Sala Primera denies annulment of arbitration award for lack of defenselessness and formal defects in the groundsSala Primera rechaza recurso de nulidad contra laudo arbitral por falta de indefensión y defectos formales en los cargos

**Review of the Document** *170002510004AR* Res. No. 002030-F-S1-2019 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at twelve hours fifteen minutes on August twenty-first, two thousand nineteen.

Arbitration proceeding established in the Conciliation and Arbitration Center of the Chamber of Commerce of Costa Rica, by VILLA SAINT TROPEZ S.A. and VILLAS MEDITERRANEAS S.A., represented by special judicial attorneys-in-fact Andre Jesús Vargas Siverio and José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal; against BOA CONSTRUCTOR S.A. and SEAN MC QUADE, represented by special judicial attorney-in-fact Wady Flores Acuña. The defendant party filed an appeal against arbitral award number 18-17 of 14:00 hours on October 24, 2017. The representatives of the plaintiff party appeared.

Magistrate Rivas Loáiciga writes **WHEREAS** I.- On January 12, 2010, Mr. Jean Francois Alves and Ms. Laurence Marie Odette Planes Ep Monnereau, both French nationals, in their capacity as representatives of the corporation Villa Saint Tropez Sociedad Anónima, signed a turnkey construction contract for the building of a residence in the locality of Uvita de Puntarenas with Mr. Sean Mc Quade as representative of the corporation Boa Constructor Sociedad Anónima. By the year 2017, the corporation Villa Saint Tropez, through its representatives, turned to the arbitral forum, alleging contractual breaches and deceptions by the defendant corporation Boa Constructor and its representative Mr. Mc Quade. It argued incomplete delivery of the building as well as inconsistencies in the handling of funds. In its arbitration claim, it listed a total of 13 claims, which generally refer to the resolution of the contract, the recognition of the damages caused, as well as the payment of the costs of the proceeding. By resolution of 9:00 hours on September 28, 2016 (pages 26 to 28, volume I), the Arbitral Tribunal ordered notification of the arbitration request to the defendant parties (Boa Constructor and Sean Mc Quade), which was carried out on October 7 and October 26, 2016, respectively, according to the notarial notification proceedings visible at pages 34 and 35 of volume I. Subsequently, on March 7, 2017, resolution no. 3 was issued, where the Arbitral Tribunal ordered the transfer of the complaint to the defendants for a period of 15 business days, emphasizing that this was the moment to submit testimonial, documentary, or expert evidence they deemed pertinent. At page 321, it was recorded that it was not possible to notify the defendant parties as they had not appeared in the proceeding. It is for this reason that, through resolution no. 4 of 10:00 hours on April 3, 2017, the latter were declared in default (rebeldes) and they were informed that the acts performed prior to their appearance will not be repeated and that their participation will be active only from the moment they present themselves. Hence, there is no reply from the defendant parties. It was not until March 14, 2017, that the defendants appeared in the proceeding. However, the preliminary hearing was held only with the presence of the plaintiff corporation due to the absence of the defendant parties and their representative (see page 375). In issuing the award, the Arbitral Tribunal determined that the nature of the contract can be framed within a fixed-price agreement (precio alzado), a figure in which it is not appropriate to discuss variations in prices or labor, but rather whether the total volume of the contracted work was carried out. It considered that the request for resolution of the contract sought by the plaintiff party is justified, since the defendants unilaterally decided to terminate the work without a technical settlement (finiquito técnico). By virtue of that, and regarding what is of interest to this appeal, it partially granted the arbitration claim, establishing the plaintiff as the compliant party and awarding it, specifically, the payment of $14,642.00 for the fees that the latter had previously paid to the technical director of the work. It declared the construction contract and its addendum of August 6, 2010, terminated. It ordered the defendants to pay personal and procedural costs. It ordered that all the awards must be executed through judicial channels, indexed from the date of issuance of the award until its effective payment. Disagreeing, the defendant parties filed an appeal for annulment of the award.

II.- They raise a total of seven objections. In the first, they accuse a violation of due process, by virtue of the fact that the arbitral award was not notified to them through the means indicated at the time for communications. They argue that, at the moment this challenge was filed, the award had not been notified to them, hence they are unaware of the day when the legal time limit began to run. However, they maintain, pursuant to numeral 65 of the Law on Alternative Dispute Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley RAC) and 63 of the Judicial Notifications Law, the time limit does not expire until within the 15 days following the notification of the award, or the party or interested third person who appears in the proceeding without having received any notification shall be deemed notified, as in the present case, where the appeal must be considered filed in due form and time. In the second charge, they refer to a violation of due process as well as mandatory and public policy rules. They point out that their representative was unable to attend the preliminary hearing scheduled for May 17, 2017, by virtue of having a previously scheduled judicial proceeding for the day before that date. For this reason, they explain, a change of date was requested, which the Arbitral Tribunal denied, arguing "...that the defendants (...) should have hired a professional who did not have scheduling conflicts for the day of the hearing"; which, in their opinion, violates the due process, the principle of legality, and the adversarial principle that inform the proceeding. They emphasize that their represented clients were denied the opportunity to intervene and attend said hearing despite the existence of a justification for it. The third charge is closely related to the second, as they consider due process was also violated by not having taken into consideration the justification provided by their represented client, Mr. Mc Quade, for also being absent from the preliminary hearing. In the fourth objection, they allege a violation of due process, considering it contrary to law that the testimony of Mr. Bernad Monnereau and Ms. Catherine Gabrielle Sourd Ep Alves was allowed, given that they act as representatives of the plaintiff corporation. They assert that the statements given there are null and, therefore, cannot be evaluated to support the arbitral decision. The fifth charge relates to the protest the appellant makes that the award states in its first section that no procedural incidents, annulments, or defects requiring consideration were presented. In their opinion, omitting mention in the award of the objections filed on behalf of the defendant parties generates nullifying defects, given that it is necessary to address all the points that were subject to debate. The disagreement cited in the sixth objection refers to the Tribunal's rejection of the evidence they submitted and the evidence offered as evidence for better resolution. They list all the evidentiary elements they provided. In their view, the evidence was admissible and pertinent; hence they object to the justification the arbitrators gave when denying it for having been presented untimely. In the seventh and final grievance, they accuse a violation of due process regarding the Arbitral Tribunal's rejection of the request for suspension of the arbitration proceeding, given a criminal proceeding that Mr. Mc Quade initiated against the plaintiff company Villa Saint Tropez and its representatives.

III.- Before entering into the analysis of the charges, it is necessary to mention some general aspects of the appeal for annulment of arbitral awards. In accordance with what is provided for in numeral 65 of the Ley RAC, the appeal for annulment against an award must be filed within the period of 15 days following its proper notification, or the communication of the decision ruling on the request for clarification or addition. In all cases, the appellant must technically and orderly set forth their grounds of disagreement in which they believe the pathology lies, being obligated to explain the clear and precise reasons on which their complaint is based. This Deciding Body has repeatedly indicated that this type of challenge allows the points developed in the award that have been unfavorable to the appellant, and whose infraction is covered by one of the grounds for annulment exhaustively provided in the same legislation, to be contested. In this understanding, the role of this Chamber, by virtue of the competence the law grants it in this matter, is restricted to an analysis of the award, not the specific case that gave rise to it; that is, it involves a review of its content to determine if it has generated any of the grounds leading to its annulment. Hence, it does not permit entering into the specific study of the object of the arbitration and of the litigation itself, a task that escapes the spectrum of powers granted by the Law (in this regard, see judgment no. 766 of 16 hours 10 minutes of September 26, 2001, and no. 720 of 15 hours 40 minutes of September 27, 2006). Annulment in these cases must be understood as an appeal in relation, since the competence of this Chamber is restricted exclusively to the arguments outlined by the party filing it, such that it can only deliberate on the points submitted for review. Along these lines, it aims to guarantee due process and legal certainty through the correct application of the arbitral proceeding. In addition, not all procedural defects are subject to review, but only those expressly listed in numeral 67 of the Ley RAC, as the grounds for annulment are exhaustive and, therefore, cannot be extended by analogy or by greater reason (ruling no. 748 of 16 hours of October 2, 2002). In this sense, the annulment of the award may only be declared in the following scenarios: a) when its issuance exceeds the period agreed upon by the parties for that decision, b) if it does not cover all the aspects submitted to arbitration necessary for its effectiveness and validity, c) when it decides on points not submitted to arbitration, d) if it deals with a matter not susceptible to arbitration, e) if it violates the principle of due process, f) if it is pronounced contrary to mandatory or public policy rules, and, g) if the Arbitral Tribunal charged with resolving the dispute is not competent. Viewed this way, the examination is limited to procedural aspects; hence the award cannot be reviewed on its merits. The only exception, even indirectly, occurs when it is challenged based on the grounds of subsections e) and f) of the aforementioned precept 67. However, even under the exceptions, the scrutiny is limited to confronting the operative part with the content of due process and the cited mandatory or public policy rules, respectively, without this Chamber being able to give it new content in the event of annulment (related, among others, to this Chamber's rulings no. 504 of 11 hours 45 minutes of June 17, 2004, and no. 154 of 11 hours 5 minutes of March 3, 2004, 1538-2013 of November 14, 2013). In summary, this Chamber does not review the substantial aspects resolved by the Tribunal; it limits itself to a procedural verification of the exhaustive grounds stipulated in the Ley RAC. Consequently, this appeal is granted to challenge the foundations or arguments sustained in the awards insofar as they are unfavorable to the challenger, but because they violated one of the specific procedural grounds. That is, this means of challenge was conceived to safeguard the correct application of the arbitral proceeding, not to achieve the correct interpretation of the law.

IV.- Thus, the limits to which this appeal is restricted being clear, the analysis of the seven objections filed by the defendant party proceeds. FIRST: From page 1794, it is evident that the notification of the award was indeed not carried out at the email addresses proposed by the defendant parties. However, this Chamber does not observe any defect, since, as the party itself states, by having appeared in the proceeding through the appeal for annulment, it has considered itself notified of the content and has thereby convalidated the alleged omission it accuses. Added to this, the appeal was filed within the legal time limit; therefore, there exists no violation that affects its right of defense nor any aspect that has harmed it; hence the charge must be rejected (articles 9 and 10 of the Notifications Law). SECOND: In this objection, they refer to a violation of public policy rules but do not specify which rules of the legal system were violated, which makes it impossible to make any reference to their allegation concerning that point. Regarding the violation of due process for not having rescheduled the preliminary hearing set by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is the opinion of this Chamber that the accused objection is not visible. From an exhaustive review of the case file, it is evident that, by resolution number 5-17 of May 5, 2017, and visible at page 351, the Tribunal set the date for holding the preliminary hearing, that is, it would be held on May 17, 2017; the notification to the defendant party was made on May 8, 2017 (page 354). As seen at page 364, the special power of attorney to act in this proceeding granted by the defendants to attorney Wady Flores Acuña is dated May 11, 2017; which leads to the conclusion that on the date when that mandate was conferred (May 11), the defendants already knew that the hearing would be held on the 17th of that month. Added to the above, the document with which attorney Flores Acuña intends to justify his absence from the preliminary hearing (page 360) is related to a proceeding that was to be held the day before the hearing, that is, on May 16, 2017. Since the holding of the hearing was scheduled for the following day and said professional did not prove any other valid reason to justify his absence from the hearing, this Chamber finds no reason for the designated professional to breach his obligation to attend the proceeding to which his clients were summoned; to that extent, the complaint is unfounded and must also be rejected. THIRD: As in the previous charge, the appellant omits mentioning the public policy rules that, in his opinion, were violated, which prevents a ruling in this regard. Regarding the absence of defendant Mc Quade from the preliminary hearing, it is important to highlight that a certification issued by the outpatient department head of Hospital San Juan de Dios, visible at page 368, is indeed presented, from which it is not possible to deduce that Mr. Sean specifically had a scheduled medical procedure on May 17, 2017, that prevented him from attending the said proceeding. However, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is also no violation of due process in this case, because even if the defendant had proven he had an excuse to be absent, the one who did not have one was his representative, attorney Flores Acuña, since he was the one called to attend the scheduled hearing in order to exercise the defense of his clients' interests; hence this attack must be dismissed.

V.- The charges designated as FOURTH, SIXTH, and SEVENTH relate to questioning evidentiary matters connected to the defendant's disagreement with the Arbitral Tribunal's decision to accept the testimony of two witnesses, which in its opinion was improper because they held positions in the plaintiff corporation; the rejection of evidentiary elements that were submitted untimely; and the arbitrators' denial of the request for suspension of the arbitration proceeding. In all these objections, the appellant alleges a violation of due process and public policy rules; however, regarding the latter, it does not even state which postulates it claims were violated. Concerning the violation of due process, this Chamber in other precedents has already referred to this type of defect, highlighting that national doctrine has understood it as any infringement produced against essential, non-waivable procedural rules and relevant phases agreed upon by the parties. For such purposes, it is fundamental that the impact has caused harm to the claimant, or minor violations of due process may occur that could be corrected or overcome during the course of the arbitration, or that do not cause defenselessness (sentencia no. 000495-F-S1-2008 of 15 hours 30 minutes of July 24, 2008). For the purposes of the annulment of the award, as derived from subsection e) of numeral 67 of Law no. 7727, the defenselessness must have been produced by the omission of one or some stages of the arbitration proceeding, leaving the harmed party without the possibility of defense (see equally precedent no. 47 of 9 hours 47 minutes of January 31, 2003). In this understanding, it must be highlighted that concerning the cited objections, no omissions or flaws that harm this fundamental principle are observed, because the procedures referred to by the objector were resolved through the resolutions issued by the Tribunal identified with numeration 12-17 of 11 hours on September 26, 2017, and 13-2017 of 11 hours on September 28, 2017 (pages 1570 and 1575). If their disagreement is rather with the substance and the rationale provided by the arbitrators in those pronouncements, we are then facing substantial aspects that, as already indicated, are excluded by legal provision from the knowledge of this Chamber. Consequently, since these are obscure complaints and their nature is substantial, this Chamber is precluded from hearing them, and by virtue of that, the objections must be rejected.

VI.- The fifth charge suffers the same fate, where it exposes a violation of due process because the award did not address all matters submitted to arbitration – according to its opinion – insofar as no reference was made to the resolution the Tribunal gave to its proceedings related to annulments and evidence submissions. In this regard, the accused violation is also not observed, because contrary to what the appellant claims, the arbitral award contains a reference and a summary of each of the decisions adopted in the resolutions issued by the arbitrators. Added to this, in light of what was expressed in the preceding whereas clause, the objector is not clear in expressing what the defenselessness consisted of or what harm was caused, which turns the grievance into a mere disagreement making it unsuitable for consideration; and must be rejected for that reason.

VII.- Based on the foregoing, this appeal for annulment must be denied.

THEREFORE

The appeal for annulment is declared without merit.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero LTREJOSA In the **second** charge, it refers to a violation of due process as well as of imperative norms and public policy. It indicates that his representative was unable to attend the preliminary hearing scheduled for May 17, 2017, by virtue of the fact that on the day before that date he already had a judicial proceeding scheduled. For that reason, he explains, a change of date was requested, which the Arbitral Tribunal denied arguing "...that the defendants (...) should have hired a professional who did not have proceedings scheduled for the day of the hearing"; which in his view, violates due process, the principle of legality and the adversarial principle that inform the process. He emphasizes that his represented parties were denied the opportunity to participate in and attend said hearing despite there being justification for it. The **third** charge is closely related to the second, insofar as it considers due process also violated by not having taken into consideration the justification provided by his represented party, Mr. Mc Quade, for also being absent from the preliminary hearing. In the **fourth** objection, it alleges violation of due process, considering it contrary to law that the statements of Messrs. Bernad Monnereau and Catherine Gabrielle Sourd Ep Alves were permitted given that they appear as representatives of the plaintiff company. It asserts that the statements given there are null and void and therefore cannot be evaluated to support the arbitral decision. The **fifth** charge relates to the protest issued by the appellant regarding the fact that the award states in its first section that no incidents, nullities, or defects requiring attention were presented. In his view, omitting from the award any reference to the claims presented in favor of the defendant parties generates defects of nullity, given that it is necessary to address all points that have been the subject of debate. The objection cited in the **sixth** censure refers to the rejection that the Tribunal made of the evidence they provided, and of that offered as evidence for better resolution. It lists all the demonstrative elements it provided. In his opinion, the evidence was admissible and pertinent; hence he objects to the justification the arbitrators gave when they denied it for having been presented in an untimely manner. In the **seventh** and last grievance, it accuses violation of due process due to the rejection that the Arbitral Tribunal made of the request for suspension of the arbitral process, in light of a criminal proceeding that Mr. Mc Quade initiated against the plaintiff company Villa Saint Tropez and its representatives.

**III.-** Before entering into the analysis of the charges, it is necessary to mention some generalities of the appeal for annulment (recurso de nulidad) of arbitral awards. In accordance with what is provided to that effect by Article 65 of the Ley RAC, the appeal for annulment against an award must be filed within a period of 15 days following its proper notification, or, of the communication of the ruling issued on the request for clarification or supplementation. In all cases, the appellant must raise his grounds of disagreement, in which he believes the pathology lies, in a technical and orderly manner, being obligated to explain the clear and precise reasons on which he bases his claim. This Decisive Body has indicated on repeated occasions that this type of challenge allows for contesting the points developed by the award that have been unfavorable to the appellant and whose infraction is provided for in one of the grounds for annulment (causales de nulidad) exhaustively contemplated in the same legislation. In this understanding, the role of this Chamber, by virtue of the competence that the law gives it in this matter, is restricted to an analysis of the award, not the specific case that gave rise to it, that is, it is a review of its content, in order to determine if it has generated any of the motives that lead to its annulment. Hence, it does not permit entering into the specific study of the object of the arbitration and of the litigation itself, a task that escapes the spectrum of powers granted by the Law (in that sense, see judgment no. 766 at 4:10 p.m. of September 26, 2001, and no. 720 at 3:40 p.m. of September 27, 2006). Annulment in these cases must be understood as a related appeal, since the competence of this Chamber is restricted exclusively to the arguments outlined by the party formulating it, in such a way that it can only deliberate on the points submitted for review. In this vein, it seeks to guarantee due process and legal certainty through the correct application of the arbitral process. In addition, not all procedural defects are capable of being reviewed, but solely those that are expressly listed in Article 67 of the Ley RAC, since the causes of annulment are exhaustive, therefore, they cannot be extended neither by analogy nor by superior reasoning (ruling no. 748 at 4:00 p.m. of October 2, 2002). In this sense, the annulment of the award may only be declared in the following cases: a) when its issuance exceeds the period agreed by the parties for that ruling, b) if it does not cover all the aspects submitted to arbitration necessary for its effectiveness and validity, c) when it resolves on points not submitted to arbitration, d) if it deals with a matter not subject to arbitration, e) it violates the principle of due process, f) it was pronounced contradicting imperative norms or public policy, and, g) if the Arbitral Tribunal charged with resolving the dispute was not competent. **Thus viewed, the examination is limited to procedural aspects, hence the award cannot be reviewed on the merits.** The only exception, even if indirectly, occurs when it is attacked based on the grounds in subsections e) and f) of the aforementioned precept 67. However, even in the exceptions, the scrutiny is limited to comparing the decisory part with the content of due process and the imperative norms or public policy invoked, respectively, without this Chamber being able to give it new content in the event of annulment (in relation, among others, of this Chamber, rulings no. 504 at 11:45 a.m. of June 17, 2004, and no. 154 at 11:05 a.m. of March 3, 2004, 1538-2013 of November 14, 2013). In summary, this Chamber **does not review the substantial aspects resolved by the Tribunal**, it is limited to a procedural verification of the exhaustive grounds stipulated in the Ley RAC. Consequently, this appeal is granted to attack the foundations or arguments sustained in the awards insofar as they are unfavorable to the challenger, but for having violated one of the specific procedural grounds. That is, this means of challenge was conceived to safeguard the correct application of the arbitral process, not to achieve the correct interpretation of the law.

**IV.-** Thus, the limits to which this appeal is restricted being clear, the analysis of the seven objections formulated by the defendant party proceeds. **FIRST:** From folio 1794 it is clear that the notification of the award was indeed not carried out at the electronic addresses proposed by the defendant parties. However, this Chamber does not observe any defect since, as the same party states, by having appeared in the process through the appeal for annulment, it has been deemed notified of the content and has thereby validated the alleged omission it accuses. Added to this, the appeal was filed within the legal period, therefore there is no violation whatsoever affecting its right to defense nor any aspect that has prejudiced it; hence the charge must be rejected (Articles 9 and 10 of the Ley de Notificaciones). **SECOND:** In this censure, it refers to violation of public policy norms but does not specify which rules of the legal system were violated, which makes it impossible to make any reference to its allegation regarding that point. Regarding the violation of due process for not having rescheduled the preliminary hearing established by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is the criterion of this Chamber that the accused censure is also not visible. From an exhaustive review of the record, it is clear that by resolution number **5-17 of May 5, 2017 and visible at folio 351** the Tribunal established the date for holding the preliminary hearing, that is, it would be held on **May 17, 2017**; notification of which to the defendant party was made on May 8, 2017 (folio 354). As seen in folio 364, the special power of attorney to act in this process granted by the defendants to attorney Wady Flores Acuña is dated **May 11, 2017**; which leads to the conclusion that by the date when that mandate was conferred (May 11), the defendants were already aware that the hearing would be held on the 17th of that month. Added to the above, the document with which attorney Flores Acuña intends to serve as justification for his absence from the preliminary hearing (folio 360) is related to a proceeding that would be held on the day before the hearing, that is, on **May 16, 2017**. Since the holding of the hearing was scheduled for the following day and said professional did not provide any other valid reason justifying his absence from the hearing, this Chamber finds no reason for the designated professional to fail to comply with his obligation to attend the proceeding to which his represented parties were summoned; to that extent, the claim has no merit and must therefore also be rejected. **THIRD:** As in the previous charge, the appellant omits mentioning the public policy norms that in his view were violated, which prevents a pronouncement in that regard. Regarding the absence of the defendant Mc Quade from the preliminary hearing, it is important to highlight that indeed a certification issued by the head of external consultation of Hospital San Juan de Dios visible at folio 368 is presented, from which it is not possible to extract that Mr. Sean specifically had a medical procedure scheduled for **May 17, 2017** that prevented him from appearing at said proceeding. However, in the criterion of this Chamber, there is also no violation of due process in this case, because even if the defendant had proven to have an excuse for being absent, his representative, attorney Flores Acuña, did not have one, since he was the one called to attend the scheduled hearing in order to exercise the defense of his represented parties' interests; hence this challenge must be dismissed.

**V.-** The charges denominated as **FOURTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH** are directed at questioning evidentiary matters, related to the defendant's disagreement with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal to accept the statement of two witnesses, which in its view was improper because they held positions in the plaintiff company, the rejection of evidentiary elements that were submitted untimely, and the refusal that the arbitrators gave to the request for suspension of the arbitral process. In all these objections, the appellant alleges violation of due process and public policy norms; however, with respect to the latter, it does not even state which postulates it asserts were violated. As for the violation of due process, this Chamber in other precedents has referred to this type of defect, noting that national doctrine has understood it as any infraction produced regarding essential and inalienable procedural norms and relevant phases agreed upon by the parties. **For such purposes, it is elementary that the affectation has caused prejudice to the claimant,** or there may be minor violations of due process that could be corrected or overcome in the course of the arbitration, or that do not cause defenselessness (judgment no. 000495-F-S1-2008 at 3:30 p.m. of July 24, 2008). For the purposes of annulment of the award, as derived from subsection e) of Article 67 of Law no. 7727, the defenselessness must have been produced by the omission of one or some stages of the arbitral proceeding, leaving the prejudiced party without the possibility of defense (likewise, precedent no. 47 at 9:47 a.m. of January 31, 2003, can be consulted). In this understanding, it must be highlighted that with respect to the cited objections, no omissions or deficiencies that injure that fundamental principle are appreciated, since by the resolutions issued by the Tribunal identified with numbering 12-17 at 11:00 a.m. of September 26, 2017, 13-2017 at 11:00 a.m. of September 28, 2017 (folios 1570 and 1575) **the proceedings referred to by the objector were resolved**. If his disagreement is rather with the merits and the basis provided by the arbitrators in those pronouncements, we are then dealing with substantial aspects that, as already indicated, are beyond the knowledge of this Chamber by legal provision. Therefore, as these are vague claims whose nature is substantial, this Chamber is barred from hearing them and by virtue thereof the objections must be rejected.

**VI.-** The same fate awaits the **fifth** charge, where it sets forth a violation of due process for the fact that the award did not address all the matters submitted to arbitration –according to its criterion–, insofar as no reference was made to the resolution the Tribunal gave to its proceedings related to nullities and contributions of evidence. In this regard, the violation accused is also not evident, because contrary to what the appellant maintains, the arbitral award contains a reference and a summary of each of the decisions adopted in the resolutions issued by the arbitrators. Added to this, in light of what was expressed in the preceding considering, the objector is not clear in expressing in what way the defenselessness lay or what was the prejudice caused, which renders the grievance a mere disagreement making it unaddressable; and must be rejected for that reason.

VII.- Based on the foregoing, the present motion for annulment (recurso de nulidad) must be denied.

THEREFORE

The motion for annulment (recurso de nulidad) is dismissed.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero LTREJOSA Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected] In the instant case, no omissions or deficiencies that harm that fundamental principle are observed, as the proceedings referred to by the objector were resolved through the decisions issued by the Tribunal (voto 2030-F-2020). If the disagreement is with the merits and the grounds provided by the arbitrators in their rulings, we are then dealing with substantive aspects that fall outside the purview of this Chamber (voto 2030-F-2020).

Res. No. 002030-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at twelve hours fifteen minutes on August twenty-first, two thousand nineteen.

Arbitration proceeding established at the Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica, by VILLA SAINT TROPEZ S.A. and VILLAS MEDITERRANEAS S.A., represented by their special judicial attorneys Andre Jesús Vargas Siverio and José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal; against BOA CONSTRUCTOR S.A. and SEAN MC QUADE, represented by their special judicial attorney Wady Flores Acuña. The defendant filed an appeal against the arbitration award (laudo arbitral) number 18-17 from 2:00 p.m. on October 24, 2017. The representatives of the plaintiff appeared.

Drafted by Judge Rivas Loáiciga

CONSIDERANDO

I.-On January 12, 2010, Messrs. Jean Francois Alves and Laurence Marie Odette Planes Ep Monnereau, both of French nationality and in their capacity as representatives of the corporation Villa Saint Tropez Sociedad Anónima, signed a turnkey construction contract (contrato de construcción de obra "llave en mano") for the building of a residence in the town of Uvita de Puntarenas with Mr. Sean Mc Quade as representative of the corporation Boa Constructor Sociedad Anónima. By 2017, the corporation Villa Saint Tropez, through its representatives, resorted to arbitration, alleging contractual breaches and deceptions by the defendant Boa Constructor and its representative Mr. Mc Quade. It argued incomplete delivery of the building as well as inconsistencies in the handling of funds. In its arbitration claim, it listed a total of 13 claims, which generally relate to the termination (resolución) of the contract, the recognition of the losses and damages caused, as well as the payment of the costs of the proceeding. By ruling issued at 9:00 a.m. on September 28, 2016 (folios 26 to 28, volume I), the Arbitration Tribunal ordered the notification of the arbitration claim to the defendants (Boa Constructor and Sean Mc Quade), which was carried out on October 7 and October 26, 2016, respectively, according to the notarial notification proceedings visible at folios 34 and 35 of volume I. Subsequently, on March 7, 2017, ruling no. 3 was issued, in which the Arbitration Tribunal orders that the claim be served upon the defendants for a period of 15 business days, emphasizing that this was the moment to submit any testimonial, documentary, or expert evidence they deem pertinent. At folio 321, a record was made that it was not possible to notify the defendant parties due to their failure to appear in the proceeding. It is for this reason that, through ruling no. 4 issued at 10:00 a.m. on April 3, 2017, the latter are declared in default (rebeldía) and are informed that the actions carried out prior to their appearance will not be repeated and that their participation will be active from the moment they appear. Consequently, there is no statement of defense from the defendant parties. It is not until March 14, 2017, that the defendants appeared in the proceeding. However, the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) was held only with the presence of the plaintiff corporation due to the absence of the defendants and their representative (see folio 375). When issuing the award (laudo), the Arbitration Tribunal determined that the nature of the contracting can be framed within a fixed-price agreement (convenio de precio alzado), a legal construct in which it is not appropriate to discuss variations in prices or labor, but rather whether the total volume of the contracted work was performed or not. It deemed that the request for termination (resolución) of the contract requested by the plaintiff was justified, since the defendants decided unilaterally to conclude the work without a technical sign-off (finiquito técnico) existing. On that basis, and as relevant to this appeal, it partially granted the arbitration claim, establishing the plaintiff as the performing party and specifically awarding it the payment of $14,642.00 for fees that the latter had previously paid to the project's technical director. It declared the construction contract and its addendum of August 6, 2010 terminated (resuelto). It ordered the defendants to pay attorney's fees and costs (costas personales y procesales).

It ordered that all awards must be executed through judicial channels, indexed from the date of issuance of the award until its effective payment. The respondent parties, dissatisfied, file an appeal for annulment (recurso de nulidad) of the award.

II.- They raise a total of seven challenges. In the first, they allege a violation of due process, by virtue of the fact that the arbitral award was not notified to them through the means indicated at the time for communications. They argue that, at the time they filed this challenge, the award had not yet been notified to them, hence they do not know the day when the legal time limit began to run. Nevertheless, they maintain that, in accordance with article 65 of the Law on Alternative Conflict Resolution and Promotion of Social Peace (Ley RAC) and article 63 of the Judicial Notifications Law, the period does not expire until within the 15 days following notification of the award, or a party or interested third person who appears in the proceedings without having received any notification shall be deemed notified, as in the present case where the appeal should be deemed filed in due form and time. In the second charge, they refer to a breach of due process as well as peremptory norms and public policy. They point out that their representative was unable to attend the preliminary hearing scheduled for May 17, 2017, by virtue of having already scheduled a judicial proceeding for the day before that date. For that reason, they explain, a change of date was requested, which the Arbitral Tribunal denied, arguing “…that the respondents (…) should have hired a professional who did not have scheduling conflicts for the day of the hearing”; which, in their opinion, violates the due process, the principle of legality, and the adversarial principle that inform the proceedings. They emphasize that their represented parties were denied the opportunity to intervene and attend said hearing despite there being justification for doing so. The third charge is closely related to the second, inasmuch as they consider due process was also breached by not taking into consideration the justification provided by their represented party, Mr. Mc Quade, for also being absent from the preliminary hearing. In the fourth objection, they allege a violation of due process, considering it contrary to law that the testimony of Mr. Bernad Monnereau and Ms. Catherine Gabrielle Sourd Ep Alves was permitted, given that they appear as legal representatives of the plaintiff company. They assert that the testimony given there is null and void and therefore cannot be assessed to support the arbitral decision. The fifth charge is related to the objection raised by the appellant concerning the award's statement in its first section that no motions, nullities, or defects requiring resolution were presented. In their opinion, omitting from the award the reference to the claims presented on behalf of the respondent parties generates nullity defects, given that it is necessary to address all the points that were the subject of debate. The challenge cited in the sixth objection refers to the Tribunal's rejection of the evidence they provided, and of that offered as evidence for a better determination (prueba para mejor resolver). They list all the demonstrative elements they contributed. According to their view, the evidence was admissible and pertinent; hence they object to the justification given by the arbitrators when they denied it for having been presented extemporaneously. In the seventh and last grievance, they allege a violation of due process in light of the Arbitral Tribunal’s rejection of the request for a stay of the arbitral proceedings, due to a criminal proceeding that Mr. Mc Quade initiated against the plaintiff company Villa Saint Tropez and its representatives.

III.- Before proceeding to the analysis of the charges, it is necessary to mention some general aspects of the appeal for annulment of arbitral awards. In accordance with what article 65 of the Ley RAC provides for such effect, the appeal for annulment against an award must be filed within a period of 15 days following its proper notification, or, from the communication of the ruling that resolves the request for clarification or addition. In all cases, the appellant must raise their grounds of disagreement, in which they believe the defect lies, in a technical and orderly manner, being obligated to explain the clear and precise reasons on which they base their claim. This Decision-Making Body has indicated on repeated occasions that this type of challenge allows for contesting the points developed by the award that have been unfavorable to the appellant and whose infraction is provided for in one of the grounds for annulment exhaustively listed in the same legislation. In this understanding, the role of this Chamber, by virtue of the competence the law grants it in this matter, is restricted to an analysis of the award, not of the specific case that gave rise to it, that is, it is a review of its content, in order to determine if it has produced any of the grounds that lead to its annulment. Hence, it does not allow for entering into a specific study of the object of the arbitration and the litigation itself, a task that falls outside the spectrum of the powers granted by the Law (in this regard, see judgment no. 766 of 16 hours 10 minutes on September 26, 2001 and no. 720 of 15 hours 40 minutes on September 27, 2006). Annulment in these cases must be understood as a relative remedy, since the competence of this Chamber is restricted exclusively to the arguments outlined by the party who files it, such that it can only deliberate on the points submitted for review. In this line, it seeks to guarantee due process and legal certainty through the correct application of the arbitral proceeding. In addition, not all procedural defects are subject to review, but only those that are expressly listed in article 67 of the Ley RAC, since the grounds for annulment are exhaustive, therefore, they cannot be extended by analogy or a fortiori reasoning (ruling no. 748 of 16 hours on October 2, 2002). In this sense, the annulment of the award may only be declared in the following cases: a) when its issuance exceeds the time period agreed upon by the parties for that decision, b) if it does not cover all aspects submitted to arbitration necessary for its effectiveness and validity, c) when it resolves points not submitted to arbitration, d) if it deals with a matter not subject to arbitration, e) if it violates the principle of due process, f) if it was pronounced contrary to peremptory norms or public policy, and, g) if the Arbitral Tribunal charged with resolving the dispute was not competent. Thus viewed, the examination is limited to procedural aspects, hence the award cannot be reviewed on the merits. The only exception, even if indirectly, occurs when challenged based on the grounds of subsections e) and f) of the aforementioned article 67. Nevertheless, even in these exceptions, the scrutiny is limited to comparing the operative part with the content of due process and the invoked peremptory norms or public policy, respectively, without this Chamber being able to give it new content in the event of annulment (in relation, among others, from this Chamber, rulings no. 504 of 11 hours 45 minutes on June 17, 2004 and no. 154 of 11 hours 5 minutes on March 3, 2004, 1538-2013 of November 14, 2013). In summary, this Chamber does not review the substantial aspects resolved by the Tribunal; it limits itself to a procedural verification of the exhaustive grounds stipulated in the Ley RAC. Consequently, this appeal is granted to attack the foundations or arguments sustained in awards insofar as they are unfavorable to the challenger, but for having violated one of the specific procedural grounds. That is, this means of challenge was conceived to safeguard the correct application of the arbitral proceeding, not to achieve a correct interpretation of the law.

IV.- Thus, with the limits to which this appeal is restricted now clear, we proceed to the analysis of the seven objections raised by the respondent party. FIRST: From folio 1794 it is evident that the notification of the award was indeed not carried out at the electronic addresses proposed by the respondent parties. Nevertheless, this Chamber observes no defect whatsoever because, as the same party states, by having appeared in the proceedings through the appeal for annulment, they have deemed themselves notified of the content and have thereby validated the supposed omission they allege. Added to this, the appeal was filed within the legal time period, therefore there is no breach whatsoever affecting their right of defense or any aspect that has caused them harm; hence the charge must be rejected (articles 9 and 10 of the Notifications Law). SECOND: In this challenge, they refer to a breach of public policy norms but do not specify which rules of the legal system were violated, making it impossible to make any reference to their argument regarding that point. As for the breach of due process by not having rescheduled the preliminary hearing set by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is the opinion of this Chamber that the alleged challenge is also not apparent. From an exhaustive review of the case file, it is evident that by resolution number 5-17 of May 5, 2017 and visible at folio 351, the Tribunal set a date for holding the preliminary hearing, that is, it would be held on May 17, 2017; notification of which to the respondent party was effected on May 8, 2017 (folio 354). As can be seen at folio 364, the special power of attorney to act in this proceeding granted by the respondents to attorney Wady Flores Acuña is dated May 11, 2017; which leads to the conclusion that by the date that mandate was conferred (May 11), the respondents already knew that the hearing would be held on the 17th of that month. In addition to the foregoing, the document with which attorney Flores Acuña intends to justify his absence from the preliminary hearing (folio 360) is related to a proceeding that would take place the day before the hearing, that is, on May 16, 2017. Since the holding of the hearing was scheduled for the following day and said professional did not accredit any other valid reason justifying his absence from the hearing, this Chamber finds no reason for the designated professional to have failed to fulfill his obligation to attend the proceeding to which his represented parties were summoned; to that extent, the claim is without merit and must also be rejected. THIRD: As in the previous charge, the appellant omits mentioning the public policy norms that in their opinion were violated, which prevents a ruling in that regard. Regarding the absence of respondent Mc Quade at the preliminary hearing, it is important to highlight that a certification issued by the outpatient clinic department head of Hospital San Juan de Dios, visible at folio 368, is indeed presented, from which it is not possible to infer that Mr. Sean had specifically on May 17, 2017 a medical procedure scheduled that prevented him from appearing at the cited proceeding. Nevertheless, in the opinion of this Chamber, there is also no breach whatsoever of due process in this case, because even if the respondent had demonstrated having an excuse for being absent, his representative, attorney Flores Acuña, did not have one, since he was the one called to attend the scheduled hearing in order to exercise the defense of his represented parties’ interests; hence this challenge must be dismissed.

V.- The charges designated as FOURTH, SIXTH and SEVENTH, refer to questioning matters of evidence, related to the respondent's disagreement with the Arbitral Tribunal's decision to admit the testimony of two witnesses, which in their opinion was inadmissible as they hold positions in the plaintiff company, the rejection of evidentiary elements that were contributed extemporaneously, and the denial the arbitrators gave to the request for a stay of the arbitral proceedings. In all these objections, the appellant alleges a violation of due process and of public policy norms; however, regarding the latter, they do not even mention which postulates they claim were violated. As for the breach of due process, this Chamber has referred to this type of defect in other precedents, highlighting that national doctrine has understood it as any infraction produced against essential and non-waivable procedural norms and relevant phases agreed upon by the parties. For such purposes, it is fundamental that the impact has caused harm to the claimant, or there may be minor violations of due process that could be corrected or overcome in the course of the arbitration, or that do not cause defenselessness (indefensión) (judgment no. 000495-F-S1-2008 of 15 hours 30 minutes on July 24, 2008). For purposes of annulment of the award, as derived from subsection e) of article 67 of Law no. 7727, the defenselessness must have been produced by the omission of one or some stages of the arbitral proceeding, leaving the harmed party without the possibility of defense (precedent no. 47 of 9 hours 47 minutes on January 31, 2003 can also be consulted). In this understanding, it must be emphasized that regarding the cited objections, no omissions or flaws that harm that fundamental principle are observed, since the motions referred to by the objecting party were resolved by the resolutions issued by the Tribunal identified with numbers 12-17 of 11 hours on September 26, 2017, 13-2017 of 11 hours on September 28, 2017 (folios 1570 and 1575). If their disagreement is rather with the merits and the support provided by the arbitrators in those pronouncements, we are then dealing with substantial aspects that, as already indicated, fall outside this Chamber’s knowledge by legal provision.

Thus, since the objections are obscure and their nature is substantial, this Chamber is barred from hearing them, and by virtue of that, the challenges must be dismissed. </span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify; text-indent:28.4pt\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">V</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">I</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">.- </span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">The </span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">fifth</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\"> ground suffers the same fate, where it alleges a violation of due process due to the fact that the award did not address all the matters submitted to arbitration—in its view—insofar as no reference was made to the Tribunal’s resolution of its motions related to nullities and the submission of evidence. In this regard, the alleged violation is also not apparent, because contrary to what the appellant maintains, the arbitral award contains a reference and a summary of each of the decisions adopted in the rulings issued by the arbitrators. In addition to that, in light of what was stated in the preceding recital, the objector is not clear in expressing what the defenselessness consisted of or what the harm caused was, which turns the grievance into a mere disagreement that makes it unaddressable; it must therefore be rejected for that reason. </span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\"> </span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">V</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">I</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">I</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">.-</span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\"> According to the foregoing, the present motion for annulment must be denied.</span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">POR TANTO</span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\"> </span><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">The motion for annulment is dismissed.</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:normal; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:12pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:10pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:baseline\">&#xa0;</span></p><p style=\"font-size:8pt; line-height:200%; margin:0pt; text-align:justify\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">LTREJOSA</span></p><p style=\"margin:0pt; text-align:center\"><span style=\"display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:10pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline\">Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected]</span></p></div></body></html>" }

Revisión del Documento *170002510004AR* Res. Nº 002030-F-S1-2019 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las doce horas quince minutos del veintiuno de agosto de dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso arbitral establecido en el Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de Costa Rica, por VILLA SAINT TROPEZ S.A. y VILLAS MEDITERRANEAS S.A., representadas por los apoderados especiales judiciales licenciado Andre Jesús Vargas Siverio y el licenciado José Francisco Madrigal Madrigal; contra el BOA CONSTRUCTOR S.A. y SEAN MC QUADE, representadas por el apoderado especial judicial Licenciado Wady Flores Acuña. La parte demandada formuló recurso contra el laudo arbitral número 18-17 de las 14:00 horas del 24 de octubre de 2017. Se apersonaron los representantes de la parte actora.

Redacta el magistrado Rivas Loáiciga

CONSIDERANDO

I.-El 12 de enero de 2010, los señores Jean Francois Alves y Laurence Marie Odette Planes Ep Monnereau ambos de nacionalidad francesa y en su carácter de representantes de la sociedad Villa Saint Tropez Sociedad Anónima, firmaron un contrato de construcción de obra (llave en mano), para la edificación de una residencia en la localidad de Uvita de Puntarenas con el señor Sean Mc Quade como representante de la sociedad Boa Constructor Sociedad Anónima. Para el año 2017, la sociedad Villa Saint Tropez, por medio de sus representantes, acude a la vía arbitral acusando incumplimientos contractuales y engaños por parte de la sociedad accionada Boa Constructor y de su representante el señor Mc Quade. Argumentó entrega incompleta de la edificación así como inconsistencias en el manejo de los dineros. En su demanda arbitral, enlistó un total de 13 pretensiones, que en general están referidas a la resolución del contrato, al reconocimiento de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados; así como al pago de los costos del proceso. Por resolución de las 9 horas del 28 de setiembre de 2016 (folio 26 a 28 tomo I) el Tribunal Arbitral ordenó la notificación del requerimiento arbitral a las partes accionadas (Boa Constructor y Sean Mc Quade) la cual se llevó a cabo el 7 y el 26 de octubre de 2016, respectivamente según diligencias de notificación notarial visible a folios 34 y 35 del tomo I. Posteriormente y en data del 7 de marzo de 2017, se dicta la resolución no. 3 donde el Tribunal Arbitral ordena el traslado de la demanda a las accionadas por un plazo de 15 días hábiles, enfatizando que ese era el momento para aportar la prueba testimonial, documental o pericial que estimen pertinente. A folio 321, se dejó constancia de que no fue posible notificar a las partes demandadas al no existir apersonamiento de estas al proceso. Es por lo anterior, que por medio de la resolución no. 4 de las 10 horas del 3 de abril de 2017, se declara a estas últimas rebeldes y se les comunica que los actos realizados previos a su comparecencia no se repetirán y que su participación será activa hasta el momento cuando se presenten. De ahí que, no haya contestación de las partes demandadas. Es hasta el día 14 de marzo de 2017, que las accionadas se apersonan al proceso. Sin embargo, la audiencia preliminar se realizó únicamente con la presencia de la sociedad actora en razón de la ausencia de las partes accionadas y de su representante (ver folio 375). El Tribunal Arbitral al dictar el laudo, determinó que la naturaleza de la contratación puede enmarcarse en un convenio de precio alzado, figura en la que no es procedente discutir las variaciones de los precios o mano de obra, sino de la realización total o no del volumen de la obra contratada. Estimó, la solicitud de resolución del contrato peticionado por la parte actora se justifica, toda vez que las accionadas decidieron de manera unilateral dar por concluida la obra sin que existiera un finiquito técnico. En esa virtud y en lo que interesa a este recurso, declaró parcialmente con lugar la demanda arbitral, estableciendo como parte cumpliente a la actora y otorgándole en concreto, el pago de $14.642,00 por concepto de los honorarios que en su momento, esta última le canceló al director técnico de la obra. Declaró resuelto el contrato constructivo y su adendum del 6 de agosto de 2010. Condenó a los demandados al pago de las costas personales y procesales. Dispuso, todas las condenas, deben ser ejecutadas por medio de la vía judicial, indexado a la fecha de emisión del laudo y hasta su efectivo pago. Inconformes las partes accionadas formulan recurso de nulidad del laudo.

II.-Plantean un total de siete censuras. En la primera acusa violación al debido proceso, en virtud de que el laudo arbitral no le fue notificado en los medios señalados en su momento para ser comunicados. Aduce, al momento cuando presentó esta impugnación, no le ha sido notificado el laudo, de ahí que desconozca el día cuando empezó a correr el emplazamiento de ley. No obstante, sostiene, conforme con el numeral 65 de la Ley de sobre Resolución Alterna de Conflictos y Promoción de la Paz Social (Ley RAC) y 63 de la Ley de Notificaciones Judiciales, el plazo no vence sino hasta dentro de los 15 días siguientes a la notificación del laudo, o bien se tendrá por notificada la parte o tercera persona interesada que sin haber recibido notificación alguna se apersone al proceso, como en el presente caso donde el recurso deberá tenerse por interpuesto en forma y tiempo. En el segundo cargo, refiere quebranto del debido proceso así como de normas imperativas y de orden público. Señala a su representate, no le fue posible asistir a la audiencia preliminar prevista para el día 17 de mayo de 2017, en virtud de que para el día anterior a esa fecha tenía ya agendada una diligencia judicial. En razón de ello, explica, sesolicitó un cambio de señalamiento, que el Tribunal Arbitral denegó argumentando “…que los accionados (…) debieron de haber contratado un profesional que no tuviera señalamientos para el día de la audiencia"; lo que en su criterio, violenta el debido proceso, el principio de legalidad y contradicción que informan el proceso. Enfatiza, le fue vedada a sus representadas la oportunidad de intervenir y asistir a dicha audiencia pese a existir justificación para ello. El tercer cargo está estrechamente relacionado con el segundo, en el tanto estima quebrantado también el debido proceso al no haberse tomado en consideración la justificación aportada por su representado el señor Mc Quade para ausentarse también a la audiencia preliminar. En el cuarto reparo, aduce violación al debido proceso, estima contrario a derecho el que se haya permitido la declaración de los señores Bernad Monnereau y Catherine Gabrielle Sourd Ep Alves dado que estos figuran como personeros de la sociedad actora. Asegura, las declaraciones ahí vertidas resultan nulas y por lo tanto no pueden ser valoradas para fundar la decisión arbitral. El quinto cargo tiene relación con la protesta que emite el recurrente en cuanto a que el laudo señala en su acápite primero, que no se presentaron incidencias, nulidades ni vicios que deban ser conocidos. En su criterio, omitir en el laudo la referencia de los reclamos presentados en favor de las partes accionadas, generan vicios de nulidad, dado que es preciso que se aborden todos los puntos que hayan sido objeto de debate. La inconformidad citada en la sexta censura está referida al rechazo que el Tribunal hizo de la prueba por ellos aportada,y de la ofrecida como prueba para mejor resolver. Enlista todos los elementos demostrativos que aportó. Según su parecer, la prueba era admisible y pertinente; de ahí que objeta la justificación que dieron los árbitros cuando la denegaron por haberla presentado de manera extemporánea. En el sétimo y último agravio acusa violación al debido proceso ante el rechazo que el Tribunal Arbitral hizo de la solicitud de suspensión del proceso arbitral, ante un proceso penal que el señor Mc Quade incoó en contra de la empresa actora Villa Saint Tropez y sus representantes.

III.- De previo a ingresar al análisis de los cargos, resulta preciso hacer mención de algunas generalidades del recurso de nulidad de laudos arbitrales. De conformidad con lo que al efecto dispone el numeral 65 de la Ley RAC, el recurso de nulidad contra un laudo, deberá interponerse dentro del plazo de 15 días siguientes a su debida notificación, o bien, de la comunicación del fallo que se pronuncie sobre la solicitud de aclaración o adición. En todos los casos, el recurrente ha de plantear técnica y ordenadamente sus motivos de disconformidad en los cuales, estima, radica la patología, estando obligado a explicar las razones claras y precisas en las cuales funda su reclamo. Este Órgano decisor ha indicado en reiteradas ocasiones que este tipo de impugnación permite combatir los puntos desarrollados por el laudo que hayan sido desfavorables a la parte recurrente y cuya infracción esté prevista en alguna de las causales de nulidad que en forma taxativa contempla la misma legislación. En esta inteligencia, el papel de esta Sala, en virtud de la competencia que en esta materia le da la ley, se restringe a un análisis del laudo, no así del caso concreto que le dio motivo, es decir, se trata de una revisión de su contenido, a efecto de determinar si ha generado alguno de los motivos que concurren a su anulación. De ahí que, no permite ingresar al estudio específico del objeto del arbitraje y del litigio en sí, tarea que escapa al espectro de las potestades otorgadas por la Ley (en ese sentido, puede verse la sentencia no. 766 de las 16 horas 10 minutos del 26 de septiembre de 2001 y la no. 720 de las 15 horas 40 minutos del 27 de septiembre de 2006). La nulidad en estos casos, debe entenderse como un recurso en relación, pues la competencia de esta Sala se restringe con exclusividad a los argumentos esbozados por la parte que lo formula, de modo tal, que solo puede ingresar a deliberar sobre los puntos sometidos a revisión. En esta línea, pretende garantizar el debido proceso y la seguridad jurídica a través de la recta aplicación del proceso arbitral. En adición, no todos los vicios de procedimiento son pasibles de ser revisados, sino únicamente aquellos que expresamente se encuentran enlistados en el numeral 67 de la Ley RAC, por cuanto las causas de nulidad son taxativas, por tanto, no pueden ampliarse ni por analogía ni por mayoría de razón (fallo no. 748 de las 16 horas del 2 de octubre de 2002). En este sentido, la nulidad del laudo solo podrá ser declarada en los siguientes supuestos: a) cuando su dictado sobrepase el plazo acordado por las partes para ese fallo, b) si no abarca todos los aspectos sometidos al arbitraje necesarios para su eficacia y validez, c) cuando resuelva sobre puntos no sometidos a arbitraje, d) si versare sobre un tema no susceptible de arbitraje, e) violare el principio del debido proceso, f) fuere pronunciado contrariando normas imperativas o de orden público, y, g) si el Tribunal Arbitral encargado de resolver la controversia no fuere competente. Visto así, el examen se limita a aspectos procesales, de ahí que el laudo no pueda ser revisado por el fondo. La única salvedad, aún sea de manera indirecta, ocurre cuando se ataca con base en las causales de los incisos e) y f) del referido precepto 67. No obstante, aún ante las excepciones, el escrutinio se limita a confrontar la parte decisoria con el contenido del debido proceso y de las normas imperativas o de orden público invocadas, respectivamente, sin que pueda la Sala darle un contenido nuevo en caso de llegarse a anular (en relación entre otras, de esta Cámara, fallos no. 504 de las 11 horas 45 minutos del 17 de junio de 2004 y no. 154 de las 11 horas 5 minutos del 3 de marzo de 2004, 1538-2013 del 14 de noviembre de 2013). En resumen, esta Sala no revisa los aspectos sustanciales resueltos por el Tribunal, se limita a una verificación adjetiva de las causales taxativas estipuladas en la Ley RAC. En consecuencia, este recurso se concede para atacar los fundamentos o argumentos sostenidos en los laudos en cuanto resulten desfavorables al impugnante, pero por haber vulnerado alguna de las causales procesales específicas. Sea, este medio de impugnación se concibió para salvaguardar la correcta aplicación del proceso arbitral, no para alcanzar la correcta interpretación del derecho.

IV.- Quedando así claro entonces los límites a los que se restringe este recurso, procede el análisis de los siete reparos formulados por la parte demandada. PRIMERO: Del folio 1794 se desprende que la notificación del laudo en efecto no se llevó a cabo en las direcciones electrónicas propuestas por las partes accionadas. No obstante, no observa vicio alguno esta Cámara por cuanto, según lo refiere la misma parte, al haberse apersonado al proceso mediante el recurso de nulidad, se ha dado por notificada del contenido y con ello ha convalidado la supuesta omisión que acusa. Sumado a ello, el recurso fue planteado dentro del plazo de ley, por lo tanto no existe quebranto alguno que afecte su derecho defensa ni aspecto alguno que le haya perjudicado; de ahí que el cargo deba ser rechazado (artículos 9 y 10 de la Ley de Notificaciones). SEGUNDO: En esta censura, refiere quebranto de normas de orden público pero no específica cuales reglas del ordenamiento jurídico fueron violentadas, lo que hace imposible hacer referencia alguna a su alegato en lo que atañe a ese punto. En cuanto al quebranto al debido proceso al no haberse reprogramado la audiencia preliminar establecida por el Tribunal Arbitral, es criterio de esta Sala que tampoco es visible la censura acusada. De una revisión exhaustiva de los autos, se desprende que por resolución número 5-17 del 5 de mayo de 2017 y visible a folio 351 el Tribunal estableció fecha para la realización de la audiencia preliminar, sea que se llevaría a cabo el día 17 de mayo de 2017; cuya notificación a la parte demandada se efectuó el 8 de mayo de 2017 (folio 354). Según se aprecia en el folio 364, el poder especial para actuar en este proceso otorgado por los accionados al licenciado Wady Flores Acuña, tiene fecha del 11 de mayo de 2017; lo que lleva a concluir que para la data cuando fue conferido ese mandato (11 de mayo) ya los accionados tenían conocimiento de que la audiencia se llevaría a cabo el día 17 de ese mes. Sumado a lo anterior, el documento con el cual el abogado Flores Acuña pretende sirva para justificar su ausencia a la audiencia preliminar (folio 360), está relacionado con una diligencia que se llevaría a cabo el día anterior de la audiencia sea el 16 de mayo de 2017. Como que la realización de la audiencia estaba prevista para el día siguiente y no acreditó dicho profesional ninguna otra razón válida que justificara su ausencia a la audiencia, no encuentra motivo alguno esta Cámara para que el profesional designado incumpliera su obligación de asistir a la diligencia a la que fueron convocados sus representados; en ese tanto no tiene el lugar el reclamo por lo que debe ser rechazado también. TERCERO: Igual que en el cargo anterior, el recurrente omite mencionar las normas de orden público que en su criterio fueron vulneradas, lo que impide el pronunciamiento al respecto. En lo tocante a la ausencia del accionado Mc Quade a la audiencia preliminar, resulta importante resaltar que en efecto se presenta una certificación emitida por la jefatura de consulta externa del Hospital San Juan de Dios visible a folio 368, de la cual no es posible extraer que don Sean tuviera específicamente el día 17 de mayo de 2017 la realización de un procedimiento médico que le impedía apersonarse a la citada diligencia. No obstante, en criterio de esta Cámara, tampoco hay quebranto alguno al debido proceso en este caso, pues aún y cuando el demandado hubiese demostrado tener excusa para ausentarse, quien si no la tenía era su representante el licenciado Flores Acuña, pues este era el llamado a asistir a la audiencia conferida a fin de ejercer la defensa de los intereses de sus representados; de ahí que este embate deba ser desestimado.

V.-Los cargos denominados como CUARTO, SEXTO y SETIMO, están referidos a cuestionar temas probatorios, relacionados con la inconformidad de la accionada respecto de la decisión del Tribunal Arbitral de aceptar la declaración de dos testigos, que en su criterio resultaba improcedentes por ostentar cargos en la sociedad accionante, del rechazo de elementos probatorios que fueron aportados de manera extemporánea y de la negativa que los árbitros dieron a la solicitud de suspensión del proceso arbitral. En todos estos reparos, el recurrente alega violación al debido proceso y a normas de orden público; sin embargo en lo que atañe a esta última ni siquiera refiere cuales son los postulados que señala vulnerados. En cuanto al quebranto al debido proceso, ya esta Sala en otros precedentes se ha referido a este tipo de vicio, resaltando que la doctrina nacional lo ha entendido como toda aquella infracción producida a normas esenciales e irrenunciables del procedimiento y a fases relevantes acordadas por las partes. Para tales efectos, resulta elemental que la afectación haya provocado un perjuicio al reclamante, o bien pueden darse violaciones menores al debido proceso que podrían subsanarse o superarse en el devenir del arbitraje, o que no causen indefensión (sentencia no. 000495-F-S1-2008 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 24 de julio de 2008). Para efectos de la nulidad del laudo, como derivado del inciso e) del numeral 67 de la Ley no. 7727, la indefensión debe haberse producido por la omisión de alguna o algunas etapas del trámite arbitral, dejando a la parte perjudicada sin la posibilidad de defensa (igualmente se puede consultar el precedente no. 47 de las 9 horas 47 minutos del 31 de enero del 2003). En este entendido, debe resaltarse que en lo que atañe a los citados reparos, no se aprecian omisiones o falencias que lesionen ese principio fundamental, pues con las resoluciones emitidas por el Tribunal identificadas con la numeración 12-17 de las 11 horas del 26 de setiembre 2017, 13-2017 de las 11 horas del 28 de setiembre de 2017 (folios 1570 y 1575) fueron resueltas las gestiones que refiere el objetante. Si su disconformidad es más bien con el fondo y el sustento vertido por los árbitros en esos pronunciamientos, estamos entonces ante aspectos sustanciales que como ya se indicó escapan por disposición legal del conocimiento de esta Sala. De manera tal, que al tratarse de reclamos oscuros y cuya naturaleza es sustancial, le está vedado a esta Cámara su conocimiento y en esa virtud los reparos deben rechazarse.

VI.- Igual suerte corre el quinto cargo, donde expone un quebranto al debido proceso por el hecho de que el laudo no abordó todos los asuntos sometidos al arbitraje –según su criterio-, en el tanto no se hizo referencia de la resolución que dio el Tribunal a sus gestiones relacionadas con nulidades y aportes de prueba. Al respecto tampoco se advierte la violación que se acusa, pues contrario a lo que sostiene el recurrente, el laudo arbitral contiene una referencia y un resumen de cada una de las decisiones adoptadas en las resoluciones emitidas por los árbitros. Sumado a ello, a la luz de lo expresado en el considerando anterior, no es claro el objetante en expresar en qué radicó la indefensión o cual fue el perjuicio ocasionado, lo que torna el agravio en una mera inconformidad que la hace inatendible; debiendo ser rechazada por esa razón.

VII.- Según lo expuesto, habrá de denegarse el presente recurso de nulidad.

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de nulidad.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Yazmín Aragón Cambronero LTREJOSA