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Res. 07812-2025 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 14/03/2025
OutcomeResultado
The amparo was denied because no omissions by the respondent ministries were proven; responses existed but notification failed due to the petitioner's lack of precise contact information, and disagreement with the Ministry of Health's substantive decision cannot be reviewed through this remedy.El recurso de amparo fue declarado sin lugar al no evidenciarse omisiones de los ministerios recurridos; las respuestas existían pero la notificación falló por falta de medios precisos del recurrente, y la disconformidad con el fondo del acto administrativo del Ministerio de Salud no es revisable en esta vía.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber declared without merit an amparo filed by an elderly person with respiratory illnesses against the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG), and the Ministry of Environment (MINAE) for alleged inaction regarding sugarcane burning in Turrialba. The Chamber found that the MAG had indeed responded to the petitioner's complaints well before the amparo was filed, but notification was delayed because the petitioner did not provide a precise address for service. As for MINAE, no formal complaint from the petitioner was found in its records. With respect to the Ministry of Health, the Chamber noted that the petitioner had no pending matters, and his disagreement with the Ministry's decision could not be reviewed through amparo, as it is not a mechanism for controlling the legality of administrative acts; he should resort to ordinary administrative litigation. Judge Cruz Castro dissented on the issue of administrative delay, arguing that the Chamber should hear such claims as a violation of the right to swift and complete justice (Article 41 of the Constitution).La Sala Constitucional declaró sin lugar un recurso de amparo interpuesto por un adulto mayor con enfermedades respiratorias contra el Ministerio de Salud, el MAG y el MINAE, por presuntas omisiones ante las quemas de caña de azúcar en Turrialba. La Sala determinó que el MAG sí había emitido respuesta a las gestiones del recurrente mucho antes de la interposición del amparo, pero la notificación se demoró porque aquel no proporcionó un medio preciso para recibir comunicaciones. Respecto al MINAE, no constaba en sus registros denuncia formal alguna del recurrente, por lo que no se acreditó omisión. En cuanto al Ministerio de Salud, la Sala advirtió que el recurrente ya no tenía gestiones pendientes y su disconformidad con lo resuelto por esa cartera no podía ser revisada en sede de amparo, pues este no es un instrumento de control de legalidad de los actos administrativos, debiendo acudir a la vía contencioso-administrativa. El magistrado Cruz Castro salvó el voto en lo relativo a la mora administrativa, sosteniendo que la Sala sí debería conocer de tales reclamos como violación al derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida (artículo 41 constitucional).
Key excerptExtracto clave
IV. ON THE MERITS. In the case at hand, it follows from the proven facts that the claims filed by the petitioner with the MAG were resolved well before the date this appeal was filed, but could not be notified in time because he did not provide a precise means of receiving service. Likewise, it is reported that the MINAE records contain no formal complaint filed by the petitioner [Name1]. Given the foregoing, it is appropriate to declare this appeal without merit. V. DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE CRUZ CASTRO ON ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY. Although in the past I have held the majority opinion of the Court, upon a better weighing of the fundamental rights claimed, I consider that administrative delay constitutes a violation of a fundamental procedural guarantee, for which reason I change the opinion I had expressed, admitting the possible infringement of the right to swift and complete administrative justice, departing from the majority's view that—save for rare exceptions—such grievances must be resolved in the administrative litigation jurisdiction.IV.- SOBRE EL FONDO. En el sub lite, del elenco de hechos probados se colige que los reclamos que el accionante interpuso ante el MAG fueron resueltos mucho antes de la fecha de interposición de este recurso, pero no pudieron serle notificados en tiempo porque él no suministró un medio preciso para recibir notificaciones. Asimismo, se informa que en los registros del MINAE no consta ninguna denuncia formal presentada por el recurrente [Nombre1]. Dado lo anterior, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar este recurso. V.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO CRUZ CASTRO SOBRE MORA ADMINISTRATIVA. Si bien en el pasado he sostenido el criterio de mayoría del Tribunal, bajo una mejor ponderación de los derechos fundamentales que se reclaman, estimo que la mora administrativa constituye una lesión a una garantía procesal fundamental, razón por la que cambio el criterio que había expuesto, admitiendo la posible infracción al derecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, separándome de la visión de la mayoría del Tribunal, en el sentido que -salvo contadas excepciones- este tipo de reproches deben resolverse en la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"no es resorte de esta Sala pronunciarse sobre semejante disconformidad, ya que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no servir como instrumento de control de la legalidad de los actos de las distintas Administraciones Públicas."
"it is not the role of this Chamber to pronounce on such disagreement, since the purpose of the amparo remedy is to provide timely protection against violations or threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, not to serve as an instrument for controlling the legality of acts of the various Public Administrations."
Considerando I
"no es resorte de esta Sala pronunciarse sobre semejante disconformidad, ya que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no servir como instrumento de control de la legalidad de los actos de las distintas Administraciones Públicas."
Considerando I
"los reclamos que el accionante interpuso ante el MAG fueron resueltos mucho antes de la fecha de interposición de este recurso, pero no pudieron serle notificados en tiempo porque él no suministró un medio preciso para recibir notificaciones."
"the claims that the petitioner filed with the MAG were resolved well before the date this appeal was filed, but could not be notified to him in time because he did not provide a precise means of receiving service."
Considerando IV
"los reclamos que el accionante interpuso ante el MAG fueron resueltos mucho antes de la fecha de interposición de este recurso, pero no pudieron serle notificados en tiempo porque él no suministró un medio preciso para recibir notificaciones."
Considerando IV
"la mora administrativa constituye una lesión a una garantía procesal fundamental, razón por la que cambio el criterio que había expuesto, admitiendo la posible infracción al derecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida."
"administrative delay constitutes a violation of a fundamental procedural guarantee, for which reason I change the opinion I had expressed, admitting the possible infringement of the right to swift and complete administrative justice."
Voto salvado
"la mora administrativa constituye una lesión a una garantía procesal fundamental, razón por la que cambio el criterio que había expuesto, admitiendo la posible infracción al derecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida."
Voto salvado
Full documentDocumento completo
Date of Resolution: March 14, 2025, at 09:20 Type of matter: Amparo action SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine hours twenty minutes of March fourteenth, two thousand twenty-five.
Amparo action processed in expediente number 25-002729-0007-CO, filed by [Name1], identity card CED1, against the MINISTERIO DE SALUD, the MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (MAG), and the MINISTERIO DE AMBIENTE Y ENERGÍA (MINAE).
Resultando:
The Technical Report in question concludes that: According to the regulations on agricultural burning, the suspension of a burning permit is appropriate if the controlled burn generates an imminent and notorious risk to the health and safety of the immediate population or to the environment. Given that the activity is regulated by the aforementioned decree, the complainant must indicate the non-compliance of the reported farms to evaluate the possible suspension of the burning permit, should what is indicated be proven. In the description of the complaint, the complainant points out a series of health effects, which they indicate were caused by the agricultural burning, attaching epicrisis and medical diagnoses of respiratory diseases. However, these provided elements are not binding for addressing the complaint since it is not possible to verify the relationship between the activity and a direct impact on the complainant's health.
Likewise, the complainant requests the elimination of the practice of burning cane fields throughout the canton; however, at the local level, there is no authority to prohibit an activity that is being regulated by a decree, except when it represents an imminent risk or provable non-compliance, as indicated above. Therefore, said request for prohibition must be submitted to the corresponding entities…' …By virtue of Technical Report MS-DRRSCE-DARST-IT-0285-2024, Official Letter MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024 is issued, which states in relevant part: 'The complaint assigned with the consecutive number # 0066-2024, which indicated problems with sugar cane burning specifically at [Dirección7] and possibly [Dirección8], is hereby addressed. According to what is indicated in Decreto N°35368-MAG-S-MINAET Reglamento para Quemas Agrícolas Controladas, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería) is responsible for the stewardship of the Agricultural Sector, the granting of permits for controlled agricultural burning, as well as the supervision and monitoring of compliance with the required conditions.
However, this same regulation states in Article 22° Suspension. If, as a consequence of the controlled burn, an imminent and notorious risk is generated to the health and safety of the immediate population or to the environment, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, as well as the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications, in a coordinated or separate manner, may temporarily or permanently suspend the burn, recording the minutes justifying the reasons for which the suspension was ordered. Once the risk is controlled, the suspension order shall be lifted, allowing the burn to continue... (…) it is indicated that the MAG is in charge of granting agricultural burning permits; however, the legislation indicates the authority of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications to proceed with the suspension of the burning activity, should the reasons for the order be justified.
Having said that, the prohibition of burning, as requested by the complainant, may only proceed if inconsistencies are identified in the permits or activities carried out by the legal representatives of the activity… On May 14, 2024, a joint visit was conducted with the official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, [Nombre3]. The MAG official indicates that the farm has the corresponding permit allowing them to burn the cane fields, thus complying with the provisions of the Reglamento para Quemas Agrícolas Controlada N°35368-MAG-S-MINAE, which specifies the conditions necessary for the approval of the permit; I am informed that said permit is valid for 6 months and no follow-up visits are conducted during cane field burning, only in the event of a complaint. The legal representative presents a document similar to a sworn statement of compliance with the regulated conditions. Likewise, the official points out that in the field, the presence of the necessary equipment for extinguishing fire in cases of emergencies is not verified…
Similarly, the MAG official indicates that to date, no complaints have been filed against the farm [Dirección9] or any other farm in the canton regarding non-compliance with the agricultural burning regulations. Furthermore, it was not possible to determine or locate the [Dirección14]… During the visit, it was not possible to observe the burning of cane fields because the regulated schedule is from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. According to what the regulations on agricultural burning indicate, the suspension of a burning permit is appropriate if the controlled burn generates an imminent and notorious risk to the health and safety of the immediate population or to the environment. Given that the activity is regulated by the aforementioned decree, the complainant must indicate the non-compliance of the reported farms to evaluate the possible suspension of the burning permit, should what is indicated be proven.
In their complaint, they point out a series of health effects, which they indicate were caused by the agricultural burning; however, these provided elements are not binding for addressing the complaint since it is not possible to verify the relationship between the activity and a direct impact on health. On the other hand, regarding their request for the elimination of the burning practice, at the local level, there is no authority to prohibit an activity that is being regulated by a decree, except when it represents an imminent risk or provable non-compliance, as previously indicated. In view of the foregoing, it is held that it is the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock that is responsible for the stewardship of the Agricultural Sector, and therefore the granting of permits for controlled agricultural burning, as well as the supervision and monitoring of compliance with the required conditions.
That non-compliance on the part of [Dirección3] regarding what is indicated in Decreto N°35368-MAG-S-MINAET Reglamento para Quemas Agrícolas Controladas has not been proven, and that said farm has a valid permit for controlled burning. That, although it is true, the legislation indicates the authority of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment, Energy, and Telecommunications to proceed with the suspension of the burning activity, this only proceeds if inconsistencies are identified in the permits or activities carried out by the legal representatives of the activity, or if, as a consequence of the controlled burn, an imminent and notorious risk is generated to the health and safety of the immediate population or to the environment. The content of Official Letter MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024 is reiterated, in the sense that '(…) the activity is regulated by the aforementioned decree, the complainant must indicate the non-compliance of the reported farms to evaluate the possible suspension of the burning permit, should what is indicated be proven.
(…) And that 'regarding their request for the elimination of the burning practice, at the local level, there is no authority to prohibit an activity that is being regulated by a decree, except when it represents an imminent risk or provable non-compliance, as previously indicated.' Bear in mind, appellant, that the administrative acts issued by the Ministry of Health, guarantor of Public Health, adhere to the Principle of Legality or Primacy of Law, which is a fundamental principle, according to which every exercise of Public Power must be carried out in accordance with the current law and its jurisdiction. In the case at hand, since non-compliance on the part of [Dirección3] regarding what is indicated in Decreto N°35368-MAG-S-MINAET Reglamento para Quemas Agrícolas Controladas has not been proven, and the appellant does not offer objective evidence that indicates, verifies, or proves non-compliance with the aforementioned regulation, consequently, the arguments put forth by the appellant are not accepted; rather, they are limited to issuing subjective criteria with no probative value.
That being the case, and since this Ministry is acting in accordance with the law, the contested health order must be upheld, and so it shall be declared. Therefore, The Regional Director of the Central East Region, Resolves: With legal basis in Article 60 of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, and on the factual and legal grounds set forth above, the appeal for reversal filed by Mr. [Nombre1] against Official Letter No. MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024 IS HEREBY REJECTED' …This document was notified to Mr. [Nombre1] on July 3, 2024 …On July 9, 2024, Mr. [Nombre1] filed a document challenging resolution MS-DRRSCE-00628-2024. …In response to said document, a reply is given via official letter MS-DRRSCE-DARST0922-2024, indicating the following verbatim: '…In response to the document filed with this Ministry on July 9, 2024, I am pleased to inform you of the following: 1. On June 6, 2024, your document entitled 'Recurso de Revocatoria al oficio MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024' was received at the single customer service window. 2.
Via official letter MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0715-2024, dated June 3, 2024, and notified to the Central East Region by email on July 4, 2024, your appeal for reversal against official letter MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024 was elevated. 3. Through resolution MS-DRRSCE-00628-2024, issued on July 1, 2024, and received in this Governing Area on June 2, 2024, the Regional Director of the Central East Region rejected the appeal for reversal. 4. Nonetheless, your appeal has been elevated to the instance of the Minister as part of due process, through resolution MS-DRRSCE-00628-2024. Consequently, your appeal will be resolved by the Minister of Health, thus guaranteeing the two-instance process. Once we receive a response, we will inform you of the corresponding resolution' …This document was notified to Mr. [Nombre1] on August 7, 2024 …Via email on November 19, 2024, resolution MS-DM-AU-5926-2024, dated November 11, 2024, is received, which concludes the following: 'WHEREAS…
Demonstrating that the appeal does not meet the necessary formality to be heard on appeal, but having been addressed regarding its reversal through resolution N°MS-DRRSCE-00628-2024 (declared WITHOUT MERIT), taking into account that the facts were resolved on their merits and that official letter N°MS-DRRSCEDARST-0669-2024 was personally notified on May 30, 2024, by the Área Rectora de Salud Turrialba, and the same was appealed on June 3 of the same year, in order to address the issues brought to our attention, this Ministerial representation proceeds to hear the merits for its final resolution… Regarding the appeal in question, it is noted that it is filed against official letter N°MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024, in attention to complaint N°0066-2024, filed by Mr. [Nombre1], it being evident to this ministerial representation that the efforts made by the Área Rectora de Salud de Turrialba and the officials of MINAET, in the field investigations seen through Technical Report N°MS-DRRSCE-DARST-IT-0285-2024, are sufficient to conclude that no non-compliance was evidenced on the part of - [Dirección15] -, regarding Decreto Ejecutivo N°35368-MAG-S-MINAET -Reglamento para Quemas Agrícolas Controladas-, and that the complainant does not offer objective evidence that indicates, verifies, or proves non-compliance with the regulation governing controlled and authorized burning, there being no justifying reason for the action of the Ministry of Health to be different from what was resolved…
THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF HEALTH RESOLVES In accordance with what is set forth herein and with legal basis in Articles 11, 21, 41, 50, 66, and 129 of the Constitución Política, 1 and 60 of the Ley Orgánica del Ministerio de Salud, N°5412, 11, 131.1, 132, 133, 136, 175, 275, 345, 346, 348, 350, 355, 356, and 351 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, law N°6227, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7, 363, 378 of the Ley General de Salud N°5395; TO DECLARE WITHOUT MERIT the appeal filed by [Nombre1] against official letter N°MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024, dated May 24, 2024, signed by Dr. [Nombre11], Director of the Área Rectora de Salud Turrialba, belonging to the Dirección Regional de Rectoría de la Salud Central Este, this Ministerial office ratifying the administrative act appealed herein in all its aspects, as it is in accordance with the law… THEREFORE, THE MINISTER OF HEALTH RESOLVES …TO DECLARE WITHOUT MERIT the appeal filed by [Nombre1] against official letter N°MS-DRRSCE-DARST-0669-2024, dated May 24, 2024, signed by Dr. [Nombre11], Director of the Área Rectora de Salud Turrialba, belonging to the Dirección Regional de Rectoría de la Salud Central Este, this Ministerial office ratifying the administrative act appealed herein in all its aspects, as it is in accordance with the law…' …This document was notified to Mr. [Nombre1] on December 2, 2024 …After the notification of the resolution mentioned in the tenth point of this report, no further action is recorded in the file.
It is important to highlight that our institution has diligently attended to each action related to this case and the competence of this Ministry as such…'…” Requests that the filed appeal be declared without merit.
Drafted by Magistrate Garro Vargas; and,
Whereas:
In the sub judice case, the petitioner's claim is due, in part, to the alleged lack of response to a series of complaints they filed against sugar cane burning, reportedly caused by employees of [Dirección17]; all of which, if true, could constitute a violation of the right to prompt and complete administrative justice. Therefore, before analyzing the merits of this matter concerning the alleged violation of the right to a prompt and complete procedure, it must be clarified that, based on judgment N° 2008-02545 of 8:55 a.m. on February 22, 2008, this Chamber has referred to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction —with some exceptions— those matters in which it is discussed whether the public administration has complied or not with the deadlines set by the Ley General de la Administración Pública (Articles 261 and 325) or by sectoral laws relating to special administrative procedures, both to resolve an administrative procedure by final act —initiated ex officio or at the request of a party— and to hear admissible administrative appeals. Now then, in this case, an exception applies, precisely, since it involves complaints of environmental contamination. By virtue of the above, the Chamber will proceed to resolve these issues.
However, as inferred from the writ of appeal itself and the report rendered under solemn oath by Dr. Mary Denisse Munive Angermüller, in her capacity as Minister of Health, the petitioner has no pending action or complaint to be resolved before the Ministry of Health, and appears before this Court to express disagreement with what was resolved by that ministry. On this point, it is noted that it is not the purview of this Chamber to rule on such disagreement, since the purpose of the amparo appeal is to provide timely protection against infringements or threats to fundamental rights and freedoms, not to serve as an instrument for controlling the legality of the acts of the various Public Administrations. Consequently, the Chamber cannot act as an appellate instance in the matter presented and review whether what was resolved by the Ministry of Health conforms to the facts and current legal regulations. In this sense, as the issue in question pertains to ordinary legality and must be settled through ordinary channels, the correct course is for the appellant to, if they see fit, submit their disagreements or claims through the competent jurisdictional route, a venue where they can broadly discuss the merits of the matter and assert their claims.
The appellant is an elderly, disabled person suffering from several respiratory diseases. They state that in 2008, they filed a complaint before the Área de Salud de Turrialba of the Ministry of Health, copied to the MAG and MINAE, among other authorities, against the frequent sugar cane burning, reportedly caused by employees of [Dirección17], and subsequently noticed that the burning continued, leading them to submit respective communications on March 18, 2024, to the Área de Salud de Turrialba, to explain what was happening. However, because the Ministry of Health rejected their complaint —despite appealing the resolution indicating everything was in order, filing appeal measures which, in the final instance, reached the Minister of Health—, they filed a claim before the MAG, delivered on May 31, 2024, as well as a writ dated June 4 of that same year, reiterating the same complaints presented to the Ministry of Health. They claim, however, that the MAG has not yet ruled on the matter. They also insist that MINAE, which according to the responses sent by the Ministry of Health should have intervened, also did not rule on the matter. Based on the arguments made, they believe the accused actions violate their fundamental rights.
Of importance for the decision in this matter, the following facts are deemed duly proven, either because they have been accredited or because the respondent has failed to refer to them as prescribed in the initial order:
Additionally, an attempt was made to contact him via the telephone number he provided for these purposes, but communication was also unsuccessful (see evidence and reports received).
In the sub lite matter, it follows from the set of proven facts that the claims the petitioner lodged before the MAG were resolved well before the date this appeal was filed, but could not be notified to him in a timely manner because he did not provide a precise means for receiving notifications. Likewise, it is reported that MINAE’s records contain no formal complaint filed by the petitioner [Nombre1] . Given the foregoing, it is appropriate to dismiss this appeal.
Although in the past I have held the majority opinion of the Court, upon better weighing of the fundamental rights claimed, I consider that administrative delay constitutes a violation of a fundamental procedural guarantee, which is why I change the reasoning I had expressed, admitting the possible infringement of the right to prompt and effective administrative justice, departing from the view of the majority of the Court, in the sense that—save for rare exceptions—this type of challenge must be resolved in the administrative litigation jurisdiction. On the contrary, I consider that one of the rights this jurisdiction is called upon to protect is that of prompt and effective justice, expressly enshrined in Article 41 of the Constitution. This is in accordance with the scope of competence assigned to this Court in matters of fundamental rights protection, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 10 and 48 of the Political Constitution.
While I understand the importance of the reforms to the administrative litigation jurisdiction since the entry into force of Law 8508 of April twenty-fourth, two thousand six, the fact remains that this situation does not justify remitting to that venue matters that fall within the competence of this Chamber, which has demonstrated over the years that it is a swift and effective means for the protection of the fundamental rights of the country’s inhabitants.
The parties are warned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained on any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be retrieved from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not retrieved within this period shall be destroyed, in accordance with the provisions of the “Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial,” approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.
Por tanto:
The appeal is DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT. Judge Cruz Castro issues a dissenting vote regarding the provisions on Article 41 of the Constitution.
[Nombre16] .
President [Nombre17] Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
Ana Cristina Fernandez A.
Telephones: [Telf2] / (). Fax: [Telf3] / [Telf4]. Electronic address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: ([Dirección20] , [Dirección21] , . ).
SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del catorce de marzo de dos mil veinticinco .
Recurso de amparo que se tramita en expediente número 25-002729-0007-CO, interpuesto por [Nombre1] , cédula de identidad CED1, contra el MINISTERIO DE SALUD, el MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y GANADERÍA (MAG) y el MINISTERIO DE AMBIENTE Y ENERGÍA (MINAE).-
Resultando:
Redacta la Magistrada Garro Vargas; y,
Considerando:
En el sub judice, el reclamo del recurrente se debe, en parte, a la supuesta falta de respuesta a una serie de denuncias que presentó contra las quemas de caña de azúcar, propiciadas por empleados de las [Dirección17] , todo lo cual, de ser cierto, podría configurar una lesión al derecho a gozar de una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida. Por lo tanto, antes de analizar el fondo del presente asunto por la presunta violación del derecho a un procedimiento pronto y cumplido, debe aclararse que, a partir de la sentencia N° 2008-02545 de las 8:55 horas del 22 de febrero de 2008, esta Sala ha remitido a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa —con algunas excepciones— aquellos asuntos en los que se discute si la administración pública ha cumplido o no los plazos, pautados por la Ley General de la Administración Pública (artículos 261 y 325) o por las leyes sectoriales relativas a los procedimientos administrativos especiales, tanto para resolver por acto final un procedimiento administrativo —instruido de oficio o a instancia de parte— como para conocer de los recursos administrativos procedentes. Ahora bien, en este caso se plantea, justamente, un supuesto de excepción, pues se está ante denuncias por contaminación ambiental. En virtud de lo anterior, la Sala entrará a resolver esos extremos.
Sin embargo, como del propio escrito de interposición del recurso y el informe rendido bajo gravedad de juramento la Dra. Mary Denisse Munive Angermüller, en su calidad de ministra de Salud, se colige que el recurrente no tiene ninguna gestión o denuncia pendiente de resolver ante el Ministerio de Salud, y que acude ante este Tribunal para exponer una inconformidad con lo resuelto por ese ministerio, en este punto se hace la salvedad de que no es resorte de esta Sala pronunciarse sobre semejante disconformidad, ya que la finalidad del recurso de amparo es brindar tutela oportuna contra infracciones o amenazas a los derechos y libertades fundamentales, no servir como instrumento de control de la legalidad de los actos de las distintas Administraciones Públicas. En consecuencia, la Sala no puede hacer las veces de alzada en la materia expuesta y revisar si lo resuelto por el Ministerio de Salud se ajusta o no a los hechos y a la normativa legal vigente. En este sentido, como el extremo en cuestión es propio de la legalidad ordinaria y debe dirimirse en la vía común, lo correcto es que la parte recurrente, si a bien lo tiene, exponga sus inconformidades o reclamos en la vía jurisdiccional competente, sede en la cual podrá, en forma amplia, discutir el fondo del asunto y hacer valer sus pretensiones.
El recurrente es una persona adulta mayor, discapacitada, que sufre varias enfermedades respiratorias. Dice que en el año 2008, planteó una queja ante el Área de Salud de Turrialba del Ministerio de Salud, con copia al MAG y al MINAE, entre otras autoridades, contra las frecuentes quemas de caña de azúcar, propiciadas por empleados de las [Dirección17] , y luego se percató de que las quemas continuaban, por lo que remitió sendas gestiones, el 18 de marzo de 2024, al Área de Salud de Turrialba, a fin de explicar lo que acontecía. No obstante, como el Ministerio de Salud rechazó su denuncia —lo anterior pese a que apeló la resolución que indicaba que todo estaba en regla, planteando medidas recursivas que, ya en última instancia, llegaron hasta la ministra de Salud—, planteó un reclamo ante el MAG, entregado el 31 de mayo de 2024, así como un escrito de 4 de junio de ese mismo año, reproduciendo las mismas quejas expuestas ante el Ministerio de Salud. Reclama que, sin embargo, que el MAG no se ha pronunciado al respecto. Asimismo, insiste en que el MINAE, que debía intervenir según las respuestas remitidas por el Ministerio de Salud, tampoco se pronunció al respecto. Con base en los alegatos efectuados, estima que las actuaciones acusadas vulneraran sus derechos fundamentales.
De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se estiman como debidamente demostrados los siguientes hechos, sea porque así han sido acreditados o bien porque el recurrido haya omitido referirse a ellos según lo prevenido en el auto inicial:
En el sub lite, del elenco de hechos probados se colige que los reclamos que el accionante interpuso ante el MAG fueron resueltos mucho antes de la fecha de interposición de este recurso, pero no pudieron serle notificados en tiempo porque él no suministró un medio preciso para recibir notificaciones. Asimismo, se informa que en los registros del MINAE no consta ninguna denuncia formal presentada por el recurrente [Nombre1] . Dado lo anterior, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar este recurso.
Si bien en el pasado he sostenido el criterio de mayoría del Tribunal, bajo una mejor ponderación de los derechos fundamentales que se reclaman, estimo que la mora administrativa constituye una lesión a una garantía procesal fundamental, razón por la que cambio el criterio que había expuesto, admitiendo la posible infracción al derecho a una justicia administrativa pronta y cumplida, separándome de la visión de la mayoría del Tribunal, en el sentido que -salvo contadas excepciones- este tipo de reproches deben resolverse en la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa. Por el contrario, estimo que uno de los derechos que esta jurisdicción se encuentra llamada a tutelar es el de la justicia pronta y cumplida, expresamente consagrado en el artículo 41 constitucional. Ello conforme al ámbito de competencia asignado a este Tribunal en materia de protección a derechos fundamentales, en atención a lo dispuesto en los artículos 10 y 48 de la Constitución Política.
Si bien, entiendo la importancia de las reformas de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa a partir de la vigencia de la Ley 8508 del veinticuatro de abril de dos mil seis, lo cierto es que dicha situación no justifica la remisión a dicha instancia de los asuntos que versan sobre materia que es competencia de esta Sala, la cual ha demostrado a lo largo de los años que es un medio célere y efectivo para la tutela de los derechos fundamentales de los habitantes del país.
Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, éstos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.
Por tanto:
Se declara SIN LUGAR el recurso. El magistrado Cruz Castro salva el voto en relación con lo dispuesto sobre el artículo 41 constitucional.
[Nombre16] .
Presidente [Nombre17] Paul Rueda L.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
Jorge Araya G.
Anamari Garro V.
Ingrid Hess H.
Ana Cristina Fernandez A.
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