción contra lo resuelto por un órgano jurisdiccional en un caso determinado, se estaría interpretando lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, en contradicción con lo regulado en el 74, ambos de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, que señala que no cabe la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los actos jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial. Esto ha sido expuesto por la Sala en numerosas resoluciones de las cuales se transcribe la parte que interesa de la siguiente:

“Al respecto, deben los accionantes tener en cuenta que, es a la jurisprudencia a la que esta Sala ha reconocido como objeto del control de constitucionalidad, en los casos en que una determinada tendencia de los tribunales de justicia resulte contraria al bloque de legitimidad constitucional, y únicamente cuando se demuestre efectiva reiteración de un criterio jurídico emanado por las autoridades jurisdiccionales, mediante una pluralidad de sentencias, a manera de fuente no escrita del ordenamiento de los precedentes, en la resolución de todos o al menos una representativa cantidad de los casos asignados a los jueces en el ámbito de su competencia, es que puede hablarse de que existe una jurisprudencia en tal sentido, según ya lo indicó con anterioridad este Tribunal por sentencia número 6489-93, de las diez horas veinticuatro minutos del nueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, en su Considerando III:

“... Cuando el artículo 3 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional indica que se tendrá por infringida la Constitución Política cuando ello resulte de la interpretación que hagan las autoridades públicas de las leyes con las normas y principios constitucionales, lo que permite es examinar la constitucionalidad de la jurisprudencia, esto es, de pronunciamientos judiciales reiterados, a efectos de hacerlos valer en asuntos en trámite aún no resueltos. No permite, como lo pretende el accionante, que se revisen los fallos de primera y segunda instancia, para que una determinada interpretación judicial no sea aplicada en la Sala de Casación; pues esto equivaldría a convertir a la Sala Constitucional en una instancia más de revisión de las sentencias."(sentencia No. 1995-5981 de las 15:51 horas del 7 de noviembre de 1995)" Es importante señalar para los efectos de esta sentencia que la imposición de medidas cautelares en materia de violencia doméstica, carece de recurso de casación, resultando imposible encontrar pronunciamientos de la Sala Segunda.

Son entonces los pronunciamientos del Tribunal Superior de Familia los que constituyen doctrina jurisprudencial, por lo que amerita admitir la acción también en ese sentido (ver sentencia No. 2005-6224). Ahora bien, el accionante aporta cuatro resoluciones del Tribunal de Familia de San José: la Resolución número 483-2000 de las nueve horas veinte minutos del diez de mayo del dos mil, en la cual el Tribunal indicó: “… En conclusión, el solicitante, requiere la aplicación de la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica, con respecto a un sujeto que no tiene ningún tipo de parentesco ni dependencia hacia el solicitante, pero que aparentemente lo agrede de palabra, poniendo en duda su honradez y decoro profesional. Evidentemente no es la jurisdicción de familia, la competente para conocer de este asunto, de forma que el recurrente debe acudir a la vía correspondiente a hacer valer sus derechos, sea mediante un proceso penal, civil o constitucional, en el entendido que la protección que brinda la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor solamente puede ser solicitada ante un Juzgado de Familia o el que deba conocer por Ministerio de Ley, en los supuestos establecidos en la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica y la Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las personas discapacitadas, entendiendo incluso que, también los servidores que cuiden de personas discapacitadas o adultas mayores, pueden ser objeto de un proceso de medidas de protección, precisamente porque su trabajo consiste en velar por el cuidado e integridad de esas personas dentro de una relación de dependencia… ” ; en la Resolución número 225-2001 de las ocho horas cuarenta minutos del cinco de febrero del dos mil uno se siguió la misma línea de la sentencia anterior: “…

Es claro entonces, que todo tipo de agresión que sea tipificada como delito debe ser conocido por un Juez Penal, mientras que la agresión doméstica, es decir, la referida a un ámbito de familiaridad y/o dependencia emocional por la existencia de parentesco debe ser de conocimiento de un Juez de Familia sin perjuicio de que sean debatidos los hechos en un proceso penal si fuere el caso. En el presente asunto, la solicitante, requiere la aplicación de la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica, con respecto a sujetos que no guardan ningún tipo de parentesco ni dependencia hacia los presuntos agredidos. Evidentemente no es la jurisdicción de familia, la competente para conocer de este asunto, de forma que los interesados deben acudir a la vía correspondiente a hacer valer sus derechos, sea mediante un proceso penal, civil o constitucional, en el entendido que la protección que brinda la Ley Integral del Adulto Mayor solamente puede ser solicitada ante un Juzgado de Familia o el que deba conocer por Ministerio de Ley, en los supuestos establecidos en la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica y la Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las personas discapacitadas, entendiendo incluso que, también los servidores que cuiden de personas discapacitadas o adultas mayores, pueden ser objeto de un proceso de medidas de protección, precisamente porque su trabajo consiste en velar por el cuidado e integridad de esas personas dentro de una relación de dependencia…” ; 3.

En resolución número 1769-2003 de las catorce horas del tres de diciembre del dos mil tres, se señaló: “ Debe notarse que la remisión es a “las medidas de protección” y a los “procedimientos” no así a otros presupuestos como el parentesco, pues se trata de una tutela especial al adulto mayor en cualquier ámbito. El artículo 2 de la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, define lo que representa la “violencia contra las personas adultas mayores: “Cualquier acción u omisión, directa o indirecta ejercida contra una persona adulta mayor, que produzca, como consecuencia, el menoscabo de su integridad física, sexual, psicológica o patrimonial”. Pero es evidente, del sistema que plantea la ley especial de tutela a la persona adulta mayor, que debe mediar en la relación “una situación de poder de hecho o de derecho” por parte del agresor y “un estado especial de vulnerabilidad” de la víctima, pues tampoco se trata de establecer una situación de prevalencia en todas las relaciones sociales, de una persona mayor de sesenta y cinco años respecto de las demás.

Es evidente que entre los intervinientes existe un conflicto referido a bienes de una sucesión, no obstante es cierto lo que señala el juzgador de primera instancia en el sentido de que no existe “relación de verticalidad entre las partes, no hay dependencia emocional ni económica”, aspecto que equivale a los presupuestos mencionados de la situación de poder de hecho o de derecho y del estado especial de vulnerabilidad. ”; y en la última, Resolución número 215-2006 de las nueve horas veinte minutos del primero de marzo del dos mil seis: “Al respecto, debe señalarse que precisamente la ausencia de una relación de poder en este caso además de carecer de parentesco, es lo que hace determinar la improcedencia de la gestión, no por las razones dadas por el órgano de primera instancia, sino porque no se cumplen en la especie los presupuestos para que sea aplicable la protección prevista en la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica.

Véase que la misma solicitante lo indica, no residen en el mismo sitio, pues más bien esta la causa del conflicto, no los une parentesco alguno y en consecuencia no existe abuso de poder que deba protegerse, sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan promoverse con sustento en la Ley de Protección al Adulto Mayor… ”. En las dos primeras sentencias en forma expresa el Tribunal de Familia indica que es necesario que exista una relación de parentesco y de poder entre las partes; la tercera tiene como fundamento la necesaria relación de poder y la cuarta es un tanto ambigua en la aplicación de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica. Sin embargo debe señalarse que si hace referencia a que es “…precisamente la ausencia de una relación de poder en este caso además de carecer de parentesco,… lo que hace determinar la improcedencia de la gestión…”. Pareciera desprenderse de la lectura de la sentencia que el Tribunal consideró para la aplicación de la Ley, la posibilidad de la relación de poder.

La Procuraduría General por su parte, señala que también mediante sentencias No. 1274-04 de las nueve horas diez minutos del veintisiete de julio de dos mil cuatro y la 1509-2005 de las catorce horas con cincuenta minutos del cinco de octubre del dos mil cinco, el Tribunal de Familia reiteró el criterio respecto a una necesaria relación de poder, no así respecto al parentesco. No obstante lo anterior, el Organo Jurisdiccional en su apersonamiento en este expediente, señaló que a pesar de que el criterio del Tribunal ha sido el descrito en las sentencias aportadas, tal criterio ha ido evolucionando con los nuevos instrumentos jurídicos. Actualmente con la utilización sistemática de la Ley contra la violencia doméstica y el incremento en el número y variedad de los casos sometidos a protección, se entiende que la Ley Integral de la Persona Adulta Mayor, remite a la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica, para la aplicación de las medidas cautelares, sin que deban tomarse en consideración los demás presupuestos que se requieren para los casos ordinarios de violencia doméstica, (relación de poder, parentesco).

En sus resoluciones más recientes entre las cuales refieren los votos 631-06, 1509-05, 23-06, 1660-06, 485-07, se parte de esa nueva visión, siendo que en algunos de estos casos, no existe relación de parentesco, verticalidad, dependencia o subordinación y sin embargo, se ha otorgado la protección solicitada. A criterio de la Sala y las resoluciones aportadas por el accionante, aunadas a las sentencias ofrecidas por el Tribunal de Familia, así como por la Procuraduría General, arriba a la conclusión que éstas no configuran una línea jurisprudencial uniforme que sustente el alegato del accionante de forma que amerite un análisis de constitucionalidad por parte de esta jurisdicción, toda vez que la inconstitucionalidad acusada en el sentido de que es necesaria una relación de parentesco para la aplicación de la Ley de Violencia Doméstica no se aprecia en todas las resoluciones aportadas. El Tribunal de Familia agrega resoluciones más recientes, en las cuales se tutela la protección del adulto mayor bajo los presupuestos que echa de menos el accionante y que teme que no sean considerados por ese Tribunal a la hora de resolver su recurso de apelación, sin atender a una relación de parentesco, verticalidad, dependencia o subordinación.

Frente a lo anterior, la Sala considera que lo procedente es rechazar la presente acción, toda vez que no se ha demostrado el presupuesto necesario que debe existir para invocar la inconstitucionalidad de una línea jurisprudencial, además esta jurisdicción no constituye una instancia más de revisión de las sentencias de los tribunales ordinarios, como se pretende en este caso.

III.No obstante lo anterior, este Tribunal considera conveniente reiterar la importancia de la tutela de este sector de la población según lo dispone el párrafo final del artículo 51 de la Constitución Política cuando establece:

"Igualmente tendrán derecho a esa protección la madre, el niño, el anciano y el enfermo desvalido." Es evidente de acuerdo a la norma transcrita, el deber dual que tiene el Estado costarricense a) Por un la debe producir un marco normativo adecuado con el fin de brindar una protección especial para esos grupos de personas, lo cual constituye un verdadero derecho fundamental y b) Respetar y hacer respetar a través de las correspondientes dependencias administrativas y tribunales de justicia tales derechos. A partir del concepto del Estado Social de Derecho, es posible derivar obligaciones para las autoridades públicas, precisamente en aras de la búsqueda del mayor bienestar de "todos los habitantes del país", dentro de los cuales, el Derecho de la Constitución señala de manera especial a los niños, a las madres, al anciano y personas desvalidas. El Estado Social consagrado en nuestra Constitución Política, desarrolla en su contenido normativo una relevante y obligada intervención estatal en materia social a favor de aquellos sectores especiales de la población que, por su condición, así lo requieran; tal es el caso –sin duda alguna- de los ancianos, o personas de la tercera edad, o personas adultas mayores.

Hasta hace pocos años, no se contaba con una normativa tendente a garantizar de forma adecuada, la especial protección y tutela estatal que requiere el adulto mayor de nuestro país; sin embargo, el diecinueve de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y nueve la Asamblea Legislativa promulgó la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, número 7935, con la que se pretende:

"a) Garantizar a las personas adultas mayores, igualdad de oportunidades y vida digna en todos los ámbitos.

b)Garantizar la participación activa de las personas adultas mayores en la formulación y aplicación de las políticas que las afecten.
c)Promover la permanencia de las personas adultas mayores en su núcleo familiar comunitario.
d)Propiciar formas de organización y participación de las personas adultas mayores, que le permitan al país aprovechar la experiencia y el conocimiento de esta población.
e)Impulsar la atención integral e interinstitucional de las personas adultas mayores por parte de las entidades públicas y privadas, y velar por el funcionamiento adecuado de los programas y servicios, destinados a esta población.
f)Garantizar la protección y la seguridad social de las personas adultas mayores." Sin embargo, no puede ni debe pretenderse que esa normativa agote la tutela y especial protección por parte del Estado de los derechos fundamentales de los adultos, pues es precisamente a partir del marco jurídico que debe darse ese desarrollo jurisprudencial por parte de la judicatura de obligatoriedad y respeto. La normativa es solo un marco introductorio que dispone que “la persona adulta mayor, debe ser considerada toda persona de sesenta y cinco años o más”. Asimismo, pretende entre otras cosas, una atención integral de este grupo, definida en la ley como la satisfacción de las necesidades físicas, materiales, biológicas, emocionales, sociales, laborales, productivas y espirituales de las personas adultas mayores. Para facilitarles una vejez plena y sana, se considerarán sus hábitos, capacidades funcionales y preferencias.

En razón de ello, y ante la vulnerabilidad de este sector de la población, también se dispone su protección frente a la violencia que sufren, entendiéndose por ésta como “cualquier acción u omisión, directa o indirecta, ejercida contra una persona adulta mayor, que produzca, como consecuencia, el menoscabo de su integridad física, sexual, psicológica o patrimonial. Las personas adultas mayores tienen derecho a que se respete su integridad física, psíquica y moral, derecho que comprende además la protección de su imagen, autonomía, pensamiento, dignidad y valores”. Para ello esta misma ley dispone el mecanismo de protección de dichos derechos, ejemplo claro de ello es el artículo 57, cuya interpretación jurídica es la que está siendo impugnada en esta acción. Esta norma dispone:

“ARTÍCULO 57.- Medidas de protección Para prevenir la violencia física, psicológica, patrimonial o sexual contra las personas adultas mayores, se aplicarán las medidas de protección y los procedimientos ordenados en la Ley contra la violencia doméstica, No. 7586, de 10 de abril de 1996. Estarán legitimados para solicitarlos, en especial los representantes de las instituciones públicas y privadas encargadas de los programas de atención a la persona adulta mayor, así como cualquier persona que conozca de estos abusos.” Efectivamente la disposición cuestionada remite a la ley de violencia doméstica únicamente para efectos procesales, pues para configurar un caso de violencia doméstica, el fundamento legal de esta protección no deriva de una ley de esa naturaleza, sino de la Ley Integral para la persona adulta mayor, cuyo único fin es garantizar a las personas adultas mayores, igualdad de oportunidades y una vida digna en todos los ámbitos, protegiéndolas contra todo aquel que pretenda el menoscabo de su integridad física, sexual, psicológica o patrimonial.

IV.El proceso sumario de las medidas de protección reguladas en la Ley contra la Violencia Doméstica, ha sido avalado por este Tribunal, atendiendo a la vulnerabilidad de los sectores de protección de conformidad con el artículo 51 de la Constitución Política. Norma programática que establece la obligación del Estado de dar protección especial a la familia como elemento natural y fundamento esencial de la sociedad, así como a las madres, niños, ancianos y enfermos desvalidos. En tales términos, no sólo esta ley sino la Ley Integral para la Persona Adulta Mayor, es una manifestación del cumplimiento de esa directriz constitucional, cuyo espíritu permea todo su contenido. En ella están garantizados el derecho a la vida, a la salud y a la integridad física, conforme se establece en nuestra Carta Fundamental y por el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Es así como se vulnera este Derecho de la Constitución no solo cuando uno de los miembros de un núcleo familiar abusando de su fuerza física o de su posición de autoridad, le inflige vejámenes físicos, sexuales, psicológicos o patrimoniales a uno o varios de sus integrantes, sino cuando otras personas lesionan de alguna forma a un adulto mayor, cuya vulnerabilidad es inherente.- En aras de su protección, respeto e integridad, es que el legislador consideró oportuno dotar a las personas adultas víctimas de violencia de un procedimiento ágil y oportuno, que les garantizara en forma inmediata el cumplimiento de los postulados constitucionales mencionados remitiendo únicamente para efectos de la aplicación de medidas de protección a la Ley contra violencia doméstica.

V.Conclusión. A pesar de todo lo anterior, esta acción debe ser rechazada, según lo indicado en el considerando II, en tanto que las resoluciones aportadas por el accionante, no pueden ser consideradas una línea jurisprudencial del Tribunal de Familia, que amerite un análisis de constitucionalidad por parte de esta Sala. Por consiguiente, procede rechazar de plano la acción.

Por tanto:

Se rechaza de plano la acción.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Luis Paulino Mora M. Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Adrián Vargas B. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Horacio González Q.

Constitutional Challenge to Precautionary Measures for Older AdultsAcción de inconstitucionalidad sobre medidas cautelares para adultos mayores

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