Dismissal of unconstitutionality challenge against public procurement rulesRechazo de acción de inconstitucionalidad contra normas de contratación administrativa

**Review of the Document** **Exp: 23-028497-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2024003884** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours twenty-five minutes on the fourteenth of February of two thousand twenty-four.** Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre01, attorney and notary, bearer of identity card no. CED01, against subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph in fine of article 191; all of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, as well as article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code.

**WHEREAS:** **1.-** By writing received via the Judiciary's Online Filing System at 16:20 hours on November 15, 2023, the petitioner challenges the following norms: subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph in fine of article 191; all of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, as well as article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, applicable ultra-actively in the bidding procedure (procedimiento licitatorio) no. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, as well as in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], and article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. The claimant states that the ratio of this action of unconstitutionality, as a reasonable means for the protection of the substantial legal situation that is estimated to be harmed in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], pending resolution in the Courts, lies in that: Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 is triply unconstitutional: a) because it excludes in-kind reparation, that is, re-award (readjudicación), making only restitution by equivalent through the monetary payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) possible, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, the situation cannot be reverted to the previous status quo; b) equally, the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act of bidding procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001 in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], frontally violates the fundamental right to interim relief (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, since, through its means, the effectiveness of the definitive or merit judgment can be provisionally guaranteed; and, c) finally, the indicated precept is unconstitutional, since the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act is also discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of juridical equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all this, without an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement. While article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code is unconstitutional, as it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to interim relief (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the definitive or merit judgment, on the existence or production of serious damages or injuries, current or potential, from the situation alleged. This right to interim relief, being an integral part of the essential core of the right to prompt and fulfilled justice, cannot be denied, restricted, or conditioned by the legislator to the existence or production of serious damages or injuries, current or potential, due to the execution or permanence of the conduct submitted to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment. Finally, subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph in fine of article 191, all of Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, applicable ultra-actively in the present case, are unconstitutional, as they violate the principle of equality of bidders (oferentes), including a disadvantage for the other participants because the distinctions and differentiations of treatment are odious matters and of restrictive interpretation, the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reservation, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with due guarantees. The claimant sets forth the following facts: 1. The Banco de Costa Rica, for the hiring of external Notaries Public, promoted Public Tender (Licitación Pública) no. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominated: “CONTRATACIÓN DE PROFESIONALES QUE BRINDEN SERVICIOS COMO NOTARIOS EXTERNOS PARA OFICINAS DEL BANCO DE COSTA RICA”, according to publication in the Integrated Public Procurement System (SICOP) on Monday, November 22, 2021. 2. Public Tender no. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominated: “CONTRATACIÓN DE PROFESIONALES QUE BRINDEN SERVICIOS COMO NOTARIOS EXTERNOS PARA OFICINAS DEL BANCO DE COSTA RICA”, regarding the independent line Item 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles, and Guatuso, is currently in the contractual execution phase as the award act is final in the administrative channel, given the exhaustion of the appeals stage. 3. The claimant was the only non-awarded finalist bidder for Item 3, of the referenced tender, who did not consent to the award act contrary to his legitimate interests, having challenged it in a timely and proper manner via SICOP before the Contraloría General de la República. 4. He received the maximum qualification from the tendering entity in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001. 5. He holds the status of Service PYME in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001. 6. Given that he received the maximum qualification from the tendering entity in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, while also holding the status of Service PYME in said competition, he holds the right to the (re)award (readjudicación) of the indicated competition regarding any of the slots of the bidders/now awardees [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003], whose bids were improperly qualified by the tendering entity, being unable to achieve the maximum qualification in the competition, with their bids being displaced by his, his bid having to be considered the most convenient, for having fully complied with everything required by the bidding documents (cartel), and given that he was the only non-awarded finalist bidder for Item 3, ZONA Alajuela 3, of the above-referenced tender who did not consent to the award act contrary to his legitimate interests, for having challenged it in a timely and proper manner; all of which is subject to jurisdictional review within the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], brought by the claimant against the Banco de Costa Rica, the Contraloría General de la República jointly with the State, and [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003]. 7. This action of unconstitutionality stands as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest he considers harmed, given that, the main object of the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case file number [Valor 001] being the direct re-award (readjudicación) to the plaintiff of a slot in Item 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles, and Guatuso, of Public Tender no. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, of any of the slots granted to the bidders/now awardees [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003], he cannot access either the re-award in a judgment on the merits or interim relief (tutela cautelar), both due to legal impossibility, given that article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its reforms, which prescribes: “Exhaustion of the administrative channel. The final resolution or the order that terminates the appeal will deem the administrative channel exhausted. Within three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects, before the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, through the special process regulated in articles 89 and 90 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. If the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, the judgment favorable to the claimant may only recognize the payment of the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused.”, unconstitutionally denies both the re-award and also the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act. 8. Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its reforms, is unconstitutional, as such precept excludes the fundamental right to in-kind reparation, that is, re-award (readjudicación), making only restitution by equivalent through monetary payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) possible in the current state of the Costa Rican legal system, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, as occurs in the present case, the situation cannot be reverted to the previous status quo, and it equally is so for the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, as it frontally violates the fundamental right to interim relief (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, since, through its means, the effectiveness of the definitive or merit judgment can be provisionally guaranteed. This right to interim relief, being an integral part of the essential core of the right to prompt and fulfilled justice, cannot be denied, restricted, or conditioned by the legislator, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment. 9. Equally, the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act provided by article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its reforms, is also unconstitutional for being discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of juridical equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, since in its ninth chapter, relating to "contratación pública" (public procurement), article 9.15.2 -applicable to the goods, services, and public entities covered by the commercial agreement- provides that "Each Party shall stipulate that the authority established or designated in paragraph 1 - impartial and independent administrative or judicial authority that must hear the bidder's challenges- may take timely precautionary measures, while the resolution of a challenge is pending, to preserve the opportunity to correct a potential breach of this Chapter, including the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded"; a protective regime, where it is indeed feasible to access the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, since said protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all this, without an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement. An identical situation exists, and in the specific case, a discriminatory normative-legislative treatment devoid of all objective and reasonable justification occurs. Only within the framework of equality is restriction, but not nullification, of fundamental rights possible. 10. For its part, article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, which provides: “The precautionary measure (medida cautelar) shall be appropriate when the execution or permanence of the conduct submitted to process produces serious damages or injuries, current or potential, to the alleged situation, and provided that the claim is not reckless or, in a manifest manner, lacking in seriousness.”, is unconstitutional, as it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to interim relief (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the definitive or merit judgment, on the existence or production of serious damages or injuries, current or potential, from the alleged situation, that is, through the known expedient of the use of discretion, which ends up being unlimited for the legal operator, through the interpretation of indeterminate legal concepts, given that, the granting of a precautionary measure (medida cautelar) does not depend, exclusively, on free and prudent judgment or judicial discretion, given that, the right to interim relief, being embedded in the essential content of the more general right to prompt and fulfilled justice, comprises the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) to guarantee the effectiveness of the merit judgment –essential function of interim relief–, if its requirements are met (appearance of a good right -fumus boni iuris- and danger in delay -periculum in mora). Correlatively, the jurisdictional body has the obligation to order or issue the provisional measure if the requirements for its adoption are met. This right, being an integral part of the essential core of the right to prompt and fulfilled justice, cannot be denied, restricted, or conditioned by the legislator to the existence or production of serious damages or injuries, current or potential, from the alleged situation, due to the execution or permanence of the conduct submitted to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment, given that, in accordance with binding erga omnes constitutional jurisprudence (Constitutional Chamber, Vote no. 6224-2005 of fifteen hours sixteen minutes of May twenty-fifth, two thousand five), any precautionary measure (medida cautelar) is appropriate provided its requirements are met, that is, appearance of a good right (fumus boni iuris) and danger in delay (periculum in mora). Correlatively, the jurisdictional body has the obligation to order or issue the provisional measure if the requirements for its adoption are met, since interim relief (tutela cautelar) is constitutionally obligatory when the substantial legal situations of the parties, be they subjective rights or legitimate interests, may irremediably disappear, be damaged, or be harmed, since the judge is called to protect and repair them (articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution). 11. Both subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta no. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its reforms, applicable ultra-actively in case [Valor 001] (preliminary matter), as well as the "remedial power (poder subsanador)" developed by the administrative jurisprudence of the CGR based on them, are unconstitutional, as they violate the principle of equality of bidders (oferentes), including a disadvantage for the other participants, by allowing, based on them, remediation (subsanaciones) of bids for bidders who, at the end of the bidding procedure (procedimiento licitatorio), end up being awardees, a remediation that is always carried out in contravention of the positivized principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, an aspect this last where the inclusion of the disadvantage lies for the bidder who did fully comply with everything required by the bidding documents (cartel), since according to the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, insofar as the contractor selection procedures must be defined a priori in a precise, certain, and concrete manner, the Administration cannot avoid the predefined rules in the legal norm (bidding documents - cartel), which determines the scope of action. Stated differently, there is no possibility that the remediation, in the case of admissibility requirements or evaluation or qualification of bids, does not represent an undue advantage for the bidders who did fully comply with everything required by the bidding documents (cartel), because even when it concerns "formal aspects or unmodifiable historical facts", given that, if the accrediting document of the requirement that is sought to be remedied did not meet the parameters of the bidding documents (cartel), the requirement must be considered unfulfilled, that is, there is no alternative. Inevitably the contrary places the bidder warned by the Administration in the position of obtaining an undue advantage, if they correct the defective requirement, or provide the requirement omitted from their bid, regarding the bidders who did fully comply with everything required by the bidding documents (cartel). Equally, subsections b) and i) of article 81, of said Regulation and the "remedial power" anchored in them, violate the principle of normative hierarchy according to which, norms from the lower source cannot modify or substitute those from the higher source, which implies a relationship of subordination. This is the case of the Constitution in relation to the law and the rest of the norms of the order, and it is also the case of the law in relation to the regulation, where, in case of contradiction, the law always and necessarily prevails. The principle of equality of bidders (oferentes), derived from article 182 of the Political Constitution, does not legitimize any inequality to authorize differentiated treatment, given the requirement of equality and non-discrimination instituted by the fundamental right to equality before the law according to numeral 33 of the Political Constitution and articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, a reason why the distinctions and differentiations of treatment are odious matters and of restrictive interpretation. In this sense, the differentiation of treatment (in the case, that is, compliant/non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of article 81 ibidem, is not imposed by a norm of legal rank; quite the contrary, the classification and differentiation of treatment beyond the application of the regulations provided by article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 was "delegated" to the Public Administration, creating normative hypotheses that only it is called to determine, regulate, and establish, so that the cited regulatory provision violates the right of equality before the law and the principle of legal reservation. Furthermore, the Contraloría General de la República, as expressly indicated in resolution number R-DCA-SICOP-00286-2023, associated with addressing the additions/clarifications of procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, subject to review in case [Valor 001] (preliminary matter), considers that: “…the principle of conservation of bids (Sic…) supports the figure of remediation. The foregoing, starting from the basis that based on the principle of efficiency, not every defect in a bid causes its exclusion…”, whose normative foundation is provided by article 4, fourth paragraph of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494; this precept does not justify the differentiation of treatment inherent in the remediation figure in values of rank equivalent to equality (legal/constitutional) as it does not seek to achieve material equality (generally or implicitly). Ergo, the regulatory provisions of interest, reasonably cannot achieve the ends constitutionally sought (equality of bidders without including a disadvantage for the other participants). The "remedial power" developed regulatorily in subsections b) and i) of article 81 of said Regulation, is based on substantially different factual assumptions. That is, it is not intended to correct reality; thus, the differentiation is not justified. The differentiation of treatment created by regulation greatly, unjustly, and unduly benefits non-compliant bidders, causing discriminatory treatment regarding the bidders who fully complied with everything required by the bidding documents (cartel). There is no proportionality between the legal purpose (article 42 subsection j) Law No. 7494) and the one pursued with the regulatory provision, given the differentiated treatment that the latter provides or implies. There is no proportionality between the motive (conservation of the bid. Remediable defects shall not disqualify the bid containing them) and the content (regulatory remediation hypotheses always imply the inclusion of a disadvantage regarding the bidders who fully complied with everything required by the cartel) of the differentiation of treatment created and implemented by the regulatory provision. It is unsuitable to achieve the intended purpose, of facilitating the adoption of the final decision under conditions beneficial to the general interest, because, ontologically rooted in the philosophy of the "pobrecito", it does not encourage timely compliance, or, it promotes non-compliance and mediocrity. The regulatory provision is unnecessary for being constituted as an autonomous regulation where there is a provision of legal rank. It is simply useful or convenient for the activity deployed by the Contraloría General de la República as Improper Hierarch in matters of public procurement, but correlatively disrespectful of the rights and interests of the particular compliant bidder. Consequently, the differentiation of treatment under examination is contrary to equality. Equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, so that this is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights. 12. Article 190, sixth paragraph of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta no. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its reforms, applicable ultra-actively in case [Valor 001] (preliminary matter), is unconstitutional, as it is optional and not mandatory for the Contraloría General de la República, prior to issuing the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process and the right of defense, and causes defenselessness by preventing the right to a contradictory proceeding or to contradict the appealed counterparty and its counter-evidence, given the burdensome nature for the party that appealed the award act, of the negative effects of the final resolution adverse to its interests. The human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is also violated. 13. Article 191, third or final paragraph of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta no. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its reforms, applicable ultra-actively in case [Valor 001] (preliminary matter), is unconstitutional, for being discretionary and not mandatory for the Contraloría General de la República, being an open door to arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary to examine all the parties' submissions, which violates the principles of due process and right of defense, legality and legal reservation, since the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to the law, given that, via regulation, the hard core is diminishedly affected, both of the fundamental right to due process and right of defense and of the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to a remedy, provided respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 14. The IACHR Court has emphasized that the general guarantees of article 8 must be present in the determination of rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature, "and, therefore, in these types of matters, the individual also has the right to the due process that is applied in criminal matters" (IACHR Court, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, para. 28. IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay FRC. 2011, para. 117.). In this sense, when the ACHR refers to the right of every person to be heard by a "competent judge or tribunal" for the "determination of their rights", this expression refers to any public authority, be it administrative –collegiate or single-person–, legislative, or judicial, "that through its resolutions determines rights and obligations of persons", that is, that "[a]rticle 8.1 of the ACHR does not apply only to judges and judicial tribunals", but also to those who, despite not being formally so, act as such (IACHR Court. Case of Claude Reyes et al. vs. Chile. FCR. 2006, para., 118. IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, para. 118. Case of Nombre03 vs. Peru. EPFRC. 2015, para. 208. See IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011. Dissenting vote of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, and the concurring votes of Judge Diego García Sayán, Judge Margarette May Macaulay, and Judge Rhadys Abreu Blondet.). Likewise, the IACHR Court has stated that the requirement that a person be heard "is comparable to the right to a fair 'trial' or 'judicial proceedings'." On the matter, following the ECtHR in the cases Nombre04 vs. Switzerland, Van de Hurk vs. Netherlands, Nombre05 vs. Germany, and Nombre06 vs. Russia, the IACHR Court has established that a fair procedure implies that the body responsible for administering justice carries out "an appropriate examination of the submissions, arguments, and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessments as to whether they are relevant to its decision" (IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, para. 121. IACHR Court. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) vs. Ecuador. EPFCR. 2013. Para. 182.). Consequently, the jurisprudential standard implies that a fair trial is one in which a person has been heard with due guarantees. According to the IACHR Court, the right to be heard thus comprises two spheres, the formal and the material. The formal or procedural sphere of the right implies "ensuring access to the competent body to determine the right claimed in compliance with due procedural guarantees (such as the submission of arguments and the presentation of evidence)". For its part, the material sphere of the right implies "that the State guarantees that the decision produced through the procedure satisfies the end for which it was conceived". For the IACHR Court, "[t]his last does not mean that it must always be upheld but that its capacity to produce the result for which it was conceived must be guaranteed" (IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, para. 122. IACHR Court. Case of the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its members vs. Honduras. FRC. 2015, para. 237). On the other hand, it should be noted that although the wording of the ACHR refers to the right of "[e]very person accused of a crime" and therefore subject to criminal prosecution in its different stages –investigation, accusation, trial, and conviction– (IACHR Court. Case of Nombre07 vs. Argentina. EPFRC. 2012, para. 91.), in accordance with the jurisprudence of the IACHR Court, the minimum guarantees established in numeral 2 of article 8 apply mutatis mutandis as relevant to other orders distinct from criminal matters, that is, to civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature (IACHR Court. Case of the "White Panel" (Paniagua Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala. F. 1998, para. 149. IACHR Court. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal vs. Peru. FCR. 2001. Paras. 69-71. IACHR Court. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. vs. Dominican Republic. FCR. 2012. Para. 157.). According to the IACHR Court, obtaining all guarantees that allow for reaching fair decisions is a human right.

Thus, “[t]he minimum guarantees must be respected in the administrative proceeding and in any other proceeding whose decision may affect the rights of persons” (IACHR Court. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama. FCR. 2001, para. 127. IACHR Court. Case of Nombre08 vs. Guatemala. EPFRC. 2016, para. 73.). The petitioner indicates the following as legal grounds: Relies on Articles 7, 10, 11, 18, 33, 39, 41, 49, 153 of the Political Constitution; on Articles 1.1, 2.1, 8.1, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José; on the unwritten norm that is Voto n.° 6224-2005 of fifteen hours and sixteen minutes of the twenty-fifth of May of two thousand five, issued by the Constitutional Chamber; as well as on the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination, effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, interim relief (tutela cautelar), due process, right of defense, rationality, reasonableness and proportionality, technical reasonableness and reasonableness of effects on personal rights, legality, without prejudice to the concordant provisions contained in the various texts for the protection of Fundamental Rights, which he considers violated for the following reasons. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality against: a) Article 90 of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) n.° 7494 and its amendments, because i) it excludes in-kind compensation, that is, re-award, thus now making it possible for this to be individually petitioned, or, together with restitution by equivalent through the monetary payment of damages (daños y perjuicios), at the choice of the administered party, regardless of whether the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, now being able to revert the situation to the previous status quo, and also ii) for providing for the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, for directly violating the fundamental right to interim relief, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter) could now be provisionally guaranteed, a legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, which is also discriminatory, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement. b) Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as it directly violates the essential content, as a permissible limit, of the fundamental right to interim relief, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter)) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious damage or harm, current or potential, from the alleged situation, given that the granting of a precautionary measure does not depend exclusively on the free and prudent judgment or judicial discretion, since the right to interim relief, as embedded in the essential content of the more general right to prompt and complete justice, comprises the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the merits judgment – the essential function of interim relief – if the prerequisites thereof are met (appearance of a good right – fumus boni iuris – and danger in delay – periculum in mora). This right to interim relief, forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to effective, prompt, and complete justice, the legislator cannot deny it, restrict it, or condition it on the existence or production of serious damage or harm, current or potential, due to the execution or permanence of the conduct submitted to the proceeding, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment; and, c) Subsections b) and i) of Article 81, the sixth paragraph of Article 190, and the third final paragraph (in fine) of Article 191, all of Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter), as they violate the principle of equality of offerors, including a disadvantage for the other participants because distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation, the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality, the principle of transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with the due guarantees; all of the foregoing, for contravening the norms, principles, and values embodied by the Political Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights, cited above, thereby re-establishing the legality proper to the Rule of Law.

2.- The petitioner bases his standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since he indicates as the underlying matter (asunto base) the ordinary contentious-administrative and civil treasury case file (expediente) n.° [Valor 001], where the petitioner is the plaintiff and the co-defendants are the Banco de Costa Rica, the Contraloría General de la República jointly with the State and the individuals [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] and [Nombre02 003]; a jurisdictional proceeding processed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda (Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court), where it is currently pending resolution. Likewise, he provides the certified brief invoking unconstitutionality.

3.- By official communication of December 6, 2023, addressed to the Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the referral to this Chamber was requested – as soon as possible – of the entirety of the judicial case file processed under number [Valor 001]. This request was reiterated by email on December 19, 2023.

4.- On December 19, 2023, the digital case file n.° [Valor 001] was received.

5.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject outright (de plano) or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition submitted for its consideration that proves to be manifestly inadmissible (improcedente), or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it involves the simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior, equal or similar petition that was rejected.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and, CONSIDERING (CONSIDERANDO):

I.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION (ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD). This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in a judicial venue – including habeas corpus or amparo remedies – or in the administrative venue – in the procedure for exhausting this route, that is, in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act –, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action – no underlying matter is required – in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, and the Defensor de los Habitantes. Regarding the requirement of a matter pending resolution, this Chamber, through judgment n.° 04190-95 of 11:33 hours on July 28, 1995, stated the following:

“(…) First, it is a proceeding of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required – whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative route – in order to access the constitutional route, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding, as it manifests on the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and only by exception does the legislation allow direct access to this route – requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (…)”.

Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged norms, duly reasoned, with a specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality (bloque de constitucionalidad) considered infringed (Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law). Furthermore, evidence of standing must be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), the stamp tax of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica must be paid (Article 4 of Law n.° 3245 of December 3, 1963), and a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the underlying matter must be provided (Article 79 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law).

II.- STANDING. In the specific case, the petitioner bases his standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, since he is the plaintiff in the contentious-administrative proceeding n.° [Valor 001], against the Contraloría General de la República, the State, the Banco de Costa Rica, [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003]. The aforementioned judicial proceeding is being processed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, an authority that deemed the proceeding established by resolution of 13:40 hours on November 1, 2023, granted a term of thirty business days to answer the complaint, and warned the plaintiff to provide the copies required by law. Subsequently, by resolution of 08:45 hours on November 17, 2023, the warning was considered fulfilled, and it was ordered to notify the transfer order (auto de traslado). Likewise, the petitioner provided a certified brief invoking the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged here within said underlying proceeding.

III.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION. The petitioner challenges the following norms:

• 1)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 81.—Correctable aspects. The following, among other elements, shall be correctable (subsanables):

• a)(…)
• b)Certifications regarding qualities, characteristics, or specifications of the good offered, provided that such circumstances existed at the time of the submission of the offer and the interested party so accredits.

(Thus amended the previous subsection by Article 1 of Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) c) (…)

• d)(…)
• e)(…)
• f)(…)
• g)(…)
• h)(…)
• i)The documents necessary to prove the veracity of facts occurring before the opening of offers.

(Thus amended the previous subsection by Article 1 of Executive Decree N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) j) (…)”.

• 2)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 190.—Procedure for admissibility of the appeal. The initial order (auto inicial) admitting the appeal for processing must be adopted no later than the tenth business day after the deadline for appealing has expired. Within this same period, it must rule on the joinder of revocation appeals, when appropriate. If this order is not issued within the indicated period, the Contraloría General de la República must establish the corresponding disciplinary liability of the responsible official.

In this order, when dealing with public tenders (licitaciones públicas), the Administration and the awarded party shall be granted a period of ten business days to respond to the appellant's allegations and submit the respective evidence. In the case of abbreviated tenders (licitaciones abreviadas) or competitions (concursos) promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Administrative Procurement Law, this summons shall be for five business days.

When answering the initial hearing (audiencia inicial), if the parties argue against the appellant's offer, a special hearing shall be granted for five business days in the case of a public tender and three business days for an abbreviated tender, so that the appellant may refer exclusively to what was alleged.

The Contraloría General de la República must expressly rule, before the final resolution, on the evidentiary requests of the parties, when they exist, admitting or denying them, by means of a reasoned resolution. Likewise, it shall adopt the evidentiary measures necessary for the proper processing of the appeal. All administrative offices are obliged to provide their free collaboration in providing expert evidence (prueba pericial) requested ex officio by the Contraloría General.

In highly qualified cases, the Contraloría General de la República may grant new hearings for the purpose of clarifying aspects for the proper resolution of the appeal.

Prior to the issuance of the final resolution, the Contraloría General de la República shall, at its discretion, grant the parties a final hearing, providing a period of three business days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, without the introduction of new facts not debated in the appeal being admissible. When deemed convenient, the final hearing may be oral. To this end, the parties shall be summoned at least three business days in advance to present their conclusions, and a notice of the date and time of the hearing shall also be posted in a place accessible to the public. Minutes (acta) shall be drawn up from the proceedings, containing at least the names (Nombre02) of the parties and a summary of the proceedings, which shall be incorporated into the case file.

In cases where the Contraloría General de la República deems it opportune, a public hearing may be held for the presentation of arguments, the taking of evidence, and conclusions, according to the rules set forth in the initial hearing order. This hearing must take place once all corresponding written hearings have been completed and must be summoned at least three business days in advance.

(Thus added the previous paragraph by Article 2 of Executive Decree N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) In the event that an oral hearing of any nature has been conducted, the final resolution may be delivered orally, either immediately following the conclusion of the hearing, or within a period no greater than three business days after its holding. Said resolution shall be reasoned and it shall suffice that it be recorded by any suitable means whose record shall be incorporated into the appeal file.

(Thus added the previous paragraph by Article 2 of Executive Decree N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) (Its numbering run by Article 2 of Executive Decree N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from the former Article 182 to 190)" (The underline does not correspond to the original).

• 3)Article 191, third final paragraph (in fine), of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 191.—Resolution. In public tenders, the final resolution must be adopted within forty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended by twenty more business days, by means of a reasoned resolution, when to resolve the appeal it is necessary to gather evidence for a better resolution (prueba para mejor resolver) or when due to its complexity it cannot be resolved within the normal resolution period.

In abbreviated tenders or competitions promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Administrative Procurement Law, the final resolution must be rendered no later than thirty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended by ten more business days, by means of a reasoned resolution under the same assumptions indicated for the public tender.

The Contraloría General de la República shall issue its ruling confirming or annulling, totally or partially, without it being necessary for it to examine all the arguments of the parties when one or several of these are decisive for issuing it.

(Its numbering run by Article 2 of Executive Decree N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from the former Article 183 to 191)". (The underline does not correspond to the original).

• 4)Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, which literally provides the following:

"ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of the administrative route. The final resolution or the order that concludes the appeal shall exhaust the administrative route. Within the three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects (efectos suspensivos), before the Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, by means of the special proceeding regulated in Articles 89 and 90 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. If the procurement whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, a judgment favorable to the petitioner may only recognize the payment of the damages caused." 5) Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, which literally provides the following:

"ARTICLE 21.- The precautionary measure (medida cautelar) shall be appropriate when the execution or permanence of the conduct submitted to the proceeding produces serious damage or harm, current or potential, from the alleged situation, and provided that the claim is not reckless or, in a manifest manner, lacking in seriousness." IV.- GRIEVANCES. In summary, the petitioner alleges the following grievances of unconstitutionality:

• a)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494: In general, the petitioner argues that this article (as well as Article 190, sixth paragraph, and Article 191, third final paragraph (in fine), all of Regulation n.° 33411) violates the principle of equality of offerors, including a disadvantage for the other participants, because distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with the due guarantees.
• b)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494: the petitioner considers that this violates the principle of equality of offerors, including a disadvantage for the other participants, because distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with the due guarantees.
• c)Article 191, third final paragraph (in fine), of the repealed Regulation n.° 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494: the petitioner considers that this violates the principle of equality of offerors, including a disadvantage for the other participants, because distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with the due guarantees.
• d)Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494: The petitioner considers this article unconstitutional for three reasons, namely: i. because it excludes in-kind compensation, that is, re-award, given that only restitution by equivalent through the monetary payment of damages is possible, since, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, the situation cannot be reverted to the previous status quo; ii. likewise, the petitioner alleges that the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the act of award of the tender procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], directly violates the fundamental right to interim relief, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment can be provisionally guaranteed; and, iii. finally, the petitioner considers that the indicated precept is unconstitutional, because the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act is also discriminatory, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement.
• e)Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code: the petitioner considers that this article directly violates the essential content, as a permissible limit, of the fundamental right to interim relief, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious damage or harm, current or potential, from the alleged situation.

V.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 81, SUBSECTIONS B) AND I), OF THE REPEALED REGULATION N.° 33411 TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT LAW N.° 7494. Regarding subsections b) and i) of Article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 33411 (published in La Gaceta n.° 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments, the petitioner alleges the following ground of unconstitutionality:

"(...) they violate the principle of equality of offerors, including a disadvantage for the other participants, by providing, based on them, for corrections (subsanaciones) to sealed offers (plicas) for offerors, who at the end of the tender procedure, end up being awarded, a correction that is always carried out in contravention of the positivist principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the latter aspect being where the inclusion of the disadvantage for the offeror who did fully comply with what was required by the tender documents (cartel) resides (...)"

"(...) Likewise, subsections b) and i) of Article 81, of the said Regulation and the 'corrective power' anchored in them, violate the principle of normative hierarchy (...) In this sense, the differentiation of treatment (in the case, that is, compliant / non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of Article 81 ibidem, is not imposed by a norm of legal rank;

all the contrary, the classification and differentiation of treatment beyond the application of the regulations provided by Article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Procurement Law N° 7494 was 'delegated' to the Public Administration, such that the cited regulatory provision violates the right to equality before the law and the principle of legal reserve." Regarding the first grievance, that is, the alleged violation of the principle of equality, the Chamber, in reiterated case law, has indicated that when the petitioner alleges a violation of the principle of equality, they have the duty to provide the parameter of comparison between the subjects treated differently, in order to provide sufficient elements of judgment to allow this Court to contrast whether the alleged inequality occurs. This, in doctrine, is known as the “tertium comparationis” (point of reference, of comparison), and regarding it, in judgment n.° 7261-94 of 08:30 hours on December 9, 1994, it was stated:

“With respect to the principle of equality, as this Chamber has repeatedly held, the most important factual requirement is that there be discriminatory treatment devoid of any objective and reasonable justification; this is the reason why whoever invokes the violation of this principle must supply, for the purpose of allowing a full confrontation, parameters of comparison in order to contrast whether or not inequality occurs (see, among others and by way of example, Judgments Nos. 196-91 in considering (considerando) II; 1432-91, in considering II and 1732-91)”. (The highlighting and underline are not from the original).

Now, in the specific case, the petitioner alleges that the norm that is the subject of this action, by allowing the correction of defects, puts participants who fully complied with what was required at a disadvantage. However, from a reading of the norm, it does not follow that this is so, as it does not make any differentiation between offerors, so that anyone can benefit from the correction of omitted requirements. This, added to the fact that the petitioner did not provide any element or parameter of comparison that allows demonstrating discriminatory treatment devoid of objective and reasonable justification.

VI.- On the other hand, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of normative hierarchy or legal reserve, since, in the petitioner's opinion, the regulatory norm exceeds what is provided in Article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Procurement Law n.° 7494, this grievance also becomes inadmissible, given that the conflict it raises is one of ordinary legality (legalidad ordinaria), which is not capable of being examined through the unconstitutionality action, but must be raised before the administration itself or in the ordinary venue. The apparent confrontation between the legal norm and the regulation in question implies a legality conflict. On repeated occasions (see judgments n.° 2000-01149 of 15:39 hours on February 2, 2000, and 2021-11972 of 9:30 hours on May 26, 2021, among others) this Chamber has held that determining whether a regulatory norm, such as the one challenged, violates or exceeds what is provided in a law, is a matter of legality whose discussion does not correspond to this jurisdiction. Article 49 of the Fundamental Charter assigns the control of legality of the State's administrative function to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, not to the constitutional one. If this Chamber were to attempt to oversee, through the unconstitutionality action, the various possible hypotheses of infringement of the principle of legality that may occur in administrative offices, it would in practice supplant —against the grain of the constitutional text— the courts of that subject matter. Consequently, if the petitioner considers that the challenged norm is illegal or has been applied incorrectly, they may resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in defense of their rights.

In this order of considerations, the action is inadmissible with respect to subsections b) and i) of Article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411.

VII.- REGARDING ARTICLE 190, SIXTH PARAGRAPH, OF THE REGULATION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 33411. The claimant considers that Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411 (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments, is unconstitutional, because it is optional and not mandatory for the Contraloría General de la República, prior to issuing the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process and the right of defense, and causes defenselessness by impeding the right to a contradictory process or to contradict the opposing party appealed against and its counter-evidence. Also, in the claimant's view, it violates the human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

In this regard, the Chamber has repeatedly identified the essential elements of due process in administrative matters; for example, in judgment No. 11860-2014 of 3:05 p.m. on July 22, 2014, the following was ordered:

"(…) III.- On the merits. This Court has on multiple occasions developed the scope and nuances of the right enshrined in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution. The reasoning of judgment #15-90 of 4:45 p.m. on January 5, 1990, is particularly illustrative:

"... the right of defense guaranteed by Article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in Article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is often called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilateral hearing' of 'due legal process' or 'principle of contradiction' (...) has been summarized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the proceeding; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence it deems pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and the reasons on which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." "... the right of defense safeguarded in Article 39 ibidem governs not only judicial proceedings, but also any administrative proceeding carried out by the public administration; and the claimant must necessarily be granted, if it so wishes, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise its defense...' And the following has also been indicated:

"This Chamber has pointed out the elements of the right to due legal process (see especially Advisory Opinion No. 1739-92), applicable to any sanctioning procedure or one that may result in the loss of subjective rights. The Administration must, in consideration of the administered party's right of defense: a) Notify the affected party of the charges, which implies communicating, in an individualized, concrete, and timely manner, the facts being imputed; b) Allow unrestricted access to the administrative file; c) Grant a reasonable period for the preparation of its defense; d) Grant a hearing and allow it to provide all evidence it deems appropriate to support its defense; e) Substantiate the resolutions that end the proceeding; f) Recognize its right to appeal the sanctioning resolution.' (judgment #5469-95 of 6:03 p.m. on October 4, 1995).

The foregoing should not be understood, however, to mean that every violation that arises in the course of an administrative proceeding is amenable to protection in this Jurisdiction, since only those substantial violations that place the affected party in a state of defenselessness are protectable in this venue, as detailed in judgment #2001-10198 of 10:29 a.m. on October 10, 2001 (…)". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Now then, regarding the omission by the Contraloría General de la República to grant a party the final conclusive hearing, in judgment No. 2000-04142 of 4:05 p.m. on May 16, 2000, the Chamber ruled in the following manner:

"(…) As has been proven, the disagreement raised by the appellant in the sense that he was not notified of the order granting a final hearing in the appeal process followed before the Contraloría General de la República does not violate his opportunity to appeal the Administration's decision regarding the public tender (licitación) in which he participated as an offeror, since, as the Contraloría correctly points out in its report, this opportunity is exercised with full breadth at the time of filing the appeal. The final hearing is a merely conclusive stage, in which no new arguments or evidentiary elements capable of altering the final decision that could be adopted based on the terms in which the appeal was initially filed may be invoked, and in this sense, it cannot be said that an injury to his right of defense and due process has occurred. Likewise, for that reason the questioned action does not entail discriminatory treatment regarding the right to appeal the award act, which is the purpose of the appeal provided for by the legal system in matters of administrative contracting. Consequently, the omission incurred by the Contraloría regarding the notification of the final hearing, if it departed from the provisions of the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting, could certainly be outlined as an infraction of the principle of legality. However, this Court has repeatedly pronounced that, through the amparo remedy, this infraction can only be protected when it, in turn, implies a violation of some other fundamental right or guarantee". (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).

Based on the foregoing, this Chamber observes that the alleged injury to due process alleged by the claimant lacks foundation, since the authority of the Contraloría General de la República to grant the parties a final hearing to issue their conclusions is not injurious to any essential element of administrative due process that leaves the parties defenseless, and therefore it lacks constitutional relevance. For this reason, it is appropriate to reject the action on the merits regarding this aspect.

VIII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 191, THIRD PARAGRAPH IN FINE, OF THE REPEALED REGULATION NO. 33411 TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 7494.- This action lacks substantiation regarding the ground of unconstitutionality relating to Article 191, third paragraph in fine, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494. This is because the claimant merely stated the following:

"Article 191, third or final paragraph, of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 11-02-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, for being discretionary and not mandatory for the Contraloría General de la República, being an open door to arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary to examine all the parties' pleadings, which violates the principles of due process and the right of defense, legality and legal reserve, since the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to the law, given that, via regulation, the hard core of both the fundamental right to due process and the right of defense and the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to an appeal, are affected in a diminishing way, provided for respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights".

From the arguments presented by the claimant, it is not possible to clearly discern the reason why he considers that Article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411, is unconstitutional, since he merely mentions the violation of the principles of due process and the right of defense, without developing its content in order to contrast it with the norm in question. As indicated in the preceding recital (considerando), this Chamber only intervenes in the face of violations of the essential elements of due process, so it is required that the claimant party clearly and precisely develop how the challenged norm prevents the exercise of his right of defense, which he did not argue in the filing brief. Based on the foregoing, it is appropriate to flatly reject this action regarding Article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411.

IX.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 90 OF THE REPEALED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 7494. Regarding Article 90 of Law No. 7494, the claimant's first allegation is that this norm is unconstitutional "because such precept excludes the fundamental right to in-kind reparation, that is, re-awarding, thus, in the current state of the Costa Rican legal system, only restitution by equivalent through the payment in cash of damages (daños y perjuicios) is possible, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, as occurs in the present case, the situation cannot be reverted to the prior status quo". Throughout the filing brief, the claimant merely raises this argument without specifically indicating which fundamental right or principle of Constitutional Law he considers injured. Regarding the impossibility of suspending the execution of the award, the truth is that this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the enforceability (ejecutividad) and self-executing nature (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts is a General Principle of Administrative Law, embodied in Articles 146 and 148 of the General Law of Public Administration, which is in accordance with Constitutional Law and the principles and values that inform it (in this regard, see judgments numbers 2002-000928 of 09:47 a.m., on February 1, 2002, 2014-004307 of 09:15 a.m. on March 28, 2014 and 2015-004019 of 09:05 a.m. on March 20, 2015, among many others). Consequently, this argument by the claimant must be flatly rejected.

X.Regarding his second allegation, namely, that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 violates the right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), in unconstitutionality action No. 23-005726-0007-CO, filed by the claimant herein against Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, this Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2023-012773 of 09:20 a.m. on May 31, 2023, the following:

"II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION. In the specific case, the claimant challenges Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, which states the following:

"ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of the administrative channel. The final resolution or the order that puts an end to the appeal shall exhaust the administrative channel. Within three days after notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects, before the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, through the special process regulated in Articles 89 and 90 of the Law regulating the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. If the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, the judgment favorable to the claimant may only recognize the payment of the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused." The petitioner alleges that the aforementioned norm is unconstitutional because, in his view, the denial of the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge to the award act of the bidding process violates the right to precautionary protection. Likewise, the claimant considers that the challenged norm violates the principle of equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, whose protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or its execution. To this effect, the claimant indicates as a prior matter pending resolution, the contentious-administrative process No. 22-005575-1027-CA, where he filed an appeal against the rejection of the variation of factual circumstances that gave rise to the denial of the urgent precautionary measure requested by the claimant. He also certifies that he invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm within said judicial process.

However, despite the claimant's allegations, this matter is inadmissible, given that the matter the claimant indicates as pending before the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Judicial Branch has two files for precautionary measures that were definitively resolved and are archived, while he failed to prove that the necessary connection exists between this action and the main contentious-administrative file, since he only based his claim of unconstitutionality in relation to the protection of his fundamental right to precautionary protection. Thus, from the study of the certified copy of file No. 22-005575-1027-CA, filed by Name01 against Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, consisting of the main cognizance process and two precautionary measure files, it was proven that the claimant filed a "request for urgent and provisionalísima precautionary measure" via a brief dated October 17, 2022, such that, the provisionalísima precautionary measure was rejected by the Contentious-Administrative Court within the first precautionary measure file, through a resolution at 11:40 a.m. on October 19, 2022. Subsequently, by vote No. 1906-2022-T at 3:25 p.m. on November 15, 2022, the request for a precautionary measure was declared without merit. Said resolution was challenged and the Appeals Court for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters, by judgment No. 470-2022-II at 11:06 a.m. on December 20, 2022, confirmed the appealed resolution. Similarly, in the second precautionary measure file, it is noted that the claimant again raised a request for an urgent precautionary measure by official communication dated January 20, 2023, which was understood as filed under the parameters of subsection 2) of Article 29 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure. In this matter, the Contentious-Administrative Court resolved to reject the request for a change of circumstances for granting the precautionary measure, by resolution at 4:01 p.m. on February 8, 2023. Subsequently, the Appeals Court for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters issued vote No. 120-2023-I at 10:57 a.m. on March 21, 2023, where it confirmed the resolution at 4:01 p.m. on February 8, 2023. Finally, it is noted that the cognizance process is pending and within it the claimant filed a brief where "a provisionalísima precautionary measure is again requested immediately and prima facie and invocation of unconstitutionality" dated March 6, 2023, regarding which the Contentious-Administrative Court, by resolution at 11:58 a.m. on March 31, 2023, resolved the following: "Having seen the brief incorporated on 03/06/2023 by the claimant party in which a request for a provisionalísima precautionary measure is presented, from the study thereof it is observed that it is a reiterative request for a precautionary measure, therefore it is flatly rejected and the claimant party is referred to what has already been resolved in the corresponding files for the requests for precautionary measures (…)". Consequently, this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right to precautionary protection alleged by the claimant within the base matter in question, so it is appropriate to flatly reject this action, as is hereby ordered".

In a similar sense to the abovementioned precedent, this aspect of the action must be rejected for lack of connection, given that, in the base matter, namely, file No. [Value 001], it is not recorded that there is any proceeding whatsoever referring to the precautionary measure of suspension of the act, since, on the contrary, in the initial contentious-administrative complaint brief the claimant party stated the following:

"I) Regarding the non-request for a precautionary measure along with the complaint due to legal impediment: Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the present case, transcribed above, excludes and/or denies the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge to the award act, for which reason, at this moment, it is impossible for me to exercise my fundamental right to precautionary protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment not being able to be provisionally guaranteed for such reason, until the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice processes the unconstitutionality action I will file against said normative provision, among others, once, in the contentious-administrative venue, the present cognizance process is given course".

That is, the claimant did not request any precautionary measure in the contentious-administrative judicial process that serves as the basis for this action, so the pronouncement that this Chamber makes on the alleged violation of the right to precautionary protection lacks interest, since what is resolved would have no effect within file No. [Value 001]. In this regard, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that, when standing in an unconstitutionality action derives from Article 75, paragraph 1°, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that is, from the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, it is necessary to analyze whether what is resolved in the action will have a direct and decisive influence on the main matter. This Chamber, in vote No. 3040-97, indicated that between the base case and the unconstitutionality action "there must exist such a connection that the first, if upheld, directly affects the base case, as one more procedural remedy in favor of the party's rights", a requirement that cannot be verified in this matter in question, so it is appropriate to flatly reject it regarding this aspect.

XI.- Finally, regarding his third allegation, namely, that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 injures the right to equality, since in the claimant's words:

"(…) Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, is also unconstitutional for being discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, since in its chapter nine, related to "public procurement", Article 9.15.2 -applicable to the goods, services, and public entities covered by the commercial agreement- provides that "Each Party shall stipulate that the impartial and independent administrative or judicial authority established or designated in paragraph 1 that must hear the suppliers' challenges- may take timely precautionary measures, while the resolution of a challenge is pending, to preserve the opportunity to correct a potential breach of this Chapter, including the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded"; a protective regime, where it is indeed feasible to access the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge to the award act, since said protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without there being an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, namely, public procurement. An identical situation exists and in the specific case a discriminatory normative-legislative treatment devoid of all objective and reasonable justification occurs. (…)".

As indicated in Recital V of this judgment, this Chamber holds the reiterated criterion that whoever invokes the violation of the principle of equality must supply sufficient comparison parameters, allowing for a comparison of whether unequal treatment exists between subjects who are in the same conditions, without objective reasons justifying such differentiation. Now then, the truth is that the claimant omitted to provide objective elements of comparison that would justify this Chamber examining his claim on the merits, so it is appropriate, equally, to flatly reject the action regarding this aspect.

XII.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 21 OF THE CODE OF CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. The petitioner challenges Article 21 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure, alleging, once again, the violation of the fundamental right to precautionary protection. However, it is appropriate to flatly reject this aspect of the action, based on the same arguments set forth in Recital V of the judgment, given that there is no connection between his unconstitutionality argument and the judicial process that is the basis of this action, since he fails to prove that the challenged norm will be applied in said matter, as he does not prove the existence of a precautionary measure file in progress.

XIII.- CONCLUSION. Based on the considerations set forth, this action is rejected.

XIV.- SEPARATE NOTE BY JUDGES CASTILLO VÍQUEZ AND CRUZ CASTRO. We agree with our colleagues in the arguments they put forward to flatly reject the action, given that there is no evident and manifest contradiction between the Law and the Regulation being challenged. The Court's position, in the sense that when a regulatory norm violates or exceeds what is provided in a law it is a matter of legality, the discussion of which does not correspond to this jurisdiction, is, in general terms, legally correct. There is no doubt that it is the ordinary Judge who has the competence to determine the scope of the interpretation and application of the Law and, consequently, it is they who are called upon to establish whether a regulatory norm violates the legal norm or not. However, there is an important nuance in this matter, and it is that, from our point of view, when there is manifest evidence, that is obvious, that the regulatory norm exceeds, suppresses- or contradicts the text of the Law- there is no doubt that, in a gross manner, the principle of the force, authority or efficacy of the Law is violated; a principle that has constitutional coverage and that must be protected by this Court. As is well known, the principle of the force, authority or efficacy of law refers us to the potency (active force), the resistance (passive force), and the challenge regime of the Law. Based on the first aspect of the concept, the Law, once it enters into force, derogates or modifies any norm of equal or lower rank. Based on the second, the Law cannot be derogated or modified by a norm of lower rank. Finally, based on the third, the Law can only be challenged for reasons of unconstitutionality and, therefore, can only be annulled through a resolution of the Constitutional Chamber. The constitutional basis for this principle is found in numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter, which indicates that the Law can only be derogated, abrogated, or modified by another later norm of equal rank. On the other hand, the principle of the force, authority or efficacy of law is an essential presupposition of the social and democratic State of Law, since it starts from a core idea: the parliamentary normative act is superior in rank to the normative act issued by the other Branches of the State, especially the Executive Branch, which supposes that all Branches of the State, when exercising normative authority (Article 6, subsection d) of the General Law of Public Administration), must conform to what was provided by the legislator. When this does not occur, the normative rank of the Law is ignored which, in the normative hierarchical scale, occupies third place in importance after the Political Constitution and International Treaties (Articles 10 and 7) and, consequently, a key principle of the social and democratic State of Law is violated. Ergo, when a regulatory norm manifestly and evidently exceeds, suppresses, or contradicts a Law of the Republic, numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter and the principle of the force, authority or efficacy of the Law are violated, and the Constitutional Court does have competence in this matter, without prejudice to the competence also held by the members of the ordinary jurisdiction when we are not in the commented-upon scenario.

XV.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE BY JUDGE GARRO VARGAS. I separate from the majority opinion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, as I consider that the decision to reject certain parts of this unconstitutionality action is premature.

It is unquestionable that the unconstitutionality action is a process "established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of general nature and that for that same reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge", as has been indicated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. This is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction which states:

"Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which are the omitted requirements and shall order them to be fulfilled within three days (…)".

In this matter, it is proposed to flatly reject the action in some aspects due to insufficient substantiation, or because the claimant did not provide the parameters that allow this Chamber to conduct an examination of an eventual violation of the principle of equality. From my perspective, in relation to said grievances, the application of a warning to the claimant to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionable.

Likewise, it should be noted that both the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79 and that of Article 80 itself of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad, to the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.

XVI.- DISSENTING VOTE BY JUDGE RUEDA LEAL. I separate from the majority opinion of this Court and dissent from the vote in this matter, as I consider that the decision to reject this unconstitutionality action is premature. It is unquestionable that the unconstitutionality action is a process, "established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of general nature and that for that same reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge" as has been indicated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance, as extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction which states:

"Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which are the omitted requirements and shall order them to be fulfilled within three days (…)" In this matter, among other requirements, adequate and sufficient substantiation is lacking, as required by Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, so the application of a warning to the claimant to remedy the detected omission is unquestionable. Likewise, it is not at all superfluous to state on the record that –in my view- both the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79 and that of Article 80 itself of the Law governing this jurisdiction, must be broad to the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.

XVII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.

The parties are warned that, if any document has been submitted in paper form, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not removed within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, article LXXXI.

THEREFORE:

The action is rejected on the merits regarding article 190, sixth paragraph of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411. In all other respects, this action is rejected outright. Judges Castillo Víquez and Cruz Castro note their position. Judge Garro Vargas partially dissents and orders the warning of article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional be made. Judge Rueda Leal dissents and orders the warning of article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional be made.

Fernando Castillo V.

President Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --  Inexorably, the contrary places the bidder warned by the Administration in a position to obtain an undue advantage if they correct the defective requirement or supply the omitted requirement with their bid, vis-à-vis the bidders who fully complied with what was required by the tender specifications. Likewise, subsections b) and i) of Article 81 of said Regulations and the "remedial power (poder subsanador)" anchored therein violate the principle of normative hierarchy, according to which norms from a lower source cannot modify or substitute those from a higher source, which implies a relationship of subordination. This is the case of the Constitution vis-à-vis the law and the rest of the norms of the legal order, and it is also the case of the law vis-à-vis a regulation, whereby in the event of contradiction, the law always and necessarily prevails. The principle of equality among bidders, derived from Article 182 of the Political Constitution, does not legitimize just any inequality to authorize differential treatment, given the requirement of equality and non-discrimination instituted by the fundamental right to equality before the law under Article 33 of the Political Constitution and Articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which is why distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. In this sense, the differentiation in treatment (in the case at hand, compliant/non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of Article 81 ibidem is not imposed by a legal-rank norm; quite the contrary, the classification and differentiation of treatment was "delegated" to the Public Administration beyond the application of the regulations provided by Article 42 subsection j) of the Public Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa) No. 7494, creating normative hypotheses that only it is called upon to determine, regulate, and establish, such that the cited regulatory provision violates the right to equality before the law and the principle of legal reservation (reserva de ley). Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), as expressly indicated in resolution number R-DCA-SICOP-00286-2023, associated with addressing the additions/clarifications of procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, subject to review in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), considers that: "…the principle of preservation of bids (principio de conservación de las ofertas) (Sic…) provides support for the remedial figure. The foregoing, based on the premise that, according to the principle of efficiency, not every defect in a bid causes its exclusion…", whose normative basis is provided by Article 4, fourth paragraph of the Public Procurement Law No. 7494; such precept not justifying the differentiation of treatment inherent in the remedial figure at values equivalent to equality (legal/constitutional) since it does not seek to achieve material equality (generally or implicitly). Ergo, the regulatory provisions of interest cannot reasonably achieve the constitutionally intended goals (equality of bidders without including a disadvantage for the other participants). The "remedial power" developed in regulations in subsections b) and i) of Article 81 of said Regulations is based on substantively different factual assumptions. That is, the reality is not intended to be corrected; thus, the differentiation is not justified. The differentiation in treatment created by regulation greatly, unfairly, and unduly benefits non-compliant bidders, causing discriminatory treatment with respect to bidders who fully complied with what was required by the tender specifications. There is no proportionality between the legal purpose (Article 42 subsection j) Law No. 7494) and that pursued by the regulatory provision, given the differentiated treatment that the latter provides or implies. There is no proportionality between the motive (preservation of the bid. Remediable defects will not disqualify the bid containing them) and the content (regulatory remedial hypotheses always imply the inclusion of a disadvantage with respect to bidders who fully complied with what was required by the tender specifications) of the differentiation in treatment created and implemented by the regulatory provision. It is unsuitable for achieving the intended purpose of facilitating the final decision under conditions beneficial to the general interest, because, ontologically rooted in the philosophy of the "poor little thing (pobrecito)", it does not encourage timely compliance, or rather, it promotes non-compliance and mediocrity. The regulatory provision is unnecessary because it constitutes an autonomous regulation where a legal-rank provision exists. It is simply useful or convenient for the activity deployed by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic as Improper Hierarch (Jerarca Impropio) in public procurement matters, but correlatively disrespectful of the rights and interests of the particular compliant bidder. Therefore, the differentiation in treatment being examined is contrary to equality. Equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this right is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights. 12. Article 190, sixth paragraph of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, insofar as it is optional and not mandatory for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, prior to issuing the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process (debido proceso) and the right of defense (derecho de defensa), and causes defenselessness (indefensión) by impeding the right to adversarial proceedings or to contradict the respondent counterparty and its counter-evidence, given the burdensome nature for the party that appealed the award act, of the negative effects of the final resolution adverse to its interests. The human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by Article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is also violated. 13. Article 191, third or final paragraph of the Regulations to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, for being discretionary and not mandatory for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, being an open door to arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary to examine all the parties' articulations, which violates the principles of due process and right of defense, of legality and legal reservation, since the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to the law, given that, via regulation, the hard core is diminished, both of the fundamental right to due process and right of defense and of the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to the appeal, provided respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights. 14. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte IDH) has emphasized that the general guarantees of Article 8 must be present in the determination of rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other character, "and, therefore, in such matters the individual also has the right to the due process applicable in criminal matters" (IACHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, para. 28. IACHR. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 117.). In this sense, when the ACHR refers to the right of every person to be heard by a "competent judge or tribunal" for the "determination of his rights", this expression refers to any public authority, whether administrative –collegiate or single-person–, legislative, or judicial, "that through its resolutions determines rights and obligations of persons", that is, that "[A]rticle 8.1 of the ACHR does not apply solely to judges and judicial courts", but also to those that, despite not being so formally, act as such (IACHR. Case of Claude Reyes et al. vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2006, para., 118. IACHR. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 118. Case of Name03 vs. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2015, para. 208. See IACHR. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011. Dissenting Vote of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, and the concurring votes of Judge Diego García Sayán, Judge Margarette May Macaulay, and Judge Rhadys Abreu Blondet.). Likewise, the IACHR has affirmed that the requirement that a person be heard "is comparable to the right to a fair 'trial' or 'judicial proceedings'". On this matter, following the ECtHR in the cases of Name04 vs. Switzerland, Van de Hurk vs. Netherlands, Name05 vs. Germany, and Name06 vs. Russia, the IACHR has established that a fair proceeding requires the body responsible for administering justice to carry out "an appropriate examination of the allegations, arguments, and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessments as to whether they are relevant to its decision" (IACHR. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 121. IACHR. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) vs. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2013. Para. 182.). Consequently, the jurisprudential standard assumes that a fair trial is one in which a person has been heard with due guarantees. According to the IACHR, the right to be heard therefore comprises two spheres, the formal and the material. The formal or procedural sphere of the right implies "ensuring access to the competent body to determine the right claimed in accordance with due procedural guarantees (such as the presentation of arguments and the submission of evidence)". For its part, the material sphere of the right implies "that the State guarantees that the decision produced through the proceeding satisfies the end for which it was conceived". For the IACHR, "[t]his latter does not mean that it must always be granted, but rather that its capacity to produce the result for which it was conceived must be guaranteed" (IACHR. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 122. IACHR. Case of the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its Members vs. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2015, para. 237). On the other hand, it should be noted that although the wording of the ACHR refers to the right of "[e]very person accused of a crime" and therefore subject to criminal prosecution in its various stages –investigation, accusation, trial, and conviction– (IACHR. Case of Name07 vs. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2012, para. 91.), in accordance with the IACHR's jurisprudence, the minimum guarantees established in numeral 2 of Article 8 apply mutatis mutandis as appropriate to other areas distinct from the criminal one, that is, to civil, labor, fiscal, or any other character (IACHR. Case of the "White Panel" (Paniagua Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala. Merits. 1998, para. 149. IACHR. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal vs. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2001. Paras. 69-71. IACHR. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. vs. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2012. Para. 157.). According to the IACHR, obtaining all the guarantees that allow for just decisions is a human right. Thus, "[t]he minimum guarantees must be respected in the administrative proceeding and in any other proceeding whose decision may affect the rights of persons" (IACHR. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2001, para. 127. IACHR. Case of Name08 vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2016, para. 73.). The claimant indicates the following as legal grounds: It is based on Articles 7, 10, 11, 18, 33, 39, 41, 49, 153 of the Political Constitution; on Articles 1.1, 2.1, 8.1, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José; on the unwritten norm that is Voto No. 6224-2005 of the fifteen hours and sixteen minutes of the twenty-fifth of May of two thousand five, issued by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional); as well as on the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination, effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva pronta y cumplida), provisional remedies (tutela cautelar), due process, right of defense, rationality, reasonableness and proportionality, technical reasonableness and reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, legality, without prejudice to the concordant provisions contained in the various texts for the protection of Fundamental Rights, which it considers violated for the following reasons. Based on the foregoing, the claimant seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality for: a) Article 90 of the Public Procurement Law No. 7494 and its amendments, insofar as i) it excludes in-kind reparation (reparación in natura), that is, re-award, being, then now possible, this individually petitioned, or, together with restitution by equivalent through monetary payment of damages and losses, at the choice of the administered party, regardless of whether the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, now being possible to reverse the situation to the prior status quo, as also ii) for providing the denial of the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge of the award act, for frontally violating the fundamental right to provisional remedies, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment could now be provisionally guaranteed in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), a legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge of the award act, which is also discriminatory, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without there being an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, to public procurement. b) Article 21 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to provisional remedies, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing, in the case [Value 001] (prior matter)) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious damages or losses, current or potential, of the alleged situation, given that the granting of a precautionary measure does not depend exclusively on free and prudent judicial arbitrariness or discretion, since the right to provisional remedies, as enshrined in the essential content of the more general right to prompt and complete justice, includes the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the merits judgment –the essential function of provisional remedies–, if its prerequisites are met (appearance of a good right -fumus boni iuris- and danger in delay -periculum in mora). This right to provisional remedies, forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to effective, prompt, and complete justice, cannot be denied, restricted, or conditioned by the legislator on the existence or production of serious damages or losses, current or potential, due to the execution or permanence of the conduct subjected to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment; and, c) Subsections b) and i) of Article 81, the sixth paragraph of Article 190, and the third paragraph in fine of Article 191, all of Regulations No. 33411 to the Public Procurement Law No. 7494, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Value 001] (prior matter), since they violate the principle of equality among bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants because distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation, the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations (inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos), the principle of legality, that of transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reservation, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to appeal and to be heard with due guarantees; all of the foregoing, for contravening the norms, principles, and values enshrined in the Political Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights, cited above, thus re-establishing the proper legality of the State of Law.

2.- The claimant bases his standing on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), since he indicates as the underlying matter in the ordinary administrative-contentious and civil treasury case file No. [Value 001], where the claimant is the plaintiff and the co-defendants are the Bank of Costa Rica (Banco de Costa Rica), the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic jointly with the State, and the private individuals [Name02 001], [Name02 002], and [Name02 003]; a jurisdictional proceeding processed before the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), where it is currently pending resolution. Likewise, he provides the certified brief invoking unconstitutionality.

3.- By official communication dated December 6, 2023, addressed to the Administrative Contentious and Civil Treasury Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the referral to this Chamber –as soon as possible– of the entirety of the judicial case file being processed under number [Value 001] was requested. This request was reiterated by email on December 19, 2023.

4.- On December 19, 2023, digital case file No. [Value 001] was received.

5.- Article 9 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law empowers the Chamber to reject, outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any petition brought to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of a prior equal or similar rejected petition.

Drafted by Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a pending matter to be resolved, either in a judicial venue –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in an administrative venue –in the procedure for exhausting this channel, that is, in the administrative challenge proceeding against the final act–, in which the unconstitutionality of the questioned norm is invoked as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered harmed in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –no underlying matter is required–, in the following cases: a) when, due to the nature of the matter, there is no individual and direct harm; b) it involves the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole; and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, through judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, indicated the following:

"(…) Firstly, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, meaning that the existence of a pending matter to be resolved -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust administrative channels- is required to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered harmed in the main matter, so that what is decided by the Constitutional Tribunal has a positive or negative impact on said pending proceeding to be resolved, since it addresses the constitutionality of the norms that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation allows direct access to this avenue -requirements of the second and third paragraphs of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (…)".

Likewise, other formalities must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly grounded, with specific citation of the components of the constitutionality block (bloque de constitucionalidad) considered infringed (Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law).

Additionally, the conditions of standing (legitimación) must be accredited (powers of attorney and certifications), payment of the Costa Rica Bar Association (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) stamp tax must be made (Article 4 of Law No. 3245 of December 3, 1963), and a certified copy of the filing in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged rules was invoked in the base case must be provided (Article 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

II.- STANDING (LEGITIMACIÓN). In the specific case, the claimant bases his standing (legitimación) on Article 75, first paragraph, of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, given that he is the plaintiff in the administrative contentious proceeding No. [Valor 001], against the Contraloría General de la República, the State, the Banco de Costa Rica, [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003]. The aforementioned judicial process is being processed before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, an authority that deemed the process established by resolution at 1:40 p.m. on November 1, 2023, granted a period of thirty business days to respond to the complaint, and warned the plaintiff to provide the legal copies. Subsequently, by resolution at 8:45 a.m. on November 17, 2023, the warning was deemed fulfilled and it was ordered that the order to respond be notified. Likewise, the claimant provided a certified filing invoking the unconstitutionality of the rules challenged here within that base process.

III.- PURPOSE OF THE ACTION. The claimant challenges the following rules:

• 1)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 81.- Rectifiable aspects. The following aspects, among others, shall be rectifiable: a) (...) b) Certifications regarding qualities, characteristics, or specifications of the offered good, provided that such circumstances existed at the time of the offer submission and the interested party so proves it. (Previous subsection as amended by Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) c) (...) d) (...) e) (...) f) (...) g) (...) h) (...) i) Documents necessary to prove the veracity of facts that occurred before the opening of bids. (Previous subsection as amended by Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) j) (...)".

• 2)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 190.- Admissibility procedure for the appeal. The initial order admitting the appeal for processing must be adopted no later than the tenth business day after the deadline to appeal has expired. Within this same period, a ruling must be made on the accumulation of revocation appeals, when appropriate. If this order is not issued within the indicated period, the Contraloría General de la República must establish the corresponding disciplinary responsibility of the official in charge.

In this order, in the case of public tenders, the Administration and the awarded party shall be granted a period of ten business days to respond to the appellant's allegations and provide the respective evidence. In the case of abbreviated tenders or tenders promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, this notification period shall be five business days.

When answering the initial hearing, if the parties argue against the appellant's offer, a special hearing shall be granted for five business days in the case of a public tender and three business days for an abbreviated tender so that the appellant may refer exclusively to what was alleged.

The Contraloría General de la República must expressly rule, before the final resolution, on the parties' evidentiary requests, when they exist, admitting or denying them by means of a reasoned resolution. Likewise, it shall adopt the evidentiary measures necessary for the proper processing of the appeal. All administrative departments are obligated to provide their free collaboration in contributing expert evidence requested ex officio by the Contraloría General.

In highly qualified cases, the Contraloría General de la República may grant new hearings to clarify aspects for the proper resolution of the appeal.

Prior to issuing the final resolution, the Contraloría General de la República may, at its discretion, grant the parties a final hearing, giving them a period of three business days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, without the argumentation of new facts not debated in the appeal being admissible. When it deems it convenient, the final hearing may be oral. To this end, the parties shall be summoned at least three business days in advance to present their conclusions, and a notice of the date and time of the hearing shall also be placed in a place accessible to the public. A record shall be drawn up of the proceedings, containing at least the Name02 of the parties and a summary of the proceedings, which shall be incorporated into the expediente.

In cases where the Contraloría General de la República deems it opportune, a public hearing may be held for the presentation of arguments, evidentiary proceedings, and conclusions, according to the rules set forth in the initial hearing order. This hearing must take place once all corresponding written hearings have been conducted and must be convened at least three business days in advance. (Previous paragraph as added by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) In the event that an oral hearing of any nature has been conducted, the final resolution may be issued orally, either immediately following the conclusion of the hearing, or within a period not exceeding three business days after it is held. This resolution shall be reasoned, and it shall suffice that it be recorded by some suitable means, the recording of which shall be incorporated into the appeal expediente. (Previous paragraph as added by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) (Its numbering run by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from former 182 to 190)" (The underlining does not correspond to the original).

• 3)Article 191, third paragraph in fine, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494, which literally provides the following:

"Article 191.- Resolution. In public tenders, the final resolution must be adopted within forty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended for an additional twenty business days, by reasoned resolution, when it is necessary to gather evidence for a better resolution to decide the appeal or when, due to its complexity, it cannot be resolved within the normal resolution period.

In abbreviated tenders or tenders promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the final resolution must be rendered no later than thirty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended for an additional ten business days, by reasoned resolution under the same assumptions indicated for public tenders.

The Contraloría General de la República shall issue its ruling confirming or annulling, totally or partially, without it being necessary for it to examine all the parties' submissions when one or several of them are decisive for issuing it.

(Its numbering run by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from former 183 to 191)". (The underlining does not correspond to the original).

• 4)Article 90 of the repealed Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494, which literally provides the following:

"ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The final resolution or the final order concluding the appeal shall exhaust administrative remedies. Within three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects, before the Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, through the special process regulated in Articles 89 and 90 of the Ley reguladora de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. If the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, the judgment favorable to the claimant may only recognize the payment of the damages caused".

• 5)Article 21 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which literally provides the following:

"ARTICLE 21.- The precautionary measure shall be appropriate when the execution or continuation of the conduct subject to process produces serious, actual or potential, damages or harm to the alleged situation, and provided that the claim is not reckless or, in a manifest manner, lacking in seriousness".

IV.- GRIEVANCES. In summary, the claimant alleges the following grievances of unconstitutionality:

• a)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494: In general, the plaintiff alleges that this article (as well as Article 190, sixth paragraph, and Article 191, third paragraph in fine, all of Regulation No. 33411) violates the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reservation, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as to the human rights to an appeal and to be heard with the proper guarantees.
• b)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494: the plaintiff considers that this violates the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reservation, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as to the human rights to an appeal and to be heard with the proper guarantees.
• c)Article 191, third paragraph in fine, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494: the plaintiff considers that this violates the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters subject to restrictive interpretation.

Likewise, it considers that it is contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to an appeal and to be heard with due guarantees.</span></p></div><div style=\"margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'lowerLetter'; -aw-list-number-values:'4'; -aw-list-padding-sml:5.55pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">d)</span><span style=\"width:5.55pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494:</span><span> The claimant considers this article unconstitutional for three reasons, namely: </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">i.</span><span> because it excludes restitution in kind (reparación </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">in natura</span><span>), that is, re-awarding, given that only restitution by equivalent through the payment in cash of damages is possible, since, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, the situation cannot be reverted to the prior </span><span style=\"font-style:italic\">status quo</span><span>; </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">ii.</span><span> likewise, the plaintiff alleges that the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act in bidding procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], frontally violates the fundamental right to interim protection (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment can be provisionally guaranteed; and, </span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">iii.</span><span> finally, the claimant considers that the indicated precept is unconstitutional, since the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act is also discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Ley 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement.</span></p></div><div style=\"margin-left:35.4pt; margin-bottom:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:18pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-18pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; -aw-import:list-item; -aw-list-level-number:0; -aw-list-number-format:'%0)'; -aw-list-number-styles:'lowerLetter'; -aw-list-number-values:'5'; -aw-list-padding-sml:7.12pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\"><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">e)</span><span style=\"width:7.12pt; font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; display:inline-block; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span></span><span style=\"font-weight:bold\">Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code</span><span>: the plaintiff considers that this article frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to interim protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious, current, or potential damages derived from the alleged situation.</span></p></div><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">V.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 81, SUBSECTIONS B) AND I), OF THE REPEALED REGULATION NO. 33411 TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 7494</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">. Regarding subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411 (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments, the plaintiff alleges the following ground of unconstitutionality: </span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“(…) violate the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, by providing, based on them, for the correction of bids (subsanaciones de plicas) to bidders, who, at the end of the bidding procedure, end up being awarded the contract, a correction that is always carried out in contravention of the positivized principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, this last aspect being where the inclusion of the disadvantage lies for the bidder who did fully comply with what was required by the tender specifications (cartel) (…)”</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“(…) Likewise, subsections b) and i) of article 81, of said Regulation and the “corrective power” (poder subsanador) rooted in them, violate the principle of normative hierarchy (…) In this sense, the differentiation of treatment (in the case, that is, compliant / non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of article 81 ibidem, is not imposed by a norm of legal rank; quite the contrary, the classification and differentiation of treatment was “delegated” to the Public Administration beyond the application of the rules provided by article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, such that the cited regulatory provision violates the right to equality before the law and the principle of legal reserve.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:56.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Regarding the first argument, that is, the alleged violation of the principle of equality, this Chamber (Sala) has pointed out in reiterated case law that when the claimant alleges a violation of the principle of equality, they have the duty to provide the comparison parameter between subjects treated differently, in order to provide sufficient elements of judgment that allow this Court to verify whether the alleged inequality occurs. This, in doctrine, is known as the “</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">tertium comparationis</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">” (point of reference, of comparison), and regarding it, in judgment No. 7261-94 of 08:30 hours on December 9, 1994, it was stated:</span></p><p style=\"margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“Regarding the principle of equality, as this Chamber has repeatedly held, the most important factual assumption is that there exists discriminatory treatment devoid of any objective and reasonable justification; </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">this is the reason why whoever invokes the violation of this principle must supply, for the purpose of enabling a full confrontation, comparison parameters and thus verify whether or not inequality occurs</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> (see among others and by way of example, Judgments Nos. 196-91 in the Second Considerando (Considerando II); 1432-91, in the Second Considerando (Considerando II) and 1732-91).”</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> (The highlighting and underlining do not originate from the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Now, in the specific case, the claimant alleges that the norm subject to this action, by allowing the correction of defects, puts participants who fully complied with what was required at a disadvantage.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0; </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">However, from a reading of the norm, it does not follow that this is so, as it does not make any differentiation between the bidders, so that any of them can benefit from the correction of the omitted requirements. This, in addition to the fact that the claimant did not provide any element or comparison parameter that would allow evidence of discriminatory treatment devoid of objective and reasonable justification.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">VI.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> On the other hand, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of normative hierarchy or legal reserve, given that, in the plaintiff's opinion, the regulatory norm exceeds what is provided in article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, this argument also becomes inadmissible, since the conflict it raises is one of ordinary legality, which cannot be heard through the unconstitutionality action, but must be raised before the administration itself or through the ordinary channels. The apparent confrontation between the legal norm and the regulation in question constitutes a legality conflict. On repeated occasions (see judgments No. 2000-01149 of 15:39 hours on February 2, 2000, and 2021-11972 of 9:30 hours on May 26, 2021, among others) this Chamber has held that determining whether a regulatory norm, like the one challenged, transgresses or exceeds what is provided in a law is a legality issue whose discussion does not correspond to this jurisdiction. Article 49 of the Fundamental Charter assigns the control of the legality of the administrative function of the State to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, not to the constitutional one. If this Chamber were to attempt to supervise, through the unconstitutionality action, the different possible hypotheses of infringement of the principle of legality that may occur in administrative offices, it would in practice supplant – against the grain of the constitutional text – the courts of that matter. Consequently, if the claimant party considers that the challenged regulation is illegal or has been applied erroneously, they may turn to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in defense of their rights. In this order of considerations, the action is inadmissible regarding subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">VII.- REGARDING ARTICLE 190, SIXTH PARAGRAPH, OF THE REGULATION TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 33411.</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> The claimant considers that article 190, sixth paragraph, of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411 (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments,</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">is unconstitutional, because it is optional and not mandatory for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), prior to the issuance of the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process and the right of defense, and causes defenselessness by preventing the right to an adversarial proceeding or to contradict the respondent counterparty and its counter-evidence. Also, in the plaintiff's opinion, it violates the human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">In this regard, the Chamber has on repeated occasions identified the essential elements of due process in administrative matters; for example, in judgment No. 11860-2014 of 15:05 hours on July 22, 2014, the following was provided: </span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“(…) </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">III</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">.- </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">On the Merits (Sobre el fondo)</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">. In this venue, the scope and nuances of the right enshrined in articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution have been developed on multiple occasions. The argumentation of judgment #15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, is particularly illustrative:</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“... the right of defense guaranteed by article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is often called in doctrine, the principle of the 'bilateral nature of the hearing' of 'due legal process' or 'adversarial principle' (...) has been synthesized thus: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegations, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the grounds upon which it is based; and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued.\" \"... the right of defense protected in article 39 ibidem, not only governs for jurisdictional procedures, but also for any administrative procedure carried out by the public administration; and that the claimant must necessarily be given, if they so wish, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise their defense...´</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">And the following has also been indicated:</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“This Chamber has pointed out the elements of the right to due legal process, (especially see advisory opinion nº1739-92), applicable to any sanctioning procedure or one that may result in the loss of subjective rights. The Administration must, in consideration of the administered party's right of defense: a) Transfer the charges to the affected party, which implies communicating the imputed facts in an individualized, concrete, and timely manner; b) Allow unrestricted access to the administrative file; c) Grant a reasonable period for the preparation of their defense; d) Grant the hearing and allow them to provide all evidence deemed appropriate to support their defense; e) Ground the resolutions that terminate the procedure; f) Recognize their right to appeal against the sanctioning resolution.´ (judgment #5469-95 of 18:03 hours on October 4, 1995).</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">The foregoing should not be understood, however, as meaning that every violation arising in the processing of an administrative procedure is amenable to protection in this Jurisdiction, since only those substantial violations that place the affected party in a state of defenselessness are protectable through this avenue</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">,</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> as detailed in judgment #2001-10198 of 10:29 hours on October 10, 2001 (…)”. </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">(The highlighting does not correspond to the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Now, regarding the omission by the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to grant a party the final concluding hearing, in judgment No. 2000-04142 of 16:05 hours on May 16, 2000, the Chamber ruled in the following sense: </span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“(…) As has been proven, the non-conformity raised by the appellant in the sense that they were not notified of the order granting a final hearing in the appeal process followed before the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, does not violate their opportunity to appeal the Administration's decision regarding the bidding process in which they participated as a bidder, since, as the Comptroller's Office correctly points out in its report, this opportunity is exercised with full scope at the moment of filing the appeal. </span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub\">The final hearing is a merely concluding stage, in which new arguments or evidentiary elements that could vary the final decision that might be adopted based on the terms in which the appeal was initially filed cannot be invoked, and in this sense, it cannot be said that an injury to their right of defense and to due process has occurred</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">. Likewise, for that reason, the questioned action does not entail discriminatory treatment regarding the right to appeal the award act, which is the purpose of the appeal provided for by the legal system in matters of administrative contracting. Consequently, the omission incurred by the Comptroller's Office with respect to the notification of the final hearing, if it departed from the provisions of the General Regulation of Administrative Contracting, could certainly appear as an infringement of the principle of legality. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled in the sense that, through the amparo proceeding, this infringement can only be protected when it simultaneously implies the violation of some other fundamental right or guarantee.”</span><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> (The highlighting does not correspond to the original).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:56.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Based on the foregoing, this Chamber observes that the alleged injury to due process claimed by the plaintiff lacks foundation, since the power of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic to grant the parties a final hearing to issue their conclusions does not injure any essential element of administrative due process that leaves the parties defenseless, and therefore lacks constitutional relevance. For this reason, it is appropriate to dismiss the action on the merits regarding this aspect.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">VIII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 191, THIRD PARAGRAPH IN FINE, OF THE REPEALED REGULATION NO. 33411 TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 7494.-</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> This action lacks substantiation regarding the ground of unconstitutionality concerning article 191, third paragraph in fine, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494. This, given that the claimant limited himself to stating the following:</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt 45pt 0pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“Article 191, third or final paragraph, of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 11-02-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in case [Valor 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, for being discretionary and not mandatory for the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, being an open door to arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary for it to examine all the articulations of the parties, which violates the principles of due process and right of defense, of legality and legal reserve, because the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to the law, since, via regulation, the hard core is affected in a diminishing manner, both of the fundamental right to due process and the right of defense, and of the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to an appeal, provided respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights.”</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-left:56.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.45pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">From the arguments presented by the plaintiff, the reason why he considers article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411 to be unconstitutional cannot be clearly inferred, as he limits himself to mentioning the violation of the principles of due process and the right of defense, without developing its content to counterpose it to the norm in question. As indicated in the previous recital (considerando), this Chamber only intervenes in the case of violations of the essential elements of due process, so it is required that the plaintiff party develop clearly and precisely how the challenged norm prevents them from exercising their right of defense, which was not argued in the filing brief. For the foregoing reason, it is appropriate to summarily dismiss this action regarding article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">IX.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 90 OF THE REPEALED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING LAW NO. 7494. </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Regarding article 90 of Ley No. 7494, the plaintiff's first argument is that this norm is unconstitutional </span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">“because such precept excludes the fundamental right to restitution in kind, that is, re-awarding, it being, therefore, possible in the current state of the Costa Rican legal system, only restitution by equivalent through the payment in cash of damages, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, as occurs in the present case, the situation cannot be reverted to the prior status quo.”</span><span style=\"line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"> Throughout the filing brief, the claimant limits himself to raising this argument without concretely indicating which fundamental right or principle of the Law of the Constitution he considers injured. Regarding the impossibility of suspending the execution of the award, the truth is that this Chamber has on repeated occasions pointed out that the enforceability (ejecutividad) and self-executing nature (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts is a General Principle of Administrative Law, enshrined in articles 146 and 148 of the General Public Administration Law, which is in conformity with the Law of the Constitution and the principles and values that inform it (in this sense, see judgments numbers 2002-000928 of 09:47 hours, of February 1, 2002, 2014-004307 of 09:15 hours of March 28, 2014, and 2015-004019 of 09:05 hours of March 20, 2015, among many others).</span></p></div> Consequently, this argument of the claimant must be rejected outright.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">X.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> Regarding his second allegation, that is, that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 violates the right to interim relief (tutela cautelar), in the acción de inconstitucionalidad No. 23-005726-0007-CO, filed by the claimant here against Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, this Chamber ruled by judgment No. 2023-012773 at 09:20 hours on May 31, 2023, as follows: </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION. In the specific case, the claimant challenges Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, which states the following:</span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The final resolution or the order that concludes the appeal will exhaust administrative remedies. Within three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effect, before the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, through the special process regulated in articles 89 and 90 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. If the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in the process of execution, a judgment favorable to the claimant may only award payment of the damages caused.”</span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">The petitioner alleges that the aforementioned rule is unconstitutional because, in his opinion, the denial of suspensive effect to the jurisdictional challenge of the contract award act in a bidding procedure violates the right to interim relief. Likewise, the claimant considers that the challenged rule violates the principle of equality with respect to the protective regime for public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, whose protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or its execution. To this effect, the claimant indicates as a prior pending matter the contentious-administrative proceeding No. 22-005575-1027-CA, where he filed an appeal against the rejection of the change in factual circumstances that gave rise to the denial of the urgent interim relief (medida cautelar urgente) requested by the plaintiff. Likewise, he certifies that he invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule within said judicial process. </span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">However, despite the claimant's allegations, this matter is inadmissible, given that the matter the claimant indicates as pending before the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Judiciary, has two interim relief files (legajos de medida cautelar) that were definitively resolved and are archived, whereas he failed to prove that there exists the necessary connection between this action and the main contentious-administrative file, since he only based his claim of unconstitutionality on the protection of his fundamental right to interim relief. Thus, from the study of the certified copy of file No. 22-005575-1027-CA, filed by Nombre01 against Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, consisting of the main proceeding and two interim relief files, it was proven that the claimant filed a “request for urgent and provisionalísima interim relief (solicitud de medida cautelar urgente y provisionalísima)” by a writing dated October 17, 2022, such that the provisionalísima interim relief was rejected by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo within the first interim relief file,</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">by resolution at 11:40 hours on October 19, 2022. Subsequently, by vote No. 1906-2022-T at 15:25 hours on November 15, 2022, the request for interim relief was declared without merit. Said resolution was challenged, and the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, by judgment No. 470-2022-II at 11:06 hours on December 20, 2022, confirmed the appealed resolution. Similarly, in the second interim relief file, it is noted that the plaintiff again filed a request for urgent interim relief by official letter dated January 20, 2023, which was understood as being filed under the parameters of subsection 2) of Article 29 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. In this matter, the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resolved to reject the request for change of circumstances for granting interim relief, by resolution at 16:01 hours on February 8, 2023. Subsequently, the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda issued vote No. 120-2023-I at 10:57 hours on March 21, 2023, where it confirmed the resolution at 16:01 hours on February 8, 2023. Finally, it is noted that the main proceeding is ongoing and within it, the claimant filed a writing where again “provisionalísima interim relief is requested immediately and prima facie and invocation of unconstitutionality” dated March 6, 2023, regarding which the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, by resolution at 11:58 hours on March 31, 2023, resolved as follows: “Having seen the writing submitted on 03/06/2023 by the plaintiff party in which a request for provisionalísima interim relief is filed, from its study it is observed that it is a reiterative request for interim relief, therefore it is rejected outright, and the plaintiff party is referred to what has already been resolved in the corresponding files of the requests for interim relief (…)”. Consequently, this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right to interim relief alleged by the claimant within the base matter in question, therefore this action shall be rejected outright, as is hereby ordered”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">In a similar sense to the aforementioned precedent, this aspect of the action must be rejected for lack of connection (conexidad), given that, in the base matter, that is, file No. [Value 001], there is no record of any proceeding related to the interim relief of suspension of the act, since, on the contrary, in the initial complaint of the contentious-administrative lawsuit, the plaintiff party indicated the following:</span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">“I) </span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub">Regarding the non-request for interim relief together with the lawsuit due to legal impediment</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">: Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in this case, transcribed above, excludes and/or denies the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, for which reason, at this moment, it is impossible for me to exercise my fundamental right to interim relief, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and fulfilled judicial protection, not being able to provisionally guarantee the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment for that reason, until the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice processes the acción de inconstitucionalidad that I will file against said normative provision, among others, once the present proceeding is admitted in the contentious-administrative venue</span><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-left:7.1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.3pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">That is, the claimant did not request any interim relief in the contentious-administrative judicial process that serves as the basis for this action, therefore, the pronouncement that this Chamber makes on the alleged violation of the right to interim relief lacks interest, since what is resolved would have no effect within file No. [Value 001]. In this regard, this Chamber has repeatedly pointed out that, when standing in an acción de inconstitucionalidad derives from Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, that is, from the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, it is necessary to analyze whether what is resolved in the action will have a direct and decisive influence on the main matter. This Chamber, in vote No. 3040-97, indicated that between the base proceeding and the acción de inconstitucionalidad “</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">there must exist such a connection (conexidad) that, if the former is upheld, it directly impacts the base proceeding, as one more procedural remedy in favor of the party's rights</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">”, a requirement that cannot be verified in this matter in question, therefore it is appropriate to reject it outright regarding this aspect.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XI.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> Finally, regarding his third allegation, that is, that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 injures the right to equality, since in the claimant's words:</span></p><p style="margin:8pt 45pt 8pt 56.7pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“(…) Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, is also unconstitutional for being discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime for public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, in that in its ninth chapter, relating to \"public procurement\", Article 9.15.2 -applicable to the goods, services, and public entities covered by the trade agreement- provides that \"Each Party shall stipulate that the authority established or designated in paragraph 1 - impartial and independent administrative or judicial authority that must hear supplier challenges - may take timely provisional measures, while a challenge resolution is pending, to preserve the opportunity to correct a potential breach of this Chapter, including the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded\"; a protective regime, where it is indeed feasible to access the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, since said protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all this, without there being an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement. An identical situation exists, and in the specific case, discriminatory normative-legislative treatment devoid of all objective and reasonable justification is produced. (…)”.</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">As indicated in considerando V of this judgment, this Chamber holds the reiterated criterion that whoever invokes the violation of the principle of equality must provide sufficient comparison parameters, allowing verification of whether unequal treatment exists among subjects in the same conditions, without objective reasons justifying such differentiation. Now, the truth is that the plaintiff failed to provide objective elements of comparison that would justify this Chamber hearing the merits of his claim, therefore, it is equally appropriate to reject the action outright regarding this aspect. </span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XII.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CODE.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> The petitioner challenges Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, alleging, once again, a violation of the fundamental right to interim relief. However, it is appropriate to reject this aspect of the action outright, based on the same arguments set forth in considerando V of the judgment, given that no connection (conexidad) exists between his argument of unconstitutionality and the judicial process that is the basis for this action, since he fails to prove that the questioned rule will be applied in said matter, as he does not demonstrate the existence of a pending interim relief file. </span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XIII.- CONCLUSION. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Based on the considerations set forth, this action is rejected.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:34pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XIV.- SEPARATE NOTE BY JUDGES CASTILLO VÍQUEZ AND CRUZ CASTRO. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">We agree with our colleagues regarding the arguments they put forward to reject the action outright, given that there is no clear and manifest contradiction between the Law and the Regulation being challenged. The Court's position, to the effect that when a regulatory norm violates or exceeds what is provided in a law, it is a matter of legality, the discussion of which does not correspond to this jurisdiction, is, in general terms, legally correct. There is no doubt that it is the ordinary Judge who is responsible for determining the scope of the interpretation and application of the Law and, consequently, it is he who is called upon to establish whether a regulatory norm violates or does not violate the legal norm. However, there is an important nuance in this matter, and that is that, from our point of view, when there is manifest evidence, obvious at first glance, that the regulatory norm exceeds, suppresses, or contradicts the text of the Law, there is no doubt that, in a gross manner, the principle of force, authority, or efficacy of the Law is violated; a principle that has constitutional coverage and that must be protected by this Court. As is well known, the principle of force, authority, or efficacy of the law refers to the power (active force), the resistance (passive force), and the regime for challenging the Law. Based on the first aspect of the concept, the Law, once it enters into force, repeals or modifies any norm of equal or lower rank. Based on the second, the Law cannot be repealed or modified by a norm of lower rank. Finally, based on the third, the Law can only be challenged for reasons of unconstitutionality and, therefore, can only be annulled through a resolution of the Constitutional Chamber. The constitutional basis of this principle is found in numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter, which states that the Law can only be repealed, abrogated, or modified by another subsequent norm of equal rank. On the other hand, the principle of force, authority, or efficacy of the law is an essential prerequisite of the social and democratic rule of law (Estado social y democrático de Derecho), since it starts from a core idea: the parliamentary normative act is superior in rank to the normative act issued by the other Branches of State, especially the Executive Branch, which implies that all Branches of State, when exercising normative power (Article 6, subsection d), of the General Law of Public Administration), must adjust to what was provided by the legislator. When this does not occur, the normative rank of the Law is disregarded, which, in the normative hierarchical scale, occupies third place in importance after the Political Constitution and International Treaties (articles 10 and 7) and, consequently, a key principle of the social and democratic rule of law is violated. Ergo, when a regulatory norm clearly and manifestly exceeds, suppresses, or contradicts a Law of the Republic, numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter and the principle of force, authority, or efficacy of the Law are violated, and the Constitutional Court does have jurisdiction in this matter, without prejudice to the jurisdiction also held by the members of the ordinary courts when we are not in the commented scenario.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XV.- PARTIALLY DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE GARRO VARGAS. </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">I separate from the majority opinion of this Court and partially dissent from the vote in this matter, considering that the decision to reject some aspects of this acción de inconstitucionalidad is premature. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">It is unquestionable that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is a process “established with the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution over norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for that very reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge”, as has been indicated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance. This is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which states:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">“Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements are omitted and shall order compliance within three days (…)”. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">In this matter, it is proposed to reject the action outright in some aspects due to insufficient reasoning, or because the claimant did not provide the parameters that would allow this Chamber to conduct an examination of a possible violation of the principle of equality. From my perspective, in relation to said grievances, the application of a warning (prevención) to the claimant to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Similarly, it should be noted that the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79, as well as Article 80 itself, of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad, in benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XVI.- DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE RUEDA LEAL</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">. I separate from the majority opinion of this Court and dissent in this matter, considering that the decision to reject this acción de inconstitucionalidad is premature. It is unquestionable that the acción de inconstitucionalidad is a process, “</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">established with the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution over norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for that very reason a set of formalities must be fulfilled, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">”, as has been indicated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment to be given to the different formalities and their eventual non-compliance, as extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, which states:</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">“</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub">Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements are omitted and shall order compliance within three days</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub"> (…)”</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">In this matter, among other requirements, what is lacking is an adequate and sufficient reasoning as required by Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, therefore the application of a warning to the claimant to remedy the detected omission is unquestionably applicable.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">Likewise, it is absolutely not superfluous to state that – in my opinion – the interpretation of Articles 78 and 79, as well as Article 80 itself, of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad, in benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited. </span></p><p style="margin-top:8pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">XVII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">. The parties are warned that, if any paper documents, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, informatic, magnetic, optical, telematic device or produced by new technologies have been provided, they must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial" (Regulation on Electronic Court Files before the Judiciary), approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judiciary, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">POR TANTO:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:8pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:150%; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="line-height:150%; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub">The action is rejected on the merits regarding Article 190, sixth paragraph, of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411. In all other respects, this action is rejected outright. Judges Castillo Víquez and Cruz Castro place a note. Judge Garro Vargas partially dissents and orders the warning under Article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law to be made. Judge Rueda Leal dissents. Judge Salazar Alvarado, in a separate note, and Judge Rueda Leal, in his dissenting vote, order the warning under Article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law to be made.</span></p> Justice Rueda Leal issues a dissenting vote and orders the warning under Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

The image is a signature appearing at the end of the document, with the text "Luis Fdo." below it, indicating it is the signature of a person named Luis.

Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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width=\"164\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Jorge Araya G.</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Anamari Garro V.</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style=\"padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><img 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KkhttTgCFBbXkR/mOJS8txbSCfFnzcV0Csk99hKkoPknx7WpQT6JSFHyIJBI78ionr++vtpoOC/aFj37Qv+nZ/BH4Hsk/0H9dRp2tsY83f/krGZdDsiqlbTRJigg9ILmFTJKY4V+A4P1TT5SffxOtq/lWk6kzqM+xlXHZ3E5O3gaWmZcb1VcNTjg6K62l2X2pZruj68my5JnrQQOvJZHo9jQSY0000DTTTQNNNNA0000DTTTQNNNNA0000DWIv4xRDLxmioMcZH/Dv8Li0Uk/Omncsk2X6FK/EhLS7ENPqHY7KQVehrLtfNQBUSQCfA/0/wBzoOYHQA666AHQ/A/21+6aaBpppoGuu1Gjx3HnWWkNrkufK+pCUpLjgQlAW4QB5KCG0I8ldnwQhPfilIHY00DTTTQNNNNA0000DTTTQNNNNA0000H/2Q==\" width=\"162\" height=\"74\" alt=\"\" style=\"-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline\" /></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub\">Ingrid Hess H.</span></p></td></tr></table><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Digitally Signed Document</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">-- Verification Code --</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:'WASP 39 L'; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\"></span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:spaces\">&#xa0;</span><span style=\"font-family:Tahoma; font-size:9.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">9D4HFVC8MDC61 </span></p><div style=\"-aw-headerfooter-type:footer-primary; clear:both\"><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">EXPEDIENTE N° 23-028497-0007-CO </span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:1pt; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:1pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:8pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-size:5.33pt; vertical-align:sub\">Telephones: Telf01/ ALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: Telf02 / Telf03. E-mail: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección02, Dirección03, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters for vulnerable groups: Dirección04, San José, Distrito Catedral, Dirección05, calles 19 y 21, Dirección06</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt\"><span style=\"-aw-import:ignore\">&#xa0;</span></p></div></div></body></html>", "tipoDescarga": "CONTIENE SENTENCIA A TEXTO COMPLETO", "tipoAsunto": "CA-02", "original": "SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA", "fechaPublicacion": "2024-02-14", "normasInternacionales": [], "tituloExtracto": "Acción de inconstitucionalidad" } } ], "descriptores": "CONTRATOS O LICITACIONES", "numeroRegistro": "002793", "expediente": "230284970007CO", "tipoResolucion": "De Fondo", "normas": [ { "norm_nom": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_obs": "", "norm_fecha": "22 Nov 2022", "norm_ver": "133696", "norm_id": "58314", "art_id": "82", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_detalle": "", "selected": "1" }, { "norm_nom": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_obs": "", "norm_fecha": "22 Nov 2022", "norm_ver": "133696", "norm_id": "58314", "art_id": "91", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_detalle": "", "selected": "1" }, { "norm_nom": "Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "33411", "norm_obs": "", "norm_fecha": "22 Nov 2022", "norm_ver": "133696", "norm_id": "58314", "art_id": "184", "tipo_norma": "Decreto Ejecutivo", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_detalle": "", "selected": "1" }, { "norm_nom": "Ley de Contratación Administrativa", "norm_num": "7494", "norm_obs": "", "norm_fecha": "16 Feb 2022", "norm_ver": "129096", "norm_id": "24284", "art_id": "120805", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_detalle": "", "selected": "1" }, { "norm_nom": "Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo", "norm_num": "8508", "norm_obs": "", "norm_fecha": "12 Nov 2019", "norm_ver": "118784", "norm_id": "57436", "art_id": "22", "tipo_norma": "Ley", "art_subnum": "0", "norm_detalle": "", "selected": "1" } ], "html_res": "...observa esta Sala que la supuesta lesión al debido proceso alegada por el actor carece de fundamento, pues la facultad de la Contraloría General de la República de conceder a las partes una audiencia final para emitir sus conclusiones no resulta lesiva de ningún elemento esencial del debido proceso administrativo que deje en indefensión a las partes, por lo que carece de relevancia constitucional." }, "content": "CONTRACTS OR TENDERS. CONTRACTING OF EXTERNAL PROFESSIONALS FOR OFFICES OF THE BANCO DE COSTA RICA \nFile: 23-028497-0007-CO\nJudgment: 003884-24 of February 14, 2024\nType of matter: acción de inconstitucionalidad\nChallenged regulation: Article 81 subsections b), e) i), 190 sixth paragraph, 191 third paragraph infine of the Reglamento de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411. Article 90 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 7494, applicable in the bidding procedure 2021LN-000023-0015700001, contentious-administrative process number 23-005948-1027-CA and article 21 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. \nOperative part: The acción is rejected on the merits with respect to article 190 sixth paragraph of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411. In all other respects, this acción is rejected outright. Magistrates Castillo Víquez and Cruz Castro place a note. Magistrate Garro Vargas partially saves her vote and orders the prevention of article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to be carried out. Magistrate Rueda Leal saves his vote and orders the prevention of article 80 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional to be carried out. \"...this Chamber observes that the alleged injury to due process alleged by the plaintiff lacks foundation, since the power of the Contraloría General de la República to grant the parties a final hearing to issue their conclusions is not injurious to any essential element of administrative due process that leaves the parties defenseless, and therefore lacks constitutional relevance." } Res. Nº 2024003884 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.

San José, at nine hours twenty-five minutes on the fourteenth of February, two thousand twenty-four.

Action of unconstitutionality filed by Nombre01, attorney and notary, bearer of identity card no. CED01, against subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph *in fine* of article 191; all of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, as well as article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code.

**RESULTANDO:** **1.-** By brief received via the Judiciary's Online Management system at 16:20 hours on November 15, 2023, the petitioner challenges the following norms: subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph *in fine* of article 191; all of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, as well as article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, applied ultraactively in bidding procedure No. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, as well as in contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], and article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code. The petitioner states that the *ratio* of this action of unconstitutionality, as a reasonable means for the protection of the substantial legal situation deemed injured in the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], pending resolution in the Courts, lies in that: **article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494**, is triply unconstitutional: **a)** because it excludes reparation *in natura*, that is, re-awarding, it being, therefore, possible, only, restitutio in equivalent through the payment in cash of damages and losses, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, the situation cannot be reversed to the previous *status quo*; **b)** likewise, the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act of bidding procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001 in contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], frontally violates the fundamental right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida), since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment can be provisionally guaranteed; and, **c)** finally, the indicated precept is unconstitutional, since the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act is also discriminatory, the foregoing, because it is contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the awarding of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without there being an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same subject matter, that is, public procurement. While **article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code** is unconstitutional, since it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida), since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious current or potential damages or losses from the alleged situation. This right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to effective, prompt, and complete justice, the legislator cannot deny, restrict, or condition it on the existence or production of serious current or potential damages or losses, due to the execution or continuation of the conduct subject to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment. Finally, **subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph *in fine* of article 191, all of Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494,** applied ultraactively in the present case, are unconstitutional, since they violate the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants because distincions and differentiations in treatment are odious matter and subject to restrictive interpretation, the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley), the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to an appeal and to be heard with due guarantees. The petitioner sets forth the following facts: **1.** The Banco de Costa Rica, for the hiring of external Notaries Public, promoted Public Tender No. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominated: "HIRING OF PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVIDE SERVICES AS EXTERNAL NOTARIES FOR BANCO DE COSTA RICA OFFICES", according to publication in the Integrated Public Procurement System (SICOP) on Monday, November 22, 2021. **2.** Public Tender No. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominated: "HIRING OF PROFESSIONALS WHO PROVIDE SERVICES AS EXTERNAL NOTARIES FOR BANCO DE COSTA RICA OFFICES", regarding the independent line Item 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles and Guatuso, is currently in the contractual execution phase because the award act is final in the administrative channel, given the exhaustion of the appeal stage. **3.** The petitioner was the only one of the finalist non-awardee bidders of Item 3, of the referenced tender, who did not consent to the award act contrary to their legitimate interests, for having challenged it in time and form via SICOP before the Contraloría General de la República. **4.** Received the highest score from the tendering entity in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001. **5.** Holds the status of Service PYME in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001. **6.** Given that they received the highest score from the tendering entity in Public Tender number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, while also holding the status of Service PYME in said contest, holds the right to the (re)awarding of the indicated contest regarding any of the quotas of the bidders/now awardees [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003], whose offers were improperly scored by the tendering entity, not being able to achieve the highest score in the contest, their offers being displaced by theirs, their offer having to be considered the most convenient, for having fully complied with everything required by the tender specifications (cartel), and taking into account that they were the only one of the finalist non-awardee bidders of Item 3, ZONA Alajuela 3, of the above-referenced tender who did not consent to the award act contrary to their legitimate interests, for having challenged it in time and form; all of which is subject to jurisdictional review within the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], instituted by the petitioner against Banco de Costa Rica, the Contraloría General de la República jointly with the State and [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003]. **7.** This action of unconstitutionality stands as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered injured, taking into account that, the main object of the contentious-administrative and civil treasury case file number [Valor 001] being the direct re-awarding to the plaintiff of a quota of Item 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles and Guatuso, of Public Tender No. 2021LN-000023-0015700001, from any of the quotas granted to the bidders/now awardees [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002], and [Nombre02 003], they cannot access, neither to re-awarding in a substantive judgment nor to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), both due to legal impossibility, given that article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, which prescribes: *"Exhaustion of the administrative channel. The final resolution or the order that puts an end to the appeal shall exhaust the administrative channel. Within the three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects, before the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, through the special process regulated in articles 89 and 90 of the Law regulating the contentious-administrative jurisdiction. If the contract whose award is challenged has been executed or is in course of execution, the judgment favorable to the plaintiff may only award the payment of the damages and losses caused."*, unconstitutionally denies both re-awarding, as well as the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act. **8.** Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments is unconstitutional, because said precept excludes the fundamental right to reparation *in natura*, that is, re-awarding, it therefore being possible, in the current state of the Costa Rican legal order, only restitutio in equivalent through the payment in cash of damages and losses, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in course of execution, as occurs in the present case, the situation cannot be reversed to the previous *status quo*, and equally so for the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act, since it frontally violates the fundamental right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida), since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment can be provisionally guaranteed. This right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to prompt and complete justice, the legislator cannot deny, restrict, or condition it and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment. **9.** Likewise, the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act provided by article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, is also unconstitutional as discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, because in its chapter nine, relating to "public procurement", article 9.15.2 —applicable to the goods, services, and public entities covered by the trade agreement— provides that *"Each Party shall stipulate that the authority established or designated in paragraph 1 —impartial and independent administrative or judicial authority that must hear suppliers' challenges— may take timely provisional measures, while the resolution of a challenge is pending, to preserve the opportunity to correct a potential non-compliance with this Chapter, including suspending the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded"*; a protective regime where accessing the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge of the award act is indeed feasible, inasmuch as said protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without there being an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same subject matter, that is, public procurement. There exists an identical situation and, in the specific case, discriminatory normative-legislative treatment devoid of any objective and reasonable justification occurs. Only within the framework of equality is restriction, but not annulment, of fundamental rights possible. **10.** For its part, article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, which provides: *"The precautionary measure shall be appropriate when the execution or continuation of the conduct subject to process produces serious current or potential damages or losses to the alleged situation, and provided that the claim is not reckless or, in a glaring manner, lacking in seriousness."*, is unconstitutional, since it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida), since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious current or potential damages or losses from the alleged situation, that is, through the well-known expedient of the use of discretion, which ends up being unlimited for the legal operator, through the interpretation of indeterminate legal concepts, it being that the granting of a precautionary measure does not depend exclusively on the free and prudent judgment or judicial discretion, given that the right to precautionary protection (tutela cautelar), insofar as it is embedded in the essential content of the more general right to prompt and complete justice, comprises the right to petition and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the efficacy of the merits judgment —essential function of precautionary protection (tutela cautelar)— if its prerequisites are met (appearance of good law —*fumus boni iuris*— and danger in delay —*periculum in mora*). Correspondingly, the jurisdictional body has the obligation to order or issue the provisional measure if the prerequisites for its adoption are met. This right, forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to prompt and complete justice, the legislator cannot deny, restrict, or condition it on the existence or production of serious current or potential damages or losses from the alleged situation, due to the execution or continuation of the conduct subject to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment, given that, according to binding constitutional jurisprudence *erga omnes* (Constitutional Chamber, Voto n.° 6224-2005 of fifteen hours and sixteen minutes of May twenty-fifth, two thousand five), any precautionary measure is appropriate whenever its prerequisites are met, that is, appearance of good law —*fumus boni iuris*— and danger in delay —*periculum in mora*. Correspondingly, the jurisdictional body has the obligation to order or issue the provisional measure if the prerequisites for its adoption are met, because precautionary protection (tutela cautelar) is constitutionally mandatory when the substantial legal situations of the parties, be they subjective rights or legitimate interests, may disappear, be damaged, or be irremediably harmed, since the judge is called upon to protect and repair them (articles 41 and 49 of the Political Constitution). **11.** Both subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Administrative Contracting Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its amendments, applied ultraactively in case [Valor 001] (prior matter), as well as the "*poder subsanador* (remedial power)" developed by the administrative jurisprudence of the CGR based on them, are unconstitutional, since they violate the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, by preventing, based on them, corrections (subsanaciones) of bids to bidders, who at the end of the bidding procedure end up becoming awardees, a correction that is always carried out in contravention of the positivized principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, this last aspect being where the inclusion of the disadvantage for the bidder who did fully comply with what was required by the tender specifications (cartel) lies, since according to the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, insofar as the contractor selection procedures must be defined *a priori* in a precise, certain, and concrete manner, the Administration cannot ignore the predefined rules in the legal norm (tender specifications (cartel)), which determines the framework for action. Put another way, there is no possibility that the correction (subsanación), in the case of admissibility requirements or evaluation or scoring of bids, does not represent an undue advantage for the bidders who did fully comply with what was required by the tender specifications (cartel), because even when dealing with "formal aspects or unmodifiable historical facts", given that, if the accrediting document for the requirement that one seeks to correct did not meet the parameters of the tender specifications (cartel), the requirement must be deemed unmet, that is, there is no alternative. Unfailingly, the contrary places the bidder warned by the Administration in the possibility of obtaining an undue advantage, if they correct the defective requirement, or provide the requirement omitted from their bid, vis-à-vis the bidders who did fully comply with what was required by the tender specifications (cartel). Equally, subsections b) and i) of article 81, of said Regulation and the "*poder subsanador* (remedial power)" based on them, violate the principle of normative hierarchy according to which norms of the inferior source cannot modify or substitute those of the superior source, which *implies a relationship of subordination*. *It is the case of the Constitution vis-à-vis the law and the rest of the norms of the order, and it is also the case of the law vis-à-vis the regulation, that in case of contradiction, the law always and necessarily prevails*. The principle of equality of bidders, derived from article 182 of the Political Constitution, does not legitimize just any inequality to authorize differentiated treatment, given the requirement of equality and non-discrimination instituted by the fundamental right to equality before the law according to numeral 33 of the Political Constitution and articles 1.1 and 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, reason for which distincions and differentiations in treatment are odious matter and subject to restrictive interpretation. In this sense, the differentiation of treatment (in the case, that is, compliant/non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of article 81 *ibidem*, is not imposed by a norm of legal rank; quite the opposite, the classification and differentiation of treatment beyond the application of the regulations provided by article 42 subsection j) of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 was "delegated" to the Public Administration, creating normative hypotheses that only it is called upon to determine, regulate, and establish, such that the cited regulatory provision violates the right of equality before the law and the principle of legal reserve (reserva de ley). On the other hand, the Contraloría General de la República, as it expressly indicated in resolution number R-DCA-SICOP-00286-2023, associated with the attention of addenda/clarifications of procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, subject to review in case [Valor 001] (prior matter), considers that: *“…the principle of conservation of bids (Sic…) gives support to the figure of correction (subsanación). The foregoing, starting from the principle of efficiency, not every defect in a bid generates its exclusion…”*, the normative basis for which is provided by article 4, fourth paragraph of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494; said precept not justifying the differentiation of treatment inherent in the figure of correction (subsanación) in values of a rank equivalent to equality (legal / constitutional) because it does not seek to achieve material equality (in general or implicitly). Ergo, the regulatory provisions of interest cannot reasonably achieve the ends constitutionally intended (equality of bidders without inclusion of a disadvantage for the other participants).

The "power to cure" (poder subsanador) developed in regulatory form in subsections b) and i) of article 81 of said Regulation is based on substantively different factual assumptions. That is, it does not purport to correct reality; thus, the differentiation is not justified. The differentiation of treatment created by regulation greatly, unjustly, and unduly benefits non-compliant bidders (oferentes), causing discriminatory treatment with respect to bidders who fully complied with what was required by the tender specifications (cartel). There is no proportionality between the legal purpose (article 42 subsection j) of Law No. 7494) and that pursued by the regulatory provision, given the differentiated treatment that the latter establishes or implies. There is no proportionality between the reason (conservation of the offer. Curable defects (defectos subsanables) shall not disqualify the offer containing them) and the content (regulatory hypotheses for curing always imply the inclusion of a disadvantage compared to bidders who fully complied with what was required by the tender specifications) of the differentiation of treatment created and implemented by the regulatory provision. It is unsuitable for achieving the intended purpose of facilitating the adoption of the final decision under conditions beneficial to the general interest, because, ontologically rooted in the philosophy of the "poor thing" (pobrecito), it does not encourage timely compliance, or rather, it promotes non-compliance and mediocrity. The regulatory provision is unnecessary because it constitutes an autonomous regulation where a legal-rank provision exists. It is simply useful or convenient for the activity carried out by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República) as Improper Hierarch (Jerarca Impropio) in matters of public procurement, but correspondingly disrespectful of the rights and interests of the compliant individual bidder. Therefore, the differentiation of treatment under examination is contrary to equality. Equality, besides being a criterion for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, is itself a fundamental right, such that this right is also violated when discrimination occurs regarding non-fundamental rights. 12. The sixth paragraph of article 190 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, because it is optional and not mandatory for the Comptroller General of the Republic, prior to issuing the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to submit conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process (debido proceso) and the right of defense (derecho de defensa), and causes defenselessness by impeding the right to adversarial proceedings or to contradict the opposing respondent party and its counter-evidence, given the burden on the party that appealed the award act of the negative effects of the final resolution adverse to its interests. The human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is also violated. 13. The third or final paragraph of article 191 of the Regulation to the Administrative Procurement Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 02-11-2006) and its amendments, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter), is unconstitutional, because it is discretionary and not mandatory for the Comptroller General of the Republic, being an open door to arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary to examine all the articulations of the parties, which violates the principles of due process and right of defense, legality and legal reservation (reserva de ley), since the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to the law, given that, via regulation, the hard core of both the fundamental right to due process and right of defense and the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to the remedy, provided respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights, is diminished. 14. The IACHR Court has emphasized that the general guarantees of article 8 must be present in the determination of rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature, "and, therefore, in such types of matters the individual also has the right to the due process that applies in criminal matters" (IACHR Court, Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, para. 28. IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 117.). In this sense, when the ACHR refers to the right of every person to be heard by a "competent judge or tribunal" for the "determination of his rights," this expression refers to any public authority, whether administrative –collegiate or single-member–, legislative, or judicial, "that through its resolutions determines rights and obligations of persons," that is, "[a]rticle 8.1 of the ACHR does not apply only to judicial judges and tribunals," but also to those that, although not formally so, act as such (IACHR Court. Case of Claude Reyes et al. vs. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2006, para. 118. IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 118. Case of [Nombre03] vs. Perú. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2015, para. 208. See IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011. Dissenting Vote of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, and the concurring votes of Judge Diego García Sayán, Judge Margarette May Macaulay, and Judge Rhadys Abreu Blondet.). Likewise, the IACHR Court has affirmed that the requirement that a person be heard "is comparable to the right to a fair 'trial' or 'judicial proceedings'." In this regard, following the ECtHR in the cases [Nombre04] vs. Switzerland, Van de Hurk vs. Netherlands, [Nombre05] vs. Germany, and [Nombre06] vs. Russia, the IACHR Court has established that a fair procedure supposes that the body responsible for administering justice carries out "an appropriate examination of the allegations, arguments, and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessments regarding whether they are relevant to its decision" (IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 121. IACHR Court. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) vs. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2013. Para. 182.). Consequently, the jurisprudential standard supposes that a fair trial is one in which a person has been heard with due guarantees. According to the IACHR Court, the right to be heard then comprises two spheres, the formal and the material. The formal or procedural sphere of the right implies *"ensuring access to the competent body so that it determines the right claimed in adherence to due procedural guarantees (such as the presentation of arguments and the submission of evidence)."* For its part, the material sphere of the right supposes *"that the State guarantees that the decision produced through the procedure satisfies the purpose for which it was conceived."* For the IACHR Court, *"[t]his latter does not mean that it must always be accepted, but rather that its capacity to produce the result for which it was conceived must be guaranteed"* (IACHR Court. Case of Barbani Duarte et al. vs. Uruguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2011, para. 122. IACHR Court. Case of the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its members vs. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2015, para. 237). On the other hand, it is worth noting that although the wording of the ACHR refers to the right of *"[e]very person accused of a crime"* and therefore subject to criminal prosecution in its various stages –investigation, accusation, trial, and conviction– (IACHR Court. Case of [Nombre07] vs. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2012, para. 91.), in accordance with the jurisprudence of the IACHR Court, the minimum guarantees established in numeral 2 of article 8 apply mutatis mutandis to what corresponds to other orders besides the criminal one, that is, to civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature (IACHR Court. Case of the "White Van" (Paniagua Morales et al.) vs. Guatemala. Merits. 1998, para. 149. IACHR Court. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal vs. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2001. Paras. 69-71. IACHR Court. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. vs. Dominican Republic. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2012. Para. 157.). According to the IACHR Court, obtaining all guarantees that allow for reaching fair decisions is a human right. Thus, *"[t]he minimum guarantees must be respected in the administrative procedure and in any other procedure whose decision may affect the rights of persons"* (IACHR Court. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. vs. Panama. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2001, para. 127. IACHR Court. Case of [Nombre08] vs. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 2016, para. 73.). The petitioner indicates the following as legal grounds: Based on articles 7, 10, 11, 18, 33, 39, 41, 49, 153 of the Political Constitution; on articles 1.1, 2.1, 8.1, 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José; on the unwritten norm that is Vote No. 6224-2005 of the fifteen hours and sixteen minutes of the twenty-fifth of May of two thousand five, issued by the Constitutional Chamber; as well as on the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination, effective prompt and complete judicial protection (tutela judicial efectiva pronta y cumplida), provisional protection (tutela cautelar), due process, right of defense, rationality, reasonableness and proportionality, technical reasonableness and reasonableness of the effects on personal rights, legality, without prejudice to the concordant provisions contained in the various texts protecting Fundamental Rights, which he considers violated for the following reasons. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality: a) Of article 90 of the Administrative Procurement Law No. 7494 and its amendments, because i) it excludes reparation in kind (reparación in natura), that is, the re-award (readjudicación), it being, therefore now possible, this individually petitioned, or, together with restitution by equivalent through the payment in cash of damages and losses, at the choice of the administered party, regardless of whether the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, it now being possible to reverse the situation to the previous status quo (status quo anterior), as also ii) by providing for the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, for frontally violating the fundamental right to provisional protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective prompt and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the definitive or merits judgment could now be provisionally guaranteed in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter), a legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, which is also discriminatory, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, with respect to the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, to public procurement. b) Of article 21 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, as it frontally violates the essential content as a permissible limit of the fundamental right to provisional protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective prompt and complete judicial protection, given that it conditions (and ends up preventing in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter) guaranteeing provisionally the effectiveness of the definitive or merits judgment, on the existence or production of serious damages or losses, current or potential, of the alleged situation, since the granting of a provisional remedy does not depend, exclusively, on free and prudent judicial discretion or discretionary power, given that the right to provisional protection, as enshrined in the essential content of the more general right to prompt and complete justice, comprises the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent provisional remedies to guarantee the effectiveness of the merits judgment –the essential function of provisional protection–, if the prerequisites thereof are met (appearance of a good right -fumus boni iuris- and the danger in delay -periculum in mora). This right to provisional protection, forming an integral part of the essential core of the right to effective, prompt, and complete justice, cannot be denied, restricted, or conditioned by the legislator on the existence or production of serious damages or losses, current or potential, due to the execution or permanence of the conduct subject to process, and the judge must make it effective when there is danger to the effectiveness of the judgment; and, c) Subsections b) and i) of article 81, the sixth paragraph of article 190, and the third paragraph in fine of article 191, all of Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law No. 7494, applicable ultra-actively in the case [Valor 001] (prior matter), because they violate the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants since the distinctions and differentiations of treatment are odious matter and of restrictive interpretation, the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality, that of transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reservation, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to a remedy and to be heard with due guarantees; all of the foregoing, for contravening the norms, principles and values embodied by the Political Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights, cited above, reestablishing the legality proper to the Rule of Law.

2.- The petitioner bases his standing on article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, since he indicates as the underlying matter in ordinary contentious-administrative and civil treasury case file No. [Valor 001], where the petitioner is the plaintiff and the co-defendants are the Bank of Costa Rica (Banco de Costa Rica), the Comptroller General of the Republic jointly with the State and the private parties [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] and [Nombre02 003]; a jurisdictional process processed before the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, where it is currently pending resolution. Likewise, he provides the certified brief invoking unconstitutionality.

3.- By official communication of December 6, 2023, addressed to the Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Procedural Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, the remission to this Chamber was requested –as soon as possible– of the entirety of the judicial file processed under number [Valor 001]. This request was reiterated by email on December 19, 2023.

4.- On December 19, 2023, digital file No. [Valor 001] was received.

5.- Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction empowers the Chamber to reject outright or on the merits, at any time, even from its presentation, any motion submitted to its knowledge that proves to be manifestly improper, or when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment to reject it, or that it is a simple reiteration or reproduction of an equal or similar previously rejected motion.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- REQUIREMENTS AND FORMALITIES OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION. This Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the unconstitutionality action is a process with certain formalities, which, if not met, make it impossible to rule on the merits of the matter. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the admissibility requirements for unconstitutionality actions and regulates different situations. The first paragraph requires the existence of a matter pending resolution, whether in judicial proceedings –including habeas corpus or amparo appeals– or in administrative proceedings –in the procedure for exhausting this avenue, that is, in the administrative challenge procedure against the final act–, in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm is invoked, as a reasonable means of protecting the right or interest considered injured in the main matter. The second and third paragraphs regulate the direct action –no underlying matter is required–, in the following cases: a) when by the nature of the matter there is no individual and direct injury; b) it concerns the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole and c) when the action is brought by the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República) and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Regarding the requirement of a pending matter to be resolved, this Chamber, by means of judgment No. 04190-95 of 11:33 a.m. on July 28, 1995, stated the following:

*"(...) First of all, it is a process of an incidental nature, and not a direct or popular action, which means that the existence of a matter pending resolution is required -whether before the courts of justice or in the procedure to exhaust the administrative avenue- in order to access the constitutional avenue, but in such a way that the action constitutes a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured in the main matter, so that what is resolved by the Constitutional Court has a positive or negative impact on said pending process, since it pronounces on the constitutionality of the rules that must be applied in said matter; and it is only by exception that the legislation allows direct access to this avenue -requirements of the second and third paragraphs of article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (...)".* Likewise, there are other formalities that must be fulfilled, namely: the filing brief must be authenticated and contain an explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the components of the block of constitutionality that are considered infringed (article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction). It must also accredit the conditions of standing (powers of attorney and certifications), pay the stamp tax of the Bar Association of Costa Rica (Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica) (article 4 of Law No. 3245 of December 3, 1963), and provide a literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the challenged norms was invoked in the underlying matter (article 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction).

II.- STANDING. In the specific case, the petitioner bases his standing on article 75, first paragraph, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, considering that he is the plaintiff in the contentious-administrative proceeding No. [Valor 001], against the Comptroller General of the Republic, the State, the Bank of Costa Rica, [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] and [Nombre02 003]. The aforementioned judicial process is underway before the Contentious Administrative Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, authority that deemed the process established by resolution at 1:40 p.m. on November 1, 2023, granting a period of thirty business days to answer the complaint and warning the plaintiff to provide the legal copies. Subsequently, by resolution at 8:45 a.m. on November 17, 2023, the warning was deemed fulfilled and it was ordered to notify the transfer order. Likewise, the petitioner provided a certified brief invoking the unconstitutionality of the norms challenged here within said underlying process.

III.- OBJECT OF THE ACTION. The petitioner challenges the following norms:

• 1)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Administrative Procurement Law No. 7494, which literally states the following:

*"Article 81.- Curable aspects (Aspectos subsanables).* The following elements, among others, shall be curable:

• a)(…)
• b)Certifications regarding qualities, characteristics, or specifications of the good offered, provided that such circumstances existed at the time of submission of the offer and the interested party so accredits.

(Subsection c as amended above by Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) c) (…)

• d)(…)
• e)(…)
• f)(…)
• g)(…)
• h)(…)
• i)The documents necessary to prove the veracity of facts occurring prior to the opening of offers.

(Subsection i as amended above by Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 41243 of July 10, 2018) j) (…)”.

• 2)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of repealed Reglamento n.° 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, which literally provides as follows:

“Article 190.- Processing of the admissibility of the appeal (recurso). The initial order (auto inicial) admitting the appeal for processing must be adopted no later than the tenth business day after the deadline for appealing has expired. Within this same period, it must rule on the joinder (acumulación) of appeals for revocation (recursos de revocatoria), when applicable. If this order is not issued within the indicated period, the Contraloría General de la República must establish the disciplinary liability (responsabilidad disciplinaria) corresponding to the official in charge.

In this order, in the case of public tenders (licitaciones públicas), the Administration and the awarded party shall be granted a period of ten business days to respond to the appellant's allegations and provide the respective evidence. In the case of abbreviated tenders (licitaciones abreviadas) or contests (concursos) promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, this summons (emplazamiento) shall be for five business days.

When, in answering the initial hearing (audiencia inicial), the parties argue against the appellant's offer, a special hearing shall be granted for five business days in the case of a public tender and three business days for an abbreviated tender so that the appellant may refer exclusively to what has been alleged.

The Contraloría General de la República must expressly rule, before the final resolution (resolución final), on the parties' requests for evidence (prueba), if any, admitting or denying them, by means of a reasoned resolution (resolución motivada). Likewise, it shall adopt the evidentiary measures (providencias probatorias) that are necessary for the proper processing of the appeal. All administrative dependencies are obligated to lend their free collaboration in providing expert evidence (prueba pericial) requested ex officio by the Contraloría General.

In highly qualified cases, the Contraloría General de la República may grant new hearings in order to clarify aspects for the proper resolution of the appeal.

Prior to issuing the final resolution, the Contraloría General de la República may facultatively grant the parties a final hearing (audiencia final), granting them a period of three business days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, without the argumentation of new facts not debated in the appeal being admissible. When it deems it convenient, the final hearing may be oral. For this purpose, the parties shall be summoned at least three business days in advance to present their conclusions, and a notice of the date and time of the hearing shall also be posted in a place accessible to the public. A record (acta) shall be drawn up of the proceedings, which shall contain, at a minimum, the Name02 of the parties and a summary of the proceedings, and which shall be incorporated into the case file (expediente).

In cases where the Contraloría General de la República deems it opportune, a public hearing may be held for the presentation of allegations, the taking of evidence, and conclusions, according to the rules set forth in the initial hearing order. This hearing must be held once all corresponding written hearings have been completed and must be convened at least three business days in advance.

(Paragraph added above by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) In the event that an oral hearing of any nature has been processed, the final resolution may be issued orally, either immediately following the conclusion of the hearing, or within a period not exceeding three business days after its holding. This resolution shall be reasoned (motivada) and it shall suffice that it be recorded by some suitable means, the recording of which shall be incorporated into the appeal case file.

(Paragraph added above by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 35218 of April 30, 2009) (Its numbering renumbered by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from former 182 to 190)” (The underlining does not correspond to the original).

• 3)Article 191, third paragraph in fine, of repealed Reglamento n.° 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, which literally provides as follows:

“Article 191.- Resolution (Resolución). In public tenders, the final resolution must be adopted within the forty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended by an additional twenty business days, by means of a reasoned resolution, when to resolve the appeal it is necessary to gather evidence for a better decision (prueba para mejor resolver) or because its complexity prevents it from being resolved within the normal resolution period.

In abbreviated tenders or contests promoted in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Ley de Contratación Administrativa, the final resolution must be delivered no later than thirty business days following the initial order. This period may be extended by an additional ten business days, by means of a reasoned resolution under the same assumptions indicated for the public tender.

The Contraloría General de la República shall issue its decision (fallo) confirming or annulling, totally or partially, without it being necessary for it to examine all the articulations of the parties where one or several of these are decisive for rendering it.

(Its numbering renumbered by Article 2 of Decreto Ejecutivo N° 40124 of October 10, 2016, which transferred it from former 183 to 191)”. (The underlining does not correspond to the original).

• 4)Article 90 of repealed Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, which literally provides as follows:

“ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of administrative remedies (Agotamiento de la vía administrativa). The final resolution or the order that puts an end to the appeal shall exhaust administrative remedies. Within three days following notification (comunicación), the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects (efectos suspensivos), before the Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, through the special proceeding regulated in Articles 89 and 90 of the Ley reguladora de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. If the procurement whose award (adjudicación) is challenged has been executed or is in the course of execution, the judgment favorable to the plaintiff may only recognize the payment of the damages caused (daños y perjuicios)”.

• 5)Article 21 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, which literally provides as follows:

“ARTICLE 21.- The interim measure (medida cautelar) shall be appropriate when the execution or continuation of the conduct subject to the proceeding produces serious harm or damage (graves daños o perjuicios), actual or potential, from the situation adduced, and provided that the claim (pretensión) is not reckless (temeraria) or, in a manifest manner, lacking in seriousness”.

IV.- GRIEVANCES (AGRAVIOS). In summary, the plaintiff (accionante) alleges the following grievances of unconstitutionality (agravios de inconstitucionalidad):

• a)Article 81, subsections b) and i), of repealed Reglamento n.° 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: In general, the plaintiff alleges that this article (as well as Article 190, sixth paragraph, and Article 191, third paragraph in fine, all of Reglamento n.° 33411) violates the principle of equality of bidders (principio de igualdad de los oferentes), including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy (principio de jerarquía normativa), the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations (principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos), the principle of legality or transparency of procedures (principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos), the principle of legal reserve (principio de reserva de ley), the principle of due process (principio del debido proceso) and the right of defense (derecho de defensa), as well as the human rights to appeal (recurso) and to be heard with due guarantees.
• b)Article 190, sixth paragraph, of repealed Reglamento n.° 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: the plaintiff considers that this violates the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation. Likewise, he considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to appeal and to be heard with due guarantees.
• c)Article 191, third paragraph in fine, of repealed Reglamento n.° 33411 to the Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: the plaintiff considers that this violates the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, since distinctions and differentiations in treatment are odious matters and subject to restrictive interpretation.

Likewise, it considers it contrary to the principle of normative hierarchy, the principle of the singular non-derogability of regulations, the principle of legality or transparency of procedures, the principle of legal reserve, the principle of due process and the right of defense, as well as the human rights to an appeal and to be heard with due guarantees.

**d) Article 90 of the repealed Public Procurement Law No. 7494:** The claimant considers this article unconstitutional for three reasons, namely: **i.** because it excludes *in natura* reparation, that is, re-awarding (readjudicación), given that only restitution by equivalent through the monetary payment of damages is possible, since, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, it will not be possible to revert the situation to the prior *status quo*; **ii.** likewise, the plaintiff alleges that the denial of the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge to the award act of bidding procedure number 2021LN-000023-0015700001, in contentious-administrative and civil treasury case number [Valor 001], frontally violates the fundamental right to interim protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since, through it, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment can be provisionally guaranteed; and, **iii.** finally, the claimant considers that the indicated precept is unconstitutional, since the legal or legislative denial of the suspensive effect of the judicial challenge to the award act is also discriminatory, the foregoing, because it is contrary to the principle of legal equality, regarding the protective regime in matters of public procurement, regulated by the Free Trade Treaty with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, a protective regime that does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all of this, without an objective reason justifying the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement.

**e) Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code**: the plaintiff considers that this article frontally violates the essential content, as a permissible limit, of the fundamental right to interim protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, since it conditions (and ends up preventing) the provisional guarantee of the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment on the existence or production of serious, current, or potential harm or damages from the alleged situation.

**V.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 81, SUBSECTIONS B) AND I), OF THE REPEALED REGULATION No. 33411 TO THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW NO. 7494**. Regarding subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411 (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments, the plaintiff alleges the following ground of unconstitutionality:

*"(…) they violate the principle of equality of bidders, including a disadvantage for the other participants, by providing, based on them, corrections of bids to bidders, who at the end of the bidding procedure, end up being awardees, a correction that is always carried out in contravention of the positivized principle of the singular non-derogability of regulations, this last aspect being where the inclusion of the disadvantage lies for the bidder who did fully comply with what was required by the bidding terms (cartel) (…)"* *"(…) Likewise, subsections b) and i) of article 81 of said Regulation and the "corrective power (poder subsanador)" rooted in them, violate the principle of normative hierarchy (…) In this sense, the differentiation of treatment (in the case, that is, compliant / non-compliant) implied by subsection i) of article 81 ibidem, is not imposed by a rule of legal rank;* *quite the contrary, the classification and differentiation of treatment beyond the application of the regulations provided by article 42 subsection j) of the Public Procurement Law No. 7494 was "delegated" to the Public Administration, so that the cited regulatory provision violates the right to equality before the law and the principle of legal reserve."* Regarding the first allegation, that is, the supposed violation of the principle of equality, the Chamber has repeatedly stated in its jurisprudence that when the claimant alleges a violation of the principle of equality, they have the duty to provide the parameter of comparison between the subjects treated differently, in order to provide sufficient elements of judgment to allow this Tribunal to compare if the alleged inequality occurs. This, in doctrine, is known as the "*tertium comparationis*" (point of reference, of comparison), and regarding it, in judgment No. 7261-94 of 08:30 hours on December 9, 1994, it was stated:

*"With respect to the principle of equality, as this Chamber has repeatedly held, the most important factual presupposition is that there exists discriminatory treatment devoid of any objective and reasonable justification; __this is the reason why whoever invokes the violation of this principle must supply, for the purpose of enabling a full confrontation, parameters of comparison and in this way, verify whether or not inequality occurs__ (see, among others and by way of example, Judgments Nos. 196-91 in Considering II; 1432-91, in Considering II and 1732-91)".* (The highlighting and underlining are not from the original).

Now, in the specific case, the claimant alleges that the norm that is the object of this action, by allowing the correction of defects, puts at a disadvantage the participants who fully complied with what was required. However, from the reading of the norm it does not follow that this is so, since it makes no differentiation whatsoever among the bidders, so that anyone can benefit from the correction of the omitted requirements. This, added to the fact that the claimant did not provide any element or parameter of comparison that would allow evidencing discriminatory treatment devoid of objective and reasonable justification.

**VI.-** On the other hand, regarding the alleged violation of the principle of normative hierarchy or legal reserve, given that, in the plaintiff's opinion, the regulatory norm exceeds what is provided in article 42 subsection j) of the Public Procurement Law No. 7494, this allegation also becomes inadmissible, since the conflict it raises is one of ordinary legality, which is not susceptible to being heard through the unconstitutionality action, but must be raised before the administration itself or in the ordinary channel. The apparent confrontation between the legal norm and the regulation in question supposes a conflict of legality. On repeated occasions (see judgments No. 2000-01149 of 15:39 hours on February 2, 2000, and 2021-11972 of 9:30 hours on May 26, 2021, among others) this Chamber has held that determining whether a regulatory norm, such as the one challenged, transgresses or exceeds what is provided in a law is a matter of legality whose discussion does not correspond to this jurisdiction. Article 49 of the Fundamental Charter assigns the control of the legality of the administrative function of the State to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, not the constitutional one. If this Chamber were to attempt to oversee, through the unconstitutionality action, the various possible hypotheses of infringement of the principle of legality that may occur in administrative offices, it would in practice supplant – against the grain of the constitutional text – the courts of that matter. Consequently, if the claimant party considers that the challenged regulation is illegal or has been applied erroneously, they may resort to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in defense of their rights. In this order of considerations, the action is inadmissible regarding subsections b) and i) of article 81 of the Regulation to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411.

**VII.- ON ARTICLE 190, SIXTH PARAGRAPH OF THE REGULATION TO THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW NO. 33411.** The claimant considers that article 190, sixth paragraph of the Regulation to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411 (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of November 2, 2006) and its amendments, is unconstitutional, because it is optional and not mandatory for the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), prior to issuing the final resolution, to grant the parties a final hearing of 3 days to formulate conclusions on the merits of the matter, which violates the principle of due process and the right of defense, and causes defenselessness by preventing the right to the adversarial principle or to contradict the appealed counterparty and its counter-evidence. Also, in the plaintiff's opinion, the human right to be heard with due guarantees, established by article 8.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, is violated.

In this regard, the Chamber has on repeated occasions identified the essential elements of due process in administrative matters; for example, in judgment No. 11860-2014 of 15:05 hours on July 22, 2014, the following was ordered:

*"(…) **III**.- **On the merits**. In this venue, the scope and nuances of the right enshrined in articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution have been developed on multiple occasions. The argumentation of judgment #15-90 of 16:45 hours on January 5, 1990, is particularly illustrative:* *"... the right of defense guaranteed by article 39 of the Political Constitution and consequently the principle of due process, contained in article 41 of our Fundamental Charter, or as it is usually called in doctrine, the principle of 'bilaterality of the hearing' of 'due legal process' or 'adversarial principle' (...) has been synthesized as follows: a) Notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure; b) right to be heard, and opportunity for the interested party to present the arguments and produce the evidence they deem pertinent; c) opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to the information and the administrative records, linked to the matter in question; ch) right of the administered party to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons; d) adequate notification of the decision issued by the administration and of the reasons on which it is based and e) right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued." "... the right of defense protected in article 39 ibidem, not only governs for jurisdictional procedures, but also for any administrative procedure carried out by the public administration; and that the claimant must necessarily be given, if they so wish, the right to be assisted by a lawyer, in order to exercise their defense...`* *And the following has also been indicated:* *"This Chamber has indicated the elements of the right to due legal process, (see especially advisory opinion nº1739-92), applicable to any sanctioning procedure or one that may result in the loss of subjective rights. The Administration must, in attention to the right of defense of the administered party: a) Transfer the charges to the affected party, which implies communicating in an individualized, concrete, and timely manner the facts that are imputed; b) Allow them unrestricted access to the administrative file; c) Grant them a reasonable period for the preparation of their defense; d) Grant them the hearing and allow them to provide all evidence they consider appropriate to support their defense; e) Ground the resolutions that put an end to the procedure; f) Recognize their right to appeal against the sanctioning resolution.´ (judgment #5469-95 of 18:03 hours on October 4, 1995).* *__The foregoing should not be understood, however, in the sense that every violation that arises in the processing of an administrative procedure is protectable in this Jurisdiction, since only those substantial violations that place the affected party in a state of defenselessness are tutelable in this channel__, as detailed in judgment #2001-10198 of 10:29 hours on October 10, 2001 (…)".* (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Now, regarding the omission of the Comptroller General of the Republic in granting a party the concluding final hearing, in judgment No. 2000-04142 of 16:05 hours on May 16, 2000, the Chamber ruled in the following sense:

*"(…) As has been proven, the disagreement raised by the appellant in the sense that they were not notified of the order granting a final hearing in the appeal process followed before the Comptroller General of the Republic, does not violate their opportunity to appeal the Administration's decision regarding the bidding in which they participated as a bidder, since, as the Comptroller's Office correctly points out in its report, this opportunity is exercised with full breadth at the moment of filing the appeal. __The final hearing is a merely concluding stage, in which new arguments or evidentiary elements that could have the virtue of varying the final decision that might be adopted based on the terms in which the appeal was initially filed cannot be invoked, and in this sense, it cannot be said that a lesion to their right of defense and to due process has occurred__. Likewise, for this reason, the questioned action does not entail discriminatory treatment regarding the right to appeal the award act, which is the purpose of the remedy provided by the legal system in matters of administrative procurement. Consequently, the omission incurred by the Comptroller's Office regarding the notification of the final hearing, if it departed from the provisions of the General Regulation of Administrative Procurement, could certainly be outlined as an infringement of the principle of legality. However, this Tribunal has repeatedly ruled in the sense that in the amparo channel this infringement can be protected only when it in turn implies the violation of some other fundamental right or guarantee".* (The emphasis does not correspond to the original).

Based on the foregoing, this Chamber observes that the supposed lesion to due process alleged by the plaintiff lacks foundation, since the power of the Comptroller General of the Republic to grant the parties a final hearing to issue their conclusions is not injurious to any essential element of administrative due process that leaves the parties defenseless, and therefore lacks constitutional relevance. For this reason, it is appropriate to reject the action on the merits regarding this aspect.

**VIII.- INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 191, THIRD PARAGRAPH IN FINE, OF THE REPEALED REGULATION NO. 33411 TO THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW NO. 7494.-** This action lacks grounding regarding the ground of unconstitutionality referring to article 191, third paragraph in fine, of the repealed Regulation No. 33411 to the Public Procurement Law No. 7494. This, given that the claimant limited themselves to stating the following:

*"Article 191 third or final paragraph of the Regulation to the Public Procurement Law No. 33411-H (published in La Gaceta No. 210 of 11-02-2006) and its amendments, applicable with ultra-activity in the case [Valor 001] (preliminary matter), is unconstitutional, for being discretionary and not mandatory for the Comptroller General of the Republic, being an open door for arbitrariness, to issue the ruling without it being necessary for it to examine all the articulations of the parties, which violates the principles of due process and right of defense, of legality and legal reserve, because the legal regime of fundamental rights is reserved to law, since, via regulation, the hard core is affected in diminishment, of both the fundamental right to due process and right of defense and of the human rights to be heard with due guarantees, and to an appeal, provided respectively by numerals 8.1 and 8.2.h) of the American Convention on Human Rights".* From the arguments set forth by the plaintiff, it is not possible to clearly deduce the reason why they consider that article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411 is unconstitutional, as they limit themselves to mentioning the violation of the principles of due process and the right of defense, without developing their content in order to contrast it with the norm in question. As indicated in the previous considering, this Chamber only intervenes in the face of violations of the essential elements of due process, so it is required that the plaintiff party develop in a clear and precise manner, in what way, the challenged norm prevents the exercise of their right of defense, which they did not argue in the filing brief. In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to summarily reject this action regarding article 191, final paragraph, of Regulation No. 33411.

**IX.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 90 OF THE REPEALED PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW NO. 7494.** Regarding article 90 of Law No. 7494, the plaintiff's first allegation is that this norm is unconstitutional *"because this precept excludes the fundamental right to* in natura *reparation, that is, re-awarding (readjudicación), being, therefore, possible in the current state of the Costa Rican legal system, only restitution by equivalent through the monetary payment of damages, given that, if the contract has been executed or is in the course of execution, as occurs in the present case, it will not be possible to revert the situation to the prior status quo ante".* Throughout the filing brief, the claimant limits themselves to raising this argument without indicating, concretely, which is the fundamental right or principle of the Law of the Constitution they consider injured. Regarding the impossibility of suspending the execution of the award, the truth is that this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that the enforceability (ejecutividad) and self-executing nature (ejecutoriedad) of administrative acts is a General Principle of Administrative Law, embodied in articles 146 and 148 of the General Law of Public Administration, which is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution and the principles and values that inform it (in this sense, see judgments numbers 2002-000928 of 09:47 hours, of February 1, 2002, 2014-004307 of 09:15 hours of March 28, 2014 and 2015-004019 of 09:05 hours of March 20, 2015, among many others).

Consequently, this argument of the claimant must be rejected outright.

**X.** Regarding his second allegation, namely that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 violates the right to interim protection (tutela cautelar), in the action of unconstitutionality No. 23-005726-0007-CO, filed by the claimant here against Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494, this Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2023-012773 at 09:20 hours on May 31, 2023, the following:

*“II.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION. In the specific case, the claimant challenges Article 90 of the repealed Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 of May 2, 1995, which states the following:”* *“ARTICLE 90.- Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The final resolution or the order that terminates the appeal shall be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies. Within three days following notification, the interested party may challenge the final act, without suspensive effects, before the Superior Contentious-Administrative Court, through the special proceeding regulated in Articles 89 and 90 of the Law Regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction. If the contract whose award is being challenged has been executed or is in the process of execution, a judgment favorable to the claimant may only recognize payment for the damages caused.”* *The petitioner alleges that the aforementioned rule is unconstitutional because, in his view, the denial of the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act of the bidding procedure violates the right to interim protection. Likewise, the claimant considers that the challenged rule violates the principle of equality, with respect to the protective regime in public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, whose protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or its execution. To this effect, the claimant indicates as a prior matter pending resolution, the contentious-administrative proceeding No. 22-005575-1027-CA, where he filed an appeal against the rejection of the change in factual circumstances that gave rise to the denial of the urgent precautionary measure (medida cautelar urgente) requested by the actor. Likewise, he certifies that he invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged rule within said judicial process.* *However, despite the claimant's allegations, this matter is inadmissible, since the matter that the claimant indicates as pending before the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Judiciary, has two files of precautionary measures that were definitively resolved and are archived, while he failed to prove that the necessary connection exists between this action and the main contentious-administrative file, as he only based his claim of unconstitutionality in relation to the protection of his fundamental right to interim protection. Thus, from the study of the certified copy of file No. 22-005575-1027-CA, filed by Nombre01 against the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, consisting of the main declaratory proceeding and two files of precautionary measures, it was proven that the claimant filed a “request for urgent and provisionalísima precautionary measure” by means of a brief dated October 17, 2022, so that the provisionalísima precautionary measure was rejected by the Contentious-Administrative Court within the first file of precautionary measures, by resolution at 11:40 hours on October 19, 2022. Subsequently, by vote No. 1906-2022-T at 15:25 hours on November 15, 2022, the request for a precautionary measure was declared without merit. Said resolution was challenged and the Court of Appeals for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters, by judgment No. 470-2022-II at 11:06 hours on December 20, 2022, confirmed the appealed resolution. Similarly, in the second file of precautionary measures, it is noted that the actor again filed a request for an urgent precautionary measure by official letter dated January 20, 2023, which was understood as having been submitted under the parameters of subsection 2) of Article 29 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code. In this matter, the Contentious-Administrative Court resolved to reject the request for change of circumstances for the granting of the precautionary measure, by resolution at 16:01 hours on February 8, 2023. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Matters issued vote No. 120-2023-I at 10:57 hours on March 21, 2023, where it confirmed the resolution at 16:01 hours on February 8, 2023. Finally, it is noted that the declaratory proceeding is ongoing and within it, the claimant filed a brief where he again “requests a provisionalísima precautionary measure immediately and prima facie and invocation of unconstitutionality” dated March 6, 2023, regarding which the Contentious-Administrative Court, by resolution at 11:58 hours on March 31, 2023, resolved the following: “Having seen the brief incorporated on 03/06/2023 by the plaintiff party in which a request for a provisionalísima precautionary measure is presented, from the study of the same it is observed that it is a reiterative request for a precautionary measure, therefore, it is rejected outright and the plaintiff party is referred to what has already been resolved in the corresponding files of the requests for precautionary measures (…)”. Consequently, this action does not constitute a reasonable means to protect the right to interim protection alleged by the claimant within the base matter in question, therefore, it is appropriate to reject this action outright, as is hereby ordered.”* In a similar sense to the aforementioned precedent, this aspect of the action must be rejected for lack of connection, since, in the base matter, that is, file No. [Valor 001], there is no record of any proceeding whatsoever related to the precautionary measure of suspension of the act, as, on the contrary, in the initial brief of the contentious-administrative claim, the plaintiff party indicated the following:

*“I) On the non-request for a precautionary measure together with the claim due to legal impediment: Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, applicable ultraactively in the present case, transcribed above, excludes and/or denies the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, which is why, at this time, it is impossible for me to exercise my fundamental right to interim protection, an integral part of the fundamental right to effective, prompt, and complete judicial protection, the effectiveness of the final or merits judgment provisionally cannot be guaranteed for that reason, until the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice processes the action of unconstitutionality that I will file against said normative provision, among others, once, in the contentious-administrative venue, this declaratory proceeding is given course”.* That is, the claimant did not request any precautionary measure in the contentious-administrative judicial process that serves as the basis for this action, and therefore, the pronouncement made by this Chamber on the alleged violation of the right to interim protection lacks interest, since what is resolved would have no effect within file No. [Valor 001]. In this regard, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that, when the standing in an action of unconstitutionality derives from Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, that is, from the existence of a prior matter pending resolution, it is necessary to analyze whether what is resolved in the action will have a direct and decisive influence on the main matter. This Chamber, in vote No. 3040-97, indicated that between the base trial and the action of unconstitutionality *“there must exist such a connection that, if the former is upheld, it directly affects the base trial, as one more procedural remedy in favor of the party’s rights”*, a requirement that cannot be verified in this matter in question, so it is appropriate to reject it outright with respect to this aspect.

**XI.-** Finally, regarding his third allegation, that is, that Article 90 of Law No. 7494 harms the right to equality, since, in the words of the claimant:

*“(…) Article 90 of the Administrative Contracting Law No. 7494 and its amendments, is also unconstitutional for being discriminatory, the foregoing, for being contrary to the principle of legal equality, regarding the protective regime in public procurement matters, regulated by the Free Trade Agreement with the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America, endorsed by Law 8622 of November 21, 2007, since in its ninth chapter, relating to ‘public procurement,’ Article 9.15.2 -applicable to the goods, services, and public entities covered by the trade agreement- provides that ‘Each Party shall stipulate that the authority established or designated in paragraph 1 - impartial and independent administrative or judicial authority that must hear the challenges of suppliers - may take timely provisional measures, while the resolution of a challenge is pending, to preserve the opportunity to correct a potential breach of this Chapter, including the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded’; a protective regime, where it is indeed feasible to access the suspensive effect of the jurisdictional challenge to the award act, because said protective regime does include the suspension of the award of a contract or the execution of a contract that has already been awarded, all this, without an objective reason that justifies the difference in treatment between both regimes, which refer to the same matter, that is, public procurement. An identical situation exists and in the specific case, discriminatory normative-legislative treatment, devoid of any objective and reasonable justification, occurs. (…).”* As indicated in Considerando V of this judgment, this Chamber holds the reiterated criterion that whoever invokes the violation of the principle of equality must provide sufficient parameters for comparison, allowing a check of whether unequal treatment exists between subjects who are in the same conditions, without objective reasons justifying such differentiation. However, the truth is that the actor failed to provide objective elements of comparison that would justify this Chamber hearing the merits of his claim, so it is equally appropriate to reject the action outright with respect to this aspect.

**XII.- ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS ACTION REGARDING ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CODE.** The petitioner challenges Article 21 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, alleging, once again, the violation of the fundamental right to interim protection. However, it is appropriate to reject this aspect of the action outright, based on the same arguments set forth in Considerando V of the judgment, since there is no connection between his unconstitutionality argument and the judicial process that is the basis of this action, as he fails to prove that the questioned rule will be applied in said matter, because he does not prove the existence of a file of precautionary measures in process.

**XIII.- CONCLUSION.** Based on the considerations set forth, this action is rejected.

**XIV.- SEPARATE NOTE BY JUDGES CASTILLO VÍQUEZ AND CRUZ CASTRO.** We agree with our colleagues on the arguments they put forward to reject the action outright, since there is no evident and manifest contradiction between the Law and the Regulation being challenged. The Court's position, in the sense that when a regulatory norm violates or exceeds what is provided in a law, it is a matter of legality, whose discussion does not correspond to this jurisdiction, is, in general terms, legally correct. There is no doubt that it is the ordinary Judge who is responsible for determining the scope of the interpretation and application of the Law and, consequently, he is the one called upon to establish whether a regulatory norm violates or does not violate the legal norm. However, there is an important nuance in this matter, and that is that, from our point of view, when there is manifest evidence, which is obvious, that the regulatory norm exceeds, suppresses - or contradicts the text of the Law - there is no doubt that, in a gross manner, the principle of force, authority, or effectiveness of the Law is violated; a principle that has constitutional coverage and must be protected by this Court. As is well known, the principle of force, authority, or effectiveness of the law refers us to the power (active force), the resistance (passive force), and the system for challenging the Law. Based on the first aspect of the concept, the Law, once it comes into effect, repeals or modifies any norm of equal or lower rank. Based on the second, the Law cannot be repealed or modified by a norm of lower rank. Finally, based on the third, the Law can only be challenged for reasons of unconstitutionality and, therefore, can only be annulled through a resolution of the Constitutional Chamber. The constitutional foundation of this principle is found in numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter, which states that the Law can only be repealed, abrogated, or modified by another subsequent norm of equal rank. On the other hand, the principle of force, authority, or effectiveness of the law is an essential premise of the social and democratic State of Law, since it stems from a core idea: the parliamentary normative act is superior in rank to the normative act issued by the other Branches of State, especially the Executive Branch, which implies that all Branches of State, when exercising normative power (Article 6, subsection d) of the General Law of Public Administration), must conform to what was ordered by the legislator. When this does not occur, the normative rank of the Law is disregarded, which, in the normative hierarchical scale, occupies the third place in importance after the Political Constitution and International Treaties (Articles 10 and 7) and, consequently, a key principle of the social and democratic State of Law is violated. Ergo, when a regulatory norm evidently and manifestly exceeds, suppresses, or contradicts a Law of the Republic, numeral 129 of the Fundamental Charter and the principle of force, authority, or effectiveness of the Law are violated, and the Constitutional Court does have jurisdiction in this matter, without prejudice to the jurisdiction also held by the members of the ordinary jurisdiction when we are not in the situation discussed.

**XV.- PARTIAL DISSENTING VOTE BY JUDGE GARRO VARGAS.** I separate from the criterion of the majority of this Court and partially save my vote in this matter, considering that the decision to reject some aspects of this action of unconstitutionality is premature.

It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a process *“established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for that very reason, a set of formalities must be met, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge”*, as has been stated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment that must be given to the various formalities and their eventual non-compliance. This is extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction which states:

*“Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements have been omitted and shall order that they be fulfilled within three days (…)”.* In this matter, it is proposed to reject the action outright in some aspects due to insufficient reasoning, or because the claimant did not provide the parameters that would allow this Chamber to carry out an examination of a possible violation of the principle of equality. From my perspective, in relation to said grievances, the application of a warning to the claimant to remedy the detected omissions is unquestionably applicable.

Similarly, it should be noted that the interpretation of both Articles 78 and 79 and that of Article 80 itself of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad, to the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.

**XVI.- DISSENTING VOTE BY JUDGE RUEDA LEAL.** I separate from the criterion of the majority of this Court and save my vote in this matter, considering that the decision to reject this action of unconstitutionality is premature. It is unquestionable that the action of unconstitutionality is a process, *“established for the purpose of guaranteeing the supremacy of the Political Constitution against norms or other provisions of a general nature and that for that very reason, a set of formalities must be met, so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge”* as has been stated in the extensive jurisprudence of this Chamber. However, it is precisely the law itself that orders the treatment that must be given to the various formalities and their eventual non-compliance, as extracted from the text of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction which states:

*“Article 80.- If the formalities referred to in the two preceding articles are not fulfilled, the President of the Chamber shall indicate by resolution which requirements have been omitted and shall order that they be fulfilled within three days (…)”* In this matter, among other requirements, an adequate and sufficient reasoning is lacking, as required by Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, so the application of a warning to the claimant to remedy the detected omission is unquestionably applicable. Likewise, it is absolutely relevant to state for the record that –in my view– the interpretation of both Articles 78 and 79 and that of Article 80 itself of the Law governing this jurisdiction must be broad, to the benefit of those who come before this Chamber, so that access to constitutional justice is not unnecessarily limited.

**XVII.- DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED TO THE FILE.** The parties are warned that, if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, Article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, 2012, Article LXXXI.

**POR TANTO:** The action is rejected on the merits regarding Article 190, sixth paragraph of the Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa No. 33411. In all other respects, this action is rejected outright. Judges Castillo Víquez and Cruz Castro set forth a note. Judge Garro Vargas partially dissents and orders the warning of Article 80 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction be carried out.

Justice Rueda Leal dissents and orders the prevention under Article 80 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.

The image is a signature appearing at the end of the document, with the text "Luis Fdo." below it, indicating it is the signature of a person named Luis.

Salazar A.</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.65pt; padding-left:5.65pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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Fax: Telf02 / Telf03. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Dirección02, Dirección03, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Dirección04, San José, Catedral District, Dirección05, calles 19 y 21, Dirección06</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="-aw-import:ignore">&#xa0;</span></p></div></div></body></html>"

Revisión del Documento  Res. Nº 2024003884 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinticinco minutos del catorce de febrero de dos mil veinticuatro .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por Nombre01, abogado y notario, portador de la cédula de identidad n.° CED01, contra los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, el párrafo sexto del artículo 190 y el párrafo tercero in fine del artículo 191; todos del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, así como el artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 y el artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo.

RESULTANDO:

1.- Por escrito recibido mediante Gestión en Línea del Poder Judicial a las 16:20 horas del 15 de noviembre de 2023, el promovente impugna las siguientes normas: los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, el párrafo sexto del artículo 190 y el párrafo tercero in fine del artículo 191; todos del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, así como el artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, aplicable ultraactivamente en el procedimiento licitatorio n.° 2021LN-000023-0015700001, así como en la causa contencioso administrativa y civil de hacienda número [Valor 001], y el artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. El accionante manifiesta que la ratio esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, como medio razonable para la tutela de la situación jurídica sustancial que se estima lesionada en el proceso contencioso administrativo y civil de hacienda número [Valor 001], pendiente de resolver en los Tribunales, radica en que: El artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, es triplemente inconstitucional: a) por cuanto excluye la reparación in natura, sea, la readjudicación, siendo, entonces posible, únicamente, la restitución por equivalente a través del pago en numerario de los daños y perjuicios, dado que, si el contrato ha sido ejecutado o se encuentra en curso de ejecución no se podrá revertir la situación al status quo anterior; b) igualmente, la negación del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación del procedimiento licitatorio número 2021LN-000023-0015700001 en la causa contencioso administrativa y civil de hacienda número [Valor 001], violenta frontalmente el derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, por su medio puede garantizarse provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito; y, c) finalmente, el precepto indicado, es inconstitucional, puesto que la negación legal o legislativa del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, también es discriminatorio, lo anterior, por ser contrario al principio de igualdad jurídica, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, refrendado por la Ley 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, régimen tutelar que si incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado, todo esto, sin que exista una razón objetiva que justifique la diferencia de trato entre ambos regímenes, que refieren a la misma materia, sea, a la contratación pública. Mientras que, el artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo es inconstitucional, pues violenta frontalmente el contenido esencial como límite permisible del derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, condiciona (y termina impidiendo) el garantizar provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito, a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales de la situación aducida. Este derecho a la tutela cautelar, al formar parte integral del núcleo esencial del derecho a una justicia efectiva, pronta y cumplida, el legislador no puede negarlo, restringirlo o condicionarlo a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, debidos a la ejecución o permanencia de la conducta sometida a proceso, y el juez debe hacerlo efectivo cuando haya peligro para la efectividad de la sentencia. Finalmente, los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, el párrafo sexto del artículo 190 y el párrafo tercero in fine del artículo 191, todos del Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Admnistrativa n.° 7494, aplicables ultraactivamente en la presente causa, son inconstitucionales, pues violentan el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes por cuanto las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva, el principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, el principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, el principio de reserva de ley, el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, así como de los derechos humanos al recurso y a ser oído con las debidas garantías. El accionante expone los siguientes hechos: 1. El Banco de Costa Rica, para la contratación de Notarios Públicos externos, promovió la Licitación Pública n.° 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominada: “CONTRATACIÓN DE PROFESIONALES QUE BRINDEN SERVICIOS COMO NOTARIOS EXTERNOS PARA OFICINAS DEL BANCO DE COSTA RICA”, según publicación en el Sistema Integrado de Compras Públicas (SICOP) el lunes 22 de noviembre de 2021. 2. La Licitación Pública n.° 2021LN-000023-0015700001, denominada: “CONTRATACIÓN DE PROFESIONALES QUE BRINDEN SERVICIOS COMO NOTARIOS EXTERNOS PARA OFICINAS DEL BANCO DE COSTA RICA”, respecto de la línea independiente Ítem 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles y Guatuso, se encuentra actualmente en fase de ejecución contractual por estar firme en vía administrativa, el acto de adjudicación, dado el agotamiento de la etapa recursiva. 3. El accionante fue el único de los oferentes finalistas no adjudicatarios del Ítem 3, de la licitación referenciada, que no consintió el acto de adjudicación contrario a sus legítimos intereses, por haberlo recurrido en tiempo y forma vía SICOP ante la Contraloría General de la República. 4. Recibió la máxima calificación por el ente licitante en la Licitación Pública número 2021LN-000023-0015700001. 5. Ostenta la condición de PYME de Servicios en la Licitación Pública número 2021LN-000023-0015700001. 6. Dado que recibió la máxima calificación por el ente licitante en la Licitación Pública número 2021LN-000023-0015700001, a la vez que ostenta la condición de PYME de Servicios en tal concurso, ostenta derecho a la (re)adjudicación del concurso indicado respecto cualesquiera de los cupos de los oferentes/hoy adjudicatarios [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] y [Nombre02 003], cuyas ofertas fueron indebidamente calificadas por el ente licitante, no pudiendo alcanzar la máxima calificación en el concurso, viéndose desplazadas sus ofertas por la suya, debiendo su oferta ser considerada la más conveniente, por haber cumplido a cabalidad, con todo lo requerido por el cartel, y habida cuenta que fue el único de los oferentes finalistas no adjudicatarios del Ítem 3, ZONA Alajuela 3, de la licitación arriba referenciada que no consintió el acto de adjudicación contrario a sus legítimos intereses, por haberlo recurrido en tiempo y forma; todo lo cual, es objeto de revisión jurisdiccional dentro del proceso contencioso administrativo y civil de hacienda número [Valor 001], instaurado por el accionante contra el Banco de Costa Rica, la Contraloría General de la República conjuntamente con el Estado y [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] y [Nombre02 003]. 7. La presente acción de inconstitucionalidad se erige en medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que considera lesionado, habida cuenta que, siendo el objeto principal del proceso contencioso administrativo y civil de hacienda expediente número [Valor 001], la readjudicación directa al actor de un cupo del Ítem 3, Dirección01: San Carlos, Río Cuarto, Los Chiles y Guatuso, de la Licitación Pública n.° 2021LN-000023-0015700001, de cualesquiera de los cupos otorgados a los oferentes/hoy adjudicatarios [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] y [Nombre02 003], no puede acceder, ni a la readjudicación en sentencia de fondo ni tampoco a la tutela cautelar, ambas por imposibilidad legal, dado que el artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 y sus reformas, que preceptúa: “Agotamiento de la vía administrativa. La resolución final o el auto que ponga término al recurso dará por agotada la vía administrativa. Dentro de los tres días posteriores a la comunicación, el interesado podrá impugnar el acto final, sin efectos suspensivos, ante el Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, por medio del proceso especial regulado en los artículos 89 y 90 de la Ley reguladora de la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa. Si la contratación cuya adjudicación se impugna ha sido ejecutada o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, la sentencia favorable al accionante solo podrá reconocer el pago de los daños y perjuicios causados.”, niega inconstitucionalmente tanto la readjudicación, como también el efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación. 8. El artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 y sus reformas, es inconstitucional, por cuanto tal precepto excluye el derecho fundamental a la reparación in natura, sea, la readjudicación, siendo, entonces posible en el estado actual del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, únicamente la restitución por equivalente a través del pago en numerario de los daños y perjuicios, dado que, si el contrato ha sido ejecutado o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, como acaece en el presente caso, no se podrá revertir la situación al status quo anterior, e igualmente lo es por la negación del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, pues violenta frontalmente el derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, por su medio puede garantizarse provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito. Este derecho a la tutela cautelar, al formar parte integral del núcleo esencial del derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida, el legislador no puede negarlo, restringirlo o condicionarlo y el juez debe hacerlo efectivo cuando haya peligro para la efectividad de la sentencia. 9. Igualmente, la negación legal o legislativa del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación dispuesta por el artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 y sus reformas, también es inconstitucional por discriminatorio, lo anterior, por ser contrario al principio de igualdad jurídica, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, refrendado por la Ley 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, por cuanto en su capítulo noveno, relativo a la "contratación pública", el artículo 9.15.2 -aplicable a las mercancías, servicios y entes públicos que cubre el acuerdo comercial- dispone que "Cada Parte estipulará que la autoridad establecida o designada en el párrafo 1 administrativa o judicial imparcial e independiente que debe conocer de las impugnación de los proveedores- podrá tomar medidas precautorias oportunas, mientras se encuentre pendiente la resolución de una impugnación, para preservar la oportunidad de corregir un potencial incumplimiento del presente Capítulo, incluyendo la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado"; régimen tutelar, donde sí es factible acceder al efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, por cuanto, dicho régimen tutelar sí incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado, todo esto, sin que exista una razón objetiva que justifique la diferencia de trato entre ambos regímenes, que refieren a la misma materia, sea, a la contratación pública. Existe una situación idéntica y en el caso concreto se produce un trato normativo-legislativo discriminatorio desprovisto de toda justificación objetiva y razonable. Únicamente en el marco de la igualdad es posible la restricción, más no la anulación, de los derechos fundamentales. 10. Por su parte, el artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que dispone: “La medida cautelar será procedente cuando la ejecución o permanencia de la conducta sometida a proceso, produzca graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, de la situación aducida, y siempre que la pretensión no sea temeraria o, en forma palmaria, carente de seriedad.”, es inconstitucional, pues violenta frontalmente el contenido esencial como límite permisible del derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, condiciona (y termina impidiendo) el garantizar provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito, a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, de la situación aducida, sea, mediante el conocido expediente de la utilización de la discrecionalidad, que termina siendo ilimitada para el operador jurídico, a través de la interpretación de conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, siendo que, el otorgamiento de una medida cautelar no depende, exclusivamente, del libre y prudente arbitrio o discrecionalidad judicial, dado que, el derecho a la tutela cautelar, en cuanto incardinado en el contenido esencial del derecho más general a una justicia pronta y cumplida, comprende el derecho de pedir y obtener del órgano jurisdiccional las medidas cautelares necesarias, idóneas y pertinentes para garantizar la eficacia de la sentencia de mérito –función esencial de la tutela cautelar-, si se cumplen los presupuestos de ésta (apariencia de buen derecho -fumus boni iuris- y el peligro en la mora -periculum in mora). Correlativamente, el órgano jurisdiccional tiene la obligación de ordenar o emitir la medida provisoria si concurren los presupuestos para su adopción. Este derecho, al formar parte integral del núcleo esencial del derecho a una justicia pronta y cumplida, el legislador no puede negarlo, restringirlo o condicionarlo a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, de la situación aducida, debidos a la ejecución o permanencia de la conducta sometida a proceso, y el juez debe hacerlo efectivo cuando haya peligro para la efectividad de la sentencia, dado que, conforme con la jurisprudencia constitucional vinculante erga omnes (Sala Constitucional, Voto n.° 6224-2005 de las quince horas con dieciséis minutos del veinticinco de mayo de dos mil cinco), toda medida cautelar es procedente siempre que concurran los presupuestos de ésta, sea, apariencia de buen derecho fumus boni iuris- y el peligro en la demora -periculum in mora-. Correlativamente, el órgano jurisdiccional tiene la obligación de ordenar o emitir la medida provisoria si concurren los presupuestos para su adopción, pues la tutela cautelar es constitucionalmente obligatoria cuando puedan desaparecer, dañarse o perjudicarse, irremediablemente, las situaciones jurídicas sustanciales de las partes, llámense derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos, puesto que, el juzgador está llamado a protegerlos y repararlos (artículos 41 y 49 de la Constitución Política). 11. Tanto los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411-H (publicado en La Gaceta n.° 210 del 02-11-2006) y sus reformas, aplicables ultraactivamente en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), como también el “poder subsanador” desarrollado por la jurisprudencia administrativa de la CGR con fundamento en los mismos, son inconstitucionales, pues violentan el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes, al prevenirse, con fundamento en los mismos, subsanaciones de plicas a oferentes, que al final del procedimiento licitatorio, terminan resultando adjudicatarios, subsanación que se realiza siempre en contravención del principio positivizado de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, aspecto este último en donde radica la inclusión de la desventaja para el oferente que sí cumplió a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel, puesto que según el principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, en tanto los procedimientos de selección del contratista deben estar definidos a priori en forma precisa, cierta y concreta, la Administración no puede obviar las reglas predefinidas en la norma jurídica (cartel), que determina el marco de acción. Dicho de otra manera, no existe posibilidad que la subsanación, entratándose de requisitos de admisibilidad o de evaluación o calificación de las ofertas, no represente una ventaja indebida para los oferentes que si cumplieron a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel, pues aún y cuando se trate de “aspectos formales u hechos históricos inmodificables”, dado que, si el documento acreditativo del requisito que se previene subsanar no cumplía los parámetros del cartel, el requisito se debe tener por incumplido, sea, no hay alternativa. Indefectiblemente lo contrario, coloca al oferente prevenido por la Administración en la posibilidad de obtener una ventaja indebida, si corrige el requisito defectuoso, o aporta el requisito omitido con su oferta, de cara a los oferentes que si cumplieron a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel. Igualmente, los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, del Reglamento dicho y el “poder subsanador” afincado en los mismos, violentan el principio de jerarquía normativa conforme con el cual, las normas de la fuente inferior no pueden modificar ni sustituir a las de la fuente superior, lo que supone, una relación de subordinación. Es el caso de la Constitución frente a la ley y al resto de las normas del orden, y es también el caso de la ley frente al reglamento, que en caso de contradicción prevalece siempre y necesariamente la ley. El principio de igualdad de los oferentes, derivado del artículo 182 de la Constitución Política, no legitima cualquier desigualdad para autorizar un trato diferenciado, dada la exigencia de igualdad y no discriminación instituida por el derecho fundamental a la igualdad ante la ley según el numeral 33 de la Constitución Política y los artículos 1.1 y 24 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, razón por la que las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva. En este sentido, la diferenciación de trato (en la causa, sea, cumpliente/incumpliente) implicada por el inciso i) del artículo 81 ibidem, no es impuesta por una norma de rango legal; todo lo contrario, se “delegó” en la Administración Pública la clasificación y diferenciación de trato más allá de la aplicación de la normativa dispuesta por el artículo 42 inciso j) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, creando hipótesis normativas que sólo ella está llamada a determinar, regular y establecer, de manera que la disposición reglamentaria citada viola el derecho de igualdad ante la ley y el principio de reserva de ley. Por otra parte, la Contraloría General de la República, según lo indicó expresamente en la resolución número R-DCA-SICOP-00286-2023, asociada a la atención de las adicciones/aclaraciones del procedimiento número 2021LN-000023-0015700001, objeto de revisión en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), considera que: “…el principio de conservación de las ofertas (Sic…) da sustento a la figura de subsanación. Lo anterior, partiendo de que a partir del principio de eficiencia, no todo vicio en una oferta genera su exclusión…”, cuyo fundamento normativo lo brinda el artículo 4 párrafo cuarto de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494; no justificando tal precepto, la diferenciación de trato ínsita en la figura de la subsanación en valores de rango equivalente a la igualdad (legal / constitucional) pues no busca alcanzar una igualdad material (en general o implícitamente). Ergo, las disposiciones reglamentarias de interés, razonablemente no pueden alcanzar los fines que se pretenden constitucionalmente (igualdad de los oferentes sin inclusión de una desventaja para los demás participantes). El “poder subsanador” desarrollado reglamentariamente en los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81 del Reglamento dicho, se funda en supuestos de hecho sustantivamente diferentes. Es decir, la realidad no se pretende corregir; no justificándose de esta manera, la diferenciación. La diferenciación de trato creada reglamentariamente, beneficia por mucho, injusta e indebidamente a los oferentes incumplientes, provocando un trato discriminatorio respecto de los oferentes que cumplieron a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel. No existe proporcionalidad entre el fin legal (artículo 42 inciso j) Ley n.° 7494) y el que se persigue con la disposición reglamentaria, dado el trato diferenciado que esta última dispone o implica. No existe proporcionalidad entre el motivo (conservación de la oferta. Los defectos subsanables no descalificarán la oferta que los contenga) y el contenido (hipótesis reglamentarias de subsanación implican siempre la inclusión de desventaja respecto de los oferentes que cumplieron a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel) de la diferenciación de trato creada e implementada por la disposición reglamentaria. Es inidónea para alcanzar el fin que se pretende, de facilitar adoptar la decisión final en condiciones beneficiosas para el interés general, pues afincada ontológicamente en la filosofía del “pobrecito”, no fomenta el cumplimiento oportuno, o, promueve el incumplimiento y la mediocridad. La disposición reglamentaria es innecesaria por constituirse en un reglamento autónomo donde existe previsión de rango legal. Es simplemente útil o conveniente para la actividad desplegada por Contraloría General de la República como Jerarca Impropio en materia de contratación pública, pero correlativamente irrespetuoso de los derechos e intereses del particular oferente cumpliente. Luego, la diferenciación de trato que se examina, es contraria a la igualdad. La igualdad, además de criterio de interpretación y aplicación de los derechos fundamentales, es ella misma un derecho fundamental, de modo que también se viola éste cuando se discrimina respecto de derechos no fundamentales. 12. El artículo 190 párrafo sexto del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411-H (publicado en La Gaceta n.° 210 del 02-11-2006) y sus reformas, aplicable ultraactivamente en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), es inconstitucional, por cuanto es facultativo y no preceptivo para la Contraloría General de la República, previo al dictado de la resolución final, conceder a las partes una audiencia final de 3 días para que formulen conclusiones sobre el fondo del asunto, lo cual violenta el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, y causa indefensión por impedir el derecho al contradictorio o a contradecir a la contraparte recurrida y sus contrapruebas, dado lo gravoso para la parte que recurrió el acto de adjudicación, de los efectos negativos de la resolución final adversa a sus intereses. También se violenta el derecho humano a ser oído con las debidas garantías, establecido por el artículo 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. 13. El artículo 191 párrafo tercero o final del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411-H (publicado en La Gaceta n.° 210 del 02-11-2006) y sus reformas, aplicable ultraactivamente en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), es inconstitucional, por ser discrecional y no preceptivo para la Contraloría General de la República, siendo una puerta abierta para la arbitrariedad, emitir el fallo sin que para ello sea preciso que examine todas las articulaciones de las partes, lo cual violenta los principios del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, de legalidad y reserva de ley, por cuanto el régimen jurídico de los derechos fundamentales está reservado a la ley, puesto que, vía reglamento, se afecta en disminución, el núcleo duro, tanto del derecho fundamental al debido proceso y derecho de defensa como de los derechos humanos a ser oído con las debidas garantías, y al recurso, dispuestos respectivamente por los numerales 8.1 y 8.2.h) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. 14. La Corte IDH ha enfatizado que las garantías generales del artículo 8 deben estar presentes en la determinación de los derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter, “y, por ende, en ese tipo de materias el individuo tiene derecho también al debido proceso que se aplica en materia penal” (Corte IDH, Opinión Consultiva OC-11/90, párr. 28. Corte IDH. Caso Barbani Duarte y otros vs. Uruguay FRC. 2011, párr. 117.). En este sentido, cuando la CADH se refiere al derecho de toda persona a ser oída por un “juez o tribunal competente” para la “determinación de sus derechos”, esta expresión se refiere a cualquier autoridad pública, sea administrativa –colegiada o unipersonal-, legislativa o judicial, “que a través de sus resoluciones determine derechos y obligaciones de las personas”, es decir, que “[e]l artículo 8.1 de la CADH no se aplica solamente a jueces y tribunales judiciales”, sino también a los que pese a no serlo formalmente, actúen como tal (Corte IDH. Caso Claude Reyes y otros vs. Chile. FCR. 2006, párr., 118. Corte IDH. Caso Barbani Duarte y otros vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, párr. 118. Caso Nombre03 vs. Perú. EPFRC. 2015, párr. 208. Ver Corte IDH. Caso Barbani Duarte y otros vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011. Voto disidente del juez Eduardo Vio Grossi, y los votos concurrentes del juez Diego García Sayán, de la jueza Margarette May Macaulay y de la jueza Rhadys Abreu Blondet.). Asimismo, la Corte IDH ha afirmado que la exigencia de que una persona sea oída “es equiparable al derecho a un “juicio” o a “procedimientos judiciales” justos”. Sobre el particular, siguiendo al TEDH en los casos Nombre04 vs. Switzerland, Van de Hurk vs. Nethelands, Nombre05 vs.Germany, y, Nombre06 vs. Rusia, la Corte IDH ha establecido que un procedimiento justo supone que el órgano encargado de administrar justicia efectúe “un examen apropiado de las alegaciones, argumentos y pruebas aducidas por las partes, sin perjuicio de sus valoraciones acerca de si son relevantes para su decisión” (Corte IDH. Caso Barbani Duarte y otros vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, párr. 121. Corte IDH. Caso del Tribunal Constitucional (Camba Campos y otros) vs. Ecuador. EPFCR. 2013. Párr. 182.). En consecuencia, el estándar jurisprudencial supone que un juicio justo es aquel en el cual una persona ha sido oída con las debidas garantías. De acuerdo con la Corte IDH, el derecho a ser oído comprende entonces dos ámbitos, el formal y el material. El ámbito formal o procesal del derecho implica “asegurar el acceso al órgano competente para que determine el derecho que se reclama en apego a las debidas garantías procesales (tales como la presentación de alegatos y la aportación de prueba)”. Por su parte, el ámbito material del derecho, supone “que el Estado garantice que la decisión que se produzca a través del procedimiento satisfaga el fin para el cual fue concebido”. Para la Corte IDH, “[e]sto último no significa que siempre deba ser acogido sino que se debe garantizar su capacidad para producir el resultado para el que fue concebido” (Corte IDH. Caso Barbani Duarte y otros vs. Uruguay. FRC. 2011, párr. 122. Corte IDH. Caso Comunidad Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz y sus miembros vs. Honduras. FRC. 2015, párr. 237). Por otro lado, cabe resaltar que si bien la redacción de la CADH se refiere al derecho de “[t]oda persona inculpada de delito” y por ende sujeta a un enjuiciamiento penal en sus distintas etapas –investigación, acusación, juzgamiento y condena- (Corte IDH. Caso Nombre07 vs. Argentina. EPFRC. 2012, párr. 91.), conforme con la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH, las garantías mínimas establecidas en el numeral 2 del artículo 8 se aplican mutatis mutandis en lo que corresponda a otros órdenes distintos al penal, esto es, al civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter (Corte IDH. Caso de la “Panel Blanca” (Paniagua Morales y otros) vs. Guatemala. F. 1998, párr. 149. Corte IDH. Caso del Tribunal Constitucional vs. Perú. FCR. 2001. Párrs. 69-71. Corte IDH. Caso Nadege Dorzema y otros vs. República Dominicana. FCR. 2012. Párr. 157.). De acuerdo con la Corte IDH, obtener todas las garantías que permitan alcanzar decisiones justas es un derecho humano. Así, “[l]as garantías mínimas deben respetarse en el procedimiento administrativo y en cualquier otro procedimiento cuya decisión pueda afectar los derechos de las personas” (Corte IDH. Caso Baena Ricardo y otros vs. Panamá. FCR. 2001, párr. 127. Corte IDH. Caso Nombre08 vs. Guatemala. EPFRC. 2016, párr. 73.). El accionante indica como fundamentos de derecho lo siguiente: Se basa en los artículos 7, 10, 11, 18, 33, 39, 41, 49, 153 de la Constitución Política; en los artículos 1.1, 2.1, 8.1, 24 de la Convención Americana sobre los Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José; en la norma no escrita que es el Voto n.° 6224-2005 de las quince horas con dieciséis minutos del veinticinco de mayo del dos mil cinco, dictado por la Sala Constitucional; así como en los principios constitucionales de igualdad y no discriminación, tutela judicial efectiva pronta y cumplida, tutela cautelar, debido proceso, derecho de defensa, racionalidad, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, razonabilidad técnica y razonabilidad de los efectos sobre los derechos personales, legalidad, sin perjuicio de las disposiciones concordantes contenidas en los distintos textos de protección a los Derechos Fundamentales, los cuales estima violados por las siguientes razones. Con base en lo anterior, el accionante pretende que se declare la inconstitucionalidad: a) Del artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 y sus reformas, por cuanto i) excluye la reparación in natura, sea, la readjudicación, siendo, entonces ahora posible, esta individualmente peticionada, o, junto con la restitución por equivalente a través del pago en numerario de los daños y perjuicios, a elección del administrado, con independencia de si el contrato ha sido ejecutado o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, pudiéndose ahora revertir la situación al status quo anterior, como también ii) por disponer la negación del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, por violentar frontalmente el derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, por su medio ahora podría garantizarse provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), negación legal o legislativa del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, que también es discriminatorio, por ser contrario al principio de igualdad jurídica, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, refrendado por la Ley 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, régimen tutelar que si incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado, todo esto, sin que exista una razón objetiva que justifique la diferencia de trato entre ambos regímenes, que refieren a la misma materia, sea, a la contratación pública. b) Del artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, pues violenta frontalmente el contenido esencial como límite permisible del derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, condiciona (y termina impidiendo en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo) el garantizar provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito, a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales de la situación aducida, siendo que, el otorgamiento de una medida cautelar no depende, exclusivamente, del libre y prudente arbitrio o discrecionalidad judicial, dado que, el derecho a la tutela cautelar, en cuanto incardinado en el contenido esencial del derecho más general a una justicia pronta y cumplida, comprende el derecho de pedir y obtener del órgano jurisdiccional las medidas cautelares necesarias, idóneas y pertinentes para garantizar la eficacia de la sentencia de mérito –función esencial de la tutela cautelar-, si se cumplen los presupuestos de ésta (apariencia de buen derecho fumus boni iuris- y el peligro en la mora -periculum in mora). Este derecho a la tutela cautelar, al formar parte integral del núcleo esencial del derecho a una justicia efectiva, pronta y cumplida, el legislador no puede negarlo, restringirlo o condicionarlo a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, debidos a la ejecución o permanencia de la conducta sometida a proceso, y el juez debe hacerlo efectivo cuando haya peligro para la efectividad de la sentencia; y, c) Los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, el párrafo sexto del artículo 190 y el párrafo tercero in fine del artículo 191, todos del Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Admnistrativa n.° 7494, aplicables ultraactivamente en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), pues violentan el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes por cuanto las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva, el principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, el principio de legalidad, el de transparencia de los procedimientos, el principio de reserva de ley, el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, así como de los derechos humanos al recurso y a ser oído con las debidas garantías; todo lo anterior, por contravenir las normas, principios y valores plasmados por la Constitución Política y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, supracitados, restableciéndose la juridicidad propia del Estado de Derecho.

2.- El accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que indica como asunto base en expediente ordinario contencioso-administrativo y civil de hacienda n.° [Valor 001], donde el accionante es parte actora y son codemandados el Banco de Costa Rica, la Contraloría General de la República conjuntamente con el Estado y los particulares [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] y [Nombre02 003]; proceso jurisdiccional tramitado ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, donde actualmente pende de resolverse. Asimismo, aporta el libelo certificado de invocación de la inconstitucionalidad.

3.- Por oficio del 6 de diciembre de 2023 dirigido al Tribunal Procesal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, se solicitó la remisión a esta Sala -a la mayor brevedad-, de la totalidad del expediente judicial que se tramita con el número [Valor 001]. Esta solicitud fue reiterada por correo electrónico del 19 de diciembre de 2023.

4.- El 19 de diciembre de 2023 se recibió el expediente digital n.° [Valor 001].

5.- El artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional faculta a la Sala a rechazar de plano o por el fondo, en cualquier momento, incluso desde su presentación, cualquier gestión que se presente a su conocimiento que resulte ser manifiestamente improcedente, o cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes para rechazarla, o que se trata de la simple reiteración o reproducción de una gestión anterior igual o similar rechazada.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- REQUISITOS Y FORMALIDADES DE LA ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD. Esta Sala ha señalado, de forma reiterada, que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que, si no se reúnen, imposibilitan pronunciarse sobre el fondo del asunto. En el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional se establecen los presupuestos de admisibilidad para las acciones de inconstitucionalidad y se regulan situaciones distintas. En el párrafo primero se exige la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, sea en sede judicial –incluyendo los recursos de hábeas corpus o de amparo– o en la administrativa –en el procedimiento de agotamiento de esta vía, sea, en el procedimiento administrativo de impugnación contra el acto final–, en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad de la norma cuestionada, como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado en el asunto principal. En los párrafos segundo y tercero se regula la acción directa –no se requiere del asunto base–, en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando por la naturaleza del asunto no exista lesión individual y directa; b) se trate de la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto y c) cuando la acción sea promovida por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. En cuanto a la exigencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver, esta Sala, mediante sentencia n.° 04190-95 de las 11:33 horas del 28 de julio de 1995, señaló lo siguiente:

“(…) En primer término, se trata de un proceso de naturaleza incidental, y no de una acción directa o popular, con lo que se quiere decir que se requiere de la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver -sea ante los tribunales de justicia o en el procedimiento para agotar la vía administrativa- para poder acceder a la vía constitucional, pero de tal manera que, la acción constituya un medio razonable para amparar el derecho considerado lesionado en el asunto principal, de manera que lo resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional repercuta positiva o negativamente en dicho proceso pendiente de resolver, por cuanto se manifiesta sobre la constitucionalidad de las normas que deberán ser aplicadas en dicho asunto; y únicamente por excepción es que la legislación permite el acceso directo a esta vía -presupuestos de los párrafos segundo y tercero del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional (…)”.

Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser cumplidas, a saber: el escrito de interposición debe estar autenticado y contener una determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de los componentes del bloque de constitucionalidad que se consideren infringidos (artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). Debe, además, acreditarse las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), procederse al pago del timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica (artículo 4 de la Ley n.° 3245 del 3 de diciembre de 1963) y aportarse certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas en el asunto base (artículo 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional).

II.- LEGITIMACIÓN. En el caso concreto, el accionante fundamenta su legitimación en el artículo 75, párrafo primero, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, toda vez que es parte actora en el proceso de conocimiento contencioso administrativo n.° [Valor 001], contra la Contraloría General de la República, el Estado, el Banco de Costa Rica, [Nombre02 001], [Nombre02 002] y [Nombre02 003]. El mencionado proceso judicial se encuentra en trámite ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, autoridad que tuvo por establecido el proceso por resolución de las 13:40 horas del 1° de noviembre de 2023, se otorgó el plazo de treinta días hábiles para contestar la demanda y se previno al actor aportar las copias de ley. Posteriormente, por resolución de las 08:45 horas del 17 de noviembre de 2023 se tuvo por cumplida la prevención y se dispuso notificar el auto de traslado. Asimismo, el accionante aportó libelo certificado de invocación de la inconstitucionalidad de las normas aquí impugnadas dentro de dicho proceso base.

III.- OBJETO DE LA ACCIÓN. El accionante impugna las siguientes normas:

• 1)Artículo 81, incisos b) e i), del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, que dispone literalmente lo siguiente:

“Artículo 81.-Aspectos subsanables. Serán subsanables, entre otros elementos, los siguientes:

• a)(…)
• b)Certificaciones sobre cualidades, características o especificaciones del bien ofrecido, siempre y cuando tales circunstancias existieran al momento de la presentación de la oferta y así lo acredite el interesado.

(Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1° del decreto ejecutivo N° 41243 del 10 de julio del 2018) c) (…)

• d)(…)
• e)(…)
• f)(…)
• g)(…)
• h)(…)
• i)Los documentos necesarios para probar la veracidad de hechos acaecidos antes de la apertura de ofertas.

(Así reformado el inciso anterior por el artículo 1° del decreto ejecutivo N° 41243 del 10 de julio del 2018) j) (…)”.

• 2)Artículo 190, párrafo sexto, del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, que dispone literalmente lo siguiente:

“Artículo 190.-Trámite de procedencia del recurso. El auto inicial que admite a trámite el recurso, deberá adoptarse a más tardar al décimo día hábil después de vencido el plazo para apelar. En este mismo plazo deberá manifestarse sobre la acumulación de los recursos de revocatoria, cuando así proceda. De no dictarse este auto en el plazo indicado, la Contraloría General de la República deberá establecer la responsabilidad disciplinaria que corresponda al funcionario encargado.

En este auto, cuando se trate de licitaciones públicas, se conferirá a la Administración y a la parte adjudicada, un plazo de diez días hábiles para que se manifiesten sobre los alegatos del apelante y aporte las pruebas respectivas. En el caso de licitaciones abreviadas o de concursos promovidos de conformidad con el párrafo segundo del artículo 1° de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, este emplazamiento será por cinco días hábiles.

Cuando al contestar la audiencia inicial, las partes argumenten en contra de la oferta del apelante, se concederá una audiencia especial por cinco días hábiles en el caso de la licitación pública y tres días hábiles para la licitación abreviada para que el recurrente se refiera exclusivamente a lo alegado.

La Contraloría General de la República deberá manifestarse expresamente, antes de la resolución final, sobre las solicitudes de prueba de las partes, cuando lo hubiere, admitiéndolas o denegándolas, mediante resolución motivada. Igualmente, adoptará las providencias probatorias que sean necesarias para la correcta tramitación de la apelación. Todas las dependencias administrativas se encuentran obligadas a prestar su colaboración gratuita en la aportación de la prueba pericial solicitada de oficio por la Contraloría General.

En casos muy calificados la Contraloría General de la República podrá conferir nuevas audiencias a efecto de aclarar aspectos para la debida resolución del recurso.

De previo al dictado de la resolución final, la Contraloría General de la República facultativamente concederá a las partes una audiencia final otorgándoles un plazo de tres días hábiles para que formulen conclusiones sobre el fondo del asunto, sin que sea admisible la argumentación de hechos nuevos no debatidos en el recurso. Cuando lo considere conveniente, la audiencia final podrá ser oral. Para ello, se convocará a las partes con al menos tres días hábiles de anticipación para que expongan sus conclusiones y se colocará, además, el aviso de la fecha y hora de la audiencia en un lugar accesible al público. De lo actuado se levantará un acta que contendrá, al menos, del Nombre02 de las partes y resumen de lo actuado, la cual se incorporará al expediente.

En los casos, que la Contraloría General de la República así lo considere oportuno, podrá realizarse una audiencia pública de exposición de alegatos, evacuación de pruebas y conclusiones, según las reglas que se dispongan en el auto de audiencia inicial. Esta audiencia deberá llevarse a cabo una vez evacuadas todas las audiencias escritas que correspondan y deberán convocarse con al menos tres días hábiles de anticipación.

(Así adicionado el párrafo anterior por el artículo 2° del decreto ejecutivo N° 35218 del 30 de abril de 2009) En caso de que se hubiese tramitado una audiencia oral de cualquier naturaleza, la resolución final podrá ser dictada de manera oral, ya sea de seguido a la finalización de la audiencia, o en un plazo no mayor a tres días hábiles posteriores a su realización. Esa resolución será motivada y bastará que se grabe por algún medio idóneo cuyo registro se incorporará al expediente de apelación.

(Así adicionado el párrafo anterior por el artículo 2° del decreto ejecutivo N° 35218 del 30 de abril de 2009) (Corrida su numeración por el artículo 2° del decreto ejecutivo N° 40124 del 10 de octubre del 2016, que lo traspasó del antiguo 182 al 190)” (El subrayado no corresponde al original).

• 3)Artículo 191, párrafo tercero in fine, del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, que dispone literalmente lo siguiente:

“Artículo 191.-Resolución. En las licitaciones públicas, la resolución final deberá ser adoptada dentro de los cuarenta días hábiles siguientes al auto inicial. Este plazo podrá ampliarse por veinte días hábiles más, mediante resolución motivada, cuando para resolver el recurso sea necesario recabar prueba para mejor resolver o que por su complejidad no pueda ser resuelto dentro del plazo normal de resolución.

En las licitaciones abreviadas o los concursos promovidos de conformidad con el párrafo segundo del artículo 1° de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa, la resolución final deberá rendirse a más tardar treinta días hábiles siguientes al auto inicial. Este plazo podrá ampliarse por diez días hábiles más, mediante resolución motivada bajo los mismos supuestos indicados para la licitación pública.

La Contraloría General de la República emitirá su fallo confirmando o anulando, total o parcialmente, sin que para ello sea preciso que examine todas las articulaciones de las partes cuando una sola o varias de éstas sean decisivas para dictarlo.

(Corrida su numeración por el artículo 2° del decreto ejecutivo N° 40124 del 10 de octubre del 2016, que lo traspasó del antiguo 183 al 191)”. (El subrayado no corresponde al original).

• 4)Artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, el cual dispone literalmente lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 90.- Agotamiento de la vía administrativa. La resolución final o el auto que ponga término al recurso dará por agotada la vía administrativa. Dentro de los tres días posteriores a la comunicación, el interesado podrá impugnar el acto final, sin efectos suspensivos, ante el Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, por medio del proceso especial regulado en los artículos 89 y 90 de la Ley reguladora de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Si la contratación cuya adjudicación se impugna ha sido ejecutada o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, la sentencia favorable al accionante solo podrá reconocer el pago de los daños y perjuicios causados”.

• 5)Artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, que dispone literalmente lo siguiente:

“ARTÍCULO 21.- La medida cautelar será procedente cuando la ejecución o permanencia de la conducta sometida a proceso, produzca graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales, de la situación aducida, y siempre que la pretensión no sea temeraria o, en forma palmaria, carente de seriedad”.

IV.- AGRAVIOS. En síntesis, el accionante alega los siguientes agravios de inconstitucionalidad:

• a)Artículo 81, incisos b) e i), del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: En general el actor alega que este artículo (al igual que el 190, párrafo sexto, y 191, párrafo tercero in fine, todos del Reglamento n.° 33411) violenta el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes, por cuanto las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva. Asimismo, estima que es contrario al principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, el principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, el principio de reserva de ley, el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, así como a los derechos humanos al recurso y a ser oído con las debidas garantías.
• b)Artículo 190, párrafo sexto, del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: el actor considera que este violenta el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes, por cuanto las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva. Asimismo, estima que es contrario al principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, el principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, el principio de reserva de ley, el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, así como a los derechos humanos al recurso y a ser oído con las debidas garantías.
• c)Artículo 191, párrafo tercero in fine, del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: el actor considera que este violenta el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes, por cuanto las distinciones y diferenciaciones de trato son materia odiosa y de interpretación restrictiva. Asimismo, estima que es contrario al principio de jerarquía normativa, el principio de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, el principio de legalidad o transparencia de los procedimientos, el principio de reserva de ley, el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, así como a los derechos humanos al recurso y a ser oído con las debidas garantías.
• d)Artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494: El accionante estima que este artículo es inconstitucional por tres motivos, a saber: i. por cuanto excluye la reparación in natura, sea, la readjudicación, dado que únicamente es posible la restitución por equivalente a través del pago en numerario de los daños y perjuicios, ya que, si el contrato ha sido ejecutado o se encuentra en curso de ejecución no se podrá revertir la situación al status quo anterior; ii. igualmente, alega el actor que la negación del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación del procedimiento licitatorio número 2021LN-000023-0015700001, en la causa contencioso administrativa y civil de hacienda número [Valor 001], violenta frontalmente el derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, por su medio puede garantizarse provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito; y, iii. finalmente, el accionante considera que el precepto indicado, es inconstitucional, puesto que la negación legal o legislativa del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, también es discriminatorio, lo anterior, por ser contrario al principio de igualdad jurídica, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, refrendado por la Ley 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, régimen tutelar que sí incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado, todo esto, sin que exista una razón objetiva que justifique la diferencia de trato entre ambos regímenes, que refieren a la misma materia, sea, a la contratación pública.
• e)Artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo: el actor considera que este artículo violenta frontalmente el contenido esencial como límite permisible del derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, puesto que, condiciona (y termina impidiendo) el garantizar provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito, a la existencia o producción de graves daños o perjuicios, actuales o potenciales de la situación aducida.

V.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN EN CUANTO AL ARTÍCULO 81, INCISOS B) E I), DEL DEROGADO REGLAMENTO N.° 33411 A LA LEY DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA N.° 7494. En cuanto a los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411 (publicado en La Gaceta n.° 210 del 02 de noviembre de 2006) y sus reformas, el actor alega el siguiente motivo de inconstitucionalidad:

“(…) violentan el principio de igualdad de los oferentes, incluyendo una desventaja para los demás participantes, al prevenirse, con fundamento en los mismos, subsanaciones de plicas a oferentes, que al final del procedimiento licitatorio, terminan resultando adjudicatarios, subsanación que se realiza siempre en contravención del principio positivizado de inderogabilidad singular de los reglamentos, aspecto este último en donde radica la inclusión de la desventaja para el oferente que sí cumplió a cabalidad con lo requerido por el cartel (…)” “(…) Igualmente, los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81, del Reglamento dicho y el “poder subsanador” afincado en los mismos, violentan el principio de jerarquía normativa (…) En este sentido, la diferenciación de trato (en la causa, sea, cumpliente / incumpliente) implicada por el inciso i) del artículo 81 ibidem, no es impuesta por una norma de rango legal; todo lo contrario, se “delegó” en la Administración Pública la clasificación y diferenciación de trato más allá de la aplicación de la normativa dispuesta por el artículo 42 inciso j) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa N° 7494, de manera que la disposición reglamentaria citada viola el derecho de igualdad ante la ley y el principio de reserva de ley”.

En cuanto al primer alegato, sea la supuesta violación al principio de igualdad, la Sala en reiterada jurisprudencia ha señalado que cuando la parte accionante alega la vulneración al principio de igualdad, está en el deber de aportar el parámetro de comparación entre los sujetos tratados en forma diferente, a fin de aportar elementos de juicio suficientes que permita a este Tribunal cotejar su se produce la alegada desigualdad. Esto, en doctrina, se conoce como el “tertium comparationis” (punto de referencia, de comparación), y sobre él, en sentencia n.° 7261-94 de las 08:30 horas del 9 de diciembre de 1994, se dijo:

“En lo que respecta al principio de igualdad, como reiteradamente lo ha sostenido esta Sala, el presupuesto fáctico más importante es que exista un trato discriminatorio desprovisto de toda justificación objetiva y razonable; esta es la razón por la que quien invoca la violación de este principio, debe suministrar, a los efectos de que se pueda hacer una confrontación plena, parámetros de comparación y de esta forma, cotejar si se produce o no la desigualdad (véanse entre otras y a manera de ejemplo, las Sentencias Nos. 196-91 en el considerando II; 1432-91, en el considerando II y 1732-91)”. (El resaltado y subrayado no es del original).

Ahora bien, en el caso concreto, el accionante alega que la norma objeto de esta acción, al permitir la subsanación de defectos, pone en desventaja a los participantes que sí cumplieron a cabalidad con lo requerido. No obstante, a partir de la lectura de la norma no se desprende que esto sea así, pues esta no hace diferenciación alguna entre los oferentes, de modo que cualquiera puede beneficiarse de la subsanación de los requisitos omitidos. Esto, sumado a que el accionante no aportó ningún elemento o parámetro de comparación que permita evidenciar un trato discriminatorio desprovisto de justificación objetiva y razonable.

VI.- De otra parte, en cuanto a la alegada violación al principio de jerarquía normativa o reserva de Ley, toda vez que, en criterio del actor, la norma reglamentaria supera lo dispuesto en el artículo 42 inciso j) de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, este alegato también deviene en inadmisible, dado que el conflicto que plantea es de legalidad ordinaria, que no es susceptible de ser conocido a través de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, sino que debe ser planteado ante la propia administración o en la vía ordinaria. La aparente confrontación entre la norma legal y el reglamento en cuestión, supone un conflicto de legalidad. En reiteradas ocasiones (véanse las sentencias n.° 2000-01149 de las 15:39 horas del 2 de febrero de 2000 y la 2021-11972 de las 9:30 horas del 26 de mayo de 2021, entre otras) esta Sala ha sostenido que, determinar si una norma reglamentaria como la impugnada, transgrede o excede lo dispuesto en una ley, es un tema de legalidad cuya discusión no corresponde a esta jurisdicción. El artículo 49 de la Carta Fundamental asigna el control de la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa, no a la constitucional. Si esta Sala pretendiera fiscalizar por medio de la acción de inconstitucionalidad las distintas posibles hipótesis de infracción al principio de legalidad que pueden darse en los despachos administrativos, en la práctica suplantaría -a contrapelo del texto constitucional- a los tribunales de esa materia. En consecuencia, si la parte accionante considera que la normativa impugnada es ilegal o ha sido aplicada en forma errónea, puede acudir ante la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa en defensa de sus derechos. En este orden de consideraciones, la acción es inadmisible en cuanto a los incisos b) e i) del artículo 81 del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411.

VII.- SOBRE EL ARTÍCULO 190 PÁRRAFO SEXTO DEL REGLAMENTO A LA LEY DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA N.° 33411. El accionante estima que el artículo 190 párrafo sexto del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411 (publicado en La Gaceta n.° 210 del 02 de noviembre de 2006) y sus reformas, es inconstitucional, por cuanto es facultativo y no preceptivo para la Contraloría General de la República, previo al dictado de la resolución final, conceder a las partes una audiencia final de 3 días para que formulen conclusiones sobre el fondo del asunto, lo cual violenta el principio del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, y causa indefensión por impedir el derecho al contradictorio o a contradecir a la contraparte recurrida y sus contrapruebas. También, en criterio de actor, se violenta el derecho humano a ser oído con las debidas garantías, establecido por el artículo 8.1 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos.

Al respecto, la Sala en reiteradas ocasiones ha identificado los elementos esenciales del debido proceso en materia administrativa; por ejemplo, en la sentencia n.° 11860-2014 de las 15:05 horas del 22 de julio de 2014 se dispuso lo siguiente:

“(…) III.- Sobre el fondo. En esta sede se ha desarrollado en múltiples ocasiones los alcances y matices del derecho consagrado en los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política. Particularmente ilustrativa es la argumentación de la sentencia #15-90 de las 16:45 horas de 5 de enero de 1990:

“... el derecho de defensa garantizado por el artículo 39 de la Constitución Política y por consiguiente el principio del debido proceso, contenido en el artículo 41 de nuestra Carta Fundamental, o como suele llamársele en doctrina, principio de 'bilateralidad de la audiencia' del 'debido proceso legal' o 'principio de contradicción' (...) se ha sintetizado así: a) Notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento; b) derecho de ser oído, y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; ch) derecho del administrado de hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas; d) notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde y e) derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada." "... el derecho de defensa resguardado en el artículo 39 ibídem, no sólo rige para los procedimientos jurisdiccionales, sino también para cualquier procedimiento administrativo llevado a cabo por la administración pública; y que necesariamente debe dársele al accionante si a bien lo tiene, el derecho de ser asistido por un abogado, con el fin de que ejercite su defensa...´ Y también se ha indicado lo siguiente:

“Esta Sala ha señalado los elementos del derecho al debido proceso legal, (ver especialmente la opinión consultiva nº1739-92), aplicables a cualquier procedimiento sancionatorio o que pueda tener por resultado la pérdida de derechos subjetivos. La Administración debe, en atención al derecho de defensa del administrado: a) Hacer traslado de cargos al afectado, lo cual implica comunicar en forma individualizada, concreta y oportuna, los hechos que se imputan; b) Permitirle el acceso irrestricto al expediente administrativo; c) Concederle un plazo razonable para la preparación de su defensa; d) Concederle la audiencia y permitirle aportar toda prueba que considere oportuna para respaldar su defensa; e) Fundamentar las resoluciones que pongan fin al procedimiento; f) Reconocer su derecho a recurrir contra la resolución sancionatoria.´(sentencia #5469-95 de las 18:03 horas del 4 de octubre de 1995).

Lo anterior no debe entenderse, sin embargo, en el sentido que toda violación que surja en el trámite de un procedimiento administrativo es amparable en esta Jurisdicción, pues solamente son tutelables en esta vía aquellas vulneraciones sustanciales que colocan en indefensión a la parte afectada, según se detalló en la sentencia #2001-10198 de las 10:29 horas de 10 de octubre de 2001 (…)”. (El destacado no corresponden al original).

Ahora bien, en cuanto a la omisión de la Contraloría General de la República en otorgar a una parte la audiencia final de carácter conclusiva, en la sentencia n.° 2000-04142 de las 16:05 horas del 16 de mayo de 2000, la Sala se pronunció en el siguiente sentido:

“(…) Como ha quedado acreditado, la inconformidad planteada por el recurrente en el sentido de que no le fue notificado el auto que confería audiencia final en el proceso de apelación seguido ante la Contraloría General de la República, no violenta su oportunidad de recurrir la decisión de la Administración en cuanto a la licitación en que participó como oferente, pues, como bien señala la Contraloría en su informe, esta oportunidad se ejerce con toda amplitud al momento de plantear el recurso. La audiencia final es una etapa meramente conclusiva, en la que no pueden invocarse nuevos argumentos o elementos probatorios que tengan la virtud de variar la decisión final que pudiera adoptarse con base en los términos en que inicialmente fue planteado el recurso, y en este sentido, no puede decirse que se haya producido una lesión a su derecho de defensa y a debido proceso. Igualmente, por esa razón la actuación cuestionada no entraña un trato discriminatorio en cuanto al derecho de recurrir el acto de adjudicación, que es la finalidad del recurso previsto por el ordenamiento en materia de contratación administrativa. En consecuencia, la omisión en que incurrió la Contraloría en orden a la notificación de la audiencia final, si se apartó de las disposiciones del Reglamento General de Contratación Administrativa, ciertamente podría perfilarse como una infracción al principio de legalidad. Sin embargo, este Tribunal se ha pronunciado en forma reiterada en el sentido de que en la vía de amparo esta infracción se puede tutelar únicamente cuando a su vez implique la violación a algún otro derecho o garantía fundamental”. (El destacado no corresponde al original).

Con base en lo anterior, observa esta Sala que la supuesta lesión al debido proceso alegada por el actor carece de fundamento, pues la facultad de la Contraloría General de la República de conceder a las partes una audiencia final para emitir sus conclusiones no resulta lesiva de ningún elemento esencial del debido proceso administrativo que deje en indefensión a las partes, por lo que carece de relevancia constitucional. Por esto, procede rechazar por el fondo la acción en cuanto a este aspecto.

VIII.- INADMISIBILIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN EN CUANTO AL ARTÍCULO 191, PÁRRAFO TERCERO IN FINE, DEL DEROGADO REGLAMENTO N.° 33411 A LA LEY DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA N.° 7494.- Esta acción carece de fundamentación en cuanto al motivo de inconstitucionalidad referente al artículo 191, párrafo tercero in fine, del derogado Reglamento n.° 33411 a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494. Esto, toda vez que el accionante se limitó a manifestar lo siguiente:

“El artículo 191 párrafo tercero o final del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa Nº 33411-H (publicado en La Gaceta Nº 210 del 02-11-2006) y sus reformas, aplicable ultraactivamente en la causa [Valor 001] (asunto previo), es inconstitucional, por ser discrecional y no preceptivo para la Contraloría General de la República, siendo una puerta abierta para la arbitrariedad, emitir el fallo sin que para ello sea preciso que examine todas las articulaciones de las partes, lo cual violenta los principios del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, de legalidad y reserva de ley, por cuanto el régimen jurídico de los derechos fundamentales está reservado a la ley, puesto que, vía reglamento, se afecta en disminución, el núcleo duro, tanto del derecho fundamental al debido proceso y derecho de defensa como de los derechos humanos a ser oído con las debidas garantías, y al recurso, dispuestos respectivamente por los numerales 8.1 y 8.2.h) de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos”.

A partir de los argumentos expuestos por el actor, no se logra desprender con claridad el motivo por el cual estima que el artículo 191, párrafo final, del Reglamento n.° 33411, es inconstitucional, pues se limita a mencionar la vulneración a los principios del debido proceso y el derecho de defensa, sin desarrollar su contenido a fin de contraponerlo a la norma en cuestión. Tal como se indicó en el considerando anterior, esta Sala únicamente interviene ante violaciones a los elementos esenciales del debido proceso, por lo que es requerido que la parte actora desarrolle de manera clara y precisa, de qué forma, la norma cuestionada impide ejercer su derecho de defensa, lo cual no argumentó en el escrito de interposición. Por lo anterior, procede rechazar de plano esta acción en cuanto al artículo 191, párrafo final, del Reglamento n.° 33411.

IX.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN EN CUANTO AL ARTÍCULO 90 DE LA DEROGADA LEY DE CONTRATACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA N.° 7494. Respecto al artículo 90 de la Ley n.° 7494, el primer alegato del actor es que esa norma es inconstitucional “por cuanto tal precepto excluye el derecho fundamental la reparación in natura, sea, la readjudicación, siendo, entonces posible en el estado actual del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, únicamente la restitución por equivalente a través del pago en numerario de los daños y perjuicios, dado que, si el contrato ha sido ejecutado o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, como acaece en el presente caso, no se podrá revertir la situación al status quo anterior”. A lo largo del escrito de interposición, el accionante se limita a plantear este argumento sin indicar, concretamente, cuál es el derecho fundamental o principio del Derecho de la Constitución que estima lesionado. En cuanto a la imposibilidad de suspensión de la ejecución de la adjudicación, lo cierto es que esta Sala en reiteradas ocasiones ha señalado que la ejecutividad y ejecutoriedad de los actos administrativos es un Principio General del Derecho Administrativo, recogido en los artículos 146 y 148 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que resulta conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución y los principios y valores que lo informan (en este sentido, véanse las sentencias números 2002-000928 de las 09:47 horas, del 01 de febrero de 2002, 2014-004307 de las 09:15 horas del 28 de marzo de 2014 y 2015-004019 de las 09:05 horas del 20 de marzo de 2015, entre muchas otras). En consecuencia, este argumento del accionante debe ser rechazado de plano.

X.En cuanto a su segundo alegato, sea que el artículo 90 de la Ley n.° 7494 viola el derecho a la tutela cautelar, en la acción de inconstitucionalidad n.° 23-005726-0007-CO, interpuesta por el aquí accionante contra el artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494, esta Sala resolvió por sentencia n.° 2023-012773 de las 09:20 horas del 31 de mayo de 2023 lo siguiente:

“II.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBLIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN. En el caso concreto, el accionante impugna el artículo 90 de la derogada Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 7494 del 2 de mayo de 1995, que indica lo siguiente:

“ARTICULO 90.- Agotamiento de la vía administrativa. La resolución final o el auto que ponga término al recurso dará por agotada la vía administrativa. Dentro de los tres días posteriores a la comunicación, el interesado podrá impugnar el acto final, sin efectos suspensivos, ante el Tribunal Superior Contencioso-Administrativo, por medio del proceso especial regulado en los artículos 89 y 90 de la Ley reguladora de la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa. Si la contratación cuya adjudicación se impugna ha sido ejecutada o se encuentra en curso de ejecución, la sentencia favorable al accionante solo podrá reconocer el pago de los daños y perjuicios causados.” El gestionante alega que la norma precitada es inconstitucional porque, en su criterio, la negación del efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación del procedimiento licitatorio viola el derecho a la tutela cautelar. Asimismo, el accionante considera que la norma impugnada viola el principio de igualdad, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, cuyo régimen tutelar sí incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de este. Al efecto, el accionante indica como asunto previo pendiente de resolución, el proceso contencioso administrativo n.° 22-005575-1027-CA, donde interpuso un recurso de apelación contra el rechazo de la variación de circunstancias de hecho que dieron motivo al denegatoria de medida cautelar urgente solicitada por el actor. Asimismo, acredita que invocó la inconstitucionalidad de la norma impugnada dentro de dicho proceso judicial.

No obstante, pese a las alegaciones del accionante, este asunto resulta inadmisible, toda vez que, el asunto que el accionante indica como pendiente ante el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial del Poder Judicial, cuenta con dos legajos de medida cautelar que fueron resueltos de manera definitiva y se encuentran archivados, mientras que no logró acreditar que existe la conexidad necesaria entre esta acción y el expediente principal contencioso administrativo, pues únicamente fundamentó su reclamo de inconstitucionalidad en relación con la protección de su derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar. Así, a partir del estudio de la copia certificada del expediente n.° 22-005575-1027-CA, interpuesto por Nombre01 en contra del Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal, constituido por el proceso de conocimiento principal y dos legajos de medida cautelar, se logró acreditar que el accionante interpuso una “solicitud de medida cautelar urgente y provisionalísima” mediante escrito fechado 17 de octubre de 2022, de modo que, la medida cautelar provisionalísima fue rechazada por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo dentro del primer legajo de medida cautelar, mediante resolución de las 11:40 horas del 19 de octubre de 2022. Posteriormente, por voto n.° 1906-2022-T de las 15:25 horas del 15 de noviembre de 2022 se declaró sin lugar la solicitud de medida cautelar. Dicha resolución fue impugnada y el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, por sentencia n.° 470-2022-II de las 11:06 horas del 20 de diciembre de 2022 confirmó la resolución recurrida. Del mismo modo, en el segundo legajo de medida cautelar, se tiene que el actor planteó nuevamente una solicitud de medida cautelar urgente por oficio fechado 20 de enero de 2023, la cual se entendió como presentada bajo los parámetros del inciso 2) del artículo 29 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. En este asunto el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo resolvió rechazar la solicitud de cambio de circunstancias para otorgamiento de la medida cautelar, por resolución de las 16:01 horas del 8 de febrero de 2023. Seguidamente, el Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda dictó el voto n.° 120-2023-I de las 10:57 horas del 21 de marzo de 2023, donde confirmó la resolución de las 16:01 horas del 8 de febrero de 2023. Finalmente, se tiene que el proceso de conocimiento se encuentra en trámite y dentro de este el accionante interpuso un escrito donde nuevamente “se solicita medida cautelar provisionalísima de manera inmediata y prima facie e invocación de inconstitucionalidad” fechado el 6 de marzo de 2023, respecto del cual el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, mediante resolución de las 11:58 horas del 31 de marzo de 2023 resolvió lo siguiente: “Visto el escrito incorporado en fecha 06/03/2023 por la parte actora en el cual se presenta solicitud de medida cautelar provisionalísima, del estudio del mismo se observa que se trata de una solicitud de medida cautelar reiterativa, por lo que se rechaza de plano el mismo y se le remite a la parte actora a lo ya resuelto en los legajos correspondientes de las solicitudes de medidas cautelares (…)”. En consecuencia, esta acción no constituye un medio razonable para amparar el derecho a la tutela cautelar alegado por el accionante dentro del asunto base en cuestión, por lo que procede rechazar de plano esta acción, como en efecto se dispone”.

En similar sentido al precitado antecedente, este aspecto de la acción debe ser rechazado por falta de conexidad, toda vez que, en el asunto base, sea el expediente n.° [Valor 001], no consta que exista trámite alguno referido a la medida cautelar de suspensión del acto, pues, por el contrario, en el escrito inicial de demanda contenciosa-administrativa la parte actora indicó lo siguiente:

“I) Sobre la no solicitud de medida cautelar junto con la demanda por impedimento legal: El artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa Nº 7494 y sus reformas, aplicable ultraactivamente en la presente causa, arriba transcrito, excluye y/o niega el efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, razón por la cual, en este momento, me es imposible ejercer mi derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar, integrante del derecho fundamental a tutela judicial efectiva, pronta y cumplida, no pudiéndose garantizar provisionalmente la efectividad de la sentencia definitiva o de mérito por tal motivo, hasta tanto la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia curse la acción de inconstitucionalidad que intempondré contra dicha disposición normativa, entre otras, una vez que, en vía contencioso administrativa, se le de curso al presente proceso de conocimiento”.

Es decir, el accionante no solicitó medida cautelar alguna en el proceso judicial contencioso administrativo que sirve de base a esta acción, por lo que, carece de interés el pronunciamiento que haga esta Sala sobre la alegada violación al derecho a la tutela cautelar, pues lo resuelto no tendría ningún efecto dentro del expediente n.° [Valor 001]. Al respecto, en forma reiterada esta Sala ha señalado que, cuando la legitimación en una acción de inconstitucionalidad deriva del artículo 75, párrafo 1°, de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, es decir, de la existencia de un asunto previo pendiente de resolución, es preciso analizar si lo que se resuelva en la acción tendrá influencia directa y decisiva en el asunto principal. Esta Sala, en el voto n.° 3040-97, indicó que entre el juicio base y la acción de inconstitucionalidad “debe existir una conexidad tal, que la primera de ser acogida, incida en forma directa en el juicio base, como un remedio procesal más a favor de los derechos de la parte”, requerimiento que no se logra constatar en este asunto en cuestión, por lo que procede rechazarlo de plano en cuanto a este aspecto.

XI.- Finalmente, respecto a su tercer alegato, sea que el artículo 90 de la Ley n.° 7494 lesiona el derecho a la igualdad, pues en palabras del accionante:

“(…) el artículo 90 de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa Nº 7494 y sus reformas, también es inconstitucional por discriminatorio, lo anterior, por ser contrario al principio de igualdad jurídica, respecto del régimen tutelar en materia de contratación pública, regulado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio con República Dominicana, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, refrendado por la Ley 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, por cuanto en su capítulo noveno, relativo a la "contratación pública", el artículo 9.15.2 -aplicable a las mercancías, servicios y entes públicos que cubre el acuerdo comercial- dispone que "Cada Parte estipulará que la autoridad establecida o designada en el párrafo 1 administrativa o judicial imparcial e independiente que debe conocer de las impugnación de los proveedores- podrá tomar medidas precautorias oportunas, mientras se encuentre pendiente la resolución de una impugnación, para preservar la oportunidad de corregir un potencial incumplimiento del presente Capítulo, incluyendo la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado"; régimen tutelar, donde si es factible acceder al efecto suspensivo de la impugnación jurisdiccional del acto de adjudicación, por cuanto, dicho régimen tutelar si incluye la suspensión de la adjudicación de un contrato o la ejecución de un contrato que ya ha sido adjudicado, todo esto, sin que exista una razón objetiva que justifique la diferencia de trato entre ambos regímenes, que refieren a la misma materia, sea, a la contratación pública. Existe una situación idéntica y en el caso concreto se produce un trato normativo-legislativo discriminatorio desprovisto de toda justificación objetiva y razonable. (…)”.

Tal y como se indicó en el considerando V de esta sentencia, esta Sala sostiene el criterio reiterado de que quien invoque la violación del principio de igualdad, debe suministrar parámetros de comparación suficientes, que permitan cotejar si se da un trato desigual entre sujetos que se encuentran en las mismas condiciones, sin que existan razones objetivas que justifiquen tal diferenciación. Ahora bien, lo cierto es que el actor omito brindar elementos objetivos de comparación que justifiquen que esta Sala conozca de su reclamo por el fondo, por lo que procede, igualmente, rechazar de plano la acción en cuanto a este aspecto.

XII.- SOBRE LA INADMISIBILIDAD DE ESTA ACCIÓN RESPECTO AL ARTÍCULO 21 DEL CÓDIGO PROCESAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. El gestionante impugna el artículo 21 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, alegando, una vez más, la violación al derecho fundamental a la tutela cautelar. No obstante, procede rechazar de plano este aspecto de la acción, con base en los mismos argumentos expuestos en el considerando V de la sentencia, toda vez que, no existe conexidad entre su argumento de inconstitucionalidad y el proceso judicial base de esta acción, ya que no logra acreditar que la norma cuestionada vaya a ser aplicada en dicho asunto, pues no comprueba la existencia de un legajo de medida cautelar en trámite.

XIII.- CONCLUSIÓN. Con fundamento en las consideraciones expuestas, se rechaza esta acción.

XIV.- NOTA SEPARADA DE LOS MAGISTRADOS CASTILLO VÍQUEZ Y CRUZ CASTRO. Coincidimos con nuestros colegas en los argumentos que esgrimen para rechazar de plano la acción, toda vez que no hay una contradicción evidente y manifiesta entre la Ley y el Reglamento que se impugna. La postura del Tribunal, en el sentido de cuando una norma reglamentaria violenta o excede lo dispuesto en una ley es un tema de legalidad, cuya discusión no corresponde a esta jurisdicción, en términos generales, acierta jurídicamente. No cabe duda que es al Juez ordinario a quien compete determinar los alcances de la interpretación y aplicación de la Ley y, por consiguiente, es él el llamado a establecer si una norma reglamentaria vulnera o no la norma legal. Sin embargo, hay un matiz importante en este asunto, y es que, desde nuestro punto de vista, cuando hay una evidencia manifiesta, que salta a la vista, que la norma reglamentaria excede, suprime- o contradice el texto de la Ley- no cabe duda que, de forma grosera, se vulnera el principio de fuerza, autoridad o eficacia de la Ley; principio que tiene cobertura constitucional y que debe ser tutelado por este Tribunal. Como es bien sabido, el principio de fuerza, autoridad o eficacia de ley nos remite a la potencia (fuerza activa), a la resistencia (fuerza pasiva) y al régimen de impugnación de la Ley. Con base en el primer aspecto del concepto, la Ley, una vez que entra en vigencia, deroga o modifica toda norma de igual o inferior rango. Con fundamento en el segundo, la Ley no puede ser derogada ni modificada por una norma de inferior rango. Por último, con base en el tercero, la Ley sólo puede ser impugnada por razones de inconstitucionalidad y, por ende, sólo a través de una resolución de la Sala Constitucional se puede anular. El basamento constitucional de este principio lo encontramos en el numeral 129 de la Carta Fundamental, que señala que la Ley sólo puede ser derogada, abrogada o modificada por otra norma posterior de igual rango. Por otra parte, el principio de fuerza, autoridad o eficacia de ley es un presupuesto esencial del Estado social y democrático de Derecho, toda vez que parte de una idea nuclear: el acto normativo parlamentario es superior en rango al acto normativo que emiten los otros Poderes del Estado, en especial del Poder Ejecutivo, lo que supone que todos los Poderes del Estado, cuando ejercen la potestad normativa (artículo 6 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública inciso d), deben de ajustarse a lo dispuso por el legislador. Cuando ello no ocurre, se desconoce el rango normativo de la Ley que, en la escala jerárquica normativa, ocupa el tercer lugar en importancia después de la Constitución Política y los Tratados Internacionales (artículos 10 y 7) y, por consiguiente, se vulnera un principio clave del Estado social y democrático de Derecho. Ergo, cuando de manera evidente y manifiesta una norma reglamentaria rebasa, suprime o contradice una Ley de la República, se vulnera el numeral 129 de la Carta Fundamental y el principio de fuerza, autoridad o eficacia de la Ley, y el Tribunal Constitucional sí tiene competencia en este asunto, sin demérito de la competencia que también le asiste a los integrantes de la jurisdicción ordinaria cuando no estamos en el supuesto comentado.

XV.- VOTO SALVADO PARCIAL DE LA MAGISTRADA GARRO VARGAS. Me separo del criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal y salvo parcialmente el voto en este asunto, por considerar que la decisión de rechazar unos extremos de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad es prematura.

Es incuestionable que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso “instaurado con el propósito de garantizar la supremacía de la Constitución Política frente a normas u otras disposiciones de carácter general y que por esa misma razón deben cumplirse un conjunto de formalidades, a los efectos de que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación”, como se ha señalado en la amplia jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Sin embargo, es precisamente la propia ley la que ordena el tratamiento que debe darse a las distintas formalidades y a su eventual incumplimiento. Así se extrae del texto del artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional que señala:

“Artículo 80.- Si no se llenaren las formalidades a que se refieren los dos artículos anteriores, el Presidente de la Sala señalará por resolución, cuáles son los requisitos omitidos y ordenará cumplirlos dentro de tercero día (…)”.

En este asunto, se propone rechazar de plano la acción en algunos aspectos por una insuficiente fundamentación, o porque el accionante no aportó los parámetros que permitan a esta Sala realizar un examen de una eventual violación al principio de igualdad. Desde mi perspectiva, en relación con dichos agravios, resulta de incuestionable aplicación la prevención al accionante para que remedie las omisiones detectadas.

De igual forma, cabe señalar que tanto la interpretación de los artículos 78 y 79 como la del propio artículo 80 de la Ley que rige esta jurisdicción debe ser amplia, en beneficio de quienes acuden a esta Sala, de modo que el acceso a la justicia constitucional no resulte innecesariamente limitado.

XVI.- VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO RUEDA LEAL. Me separo del criterio de la mayoría de este Tribunal y salvo el voto en este asunto, por considerar que la decisión de rechazar esta acción de inconstitucionalidad es prematura. Es incuestionable que la acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso, “instaurado con el propósito de garantizar la supremacía de la Constitución Política frente a normas u otras disposiciones de carácter general y que por esa misma razón deben cumplirse un conjunto de formalidades, a efecto de que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación” como se ha señalado en la amplia jurisprudencia de esta Sala. Sin embargo, es precisamente la propia ley la que ordena el tratamiento que debe darse a las distintas formalidades y a su eventual incumplimiento, como se extrae del texto del artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional que señala:

“Artículo 80.- Si no se llenaren las formalidades a que se refieren los dos artículos anteriores, el Presidente de la Sala señalará por resolución, cuáles son los requisitos omitidos y ordenará cumplirlos dentro de tercero día (…)” En este asunto, entre otros requisitos, se echa de menos una fundamentación adecuada y suficiente tal y como lo exige el artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, por lo que resulta de incuestionable aplicación la prevención al accionante para que remedie la omisión detectada. De igual forma, no sobra en absoluto dejar sentado que –en mi criterio- tanto la interpretación de los artículos 78 y 79 como la del propio 80 de la Ley que rige esta jurisdicción, debe ser amplia en beneficio de quienes acuden a esta Sala, de modo que el acceso a la justicia constitucional no resulte innecesariamente limitado.

XVII.- DOCUMENTACIÓN APORTADA AL EXPEDIENTE. Se previene a las partes que, de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del 2012, artículo LXXXI.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza por el fondo la acción en cuanto al artículo 190 párrafo sexto del Reglamento a la Ley de Contratación Administrativa n.° 33411. En todo lo demás, se rechaza de plano esta acción. Los magistrados Castillo Víquez y Cruz Castro ponen nota. La magistrada Garro Vargas salva parcialmente el voto y ordena realizar la prevención del artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. El magistrado Rueda Leal salva el voto y ordena hacer la prevención del artículo 80 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Fernando Castillo V.

Fernando Cruz C.

Paul Rueda L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ingrid Hess H.

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