Statute of limitations for disciplinary powers in state-owned banksPrescripción de la potestad disciplinaria en entidades bancarias públicas

*180006760641LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2020-001279 SECOND DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten o'clock on the tenth of July two thousand twenty.

Ordinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of Cartago, by [Name 001], platform worker and resident of Cartago, against BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, represented by its general attorney-in-fact, Rosaysella Ulloa Villalobos, married, deputy general manager of development and people. The respondent's special judicial attorney is María Yocelin Quesada Porras, single. All of legal age and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions indicated.

Drafted by Judge Olaso Álvarez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff stated that she provided her services to the respondent, as [...], for ten years. According to her, in 2014, the General Audit Office prepared report AGPN-RH-002-2014 entitled “Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas-sector estratégico de Cartago”; on December 15 of that year, she was suspended for six months and, after that term expired, said measure was extended for the same period; on August 24, 2015, she was notified of the statement of charges, in the cause followed under file number 2015-07-059; on December 28, 2016, the final report of the investigating body was sent to the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo and on March 21, 2017, her dismissal was ordered, under the protection of ground l) of article 81 of the Labor Code. She requested that the illegality of her dismissal and the nullity of everything acted upon within the disciplinary administrative procedure be declared; that her reinstatement to the position she held before the termination be ordered, the payment of lost wages from the end of the relationship until the finality of the judgment; that the statute of limitations of numeral 414 of the Labor Code (ordinal 603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343) be upheld; that she be paid eighteen million colones for moral damages, interest, indexation, worker-employer contributions, and both costs. In the alternative, she requested payment of notice, severance pay, and back pay (images 2-13 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file). The Bank's general judicial attorney answered in negative terms and raised the exceptions of lack of right and lack of active and passive standing (images 812-913 idem). The Labor Court of Cartago, through judgment No. 61, at 11:26 a.m. on February 6, 2019, dismissed the lawsuit and decided without special condemnation in costs (images 1829-1848 ibid.).

II.- GRIEVANCES: The plaintiff disagrees with the resolution. Procedural reasons. First: lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the court and lack of grounds or insufficient grounds for the judgment. She argues that the Court did not consider that the respondent contravened the provisions of article 68 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, since she was kept suspended for eight months and nine days and said provision establishes that in administrative sanctioning procedures, suspension—as a precautionary measure—is appropriate for three months, extendable only once for three more months. Based on the foregoing, she considers that the proceedings are null and void and must be ordered as such, as they violated the due process outlined in the collective instrument. She states that the collective bargaining agreement is law between the parties and that the only way to disapply it is when its expiration occurs or it is declared unconstitutional. She alleges unjustified delay in the administrative procedure, since its processing lasted one year and four months. She highlights that the Audit Office rendered its final report to the General Management of the Bank on June 8, 2015. She considers the principle of prompt and complete justice, regulated in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, to be infringed. Substantive reasons. First: she accuses violation of ordinal 414 of the Labor Code (603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343), since the statute of limitations was rejected. She points out that the Constitutional Division has defined that prior to the initiation of an ordinary administrative procedure, a prior investigation phase or preliminary phase must be carried out. She adds that Audit reports constitute typical examples of that phase. She states that the one-month term contemplated in said article begins to run once the result of the investigation or audit report is made known to the deciding body. She summarizes what happened in the specific case and requests that the statute of limitations exception be upheld. Second: she reiterates that the collective bargaining agreement is professional law and that the only way to disapply it is when its expiration occurs or it is declared unconstitutional. She again brings up conventional numeral 68. She alludes that said provision sets forth an entire procedure in sanctioning matters, which includes the participation of a Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. She notes that although the criterion of said collegiate body is not binding, the truth is that it cannot be dispensed with. She reproaches that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and raison d'être of the Board. She argues that the appealed judgment confuses the procedure of the sanctioning administrative body and the procedure followed internally by the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. She adds that the participation of the Bank's Legal Directorate was considered as part of the procedure within the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. She considers that the participation of a Legal Directorate within a process would be in coordination or advisory tasks with the Management, but never as part of the formal investigative process. She mentions that the Court did not adjust its judgment accordingly, as it did not call attention to, much less resolve, that the General Manager breached the mandatory eight-day deadline for issuing the final act. Third: she does not agree that it was said that the final act is reasoned, insofar as it adopted the report rendered by the Legal Directorate. She explains that in a sanctioning procedure there are two bodies, the investigator and the decision-maker, and it is to these that the deadlines run. She insists that the Management issued the act outside the eight-day term. She argues that the act that justified the dismissal lacks the essential elements, namely: grounds, content, and purpose, and is therefore null and void. She invokes ordinals 132 and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration. She highlights that it is imperative that the act indicate the factual basis and the legal norm that supports the adopted content. She says that in her case it was ordered that the detected actions are serious breaches of her duties, but the violated norms were not specified (images 1851-1861 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file).

III.- FORMAL GRIEVANCES: Article 587 of the Labor Code admits the appeal for cassation due to procedural defects, in the cases exhaustively regulated therein. Thus, subsection 3 provides as a ground for cassation for form, the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the court, and in 5, the lack of grounds or insufficient reasoning of the judgment. The first defect occurs when the factual picture set forth in the preceding instances is confusing or contradictory, such that it is impossible to know exactly what the judging person really meant. Likewise, this defect is incurred when the list of proven and unproven facts is incomplete, in such a way that the omission negatively affects the substantive analysis of the matter. In relation to the second defect, it should be noted that the duty to properly ground judicial resolutions constitutes an obligation consubstantial to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the judging person to adopt one or another decision is what allows the parties to exercise control over what has been resolved, through the procedural mechanisms conceived for this purpose. In this case, the appellant raises both defects, but the arguments put forth in this regard are not related to those grounds. Note that they are aimed at the fact that the Court did not consider that the banking entity contravened the provisions of numeral 68 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the time the processing of the administrative procedure was delayed. Consequently, the objections are not subsumed under the grounds invoked or any of the cases regulated in cited ordinal 587, nor even through referral to article 471 ibid., so they are not addressed as to form but as to substance. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that upon analyzing the appealed judgment, this Division notes that the Court clearly and precisely determined the facts it deemed accredited and, in the fifth considering, set forth, in an ample and detailed manner, the legal and factual reasons on which it based its decision, and therefore did not incur the alleged defects.

IV.- INADMISSIBLE GRIEVANCES: Numeral 590 of the Labor Code states: “The brief in which the appeal is filed must contain, under penalty of being declared inadmissible, the clear and precise reasons that warrant the revocation of the pronouncement, including any concomitant nullity allegations deemed of interest. The cassation appeal must specify in the same manner the reasons to believe that the legal system has been violated and those for which the nullity and eventual revocation of the appealed judgment are appropriate; formal claims will be made first and then substantive claims…” In accordance with this rule, for the appeal filed before this Division to be admissible, the appellant must clearly and precisely state the reasons on which they base their grievances against the provisions of the appealed judgment. In light of that provision, the reproach noting the unjustified delay in the processing of the case followed in the administrative venue, included in the section entitled “cassation for reasons of form”, becomes inadmissible, since it is not directed against the judgment issued by the Court or against the reasoning set forth therein, but directly against the procedure followed by the respondent. On the other hand, it is also alleged that the Court did not notice that the Bank breached the stipulations of ordinal 68 of the collective bargaining agreement, regarding the time a person can be suspended as a precautionary measure and the deadline that Management has to issue the final act. Both protests are inadmissible, as the corresponding request for addition and clarification was not filed, as required by article 587, subsection 2, of the Labor Code. Take into consideration that numeral 578 idem establishes: “…Addition and clarification shall be limited to the omissions or obscurities of the operative part of the judgment and to the contradictions that may exist between the recital part and the operative part…” (Emphasis added). In this case, it is argued that the judgment did not refer to those aspects, but the addition and clarification that were appropriate in this regard were not requested; which prevents this Division from addressing and resolving both objections. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that, upon studying the conventional provision, it is not observed that it provides any consequence, including the nullity sought by the plaintiff, in the event that the deadlines contained therein are violated.

V.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: The appellant objects that the statute of limitations defense raised in the initial brief was rejected and, in support of her thesis, invokes ordinals 414 and 415 of the Labor Code. Having analyzed the record, this Division reaches the same conclusion as the Court, but for other reasons. In the specific case, as pointed out by the respondent's general judicial attorney in the answer, the provisions of article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic are applicable, which – in express text – states: “Prescripción de la responsabilidad disciplinaria. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the superior control and oversight regulations shall prescribe according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. / b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious - understood as that fact which requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity - the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the head or the official competent to initiate the respective procedure. / The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the presumed responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure…” From the reading of the transcribed text, it is clear that the extended term provided for in said rule is applicable when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law, or those contemplated by the superior control and oversight regulations of the Hacienda Pública. In accordance with numeral 8 of that same normative body, “La Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos…” In that order of ideas, it must be indicated that ordinal 9 of the law in question defines public funds as all those “…recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos” and the following article 10 states: “El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta. Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional”. This control and oversight system has as its primary purpose “…garantizar la legalidad y la eficiencia de los controles internos y del manejo de los fondos públicos en los entes sobre los cuales tiene jurisdicción la Contraloría General de la República, de conformidad con esta Ley” (numeral 11 idem). These latter norms must be read in concordance with the stipulations of transcribed ordinal 8, which expressly includes, as part of the control and oversight system, the regulations related to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in those matters, which are undoubtedly provisions that tend to ensure legality through internal controls and efficiency, seeking the efficient and lawful handling of public funds. Therefore, it is not just any fault committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic, but only the faults committed by persons performing a public function who, in the exercise of those special competencies, infringe either the regulations of said legal instrument or the control and oversight system. In accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to determine who holds the power to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest public funds. Firstly, it must be noted that a Hacienda Pública official is not just anyone who has some type of relationship with public funds, but one who has duties related to the receipt, administration, custody, conservation, management, spending, and investment – in general, disposition of public funds – according to the parameters of numeral 8 mentioned above. Thus, the need for the official to hold a position in the Hacienda Pública is excluded, as it is sufficient that they have the powers mentioned above. In this case, the plaintiff was attributed with “incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema cajas-sector estratégico de Cartago” (Sic. Image 18 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file); actions that violated norms of the General Law of Internal Control, the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, the Organic Law of the National Banking System, among other bodies of law, as is derived from the statement of charges made in the administrative venue (images 33-34 idem). In the second allegation of the claim, the plaintiff stated that her functions were “basically, of mere institutional information, that is, customer service assisting with their requirements, whether these were account openings, investment placements, information on their relationship with the Bank and other similar ones…” (Sic. Image 2 ibid.). In this regard, the respondent answered: “The Platform position involves direct contact with the institution's clients, and among its main functions is making withdrawals and deposits from client accounts when they appear at the respective office, in strict adherence to the Cajas y Tesorerías directives” (sic. Image 812 ibid.). From the evidence adduced in the file, it is observed that the plaintiff's duties were not as simple as she described them. In the “OFICIO DE TRASLADO DE CARGOS”, made in administrative file No. 2015-07-059, the following charges were imputed to her: “Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago y su condición de funcionaria bancaria para influir y en otro compañero (tráfico de influencias) y generar a su favor aparentemente un beneficio económico. / Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago y su condición de funcionaria bancaria al autorizar ʻen beneficio propioʼ trámites y transacciones en provecho propio y del señor Iván DʼAvanzo. / Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo y su posición jerárquica como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago para incrementar su patrimonio y recibir beneficio de forma indebida. / Aparentemente aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo y posición jerárquica como plataformista de la sucursal de Cargado, al recibir beneficios de créditos y sus cancelaciones. / Aparentemente faltar a su deber de probidad por no administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia y al no demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Lo anterior por cuanto gestiona y tramita créditos en los cuales recibe beneficios. / Incumplir en apariencia con los deberes y obligaciones inherentes establecidos en el contrato de trabajo. Al no desempeñar su trabajo con la intensidad, cuidado y esmero apropiados y en el tiempo y lugar convenido. / Incumplir en apariencia con los valores y principios éticos regulados en el Código de conducta del conglomerado Banco Nacional de Costa Rica” (sic. Images 66-67 ibid.). Furthermore, the respondent is a state public bank, regulated by the Organic Law of the National Banking System, the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, and the Political Constitution. In addition, it is subject to the oversight of the Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF) and the General Comptroller of the Republic and, like the other state banks, has the guarantee and most complete cooperation of the State, due to the nature of its function and the public nature of the funds it administers. According to the foregoing, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations term applicable to this matter is that stipulated in ordinal 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic and not that contemplated in the Labor Code. Having defined the applicable norm, it is appropriate to analyze the factual situation that was found to be proven in order to determine whether the Bank's disciplinary power is time-barred or not. In view of the facts deemed proven, in 2014 the Internal Audit Office of the respondent prepared report AGPN-RH-002-2014 entitled: “Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas sector estratégico de Cartago”; on August 14, 2015, the directing body was appointed; on August 24 of that same year, the statement of charges was made; the oral hearing scheduled for December 1 and 2, 2015 was rescheduled – at the request of the plaintiff's lawyer – for January 17 and 18, 2016; on December 26, 2016, the transcription of the hearing was communicated to the plaintiff; on January 6, 2017 (erroneously recorded as 2016), the final report of the investigating body was transferred to the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo; on March 3, 2017, the General Manager was informed of the tie vote arising internally within the Board; on March 20, 2017, the Legal Directorate resolved on said tie; on March 22, the administrative file was returned to the Board to notify the plaintiff of the decision –dismissal without employer liability–; the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and on April 3, 2017, the Legal Directorate recommended rejecting the appeal (images 1831-1832 ibid.). Having analyzed the factual list, it is concluded that the disciplinary power is not time-barred, insofar as it was exercised within the period provided for in article 71 of the Organic Law of the General Comptroller of the Republic -5 years-.

VI.- REGARDING THE JUNTA DE RELACIONES DE TRABAJO: Before this Division, it is protested that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and raison d'être of the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo and also confused the procedure of the sanctioning administrative body and the procedure followed internally within that Board. Although it is not explained where the alleged confusion lies, making it impossible to understand the objection more precisely, upon reviewing the resolution, what was raised in the appeal is not observed. In relation to this collegiate body, the trial judge stated: “…Incluso vemos que la aplicación de la norma convencional que establece que una vez recibido por el Gerente General el criterio emitido por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales no es de recibo, porque la potestad sancionatoria –particularmente en entes cubiertos por disposiciones legales expresas- es una facultad inherente al empleador que no puede estar limitada por una Junta de Relaciones Laborales […] De modo que, a pesar de que la Junta de Relaciones Laborales haya valorado la conducta de la actora con empate, esa divergencia de criterios no limitaba la potestad disciplinaria del empleador, por ser una competencia dispuesta por ley…” (Sic. Images 1844 and 1846 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file). Furthermore, as stated before this Division, the criterion issued by these collegiate bodies is not binding on the decision-making body in a disciplinary procedure. More importantly, it should be highlighted that the decision of the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo is not the subject of debate in this process; therefore, it is not transcendental for the resolution of this matter. In another order of ideas, this Division considers that the intervention of the Legal Directorate in the administrative procedure was intended to advise and support the Management, but not as another formal stage within it, and therefore its participation does not render the procedure null and void.

VII.- REGARDING THE FINAL ACT: The appeal objects that it was said that the final act is reasoned. Let us see what was stated on this point in the appealed judgment: “…La falta de motivación del acto sí podría configurar una violación a la garantía del debido proceso; sin embargo, el acto por el cual se dispuso la suspensión de la demandante se encuentra debidamente motivado ya que el Gerente General se adhirió al informe de la Dirección jurídica y lo hizo suyo, en él si se notan los elementos del actor (sic) administrativo para asegurar su validez, sea el motivo, contenido y fin…” (Image 1844 idem). Numeral 136, subsection 2, of the General Law of Public Administration states: “La motivación podrá consistir en la referencia explícita o inequívoca a los motivos de la petición del administrado, o bien a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado realmente la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañe copia”. This norm was interpreted by the First Division in judgment No. 278-F-S1-2017, at 9:40 a.m. on March 16, 2017, in the following manner: “…This Division has considered, ‘…the existence and validity of administrative acts are subject to the presence of several essential elements, expressly established by the legal system, namely: material elements, referring to subjective elements (competence, standing, and investiture), objective elements (purpose, content, and grounds –articles 131, 132, and 133 of the LGAP and 49 of the Political Constitution) and formal elements, including the form in which the act is adopted, i.e., the means of expression or manifestation (instrumentation), reasoning or grounds (article 136 of the cited General Law) and the procedure for its adoption (articles 214 and 308 of the LGAP, and 39 and 41 of the Constitution). Of interest to this matter is the reasoning of the administrative act. In vote no. 430-F-00 of Res: 2020-001279 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at ten hours on the tenth of July of two thousand twenty.

Ordinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of Cartago, by [Name 001], platform worker and resident of Cartago, against BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, represented by its generalísima proxy, Rosaysella Ulloa Villalobos, married, deputy general manager of development and people. Appearing as special judicial proxy of the defendant, licensed attorney María Yocelin Quesada Porras, single. All of legal age and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions indicated.

Drafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff stated that she provided her services to the defendant, as [...], for ten years. According to her, in 2014, the General Audit Office prepared report AGPN-RH-002-2014 called "Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas-sector estratégico de Cartago"; on December 15 of that year she was suspended for six months and upon expiration of that term, said measure was extended for the same period; on August 24, 2015, she was notified of the statement of charges, in the case followed under file number 2015-07-059; on December 28, 2016, the final report of the investigating body was sent to the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo and on March 21, 2017, her dismissal was ordered, under cause l) of article 81 of the Labor Code.

7390-03, at 15 hours and 28 minutes on July 22, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber, regarding the statement of reasons (motivación) for administrative acts and resolutions, determined: “…it is a requirement of due process and the right of defense, since it implies the obligation to provide the administered party with a justificatory discourse accompanying an act of public power… It is a means of democratic and diffuse control, exercised by the administered party over the non-arbitrariness of the manner in which public powers are exercised, given that in the constitutional requirement to state reasons for administrative acts, a supra-procedural function of this institute is thus discovered, which places such a requirement among the consequences of the constitutional principle of which it is an expression, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of public acts… The statement of reasons for the administrative act implies then that it must contain at least a succinct reference to facts and legal grounds, given that the administered party necessarily must know the actions or omissions for which they are to be sanctioned or simply for which a procedure is denied that may affect the sphere of their legitimate interests or even their subjective rights and the regulations applied to them”. In sum, the statement of reasons implies that the reasons for which the act is issued must be formally enunciated (enunciadas formalmente), in an explicit and clear manner. In its absence, the affected party would see their right to due process harmed, since they will not have the opportunity to efficiently exercise their right of defense, by not having all the factual and legal elements for its challenge. Article 136 of the LGAP proclaims…’ (judgment no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 at 9 hours and 30 minutes on March 15, 2012)”. It continues further on, saying: “…Based on the foregoing, this decision-making body considers that the Court is correct when it establishes the following: ‘…it is clear that in order to protect the guarantees of due process and the right of defense, it is necessary that the administrative act be issued in accordance with the requirements demanded by the legal system. It is for this reason that the General Public Administration Law prescribes that the reason (motivo) for which the active Administration issues an act must be legitimate, since it is subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality that governs administrative conduct, and furthermore, it must exist as the Administration invokes it, since this element supports the decision adopted, which is intimately related to another essential element of the act, namely, the statement of reasons. As relevant here, it should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of article 136 of the cited law, any act that imposes obligations or that limits, supersedes, or denies subjective rights must be motivated with at least a succinct mention of its grounds, it being possible for this to consist of an explicit or unequivocal reference to the reasons for the administered party's petition, or to proposals, opinions (dictámenes), or previous resolutions that have actually determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy thereof is attached… Note then that upon the adoption of a specific decision, the Administration must harmonize the factual elements that constitute the background, with the applicable normative support. It is for this reason that if, upon issuing the administrative act, only a brief or laconic allusion to general norms and unspecific facts is made, it can be concluded that there is an insufficient contribution of justification, insofar as from them it is not possible to deduce the elements assessed by the administrative authority to adopt the decision, which acquires the greatest importance when it concerns acts limiting or restricting subjective rights or those in which a sanction is imposed on the administered party…’” (Sic). This Chamber, for its part, in judgment no. 1065, at 8:30 hours on August 6, 2010, pointed out: “…In relation to the reason (motivo) as an element of validity of the administrative act, article 133 of the General Public Administration Law expresses that this must be legitimate and exist as it has been taken into account for the issuance of the act; for its part, 136 of that same body of law indicates that those acts that impose obligations or that limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights must be motivated, at least with a succinct mention of their grounds (subsection 1), it being possible for that statement of reasons to consist, as relevant here, of the explicit or unequivocal reference to proposals, opinions, or prior resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act (subsection 2). Doctrine properly separates what the reason (motivo) is as an objective material element of the act –background, factual and legal reasons– from what the statement of reasons (motivación) for the administrative act is –which is the expression of those reasons– that lead to the issuance of the specific act (the former regulated in the first cited numeral and the latter in the second, see Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto, 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín, Colombia: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. Tomo I, pp. 370 and 387)” (sic). In accordance with the transcribed ordinal and case law, it is clear that the statement of reasons for an administrative act can be given by reference to an opinion (dictamen); as happened in this matter, so there is no violation whatsoever of the legal system in that sense. Furthermore, the General Public Administration Law also regulates in which cases the annulment of what has been done can be issued. Thus, article 223 establishes: “1.- Only the omission of substantial formalities of the procedure will cause the annulment of what has been done. / 2.- A formality whose correct performance would have prevented or changed the final decision in important aspects, or whose omission caused defenselessness, shall be understood as substantial”. In the case under analysis, the annulment sought is not admissible. In the first place, because we are not in the presence of the situations contemplated in this numeral, since the fact that the General Manager adopted the report rendered by the Legal Department in no way varies the final decision taken in the administrative channel. In addition to this, it does not appear from the case file that the plaintiff's right of defense was limited. On the contrary, she has been able to exercise it fully. Note that within the administrative procedure, the evidence offered by her was taken, she participated in the hearings held, and she even had legal representation. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a "motion for reversal (recurso de reposición)", in accordance with the provisions of ordinal 345 of the General Public Administration Law, and a "motion for review (recurso de revisión)", pursuant to article 353, subsection a, idem, against resolution no. GG-110-17 (images 702-733 of the full view of the Court's electronic case file); whose annulment she seeks in judicial proceedings. More abundantly, it is considered that in this matter it was not necessary for the General Manager to set forth all the vicissitudes of the procedure followed, as the plaintiff intends, insofar as it was based on opinion (dictamen) D.J.829-2017 rendered by the Legal Department, which clearly, in detail, and broadly set forth the reasons why the plaintiff's dismissal was recommended; which, as appears from the resolution, was attached to it (image 634 idem). In any case, the challenged document does allow one to extract why the plaintiff was dismissed, so it is not true that she was left defenseless. The defendant's General Manager stated: “This General Management resolves the tie situation that arose at the time of issuing the final act of procedure 2015-07-059 in which she was considered investigated for repeated conduct documented in audit report AGPN-RH-002-2014, all of these actions contrary to her obligations as a Bank official. / Based on opinion (dictamen) D.J.829-2017 from the Legal Department, which I share and endorse and a copy of which I attach to this resolution, in accordance with article 136 of the General Public Administration Law, it is decided to impose the disciplinary sanction of Dismissal without employer liability due to Loss of Confidence, a cause established in subsection L of article 81 of the Labor Code, for her demonstrated responsibility in the investigated facts. Against this resolution, a motion for reversal (recurso de reposición) may be filed under the terms of article 345 of the General Public Administration Law” (sic. Image 633 ibidem). Finally, the appellant is not correct in indicating that in her case it was provided that the detected actions are serious breaches of her duties, but the violated rules were not specified. Having reviewed the case file, it is observed that both official letter GG-111-2017 and the Legal Department's report pointed out the contravened provisions. In that sense, the first document made reference to numeral 81, subsection l), of the Labor Code and the second, in section IV, titled “Legal Basis (Fundamento legal)”, listed in detail the violated regulatory bodies (images 681-382 ibidem).

VIII.- FINAL CONSIDERATION: As a corollary of the foregoing, as there is no objection whatsoever to be made to the appealed judgment in the terms indicated in the appeal, what is appropriate is to declare the appeal without merit.

POR TANTO:

The appeal filed is declared without merit.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia Res: 2020-001279 PROJASM/SHERRERAC 1 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2295-3009. Electronic Mails: [email protected] and [email protected] She requested that the illegality of her dismissal be declared, as well as the nullity of all actions within the disciplinary administrative procedure; that her reinstatement to the position she held before the termination be ordered, along with the payment of lost wages from the end of the employment relationship until the finality of the judgment; that the statute of limitations under numeral 414 of the Labor Code (ordinal 603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343) be upheld; and that she be paid eighteen million colones for moral damages, interest, indexation, worker-employer contributions, and all costs. In the alternative, she requested payment of severance notice, unemployment assistance (auxilio de cesantía), and lost wages (images 2-13 of the complete electronic court file). The Bank's general judicial representative answered in negative terms and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active and passive standing (images 812-913 *ídem*). The Labor Court of Cartago, by judgment No. 61, at 11:26 a.m. on February 6, 2019, dismissed the lawsuit and resolved without special condemnation for costs (images 1829-1848 *ibídem*).

**II.-** **APPEALS:** The plaintiff is dissatisfied with the decision. **Procedural reasons.** *First*: lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the court and lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment. She argues that the Court did not consider that the defendant contravened the provisions of article 68 of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo), since she was kept suspended for eight months and nine days, and said rule establishes that in administrative sanctioning procedures, a suspension—as a precautionary measure—is applicable for three months, extendable only once for three more months. Based on the foregoing, she considers that the actions taken are null and must be ordered as such, as they violated the due process established in the collective instrument. She states that the collective agreement (convención colectiva) is law between the parties and that the only way to not apply it is upon its expiration or if it is declared unconstitutional. She alleges unjustified delay in the administrative procedure, as its processing lasted one year and four months. She highlights that the Internal Audit (Auditoría) issued its final report to the Bank's General Management on June 8, 2015. She considers the principle of swift and complete justice, regulated in numeral 41 of the Political Constitution, to be infringed. **Substantive reasons.** *First*: she accuses a violation of ordinal 414 of the Labor Code (603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343), since the statute of limitations was rejected. She points out that the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has defined that before the start of an ordinary administrative procedure, a phase of preliminary investigation or preliminary phase must be carried out. She adds that audit reports constitute typical examples of that phase. She states that the one-month term contemplated in said article begins to run once the result of the investigation or audit report is made known to the decision-making body. She summarizes what happened in the specific case and requests that the statute of limitations defense be upheld. *Second*: she reiterates that the collective agreement (convención colectiva) is professional law and that the only way to not apply it is upon its expiration or if it is declared unconstitutional. She again brings up conventional numeral 68. She alludes that said rule provides an entire procedure in sanctioning matters, which includes the participation of a Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo). She notes that although the criterion of said collegiate body is not binding, the fact is that it cannot be dispensed with. She reproaches that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and reason for being of the Board. She argues that the appealed judgment confuses the procedure of the sanctioning administrative body with the one followed internally within the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo). She adds that the participation of the Bank's Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) was considered as part of the procedure within the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo). She considers that the participation of a Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) within a process would be in coordination or advisory tasks with the Management, but never as part of the formal investigative process. She mentions that the Court did not adjust its judgment as required, as it did not draw attention to, much less resolve, that the General Manager failed to comply with the mandatory eight-day deadline to issue the final act. *Third*: she does not agree that the final act was stated to be reasoned, insofar as it adopted the report rendered by the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica). She explains that in a sanctioning procedure, there are two bodies, the investigator and the decision-maker, and it is for them that the deadlines run. She insists that the Management issued the act outside the eight-day term. She argues that the act that justified the dismissal lacks the essential elements, namely: motive, content, and purpose, and is therefore null. She invokes ordinals 132 and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). She emphasizes that it is imperative that the act indicates the factual basis and the legal rule that supports the adopted content. She says that in her case, it was ordered that the detected actions are serious breaches of her duties, but the violated rules were not specified (images 1851-1861 of the complete electronic court file).

**III.- FORMAL APPEALS:** Article 587 of the Labor Code admits the appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) for procedural defects, in the cases exhaustively regulated therein. Thus, subsection 3 provides as a ground for cassation on form the lack of clear and precise determination of the facts accredited by the court, and subsection 5 provides the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment. The first defect occurs when the factual picture presented in the preceding instances is confusing or contradictory, such that it is impossible to know exactly what the judge really meant. Similarly, this defect occurs when the list of proven and unproven facts is incomplete, in a way that the omission negatively affects the substantive analysis of the matter. Regarding the second defect, it must be noted that the duty to properly reason judicial resolutions constitutes an obligation inherent to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the judge to adopt one decision or another is what allows the parties to exercise control over what was resolved, through the procedural mechanisms designed for that purpose. In this case, the appellant raises both defects, but the arguments presented in this regard are not related to those grounds. It can be seen that they are directed at the Court not having considered that the banking entity contravened the provisions of numeral 68 of the Collective Labor Agreement (Convención Colectiva de Trabajo) and the time it took to process the administrative procedure. Consequently, the objections do not fall within the grounds invoked or any of the cases regulated in cited ordinal 587, not even through referral to article 471 *ibídem*, so they are not examined on form but on the merits. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that having analyzed the appealed judgment, the Chamber notes that the Court clearly and precisely determined the facts it held as accredited, and, in the fifth recital (considerando), exposed, in a broad and detailed manner, the legal and factual reasons on which it based its decision, so it did not incur in the alleged defects.

**IV.- INADMISSIBLE APPEALS:** Numeral 590 of the Labor Code reads: *"The pleading in which the appeal is filed must contain, under penalty of being declared inadmissible, the clear and precise reasons that merit the revocation of the pronouncement, including any concomitant allegations of nullity deemed of interest. The cassation appeal must specify, in the same manner, the reasons why it is considered that the legal order has been violated and why the nullity and eventual revocation of the appealed judgment are appropriate; formal claims shall be made first, then substantive ones…"* According to this rule, for the appeal filed before the Chamber to be admissible, the appellant must clearly and precisely state the reasons on which they base their grievances against what was ordered in the appealed judgment. In light of that provision, the reproach that notes the unjustified delay in the processing of the procedure followed in the administrative venue, included in the section titled *"cassation for reasons of form,"* becomes inadmissible, as it is not directed against the judgment issued by the Court or the reasoning set forth therein, but directly against the procedure followed by the defendant. On the other hand, it is also alleged that the Court did not notice that the Bank breached what was stipulated in ordinal 68 of the collective agreement (convención colectiva), regarding the time a person can be suspended as a precautionary measure and the deadline that the Management has to issue the final act. Both protests are inadmissible, as the corresponding request for addition and clarification (gestión de adición y aclaración) was not submitted, as required by article 587, subsection 2, of the Labor Code. It must be considered that numeral 578 *ídem* establishes: *"…The addition and clarification shall be limited to the omissions or obscurities of the operative part of the judgment and to* ***the contradictions that may exist between the recital part and the operative part*** *…"* (Emphasis added). In this case, it is argued that the judgment did not refer to those aspects, but the addition and clarification (adición y aclaración) that was appropriate in that regard was not requested; which prevents this Chamber from examining and resolving both objections. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that upon studying the conventional rule, it is not observed that it provides any consequence, including the nullity sought by the plaintiff, in the event that the deadlines contained therein are violated.

**V.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:** The appellant objects to the rejection of the statute of limitations defense raised in the initial pleading and, in support of her thesis, invokes ordinals 414 and 415 of the Labor Code. Having analyzed the record, this Chamber reaches the same conclusion as the Court, but for other reasons. In the specific case, as pointed out by the defendant's general judicial representative in the response, the provisions of article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) are applicable, which—in express text—states: "*Statute of limitations for disciplinary responsibility. The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización) shall prescribe according to the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular act is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the act. / b) In cases where the irregular act is not notorious—understood as that act which requires an inquiry or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective inquiry or audit is brought to the attention of the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. / The statute of limitations shall be interrupted, with continuous effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure…*" From reading the transcribed text, it is noted that the extended period provided for in that rule is applicable when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law, or in those contemplated by the higher control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización) of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). In accordance with numeral 8 of that same regulatory body, "*The Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative, and financial rules relative to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials…*" In that vein, it must be indicated that ordinal 9 of the law in question defines public funds as all those "*…resources, values, goods, and rights owned by the State, by organs, by companies, or by public entities*" and the following article 10 states: "*The higher control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización) of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) comprises the set of rules that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from or necessary for such oversight. This legal framework also comprises the rules that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and organs and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental rule, within the constitutional framework*." That control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización) has as its primary purpose "*…to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Comptroller General of the Republic has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law*" (numeral 11 *ídem*). These latter rules must be read in concordance with what is stipulated in ordinal 8 transcribed, which includes, expressly, as part of the control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización), the regulations related to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in these matters, which are undoubtedly provisions that tend to ensure legality through internal controls and efficiency, seeking the efficient and law-abiding management of public funds. Therefore, it is not just any fault committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República), but only faults committed by persons who perform a public function and who, in the exercise of those special competencies, infringe either the regulations of said legal instrument or the control and oversight legal framework (ordenamiento de control y fiscalización). In accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to determine who holds the power to receive, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest public funds. Firstly, it must be noted that a Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) official is not just anyone who has some type of relationship with public funds, but someone who has duties related to the receipt, administration, custody, conservation, management, spending, and investment—in general, disposition of public funds—, according to the parameters of numeral 8 mentioned above. In this way, the need for the official to hold a position in the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) is excluded, as it suffices that they have the aforementioned powers. In this case, the plaintiff was attributed with *"non-compliance with laws and regulations in the processing of credit operations and in procedures carried out in the cashier system-strategic sector of Cartago"* (Sic. Image 18 of the complete electronic court file); action that violated rules of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), among other regulatory bodies, as can be deduced from the formal statement of charges (traslado de cargos) carried out in the administrative venue (images 33-34 *ídem*). In the second fact of the lawsuit, the plaintiff stated that her functions were *"basically, of mere institutional information, namely, customer service, collaborating with their requirements, whether these be account openings, placement of investments, information regarding their relationship with the Bank, and other similar ones…*" (Sic. Image 2 *ibídem*). In this regard, the defendant answered: *"The Platform position is one of direct contact with the institution's clients, and among its main functions is to make withdrawals and deposits from clients' accounts at the moment they present themselves at the respective office, in strict adherence to the Cashier and Treasury directives*" (sic. Image 812 *ibídem*). From the evidence added to the file, it is observed that the plaintiff's duties were not as simple as she described them. In the *"STATEMENT OF CHARGES MEMO (OFICIO DE TRASLADO DE CARGOS)"*, carried out in administrative file No. 2015-07-059, the following charges were imputed to her: *"Apparently taking advantage of her position as platform officer (plataformista) of the Cartago branch and her condition as a banking official to influence another colleague (traffic of influences) and apparently generate an economic benefit in her favor. / Apparently taking advantage of her position as platform officer (plataformista) of the Cartago branch and her condition as a banking official by authorizing ʻ for her own benefit ʼ procedures and transactions for her own benefit and that of Mr. Iván DʼAvanzo. / Apparently taking advantage of her position and her hierarchical position as platform officer (plataformista) of the Cartago branch to increase her assets and receive benefits improperly. / Apparently taking advantage of her position and hierarchical position as platform officer (plataformista) of the Cargado branch, by receiving benefits from credits and their cancellations. / Apparently failing in her duty of probity by not administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy, and efficiency and by not demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of her functions. The foregoing because she manages and processes credits in which she receives benefits. / Apparently failing to comply with the inherent duties and obligations established in the employment contract. By not performing her work with the appropriate intensity, care, and diligence and at the agreed time and place. / Apparently failing to comply with the ethical values and principles regulated in the Code of Conduct of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica conglomerate*" (sic. Images 66-67 *ibídem*). On the other hand, the defendant is a state public bank, regulated by the Organic Law of the National Banking System (Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional), the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, and the Political Constitution. Furthermore, it is subject to the oversight of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities (Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras, SUGEF) and the Comptroller General of the Republic, and, like the other state banks, it has the guarantee and fullest cooperation of the State, due to the nature of its function and the public nature of the funds it administers. In accordance with the foregoing, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations applicable to this matter is the one stipulated in ordinal 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) and not the one contemplated in the Labor Code. Having defined the applicable rule, it is appropriate to analyze the factual situation that was deemed proven in order to determine whether the Bank's disciplinary power is time-barred or not.

In attention to the facts held as proven, in 2014 the Internal Audit of the defendant prepared the report AGPN-RH-002-2014 titled: "Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas sector estratégico de Cartago"; on August 14, 2015, the directing body was appointed; on August 24 of that same year, the statement of charges was served; the oral hearing scheduled for December 1 and 2, 2015, was rescheduled—at the request of the plaintiff's attorney—for January 17 and 18, 2016; on December 26, 2016, the plaintiff was notified of the hearing transcript; on January 6, 2017 (erroneously recorded as 2016), the final report of the investigating body was forwarded to the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo; on March 3, 2017, the General Manager was informed of the tie that arose internally within the Board; on March 20, 2017, the Dirección Jurídica resolved said tie; on March 22, the administrative file was returned to the Board so that it could notify the plaintiff of the decision adopted—dismissal without employer liability—; the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) and on April 3, 2017, the Dirección Jurídica recommended rejecting the challenge (images 1831-1832 ibid.). Having analyzed the factual scenario, it is concluded that the disciplinary power is not time-barred, as it was exercised within the period provided for in Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República -5 years-.

**VI.- REGARDING THE JUNTA DE RELACIONES DE TRABAJO:** Before this Chamber, it is protested that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and raison d'être of the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo and also confused the procedure of the sanctioning administrative body with the one followed internally within that Board. Although it is not explained where the alleged confusion lies, which makes it impossible to understand the objection with greater precision, the truth is that upon reviewing the resolution, what is raised in the appeal is not observed. In relation to this collegiate body, the trial judge stated: "…We even see that the application of the conventional rule establishing that once the General Manager has received the opinion issued by the Junta de Relaciones Laborales is not acceptable, because the sanctioning power—particularly in entities covered by express legal provisions—is an inherent faculty of the employer that cannot be limited by a Junta de Relaciones Laborales [...] Therefore, even though the Junta de Relaciones Laborales evaluated the plaintiff's conduct with a tie, this divergence of criteria did not limit the employer's disciplinary power, as it is a competence provided by law…" (Sic. Images 1844 and 1846 of the full view of the court's electronic file). Furthermore, as affirmed before this Chamber, the opinion issued by these collegiate bodies is not binding on the decision-making body of a disciplinary procedure. Moreover, it must be highlighted that what was decided by the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo is not the subject of debate in this proceeding; therefore, it is not transcendental for the resolution of this matter. In another line of thought, this Chamber considers that the intervention of the Dirección Jurídica in the administrative procedure was with the intention of advising and providing support to the Management, but not as another formal stage within that procedure, so its participation does not render the procedure null.

**VII.- REGARDING THE FINAL ACT:** The appeal objects to the statement that the final act is duly reasoned. Let us see what was stated on this particular in the appealed ruling: "…The lack of reasoning (motivación) of the act could indeed constitute a violation of the due process guarantee; however, the act by which the plaintiff's suspension was ordered is duly reasoned, since the General Manager adhered to the report of the Dirección Jurídica and made it his own, and within it, the elements of the administrative act are noted to ensure its validity, namely, the reason (motivo), content, and purpose…" (Image 1844 idem). Article 136, subsection 2, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública reads: "The reasoning (motivación) may consist of an explicit or unequivocal reference to the grounds of the individual's petition, or to proposals, opinions (dictámenes), or prior resolutions that have actually determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy is attached." This rule was interpreted by the First Chamber in judgment No. 278-F-S1-2017, of 9:40 a.m. on March 16, 2017, in the following manner: "…This Chamber has considered, '…the existence and validity of administrative acts are subject to the presence of several essential elements, expressly established by the legal system, namely: material elements, referring to subjective elements (competence, standing (legitimación), and investiture), objective elements (purpose, content, and reason (motivo) –Articles 131, 132, and 133 of the LGAP and 49 of the Constitución Política), and formal elements, comprising the form in which the act is adopted, that is, the means of expression or manifestation (documentation), the reasoning or statement of grounds (motivación o fundamentación) (Article 136 of the cited General Law), and the procedure for its adoption (Articles 214 and 308 of the LGAP, and 39 and 41 of the Constitution). Of interest for this matter is the reasoning (motivación) of the administrative act. In Vote No. 7390-03, of 3:28 p.m. on July 22, 2003, the Constitutional Chamber, regarding the reasoning of administrative acts and resolutions, determined: "…it is a requirement of due process and the right of defense, since it implies the obligation to provide the individual with a justificatory discourse that accompanies an act of public power… It is a means of democratic and diffuse control, exercised by the individual over the non-arbitrariness of the way in which public powers are exercised, given that in the constitutional requirement for reasoning (motivación) of administrative acts, a supra-procedural function of this institution is thus discovered, which places such a requirement among the consequences of the constitutional principle of which it is an expression, the principle of prohibition of arbitrariness of public acts… The reasoning (motivación) of the administrative act therefore implies that it must contain at least a succinct reference to the facts and legal grounds, given that the individual must necessarily know the actions or omissions for which they are to be sanctioned or simply denied a petition that may affect the sphere of their legitimate interests or even their subjective rights, and the regulations applied to them." In sum, reasoning implies that the reasons for which the act is issued must be formally stated, in an explicit and clear manner. In its absence, the affected party would see their right to due process harmed, since they will not have the opportunity to effectively exercise their right of defense, lacking all the factual and legal elements for its challenge. Article 136 of the LGAP proclaims…' (judgment No. 0000352-F-S1-2012 of 9:30 a.m. on March 15, 2012)"." Subsequently, it continues to state: "…Due to the foregoing, this decision-making body considers that the Tribunal is correct when it establishes the following: '…it is clear that in the interest of protecting the guarantees of due process and the right of defense, it is necessary for the administrative act to be issued in accordance with the assumptions required by the legal system. That is why the Ley General de la Administración Pública prescribes that the reason (motivo) for which the active Administration issues an act must be legitimate, as it is subject to the legal system, as a corollary of the principle of legality that governs administrative conduct, and furthermore, it must exist as the Administration invokes it, since this element supports the adopted decision, which is intimately related to another essential element of the act, namely, the reasoning (motivación). In what is relevant, it should be noted that in accordance with the provisions of Article 136 of the cited law, any act that imposes obligations or that limits, exceeds, or denies subjective rights must be reasoned (motivado) with at least a succinct mention of its grounds, it being possible for this reasoning to consist of an explicit or unequivocal reference to the grounds of the individual's petition, or to proposals, opinions (dictámenes) or prior resolutions that have actually determined the adoption of the act, provided that a copy thereof is attached… Note then that when adopting a specific decision, the Administration must harmonize the factual elements that constitute the background with the applicable regulatory support. That is why, if when issuing the administrative act only a brief or laconic allusion to general rules and unspecific facts is made, it can be concluded that there is no sufficient contribution of justification, to the extent that from them it is not possible to deduce the elements assessed by the administrative authority to adopt the decision, which acquires the greatest transcendence when dealing with acts that limit or restrict subjective rights or in which a sanction is imposed on the individual…'" (Sic). This Chamber, for its part, in judgment No. 1065, of 8:30 a.m. on August 6, 2010, pointed out: "…In relation to the reason (motivo) as an element of validity of the administrative act, Article 133 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública states that it must be legitimate and exist as it has been taken into account for the issuance of the act; for its part, Article 136 of that same legal body indicates that, among others, those acts that impose obligations or that limit, suppress, or deny subjective rights must be reasoned (motivados), at least with a succinct mention of their grounds (subsection 1), and this reasoning (motivación) may consist, in what is of interest, of an explicit or unequivocal reference to proposals, opinions (dictámenes) or prior resolutions that have determined the adoption of the act (subsection 2). The doctrine properly separates what is the reason (motivo) as a material objective element of the act –background, factual and legal reasons– from what is the reasoning (motivación) of the administrative act –which is the expression of those reasons– that lead to the issuance of the specific act (the former regulated in the first cited article and the latter in the second, see Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto, 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín, Colombia: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. Tomo I, pp. 370 and 387)" (sic). In accordance with the transcribed article and case law, it is clear that the reasoning (motivación) of an administrative act can be provided through reference to an opinion (dictamen); as happened in this matter, so there is no violation of the legal system in that sense. Furthermore, the Ley General de la Administración Pública also regulates in which cases the nullity of the proceedings may be declared. Thus, Article 223 establishes: "1.- Only the omission of substantial formalities of the procedure shall cause nullity of the proceedings. / 2.- A formality shall be understood as substantial if its correct performance would have prevented or changed the final decision in important aspects, or if its omission caused defenselessness (indefensión)." In the case under analysis, the nullity sought is not appropriate. Firstly, because we are not in the presence of the scenarios contemplated in this article, since the fact that the General Manager adopted the report rendered by the Dirección Jurídica as his own in no way changes the final decision taken in the administrative proceeding. In addition to this, it is not evident from the case file that the plaintiff's right of defense was limited. On the contrary, she has been able to exercise it fully. Note that within the administrative procedure, the evidence offered by her was admitted, she participated in the hearings held, and even had legal counsel. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición)", in accordance with the provisions of Article 345 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and a "motion for review (recurso de revisión)", as provided for in Article 353, subsection a, idem, against resolution No. GG-110-17 (images 702-733 of the full view of the court's electronic file); whose nullity she seeks through judicial means. Moreover, it is considered that in this matter, it was not necessary for the General Manager to set forth all the vicissitudes of the procedure followed, as the plaintiff intends, insofar as it was based on the opinion (dictamen) D.J.829-2017 rendered by the Dirección Jurídica, which clearly, in detail, and extensively set forth the reasons why the plaintiff's dismissal was recommended; which, as can be deduced from the resolution, was attached thereto (image 634 idem). In any case, from the challenged document it is indeed possible to extract why the plaintiff was dismissed, so it is not true that she was left defenseless. The General Manager of the defendant declared: "This General Management resolves the tie situation that arose at the time of issuing the final act of procedure 2015-07-059 in which [she] was investigated for repeated behaviors documented in the audit report AGPN-RH-002-2014, all these actions contrary to her obligations as a Bank employee. / Having as a basis the opinion (dictamen) D.J.829-2017 from the Dirección Jurídica, which I share and endorse, and a copy of which I attach to this resolution, in accordance with Article 136 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, it is decided to impose the disciplinary sanction of Dismissal without employer liability for Loss of Confidence, a cause established in subsection L of Article 81 of the Código de Trabajo, for her demonstrated responsibility in the investigated facts. Against this resolution, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) may be filed in the terms of Article 345 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública" (sic. Image 633 ibidem). Finally, the appellant is incorrect in indicating that in her case it was ordered that the detected actions constitute serious breaches of her duties, but the violated rules were not specified. Upon reviewing the case file, it is observed that both the official letter GG-111-2017 and the report of the Dirección Jurídica pointed out the contravened provisions. In that sense, the first document referred to Article 81, subsection l), of the Código de Trabajo, and the second, in Section IV, titled "Fundamento legal", listed in detail the regulatory bodies violated (images 681-382 ibidem).

**VIII.- FINAL CONSIDERATION:** As a corollary of the foregoing, as there is no objection whatsoever to be made to the appealed judgment in the terms set forth in the appeal, it is appropriate to dismiss the appeal (declarar sin lugar el recurso).

**POR TANTO:** The appeal filed is dismissed.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia** Res: 2020-001279 PROJASM/SHERRERAC 1 ***180006760641LA*** **Corte Suprema de Justicia** **SALA SEGUNDA** **Exp: 18-000676-0641-LA** **Res: 2020-001279** **SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at ten o'clock on the tenth of July, two thousand twenty.

Ordinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of Cartago, by [Name 001], platform operator and resident of Cartago, against the **BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA**, represented by its generalísima attorney-in-fact, Rosaysella Ulloa Villalobos, married, deputy general manager of development and people. The respondent's special judicial attorney-in-fact is María Yocelin Quesada Porras, single. All of age and residents of Alajuela, with the exceptions noted.

**Drafted by Magistrate Olaso Álvarez; and,** **CONSIDERANDO:** **I.- ANTECEDENTES:** The plaintiff stated that she provided her services to the respondent, as [...], for ten years. According to her indication, in 2014, the General Audit Office prepared report AGPN-RH-002-2014 called *"Alleged breach of laws and regulations in the processing of credit operations and in procedures carried out in the cashier system-strategic sector of Cartago"*; on December 15 of that year, she was suspended for six months and upon expiration of that term, that measure was extended for the same period; on August 24, 2015, she was notified of the statement of charges, in the case proceeding under expediente number 2015-07-059; on December 28, 2016, the final report of the investigating body was sent to the Labor Relations Board and on March 21, 2017, her dismissal was ordered, under cause l) of article 81 of the Labor Code. She requested that the illegality of her dismissal and the nullity of all actions taken within the administrative disciplinary procedure be declared; that her reinstatement to the position she held before the termination be ordered, along with the payment of lost wages from the end of the employment relationship until the judgment becomes final; that the statute of limitations of numeral 414 of the Labor Code (ordinal 603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343) be upheld; that she be paid eighteen million colones for non-material damage (daño moral), interest, indexation, worker-employer contributions, and costs of both instances. In the alternative, she requested the payment of notice, severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), and back pay (salarios caídos) (images 2-13 of the full view of the Court's electronic expediente).

The Bank's general judicial attorney answered in the negative and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of active and passive standing (images 812-913 *ibidem*). The Labor Court of Cartago, through judgment No. 61, at 11:26 a.m. on February 6, 2019, declared the claim without merit and resolved with no special award of costs (images 1829-1848 *ibidem*).

**II.- GROUNDS FOR APPEAL:** The plaintiff disagrees with the decision. **Procedural grounds.** *First*: lack of a clear and precise determination of the facts proven by the court and lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning in the judgment. She argues that the Court did not consider that the defendant contravened the provisions of Article 68 of the Collective Labor Agreement (*Convención Colectiva de Trabajo*), since she was suspended for eight months and nine days, and said provision establishes that in administrative sanctioning procedures, suspension is appropriate—as a precautionary measure—for three months, extendable only once for three more months. Based on the foregoing, she considers the proceedings to be null and void and that this should be ordered, because it violated the due process established in the collective instrument. She states that the collective agreement is law between the parties and that the only way to not apply it is upon its expiration or if it is declared unconstitutional. She alleges unjustified delay in the administrative procedure, since its processing lasted one year and four months. She highlights that the Audit Department submitted its final report to the Bank's General Management on June 8, 2015. She considers the principle of prompt and complete justice, regulated in Article 41 of the Political Constitution, to have been harmed. **Substantive grounds.** *First*: she accuses a violation of Article 414 of the Labor Code (603 before the entry into force of Law No. 9343), since the statute of limitations defense was rejected. She points out that the Constitutional Chamber has defined that prior to the initiation of an ordinary administrative procedure, a prior investigation phase or preliminary phase must be carried out. She adds that Audit reports constitute typical examples of this phase. She states that the one-month term contemplated in said article begins to run once the result of the investigation or audit report is made known to the decision-making body. She summarizes what happened in the specific case and requests that the statute of limitations defense be upheld. *Second*: she reiterates that the collective agreement is professional law and that the only way to not apply it is upon its expiration or if it is declared unconstitutional. She again brings up Article 68 of the collective agreement. She alludes that said provision establishes an entire procedure in sanctioning matters, which includes the participation of a Labor Relations Board (*Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo*). She notes that although the opinion of said collegiate body is not binding, the truth is that it cannot be dispensed with. She reproaches that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and reason for being of the Board. She argues that the contested judgment confuses the procedure of the sanctioning administrative body with the procedure followed within the Labor Relations Board. She adds that the participation of the Bank's Legal Directorate was considered as part of the procedure within the Labor Relations Board. She considers that the participation of a Legal Directorate within a process would be in coordination or advisory tasks with Management, but never as part of the formal investigative process. She mentions that the Court did not adjust its judgment as it should have, because it did not draw attention to, much less resolve, that the General Manager failed to meet the procedural deadline of eight days to issue the final act. *Third*: she does not agree that it was stated that the final act is reasoned, as it adopted the report issued by the Legal Directorate. She explains that in a sanctioning procedure there are two bodies, the investigator and the decision-maker, and it is these whose deadlines run. She insists that Management issued the act outside the eight-day term. She asserts that the act that justified the dismissal lacks the essential elements, namely: motive, content, and purpose, and is therefore null and void. She invokes Articles 132 and 133 of the General Law of Public Administration (*Ley General de la Administración Pública*). She highlights that it is imperative that the act indicates the factual premise and the legal provision that supports the adopted content. She says that in her case it was ordered that the detected actions constitute serious breaches of her duties, yet the violated provisions were not specified (images 1851-1861 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file).

**III.- FORMAL GROUNDS FOR APPEAL:** Article 587 of the Labor Code admits the appeal on cassation for procedural defects, in the cases exhaustively regulated therein. Thus, subsection 3 provides as a ground for cassation on procedural grounds the lack of a clear and precise determination of the facts proven by the court, and subsection 5 provides the lack of reasoning or insufficient reasoning of the judgment. The first defect occurs when the factual picture presented in the preceding instances is confusing or contradictory, so that it cannot be known exactly what the judge actually meant. Likewise, this defect is incurred when the list of proven and unproven facts is incomplete, such that the omission negatively affects the analysis of the merits of the matter. In relation to the second defect, it must be noted that the duty to properly reason judicial decisions constitutes an obligation inherent to the fundamental rights of due process and defense. The materialization of the reasons that led the judge to adopt one decision or another is what allows the parties to exercise control over what was decided, through the procedural mechanisms designed for that purpose. In this case, the appellant raises both defects, but the arguments presented in this regard are not related to those grounds. Note that they are directed at the Court's failure to consider that the banking entity contravened the provisions of Article 68 of the Collective Labor Agreement and that the processing of the administrative procedure was delayed. Consequently, the objections do not fall under the invoked grounds or any of the cases regulated in the cited Article 587, not even through reference to Article 471 *ibidem*, and therefore they are not addressed on procedural grounds but on the merits. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that upon analyzing the appealed judgment, this Chamber observes that the Court clearly and precisely determined the facts it deemed proven and, in the fifth recital, extensively and in detail set forth the legal and factual reasons on which it based its decision, and therefore did not incur in the alleged defects.

**IV.- INADMISSIBLE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL:** Article 590 of the Labor Code reads: *"The written document in which the appeal is filed must contain, under penalty of being declared inadmissible, the clear and precise reasons warranting the revocation of the ruling, including the concomitant allegations of nullity deemed of interest. The cassation document must specify in the same manner the reasons for which it is considered that the legal system has been violated and for which the nullity and eventual revocation of the contested judgment are appropriate; the formal claims shall be made first and then the substantive ones…"* In accordance with this provision, for the appeal filed before this Chamber to be admissible, the appellant must clearly and precisely state the reasons on which she bases her grievances against the provisions of the contested judgment. In light of that provision, the reproach that notes the unjustified delay in the processing of the procedure followed in the administrative venue, included in the section titled *"cassation on procedural grounds"*, becomes inadmissible, as it is not directed against the judgment issued by the Court or against the reasoning set forth therein, but directly against the procedure followed by the defendant. On the other hand, it is also alleged that the Court failed to note that the Bank breached what is stipulated in Article 68 of the collective agreement, regarding the time a person can be suspended as a precautionary measure and the deadline Management has to issue the final act. Both complaints are inadmissible, since the corresponding motion for addition and clarification (*adición y aclaración*) was not filed, as required by Article 587, subsection 2, of the Labor Code. It should be taken into account that Article 578 *ibidem* establishes: *"…The addition and clarification shall be limited to the omissions or obscurities of the operative part of the judgment and to the contradictions that may exist between the recitals and the operative part…"* (Emphasis added). In this case, it is argued that the judgment did not refer to these aspects, but the addition and clarification that were pertinent in this regard were not requested; which prevents this Chamber from considering and resolving both objections. In any case, it is not omitted to indicate that upon studying the collective agreement provision, it is not observed that it provides any consequence, including the nullity sought by the plaintiff, in the event that the deadlines contained therein are violated.

**V.- REGARDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:** The appellant objects to the rejection of the statute of limitations defense (*prescripción*) raised in the initial document and, in support of her thesis, invokes Articles 414 and 415 of the Labor Code. Having analyzed the case record, this Chamber reaches the same conclusion as the Court, but for other reasons. To the specific case, as pointed out by the defendant's general judicial attorney in the response, the provisions of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (*Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República*) are applicable, which – in express text – states: ***"Statute of limitations for disciplinary responsibility.** The administrative responsibility of the public official for the infractions provided for in this Law and in the higher control and oversight legal system, shall prescribe in accordance with the following rules: / a) In cases where the irregular fact is notorious, the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the occurrence of the fact. / b) In cases where the irregular fact is not notorious—understood as a fact that requires an investigation or an audit study to report its possible irregularity—the responsibility shall prescribe in five years, counted from the date on which the report on the respective investigation or audit is made known to the head or the competent official to initiate the respective procedure. / The prescription shall be interrupted, with continuing effects, by the notification to the alleged responsible person of the act ordering the initiation of the administrative procedure…"* From the reading of the transcribed text, it is observed that the extended period provided for in said provision applies when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law, or in those contemplated by the higher control and oversight legal system of the Public Treasury (*Hacienda Pública*). In accordance with Article 8 of that same regulatory body, *"The Public Treasury shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to collect, administer, custody, conserve, manage, spend and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative and financial norms, related to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials…"* In that order of ideas, it must be indicated that Article 9 of the law in question defines public funds as all those *"…resources, values, goods and rights owned by the State, by organs, by companies or by public entities"* and the following Article 10 states: *"The higher control and oversight legal system of the Public Treasury comprises the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, responsibilities and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it. This legal system also comprises the norms that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and organs and of private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework."* This control and oversight legal system has as its primary purpose *"…to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Comptroller General of the Republic has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law"* (Article 11 *ibidem*). These last provisions must be read in accordance with what is stipulated in the transcribed Article 8, which expressly includes, as part of the control and oversight legal system, the regulations related to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in these matters, which are undoubtedly provisions that tend to ensure legality through internal controls and efficiency, seeking the efficient and lawful management of public funds. Therefore, it is not just any fault committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, but only the faults committed by persons performing a public function and who, in the exercise of those special duties, infringe either the regulations of said legal instrument or the control and oversight legal system. In accordance with the foregoing, it is necessary to determine who holds the power to collect, administer, custody, conserve, manage, spend and invest public funds. Firstly, it must be noted that a Public Treasury official is not just anyone who has some type of relationship with public funds, but rather someone whose duties are related to the collection, administration, custody, conservation, management, spending, and investment—in general, disposition of public funds—according to the parameters of Article 8 mentioned above. Thus, the need for the official to hold a position in the Public Treasury is excluded, as it is sufficient that they have the aforementioned powers. In this case, the plaintiff was accused of *"breach of laws and regulations in the processing of credit operations and in procedures carried out in the teller system-strategic sector of Cartago"* (Sic. Image 18 of the complete view of the Court's electronic file); an action that violated provisions of the General Law on Internal Control (*Ley General de Control Interno*), the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (*Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública*), the Organic Law of the National Banking System (*Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional*), among other regulatory bodies, as derived from the formal notification of charges made in the administrative venue (images 33-34 *ibidem*). In the second fact of the complaint, the plaintiff stated that her duties were *"basically, of mere institutional information, namely, customer service, assisting with their requirements, whether these were account opening, investment placement, information on their relationship with the Bank, and other similar ones…"* (Sic. Image 2 *ibidem*). In this regard, the defendant responded: *"The Platform position is one of direct attention to the institution's clients, and its main functions include making withdrawals and deposits from client accounts when they appear at the respective office, in strict adherence to Teller and Treasury directives"* (sic. Image 812 *ibidem*). From the evidence provided in the file, it is observed that the plaintiff's duties were not as simple as she described them. In the *"OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES"*, made in administrative file No. 2015-07-059, the following charges were imputed to her: *"Apparently taking advantage of her position as a platform worker at the Cartago branch and her condition as a banking official to influence and another colleague (traffic of influences) and apparently generating an economic benefit in her favor. / Apparently taking advantage of her position as a platform worker at the Cartago branch and her condition as a banking official by authorizing for her own benefit procedures and transactions for her own benefit and that of Mr. Iván D'Avanzo. / Apparently taking advantage of her position and her hierarchical position as a platform worker at the Cartago branch to increase her assets and receive benefit improperly. / Apparently taking advantage of her position and hierarchical position as a platform worker at the Cartago branch, by receiving benefits from loans and their cancellations. / Apparently failing in her duty of probity by not administering public resources in adherence to the principles of legality, effectiveness, economy and efficiency and by not demonstrating rectitude and good faith in the exercise of her duties. The foregoing because she manages and processes loans from which she receives benefits. / Apparently breaching the inherent duties and obligations established in the employment contract. By not performing her work with the appropriate intensity, care and diligence and in the agreed time and place. / Apparently breaching the ethical values and principles regulated in the Code of Conduct of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica conglomerate"* (sic. Images 66-67 *ibidem*). On the other hand, the defendant is a state-owned public bank, regulated by the Organic Law of the National Banking System, the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, and the Political Constitution. Furthermore, it is subject to the oversight of the General Superintendency of Financial Entities (SUGEF) and the Comptroller General of the Republic and, like the other state banks, has the guarantee and most complete cooperation of the State, due to the nature of its function and the public nature of the funds it administers. In accordance with the foregoing, there is no doubt that the statute of limitations period applicable to this matter is that stipulated in Article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and not that contemplated in the Labor Code. Having defined the applicable rule, it is appropriate to analyze the factual situation that was considered proven in order to determine whether the Bank's disciplinary power is time-barred or not.

In light of the facts deemed proven, in 2014 the Internal Audit Office of the defendant prepared report AGPN-RH-002-2014 entitled: *“Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas sector estratégico de Cartago”*; on August 14, 2015, the directing body was appointed; on August 24 of that same year, the statement of charges was served; the oral hearing scheduled for December 1st and 2nd, 2015, was rescheduled—at the request of the plaintiff's attorney—for January 17 and 18, 2016; on December 26, 2016, the plaintiff was notified of the hearing transcript; on January 6, 2017 (erroneously recorded as 2016), the final report of the investigating body was forwarded to the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo; on March 3, 2017, the General Manager was informed of the tie vote that arose within the Junta; on March 20, 2017, the Legal Directorate (Dirección Jurídica) resolved that tie; on March 22, the administrative file was returned to the Junta so that it could notify the plaintiff of the decision—dismissal without employer liability (despido sin responsabilidad patronal)—; the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición) and on April 3, 2017, the Legal Directorate recommended rejecting the challenge (images 1831-1832 *ibídem*). Having analyzed the factual record, it is concluded that the disciplinary power is not time-barred, as it was exercised within the period provided for in Article 71 of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República—5 years—.

**VI.- REGARDING THE JUNTA DE RELACIONES DE TRABAJO:** Before the Chamber, it is complained that the appealed judgment denied the existence, functions, and purpose of the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo and also confused the procedure of the administrative sanctioning body with the one followed internally within that Junta. Although it is not explained where the alleged confusion lies, which makes it impossible to understand the objection with greater precision, the truth is that upon reviewing the decision, what is raised in the appeal is not observed. Regarding this collegiate body, the trial judge stated: *“…Incluso vemos que la aplicación de la norma convencional que establece que una vez recibido por el Gerente General el criterio emitido por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales no es de recibo, porque la potestad sancionatoria –particularmente en entes cubiertos por disposiciones legales expresas- es una facultad inherente al empleador que no puede estar limitada por una Junta de Relaciones Laborales […] De modo que, a pesar de que la Junta de Relaciones Laborales haya valorado la conducta de la actora con empate, esa divergencia de criterios no limitaba la potestad disciplinaria del empleador, por ser una competencia dispuesta por ley…”* (Sic. Images 1844 and 1846 of the complete view of the electronic court file). Moreover, as asserted before the Chamber, the opinion issued by these collegiate bodies is not binding on the decision-making body in a disciplinary procedure. For the sake of completeness, it should be emphasized that what was decided by the Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo is not the subject of debate in this proceeding; therefore, it is not crucial for the resolution of this matter. In another vein, this Chamber considers that the Legal Directorate's intervention in the administrative procedure was intended to advise and support the Management, but not as an additional formal stage within it, so its participation does not render the procedure null.

**VII.- ON THE FINAL ACT:** The appeal objects that the final act was said to be reasoned (motivado). Let us see what was stated on this point in the contested ruling: *“…La falta de motivación del acto sí podría configurar una violación a la garantía del debido proceso; sin embargo, el acto por el cual se dispuso la suspensión de la demandante se encuentra debidamente motivado ya que el Gerente General se adhirió al informe de la Dirección jurídica y lo hizo suyo, en él si se notan los elementos del actor* (sic) *administrativo para asegurar su validez, sea el motivo, contenido y fin…”* (Image 1844 *ídem*). Article 136, subsection 2, of the Ley General de la Administración Pública reads: *“La motivación podrá consistir en la referencia explícita o inequívoca a los motivos de la petición del administrado, o bien a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado realmente la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañe copia”*. This provision was interpreted by the First Chamber in judgment no. 278-F-S1-2017, of 9:40 a.m. on March 16, 2017, as follows: *“…Ha estimado esta Sala, ‘…la existencia y validez de los actos administrativos se encuentra sujeta a la presencia de varios elementos esenciales, establecidos expresamente por el ordenamiento jurídico, a saber: materiales, referente a los elementos subjetivos (competencia, legitimación e investidura), objetivos (fin, contenido y motivo –artículos 131, 132 y 133 de la LGAP y 49 de la Constitución Política) y formales, comprensivos de la forma en que se adopta el acto, sea, el medio de expresión o manifestación (instrumentación),* **la motivación o fundamentación** *(artículo 136 de la cita Ley General) y el procedimiento para su adopción (artículos 214 y 308 de la LGAP, y 39 y 41 de la Constitución). De interés para este asunto, resulta la motivación del acto administrativo. En el voto no. 7390-03, de las 15 horas 28 minutos del 22 de julio de 2003, la Sala Constitucional en relación con la motivación de los actos y resoluciones administrativas determinó: “…es una exigencia del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa, puesto que implica la obligación de otorgar al administrado un discurso justificativo que acompañe a un acto de un poder público… Se trata de un medio de control democrático y difuso, ejercido por el administrado sobre la no arbitrariedad del modo en que se ejercen las potestades públicas, habida cuenta que en la exigencia constitucional de motivación de los actos administrativos se descubre así una función supraprocesal de este instituto, que sitúa tal exigencia entre las consecuencias del principio constitucional del que es expresión, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad de los actos públicos… La motivación del acto administrativo implica entonces que el mismo debe contener al menos la sucinta referencia a hechos y fundamentos de derecho, habida cuenta que el administrado necesariamente debe conocer las acciones u omisiones por las cuales ha de ser sancionado o simplemente se le deniega una gestión que pueda afectar la esfera de sus intereses legítimos o incluso de sus derechos subjetivos y la normativa que se le aplica”. En suma, la motivación implica que las razones por las cuales se dicta el acto deben ser enunciadas formalmente, de* **manera explícita y clara** *. Ante su ausencia, la parte afectada vería lesionado su derecho al debido proceso, puesto que no va a tener la oportunidad de ejercer eficientemente su derecho de defensa, al no contar con todos los elementos fácticos y jurídicos para su impugnación. El artículo 136 de la LGAP, pregona…’ (sentencia no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 15 de marzo de 2012)”*. Further on it continues: *“…Por lo indicado anteriormente, considera este órgano decisor, lleva razón el Tribunal cuando establece lo siguiente: ‘…es claro que en aras de tutelar las garantías del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, es necesario que el acto administrativo se dicte atendiendo a los presupuestos que exige el ordenamiento jurídico. Es por ello, que la Ley General de la Administración Pública prescribe que* **el motivo** *por el cual dicta la Administración activa un acto, debe ser legítimo, por cuanto está supeditado al ordenamiento jurídico, como corolario del principio de legalidad que rige la conducta administrativa y además, debe existir tal y como la Administración lo invoca, toda vez que este elemento sustenta la decisión adoptada que se encuentra íntimamente relacionada con otro elemento esencial del acto, cual es, la motivación. En lo que interesa, cabe señalar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 136 de la ley de cita, todo acto que imponga obligaciones o bien que limite, supere o deniegue derechos subjetivos deberá ser motivado con mención al menos sucinta de sus fundamentos, siendo que ésta podrá consistir en la referencia explícita o inequívoca a los motivos de la petición del administrado, o bien a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado realmente la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañe su copia… Nótese entonces que ante la adopción de una decisión concreta, la Administración debe armonizar los elementos de hecho que constituyen los antecedentes, con el sustento normativo aplicable. Es por ello, que si únicamente al dictarse el acto administrativo se realiza una breve o lacónica alusión a normas generales y hechos inespecíficos, se puede concluir que no hay aporte suficiente de justificación, en la medida en que a partir de ellos no es posible deducir los elementos valorados por la autoridad administrativa para adoptar la decisión, lo cual adquiere la mayor trascendencia cuando se trata de actos limitativos o restrictivos de derechos subjetivos o en los que se impone una sanción al administrado…’”* (Sic). This Chamber, for its part, in judgment no. 1065, of 8:30 a.m. on August 6, 2010, noted: *“…En relación con el* **motivo** *como elemento de validez del acto administrativo, el artículo 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública expresa que este deberá ser legítimo y existir tal y como ha sido tomado en cuenta para la emisión del acto; por su parte, el 136 de ese mismo cuerpo legal señala que deben ser motivados, al menos con mención sucinta de sus fundamentos, entre otros, aquellos actos que impongan obligaciones o que limiten, supriman o denieguen derechos subjetivos (inciso 1), pudiendo consistir esa motivación en la referencia explícita o inequívoca, en lo que interesa, a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado la adopción del acto (inciso 2). La doctrina separa propiamente lo que es el motivo como elemento material objetivo del acto –antecedentes, razones fácticas y jurídicas- de lo que es la motivación del acto administrativo –que es la expresión de esas razones- que llevan a la emisión del acto concreto (el primero regulado en el primer numeral citado y el otro en el segundo, puede verse a Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto, 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín, Colombia: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. Tomo I, pp. 370 y 387)”* (sic). In accordance with the article and case law transcribed, it is clear that the reasoning (motivación) of an administrative act may be given by reference to a legal opinion (dictamen); as occurred in this matter, so there is no violation of the legal system in that regard. Furthermore, the Ley General de la Administración Pública also regulates the circumstances under which nullity of the proceedings may be declared. Thus, Article 223 establishes: *“1.- Sólo causará nulidad de lo actuado la omisión de formalidades sustanciales del procedimiento. / 2.- Se entenderá como sustancial la formalidad cuya realización correcta hubiera impedido o cambiado la decisión final en aspectos importantes, o cuya omisión causare indefensión”*. In the case under analysis, the nullity sought is not appropriate. Firstly, because the conditions contemplated in this article are not present, since the fact that the General Manager adopted the report issued by the Legal Directorate as his own in no way changes the final decision taken in the administrative channel. Added to this, the case file does not show that the plaintiff’s right of defense was limited. On the contrary, she has been able to exercise it fully. Note that within the administrative procedure, the evidence offered by her was taken, she participated in the hearings held, and she even had legal counsel. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a “motion for reconsideration (recurso de reposición)”, in accordance with the provisions of Article 345 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and a “motion for review (recurso de revisión)”, according to the rules of Article 353, subsection a, *ídem*, against resolution no. GG-110-17 (images 702-733 of the complete view of the electronic court file); the nullity of which she seeks in judicial proceedings. For the sake of completeness, it is considered that in this matter it was not necessary for the General Manager to set forth all the vicissitudes of the procedure followed, as the plaintiff claims, since it was based on legal opinion D.J.829-2017 issued by the Legal Directorate, which clearly, in detail, and extensively set forth the reasons why the plaintiff's dismissal was recommended; which, according to what can be inferred from the resolution, was attached thereto (image 634 *ídem*). In any case, the reason why the plaintiff was dismissed can indeed be extracted from the contested document, so it is not true that she was left defenseless. The defendant's General Manager stated: *“Resuelve esta Gerencia General la situación de empate que se suscitó a la hora del dictado del acto final del procedimiento 2015-07-059 en el que se le tuvo por investigado por conductas reiteradas y documentadas en el informe de auditoría AGPN-RH-002-2014, acciones todas estas contrarias a sus obligaciones como funcionario Bancario. / Teniendo como fundamento el dictamen D.J.829-2017 de la Dirección Jurídica el cual comparto y avalo y copia del cual acompaño a la presente resolución, de conformidad con el artículo 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se decide imponerle la sanción disciplinaria de Despido sin responsabilidad patronal por Pérdida de Confianza causal establecida en el inciso L del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo, por su responsabilidad demostrada en los hechos investigados. Contra la presente resolución cabe la interposición del recurso de reposición en los términos del artículo 345 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública”* (sic. Image 633 *ibídem*). Finally, the appellant is incorrect in stating that in her case it was ordered that the detected actions were serious breaches of her duties, but the violated rules were not specified. Having reviewed the case file, it is observed that both official communication GG-111-2017 and the Legal Directorate's report pointed out the provisions contravened. In that sense, the first document referred to Article 81, subsection l), of the Código de Trabajo and the second, in Section IV, titled *“Fundamento legal”*, listed in detail the normative texts violated (images 681-382 *ibídem*).

**VIII.- FINAL CONSIDERATION:** As a corollary of the foregoing, as there is no objection whatsoever to be made to the contested judgment in the terms set forth in the appeal, the appropriate course is to dismiss the appeal.

**POR TANTO:** It is declared without merit the appeal filed.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia** **Res: 2020-001279** PROJASM/SHERRERAC 1 Telephones: 2295-3671, 2295-3676, 2295-3675 and 2295-4406. Facsimile: 2295-3009. E-mails: [email protected] and [email protected]

*180006760641LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2020-001279 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA . San José, a las diez horas del diez de julio de dos mil veinte.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo de Cartago, por [Nombre 001], plataformista y vecina de Cartago, contra el BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA, representado por su apoderada generalísima, Rosaysella Ulloa Villalobos, casada, subgerente general de desarrollo y personas. Figura como apoderada especial judicial del demandado, la licenciada María Yocelin Quesada Porras, soltera. Todos mayores y vecinos de Alajuela, con las excepciones indicadas.

Redacta el Magistrado Olaso Álvarez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: La actora refirió que prestó sus servicios al accionado, como [...], durante diez años. Según indicó, en el 2014, la Auditoría General elaboró el informe AGPN-RH-002-2014 denominado “Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas-sector estratégico de Cartago”; el 15 de diciembre de ese año se le suspendió por seis meses y vencido ese término se le prorrogó dicha medida por el mismo período; el 24 de agosto de 2015 se le notificó el traslado de cargos, en la causa seguida bajo el expediente número 2015-07-059; el 28 de diciembre de 2016 se remitió el informe final del órgano instructor a la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo y el 21 de marzo de 2017 se ordenó su despido, al amparo de la causal l) del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo. Solicitó se declare la ilegalidad de su despido y la nulidad de todo lo actuado dentro del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario; se ordene su reinstalación al puesto que ocupaba antes del cese, el pago de los salarios dejados de percibir desde el término de la relación y hasta la firmeza de la sentencia; se acoja la prescripción del numeral 414 del Código de Trabajo (ordinal 603 antes de entrada en vigencia la Ley n.° 9343); se le cancelen dieciocho millones de colones por daño moral, intereses, indexación, cuotas obrero-patronales y ambas costas. Subsidiariamente, pidió el pago de preaviso, auxilio de cesantía y salarios caídos (imágenes 2-13 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado). La apoderada general judicial del Banco contestó en términos negativos y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación activa y pasiva (imágenes 812-913 ídem). El Juzgado de Trabajo de Cartago mediante sentencia n.° 61, de las 11:26 horas del 6 de febrero de 2019, declaró sin lugar la demanda y resolvió sin especial condenatoria en costas (imágenes 1829-1848 ibídem).

II.- AGRAVIOS: La accionante se muestra disconforme con lo resuelto. Razones procesales. Primero: falta de determinación, clara y precisa, de los hechos acreditados por el juzgado y falta de fundamento o fundamento insuficiente de la sentencia. Arguye que el Juzgado no contempló que el demandado contravino lo dispuesto en el artículo 68 de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo, toda vez que la mantuvo suspendida por ocho meses y nueve días y dicha norma establece que en procedimientos sancionatorios administrativos procede –como medida cautelar- la suspensión por tres meses, prorrogable por una única vez por tres meses más. Con base en lo anterior, estima que lo actuado es nulo y así debe ordenarse, pues violentó el debido proceso normado en el instrumento colectivo. Expone que la convención colectiva es ley entre partes y que la única forma de desaplicarla es cuando acaezca su vencimiento o sea declarada inconstitucional. Alega dilación injustificada en el procedimiento administrativo, por cuanto su tramitación duró un año y cuatro meses. Destaca que la Auditoría rindió su informe final a la Gerencia General del Banco el 8 de junio de 2015. Considera lesionado el principio de justicia pronta y cumplida, regulado en el numeral 41 de la Constitución Política. Razones de fondo. Primero: acusa violación del ordinal 414 del Código de Trabajo (603 antes de entrada en vigencia la Ley n.° 9343), ya que se rechazó la prescripción. Señala que la Sala Constitucional ha definido que previo al inicio de un procedimiento administrativo ordinario se debe realizar una fase de investigación previa o fase preliminar. Agrega que los informes de Auditoría constituyen ejemplos típicos de esa fase. Manifiesta que el término de un mes contemplado en dicho artículo comienza a correr una vez que el resultado de la investigación o informe de auditoría se pone en conocimiento del órgano decisor. Resume lo sucedido en el caso concreto y pide se acoja la excepción de prescripción. Segundo: reitera que la convención colectiva es ley profesional y que la única forma de desaplicarla es cuando acaezca su vencimiento o sea declarada inconstitucional. Nuevamente trae a colación el numeral 68 convencional. Alude que dicha norma dispone todo un procedimiento en materia sancionatoria, el cual incluye la participación de una Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. Apunta que si bien el criterio de dicho órgano colegiado no es vinculante, lo cierto es que no se puede prescindir de este. Reprocha que en la sentencia recurrida se negara la existencia, funciones y razón de ser de la Junta. Aduce que en la sentencia impugnada se confunde el procedimiento del órgano administrativo sancionador y el seguido a lo interno de la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. Añade que se consideró la participación de la Dirección Jurídica del Banco como parte del procedimiento en la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo. Estima que la participación de una Dirección Jurídica dentro de un proceso lo sería en labores de coordinación o asesoría con la Gerencia, pero nunca como parte del proceso formal investigativo. Menciona que el Juzgado no ajustó su sentencia como correspondía, pues no llamó la atención ni mucho menos resolvió que el Gerente General incumplió el plazo ordenatorio de ocho días para dictar el acto final. Tercero: no comparte que se haya dicho que el acto final se encuentra motivado, en tanto hizo suyo el informe rendido por la Dirección Jurídica. Explica que en un procedimiento sancionatorio hay dos órganos, el investigador y el decisor, y es a estos a quienes les corren los plazos. Insiste en que la Gerencia dictó el acto fuera del término de ocho días. Plantea que el acto que justificó el despido carece de los elementos esenciales, a saber: motivo, contenido y fin, por lo que es nulo. Invoca los ordinales 132 y 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Resalta que es imperativo que el acto indique el presupuesto fáctico y la norma jurídica que ampara el contenido adoptado. Dice que en su caso se dispuso que las actuaciones detectadas son incumplimientos graves a sus funciones, mas no se precisaron las normas violentadas (imágenes 1851-1861 de la vista completa del III.- AGRAVIOS FORMALES: El artículo 587 del Código de Trabajo admite el recurso de casación por vicios de orden procesal, en los supuestos que ahí se regulan de manera taxativa. Así, en el inciso 3 prevé como motivo de casación por la forma la falta de determinación, clara y precisa, de los hechos acreditados por el juzgado y en el 5 la falta de fundamentación o la motivación insuficiente de la sentencia. El primer vicio se produce cuando el cuadro fáctico manera que no puede conocerse con exactitud qué fue lo que realmente quiso decir la persona juzgadora. De igual manera, se incurre en esta falta cuando el elenco de hechos probados y no probados está incompleto, de forma tal que la omisión incide negativamente en el análisis de fondo del asunto. En relación con el segundo vicio, debe anotarse que el deber de fundamentar debidamente las resoluciones judiciales constituye una obligación consustancial a los derechos fundamentales del debido proceso y de defensa. La materialización de las razones que condujeron a la persona juzgadora a adoptar una u otra decisión es lo que permite a las partes poder ejercer control sobre lo resuelto, mediante los mecanismos procesales concebidos para ello. En este caso, la recurrente plantea ambos vicios, mas las argumentaciones expuestas a este respecto no están referidas a dichas causales. Véase que van dirigidas a que el Juzgado no contempló que la entidad bancaria contravino lo dispuesto en el numeral 68 de la Convención Colectiva de Trabajo y al tiempo que demoró la tramitación del procedimiento administrativo. Consecuentemente, los reparos no se subsumen en las causales invocadas ni en ninguno de los supuestos regulados en el ordinal 587 citado, ni siquiera mediante la remisión al artículo 471 ibídem, por lo que no se entran a conocer por la forma sino por el fondo. En todo caso, no se omite indicar que analizada la sentencia recurrida, la Sala advierte que el Juzgado determinó de forma clara y precisa los hechos que tuvo por acreditados y, en el quinto considerando, expuso, de manera amplia y detallada, las razones jurídicas y de hecho con base en las cuales sustentó su decisión, por lo que no incurrió en los vicios alegados.

IV.- AGRAVIOS INADMISIBLES: El numeral 590 del Código de Trabajo reza: “El escrito en que se interponga el recurso de apelación deberá contener, bajo pena de ser declarado inadmisible, las razones claras y precisas que ameritan la revocatoria del pronunciamiento, incluidas las alegaciones de nulidad concomitante que se estimen de interés. El de casación deberá puntualizar en esa misma forma los motivos por los cuales se estima que el ordenamiento jurídico ha sido violentado y por los cuales procede la nulidad y eventual revocatoria de la sentencia impugnada; primero se harán las reclamaciones formales y después las sustanciales…” De conformidad con esta norma, para que el recurso presentado ante la Sala sea admisible, la parte recurrente debe exponer con claridad y precisión las razones en las cuales sustenta sus agravios contra lo dispuesto en la sentencia impugnada. A la luz de aquella disposición, el reproche que advierte la dilación injustificada en la tramitación del proceso seguido en sede administrativa, incluido en el apartado titulado “casación por razones de forma ” , deviene en inadmisible, pues no se dirige contra la sentencia dictada por el Juzgado ni contra los razonamientos en ella expuestos, sino directamente contra el procedimiento seguido por el accionado. Por otro lado, también se alega que el Juzgado no advirtiera que el Banco incumplió lo estipulado en el ordinal 68 de la convención colectiva, en cuanto al tiempo en que puede ser suspendida una persona como medida cautelar y el plazo que tiene la Gerencia para dictar el acto final. Ambas protestas resultan inadmisibles, ya que no se presentó la gestión de adición y aclaración correspondiente, tal y como lo exige el artículo 587, inciso 2, del Código de Trabajo. Tómese en consideración que el numeral 578 ídem establece: “…La adición y aclaración se limitará a las omisiones u oscuridades de la parte dispositiva de la sentencia y a las contradicciones que puedan existir entre la parte considerativa y la dispositiva…” (El resaltado es agregado). En este caso, se arguye que en la sentencia no se hizo referencia a dichos aspectos, mas no se requirió la adición y aclaración que a ese respecto cabía; lo que le impide a esta Sala entrar a conocer y resolver ambos reparos. En todo caso, no se omite indicar que estudiada la norma convencional no se observa que esta disponga alguna consecuencia, entre ellas la nulidad pretendida por la parte demandante, en caso de que los plazos en ella contenidos sean violentados.

V.- SOBRE LA PRESCRIPCIÓN: La recurrente objeta que se haya rechazado la defensa de prescripción planteada en el escrito inicial y, en apoyo a su tesis, invoca los ordinales 414 y 415 del Código de Trabajo. Analizados los autos, esta Sala llega a la misma conclusión que el Juzgado, pero por otras razones. Al caso concreto, tal y como lo apuntó la apoderada general judicial del demandando en la contestación, resulta aplicable lo dispuesto en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República que –a texto La responsabilidad administrativa del funcionario público por las infracciones previstas en esta Ley y en el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, prescribirá de acuerdo con las siguientes reglas: / a) En los casos en que el hecho irregular sea notorio, la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir del acaecimiento del hecho. / b) En los casos en que el hecho irregular no sea notorio -entendido este como aquel hecho que requiere una indagación o un estudio de auditoría para informar de su posible irregularidad- la responsabilidad prescribirá en cinco años, contados a partir de la fecha en que el informe sobre la indagación o la auditoría respectiva se ponga en conocimiento del jerarca o el funcionario competente para dar inicio al procedimiento respectivo. / La prescripción se interrumpirá, con efectos continuados, por la notificación al presunto responsable del acto que acuerde el inicio del procedimiento administrativo…” De la lectura del texto trascrito se advierte que el plazo ampliado que prevé dicha norma resulta de aplicación cuando la persona funcionaria pública incurre en las infracciones previstas en esa ley específica, o bien, en las que contempla el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública. De conformidad con el numeral 8 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo, “La Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos…” En ese orden de ideas, debe indicarse que el ordinal 9 la ley en cuestión define fondos públicos como todos aquellos “…recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos” y el artículo 10 siguiente señala: “ El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta. Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional”. Ese ordenamiento de control y fiscalización tiene como finalidad primordial “…garantizar la legalidad y la eficiencia de los controles internos y del manejo de los fondos públicos en los entes sobre los cuales tiene jurisdicción la Contraloría General de la República, de conformidad con esta Ley” (numeral 11 ídem ). Estas últimas normas deben leerse en concordancia con lo estipulado en el ordinal 8 trascrito, el cual incluye, normativa relacionada con el proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos en esas materias, que sin duda son disposiciones que tienden a velar por la legalidad mediante los controles internos y la eficiencia, procurando el manejo eficiente y apegado a la ley de los fondos públicos. Luego, no es cualquier falta cometida por una persona servidora pública la que da lugar a la aplicación del artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, sino únicamente las faltas cometidas por las personas que desempeñan una función pública y que en el ejercicio de esas especiales competencias infrinjan, ya sea las regulaciones de dicho instrumento jurídico o el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización. Conforme lo anterior, es necesario determinar quién ostenta la potestad de percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir los fondos públicos. Primeramente, debe acotarse que una persona funcionaria de la Hacienda Pública no es cualquiera que tenga algún tipo de relación con fondos públicos, sino quien tenga labores relacionadas con la percepción, administración, custodia, conservación, manejo, gasto e inversión -en general, disposición de fondos públicos-, según los parámetros del numeral 8 antes aludido. De esta manera, queda excluida la necesidad de que la persona funcionaria ocupe un cargo en la Hacienda Pública, pues basta con que cuente con las potestades mencionadas anteriormente. En este caso, a la actora se le atribuyó “incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema cajas-sector estratégico de Cartago” (Sic. Imagen 18 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado); accionar que violentó normas de la Ley General de Control Interno, Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, entre otros cuerpos normativos, según se desprende del traslado de cargos realizado en vía administrativa (imágenes 33-34 ídem). En el hecho segundo de la demanda, la accionante expuso que sus funciones eran “básicamente, de mera información institucional, a saber, de atención al cliente colaborando con sus requerimientos, fueran estos de apertura de cuentas, colocación de inversiones, información de su relación con el Banco y otras similares…” (Sic. Imagen 2 ibídem). A este respecto, el demandando contestó: “El puesto de Plataforma es de atención directa con los clientes de la institución, y entre sus principales funciones es realizar retiros y depósitos de las cuentas de clientes al momento en que estos se presenten a la respectiva oficina, en estricto apego a las directrices de Cajas y Tesorerías” (sic. Imagen 812 ibídem ). De las pruebas allegadas al expediente se observa que las labores de la demandante no eran tan simples como ella las describió. En el “OFICIO DE TRASLADO DE CARGOS”, realizado en el cargos: “Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago y su condición de funcionaria bancaria para influir y en otro compañero (tráfico de influencias) y generar a su favor aparentemente un beneficio económico. / Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago y su condición de funcionaria bancaria al autorizar ʻ en beneficio propio ʼ trámites y transacciones en provecho propio y del señor Iván Dʼ Avanzo. / Aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo y su posición jerárquica como plataformista de la sucursal de Cartago para incrementar su patrimonio y recibir beneficio de forma indebida. / Aparentemente aprovecharse en apariencia de su cargo y posición jerárquica como plataformista de la sucursal de Cargado, al recibir beneficios de créditos y sus cancelaciones. / Aparentemente faltar a su deber de probidad por no administrar los recursos públicos con apego a los principios de legalidad, eficacia, economía y eficiencia y al no demostrar rectitud y buena fe en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Lo anterior por cuanto gestiona y tramita créditos en los cuales recibe beneficios. / Incumplir en apariencia con los deberes y obligaciones inherentes establecidos en el contrato de trabajo. Al no desempeñar su trabajo con la intensidad, cuidado y esmero apropiados y en el tiempo y lugar convenido. / Incumplir en apariencia con los valores y principios éticos regulados en el Código de conducta del conglomerado Banco Nacional de Costa Rica” (sic. Imágenes 66-67 ibídem). Por otro lado, el accionado es un banco público estatal, regulado por la Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, la Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica y la Constitución Política. Además, está sujeto a la fiscalización de la Superintendencia General de Entidades Financieras (SUGEF) y de la Contraloría General de la República y, al igual que los otros bancos estatales, cuenta con la garantía y más completa cooperación del Estado, por la naturaleza de su función y la naturaleza pública de los fondos que administra. Conforme lo expuesto, no cabe duda de que el término de prescripción aplicable a este asunto es el estipulado en el ordinal 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y no el contemplado en el Código de Trabajo. Definida la norma aplicable, procede analizar la situación fáctica que se tuvo por probada para así determinar si la potestad disciplinaria del Banco está prescrita o no. En atención a los hechos tenidos por demostrados, en el 2014 la Auditoría Interna del demandando elaboró el informe AGPN-RH-002-2014 titulado: “Presunto incumplimiento de leyes y normativa en el trámite de operaciones crediticias y en trámites realizados en el sistema de cajas sector estratégico de Cartago”; el 14 de agosto de 2015 se nombró al órgano director; el 24 de agosto de ese mismo año se realizó el traslado de cargos; la audiencia oral programada para el 1° y 2 de diciembre de 2015 se reprogramó –a solicitud del abogado de la actora- para el 17 y 18 de enero de 2016; el 26 de diciembre de 2016 se le comunicó a la accionante la transcripción de la audiencia; el 6 de enero de 2017 (consignado erróneamente 2016) se le trasladó a la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo el informe final del órgano instructor; el 3 de marzo de 2017 se le informó al Gerente General del empate suscitado a lo interno de la Junta; el 20 de marzo de 2017 la Dirección Jurídica resolvió sobre dicho empate; el 22 de marzo se devolvió el expediente administrativo a la Junta para que notificara a la demandante lo dispuesto –despido sin responsabilidad patronal-; la actora presentó recurso de reposición y el 3 de abril de 2017 la Dirección Jurídica recomendó rechazar la impugnación (imágenes 1831-1832 ibídem). Analizado el elenco fáctico, se concluye que la potestad disciplinaria no está prescrita, en tanto se ejerció dentro del plazo previsto en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República -5 años-.

VI.- RESPECTO DE LA JUNTA DE RELACIONES DE TRABAJO: Ante la Sala se protesta que en la sentencia recurrida se negó la existencia, funciones y razón de ser de la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo y también se confundió el procedimiento del órgano administrativo sancionador y el seguido a lo interno de aquella Junta. Si bien no se explica en dónde radica la confusión acusada, lo que imposibilita entender con mayor precisión el reparo, lo cierto es que revisada la resolución no se observa lo planteado en el recurso. En relación con este órgano colegiado, la juzgadora de instancia indicó: “…Incluso vemos que la aplicación de la norma convencional que establece que una vez recibido por el Gerente General el criterio emitido por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales no es de recibo, porque la potestad sancionatoria –particularmente en entes cubiertos por disposiciones legales expresas- es una facultad inherente al empleador que no puede estar limitada por una Junta de Relaciones Laborales […] De modo que, a pesar de que la Junta de Relaciones Laborales haya valorado la conducta de la actora con empate, esa divergencia de criterios no limitaba la potestad disciplinaria del empleador, por ser una competencia dispuesta por ley…” (Sic. Imágenes 1844 y 1846 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado). Además, tal y como se afirma ante la Sala, el criterio emitido por estos órganos colegiados no resultan vinculantes para el órgano decisor de un procedimiento disciplinario. A mayor abundamiento, debe resaltarse que lo dispuesto por la Junta de Relaciones de Trabajo no es objeto de debate en este proceso; por lo que no es trascendental para la resolución de este asunto. En otro orden de ideas, esta Sala considera que la intervención de la Dirección Jurídica en el procedimiento administrativo lo fue con la intención de asesorar y dar apoyo a la Gerencia, mas no como una etapa formal más dentro de aquel, por lo que su participación no torna nulo el procedimiento.

VII.- SOBRE EL ACTO FINAL: En el recurso se objeta que se haya dicho que el acto final se encuentra motivado. Veamos lo que sobre el particular se expuso en el fallo recurrido: “…La falta de motivación del acto sí podría configurar una violación a la garantía del debido proceso; sin embargo, el acto por el cual se dispuso la suspensión de la demandante se encuentra debidamente motivado ya que el Gerente General se adhirió al informe de la Dirección jurídica y lo hizo suyo, en él si se notan los elementos del actor (sic) administrativo para asegurar su validez, sea el motivo, contenido y fin…” (Imagen 1844 ídem). El numeral 136, inciso 2, de la Ley General de la Administración Pública reza: “La motivación podrá consistir en la referencia propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado realmente la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañe copia”. Esta norma fue interpretada por la Sala Primera en la sentencia n.° 278-F-S1-2017, de las 9:40 horas del 16 de marzo de 2017, de la siguiente manera: “…Ha estimado esta Sala, ‘…la existencia y validez de los actos administrativos se encuentra sujeta a la presencia de varios elementos esenciales, establecidos los elementos subjetivos (competencia, legitimación e investidura), objetivos (fin, contenido y motivo –artículos 131, 132 y 133 de la LGAP y 49 de la Constitución Política) y formales, comprensivos de la forma en que se adopta el acto, sea, el medio de expresión o manifestación (instrumentación), la motivación o fundamentación (artículo 136 de la cita Ley General) y el procedimiento para su adopción (artículos 214 y 308 de la LGAP, y 39 y 41 de la Constitución). De interés para este asunto, resulta la motivación del acto administrativo. En el voto no. 7390-03, de las 15 horas 28 minutos del 22 de julio de 2003, la Sala Constitucional en relación con la motivación de los actos y resoluciones administrativas determinó: “…es una exigencia del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa, puesto que implica la obligación de otorgar al administrado un discurso justificativo que acompañe a un acto de un poder público… Se trata de un medio de control democrático y difuso, ejercido por el administrado sobre la no arbitrariedad del modo en que se ejercen las potestades públicas, habida cuenta que en la exigencia constitucional de motivación de los actos administrativos se descubre así una función supraprocesal de este instituto, que sitúa tal exigencia entre las consecuencias del principio constitucional del que es expresión, el principio de interdicción de la arbitrariedad de los actos públicos… La motivación del acto administrativo implica entonces que el mismo debe contener al menos la sucinta referencia a hechos y fundamentos de derecho, habida cuenta que el administrado necesariamente debe conocer las acciones u omisiones por las cuales ha de ser sancionado o simplemente se le deniega una gestión que pueda afectar la esfera de sus intereses legítimos o incluso de sus derechos subjetivos y la normativa que se le aplica”. En suma, la motivación implica que las razones por las cuales se dicta el acto deben ser enunciadas formalmente, de manera explícita y clara . Ante su ausencia, la parte afectada vería lesionado su derecho al debido proceso, puesto que no va a tener la oportunidad de ejercer eficientemente su derecho de defensa, al no contar con todos los elementos fácticos y jurídicos para su impugnación. El artículo 136 de la LGAP, pregona…’ (sentencia no. 0000352-F-S1-2012 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 15 de marzo de 2012)”. Más adelante continúa diciendo: “…Por lo indicado anteriormente, considera este órgano decisor, lleva razón el Tribunal cuando establece lo siguiente: ‘…es claro que en aras de tutelar las garantías del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, es necesario que el acto administrativo se dicte atendiendo a los presupuestos que exige el ordenamiento jurídico. Es por ello, que la Ley General de la Administración Pública prescribe que el motivo por el cual dicta la Administración activa un acto, debe ser legítimo, por cuanto está supeditado al ordenamiento jurídico, como corolario del principio de legalidad que rige la conducta administrativa y además, debe existir tal y como la Administración lo invoca, toda vez que este elemento sustenta la decisión adoptada que se encuentra íntimamente relacionada con otro elemento esencial del acto, cual es, la motivación. En lo que interesa, cabe señalar que de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 136 de la ley de cita, todo acto que imponga obligaciones o bien que limite, supere o deniegue derechos subjetivos deberá ser motivado con mención al menos suscinta de sus fundamentos, siendo que ésta podrá consistir en la referencia explícita o inequívoca a los motivos de la petición del administrado, o bien a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado realmente la adopción del acto, a condición de que se acompañe su copia… Nótese entonces que ante la adopción de una decisión concreta, la Administración debe armonizar los elementos de hecho que constituyen los antecedentes, con el sustento normativo aplicable. Es por ello, que si únicamente al dictarse el acto administrativo se realiza una breve o lacónica alusión a normas generales y hechos inespecíficos, se puede concluir que no hay aporte suficiente de justificación, en la medida en que a partir de ellos no es posible deducir los elementos valorados por la autoridad administrativa para adoptar la decisión, lo cual adquiere la mayor trascendencia cuando se trata de actos limitativos o restrictivos de derechos subjetivos o en los que se impone una sanción al administrado…’” (Sic). Esta Sala, por su parte, en la sentencia n.° 1065, de las 8:30 horas del 6 de agosto de 2010, apuntó: “…En relación con el motivo como elemento de validez del acto administrativo, el artículo 133 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública expresa que este deberá ser legítimo y existir tal y como ha sido tomado en cuenta para la emisión del acto; por su parte, el 136 de ese mismo cuerpo legal señala que deben ser motivados, al menos con mención sucinta de sus fundamentos, entre otros, aquellos actos que impongan obligaciones o que limiten, supriman o denieguen derechos subjetivos (inciso 1), pudiendo consistir esa motivación en la referencia explícita o inequívoca, en lo que interesa, a propuestas, dictámenes o resoluciones previas que hayan determinado la adopción del acto (inciso 2). La doctrina separa propiamente lo que es el motivo como elemento material objetivo del acto –antecedentes, razones fácticas y jurídicas- de lo que es la motivación del acto administrativo –que es la expresión de esas razones- que llevan a la emisión del acto concreto (el primero regulado en el primer numeral citado y el otro en el segundo, puede verse a Jinesta Lobo, Ernesto, 2002. Tratado de Derecho Administrativo. Medellín, Colombia: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké. Tomo I, pp. 370 y 387)” (sic). De conformidad con el ordinal y jurisprudencia trascritos, queda claro que la motivación de un acto administrativo puede darse mediante referencia a un dictamen; tal y como sucedió en este asunto, por lo que no existe violación alguna al ordenamiento jurídico en ese sentido. Además, la Ley General de la Administración Pública también regula en qué supuestos cabe dictar la nulidad de lo actuado. Así, en el artículo 223 establece: “1.- Sólo causará nulidad de lo actuado la omisión de formalidades sustanciales del procedimiento. / 2.- Se entenderá como sustancial la formalidad cuya realización correcta hubiera impedido o cambiado la decisión final en aspectos importantes, o cuya omisión causare indefensión”. En el caso bajo análisis, la nulidad pretendida no resulta procedente. En primer lugar, porque no se está en presencia de los supuestos contemplados en este numeral, pues el hecho de que el Gerente General haya hecho suyo el informe rendido por la Dirección Jurídica en nada varía la decisión final tomada en vía administrativa. Aunado a ello, de los autos no se desprende que a la accionante se le haya limitado el derecho de defensa. Por el contrario, lo ha podido ejercer a plenitud. Nótese que dentro del procedimiento administrativo se evacuó la ofrecida por ella, tuvo participación en las audiencias realizadas e incluso contó con patrocinio letrado. Adicionalmente, la demandante interpuso “recurso de reposición”, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el ordinal 345 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y “recurso de revisión”, según lo normado en el artículo 353, inciso a, ídem, contra la resolución n.° GG-110-17 (imágenes 702-733 de la vista completa del expediente electrónico del Juzgado); cuya nulidad pretende en vía judicial. A mayor abundamiento, se estima que en este asunto no era necesario que el Gerente General expusiera todas las vicisitudes del procedimiento seguido, como lo pretende la actora, en tanto este se fundamentó en el dictamen D.J.829-2017 rendido por la Dirección Jurídica, el cual expuso de manera clara, detallada y amplia, las razones por las cuales se recomendó el despido de la accionante; el cual, según se desprende de la resolución, fue adjuntado con esta (imagen 634 ídem). En todo caso, del documento impugnado sí se logra extraer por qué se despidió a la demandante, por lo que no es cierto que se le haya dejado en indefensión. El Gerente General del accionado manifestó: “Resuelve esta Gerencia General la situación de empate que se suscitó a la hora del dictado del acto final del procedimiento 2015-07-059 en el que se le tuvo por investigado por conductas reiteradas y documentadas en el informe de auditoría AGPN-RH-002-2014, acciones todas estas contrarias a sus obligaciones como funcionario Bancario. / Teniendo como fundamento el dictamen D.J.829-2017 de la Dirección Jurídica el cual comparto y avalo y copia del cual acompaño a la presente resolución, de conformidad con el artículo 136 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se decide imponerle la sanción disciplinaria de Despido sin responsabilidad patronal por Pérdida de Confianza causal establecida en el inciso L del artículo 81 del Código de Trabajo, por su responsabilidad demostrada en los hechos investigados. Contra la presente resolución cabe la interposición del recurso de reposición en los términos del artículo 345 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública” (sic. Imagen 633 ibídem ). Por último, no lleva razón la recurrente al indicar que en su caso se dispuso que las actuaciones detectadas son incumplimientos graves a sus funciones, mas no se precisaron las normas violentadas. Revisados los autos, se observa que tanto el oficio GG-111-2017 como el informe de la Dirección Jurídica apuntaron las disposiciones contravenidas. En ese sentido, el primer documento hizo referencia al numeral 81, inciso l), del Código de Trabajo y el segundo, en el apartado IV, titulado “Fundamento legal”, enlistó detalladamente los cuerpos normativos violentados (imágenes 681-382 ibídem).

VIII.- CONSIDERACIÓN FINAL: Como corolario de lo expuesto, al no haber reparo alguno que hacerle a la sentencia impugnada en los términos señalados en el recurso, lo procedente es declarar sin lugar el recurso.

POR TANTO:

Se declara sin lugar el recurso interpuesto.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Roxana Chacón Artavia Res: 2020-001279 PROJASM/SHERRERAC 1 [email protected]. y [email protected]