Statute of limitations on disciplinary power in public employee dismissalPrescripción potestad disciplinaria en despido de funcionario público

*180013380505LA* Supreme Court of Justice SECOND CHAMBER Res: 2022-001989 SECOND CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten fifty-five hours of the twenty-first of July of two thousand twenty-two.

Ordinary proceeding filed before the Labor Court of Heredia, by [Name 001], security officer, against the UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL, represented by its general judicial proxy, Lic. Gerardo Solís Esquivel, married. Acting as the plaintiff's social assistance lawyer, Lic. Carlos Rubén Hernández Aguirre, qualifications not stated; and, as special judicial proxies of the defendant, Lic. Marcos Ruiz Badilla and Lic. Julio García Paniagua. All of legal age and residents of Heredia.

Drafted by Judge Sánchez Rodríguez; and,

CONSIDERING:

I.- BACKGROUND: The plaintiff filed the lawsuit seeking a declaration of nullity of his dismissal, due to injury to due process (debido proceso), non-compliance with deadlines, and violation of trade union immunity (fuero sindical). He sought his reinstatement, with full enjoyment of labor guarantees and conditions (he later withdrew this claim pursuant to a conciliatory agreement adopted as an alternative measure in criminal proceedings). He requested the annulment of the resolutions by which the maximum sanction was recommended and ordered, as well as the one that exhausted the administrative channel. He invoked the statute of limitations (prescripción) and the expiration (caducidad) of the disciplinary procedure. He claimed payment of interest, indexation, and both costs. In the alternative, should reinstatement not be appropriate, he claimed the corresponding amounts for notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). The general judicial proxy of the Universidad Nacional responded in negative terms and raised the defenses of lack of right, lack of interest, and lack of standing. The Court of Heredia, by judgment number 1628, issued at 16:28 hours on October 12, 2018, dismissed the claims and ruled without special sanction on costs.

II.- GRIEVANCES: i.- Appeal of the plaintiff: First, he alleges that the judgment does not meet the requirements of numeral 155 of the former Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) and is therefore null and void. He affirms that the decision leaves him defenseless, as the judge issued a resolution based on subjective criteria. He objects to the ruling and argues that the defendant did not comply with the special procedure to which he was entitled; which, in any case, was affected by the expiration (caducidad) and the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power. He asserts that the rules on evidentiary burdens and assessment that governed before the Labor Procedural Reform Law (Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral) are applicable to this matter. He transcribes the content of Transitory Provision II of said law and states that the decision must be adopted in light of the rules on statute of limitations (prescripción) that were regulated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) prior to being modified by the new procedural law. He argues that the due process (debido proceso) regulated in numeral 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) was not followed; since, from the outset, the investigation was not ordered in accordance with the content of that rule. He notes that by resolution RH-AD-R-023-2015, at 8:00 hours on March 2, 2015, the commencement of an ordinary procedure was ordered. According to his account, he filed a motion for reversal with a subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity against said resolution, in which he argued the right to have the special procedure contemplated in canon 158 of the collective agreement applied to him. This request was subsequently reiterated. The reversal was denied, so the appeal was processed. He reproduces the content of that rule and points out that, by official communication of June 11, 2015, the University Appeals Tribunal referred the file to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), so that it could continue the special procedure provided therein for persons holding union leadership positions. On February 25, 2016, the said Board concluded in favor of acquittal. Despite this, and contrary to the special procedure, it transferred the file to the directing body, which ignored the recommendation made by the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales). He argues that the time taken to resolve reached eight months, thereby exceeding the one-month period regulated in numeral 91 of the collective agreement, which violated due process (debido proceso) and the principle of promptness, without vacation periods being able to suspend the calculation of peremptory deadlines. He asserts that the regulated deadlines were disregarded, since between the resolution at 11:00 hours on February 25, 2016, and the execution of the dismissal, a little over one year and seven months elapsed. He states that the delay violated numerals 225 and 261 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), since even if the deadlines are directory in nature, the Administration cannot take as long as it wants to complete the procedure. He alleges that the rules of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) are applicable to the case, specifically article 603, as it read before the Labor Procedural Reform Law (Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral) came into force, which he reproduces. He indicates that the investigation of the disciplinary procedure must begin within one month after the facts become known, i.e., from the receipt of the complaint. Once the investigation is concluded, the deciding body must adopt the disciplinary measure within one month after being in a position to rule. He affirms that he enjoyed employment stability, pursuant to the provisions of articles 62 and 63 of the collective agreement, which he transcribes. He also reproduces numerals 63, 69, 157, and, again, 158 of the collective bargaining agreement (convenio colectivo). He emphasizes that this last rule was interpreted by the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) and cites the interpretative criterion issued by said body. He reiterates that, based on these rules, he was entitled to have the special procedure provided therein followed from the beginning. The omission incurred by the defendant rendered the followed procedure null and void. He insists that the investigating body should have been, from the beginning, the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales). Thus, if the facts were known to the defendant since March 9, 2015, and the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) began to hear the matter on November 19 of that year, the peremptory period regulated in former article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) expired. He reiterates his arguments regarding non-compliance with the special procedure and the timeliness of the acts. He requests that the appeal be granted, the ruling be annulled, and the lawsuit be declared with merit, with costs to be borne by the defendant. ii.- Appeal of the defendant: Its proxy criticizes that the ruling was made without special sanction on costs, despite the plaintiff having been defeated on all his claims. He transcribes the Court's reasoning on this point and states that the plaintiff's claim required his client to engage in significant procedural activity in the exercise of its defense. He considers that the plaintiff's conduct has been in bad faith, by arguing an alleged injury to due process (debido proceso) and trade union immunity (fuero sindical), without any support. He cites a judicial precedent on the matter and reiterates that the decision limits the possibility of recovering the expenses incurred for handling the process. He believes the pronouncement on this point is not substantiated. He reproduces, in part, several judgments of this Chamber on the subject of costs. Based on these, he argues that the rule in this matter is to order the losing party to pay costs. He requests the annulment of the judgment in this aspect and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs, plus interest until their effective payment.

III.- INADMISSIBLE OBJECTIONS: The appellant alleges that the judgment does not meet the requirements of numeral 155 of the former Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). This is a procedural defect that is not provided for in canon 587 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) as a ground for cassation on procedural grounds. In any case, it should be noted that at the time the judgment was issued, the Labor Procedural Reform Law (Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral) was already in force, which regulates the requirements for judgments in this matter (article 560, Labor Code (Código de Trabajo)).

IV.- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER: This Chamber had the opportunity to hear a matter similar to the present one and concluded that the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power had run, since more than one month had elapsed between the act by which the directing body of the proceeding recommended the maximum sanction and the adoption of the dismissal. The same situation occurs in this case. The precedent referred to is judgment 1150, issued at 11:40 hours on June 28, 2019, in which it was concluded that the statute of limitations (prescripción) period regulated in former article 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is applicable, according to what is provided in Transitory Provision II of the Labor Procedural Reform Law (Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral). Indeed, said transitory rule clearly stipulated that “The new rules on statute of limitations (prescripción) and any other modification that affects substantive relations shall apply to events occurring after their entry into force. The rights and actions derived from events occurring before their entry into force shall be governed by the legal provisions in force at the time they occurred...” In this case, the known events occurred before the entry into force of this law -July 25, 2017-, dating back to the years 2013 to 2015. Now, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period regulated in article 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic (Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República) invoked by the plaintiff in conjunction with numerals 3 and 44 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública) is not applicable. This article 3 refers to the duty of probity of public officials, and article 44 contemplates the statute of limitations (prescripción) period applicable for claiming liability from the official for the violation of the obligations contained in that special law and in the regulations concerning the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). For its part, article 71 of the cited Organic Law, to which this last rule refers, as well as numeral 43 of the General Law of Internal Control (Ley General de Control Interno), provides for a statute of limitations (prescripción) period for the exercise of disciplinary power, which shall be one or five years depending on whether the fault is notorious or not. Thus, that rule is applicable when it concerns the violation of the obligations contained in said law, or those of the superior control and oversight regulations. Regarding the application of this provision, this Chamber has explained: “From the highlighted text it is extracted that the extended period provided for by said rule is applicable when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law or those contemplated in the superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), understood as set out in articles 1° and 8 of the related Organic Law. The Comptroller General of the Republic exercises control over the entities and bodies that comprise the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública), without prejudice to the optional regulation it may deploy regarding other entities. Now, in accordance with article 8 ibidem 'The Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) shall be constituted by public funds, the powers to collect, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend and invest such funds, and the legal, administrative and financial rules, relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials'... In accordance with said numeral, the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) is constituted by two essential components: a) public funds (and everything related to their management) and b) the administrative and financial legal rules relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, control –both external and internal– and the responsibility of public servants in those matters. The law defines what is to be understood by public funds and also by superior control and oversight regulations, which are the express terms contemplated in the related article 71. Thus, canon 9 defines public funds as all those '…resources, securities, goods and rights owned by the State, by bodies, by companies or by public entities'. The following numeral 10, for its part, states: 'The superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública) comprise the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it. These regulations also comprise the norms that regulate the oversight of foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental rule, within the constitutional framework'. Those control and oversight regulations have as their primary purpose '…guaranteeing the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Comptroller General of the Republic has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law' (article 11, ibidem). These last numerals must be read in conjunction with what is stipulated in the cited article 8, which expressly includes as part of the control and oversight regulations the rules related to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in those matters, which are undoubtedly rules that tend to ensure the legality and efficiency not only of internal controls but also the efficient and lawful management of public funds. Thus, it is not just any fault committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of article 71 ibidem. Only faults committed by persons performing a public function in the exercise of those special competencies (management of public funds) and that violate either the regulations of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic or those control and oversight regulations (rules on the budgetary process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, responsibilities in that matter) give rise to an extension of the period for the exercise of disciplinary power. In summary, the period for sanctioning actions or omissions contrary to those specific regulations, which may cause inefficient or illegal management of public funds, is longer than the generic one provided for in numeral 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), since in such cases the five-year period contemplated by that particular rule must apply, which undoubtedly seeks to protect a public interest of great significance, namely the transparent management of public funds”. (Several of the emphases were added). Having clarified the above, it is evident that the period regulated in numeral 71 of the Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic is not applicable to the specific case, since the nature of the attributed fault does not coincide with those intended to be regulated by that special law. Indeed, the plaintiff was attributed with a common fault, so the disciplinary power was subject to the statute of limitations (prescripción) period provided for in article 603 of the former Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). From resolution RH-AD-R-023-2015 at 8:00 hours on March 2, 2015, and the subsequent one, by which the charges were expanded (RH-AD-R-032-2015, at 8:30 hours on March 12, 2015), it follows that the plaintiff was attributed with having presented supposedly false medical incapacity slips, insofar as the insuring entity -Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social- reported that those sent for its study did not correspond to medical care provided to the plaintiff. Consequently, these are not facts related to the management of public funds, violating the rules of the special laws or the control and oversight regulations relating to the budgetary process, administrative contracting, or internal or external control. Therefore, the generic violation of the duty of probity that assists any public official is not sufficient for the special statute of limitations (prescripción) period referred to be applied. Consequently, as stated, the text of the referred article 603 is applicable, which expressly stipulated: “The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment the cause for the separation arose or, as the case may be, from the moment the facts giving rise to the disciplinary correction were known.” In the case of public entities where a procedure must be carried out prior to the adoption of any sanction in general and of dismissal in particular, the reiterated criterion of this Chamber has been that the one-month period regulated therein cannot begin to be counted except once the body competent to order the sanction is in a position to do so. Likewise, it has been indicated that this period must be respected both when initiating the disciplinary procedure and during its course, so as not to incur unjustified delays. In this regard, it is relevant to bring up what was explained in judgment 953, issued at 10:35 hours on November 18, 2011. In said ruling, it was held: “Having reached this point, it is convenient to distinguish between several moments in which the statute of limitations (prescripción) may occur. The first is that the administrative procedure must begin within one month of the facts becoming known. Then, once the inquiry has begun, if it is unjustifiably halted for more than one month, the statute of limitations (prescripción) occurs. The same happens if, once the investigation is concluded and the file is instructed by the investigating body, the decision-maker does not adopt the final act within one month of being in a position to do so (in this regard, review our ruling no. 938-05). It is important to keep in mind that the employer's knowledge of the irregularity that starts the computation of the statute of limitations (prescripción) is that which is qualified, i.e., not superficial or generic, meaning mere rumor or general comment, but must be precise, exact, and certain, particularly when the type of fault is unclear and requires a preliminary investigation or an audit study to determine whether there is sufficient merit to open a disciplinary case (on this topic, see judgments of this Office no. 450-05 and 725-07). In such a case, while the audit reports are being prepared, it is clear that the statute of limitations (prescripción) period does not start to run, but rather begins to run once the result of the prior investigation is made known to the body competent to sanction (in this sense, read pronouncements no. 334-99, 721-04 and 386-06 of this Chamber). Obviously, that preliminary stage must have a reasonable duration, as was pointed out in our vote no. 672-04... As already mentioned, once the employer is aware of the fault, it has one month to implement the respective administrative procedure, failing which the sanctioning power shall prescribe (as was resolved in votes no. 197-09, 353-10 and 249-11 of this Office) ... In a different line of thought, it has already been said that in the public sector the fatal one-month term begins to run after the result of the investigation is made known to the body competent to adopt the final decision (in this regard, study rulings no. 477-00, 1078-04, 143-07 and 752-08 of this Chamber).” In the case under study, the procedure began in a timely manner, once the official communication CERT-RM-0038-2015, at 11:00 hours on February 13, 2015, became known, by which a response was received from the head of Medical Records and Health Statistics of Hospital San Vicente de Paúl, and in which it was reported that the plaintiff had no record of health care at that medical center and that the incapacity slips did not belong to that hospital. Then, the expansion of charges was ordered based on the certification, with identical content, number CERT-RM-0072-2015 of March 9 of that same year. Based on those documents, resolutions SSI-R-05-2015 at 15:00 hours on February 25 and SSI-R-12-2015, at 9:00 hours on March 10, both of 2015, were issued, by which the initiation of the administrative disciplinary procedures –later consolidated– was requested, a request that was accepted in a timely manner. Consequently, the initiation of the procedure and the expansion of charges occurred before one month, regulated in the cited numeral 603, had elapsed, as both resolutions were notified on March 9 and 12, 2015, respectively. By official communication SITUN-AL-135-2015, of March 12, the plaintiff filed motions for reversal with a subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity, while requesting that the matter be referred to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales). By resolution RH-AD-R-045-2015, at 16:00 hours on March 24, 2015, the file was ordered to be transferred to said Board. On the following April 9, the latter agreed to convene a conciliation hearing, to be held on the 16th of that month and year. By brief SITUN-AL-189-2015, filed on April 15, the plaintiff noted that the request made aimed for said Board to investigate the procedure, according to the regulation contained in article 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva). On April 22, the original investigating body ordered the file to be transferred to the Board, according to the result of the conciliation hearing. By resolution RH-AD-R-070-2015, at 15:30 hours on April 28, 2015, it was resolved to deny the motion for reversal against the initial act and to elevate the appeal to the University Appeals Tribunal. On the following April 30, the plaintiff reiterated before the Board that his request aimed for said body to investigate the inquiry. By brief filed on May 8, he gave notice of his request to the directing body. On that same date, he submitted his allegations to the University Appeals Tribunal, before which he reiterated his petition that the Board investigate the inquiry. On the following May 12, he presented arguments before that Tribunal. On June 3, the Tribunal required the plaintiff to prove his status as a union leader. On June 10, the order was complied with. By resolution at 10:25 hours on June 11, 2015, the Administrative University Tribunal agreed to transfer the file to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), so that it could proceed in accordance with canon 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva). In session of November 5, 2015, the Board agreed that it should investigate the plaintiff's case and by agreement of the following November 19, ordered an oral hearing to be held on February 11, 2016. On this last date, the plaintiff presented official communication SITUN-AL-049-2016, by which he reiterated his arguments. The Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales) issued its final recommendation, as recorded in official communication UNA-JRL-RESO-01-2016, of February 22, 2016, through an agreement adopted in an ordinary session on February 18, by which it advised absolving the plaintiff of responsibility and ordering the archiving of the file. Later, it notified the body it considered the directing body on September 5, 2016. From the foregoing, it is noted that between some of those acts and others, more than one month elapsed; however, it has been repeatedly established that the period during which the proceeding remains with a body of that nature, the statute of limitations (prescripción) period does not run. In that sense, judgment 1150, at 11:40 hours on June 28, 2019, stated: “It is important to highlight that from this moment, when the file is transferred to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), the statute of limitations (prescripción) period is interrupted, because the employer is prevented from making a decision, since these Boards are not exclusive bodies of the employer entities or the administration of the institutions or workplaces, but rather an instance of common interest to the employer and its workers, integrated inter partes or on a joint or bipartite basis, for that reason their intervention means that their actions or omissions cannot be attributed directly and exclusively to the employer.” On October 4, 2016, resolution UNA-SSI-RESO-038-2016 was issued, by which the original directing body recommended dismissal without employer liability. However, it was not until resolution UNA-R-RESO-001-2017, at 8:32 hours on January 16, 2017, that the final resolution was issued, ordering the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff, i.e., more than three months after the competent body was in a position to do so. As observed, between the final recommendation and the decision of the competent hierarch, more than one month elapsed, thereby fulfilling, in excess, the period regulated in canon 603 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), requiring the conclusion that the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the disciplinary power has run, without it being necessary to analyze the other procedures carried out subsequently. To that extent, the appeal filed by the plaintiff must be granted, insofar as he alleges an improper decision by the Court regarding the defense raised. Then, given the finding of the statute of limitations (prescripción), addressing the grievances relating to the possible violation of due process (debido proceso) is moot. For the same reason, the defendant's appeal becomes inoperative. Consequently, the judgment must be annulled. In its place, the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked by the plaintiff must be upheld, declaring the disciplinary power time-barred and the nullity of the dismissal.

V.- OF THE WITHDRAWAL: Due to the way it is now resolved, a decision must necessarily be made regarding the withdrawal formulated by the plaintiff, in relation to the request for an order to reinstate him to his position with the enjoyment of his labor guarantees and under the same conditions he had prior to the termination.

The case file shows that on October 7, 2020, the plaintiff filed a brief expressly stating: “Given that this has been agreed to in the criminal proceeding being processed under case file number 19-000015-0513-PE, before the Criminal Court of Heredia (Juzgado Penal de Heredia), in which the undersigned appears as a defendant and the Universidad Nacional as complainant and victim, I hereby withdraw (desisto) the petition for reinstatement (reinstalación) to the position, while the remaining petitions made in this proceeding remain intact.” This filing was submitted before the delivery of the first-instance judgment—October 12, 2018—although it was incorporated into the digital case file two days later (October 14). Pursuant to the provisions of the final paragraph of section 570 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the Court granted a hearing (audiencia) on this filing to the defendant party, as reflected in the resolution of 12:34 p.m. on October 29, 2020, which was responded to by an undated brief, incorporated on November 4, 2020, at 4:49:37 p.m. and from which its agreement can be inferred. Having set forth the above, it is noted that the cited rule, as relevant, states that “what is provided for in civil procedural legislation” is applicable to the figure of withdrawal (desistimiento), without detailing any particularity regarding that figure, except that relating to the said hearing (audiencia). The Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) regulates the relevant matter in canon 56, according to which “Withdrawal (Desistimiento) is permissible before a final judgment (sentencia definitiva). It may refer to all or part of the claims (pretensiones), to one of the parties, or to the opposition... In the ordinary proceeding (proceso ordinario), if it is requested after the statement of defense (contestación), the acceptance of the opposing party is essential. If it is unilateral, the other party shall be granted a hearing (audiencia) for five days, to state whether it agrees with the request, under the warning (apercibimiento) that it will be deemed accepted if it remains silent. In other proceedings, acceptance is not essential.” Therefore, the said claim (pretensión) must be deemed withdrawn (desistida), since the withdrawal (desistimiento) was formulated prior to the delivery of the final judgment (sentencia definitiva) and was accepted by the defendant party when it responded to the hearing (audiencia) granted. The appropriate course, then, is to uphold the subsidiary claim (pretensión subsidiaria) and order the defendant to pay the plaintiff the notice period (preaviso) and the severance pay (cesantía) legally due, which shall be determined in the administrative venue (sede administrativa) or at the judgment execution phase (etapa de ejecución de sentencia) in the event of the plaintiff's disagreement, in accordance with the parameters regulated by the conventional norm and as set forth below. On the resulting amounts, the losing party shall be ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest (intereses legales), as well as indexation (indexación), under the terms indicated below.

VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: In accordance with the reasons given, the appropriate course is to grant the appeal (recurso) filed by the plaintiff. Consequently, it is appropriate to annul the appealed judgment (sentencia impugnada). In its place, the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) invoked by the plaintiff must be upheld, the disciplinary authority (potestad disciplinaria) must be declared time-barred (prescrita), and, therefore, the nullity (nulidad) of the dismissal (despido) must be ordered. The defendant entity must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amounts corresponding to the notice period (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), the calculation of which is deferred to be carried out in the administrative venue (sede administrativa), without prejudice to the plaintiff's ability to resort to the judgment execution phase (etapa de ejecución de sentencia) in the event of disagreement. For the notice period (preaviso), one month's salary shall be granted, pursuant to the provisions of Article 28 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), of supplementary application as provided in numerals 3 and 184 of the collective bargaining agreement (convenio colectivo). For severance pay (cesantía), twenty months' salary shall be granted, according to the rule in force at the time of dismissal (despido) (September 27, 2017), as well as the transitory provision that gradually increased the severance pay (cesantía) cap from fifteen to twenty years up to the year 2017, under the terms regulated in numeral 95 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), according to which: “Upon the termination of any employment contract... the University must pay the worker, or their beneficiaries, as severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), a sum equivalent to one month's salary for each year of work...” It must be borne in mind that the twenty-year cap was declared unconstitutional through vote number 9722, of 12:21 p.m. on May 29, 2019, effective as of June 20, 2019, that is, after the plaintiff's termination (cese). On the other hand, what is regulated in that norm must be observed, in the sense that “For the purposes of calculating the sum to be paid, the average of the three (3) highest nominal salaries of the employment relationship shall be taken and the form of payment shall respect the provisions of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador) (Reforms to Article 29 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), subsection No. 3).” On the resulting sums, the applicable legal interest (intereses legales) must be paid, from the date of termination of the employment relationship until effective payment, according to the rate regulated in numeral 497 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio), in accordance with the referral provided in canon 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and which corresponds to the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva) recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica) for operations in national currency. Likewise, in light of the specific claim formulated, the amounts must be indexed (indexados), from the date of their enforceability until the date of effective payment, according to the same percentage variation in the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area (Área Metropolitana). Due to the way this is now resolved, a ruling must be made regarding the costs (costas) of the proceeding (Article 562 ibid.). In the opinion of the Chamber (Sala), it is possible to resolve the matter without special sanction in costs (costas) insofar as the procedural conduct of the defendant party is deemed to be in evident good faith, in accordance with the regulation provided in canon 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

THEREFORE:

The request for reinstatement (reinstalación) with full enjoyment of guarantees and working conditions is deemed withdrawn (desistida). The plaintiff's appeal (recurso) is granted. The appealed judgment (sentencia impugnada) is annulled. The defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) is upheld and the defendant's disciplinary authority (potestad disciplinaria) is declared time-barred (prescrita), ordering the nullity of the dismissal (despido). The Universidad Nacional is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amounts corresponding to notice period (preaviso) and severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), the calculation of which is deferred to be carried out in the administrative venue (sede administrativa), without prejudice that, in the event of disagreement, the plaintiff may resort to the judgment execution phase (etapa de ejecución de sentencia). For notice period (preaviso), one month's salary is granted, under the terms regulated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). For severance assistance (auxilio de cesantía), twenty months' salary is granted, which shall be calculated according to the content of Article ninety-five of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), according to the text in force at the date of dismissal (despido). On the resulting amounts, the defendant is ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest (intereses legales), from the date of dismissal (despido) until effective payment, according to the basic passive rate (tasa básica pasiva) recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Banco Central de Costa Rica) for operations in national currency. The resulting amounts must also be indexed (indexadas), from their demand until cancellation, according to the same percentage variation in the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area (Área Metropolitana). It is resolved without special sanction in costs (costas). As it is moot, no ruling is made regarding the appeal (recurso) of the defendant party.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Olman Gerardo Ugalde González Res: 2022-001989 GGONZALEZ/RPC 1 It reproduces the content of that regulation and notes that, by official communication of June 11, 2015, the University Appeals Tribunal referred the case file to the Labor Relations Board, so that it could continue the special procedure provided for in said regulation for persons holding union leadership positions. On February 25, 2016, the aforementioned Board concluded in favor of acquittal. Despite this, contrary to the special procedure, it transferred the case file to the directing body, which completely ignored the recommendation made by the Labor Relations Board. It argues that the deadline for reaching a decision reached eight months, thereby exceeding the one-month period regulated in clause 91 of the collective bargaining agreement, which violated due process and the principle of celerity, without vacation periods being able to suspend the calculation of peremptory deadlines. It asserts that the regulated deadlines were disrespected, since slightly more than one year and seven months elapsed between the resolution of 11:00 a.m. on February 25, 2016, and the execution of the dismissal. It states that the delay transgressed clauses 225 and 261 of the *Ley General de la Administración Pública*, since even though the deadlines are of a directory nature, the Administration cannot take as long as it wants to complete the procedure. It alleges that the regulations of the *Código de Trabajo* are applicable to the case, specifically article 603, according to the text it had prior to the entry into force of the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral*, which it reproduces. It indicates that the investigation (instrucción) of the disciplinary procedure must begin within one month following the moment the facts are known, that is, from when the complaint is received. Once the investigation (instrucción) is concluded, the decision-making body must adopt the disciplinary measure within the following month from the moment it was in a position to issue a ruling. It affirms that it enjoyed employment stability, in accordance with the provisions of conventional articles 62 and 63, which it transcribes. It also reproduces clauses 63, 69, 157, and, again, 158 of the collective bargaining agreement. It highlights that this last norm was interpreted by the Labor Relations Board and cites the interpretative criterion issued by said body. It reiterates that, based on those norms, it had the right to be subjected, from the outset, to the special procedure provided for therein. The omission incurred by the respondent rendered the completed proceedings null. It insists that the investigating body should have been, from the beginning, the Labor Relations Board. In this way, if the facts were known by the respondent as of March 9, 2015, and the Labor Relations Board began hearing the case on November 19 of that year, the peremptory deadline regulated in the former article 603 of the *Código de Trabajo* elapsed. It reiterates its arguments regarding the non-compliance with the special procedure and the timeliness of the acts. It requests that the appeal be granted, the ruling be annulled, and the lawsuit be declared with merit, with costs to be borne by the respondent. **ii.- Appeal of the defendant:** Its legal representative objects to the fact that the judgment was rendered without a special sanction regarding costs, despite the plaintiff having been defeated in all its claims. It transcribes the Court's reasoning on this particular point and states that the plaintiff's claim required its client to deploy significant procedural activity in the exercise of its defense. It considers that the plaintiff's conduct has been in bad faith, by arguing an alleged injury to due process and union privilege (fuero sindical), without any basis whatsoever. It cites a judicial precedent on the subject and reiterates that the decision curtails the possibility of being reimbursed for the expenses it had to incur for handling the proceedings. It deems that the pronouncement on this particular point is unfounded. It reproduces, in part, several rulings of this Chamber on the subject of costs. Based on these, it states that the rule in this matter is to order the losing party to pay costs. It requests the reversal of the judgment in this aspect and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs, plus interest until their effective payment.

**III.- INADMISSIBLE OBJECTIONS:** The appellant alleges that the judgment does not meet the requirements of clause 155 of the former *Código Procesal Civil*. This is a procedural defect that is not provided for in canon 587 of the *Código de Trabajo* as a ground for cassation on form. In any case, it should be noted that at the time the judgment was rendered, the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral* was already in force, which regulates the requirements for a judgment in this matter (article 560, *Código de Trabajo*).

**IV.- PRESCRIPTION OF THE DISCIPLINARY POWER:** This Chamber had the opportunity to hear a matter similar to the present one and concluded that the disciplinary power had prescribed, as more than one month had elapsed between the act by which the directing body of the process recommended the maximum sanction and the adoption of the dismissal. The same situation occurs in this case. The precedent to which reference is made is ruling 1150, handed down at 11:40 a.m. on June 28, 2019, in which it was concluded that the prescription period regulated in the former article 603 of the *Código de Trabajo* is applicable, in accordance with the provisions of Transitional Provision II of the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral*. Indeed, said transitory norm clearly stipulated that *"The new rules on prescription and any other modification affecting substantive relations shall apply to events occurring after their entry into force. The rights and actions derived from events occurring before their entry into force shall be governed by the legal provisions in force at the time they occurred..."* In this case, events that occurred before the entry into force of this law –July 25, 2017– are known, dating back to the years 2013 to 2015. That being said, the prescription period regulated in article 71 of the *Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República* invoked by the plaintiff in conjunction with clauses 3 and 44 of the *Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública* is not applicable. This article 3 refers to the duty of probity of public officials, and article 44 contemplates the applicable prescription period for claiming liability from the official for the breach of the obligations contained in that special law and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury (Hacienda Pública). For its part, article 71 of the cited *Ley Orgánica*, to which this latter norm refers, as well as clause 43 of the *Ley General de Control Interno*, provides for a prescription period for the exercise of the disciplinary power, which shall be one or five years depending on the notorious or non-notorious nature of the fault. Therefore, that rule is applicable when it concerns the breach of the obligations contained in said law, or those of the superior control and oversight regulations. Regarding the application of this provision, this Chamber has explained: *"From the highlighted text it is extracted that* ***the extended period provided for by said norm is applicable when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law or in those contemplated by the superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury, it is understood*** *, as regulated in articles 1 and 8 of the related Ley Orgánica. The Contraloría General de la República exercises control over the entities and bodies that make up the Public Treasury, without prejudice to the facultative regulation it may deploy with respect to other entities. That being said, in accordance with article 8, ibid, 'The* ***Public Treasury*** *shall be constituted by the* ***public funds*** *, the powers to collect, administer, guard, conserve, manage, spend, and invest such funds* ***and the legal, administrative, and financial rules relating to the budget process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials** '... Pursuant to said clause, the Public Treasury is constituted by two essential components:* ***a)*** *public funds (and everything related to their management) and* ***b)*** *the legal rules of an administrative and financial nature relating to the budget process, administrative procurement, control –both external and internal– and the responsibility of public servants in those matters. The law is responsible for defining what is to be understood by public funds and also by the superior control and oversight regulations, which are the express terms contemplated in related article 71. Thus, canon 9 defines public funds as all those '...resources, securities, assets, and rights owned by the State, bodies, companies, or public entities.' Clause 10 following, for its part, states: 'The superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury comprise the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relations, procedures, responsibilities, and sanctions derived from that oversight or necessary for it. These regulations also comprise the norms that regulate oversight over foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, referred to in this Law, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework.' That control and oversight regulatory framework has as its primary purpose '...to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and the management of public funds in the entities over which the Contraloría General de la República has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law' (article 11, ibid). These latter clauses must be read in conjunction with the stipulations in cited article 8, which expressly includes as part of the control and oversight regulations the norms related to the budget process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, and the responsibility of public officials in those matters, which are undoubtedly norms that tend to ensure the legality and efficiency not only of internal controls but also the efficient and law-abiding management of public funds.* ***Thus, it is not any fault committed by a public servant that gives rise to the application of article 71, ibid. It is only the faults committed by persons performing a public function in the exercise of those special competencies (management of public funds) and that infringe either the regulations of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República or those control and oversight regulations (rules on the budget process, administrative procurement, internal and external control, responsibilities in that matter) that give rise to an extension of the deadline for the exercise of the disciplinary power.** *In summary, the period for sanctioning the actions or omissions contrary to those specific regulations,* ***which may cause inefficient or illegal management of public funds** , is longer than the generic one provided for in clause 603 of the Código de Trabajo, since in such cases the five-year period contemplated by that particular norm must be applied, which undoubtedly seeks to protect a public interest of great significance,* ***which is the transparent management of public funds** ". (Several of the emphases were added). Having clarified the above, it is evident that the period regulated in clause 71 of the *Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República* is not applicable to this specific case, since the nature of the attributed fault does not coincide with those that were intended to be regulated by that special law. Indeed, the plaintiff was attributed a common fault, therefore the disciplinary power was subject to the prescription period provided for in article 603 of the former *Código de Trabajo*. From resolution RH-AD-R-023-2015 of 8:00 a.m. on March 2, 2015, and the subsequent one, by which the charges were expanded (RH-AD-R-032-2015, of 8:30 a.m. on March 12, 2015), it follows that the plaintiff was attributed with having submitted supposedly false medical incapacity certificates (boletas de incapacidad médica), since the insuring entity -Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social- reported that those sent for its study did not correspond to medical care provided to the plaintiff. Consequently, these are not facts related to the management of public funds, that infringe the norms of the special laws or the control and oversight regulations relating to the budget process, administrative procurement, or internal or external control. Therefore, the generic breach of the duty of probity incumbent upon any public official is not sufficient for the referred special prescription period to be applicable. Hence, as stated, the text of the referred article 603 is applicable, which expressly stipulated: *"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from the moment cause for the separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known"*. Regarding public entities where a procedure must be carried out prior to the adoption of any sanction in general and dismissal in particular, the reiterated criterion of this Chamber has been to the effect that the one-month period regulated therein cannot begin to be calculated until the body competent to order the sanction is in a position to do so. Similarly, it has been indicated that this period must be respected for the purpose of initiating the disciplinary procedure and during its course, in such a way that unjustified delays are not incurred. In this regard, it is relevant to bring up what was explained in ruling 953, handed down at 10:35 a.m. on November 18, 2011. In said ruling it was held: *"Having reached this point, it is pertinent to distinguish between several moments in which the prescription can occur. The first consists of the fact that the administrative procedure must begin within one month from when the facts become known. Later, once the inquiry has begun, if it is unjustifiably paralyzed for more than one month, the prescription occurs. The same occurs if, once the investigation is concluded and the case file instructed by the investigating body, the decision-maker does not adopt the final act within the following month after being in a position to do so (in this respect, review our ruling no. 938-05). It is important to bear in mind that the employer's knowledge of the irregularity that triggers the beginning of the prescription calculation is that which is qualified, that is, not superficial or generic, nor mere rumor or general commentary, but rather must be precise, exact, and certain, particularly when the type of fault is unclear and requires a preliminary investigation or an audit study to determine if there is sufficient merit to open a disciplinary cause (on this subject see rulings of this Office no. 450-05 and 725-07). In such a case, while the audit reports are being prepared, it is clear that the prescription period does not begin to run; rather, it begins to run from the moment the result of the prior investigation is made known to the body competent to sanction (in this sense, read pronouncements no. 334-99, 721-04, and 386-06 of this Chamber). Obviously, that preliminary stage must have a reasonable duration, as was pointed out in our vote no. 672-04... As already mentioned, once the employer is aware of the fault, it has one month to implement the respective administrative procedure, under penalty of the sanctioning power prescribing (as was decided in votes no. 197-09, 353-10, and 249-11 of this Office) ... In a different line of thought, it has already been stated that in the public sector the fatal one-month term begins to run after the result of the investigation is made known to the body competent to adopt the final decision (in this regard, study rulings no. 477-00, 1078-04, 143-07, and 752-08 of this Chamber)"*. In the case under study, the procedure began in a timely manner, once knowledge was had of official communication CERT-RM-0038-2015, of 11:00 a.m. on February 13, 2015, by which a response was received from the head of Medical Records and Health Statistics of the Hospital San Vicente de Paúl, and in which it was reported that the plaintiff had no record of healthcare at that medical center and that the incapacity certificates did not belong to that hospital. Subsequently, the expansion of charges was ordered based on certification, of the same content, number CERT-RM-0072-2015 of March 9 of that same year. Based on those documents, resolutions SSI-R-05-2015 of 3:00 p.m. on February 25 and SSI-R-12-2015, of 9:00 a.m. on March 10, both of 2015, were issued, by which the initiation of the administrative disciplinary procedures –later consolidated– was requested, a step that was accepted in a timely manner. Consequently, the initiation of the procedure and the expansion of charges occurred before the one-month period regulated in cited clause 603 elapsed, since the notification of both resolutions occurred on March 9 and 12, 2015, respectively. By official communication SITUN-AL-135-2015, of March 12, the plaintiff filed motions for revocation with subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity, while requesting that the matter be elevated to the knowledge of the Labor Relations Board. By resolution RH-AD-R-045-2015, of 4:00 p.m. on March 24, 2015, the transfer of the case file to said Board was ordered. On April 9 following, the latter agreed to call a conciliation hearing, to be held on the 16th day of that month and year. By brief SITUN-AL-189-2015, filed on April 15, the plaintiff pointed out that the action taken was intended for said Board to investigate (instruir) the procedure, in accordance with the regulation contained in article 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On April 22, the original investigating body ordered the case file to be transferred to the Board, according to the result of the conciliation hearing. By resolution RH-AD-R-070-2015, of 3:30 p.m. on April 28, 2015, it was decided to deny the motion for revocation against the initial act and to elevate the appeal to the University Appeals Tribunal. On April 30 following, the plaintiff reiterated before the Board that its request was intended for said body to instruct the investigation. By a brief filed on May 8, it notified the directing body of its action. On that same date, it presented its arguments before the University Appeals Tribunal, before which it reiterated its petition that the Board instruct the investigation. On May 12 following, it presented arguments before that Tribunal. On June 3, the Tribunal required the plaintiff to demonstrate its status as a union leader. On June 10, the required compliance was fulfilled. By resolution of 10:25 a.m. on June 11, 2015, the University Administrative Tribunal agreed to transfer the case file to the Labor Relations Board, so that it could proceed in accordance with canon 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In session on November 5, 2015, the Board agreed that it should instruct the plaintiff's case, and by agreement of November 19 following, it ordered an oral hearing to be held on February 11, 2016. On this latter date, the plaintiff presented official communication SITUN-AL-049-2016, by which it reiterated its positions. The Labor Relations Board issued its final recommendation, as recorded in official communication UNA-JRL-RESO-01-2016, of February 22, 2016, by means of an agreement adopted in an ordinary session on February 18, by which it advised absolving the plaintiff of liability and ordering the archiving of the case file. Subsequently, it notified it, the entity it considered as the directing body, only on September 5, 2016. From the foregoing, it is noted that more than one month elapsed between some of those acts and others; however, it has been repeatedly established that the period during which the proceedings remain before a body of that nature does not cause the prescription period to run. In that sense, in ruling 1150, of 11:40 a.m. on June 28, 2019, it was stated: *"It is important to highlight that from this moment, when the case file is transferred to the Labor Relations Board, the prescription period is interrupted, because the employer is prevented from making a decision, since these Boards are not exclusive bodies of the employer entities or the administration of the institutions or workplaces, but rather an instance of common interest to the employer and its workers, composed inter partes or on a joint or bipartite basis, for that reason its intervention does not mean that its actions or omissions can be attributed directly and exclusively to the employer".* On October 4, 2016, resolution UNA-SSI-RESO-038-2016 was issued, by which the original directing body recommended dismissal without employer liability. However, it was not until resolution UNA-R-RESO-001-2017, of 8:32 a.m. on January 16, 2017, that the final resolution was issued, ordering the dismissal without employer liability of the plaintiff, that is, more than three months after the competent body was in a position to do so. As observed, more than one month elapsed between the final recommendation and the decision of the competent hierarchical superior, thereby fulfilling, in excess, the period regulated in canon 603 of the *Código de Trabajo*, leading to the conclusion that the disciplinary power has prescribed, without it being deemed necessary to analyze the other steps taken subsequently. In this respect, the appeal filed by the plaintiff must be granted, insofar as it alleges an improper decision by the Court regarding the defense raised. Therefore, as the applicability of the prescription is found to be merited, it serves no purpose to address the grievances regarding the possible violation of due process.

For the same reason, the respondent's appeal becomes moot. Consequently, the judgment must be annulled. In its place, the statute of limitations (prescripción) defense invoked by the plaintiff must be granted, declaring the disciplinary power statute-barred (prescrita) and the dismissal null and void.

**V.- REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL (DESISTIMIENTO):** Given the manner in which this matter is now resolved, a decision must necessarily be made regarding the withdrawal (desistimiento) filed by the plaintiff concerning the request for reinstatement to his position with full enjoyment of his labor guarantees and under the same conditions as before the termination. The case file shows that on October 7, 2020, the plaintiff filed a brief expressly stating: *"Given that it was so agreed in the criminal proceeding being processed under case file number 19-000015-0513-PE, before the Criminal Court of Heredia, in which the undersigned appears as the accused and the National University as the complainant and victim, I hereby withdraw (desisto) the petition for reinstatement to the position, with the rest of the petitions made in this proceeding remaining intact."* This action was filed before the issuance of the first-instance judgment—October 12, 2018—although it was incorporated into the virtual case file two days later (October 14). Pursuant to the provisions of the final paragraph of numeral 570 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), the Court granted the respondent a hearing regarding this action, as recorded in the resolution issued at 12:34 p.m. on October 29, 2020, which was responded to by an undated brief, incorporated on November 4, 2020, at 4:49:37 p.m., from which its conformity is evident. Given the foregoing, the cited provision, as relevant, states that the mechanism of withdrawal (desistimiento) *"is subject to the provisions of the civil procedural legislation,"* without detailing any particularities regarding this mechanism, except for the one related to the aforementioned hearing. The Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil) regulates the relevant matter in canon 56, according to which *"Withdrawal (desistimiento) is permissible prior to a final judgment. It may refer to all or part of the claims, to any of the parties, or to the objection... In the ordinary proceeding, if requested after the statement of defense, the acceptance of the opposing party is essential. If unilateral, the other party shall be granted a five-day hearing to state whether it agrees with the request, under warning of having it deemed accepted if it remains silent. In other proceedings, acceptance is not essential."* Based on the foregoing, the aforementioned claim must be deemed withdrawn (desistida), since the withdrawal (desistimiento) was filed prior to the issuance of the final judgment and was admitted by the respondent when it responded to the granted hearing. It is therefore appropriate to grant the subsidiary claim and order the respondent to pay the plaintiff the statutory notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), which shall be determined in the administrative venue or at the judgment enforcement stage in case of the plaintiff's disagreement, pursuant to the parameters regulated by the conventional norm and set forth below. On the resulting amounts, the losing party shall be ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest, as well as indexation, under the terms indicated below.

**VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the reasons given, it is appropriate to grant the plaintiff's appeal. Consequently, the appealed judgment must be annulled. In its place, the statute of limitations (prescripción) defense invoked by the plaintiff must be granted, the disciplinary power declared statute-barred (prescrita), and, therefore, the dismissal must be declared null and void. The defendant entity must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the corresponding amounts for statutory notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), the calculation of which is deferred to be carried out in the administrative venue, without prejudice to the plaintiff's ability to resort to the judgment enforcement stage in case of disagreement. For statutory notice (preaviso), one month's salary is granted, as stipulated in article 28 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), of supplementary application as provided in numerals 3 and 184 of the collective bargaining agreement (convenio colectivo). For severance pay (cesantía), twenty months' salary must be granted, according to the rule in effect at the time of dismissal (September 27, 2017), as well as the transitory provision that gradually increased the severance pay (cesantía) cap from fifteen to twenty years up to the year 2017, under the terms regulated in numeral 95 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), according to which, *"Upon the conclusion of any employment contract... the University must pay the worker, or their heirs, as severance pay (cesantía), a sum equivalent to one month's salary for each year of service..."* It must be kept in mind that the twenty-year cap was declared unconstitutional by vote number 9722, at 12:21 p.m. on May 29, 2019, effective as of June 20, 2019, that is, after the plaintiff's termination. Furthermore, the provisions of that norm must be observed, in the sense that *"For the purposes of calculating the sum to be paid, the average of the three (3) highest nominal salaries of the employment relationship shall be taken, and the form of payment shall respect the provisions of the Worker Protection Law (Ley de Protección al Trabajador) (Reforms to Article 29 of the Labor Code, subsection No. 3)."* On the resulting sums, the applicable legal interest must be paid, from the date of termination of the employment relationship until effective payment, according to the rate regulated in numeral 497 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio), in accordance with the referral provided in canon 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which corresponds to the basic passive rate recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica for transactions in national currency. Likewise, in light of the specific claim made, the amounts must be indexed, from the date they became due and payable until the date of effective payment, in accordance with the same percentage by which the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area has varied. Given the manner in which this matter is now resolved, there must be a pronouncement regarding the costs of the proceeding (article 562 ibidem). In the opinion of this Chamber, it is possible to resolve this matter without a special sanction for costs insofar as the procedural conduct of the respondent is observed to be clearly in good faith, in accordance with the regulation provided in canon 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

**POR TANTO:** The request for reinstatement with full enjoyment of guarantees and working conditions is deemed withdrawn (desistida). The plaintiff's appeal is granted. The appealed judgment is annulled. The statute of limitations (prescripción) defense is granted, and the respondent's disciplinary power is declared statute-barred (prescrita), ordering the dismissal to be null and void. The National University is ordered to pay the plaintiff the corresponding amounts for statutory notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía), the settlement of which is deferred to be carried out in the administrative venue, without prejudice to the plaintiff's ability to resort to the judgment enforcement stage in case of disagreement. For statutory notice (preaviso), one month's salary is granted, under the terms regulated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). For severance pay (cesantía), twenty months' salary are granted, which will be settled in accordance with the content of article ninety-five of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), according to the text in force on the date of dismissal. On the resulting amounts, the respondent is ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest, from the date of dismissal until the date of effective payment, according to the basic passive rate recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica for transactions in national currency. The resulting amounts must also be indexed, from the time they became due until payment, in accordance with the same percentage by which the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area has varied. The matter is resolved without a special sanction for costs. As it is moot, no pronouncement is made regarding the respondent's appeal.

**Orlando Aguirre Gómez** **Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez** **Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Olman Gerardo Ugalde González** **Res: 2022-001989** **GGONZALEZ/RPC** 1 *180013380505LA* **Corte Suprema de Justicia** **SALA SEGUNDA** **Exp: 18-001338-0505-LA** **Res: 2022-001989** **SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**. San José, at ten fifty-five hours on the twenty-first of July of two thousand twenty-two.

Ordinary proceeding established before the Labor Court of Heredia, by [Name 001], security officer, against the **UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL**, represented by its general judicial attorney, Mr. Gerardo Solís Esquivel, married. The actor's social assistance lawyer is Mr. Carlos Rubén Hernández Aguirre, whose qualifications are not indicated; and, as special judicial attorneys of the defendant, the attorneys Marcos Ruiz Badilla and Julio García Paniagua. All of legal age and residents of Heredia.

**Drafted by Magistrate Sánchez Rodríguez; and,** **CONSIDERING:** **I.- BACKGROUND:** The actor filed the lawsuit in order to have the nullity of his dismissal declared, due to injury to due process, failure to comply with deadlines, and violation of the trade union immunity (fuero sindical). He requested his reinstatement (reinstalación), with full enjoyment of labor guarantees and conditions (he later withdrew this claim pursuant to a conciliatory agreement adopted as an alternative measure in criminal proceedings). He requested that the resolutions by which the maximum sanction was recommended and ordered be annulled, as well as the one that deemed the administrative route exhausted. He invoked the statute of limitations (prescripción) and the expiration (caducidad) of the disciplinary procedure. He claimed payment of interest, indexation (indexación), and both costs. In the alternative, in the event that reinstatement did not proceed, he claimed the corresponding amounts for prior notice (preaviso) and severance pay (cesantía). The general judicial attorney of the Universidad Nacional responded in the negative and raised the exceptions of lack of right, lack of interest, and lack of standing. The Heredia Court, through judgment number 1628, issued at 16:28 hours on October 12, 2018, dismissed the claims and ruled without special sanction on costs.

**II.- GRIEVANCES:** **i.- Actor's Appeal:** Firstly, he alleges that the judgment does not meet the requirements of numeral 155 of the former *Código Procesal Civil*, and is therefore null. He affirms that the decision leaves him defenseless, as the judge issued a resolution based on subjective criteria. He objects to the ruling and argues that the defendant did not comply with the special procedure to which he was entitled; which, in any case, was affected by the expiration and the statute of limitations of the disciplinary power. He asserts that the rules on evidentiary burdens and assessment that were in force before the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral* are applicable to this matter. He transcribes the content of Transitory Provision II of said law and says that the decision must be adopted in light of the rules on the statute of limitations regulated in the *Código de Trabajo* prior to its amendment by the new procedural law. He states that the due process regulated in numeral 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva) was not followed; because, from the beginning, the investigation (instrucción) was not ordered in accordance with the content of that rule. He points out that through resolution RH-AD-R-023-2015, of 8:00 a.m. on March 2, 2015, the initiation of an ordinary process was ordered. According to his exposition, he filed a motion for reconsideration (revocatoria) with an alternative appeal (apelación en subsidio) and concomitant nullity against said resolution, in which he argued the right to have the special procedure contemplated in conventional canon 158 applied to him. He later reiterated this petition. The reconsideration was rejected, so the appeal was processed. He reproduces the content of that rule and notes that, through official communication of June 11, 2015, the University Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal Universitario de Apelaciones) referred the file to the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales), so that the special procedure provided for in that regulation for persons with trade union leadership positions would continue. On February 25, 2016, the aforementioned Board concluded in favor of acquittal. Despite this, contrary to the special procedure, it transferred the file to the directing body, which ignored the recommendation made by the Labor Relations Board. He argues that the time taken to resolve reached eight months, thereby exceeding the one-month period regulated in numeral 91 of the collective bargaining agreement, violating due process and the principle of celerity (principio de celeridad), without vacation periods being able to suspend the calculation of peremptory deadlines. He asserts that the regulated deadlines were disrespected, since a little more than one year and seven months elapsed between the resolution at 11:00 a.m. on February 25, 2016, and the execution of the dismissal. He says the delay violated numerals 225 and 261 of the *Ley General de la Administración Pública*, because even though the deadlines are of an ordering nature, the Administration cannot take as long as it wants to complete the procedure. He alleges that the regulations of the *Código de Trabajo* are applicable to the case, specifically article 603, according to the text it had prior to the entry into force of the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral*, which he reproduces. He indicates that the investigation phase of the disciplinary procedure must begin within one month after becoming aware of the facts, that is, from the receipt of the complaint. Once the investigation is concluded, the decision-making body must adopt the disciplinary measure within one month from the moment it was able to rule. He affirms that he enjoyed employment stability (estabilidad laboral), in accordance with the provisions of conventional articles 62 and 63, which he transcribes. He also reproduces numerals 63, 69, 157 and, again, 158 of the collective bargaining agreement. He emphasizes that this last norm was interpreted by the Labor Relations Board and cites the interpretive criterion issued by said body. He reiterates that, based on these norms, he had the right to have the special procedure provided therein followed from the outset. The omission incurred by the defendant rendered the procedures followed null. He insists that the investigating body should have been, from the beginning, the Labor Relations Board. In this way, if the facts were known by the defendant as of March 9, 2015, and the Labor Relations Board began to hear the case on November 19 of that year, the peremptory deadline regulated in former article 603 of the *Código de Trabajo* elapsed. He reiterates his arguments regarding the non-compliance with the special procedure and the timeliness of the acts. He requests that the appeal be granted, the resolved matter be annulled, and the lawsuit be upheld, with costs to be borne by the defendant. **ii.- Defendant's Appeal:** Its attorney reproaches that the ruling was without special sanction on costs, despite the fact that the actor was defeated in all his claims. He transcribes the Court's reasoning on the matter and says that the plaintiff's claim required his represented party to deploy significant procedural activity in exercising its defense. He considers that the actor's conduct has been in bad faith, by arguing an alleged injury to due process and to the trade union immunity, without any basis. He cites a judicial precedent on the subject and reiterates that the decision curtails the possibility of seeing the expenses incurred for the attention of the process reimbursed. He finds that the pronouncement on this matter is not substantiated. He reproduces, in part, several judgments of this Chamber on the issue of costs. Based on these, he states that the rule in this matter is to condemn the losing party. He requests the reversal of the judgment in this aspect and that the actor be ordered to pay both costs, plus interest until its effective payment.

**III.- INADMISSIBLE REPROACHES:** The appellant alleges that the judgment does not meet the requirements of numeral 155 of the former *Código Procesal Civil*. This is a procedural defect that is not provided for in canon 587 of the *Código de Trabajo* as a ground for cassation on form. In any case, it must be noted that at the time the judgment was issued, the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral* was already in force, which regulates the requirements for a judgment in this matter (article 560, *Código de Trabajo*).

**IV.- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR DISCIPLINARY POWER:** This Chamber had the opportunity to hear a matter similar to the present one and concluded on the statute of limitations for disciplinary power, given that more than one month had elapsed between the act by which the body directing the process recommended the maximum sanction and the adoption of the dismissal. The same situation occurs in this case. The precedent referred to is Judgment 1150, handed down at 11:40 a.m. on June 28, 2019, in which it was concluded that the statute of limitations period regulated in former Article 603 of the *Código de Trabajo* was applicable, according to the provisions of Transitional Provision II of the *Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral*. Indeed, said transitional provision clearly stipulated that *"The new rules on statutes of limitations and any other modification affecting substantive relationships shall apply to events occurring after their entry into force. Rights and actions arising from events occurring before their entry into force shall be governed by the legal provisions in effect at the time they occurred..."* In this case, known events occurred before the effective date of this law -July 25, 2017-, which date back to the years 2013 to 2015. Now then, the statute of limitations period regulated in Article 71 of the *Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República* invoked by the plaintiff in accordance with numerals 3 and 44 of the *Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública* is not applicable. This Article 3 refers to the duty of probity of public officials and Article 44 contemplates the applicable statute of limitations period for demanding liability from an official, for the infringement of obligations contained in that special law and in the regulations relating to the Public Treasury. For its part, Article 71 of the cited *Ley Orgánica*, to which this latter norm refers, as well as numeral 43 of the *Ley General de Control Interno*, provides a statute of limitations period for the exercise of disciplinary power, which shall be one or five years depending on whether the fault is notorious or not. Then, that rule is applicable when it concerns the infringement of the obligations contained in said law, or those of the superior control and oversight regulations. Regarding the application of this provision, this Chamber has explained: *"From the highlighted text it is extracted that **the extended period provided by said norm is applicable when the public official incurs the infractions provided for in that specific law or in those contemplated by the superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury, it is understood**, according to the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 of the related Organic Law. The Contraloría General de la República exercises control over the entities and bodies that comprise the Public Treasury, without prejudice to the optional regulation it may deploy with respect to other entities. Now then, in accordance with Article 8 *ibidem* 'The **Public Treasury** shall be constituted by the ***public funds***, the powers to receive, administer, safeguard, conserve, manage, spend and invest such funds ***and the legal, administrative and financial norms, relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control and the liability of public officials***'... Pursuant to said numeral, the Public Treasury consists of two essential components: **a)** public funds (and everything related to their management) and **b)** administrative and financial legal norms relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, control –both external and internal– and the liability of public servants in these matters. The law is responsible for defining what is to be understood by public funds and also by superior control and oversight regulations, which are the express terms contemplated in the related Article 71. Thus, in canon 9, public funds are defined as all those '...resources, values, goods and rights owned by the State, by organs, by companies or by public entities.' The following numeral 10, in turn, states: 'The superior control and oversight regulations of the Public Treasury comprise the set of norms that regulate the competence, structure, activity, relationships, procedures, responsibilities and sanctions derived from said oversight or necessary for it. These regulations also comprise the norms that regulate oversight over foreign entities and bodies and private funds and activities, to which this Law refers, as its fundamental norm, within the constitutional framework.' This control and oversight regulation has as its primary purpose '...to guarantee the legality and efficiency of internal controls and of the management of public funds in the entities over which the Contraloría General de la República has jurisdiction, in accordance with this Law' (Article 11, *ibidem*). These last numerals must be read in accordance with the provisions of the cited Article 8, which expressly includes as part of the control and oversight regulations the norms related to the *budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control and the liability of public officials* in these matters, *which are undoubtedly norms that tend to ensure the legality and efficiency not only of internal controls but also of the efficient and law-abiding management of public funds.* **Thus, not just any fault committed by a public servant gives rise to the application of Article 71 *ibidem*. Only faults committed by persons performing a public function in the exercise of those special competencies (management of public funds) and that infringe either the regulations of the Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República or those control and oversight regulations (norms on the budget process, administrative contracting, internal and external control, responsibilities in that matter) are the ones that give rise to an extension of the period for the exercise of disciplinary power.** In summary, the period for sanctioning actions or omissions contrary to those specific regulations, **that may cause inefficient or illegal management of public funds**, is longer than the generic one provided for in numeral 603 of the Código de Trabajo, since in such cases the five-year period contemplated by that particular norm must be applied, which undoubtedly seeks to protect a public interest of great significance, **which is the transparent management of public funds***". (Several emphases added). Having clarified the foregoing, it is evident that the period regulated in numeral 71 of the *Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República* is not applicable to the specific case, because the nature of the attributed fault does not coincide with those intended to be regulated by that special law. Indeed, the plaintiff was attributed a common fault, for which the disciplinary power was subject to the statute of limitations period provided for in Article 603 of the former *Código de Trabajo*. From resolution RH-AD-R-023-2015 of 8:00 a.m. on March 2, 2015, and the subsequent one, by which the charges were expanded (RH-AD-R-032-2015, of 8:30 a.m. on March 12, 2015), it follows that the claimant was attributed with having presented supposedly false medical disability certificates, as the insuring entity -Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social- reported that those submitted for its study did not correspond to medical care provided to the plaintiff. Consequently, these are not facts related to the management of public funds, which infringe the norms of the special laws or the control and oversight regulations relating to the budget process, administrative contracting, or internal or external control. Therefore, the generic infringement of the duty of probity incumbent upon any public official is not sufficient for the referred special statute of limitations period to be applied. Consequently, as stated, the text of the referenced Article 603 is applicable, which expressly stipulated: *"The rights and actions of employers to justifiably dismiss workers or to discipline their faults shall prescribe in one month, which shall begin to run from when cause for separation arose or, as the case may be, from when the facts that gave rise to the disciplinary correction were known"*. In the case of public entities where a procedure must be carried out prior to the adoption of any sanction in general and of dismissal in particular, the reiterated criterion of this Chamber has been to the effect that the one-month period regulated therein cannot begin to be computed until the body competent to order the sanction is in a position to do so. Similarly, it has been indicated that this period must be respected for the purpose of initiating the disciplinary procedure and during its course, so that unjustified delays are not incurred. In this regard, it is relevant to bring up what was explained in Judgment 953, handed down at 10:35 a.m. on November 18, 2011. In said ruling, it was held: *"Having reached this point, it is convenient to distinguish between several moments in which the statute of limitations may occur. The first is that the administrative procedure must begin within one month from when the facts are known. Then, once the inquiry has begun, if it is unjustifiably halted for more than a month, the statute of limitations occurs. The same occurs if, once the investigation is concluded and the file is instructed by the instructing body, the decision-maker does not adopt the final act within the following month from when they are in a position to do so (in this regard, review our ruling No. 938-05). It is important to bear in mind that the employer's knowledge of the irregularity that begins the computation of the statute of limitations is that which is qualified, that is, not superficial or generic, or mere rumor or general comment, but must be precise, exact and certain, particularly when the type of fault is unclear and requires a preliminary investigation or an audit study to determine if there is sufficient merit to open a disciplinary case (on this subject see the judgments of this Office No. 450-05 and 725-07). In such a case, while the audit reports are being prepared, it is clear that the statute of limitations period does not begin to run, but rather it begins to run from when the result of the prior investigation is brought to the attention of the body competent to sanction (in this sense, read pronouncements No. 334-99, 721-04 and 386-06 of this Chamber). Obviously, that preliminary stage must have a reasonable duration, as was pointed out in our vote No. 672-04... As already noted, once the employer is aware of the fault, they have one month to implement the respective administrative procedure, under penalty of the sanctioning power prescribing (as was resolved in votes No. 197-09, 353-10 and 249-11 of this Office) ... In a different line of thought, it has already been said that in the public sector the fatal one-month term begins to run after the result of the investigation is brought to the attention of the body competent to adopt the final decision (in this regard, study rulings No. 477-00, 1078-04, 143-07 and 752-08 of this Chamber)*". In the case under study, the procedure began in a timely manner, once knowledge was had of official letter CERT-RM-0038-2015, of 11:00 a.m. on February 13, 2015, through which a response was received from the head of Medical Records and Health Statistics of the Hospital San Vicente de Paúl, and in which it was reported that the claimant did not record health care at that medical center and that the disability certificates did not belong to that hospital. Then, the expansion of charges was ordered based on certification, of the same content, number CERT-RM-0072-2015 of March 9 of that same year. Based on those documents, resolutions SSI-R-05-2015 of 3:00 p.m. on February 25 and SSI-R-12-2015, of 9:00 a.m. on March 10, both of 2015, were issued, by which the initiation of disciplinary administrative procedures -later consolidated- was requested, a procedure that was accepted in a timely manner. Consequently, the initiation of the procedure and the expansion of charges occurred before the month regulated in the cited numeral 603 had elapsed, since the notification of both resolutions occurred on March 9 and 12, 2015, respectively. Through official letter SITUN-AL-135-2015, of March 12, the plaintiff filed appeals for revocation with subsidiary appeal and concomitant nullity, while requesting that the matter be elevated to the knowledge of the Labor Relations Board (Junta de Relaciones Laborales). By resolution RH-AD-R-045-2015, of 4:00 p.m. on March 24, 2015, the transfer of the file to said Board was ordered. On the following April 9, the latter agreed to convene a conciliation hearing, to be held on the 16th of that month and year. By brief SITUN-AL-189-2015, filed on April 15, the plaintiff made it known that the procedure filed was intended for said Board to instruct the procedure, in accordance with the regulation contained in Article 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On April 22, the original instructing body ordered the file to be transferred to the Board, according to the result of the conciliation hearing. By resolution RH-AD-R-070-2015, of 3:30 p.m. on April 28, 2015, it was resolved to deny the appeal for revocation against the initial act and to elevate the appeal to the University Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal Universitario de Apelaciones). On the following April 30, the claimant reiterated before the Board that their request was intended for said body to instruct the investigation. By brief filed on May 8, they notified the directing body of their procedure. On that same date, they submitted their allegations before the University Appeals Tribunal, before which they reiterated their request that the Board instruct the investigation. On the following May 12, they presented arguments before that Tribunal. On June 3, the Tribunal required the plaintiff to prove their status as a union leader. On June 10, the requirement was fulfilled. By resolution of 10:25 a.m. on June 11, 2015, the University Administrative Tribunal agreed to transfer the file to the Labor Relations Board, so that it could proceed in accordance with canon 158 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In a session on November 5, 2015, the Board agreed that it should instruct the plaintiff's case and by an agreement of the following November 19, it ordered an oral hearing to be held on February 11, 2016. On this last date, the plaintiff presented official letter SITUN-AL-049-2016, by which they reiterated their arguments. The Labor Relations Board issued its final recommendation, as stated in official letter UNA-JRL-RESO-01-2016, of February 22, 2016, by means of an agreement adopted in an ordinary session on February 18, by which it advised absolving the plaintiff of responsibility and ordering the archiving of the file. Then, it notified it until September 5, 2016, to what it considered as the directing body. From the foregoing, it is noted that between some of these acts and others more than a month elapsed; however, it has been repeatedly established that during the period in which the procedure remains in a body of that nature, the statute of limitations period does not run. In that sense, in Judgment 1150, of 11:40 a.m. on June 28, 2019, it was indicated: *"It is important to highlight that from this moment, when the file is transferred to the Labor Relations Board, the statute of limitations period is interrupted, because the employer is prevented from making a decision, since these Boards are not exclusive bodies of the employer entities or the administration of the institutions or workplaces, but rather an instance of common interest to the employer and its workers, integrated inter partes or in a joint or bipartite manner, for this reason its intervention does not determine that its actions or omissions can be attributed directly and exclusively to the employer".* On October 4, 2016, resolution UNA-SSI-RESO-038-2016 was issued, by which the original directing body recommended dismissal without employer liability. However, it was not until resolution UNA-R-RESO-001-2017, of 8:32 a.m. on January 16, 2017, that the final resolution was issued, ordering the dismissal without employer liability of the claimant, that is, more than three months after the competent body was in a position to do so. As can be observed, between the final recommendation and the decision of the competent head, more than one month elapsed, thereby completing, in excess, the period regulated in canon 603 of the *Código de Trabajo*, and it must be concluded that the disciplinary power is time-barred, without it being deemed necessary to analyze the other procedures carried out subsequently. To that extent, the appeal filed by the plaintiff must be upheld, insofar as it alleges an improper decision by the Court regarding the defense raised. Then, having found the applicability of the statute of limitations, it is fruitless to address the grievances relating to a possible violation of due process. For the same reason, the appeal by the defendant becomes moot. Consequently, the judgment must be annulled. In its place, the statute of limitations defense invoked by the plaintiff must be upheld, declaring the disciplinary power time-barred and the dismissal null and void.

**V.- DISMISSAL OF CLAIM:** Given the manner in which this is now resolved, a decision must necessarily be made on the dismissal of claim formulated by the plaintiff, in relation to the request that their reinstatement to their position be ordered with the enjoyment of their labor guarantees and under the same conditions they had prior to the termination. The file shows that on October 7, 2020, the plaintiff filed a brief in which they expressly stated: *"That as agreed in the criminal proceeding being processed under file number 19-000015-0513-PE, before the Juzgado Penal de Heredia, in which the undersigned appears as a defendant and the Universidad Nacional as complainant and victim, I hereby dismiss the petition for reinstatement to the position, the rest of the petitions made in this proceeding remaining unaffected."* This procedure was formulated before the issuance of the first-instance judgment -October 12, 2018-, although it was incorporated into the virtual file two days later (October 14). Pursuant to the provisions of the final paragraph of numeral 570 of the *Código de Trabajo*, the Court granted a hearing to the defendant regarding this procedure, as stated in the resolution of 12:34 p.m. on October 29, 2020, which was addressed by an undated brief, incorporated on November 4, 2020, at 4:49:37 p.m., from which its conformity is inferred. Having stated the foregoing, it is noted that the cited norm, insofar as relevant, indicates that to the figure of dismissal of claim *"the provisions of civil procedural law are applicable"*, without detailing any particularities regarding that figure, except for that relating to the said hearing. The *Código Procesal Civil* regulates the relevant matter in canon 56, according to which *"Dismissal of claim is permissible before a final judgment. It may refer to all or part of the claims, to any of the parties, or to the opposition... In the ordinary process, if it is requested after the answer, the acceptance of the opposing party is indispensable. If it is unilateral, a hearing shall be granted to the other party for five days, so that they may state whether they agree with the request, under warning that it will be deemed accepted if they remain silent. In other processes, acceptance is not indispensable."* Due to the foregoing, the said claim must be deemed dismissed, since the dismissal was formulated prior to the issuance of the final judgment and was admitted by the defendant upon attending the granted hearing. It is appropriate, then, to uphold the subsidiary claim and order the defendant to pay the plaintiff the statutory notice period and severance pay due by law, which shall be determined at the administrative level or at the judgment enforcement stage in case of disagreement by the plaintiff, in accordance with the parameters regulated by the conventional norm and as set forth below. Regarding the resulting amounts, the losing party must be ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest, as well as indexation, in the terms indicated below.

**VI.- FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:** In accordance with the reasons given, it is appropriate to declare the plaintiff's appeal granted. Therefore, the appealed judgment must be annulled. In its place, the statute of limitations defense invoked by the plaintiff must be upheld, declaring the disciplinary power time-barred and, consequently, the nullity of the dismissal must be ordered. The defendant entity must be ordered to pay the plaintiff the corresponding amounts for statutory notice period and severance pay, the calculation of which is deferred to be carried out at the administrative level, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to resort to the judgment enforcement stage in case of disagreement. For the statutory notice period, one month's salary shall be granted, in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the *Código de Trabajo*, as applicable on a supplementary basis pursuant to numerals 3 and 184 of the collective bargaining agreement.

For severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), it must award twenty months of salary, according to the rule in force at the time of the dismissal (September 27, 2017), as well as the transitory provision that gradually increased the severance pay cap from fifteen to twenty years up to the year 2017, under the terms regulated in numeral 95 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convención Colectiva), pursuant to which, "Upon the conclusion of any employment contract... the University must pay the worker, or their legal heirs, as severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), a sum equivalent to one month of salary for each year of service..." It must be borne in mind that the twenty-year cap was declared unconstitutional by vote number 9722, at 12:21 p.m. on May 29, 2019, effective as of June 20, 2019, that is, after the plaintiff's termination. Furthermore, what is regulated in that rule must be observed, in that "For the purposes of calculating the sum to be paid, the average of the three (3) highest nominal salaries of the employment relationship shall be taken, and the form of payment shall respect the provisions of the Worker Protection Law (Reforms of Article 29 of the Labor Code, subsection No. 3)." On the resulting sums, it must pay the applicable legal interest, from the date of termination of the relationship until effective payment, at the rate regulated in numeral 497 of the Commerce Code (Código de Comercio), in accordance with the referral provided in canon 565 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which corresponds to the basic passive rate recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency. Likewise, in light of the specific claim made, the amounts must be indexed, from the date they became due until effective payment, bearing in mind the same percentage by which the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area has varied. Given how the matter is now resolved, a ruling must be made regarding the costs of the proceeding (article 562 idem). In the Chamber's view, it is possible to resolve the matter without a special sanction of costs, as the procedural conduct of the defendant is deemed to be in evident good faith, pursuant to the regulation provided in canon 563 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

POR TANTO:

The reinstatement request with full enjoyment of labor guarantees and conditions is deemed withdrawn. The plaintiff's appeal is granted. The appealed judgment is overturned. The statute of limitations (prescripción) defense is upheld, and the defendant's disciplinary authority is declared time-barred (prescrita), declaring the nullity of the dismissal. The Universidad Nacional is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amounts corresponding to notice (preaviso) and severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), the liquidation of which is deferred to the administrative venue, without prejudice to the plaintiff being able to resort to the judgment execution stage in case of disagreement. For notice (preaviso), one month of salary is granted, under the terms regulated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). For severance pay (auxilio de cesantía), twenty months of salary are awarded, which will be liquidated in accordance with the content of article ninety-five of the collective bargaining agreement (convención colectiva), according to the text in force on the date of the dismissal. On the resulting amounts, the defendant is ordered to pay the corresponding legal interest, from the date of dismissal until effective payment, at the basic passive rate recognized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica for operations in national currency. The resulting amounts must also be indexed, from the time they became due until cancellation, in accordance with the same percentage by which the consumer price index for the Metropolitan Area has varied. The matter is resolved without a special sanction of costs. As it is insubsistent, a ruling on the defendant's appeal is omitted.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Olman Gerardo Ugalde González Res: 2022-001989 GGONZALEZ/RPC 1

*180013380505LA* Corte Suprema de Justicia SALA SEGUNDA Res: 2022-001989 SALA SEGUNDA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del veintiuno de julio de dos mil veintidós.

Proceso ordinario establecido ante el Juzgado de Trabajo de Heredia, por [Nombre 001], oficial de seguridad, contra la UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL, representada por su apoderado general judicial, el licenciado Gerardo Solís Esquivel, casado. Figura como abogado de asistencia social del actor, el licenciado Carlos Rubén Hernández Aguirre, no se indican calidades; y, como apoderados especiales judiciales del demandado, los licenciados Marcos Ruiz Badilla y Julio García Paniagua. Todos mayores y vecinos de Heredia.

Redacta el Magistrado Sánchez Rodríguez; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ANTECEDENTES: El actor formuló la demanda con el objeto de que se declare la nulidad de su despido, por lesión al debido proceso, incumplimiento de plazos y violación del fuero sindical. Requirió su reinstalación, con pleno goce de garantías y condiciones laborales (más adelante desistió de esta pretensión conforme a acuerdo conciliatorio adoptado como medida alterna en proceso penal). Pidió que se anularan las resoluciones por las cuales se recomendó y dispuso la máxima sanción, así como aquella que dio por agotada la vía administrativa. Invocó la prescripción y la caducidad del procedimiento disciplinario. Reclamó el pago de intereses, indexación y ambas costas. De manera subsidiaria, para el caso de que no procediera la reinstalación, demandó lo correspondiente por el preaviso y la cesantía. El apoderado general judicial de la Universidad Nacional contestó en términos negativos y opuso las excepciones de falta de derecho, falta de interés y falta de legitimación. El Juzgado de Heredia, mediante sentencia número 1628, dictada a las 16:28 horas del 12 de octubre de 2018, desestimó las pretensiones y falló sin especial sanción en costas.

II.- AGRAVIOS: i.- Recurso del actor: En primer lugar, alega que la sentencia no reúne los requisitos del numeral 155 del anterior Código Procesal Civil anterior, por lo que deviene nula. Afirma que lo decidido le causa indefensión, en tanto la juzgadora emitió una resolución basada en criterios subjetivos. Objeta lo fallado y argumenta que la parte accionada no cumplió el procedimiento especial al que tenía derecho; el cual, en todo caso, se vio afectado por la caducidad y la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria. Asevera que al presente asunto resultan aplicables las reglas sobre cargas y valoración probatoria que regían antes de la Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral. Transcribe el contenido del Transitorio II de dicha ley y dice que la decisión debe adoptarse a la luz de las normas que sobre prescripción se regulaban en el Código de Trabajo de previo a ser modificado por la nueva ley procesal. Expone que no se siguió el debido proceso regulado en el numeral 158 de la Convención Colectiva; pues, desde un principio, la instrucción no se dispuso conforme al contenido de esa norma. Hace ver que mediante resolución RH-AD-R-023-2015, de las 8:00 horas del 2 de marzo de 2015 se ordenó el inicio de un proceso ordinario. Según expone, contra dicha resolución formuló recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio y nulidad concomitante, en el cual argumentó el derecho a que se le aplicara el procedimiento especial contemplado en el canon 158 convencional. Dicha petición la reiteró posteriormente. La revocatoria fue desestimada, por lo que se le dio trámite a la apelación. Reproduce el contenido de esa norma y apunta que, mediante oficio del 11 de junio del 2015, el Tribunal Universitario de Apelaciones remitió el especial previsto en esa normativa para las personas con cargo de dirección sindical. El 25 de febrero de 2016, la referida Junta concluyó sobre la absolutoria. Pese a ello, de manera contrapuesta al trámite especial, trasladó el expediente al órgano director, el cual hizo caso omiso de la recomendación hecha por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Plantea que el plazo para resolver alcanzó ocho meses, con lo cual excedió el de un mes regulado en el numeral 91 del convenio colectivo, con lo que se violentó el debido proceso y el principio de celeridad, sin que los periodos de vacaciones puedan suspender el cómputo de los plazos perentorios. Asevera que se irrespetaron los plazos regulados, pues entre la resolución de las 11:00 horas del 25 de febrero de 2016 y la ejecución del despido, transcurrió un poco más de un año y siete meses. Dice que la dilación transgredió los numerales 225 y 261 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, pues aun cuando los plazos son de naturaleza ordenatoria, la Administración no puede tardar lo que quiera para completar el procedimiento. Alega que al caso resulta de aplicación la normativa del Código de Trabajo, concretamente el artículo 603, según el texto que tenía de previo al rige de la Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral, el cual reproduce. Indica que la instrucción del procedimiento disciplinario debe iniciarse dentro del mes siguiente a que se tenga conocimiento de los hechos, es decir, a partir de que se recibe la denuncia. Una vez concluida la instrucción, el órgano decisor debe adoptar la medida disciplinaria en el mes siguiente a partir del momento en que estuvo en posibilidad de pronunciarse. Afirma que él gozaba de estabilidad laboral, conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículos 62 y 63 convencionales, los cuales transcribe. También reproduce los numerales 63, 69, 157 y, de nuevo, el 158 del convenio colectivo. Destaca que esta última norma fue interpretada por la Junta de Relaciones Laborales y cita el criterio interpretativo emitido por dicho órgano. Reitera que, con base en esas normas, tenía derecho a que se le siguiera, desde un inicio, el procedimiento especial ahí previsto. La omisión en que incurrió la accionada torno nulo el trámite seguido. Insiste en que el órgano instructor debió ser, desde el inicio, la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. De esa manera, si los hechos fueron conocidos por la accionada desde el 9 de marzo de 2015 y la Junta de Relaciones Laborales comenzó a conocer el 19 de noviembre de ese año, transcurrió el plazo perentorio regulado en el anterior artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo. Reitera sus argumentos en cuanto al incumplimiento del trámite especial y la oportunidad de los actos. Solicita que se acoja el recurso, se anule lo resuelto y se declare con lugar la demanda, con las costas a cargo de la accionada. ii.- Recurso de la parte demandada: Su apoderado reprocha que se haya fallado sin especial sanción en costas, a pesar de que el actor haya resultado vencido en todas sus pretensiones. Transcribe el razonamiento del Juzgado sobre el particular y dice que el reclamo del accionante exigió que su representada desplegara una importante actividad procesal en el ejercicio de su defensa. Considera que la conducta del actor ha sido de mala fe, al argüir una supuesta lesión al debido proceso y al fuero sindical, sin sustento alguno. Cita un antecedente judicial sobre el tema y reitera que la decisión coarta la posibilidad de ver resarcidos los gastos en que tuvo que incurrir para la atención del proceso. Estima que el pronunciamiento sobre el particular no está fundamentado. Reproduce, en parte, varias sentencias de esta Sala sobre el tema de costas. Con base en estas, expone que la regla, en esta materia, es condenar a la parte vencida. Solicita la revocatoria del fallo en este aspecto y que se condene al actor al pago de ambas costas, más los intereses hasta su efectivo pago.

III.- REPROCHES INADMISIBLES: El recurrente alega que la sentencia no reúne los requisitos del numeral 155 del anterior Código Procesal Civil. Se trata de un vicio de orden procesal que no está previsto en el canon 587 del Código de Trabajo como motivo de casación por la forma. En cualquier caso, debe hacerse ver que al momento en que se dictó el fallo ya estaba vigente la Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral, la cual regula los requisitos del fallo en esta materia (artículo 560, Código de Trabajo).

IV.- PRESCRIPCIÓN DE LA POTESTAD DISCIPLINARIA: Esta Sala tuvo la oportunidad de conocer un asunto similar al presente y concluyó sobre la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, al haber transcurrido más de un mes entre el acto por el cual el órgano director del proceso recomendó la máxima sanción y la adopción del despido. La misma situación se da en este caso. El antecedente al que se hace referencia es la sentencia 1150, dictada a las 11:40 horas del 28 de junio de 2019, en el que se concluyó que resulta de aplicación el plazo de prescripción que se regulaba en el anterior artículo 603 del Código de Trabajo, según lo normado en el Transitorio II de la Ley de Reforma Procesal Laboral. En efecto, dicha norma transitoria claramente estipuló que “Las nuevas reglas de prescripción y cualquier otra modificación que afecte las relaciones sustantivas se aplicarán a los hechos acaecidos a partir de su vigencia. Los derechos y las acciones derivados de hechos acaecidos antes de su vigencia se regirán por las disposiciones legales vigentes en el momento en que se dieron...” En el caso, se conocen hechos acaecidos antes del rige de esta ley -25 de julio de 2017-, los cuales se remontan a los años del 2013 al 2015. Ahora bien, no resulta aplicable el plazo de prescripción regulado en el artículo 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República invocado por la parte actora en concordancia con los numerales 3 y 44 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública. Este artículo 3 hace referencia al deber de probidad de las personas funcionarias públicas y el 44 contempla el plazo de prescripción aplicable para demandar responsabilidad a la persona funcionaria, por la infracción de las obligaciones contenidas en esa ley especial y en el ordenamiento relativo a la Hacienda Pública. Por su parte, el artículo 71 de la citada Ley Orgánica, al que remite esta última norma, así como el numeral 43 de la Ley General de Control Interno, prevé un plazo de prescripción para el ejercicio del poder disciplinario, que será de uno o de cinco años en atención a la naturaleza notoria o no de la falta. Luego, esa regla es aplicable cuando se trate de la infracción de las obligaciones contenidas en dicha ley, o de las del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores. En relación con la aplicación de esta disposición, esta Sala ha explicado: “Del texto resaltado se extrae que el plazo ampliado que prevé dicha norma resulta de aplicación cuando el o la funcionaria pública incurren en las infracciones previstas en esa ley específica o bien en las que contempla el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública se entiende, según lo regulado en los artículos 1° y 8 de la Ley Orgánica relacionada. La Contraloría General de la República ejerce control sobre los entes y órganos que integran la Hacienda Pública, sin perjuicio de la regulación facultativa que puede desplegar respecto de otros entes. Ahora bien, de conformidad con el artículo 8 ídem 'La Hacienda Pública estará constituida por los fondos públicos, las potestades para percibir, administrar, custodiar, conservar, manejar, gastar e invertir tales fondos y las normas jurídicas, administrativas y financieras, relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos'... De conformidad con dicho numeral, la Hacienda Pública está constituida por dos componentes esenciales: a) los fondos públicos (y todo lo relacionado con su manejo) y b) las normas jurídicas de carácter administrativo y financiero relativas al proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control –tanto externo como interno- y la responsabilidad de las y los servidores públicos en esas materias. La ley se encarga de definir lo que ha de entenderse por fondos públicos y también por ordenamiento de control y fiscalización superiores, que son los términos expresos que contempla el artículo 71 relacionado. Así, en el canon 9 se definen los fondos públicos como todos aquellos '…recursos, valores, bienes y derechos propiedad del Estado, de órganos, de empresas o de entes públicos'. El numeral 10 siguiente, por su parte, señala: 'El ordenamiento de control y de fiscalización superiores de la Hacienda Pública comprende el conjunto de normas, que regulan la competencia, la estructura, la actividad, las relaciones, los procedimientos, las responsabilidades y las sanciones derivados de esa fiscalización o necesarios para esta. Este ordenamiento comprende también las normas que regulan la fiscalización sobre entes y órganos extranjeros y fondos y actividades privados, a los que se refiere esta Ley, como su norma fundamental, dentro del marco constitucional'. Ese ordenamiento de control y fiscalización tiene como finalidad primordial '…garantizar la legalidad y la eficiencia de los controles internos y del manejo de los fondos públicos en los entes sobre los cuales tiene jurisdicción la Contraloría General de la República, de conformidad con esta Ley' (artículo 11, ídem). Estos últimos numerales deben leerse en concordancia con lo estipulado en el artículo 8 citado, que expresamente incluye como parte del ordenamiento de control y fiscalización a la normativa relacionada con el proceso presupuestario, la contratación administrativa, el control interno y externo y la responsabilidad de los funcionarios públicos en esas materias, que sin duda son normas que tienden a velar por la legalidad y la eficiencia no solo de los controles internos sino también por el manejo eficiente y apegado a la ley de los fondos públicos. Así, no es cualquier falta cometida por un servidor o servidora pública la que da lugar a la aplicación del artículo 71 ídem. Son únicamente las faltas cometidas por las personas que desempeñan una función pública en el ejercicio de esas especiales competencias (manejo de los fondos públicos) y que infrinjan ya sea las regulaciones de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República o de ese ordenamiento de control y fiscalización (normativa sobre proceso presupuestario, contratación administrativa, control interno y externo, responsabilidades en esa materia) las que dan lugar a una ampliación del plazo para el ejercicio de la potestad disciplinaria. En resumen, el período para sancionar las acciones u omisiones contrarias a esas regulaciones específicas, que pueden ocasionar un manejo ineficiente o ilegal de los fondos públicos, es mayor que el genérico previsto en el numeral 603 del Código de Trabajo, pues en tales supuestos debe aplicarse el de cinco años que contempla aquella norma particular, que sin duda busca tutelar un interés público de gran trascendencia, cual es el manejo transparente de los fondos públicos ”. (Varios de los destacados se agregaron). Teniendo claro lo anterior, resulta evidente que el plazo regulado en el numeral 71 de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República no es aplicable al caso concreto, pues la naturaleza de la falta atribuida no coincide con las que se han querido regular mediante esa ley especial. En efecto, al actor se le atribuyó una falta común, por lo que el poder disciplinario quedó sujeto al plazo de prescripción previsto en el artículo 603 del anterior Código de Trabajo. De la resolución RH-AD-R-023-2015 de las 8:00 horas del 2 de marzo de 2015 y de la posterior, por la cual se ampliaron los cargos (RH-AD-R-032-2015, de las 8:30 horas del 12 de marzo de 2015) se sigue que al demandante se le atribuyó haber presentado boletas de incapacidad médica supuestamente falsas, en tanto la entidad aseguradora -Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social- informó que las remitidas para su estudio no correspondían a atención médica brindada al accionante. En consecuencia, no se trata de hechos relacionados con el manejo de fondos públicos, que infrinjan las normas de las leyes especiales ni el ordenamiento de control y fiscalización relativo al proceso presupuestario, de contratación administrativa o de control interno o externo. Por consiguiente, no basta la infracción genérica del deber de probidad que le asiste a cualquier persona funcionaria pública, para que pueda ser aplicado el plazo especial de prescripción referido. Por consiguiente, como se dijo, resulta aplicable el texto del referido artículo 603, que en forma expresa estipulaba: “Los derechos y acciones de los patronos para despedir justificadamente a los trabajadores o para disciplinar sus faltas prescriben en un mes, que comenzará a correr desde que se dio causa para la separación o, en su caso, desde que fueron conocidos los hechos que dieron lugar a la corrección disciplinaria”. Tratándose de entidades públicas donde se requiere llevar a cabo un procedimiento previo a la adopción de cualquier sanción en general y del despido en particular, el criterio reiterado de esta Sala ha sido en el sentido de que el plazo de un mes ahí regulado no puede comenzar a computarse sino una vez que el órgano competente para disponer la sanción esté en posibilidad de hacerlo. De igual forma, se ha señalado que ese plazo debe respetarse a efecto de dar inicio al procedimiento disciplinario y durante su curso, de forma tal que no se incurra en dilaciones injustificadas. A ese tenor, es relevante traer a colación lo explicado en la sentencia 953, dictada a las 10:35 horas del 18 de noviembre de 2011. En dicho fallo se sostuvo: “Llegados a este punto, conviene distinguir entre varios momentos en que se puede presentar la prescripción. El primero consiste en que el procedimiento administrativo tiene que empezar dentro del mes a partir de que se tenga conocimiento de los hechos. Luego, ya comenzada la pesquisa, si esta se paraliza injustificadamente por más de un mes, se produce la prescripción. Lo mismo ocurre si, concluida la investigación e instruido el expediente por el órgano instructor, el decisor no adopta el acto final dentro del mes siguiente a que esté en posibilidad de hacerlo (al respecto revísese nuestro fallo n.° 938-05). Es importante tener presente que el conocimiento patronal de la irregularidad que da inicio al cómputo de la prescripción es aquel que sea calificado, es decir, que no resulte superficial o genérico, o sea el mero rumor o comentario general, sino que debe ser preciso, exacto y cierto, particularmente cuando el tipo de falta es poco clara y requiere de una investigación preliminar o de un estudio de auditoría para determinar si existe mérito suficiente para abrir una causa disciplinaria (sobre este tema véanse las sentencias de este Despacho n.° 450-05 y 725-07). En tal supuesto, mientras se elaboran los informes de auditoría es claro que no empieza a correr el plazo de la prescripción, sino que este empieza a discurrir a partir de que el resultado de la investigación previa es puesto en conocimiento del órgano competente para sancionar (en este sentido léanse los pronunciamientos n.° 334-99, 721-04 y 386-06 de esta Sala). Obviamente, esa etapa preliminar ha de tener una duración razonable, como se puntualizó en nuestro voto n.° 672-04... Como ya se adelantó, una vez que el patrono está enterado de la falta, cuenta con un mes para implementar el respectivo procedimiento administrativo, so pena de que prescriba la potestad sancionatoria (así se resolvió en los votos n.° 197-09, 353-10 y 249-11 de este Despacho) ... En distinta línea de pensamiento, ya se dijo que en el sector público el término fatal de un mes empieza a correr luego de que el resultado de la investigación se pone en conocimiento del órgano competente para adoptar la decisión final (al respecto estúdiense los fallos n.° 477-00, 1078-04, 143-07 y 752-08 de esta Cámara)”. En el caso bajo estudio, el procedimiento dio inicio de manera oportuna, una vez que se tuvo conocimiento del oficio CERT-RM-0038-2015, de las 11:00 horas del 13 de febrero de 2015, por el cual se recibió respuesta de la jefatura de Registros Médicos y Estadísticas de Salud del Hospital San Vicente de Paúl, y en el que se informó que el demandante no registraba atención sanitaria en ese centro médico y que las boletas de incapacidad no pertenecían a ese hospital. Luego, la ampliación de cargos se dispuso con base en la certificación, de igual contenido, número CERT-RM-0072-2015 del 9 de marzo de ese mismo año. Con base en esos documentos se emitieron las resoluciones SSI-R-05-2015 de las 15:00 horas del 25 de febrero y SSI-R-12-2015, de las 9:00 horas del 10 de marzo, ambas del 2015, por las cuales se solicitó el inicio de los procedimientos administrativos disciplinarios -después acumulados-, gestión que fue acogida en forma oportuna. En consecuencia, el inicio del procedimiento y la ampliación de cargos se dieron antes de que transcurriera el mes regulado en el numeral 603 citado, en tanto la notificación de ambas resoluciones se produjo el 9 y 12 de marzo del 2015, respectivamente. Mediante oficio SITUN-AL-135-2015, del 12 de marzo, el accionante planteó recursos de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio y nulidad concomitante, al tiempo que requirió que el asunto fuera elevado a conocimiento de la Junta de Relaciones Laborales. Por resolución RH-AD-R-045-2015, de las 16:00 horas del 24 de marzo de 2015, se dispuso el traslado del expediente a dicha Junta. El 9 de abril siguiente, esta última acordó convocar a una audiencia de conciliación, que se llevaría a cabo el día 16 de ese mes y año. Por memorial SITUN-AL-189-2015, presentado el 15 de abril, el actor hizo ver que la gestión formulada tendía a que dicha Junta instruyera el procedimiento, conforme la regulación contenida en el artículo 158 de la Convención Colectiva. El 22 de abril, el órgano instructor original dispuso trasladar el expediente a la Junta, según el resultado de la audiencia de conciliación. Por resolución RH-AD-R-070-2015, de las 15:30 horas del 28 de abril de 2015, se resolvió denegar el recurso de revocatoria contra el acto inicial y elevar el de apelación ante el Tribunal Universitario de Apelaciones. El 30 de abril siguiente, el demandante reiteró ante la Junta que su solicitud tendía a que dicho órgano instruyera la investigación. Por memorial presentado el 8 de mayo, advirtió de su gestión al órgano director. En esa misma data, presentó sus alegaciones ante el Tribunal Universitario de Apelaciones, ante el cual reiteró su petición de que la Junta instruyera la investigación. El 12 de mayo siguiente planteó argumentaciones ante ese Tribunal. El 3 de junio, el Tribunal requirió al actor que demostrara su condición de dirigente sindical. El 10 de junio se cumplió la prevención efectuada. Por resolución de las 10:25 horas del 11 de junio del 2015, el Tribunal Universitario Administrativo acordó trasladar el expediente a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, a fin de que procediera conforme al canon 158 de la Convención Colectiva. En sesión del 5 de noviembre del 2015, la Junta acordó que debía instruir el caso del accionante y por acuerdo del 19 de noviembre siguiente dispuso efectuar audiencia oral a celebrarse el día 11 de febrero de 2016. En esta última fecha, el actor presentó el oficio SITUN-AL-049-2016, por el cual reiteraba sus planteamientos. La Junta de Relaciones Laborales emitió su recomendación final, según consta en oficio UNA-JRL-RESO-01-2016, del 22 de febrero de 2016, mediante acuerdo adoptado en sesión ordinaria del 18 de febrero, por la cual aconsejó absolver al actor de responsabilidad y disponer el archivo del expediente. Luego, la notificó hasta el 5 de setiembre de 2016, al que estimó como órgano director. De lo embargo, de manera reiterada se ha establecido que el período en que el trámite permanezca en un órgano de esa naturaleza, el plazo de prescripción no corre. En ese sentido, en la sentencia 1150, de las 11:40 horas del 28 de junio de 2019, se indicó: “Es importante destacar que a partir de este momento, cuando el expediente se traslada a la Junta de Relaciones Laborales, el plazo de prescripción se interrumpe, porque el patrono se encuentra impedido para tomar una decisión, ya que estas Juntas no son órganos exclusivos de los entes patronales o de la administración de las instituciones o centros de trabajo, sino más bien una instancia de interés común a la parte patronal y a sus trabajadores, integrada inter partes o en forma paritaria o bipartita, por ese motivo su intervención no determina que sus acciones u omisiones se le pueden atribuir directa y exclusivamente a la parte empleadora”. El 4 de octubre del 2016 se emitió la resolución UNA-SSI-RESO-038-2016, por la cual el órgano director original recomendó el despido sin responsabilidad patronal. No obstante, no fue sino mediante resolución UNA-R-RESO-001-2017, de las 8:32 horas del 16 de enero de 2017, que se dictó la resolución final, por la cual se dispuso el despido sin responsabilidad patronal del demandante, es decir, más de tres meses después de que el órgano competente estuvo en posibilidad de hacerlo. Como se observa, entre la recomendación final y la decisión del jerarca competente transcurrió más de un mes, con lo cual se cumplió, en exceso, el plazo regulado en el canon 603 del Código de Trabajo, debiéndose concluir sobre la prescripción de la potestad disciplinaria, sin que se advierta como necesario analizar los demás trámites que se efectuaron con posterioridad. En ese tanto, debe acogerse el recurso formulado por la parte actora, en cuanto alega una indebida decisión por parte del Juzgado, respecto de la defensa opuesta. Luego, al estimar la procedencia de la prescripción a nada conduce atender los agravios relativos a la posible violación del debido proceso. Por la misma razón, el recurso de la parte accionada deviene insubsistente. En consecuencia, el fallo debe ser anulado. En su lugar, debe acogerse la defensa de prescripción invocada por la parte actora, declarar prescrita la potestad disciplinaria y la nulidad del despido.

V.- DEL DESISTIMIENTO: Por la forma como ahora se resuelve, necesariamente debe decidirse sobre el desistimiento formulado por la parte actora, en relación con la solicitud para que se ordenara reinstalarlo en su puesto con el goce de sus garantías laborales y en las mismas condiciones que tenía de previo al cese. En el expediente consta que en fecha 7 de octubre de 2020, el actor presentó un escrito en el que expresamente señaló: “Que por haberse acordado así en el proceso penal que se tramita bajo el expediente número 19-000015-0513-PE, que se tramita ante el Juzgado Penal de Heredia, en donde el suscrito figura como imputado y la Universidad Nacional como denunciante y ofendida, por este medio desisto de la petitoria de reinstalación en el puesto, permaneciendo incólumes el resto de las petitorias realizadas en el presente proceso.” Tal gestión se formuló antes del dictado de la sentencia de primera instancia -12 de octubre de 2018-, aunque se incorporó al expediente virtual dos días después (14 de octubre). En atención a lo dispuesto en el párrafo final del numeral 570 del Código de Trabajo, el Juzgado confirió audiencia a la parte demandada de dicha gestión, según consta en resolución de las 12:34 horas del 29 de octubre de 2020, la cual fue atendida mediante memorial sin fecha, incorporado el 4 de noviembre de 2020, a las 16:49:37 horas y del cual se desprende su conformidad. Expuesto lo anterior, se tiene que la norma citada, en lo que interesa, señala que a la figura del desistimiento “es aplicable lo que dispone la legislación procesal civil”, sin que se detalle ninguna particularidad en cuanto a esa figura, salvo la relativa a la audiencia dicha. El Código Procesal Civil regula lo pertinente en el canon 56, conforme al cual “ Es procedente el desistimiento antes de sentencia definitiva. Podrá referirse a todas o a parte de las pretensiones, a alguna de las partes o a la oposición... En el proceso ordinario, si se pide después de la contestación, es indispensable la aceptación de la parte contraria. Si fuera unilateral se conferirá audiencia a la otra parte por cinco días, para que manifieste si está de acuerdo con la solicitud, bajo apercibimiento de tenerlo por aceptado si guardara silencio. En los demás procesos no es indispensable la aceptación”. Por lo anterior, debe tenerse por desistida la pretensión dicha, ya que el desistimiento se formuló de previo al dictado de la sentencia definitiva y fue admitido por la parte accionada al atender la audiencia conferida. Lo procedente, entonces, es acoger la pretensión subsidiaria y condenar a la demandada a pagar al actor el preaviso y la cesantía que en derecho correspondan, lo que se determinará en sede administrativa o en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia en caso de disconformidad del accionante, en atención a los parámetros que regula la norma convencional y que de seguido se intereses legales correspondientes, así como la indexación, en los términos que a continuación se indican.

VI.- CONSIDERACIONES FINALES: De conformidad con las razones dadas, lo procedente es declarar con lugar el recurso de la parte actora. Por consiguiente, procede anular la sentencia impugnada. En su lugar, se debe acoger la defensa de prescripción invocada por el accionante, declarar prescrita la potestad disciplinaria y, por ende, se ha de disponer la nulidad del despido. Se debe condenar a la entidad demandada a pagar al actor lo correspondiente por preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, cuyo cálculo se posterga para que sea efectuado en sede administrativa, sin perjuicio de que el accionante pueda acudir a la etapa de ejecución de sentencia en caso de disconformidad. Por el preaviso concederá un mes de salario, conforme a lo estipulado en el artículo 28 del Código de Trabajo, de aplicación supletoria dispuesta en los numerales 3 y 184 del convenio colectivo. Por cesantía deberá otorgar veinte meses de salario, según la norma que regía al momento del despido (27 de setiembre de 2017), así como la disposición transitoria que aumentó el tope de cesantía de quince a veinte años de manera gradual hasta el año 2017, en los términos regulados en el numeral 95 de la Convención Colectiva, conforme al cual, “Al concluir todo contrato de trabajo... la Universidad deberá pagarle al trabajador o trabajadora, o a sus causahabientes, por concepto de auxilio de cesantía, una suma equivalente a un mes de salario por cada año laboral...” Debe tenerse presente que el tope de veinte años fue declarado inconstitucional mediante voto número 9722, de las 12:21 horas del 29 de mayo del 2019, con rige a partir del 20 de junio de 2019, es decir, con posterioridad al cese del demandante. Por otra parte, deberá atenderse lo regulado en esa norma, en el sentido de que “Para los efectos de cálculo de la suma a cancelar, se tomará el promedio de los tres (3) salarios nominales más altos de la relación laboral y la forma de pago respetará lo dispuesto en la Ley de Protección al Trabajador (Reformas del Artículo 29 del Código de Trabajo, inciso No 3)”. Sobre las sumas resultantes, deberá pagar los intereses legales que procedan, a partir de la fecha de terminación del vínculo y hasta el efectivo pago, según la tasa regulada en el numeral 497 del Código de Comercio, conforme a la remisión prevista en el canon 565 del Código de Trabajo, y que corresponde a la tasa básica pasiva reconocida por el Banco Central de Costa Rica para las operaciones en moneda nacional. De igual forma, a la luz de la pretensión concreta formulada, los montos deberán ser indexados, desde la fecha de su exigibilidad y hasta la del efectivo pago, en atención al mismo porcentaje en que haya variado el índice de precios para los consumidores del Área Metropolitana. Por la forma como ahora se resuelve, debe mediar pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas del proceso (artículo 562 ídem). A juicio de la Sala, resulta posible resolver el asunto sin especial sanción en costas en tanto se advierte la conducta procesal de la parte accionada como de evidente buena fe, conforme a la regulación prevista en el canon 563 del Código de Trabajo.

POR TANTO:

Se tiene por desistida la solicitud de reinstalación con pleno goce de garantías y condiciones laborales. Se declara con lugar el recurso del accionante. Se anula la sentencia impugnada. Se acoge la defensa de prescripción y se declara prescrita la potestad disciplinaria de la demandada, disponiéndose la nulidad del despido. Se condena a la Universidad Nacional a pagar al accionante lo correspondiente por preaviso y auxilio de cesantía, cuya liquidación se difiere para que se realice en sede administrativa, sin perjuicio de que, en caso de disconformidad, el actor pueda acudir a la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. Por preaviso se concede un mes de salario, en los términos regulados en el Código de Trabajo. Por auxilio de cesantía se otorgan veinte meses de salario, los cuales se liquidarán conforme al contenido del artículo noventa y cinco de la convención colectiva, según el texto vigente a la fecha del despido. Sobre los montos que resulten, se condena a la accionada a pagar los intereses legales correspondientes, a partir de la fecha del despido y hasta la del efectivo pago, según la tasa básica pasiva reconocida por el Banco Central de Costa Rica por las operaciones en moneda nacional. Las cantidades resultantes también deberán ser indexadas, desde su exigencia y hasta la cancelación, conforme al mismo porcentaje en que haya variado el índice de precios para los consumidores del Área Metropolitana. Se resuelve sin especial sanción en costas. Por insubsistente, se omite pronunciamiento acerca del recurso de la parte demandada.

Orlando Aguirre Gómez Julia Varela Araya Luis Porfirio Sánchez Rodríguez Jorge Enrique Olaso Álvarez Olman Gerardo Ugalde González Res: 2022-001989 GGONZALEZ/RPC 1