Constitutionality of the Presumption of Income on Loans Without a Written DocumentConstitucionalidad de la presunción de renta en préstamos sin documento escrito

**Constitutional Chamber Review**  Res. No. 2024036173 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine thirty hours on December fourth, two thousand twenty-four.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by Federico Sosto López, bearer of identity card number 1-606-338, in his capacity as Special Judicial Proxy of Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, legal entity identification number 3-101-355710, against Article 10 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), and Article 13 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law (Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta).

**Whereas (Resultando)** 1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on November 20, 2019, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, Law number 7092, and of Article 13 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law, Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 18445-H, be declared. He states that his standing is based on the existence of the administrative contentious proceeding being processed under case file 14-006900-1027-CA, within which, and by resolution at eight forty-five hours on November 14, 2019, a cassation appeal was admitted. He explains that Chapter V of the Income Tax Law establishes various presumptions of income, such as the income of companies not domiciled in the country, the provision of services in a liberal form, the exploitation of paid land transport of persons and cargo, or the presumptive income from loans and financings. On this last aspect, he continues, Article 10 of the law states that, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that every financing loan contract (contrato de préstamo de financiamiento) earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank, and that in cases where no written document exists, the presumption does not admit proof to the contrary. For its part, Article 13 of the Regulations to the law indicates that, unless there is proof to the contrary, in any loan contract (contrato de préstamo) or loan operation (operación de préstamo) that implies financing (financiamiento), it is presumed that there is a net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest active interest rate set by the Central Bank, and that when no written document exists, no proof to the contrary is admitted. He adds that, based on these rules, the Administrative Contentious Tribunal considers it to be a *iures et de iure* presumption, and rejected all other evidence adduced during the proceeding, leaving the company he represents defenseless. The petitioner considers that such provisions are contrary to the principles of due process (debido proceso), the prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). Regarding due process, he states that the challenged rules exclude any possibility of presenting proof to the contrary in cases where no written document exists, which violates the right of defense, and contradicts the rules on presumptions, regarding which, the Civil Procedure Code in force at that time, indicated that whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts on which it is based, while also establishing a distinction between absolute and relative presumptions, such that relative presumptions could be contested by proof to the contrary through all legal means, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing presumptions. He mentions that the challenged rules presume a taxable income (ingreso gravable) chargeable to the taxpayer, because they determine a minimum interest rate on loans agreed upon in the exercise of freedom of contract, not admitting proof to the contrary when there is no written document, thereby treating it as an absolute presumption, when, in his opinion, it should not be, because it does not involve the annulment of acts or the incorporation of a peremptory exception. He adds that the legal prohibition against the taxpayer contradicting the presumption alleged by the tax authority violates the right to provide and produce evidence as a guarantee of constitutional due process, since according to Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, in cases where no written document exists, the tax administration (administración tributaria) can consider the existence of a loan (préstamo) or financing proven to apply the minimum interest rate, but does not allow the taxpayer to resort to another means of proof to demonstrate that a lower rate, or even a zero rate, applies to the loan, thus leaving the taxpayer in a disadvantageous position against the sovereign power (potestad de imperio) of the tax administration. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, he mentions that the challenged articles are not reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology; he indicates that they are capricious provisions that create an arbitrary advantage for tax authorities to the detriment of the taxpayer's rights. He points out that the established presumption is contradictory and absurd, which allows the conclusion that in cases where a written contract or document exists, there is no presumption, because the reality of the loan is determined by the written agreement of the contracting parties; but when there is no written contract or document, the legal presumption does apply, but he believes that its use would be conditional on the demonstration of the basic fact, which consists of the existence of a loan between taxpayers, and if there is no written contract, it would be an informal or unwritten agreement. For this reason, he considers that the rules are unreasonable, since the powers recognized to the tax administration to presume the existence of the loan are incongruent with the solution chosen by the legislator, that they are presumed when there is no written contract, such that there is no formal verification of the loan. He adds that the presumption applies, according to the third paragraph of the challenged Article 10, even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, a figure defined in Article 13 of the Regulations, which allows that such financing is carried out using assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities (títulos valores) or other commercial documents or titles, all of which would necessarily be through a written physical or digital document. He argues that for the application of the presumption, the rule requires verifying in documentary or accessory evidence the existence of the financing, but, because there is no principal document, proof to the contrary regarding the actual reality of the loan or financing is excluded, thereby breaking the logical unity of the normative proposal. Therefore, he believes the presumption is not sufficiently coherent or reasonably supported within the block of legality. Regarding effective judicial protection, he points out that evidentiary freedom is one of the relevant components of effective judicial protection and the guarantee of legality control over the conduct of public administration, to the point that Article 82 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code states that means of proof can be all those permitted by Public Law and Common Law, while Article 298 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública) states that means of proof can be all those permitted by Public Law, even if they are not admissible under Common Law. However, he adds, the challenged articles exclude any possibility of offering proof to the contrary, without criteria of reasonableness or proportionality. He mentions that the legal and regulatory impediment to admit proof to the contrary against an administrative authority's decision to apply the minimum interest rate presumption represents an unconstitutional constraint that restricts the work of the administrative contentious judge, and creates a circle exempt from administrative contentious control; he affirms that they suppress the possibility of questioning the exercise of a power of the tax authority to apply a presumption. He requests the action be granted.

2.- By resolution at fifteen fifty-eight hours on January 8, 2020, this action of unconstitutionality is processed, and a hearing is granted to the Attorney General's Office and the Ministry of Finance.

3.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in editions numbers 25, 26, and 27 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), on February 7, 10, and 11, 2020, respectively.

4.- By brief added to the file on January 25, 2020, Rodolfo Cordero Vargas appears, in his capacity as Vice Minister of Expenditures of the Ministry of Finance, who points out that the presumption of Article 10 of the Income Tax Law is subject to the application of a regulated administrative procedure that complies with the constitutional principles referred to by the petitioner. He explains that the challenged rules are applied within and only after an ex officio tax assessment procedure, which begins once the deadline for the taxpayer to file and pay the tax return for the corresponding tax period has expired; that is, the presumption is not applied automatically. He notes that such procedures consist of four stages: initiation of the procedures or start of the auditing action; development of the procedures; conclusion of the procedures; review of the ex officio assessment act. He mentions that in the development stage of the procedures, every taxpayer is obliged to make available the supporting documents for their income, contracts, and others, which the taxpayer is obliged to keep and maintain for a period of five years and keep up to date; it is from these supports that the Tax Audit auditor must start to carry out the auditing action and determine the accuracy or not of the self-assessed tax obligation. Then, in the conclusion stage of the procedures, the taxpayer is proposed to regularize their situation, and if they fail to do so, they are notified of the statement of charges, which can be challenged by presenting the arguments and evidence they deem pertinent, to finally issue a determinative resolution or assessment act, in which it either confirms and declares the challenge without merit, or, on the contrary, partially or totally annuls or revokes the determination made. In that sense, he adds, the presumption of Article 10 of the Income Tax Law is a substantive rule whose application complies with the constitutional principles mentioned. He explains the taxable base of the income tax, noting that in the case of loans or financings, the returns obtained in an economic activity subject to profit tax constitute taxable income (ingreso gravable) or a deductible expense, depending on who is declaring that return. He adds that, under normal conditions, where the taxpayer under audit has the supporting documents for their tax return, income from financial returns is analyzed in light of what was declared, recorded, and supported by the taxpayer, and based on these inputs and on information that the Tax Administration obtains on its part from the other legal means cited above, a conclusion is reached (determination of the certain taxable base) on the taxpayer's taxable income or Gross Income (Renta bruta), from which deductible expenses are deducted (net income) to apply the tax rate and determine if the tax or tax obligation was declared exactly, or not. However, in reality, cases arise where taxpayers do not have the justifying documents for their return, and faced with the impossibility of obtaining a certain base that allows accurately knowing the financial income obtained by the taxpayer as a product of granting loans or financings, the questioned articles establish a presumptive way to determine the returns obtained. It starts from the premise that every loan or financing made within an economic activity seeking profit responds to that profit motive, so it is presumed that the company obtains a return on the loans or financings in which it participates or invests. Therefore, in the absence of a certain base as a form of determining the taxable base, Article 10 of the Law presumes the interest earned during a specific tax period, making a distinction between a contract that has a written document and one that does not. It is a legal presumption that does not admit proof to the contrary, and it is up to the Tax Administration to prove the existence of the fact—loan or financing—in order to thereby shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer under audit, so that they demonstrate if a written contract exists, that the interest earned is lower than what the rule intends to apply, or, if no written contract exists, proof to the contrary is not admitted, as the tax administration has proven that a loan or financing contract has indeed been present during the tax period under investigation. He reiterates that the application of these rules is only carried out once the auditing action has been followed, which implies a procedure for determining the tax obligation, in which the audited taxpayer participates from the very moment the auditing action begins, and that in the absence of a certain base as a form of determining the taxable base, the tax administration can apply the presumption established in Article 10 of the Law, and only once the administration proves the existence of a loan or financing contract; if the supporting written document is not provided, the administration presumes the interest earned in the lucrative economic activity, without admitting proof to the contrary, because such proof to the contrary could have been provided by the taxpayer throughout the entire auditing action process, and even after it concludes, they can demonstrate it during the continuation of the determination phase of the tax obligation, through the non-acceptance of the regularization of their obligation proposed by the tax administration and the challenge of the statement of charges. He states that since the presumption of Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulations is applied only after the conclusion of a procedure in which the taxpayer can oppose and defend against the charges, it is not true that due process and the right of defense are violated; although it is true that the rules exclude the presentation of proof to the contrary in cases where no written document exists, the presumption only operates in the absence of determining the taxable base and once all the opportunities the taxpayer has in the auditing action and in the ex officio determination of the tax obligation to demonstrate with written documents the terms of the loan or financing granted have been exhausted, so that the tax administration can accurately tax the financial income obtained in a specific tax period. He argues that it is also not true that the application of this presumption is contrary to the rules on presumptions, since Article 155 of the Tax Code is clear in stating that in procedural matters, the Civil Procedure Code is only applicable as a supplementary rule and in the absence of an express norm in the Tax Code, which is not the case here, because the norm of Article 10 of the Law is self-sufficient. He adds that just as the Civil Procedure Code requires proof of the existence of the facts on which the presumption is based, the tax legal norm requires proof of the existence of a loan or financing by the tax administration, which, in the absence of a written document, results in the presumption of the existence of interest earnings at a specific rate in favor of the taxpayer who generated them, without admitting proof to the contrary. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, he states that it is not true that the questioned rules are not reasonably founded and justified, nor that the provision is contradictory, absurd, or unreasonable, because it is presumed when there is no written contract, and what is taken as true is the existence of the loan or financing. He adds that there is no lack of legal support or basis, because the determination of financial income as presumptive net income in loans and financings starts from the interpretive exercise of the facts and their framing within the tax rule, as regulated in the tax obligation determination procedure. Regarding the principle of effective judicial protection, he affirms that although the challenged articles exclude any possibility of offering proof to the contrary, it is not true that the principle of evidentiary freedom applicable to the administrative contentious process is affected, since any taxpayer who has been subject to an auditing action and the ex officio determination of the tax obligation has been able to resort to the jurisdictional route to challenge the validity of the rules or the procedure followed in their case. He requests that the action be dismissed.

5.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on January 31, 2020, Julio Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, who points out that the action is admissible due to the existence of an administrative contentious process within which the respective cassation appeal has been filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He specifies that, basically, the petitioner's objection is summarized in that, in his opinion, the presumption of interest in loan and financing contracts does not admit proof to the contrary, which he considers contrary to the right of defense, by preventing him from providing any type of evidentiary means that disproves a taxable income (ingreso gravable), except a written document; unreasonable, because it establishes the presumption without having first proven the basic fact from which it derives, that is, the existence of a loan or financing; and that this administrative power falls outside the control of the administrative contentious judge, whose work of legality control to reach the real truth of the facts through other evidentiary elements that are not the written document to question the application of the income presumption is restricted, which, in his view, harms access to justice and effective judicial protection.

Regarding the challenged Article 10, he explains that the first paragraph starts from the premise that a loan contract exists to which the presumptive interest or return is applied. He emphasizes that the text is provided to be applied to loan contracts, and does not contain a presumption in that sense; rather, simply, if the administration verifies that it is in the presence of a contract of that type, it must apply the provision under discussion with the consequent legal consequence it contains. The consequence of this rule is the application of the legal presumption for the interest rate, that is, once the loan contract is detected in the audited case, the presumption of the generated return is applied. Furthermore, the final paragraph of the same numeral states that this presumption may be applied in other cases where no loan contract exists, but financing does, for which it refers to Article 13 of the Regulations, which defines what should be understood as financing. Thus, if the loan or financing does not exist, the rules are not even applicable.

He reaffirms that the legal presumption of Article 10 is very specific and relates to the applicable interest rate, assuming that the loan or financing is for a valuable consideration (a título oneroso), since the taxable event (hecho generador) of the income comes from the interest that the lender obtains from that operation; otherwise, it would not be subject to taxation. What is presumed is the applicable interest rate, not the existence of the contract or financing, and it is a rate set at the minimum interest, which is reasonable and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, limiting any type of excessive burden to the detriment of taxpayers.

He states that this presumption does admit proof to the contrary, conditioning it on it being a written document. It is, then, an *iuris tantum* presumption, capable of being disproven on the precise point of the interest applied, either to demonstrate a lower interest, or that no interest was agreed upon. He adds that the legislator established that a written document or contract must exist to admit proof to the contrary. But, in the absence of that written document, the presumption of minimum profitability does not admit proof to the contrary, it being that with this, the legislator seeks to reduce sources of tax evasion, by establishing that every loan of money or financing operation granted by a taxpayer to a third party generates a minimum return.

He points out that from reading the challenged phrases, it is verified that, in reality, the taxpayer is not being denied the possibility of providing evidence, but only the admissible type of evidence is restricted, so that it is a written contract or document in which the operation was recorded. Otherwise, he continues, it is a common forensic practice in any jurisdiction to admit only that evidence which is pertinent to the case theory one seeks to prove. He adds that since the point to be rebutted is so specific - the interest - it is entirely congruent and reasonable that the admissible evidence is limited to that which is truly useful, for which the written document showing the loan or financing at a lower rate, zero rate, or no return must be provided. Without that written document, no other type of evidence will be admitted, but as a matter of relevance. So, proof to the contrary is admitted, but conditioned on the existence of the written document where the loan contract was recorded, therefore there is indeed opportunity or possibility for the taxpayer to prove that the presumed fact or situation is false or inaccurate, simply by providing the written document in which the loan contract or financing is recorded.

He mentions that one should not make the mistake of understanding that the questioned rules establish a presumption about the existence of the loan contract, and much less, that this presumption is absolute, since the taxpayer can provide all types of evidentiary elements to demonstrate that the legal classification made by the tax administration was incorrect and that it is not a loan or financing.

He affirms that the constitutionality challenges must be dismissed, as no defect of unconstitutionality is observed in relation to the constitutional rules and principles, especially if they are examined within the framework of the applicable block of legality, particularly, in light of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios).

Regarding the allegation of violation of the right of defense, he asserts that there is no curtailment of the guarantees of due process or the right of defense, because, contrary to what the petitioner claims, they not only have the right, but also the duty to provide all evidence that can accurately reflect the data and circumstances attributable in the taxable base. He explains that Article 103 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures empowers the tax administration to require any person to declare their tax obligations and to ascertain the veracity of the content of sworn statements. For its part, Article 104 says that the tax administration may require the presentation of books, archives, records, and all other information of tax significance, such as copies of documentary or magnetic supports of credit operations and other financial conditions of transactions, it being an obligation of the taxpayer to keep the records of operations or situations constituting taxable events (hechos gravados), as provided by Article 128 of the same Code. He explains that these rules, together with those challenged in the action, make up the block of legality to which the Tax Administration is subject, and that it is the taxpayer who is responsible for providing and keeping the documentation and accounting support for taxable operations. It is based on this documentation that the Tax Administration carries out the qualification act.

He reiterates that the articles do not contain a presumption about the existence of the loan contract or financing, but only its return is presumed by determining the applicable interest rate, and the application of Articles 10 of the Law and 13 of the Regulations does not correspond to a presumption by the Tax Administration, but is the result of the assessment of all the evidence that the taxpayer themselves provided at the time of being audited. Thus, none of the challenged rules prevents the taxpayer from presenting any type of evidence to demonstrate the reality of the operation or business carried out. He believes there is an error of assessment by the petitioner, in considering that there is a presumption about the existence of the loan contract or financing, but this is not so, because the starting point is that for the interest presumption to apply, a loan or financing must exist. He affirms that this error of assessment is evident from the petitioner's statements about how they could provide a document that does not exist, but upon reviewing the first-instance judgment issued in the underlying matter, it appears that the judicial body seems to admit and assess all types of evidence, including witness evidence, to demonstrate the existence of the loan. He reaffirms that the presumption contained in the challenged rules is based on the existence of the loan contract or financing.

He adds that, furthermore, common law rules on presumptions could not be used, since Article 169 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures expressly states that presumptions established by tax laws can be contested by proof to the contrary, except in cases where those laws expressly prohibit it.

He states that a violation of the principle of equality cannot be alleged, because it is the taxpayer who must provide the evidence and other pertinent documentation to determine their legal situation and the economic reality of their activity.

Therefore, the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, by considering it an unreasonable or disproportionate rule, is inaccurate. He emphasizes that the presumption is about the applicable rate, and that presumption arises in the event that a loan or financing contract exists, which is determined based on the documentation provided by the taxpayer themselves. He reiterates that this presumption admits proof to the contrary, for which the written document in which it was so stipulated must be provided. The questioned rules are not unreasonable or disproportionate, as they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all the documentation they consider useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the taxed operation or business, and if from that evidence it is verified that a loan or financing contract exists, refuting the presumption of the return is also allowed through the suitable evidence, which is the respective written document in which the taxed operation was formalized.

It specifies that the constitutional jurisprudence itself cited by the claimant references judgment 2004-14421, which states that administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the legality framework (bloque de legalidad), and in this case, that framework is comprised of Articles 103, 104, 123, and 128 of the Tax Code, which help to understand that the administration’s sovereign power to apply the legal presumption responds to a measured exercise, marked by the taxpayer's possibility to provide all documentation or information demonstrating the economic reality of their activity.

Thus, it continues, the mere wording of the questioned provisions does not give rise to capricious or arbitrary applications, and they are not observed to be incompatible or incongruent with the norms of the Tax Code.

Regarding effective judicial protection, it considers that the claimant's disagreement lies in the way the norm is applied and not in its intrinsic unconstitutionality. The challenged articles do not impose any type of restriction on the administrative litigation judge to control whether both provisions were duly applied or not to the specific case, so the judge can assess the same information that the taxpayer provided to the tax authority and determine if there was indeed a credit or financing operation (operación de crédito o financiamiento) to which the presumption of interest should be applied. The questioned norms, far from creating areas outside of judicial control, delimit judicial discretion in determining the evidence considered suitable, without overlooking that the very presumption of the interest rate does admit proof to the contrary, so the judge can always oversee the application that the Tax Administration makes of the challenged norms.

It concludes that the action should be dismissed, because it is not observed that the constitutional principles of due process, reasonableness, proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness, and effective judicial protection are violated.

6.- By resolution of this Chamber, at nine hours fifty-seven minutes on March 5, 2020, the granted hearings are considered answered, and this action is assigned to the office of the instructing magistrate, for consideration on its merits.

7.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 of the same law, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

8.- The requirements of law have been met in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Araya García; and,

Considering

I.- On the formal prerequisites for admissibility of the unconstitutionality action. The unconstitutionality action is a process with specific technical requirements, which must be met so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction stipulates the prerequisites for admissibility of the unconstitutionality action; among these is required the existence of a pending base or prior matter to be resolved, either in court, or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered infringed. For its part, in the second and third paragraphs of the same norm, the assumptions under which the prior matter is not required are exceptionally regulated, that is, when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the protection of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsperson. Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, the Chamber, through judgment number 1995-4190, indicated that the action is "a process of incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route- to be able to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process to be resolved, as it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route - prerequisites of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction-." For this reason, the requirement of a pending prior matter to be resolved does not constitute a mere form requirement, since the existence of a base matter is not enough, nor is the invocation of unconstitutionality, as it is indispensable that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered violated, which means that the challenged norms must be applicable in the base matter –see, in a similar sense, judgments number 1990-1668, 1993-408, 1994-798, 1994-3615, 1995-409, 1995-851,1995-4190, and 1996-791-. On the other hand, it is opportune to indicate that there are other technical requirements that must be met, such as, for example, the explicit determination of the challenged norms duly motivated, with specific reference to the constitutional mandates and principles considered infringed, authentication through legal sponsorship of the filing brief for the action, accreditation of standing conditions -powers and certifications-, as well as the literal certification of the challenge brief, which, in case they are not provided by the claimants, can be ordered by the Presidency of the Chamber for their fulfillment.

II.- The standing of the claimant in this case.- Based on what was said in the previous paragraph, in the specific case, the claimant alleges to come before this Chamber under the first paragraph of the cited Article 75, offering as a base matter the administrative litigation process (proceso contencioso administrativo) processed under case file number 14-006900-1027-CA, filed against the State by the company Thunderbird Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, which later became known as CIRSA Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, and which was absorbed by the claimant company Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima. In said judicial process, Section VIII of the Administrative Litigation and Civil Treasury Court issued judgment number 62-2018-VIII, against which the claimant filed a formal cassation appeal, in which they invoked the unconstitutionality now being heard. Said cassation appeal was formally admitted by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through an order at eight hours forty-five minutes on November 14, 2019, and is pending resolution.

Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff has sufficient standing to challenge the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms, in addition to the fact that it concerns a matter whose constitutionality can be reviewed in this route. Added to the above, the plaintiff has met the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction. In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and it is resolved on the merits as indicated in the following considerandos.

III.- On the object of this unconstitutionality action. The claimant specifically questions Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, Law number 7092, of April 21, 1988, as well as Article 13 of the Regulation to the Income Tax Law, Executive Decree number 18445-H.

Article 10 of the Income Tax Law provides:

“ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income from loans and financing. It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that every loan financing contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System.

In cases where no written document exists, proof to the contrary shall not be accepted against the presumption.

The Tax Administration may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, as established in the regulation of this law.” For its part, Article 13 of the Regulation to the Income Tax Law, Executive Decree number 18445-H, established:

“ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In every loan contract or operation, which implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that there is a net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. This presumption is also applied when a lower interest rate is stipulated than that which, according to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operations in question or when it has been expressly agreed that no interest exists.

Proof to the contrary is not admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of what is stipulated in Article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles.” Regarding this regulatory norm being questioned, it must be noted that the regulation containing it -Executive Decree number 18445-H, of September 9, 1988-, is no longer in force as of the date of this judgment, because it was repealed by Executive Decree number 43198-H, of July 22, 2021, by which the current Regulation of the Income Tax Law was adopted, which, regarding this norm, maintained the identical wording of the previous Regulation, only now in its numeral 20, which states:

“Article 20.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In every loan contract or operation, which implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that there is a net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. This presumption is also applied when a lower interest rate is stipulated than that which, according to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operations in question or when it has been expressly agreed that no interest exists.

Proof to the contrary is not admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of what is stipulated in Article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles.” Thus, the regulatory norm being challenged is not formally in force, although it is clear that the same identical provision is in force as established in Article 20 of the new Regulation adopted through Executive Decree number 43198-H.

In this sense, the Chamber will rule on the questions raised by virtue of the legal effects that such norm may have produced during its validity -see judgments number 5445-99 and 2024-3228-. On this matter, it is worth recalling what the Chamber has provided in reiterated pronouncements since judgment number 3152-1994 -including the recent judgment mentioned, number 2024-3228-, in the sense that:

“[T]he control of constitutionality is exercised with reference to the law in force, however, some exceptions to this rule can be considered. There are situations in which a repealed norm may have been applied during its validity or be being applied in violation of the Constitution and to the detriment of a subject whose grievance subsists after the repeal, in which case that norm can and must be subject to interpretation and control even if it is not in force at the time of issuing the judgment; these are cases where the repeal does not turn the question into something abstract that prevents the subsequent constitutional control of the repealed norm. In the specific case of this action, it is appropriate to carry out the constitutionality analysis because the norm can still affect the interests of the claimant, that is, unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed, in the terms of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.”.

In the opinion of the claimant, Article 10 of the Income Tax Law and Article 13 of the then Regulation to the Income Tax Law -now Article 20 of said regulation-, contravene the right of defense, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, and the principle of effective judicial protection, as they consider that such norms establish a presumption regarding the applicable interest rates in cases of loans or financing, against which proof to the contrary is not admitted.

In this sense, the following considerandos will address each of the disagreements raised by the claimant, with two prior warnings. The first, that since the core reason for the alleged disagreement regarding Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulation is the same, both norms will be assessed jointly in relation to the right and principles considered violated. The second, that upon evidencing that the arguments raised by the claimant regarding the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness and effective judicial protection are intimately related to and dependent on what is alleged regarding the right of defense, by resolving the latter, those are, in essence, also resolved.

IV.- On the challenged norms and the alleged violation of the right of defense. The claimant states that the presumption established in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, and Article 13 of the Regulation to said law, violate the taxpayer's right of defense, to the extent that they do not admit proof to the contrary.

In this regard, it is appropriate to reiterate, as relevant, what is prescribed by both norms regarding the alleged presumption and the supposed impossibility of providing proof to the contrary. In what is relevant, Article 10 of the Law states:

“ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income from loans and financing. It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that every loan financing contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System.

In cases where no written document exists, proof to the contrary shall not be accepted against the presumption.

The Tax Administration may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, as established in the regulation of this law.” -emphasis added- For its part, Article 13 of the Regulation -current Article 20- provides:

“ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In every loan contract or operation, which implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that there is a net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank of Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. This presumption is also applied when a lower interest rate is stipulated than that which, according to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operations in question or when it has been expressly agreed that no interest exists.

Proof to the contrary is not admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of what is stipulated in Article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or titles.” -the highlights are not from the original- It is clear, then, that both norms contain a similar provision regarding what constitutes the object of this action, in the sense that when a written loan or financing contract exists, a certain interest rate is presumed, with respect to which proof to the contrary is admitted. In contrast, if no written document exists, proof to the contrary is not admitted.

Thus, regarding the first scenario -that a written document exists-, contrary to what is alleged by the claimant, it is evident that the presumption does admit proof to the contrary. Note that the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Law clearly and expressly provides that "unless proven otherwise", it is presumed that interest is earned at no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank, or, that in the absence of this rate, it is presumed that it will be according to the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the National Banking System. In these cases, the taxpayer can indeed provide proof to the contrary to question the presumption that the Tax Administration would be applying to determine their presumptive income, which clearly evidences that the possibility of providing proof to the contrary does exist in these cases, so that, inherently, there is no impact, not even remotely, on the taxpayer's right of defense, since they can provide proof to the contrary to question the rate that could be applied presumptively to determine the income on which they must pay tax.

A similar provision is found in the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Regulation regarding the applicable rate when a written document exists.

The apparent problem seems to arise in the second scenario, that is, with what is provided in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Law, and in the second paragraph -ab initio- of Article 13 of the Regulation, which essentially state that proof to the contrary is not admitted against that presumption when no written document exists. To understand how this provision equally falls short of constituting a negative impact on the right of defense, the process involved by which the Tax Administration can make use and application of this presumption must be considered.

V.- The application of the presumption indicated in the challenged articles is a power of the Tax Administration that arises in the process of determining the tax obligation (determinación de la obligación tributaria) of a taxpayer regarding income tax. That is, it is not an autonomous determination, unrelated to a process of determining the tax obligation, much less arbitrary or lacking support; nor is it an arbitrary determination or a product of any discretionary power of the administration. On the contrary, said presumption is established by law in a specific scenario, and after concluding that its application is necessary.

In this regard, one must start from the tax obligations of every taxpayer subject to income tax and from the oversight powers of the Tax Administration, for which what is prescribed in the following articles of the Code of Tax Norms and Procedures is of particular interest.

Article 103 of the Code provides that said Administration is responsible for verifying the correct fulfillment of tax obligations, and may require the declaration of obligations and verify the truthfulness of its content. In what is relevant, this article states:

“Article 103.- Tax control The Tax Administration is empowered to verify the correct fulfillment of tax obligations by all legal means and procedures. To that effect, said Administration is specifically authorized to:

• a)Require any natural or legal person, whether or not registered for the payment of taxes, to declare their tax obligations within the period indicated for that purpose, through the means that, in accordance with the advancement of science and technology, it establishes as mandatory for the tax obligors, while guaranteeing that persons who do not have access to the required technologies for declaring have facilities provided by the Administration itself.
• b)Verify the truthfulness of the content of sworn statements through the legal analysis and investigation means and procedures it deems convenient.

(…)”. -the highlight is not from the original- For its part, Article 104 of the same Code states that the Tax Administration may request various information from the taxpayer, precisely to verify the truthfulness indicated in the previous article and "verify the tax situation of the taxpayers". This Article 104 provides:

“Article 104.- Requests for information from the taxpayer To facilitate the timely verification of the tax situation of taxpayers, the Tax Administration may require them to present books, files, accounting records, and all other information of tax significance that is found printed in document form, on technical media, or recorded by any other technological means.

Without prejudice to these general powers, the Administration may request from taxpayers and responsible parties:

• a)From taxpayers classified, according to the established criteria, as large national taxpayers or large territorial enterprises, the financial statements duly audited by an authorized public accountant, including the explanatory notes on the most significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes contained in the opinion of the independent professional who audited them. The Tax Administration is empowered to also require them from other groups of taxpayers for whom, due to the volume and nature of their operations, this requirement does not pose disproportionate costs.
• b)A copy of the books, files, and accounting records.

(…)

• e)A copy of the documentary or magnetic supports of credit operations, purchases, sales, and/or leases of goods and trust contracts (financial or operative), processed in private companies, collective entities, cooperatives, banks of the National Banking System, financial entities, whether or not regulated; de facto partnerships or any other natural, legal, or de facto person, identifying the amounts of the respective operations, the capacities of the involved subjects, and the other financial conditions of the transactions, in the terms regulated in the regulation.

The expenses for the application of the provisions in subsections b), c), d), and e) above shall be borne by the Tax Administration.” -emphasis added- Likewise, always in the vein of the importance of verifying the information and declarations provided by taxpayers, Article 123 of the same Code of Tax Norms and Procedures provides that the declarations and documentation of taxpayers are subject to verification by the Tax Administration, which may conduct the appropriate investigations, proceedings, and examinations to verify the declarations and data contained in the documentation. This Article 123 states:

“Article 123.- Verification of declarations, books, and other documents The sworn statements filed by taxpayers and responsible parties and the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, insofar as they must contain the information relating to the settlement or payment of taxes, are subject to verification by the Tax Administration. For such purposes, it may conduct, within the law and through duly authorized officials, all verification investigations, proceedings, and examinations that it deems necessary and useful.

Once the verification is carried out, the tax difference resulting as payable by the taxpayer or responsible declarant must be collected; or, as the case may be, the excess they have paid must be refunded ex officio.” -emphasis supplied- Finally, Article 128 of the same Code of Tax Norms and Procedures specifies that it is the obligation of taxpayers, not only to facilitate the tasks of determination, oversight, and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration, but, especially, to keep the records of any operation or situations giving rise to taxable events. In what is relevant, this article provides:

“Article 128.- Obligations of individuals Taxpayers and responsible parties are obliged to facilitate the tasks of determination, oversight, and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration and, especially, must:

• a)When required by laws or regulations, or demanded by said Administration by virtue of the powers granted by this Code:

(…)

iii. File the corresponding declarations.

• b)Keep, in an orderly manner, financial, accounting, and any other type of records, and the records of operations or situations that constitute taxable events.

(…)

• d)Present or exhibit, at the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, related to events generating their tax obligations, and formulate the statements or clarifications requested.

(…)”.

- emphasis added - Consequently, it is clear not only that the taxpayer has the duty to file their returns, providing the corresponding documentation for that purpose, and, at the same time, that it is incumbent upon the Tax Administration to verify the veracity of the information received, for which it may request and have access to the returns, books, deeds, documentary or magnetic supports, accounting records, and all other information of tax significance, the taxpayer, in turn, having to facilitate that task of determination, audit, and investigation, for which they must keep the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events.

It is based on these obligations imposed on the taxpayer and the powers granted to the Tax Administration, that in the event of a tax return, such as the income tax return, the Administration may take the necessary steps to determine its content, veracity, and scope, which is carried out through a tax assessment procedure that, as the Ministry of Finance explains, is composed of four phases or stages, namely:

Initiation of the audit activity: this is the beginning of the audit action, through which the taxpayer is informed when it will commence, and where they are expressly instructed that they must have the supporting documents for the tax return available.

Development of the procedures: this is the phase where the taxpayer must make all necessary documentation available to the Administration - Article 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures - and in which the Administration carries out all verification of the documentation provided. In this phase, as the Ministry of Finance emphasizes, documentary support is vital, "since it is from these supports that the audit auditor must start to carry out the audit action and determine the accuracy or otherwise of the tax obligation that was self-assessed and declared at the time by the taxpayer." Conclusion of the procedures: once the investigation and evaluation of the pertinent documentation is completed, the taxpayer is summoned to a hearing to present the conclusions of the audit action and its results, indicating whether or not there were tax differences, or even credit balances in favor of the taxpayer. If necessary, the taxpayer is warned to regularize their situation, and the notice of determinative charges (traslado de cargos) is notified, indicating the charges, facts, and grounds specific to the determination made.

Challenge of the notice of determinative charges or the assessment order: in accordance with Article 144 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, against the notice of charges (traslado de cargos), the taxpayer may file a formal challenge, presenting the pertinent allegations and evidence, so that the Tax Administration issues a determinative resolution or assessment act, in which the challenge is confirmed or declared without merit, or the determination made is annulled in whole or in part. This challenge is made through the appeal for reversal (recurso de revocatoria) provided for in Article 145 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, and the appeal before the Administrative Tax Tribunal, as established in Article 146 of the same Code.

Thus, the application of the presumption indicated in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, and in Article 13 - today Article 20 - of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law, takes place after the application of this tax determination procedure that begins with the filing of the return. This is so, because upon the filing of a return related to income tax, and for the purpose of verifying the veracity of the data contained therein, the Tax Administration has the power to review all the documentation described in the cited rules of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures. It is in that audit process carried out by the Tax Administration that the presumption regarding the applicable interest rate in written loan or financing contracts can be applied, in which case, according to what was stated in the previous recital, evidence to the contrary can be presented to prove a different or non-existent interest rate.

But in those cases where the existence of a loan or financing operation that is not in writing is alleged, the presumption regarding the interest rate applies, without it being possible to provide evidence to the contrary. This is so, because from the cited regulations, it is evident that the entire process of verifying a tax obligation according to the indicated procedure starts from the review and validation of supporting documentation of different nature that the taxpayer is obliged to have and keep. In this regard, the definition in subsection b) of Article 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures - already expressly cited - is highly illustrative when it defines as an obligation of the taxpayer "[t]o keep, in an orderly manner, the financial, accounting, and any other records, and the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events." This regulatory provision is based on the obligation of the taxpayer to have and make available in an appropriate manner those "records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events," from which it follows that if the existence of a loan or financing contract is alleged in the tax return, the taxpayer must be able to demonstrate the existence of the applicable rate because subsection b) of Article 128 of this Code imposes it upon them. Otherwise, the failure to have that documentation prevents the Tax Administration from exercising its audit and verification function of the tax obligation, and hence the existence and application of the legally established presumption. It is clear that if there is supporting documentation regarding the loan or financing contract alleged in a tax return and the rate applicable to it, the presumption would admit evidence to the contrary, precisely because in compliance with the obligation indicated in subsection b) of Article 128 of the Code, the taxpayer can prove not only the existence of the loan or financing contract, but also the agreed rate; but, otherwise, the non-compliance with that obligation gives rise to the impossibility of verifying what was declared, therefore the application of the presumption being challenged arises.

In other words, the due fulfillment of the obligation in subsection b) of Article 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures allows the taxpayer not only to demonstrate the existence of the loan or financing contract adduced in their return and the applicable rate, but also, that upon the application of the presumption indicated in the challenged rules, they can validly present evidence to the contrary so that in the tax verification and audit process, the Administration evaluates that written evidence and resolves accordingly. On the contrary, non-compliance with that duty of Article 128 of the Code prevents the taxpayer from proving the existence of a different interest rate, which in turn prevents the Tax Administration from verifying whether what is stated in the return is valid or not, so that given that non-compliance by the taxpayer and the impossibility of the Tax Administration, the presumption under discussion becomes applicable.

Likewise, it should be noted that all this evaluation must be carried out in the context of that verification procedure mentioned in previous paragraphs, so that in the second stage thereof - development of the procedures - is when the taxpayer can demonstrate and prove the existence of a lower rate if they have it in writing, which could also be done even before the conclusion of the administrative procedure before the Tax Administration itself or before the Administrative Tax Tribunal - Articles 144 and 145 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures - as well as it could also be done through the judicial channel, provided that the necessary prior written documentation is available that allows rebutting the presumption intended to be applied.

VI.- On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the challenged rules, by establishing the application of this presumption on the applicable rate in loan or financing contracts, would be contrary to the general rules of presumptions indicated in common law. However, it must be noted that the specialty of the tax matter gives rise to the existence of sectoral principles and specific rules to regulate this type of situation, and that, precisely because of their specialty, they are of particular application instead of ordinary or common law rules. Thus, specifically on this matter, Article 169 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures is highly illustrative, stating:

"Article 169.- Tax regulations Laws and regulations containing tax rules must expressly mention it in their title and in a heading with which each one of the articles must be titled, in order to facilitate their understanding and handling. Laws and regulations that modify tax rules shall contain a complete list of the repealed rules and the new wording of those that are modified. The rules that regulate the regime of tax infractions and sanctions, as well as surcharges, fines, and interest, shall have retroactive effects when their application is more favorable for the affected party. The presumptions established by tax laws may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, except in cases where those expressly prohibit it." - emphasis added - Thus, it is clear, according to what has been said, that these special rules on the presumption for determining the interest rate in cases of presumptive income (rente presuntiva) are far from being contrary to the general rules on presumptions, since the truth is that on this particular topic, the specialty of the tax matter prevails, as determined by the law itself. In any case, see that what is adduced by the petitioner falls within the scope of an apparent contradiction - which does not exist - between the application of rules within the scope of legality, which, in accordance with what has been stated, has no bearing whatsoever on there being a constitutional non-conformity of the rules challenged in this action.

VII.- Consequently, it is clear that the application of the presumption under discussion arises after the completion of a verification and audit process carried out by the Tax Administration, in accordance with the cited rules and in which the taxpayer has direct participation, not only as a subject obliged to file the tax return and to keep and preserve the supporting documentation of their operations, but also as an active party in that verification process, where they must not only make all supporting documentation available to the Tax Administration, but also where they are previously notified, participate in the process, are informed of the result of the investigation, are notified of a notice of charges, which they can challenge before the Tax Administration itself or before the Administrative Tax Tribunal. Thus, it is improper to adduce that the application of this presumption indicated in the challenged articles is contrary to the right of defense (derecho de defensa), since it is clear that the taxpayer not only has the mentioned obligations, but also that this right of participation in the process of determining the tax obligation is recognized, being able to exercise the pertinent appeal activity, and that it is due to the non-compliance with their duties as a taxpayer and the impossibility of the Tax Administration to verify the data contained in the return, that the application of the presumption in question arises.

Thus, as the violation of the right of defense is ruled out, the action must be declared without merit regarding this point.

VIII.- On the challenged rules and the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad). The petitioner adduces that together with the impact on the right of defense -already ruled out-, the challenged rules and the presumption indicated therein also violate the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness.

The principle of prohibition of arbitrariness determines that every action, activity, and expression of the administration must be duly and reasonably grounded in accordance with the block of legitimacy or Law of the current Constitution; it implies that every action must be clothed with the necessary objectivity, which not only prevents its issuance or adoption without that reasonable foundation, but also avoids an action that causes differentiation without sufficient and just reason. Thus, in reiterated jurisprudence, this Chamber has recognized and applied this principle. In judgment number 2007-11155 - reiterated, among many others, by judgments 2008-11390 and 2012-18298 -, the Chamber stated that:

"[T]he principle of prohibition of arbitrariness supposes the prohibition of arbitrariness, that is, of any difference lacking a sufficient and just reason. (...) Arbitrariness is synonymous with ostensible injustice and injustice is not limited to discrimination. Arbitrary action is that contrary to justice, reason, or the laws, which obeys the mere whim or will of the public agent. The prohibition of arbitrariness condemns the lack of objective legal support or foundation of an administrative conduct and, consequently, the infraction of the material order of the principles and values proper to the Rule of Law. In essence, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness has been operating as a powerful corrective against abusive and discriminatory actions of public administrations when they exercise discretionary powers (abuse or excess of discretion). Regarding the application of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness in the sphere of regulatory power, it must be indicated that as it is, naturally, discretionary, the prohibitive principle of arbitrariness plays a role of the first order. In the first place, it must be pointed out that except for matters that are reserved for regulation - internal organization and statutory or service relationship - and in which autonomous or independent regulations - from the law - are admissible, a first limit of the regulatory power is the subjection to the law that is intended to be developed or executed, an extreme that obviously has a connection with constitutional principles such as legality, legal reservation, and normative hierarchy. The regulatory power is, except in the indicated cases, the expression of an option or alternative predetermined by the ordinary legislator in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, from which the competent body to exercise the regulatory power cannot separate itself." - emphasis supplied - The need to ground the action in the block of legitimacy - which is known to be more comprehensive than legality itself - is evident when, through judgment 2004-14421, the Chamber stated that:

"[T]he administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably sustained in the block of legality, so that it is based on and explains itself." As has been indicated, the reasonable nature of the action, and the consequent inexistence of arbitrariness, is sustained by the measure being grounded in that block of legitimacy that has been mentioned, in which not only the rules themselves are considered, but also the set of applicable values and principles that, in turn, inform the rules to endow them with legitimate validity.

It is for this reason that, applying this principle of prohibition of arbitrariness to the tax matter itself, through judgment 2011-1356 the Chamber defined:

"It must be remembered that presumptive determinations cannot be arbitrary, so as not to undermine the contributive capacity and the possible insolvency or bankruptcy of a natural or legal person. What the legislation does is to establish the minimum tax which can be rebutted even though it is a iuris tantum presumption, so that this initial determination can be modified." Thus, and in accordance with what was indicated in the previous recital, it is important to reiterate that the application of the presumption contemplated in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, and Article 13 - current Article 20 - of its Regulations, regarding the applicable rate in those cases where there is no written document, is the result of a verification and audit process carried out by the Tax Administration based on the documentation that the taxpayer themselves must keep, maintain, provide, and make available; it is not about information prepared by the Administration, nor whimsical, absolutely discretionary, or normatively unsupported actions, but rather evaluation elements provided by the interested party themselves within a verification, audit, and determination procedure that is carried out according to the provisions of Articles 103, 104, 123, and 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures.

In this sense, it could in no way be adduced that the application of this presumption by the Tax Administration is an unfounded act, without objective support, or arbitrary, that results contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, since the truth of the matter is that we are facing the application of a presumption duly enabled by law, given a specific and exceptional case, which would be the non-existence of documentation that should not only exist, but be kept, maintained, and made available to the Tax Administration when required, and that if the conditions existed or were recorded in writing, the presentation of evidence to the contrary would be viable.

It is for this reason that the Chamber coincides with the criterion of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), in saying that:

"From that perspective, the challenged rules are not unreasonable, nor disproportionate, since they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all documentation they consider useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the taxed operation or business, without imposing any type of requirement. And if from that evidence it is verified that, indeed, there is a loan contract or another class of financing, a circumstance in which the challenged rules would be applicable; they are also allowed to refute the presumption of the yield generated through suitable evidence, which involves having the respective written document in which the taxed operation was formalized." In this sense, taking into consideration that the application of the presumption provided for in the articles challenged in this action is the product of the execution of an administrative procedure in which the Tax Administration must subject itself to the referred provisions of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, a procedure in which, moreover, the taxpayer's right of defense is guaranteed, it must be concluded that the application of the presumption and the consequent tax determination itself are far from being the result of an arbitrary action by the Tax Administration. Likewise, it must also be concluded that Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 - current 20 - of the Regulations are not, in themselves, contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, since the possibility of applying that presumption recognized in them is necessarily subject to the execution of the corresponding verification procedure.

Consequently, the rules challenged in this action do not violate the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness either.

IX.- On the challenged rules and the alleged violation of the principle of effective judicial protection (principio de tutela judicial efectiva). The petitioner adduces that the articles challenged in this action also violate the principle of effective judicial protection, and, consequently, Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, essentially because, in their opinion, the presumption in question suppresses "the possibility of questioning the exercise of a power of the tax authority to apply a presumption of income," adding, moreover, that the rules in dispute violate the principle of freedom of evidence and prevent evidence to the contrary in this regard.

On this matter, it must be pointed out that starting from the integration of Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, the recognition of the principle of effective judicial protection is certainly produced, from which the right to access the judicial channel in defense of rights that are deemed affected is enabled, and to carry out, through judicial means, the legality control of administrative conducts. Specifically, Article 49 of the Constitution establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa) to guarantee the legality of the State's administrative function.

On the other hand, from the principle of freedom of evidence, it is validated that the facts alleged within a process can be demonstrated by any legitimate and valid means available, always starting from the premise of lawful obtaining of the evidence, its relevance for the purposes of the process, and the viability of its use in the context of the situation intended to be elucidated or resolved. Thus, in judgment number 2004-12385, the Chamber stated that:

"According to it [the principle of freedom of evidence] everything can be proved by any means, provided it is not illegal. This is because, in the structure of a Democratic Rule of Law, the search for real truth is an objective that cannot be above the fundamental rights of the parties in the criminal process, so that it is not a truth at all costs but one obtained by legitimate means, subject to limitations (...)." - emphasis added - Thus, the petitioner understands that the rules they challenge in this action violate both principles, because, in their opinion, the presumption established therein prevents exercising a judicial activity where it is possible to admit evidence that could rebut the determination made based on that presumption.

However, in accordance with what has been extensively stated in the previous recitals, the special tax rule governing the matter is the one that indicates the existence of that presumption, which does admit evidence to the contrary if it is of a written documentary nature. It has already been explained that this is so, because given the nature of the tax obligation, it is the taxpayer who has the duty to have, keep, and preserve the documentation that serves as the basis for their tax return, as well as to make it available to the Tax Administration if necessary to verify what is stated in the return, which is carried out within an administrative procedure that gives rise to a determination, which can be challenged through administrative channels and, clearly, also through judicial channels. Likewise, if in that tax determination the presumption indicated in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law and in Article 13 - current Article 20 - of its Regulations has been applied, the taxpayer has the possibility of providing evidence to the contrary, provided it is written documentation, since, as has been reiterated, the special nature of the tax obligation so imposes it.

This allows the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the adequate exercise of evaluation in the judicial venue of the claims that may be presented for that purpose, and, whether or not that written documentation exists, to resolve as is appropriate in law in each specific case.

It is for the above that, in the words of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic:

"[T]he questioned articles do not impose any type of restriction on the contentious-administrative judge to control whether both precepts were duly applied or not to the specific case of the taxpayer by the Administration. So, the judge can evaluate the same information that the taxpayer supplied to the tax authority and determine, as an entry premise, if indeed there was a credit or financing operation to which the presumption of interest should be applied; in which case, had there been an improper appreciation of the factual picture, and of the legal qualification made, the judge could perfectly annul the determinative acts of the Tax Administration." Thus, it is clear that it is possible to question the determination through judicial channels, from which it naturally follows that it is improper to adduce an impossibility of accessing said channel and a consequent negative impact on the principle of effective judicial protection, since not only is the judicial channel enabled, but in the exercise of that function, the judging person exercises it based on the special provisions governing the tax matter and the corresponding judicial process. The presumption established in the rules challenged in this action in no way prevents access to the judicial channel and the pronouncement of the judging person; on the contrary, said channel is enabled, and the judging person evaluates the circumstances of fact and law in accordance with the provisions of the current regulations. Now, regarding the principle of freedom of evidence, if that evidentiary breadth must also be exercised in accordance with the law, and adjust to the special provisions - since it is adjusted to what the law provides and to the limitations specific to the process in question -, in this matter it turns out that the possibility of providing evidence does exist, but restricted by law to written documentation, due to, as has already been widely reiterated, the special nature of the tax matter.

Consequently, it must also be ruled out that the challenged rules are contrary to the principles of effective judicial protection and freedom of evidence.

X.- By way of conclusion. Ultimately, since Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, and Article 13 - current Article 20 - of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law, are far from constituting a violation of the right of defense, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, and the principles of effective judicial protection and freedom of evidence, what is appropriate is to declare the action without merit.

Therefore (Por tanto) The action is declared without merit.

Fernando Castillo V. President Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G. Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

Digitally Signed Document -- Verification Code -- CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours thirty minutes on the fourth of December two thousand twenty-four.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by Federico Sosto López, holder of identity card number 1-606-338, in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact of Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, legal entity identification number 3-101-355710, against Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, and Article 13 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law.

**Resultando** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on November 20, 2019, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, Law number 7092, and Article 13 of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law, Executive Decree number 18445-H, be declared. He states that his standing is based on the existence of the administrative litigation proceeding being processed under expediente 14-006900-1027-CA, within which, and by resolution at eight hours forty-five minutes on November 14, 2019, a cassation appeal was admitted. He explains that in Chapter V of the Income Tax Law, various income presumptions are established, such as the income of companies not domiciled in the country, the provision of services in a liberal manner, the operation of remunerated land transport of persons and cargo, or the presumptive income from loans and financings. On this last aspect, he continues, Article 10 of the law states that, unless there is proof to the contrary, every loan financing contract is presumed to accrue interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate fixed by the Central Bank, and that in cases where no written document exists, the presumption does not admit proof to the contrary. For its part, Article 13 of the Regulations to the law, indicates that, unless there is proof to the contrary, in any loan contract or operation involving financing, the existence of net income from interest is presumed, which must be calculated at an interest rate no lower than the highest active interest rate fixed by the Central Bank, and that when no written document exists, proof to the contrary is not admitted. He adds that, based on these norms, the Administrative Litigation Tribunal considers it to be a iures et de iure presumption, and rejected all the other evidence presented during the process, leaving the company he represents defenseless. The petitioner considers that such provisions are contrary to the principles of due process, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and effective judicial protection. Regarding due process, he states that the questioned norms exclude all possibility of presenting proof to the contrary in the event that no written document exists, which violates the right of defense, and contradicts the rules on presumptions, regarding which the Civil Procedure Code in force at that time stated that whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts that serve as its basis, while also establishing a distinction between absolute and relative presumptions, such that relative presumptions could be challenged by proof to the contrary through all legal means, unless otherwise established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing the presumptions. He mentions that the challenged norms presume a taxable income chargeable to the taxpayer, because they determine a minimum interest rate on loans agreed upon in the exercise of freedom of contract, not admitting proof to the contrary when there is no written document, thus treating it as an absolute presumption, when, in his view, it should not be so, because it does not involve the annulment of acts or the incorporation of a peremptory exception. He adds that the legal prohibition on the taxpayer from contradicting the presumption alleged by the tax authority violates the right to offer and produce evidence as a guarantee of constitutional due process, since pursuant to Article 10 of the Income Tax Law, in the event there is no written document, the tax administration can consider the existence of a loan or financing proven in order to apply the minimum interest rate, but does not allow the taxpayer to resort to another means of proof to demonstrate that a lower rate, or even a zero rate, applies to the loan, thus leaving the taxpayer in a position of disadvantage against the power of the tax administration. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, he mentions that the challenged articles are not reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology; he indicates that they are capricious provisions, which create an arbitrary advantage for tax authorities to the detriment of taxpayer rights. He points out that the presumption established is contradictory and absurd, allowing the conclusion that in cases where a contract or written document exists, there is no presumption, since the reality of the loan is determined by the written agreement of the contracting parties; but when there is no contract or written document, the legal presumption does apply, but he considers that this use would be conditional on the demonstration of the underlying fact, which consists of the existence of a loan between taxpayers, which, if there is no written contract, would be an informal or unwritten agreement. For this reason he considers the norms unreasonable, as the powers granted to the tax administration to presume the existence of the loan are incongruent with the solution chosen by the legislator, which presumes them when there is no written contract, meaning there is no formal verification of the loan. He adds that the presumption applies, according to the third paragraph of the challenged Article 10, even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, a figure defined in Article 13 of the Regulations, which allows such financing to be carried out using assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or instruments, all of which would necessarily be by means of a physical or digital written document. He argues that for the application of the presumption, the norm requires verifying the existence of the financing through documentary or accessory evidence, but, because there is no principal document, proof to the contrary regarding the actual reality of the loan or financing is excluded, thus breaking the logical unity of the normative proposal.

Therefore, it considers that the presumption is not sufficiently coherent or reasonably supported within the block of legality. Regarding effective judicial protection, it points out that freedom of evidence is one of the relevant components of effective judicial protection and of the guarantee of legality control over the conduct of the public administration, to the point that Article 82 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states that the means of proof may be all those permitted by Public Law and Common Law, while Article 298 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública indicates that the means of proof may be all those permitted by Public Law, even if they are not admissible under Common Law. However, it adds, the challenged articles exclude any possibility of offering proof to the contrary, and without criteria of reasonableness or proportionality. It mentions that the legal and regulatory impediment to admitting proof to the contrary to the decision of an administrative authority, to apply the minimum interest rate presumption, represents an unconstitutional shackle that restricts the work of the administrative contentious judge, and creates a circle exempt from administrative contentious control; it affirms that they suppress the possibility of questioning the exercise of a power of the tax authority to apply a presumption. It requests that the action be declared with merit.

2.- By resolution issued at fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes on January 8, 2020, this unconstitutionality action is admitted, and a hearing is granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministerio de Hacienda.

3.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in editions numbers 25, 26, and 27 of the Boletín Judicial, dated February 7, 10, and 11, 2020, respectively.

4.- By writ added to the docket on January 25, 2020, Rodolfo Cordero Vargas, in his capacity as Viceministro de Egresos of the Ministerio de Hacienda, appears and indicates that the presumption of Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is subject to the application of a regulated administrative procedure that complies with the constitutional principles referred to by the claimant. It explains that the impugned norms are applied within and only starting from an ex officio determination procedure of tax obligations, which initiates once the deadline for the taxpayer to file and pay the tax return and corresponding fiscal period has expired; that is, the presumption is not applied automatically. It points out that such procedures are comprised of four stages: initiation of the procedures or initiation of the audit action; development of the procedures; conclusion of the procedures; review of the ex officio assessment act. It mentions that in the development stage of the procedures, every taxpayer is obligated to make available the supporting documents for their income, contracts, and others, which the taxpayer has the obligation to conserve and maintain for a period of five years and keep up to date; it is from these supports that the Audit auditor must start to carry out the audit action and determine the accuracy or not of the tax obligation that was self-assessed. Then, in the conclusion stage of procedures, the taxpayer is proposed to regularize their situation, and in case of not doing so, they are notified of the transfer of charges, which can be challenged, presenting the arguments and evidence they deem pertinent, to finally issue a determinative resolution or assessment act, in which it confirms and declares the challenge without merit, or, on the contrary, annuls or revokes totally or partially the determination made. In that sense, it adds, the presumption of Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is a substantive norm whose application complies with the indicated constitutional principles. It explains the taxable base of the income tax, pointing out that in the case of loans or financing, the yields obtained in an economic activity subject to the tax on profits constitute taxable income or a deductible expense, depending on who is declaring said yield. It adds that, under normal conditions, in which the audited taxpayer has the supporting documents for their tax return, the income from financial yields is analyzed in light of what is declared, recorded, and supported by the taxpayer, and based on these inputs and the information that the Tax Administration itself obtains from the other legal means cited previously, a conclusion is reached (determination of the certain taxable base) on the taxpayer's taxable income or Gross Income, and from which the deductible expenses (net income) are deducted to apply the tax rate and ascertain if the tax or tax obligation was declared accurately, or not. However, in reality, cases arise in which taxpayers do not have the supporting documents for their return, and faced with the impossibility of obtaining a certain base that allows knowing with accuracy the financial income obtained by the taxpayer as a product of granting loans or financing, the questioned articles establish a presumed form of determining the yields obtained. It is assumed that any loan or financing carried out within an economic activity seeking profit responds to that for-profit purpose, so it is presumed that the company obtains a yield on the loans or financings in which it participates or invests. Therefore, in the absence of a certain base as a form of determining the taxable base, Article 10 of the law presumes the interest accrued during a specific fiscal period, making a distinction between a contract that has a written document and one that does not. It is a legal presumption that does not admit proof to the contrary, and it corresponds to the Tax Administration to demonstrate the existence of the fact —loan or financing—, in order to thereby shift the burden of proof to the audited subject, so that they demonstrate if a written contract exists, that the accrued interest is less than what the norm seeks to apply, or, if no written contract exists, proof to the contrary is not admitted, as the tax administration has demonstrated that a loan or financing contract has indeed occurred during the investigated fiscal period.

Reiterates that the application of these rules is only carried out after the audit action (actuación fiscalizadora) has been completed, which entails a procedure for determination (determinación) of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), in which the audited taxpayer participates from the very moment the audit action begins, and that in the absence of a certain basis as a means of determining the taxable base (base imponible), the tax administration (administración tributaria) may apply the presumption established in Article 10 of the Law, and only when the administration demonstrates the existence of a loan or financing contract; if the written supporting document is not provided, the administration presumes the interest earned in the lucrative economic activity, without admitting proof to the contrary, because that proof to the contrary could have been provided by the taxpayer throughout the entire audit action process and even after it concludes, it can be demonstrated during the continuation of the tax obligation determination phase, through the non-acceptance of the regularization of its obligation proposed by the tax administration and challenge of the statement of charges. It states that since the presumption of Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulation is applied only after the conclusion of a procedure in which the taxpayer can oppose and defend against the charges, it is not true that due process and the right of defense are violated; while it is true that the rules exclude the presentation of proof to the contrary in the absence of a written document, the presumption only operates in the absence of the determination of the taxable base and once all opportunities available to the taxpayer in the audit action and in the ex officio determination of the tax obligation have been exhausted, to demonstrate with written documents the terms of the loan or financing granted, so that the tax administration can accurately tax the financial income obtained in a specific fiscal period. It argues that it is also not true that the application of this presumption is contrary to the rules on presumptions, since Article 155 of the Tax Code is clear in stating that in procedural matters, the Civil Procedure Code is only applicable as a supplementary rule and in the absence of an express rule in the Tax Code, which is not the case here, because the rule of Article 10 of the Law is self-sufficient. It adds that just as the Civil Procedure Code requires proving the existence of the facts that serve as the basis for the presumption, the tax legal rule requires the tax administration to demonstrate the existence of a loan or financing, which, in the absence of a written document, generates the effect of presuming the existence of the accrual of interest at a specific rate and in favor of the taxpayer who has generated it, without admitting proof to the contrary. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), it states that it is not true that the questioned rules are not reasonably founded and justified, nor that the provision is contradictory, absurd, or unreasonable, because it is presumed when there is no written contract, and what is taken as certain is the existence of the loan or financing. It adds that there is no lack of legal support or foundation, because the determination of financial income as presumptive net income in loans and financing is based on the interpretive exercise of the facts and their framing within the tax rule, according to what is regulated in the determinative procedure of the tax obligation. Regarding the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), it affirms that although the challenged articles exclude any possibility of offering proof to the contrary, it is not true that the principle of evidentiary freedom applicable to the contentious-administrative process is affected, since any taxpayer who has been subject to an audit action and the ex officio determination of the tax obligation has been able to resort to the jurisdictional route to challenge the validity of the rules or the procedure followed in their case. It requests that the action be declared without merit.

5.- By means of a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on January 31, 2020, Julio Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), who indicates that the action is admissible because there is a contentious-administrative process within which the respective cassation appeal has been filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He specifies that, basically, the objection of the claimant is summarized in that, in their opinion, the presumption of interest in loan and financing contracts does not admit proof to the contrary, which they consider contrary to the right of defense, by denying them the possibility of providing any type of evidentiary means to refute a taxable income, except a written document; unreasonable, because it establishes the presumption without having first demonstrated the basic fact from which it derives, that is, the existence of a loan or financing; and that this administrative power is beyond the control of the contentious-administrative judge, whose function of legality control to reach the real truth of the facts is restricted by means of other evidentiary elements that are not the written document to question the application of the income presumption, which, in their opinion, injures access to justice and effective judicial protection.

Regarding the challenged Article 10, he explains that the first paragraph starts from the premise that there is a loan contract to which the presumptive interest or yield is applied. He emphasizes that the text is intended to be applied to loan contracts, and does not contain a presumption in that sense; rather, simply, if the administration verifies that it is in the presence of a contract of that type, it must apply the provision in question with the consequent legal consequence it contains. The consequence of this rule is the application of the legal presumption for the interest rate, that is, once the loan contract is detected in the audited case, the presumption of the generated yield is applied. Furthermore, the final paragraph of the same numeral indicates that this presumption may be applied in other cases where there is no loan contract, but there is financing, for which it refers to Article 13 of the Regulation, which defines what should be understood as financing.

Thus, if the loan or financing does not exist, the rules are not even applicable.

It reaffirms that the legal presumption of article 10 is very specific and relates to the applicable interest rate, assuming that the loan or financing is for consideration, since the taxable event of the income derives from the interest that the lender obtains from said transaction; otherwise, it would not be subject to taxation. What is presumed is the applicable interest rate, not the existence of the contract or financing, and it is a rate set at the minimum interest, which is reasonable and consistent with the principle of proportionality, limiting any type of excessive burden to the detriment of taxpayers.

It notes that this presumption does admit contrary evidence (prueba en contrario), conditioned on it being a written document. It is, then, a *iuris tantum* presumption, capable of being refuted on the precise point of the interest used, whether to demonstrate a lower interest rate, or that no interest was agreed upon. It adds that the legislator established that a written document or contract must exist to admit contrary evidence (prueba en contrario). But, in the absence of that written document, the minimum profitability (rentabilidad mínima) presumption does not admit contrary evidence (prueba en contrario), and in doing so, the legislator seeks to reduce sources of tax evasion, by establishing that any loan of money or financing transaction granted by a taxpayer to a third party generates a minimum yield (rendimiento mínimo).

It points out that from reading the challenged phrases, it is verified that, in reality, the taxpayer is not being denied the possibility of providing evidence, but rather only the type of admissible evidence is restricted, so that it must be a written contract or document reflecting the transaction. Moreover, it continues, it is a usual forensic practice in any jurisdiction to admit only that evidence which is pertinent to the theory of the case sought to be demonstrated. It adds that the aspect sought to be rebutted—the interest rate—being so specific, it is entirely congruent and reasonable that admissible evidence be limited to that which is truly useful, for which the written document recording the loan or financing at a lower rate, zero rate, or without yield must be provided. Without that written document, no other type of evidence will be admitted, but as a matter of relevance. Therefore, contrary evidence (prueba en contrario) is admitted, but conditioned on the existence of the written document where the loan contract has been recorded, so the taxpayer does have the opportunity or possibility to prove that the fact or situation presumed is false or inaccurate, simply by providing the written document where the loan contract or financing is set forth.

It mentions that one must not fall into the mistake of understanding that the questioned rules establish a presumption regarding the existence of the loan contract, and much less that this presumption is absolute, because all types of probative elements can indeed be provided to demonstrate that the legal classification made by the tax administration was incorrect and that it is not a loan or financing.

It asserts that the claims of unconstitutionality must be dismissed, since no defect of unconstitutionality is observed in relation to the constitutional norms and principles, especially if examined within the framework of the applicable legal corpus, particularly in light of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios).

Regarding the allegation of violation of the right of defense, it assures that there is no curtailment of the guarantees of due process or the right of defense, because, contrary to what the plaintiff claims, the taxpayer is not only entitled to but also has the duty to provide all evidence that can accurately reflect the data and circumstances attributable to the taxable base. It explains that Article 103 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) empowers the tax administration to require any person to declare their tax obligations, and to ascertain the veracity of the content of sworn statements. Furthermore, Article 104 states that the tax administration may require the presentation of books, files, records, and any other information of tax relevance, such as copies of documentary or magnetic supports of credit transactions and other financial conditions of the transactions, with it being an obligation of the taxpayer to keep the records of transactions or situations that constitute taxable events, as provided by Article 128 of the same Code. It explains that these norms, together with those questioned in the action, make up the legal corpus to which the Tax Administration is subject, and that it is the taxpayer who is responsible for providing and keeping the documentation and accounting support of taxed transactions. It is based on that documentation that the Tax Administration carries out the classification act (acto de calificación).

It reiterates that the articles do not contain a presumption regarding the existence of the loan contract or financing, but rather only its yield (rendimiento) is presumed through the determination of the applicable interest rate, and the application of articles 10 of the Law and 13 of the Regulation does not arise from a presumption by the Tax Administration, but is the result of the assessment of all the evidence that the taxpayer themselves provided at the time of being audited. Thus, none of the challenged rules prevents the taxpayer from presenting any type of evidence to demonstrate the reality of the transaction or business conducted. It considers there to be an error of appreciation by the plaintiff, in considering that there is a presumption regarding the existence of the loan contract or financing, but this is not the case, because the application of the interest presumption presupposes that a loan or financing exists. It affirms that this error of appreciation is evidenced by the plaintiff’s statements about how they could provide a document that does not exist, but that upon reviewing the first-instance judgment issued in the underlying matter, it is observed that the judicial body seems to admit and assess all types of evidence, including testimonial evidence, to demonstrate the existence of the loan.

It reaffirms that the presumption contained in the challenged norms is based on the existence of a loan or financing agreement.

It adds that, furthermore, the rules of common law regarding presumptions cannot be invoked, since Article 169 of the Tax Rules and Procedures Code expressly indicates that the presumptions established by tax laws may be challenged by evidence to the contrary, except in cases where those laws expressly prohibit it.

It states that a violation of the principle of equality cannot be alleged, because it is the taxpayer who must provide the evidence and other pertinent documentation to determine their legal situation and the economic reality of their activity.

For this reason, the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), based on considering it an unreasonable or disproportionate norm, is inaccurate. It emphasizes that the presumption concerns the applicable rate, and this presumption arises in the scenario where a loan or financing agreement exists, which is determined based on documentation provided by the taxpayer themselves. It reiterates that this presumption admits evidence to the contrary, for which the written document in which it was so stipulated must be provided. The challenged norms are not unreasonable or disproportionate, since they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all documentation they consider useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the taxed transaction or business, and if, based on that evidence, it is verified that a loan or financing agreement exists, it is also permitted to refute the presumption of the yield by means of the appropriate evidence, which is the respective written document in which the taxed transaction was formalized. It specifies that in the very constitutional jurisprudence cited by the claimant, reference is made to judgment 2004-14421, in which it is stated that administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the block of legality, and in this case, that block is comprised of articles 103, 104, 123, and 128 of the Tax Code, which help to understand that the administration's sovereign power to apply the legal presumption responds to a measured exercise, marked by the taxpayer's ability to provide all documentation or information that demonstrates the economic reality of their activity.

Thus, it continues, the mere wording of the challenged precepts does not give rise to capricious or arbitrary applications, and they are not seen to be incompatible or incongruent with the norms of the Tax Code.

Regarding effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), it considers that the claimant's disagreement lies in the way the norm is applied and not in its intrinsic unconstitutionality. The contested articles do not impose any type of restriction on the administrative litigation judge to control whether both precepts were duly applied or not to the specific case, so that the judge can assess the same information that the taxpayer provided to the tax authorities, and determine if there was indeed a credit or financing transaction to which the presumption of interest should be applied. The challenged norms, far from creating areas beyond judicial control, delimit judicial discretion in determining what is considered appropriate evidence, without overlooking that the same presumption of the interest rate does admit evidence to the contrary, so the judge will always be able to oversee the application that the Tax Administration makes of the contested norms.

It concludes that the action must be dismissed, because no violation of the constitutional principles of due process (debido proceso), reasonableness, proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción a la arbitrariedad), and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) is observed.

6.- By resolution of this Chamber, at nine hours and fifty-seven minutes on March 5, 2020, the hearings granted are deemed answered, and this action is assigned to the office of the instructing magistrate, for its consideration on the merits.

7.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 of the same law, deeming this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

8.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Rendered by Magistrate Araya García; and,

Considering

I.- On the formal prerequisites for the admissibility of the unconstitutionality action. The unconstitutionality action is a process with specific technical requirements, which must be met so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction stipulates the admissibility prerequisites for the unconstitutionality action; among these, the existence of a pending base or prior matter is required, whether in judicial proceedings or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered infringed. For its part, the second and third paragraphs of the same norm exceptionally regulate the prerequisites under which the prior matter is not required, that is, when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct injury, or it concerns the protection of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Defender of the Inhabitants.

Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, the Chamber, through judgment number 1995-4190, indicated that the action is "a proceeding of an incidental nature (proceso de naturaleza incidental), and not a direct or popular action (acción directa o popular), which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required —whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue (vía administrativa)— in order to access the constitutional avenue (vía constitucional), but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means (medio razonable) to protect the right considered injured in the principal matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Tribunal Constitucional) has a positive or negative repercussion on said pending proceeding, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation permit direct access to this avenue — assumptions of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—." For this reason, the requirement of a prior pending matter does not constitute a mere procedural requirement (requisito de forma), since the mere existence of a base matter (asunto base) is not sufficient, nor is the invocation of unconstitutionality, as it is indispensable that the action constitutes a reasonable means (medio razonable) to protect the right or interest considered violated, which means that the challenged norms must be applicable in the base matter (asunto base) —see, in a similar sense, judgments numbers 1990-1668, 1993-408, 1994-798, 1994-3615, 1995-409, 1995-851, 1995-4190 and 1996-791—. On the other hand, it is opportune to indicate that there are other technical formalities (recaudos técnicos) that must be fulfilled, such as, for example, the explicit determination of the challenged norms duly founded (debidamente motivadas), with specific reference to the constitutional mandates and principles considered infringed, the authentication (autenticación) through legal representation (patrocinio letrado) of the writ of filing (escrito de interposición) of the action, the accreditation (acreditación) of the conditions of standing (legitimación) —powers of attorney and certifications—, as well as the literal certification (certificación literal) of the libel of challenge (libelo de impugnación), which, in case of not being provided by the plaintiffs, can be requested for compliance by the Presidency of the Chamber.

II.- The standing (legitimación) of the plaintiff in this case.- Based on what was stated in the previous paragraph, in the specific case, it is understood that the plaintiff claims to appear before this Chamber under the first paragraph of the cited article 75, offering as a base matter (asunto base) the administrative contentious proceeding (proceso contencioso administrativo) processed under expediente number 14-006900-1027-CA, filed against the State by the company Thunderbird Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, which later changed its name to CIRSA Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, and which was absorbed by the plaintiff company Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima. In this judicial proceeding, Section VIII of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda issued judgment number 62-2018-VIII, against which the plaintiff filed a formal cassation appeal (recurso de casación), in which it invoked the unconstitutionality now being heard. Said cassation appeal (recurso de casación) was formally admitted by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), through a ruling at eight hours forty-five minutes on November 14, 2019, and is pending resolution.

Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff possesses sufficient standing (legitimación) to challenge the constitutionality of the challenged norms, in addition to the fact that it is a matter whose constitutionality is appropriate to review in this avenue (vía). In addition to the foregoing, it is understood that the plaintiff has complied with the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and it is resolved on the merits as indicated in the following recitals (considerandos).

III.- On the object of this action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad). The plaintiff specifically challenges Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Law number 7092, of April 21, 1988, as well as Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo number 18445-H.

Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta provides:

"ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income from loans and financing (Renta neta presuntiva de préstamos y financiamientos). It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that every loan or financing contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional.

In cases where no written document exists, no proof to the contrary shall be accepted against the presumption.

The Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, as established in the regulation to this law." For its part, Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo number 18445-H, established:

"ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts (Renta neta presuntiva y contratos de financiamiento). In every loan contract or operation that implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if a written document exists, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that there is a net income from interest, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, at the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption also applies when an interest lower than that which, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operation in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that there is no interest whatsoever.

No proof to the contrary is admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists." For the purposes of the provisions set forth in article 10 of the law, financing (financiamiento) is understood to be any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal course of business, by using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities (títulos valores) or other commercial documents or instruments.

Regarding this regulatory provision that is being challenged, it must be noted that the regulation that contained it—Decreto Ejecutivo No. 18445-H, of September 9, 1988—is no longer in force as of the date of this judgment, because it was repealed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 43198-H, of July 22, 2021, which adopted the current Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. This current regulation, with respect to this provision, maintained the identical wording of the previous regulation, only now in its Article 20, which states:

"Article 20.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In any loan contract or operation that implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, it is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary, that there is net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate not less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption also applies when an interest rate lower than that which, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operation in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that there is no interest whatsoever.

No proof to the contrary is admitted for the established presumption when there is no written document. The Tax Administration (Administración) may apply the presumption referred to in article 10 of the law if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of the provisions set forth in article 10 of the law, financing is understood to be any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal course of business, by using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or instruments." Thus, as of today, the regulatory provision being challenged is not formally in force, though it is clear that the same identical disposition is in force according to the provisions set forth in Article 20 of the new regulation adopted by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 43198-H.

In this regard, the Chamber (Sala) will rule on the questions raised by virtue of the legal effects that such provision might have produced during its validity—see judgments No. 5445-99 and 2024-3228. On this point, it is pertinent to recall what the Chamber has held in repeated pronouncements since judgment No. 3152-1994—including the recent judgment mentioned, No. 2024-3228—to the effect that:

"[T]he control of constitutionality is exercised with reference to the law in force; however, one can conceive of some exceptional cases to this rule. There are situations in which a repealed provision may have been applied during its validity or may be being applied in violation of the Constitution and to the detriment of a person whose grievance persists after the repeal, in which case that provision can and must be subject to interpretation and control even though it is not in force at the time of issuing the judgment; these are cases where the repeal does not turn the matter into something abstract that impedes the subsequent constitutional control of the repealed provision. In the specific case of this action, it is appropriate to conduct the constitutional analysis because the provision can still affect the interests of the petitioner; that is, unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured, under the terms of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional." In the opinion of the petitioner, Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta and Article 13 of the then-effective Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta—currently Article 20 of said regulation—violate the right of defense, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), and the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), since it considers that such provisions establish a presumption regarding the applicable interest rates in cases of loans or financing, against which no proof to the contrary is admitted.

In this sense, the following recitals (considerandos) will address each of the objections raised by the petitioner, with two prior warnings. The first, that since it essentially concerns the same objection raised regarding Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulation, both provisions will be assessed together in relation to the right and the principles deemed violated. The second, that since it is evident that the arguments raised by the petitioner regarding the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness and effective judicial protection are intimately related and dependent upon what is argued regarding the right of defense, by resolving the latter, the former are essentially resolved as well.

IV.- Regarding the challenged provisions and the alleged violation of the right of defense. The petitioner argues that the presumption established in Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and Article 13 of the Regulation to said law, violates the taxpayer's right of defense, insofar as they do not admit proof to the contrary.

In this regard, it is appropriate to reiterate, as relevant, what is prescribed by both provisions regarding the alleged presumption and the alleged impossibility of providing proof to the contrary. Regarding what is relevant, Article 10 of the Law states:

"ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income from loans and financing.

It is presumed, <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">unless there is proof to the contrary</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, that every loan contract for financing, whatever its nature or denomination, </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">if there is a written document</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, earns interest at a rate not less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><br><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">In cases where there is no written document, no proof to the contrary shall be admitted against the presumption</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">The Tax Administration may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does exist, as established in the regulations to this law.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> -</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">emphasis added-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">For its part, Article 13 of the Regulations – now Article 20 – provides:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income (renta neta presuntiva) and financing contracts. In every loan contract or operation, which implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">if there is a written document, it is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary, that there is a net income from interest (renta neta por intereses)</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, which must be calculated at an interest rate not less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, at the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption shall also apply when an interest rate lower than that which, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operation in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that no interest whatsoever exists.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">No proof to the contrary is admitted for the presumption established, when there is no written document</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">. The Administration may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs,</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">even</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of the provisions of Article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal line of business, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities (títulos valores) or other documents or commercial instruments.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> -the highlights are not from the original-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">It is clear, then, that both norms contain a similar provision regarding the subject matter of this action, in the sense that in the presence of a written loan or financing contract, a specific interest rate is presumed, against which proof to the contrary is admitted. In contrast, if no written document exists, no proof to the contrary is admitted.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Thus, with respect to the first scenario – that a written document exists – contrary to what the claimant argued, it is evident that the presumption does admit proof to the contrary. It should be noted that the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Law clearly and expressly provides that </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">«</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">unless there is proof to the contrary</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">»</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">, it is presumed that interest is earned at a rate not less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank, or, in the absence of this rate, it is presumed that the rate will be according to the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. In these cases, the taxpayer can indeed present proof to the contrary to challenge the presumption that the Tax Administration would apply to determine its presumptive income (renta presuntiva), which clearly demonstrates that the possibility of providing proof to the contrary does exist in these cases, such that there is not even the slightest violation of the taxpayer's right of defense, since they can indeed present proof to the contrary to challenge the rate that could be presumptively applied to determine the income on which they must pay tax.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">A similar provision is found in the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Regulations regarding the applicable rate when a written document exists.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The apparent problem seems to arise in the second scenario, that is, with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Law, and in the second paragraph – </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">ab initio</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> – of Article 13 of the Regulations, which essentially state that no proof to the contrary is admitted against that presumption when no written document exists. To understand how this provision also falls far short of constituting a negative impact on the right of defense, one must consider the process by which the Tax Administration may use and apply this presumption.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">V.-</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> The application of the presumption indicated in the challenged articles is a power of the Tax Administration that arises in the process of determining the tax liability (determinación de la obligación tributaria) of a taxpayer with respect to income tax. That is, it is not an autonomous determination, separate from a process of determining the tax liability, and much less arbitrary or lacking in support; nor is it an arbitrary determination or a product of some discretionary power of the administration.</span></p> On the contrary, said presumption is established by law in a specific case, and after it is concluded that its application is necessary.

In this regard, one must start from the tax obligations of every taxpayer who is subject to income tax and from the audit powers of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), from which what is prescribed in the following articles of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) is of particular interest.

Article 103 of the Code provides that it is the responsibility of said Administration to verify the correct compliance with tax obligations, being able to require that the declaration of obligations be made and to ascertain the veracity of its content. In what concerns us, this article states:

**“Article 103.- Tax control** The Tax Administration **is empowered to verify the correct compliance with tax obligations** by all legal means and procedures. To that effect, said Administration is specifically authorized to:

**a)** Require any natural or legal person, whether or not registered for the payment of taxes, **to declare their tax obligations** within the period indicated for that purpose, by the means that, in accordance with the advancement of science and technology, are established as mandatory for tax obligors, while guaranteeing that persons who do not have access to the technologies required to declare have facilities provided by the Administration itself.

**b)** **Ascertain the veracity of the content of the sworn declarations** by the legal means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems convenient.

**(…)**” -the highlighting is not in the original- For its part, Article 104 of the same Code states that the Tax Administration may require diverse information from the taxpayer, precisely to ascertain that veracity indicated in the previous article and “verify the tax situation of the taxpayers.” This Article 104 provides:

**“Article 104.- Requests for information from the taxpayer** To facilitate the timely verification of the tax situation of the taxpayers, the Tax Administration may require from them the presentation of books, files, accounting records, and any other information of tax significance that is printed as a document, on a technical medium, or recorded by any other technological means.

Without prejudice to these general powers, the Administration may request from taxpayers and responsible parties:

**a)** From taxpayers classified, according to the established criteria, as large national taxpayers or large territorial companies, **the financial statements duly certified by an authorized public accountant (contador público autorizado)**, including the explanatory notes on the most significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes contained in the opinion of the independent professional who has audited them. The Tax Administration is also empowered to require them, as well as other groups of taxpayers for whom, due to the volume and nature of their operations, this requirement does not entail disproportionate costs.

**b)** **A copy of the books, files, and accounting records**.

(…)

**e)** **A copy of the documentary or magnetic supporting documents for credit operations**, purchases, sales, and/or leases of goods and trust contracts (financial or operating), processed in private companies, collective entities, cooperatives, banks of the National Banking System, financial entities, whether or not regulated; de facto partnerships, or any other natural, legal, or de facto person, **and the other financial conditions of the transactions** must be identified, in the terms regulated in the regulation.

The expenses for the application of the provisions in subsections b), c), d), and e) above shall be borne by the Tax Administration.” -emphasis added- Likewise, always in the vein of the importance of verifying the information and declarations provided by taxpayers, Article 123 of the same Code of Tax Standards and Procedures provides that the declarations and documentation of taxpayers are subject to verification by the Tax Administration, which may carry out the appropriate investigations, proceedings, and examinations to verify the declarations and the data contained in the documentation.

This article 123 indicates:

"**Article 123.- Verification of sworn statements (declaraciones), books, and other documents** The sworn statements (declaraciones juradas) submitted by taxpayers (contribuyentes) and responsible parties and the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, insofar as they must contain information relating to the assessment (liquidación) or payment of taxes, are subject to verification (comprobación) by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). For such purposes, it may carry out, within the law and through duly authorized officials, all investigations, proceedings, and verification examinations it deems necessary and useful.

Once the verification is completed, the difference in tax owed by the taxpayer or the declaring responsible party must be collected; or, as the case may be, the excess they have paid must be refunded ex officio." -emphasis supplied- Finally, Article 128 of the same Tax Code and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) specifies that it is the obligation of taxpayers not only to facilitate the tasks of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration, but also, especially, to preserve the background records (antecedentes) of any operation or situation that gives rise to facts on which tax must be paid. In the pertinent part, this article provides:

"**Article 128.- Obligations of private parties** Taxpayers (contribuyentes) and responsible parties are obliged to facilitate the tasks of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and, in particular, must:

• a)When required by laws or regulations, or demanded by said Administration by virtue of the powers granted to it by this Code: (…) iii. Submit the corresponding sworn statements (declaraciones).
• b)Keep, in an orderly manner, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, and the background records (antecedentes) of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events. (…)
• d)Present or exhibit, at the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records related to events triggering their tax obligations and formulate the applications or clarifications requested of them. (…)" Consequently, it is clear not only that the taxpayer has the duty to file their returns, providing the corresponding documentation for that purpose, and, at the same time, that it is incumbent upon the Tax Administration to verify the truthfulness of the information received, for which it may request and have access to the returns, books, deeds, documentary or magnetic supports, accounting records, and all other information of tax significance, the taxpayer, in turn, having to facilitate that task of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation (investigación), for which they must keep the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events.

It is based on these obligations imposed on the taxpayer and the powers granted to the Tax Administration, that before a tax return, such as the income tax return, the Administration may act accordingly to determine its content, truthfulness, and scope, which is carried out through a tax assessment procedure (procedimiento de fijación tributaria) that, as explained by the Ministry of Finance, is composed of four phases or stages, namely:

• a)Initiation of the audit activity (actividad fiscalizadora): this is the beginning of the audit action, by means of which the taxpayer is informed when it will commence, and where they are expressly told that they must have the supporting documents for the tax return available.
• b)Development of the procedures: this is the phase where the taxpayer must make available to the Administration all the necessary documentation —article 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios— and in which the Administration carries out all the verification of the documentation provided. In this phase, as emphasized by the Ministry of Finance, documentary support is vital, "since it is from these supports that the audit auditor must depart to carry out the audit action and determine the accuracy or otherwise of the tax obligation that was self-assessed and declared at the time by the taxpayer." c) Conclusion of the procedures: once the investigation and assessment of the pertinent documentation has been carried out, the taxpayer is summoned to a hearing to present the conclusions of the audit action and the results thereof, indicating whether or not there were tax differences, or even balances in favor of the taxpayer. If necessary, the taxpayer is warned to regularize their situation, and the determinative statement of charges (traslado de cargos determinativo) is notified, indicating the charges, facts, and grounds of the determination (determinación) made.
• d)Challenge (Impugnación) of the statement of charges or the assessment order (auto de liquidación): in accordance with article 144 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the taxpayer may file a formal challenge against the statement of charges, presenting the pertinent allegations and evidence, so that the Tax Administration issues a determinative resolution (resolución determinativa) or assessment act (acto de liquidación), in which the challenge is confirmed or dismissed, or else, the determination made is annulled totally or partially. This challenge is made through the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) provided for in article 145 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, and the appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, pursuant to the provisions of article 146 of the same Code.

Thus, the application of the presumption indicated in article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and in article 13 —now article 20— of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, takes place after the application of this tax assessment procedure that begins with the filing of the return. This is so, because upon the filing of a return related to income tax, and for the purpose of verifying the truthfulness of the data contained therein, the Tax Administration has the power to review all the documentation described in the cited rules of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. It is in this audit process carried out by the Tax Administration, that the presumption regarding the applicable interest rate in written loan or financing contracts may be applied, in which case, according to what was stated in the preceding Considerando, evidence to the contrary may be presented to prove a different or non-existent interest rate.

But in those cases where the existence of a loan or financing operation that is not in writing is alleged, the presumption regarding the interest rate is applied, without it being possible to provide evidence to the contrary. This is so, because from the cited regulations, it is evident that the entire process of verifying a tax obligation according to the indicated procedure, starts from the review and validation of supporting documentation of a different nature that the taxpayer is obligated to have and maintain. In this regard, the definition in subsection b) of article 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios —already expressly cited— is highly illustrative when it defines as an obligation of the taxpayer "[to] keep, in an orderly manner, the financial, accounting, and any other kind of records, and the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events." This regulatory provision starts from the obligation that the taxpayer has to hold and properly arrange those "records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events," from which it follows that if the existence of a loan or financing contract is alleged in the tax return, the taxpayer must be able to demonstrate the existence of the applicable rate because subsection b) of article 128 of this Code so imposes it. Otherwise, not having that documentation prevents the Tax Administration from exercising its auditing and verifying function of the tax obligation, and hence the existence and application of the legally established presumption.

It is clear that if there is supporting documentation regarding the loan or financing contract alleged in a tax return and the rate that applies to it, the presumption would admit proof to the contrary, precisely because in fulfillment of the obligation indicated in subsection b) of article 128 of the Code, the taxpayer can prove not only the existence of the loan or financing contract, but also the agreed rate; however, conversely, the breach of that obligation gives rise to the impossibility of verifying what was declared, resulting in the application of the presumption under challenge.

In other words, the due fulfillment of the obligation in subsection b) of article 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures allows the taxpayer not only to demonstrate the existence of the loan or financing contract alleged in their return and the applicable rate, but also, that when faced with the application of the presumption indicated in the questioned rules, they can validly present proof to the contrary so that in the tax verification and audit process, the Administration evaluates that written evidence and resolves accordingly. On the contrary, the breach of that duty under article 128 of the Code prevents the taxpayer from proving the existence of a different interest rate, which in turn prevents the Tax Administration from verifying whether what was stated in the return is valid or not, and therefore, given that breach by the taxpayer and the impossibility for the Tax Administration, the presumption under discussion becomes applicable.

Likewise, it should be noted that all of this assessment must be carried out within the context of the verification procedure indicated in preceding paragraphs, so it is in the second stage of that procedure—development of the proceedings—when the taxpayer can demonstrate and prove the existence of a lower rate if they have it in writing, which could also even be done before the conclusion of the administrative procedure before the Tax Administration itself or before the Administrative Tax Tribunal—articles 144 and 145 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures—and it could also eventually be done in the judicial venue, provided they have the necessary prior written documentation that allows rebutting the presumption that is sought to be applied.

VI.- On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the questioned rules, by establishing the application of this presumption regarding the applicable rate in loan or financing contracts, would be contrary to the general rules of presumptions set forth in common law. However, it must be noted that the specialized nature of the tax matter gives rise to the existence of sectoral principles and specific rules to regulate this type of situation, and that, precisely because of their specialty, they are particularly applicable instead of ordinary or common law rules. Thus, specifically on this matter, article 169 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures is highly illustrative, in stating:

“Article 169.- Tax regulations Laws and regulations containing tax rules must expressly mention this in their title and in a heading with which each of the articles must be titled, in order to facilitate their understanding and handling.

Laws and regulations that modify tax rules shall contain a complete list of the repealed rules and the new wording of those that are modified.

The rules that regulate the regime of tax infractions and sanctions, as well as surcharges, fines, and interest, shall have retroactive effects when their application is more favorable to the affected party.

The presumptions established by tax laws can be challenged by proof to the contrary, except in cases where those expressly prohibit it.” -emphasis added- Thus, it is clear, according to the above, that these special rules on the presumption for the determination of the interest rate in cases of presumptive income are far from running counter to the general rules on presumptions, since the truth is that on this particular subject, the specialty of the tax matter prevails, as determined by the law itself.

In any case, it should be noted that what is alleged by the plaintiff falls within the scope of an apparent contradiction—which does not exist—between the application of norms within the sphere of legality, which, according to what has been stated, in no way implies that there is a constitutional nonconformity of the norms challenged in this action.

**VII.-** Consequently, it is clear that the application of the presumption under discussion arises after the completion of a verification and oversight (fiscalización) process carried out by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in accordance with the cited norms and in which the taxpayer has direct participation, not only as the subject obligated to file the tax return (declaración tributaria) and to maintain and preserve the supporting documentation for its operations, but also as an active party in that verification process, where it must not only make all supporting documentation available to the Tax Administration, but where it is also previously notified, participates in the process, is informed of the investigation results, is notified of a statement of objections (traslado de cargos), which it can challenge before the Tax Administration itself or before the Tax Administrative Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo). In such a manner, it is inappropriate to claim that the application of this presumption indicated in the challenged articles is contrary to the right of defense (derecho de defensa), since it is clear that the taxpayer not only has the aforementioned obligations but is also recognized that right of participation in the process of determining the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), being able to exercise the pertinent appellate activity, and that it is upon the breach of its duties as a taxpayer and upon the impossibility of the Tax Administration to verify the data contained in the return, that the application of the presumption in question takes place.

Thus, since the violation of the right of defense is ruled out, the action must be declared without merit regarding this point.

**VIII.- On the challenged norms and the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad).** The plaintiff alleges that, together with the impact on the right of defense—already ruled out—the challenged norms and the presumption indicated therein also violate the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness.

The principle of prohibition against arbitrariness determines that every action, activity, and expression of the administration must be duly and reasonably grounded in accordance with the bloc of legitimacy or the existing Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución); it implies that every action must be clothed with the necessary objectivity, which not only prevents its issuance or adoption without that reasonable basis, but also prevents an action that causes differentiation without sufficient and just reason. Thus, in reiterated case law, this Chamber has recognized and applied this principle. In judgment number 2007-11155—reiterated, among many others, by judgments 2008-11390 and 2012-18298—the Chamber stated that:

“[T]he principle of prohibition against arbitrariness supposes the prohibition of arbitrariness, that is, of any differentiation lacking a sufficient and just reason. (…) Arbitrariness is synonymous with ostensible injustice, and injustice is not limited to discrimination. Arbitrary action is that contrary to justice, reason, or the laws, which obeys the mere whim or will of the public agent. **The prohibition against arbitrariness condemns the lack of objective legal basis or foundation for an administrative conduct** and, consequently, the violation of the material order of the principles and values inherent to the Rule of Law. In essence, the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness has been operating as a powerful corrective against abusive and discriminatory actions by public administrations when exercising discretionary powers (abuse or excess of discretion). Regarding the application of the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness in the area of regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), it must be indicated that, since the latter is naturally discretionary, the prohibitive principle of arbitrariness plays a role of the highest order. In the first place, it must be noted that, except for matters that are reserved for regulation—internal organization and statutory or service relations—and in which autonomous or independent regulations—from the law—are admissible, a first limit of the regulatory power is its subjection to the law it intends to develop or execute, an aspect that obviously has a connection with constitutional principles such as legality, reserve of law, and normative hierarchy.

The regulatory power is, except in the cases indicated, the expression of an option or alternative predetermined by the ordinary legislator in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, from which the competent body to exercise the regulatory power may not depart.” – emphasis supplied- The need to base the action on the block of legitimacy – which is known to be more comprehensive than legality itself – is evident when, through judgment 2004-14421, the Chamber indicated that:

“[T]he administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the block of legality, so that it is based on and explains itself.” As has been indicated, the reasonable nature of the action, and the consequent inexistence of arbitrariness, is based on the measure being grounded in that block of legitimacy that has been mentioned, in which not only the norms themselves are considered, but also the set of applicable values and principles that, in turn, inform the norms to endow them with legitimate validity.

It is for this reason that, applying this principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad) to tax matters proper, through judgment 2011-1356 the Chamber defined:

“It must be remembered that presumptive determinations cannot be arbitrary, so as not to violate the ability to pay and the possible insolvency or bankruptcy of a natural or legal person. What the legislation does is establish the minimum of the tax, which can be rebutted even being a iuris tantum presumption, so this initial determination can be modified.” Thus, and in accordance with the provisions of the preceding recital, it is important to reiterate that the application of the presumption contemplated in article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and article 13 – current article 20 – of its Reglamento, regarding the rate applicable in those cases where no written document exists, is the result of a verification and audit process conducted by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) based on the documentation that the taxpayer himself must keep, maintain, provide, and make available; it does not involve information prepared by the Administration, nor whimsical, absolutely discretionary or normatively unsupported actions, but rather elements of assessment provided by the interested party himself within a procedure of verification, audit and determination carried out in accordance with the provisions of articles 103, 104, 123 and 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

In this sense, it could in no way be argued that the application of this presumption by the Tax Administration is an unfounded, objectively unsupported or arbitrary act that is contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, since the truth of the matter is that we are faced with the application of a presumption duly enabled by law, before a specific and exceptional scenario, which would be the inexistence of documentation that not only should exist, but should be kept, maintained and made available to the Tax Administration when so required, and that should the conditions exist or be recorded in writing, the presentation of evidence to the contrary would indeed be viable.

It is for this reason that the Chamber agrees with the criterion of the Procuraduría General de la República, in stating that:

“From that perspective, the challenged norms are not unreasonable, nor disproportionate, since they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all the documentation that he deems useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the transaction or business subject to tax, without imposing any type of requirement. And if from that evidence it is verified that, in effect, there exists a loan contract or another type of financing, a scenario in which the challenged norms would be applicable; he is also allowed to refute the presumption of the yield generated by means of suitable evidence, which requires having the respective written document in which the taxed transaction was formalized.” In this sense, taking into consideration that the application of the presumption provided for in the articles challenged in this action is the product of conducting an administrative proceeding in which the Tax Administration must adhere to the referred provisions of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, a proceeding in which, moreover, the taxpayer's right of defense is guaranteed, it must be concluded that the application of the presumption and the consequent tax determination itself are far from being the result of an arbitrary action by the Tax Administration.

Similarly, it must also be concluded that Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 —currently Article 20— of the Regulation are not, in themselves, contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, given that the possibility of applying the presumption recognized therein is necessarily subject to the completion of the corresponding verification procedure.

Consequently, the provisions challenged in this action do not violate the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness either.

IX.- Regarding the challenged provisions and the alleged violation of the principle of effective judicial protection. The claimant argues that the articles challenged in this action likewise violate the principle of effective judicial protection, and consequently, Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, essentially because, in his opinion, the presumption in question suppresses "the possibility of challenging the exercise of a power by the tax authority to apply an income presumption," adding, furthermore, that the disputed provisions violate the principle of freedom of proof and prevent proof to the contrary in this regard.

On this point, it should be noted that, based on the integration of Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, the recognition of the principle of effective judicial protection is indeed produced, from which the right to resort to judicial proceedings in defense of rights deemed affected is enabled, and to carry out, through judicial proceedings, the legality review of administrative conduct. Specifically, Article 49 of the Constitution establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, to guarantee the legality of the State's administrative function.

For its part, based on the principle of freedom of proof, it is validated that the facts alleged within a proceeding may be demonstrated through the legitimate and valid means available, always based on the premise of obtaining proof lawfully, its relevance for the purposes of the proceeding, and the viability of its use in the context of the situation to be elucidated or resolved. Thus, in judgment number 2004-12385, the Chamber stated that:

“According to this [the principle of freedom of proof] everything can be proven by any means, provided it is not illegal. This is because, in the structure of a Democratic Rule of Law, the search for the real truth is an objective that cannot be above the fundamental rights of the parties in the criminal process, such that it is not a truth at any cost but one obtained through legitimate means, subject to limitations (…)” --emphasis added- In this way, the claimant understands that the provisions he challenges in this action violate both principles, because, in his opinion, the presumption established therein prevents exercising judicial activity where it would be possible to admit evidence that could rebut the determination made based on that presumption.

However, in accordance with what has been extensively set forth in the preceding recitals, the special tax provision governing the matter is the one that indicates the existence of that presumption, which does admit proof to the contrary provided it is of a written documentary nature. It has already been explained that this is so because, given the nature of the tax obligation, it is the taxpayer who has the duty to have, maintain, and preserve the documentation that serves as the basis for their tax return, as well as to make it available to the Tax Administration if necessary to verify what was stated in the return, which is carried out within an administrative procedure that gives rise to a determination, which can be challenged through administrative channels and, clearly, also through judicial channels. Similarly, if in that tax determination the presumption indicated in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law and in Article 13 —currently Article 20— of its Regulation has been applied, the taxpayer has the possibility of providing proof to the contrary, provided it is written documentation, since, as has been reiterated, the special nature of the tax obligation so requires.

This allows the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the proper exercise of judicial assessment of any claims that may be filed in this regard, and, depending on whether or not such written documentation exists, to resolve as legally corresponds in each specific case.

It is for the foregoing reason that, in the words of the Procuraduría General de la República:

“[T]he challenged articles do not impose any type of restriction on the contentious-administrative judge to control whether both precepts were duly applied or not to the specific case of the taxpayer by the Administration.” Thus, the judge can assess the same information that the taxpayer supplied to the tax authority and determine, as an initial premise, whether there was indeed a credit or financing operation to which the presumption of interest can be applied; in which case, if an improper assessment of the factual matrix and the legal classification made were to be shown, the judge could perfectly annul the determining acts of the Tax Administration.

Therefore, it is clear that a challenge to the determination through judicial channels is indeed possible, from which it follows, naturally, that it is inappropriate to allege an impossibility of accessing said channel and a consequent negative impact on the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), since not only is the judicial channel enabled, but in exercising that function, the judging person does so based on the special provisions governing tax matters and the corresponding judicial process. The presumption established in the norms challenged in this action in no way prevents access to the judicial channel and the ruling by the judging person; on the contrary, said channel is enabled, and the judging person assesses the circumstances of fact and law in accordance with the provisions of the current regulations.

Now, as for the principle of freedom of proof, if that broad evidentiary latitude must also be exercised in accordance with the law, and conform to special provisions—since it is subject to what the law provides and to the limitations inherent in the particular proceeding at hand—in this matter, the possibility of submitting evidence does indeed exist, but is circumscribed by law to written documentation, due, as has already been repeatedly stated, to the special nature of tax matters.

Consequently, the contention that the challenged norms are contrary to the principles of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and freedom of proof must likewise be dismissed.

X.- By way of conclusion. Ultimately, given that Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and Article 13—now Article 20—of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, are far from constituting a violation of the right of defense, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, and the principles of effective judicial protection and freedom of proof, what corresponds is to declare the action without merit.

Por tanto

The action is declared without merit.

&nbsp; &nbsp;

Fernando Castillo V.

Presidente | | <img src="" width="164" height="74" alt="" /> | Fernando Cruz C. | | <img src=" | <table> <tbody> <tr> <td style="vertical-align:top; padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt;"> <p style="text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img src="" width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p> <p style="text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Paul Rueda L.</span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> Apologies, but I am unable to process this request as the content provided appears to be a random string of encoded data or technical metadata rather than a text excerpt from a Costa Rican Spanish legal document. 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Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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Ingrid Hess H.

&nbsp; &nbsp; Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --  &nbsp; Res. Nº 2024036173 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at nine thirty hours on December fourth, two thousand twenty-four.

Action of unconstitutionality (Acción de inconstitucionalidad) filed by Federico Sosto López, bearer of identity card number 1-606-338, in his capacity as Special Judicial Attorney-in-Fact (Apoderado Especial Judicial) of Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, legal entity identification number 3-101-355710, against Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.

Resultando

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber on November 20, 2019, the petitioner requests that the unconstitutionality of Article 10 of the Ley del Impuestos sobre la Renta, Law number 7092, and Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo number 18445-H, be declared. He indicates that his standing is based on the existence of the contentious-administrative proceeding processed under case file 14-006900-1027-CA, within which, and by decision rendered at eight forty-five hours on November 14, 2019, a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) was admitted. He explains that Chapter V of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta establishes various presumptions of income, such as the income of companies not domiciled in the country, the provision of services in a liberal profession, the operation of remunerated land transportation of persons and cargo, or the presumptive income from loans and financing. Regarding this last aspect, he continues, Article 10 of the law states that, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that any loan or financing contract accrues interest at a rate not lower than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central, and that in cases where there is no written document, the presumption does not admit proof to the contrary. For its part, Article 13 of the Reglamento to the law indicates that, unless there is proof to the contrary, in any loan contract or operation involving financing, it is presumed that a net interest income exists, which must be calculated at an interest rate not lower than the highest active interest rate set by the Banco Central, and that when there is no written document, proof to the contrary is not admitted. He adds that, based on these rules, the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo considers it to be an irrefutable presumption (presunción iures et de iure), and rejected all other evidence produced during the proceeding, leaving the company he represents defenseless. The petitioner considers that such provisions are contrary to the principles of due process (debido proceso), the prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), and effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). Regarding due process, he states that the challenged rules exclude any possibility of presenting proof to the contrary if no written document exists, which violates the right of defense, and contradicts the rules on presumptions, with respect to which, the Código Procesal Civil in force at that time, stipulated that whoever invokes a legal presumption must prove the existence of the facts on which it is based, while also establishing a distinction between absolute and relative presumptions, such that relative presumptions could be countered by proof to the contrary through all legal means, except as established by law in certain cases regarding the time and manner of observing presumptions. He mentions that the challenged rules presume a taxable income to be borne by the taxpayer, because they determine a minimum interest rate on loans agreed upon in the exercise of freedom of contract, not admitting proof to the contrary when there is no written document, so it is treated as an absolute presumption, when, in his view, it should not be, because it does not involve the nullification of acts or the incorporation of a peremptory exception. He adds that the legal prohibition on the taxpayer from contradicting the presumption alleged by the tax authority is a violation of the right to submit and produce evidence as a guarantee of constitutional due process, since in accordance with Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, in the event that no written document exists, the tax administration can deem the existence of a loan or financing proven in order to apply the minimum interest rate, but it does not allow the taxpayer to resort to another means of proof to show that a lower rate, or even a zero rate, applies to the loan, thereby leaving the taxpayer in a position of disadvantage against the sovereign power of the tax administration. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, he mentions that the challenged articles are not reasonably founded and justified in accordance with constitutional ideology; he indicates that they are capricious provisions, which create an arbitrary advantage for the tax authorities to the detriment of the taxpayer's rights. He points out that the established presumption is contradictory and absurd, allowing the conclusion that in cases where a contract or written document exists, there is no presumption at all, because the reality of the loan is determined by the written agreement of the contracting parties; but when there is no contract or written document, the legal presumption is applied, yet he considers that such use would be contingent on demonstrating the underlying fact, which consists of the existence of a loan between taxpayers, which, if there is no written contract, would involve an informal or unwritten agreement. He therefore considers that the rules are unreasonable, since the powers granted to the tax administration to presume the existence of the loan are incongruent with the solution chosen by the legislator, which presumes them when there is no written contract, such that there is no formal verification of the loan.

He adds that the presumption applies, according to the contested third paragraph of Article 10, even if there is no loan contract, but there is financing, a figure defined in Article 13 of the Regulations, and which allows that financing to be carried out using assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or instruments, all of which would necessarily be through a written physical or digital document. He argues that for the application of the presumption, the rule requires verifying the existence of the financing in documentary or accessory evidence, but, because there is no principal document, evidence to the contrary regarding the actual reality of the loan or financing is excluded, thus breaking the logical unity of the regulatory proposal. Therefore, he considers that the presumption is not sufficiently coherent nor reasonably supported by the legality framework. Regarding effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), he points out that freedom of evidence is one of the relevant components of effective judicial protection and of the guarantee of legality control over the conduct of the public administration, to the point that Article 82 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo states that the means of proof may be all those permitted by Public Law and Common Law, while Article 298 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública indicates that the means of proof may be all those permitted by Public Law, even if they are not admissible under Common Law. However, he adds, the contested articles exclude any possibility of offering evidence to the contrary, and without criteria of reasonableness or proportionality. He mentions that the legal and regulatory impediment to admitting evidence to the contrary to the decision of an administrative authority to apply the presumption of a minimum interest rate represents an unconstitutional constraint that restricts the work of the administrative contentious judge, and creates a circle exempt from administrative contentious control; he states that they suppress the possibility of questioning the exercise of a power of the tax authority to apply a presumption. He requests that the action be granted.

**2.-** By resolution at fifteen hours fifty-eight minutes on January 8, 2020, this acción de inconstitucionalidad is processed, and a hearing is granted to the Procuraduría General de la República and the Ministerio de Hacienda.

**3.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in editions number 25, 26, and 27 of the Boletín Judicial, on February 7, 10, and 11, 2020, respectively.

**4.-** By a brief added to the expediente on January 25, 2020, Rodolfo Cordero Vargas appears in his capacity as Viceministro de Egresos of the Ministerio de Hacienda, who points out that the presumption of Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is subject to the application of a regulated administrative procedure that complies with the constitutional principles cited by the claimant. He explains that the contested rules are applied within and only as a result of an ex officio determination procedure (procedimiento de determinación de oficio) of the tax obligations, which begins once the deadline for the taxpayer to file and pay the tax return for the corresponding fiscal period has expired; that is, the presumption is not applied automatically. He indicates that such procedures consist of four stages: initiation of the procedures or initiation of the auditing action (actuación fiscalizadora); development of the procedures; conclusion of the procedures; review of the ex officio assessment act (acto de liquidación de oficio). He mentions that in the development stage of the procedures, every taxpayer is obliged to make available the supporting documents for their income, contracts, and others, which the taxpayer has the obligation to preserve and maintain for a period of five years and keep up to date; it is based on these supports that the Audit (Fiscalización) auditor must proceed to carry out the auditing action and determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the tax obligation that was self-assessed. Then, in the conclusion of procedures stage, the taxpayer is proposed to regularize their situation, and if they do not do so, they are notified of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos), which can be challenged by presenting the arguments and evidence deemed pertinent, to finally issue a determinative resolution or assessment act (acto de liquidación), in which it confirms and declares the challenge unfounded, or, on the contrary, annuls or revokes totally or partially the determination made. In that sense, he adds, the presumption of Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta is a substantive rule whose application complies with the constitutional principles indicated. He explains the tax base (base imponible) of the income tax, pointing out that in the case of loans or financing, the returns obtained in an economic activity subject to the tax on profits constitute taxable income or a deductible expense, depending on who is declaring said return. He adds that, under normal conditions, in which the audited taxpayer has the supporting documents for their tax return, income from financial returns is analyzed in light of what is declared, recorded, and supported by the taxpayer, and from these inputs and the information that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) obtains for its part from the other legal means cited above, a conclusion is reached (determination of the certain tax base (determinación de la base imponible cierta)) regarding the taxpayer's taxable income or gross income (Renta bruta), from which the deductible expenses are deducted (net income (renta neta)) to apply the tax rate and ascertain whether the tax or tax obligation was declared accurately, or not. However, in reality, cases arise in which taxpayers do not have the justifying documents for their return, and faced with the impossibility of obtaining a certain base that allows knowing exactly the financial income obtained by the taxpayer as a result of granting loans or financing, the questioned articles establish a presumptive way of determining the returns obtained. It starts from the premise that any loan or financing made within an economic activity that seeks profit responds to that profit motive, so it is presumed that the company obtains a return on the loans or financing in which it participates or invests. Therefore, given the lack of a certain base as a form of determining the tax base, Article 10 of the Law presumes the interest accrued during a specific fiscal period, making a distinction between a contract that has a written document and one that does not.

It is a legal presumption that admits no evidence to the contrary, and it is for the Tax Administration to demonstrate the existence of the fact—the loan or financing—in order to thereby shift the burden of proof to the audited taxpayer, so that the taxpayer demonstrates whether there is a written contract, that the interest earned is less than that which the rule seeks to apply, or, if there is no written contract, no evidence to the contrary is admitted, once the tax administration has demonstrated that a loan or financing contract was indeed present during the investigated fiscal period. It reiterates that the application of these rules is only carried out once the audit action (actuación fiscalizadora) has been followed, which implies a procedure for determining the tax obligation (determinación de la obligación tributaria), in which the audited taxpayer participates from the very moment the audit action begins, and that in the absence of a certain basis as a means of determining the taxable base (base imponible), the tax administration may apply the presumption established in Article 10 of the Law, and only once the administration demonstrates the existence of a loan or financing contract; if the supporting written document is not provided, the administration presumes the interest earned in the lucrative economic activity, without admitting evidence to the contrary, because the taxpayer could have provided that contrary evidence throughout the entire process of the audit action and even after its conclusion, can demonstrate it during the continuation of the tax obligation determination phase, through the non-acceptance of the regularization of its obligation proposed by the tax administration and the challenge of the statement of charges (traslado de cargos). It states that since the presumption of Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulations is applied only upon the conclusion of a procedure in which the taxpayer can oppose and defend against the charges, it is not true that due process and the right of defense are violated; although it is true that the rules exclude the presentation of evidence to the contrary if a written document does not exist, the presumption only operates in the absence of a determination of the taxable base and once all opportunities available to the taxpayer in the audit update (actualización fiscalizadora) and in the official determination of the tax obligation have been exhausted, to demonstrate with written documents the terms of the loan or financing granted, so that with this the tax administration can accurately tax the financial income obtained in a specific fiscal period. It argues that it is also not true that the application of this presumption is contrary to the rules on presumptions, since Article 155 of the Tax Code (Código Tributario) is clear in stating that in procedural matters, the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) is only applicable as a supplementary rule and in the absence of an express rule in the Tax Code, which is not the case here, because the rule in Article 10 of the Law is self-sufficient. It adds that just as the Civil Procedure Code requires proving the existence of the facts that serve as the basis for the presumption, the tax legal rule requires the tax administration to demonstrate the existence of a loan or financing, which in the absence of a written document generates the effect of presuming the existence of the accrual of interest at a specific rate and in favor of the taxpayer who has generated it, without admitting evidence to the contrary. Regarding the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad), it states that it is not true that the questioned rules are not reasonably founded and justified, nor that the provision is contradictory, absurd, or unreasonable, because it is presumed when there is no written contract, and what is taken as true is the existence of the loan or financing. It adds that there is no lack of legal support or foundation, because the determination of financial income as presumptive net income (renta neta presuntiva) in loans and financing stems from the interpretive exercise of the facts and their framing within the tax rule, according to what is regulated in the tax obligation determination procedure. Regarding the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), it affirms that although the challenged articles exclude any possibility of offering evidence to the contrary, it is not true that the principle of evidentiary freedom applicable to the contentious-administrative process is affected, since any taxpayer who has been the subject of an audit action and the official determination of the tax obligation has been able to resort to the jurisdictional avenue to challenge the validity of the rules or the procedure followed in their case. It requests that the action be declared without merit.

5.- Through a brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber on January 31, 2020, Julio Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), who indicates that the action is admissible because there exists a contentious-administrative process within which the respective cassation appeal (recurso de casación) has been filed before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He specifies that, basically, the objection of the claimant is summarized by the fact that, in his opinion, the presumption of interest in loan and financing contracts admits no evidence to the contrary, which he deems contrary to the right of defense, by denying the claimant the ability to provide any type of evidentiary means that would disprove taxable income, except a written document; unreasonable, because it establishes the presumption without first having demonstrated the underlying fact from which it derives, that is, the existence of a loan or financing; and that this administrative power falls outside the control of the contentious-administrative judge, whose work of controlling legality to arrive at the real truth of the facts is restricted by means of evidentiary elements other than the written document to question the application of the income presumption, which, in his opinion, injures access to justice and effective judicial protection.

Regarding the challenged Article 10, he explains that the first paragraph is based on the premise that a loan contract exists to which the presumptive interest or yield is applied. He emphasizes that the text is intended to be applied to loan contracts, and does not contain a presumption in that sense; rather, simply, if the administration verifies that it is in the presence of a contract of that type, it must apply the provision under comment with the consequent legal effect it contains. The consequence of this rule is the application of the legal presumption for the interest rate, that is, once the loan contract is detected in the audited case, the presumption of the yield generated is applied.

Furthermore, the final paragraph of that same numeral indicates that this presumption may be applied in other cases where there is no loan agreement (contrato de préstamo), but there is financing (financiamiento), for which it refers to Article 13 of the Regulation, which defines what should be understood as financing. Thus, if the loan or financing does not exist, the rules are not even applicable.

It reaffirms that the legal presumption of Article 10 is very specific and relates to the applicable interest rate, assuming that the loan or financing is for consideration (a título oneroso), since the taxable event (hecho generador) for the income comes from the interest that the lender obtains from such operation; otherwise, it would not be subject to tax. What is presumed is the applicable interest rate, not the existence of the contract or the financing, and it is a rate set at the minimum interest, which is reasonable and consistent with the principle of proportionality, limiting any type of excessive burden to the detriment of taxpayers.

It notes that this presumption does admit evidence to the contrary (prueba en contrario), conditioned on it being a written document. It is, therefore, a *iuris tantum* presumption, capable of being rebutted on the precise point of the interest used, whether to demonstrate a lower interest, or that no interest was agreed upon. It adds that the legislator established that there must be a written document or contract to admit evidence to the contrary. However, in the absence of that written document, the presumption of minimum profitability (presunción de rentabilidad mínima) admits no evidence to the contrary, given that with this, the legislator intends to reduce areas of tax evasion (evasión fiscal), by establishing that all loans of money or financing operations granted by a taxpayer to a third party generate a minimum return.

It indicates that from a reading of the challenged phrases, it is verified that, in reality, the taxpayer is not being denied the possibility of providing evidence, but rather the type of admissible evidence is merely restricted, so that it is a written contract or document in which the operation is recorded. Moreover, it continues, it is a common forensic practice in any jurisdiction to admit only that evidence which is pertinent to the theory of the case one seeks to prove. It adds that, as the point to be rebutted is so specific —the interest—, it is entirely consistent and reasonable that the admissible evidence be limited to that which is truly useful, for which the written document showing the loan or financing at a lower rate, zero rate, or without return must be provided. Without that written document, no other type of evidence will be admitted, but for a matter of pertinence. Therefore, evidence to the contrary is indeed admitted, but conditioned on the existence of the written document in which the loan agreement has been set forth, so there is indeed an opportunity or possibility for the taxpayer to prove that the fact or situation presumed is false or inaccurate, simply by providing the written document in which the loan agreement or the financing is recorded.

It mentions that one should not fall into the error of understanding that the questioned rules establish a presumption about the existence of the loan agreement, and even less, that this presumption is absolute, since all types of evidentiary elements can indeed be provided to demonstrate that the legal classification made by the tax administration was incorrect and that it is not a loan or financing.

It affirms that the questions of constitutionality must be dismissed, as no defect of unconstitutionality is observed in relation to the constitutional rules and principles, especially if examined within the framework of the legal block (bloque de juridicidad) that is applicable, particularly, in light of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios).

Regarding the allegation of violation of the right of defense, it assures that there is no curtailment of the guarantees of due process or the right of defense, because, contrary to what was affirmed by the claimant, not only does he have the right, but also the duty to provide all such evidence that can accurately reflect the data and circumstances chargeable to the taxable base (base imponible). It explains that Article 103 of the Tax Code of Norms and Procedures empowers the tax administration to require any person to declare their tax obligations, and to ascertain the veracity of the content of the sworn declarations. For its part, Article 104 states that the tax administration may require the presentation of books, files, records, and any other information of tax significance, such as copies of documentary or magnetic supports of credit operations and other financial conditions of the transactions, it being an obligation of the taxpayer to keep the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events, as provided in Article 128 of the same Code. It explains that these rules, together with those challenged in the action, form the legal block to which the Tax Administration is subject, and that it is the taxpayer himself who is responsible for providing and keeping the documentation and accounting support for the taxable operations. It is based on this documentation that the Tax Administration carries out the classification act (acto de calificación).

It reiterates that the articles do not contain a presumption about the existence of the loan agreement or the financing, but rather only its return is presumed through the determination of the applicable interest rate, and the application of Articles 10 of the Law and 13 of the Regulation does not correspond to a presumption by the Tax Administration, but is the result of the assessment of all the evidence that the taxpayer himself provided at the time of being audited. Thus, none of the contested rules prevents the taxpayer from presenting any type of evidence to demonstrate the reality of the operation or business conducted. It considers that there is an error in the claimant's assessment, in considering that there is a presumption about the existence of the loan agreement or the financing, but this is not so, because it starts from the premise that for the presumption of interest to apply, there must be a loan or financing.

It states that this error of assessment is evident from the plaintiff's own statements, regarding how he could provide a document that does not exist, but that upon reviewing the first-instance judgment issued in the base matter, it is observed that the judicial body appears to admit and evaluate all types of evidence, including testimonial evidence, to demonstrate the existence of the loan. It reaffirms that the presumption contained in the challenged rules stems from the existence of the loan or financing contract.

It adds that, furthermore, the rules of common law on presumptions could not be used, since article 169 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios expressly states that presumptions established by tax laws may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, except in cases where those laws expressly prohibit it.

It refers that a violation of the principle of equality cannot be alleged, because it is the taxpayer himself who must provide the evidence and other pertinent documentation to determine his legal situation and the economic reality of his activity.

Therefore, the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad) is inaccurate, for considering it an unreasonable or disproportionate rule. It emphasizes that the presumption is about the applicable rate, and that presumption arises under the assumption that a loan or financing contract exists, which is determined based on the documentation provided by the taxpayer himself. It reiterates that this presumption admits evidence to the contrary, for which the written document in which it was so stipulated must be provided. The challenged rules are neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, since they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all the documentation he considers useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the taxed operation or business, and if from that evidence it is verified that a loan or financing contract exists, it is also permitted to refute the presumption of the yield (rendimiento) through the suitable evidence, which is the respective written document in which the taxed operation was formalized. It specifies that in the constitutional jurisprudence itself cited by the plaintiff, reference is made to judgment 2004-14421, which states that administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the block of legality, and in this case, that block is made up of articles 103, 104, 123 and 128 of the Código Tributario, which help to understand that the administration's power of imperium to apply the legal presumption corresponds to a measured exercise, marked by the possibility for the taxpayer to provide all documentation or information that demonstrates the economic reality of his activity.

Thus, it continues, the mere wording of the challenged precepts does not give rise to capricious or arbitrary applications, and it is not observed that they are incompatible or incongruent with the norms of the Código Tributario.

Regarding effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), it considers that the plaintiff's disagreement lies in the way the rule is applied and not in its intrinsic unconstitutionality. The challenged articles do not impose any type of restriction on the contentious-administrative judge to control whether both precepts were duly applied or not to the specific case, so that the judge can assess the same information that the taxpayer provided to the tax authority, and determine if indeed there was a credit or financing operation to which the interest presumption should be applied. The challenged norms, far from creating areas outside judicial control, delimit judicial discretion in determining what evidence is considered suitable, without overlooking that the same presumption of the interest rate does admit evidence to the contrary, so the judge will always be able to oversee the application that the Tax Administration makes of the challenged norms.

It concludes that the action must be dismissed, because it is not observed that the constitutional principles of due process, reasonableness, proportionality, prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción a la arbitrariedad), and effective judicial protection are violated.

6.- By resolution of this Chamber, at nine hours and fifty-seven minutes on March 5, 2020, the hearings granted are deemed answered, and this action is assigned to the office of the instructing magistrate, for its consideration on the merits.

7.- The hearing provided for in articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 of the same law, considering this resolution sufficiently grounded in clear principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

8.- The prescriptions of law have been complied with in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate Araya García; and,

Considerando

I.- On the formal admissibility requirements of the action of unconstitutionality. The action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific technical requirements, which must be fulfilled so that the Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional stipulates the admissibility requirements of the action of unconstitutionality; among these, the existence of a base or prior matter pending resolution is required, whether in judicial proceedings or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route, in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered infringed. For its part, in the second and third paragraphs of the same norm, the requirements under which the prior matter is not required are exceptionally regulated, that is, when due to the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury, or it involves the protection of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is directly filed by the Contralor General de la República, the Procurador General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes.

Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, the Chamber, through judgment number 1995-4190, indicated that the action is "a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved is required—whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route—in order to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process, since it rules on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in that matter; and only by exception does the legislation permit direct access to this route—presuppositions of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional—". For this reason, the requirement of a prior pending matter does not constitute a mere formality, since the existence of a base matter, nor the invocation of unconstitutionality, is sufficient; rather, it is indispensable that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered violated, which means that the challenged norms must be applicable in the base matter —see, in a similar sense, judgments number 1990-1668, 1993-408, 1994-798, 1994-3615, 1995-409, 1995-851,1995-4190 and 1996-791—. On the other hand, it is opportune to note that there are other technical requirements that must be met, such as, for example, the explicit determination of the duly reasoned challenged norms, with specific reference to the constitutional mandates and principles considered infringed, the authentication through legal counsel of the writ filing the action, the accreditation of the conditions of standing (legitimación)—powers and certifications—, as well as the literal certification of the claim for unconstitutionality, which, in the event they are not provided by the plaintiffs, may be ordered by the Presidency of the Chamber for compliance.

**II.- The standing (legitimación) of the plaintiff in this case.-** Based on what was stated in the previous paragraph, in the specific case, it is found that the plaintiff claims to come before this Chamber under the first paragraph of the cited Article 75, offering as the base matter the administrative contentious proceeding being processed under case file number 14-006900-1027-CA, filed against the State by the company Thunderbird Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, which later was renamed CIRSA Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, and which was absorbed by the plaintiff company Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima. In said judicial process, Section VIII of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda issued judgment number 62-2018-VIII, against which the plaintiff filed a formal appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), in which it invoked the unconstitutionality now being heard. Said appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) was formally admitted by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, by order at eight forty-five hours on November 14, 2019, and its resolution is pending.

Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff has sufficient standing (legitimación) to challenge the constitutionality of the impugned norms, in addition to the fact that this is a matter whose constitutionality it is appropriate to review in this venue. In addition to the foregoing, it is found that the plaintiff has complied with the requirements stipulated in numerals 78 and 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. In conclusion, the present action is admissible, and it is resolved on the merits as indicated in the following recitals (considerandos).

**III.- On the object of this action of unconstitutionality.** The plaintiff specifically questions Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, law number 7092, of April 21, 1988, as well as Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H.

Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta provides:

"ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income (Renta neta presuntiva) from loans and financings. It is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that any loan or financing contract, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, earns interest no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional.

In cases where no written document exists, proof to the contrary shall not be accepted against the presumption.

The Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but financing does, as established in the regulation of this law." For its part, Article 13 of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H, established:

"ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income (Renta neta presuntiva) and financing contracts. In any contract or loan operation, that implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, it is presumed, unless proven otherwise, that there is a net income from interest, which must be calculated at an interest rate no less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, in the absence thereof, at the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption also applies when an interest rate lower than that which, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operations in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that there is no interest at all.

Proof to the contrary is not admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists. The Administration (Administración) may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists." For the purposes of the provisions set forth in article 10 of the law, financing (financiamiento) is understood to be any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal course of business, by using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities (títulos valores) or other commercial documents or instruments.

Regarding this regulatory provision that is being challenged, it must be noted that the regulation that contained it—Decreto Ejecutivo No. 18445-H, of September 9, 1988—is no longer in force as of the date of this judgment, because it was repealed by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 43198-H, of July 22, 2021, which adopted the current Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta. This current regulation, with respect to this provision, maintained the identical wording of the previous regulation, only now in its Article 20, which states:

"Article 20.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In any loan contract or operation that implies financing, whatever its nature or denomination, if there is a written document, it is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary, that there is net interest income, which must be calculated at an interest rate not less than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica or, in the absence thereof, the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption also applies when an interest rate lower than that which, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of operation in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that there is no interest whatsoever.

No proof to the contrary is admitted for the established presumption when there is no written document. The Tax Administration (Administración) may apply the presumption referred to in article 10 of the law if financing occurs, even when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of the provisions set forth in article 10 of the law, financing is understood to be any action or operation that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal course of business, by using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities or other commercial documents or instruments." Thus, as of today, the regulatory provision being challenged is not formally in force, though it is clear that the same identical disposition is in force according to the provisions set forth in Article 20 of the new regulation adopted by Decreto Ejecutivo No. 43198-H.

In this regard, the Chamber (Sala) will rule on the questions raised by virtue of the legal effects that such provision might have produced during its validity—see judgments No. 5445-99 and 2024-3228. On this point, it is pertinent to recall what the Chamber has held in repeated pronouncements since judgment No. 3152-1994—including the recent judgment mentioned, No. 2024-3228—to the effect that:

"[T]he control of constitutionality is exercised with reference to the law in force; however, one can conceive of some exceptional cases to this rule. There are situations in which a repealed provision may have been applied during its validity or may be being applied in violation of the Constitution and to the detriment of a person whose grievance persists after the repeal, in which case that provision can and must be subject to interpretation and control even though it is not in force at the time of issuing the judgment; these are cases where the repeal does not turn the matter into something abstract that impedes the subsequent constitutional control of the repealed provision. In the specific case of this action, it is appropriate to conduct the constitutional analysis because the provision can still affect the interests of the petitioner; that is, unconstitutionality is a reasonable means to protect the right or interest deemed injured, under the terms of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional." In the opinion of the petitioner, Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta and Article 13 of the then-effective Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta—currently Article 20 of said regulation—violate the right of defense, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad), and the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), since it considers that such provisions establish a presumption regarding the applicable interest rates in cases of loans or financing, against which no proof to the contrary is admitted.

In this sense, the following recitals (considerandos) will address each of the objections raised by the petitioner, with two prior warnings. The first, that since it essentially concerns the same objection raised regarding Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 of the Regulation, both provisions will be assessed together in relation to the right and the principles deemed violated. The second, that since it is evident that the arguments raised by the petitioner regarding the principles of prohibition of arbitrariness and effective judicial protection are intimately related and dependent upon what is argued regarding the right of defense, by resolving the latter, the former are essentially resolved as well.

IV.- Regarding the challenged provisions and the alleged violation of the right of defense. The petitioner argues that the presumption established in Article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and Article 13 of the Regulation to said law, violates the taxpayer's right of defense, insofar as they do not admit proof to the contrary.

In this regard, it is appropriate to reiterate, as relevant, what is prescribed by both provisions regarding the alleged presumption and the alleged impossibility of providing proof to the contrary. Regarding what is relevant, Article 10 of the Law states:

"ARTICLE 10.- Presumptive net income from loans and financing.

It is presumed, <span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">unless evidence to the contrary is provided</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, that every financing loan contract, whatever its nature or name, </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">if there is a written document</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, accrues interest at a rate no lower than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica, or, failing that, at the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><br><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">In cases where no written document exists, no evidence to the contrary shall be admitted against the presumption</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">The Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may apply this presumption in other situations even if no loan contract exists, but where there is financing, as established in the regulations of this law.</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> -</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">emphasis added-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">For its part, Article 13 of the Regulations -current Article 20- provides:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">ARTICLE 13.- Presumptive net income and financing contracts. In every loan contract or transaction involving financing, whatever its nature or name, </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">if there is a written document, it is presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is provided, that there is net income from interest</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">, which must be calculated at an interest rate no lower than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Banco Central de Costa Rica or, failing that, at the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. This presumption also applies when an interest rate lower than what, according to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponds to the type of transaction in question is stipulated, or when it has been expressly agreed that no interest exists.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">No evidence to the contrary is admitted for the established presumption when no written document exists</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">. The Administration (Administración) may apply the presumption referred to in Article 10 of the law, if financing occurs,</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">even</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">when no loan contract exists. For the purposes of the provisions in Article 10 of the law, financing is understood as any action or transaction that generates funds, allowing the recipient to carry out the activities of its normal business line, using its assets as collateral or as negotiable instruments, or through the issuance of securities (títulos valores) or other commercial instruments (títulos comerciales).</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub">”</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub"> -highlighting not in the original-</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">It is clear, then, that both norms contain a similar provision regarding the subject matter of this action, in the sense that when a written loan or financing contract exists, a specific interest rate is presumed, against which evidence to the contrary is admitted. In contrast, if no written document exists, no evidence to the contrary is admitted.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Thus, regarding the first scenario -that a written document exists-, contrary to what the plaintiff argues, it is evident that the presumption does admit evidence to the contrary. Note that the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Law clearly and expressly states that </span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">«</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">unless evidence to the contrary is provided</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">»</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">, it is presumed that interest accrues at a rate no lower than the highest annual active interest rate set by the Central Bank, or that, in the absence of this rate, it is presumed that it will be according to the average of the annual active interest rates of the banks of the Sistema Bancario Nacional. In these cases, the taxpayer can present evidence to the contrary to challenge the presumption that the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) would be applying to determine their presumptive income, thereby clearly evidencing that the possibility of presenting evidence to the contrary does exist in these cases, so that, by itself, there is not even remotely an impairment of the taxpayer's right of defense, since they can present evidence to the contrary to challenge the rate that could be presumptively applied to determine the income on which they must pay taxes.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">A similar provision is found in the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Regulations regarding the applicable rate when a written document exists.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The apparent problem seems to arise in the second scenario, that is, with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Law, and in the second paragraph -</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">ab initio</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">- of Article 13 of the Regulations, which essentially state that no evidence to the contrary is admitted against that presumption when no written document exists. To understand how this provision is likewise far from constituting a negative impairment of the right of defense, one must consider the process involved through which the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) may use and apply this presumption.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">V.-</span><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> The application of the presumption indicated in the challenged articles is a power of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) that arises in the process of determining the tax obligation (obligación tributaria) of a taxpayer regarding the income tax. That is, it is not an autonomous determination, separate from a process of determining the tax obligation, much less arbitrary or lacking support; nor is it an arbitrary determination or the product of any discretionary power of the administration.</span></p> On the contrary, said presumption is established by law in a specific case, and after it is concluded that its application is necessary.

In this regard, one must start from the tax obligations of every taxpayer who is subject to income tax and from the audit powers of the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), from which what is prescribed in the following articles of the Code of Tax Standards and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) is of particular interest.

Article 103 of the Code provides that it is the responsibility of said Administration to verify the correct compliance with tax obligations, being able to require that the declaration of obligations be made and to ascertain the veracity of its content. In what concerns us, this article states:

**“Article 103.- Tax control** The Tax Administration **is empowered to verify the correct compliance with tax obligations** by all legal means and procedures. To that effect, said Administration is specifically authorized to:

**a)** Require any natural or legal person, whether or not registered for the payment of taxes, **to declare their tax obligations** within the period indicated for that purpose, by the means that, in accordance with the advancement of science and technology, are established as mandatory for tax obligors, while guaranteeing that persons who do not have access to the technologies required to declare have facilities provided by the Administration itself.

**b)** **Ascertain the veracity of the content of the sworn declarations** by the legal means and procedures of analysis and investigation it deems convenient.

**(…)**” -the highlighting is not in the original- For its part, Article 104 of the same Code states that the Tax Administration may require diverse information from the taxpayer, precisely to ascertain that veracity indicated in the previous article and “verify the tax situation of the taxpayers.” This Article 104 provides:

**“Article 104.- Requests for information from the taxpayer** To facilitate the timely verification of the tax situation of the taxpayers, the Tax Administration may require from them the presentation of books, files, accounting records, and any other information of tax significance that is printed as a document, on a technical medium, or recorded by any other technological means.

Without prejudice to these general powers, the Administration may request from taxpayers and responsible parties:

**a)** From taxpayers classified, according to the established criteria, as large national taxpayers or large territorial companies, **the financial statements duly certified by an authorized public accountant (contador público autorizado)**, including the explanatory notes on the most significant accounting policies and other explanatory notes contained in the opinion of the independent professional who has audited them. The Tax Administration is also empowered to require them, as well as other groups of taxpayers for whom, due to the volume and nature of their operations, this requirement does not entail disproportionate costs.

**b)** **A copy of the books, files, and accounting records**.

(…)

**e)** **A copy of the documentary or magnetic supporting documents for credit operations**, purchases, sales, and/or leases of goods and trust contracts (financial or operating), processed in private companies, collective entities, cooperatives, banks of the National Banking System, financial entities, whether or not regulated; de facto partnerships, or any other natural, legal, or de facto person, **and the other financial conditions of the transactions** must be identified, in the terms regulated in the regulation.

The expenses for the application of the provisions in subsections b), c), d), and e) above shall be borne by the Tax Administration.” -emphasis added- Likewise, always in the vein of the importance of verifying the information and declarations provided by taxpayers, Article 123 of the same Code of Tax Standards and Procedures provides that the declarations and documentation of taxpayers are subject to verification by the Tax Administration, which may carry out the appropriate investigations, proceedings, and examinations to verify the declarations and the data contained in the documentation.

This article 123 indicates:

"**Article 123.- Verification of sworn statements (declaraciones), books, and other documents** The sworn statements (declaraciones juradas) submitted by taxpayers (contribuyentes) and responsible parties and the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, insofar as they must contain information relating to the assessment (liquidación) or payment of taxes, are subject to verification (comprobación) by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria). For such purposes, it may carry out, within the law and through duly authorized officials, all investigations, proceedings, and verification examinations it deems necessary and useful.

Once the verification is completed, the difference in tax owed by the taxpayer or the declaring responsible party must be collected; or, as the case may be, the excess they have paid must be refunded ex officio." -emphasis supplied- Finally, Article 128 of the same Tax Code and Procedures (Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios) specifies that it is the obligation of taxpayers not only to facilitate the tasks of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration, but also, especially, to preserve the background records (antecedentes) of any operation or situation that gives rise to facts on which tax must be paid. In the pertinent part, this article provides:

"**Article 128.- Obligations of private parties** Taxpayers (contribuyentes) and responsible parties are obliged to facilitate the tasks of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation carried out by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) and, in particular, must:

• a)When required by laws or regulations, or demanded by said Administration by virtue of the powers granted to it by this Code: (…) iii. Submit the corresponding sworn statements (declaraciones).
• b)Keep, in an orderly manner, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records, and the background records (antecedentes) of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events. (…)
• d)Present or exhibit, at the offices of the Tax Administration or before authorized officials, the financial, accounting, and any other type of records related to events triggering their tax obligations and formulate the applications or clarifications requested of them. (…)" Consequently, it is clear not only that the taxpayer has the duty to file their returns, providing the corresponding documentation for that purpose, and, at the same time, that it is incumbent upon the Tax Administration to verify the truthfulness of the information received, for which it may request and have access to the returns, books, deeds, documentary or magnetic supports, accounting records, and all other information of tax significance, the taxpayer, in turn, having to facilitate that task of determination (determinación), audit (fiscalización), and investigation (investigación), for which they must keep the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events.

It is based on these obligations imposed on the taxpayer and the powers granted to the Tax Administration, that before a tax return, such as the income tax return, the Administration may act accordingly to determine its content, truthfulness, and scope, which is carried out through a tax assessment procedure (procedimiento de fijación tributaria) that, as explained by the Ministry of Finance, is composed of four phases or stages, namely:

• a)Initiation of the audit activity (actividad fiscalizadora): this is the beginning of the audit action, by means of which the taxpayer is informed when it will commence, and where they are expressly told that they must have the supporting documents for the tax return available.
• b)Development of the procedures: this is the phase where the taxpayer must make available to the Administration all the necessary documentation —article 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios— and in which the Administration carries out all the verification of the documentation provided. In this phase, as emphasized by the Ministry of Finance, documentary support is vital, "since it is from these supports that the audit auditor must depart to carry out the audit action and determine the accuracy or otherwise of the tax obligation that was self-assessed and declared at the time by the taxpayer." c) Conclusion of the procedures: once the investigation and assessment of the pertinent documentation has been carried out, the taxpayer is summoned to a hearing to present the conclusions of the audit action and the results thereof, indicating whether or not there were tax differences, or even balances in favor of the taxpayer. If necessary, the taxpayer is warned to regularize their situation, and the determinative statement of charges (traslado de cargos determinativo) is notified, indicating the charges, facts, and grounds of the determination (determinación) made.
• d)Challenge (Impugnación) of the statement of charges or the assessment order (auto de liquidación): in accordance with article 144 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, the taxpayer may file a formal challenge against the statement of charges, presenting the pertinent allegations and evidence, so that the Tax Administration issues a determinative resolution (resolución determinativa) or assessment act (acto de liquidación), in which the challenge is confirmed or dismissed, or else, the determination made is annulled totally or partially. This challenge is made through the appeal for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) provided for in article 145 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, and the appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, pursuant to the provisions of article 146 of the same Code.

Thus, the application of the presumption indicated in article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and in article 13 —now article 20— of the Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, takes place after the application of this tax assessment procedure that begins with the filing of the return. This is so, because upon the filing of a return related to income tax, and for the purpose of verifying the truthfulness of the data contained therein, the Tax Administration has the power to review all the documentation described in the cited rules of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. It is in this audit process carried out by the Tax Administration, that the presumption regarding the applicable interest rate in written loan or financing contracts may be applied, in which case, according to what was stated in the preceding Considerando, evidence to the contrary may be presented to prove a different or non-existent interest rate.

But in those cases where the existence of a loan or financing operation that is not in writing is alleged, the presumption regarding the interest rate is applied, without it being possible to provide evidence to the contrary. This is so, because from the cited regulations, it is evident that the entire process of verifying a tax obligation according to the indicated procedure, starts from the review and validation of supporting documentation of a different nature that the taxpayer is obligated to have and maintain. In this regard, the definition in subsection b) of article 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios —already expressly cited— is highly illustrative when it defines as an obligation of the taxpayer "[to] keep, in an orderly manner, the financial, accounting, and any other kind of records, and the records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events." This regulatory provision starts from the obligation that the taxpayer has to hold and properly arrange those "records of the operations or situations that constitute taxable events," from which it follows that if the existence of a loan or financing contract is alleged in the tax return, the taxpayer must be able to demonstrate the existence of the applicable rate because subsection b) of article 128 of this Code so imposes it. Otherwise, not having that documentation prevents the Tax Administration from exercising its auditing and verifying function of the tax obligation, and hence the existence and application of the legally established presumption.

It is clear that if there is supporting documentation regarding the loan or financing contract alleged in a tax return and the rate that applies to it, the presumption would admit proof to the contrary, precisely because in fulfillment of the obligation indicated in subsection b) of article 128 of the Code, the taxpayer can prove not only the existence of the loan or financing contract, but also the agreed rate; however, conversely, the breach of that obligation gives rise to the impossibility of verifying what was declared, resulting in the application of the presumption under challenge.

In other words, the due fulfillment of the obligation in subsection b) of article 128 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures allows the taxpayer not only to demonstrate the existence of the loan or financing contract alleged in their return and the applicable rate, but also, that when faced with the application of the presumption indicated in the questioned rules, they can validly present proof to the contrary so that in the tax verification and audit process, the Administration evaluates that written evidence and resolves accordingly. On the contrary, the breach of that duty under article 128 of the Code prevents the taxpayer from proving the existence of a different interest rate, which in turn prevents the Tax Administration from verifying whether what was stated in the return is valid or not, and therefore, given that breach by the taxpayer and the impossibility for the Tax Administration, the presumption under discussion becomes applicable.

Likewise, it should be noted that all of this assessment must be carried out within the context of the verification procedure indicated in preceding paragraphs, so it is in the second stage of that procedure—development of the proceedings—when the taxpayer can demonstrate and prove the existence of a lower rate if they have it in writing, which could also even be done before the conclusion of the administrative procedure before the Tax Administration itself or before the Administrative Tax Tribunal—articles 144 and 145 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures—and it could also eventually be done in the judicial venue, provided they have the necessary prior written documentation that allows rebutting the presumption that is sought to be applied.

VI.- On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the questioned rules, by establishing the application of this presumption regarding the applicable rate in loan or financing contracts, would be contrary to the general rules of presumptions set forth in common law. However, it must be noted that the specialized nature of the tax matter gives rise to the existence of sectoral principles and specific rules to regulate this type of situation, and that, precisely because of their specialty, they are particularly applicable instead of ordinary or common law rules. Thus, specifically on this matter, article 169 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures is highly illustrative, in stating:

“Article 169.- Tax regulations Laws and regulations containing tax rules must expressly mention this in their title and in a heading with which each of the articles must be titled, in order to facilitate their understanding and handling.

Laws and regulations that modify tax rules shall contain a complete list of the repealed rules and the new wording of those that are modified.

The rules that regulate the regime of tax infractions and sanctions, as well as surcharges, fines, and interest, shall have retroactive effects when their application is more favorable to the affected party.

The presumptions established by tax laws can be challenged by proof to the contrary, except in cases where those expressly prohibit it.” -emphasis added- Thus, it is clear, according to the above, that these special rules on the presumption for the determination of the interest rate in cases of presumptive income are far from running counter to the general rules on presumptions, since the truth is that on this particular subject, the specialty of the tax matter prevails, as determined by the law itself.

In any case, it should be noted that what is alleged by the plaintiff falls within the scope of an apparent contradiction—which does not exist—between the application of norms within the sphere of legality, which, according to what has been stated, in no way implies that there is a constitutional nonconformity of the norms challenged in this action.

**VII.-** Consequently, it is clear that the application of the presumption under discussion arises after the completion of a verification and oversight (fiscalización) process carried out by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria), in accordance with the cited norms and in which the taxpayer has direct participation, not only as the subject obligated to file the tax return (declaración tributaria) and to maintain and preserve the supporting documentation for its operations, but also as an active party in that verification process, where it must not only make all supporting documentation available to the Tax Administration, but where it is also previously notified, participates in the process, is informed of the investigation results, is notified of a statement of objections (traslado de cargos), which it can challenge before the Tax Administration itself or before the Tax Administrative Court (Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo). In such a manner, it is inappropriate to claim that the application of this presumption indicated in the challenged articles is contrary to the right of defense (derecho de defensa), since it is clear that the taxpayer not only has the aforementioned obligations but is also recognized that right of participation in the process of determining the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), being able to exercise the pertinent appellate activity, and that it is upon the breach of its duties as a taxpayer and upon the impossibility of the Tax Administration to verify the data contained in the return, that the application of the presumption in question takes place.

Thus, since the violation of the right of defense is ruled out, the action must be declared without merit regarding this point.

**VIII.- On the challenged norms and the alleged violation of the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad).** The plaintiff alleges that, together with the impact on the right of defense—already ruled out—the challenged norms and the presumption indicated therein also violate the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness.

The principle of prohibition against arbitrariness determines that every action, activity, and expression of the administration must be duly and reasonably grounded in accordance with the bloc of legitimacy or the existing Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución); it implies that every action must be clothed with the necessary objectivity, which not only prevents its issuance or adoption without that reasonable basis, but also prevents an action that causes differentiation without sufficient and just reason. Thus, in reiterated case law, this Chamber has recognized and applied this principle. In judgment number 2007-11155—reiterated, among many others, by judgments 2008-11390 and 2012-18298—the Chamber stated that:

“[T]he principle of prohibition against arbitrariness supposes the prohibition of arbitrariness, that is, of any differentiation lacking a sufficient and just reason. (…) Arbitrariness is synonymous with ostensible injustice, and injustice is not limited to discrimination. Arbitrary action is that contrary to justice, reason, or the laws, which obeys the mere whim or will of the public agent. **The prohibition against arbitrariness condemns the lack of objective legal basis or foundation for an administrative conduct** and, consequently, the violation of the material order of the principles and values inherent to the Rule of Law. In essence, the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness has been operating as a powerful corrective against abusive and discriminatory actions by public administrations when exercising discretionary powers (abuse or excess of discretion). Regarding the application of the principle of prohibition against arbitrariness in the area of regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria), it must be indicated that, since the latter is naturally discretionary, the prohibitive principle of arbitrariness plays a role of the highest order. In the first place, it must be noted that, except for matters that are reserved for regulation—internal organization and statutory or service relations—and in which autonomous or independent regulations—from the law—are admissible, a first limit of the regulatory power is its subjection to the law it intends to develop or execute, an aspect that obviously has a connection with constitutional principles such as legality, reserve of law, and normative hierarchy.

The regulatory power is, except in the cases indicated, the expression of an option or alternative predetermined by the ordinary legislator in the exercise of their freedom of configuration, from which the competent body to exercise the regulatory power may not depart.” – emphasis supplied- The need to base the action on the block of legitimacy – which is known to be more comprehensive than legality itself – is evident when, through judgment 2004-14421, the Chamber indicated that:

“[T]he administrative conduct must be sufficiently coherent and reasonably supported by the block of legality, so that it is based on and explains itself.” As has been indicated, the reasonable nature of the action, and the consequent inexistence of arbitrariness, is based on the measure being grounded in that block of legitimacy that has been mentioned, in which not only the norms themselves are considered, but also the set of applicable values and principles that, in turn, inform the norms to endow them with legitimate validity.

It is for this reason that, applying this principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (interdicción de la arbitrariedad) to tax matters proper, through judgment 2011-1356 the Chamber defined:

“It must be remembered that presumptive determinations cannot be arbitrary, so as not to violate the ability to pay and the possible insolvency or bankruptcy of a natural or legal person. What the legislation does is establish the minimum of the tax, which can be rebutted even being a iuris tantum presumption, so this initial determination can be modified.” Thus, and in accordance with the provisions of the preceding recital, it is important to reiterate that the application of the presumption contemplated in article 10 of the Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, and article 13 – current article 20 – of its Reglamento, regarding the rate applicable in those cases where no written document exists, is the result of a verification and audit process conducted by the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) based on the documentation that the taxpayer himself must keep, maintain, provide, and make available; it does not involve information prepared by the Administration, nor whimsical, absolutely discretionary or normatively unsupported actions, but rather elements of assessment provided by the interested party himself within a procedure of verification, audit and determination carried out in accordance with the provisions of articles 103, 104, 123 and 128 of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

In this sense, it could in no way be argued that the application of this presumption by the Tax Administration is an unfounded, objectively unsupported or arbitrary act that is contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness, since the truth of the matter is that we are faced with the application of a presumption duly enabled by law, before a specific and exceptional scenario, which would be the inexistence of documentation that not only should exist, but should be kept, maintained and made available to the Tax Administration when so required, and that should the conditions exist or be recorded in writing, the presentation of evidence to the contrary would indeed be viable.

It is for this reason that the Chamber agrees with the criterion of the Procuraduría General de la República, in stating that:

“From that perspective, the challenged norms are not unreasonable, nor disproportionate, since they do not prevent the taxpayer from providing all the documentation that he deems useful to demonstrate the economic reality of the transaction or business subject to tax, without imposing any type of requirement. And if from that evidence it is verified that, in effect, there exists a loan contract or another type of financing, a scenario in which the challenged norms would be applicable; he is also allowed to refute the presumption of the yield generated by means of suitable evidence, which requires having the respective written document in which the taxed transaction was formalized.” In this sense, taking into consideration that the application of the presumption provided for in the articles challenged in this action is the product of conducting an administrative proceeding in which the Tax Administration must adhere to the referred provisions of the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, a proceeding in which, moreover, the taxpayer's right of defense is guaranteed, it must be concluded that the application of the presumption and the consequent tax determination itself are far from being the result of an arbitrary action by the Tax Administration.

Likewise, it must also be concluded that Article 10 of the Law and Article 13 —currently Article 20— of the Regulation are not, in themselves, contrary to the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad), given that the possibility of applying the presumption recognized therein is necessarily subject to the completion of the corresponding verification procedure (procedimiento de verificación).

Consequently, the norms challenged in this action are also not violative of the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness.

IX.- Regarding the challenged norms and the alleged violation of the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva). The plaintiff argues that the articles challenged in this action are equally violative of the principle of effective judicial protection, and, consequently, of Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, essentially because, in his view, the presumption in question suppresses "the possibility of challenging the exercise of a power by the tax authority to apply a presumption of income," adding, furthermore, that the norms in dispute violate the principle of freedom of proof (libertad probatoria) and prevent proof to the contrary in this regard.

On this point, it should be noted that, based on the integration of Articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution, the recognition of the principle of effective judicial protection is certainly produced, from which the right to resort to judicial channels in defense of rights deemed affected and to carry out, through judicial channels, the legality review of administrative conduct is enabled. Specifically, Article 49 of the Constitution establishes the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contencioso administrativa) to guarantee the legality of the State's administrative function.

For its part, based on the principle of freedom of proof, it is validated that the facts alleged within a proceeding may be demonstrated through the legitimate and valid means available, always starting from the premise of licitly obtaining the evidence, its relevance for the purposes of the proceeding, and the viability of its use in the context of the situation sought to be elucidated or resolved. Thus, in judgment number 2004-12385, the Chamber stated that:

"According to this [the principle of freedom of proof], everything can be proven by any means, provided it is not illegal. This is because, in the structure of a Democratic Rule of Law, the search for the real truth is an objective that cannot be placed above the fundamental rights of the parties in the criminal process, so that it is not a truth at any cost but rather one obtained by legitimate means, subject to limitations (...)" --emphasis added-- Thus, the plaintiff understands that the norms he challenges in this action violate both principles because, in his view, the presumption established therein prevents engaging in a judicial activity where it would be possible to admit evidence that could disprove the determination made based on that presumption.

However, in accordance with what has been extensively set forth in the preceding recitals, the special tax norm governing the matter is the one that indicates the existence of that presumption, which does admit proof to the contrary if it is of a written documentary nature. It has already been explained that this is so, because given the nature of the tax obligation (obligación tributaria), it is the taxpayer who has the duty to possess, maintain, and preserve the documentation that serves as the basis for their tax return, as well as to make it available to the Tax Administration (Administración Tributaria) if necessary to verify what was stated in the return, which is carried out within an administrative proceeding that gives rise to a determination, which can be challenged through administrative channels and, clearly, also through judicial channels. Likewise, if in that tax determination the presumption indicated in Article 10 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta) and in Article 13 —now Article 20— of its Regulation has been applied, the taxpayer has the possibility of providing proof to the contrary, provided it is written documentation, since, as has been reiterated, the special nature of the tax obligation so requires.

This allows the contentious-administrative jurisdiction the proper exercise of assessment in the judicial venue of the claims that may be filed to that effect, and, whether or not that written documentation exists, to resolve as the law corresponds in each specific case.

It is for the foregoing reason that, in the words of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República):

"[T]he challenged articles do not impose any type of restriction on the contentious-administrative judge to control whether both precepts were duly applied or not to the taxpayer's specific case by the Administration." Thus, the judge can assess the same information that the taxpayer supplied to the tax authority and determine, as an initial premise, whether there was indeed a credit or financing operation to which the presumption of interest can be applied; in which case, if an improper assessment of the factual matrix and the legal classification made were to be shown, the judge could perfectly annul the determining acts of the Tax Administration.

Therefore, it is clear that a challenge to the determination through judicial channels is indeed possible, from which it follows, naturally, that it is inappropriate to allege an impossibility of accessing said channel and a consequent negative impact on the principle of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva), since not only is the judicial channel enabled, but in exercising that function, the judging person does so based on the special provisions governing tax matters and the corresponding judicial process. The presumption established in the norms challenged in this action in no way prevents access to the judicial channel and the ruling by the judging person; on the contrary, said channel is enabled, and the judging person assesses the circumstances of fact and law in accordance with the provisions of the current regulations.

Now, as for the principle of freedom of evidence (principio de libertad probatorio), if that evidentiary breadth must also be exercised in accordance with the law, and conform to the special provisions—since it is adjusted to what the law provides and to the limitations inherent to the process in question—in this matter, it turns out that the possibility of submitting evidence does exist, but is circumscribed by law to written documentation (documentación escrita), due, as has already been extensively reiterated, to the special nature of tax matters.

Consequently, it must also be ruled out that the challenged provisions are contrary to the principles of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and freedom of evidence (libertad probatorio).

**X.- By way of conclusion.** In summary, given that Article 10 of the Income Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), and Article 13—now Article 20—of the Regulations to the Income Tax Law (Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta), are far from constituting a violation of the right of defense (derecho de defensa), the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness (principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad), and the principles of effective judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva) and freedom of evidence (libertad probatorio), the proper course is to declare the action without merit.

**Por tanto** The action is declared without merit.

Here is the English translation of the provided HTML excerpt:

``` Paul Rueda L. ``` Apologies, but I am unable to process this request as the content provided appears to be a random string of encoded data or technical metadata rather than a text excerpt from a Costa Rican Spanish legal document. There is no legal text, articles, tables, or defined terms present to translate as per your instructions.

Please provide the actual Spanish legal text excerpt you would like translated.

Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&nbsp;</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'TIMES NEW ROMAN'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:21pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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Ingrid Hess H.

&nbsp; &nbsp; Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --  &nbsp;

Revisión del Documento  Res. Nº 2024036173 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas treinta minutos del cuatro de diciembre de dos mil veinticuatro .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por Federico Sosto López, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-606-338, en su condición de Apoderado Especial Judicial de Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, cédula de persona jurídica número 3-101-355710, contra el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y el artículo 13 del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta.

Resultando

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 20 de noviembre de 2019, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuestos sobre la Renta, ley número 7092, y del artículo 13 del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H. Señala que sustenta su legitimación en la existencia del proceso contencioso administrativo que se tramita bajo el expediente 14-006900-1027-CA, dentro del cual, y mediante resolución de las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos de 14 de noviembre de 2019, se admitió recurso de casación. Explica que en el capítulo V de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta se establecen distintas presunciones de ingresos, como la renta de empresas no domiciliadas en el país, la prestación de servicios en forma liberal, la explotación del transporte terrestre remunerado de personas y carga, o la renta presuntiva de préstamos y financiamientos. Sobre este último aspecto, continúa, el artículo 10 de la ley señala que, salvo prueba en contrario, se presume que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento, devenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central, y que en casos donde no exista documento escrito, la presunción no acepta prueba en contrario. Por su parte, el artículo 13 del Reglamento a la ley, indica que, salvo prueba en contrario, en todo contrato u operación de préstamo que implique financiamiento, se presume que existe una renta neta por intereses, la cual debe calcularse a una tasa de interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés más alta que fije el Banco Central, y que cuando no existe documento escrito, no se admite prueba en contrario. Agrega que, con base en esas normas, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo estima que se trata de una presunción iures et de iure, y rechazó toda la otra prueba evacuada durante el proceso, dejando en indefensión a la empresa por él representada. Estima el accionante, que tales disposiciones resultan contrarias a los principios del debido proceso, la interdicción de la arbitrariedad y la tutela judicial efectiva. Sobre el debido proceso, refiere que las normas cuestionadas excluyen toda posibilidad de presentar prueba en contrario en caso que no exista documento escrito, lo cual violenta el derecho de defensa, y contraría las reglas sobre presunciones, respecto de las cuales, el Código Procesal Civil vigente en ese momento, señalada que quien invoque una presunción legal, deberá probar la existencia de los hechos que le sirven de base, al mismo tiempo que establecía una distinción entre presunciones absolutas y relativas, de forma que las relativas podrían ser combatidas por la prueba en contrario a través de todos los medios legales, salvo lo establecido por la ley en ciertos casos sobre el tiempo y el modo de acatar las presunciones.. Menciona que las normas impugnadas, presumen un ingreso gravable al cargo del contribuyente, porque determinan una tasa de interés mínima en los préstamos acordados en ejercicio de la libertad de contratación, no admitiendo prueba en contrario cuando no haya documento escrito, por lo que se le trata como una presunción absoluta, cuando, en su criterio, no debería serlo, porque no se trata de la anulación de actos o la incorporación de una excepción perentoria. Agrega que resulta violatorio del derecho de aportar y producir prueba como garantía del debido proceso constitucional, la prohibición legal al contribuyente de contradecir la presunción alegada por la autoridad tributaria, pues conforme con el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, en caso que no exista documento escrito, la administración tributaria puede tener por probada la existencia de un préstamo o financiamiento para aplicar la tasa de interés mínima, pero no admite que el contribuyente pueda acudir a otro medio de prueba para demostrar que en el préstamo aplica una tasa menor, o bien, tasa cero, dejando así al contribuyente en una posición de desventaja frente a la potestad de imperio de la administración tributaria. En cuanto al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, menciona que los artículos impugnados no están razonablemente fundados y justificados conforme a la ideología constitucional; indica que son disposiciones caprichosas, que crean una ventaja arbitraria a las autoridades tributarias en detrimento de los derechos del contribuyente. Señala que la presunción establecida resulta contradictoria y absurda, que permite concluir que en los supuestos donde exista un contrato o documento escrito, no hay ninguna presunción, pues la realidad del préstamos la determina el acuerdo escrito de las partes contratantes; pero cuando no hay contrato o documento escrito, sí se aplica la presunción legal, pero estima que esa utilización quedaría supeditada a la demostración del hecho base, que consiste en la existencia de un préstamo entre contribuyentes, que si no hay contrato escrito, se trataría de un convenio informal o no escrito. Por eso considera que las normas son irrazonables, pues las facultades reconocidas a la administración tributaria para presumir la existencia del préstamo son incongruentes con la solución que opta el legislador, de que se presumen cuando no hay contrato escrito, de manera que no hay una verificación formal del préstamo. Agrega que la presunción aplica, según el párrafo tercero del artículo 10 impugnado, aunque no exista contrato de préstamos, pero sí financiamiento, figura que se define en el artículo 13 del Reglamento, y que permite que ese financiamiento lo sea utilizando los activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o mediante la emisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales, todo lo cual necesariamente sería mediante un documento escrito físico o digital. Argumenta que para la aplicación de la presunción, la norma exige verificar en prueba documental o accesoria la existencia del financiamiento, pero, por no haber documento principal, se excluye la prueba en contrario sobre la realidad misma del préstamo o financiamiento, y se rompe así la unidad lógica de la propuesta normativa. Por ello, estima que la presunción no es suficientemente coherente ni razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad. En cuanto a la tutela judicial efectiva, señala que la libertad probatoria es uno de los componentes relevantes de la tutela judicial efectiva y de la garantía del control de legalidad de las conductas de la administración pública, al punto que el articulo 82 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo refiere que los medios de prueba pueden ser todos los que estén permitidos por el Derecho Pública y el Derecho Común, mientras que el artículo 298 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, señala que los medios de prueba pueden ser todos los que estén permitidos por el Derecho Público, aunque no sean admisibles por el Derecho Común. No obstante, agrega, los artículos impugnados excluyen toda posibilidad de ofrecer prueba en contrario, y sin criterios de razonabilidad o proporcionalidad. Menciona que el impedimento leal y reglamentario de admitir prueba en contrario a la decisión de una autoridad administrativa, de aplicar la presunción de tasa de interés mínima, representa una atadura inconstitucional que restringe la labor del juez contencioso administrativo, y crea un círculo exento del control contencioso administrativo; afirma que suprimen la posibilidad de cuestionar el ejercicio de una potestad de la autoridad tributaria para aplicar una presunción. Solicita declarar con lugar la acción.

2.- Por resolución de las quince horas cincuenta y ocho minutos de 8 de enero de 2020, se da curso a la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, y se otorga audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República y al Ministerio de Hacienda.

3.- Los edictos a los que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, fueron publicados en las ediciones números 25, 26 y 27 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 7, 10 y 11 de febrero de 2020, respectivamente.

4.- Por escrito agregado al expediente el 25 de enero de 2020, se apersona Rodolfo Cordero Vargas, en su condición de Viceministro de Egresos del Ministerio de Hacienda, quien señala que la presunción del artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, está sujeta a la aplicación de un procedimiento administrativo reglado que cumple con los principios constitucionales referidos por el accionante. Explica que las normas impugnadas, se aplican dentro y sólo a partir de un procedimiento de determinación de oficio de las obligaciones tributarias, el cual inicia una vez que haya vencido el plazo que tiene el contribuyente para presentar y pagar la declaración del impuesto y período fiscal correspondiente; es decir, la presunción no se aplica de manera automática. Señala que tales procedimientos se conforman de cuatro etapas: inicio de los procedimientos o inicio de la actuación fiscalizadora; desarrollo de los procedimientos; conclusión de los procedimientos; revisión del acto de liquidación de oficio. Menciona que en la etapa de desarrollo de los procedimientos, todo contribuyente está obligado a poner a disposición los documentos de respaldo de sus ingresos, contratos y demás, los cuales el contribuyente tiene la obligación de conservar y mantener por un período de cinco años y mantenerse al día; es a partir de esos respaldos, que el auditor de Fiscalización debe partir para realizar la actuación fiscalizadora y determinar la exactitud o no de la obligación tributaria que fue autoliquidada. Luego, en la etapa de conclusión de procedimientos, se propone al contribuyente regularizar su situación, y en caso de no hacerlo, se le notifica el traslado de cargos, el cual puede ser impugnado, presentando los alegatos y pruebas que considere pertinentes, para, finalmente, dictar una resolución determinativa o acto de liquidación, en el que confirme y declare sin lugar la impugnación, o, por el contrario, anule o revoque total o parcialmente la determinación realizada. En ese sentido, agrega, la presunción del artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la renta, es una norma de fondo cuya aplicación cumple con los principios constitucionales señalados. Explica la base imponible del impuesto sobre la renta, señalando que en el caso de los préstamos o financiamientos, los rendimientos obtenido en una actividad económica sujeta al impuesto sobre las utilidades, constituyen un ingreso gravable o un gasto deducible, dependiendo de quién esté declarando dicho rendimiento. Agrega que, en condiciones normales, en que el contribuyente fiscalizado dispone de los documentos de respaldo desu declaración tributaria, los ingresos por rendimientos financieros se analizan a la luz de lo declarado, registrado y respaldado por el contribuyente, y a partir de estos insumos y de la información que la Administración Tributaria por su parte obtenga de los otros medios legales citados anteriormente, es que se llega a una conclusión (determinación de la base imponible cierta) sobre los ingresos gravables del contribuyente o Renta bruta, y a partir de los cuales se deducen los gastos deducibles (renta neta) para aplicar la tarifa del impuesto y conocer si el impuesto u obligación tributaria se declaró en forma exacta, o no. Sin embargo, en la realidad se presentan casos en los cuales los contribuyentes no disponen de los documentos justificativos de su declaración, y ante la imposibilidad de obtener una base cierta que permita conocer con exactitud los ingresos financieros obtenidos por el contribuyente como producto del otorgamiento de préstamos o financiamientos, los artículos cuestionados establecer una forma presunta de determinar los rendimientos obtenidos. Se parte de que todo préstamo o financiamiento que se realice dentro de una actividad económica que busca el lucro, responde a ese fin de lucro, por lo que se presume que la empresa obtiene un rendimiento en los préstamos o financiamientos en los que participe o invierta. Por ello, ante la falta de una base cierta como forma de determinación de la base imponible, el artículo 10 de la Ley presume los intereses devengados durante un período fiscal específico, haciendo la diferencia entre un contrato que tiene un documento escrito, del que no lo tiene. Es una presunción legal que no admite prueba en contrario, y que corresponde a la Administración Tributaria demostrar la existencia del hecho -préstamo o financiamiento-, para con ello trasladar la carga de la prueba al sujeto fiscalizado, de forma que demuestre si existe un contrato por escrito, que el interés devengado es menor al que pretende aplicar la norma, o bien, si no existe contrato por escrito, no se admite prueba en contrario, al haber demostrado la administración tributaria que efectivamente se ha presentado durante el período fiscal investigado, un contrato de préstamo o financiamiento. Reitera que la aplicación de estas normas sólo se realiza una vez seguida la actuación fiscalizadora, que implica un procedimiento de determinación de la obligación tributaria, en la cual participa el contribuyente fiscalizado desde el mismo momento en que inicia la actuación fiscalizadora, y que ante la falta de una base cierta como forma de determinación de la base imponible, la administración tributaria puede aplicar la presunción establecida en el artículo 10 de la Ley, y sólo hasta que la administración demuestra la existencia de un contrato de préstamo o financiamiento; de no aportarse el documento escrito de respaldo, la administración presume el interés devengado en la actividad económica lucrativa, sin admitir prueba en contrario, porque esa prueba en contrario la pudo aportar el contribuyente durante todo el proceso de la actuación fiscalizadora y aún concluida esta, puede demostrarlo durante la continuación de la fase de determinación de la obligación tributaria, a través de la no aceptación de la regularización de su obligación que le propone la administración tributaria e impugnación del traslado de cargos. Refiere que como la presunción del artículo 10 de la Ley y del artículo 13 del Reglamento, se aplica solo a partir de la conclusión de un procedimiento en el cual el contribuyente puede oponerse y defenderse de los cargos, no es cierto que se violente el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa; si bien es cierto que las normas excluyen la presentación de prueba en contrario en caso de no existir un documento escrito, la presunción sólo opera ante la falta de la determinación de la base imponible y una vez agotadas todas las oportunidades que tiene el contribuyente en la actualización fiscalizadora y en la determinación de oficio de la obligación tributaria, para demostrar con documentos escritos los términos del préstamo o financiamiento otorgados, para que con ello la administración tributaria pueda gravar en forma exacta los ingresos financieros obtenidos en un período fiscal específico. Aduce que tampoco es cierto que la aplicación de esta presunción sea contraria a las reglas sobre presunciones, pues el artículo 155 del Código Tributario es claro en señalar que en materia de procedimientos, el Código Procesal Civil sólo es aplicable en condición de norma supletoria y a falta de norma expresa en el Código Tributario, lo que no sucede en este caso, porque la norma del artículo 10 de la Ley se basta por sí misma. Agrega que al igual que el Código Procesal Civil exige probar la existencia de los hechos que le sirven de base a la presunción, la norma jurídico tributaria exige demostrar la existencia de un préstamo o financiamiento por parte de la administración tributaria, que ante la falta de documento escrito genera como efecto el presumir la existencia del devengo de intereses a una tasa específica y en favor del contribuyente que los ha generado, sin admitir prueba en contrario. En cuanto al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, refiere que no es cierto que las normas cuestionadas no estén razonablemente fundadas y justificadas, ni que la disposición sea contradictoria, absurda o irrazonable, porque se presume cuando no hay contrato escrito, y lo que se tiene por cierto es la existencia del préstamo o financiamiento. Agrega que no se presenta una falta de sustento o fundamento jurídico, debido a que la determinación de los ingresos financieros como renta neta presuntiva en préstamos y financiamientos, parte del ejercicio interpretativo de los hechos y su encuadramiento en la norma tributaria, según lo reglado en el procedimiento determinativo de la obligación tributaria. En cuanto al principio de tutela judicial efectiva, afirma que si bien los artículos impugnados excluyen toda posibilidad de ofrecer prueba en contrario, no es cierto que se afecte el principio de libertad probatoria aplicable al proceso contencioso administrativo, ya que todo contribuyente que ha sido sujeto de una actuación fiscalizadora y de la determinación de oficio de la obligación tributaria, ha podido acudir a la vía jurisdiccional a impugnar la validez de las normas o del procedimiento seguido en su caso. Solicita declarar sin lugar la acción.

5.- Mediante escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala el 31 de enero de 2020, se apersona Julio Jurado Fernández, en su condición de Procurador General de la República, quien señala que la acción es admisible por existir un proceso contencioso administrativo dentro del cual se ha planteado el respectivo recurso de casación ante la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Especifica que, básicamente, la objeción del accionante se resumen en que, en su criterio, la presunción de intereses en los contratos de préstamo y financiamiento, no admite prueba en contrario, lo que estima contrario al derecho de defensa, al negarle aportar cualquier tipo de medio probatorio que desvirtúe un ingreso gravable, salvo un documento escrito; irrazonable, porque establece la presunción sin haberse demostrado antes el hecho base del que se deriva, es decir, la existencia de un préstamo o financiamiento; y que esa potestad administrativa queda fuera del control del juez contencioso, a quien se le restringe su labor de control de legalidad de llegar a la verdad real de los hechos por medio de otros elementos probatorios que no sean el documento escrito para cuestionar la aplicación de la presunción de ingreso, lo que, en su criterio, lesiona el acceso a la justicia y la tutela judicial efectiva.

Sobre el artículo 10 impugnado, explica que el primer párrafo parte de la premisa de que existe un contrato de préstamo al que se le aplica el interés o rendimiento presuntivo. Enfatiza que el texto está previsto para ser aplicado a los contratos de préstamo, y no contiene una presunción en ese sentido; sino, sencillamente, si la administración constata que está en presencia de un contrato de ese tipo, debe aplicar la disposición de comentario con la consiguiente consecuencia jurídica que contiene. La consecuencia que tiene esta norma, es la aplicación de la presunción legal para la tasa de interés, es decir, detectado el contrato de préstamos en el caso fiscalizado, se aplica la presunción del rendimiento generado. Además, el párrafo final del mismo numeral, señala que esta presunción podrá aplicarse en otros supuestos en que no exista contrato de préstamo, pero sí financiamiento, para lo cual remite al artículo 13 del Reglamento que define qué debe entenderse como financiamiento. De tal forma que, si el préstamo o financiamiento no existe, las normas ni siquiera resultan aplicables.

Reafirma que la presunción legal del artículo 10 es muy específica y se relaciona con la tasa de interés aplicable, asumiendo que el préstamo o financiamiento es a título oneroso, pues el hecho generador de la renta proviene de los intereses que el prestamista obtenga con dicha operación; de lo contrario, no sería objeto de gravamen. Lo que se presume es la tasa de interés aplicable, no la existencia del contrato o del financiamiento, y es una tasa que se fija en el interés mínimo, lo que resulta razonable y acorde al principio de proporcionalidad, limitando cualquier tipo de carga excesiva en perjuicio de los contribuyentes.

Refiere que esa presunción sí admite prueba en contrario, condicionando a que se trate de un documento escrito. Se trata, entonces, de una presunción iuris tantum, susceptible de ser desmentida en el extremo preciso del interés utilizado, ya sea para demostrar un interés menor, o que no se acordó ningún interés. Agrega que el legislador estableció que debe existir un documento o contrato por escrito, para admitir la prueba en contrario. Pero, ante la inexistencia de ese documento escrito, la presunción de rentabilidad mínima no admite prueba en contrario, siendo que con ello, el legislador pretende reducir los focos de evasión fiscal, al establecer que todo préstamos de dinero u operación de financiamiento que otorgue un contribuyente a un tercero, genera un rendimiento mínimo.

Señala que de la lectura de las frases impugnadas, se comprueba que, en realidad, al contribuyente no se le está negando la posibilidad de aportar prueba, sino tan solo se restringe el tipo de prueba admisible, para que sea un contrato o documento escrito en el que se plasme la operación. Por lo demás, continúa, es una práctica forense habitual en cualquier jurisdicción, admitir sólo aquella prueba que resulte pertinente para la teoría del caso que se pretende demostrar. Agrega que siendo un aspecto tan puntual el que se pretende rebatir -el interés-, resulta plenamente congruente y razonable que la prueba admisible se limite a aquella que sea verdaderamente útil, para lo que deberá aportarse el documento escrito donde conste el préstamo o financiamiento a una tasa menor, tasa cero o sin rendimiento. Sin ese documento escrito no se admitirá ningún otro tipo de prueba, pero por una cuestión de pertinencia. Entonces, sí se admite prueba en contrario, pero condicionada a la existencia del documento escrito donde se haya plasmado el contrato de préstamo, por lo que sí hay oportunidad o posibilidad para el contribuyente de probar que el hecho o situación que se presume es falso o inexacto, con sólo aportar el documento escrito en el que se consigne el contrato de préstamo o el financiamiento.

Menciona que no hay que caer en el equívoco de entender que las normas cuestionadas establecen una presunción sobre la existencia del contrato de préstamo, y mucho menos, que esa presunción sea absoluta, pues sí puede aportar todo tipo de elemento probatorio para demostrar que la calificación jurídica que hizo la administración tributaria fue incorrecta y que no se trata de un préstamo o financiamiento.

Afirma que los cuestionamientos de constitucionalidad deben ser desestimados, pues no se observa ningún vicio de inconstitucionalidad en relación con las normas y principios constitucionales, sobre todo si se examinan dentro del marco del bloque de juridicidad que resulta aplicable, particularmente, a la luz del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

En lo que corresponde al alegato de violación al derecho de defensa, asegura que no hay un cercenamiento a las garantías del debido proceso ni al derecho de defensa, porque, contrario a lo afirmado por el accionante, no sólo le asiste el derecho, sino también el deber de aportar toda aquella prueba que pueda reflejar exactamente los datos y circunstancias imputables en la base imponible. Explica que el artículo 103 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, faculta a la administración tributaria para requerir a cualquier persona que declare sus obligaciones tributarias, y de cerciorarse sobre la veracidad del contenido de las declaraciones juradas. Por su parte, el artículo 104 dice que la administración tributaria podrá requerir la presentación de los libros, archivos, registros y toda otra información de trascendencia tributaria, como la copia de los soportes documentales o magnéticos de las operaciones de crédito y demás condiciones financieras de las transacciones, siendo una obligación del contribuyente el conservar los antecedentes de las operaciones o situaciones que constituyan hechos gravados, como dispone el artículo 128 del mismo Código. Explica que estas normas, junto con las cuestionadas en la acción, integran el bloque de juridicidad al que se encuentra sujeta la Administración Tributaria, y que a quien le corresponde aportar y conservar la documentación y el respaldo contable de las operaciones gravadas es al propio contribuyente. Es con base en esa documentación, que la Administración Tributaria lleva a cabo el aco de calificación.

Reitera que los artículos no contienen una presunción sobre la existencia del contrato de préstamo o del financiamiento, sino que únicamente se presume su rendimiento mediante la determinación de la tasa de interés aplicable, y la aplicación de los artículos 10 de la Ley y 13 del Reglamento, no responde a una presunción de la Administración Tributaria, sino que es el resultado de la valoración de toda la prueba que el propio contribuyente aportó al momento de ser fiscalizado. Así, ninguna de las normas impugnadas le impide al contribuyente presentar cualquier tipo de prueba para demostrar la realidad de la operación o negocio realizado. Estima que hay un error de apreciación del accionante, al considerar que hay una presunción sobre la existencia del contrato de préstamo o del financiamiento, pero eso no es así, porque se parte de que para aplicar la presunción de intereses debe existir un préstamo o un financiamiento. Afirma que ese error de apreciación se evidencia con las manifestaciones del accionante, de cómo podría aportar un documento que no existe, pero que revisando la sentencia de primera instancia dictada en el asunto base, se aprecia que el órgano judicial parece admitir y valorar todo tipo de prueba, incluso la testimonial, para demostrar la existencia del préstamo. Reafirma que la presunción contenida en las normas cuestionadas, parte de la existencia del contrato de préstamo o del financiamiento.

Agrega que, además, no se podría hacer uso de las normas del derecho común sobre las presunciones, ya que el artículo 169 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios señala expresamente que las presunciones establecidas por las leyes tributarias pueden combatirse mediante prueba en contrario, excepto en los casos en que aquellas expresamente lo prohíban.

Refiere que no puede alegarse violación al principio de igualdad, porque es el propio contribuyente quien debe aportar la prueba y demás documentación pertinente para determinar su situación jurídica y la realidad económica de su actividad.

Por eso resulta inexacta la aducida violación al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, por considerar que es una norma irrazonable o desproporcionada. Enfatiza que la presunción es sobre la tasa aplicable, y esa presunción surge en el supuesto que exista un contrato de préstamo o financiamiento, lo cual se determina con base en la documentación suministrada por el propio contribuyente. Reitera que esa presunción admite prueba en contrario, para lo que se debe aportar el documento escrito en el que así se estipuló. Las normas cuestionadas no resultan irrazonables, ni desproporcionadas, pues no impiden que el contribuyente aporte toda la documentación que considere útil para demostrar la realidad económica de la operación o negocio gravado, y si de esa prueba se verifica que existe un contrato de préstamo o de financiamiento, también se permite refutar la presunción del rendimiento mediante la prueba idónea, que es el respectivo documento escrito en el que se formalizó la operación gravada. Especifica que en la propia jurisprudencia constitucional citada por el accionante, se hace referencia la sentencia 2004-14421, en la cual se dice que la conducta administrativa debe ser suficientemente coherente y razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad, y en este caso, ese bloque lo conforman los artículos 103, 104, 123 y 128 del Código Tributario, que ayudan a comprender que la potestad de imperio de la administración para aplicar la presunción legal, responde a un ejercicio tasado, marcado por la posibilidad del contribuyente de aportar toda documentación o información que demuestre la realidad económica de su actividad.

Así, continúa, la sola redacción de los preceptos cuestionados no da pie para aplicaciones antojadizas o arbitrarias, y no se observa que resulten incompatibles o incongruentes con las normas del Código Tributario.

En cuanto a la tutela judicial efectiva, estima que la inconformidad del accionante radica en la forma en que se aplica la norma y no de su inconstitucionalidad intrínseca. Los artículos impugnados no imponen ningún tipo de restricción al juez contencioso administrativo para controlar si ambos preceptos fueron debidamente aplicados o no al caso concreto, de manera que el juez puede valorar la misma información que el contribuyente suministró al fisco, y determinar si en efecto hubo una operación de crédito o financiamiento a la que aplicarle la presunción de intereses. Las normas cuestionadas, lejos de crear áreas ajenas al control judicial, delimitan el arbitrio judicial en la determinación de la prueba que se considera idónea, sin dejar de lago que la misma presunción de la tasa de interés, sí admite prueba en contrario, por lo que el juez siempre podrá fiscalizar la aplicación que la Administración Tributaria haga de las normas impugnadas.

Concluye que la acción debe desestimarse, porque no se observa que se violen los principios constitucionales del debido proceso, razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, interdicción a la arbitrariedad y tutela judicial efectiva.

6.- Por resolución de esta Sala, de las nueve horas cincuenta y siete minutos de 5 de marzo de 2020, se tiene por contestadas las audiencias conferidas, y se asigna esta acción a la oficina del magistrado instructor, para su conocimiento por el fondo.

7.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el artículo 9 de la misma ley, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

8.- En los procedimientos se ha cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Araya García; y,

Considerando

I.- Sobre los presupuestos formales de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con requisitos técnicos específicos, que deben ser cumplidos a efecto de que la Sala logre, de forma válida, conocer el fondo de la impugnación. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, estipula los presupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad; entre estos se exige la existencia de un asunto base o previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial, o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa, en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera infringido. Por su parte, en el párrafo segundo y tercero de la misma norma, se regula de forma excepcional los presupuestos en los cuales no se requiere el asunto previo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista una lesión individual y directa, o bien, se trate de la tutela de intereses difusos o colectivos, o cuando la interpone de manera directa el Contralor General de la República, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. Sobre la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, la Sala, mediante sentencia número 1995-4190, señaló que la acción es «un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional-». Por tal razón, la exigencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver no configura un mero requisito de forma, pues no basta con la existencia de un asunto base, ni con la invocación de la inconstitucionalidad, pues resulta indispensable que la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera vulnerado, lo que significa, que las normas recurridas deben ser aplicables en el asunto base –ver, en similar sentido, sentencias números 1990-1668, 1993-408, 1994-798, 1994-3615, 1995-409, 1995-851,1995-4190 y 1996-791-. Por otra parte, es oportuno indicar que existen otros recaudos técnicos que deben cumplirse, como por ejemplo, la determinación explícita de las normas impugnadas debidamente motivadas, con referencia específica de los mandatos y principios constitucionales que se consideren infringidos, la autenticación mediante patrocinio letrado del escrito de interposición de la acción, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación -poderes y certificaciones-, así como la certificación literal del libelo de impugnación, los cuales, en caso de no ser aportadas por los accionantes, pueden ser prevenidos por la Presidencia de la Sala para su cumplimiento.

II.- La legitimación de la parte accionante en este caso.- A partir de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, en el caso concreto se tiene que el accionante aduce acudir a esta Sala al tenor del párrafo primero del citado artículo 75, ofreciendo como asunto base el proceso contencioso administrativo que se tramita bajo el expediente número 14-006900-1027-CA, interpuesto contra el Estado por la empresa Thunderbird Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, que luego pasó a denominarse CIRSA Gran Entretenimiento de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima, y que fuera absorbida por la empresa accionante Grupo Cirsa de Costa Rica Sociedad Anónima. En dicho proceso judicial, la Sección VIII del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda dictó la sentencia número 62-2018-VIII, contra la cual, la parte accionante interpuso formal recurso de casación, en el cual invocó la inconstitucionalidad que ahora se conoce. Dicho recurso de casación fue formalmente admitido por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante auto de las ocho horas cuarenta y cinco minutos de 14 de noviembre de 2019, y se encuentra pendiente de resolución.

De tal manera, es claro que la parte actora ostenta legitimación suficiente para demandar la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas, además de que se trata de materia cuya constitucionalidad procede revisar en esta vía. Aunado a lo anterior, se tiene que la parte actora ha cumplido con los requisitos estipulados en los numerales 78 y 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. En conclusión, la presente acción es admisible, y se resuelve por el fondo conforme se indica en los considerandos siguientes.

III.- Sobre el objeto de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad. El accionante cuestiona de manera concreta el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, ley número 7092, de 21 de abril de 1988, así como el artículo 13 del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H.

El artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta dispone:

“ARTICULO 10.- Renta neta presuntiva de préstamos y financiamientos. Se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, devenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central de Costa Rica, o, a falta de ésta, al promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional.

En los casos en que no exista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará prueba en contrario.

La Administración Tributaria podrá aplicar esta presunción en otras situaciones aunque no exista contrato de préstamo, pero sí financiamiento, conforme se establezca en el reglamento de esta ley.” Por su parte, el artículo 13 del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H, establecía:

“ARTICULO 13.- Renta neta presuntiva y contratos de financiamiento. En todo contrato u operación de préstamo, que implique financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que existe una renta neta por intereses, la cual debe calcularse a una tasa de interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alta que fije el Banco Central de costa Rica o bien, a falta de ésta, con el promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Esta presunción se aplica también para cuando se estipule un interés menor al que según el Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponda al tipo de operaciones de que se trate o cuando se hubiere pactado expresamente que no existe interés alguno.

No se admite prueba en contrario para la presunción que se establece, cuando no exista documento escrito. La Administración podrá aplicar la presunción a que se refiere el artículo 10 de la ley, si se produce financiamiento, aún cuando no exista contrato de préstamo. Para los efectos de lo estipulado en el artículo 10 de ley, se entiende por financiamiento toda acción u operación que genere fondos, que permitan al perceptor realizar las actividades de su giro normal, utilizando sus activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o mediante la emisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales.” En lo que concierne a esta norma reglamentaria que se cuestiona, debe hacerse la advertencia de que el reglamento que la contenía -Decreto Ejecutivo número 18445-H, de 9 de setiembre de 1988-, a la fecha de dictarse esta sentencia ya no se encuentra vigente, debido a que fue derogado por el Decreto Ejecutivo número 43198-H, de 22 de julio de 2021, por el cual se adoptó el vigente Reglamento de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, el cual, en cuanto a esta norma, mantuvo idéntica redacción del Reglamento anterior, solamente que ahora en su numeral 20, el cual señala:

“Artículo 20.- Renta neta presuntiva y contratos de financiamiento. En todo contrato u operación de préstamo, que implique financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que existe una renta neta por intereses, la cual debe calcularse a una tasa de interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alta que fije el Banco Central de costa Rica o bien, a falta de ésta, con el promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Esta presunción se aplica también para cuando se estipule un interés menor al que según el Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponda al tipo de operaciones de que se trate o cuando se hubiere pactado expresamente que no existe interés alguno.

No se admite prueba en contrario para la presunción que se establece, cuando no exista documento escrito. La Administración podrá aplicar la presunción a que se refiere el artículo 10 de la ley, si se produce financiamiento, aun cuando no exista contrato de préstamo. Para los efectos de lo estipulado en el artículo 10 de ley, se entiende por financiamiento toda acción u operación que genere fondos, que permitan al perceptor realizar las actividades de su giro normal, utilizando sus activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o mediante la emisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales.” Así, a la fecha la norma reglamentaria que se está impugnando no está formalmente vigente, aunque es claro que la misma idéntica disposición sí se encuentra vigente según lo establecido en el artículo 20 del nuevo Reglamento adoptado mediante Decreto Ejecutivo número 43198-H.

En este sentido, la Sala se pronunciará en relación con los cuestionamientos planteados en virtud de los efectos jurídicos que tal norma pudiere haber producido durante su vigencia -ver sentencias números 5445-99 y 2024-3228-. Sobre el particular, interesa recordar lo dispuesto por la Sala en reiterados pronunciamientos desde la sentencia número 3152-1994 -incluida la reciente sentencia mencionada, número 2024-3228-, en el sentido de que:

“[E]l control de constitucionalidad se ejerce con referencia al derecho vigente, sin embargo, puede pensarse en algunos casos de excepción a esta regla. Hay situaciones en que una norma derogada puede haber sido aplicada durante su vigencia o estarse aplicando en violación de la Constitución y en perjuicio de un sujeto cuyo agravio subsiste después de la derogación, en cuyo caso aquella norma puede y debe ser objeto de interpretación y control aunque no esté vigente al tiempo de dictarse la sentencia; se trata de los casos en que la derogatoria no convierte la cuestión en algo abstracto que impida el posterior control constitucional de la norma derogada. En el caso concreto de esta acción, es procedente hacer el análisis de constitucionalidad pues la norma aún puede afectar los intereses del accionante, es decir, la inconstitucionalidad es un medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considere lesionado, en los términos del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.”.

En criterio de la parte accionante, el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta y el artículo 13 del entonces Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta -hoy artículo 20 de dicho reglamento-, contrarían el derecho de defensa, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad y el principio de tutela judicial efectiva, ya que estima que tales normas establecen una presunción sobre las tasas de interés aplicables en los casos de préstamos o financiamientos, contra la cual no se admite prueba en contrario.

En este sentido, en los considerandos siguientes se abordará cada una de las inconformidades planteadas por el accionante, haciendo dos advertencias previas. La primera, que al tratarse en lo medular del mismo motivo de inconformidad aducido respecto del artículo 10 de la Ley y del artículo 13 del Reglamento, se valorarán ambas normas en su conjunto en relación con el derecho y los principios que se estiman vulnerados. La segunda, que al evidenciarse que los argumentos planteados por el accionante respecto de los principios de interdicción de la arbitrariedad y de tutela judicial efectiva, se encuentran íntimamente relacionados y dependientes de lo aducido respecto del derecho de defensa, al resolver este, se resuelve, en lo esencial, también aquellos.

IV.- Sobre las normas impugnadas y la aducida violación al derecho de defensa. La parte accionante refiere que la presunción establecida en el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y el artículo 13 del Reglamento a dicha ley, vulneran el derecho de defensa del contribuyente, en la medida que no admiten prueba en contrario.

Al respecto, conviene reiterar, en lo conducente, lo preceptuado por ambas normas en cuanto a la aducida presunción y la presunta imposibilidad de aportar prueba en contrario. En lo que interesa, dice el artículo 10 de la Ley:

“ARTICULO 10.- Renta neta presuntiva de préstamos y financiamientos. Se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que todo contrato de préstamo de financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, devenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central de Costa Rica, o, a falta de ésta, al promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional.

En los casos en que no exista documento escrito, ante la presunción no se aceptará prueba en contrario.

La Administración Tributaria podrá aplicar esta presunción en otras situaciones aunque no exista contrato de préstamo, pero sí financiamiento, conforme se establezca en el reglamento de esta ley.” -énfasis agregados- Por su parte, el artículo 13 del Reglamento -actual artículo 20- dispone:

“ARTICULO 13.- Renta neta presuntiva y contratos de financiamiento. En todo contrato u operación de préstamo, que implique financiamiento, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza o denominación, si existe documento escrito, se presume, salvo prueba en contrario, que existe una renta neta por intereses, la cual debe calcularse a una tasa de interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alta que fije el Banco Central de costa Rica o bien, a falta de ésta, con el promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Esta presunción se aplica también para cuando se estipule un interés menor al que según el Banco Central de Costa Rica, corresponda al tipo de operaciones de que se trate o cuando se hubiere pactado expresamente que no existe interés alguno.

No se admite prueba en contrario para la presunción que se establece, cuando no exista documento escrito. La Administración podrá aplicar la presunción a que se refiere el artículo 10 de la ley, si se produce financiamiento, aún cuando no exista contrato de préstamo. Para los efectos de lo estipulado en el artículo 10 de ley, se entiende por financiamiento toda acción u operación que genere fondos, que permitan al perceptor realizar las actividades de su giro normal, utilizando sus activos como garantía o como instrumentos negociables, o mediante la emisión de títulos valores u otros documentos o títulos comerciales.” -los resaltados no son del original- Es claro, entonces, que ambas normas contienen similar disposición en lo que constituye el objeto de esta acción, en el sentido de que ante la existencia de un contrato de préstamo o financiamiento por escrito, se presume una determinada tasa de interés, respecto de la cual se admite prueba en contrario. En contraposición, de no existir documento escrito, no se admite prueba en contrario.

De tal manera, en cuanto al primer supuesto -que existe documento escrito-, en contraposición a lo aducido por el accionante, es evidente que la presunción sí admite prueba en contrario. Nótese que el primer párrafo del artículo 10 de la Ley, clara y expresamente dispone que «salvo prueba en contrario», se presume que se devenga un interés no menor a la tasa activa de interés anual más alto que fije el Banco Central, o bien, que ante la falta de esta tasa, se presume que la misma será según el promedio de las tasas activas de interés anual de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. En estos casos, el contribuyente sí puede aportar prueba en contrario para cuestionar la presunción que la Administración Tributaria le estaría aplicando para determinar su renta presuntiva, con lo que se evidencia de manera palmaria que sí existe la posibilidad de aportar prueba en contrario en estos casos, por lo que, de suyo, no existe ni por asomo la afectación al derecho de defensa del contribuyente, puesto que sí puede aportar prueba en contrario para cuestionar la tasa que se le podría aplicar de manera presunta para determinar la renta sobre la cual debe tributar.

Similar disposición se encuentra en el primer párrafo del artículo 13 del Reglamento en cuanto a la tasa aplicable cuando exista documento escrito.

El aparente problema parece presentarse en el segundo de los supuestos, es decir, con lo dispuesto en el segundo párrafo del artículo 10 de la Ley, y en el segundo párrafo -ab initio- del artículo 13 del Reglamento, que en lo esencial refieren que no se admite prueba en contrario contra aquella presunción, cuando no exista documento escrito. Para comprender cómo esta previsión igualmente dista de configurar una afectación negativa al derecho de defensa, debe atenderse al proceso involucrado por medio del cual la Administración Tributaria puede hacer uso y aplicación de esta presunción.

V.- La aplicación de la presunción señalada en los artículos impugnados es una potestad de la Administración Tributaria que surge en el proceso de determinación de la obligación tributaria a cargo de un contribuyente respecto del impuesto sobre la renta. Es decir, no es una fijación autónoma, ajena a un proceso de determinación de la obligación tributaria, y mucho menos arbitraria o carente de sustento; tampoco es una fijación arbitraria o producto de alguna potestad discrecional de la administración. Por el contrario, dicha presunción se encuentra establecida por ley en un supuesto determinado, y luego de que se concluya que sea necesaria su aplicación.

Al respecto, debe partirse de las obligaciones tributarias de todo contribuyente que esté sujeto al impuesto sobre la renta y de las potestades de fiscalización de la Administración Tributaria, de donde resulta de particular interés lo preceptuado en los siguientes artículos del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

El artículo 103 del Código, dispone que corresponde a dicha Administración la verificación del correcto cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias, pudiendo requerir que se realice la declaración de las obligaciones y cerciorarse de la veracidad de su contenido. En lo que interesa, dice este artículo:

“Artículo 103.- Control tributario La Administración Tributaria está facultada para verificar el correcto cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias por todos los medios y procedimientos legales. A ese efecto, dicha Administración queda específicamente autorizada para:

• a)Requerir a cualquier persona física o jurídica, esté o no inscrita para el pago de los tributos, que declare sus obligaciones tributarias dentro del plazo que al efecto le señale, por los medios que conforme al avance de la ciencia y la técnica disponga como obligatorios para los obligados tributarios, garantizando a la vez que las personas que no tengan acceso a las tecnologías requeridas para declarar cuenten con facilidades dispuestas por la misma Administración.
• b)Cerciorarse de la veracidad del contenido de las declaraciones juradas por los medios y procedimientos de análisis e investigación legales que estime convenientes.

(…)”. -el resaltado no es del original- Por su parte, el artículo 104 del mismo Código refiere que la Administración Tributaria podrá requerir diversa información al contribuyente, precisamente para cerciorarse de aquella veracidad señalada en el artículo anterior y «verificar la situación tributaria de los contribuyentes». Este artículo 104 dispone:

“Artículo 104.- Requerimientos de información al contribuyente Para facilitar la verificación oportuna de la situación tributaria de los contribuyentes, la Administración Tributaria podrá requerirles la presentación de los libros, los archivos, los registros contables y toda otra información de trascendencia tributaria que se encuentre impresa en forma de documento, en soporte técnico o registrada por cualquier otro medio tecnológico.

Sin perjuicio de estas facultades generales, la Administración podrá solicitar a los contribuyentes y los responsables:

• a)A contribuyentes clasificados, según los criterios establecidos como grandes contribuyentes nacionales o grandes empresas territoriales, los estados financieros debidamente dictaminados por un contador público autorizado, incluyendo las notas explicativas sobre las políticas contables más significativas y demás notas explicativas contenidas en el dictamen del profesional independiente que los haya auditado. La Administración Tributaria queda facultada para requerirlos, también, a otros colectivos de contribuyentes en los que, por el volumen y la naturaleza de sus operaciones, este requerimiento no les suponga costos desproporcionados.
• b)Copia de los libros, los archivos y los registros contables.

(…)

• e)Copia de los soportes documentales o magnéticos de las operaciones de crédito, las compraventas y/o los arrendamientos de bienes y contratos de fideicomiso (financieros u operativos), que se tramiten en empresas privadas, entidades colectivas, cooperativas, bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, entidades financieras, se encuentren o no reguladas; sociedades de hecho o cualquier otra persona física, jurídica o de hecho, debiendo identificarse los montos de las respectivas operaciones, las calidades de los sujetos que intervienen y las demás condiciones financieras de las transacciones, en los términos regulados en el reglamento.

Los gastos por la aplicación de lo dispuesto en los incisos b), c), d) y e) anteriores correrán por cuenta de la Administración Tributaria.” -énfasis agregados- Asimismo, siempre en la tónica de la importancia de verificar la información y declaraciones brindadas por los contribuyentes, el artículo 123 del mismo Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, dispone que las declaraciones y documentación de los contribuyentes están sujetos a comprobación por parte de la Administración Tributaria, pudiendo realizar las investigaciones, diligencias y exámenes apropiados para comprobar las declaraciones y los datos contenidos en la documentación. Señala este artículo 123:

“Artículo 123.- Verificación de las declaraciones, los libros y los demás documentos Las declaraciones juradas presentadas por los contribuyentes y responsables y los registros financieros, contables y de cualquier índole, en cuanto en ello deba constar la información relativa a la liquidación o el pago de los tributos, están sujetos a la comprobación de la Administración Tributaria. Para tales efectos, esta puede practicar, dentro de la ley y por intermedio de los funcionarios debidamente autorizados, todas las investigaciones, las diligencias y los exámenes de comprobación que considere necesarios y útiles.

Efectuada la verificación se debe cobrar la diferencia del tributo que resulte a cargo del contribuyente o responsable declarante; o, en su caso, de oficio se le debe devolver el exceso que haya pagado.” -énfasis suplido- Finalmente, el artículo 128 del mismo Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, especifica que es obligación de los contribuyentes, no sólo facilitar las tareas de determinación, fiscalización e investigación que realice la Administración Tributaria, sino, especialmente, conservar los antecedentes de toda operación o situaciones que den lugar a hechos sobre los cuales haya que tributar. En lo que interesa, dispone este artículo:

“Artículo 128.- Obligaciones de los particulares Los contribuyentes y responsables están obligados a facilitar las tareas de determinación, fiscalización e investigación que realice la Administración Tributaria y, en especial, deben:

• a)Cuando lo requieran las leyes o los reglamentos, o lo exija dicha Administración en virtud de las facultades que le otorga este Código:

(…)

iii. Presentar las declaraciones que correspondan.

• b)Conservar, de forma ordenada, los registros financieros, contables y de cualquier índole, y los antecedentes de las operaciones o situaciones que constituyan hechos gravados.

(…)

• d)Presentar o exhibir, en las oficinas de la Administración Tributaria o ante los funcionarios autorizados, los registros financieros, contables y de cualquier índole, relacionados con hechos generadores de sus obligaciones tributarias y formular las aplicaciones o aclaraciones que se les soliciten.

(…)”. -énfasis agregados- En consecuencia, es claro no solo que el contribuyente tiene el deber de presentar sus declaraciones, aportando para ello la documentación que corresponda, y, al mismo tiempo, que compete a la Administración Tributaria verificar la veracidad de la información recibida, para lo cual podrá solicitar y tener acceso a las declaraciones, libros, escrituras, soportes documentales o magnéticos, registros contables y toda otra información de trascendencia tributaria, debiendo el contribuyente, a su vez, facilitar esa tarea de determinación, fiscalización e investigación, para lo cual deberá conservar los antecedentes de las operaciones o situaciones que constituyan hechos gravados.

Es con base en estas obligaciones señaladas al contribuyente y las potestades otorgadas a la Administración Tributaria, que ante una declaración de impuestos, como lo puede ser la declaración del impuesto sobre la renta, la Administración puede actuar lo consecuente para determinar su contenido, veracidad y alcances, lo cual se realiza mediante un procedimiento de fijación tributaria que, como explica el Ministerio de Hacienda, se compone de cuatro fases o etapas, a saber:

Inicio de la actividad fiscalizadora: es el inicio de la actuación de fiscalización, por medio de la cual se informa al contribuyente cuándo dará inicio la misma, y donde se le indica expresamente que deberá tener a disposición los documentos de respaldo de la declaración tributaria.

Desarrollo de los procedimientos: es la fase donde el contribuyente debe poner a disposición de la Administración toda la documentación necesaria -artículo 128 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios- y en la cual, la Administración realiza toda la verificación de la documentación aportada. En esta fase, según enfatiza el Ministerio de Hacienda, el respaldo documental es vital, «por cuanto es de esos respaldos que el auditor de Fiscalización debe partir para realizar la actuación fiscalizadora y determinar la exactitud o no de la obligación tributaria que fue autoliquidada y declara en su momento por el contribuyente».

Conclusión de los procedimientos: realizada la investigación y valoración de la documentación pertinente, se convoca al contribuyente a una audiencia para exponer las conclusiones de la actuación fiscalizadora y los resultados de la misma, señalando si hubo o no diferencias de impuestos, o, incluso, saldos a favor del contribuyente. De ser necesario, se previene al contribuyente regularizar su situación, y se notifica el traslado de cargos determinativo, señalando los cargos, hechos y fundamentos propios de la determinación realizada.

Impugnación del traslado de cargos o del auto de liquidación: de conformidad con el artículo 144 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, contra el traslado de cargos el contribuyente puede presentar formal impugnación, presentando los alegatos y pruebas pertinentes, para que la Administración Tributaria dicte una resolución determinativa o acto de liquidación, en el que se confirma o declare sin lugar la impugnación, o bien, se anule total o parcialmente la determinación realizada. Esta impugnación se realiza mediante el recurso de revocatoria previsto en el artículo 145 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, y el recurso de apelación ante el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo, según lo establecido en el artículo 146 del mismo Código.

De tal manera, la aplicación de la presunción señalada en el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y en el artículo 13 -hoy artículo 20- del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, tiene lugar luego de la aplicación de este procedimiento de determinación tributaria que inicia con la presentación de la declaración. Esto es así, por cuanto ante la presentación de una declaración relacionada con impuesto sobre la renta, y a efectos de verificar la veracidad de los datos allí contenidos, surge para la Administración Tributaria la potestad de realizar la revisión de toda la documentan descrita en las normas de cita del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. Es en ese proceso de fiscalización que realiza la Administración Tributaria, que se puede aplicar la presunción respecto de la tasa de interés aplicable en los contratos de préstamo o de financiamiento escritos, en cuyo caso, según lo dicho en el considerando anterior, se puede presentar prueba en contrario para acreditar una tasa de interés distinta o inexistente.

Pero en aquellos casos donde se alegue la existencia de una operación de préstamo o financiamiento que no conste por escrito, se aplica la presunción sobre la tasa de interés, sin que sea dable aportar prueba en contrario. Esto es así, porque de la normativa citada, se evidencia que todo el proceso de verificación de una obligación tributaria según el procedimiento señalado, parte de la revisión y validación de la documentación de soporte de diferente naturaleza que el contribuyente está en la obligación de tener y de mantener. Al respecto, resulta altamente ilustrativa la definición del inciso b) del artículo 128 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios -ya citado expresamente- cuando define como obligación del contribuyente «[c]onservar, de forma ordenada, los registros financieros, contables y de cualquier índole, y los antecedentes de las operaciones o situaciones que constituyan hechos gravados». Esta previsión normativa parte de la obligación que tiene el contribuyente de tener y disponer de manera adecuada esos «antecedentes de las operaciones o situaciones que constituyan hechos gravados», de donde resulta que si en la declaración tributaria se alega la existencia de un contrato de préstamo o de financiamiento, el contribuyente deberá tener cómo demostrar la existencia de la tasa aplicable porque así se lo impone el inciso b) del artículo 128 de este Código. Caso contrario, el no disponer de esa documentación, impide a la Administración Tributaria el ejercicio de su función fiscalizadora y verificadora de la obligación tributaria, y de ahí la existencia y aplicación de la presunción legalmente establecida. Es claro que de existir la documentación de respaldo sobre el contrato de préstamo o financiamiento que se alegue en una declaración tributaria y la tasa que le aplica, la presunción sí admitiría prueba en contrario, precisamente porque en cumplimiento de la obligación señalada en el inciso b) del artículo 128 del Código, el contribuyente puede acreditar no sólo la existencia del contrato de préstamo o financiamiento, sino, además, la tasa convenida; pero, caso contrario, el incumplimiento de esa obligación, da lugar a la imposibilidad de verificación de lo declarado, por lo que surge la aplicación de la presunción que se cuestiona.

Dicho de otro modo, el debido cumplimiento de la obligación del inciso b) del artículo 128 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, permite que el contribuyente no sólo pueda demostrar la existencia del contrato de préstamo o financiamiento aducido en su declaración y la tasa aplicable, sino, también, que ante la aplicación de la presunción señalada en las normas cuestionadas, pueda válidamente presentar la prueba en contrario para que en el proceso de verificación y fiscalización tributaria, la Administración valore esa prueba escrita y resuelva lo que corresponda. Por el contrario, el incumplimiento de ese deber del artículo 128 del Código, impide que el contribuyente acredite la existencia de una tasa de interés distinta, lo que a su vez impide a la Administración Tributaria de verificar si lo dicho en la declaración es válido o no, por lo que ante aquel incumplimiento del contribuyente y la imposibilidad de la Administración Tributaria, resulta de aplicación la presunción que se discute.

Asimismo, nótese que toda esa valoración se debe realizar en el contexto de aquel procedimiento de verificación señalado párrafos atrás, por lo que en la segunda etapa del mismo -desarrollo de los procedimientos- es cuando el contribuyente puede demostrar y acreditar la existencia de una tasa menor si así lo tiene por escrito, lo cual también podría incluso realizar antes de la finalización del procedimiento administrativo ante la propia Administración Tributaria o ante el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo -artículos 144 y 145 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios-, así como también podría llegar a hacerlo en la vía judicial, siempre que se disponga de la documentación escrita necesaria previa que permita desvirtuar la presunción que se pretende aplicar.

VI.- Por otra parte, aduce el accionante que las normas cuestionadas, al establecer la aplicación de esta presunción sobre la tasa aplicable en los contratos de préstamo o financiamiento, sería contraria a las reglas generales de presunciones señaladas en el derecho común. Sin embargo, debe advertirse que la especialidad de la materia tributaria da lugar a la existencia de principios sectoriales y normas específicas para regular este tipo de situaciones, y que, precisamente por su especialidad, resultan de particular aplicación en lugar de las normas ordinarias o de derecho común. Así, concretamente sobre esta materia, resulta altamente ilustrativo el artículo 169 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarias, al señalar:

“Artículo 169.- Normativa tributaria Las leyes y los reglamentos que contengan normas tributarias deberán mencionarlo expresamente en su título y en un epígrafe con el cual debe titularse cada uno de los artículos, a fin de facilitar su comprensión y manejo.

Las leyes y los reglamentos que modifiquen normas tributarias contendrán una relación completa de las normas derogadas y la nueva redacción de las que resulten modificadas.

Las normas que regulen el régimen de infracciones y sanciones tributarias, así como el de recargos, multas e intereses, tendrán efectos retroactivos cuando su aplicación resulte más favorable para el afectado.

Las presunciones establecidas por las leyes tributarias pueden combatirse mediante prueba en contrario, excepto en los casos en que aquellas expresamente lo prohíban.” -énfasis agregado- De tal manera, es claro, según lo dicho, que estas normas especiales sobre la presunción para la determinación de la tasa de interés en casos de rente presuntiva, dista de ir en un sentido que contraríe las normas generales en materia de presunciones, pues lo cierto es que sobre este tema en particular, priva la especialidad de la materia tributaria, según así lo determina la propia ley. En todo caso, véase que lo aducido por el accionante, se encuentra en el ámbito de una aparente contradicción -que no existe- entre la aplicación de normas en el ámbito de la legalidad, que, de conformidad con lo expuesto, de modo alguno incide en que haya una inconformidad constitucional de las normas cuestionadas en esta acción.

VII.- En consecuencia, es claro que la aplicación de la presunción que se discute surge luego de la realización de un proceso de verificación y fiscalización realizado por la Administración Tributaria, de conformidad con las normas de cita y en el cual el contribuyente tiene directa participación, no sólo como sujeto obligado de presentar la declaración tributaria y de mantener y conservar la documentación de respaldo de sus operaciones, sino también como parte activa en ese proceso de verificación, donde no solo debe poner a disposición de la Administración Tributaria toda la documentación de respaldo, sino donde también es notificado previamente, participa del proceso, se le comunica el resultado de la investigación, se le notifica un traslado de cargos, el cual puede cuestionar ante la propia Administración Tributaria o ante el Tribunal Fiscal Administrativo. De tal manera, resulta impropio aducir que la aplicación de esta presunción señalada en los artículos cuestionados resulta contraria al derecho de defensa, pues es claro que el contribuyente no sólo tiene las obligaciones mencionadas, sino, también, que se le reconoce ese derecho de participación en el proceso de determinación de la obligación tributaria, pudiendo llegar a ejercer la actividad recursiva pertinente, y que es ante el incumplimiento de su deberes como contribuyente y ante la imposibilidad de la Administración Tributaria de verificar los datos contenidos en la declaración, que se da lugar a la aplicación de la presunción de comentario.

De tal manera, al descartarse la vulneración del derecho de defensa, la acción debe declararse sin lugar en cuanto a este extremo.

VIII.- Sobre las normas impugnadas y la aducida violación al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad. La parte accionante aduce que junto con la afectación al derecho de defensa -ya descartado-, las normas cuestionadas y la presunción allí indicada vulneran también el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad.

El principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad determina que toda actuación, actividad y expresión de la administración, debe encontrarse debida y razonablemente fundamentada de conformidad con el bloque de legitimidad o Derecho de la Constitución vigente; implica que toda actuación debe estar revestida de la objetividad necesaria, que no sólo impida su dictado o adopción sin ese fundamento razonable, sino que también evite una actuación que cause diferenciación sin razón suficiente y justa. Así, en reiterada jurisprudencia esta Sala ha reconocido y aplicado este principio. En la sentencia número 2007-11155 -reiterada, entre muchas otras, por sentencias 2008-11390 y 2012-18298-, señaló la Sala que:

“[E]l principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad supone la prohibición de la arbitrariedad, esto es, de toda diferencia carente de una razón suficiente y justa. (…) Arbitrariedad es sinónimo de injusticia ostensible y la injusticia no se limita a la discriminación. La actuación arbitraria es la contraria a la justicia, a la razón o las leyes, que obedece al mero capricho o voluntad del agente público. La prohibición de la arbitrariedad lo que condena es la falta de sustento o fundamento jurídico objetivo de una conducta administrativa y, por consiguiente, la infracción del orden material de los principios y valores propios del Estado de Derecho. En esencia, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad ha venido operando como un poderoso correctivo frente a las actuaciones abusivas y discriminatorias de las administraciones públicas cuando ejercen potestades discrecionales (abuso o exceso de discrecionalidad). En lo que se refiere a la aplicación del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad en el ámbito de la potestad reglamentaria, debe indicarse que al ser ésta, naturalmente, discrecional, el principio prohibitivo de la arbitrariedad cumple un papel de primer orden. En primer término, debe señalarse que salvo las materias que son reserva de reglamento –organización interna y relación estatutaria o de servicio- y en las que resultan admisibles los reglamentos autónomos o independientes –de la ley-, un primer límite de la potestad reglamentaria lo constituye la sujeción a la ley que se pretende desarrollar o ejecutar, extremo que obviamente, tiene conexión con principios constitucionales como el de legalidad, reserva de ley y jerarquía normativa. El poder reglamentario es, salvo los casos señalados, expresión de una opción o alternativa predeterminada por el legislador ordinario en ejercicio de su libertad de configuración, de la cual no puede separarse el órgano competente para ejercer la potestad reglamentaria.” -énfasis suplido- La necesidad de fundamentar la actuación en el bloque de legitimidad -que se sabe es más comprehensivo que la legalidad propiamente dicha- es evidente cuando, mediante sentencia 2004-14421, señaló la Sala que:

“[L]a conducta administrativa debe ser suficientemente coherente y razonablemente sustentada en el bloque de legalidad, de modo que se base y explique por sí misma.” Tal como se ha indicado, el carácter razonable de la actuación, y la consiguiente inexistencia de arbitrariedad, se sustenta en que la medida se fundamente en ese bloque de legitimidad que se ha mencionado, en el cual se consideran no solamente las normas propiamente dichas, sino también el conjunto de valores y principios aplicables que, a su vez, informan a las normas para dotarlas de legítima vigencia.

Es por ello que, aplicando este principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad a materia tributaria propiamente dicha, mediante sentencia 2011-1356 definió la Sala:

“Debe recordarse que las determinaciones presuntivas no pueden ser arbitrarias, para no atentar con la capacidad contributiva y la posible insolvencia o quiera de una persona física o jurídica. Lo que la legislación hace es dejar sentado el mínimo del impuesto el cual se puede desvirtuar aún al ser una presunción iuris tantum, por lo que ésta determinación inicial se puede modificar.”.

De tal manera, y de conformidad con lo señalado en el anterior considerando, es importante reiterar que la aplicación de la presunción contemplada en el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y el artículo 13 -actual artículo 20- de su Reglamento, respecto de la tasa aplicable en aquellos casos donde no exista documento escrito, es el resultado de un proceso de verificación y fiscalización que realiza la Administración Tributaria a partir de la documentación que debe conservar, mantener, aportar y poner a disposición el propio contribuyente; no se trata de información elaborada por la Administración, ni de actuaciones antojadizas, absolutamente discrecionales o sin sustento normativo, sino de elementos de valoración aportados por el propio interesado dentro de un procedimiento de verificación, fiscalización y determinación que se realiza según lo preceptuado en los artículos 103, 104, 123 y 128 del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios.

En este sentido, de manera alguna podría aducirse que la aplicación de esta presunción por parte de la Administración Tributaria sea un acto sin fundamento, sin sustento objetivo o arbitrario, que resulte contrario al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, pues lo cierto del caso, es que se está ante la aplicación de una presunción debidamente habilitada por ley, ante un supuesto específico y excepcional, que sería la inexistencia de documentación que no sólo debería existir, sino conservarse, mantenerse y ser puesta a disposición de la Administración Tributaria cuando así sea requerido, y que en caso de existir o hacerse constar por escrito las condiciones, sí sería viable la presentación de prueba en contrario.

Es por ello que la Sala coincide con el criterio de la Procuraduría General de la República, al decir que:

“Desde esa perspectiva, las normas impugnadas no resultan irrazonables, ni desproporcionadas, pues no impiden que el contribuyente aporte toda la documentación que considere útil para demostrar la realidad económica de la operación o negocio gravado, sin imponerle ningún tipo de requisito. Y si de esa prueba se constata que, en efecto, existe un contrato de préstamo u otra clase de financiamiento, supuesto en que resultarían aplicables las normas impugnadas; también se le permite refutar la presunción del rendimiento generado mediante la prueba idónea, que pasa por contar con el respectivo documento escrito en el que se formalizó la operación gravada.”.

En este sentido, tomando en consideración que la aplicación de la presunción prevista en los artículos cuestionados en esta acción, es producto de la realización de un procedimiento administrativo en el cual la Administración Tributaria debe sujetarse a las referidas disposiciones del Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios, procedimiento en el cual, además, se garantiza el derecho de defensa del contribuyente, debe concluirse que la aplicación de la presunción y la consecuente determinación tributaria en sí, distan de ser el resultado de una actuación arbitraria de la Administración Tributaria. Asimismo, debe igualmente concluirse, que los artículos 10 de la Ley y 13 -actual 20- del Reglamento, tampoco son, en sí mismos, contrarios al principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, toda vez que la posibilidad de aplicar aquella presunción en ellos reconocida, está necesariamente sujeta a la realización del procedimiento de verificación correspondiente.

En consecuencia, las normas que se cuestiona en esta acción, tampoco resultan violatorias del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad.

IX.- Sobre las normas impugnadas y la aducida violación al principio de tutela judicial efectiva. El accionante aduce que los artículos cuestionados en esta acción, igualmente resultan violatorios del principio de tutela judicial efectiva, y, consecuentemente, de los artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política, esencialmente porque, en su criterio, la presunción de comentario suprime «la posibilidad de cuestionar el ejercicio de una potestad de la autoridad tributaria para aplicar una presunción de ingreso», agregando, además, que las normas en disputa vulneran el principio de libertad probatorio e impide prueba en contrario al respecto.

Sobre el particular, debe señalarse que partiendo de la integración de los artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política, ciertamente se produce el reconocimiento del principio de tutela judicial efectiva, a partir del cual se habilita el derecho de acudir a la vía judicial en defensa de los derechos que se estime afectados y para realizar, en vía judicial, el control de legalidad de las conductas administrativas. Concretamente, el artículo 49 de la Constitución, establece la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, para garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado.

Por su parte, a partir del principio de libertad probatoria, se valida que los hechos alegados dentro de un proceso puedan demostrarse mediante los medios legítimos y válidos que se disponga, partiendo siempre de la premisa de la obtención lícita de la prueba, de su pertinencia a los efectos del proceso y la viabilidad de utilización en el contexto de la situación que se pretenda dilucidar o resolver. Así, en sentencia número 2004-12385, señaló la Sala que:

“Según éste [el principio de libertad probatoria] todo se puede probar por cualquier medio, siempre que no sea ilegal. Ello por cuanto, en la estructura de un Estado Democrático de Derecho, la búsqueda de la verdad real es un objetivo que no puede estar por encima de los derechos fundamentales de las partes en el proceso penal, de manera que, no se trata de una verdad a ultranza sino obtenida por vías legitimas, sometida a limitaciones (…)”- -énfasis agregados- De tal forma, el accionante entiende que las normas que cuestiona en esta acción, vulneran ambos principios, porque, en su criterio, la presunción allí establecida impide ejercer una actividad judicial donde sea posible admitir prueba que pudiere desvirtuar la determinación efectuada con base en aquella presunción.

Sin embargo, de conformidad con lo ampliamente expuesto en los considerandos anteriores, la norma tributaria especial que rige la materia, es la que señala la existencia de esa presunción, que sí admite prueba en contrario si la misma es de carácter documental escrita. Ya se ha explicado que ello es así, por cuanto ante la naturaleza de la obligación tributaria, es el contribuyente quien tiene el deber de tener, mantener y conservar la documentación que sirva de base para su declaración tributaria, así como de ponerla a disposición de la Administración Tributaria si fuere necesario para verificar lo planteado en la declaración, lo cual se realiza dentro de un procedimiento administrativo que da lugar a una determinación, que puede ser impugnada en vía administrativa y, claramente, también en vía judicial. De igual manera, si en esa determinación tributaria se ha dado aplicación a la presunción señalada en el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta y en el artículo 13 -hoy artículo 20- de su Reglamento, tiene el contribuyente la posibilidad de aportar prueba en contrario, siempre que se trate de documentación por escrito, ya que, según se ha reiterado, la especial naturaleza de la obligación tributaria así lo impone.

Ello permite a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa el adecuado ejercicio de valoración en sede judicial de las reclamaciones que al efecto llegaren a presentarse, y, de existir o no esa documentación escrita, resolver como en derecho corresponda en cada caso concreto.

Es por lo anterior que, en palabras de la Procuraduría General de la República:

“[L]os artículos cuestionados no imponen ningún tipo de restricción al juez contencioso-administrativo para controlar si ambos preceptos fueron debidamente aplicados o no al caso concreto del contribuyente por parte de la Administrción. De manera que, el juez puede valorar la misma información que aquél suministró al fisco y determinar, como premisa de entrada, si en efecto hubo una operación de crédito o financiamiento a la que aplicarle la presunción de intereses; en cuyo caso, de haberse dato una indebida apreciación del cuadro fáctico, y de la calificación jurídica hecha, perfectamente, el juez podría anular los actos determinativos de la Administración tributaria.”.

De tal manera, es claro que sí es posible el cuestionamiento de la determinación en la vía judicial, de donde resulta, de suyo, que resulta impropio aducir una imposibilidad de acceder a dicha vía y una consecuente afectación negativa del principio de tutela judicial efectiva, pues no sólo está habilitada la vía judicial, sino que en el ejercicio de dicha función, la persona juzgadora ejerce la misma con base en las disposiciones especiales que rigen la materia tributaria y el proceso judicial correspondiente. La presunción establecida en las normas cuestionadas en esta acción, de modo alguno impiden el acceso a la vía judicial y el pronunciamiento de la persona juzgadora; por el contrario, dicha vía está habilitada, y la persona juzgadora valora las circunstancias de hecho y derecho de conformidad con lo preceptuado en la normativa vigente. Ahora, en cuanto al principio de libertad probatorio, si esa amplitud probatoria debe ser ejercida también conforme a la ley, y ajustarse a las previsiones especiales -ya que se encuentra ajustado a lo que disponga la ley y a las limitaciones propias del proceso que se trate-, en esta materia resulta que la posibilidad de aportar prueba sí existe, pero circunscrita por ley a que se trate de documentación escrita, debido, como ya se ha reiterado ampliamente, a la especial naturaleza de la materia tributaria.

En consecuencia, igualmente debe descartarse que las normas cuestionadas resulten contrarias a los principios de tutela judicial efectiva y de libertad probatorio.

X.- A modo de conclusión. En definitiva, siendo que el artículo 10 de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, y el artículo 13 -actual artículo 20- del Reglamento a la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, distan de configurar una vulneración del derecho de defensa, del principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad, y de los principios de tutela judicial efectiva y de libertad probatorio, lo que corresponde es declarar sin lugar la acción.

Por tanto

Se declara sin lugar la acción.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

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