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Res. 00568-2025 Sala Primera de la Corte · Sala Primera de la Corte · 27/03/2025
OutcomeResultado
The First Chamber, by majority, dismisses the CCSS's cassation appeal and confirms the award of costs and subjective moral damages, with a dissenting vote by Justice Rojas.La Sala Primera rechaza, por mayoría, el recurso de casación de la CCSS y confirma la condena al pago de costas y daño moral subjetivo, con el voto salvado de la magistrada Rojas.
SummaryResumen
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court dismisses the CCSS's cassation appeal against a judgment enforcing a constitutional amparo that ordered the CCSS to pay personal costs and moral damages for delaying an inguinal hernia surgery. The Constitutional Chamber had granted the amparo, finding that a 3-year-2-month wait for the surgery violated the right to health, and ordered the surgery within 3 months. In enforcement, the judge awarded ₡300,000 for moral damages and ₡181,500 for costs. The CCSS argued lack of proof of damage, no urgency, patient consent, restorative justice (since the surgery was performed), and violation of reasonableness. The majority of the First Chamber confirms the award. It holds that subjective moral damage is inferred "in re ipsa" from the unlawful conduct already determined by the Constitutional Chamber, without needing technical proof, and that providing the service does not preclude compensation for harm suffered during the wait. It also rejects the challenge to costs, clarifying that attorney fees are calculated per legal tariff without requiring an invoice. Justice Rojas dissents, finding that restorative justice had already satisfied the patient and no compensable damage occurred.La Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia rechaza el recurso de casación de la CCSS contra la sentencia que, en ejecución de un amparo constitucional, condenó a la institución al pago de costas personales y daño moral subjetivo por la tardanza en practicar una cirugía de hernia inguinal. El Tribunal Constitucional había declarado con lugar el amparo al estimar que la espera de tres años y dos meses sin fecha cierta vulneraba el derecho a la salud, y ordenó la cirugía en tres meses. En ejecución de sentencia, el juez concedió ₡300.000 por daño moral y ₡181.500 por costas. La CCSS alegó falta de prueba del daño, inexistencia de urgencia, consentimiento del paciente, justicia restaurativa (por haberse realizado la cirugía) y violación del principio de razonabilidad. La Sala Primera, por mayoría, confirma la condena. Sostiene que el daño moral subjetivo se infiere "in re ipsa" a partir de la conducta antijurídica declarada por la Sala Constitucional, sin necesidad de prueba técnica, y que la reparación del servicio no excluye la indemnización por las afectaciones sufridas durante la espera. Además, rechaza la censura sobre costas al aclarar que los honorarios de abogado se calculan según tarifa legal, sin exigir factura. La magistrada Rojas salva el voto, considerando que la justicia restaurativa ya satisfizo al paciente y que no hubo daño indemnizable.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Within this line of thought, and regarding the existence and quantification of subjective moral damage, this Chamber, from long-standing precedent, has held: "IV. [...] it arises from the injury to a non-pecuniary right. That is, it does not directly affect the patrimony. It supposes an unjust disturbance of the emotional conditions. It does not require direct proof and falls within the equitable assessment of the Judge. In the case of subjective moral damage, courts are empowered to decree and quantify the award. The legal nature of this type of damage does not obligate the liquidator to determine its existence because it belongs to the internal sphere. This is not a matter for psychiatrists or physicians. Its existence or not must be understood because it belongs to conscience. It is deduced through presumptions inferred from indicia, since the unlawful generating event reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are harmed, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa.' Nor must its value be proven because it has no concrete value. It is valued prudentially. (...) Its granting is not strictly subject to evidentiary factors (except those relating to causation), but rather to the prudence and objective discretion of the judge. However, its determination is subject to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which must be assessed by the competent authority in each case, so that its quantification conforms to law and does not lead to excessive awards that unjustifiably benefit one of the parties. (...) In accordance with the foregoing, once the existence of moral damage and its causal link with the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff are established—which is not challenged by the appellant—the determination of the quantum depends on the equitable evaluation of the Judge; for which, the special circumstances of the case, as well as the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality, must be considered." In this dispute, the Constitutional Chamber, as already indicated, determined the unlawful conduct of the CCSS upon verifying the violation of the fundamental right to health of Mr. Adrián Alberto. The postponement of the required surgery was, at the time of the constitutional judgment, approximately three years and two months, despite the fact that his condition, as that Chamber indicated, caused him pain and complications, which affected his quality of life. Such a situation—the unlawful event—in accordance with the maxims of logic, experience, and correct human understanding, as was resolved, is an adequate cause (causal link) of moral affliction, associated with anxiety, discomfort, frustration, and worry, due to the excessive time of attention—as declared, it is insisted, in the constitutional venue—of a health condition that, 'per se,' is a cause of concern for the sufferer. In accordance with correct human understanding and experience, it is insisted, one can infer, 'in re ipsa,' as the Enforcement Judge did, the existence of feelings such as those described above, without the legal duty to bear them, as they derive from an abnormal functioning of the Administration, thus decreed, it is repeated once more, by the Constitutional Chamber. Therefore, contrary to what the appellant indicated, its existence is determined and, consequently, the propriety of its compensation.Dentro de esta línea de pensamiento, y respecto a la existencia y cuantificación del daño moral subjetivo, esta Sala, desde vieja data, ha indicado que: "IV. [...] proviene de la lesión a un derecho extrapatrimonial. Sea, no repercute en el patrimonio de manera directa. Supone una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas. No requiere de una prueba directa y queda a la equitativa valoración del Juez. Si se trata de daño moral subjetivo los tribunales están facultados para decretar y cuantificar la condena. La naturaleza jurídica de este tipo de daño no obliga al liquidador a determinar su existencia porque corresponde a su ámbito interno. Ello no es problema de psiquiatras o médicos. Se debe comprender su existencia o no porque pertenece a la conciencia. Se deduce a través de las presunciones inferidas de indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc., es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe “in re ipsa”. Tampoco se debe probar su valor porque no tiene un valor concreto. Se valora prudencialmente. (...) Su otorgamiento no guarda una estrecha sujeción a factores probatorios (salvo que se refieran a la relación de causalidad), sino a la prudencia y objetivo arbitrio del juzgador. Sin embargo, su fijación está sujeta a los principios de razonabilidad y de proporcionalidad, los que deben ser valorados por la autoridad competente en cada caso, para que su cuantificación sea acorde a Derecho y no lleve a indemnizaciones excesivas que beneficien injustificadamente a una de las partes. (...) Acorde a lo expuesto, una vez establecida la existencia del daño moral y su nexo de causalidad con la causa de pedir alegada por la parte actora -lo cual, no es objetado por el casacionista-, la determinación del cuántum depende de la equitativa valoración del Juez; para lo cual, se deberá atender a las circunstancias especiales del caso, así como a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad." En esta lite, la Sala Constitucional, según ya se ha indicado, determinó la conducta antijurídica de la CCSS al verificar el quebranto al derecho fundamental a la salud de don Adrián Alberto. La postergación de la cirugía requerida era, al momento del dictado de la sentencia constitucional de, aproximadamente, tres años y dos meses, pese a que su padecimiento, tal y como lo indicó dicha Cámara, le provocaba dolores y complicaciones, lo cual afectaba su calidad de vida. Tal situación -hecho antijurídico-, conforme a las máximas de la lógica, experiencia y correcto entendimiento humano, tal y como fue resuelto, es causa adecuada (nexo causal) de una aflicción moral, asociada a ansiedad, molestia, frustración y preocupación, por el tiempo excesivo de atención -así declarado, se insiste, en sede constitucional- de una situación de salud que, “per se”, es causa de preocupación para quien lo padece. Acorde con el correcto entendimiento humano y la experiencia, se insiste, se puede colegir, “in re ipsa”, tal y como lo hizo el Juzgador de Ejecución, la existencia de sentimientos como los antes descritos, sin que tuviera el deber jurídico de soportarlos, al derivar de un funcionamiento anormal de la Administración, así decretado, se repite una vez más, por la Sala Constitucional. Ergo, distinto a lo indicado por la recurrente, se determina su existencia y, por ende, la procedencia de su resarcimiento.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Sin embargo, dicha reparación no excluye que la persona perjudicada haya sufrido afectaciones en su esfera moral y patrimonial mientras la conducta anormal persistió por la disfunción administrativa. Si se demuestran menoscabos efectivos (preceptos 196 y 197 de la LGAP) propios del caso concreto y derivados de sus particulares características, coligiéndose su existencia, incluso, por medio del proceso intelectivo 'in re ipsa', pese haberse tutelado jurisdiccionalmente a la persona usuaria, procede su reparación."
"However, such reparation does not exclude that the injured person suffered harm in their moral and patrimonial spheres while the abnormal conduct persisted due to administrative dysfunction. If effective harms (precepts 196 and 197 of the LGAP) specific to the case and derived from its particular characteristics are demonstrated, their existence being inferred even through the intellectual process 'in re ipsa,' compensation is proper despite the user having been jurisdictionally protected."
Considerando VIII
"Sin embargo, dicha reparación no excluye que la persona perjudicada haya sufrido afectaciones en su esfera moral y patrimonial mientras la conducta anormal persistió por la disfunción administrativa. Si se demuestran menoscabos efectivos (preceptos 196 y 197 de la LGAP) propios del caso concreto y derivados de sus particulares características, coligiéndose su existencia, incluso, por medio del proceso intelectivo 'in re ipsa', pese haberse tutelado jurisdiccionalmente a la persona usuaria, procede su reparación."
Considerando VIII
"Se deduce a través de las presunciones inferidas de indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc., es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe 'in re ipsa'."
"It is deduced through presumptions inferred from indicia, since the unlawful generating event reveals the moral damage, because when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are harmed, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that the proof of moral damage exists 'in re ipsa.'"
Considerando IX
"Se deduce a través de las presunciones inferidas de indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc., es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe 'in re ipsa'."
Considerando IX
"A la luz de lo dispuesto en dichas normas, es claro que, para efectos de las costas, los honorarios de abogado deben calcularse con base en los límites legales y las tarifas establecidas en el Decreto respectivo, independientemente de cualquier acuerdo privado entre el abogado y su cliente. Esto implica que, en la liquidación de costas, no es necesario que la persona ejecutante demuestre el convenio que tiene con su abogado o el pago que le haya realizado, ya que la normativa prevé que el cálculo de ese extremo debe realizarse de acuerdo con el arancel o decreto respectivo, a fin de asegurar un criterio objetivo en la liquidación de costas."
"In light of those provisions, it is clear that, for purposes of costs, attorneys' fees must be calculated based on the legal limits and rates established in the respective Decree, regardless of any private agreement between the attorney and client. This implies that, in cost liquidation, the enforcing party does not need to prove the agreement with their attorney or the payment made, because the regulations provide that the calculation must be done in accordance with the respective tariff or decree, in order to ensure an objective criterion in cost liquidation."
Considerando XV
"A la luz de lo dispuesto en dichas normas, es claro que, para efectos de las costas, los honorarios de abogado deben calcularse con base en los límites legales y las tarifas establecidas en el Decreto respectivo, independientemente de cualquier acuerdo privado entre el abogado y su cliente. Esto implica que, en la liquidación de costas, no es necesario que la persona ejecutante demuestre el convenio que tiene con su abogado o el pago que le haya realizado, ya que la normativa prevé que el cálculo de ese extremo debe realizarse de acuerdo con el arancel o decreto respectivo, a fin de asegurar un criterio objetivo en la liquidación de costas."
Considerando XV
Full documentDocumento completo
**Document PJEDITOR** **Exp. 23-000362-1028-CA** **Res. 000568-F-S1-2025** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at eleven hours forty-one minutes on the twenty-seventh of March of two thousand twenty-five.
Process of execution of the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in an amparo appeal, established by LEONARDO GÓMEZ SALAZAR, attorney, holder of identity card number 108760664 and bar association card number 17,049, in his capacity as special judicial representative of ADRIÁN ALBERTO MORERA TREJOS, computer technician, holder of identity card number 113750552 against the CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, with legal entity identification number 4-000-042147, represented by its general judicial representative without limit of sum, Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, attorney, holder of identity card number 603160877 and bar association card number 16,133. The general judicial representative of the entity subjected to execution formulated a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 2024001800 from 4:06 p.m. on July 18, 2024, issued by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of Judge Berny Solano Solano.
Magistrate Leiva Poveda drafts.
**CONSIDERING** **I.** The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through judgment no. 2023000411 from 9:20 a.m. on January 11, 2023, granted the amparo appeal filed by Lic. Leonardo Gómez Salazar on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos against the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS). The appeal, filed before this Chamber on December 28, 2022, originated from the violation of the fundamental right to health. This, by virtue of the fact that on November 6, 2019, Mr. Morera Trejos was evaluated by a medical specialist in general surgery at the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, who noted as a plan an order for ambulatory surgery, due to a diagnosis of a right inguinal hernia. That day he was placed on a waiting list for the surgical intervention with medium priority. Due to the filing of the amparo, the medical authorities of said nosocomium scheduled a reassessment appointment for February 2, 2023, at 6:00 p.m. At the time said ruling was issued, the protected party did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. In this regard, and in what is of interest, that Chamber noted: "From the analysis of the case files, this Chamber has it as proven that the foregoing is harmful to the right to health derived from Article 21 of the Constitution, and contrary to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services developed in the preceding recitals, since, despite the fact that the respondent medical authorities scheduled a reassessment appointment for the aggrieved party; the truth is that said medical officials have not provided him with a certain date for the surgery that had been prescribed since 2019. / From the foregoing it is evident that the respondent authority subjected the protected party to a state of uncertainty for the approximate period of three years and two months, a time that this Constitutional Court considers unacceptable since his condition causes him pain and complications, which evidently affects his quality of life. Additionally, this Chamber considers that there is no justification whatsoever for the delay or omissions in the healthcare of individuals, since the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and its health centers have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, effectiveness, celerity, and continuity. / Thus, upon accrediting the violation of the right to health in the stated terms, the Chamber must intervene, thereby causing the appeal to be granted, with the considerations that will be stated in the operative part of this Judgment." (The underlining is supplied). In that operative part of the ruling, the Constitutional Court ordered the Acting General Director of the indicated Hospital and the Head of the Surgery Service to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies, so that, within a period of three months from the notification of said resolution, the required surgery be performed on the aggrieved party, under the strict responsibility and supervision of his treating physician, provided that a change in circumstances does not require another type of care. Likewise, it ordered them to inform him of the date and time of said intervention, as well as the preoperative requirements established for such purposes. It warned them that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 71 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, imprisonment of three months to two years or a fine of twenty to sixty days will be imposed on anyone who receives an order that must be carried out or enforced, issued within an amparo appeal, and does not comply with it or does not enforce it, provided the offense is not more severely punished. Likewise, it condemned the CCSS to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the acts that served as the basis for said declaration, which, it ordered, shall be settled in the execution of judgment of the administrative litigation court.
**II.** In a brief uploaded to the electronic judicial file on March 16, 2023, at 10:14:39, images 01 to 26, Lic. Gómez Salazar, in his capacity as special judicial representative of Mr. Adrián Alberto, submitted the corresponding liquidation to the court. He requested that the following items be granted: 1) that the entity subjected to execution be condemned to pay the costs of the judgment execution process; 2) ₡181,500.00 for the personal costs of the amparo appeal; 3) ₡350,000.00 for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo); and 4) the payment of legal interest, from the moment the judgment becomes final and until its effective payment. Through a resolution from 10:08 a.m. on March 20, 2023 (images 27 to 29), the Execution Judge, Kenneth Arrones Morera, admitted the claim. In a brief uploaded to the file on August 3 of that year at 09:21:02, images 33 to 63, the general judicial representative without limit of sum of the CCSS, Lic. Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, opposed the execution. She formulated the defense of lack of right. In the now contested judgment, Judge Berny Solano Solano partially granted the liquidation in the following terms. He condemned the CCSS to the payment of: 1) ₡181,500.00 for the personal costs of the amparo appeal; 2) ₡300,000.00 for subjective moral damages; 3) he imposed upon the executed institution the recognition of interest at the legal rate, only on the amount granted for subjective moral damages; and 4) the costs of the execution process and their legal interest, from the finality of the judgment that sets them and until their effective payment. Disagreeing, the general judicial representative of the CCSS formulated a cassation appeal.
**III.** The first censure, on page two of the brief, the appellant announced she was filing it under the cassation ground for breach of substantive rules provided in Article 138, subsection a) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA): "A cassation appeal shall also proceed for violation of substantive rules of the legal system, in the following cases: / a) When an improper assessment is attributed to the evidence or it has been pretermitted." This, she said, due to the improper assessment of the enforceability of the constitutional judgment. She alleged a violation of Section 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). The contested judgment, she noted, did not analyze the edges contained in this Chamber's line of rulings, despite having been pointed out to the Judge. She mentioned this Chamber's judgment no. 297-F-S1-2024 from 5:27 p.m. on March 21, 2024. Within those aspects, she cited the determination of extreme necessity of the patient's case from a medical point of view (urgency), his consent to being on a waiting list, or, indeed, the existence of physical harm. She alluded to this Chamber's judgments - in order of citation - nos.: 28-F-S1-2024 from 11:05 a.m. on January 11, 2024; 1502-F-S1-2022 from 11:24 a.m. on September 1; 1823-F-S1-2022 from 2:26 p.m. on August 4; and 2429-F-S1-2022 from 2:16 p.m. on November 3; all three from the year 2022. According to the contested judgment, she pointed out, only the enforceability of the amparo appeal was appreciated to grant subjective moral damages. She reproduced, in what was of interest to her, what was considered by the Execution Judge in Section IV of the objected resolution; as well as the proven facts of the judgment under execution. The factors of restorative justice, urgency, and the patient's acquiescence, which were pointed out in the response to the claim, were not taken into account. Even, she added, the Judge added more months to the time on the waiting list. The Constitutional Chamber indicated that it was three years and two months, this being the correct data; while the Judge established it at more than four years. Likewise, she argued, in the substantive analysis of the enforceable judgment, it was considered that the amparo was granted because the petitioner was placed on a waiting list for that period, without mentioning any aspect related to the patient's pathology, or the need for immediate follow-up. She copied, to the extent relevant, what was considered in Section IV of the judgment under execution. The Constitutional Tribunal, she noted, determined that the referred waiting period was unreasonable. She transcribed another fragment from the referred Section IV of the objected judgment. With a simple enforceability, she stated, and without any technical medical report, the Judge accredited that the passage of time caused physical discomfort. He only had said evidence, that of a right granted in the abstract, to grant indemnity claims. She does not understand, she indicated, how he reached the conclusion that the wait was four years. The resolution under execution, she argued, was perfectly clear that the petitioner was placed on the surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019. This element is the only thing referred to by the contested judgment of what was assessed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the amparo appeal filed. However, she alleged, the Judge, from a technical-medical point of view, developed the alleged pathologies of the patient and that being placed on a waiting list caused a prolongation of moral damages due to uncertainty that must be compensated based on the principle "in re ipsa," when the patient's medical history does not show evidence of said "uncertainty." The contested judgment, she affirmed, breached said canon - 196 of the LGAP -, since, based on an enforceability, there is no proof of: 1) that the wait for the surgery, because he presented a diagnosis of a non-urgent unilateral inguinal hernia, generated any type of complications in the normal development of his daily life; 2) that he was denied access to health, since, at all times, he had access to the services provided by the Institution and never used emergency services, so there is not a single element that allows determining the damage, suffering, or ailment associated with the service provided (causal link between the alleged damage and the reproached conduct); and 3) the existence of uncertainty in the patient, and its prolongation by an act of her principal. The Judge, she alleged, without technical evidence, and without the enforceability of the amparo appeal mentioning any aspect from a medical point of view, determined complex technical-medical elements to conclude the existence of effective and individualized damage. Only the enforceability of a constitutional judgment, she indicated, does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of "emotional suffering" or with "feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety." This Chamber, she asserted, established in resolution no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensations for amparo appeals due to placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose a compensation on the tripartite contribution fund of the social security system. However, she noted, the Judge, distancing himself from the criterion of this decision-making body, granted that item. If the Judge had adequately assessed the evidence, she stated, the argumentation of the judgment would be different. He would have determined that it was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of harm and its aggravation due to placement on a waiting list. The objected judgment, she alleged, violated said legislative provision, since, starting from a ruling on an amparo appeal for placement on a waiting list, there is no proof whatsoever of an affectation to the inner realm of the executing party. The existence of "feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety" in the patient was validated and determined, without specifying where this assessment was taken from nor having technical evidence to support it, which, she noted, entails that the damage is not real or effective, directly violating said norm. She again mentioned this Chamber's rulings (in order of citation) nos. 28-F-S1-2024, 297-F-S1-2024, 1502-F-S1-2022, 1823-F-S1-2022, and 2429-F-S1-2022. She added a table where she set forth, in her opinion, what was specified in each of those resolutions. That line, she indicated, was communicated to the Judge, who must know that jurisprudence is a means to integrate, understand, and apply the Law. However, she noted, he ignored it and decided to condemn her principal for "discomfort, frustration, and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomforts" to the executing party, according to his understanding, without having evidence. That is, he pointed out an issue of physical discomfort that was never proven. An enforceability, she affirmed, is insufficient to determine the appropriateness of subjective moral damages. Furthermore, placing a person on a waiting list is not "per se" sufficient grounds to grant compensation. This Chamber, she concluded, established in ruling no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensations for amparo appeals due to placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose compensation on someone who has consented to a wait and received the required medical attention.
**IV.** Regarding what was related in the preceding section, it is necessary to indicate the following. FIRST. The appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an appeal). Nor is it sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. It is necessary to contrast what was decided with the violation that, in her opinion, took place. In this regard, numeral 139, subsection 3 of the CPCA provides a material requirement necessary both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent assessment on the merits. This is the motivation of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as provided by the precept under comment, the factual and legal basis of the case. Factual, to the extent that it shows disagreement with the facts that have been held as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence), or with the circumstances that occurred in the violation of procedural norms. Legal, when it is a problem set forth regarding the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the block of legality, including, of course, the principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflective or indirect effect, after the facts of the contested judgment are modified. In both the procedural violation and the evidentiary one, along with the legal reasons (always necessary), factual reasons may concur, and in that sense, the reference grounds must be directed in both aspects, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the indication of those canons related to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exempted from the legal basis by express legal mandate. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the lower court body erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they are recorded in the same contested ruling. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Before citing the latter, what is essential is that they be complied with, that they be put into practice at the time of drafting and filing the cassation appeal. Thus, the basis provided by law can be understood, roughly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, intertwined or linked together and reasonably connected in a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or, if applicable, a single one) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in the factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is a legal basis. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not constitute their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated, interpreting the referenced Article 139, "it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal basis ... the reasons on which it bases its action must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and recording at least some normative reference that gives it support" (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, from 2:25 p.m. on May 8, 2008). The basis is, therefore, foreign to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed judgment, without support in norms or legal criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship referred to, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal basis," and therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is penalized with outright rejection, in accordance with the provisions of Article 140, subsection c) of the same Procedural Code. of the same Code of reference. Likewise, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that, for an appeal to pass the admission control, in addition to the sufficient statement of reasons, the corresponding mention and linkage of the applicable norms that are deemed infringed with the contested judgment is required. In this sense, among other resolutions, nos. 677-A-S1-2021 from 9:40 a.m. on March 25, 2021 (); 755-A-S1-2022 from 10:55 a.m. on March 29 of March (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and 1663-A-S1-2022 from 10:05 a.m. on July 21 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340), both from the year 2022, may be consulted.
**V.** After a conscientious study of the censure under analysis, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant intermixed two dissimilar hypotheses, but, by the way she structured it, they are inseparable. As was set forth, she warned she was filing it for the improper assessment of the enforceable judgment, by having accredited the existence of subjective moral damages. That is how it was developed on pages 03, 04, 05, 06, and 09 of the brief. Such a line of argumentation would configure the announced cassation ground for breach of substantive rules: the one provided for in subsection a) of canon 138 of the CPCA. However, on pages 04, 05, 06, 07, and 09, she affirmed: "[...] without any technical medical report, he accredits that the passage of time causes physical discomforts, being that this even corresponds to technical evidence. As mentioned previously, the judge only had said evidence (that of a right granted in the abstract) to grant indemnity claims. [...] So, it is not understood how the judge reaches the conclusion that the wait was 4 years, when not even the Constitutional Chamber said this. [...] As is evident, it is incorrect to indicate that the waiting time was more than 4 years, as the lower court judge indicated. [...] the judgment is perfectly clear that the plaintiff [sic] was placed [sic] on a surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019, and said element is the only thing that is referred to (in the judgment being contested) of what was assessed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the Amparo Appeal filed, however, the judge, from a technical-medical point of view, develops the alleged pathologies of the patient [sic] and that placement on a waiting list caused the plaintiff [sic] a prolongation of moral damages due to uncertainty, which, according to the [sic] judge, must be compensated based on the principle in re ipsa, when from the patient's own medical history it is not possible to demonstrate said "uncertainty". [...] The axis in question is aggravated since the lower court judge, without any technical evidence, and without the enforceability of the Amparo Appeal mentioning any aspect whatsoever from a medical point of view, determines complex technical-medical elements, to conclude the existence of effective and individualized damage regarding the plaintiff. / In that sense, this representation cannot condone said opinion of the lower court judge, since the series of elements that were taken into consideration by the [sic] judge do not emerge from what was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the Amparo Appeal, especially taking into consideration that it refers to extremely technical aspects from a medical point of view (with specialties such as surgery, for example), which can only be verified with said type of (technical) evidence. / Gradually, only the enforceability of a constitutional judgment does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of "emotional suffering" or with "feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety" especially and taking into consideration, it is reiterated, that there was no technical evidence on this matter. [...] It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the Judgment Execution Judge, however, the latter [sic], distancing himself from the criterion of the High Court, grants claims, that is to say, with the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that there is an animus to condemn the CCSS at all costs (and, of course, the contributors), without any support whatsoever from the evidentiary point of view existing, it is clear. [...] that is, clearly the judge, from a simple enforceability of judgment, validates and determines the existence of "feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety" in the patient, without specifying where he takes this assessment from, nor having technical evidence that accredits it, from any angle, which entails that the damage is neither real nor effective, directly violating Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública thereby. [...] however, with an animus to condemn, the same ignores the entire preceding line, and decides to condemn my principal, even for "discomfort, frustration, and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomforts" to the plaintiff, according to his understanding, without having evidence of it. That is, the judge points out an issue of physical discomfort that was never proven. [...] It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the jurisdictional authority, however, given the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that there is an animus to condemn the CCSS at all costs (and, of course, the contributors), without any support whatsoever from the evidentiary point of view existing." (The highlighting is from the original). What is now affirmed by the challenger falls within the ground for breach of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1) point d) of the CPCA: lack of motivation. However, what is alleged is informal. She omitted to indicate, with the clarity and precision required by cassation technique, as indicated in the preceding section, under the protection of the provisions of ordinal 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA, which were the procedural norms violated, providing the explanation of how the transgression occurred. The described ambiguity conflicts with cassation technique, which imposes that the grounds of the appeal must be indicated clearly and precisely, with the factual and legal basis of the case (precept 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA). Therefore, the outright rejection of the ground of disagreement under study is required.
**VI.** Without prejudice to what was set forth in the preceding section and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to note the following. SECOND. It must be remembered that, in judgment execution processes in general and, mainly, those issued by the Constitutional Chamber, what is executed must necessarily restrict itself to what was resolved in the judgment that is the subject of enforceability. This Chamber has indicated that the judgment execution process seeks to materialize the abstract condemnation imposed on the losing party. If aspects different from - or contrary to - the pronouncement that gives rise to the execution are granted, or against persons who were not condemned, res judicata would be violated. See, among other rulings of this decision-making body, nos.: 383-F-S1-2019 from 09:50 a.m. on May 9, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-925036) and 309-F-S1-2021 from 11:20 a.m. on February 11, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1024927). Consequently, this Chamber's supervisory duty is restricted to an objective comparison between the enforceable judgment and the appealed ruling. In this sense, one may also consult, among many others, this Chamber's resolutions nos. 82-A-S1-22 from 10:06 a.m. on January 26 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1072742) and 1984-F-S1-2022 from 11:18 a.m. on September 8, both from the year 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112319).
**VII.** As already indicated in Section I of this resolution, the Constitutional Chamber, in the judgment under execution, granted the amparo appeal filed on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto, as it was held as accredited that, despite suffering from a "right inguinal hernia," on November 6, 2019, he was placed on a surgery waiting list with medium priority. However, at the time the constitutional ruling was issued, on January 11, 2023, he did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. Therefore, said Chamber deemed that the waiting period to which he had been subjected up to that moment, three years and two months, violated not only the fundamental right to health but also the principles of effectiveness and efficiency that must predominate in public services. Consequently, it ordered the Acting General Director and the Head of the Surgery Service, both of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies so that, within a period of three months from the notification of that judgment, the pending surgery be performed on the aggrieved party. As can be clearly inferred, the Constitutional Chamber granted the amparo because it deemed that the period the patient had been on the waiting list was disproportionate and violated his fundamental right to health, considering his pathology. In this sense, as set forth in the said Considering of this judgment, that Chamber indicated that the CCSS subjected the protected party to a state of uncertainty for the indicated period, which it considered unacceptable, as his condition causes him pain and complications, affecting his quality of life. Additionally, the Constitutional Tribunal pointed out, there is no justification whatsoever for the delay or omissions in the healthcare of individuals, since said Institution, and its health centers, have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, effectiveness, celerity, and continuity.
For its part, the Enforcement Judge, in Considerando IV of the challenged judgment, entitled “ON THE ALLEGED MORAL DAMAGES COMPENSATION,” stated in relevant part: “[…] In this case, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber deemed it inappropriate for [the petitioner] to be kept in uncertainty as to when he would undergo inguinal hernia surgery since November 6, 2019. Now, given that the assessment of moral damages is *in re ipsa*, that is, it implies an assessment of what a human being may experience with the situation described in the list of proven facts of the constitutional vote being enforced, for this adjudicator it is logical that any person who is told they require surgery for a health problem such as an inguinal hernia and is made to wait more than four years without being able even to know a definite date for the performance of their surgery will suffer emotionally with feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety. Therefore, in legal terms, it is considered appropriate to reject the exception of lack of right and, consequently, award compensation for subjective moral damages, which is prudentially set at the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢300,000), at the rate of two hundred thousand colones for the waiting and uncertainty to which [the petitioner] was originally subjected in order to know the date of his surgery and for it to be effectively performed, and one hundred thousand colones more, because with each day that passed without timely care, with the passing of the minutes and days, the anguish and emotional pain increase, because it is a condition that implies physical discomfort and, in human terms, the feeling of greater anxiety and vulnerability he has experienced is inferable [sic]. […]” (The underlining is supplied). Although it is true that the Enforcement Judge indicated that the waiting period of the person under amparo was more than four years, even though when the constitutional judgment was issued it was three years and two months, as expressly stated by the Constitutional Court, this is because the Enforcement Judge did not take it as proven that, at the time of issuing the judgment challenged in cassation, the surgery had already been performed on him or, at least, a date had been set to perform it. That is, when the challenged judgment was issued, the waiting period had increased to more than four years. It was not proven, it is insisted, that at the time that judgment was issued, the surgery had already been performed on the executing party. However, the appellant did not properly challenge this circumstance. She merely indicated that in this litigation there is restorative justice because the required surgical intervention was performed on the person under amparo, but without indicating with what evidence her assertion is proven; nor did she indicate when it was performed. In any event, as can be appreciated without difficulty from what was considered in the constitutional judgment and in the one now challenged, the Enforcement Judge adhered to the facts reviewed in the constitutional venue and to what was resolved by that Chamber in order to allow that item for subjective moral damages, specifically, the delay in setting the date and performing the surgery required by the person under amparo, so no transgression of the enforceable judgment is observed.
VIII.THIRD. As indicated, the cassation appellant stated that in the sub júdice, what she called “restorative justice” operated. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that this Chamber, in previous matters, recognized its applicability in matters of compensation for subjective moral damages due to the infringement of the fundamental right to health (as recognized by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in granting the respective amparo recourse, due to the CCSS's delay in providing the medical service required by the administered person), when the CCSS provides the service within the deadline ordered in the constitutional venue. In this regard, judgments nos. 1502-S1-2022 of 11:24 a.m. on September 1st (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112330), 2429-F-S1-2022 of 2:16 p.m. on November 3rd (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1123608), both from the year 2022; 28-F-S1-2024 of 11:05 a.m. on January 11th (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396), 297-F-S1-2024 of 5:27 p.m. on March 21st (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250), 901-F-S1-2024 of 12:31 p.m. on July 4th (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1240015), and 937 of 2:51 p.m. on July 10th (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925); all from the year 2024, may be consulted. However, the current composition of this Chamber, after a new study, considers it necessary to reconsider that position. Without a doubt, it is a vindication of the injured legal situation, stemming from a failure of service, that it be provided. Even more so when it is necessary, as occurs with a pending health service. However, such reparation does not exclude that the injured person may have suffered harm in their moral and pecuniary sphere while the abnormal conduct persisted due to the administrative dysfunction. If effective impairments (precepts 196 and 197 of the LGAP) specific to the particular case and derived from its particular characteristics are demonstrated, its existence being deduced even through the intellective process “in re ipsa,” despite the individual having been jurisdictionally protected, its reparation is appropriate. That is, the service rectification does not exclude the injured person from suffering harm in their moral and pecuniary sphere while the abnormal conduct persists. If that occurred and was so proven, it is obligatory to impose the corresponding compensatory consequence, if it was requested by the party who saw their legal sphere harmed. This is so in accordance with the principle of full reparation of damages, which has constitutional and legal roots (canons 9, 41, 49 of the Constitution; 190 and 197 of the LGAP).
IX.Within this line of thought, and regarding the existence and quantification of subjective moral damages, this Chamber, for a long time, has indicated that: “IV. [...] originates from the injury to an extra-patrimonial right. That is, it does not directly impact the patrimony. It supposes an unjust disturbance of the emotional conditions. It does not require direct proof and is left to the equitable assessment of the Judge. If it concerns subjective moral damages, the courts are empowered to decree and quantify the award. The legal nature of this type of damage does not oblige the liquidator to determine its existence because it corresponds to their internal sphere. This is not a problem for psychiatrists or doctors. One must understand its existence or not because it belongs to the conscience. It is deduced through presumptions inferred from indicia, since the harmful generating event makes the moral damage evident, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, which is why it is said that proof of moral damages exists ‘in re ipsa.’ Neither must its value be proven because it has no concrete value. It is valued prudentially. It is not, then, about quantifying the suffering, as it is inappreciable, but rather about fixing monetary compensation for its injury, the only mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. For more detail on this aspect, one can consult, among others, from this collegiate body, the judgments no. 112 already cited, no. 17 of 2:30 p.m. on February 21, 1996, and no. 41 of 2:40 p.m. on May 14, 1997. Its granting does not have a strict subjection to evidentiary factors (except those referring to the causal link), but rather to the prudence and objective discretion of the adjudicator. However, its determination is subject to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which must be assessed by the competent authority in each case, so that its quantification is in accordance with the Law and does not lead to excessive indemnifications that unjustifiably benefit one of the parties. That is, it must maintain a just balance derived from the specific factual picture, a matter that must be weighed within the indicated limits.” (Among many others, the judgment of this Chamber no. 468-F-S1-19 of 9:45 a.m. on May 30, 2019, may be consulted). In accordance with the foregoing, once the existence of the moral damages and their causal nexus with the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff are established —which is not challenged by the cassation appellant—, the determination of the quantum depends on the equitable assessment of the Judge; for which, special attention must be paid to the specific circumstances of the case, as well as to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality.” In this regard, one can consult, among many others, judgment no. 1098-F-S1-2023 of 10:09 a.m. on July 5, 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1170686). That is, it is regarding subjective moral damages that its demonstration is “in re ipsa,” provided it is a consequence of a harmful generating event or reason.
X.In this litigation, the Constitutional Chamber, as has already been indicated, determined the unlawful conduct of the CCSS upon verifying the violation of the fundamental right to health of Mr. Adrián Alberto. The postponement of the required surgery was, at the time of the issuance of the constitutional judgment, approximately three years and two months, despite the fact that his condition, as indicated by said Chamber, caused him pain and complications, which affected his quality of life. Such a situation —unlawful act—, in accordance with the maxims of logic, experience, and correct human understanding, as was resolved, is an adequate cause (causal nexus) of a moral affliction, associated with anxiety, annoyance, frustration, and worry, due to the excessive time of care —so declared, it is insisted, in the constitutional venue— for a health situation that, “per se,” is a cause of concern for the person who suffers from it. In accordance with correct human understanding and experience, it is insisted, one can deduce, “in re ipsa,” just as the Enforcement Judge did, the existence of feelings such as those previously described, without him having any legal duty to bear them, as they derive from an abnormal functioning of the Administration, so decreed, it is repeated once more, by the Constitutional Chamber. Ergo, differently from what was indicated by the appellant, its existence is determined and, therefore, the appropriateness of its compensation.
XI.FOURTH. Likewise, the appellant alleged that, in the case of the person under amparo, there was no urgency in the performance of the surgery. As stated in section I of this judgment, it was the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the enforceable judgment, that determined the urgency of performing the required surgical procedure on the executing party, ordering that it had to be carried out within a period of three months from the notification of that judgment. Consequently, within the objective comparison that must prevail in this type of process —enforcement of a constitutional judgment— the issue of urgency is a precluded aspect, since, it is repeated, it was so determined and resolved by the Constitutional Court.
XII.FIFTH. The appellant also indicated that the person under amparo conformed with or consented to remaining on the waiting list. Contrary to what was alleged, in this litigation the existence of consent or a tacit consented act cannot be considered, much less an express one, on the part of Mr. Morera Trejos. The amparo recourse was filed in a timely manner. So much so that the Constitutional Chamber admitted it for processing and, subsequently, granted it. This, regardless of the time elapsed between the moment when the CCSS placed him on the waiting list and the filing of the amparo. Therefore, the executing party showed his disagreement with his permanence on the waiting list, and said jurisdictional body agreed with him.
XIII.The second ground of disagreement, page nine of the writ, was announced by the appellant to be brought for the cassation ground of breach of substantive norms provided for in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA: “c) When a legal norm has been improperly applied or interpreted, or has not been applied.” She invoked that ordinal 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) was violated by improper application. She said, one is dealing with a process for the enforcement of a constitutional judgment. The award made in that venue was in abstract, she stated, therefore it must be enforced. She even alleged that the right to receive compensation for costs, damages, and losses must be demonstrated in this procedural path. She reproduced said precept. It establishes that the following shall be considered costs: attorney’s fees, compensation for the time invested, and indispensable expenses of the process. It is clear, she indicated, that no electronic invoice was issued, so the request for amounts that are not proven to have been invested and will be paid without any proof is condoned. The executing party, she alleged, did not provide any means of conviction that there had been an investment of money for attorney’s fees. For this reason, she noted, the Judge was compelled not to award any amount for costs of the amparo recourse, in the form of attorney’s fees. Under the Judge’s premise, she asserted, any person, through vicarious action, could file amparo recourses for the issue of waiting lists and, at the time of enforcing the judgment, would receive the costs of the recourse as compensation, which, in her opinion, would be an absurdity, because to receive full compensation for an expense, it must be demonstrated. That is where, she indicated, the error of the judgment lies, since it granted the amount for costs of the amparo recourse as if they were for attorney’s fees. The reasons, she pointed out, why costs are awarded to a prevailing person in a judicial process must be clear. Furthermore, she added, the magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, Mr. Fernando Castillo Víquez, on multiple occasions, has been clear in ordering both the CCSS, when it performs the extra-procedural satisfaction of the Constitutional Chamber’s awards, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, to ensure that the amounts awarded effectively reach the hands of the persons under amparo. She transcribed, in relevant part, what was stated in the separate note contained in Constitutional Chamber vote no. 2016-012528. The challenged judgment, she concluded, should have rejected that item, because, by not having provided an electronic invoice, it was not demonstrated that any legal professional had provided a professional service and charged for it.
XIV.Regarding what was stated in the previous section, it is necessary to indicate the following. FIRST. On page 10 of the writ, the appellant stated: “Under the first instance judge's premise, any person, through Vicarious Action, could file Amparo Recourses for the issue of waiting lists, and at the time of enforcing the judgment, would perfectly receive as compensation the costs of the recourse, which, respectfully, would be an absurdity […].” Differently from what was indicated, this Chamber, for a long time, has indicated the difference between personal costs and attorney’s fees, concluding that personal costs belong to the party, not to the lawyer. In this regard, one can consult, mutatis mutandis, judgments nos. 432-F-S1-2017 of 09:30 a.m. on April 20, 2017 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-950854); 515-F-S1-2018 of 11:20 a.m. on May 30, 2018 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-892742); 28-F-S1-2024 of 11:05 a.m. on January 11th (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396) and 297-F-S1-2024 of 5:27 p.m. on March 21st (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250); both from the year 2024.
XV.SECOND. On page 10 of the writ, the appellant affirmed: “In that regard, note that the very content of the norm establishes that attorney’s fees, compensation for the time invested, and indispensable expenses of the process shall be considered costs, but the plaintiff [sic], just as the judge mentions, being fully aware that no electronic invoice was issued, condones the requesting of amounts that are not demonstrated to have been invested and will be paid [sic] without any proof, based on a simple principle, which requires precisely, the existence of proof. […] the plaintiff [sic] does not provide any proof that there was an investment of money for attorney’s fees, that is, given the lack of proof regarding this, the truth of the matter is that the judge was compelled to grant the amount for costs of the Amparo Recourse, in the form of attorney’s fees for which there is no proof they were paid, with no electronic invoice involved. […] For the foregoing, it is considered that the judgment should have rejected said item, since by not having provided an electronic invoice, it was not demonstrated that any legal professional had provided a professional service and charged for it.” (The highlighting is from the original). In this regard, it is necessary to state that the CPCA, in ordinal 193, expressly regulates the imposition of costs, just as canon 73.1 of the CPC does. Consequently, the CPCA norm is the one applicable to this litigation. However, this provision does not prescribe, as the CPC does, what costs are considered. Ergo, this procedural principle, just like those contained in ordinals 76.1 and 76.4 ibid, by virtue of the remission made by article 220 of the CPCA, is applicable to this litigation. In this sense, precept 73.1 of the CPC provides: “[…] Attorney’s fees, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the process shall be considered costs.” (The underlining is supplied). In this same order of ideas, precepts 76.1 and 76.4 ibid indicate: “76.1 Right to attorney’s fees and determination. Attorney’s fees belong to the lawyer, with the exceptions established by law. When the party is a lawyer and has acted personally, they shall have the right to them. Unless otherwise agreed, they shall be determined considering the work, the status, and the economic significance of the process, based on the provisions of Law No. 13, Organic Law of the Bar Association, of October 28, 1941, and the decree on attorney and notary fees. […] 76.4 Contractual determination of attorney’s fees. Lawyers and their clients may contractually determine the amount of the fees and their payment modalities, respecting the limits imposed by the law and the respective decree. Such stipulation shall not affect the opposing parties in the process, for purposes of determining personal costs.” (Only the underlining is supplied). In light of the provisions of said norms, it is clear that, for cost purposes, attorney’s fees must be calculated based on the legal limits and the rates established in the respective Decree, independently of any private agreement between the lawyer and their client. This implies that, in the liquidation of costs, it is not necessary for the executing person to demonstrate the agreement they have with their lawyer or the payment made to them, since the regulations provide that the calculation of that item must be made in accordance with the applicable tariff or decree, in order to ensure an objective criterion in the liquidation of costs. Thus, if a party had legal representation during the processing of a case and obtained in their favor the payment of costs, the amount recognized as attorney’s fees will necessarily be that established in the “Fee Schedule for Professional Legal Services,” according to the work performed. Consequently, it is not indispensable to provide an invoice or proof of payment in favor of the legal professional for the recognition of that item to be appropriate. In this litigation, the objector did not prove that Mr. Adrián Alberto lacked legal representation during the processing of the amparo process. On the contrary, it is on record that his special judicial representative in this enforcement process was the one who filed the amparo recourse on his behalf before the Constitutional Chamber. This allows one to deduce that said professional defended the interests of the person under amparo in the constitutional venue. Ergo, the lack of presentation of the invoice or proof of payment claimed by the appellant is not sufficient to diminish or dismiss the item of personal costs liquidated by the party and expressly recognized in the enforceable judgment. It is reiterated, because the executing party had legal representation during the processing of the amparo and obtained in their favor the payment of costs. That is, they have the right to be recognized as costs the amount that, for attorney’s fees, is established in the applicable tariff. Corollary, this Chamber does not observe the legal infringement alleged and, consequently, the rejection of this challenge shall be imposed.
XVI.The third and final reproach to the challenged judgment, page 11, was announced by the cassation appellant to be brought for the cassation ground of breach of substantive norms provided for in subsection d) of numeral 138 of the CPCA: “d) When the judgment violates the norms or principles of Constitutional law, among others, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality.” She invoked that the postulate of reasonableness was infringed. The Judge, she stated, determined the reasonableness of the compensation based on the “in re ipsa” principle, setting the amount to be compensated at ₡300,000.00. She reproduced, in relevant part, what was considered in section IV of the challenged judgment. The Adjudicator, she stated, indicated that with each passing day the anguish and emotional pain increased, but this could not be proven, because the evidence was barren. The challenged judgment, she alleged, left open the possibility of seeking, unrestrictedly, double compensations: 1) of a material nature, by receiving medical care, and 2) of a pecuniary nature, without any proof whatsoever about it. With that analysis, she asserted, the indicated principle of reasonableness was breached. Although it is true, she noted, that there are waiting lists, granting pecuniary compensation for placing a person on one of them, without there being a medical criterion of urgency, as this Chamber has indicated, implies that the funds destined to guarantee the two main fundamental rights —life and health—, are diminished, which is irrational, since the persons contributing to the Sickness and Maternity Insurance do so with the objective that a health service be provided and that there be resources to guarantee it. Not to grant compensations for placing a person on a waiting list. The Adjudicator, she noted, departing from the indicated postulate, determined, without any proof, that there must be economic compensation, despite the fact that the executing party received restorative justice, when the required surgery was performed, despite his condition not being classified as urgent. That is, he determined that said double compensation must always occur when there is placement of a person on a waiting list, which generates a privilege and unjust enrichment. The objective of the person who resorts to the Constitutional Chamber, so that a surgical procedure is performed or medical care is provided, she argued, is the restoration of their health, not obtaining compensation. The cited principle was violated by granting a compensatory item, despite the required medical procedure having been performed. Likewise, she indicated, that postulate was violated by not determining that the compensation includes the restoration, which occurred due to the judicial resolution, since the user of the health service (which has limited resources), received the required medical care, so it becomes contrary to law, especially to said principle, that in addition to the restoration received, an additional amount be granted to them, the situation of being on a waiting list having been specifically derogated. Granting a sum for compensation, she said, in addition to the required medical procedure having been performed, grants them a privilege over the other insured persons, who were overtaken by the person under amparo. Said situation, she argued, was previously analyzed by this Chamber in judgments nos. 1502-F-S1-2022 and 297-F-S1-24, which she reproduced in relevant part. For the foregoing, she concluded, granting compensation for moral damages is a violation of the principle of reasonableness.
XVII.Regarding what was indicated in the preceding Considering, it is necessary to state the following. FIRST. On page 11 of the appeal, the appellant indicated: “[…] although there are waiting lists, granting pecuniary compensation for placing a person on one of them, without there being a medical criterion of urgency, as the First Chamber itself indicates in the resolutions indicated above […]”. The referral made to another complaint, as the appellant did, is not acceptable. Just as was indicated in section V of this judgment, in accordance with precept 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA, proper technique requires that the grounds for cassation be indicated clearly and precisely, with the factual and legal basis of the case. SECOND. After a detailed analysis of the complaint under study, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant argued the breach of the constitutional principle of reasonableness for two distinct reasons: A) for the amount of ₡300,000.00 granted as compensation for subjective moral damages, since, in her opinion, the existence of such damages was not demonstrated. Such a line of argument, different from what was announced, if it were to occur, would configure the cassation ground for violation of procedural norms provided for in subsection 1) point d) of article 137 of the CPCA: lack of motivation. However, what was argued is informal. The appellant did not indicate the procedural norms that were violated, with a clear and precise explanation of how the infringement occurred, just as the techniques of cassation require, as was set forth in section IV of this judgment, under the coverage of ordinal 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA. Without prejudice to the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to state, contrarily to what was argued, that in sections IX and X of this judgment, the arguments were provided by which this Chamber deems, endorsing what was decided by the Enforcement Judge, that in this litigation the executing party suffered an injury of that type, so its compensation is appropriate. That is, the existence of the subjective moral damages inflicted on the executing party by the facts known in the constitutional venue was fully evidenced. On the other hand, regarding the amount granted, in addition to what was indicated in Considering IX of this judgment for its determination, this Chamber has stated: “VIII. […] On other occasions, this cassation body has had the opportunity to highlight the necessary ‘legal reasonableness’ that this type of compensation must maintain, for the verification of which the observance of a ‘reasonableness of equality’ must be confirmed, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as ‘…the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions’ (e.g., votes no. 5236-99 and 1354-2011). That is, to avoid inequitable and illegitimate treatment in the various matters in which compensation for moral damages is discussed, it is necessary to verify that the amounts recognized are not disproportionate when compared with those established in other similar matters. In that order of ideas, the Chamber deems that the sum granted adjusts to the intensity of the damage caused.” Judgment no. 760-F-S1-2023 of 1:24 p.m. on May 29, 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1157835). In the same vein, one can consult, among others, judgments nos. 1934-F-S1-2022 of 3:00 p.m. on August 12; 2654-F-S1-2022 of 10:10 a.m. on December 08 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1132117), both from the year 2022, and 1087-F-S1-2023 of 09:36 a.m. on July 05, 2023. This Chamber deems that the sum granted for this concept, ₡300,000.00, in consideration of the circumstances of the case —the pathology suffered by the person under amparo and its consequences indicated by the Constitutional Chamber itself; as well as the waiting time to which he was subjected until the issuance of the constitutional judgment— and similar cases, is reasonable and proportionate. In this sense, as an example, the following precedents can be indicated, where this decision-making body did not consider the sums granted for the delay in providing the public health service to be unreasonable, nos. 429-F-S1-2024 of 10:41 a.m. on May 3rd (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1229475), where the Adjudicator awarded ₡500,000.00; 937-F-S1-2024 of 2:51 p.m. on July 10th (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925), set at ₡200,000.00; and 1302-F-S1-2024 of 4:14 p.m. on September 27th, all from the year 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1253306), granting the sum of ₡200,000.00. This compels the rejection of this part of the objection.
XVIII.
XIX.By virtue of the reasons stated, the rejection of the filed appeal is imposed. In accordance with the provisions of numeral 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA, since this Chamber does not consider that the cassation appellant entity has sufficient reason to appeal, for the reasons set forth when analyzing each grievance, it shall be ordered to acknowledge the costs of the cassation appeal, which must be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the executed party, granting it the respective hearing on the liquidation submitted (Articles 41 and 153 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política)).
XX.DISSENTING VOTE OF JUDGE ROJAS MORALES. I depart from the majority opinion, insofar as it deems it appropriate to order the defendant to pay subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Concerning the damages (daños y perjuicios) derived from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, upon granting an amparo appeal, it is pertinent to keep in mind that, given their nature, this type of judgments contain an abstract condemnation, without any factual consideration, and do not prejudge, as it was not subject to analysis, its existence, nor its causal link or quantification. Said Court merely determines the constitutional violation. When executing those terms, the causal relationship must be established between what was declared in the abstract and the specific matter. Thus, the fact that the Constitutional Chamber condemns in the abstract to the payment of damages does not entail an automatic condemnation to be executed, as the Executing Judge seems to wrongly understand it. It is incumbent upon the judges in charge of resolving the liquidation to assess, in each specific case, the existence of sufficient merit to grant the requested compensation. In this direction, the following must be analyzed: the particular circumstances of the case, the parties' positions, the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, as well as the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Furthermore, when the matter concerns alleged subjective moral damages suffered by a person facing a lack of medical care, as is the case here, the examination of additional aspects becomes indispensable. Firstly, the urgency factor must be assessed, since it is evident that the person requiring urgent care from the CCSS, for example: that administered who suffers from a cancer which advances irremediably, is not in the same situation as the person who presents an ailment for whom a surgical intervention or a medical appointment without pressing character has been prescribed; in both cases, the waiting time to receive the medical service does not have the same result. Likewise, the moral effect will not be of the same intensity. On the other hand, the inactivity of the patient over the passage of time on the waiting list must be analyzed (canon 30, subsection ch) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional -LJC- and 38 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)), which ceases when he appeals in amparo before the Constitutional Chamber or, indeed, to the courts of justice, to demand the attention or medical treatment he needs (administrative activity). Account must be taken that the passage of time without taking action has, in the Costa Rican legal system, clear consequences regarding the expiration of the action, an aspect assessable ex officio. A pecuniary advantage cannot be derived from inactivity, as this conflicts with the principle of proportionality in the strict sense. Thirdly, the satisfaction derived from having an order from a court of justice, by means of which the performance of a medical act or the delivery of medications is ordered (even if it arises due to a precautionary measure), must be weighed. Even the most recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has valued, as timely attention, the satisfaction generated from the notification of the amparo proceedings. This refers to those cases in which, on the occasion of the amparo and apart from the time elapsed between the filing of the appeal and the administrative response received, the respondent authority provides the administered with the required medical care (granting a certain date for a surgery or medical consultation, providing the needed medication, rescheduling an appointment, etc.). Cases, in this latter resolution, that are binding erga omnes (according to numeral 13 of the LJC). The Constitutional Judges have deemed it inappropriate to condemn for costs, damages; which must be assessed by this Chamber when ruling on cassation appeals. In this sense, among others, the judgments numbered: 2024-000017 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, 2024-000026 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, and 2024-006673 of 9:15 a.m. on March 8, 2024, all from the Constitutional Chamber, may be consulted. It is worth noting that granting the required medical service constitutes a manifestation of restorative justice, which this Deciding Body must assess. Compensation granted in violation of the reasoning set forth becomes unreasonable and disproportionate, especially when in a universal social security system, such as Costa Rica's, such compensation is paid by all insured persons, including those displaced by the executing party. Upon examining the described aspects and the particular case of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos, it becomes inappropriate to grant compensation for the emotional effect granted in the appealed judgment. The court records show that on November 6, 2019, the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela issued to Mr. Adrián a hospitalization order for ambulatory surgery, without a certain date and with medium priority. On December 28, 2022, he filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber, a jurisdictional body that ordered, by resolution 2023-000411 of 9:20 a.m. on January 11, 2023, to perform the surgical intervention within a period of three months, upon prior fulfillment of the preoperative requirements. It must be taken into account that the executing person remained waiting approximately three years for the procedure to be performed in the Surgery Service. The possibilities of social security in an area such as General Surgery must be taken into account, where there are not enough specialists to serve the population, especially since the number of people requiring intervention in that area is increasing. On the other hand, Mr. Morera Trejos did not accompany his action with more data than the enforceable judgment, so the effects on his inner sphere have no more support than the Judge's subjective appreciations, without any causal relationship being proven. It is recorded in the judicial file that, by reason of the filed amparo, a re-evaluation appointment was scheduled for the executing person on February 2, 2023, in order to ascertain the patient's current conditions. See, the waiting time Mr. Adrián endured to receive medical attention was around one month, counted from when he filed the amparo appeal on December 28, 2022, until he was evaluated in the Surgery specialty on February 2, 2023. In fact, the period is shorter if one takes into account that the enforceable judgment was notified on January 12, 2023. Periods that are reasonable per se from the point of view of providing a non-urgent service. It must be kept in mind that from the filing of the amparo, the executing party was never subjected to a prolonged or indefinite wait. He received medical attention within a more than reasonable period (even shorter than the waiting periods in private medicine). The foregoing speaks to the nonexistence of the liquidated damages. It is worth noting that in cases like the one under study, there is no doubt the user's satisfaction has already been generated; therefore, it becomes contrary to law to grant additional compensation to the one received (medical evaluation in singular derogation from the waiting list). The foregoing, far from causing him a moral effect, granted him a privilege over the other insured persons, which detracts from the claim for moral damages awarded. It is irrational, under the cited conditions, to impose on the tripartite social security contribution fund and on the other insured persons who benefit from said funds, an additional compensation to one who has received, through judicial protection, the required medical care. For the reasons indicated, the granted compensation does not conform to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality (set forth by the Constitutional Chamber itself). By virtue of the foregoing, this undersigned Judge considers the appropriate course is to uphold the grievances of the appeal related to this aspect and, consequently, to annul the appealed judgment -only- in that it recognized the amount of ¢300,000.00 for the concept of subjective moral damages, in order to, in its place, ruling on the merits, reject said aspect.
POR TANTO
By majority, the appeal is declared without merit, with its costs charged to the cassation appellant entity, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution stage. Judge Rojas Morales dissents to uphold the appeal by virtue of restorative justice having been configured.
Luis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Leiva Poveda Carlos Guillermo Zamora Campos Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- San José, at eleven forty-one hours on the twenty-seventh of March two thousand twenty-five.
Execution proceeding for the judgment issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in an amparo appeal, filed by **LEONARDO GÓMEZ SALAZAR**, attorney, bearer of identity card number 108760664 and bar association card number 17.049, in his capacity as special judicial representative of **ADRIÁN ALBERTO MORERA TREJOS**, computer technician, bearer of identity card number 113750552 **against** the **CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL**, with legal entity identification number 4-000-042147, represented by its general judicial representative without limit of amount, Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, attorney, bearer of identity card number 603160877 and bar association card number 16.133. The general judicial representative of the executed entity filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 2024001800 of 16 hours 06 minutes on July 18, 2024, issued by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, presided over by Judge Berny Solano Solano.
**Judge Leiva Poveda writes the opinion** **CONSIDERANDO** **I.** The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through judgment no. 2023000411 of 09 hours 20 minutes on January 11, 2023, granted the amparo appeal filed by attorney Leonardo Gómez Salazar on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos against the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS). The appeal, filed before that Chamber on December 28, 2022, originated from a violation of the fundamental right to health. This was because, on November 6, 2019, Mr. Morera Trejos was evaluated by a medical specialist in general surgery at Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, who noted as a plan, an order for outpatient surgery, based on a diagnosis of right inguinal hernia. That day, he was placed on a waiting list for the surgical intervention with medium priority. Due to the filing of the amparo, the medical authorities of said hospital scheduled a re-evaluation appointment for February 2, 2023, at 18 hours. At the time that ruling was issued, the protected party did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. In this regard, and in what is of interest, that Chamber stated: "*From the analysis of the case file, this Chamber has established that the foregoing is harmful to the right to health derived from Article 21 of the Constitution, and contrary to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services developed in previous recitals, since, although the respondent medical authorities scheduled a valuation appointment for the amparo petitioner; the truth is that said medical officials have not provided him with a certain date for the surgery that was prescribed since the year 2019.* **/** *From the foregoing, it is evident that the respondent authority subjected the protected party to a state of uncertainty for an approximate period of three years and two months, a time that this Constitutional Court considers unacceptable since his condition causes him pain and complications, which evidently affects his quality of life. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that there is no justification whatsoever for the delay or omissions in the health care of persons, since the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and its health centers have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, effectiveness, celerity, and continuity.* **/** *Thus, as the violation of the right to health is accredited in the stated terms, the Chamber must intervene, thus causing the appeal to be granted*, with the considerations that will be stated in the operative part of this Judgment." (The underlining is supplied). In that operative part of the ruling, the Constitutional Court ordered the Acting Director General of said Hospital and the Head of the Surgery Service to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies, so that, within a period of three months, counted from the notification of that resolution, the required surgery be performed on the amparo petitioner, under the strict responsibility and supervision of his treating physician, provided that a variation in circumstances does not require another type of care. Likewise, it ordered them to notify him of the date and time of such intervention; as well as the established preoperative requirements for such purposes. It warned them that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 71 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, imprisonment of three months to two years or a fine of twenty to sixty days will be imposed on anyone who receives an order that must be executed or enforced, issued within an amparo appeal, and does not execute or enforce it, provided that the offense is not more severely penalized. Similarly, it condemned the CCSS to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that served as the basis for that declaration, which, it ordered, shall be liquidated in the execution of the judgment of the contentious-administrative proceeding.
**II.** In a document uploaded to the electronic judicial file on March 16, 2023, at 10:14:39, images 01 to 26, attorney Gómez Salazar, in his capacity as special judicial representative of Mr. Adrián Alberto, submitted the corresponding liquidation to the court. He requested that the following items be accepted: **1)** the executed entity be condemned to pay the costs of the judgment execution proceeding; **2)** ₡181,500.00 for the personal legal costs of the amparo appeal; **3)** ₡350,000.00 for subjective moral damages; and **4)** the payment of statutory interest, from the moment the judgment became final and until its effective payment. By resolution at 10 hours 08 minutes on March 20, 2023 (images 27 to 29), the Execution Judge, Kenneth Arrones Morera, admitted the complaint.
In a document uploaded to the file on August 3 of that year at 09:21:02, images 33 to 63, the CCSS's general judicial representative without limit of amount, licensed attorney Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, opposed the execution. She raised the defense of lack of right. In the now-contested judgment, Judge Berny Solano Solano partially approved the liquidation in the following terms. He ordered the CCSS to pay: **1)** ₡181,500.00 for the personal costs of the amparo appeal; **2)** ₡300,000.00 for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo); **3)** he imposed on the executed institution the recognition of legal-rate interest, solely on the amount granted for subjective moral damage; and **4)** the costs of the execution proceeding and their legal interest, from the finality of the judgment setting them until their effective payment. Disagreeing, the CCSS's general judicial representative filed a cassation appeal.
**III.** The **first** censure, page two of the petition, the appellant announced she was filing it under the cassation ground for violation of substantive rules provided for in article 138, subsection a) of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA): “*The cassation appeal shall also proceed for violation of substantive rules of the legal order, in the following cases:* **/***a)** *When improper assessment is attributed to the evidence or it has been pretermitted.*” This, she said, was due to the improper assessment of the constitutional judgment's enforceability. She alleged violation of article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP). The challenged judgment, she noted, did not analyze the aspects contained in this Chamber's line of precedent, despite having pointed them out to the Judge. She mentioned the judgment of this Chamber no. 297-F-S1-2024 of 17:27 on March 21, 2024. Among those aspects, she cited the determination of extreme need of the patient's case from a medical point of view (urgency), his consent to being on a waiting list or, rather, the existence of physical damage. She alluded to the judgments of this Chamber—in citation order—nos.: 28-F-S1-2024 of 11:05 on January 11, 2024; 1502-F-S1-2022 of 11:24 on September 1; 1823-F-S1-2022 of 14:26 on August 4; and 2429-F-S1-2022 of 14:16 on November 3; all three from the year 2022. According to the appealed judgment, she pointed out, only the enforceability of the amparo appeal was considered to grant subjective moral damage. She reproduced, as was relevant to her, what the Execution Judge considered in section IV of the contested resolution; as well as the proven facts of the execution judgment. The factors of restorative justice, urgency, and the patient's conformity, which were brought to light in the response to the claim, were not taken into account. Even, she added, the Judge added more months on the waiting list. The Constitutional Chamber indicated it was three years and two months, this being the correct data; while the Judge established it at more than four years. Likewise, she argued, in the substantive analysis of the executable judgment, it was considered that the amparo was granted because the executing party was placed on a waiting list for that period, without mentioning any aspect related to the patient's pathology or the need for immediate follow-up. She copied, as pertinent, what was considered in section IV of the execution judgment. The Constitutional Court, she noted, determined that the referred waiting period was unreasonable. She transcribed another fragment of the referred section IV of the contested judgment. With a simple enforceable judgment, she stated, and without any medical technical report, the Judge certified that the passage of time caused physical discomfort. He only had that evidence, that of an abstractly granted right, to award indemnity claims. She does not understand, she indicated, how he reached the conclusion that the wait was four years. The execution resolution, she argued, made it clear that the executing party was placed on the surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019. This element is the only thing the questioned judgment referred to from what the Constitutional Chamber assessed to grant the filed amparo appeal. However, she alleged, the Judge, from a technical-medical point of view, developed the patient's supposed pathologies and that placement on a waiting list caused him an extension of moral damage (daño moral) due to uncertainty that must be indemnified based on the “in re ipsa” principle, when it is not possible to evidence said “uncertainty” from the patient's medical history. The questioned judgment, she affirmed, violated said canon—article 196 of the LGAP—, because, based on an enforceable judgment, there is no evidence of: **1)** that the wait for surgery, given that he presented a non-urgent diagnosis of unilateral inguinal hernia, caused him any type of complications in the normal development of his daily life; **2)** that he was denied access to health, since, at all times, he had access to the services provided by the Institution and never used emergency services, therefore there is not a single element that allows determining the damage, suffering, or affliction associated with the service provided (causal link between the alleged damage and the reproached conduct); and **3)** the existence of uncertainty in the patient, and its prolongation due to an act of her represented party. The Judge, she alleged, without technical evidence, and without the enforceable judgment of the amparo appeal mentioning any aspect from a medical point of view, determined complex technical-medical elements to conclude the existence of effective and individualized damage. Only the enforceability of a constitutional judgment, she indicated, does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of “emotional suffering” or “feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety.” This Chamber, it asserted, established in resolution no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensation for amparo appeals due to placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose compensation on the tripartite social security contribution fund. However, it noted, the Judge, departing from the criterion of this decision-making body, upheld that item. If the Adjudicator had properly assessed the evidence, it stated, the reasoning of the judgment would be different. It would have determined that it was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of damages (daño) and its aggravation by placement on a waiting list. The challenged judgment, it alleged, violated that legislative provision, since, based on a ruling in an amparo appeal for placement on a waiting list, there is no evidence whatsoever of an impact on the executing party's inner being (fuero interno). The existence of "feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety" in the patient was validated and determined, without specifying where this assessment was taken from or having any technical evidence to accredit it, which, it noted, results in the damages not being real or effective, directly violating said norm. It again mentioned the rulings of this Chamber (in order of citation) nos. 28-F-S1-2024, 297-F-S1-2024, 1502-F-S1-2022, 1823-F-S1-2022 and 2429-F-S1-2022. It added a table in which it set forth, in its view, what was specified in each of those resolutions. That line of reasoning, it indicated, was communicated to the Judge, who must know that case law (jurisprudencia) is a means to integrate, understand, and apply the Law. However, it noted, he ignored it and decided to condemn its represented party for "annoyance, frustration and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomforts" to the executing party, according to his understanding, without having proof. That is to say, it pointed out an issue of physical discomfort that was never proven. A final judgment (ejecutoria), it affirmed, is insufficient to determine the appropriateness of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Furthermore, placing a person on a waiting list is not "per se" sufficient reason to award compensation. This Chamber, it concluded, established in ruling no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensation for amparo appeals due to placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose compensation on someone who has consented to a wait and received the required medical attention.
IV.Regarding what was related in the previous section, it is necessary to indicate the following. FIRST. The appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an appeal (apelación)). Nor is it sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. It is necessary to contrast what was decided with the violation (infracción) that, in its view, took place. In this regard, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides for a necessary material requirement, both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This is the grounds (motivación) of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation (casación), must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under commentary provides, the factual and legal basis (fundamentación fáctica y jurídica) of the case. Factual, insofar as it shows disagreement with the facts that have been taken as proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence), or with the circumstances that occurred in the violation of procedural norms. Legal, when it concerns a problem raised about the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the block of legality (bloque de juricidad), including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflexive or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged sentence are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violations (infracción), the reasons of a factual nature can concur, along with the legal reasons (always necessary), and in that sense, the referenced bases must be directed on both fronts, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that, from the legal basis, the indication of those canons relating to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exempted, by express legal mandate. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the jurisdictional body of the instance mistakenly used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they are stated in the appealed pronouncement itself. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than citing these latter, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice when drafting and filing the cassation. This being the case, the basis ordered by law can be understood, broadly speaking (grosso modo), as that technical-legal argumentation (argumentación técnico-jurídica) in which a series of articles, or legal rules intertwined or concatenated with each other are mentioned and reasonably linked in a dual perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the sentence being attacked. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or if applicable, a single one) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the contested sentence (whether in its factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal basis (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, in general, they do not constitute their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated in interpreting article 139 under reference, "the appeal is required to have a minimal legal basis (fundamentación jurídica mínima) ... the reasons on which it bases its action must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed sentence and setting forth, at least, some normative reference to support it" (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, at 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008). The basis is, therefore, alien to the confused deployment of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or to the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed sentence, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is impertinent or manifestly and evidently disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal basis (total fundamentación jurídica)", and therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140 subsection c) of the same Procedural Code.
Likewise, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that, for an appeal to pass the admissibility review, it requires, in addition to a sufficient statement of grounds, the corresponding mention and linking of the applicable norms alleged to have been infringed with the challenged judgment. In this regard, see, among other resolutions, nos. 677-A-S1-2021 of 09:40 a.m. on March 25, 2021 (); 755-A-S1-2022 of 10:55 a.m. on March 29, (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and 1663-A-S1-2022 of 10:05 a.m. on July 21, (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340), both from the year 2022.
V.After a conscientious study of the criticism under analysis, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant intermingled two hypotheses that are dissimilar to each other, but, by the way she structured it, they become inseparable. As set forth, she announced its filing based on the improper assessment of the final judgment (sentencia ejecutoria), given that the existence of subjective non-material damage had been proven. This was developed on pages 03, 04, 05, 06, and 09 of the petition. Such a line of argumentation would constitute the cassation ground for violation of substantive norms as announced: the one provided for in subsection a) of canon 138 of the CPCA. However, on pages 04, 05, 06, 07, and 09, she stated: “[…] without any technical-medical report, it is proven that the passage of time causes physical discomforts, it being the case that this even stems from technical evidence. As mentioned previously, the judge only had said evidence (that of a right granted in the abstract) to award compensatory claims. […] Thus, it is not understood how the judge reaches the conclusion that the wait was 4 years, when not even the Constitutional Chamber stated this. […] As can be inferred, it is incorrect to state that the waiting time was greater than 4 years, as the trial judge indicated. […] the judgment makes it perfectly clear that the plaintiff [sic] was placed [sic] on a surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019, and this element is the only thing referred to (in the judgment being challenged) regarding what was assessed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the filed amparo appeal; however, the judge, from a technical-medical point of view, develops the alleged pathologies of the patient [sic] and that placement on a waiting list caused the plaintiff [sic] a prolongation of non-material damage due to uncertainty, which, according to the [sic] judge, must be compensated based on the in re ipsa principle, when from the patient's own medical history, such ‘uncertainty’ cannot be evidenced. […] The axis in question is aggravated since the trial judge, without any technical evidence, and without the final judgment (ejecutoria) of the amparo appeal mentioning any aspect from a medical point of view, determines complex technical-medical elements to conclude the existence of effective and individualized damage with respect to the plaintiff. / In this sense, this representation cannot concur with said opinion of the trial judge, since the series of elements that were taken into consideration by the [sic] judge, do not emerge from what was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the amparo appeal, especially and taking into consideration that it refers to highly technical aspects from a medical point of view (with specialties such as surgery, for example), which can only be verified with that type of (technical) evidence.”
/ *Gradually,* **only the enforcement of a constitutional judgment** *does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of* *“* *emotional suffering* *”* *or* *“* *feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety* *”* *especially and taking into consideration, it is reiterated, that there was no technical proof regarding it.* […] **It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the Sentence Enforcement Judge,** *however, the latter* [sic]*, moving away from the High Court's criterion, granted the claims, that is, with the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that there is an animus to condemn the CCSS at all costs (and of course, the contributors), without, of course, any support whatsoever from an evidentiary standpoint.* […] **that is, the judge clearly, from a simple enforcement of a judgment, validates and determines the existence of** **“** **feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety** **”** **in the patient, without specifying where this assessment comes from, nor having technical proof to accredit it, from any angle, which entails that the damage is neither real nor effective, thereby directly violating Article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration.** […] *however,* **with an animus of condemnation, the same ignores the entire previous line, and decides to condemn my represented party** *, for even* *“* *annoyance, frustration, and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomfort* *”* *to the plaintiff, according to his understanding, without having proof of it. That is, the judge indicates an issue of physical discomfort that was never proven.* […] *It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the jurisdictional authority, however, given the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that* **there is an animus to condemn the CCSS at all costs** *(and of course, the contributors), without any support whatsoever from an evidentiary standpoint.* ” (Highlighting is from the original). What the appellant now asserts is framed within the ground for breach of procedural rules provided for in subparagraph 1) point d) of the CPCA: lack of reasoning. However, what is alleged is informal. It omitted to indicate, with the clarity and precision required by cassation technique, as indicated in the previous section, under the protection of what is prescribed in ordinal 139 subparagraph 3) of the CPCA, which were the adjective norms violated, providing an explanation of how the transgression occurred. The ambiguity outlined clashes with the technique of cassation, which imposes that the grounds of the appeal must be indicated in a clear and precise manner, with the factual and legal basis of the case (precept 139 subparagraph 3) of the CPCA). Ergo, the outright rejection of the ground of disagreement under study is imposed.
**VI.** Notwithstanding the foregoing in the previous section and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to point out the following. **SECOND.** It must be remembered that, in sentence enforcement proceedings in general and, mainly, those issued by the Constitutional Chamber, what is executed must necessarily be constrained to what was resolved in the judgment subject to enforcement. This Chamber has indicated that the sentence enforcement process seeks to materialize the abstract condemnation imposed on the losing party. If different aspects—or contrary ones—are granted from the pronouncement giving rise to the enforcement or against persons who were not condemned, the principle of res judicata (cosa juzgada) would be violated. See, among other rulings of this decision-making body nos.: 383-F-S1-2019 of 09 hours 50 minutes on May 09, 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-925036) and 309-F-S1-2021 of 11 hours 20 minutes on February 11, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1024927). Consequently, the supervisory work of this Chamber is constrained to an objective comparison between the executory judgment and the appealed ruling. In this sense, the resolutions of this Chamber nos. 82-A-S1-22 of 10 hours 06 minutes on January 26 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1072742) and 1984-F-S1-2022 of 11 hours 18 minutes on September 08, both from the year 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112319), can also be consulted, among many others.
**VII.** As already indicated in section I of this resolution, the Constitutional Chamber, in the judgment under enforcement, granted the amparo appeal filed on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto, as it was accredited that, despite suffering from a "right inguinal hernia," on November 06, 2019, he was placed on a surgery waiting list with medium priority. However, at the time of the issuance of the constitutional ruling, on January 11, 2023, he did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. Therefore, said Chamber considered that the waiting period to which he had been subjected up to that point, three years and two months, violated not only the fundamental right to health; but also, the principles of efficacy and efficiency that must prevail in public services. Consequently, it ordered the Acting Director and the Head of the Surgery Service, both of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies so that, within three months, counted from the notification of that judgment, the protected party would undergo the pending surgery. As is clearly deduced, the Constitutional Chamber granted the amparo because it considered that the time the patient had been on the waiting list was disproportionate and violated his fundamental right to health, considering his pathology. In this sense, as stated in said Considerando of this judgment, said Chamber indicated that the CCSS subjected the protected person to a state of uncertainty for the indicated period, which it considered unacceptable, since his condition causes him pain and complications, affecting his quality of life. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court indicated that there is no justification for the delay or omissions in the health care of individuals, since said Institution, and its health centers, have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, efficacy, celerity, and continuity.
For its part, the Enforcement Judge, in Considerando IV of the challenged judgment, entitled “ON THE CLAIMED COMPENSATION FOR MORAL DAMAGES,” stated, in relevant part: “[…] In this case, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber deemed it improper for the petitioner to be kept in uncertainty about when an inguinal hernia surgery would be performed on him since November 6, 2019. However, given that the assessment of moral damages is in re ipsa, that is, it implies an assessment of what a human being may experience with the situation described in the list of proven facts of the constitutional vote being enforced, it is logical for this judge that any person who is told they require surgery for a health problem such as an inguinal hernia and is made to wait more than four years without even being able to know a definite date for the performance of their surgery will suffer emotionally with feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety. Therefore, in legal terms, it is considered appropriate to reject the defense of lack of right and, consequently, grant compensation for subjective moral damages, which is prudentially set at the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (₡300,000), at a rate of two hundred thousand colones for the waiting and uncertainty to which, originally, they were subjected to know the date of their surgery and to have it effectively performed, and an additional one hundred thousand colones, because with each day that passed without timely care, as the minutes and days went by, the anguish and emotional pain increased, because it is a condition that involves physical discomfort and, in human terms, the feeling of greater anxiety and vulnerability they have experienced is inferable [sic].” […] (The underlining is supplied). While it is true that the Enforcement Judge indicated that the protected party’s waiting period was more than four years, despite the fact that when the constitutional judgment was issued it was three years and two months, as the Constitutional Court expressly indicated, this is because the Enforcement Court did not find it proven that, at the time the ruling challenged on appeal was issued, the surgery had already been performed on them or, at least, a date had been set to perform it. That is, when the challenged judgment was issued, the waiting period had increased to more than four years. It was not proven, it is reiterated, that at the time that judgment was issued, the surgery had already been performed on the petitioner. However, the appellant did not properly challenge such circumstance. She merely pointed out that restorative justice exists in this dispute because the required surgical intervention was performed on the protected party, but without indicating with what evidence her assertion is proven; nor did she indicate when it was performed on them. In any case, as can be seen without difficulty from what was considered in the constitutional ruling and in the one now challenged, the Enforcement Judge adhered to the facts reviewed in the constitutional venue and to what was resolved by that Chamber to grant this item for subjective moral damages, that is, the delay in setting the date and performing the surgery required by the protected party, so no violation of the enforceable judgment is observed.
VIII.THIRD. As indicated, the appellant stated that what she called “restorative justice” operated in the sub-judice matter. In this regard, it is necessary to point out that this Chamber, in previous matters, recognized its applicability in the matter of compensation for subjective moral damages for the violation of the fundamental right to health (as recognized by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in upholding the respective amparo appeal, due to the delay of the CCSS in providing the medical service required by the administered person), when the CCSS provides the service within the period ordered in the constitutional venue. In this regard, see judgments nos. 1502-S1-2022 of 11:24 a.m. on September 1 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112330), 2429-F-S1-2022 of 2:16 p.m. on November 3 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1123608), both from the year 2022; 28-F-S1-2024 of 11:05 a.m. on January 11 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396), 297-F-S1-2024 of 5:27 p.m. on March 21 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250), 901-F-S1-2024 of 12:31 p.m. on July 4 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1240015) and 937 of 2:51 p.m. on July 10 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925); all from the year 2024. However, the current composition of this Chamber, after a new study, considers it necessary to reconsider that position. Without a doubt, it is a vindication of the injured legal situation, for a lack of service, that it be provided. Even more so when it becomes necessary, as occurs with a pending health service. However, such reparation does not exclude that the harmed person may have suffered effects on their moral and patrimonial sphere while the abnormal conduct persisted due to administrative dysfunction. If effective detriments (precepts 196 and 197 of the LGAP) specific to the particular case and derived from its particular characteristics are demonstrated, their existence being inferred, even, through the intellectual process “in re ipsa,” despite the user having been judicially protected, their reparation is applicable. That is, the service rectification does not exclude that the harmed person suffers effects on their moral and patrimonial sphere while the abnormal conduct persists. If that occurred and was proven thus, it is obligatory to impose the corresponding compensatory consequence, if it was requested by the person whose legal sphere was damaged.
This is so by virtue of the principle of full reparation of harm (principio de reparación integral del daño), which has constitutional and legal roots (canons 9, 41, 49 of the Constitution; 190 and 197 of the LGAP).
**IX.** Along this line of thought, and regarding the existence and quantification of subjective non-economic loss (daño moral subjetivo), this Chamber has long held that: *“IV. [...] it stems from injury to a non-pecuniary right. That is, it does not directly affect one’s assets. It entails an unjust disturbance of one’s peace of mind. It does not require direct proof and is left to the equitable assessment of the Judge. In cases of subjective non-economic loss, courts are empowered to decree and quantify the award. The legal nature of this type of harm does not oblige the liquidator to determine its existence because it corresponds to an internal realm. This is not a matter for psychiatrists or physicians. Its existence or not must be understood because it belongs to the conscience. It is deduced through presumptions inferred from circumstantial evidence, since the unlawful generating act reveals the non-economic loss, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, privacy, etc., are harmed, it is easy to infer the harm, which is why it is said that proof of non-economic loss exists “in re ipsa”. Nor must its value be proven because it has no concrete value. It is assessed prudentially. It is not, then, about quantifying the suffering, as it is priceless, but about fixing monetary compensation for its injury, the sole mechanism to which the law can resort, in order to partially, at least, repair its offense. For more detail on this matter, see, among others, rulings from this collegiate body: decision no. 112 already cited, no. 17 of 2:30 p.m. on 21 February 1996, and no. 41 of 2:40 p.m. on 14 May 1997. Its award does not closely depend on evidentiary factors (save those referring to causation), but rather on the prudence and objective discretion of the adjudicator. However, its fixing is subject to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which must be assessed by the competent authority in each case, so that its quantification is in accordance with Law and does not lead to excessive compensation that unjustifiably benefits one of the parties. That is, it must maintain a fair balance derived from the specific factual picture, a matter to be weighed within the indicated limits.”* (Among many others, see judgment of that Chamber no. 468-F-S1-19 of 9:45 a.m. on 30 May 2019). In accordance with the foregoing, once the existence of non-economic loss and its causal link to the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff have been established—which is not contested by the appellant in cassation—the determination of the quantum depends on the equitable assessment of the Judge; for which purpose, the special circumstances of the case must be taken into account, as well as the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality.” In this respect, see, among many others, judgment no. 1098-F-S1-2023 of 10:09 a.m. on 5 July 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1170686). That is, it is regarding subjective non-economic loss that its demonstration is “in re ipsa”, provided it results from an unlawful generating act or cause.
**X.** In this dispute, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as already indicated, determined the unlawful conduct of the CCSS by verifying the violation of Mr. Adrián Alberto’s fundamental right to health. The postponement of the required surgery was, at the time the constitutional judgment was rendered, approximately three years and two months, despite the fact that his condition, as that Chamber stated, caused him pain and complications, which affected his quality of life. Such situation—unlawful act—in accordance with the maxims of logic, experience, and sound human understanding, as was resolved, is an adequate cause (causal link) of moral distress, associated with anxiety, discomfort, frustration, and worry, due to the excessive waiting time for care—as declared, it is insisted, in the constitutional venue—for a health situation that, “per se”, is a cause of worry for the person suffering from it. In accordance with sound human understanding and experience, it is insisted, one can infer, “in re ipsa”, as the Enforcement Judge (Juzgador de Ejecución) did, the existence of feelings such as those described above, without him having a legal duty to endure them, as they derived from an abnormal functioning of the Administration, thus decreed, it is repeated once more, by the Constitutional Chamber. Ergo, contrary to what the appellant indicated, its existence is determined and, therefore, the appropriateness of its compensation.
**XI. FOURTH.** Likewise, the appellant argued that, in the case of the protected party, there was no urgency for the surgery. As set forth in Section I of this judgment, it was the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the enforceable judgment, that determined the urgency for the enforcing party to undergo the required surgical procedure, ordering that it be performed within three months from notification of that ruling. Consequently, within the objective comparison that must prevail in this type of process—enforcement of a constitutional judgment—the matter of urgency is a precluded aspect, as, it is repeated, it was so determined and resolved by the Constitutional Court.
**XII. FIFTH.** The challenging party also indicated that the protected party acquiesced to or consented to remaining on the waiting list. Contrary to what was argued, in this dispute, the existence of tacit consent or an acquiesced act (acto consentido), much less express consent, on the part of Mr. Morera Trejos cannot be considered. The amparo appeal was filed in time. So much so that the Constitutional Chamber admitted it for processing and subsequently granted it. This is independent of the time elapsed between the moment when the CCSS placed him on the waiting list and the filing of the amparo.
Therefore, the enforcing party expressed her disagreement with remaining on the waiting list, and said jurisdictional body agreed with her.
**XIII.** The **second** ground of disagreement, page nine of the pleading, the appellant announced she would bring it as a cassation ground for violation of substantive norms provided for in subsection c) of canon 138 of the CPCA: “***c)*** *When a legal norm has been improperly applied or interpreted or has been left unapplied.*” She invoked a violation of ordinal 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), due to improper application. She stated that this is an execution proceeding for a constitutional judgment. The condemnation rendered in that venue was in the abstract, she stated, and therefore must be executed. She even alleged that the right to receive an indemnity for court costs (costas), damages, and losses must be proven in this proceeding. She reproduced said precept. It states that court costs shall be considered as: attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested, and indispensable expenses of the proceeding. It is clear, she pointed out, that no electronic invoice was issued, which condones the request for amounts that are not proven to have been invested and that will be canceled without any proof. The enforcing party, she alleged, did not provide any means of conviction that there had been an investment of money for attorney's fees. Therefore, she noted, the Judge was compelled to grant no amount whatsoever for the court costs of the amparo remedy, in the form of fees. Under the Judge's premise, she asserted, any person, through the vicarious action, could file amparo remedies for waiting list matters and, at the time of executing the judgment, would receive the court costs of the remedy as indemnity, which, in her opinion, would be an absurdity, since to receive full indemnity for an expense, it must be demonstrated. This is where, she indicated, the error of the judgment lies, since it granted the amount for court costs of the amparo remedy as if they were for fees. The reasons, she noted, why court costs are granted to a prevailing person in a judicial proceeding must be clear. Furthermore, she added, the magistrate of the Constitutional Chamber, Mr. Fernando Castillo Víquez, has been clear on multiple occasions in ordering both the CCSS, when it carries out the extra-procedural satisfaction of the Constitutional Chamber's condemnations, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, to ensure that the amounts granted effectively reach the hands of the amparo beneficiaries. She transcribed, in what is of her interest, what was set forth in the separate note recorded in Constitutional Chamber vote no. 2016-012528. The challenged judgment, she concluded, should have rejected that point, since, no electronic invoice having been provided, it was not demonstrated that any legal professional had rendered a professional service and charged for it.
**XIV.** Regarding what was set forth in the preceding paragraph, the following must be pointed out. **FIRST.** On page 10 of the pleading, the challenger stated: “*Under the first instance judge's premise, any person, through the Vicarious Action, could file Amparo Remedies for waiting list matters, and at the time of executing the judgment, perfectly receive as indemnity the court costs of the remedy, which, respectfully, would be an absurdity* […]”. Contrary to what was indicated, this Chamber, from long-standing precedent, has noted the difference between personal court costs and attorney's fees, concluding that personal court costs belong to the party, not to the lawyer. In this regard, the following rulings may be consulted, mutatis mutandis: nos. 432-F-S1-2017 of 09 hours 30 minutes of April 20, 2017 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-950854); 515-F-S1-2018 of 11 hours 20 minutes of May 30, 2018 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-892742); 28-F-S1-2024 of 11 hours 05 minutes of January 11 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396) and 297-F-S1-2024 of 17 hours 27 minutes of March 21 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250); both from the year 2024.
**XV.** **SECOND.** On page 10 of the pleading, the appellant affirmed: “*In that sense, **note that the very content of the norm establishes that attorney's fees, compensation for the time invested, and indispensable expenses of the proceeding shall be considered court costs**, but the plaintiff* [sic]*, as mentioned by the judge **having it perfectly clear that no electronic invoice was issued, condones requesting amounts that are not demonstrated to have been invested and will be canceled*** [sic] ***without any proof, for a simple principle, which precisely requires the existence of proof.** * […] *the plaintiff* [sic] *does not provide any proof that there has been an investment of money for attorney's fees, **that is, given the lack of proof in this regard, the fact of the case is that the judge was compelled to grant the amount for court costs of the Amparo Remedy, in the form of fees that are not proven to have been paid, there being no electronic invoice involved.** * […] *Therefore, it is found that the judgment should have rejected that point, **since, no electronic invoice having been provided,** it was not demonstrated that any legal professional had rendered a professional service and charged for it.*” (The boldfacing is from the original). In this regard, it must be indicated that the CPCA, in ordinal 193, expressly regulates the imposition of court costs (costas), just as canon 73.1 of the CPC does. Consequently, it is the CPCA norm that applies to this litigation. However, this provision does not prescribe, as the CPC provision does, what is considered court costs. Ergo, this procedural principle, like those contained in ordinals 76.1 and 76.4 ibid, by virtue of the referral made by Article 220 of the CPCA, is applicable to this litigation. In this sense, precept 73.1 of the CPC provides: “[…] *<u>Attorney's fees shall be considered court costs</u>, the compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the proceeding.*” (The underlined text is supplied). In this same vein, precepts 76.1 and 76.4 ibid indicate: “***76.1 Right to fees and determination.** * <u>Attorney's fees belong to the attorney</u>, with the exceptions established by law. When the party is a lawyer and has acted personally, they shall have the right to them.*” Unless otherwise agreed, they shall be fixed based on the work, the status, and the economic significance of the proceeding, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 13, Organic Law of the Bar Association (Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas), of October 28, 1941, and the decree on lawyers' and notaries' fees. [...] 76.4 Contractual fixing of attorney's fees. Attorneys and their clients may contractually fix the amount of the fees and their payment methods, respecting the limits imposed by the law and the respective decree. Said stipulation shall not affect the opposing parties in the proceeding, for purposes of fixing personal costs. (Only the underlined portion is supplied). In light of the provisions of said norms, it is clear that, for cost purposes, attorney's fees must be calculated based on the legal limits and the rates established in the respective Decree, regardless of any private agreement between the attorney and their client. This implies that, in the settlement of costs, it is not necessary for the executing party to prove the agreement they have with their attorney or the payment they may have made to them, since the regulations provide that the calculation of this item must be performed in accordance with the applicable tariff or decree, in order to ensure an objective criterion in the settlement of costs. Thus, if a party had legal representation in the processing of a case and obtained a ruling in their favor for the payment of costs, the amount to be recognized as attorney's fees will necessarily be that established in the "Tariff of Fees for Professional Legal Services" (Arancel de Honorarios por Servicios Profesionales de Abogacía), according to the work performed. Consequently, it is not essential to provide an invoice or proof of payment in favor of the legal professional for the recognition of this item to proceed. In this dispute, the objector did not prove that Mr. Adrián Alberto lacked legal representation during the processing of the amparo proceeding. On the contrary, it is on record that his special judicial representative in this enforcement proceeding was the one who filed the amparo remedy on his behalf before the Constitutional Chamber. This allows one to infer that said professional defended the interests of the amparo petitioner in the constitutional venue. Ergo, the lack of presentation of the invoice or proof of payment claimed by the appellant is not sufficient to diminish or dismiss the item of personal costs liquidated by the party and expressly recognized in the enforceable judgment. This is reiterated because the executing party had legal representation during the processing of the amparo and obtained a ruling in their favor for the payment of costs. That is, they are entitled to be recognized as costs the amount that, as attorney's fees, is established by the applicable tariff. As a corollary, this Chamber does not observe the alleged legal violation and, consequently, the rejection of the challenge shall be imposed.
XVI.The third and final reproach to the questioned judgment, page 11, the cassation appellant announced she was filing it based on the cassation ground for breach of substantive norms provided for in subsection d) of numeral 138 of the CPCA: "d) When the judgment violates the norms or principles of Constitutional law, among others, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality." She invoked the infringement of the postulate of reasonableness. The Judge, she stated, determined the reasonableness of the indemnification starting from the "in re ipsa" principle, establishing the amount to be indemnified at ₡300,000.00. She reproduced, in what was of interest to her, what was considered in section IV of the questioned judgment. The Adjudicator, she explained, indicated that with each passing day the anguish and emotional pain increased, but this could not be proven, as the evidence was lacking. The objected judgment, she alleged, left open the possibility of unrestrictedly seeking double indemnifications: 1) the material type, by receiving medical attention, and 2) the pecuniary type, without any evidence whatsoever regarding this. With that analysis, she asserted, the indicated principle of reasonableness was breached. Although it is true, she noted, that waiting lists exist, granting a pecuniary indemnification for placing a person on one of them, without there being a medical emergency criterion, according to what this Chamber indicated, implies that the amounts destined to guarantee the two fundamental rights -life and health-, are diminished, which is irrational, since people contributing to the Sickness and Maternity Insurance do so with the objective that a health service be provided and that there be resources to guarantee it. Not for indemnifications to be granted for placing a person on a waiting list. The Adjudicator, she noted, departing from the indicated postulate, determined, without any evidence, that there must be economic compensation, despite the fact that the executing party received restorative justice, by having the required surgery performed, despite his condition not being categorized as urgent. That is, he determined that the indicated double indemnification must always take place when a person is placed on a waiting list, which generates a privilege and unjust enrichment. The objective of whoever appeals to the Constitutional Chamber, so that a surgical procedure be performed or medical attention be provided to them, she argued, is the restoration of their health, not obtaining an indemnification. The referred-to principle was violated by granting an indemnity item, despite the required medical procedure having been performed. Likewise, she indicated, that postulate was violated by not determining that the indemnification includes the restitution, which occurred due to the judicial resolution, since the health service user (which has limited resources), received the required medical attention, for which reason it becomes contrary to law, especially to said principle, that in addition to the restitution received, an additional amount be granted to them, having singularly derogated the situation of being on a waiting list. Granting a sum for the concept of indemnification, she said, in addition to having performed the required medical procedure, grants them a privilege over the other insured persons, who were surpassed by the amparo-protected person. Said situation, she argued, was previously analyzed by this Chamber in judgments nos. 1502-F-S1-2022 and 297-F-S1-24, which she reproduced in what was of interest to her. Due to the foregoing, she concluded, granting an indemnification for moral damages (daño moral) is a violation of the principle of reasonableness.
XVII.Regarding what was indicated in the preceding Whereas Clause (Considerando), it is necessary to indicate the following. FIRST. On page 11 of the appeal, the challenger stated: "[...] although it is true that waiting lists exist, granting a pecuniary indemnification for placing a person on one of these, without there being a medical emergency criterion, according to what the First Chamber itself indicates in the resolutions referenced above [...]" The reference made to another reproach, as the appellant did, is not admissible.
As noted in section V of this judgment, pursuant to the provisions of article 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA, the technique requires that the grounds for cassation (casación) be stated clearly and precisely, with the factual and legal basis of the case. **SECOND.** After a detailed analysis of the objection under review, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant argued the violation of the constitutional principle of reasonableness for two different reasons: **A)** because of the amount of ₡300,000.00 awarded as compensation for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), since, in her view, the existence of that damage was not proven. That line of argument, different from what was announced, if it were to occur, would constitute the cassation ground for violation of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1), point d) of article 137 of the CPCA: lack of reasoning. However, what was argued is informal. The appellant did not indicate the procedural rules that were violated, with a clear and precise explanation of how the infraction occurred, as required by the technique of cassation (casación), as set out in section IV of this judgment, under the provisions of article 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and for further abundance of reasons, it must be stated that, contrary to what was argued, in sections IX and X of this judgment, the reasons were provided for which this Chamber deems, endorsing the decision of the Execution Judge, that in this dispute the judgment creditor suffered an injury of that type, for which its compensation is appropriate. That is, the existence of the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) inflicted on the judgment creditor by the facts known in the constitutional venue was fully evidenced. On the other hand, regarding the amount awarded, in addition to what was indicated in Considerando IX of this ruling for its determination, this Chamber has stated: "*VIII.* [...] *On other occasions, this* cassation body *has had the opportunity to highlight the necessary* "juridical reasonableness" *that this type of compensation must maintain, for whose verification the observance of a* "reasonableness of equality" *must be confirmed, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as* "...the type of legal assessment that starts from the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions" *(e.g., rulings no. 5236-99 and 1354-2011). That is, to avoid inequitable and illegitimate treatment in the various cases where the compensation of moral damages (daños morales) is discussed, it is necessary to verify that the recognized amounts are not disproportionate when compared with those established in other similar cases. In this vein, the Chamber considers that the sum awarded is in accordance with the intensity of the damage caused.*" Judgment no. 760-F-S1-2023 of 13 hours 24 minutes on May 29, 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1157835). In the same sense, see, among others, rulings no. 1934-F-S1-2022 of 15 hours on August 12; 2654-F-S1-2022 of 10 hours 10 minutes on December 08 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1132117), both from the year 2022 and 1087-F-S1-2023 of 09 hours 36 minutes on July 05, 2023. This Chamber considers that the sum awarded for this concept, ₡300,000.00, in view of the circumstances of the case—the pathology suffered by the protected party and its consequences as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber itself; as well as the waiting time he was subjected to until the constitutional judgment was issued—and similar cases, is reasonable and proportionate. In this regard, by way of example, the following precedents can be noted, where this decision-making body did not consider unreasonable the sums awarded for the delay in the provision of the public health service, no. 429-F-S1-2024 of 10 hours 41 minutes on May 03 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1229475), in which the Judge awarded ₡500,000.00; 937-F-S1-2024 of 14 hours 51 minutes on July 10, (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925), setting it at ₡200,000.00; and 1302-F-S1-2024 of 16 hours 14 minutes on September 27, all from the year 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1253306), granting the sum of ₡200,000.00. This requires the rejection of this part of the objection.
**XVIII. B)** for having awarded a compensatory item—subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo)—despite the existence of restorative justice, since the protected party underwent the required surgery. That is, due to the alleged existence of double compensation. However, as indicated in section VII of this ruling, that factual circumstance—that the protected party underwent the surgery he required and, therefore, that "restorative justice" existed—was not accredited by the Execution Judge. Consequently, if the rebuke were to occur, it would fall within the ground for breach of substantive rules provided for in article 138, subsection a) of the CPCA for improper evidentiary assessment. Nevertheless, what was argued is also informal. The objector omitted to indicate which piece of evidence accredited her assertion and the substantive rules that were violated by said excess, with a clear and precise explanation of how they were infringed. Ergo, for the reasons stated, the rejection of the ground of disagreement under review is required. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and for further abundance of reasons, it must be indicated that in section VIII of this decision, the reasons were provided for which this Chamber reconsidered its position adopted in previous judgments regarding the issue of restorative justice. Now holding the thesis that, despite the required medical assistance being provided to the patient by virtue of the order emanating from the Constitutional Chamber, if the injured person suffers effects in his moral and financial sphere due to the abnormal conduct of the Administration because of the delay in the provision of the medical service, its existence being inferred even through the intellectual process "in re ipsa," its reparation is appropriate, if so requested. Likewise, in Considerandos XI and XII, the reasons were set forth for which it is considered that the objector's arguments, regarding the non-existence of urgency for the performance of the surgery on the protected party and his agreement with the waiting period, are not receivable. Consequently, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, reference is made to what was stated therein. Consequently, the Execution Judge has not violated the constitutional principle of reasonableness.
**XIX.** By virtue of the reasons noted, the rejection of the appeal filed is required.
In accordance with the provisions of section 150(3) of the CPCA, as this Chamber does not consider that the cassation appellant has sufficient grounds to appeal, for the reasons set forth when analyzing each grievance, it shall be imposed the payment of the costs of the cassation appeal, which must be liquidated in the sentence execution phase, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the executed party, granting the respective hearing on the liquidation presented (articles 41 and 153 of the Political Constitution).
**XX. DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ROJAS MORALES.** I dissent from the majority opinion, insofar as it deems it appropriate to order the defendant to pay subjective moral damages. Regarding the damages and losses derived from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, when granting an amparo appeal, it is worth bearing in mind that, given their nature, these types of judgments contain an abstract condemnation, without any factual consideration, and do not prejudge, as they were not the subject of analysis, their existence, nor their causal link or quantification. Said Court is limited to determining the constitutional violation. When executing these aspects, the causal relationship between what was declared in the abstract and the specific matter must be established. Thus, the fact that the Constitutional Chamber condemns in the abstract to the payment of damages and losses does not entail an automatic condemnation to execute, as the Executing Judge seems to misunderstand. It is up to the judges responsible for resolving the liquidation to assess, in each specific case, the existence of sufficient merit to grant the requested compensation. In this direction, the following must be analyzed: the particular circumstances of the case, the position of the parties, the nature, object, and purpose of the compensation, as well as the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Furthermore, when the matter concerns an alleged subjective moral damage suffered by a person facing a lack of medical care, as in this case, the examination of additional aspects becomes indispensable. In the first place, the factor of **urgency** must be assessed, since it is evident that a person who requires urgent care from the CCSS is not in the same situation, for example: an administered person suffering from cancer that advances irremediably, compared to someone who presents an ailment and has been prescribed a surgical intervention or a medical appointment without a pressing nature; in both cases, the waiting time to receive the medical service does not have the same result. Likewise, the moral affectation will not be of the same intensity. On the other hand, the **inactivity of the patient** due to the passage of time on the waiting list must be analyzed (canon 30(bis) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional -LJC- and 38 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), which ceases when they file an amparo before the Constitutional Chamber or, before the courts of justice, to claim the medical care or treatment they need (administrative activity). Take into account that the passage of time without taking action has clear consequences in the Costa Rican legal system regarding the expiration of the action, an aspect assessable ex officio. A pecuniary advantage cannot be derived from inactivity, as this confronts the principle of proportionality in the strict sense. Thirdly, the **satisfaction provided by a court order** must be weighed, through which a medical act or the delivery of medication is ordered (even if it arises from a precautionary measure). Even the most recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has assessed, as timely care, **the satisfaction generated from the notification of the amparo proceeding**. This refers to those cases in which, on the occasion of the amparo and regardless of the time elapsed between the filing of the appeal and the administrative response received, the respondent authority provides the administered person with the required medical care (giving a certain date for surgery or a medical consultation, providing the needed medication, rescheduling an appointment, etc.). Cases of the Chamber's latest resolution that are binding erga omnes (according to article 13 of the LJC). The Constitutional Judges have deemed it improper to order costs, damages, and losses; which must be assessed by this Chamber when ruling on the cassation appeals. In this regard, the following judgments, among others, can be consulted: numbers: 2024-000017 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, 2024-000026 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, and 2024-006673 of 9:15 a.m. on March 8, 2024, all from the Constitutional Chamber. It is worth highlighting that granting the required medical service constitutes a manifestation of restorative justice, which this Deciding Body must assess. The compensation granted in violation of the reasoning set forth becomes unreasonable and disproportionate, especially when in a universal social security system, such as the Costa Rican one, such compensations are paid by all insured persons, including those displaced by the executing party. Upon examining the described aspects and the particular case of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos, it becomes improper to grant compensation for the emotional affectation awarded in the appealed judgment. It is evident in the case file that, on November 6, 2019, the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela issued Mr. Adrián a hospitalization order for outpatient surgery, without a certain date and with medium priority. On December 28, 2022, he filed an amparo before the Constitutional Chamber, a jurisdictional body that ordered, by resolution 2023-000411 of 9:20 a.m. on January 11, 2023, to perform the surgical intervention within a period of three months, upon fulfillment of the preoperative requirements. Bear in mind that the executing person remained for approximately three years waiting for the procedure to be performed in the Surgery Service. One must take into account the possibilities of social security in an area such as General Surgery, where there are not enough specialists to serve the population, especially since the number of people requiring intervention in that area is increasing. On the other hand, Mr. Morera Trejos did not accompany his claim with more data than the judgment, so the affectations to his internal state have no more support than the subjective assessments of the judge, without any causal relationship being accredited. It is recorded in the judicial file that, on the occasion of the amparo filed, a reassessment appointment was scheduled for the executing person on February 2, 2023, in order to know the patient's current conditions. See, the waiting time that Mr. Adrián endured to receive medical care was approximately one month, counted from when he filed the amparo appeal on December 28, 2022, until he was assessed in the Surgery specialty on February 2, 2023. Even the period is shorter if one considers that the executed ruling was notified on January 12, 2023. Periods that are reasonable from the point of view of providing a non-urgent service. Bear in mind that, from the filing of the amparo, the executing party was never subjected to a prolonged or indefinite wait. He received the medical care within a more than reasonable period (even shorter than care periods in private medicine). The foregoing indicates the non-existence of the liquidated damage.
It bears noting, in cases such as the one under study, there is no doubt that the user's satisfaction has already been generated; therefore, granting an additional indemnity beyond what was received (medical assessment in a singular removal from the waiting list) becomes contrary to law. The foregoing, far from causing the petitioner non-material damage (daño moral), granted them a privilege over the other insured parties, which diminishes the claim for non-material damage granted. It is irrational, under the cited conditions, to impose upon the tripartite social security contribution fund and upon the other insured parties who benefit from said funds, an additional indemnity upon someone who has already received the required medical attention through judicial protection. For the reasons stated, the indemnity granted does not conform to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality (set by the Constitutional Chamber itself). By virtue of the foregoing, the undersigned considers it proper to uphold the grievances of the appeal related to this point and, consequently, to annul the contested judgment -only- insofar as it recognized the amount of ¢300,000.00 for subjective non-material damage, in order to instead, ruling on the merits, dismiss said point.
POR TANTO
By majority vote, the appeal is declared without merit, with its costs to be borne by the cassation appellant, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which shall be settled in the judgment enforcement stage.
Magistrate Rojas Morales registers a dissenting vote to grant the appeal by virtue of restorative justice having been configured.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:100%; 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width="163" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Luis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Rocío Rojas Morales</span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub; -aw-import:ignore"> </span></p></td><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Damaris Vargas Vásquez</span></p></td></tr><tr><td style="padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><img 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width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub">Damaris Vargas Vásquez</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:7pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10.5pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub">JUAN CARLOS BOLAÑOS VILLALOBOS</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10.5pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10.5pt; vertical-align:sub">SECRETARIO/A DE SALA CONSTITUCIONAL</span></p> Jorge Leiva Poveda Carlos Guillermo Zamora Campos Digitally Signed Document -- Verification Code -- See resolutions 112-1996, 41-1997, 468-2019, and 1098-2023 of the First Chamber. The Constitutional Chamber granted an amparo action against the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS), finding that the health right of the protected party had been violated, who was diagnosed with a right inguinal hernia and was placed on a waiting list, but at the time of the ruling, still did not have a certain date for his surgical intervention. It ordered the entity to perform the required surgery on the protected party within three months. In the constitutional judgment enforcement proceeding, the Court ordered the enforced party to pay a sum for subjective moral damages. Change of criterion on restorative justice. Amending service does not exclude the possibility that the injured person suffers affectations in their moral and property sphere, while the abnormal conduct, due to administrative dysfunction, persisted (principle of full reparation of harm, articles 9, 41, and 49 of the Political Constitution, 190 and 197 of the General Public Administration Law). The Constitutional Tribunal determined the unlawful conduct of the CCSS by verifying the violation of the fundamental right to health of the protected party. The postponement of the required surgery (abnormal administrative functioning) was, at the time of the constitutional ruling, approximately three years and two months, despite the fact that his condition, as indicated by said Chamber, caused him pain and complications, which affected his quality of life. Such situation—unlawful fact—according to the maxims of logic, experience, and correct human understanding, as was resolved, is an adequate cause (causal link) of moral distress, associated with anxiety, discomfort, frustration, and worry. Ergo, its existence is determined and, therefore, its compensation is appropriate. Regarding the urgency in performing the surgery, it was the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the executory judgment, who determined it, ordering that it must be carried out within three months from the notification of the resolution. Nor did the protected party conform to or consent, tacitly or expressly, to remain on a waiting list when filing the amparo action (voto 568-F-2025).
Section 139.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code provides for the factual and legal reasoning of the cassation appeal, as a material requirement necessary for its admissibility and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. See resolutions 318-2008, 677-2021, 755-2022, and 1663-2022 of the First Chamber. The appellant intermingled two dissimilar hypotheses (the violation of substantive norms due to improper evidentiary assessment—canon 138.a ibid.—and the violation of procedural norms due to lack of reasoning—137.1.d ibid.). Due to the way it was structured, they are inseparable. The allegation is deficient, as it omitted to indicate with the clarity and precision required by cassation technique which procedural norms were violated, providing an explanation of how the transgression occurred (factual and legal reasoning of the case) (voto 568-F-2025).
The judgment enforcement proceeding seeks to materialize the—abstract—order imposed on the losing party. If aspects different—or contrary—to the ruling that gives rise to the enforcement are granted, or against persons who were not ordered, res judicata is violated. See resolutions 383-2019 and 309-2021 of the First Chamber. Consequently, the supervisory function of this Chamber is constrained to an objective comparison between the executory judgment and the appealed ruling. See resolutions 82-2022 and 1984-2022 of the First Chamber. In the instant case, based on what was considered in the constitutional ruling and in the one now challenged, the Enforcement Judge adhered to the facts reviewed in the constitutional venue and to what was resolved by that First Chamber to grant said item for subjective moral damages, that is, the delay in setting the date and performing the surgery required by the protected party, so no transgression of the executory ruling is observed (voto 568-F-2025).
Distinction between personal costs (costas personales) and attorney's fees (honorarios de abogado), as the former belong to the party, not to the lawyer. See resolutions 432-2017, 515-2018, 28-2024, and 297-2024 of the First Chamber. In light of norms 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, 73.1, 76.1 and 4, of the Civil Procedure Code, for the purposes of costs (costas), attorney's fees (honorarios de abogado) must be calculated based on legal limits and the rates established in the respective Decree, regardless of any private agreement between the lawyer and their client. This implies that, in the liquidation of costs, it is not necessary for the enforcing party to demonstrate the agreement they have with their lawyer or the payment they may have made to them, since the regulations provide that the calculation of this item must be made in accordance with the respective fee schedule or decree, in order to ensure an objective criterion in the liquidation of costs. Consequently, it is not essential to provide an invoice or proof of payment in favor of the legal professional for the recognition of this item to be appropriate (voto 568-F-2025).
Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA) expressly regulates the imposition of costs (costas); as does canon 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, it is the CPCA norm that is applicable to this litigation (voto 568-F-2025).
The reference made to another objection, as the appellant did, is not acceptable. Pursuant to precept 139.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, technique requires that the grounds for cassation be indicated clearly and precisely, with the factual and legal reasoning of the case. Another argumentation configures the cassation ground for violation of procedural norms under 137.1.d ibid.: lack of reasoning. However, the argument is deficient, because the appellant did not indicate the procedural norms that were violated, with a clear and precise explanation of how the infraction occurred, as cassation technique obliges. In another charge, the complaint falls within the ground for violation of substantive norms provided in article 138.a ibid. due to improper evidentiary assessment. Nonetheless, the argument is deficient. The objector omitted to indicate with which piece of evidence her statement is accredited and the substantive norms that were violated by said impropriety, with a clear and precise explanation of how they were infringed (voto 568-F-2025).
The procedural ground of lack of reasoning of the judgment is alleged.
Sections IX and X of the ruling provided the arguments by which this Chamber considers, endorsing what was decided by the Enforcement Judge, that in this litigation the enforcing party suffered moral injury (lesión moral), making his compensation (indemnización) appropriate (voto 568-F-2025).
Necessary “legal reasonableness (razonabilidad jurídica)” that compensation awards must observe, for the verification of which compliance with a “reasonableness of equality (razonabilidad de igualdad)” must be confirmed, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as “the type of legal assessment based on the premise that equal background facts must yield equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions” (decisions 5236-1999 and 1354-2011). That is, to avoid inequitable and illegitimate treatment in the various matters in which compensation for moral damages (daños morales) is disputed, it is necessary to verify that the amounts recognized are not disproportionate, when compared with those established in other similar matters. See decisions 1934-2022, 2654-2022, 760-2023 and 1087-2023 of the First Chamber. This Chamber considers the sum granted for this moral damage (daño moral), in light of the circumstances of the case—the pathology suffered by the person protected by amparo (amparado) and its consequences indicated by the Constitutional Chamber itself; as well as the waiting time to which he was subjected until the issuance of the constitutional ruling—and similar cases, to be reasonable and proportionate. See decisions 429-2024, 937-2024 and 1302-2024 (voto 568-F-2025).
As this Chamber does not consider that the appellant entity (ente casacionista) has sufficient grounds to appeal, for the reasons set forth when analyzing each grievance, it is ordered to pay the costs (costas) of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación), which must be calculated (liquidarse) in the enforcement phase of the judgment (fase de ejecución de la sentencia) in order to guarantee the defendant's right of defense (derecho de defensa), with the respective hearing (audiencia) being granted on the calculation (liquidación) submitted (articles 41 and 153 Constitución Política) (voto 568-F-2025).
The general judicial attorney-in-fact of the executed entity filed a cassation appeal challenging judgment number 2024001800 of 16 hours 06 minutes on July 18, 2024, issued by the Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, composed of judge Berny Solano Solano.
**Drafted by Magistrate Leiva Poveda** **CONSIDERING** **I.** The Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, through judgment no. 2023000411 of 09 hours 20 minutes on January 11, 2023, granted the amparo appeal filed by attorney Leonardo Gómez Salazar on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos against the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS). The appeal, filed before that Chamber on December 28, 2022, originated from the violation of the fundamental right to health. This, by virtue of the fact that on November 6, 2019, Mr. Morera Trejos was assessed by a medical specialist in general surgery at the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, who noted as a plan, an order for outpatient surgery, by virtue of the diagnosis of right inguinal hernia. That day he was placed on a waiting list for the surgical intervention with medium priority. Due to the filing of the amparo, the medical authorities of said hospital scheduled a reassessment appointment for February 2, 2023, at 18 hours. At the time of issuing that ruling, the protected party did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. In this regard, and of interest, that Chamber stated: "*From the analysis of the case file, this Chamber has established that the foregoing is harmful to the right to health derived from Article 21 of the Constitution, and contrary to the principles of efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public services developed in the preceding recitals, since, although the respondent medical authorities scheduled an assessment appointment for the protected party; the truth is that said medical officials have not provided him with a certain date for the surgery that was prescribed since 2019.* **/** *From the foregoing, it is evident that the respondent authority subjected the protected party to a state of uncertainty for a period of approximately three years and two months, a time that this Constitutional Court considers unacceptable since his condition causes him pain and complications, which evidently affects his quality of life. Furthermore, this Chamber considers that there is no justification whatsoever for the delay or omissions in the health care of individuals, since the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social and its health centers have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, effectiveness, celerity, and continuity.* **/** *Thus, upon accrediting the violation of the right to health in the aforementioned terms, the Chamber must intervene, thereby causing the appeal to be declared with merit*, with the considerations that will be stated in the operative part of this Judgment." (The underlining is supplied). In that operative part of the ruling, the Constitutional Court ordered the Acting General Director of the indicated Hospital and the Head of the Surgery Service to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies, so that, within a period of three months, counted from the notification of that resolution, the required surgery be performed on the protected party, under the strict responsibility and supervision of his treating physician, provided that a variation of circumstances does not require another type of care. Likewise, it ordered them to communicate the date and time of such intervention to him; as well as the preoperative requirements established for such purposes. It warned them that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 71 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, imprisonment of three months to two years or a fine of twenty to sixty days will be imposed on anyone who receives an order that must be complied with or enforced, issued within an amparo appeal, and does not comply with it or does not have it complied with, provided the crime is not more severely punished. Likewise, it condemned the CCSS to pay the costs, damages, and losses caused by the facts that served as the basis for that declaration, which, it ordered, shall be liquidated in the execution of the judgment of the contentious-administrative court.
**II.** In a brief uploaded to the electronic judicial file on March 16, 2023, at 10:14:39, images 01 to 26, attorney Gómez Salazar, in his capacity as special judicial attorney-in-fact for Mr. Adrián Alberto, submitted the corresponding liquidation to the court. He requested that the following items be accepted: **1)** that the executed entity be condemned to pay the costs of the judgment execution proceeding; **2)** ₡181,500.00 for the personal costs of the amparo appeal; **3)** ₡350,000.00 for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo); and **4)** the payment of statutory interest, from the moment the judgment became final and until its effective payment. By resolution of 10 hours 08 minutes on March 20, 2023 (images 27 to 29), the Execution Judge, Kenneth Arrones Morera, admitted the claim. In a brief uploaded to the file on August 3 of that year at 09:21:02, images 33 to 63, the general judicial attorney-in-fact without sum limit of the CCSS, attorney Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, opposed the execution. She raised the defense of lack of right. In the judgment now challenged, Judge Berny Solano Solano partially accepted the liquidation in the following terms. He condemned the CCSS to pay: **1)** ₡181,500.00 for the personal costs of the amparo appeal; **2)** ₡300,000.00 for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo); **3)** he imposed on the executed institution the recognition of interest at the legal rate, solely on the amount granted for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo); and **4)** the costs of the execution proceeding and their legal interest, from the finality of the judgment that sets them and until their effective payment.
Disagreeing, the general judicial representative of the CCSS filed a cassation appeal.
III.The first objection, on page two of the pleading, was announced by the appellant as being brought on the cassation ground for breach of substantive norms provided for in article 138, subsection a) of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (CPCA): "The cassation appeal shall also lie for violation of substantive norms of the legal order, in the following cases: / a) When an improper assessment of the evidence is attributed or it has been pretermitted." This, she said, was due to the improper assessment of the constitutional judgment's enforceability order (ejecutoria de la sentencia constitucional). She alleged that article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP) had been violated. The questioned ruling, she noted, did not analyze the facets contained in this Chamber's line of authority, despite having pointed them out to the Judge. She mentioned this Chamber's judgment no. 297-F-S1-2024 of 17:27 hours on March 21, 2024. Among those aspects, she cited the determination of extreme necessity of the patient's case from a medical point of view (urgency), his consent to being on a waiting list, or, alternatively, the existence of physical harm. She alluded to this Chamber's judgments—according to the order cited—nos.: 28-F-S1-2024 of 11:05 hours on January 11, 2024; 1502-F-S1-2022 of 11:24 hours on September 1st; 1823-F-S1-2022 of 14:26 hours on August 4th; and 2429-F-S1-2022 of 14:16 hours on November 3rd; all three from the year 2022. According to the contested judgment, she pointed out, only the enforceability order from the amparo appeal was considered in order to grant subjective moral damages. She reproduced, in what was relevant to her interests, what the Enforcement Judge considered in Section IV of the challenged decision; as well as the proven facts of the enforcement ruling. The factors of restorative justice, urgency, and the patient's acquiescence—which were highlighted in the response to the complaint—were not taken into account. In fact, she added, the Judge added more months to the waiting list. The Constitutional Chamber indicated it was three years and two months, this being the correct figure; whereas the Judge established it as more than four years. Likewise, she argued, in the substantive analysis of the enforcement judgment, it was considered that the amparo was granted because the executing party was placed on a waiting list for that period, without mentioning any aspect related to the patient's pathology, or the need for immediate follow-up. She copied, as pertinent, what was considered in Section IV of the enforcement ruling. The Constitutional Court, she noted, determined that the aforementioned waiting period was unreasonable. She transcribed another fragment from the referenced Section IV of the challenged judgment. With a simple enforceability order, she stated, and without any technical medical report, the Judge accredited that the passage of time caused physical discomfort. He only had that piece of evidence, that of a right granted in the abstract, to award compensatory claims. She indicated she does not understand how he reached the conclusion that the wait was four years. The enforcement decision, she argued, was clear that the executing party was placed on the surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019. This element is the only thing the questioned judgment referred to regarding what the Constitutional Chamber evaluated to grant the amparo appeal filed. However, she alleged, the Judge, from a technical-medical point of view, developed the patient's supposed pathologies and that the placement on a waiting list caused him a prolongation of moral damages due to uncertainty that must be compensated based on the "in re ipsa" principle, when the patient's medical history does not manage to demonstrate said "uncertainty." The questioned judgment, she affirmed, breached said canon—196 of the LGAP—since, starting from an enforceability order, there is no proof of: 1) that the wait for the surgery, because he presented a diagnosis of a non-urgent unilateral inguinal hernia, generated any type of complications in the normal development of his daily life; 2) that he was denied access to health care, since, at all times, he had access to the services provided by the Institution and never used emergency services, so there is not a single element that allows determining the harm (daño), suffering, or affliction associated with the service provided (causal link between the alleged harm and the reproached conduct); and 3) the existence of uncertainty in the patient, and its prolongation due to an act of her represented party. The Judge, she alleged, without technical proof, and without the amparo appeal's enforceability order mentioning any aspect from a medical point of view, determined complex technical-medical elements to conclude the existence of effective and individualized harm. Only the enforceability order of a constitutional judgment, she indicated, does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of "emotional suffering" or "feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety." This Chamber, she asserted, established in decision no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensations for amparo appeals due to placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose a compensation on the tripartite social security contribution fund. However, she noted, the Judge, moving away from the criterion of this decision-making body, accepted that rubric. If the Court had properly assessed the evidence, she stated, the argumentation of the judgment would be different. It would have determined that it was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a harm and its aggravation by placement on a waiting list. The challenged judgment, she alleged, violated said legislative provision, since, starting from a ruling on an amparo appeal for placement on a waiting list, there is no proof whatsoever of an impact on the executing party's internal sphere.
It was validated and determined that "feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety" existed in the patient, without specifying where this assessment was taken from or having technical evidence to support it, which, she noted, means the harm is not real or effective, directly violating that norm. She again mentioned the rulings of this Chamber (in citation order) nos. 28-F-S1-2024, 297-F-S1-2024, 1502-F-S1-2022, 1823-F-S1-2022, and 2429-F-S1-2022. She added a table where she set forth, in her opinion, what was specified in each of those resolutions. In that vein, she indicated, the Judge was informed, who must know that jurisprudence is a means to integrate, understand, and apply the Law. However, she noted, he ignored it and decided to condemn her represented party for "annoyance, frustration and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomforts" against the executing party, in his understanding, without having evidence. That is, she pointed out, an issue of physical discomfort was raised that was never proven. A final judgment (ejecutoria), she affirmed, is insufficient to determine the propriety of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Furthermore, placing a person on a waiting list is not "per se" sufficient grounds to award compensation. This Chamber, she concluded, established in ruling no. 1502-F-S1-2022 that, regarding compensation for amparo appeals for placement on waiting lists, it is irrational to impose compensation on someone who has consented to a wait and received the required medical attention.
**IV.** Regarding the matters related in the previous section, the following must be stated. **FIRST.** The appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an appeal (apelación)). Nor is it sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. It is necessary to contrast what was decided with the violation (infracción) that, in her opinion, took place. In this regard, section 139, subsection 3 of the CPCA provides for a necessary material requirement, both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This involves the grounds (motivación) of the appeal, which, due to the characteristics of cassation (casación), must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as stipulated by the provision under discussion, the factual and legal basis (fundamentación fáctica y jurídica) of the case. Factual, insofar as it shows disagreement with the facts that have been considered proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of evidence (probanzas)), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it involves a problem raised regarding the application, omission, or misinterpretation of any norm that makes up the legal framework, including, of course, constitutional principles, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violations, factual reasons may concur, along with the legal reasons (always necessary). In that sense, the referenced arguments must be directed on both fronts, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the legal basis (fundamentación jurídica) is exempted, by express legal mandate, from the indication of those canons related to the weight of the wrongly assessed evidentiary element or elements. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the rules that the trial court erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the appealed pronouncement itself. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the provisions that establish the basic requirements, deadlines, and rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than citing the latter, the essential thing is that they are fulfilled, that they are put into practice when drafting and filing the cassation (casación) appeal. Thus, the grounds (fundamentación) provided by law can be understood, roughly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, interwoven or concatenated with each other and reasonably linked in a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or, if applicable, a single one) is cited, relevant and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal basis (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not make up their essence. As this Chamber has already indicated, interpreting article 139 of reference, "the appeal is required to have a minimum legal basis (fundamentación jurídica) ... the reasons on which it bases its petition must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and recording at least some normative reference that supports it" (Resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes of May 8, 2008). The grounds (fundamentación) are, therefore, foreign to the confused display of rules and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or, to the recounting of the mistakes considered to have been made in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently irrelevant or disconnected to the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal basis (total fundamentación jurídica)," and therefore, fails to fulfill the necessary requirement established in section 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, as provided in article 140, subsection c) of the same procedural Code. of the same Code of reference. Similarly, this Chamber has repeatedly stated that for an appeal to pass the admission review, in addition to the sufficient statement of reasons, the corresponding mention of, and connection to, the contested judgment of the applicable norms deemed infringed is required. In this regard, among other resolutions, nos. 677-A-S1-2021 of 09 hours 40 minutes of March 25, 2021 (); 755-A-S1-2022 of 10 hours 55 minutes of March 29 () <https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042>); and 1663-A-S1-2022 of 10 hours 05 minutes of July 21 (<https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340>), both from the year 2022.
**V.** After a thorough study of the objection under analysis, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant mixed two hypotheses dissimilar to each other, but, due to the way she structured it, they prove inseparable. As was stated, she attempted to file it for the improper assessment of the final judgment (sentencia ejecutoria), given that the existence of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) had been accredited.
This was developed on pages 03, 04, 05, 06, and 09 of the complaint. Such a line of argument would constitute the cassation ground for breach of substantive norms announced: that provided for in subsection a) of canon 138 of the CPCA. However, on pages 04, 05, 06, 07, and 09, it stated: “[…] **without any technical medical report accrediting that the passage of time causes physical discomfort,** *given that this even corresponds to technical evidence. As previously mentioned, the judge* **only had such evidence (that of a right granted in the abstract)** *to award claims for damages.* […] *Then, it is not understood how the judge reaches the conclusion that the wait was 4 years, when not even the Constitutional Chamber said this.* […] *As is evident, it is incorrect to indicate that the waiting time was greater than 4 years, as the first-instance judge stated.* […] *the judgment has it perfectly clear that the plaintiff* [sic] *was placed* [sic] *on a surgical waiting list on November 6, 2019, and that element is the only thing referenced (in the judgment under appeal) from what was assessed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the Amparo Appeal filed, however, the judge, from a technical-medical point of view, develops the patient's alleged pathologies* [sic] *and that placement on a waiting list caused the plaintiff* [sic] *a prolongation of moral damage due to uncertainty, which, according to* [sic] *the judge, must be compensated based on the in re ipsa principle, when from the patient's own medical history such 'uncertainty' cannot be evidenced.* […] *The point in question is aggravated since the first-instance judge, without any technical evidence, and without the judgment of the Amparo Appeal mentioning any aspect from a medical point of view, determines complex technical-medical elements to conclude the existence of an effective and individualized damage with respect to the plaintiff.* **/** *In this sense, this representation cannot countenance said opinion of the first-instance judge, given that* **the series of elements that were taken into consideration by the** [sic] **judge do not arise** *from what was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber to grant the Amparo Appeal, especially taking into consideration that it refers to highly technical aspects from a medical point of view (with specialties such as surgery, for example), which can only be verified with that type of (technical) evidence.* **/** *Gradually,* **only the judgment of a constitutional ruling** *does not have a nuance of such magnitude as to conclude the existence of 'emotional suffering' or 'feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety,' especially taking into consideration, it is reiterated, that there was no technical evidence on that.* […] **It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the Judgment Enforcement Judge,** *however, this* [sic]*, moving away from the High Court's criterion, grants claims, that is, with the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that there is an* animus *to condemn the CCSS at all costs (and of course, the contributors), without any clear support whatsoever from an evidentiary point of view.* […] **that is, clearly the judge, from a simple ruling judgment, validates and determines the existence of 'feelings of discomfort, frustration, and anxiety' in the patient, without specifying from where this assessment is taken, nor having technical evidence that accredits it as such, from any angle, which results in the damage being neither real nor effective, thereby directly violating Article 196 of the General Public Administration Law.** […] *however,* **with an** animus *to condemn, he ignores the entire previous line and decides to condemn my client*, *for even 'discomfort, frustration, and anxiety, uncertainty, anguish, emotional pain, physical discomfort' to the plaintiff, according to his understanding, without having evidence of it. That is, the judge points out an issue of physical discomfort that was never proven.* […] *It is important to mention, as a mere clarifying element, that this was fully pointed out to the jurisdictional authority, however, given the foregoing, this representation respectfully denotes that* **there is an** animus **to condemn the CCSS at all costs** *(and of course, the contributors), without any support whatsoever from an evidentiary point of view."* (The highlighting is from the original). What is now affirmed by the appellant falls within the cassation ground for breach of procedural norms provided for in subsection 1) point d) of the CPCA: lack of reasoning. However, what is alleged is insufficient. It omitted to indicate, with the clarity and precision required by cassation technique, as indicated in the previous section, under the protection of what is prescribed in section 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA, which procedural norms were violated, providing an explanation of how the transgression occurred.
The ambiguity noted conflicts with the technique of cassation, which requires that the grounds for the appeal be stated clearly and precisely, with the factual and legal basis of the case (precept 139, subsection 3) of the CPCA). Ergo, the outright rejection of the ground of disagreement under study is mandated.
**VI.** Without prejudice to the foregoing section and, for the sake of greater reasoning, the following must be pointed out. **SECOND.** It must be recalled that, in judgment enforcement proceedings (procesos de ejecución de sentencia) in general and, primarily, those issued by the Constitutional Chamber, what is enforced must necessarily be constrained to what was resolved in the judgment subject to enforcement (ejecutoria). This Chamber has indicated that the judgment enforcement proceeding seeks to materialize the abstract sentence imposed on the losing party. If aspects different—or contrary—to the pronouncement giving rise to the enforcement are granted, or if they are granted against persons who were not condemned, res judicata (cosa juzgada) would be violated. See, among other rulings of this decision-making body, numbers: 383-F-S1-2019 of 09:50 hours on May 9, 2019 (<a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-925036" style="text-decoration:none">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-925036</a>) and 309-F-S1-2021 of 11:20 hours on February 11, 2021 (<a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1024927" style="text-decoration:none">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1024927</a>). Consequently, the oversight function of this Chamber is constrained to an objective comparison between the judgment subject to enforcement and the appealed decision. In this regard, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 82-A-S1-22 of 10:06 hours on January 26 (<a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1072742" style="text-decoration:none">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1072742</a>) and 1984-F-S1-2022 of 11:18 hours on September 8, both from the year 2022 (<a href="https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112319" style="text-decoration:none">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112319</a>), can also be consulted, among many others.
**VII.** As already indicated in section I of this resolution, the Constitutional Chamber, in the judgment under enforcement, granted the amparo appeal filed on behalf of Mr. Adrián Alberto, as it was deemed proven that, despite suffering from a “right inguinal hernia,” on November 6, 2019, he was placed on a surgery waiting list with medium priority. However, at the time the constitutional ruling was issued, on January 11, 2023, he did not have a certain date for the surgical intervention. Therefore, said Chamber considered that the waiting period to which he had been subjected up to that moment, three years and two months, violated not only the fundamental right to health but also the principles of effectiveness and efficiency that must prevail in public services. Consequently, it ordered the Acting Director and the Head of the Surgery Service, both of the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, to issue the pertinent orders and carry out all actions within the scope of their competencies so that, within a period of three months, counted from the notification of that judgment, the pending surgery be performed on the amparo beneficiary. As can be clearly deduced, the Constitutional Chamber declared the amparo with merit because it considered that the time the patient had been on the waiting list was disproportionate and violated his fundamental right to health, considering his pathology. In this sense, as stated in that Whereas Clause of this judgment, said Chamber indicated that the CCSS subjected the protected individual to a state of uncertainty for the indicated period, which it considered unacceptable, as his condition causes him pain and complications, affecting his quality of life. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court indicated that there is no justification whatsoever for the delay or omissions in the health care of individuals, since said Institution, and its health centers, have the obligation to adopt and implement organizational changes in order to obtain the necessary resources to provide health services under the principles of mandatory nature, universality, effectiveness, speed, and continuity. For its part, the Enforcement Court (Juez de Ejecución), in Whereas Clause IV of the challenged ruling, titled “ON THE CLAIMED INDEMNIFICATION FOR NON-PECUNIARY DAMAGE (DAÑO MORAL),” in what is relevant, stated: “[…] In this specific case, it is clear that the Constitutional Chamber considered it improper that he be kept in the indefinite state of not knowing when a surgery for an inguinal hernia would be performed on him since November 6, 2019. Now, given that the assessment of non-pecuniary damage (daño moral) is in re ipsa, meaning it implies an assessment of what a human being can experience with the situation described in the list of proven facts of the constitutional ruling being enforced, for this judge it is logical that any person who is told they require surgery for a health problem like an inguinal hernia and is made to wait more than four years without even being able to know a certain date for the performance of their surgery will suffer emotionally with feelings of annoyance, frustration, and anxiety. Therefore, in legal terms, it is considered appropriate to reject the exception of lack of right and, consequently, to grant indemnification for subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo), which is prudentially set at the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢300,000) at a rate of two hundred thousand colones for the waiting and uncertainty to which, originally, he was subjected to know the date of his surgery and to have it effectively performed, and one hundred thousand colones more, because with each day that passed without timely care, with the passing of minutes and days, the anguish and emotional pain increase, because it is a condition that implies physical discomfort and, in human terms, the feeling of greater anxiety and vulnerability that he has experienced is inferable [sic]. […]” (The underlining is supplied). While it is true that the Enforcement Court indicated that the amparo beneficiary's waiting period was more than four years—despite the fact that when the constitutional judgment was issued it was three years and two months, as expressly stated by the Constitutional Court—this is due to the fact that the Enforcement Judge did not deem it proven that, at the time of issuing the ruling challenged in cassation, the surgery had already been performed on him or, at least, a date had been set to perform it. That is to say, when the questioned judgment was issued, the waiting period had increased to more than four years. It was not proven, it is insisted, that at the time of issuance of that judgment, the surgery had already been performed on the enforcing party.
However, the appellant did not properly challenge this circumstance. She merely indicated that in this dispute there is restorative justice because the required surgical intervention was performed on the protected party, but without indicating with which evidence her assertion is substantiated; neither did she indicate when it was performed. In any case, as can be easily seen from what was considered in the constitutional ruling and in the ruling now challenged, the Execution Judge adhered to the facts reviewed in the constitutional venue and to what was resolved by that Chamber to award that item for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), that is, the delay in setting the date and performing the surgery required by the protected party, so no violation of the executory judgment is observed.
**VIII. THIRD PARTY.** As indicated, the appellant for cassation stated that in the case sub judice what she called "restorative justice" operated. In this regard, it must be noted that this Chamber, in previous matters, recognized its applicability in matters of compensation for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) due to the violation of the fundamental right to health (as recognized by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice upon granting the respective recurso de amparo, due to the CCSS's delay in providing the medical service required by the administered person), when the CCSS provides the service within the time period ordered in the constitutional venue. In this regard, the judgments nos. 1502-S1-2022 at 11 hours 24 minutes on September 1 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112330), 2429-F-S1-2022 at 14 hours 16 minutes on November 3 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1123608), both from the year 2022; 28-F-S1-2024 at 11 hours 05 minutes on January 11 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396), 297-F-S1-2024 at 17 hours 27 minutes on March 21 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250), 901-F-S1-2024 at 12 hours 31 minutes on July 4 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1240015), and 937 at 14 hours 51 minutes on July 10 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925); all from the year 2024, may be consulted. However, the current composition of this Chamber, after a new study, considers it necessary to reconsider that position. Undoubtedly, it is a vindication of the injured legal situation, due to a lack of service, that it be provided. Even more so, when it proves necessary, as occurs with a pending health service. However, said reparation does not exclude that the injured person has suffered effects in their moral and patrimonial sphere while the abnormal conduct persisted due to the administrative dysfunction. If effective detriments are demonstrated (precepts 196 and 197 of the LGAP) specific to the concrete case and derived from its particular characteristics, its existence being inferred, even, through the intellectual process "in re ipsa", despite the user having been jurisdictionally protected, its reparation is appropriate. That is, the service rectification does not exclude that the injured person suffers effects in their moral and patrimonial sphere while the abnormal conduct persists. If that occurred and was so proven, it is mandatory to impose the corresponding compensatory consequence, if it was requested by the person whose legal sphere was harmed. This is so in accordance with the principle of integral reparation of damages, which has constitutional and legal roots (canons 9, 41, 49 of the Constitution; 190 and 197 of the LGAP).
**IX.** Within this line of thought, and regarding the existence and quantification of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), this Chamber, since long ago, has indicated that: *"IV. [...] it arises from the injury to an extra-patrimonial right. That is, it does not directly affect the patrimony. It supposes an unjust disturbance of the mental conditions. It does not require direct proof and is left to the equitable assessment of the Judge. If it is a matter of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), the courts are empowered to decree and quantify the sentence. The legal nature of this type of damage does not obligate the liquidator to determine its existence because it corresponds to its internal sphere. This is not a problem for psychiatrists or doctors. One must understand its existence or not because it belongs to the conscience. It is deduced through presumptions inferred from clues, since the wrongful generating fact reveals the moral damages, for when the psyche, health, physical integrity, honor, intimacy, etc., are damaged, it is easy to infer the damage, therefore it is said that proof of moral damages exists "in re ipsa". Nor must its value be proven because it does not have a concrete value. It is assessed prudentially. It is not, then, about quantifying suffering, for it is invaluable, but about setting monetary compensation for its injury, the only mechanism to which law can resort, to thus repair, at least in part, its offense. For greater detail on this aspect, one can consult, among others, from this collegiate body, rulings no. 112 already cited, no. 17 at 14 hours 30 minutes on February 21, 1996, and no. 41 at 14 hours 40 minutes on May 14, 1997. Its granting does not maintain strict subjection to evidentiary factors (except those referring to the causal link), but to the prudence and objective discretion of the judge. However, its determination is subject to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, which must be assessed by the competent authority in each case, so that its quantification is in accordance with Law and does not lead to excessive indemnifications that unjustifiably benefit one of the parties. That is, it must maintain a just equilibrium derived from the specific factual picture, a matter that must be weighed within the indicated limits."* (Among many others, the ruling of this Chamber no. 468-F-S1-19 at 9 hours 45 minutes on May 30, 2019, may be consulted). In accordance with the foregoing, once the existence of the moral damages and its causal link with the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff is established—which is not objected to by the cassation appellant—the determination of the amount depends on the equitable assessment of the Judge; for which, one must attend to the special circumstances of the case, as well as to the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In this regard, one can consult, among many others, ruling no.
1098-F-S1-2023 at 10:09 a.m. on July 5, 2023 (</span><a href=\"https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1170686\" style=\"text-decoration:none\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; text-decoration:underline; vertical-align:sub; color:#0563c1\">https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1170686</span></a><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">). That is, it is regarding subjective non-economic loss (daño moral subjetivo) that its proof is </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">in re ipsa</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">, provided it is a consequence of an unlawful triggering event or cause (motivo antijurídico).</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:42.6pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">X.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> In this litigation, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), as already indicated, determined the unlawful conduct (conducta antijurídica) of the CCSS upon verifying the violation of Mr. Adrián Alberto's fundamental right to health. The postponement of the required surgery was, at the time of the issuance of the constitutional ruling, approximately three years and two months, despite the fact that his ailment, as stated by said Chamber, was causing him pain and complications, which affected his quality of life. Such a situation - unlawful act (hecho antijurídico) -, according to the maxims of logic, experience, and correct human understanding, as was resolved, is an adequate cause (causal nexus) of a non-economic loss (aflicción moral), associated with anxiety, discomfort, frustration, and worry, due to the excessive time for attention - thus declared, it is reiterated, in the constitutional venue - for a health situation that, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">per se</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">, is a cause of concern for whoever suffers it. In accordance with correct human understanding and experience, it is reiterated, one can infer, </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">in re ipsa</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">, just as the Enforcement Judge (Juzgador de Ejecución) did, the existence of feelings such as those described above, without him having the legal duty to bear them, as they derive from an abnormal functioning of the Administration, thus decreed, it is repeated once more, by the Constitutional Chamber. Ergo, contrary to what the appellant indicated, its existence is determined and, consequently, the appropriateness of its compensation.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:42.6pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">XI.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">FOURTH.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> Likewise, the appellant alleged that, in the case of the amparo-protected party (amparado), there was no urgency in the performance of the surgery. As set out in Section I of this judgment, it was the Constitutional Chamber itself, in the enforceable judgment, that determined the urgency for the claimant to undergo the required surgical procedure, ordering that it had to be performed within a period of three months from the notification of that ruling. Consequently, within the objective comparison that must prevail in this type of proceeding - enforcement of a constitutional judgment - the issue of urgency is a precluded matter, because, it is repeated, it was so determined and resolved by the Constitutional Court.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:42.6pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">XII. FIFTH. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">The objector also indicated that the amparo-protected party acquiesced or consented to remain on the waiting list. Unlike what was alleged, in this litigation the existence of tacit consent (consentimiento tácito), and much less express consent, on the part of Mr. Morera Trejos cannot be considered. The amparo action was filed on time. So much so that the Constitutional Chamber admitted it for processing and, later, upheld it. This, regardless of the period elapsed between the time the CCSS placed him on a waiting list and the filing of the amparo. Therefore, the claimant showed his disagreement with his permanence on the waiting list, and said jurisdictional body agreed with him.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:42.6pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">XIII.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> The </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">second</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> ground of disagreement, page nine of the complaint, the appellant announced she was lodging it on the cassation ground of violation of substantive norms provided for in subsection c) of section 138 of the CPCA: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">c)</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">When a legal norm has been improperly applied or interpreted, or has been omitted.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> She invoked the violation of article 73.1 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), due to improper application. She stated that this is a proceeding for the enforcement of a constitutional judgment. The condemnation made in that venue was in the abstract, she stated, and must therefore be enforced. She even alleged that the right to receive compensation for costs (costas), damages, and losses must be proven in this proceeding. She reproduced said precept. It establishes that costs shall be considered as: attorney's fees, compensation for time invested, and indispensable expenses of the proceeding. It is clear, she noted, that no electronic invoice was issued, which condones the request for amounts that are not proven to have been invested and that will be paid without any evidence. The claimant, she alleged, did not provide any means of proof whatsoever that there had been an investment of money for attorney's fees. Therefore, she noted, the Judge was compelled to award no amount whatsoever for costs of the amparo action, under the heading of fees. Under the Judge's premise, she asserted, any person, through vicarious action, could file amparo actions regarding waiting lists and, at the time of enforcing the judgment, would perfectly receive the costs of the recourse as compensation, which, in her opinion, would be absurd, because to receive full compensation for an expense, it must be demonstrated. It is there, she indicated, where the error of the judgment lies, since it awarded the amount for the costs of the amparo action as if they were attorney's fees. The reasons, she pointed out, why costs are awarded to a prevailing person in a judicial proceeding must be clear. Furthermore, she added, Constitutional Chamber Magistrate, Mr. Fernando Castillo Víquez, has been clear on multiple occasions in ordering, both the CCSS, when it makes extra-procedural satisfaction of the Constitutional Chamber's condemnations, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, to ensure that the awarded amounts effectively reach the hands of the amparo-protected parties. She transcribed, as to her interest, what was stated in the dissenting opinion contained in Constitutional Chamber ruling no. 2016-012528. The challenged judgment, she concluded, should have rejected said element, since, as no electronic invoice was provided,</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\"> </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">it was not proven that any legal professional had provided a professional service and charged for it.</span></p><p style=\"margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:42.6pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff\"><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">XIV.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> Regarding what was stated in the previous section, it is necessary to point out the following. </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub\">FIRST.</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> On page 10 of the complaint, the objector stated: </span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">“</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-style:italic; vertical-align:sub\">Under the premise of the first-instance judge, any person, through Vicarious Action, could file Amparo Actions regarding waiting lists, and at the time of enforcing the judgment, would perfectly receive costs of the recourse as compensation, which, respectfully, would be absurd</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\"> [</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">…</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">]</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">”</span><span style=\"font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:sub\">. Contrary to what was indicated, this Chamber, for a long time, has pointed out the difference between personal costs (costas personales) and attorney's fees, concluding that personal costs belong to the party, not to the lawyer. In this regard, one may consult, mutatis mutandis, rulings nos.
432-F-S1-2017 of 09 hours 30 minutes on April 20, 2017 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-950854); 515-F-S1-2018 of 11 hours 20 minutes on May 30, 2018 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-892742); 28-F-S1-2024 of 11 hours 05 minutes on January 11 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396) and 297-F-S1-2024 of 17 hours 27 minutes on March 21 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250); both of the year 2024.
**XV.** **SECOND.** On page 10 of the libel, the appellant stated: "*In this regard, note that the very content of the rule establishes that costs shall be considered to include attorney's fees, compensation for time invested, and indispensable expenses of the process, but the plaintiff [sic], as the judge mentions, being fully aware that no electronic invoice was issued, condones requesting amounts that are not demonstrated to have been invested and paid* [sic] *without any proof, by a simple principle, which precisely requires the existence of proof.* […] *the plaintiff* [sic] *does not provide any proof that there was an investment of money for attorney's fees, that is, given the lack of proof regarding this, the truth of the matter is that the judge was compelled to grant the amount for costs of the Amparo Appeal, in the form of fees for which there is no proof they were paid, as there was no electronic invoice involved.* […] *Therefore, the judgment should have rejected this claim, since by not having provided an electronic invoice, it was not demonstrated that any legal professional had provided a professional service and charged for it.*" (Highlighting is from the original). In this regard, it must be noted that the CPCA, in article 193, expressly regulates the imposition of costs, as does article 73.1 of the CPC. Consequently, it is the CPCA norm that is applicable to this litigation. However, this provision does not prescribe, as the CPC's does, what is considered costs. Therefore, this procedural principle, as well as those contained in articles 76.1 and 76.4 ibid, by virtue of the referral made by article 220 of the CPCA, is applicable to this litigation. In this sense, article 73.1 of the CPC provides: "[…] *Costs shall be considered to include attorney's fees*, compensation for the time invested by the party in attending procedural acts where their presence was necessary, and other indispensable expenses of the process." (The underlined portion is supplied). In this same line of thought, articles 76.1 and 76.4 ibid indicate: "*76.1 Right to fees and determination*. *Attorney's fees belong to the attorney*, with the exceptions established by law. When the party is an attorney and has acted personally, they shall have the right to them. *Unless agreed otherwise, they shall be determined considering the work, the status and economic significance of the process, based on the provisions of Law No. 13, Organic Law of the Bar Association, of October 28, 1941, and the decree on attorneys' and notaries' fees*." […] *76.4 Contractual determination of attorney's fees.* *Attorneys and their clients may contractually set the amount of the fees and their payment terms, respecting the limits imposed by law and the respective decree. Such stipulation shall not affect the opposing parties in the process, for the purposes of determining personal costs*." (Only the underlined portion is supplied). In light of the provisions of these norms, it is clear that, for the purposes of costs, attorney's fees must be calculated based on the legal limits and the tariffs established in the respective Decree, regardless of any private agreement between the attorney and their client. This implies that, in the liquidation of costs, it is not necessary for the enforcing party to demonstrate the agreement they have with their attorney or the payment they have made to them, since the regulations provide that the calculation of this item must be carried out in accordance with the applicable fee schedule or decree, to ensure an objective criterion in the liquidation of costs. Thus, if a party had legal representation in the processing of a case and obtained a ruling in their favor for the payment of costs, the amount to be recognized as attorney's fees will necessarily be that established in the "Fee Schedule for Professional Legal Services" (Arancel de Honorarios por Servicios Profesionales de Abogacía), according to the work performed. Consequently, it is not essential to provide an invoice or proof of payment in favor of the legal professional for the recognition of this item to proceed. In this litigation, the objector did not prove that Mr. Adrián Alberto lacked legal representation during the processing of the amparo process. On the contrary, it is on record that his special judicial representative in this enforcement process was the one who filed the amparo appeal on his behalf before the Constitutional Chamber. This allows the inference that said professional defended the interests of the amparo petitioner in the constitutional venue. Therefore, the lack of presentation of the invoice or proof of payment claimed by the appellant is not sufficient to diminish or dismiss the item of personal costs liquidated by the party and expressly recognized in the enforceable judgment. It is reiterated, because the enforcing party had legal representation during the processing of the amparo and obtained a ruling in their favor for the payment of costs. That is, they have the right to be recognized as costs the amount that, for attorney's fees, is established by the applicable fee schedule. As a corollary, this Chamber does not observe the alleged legal violation and, consequently, the rejection of the challenge shall be imposed.
**XVI.** The **third** and last reproach to the challenged judgment, page 11, the cassation appellant announced she was filing it under the cassation ground for violation of substantive norms provided in subsection d) of numeral 138 of the CPCA: "*d) When the judgment violates the norms or principles of constitutional Law, among others, reasonableness, proportionality, legal certainty, and equality.*" She invoked the violation of the postulate of reasonableness. The Judge, she stated, determined the reasonableness of the compensation based on the "*in re ipsa*" principle, setting the amount to be compensated at ₡300,000.00. She reproduced, in what is of her interest, what was considered in section IV of the challenged judgment. The Adjudicator, she stated, indicated that with each passing day the anguish and emotional pain increased, but this could not be proven, since the evidence was insufficient. The objected judgment, she alleged, left open the possibility of seeking, unrestrictedly, double compensation: **1)** the material kind, by receiving medical care, and **2)** the pecuniary kind, without any proof thereof.
With that analysis, he asserted, the aforementioned principle of reasonableness was violated. While it is true, he noted, that waiting lists exist, granting a pecuniary compensation for placing a person on one of them, without there being a medical criterion of urgency, as indicated by this Chamber, implies that the amounts allocated to guarantee the two main fundamental rights—life and health—are diminished, which is irrational, since the contributors to the Sickness and Maternity Insurance do so with the objective of receiving a health service and having resources to guarantee it. Not for compensation to be granted for placing a person on a waiting list. The Adjudicator, he noted, departing from the indicated postulate, determined, without any proof, that economic redress must exist, despite the fact that the enforcing party received restorative justice, as the required surgery was performed, even though his condition was not classified as urgent. That is, he determined that the indicated double compensation must always be present when a person is placed on a waiting list, which generates a privilege and unjust enrichment without any cause. The objective of anyone who appeals to the Constitutional Chamber to have a surgical procedure performed or receive medical attention, he argued, is the restoration of their health, not to obtain compensation. The referred principle was violated by granting a compensatory award, despite the required medical procedure having been performed. Likewise, he indicated, that postulate was violated by not determining that the compensation includes restoration, which occurred through the judicial resolution, since the user of the health service (which has limited resources) received the required medical attention, making it contrary to law, especially to said principle, that in addition to the restoration received, an additional amount be granted, the situation of being on a waiting list having been singularly abolished. Granting a sum for compensation, he said, in addition to the required medical procedure having been performed, grants a privilege over the other insured persons, who were surpassed by the protected person. This situation, he argued, was previously analyzed by this Chamber in judgments nos. 1502-F-S1-2022 and 297-F-S1-24, which he reproduced in what was of interest to him. For the foregoing reasons, he concluded, granting compensation for moral damages (daño moral) is a violation of the principle of reasonableness.
XVII.Regarding what was stated in the previous Considerando, the following must be indicated. FIRST. On page 11 of the appeal, the appellant stated: “[…] while it is true that waiting lists exist, granting pecuniary compensation for placing a person on one of these, without there being a medical criterion of urgency, as the First Chamber itself indicates in the resolutions mentioned above […]”. The reference made to another objection, as the appellant did, is unacceptable. As noted in section V of this judgment, in accordance with what is indicated in precept 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA, the technique requires that the grounds for cassation (casación) be indicated in a clear and precise manner, with the factual and legal basis of the case. SECOND. After meticulously analyzing the objection under study, this Chamber arrives at the conviction that the appellant argued the breach of the constitutional principle of reasonableness for two different reasons: A) due to the amount of ₡300,000.00 granted as compensation for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), since, in her opinion, the existence of that damage was not demonstrated. This line of argumentation, different from what was announced, would, if proven, configure the cassation ground for violation of procedural rules provided for in subsection 1), point d) of article 137 of the CPCA: lack of legal reasoning (motivación). However, what was argued is informal. The appellant did not indicate the procedural rules that were violated, with a clear and precise explanation of how the infraction occurred, as the cassation technique imposes, as set out in section IV of this judgment, under the protection of the provisions of ordinal 139 subsection 3) of the CPCA. Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for greater abundance of reasons, it is necessary to indicate that, contrary to what was argued, in sections IX and X of this judgment, the reasons were provided for which this Chamber deems, endorsing what was decided by the Execution Adjudicator, that in this litigation the enforcing party suffered an injury of that type, and therefore its compensation is appropriate. That is, the existence of the subjective moral damages inflicted on the enforcing party by the facts known in the constitutional venue was fully evidenced. On the other hand, regarding the amount granted, in addition to what was indicated in Considerando IX of this ruling for its determination, this Chamber has stated: “VIII. […] On other occasions, this cassation body has had the opportunity to highlight the necessary 'legal reasonableness' (razonabilidad jurídica) that this type of compensation must maintain, for whose verification the observance of a 'reasonableness of equality' must be verified, which the Constitutional Chamber has defined as '…the type of legal assessment based on the premise that equal antecedents must have equal consequences, without arbitrary exceptions' (e.g., votes no. 5236-99 and 1354-2011). That is, to avoid inequitable and illegitimate treatments in the various cases in which compensation for moral damages is discussed, it is necessary to verify that the recognized amounts are not disproportionate when compared with those established in other similar cases. In that order of ideas, the Chamber deems that the granted sum conforms to the intensity of the damage caused.” Judgment no. 760-F-S1-2023 at 1:24 p.m. on May 29, 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1157835). In the same vein, one may consult, among others, judgments nos. 1934-F-S1-2022 at 3:00 p.m. on August 12; 2654-F-S1-2022 at 10:10 a.m. on December 08, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1132117), both from the year 2022, and 1087-F-S1-2023 at 9:36 a.m. on July 05, 2023. This Chamber deems that the sum granted for this concept, ₡300,000.00, considering the circumstances of the case—the pathology suffered by the protected person and its consequences as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber itself; as well as the waiting time he was kept on until the issuance of the constitutional judgment—and in similar cases, is reasonable and proportionate.
In this regard, by way of example, the following precedents can be noted, in which this decision-making body did not consider unreasonable the sums awarded for the delay in the provision of the public health service, nos. 429-F-S1-2024 of 10 hours 41 minutes on May 3 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1229475), in which the Judge awarded ₡500,000.00; 937-F-S1-2024 of 14 hours 51 minutes on July 10, (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925), setting it at ₡200,000.00; and 1302-F-S1-2024 of 16 hours 14 minutes on September 27, all of the year 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1253306), granting the sum of ₡200,000.00. This requires the rejection of this part of the objection.
**XVIII.** **B)** A compensatory extreme—subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo)—having been granted, despite the existence of restorative justice (justicia restaurativa), since the amparo beneficiary underwent the required surgery. That is, due to the alleged existence of double compensation. However, as indicated in Section VII of this ruling, this factual circumstance—that the amparo beneficiary underwent the surgery they required and, therefore, that "restorative justice" existed—was not accredited by the Execution Judge. Consequently, if what is reproached were to occur, it would fall under the cause of action for breach of substantive norms provided for in article 138, subsection a) of the CPCA due to improper evidentiary assessment. Nonetheless, the argument is also informal. The objector omitted to indicate with which piece of evidence their claim is accredited and the substantive norms that were violated by said excess, with a clear and precise explanation of how they were infringed. Ergo, for the reasons indicated, the rejection of the ground of disagreement under study is required. Notwithstanding the foregoing and, for the sake of abundant reasoning, it is necessary to indicate that in Section VIII of this resolution, the reasons were provided for which this Chamber reconsidered its position adopted in previous judgments regarding the topic of restorative justice. Now supporting the thesis that, even though the medical assistance required by the patient is provided, by virtue of the order emanating from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), if the injured party suffers effects in their moral and pecuniary sphere due to the abnormal conduct of the Administration caused by the delay in the provision of the medical service, its existence being inferred, even, through the intellectual process "in re ipsa," its reparation is appropriate, if it was so requested. Likewise, in Considerandos XI and XII, the reasons were set forth for which it is estimated that the objector's arguments, regarding that there was no urgency for the performance of the surgery on the amparo beneficiary and their conformity with the waiting period, are not admissible. Consequently, in order to avoid unnecessary reiterations, reference is made to what was indicated therein. Consequently, the Execution Judge has not infringed upon the constitutional principle of reasonableness.
**XIX.** By virtue of the reasons noted, the rejection of the appeal filed is required. In accordance with the provisions of numeral 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA, as this Chamber does not consider that the cassation appellant entity has sufficient reason to appeal, for the reasons stated when analyzing each grievance, it shall be ordered to pay the costs of the cassation appeal (costas del recurso de casación), which must be liquidated in the execution phase of the judgment, in order to guarantee the right of defense of the executed party, giving it the respective hearing on the liquidation that is presented (articles 41 and 153 of the Political Constitution).
**XX.** **DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ROJAS MORALES.** I depart from the majority criterion, insofar as it deems it appropriate to order the defendant to pay subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). Regarding the damages (daños y perjuicios) deriving from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, upon declaring an amparo appeal with merit, it is pertinent to bear in mind that, given their nature, these types of judgments contain an abstract condemnation, without any factual consideration; they do not prejudge, as they were not subject to analysis, their existence, nor their causal link or quantification. Said Court limits itself to determining the constitutional violation. When executing these extremes, the causal relationship between what was declared in abstracto and the specific matter must be established. Thus, the fact that the Constitutional Chamber condemns in abstracto to the payment of damages (daños y perjuicios) does not entail an automatic condemnation to be executed, as the Executing Judge apparently misunderstands it. It is up to the judges responsible for resolving the liquidation to assess in each specific case the existence of sufficient merit to grant the requested compensation. In that direction, the following must be analyzed: the particular circumstances of the case, the position of the parties, the nature, object and purpose of the redress, as well as the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Furthermore, when the matter concerns an alleged subjective moral damage suffered by a person facing a lack of medical attention, as occurs in the instant case, the examination of additional aspects becomes indispensable. In the first instance, the factor of **urgency** must be assessed, as it is evident that one who requires urgent attention from the CCSS is not in the same situation, for example: that administered person who suffers from cancer which advances irremediably, as compared to one who presents an ailment and has been prescribed a surgical intervention or a medical appointment without a pressing nature; in both cases, the waiting time to receive the medical service does not have the same result. Nor will the moral affectation be of the same intensity. On the other hand, the **inactivity of the patient** due to the passage of time on the waiting list must be analyzed (canon 30, subsection ch) of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law -LJC- and 38 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code), which ceases when the patient files an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber or before the courts of justice, to demand the attention or medical treatment they need (administrative activity). One must take into account that the passing of time without taking action has clear consequences in the Costa Rican legal system regarding the expiration of the action, an aspect assessable ex officio. A pecuniary advantage cannot be derived from inactivity, as this confronts the principle of proportionality in a strict sense. Thirdly, the **satisfaction provided by the order of a court of justice** must be weighed, through which the performance of a medical act or the delivery of medications is ordered (even if it arises by reason of a precautionary measure). Indeed, the most recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber has valued, as timely attention, the **satisfaction generated from the notification of the processing of the amparo appeal**. This refers to those cases in which, on the occasion of the amparo appeal and regardless of the time elapsed between filing the appeal and the administrative response received, the respondent authority provides the administered person with the required medical attention (granting a certain date for surgery or a medical consultation, providing the needed medication, rescheduling an appointment, etc.). Cases of recent resolution that are binding erga omnes (according to ordinal 13 of the LJC). The Constitutional Judges have considered it inappropriate to condemn in costs, damages (daños y perjuicios); which must be assessed by this Chamber when ruling on cassation appeals.
In this regard, one may consult, among others, judgments number: 2024-000017 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, 2024-000026 of 9:15 a.m. on January 9, 2024, and 2024-006673 of 9:15 a.m. on March 8, 2024, all from the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). It is worth noting that providing the required medical service constitutes a manifestation of restorative justice, which this Deciding Body must assess. The damages awarded in violation of the stated reasoning becomes unreasonable and disproportionate, especially when in a universal social security system, such as the Costa Rican one, such damages are paid by all insured persons, including those displaced by the executing party. Upon examining the aspects described and the particular case of Mr. Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos, it becomes improper to award damages for non-pecuniary harm (afectación anímica) granted in the appealed judgment. The record shows that, on November 6, 2019, the Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela issued Mr. Adrián a hospitalization order for outpatient surgery, with no certain date and medium priority. On December 28, 2022, he filed an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), a jurisdictional body that ordered, by resolution 2023-000411 of 9:20 a.m. on January 11, 2023, that the surgical intervention be performed within a period of three months, subject to the fulfillment of pre-operative requirements. It should be borne in mind that the executing party waited approximately three years to have the procedure performed in the Surgery Service. The possibilities of the social security system in an area such as General Surgery must be taken into account, in which there are not enough specialists to serve the population, especially since the number of people requiring intervention in that area is increasing. Furthermore, Mr. Morera Trejos did not accompany his petition with more data than the enforceable judgment, so the effects on his inner self have no more support than the subjective assessments of the judge, without any causal relationship being proven. The judicial file shows that, on the occasion of the amparo appeal filed, a reassessment appointment was scheduled for the executing party on February 2, 2023, in order to ascertain the patient's current conditions. It is evident that the waiting time Mr. Adrián endured to receive medical attention was approximately one month, counted from when he filed the amparo appeal on December 28, 2022, until he was assessed in the Surgery specialty on February 2, 2023. Even the period is shorter if it is taken into account that the enforceable ruling was notified on January 12, 2023. Periods that are reasonable from the point of view of providing a non-urgent service. It should be noted that, from the moment the amparo was filed, the executing party was never subjected to a prolonged or indefinite wait. He received medical attention within a more than reasonable period (even shorter than waiting periods in private medicine). The foregoing indicates the non-existence of the liquidated damage. It is worth emphasizing that, in cases such as the one under study, there is no doubt that the user's satisfaction was already achieved; therefore, it becomes contrary to law to grant additional compensation beyond what was received (medical assessment, as an exceptional removal from the waiting list). The foregoing, far from causing non-pecuniary harm (afectación moral) to the executing party, granted him a privilege over the other insured persons, which diminishes the claim for non-pecuniary damages (daño moral) awarded. It is irrational, under the cited conditions, to impose on the tripartite contribution fund of the social security system and on the other insured persons who benefit from those funds, an additional compensation to someone who has received the required medical attention through judicial protection. For the reasons indicated, the compensation granted does not conform to criteria of reasonableness and proportionality (established by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) itself). By virtue of the foregoing, the undersigned considers that the appropriate course is to uphold the grievances of the appeal related to this point and, consequently, to annul the contested judgment -only- insofar as it recognized the amount of ₡300,000.00 for subjective non-pecuniary damages (daño moral subjetivo), in order to instead, ruling on the merits, reject that claim.
**POR TANTO** By majority, the appeal is declared without merit, with costs to be borne by the cassation appellant, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which will be liquidated in the judgment enforcement stage.
Justice Rojas Morales dissents in order to grant the appeal by virtue of the fact that restorative justice (justicia restaurativa) has been configured.
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width="163" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /> Luis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga | | | <img 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width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /> Rocío Rojas Morales | | <img src="" width="162" height="74" alt="" style="-aw-left-pos:0pt; -aw-rel-hpos:column; -aw-rel-vpos:paragraph; -aw-top-pos:0pt; -aw-wrap-type:inline" /> Damaris Vargas Vásquez | | <img src=" <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> <head> <title></title> <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"/> </head> <body style="background-color:#ffffff"> <div style="-aw-headerfooter-type:header-primary; clear:both; background-color:#ffffff"> <table style="width:412.2pt; margin-bottom:0; margin-top:0; display:inline-table; border-collapse:collapse">...</table> <table style="width:412.2pt; margin-bottom:0; margin-top:0; display:inline-table; border-collapse:collapse">...</table> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:9pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:9pt; vertical-align:sub">Resolution No. 001555-F-2025</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:12pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:sub">First Chamber. San José, at ten fifteen hours on the third day of July of the year two thousand twenty-five.</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:sub"> </span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:sub">Administrative litigation proceeding filed by BIENES Y DESARROLLOS ALFARO SOCIEDAD ANONIMA, legal identification number three-one zero one-seven seven zero eight three six, represented by its general manager with special powers of attorney Carlos Luis Barrantes Alfaro, legal identification number one-zero four zero seven zero six, against the MUNICIPALITY OF ESCAZU, legal identification number three-zero one four-zero seven six three three, represented by its mayor Arnoldo Barahona Cortés, legal identification number one-eight four nine-zero one, and the NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT (SETENA), legal identification number three-zero zero seven-two six three nine three, represented by its executive director Laura Maritza Rivera Vindas, legal identification number one-one five eight three-zero zero, and the STATE, represented by the State Attorney, Licda. Doris Isabel Víquez Herra, legal identification number one-six nine zero-four five. Interested parties: Kattia Montero Gutiérrez, legal identification number one-seven three three-seven six; José Pablo Picado León, legal identification number one-seven three zero-seven eight. All persons of legal age and, with the exception of the Municipality and the State, married, with the same marital status regarding the other interested parties.</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:sub">RESULTANDO</span></p> <p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman'; font-size:10pt; vertical-align:sub">I.- The plaintiff, through its attorney, filed this lawsuit on April 10, 2019, with claims that were amended by the Court on February 1, 2021, to formally request the following: "Sole Claim: A) That the absence of proportionality of the water protection areas imposed in Resolution No. 191-2018-SETENA of ten forty-five hours on January 30, 2018, and Resolution No. 313-2018-SETENA of eleven hours on February 15, 2018, be declared. B) Declare, by way of review of legality, the existence of absolute nullity of Article 1 of Administrative Agreement No. 01-2008 of the Board of Directors of SETENA, in accordance with Article 131.1) of the General Public Administration Law. C) As a result of the preceding declarations, order the defendants to take the following actions: C.1) Grant the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) of the project called 'Condominio Urbanístico Residencial Campiñas de Guachipelín', in accordance with the Geohydraulic Study that supports the Environmental Management Document (Documento de Gestión Ambiental, DGA) that was submitted as an appendix to the certification of the D-1 form and that proposes protection areas (áreas de protección) of 10 meters horizontal radius. C.2) In the alternative, that said environmental viability be granted in the event that the environmental viability document is presented with the protection areas for the springs (nacientes) with a horizontal radius of 10 meters, in accordance with the Geohydraulic Study provided in the file and in accordance with, for the other bodies of water (cuerpos de agua), the provisions of Article 33 of the Forest Law (Ley Forestal). C.3) Order the defendants to pay costs, both personal and procedural, including the expert opinion costs agreed upon with the expert José Pablo Carballo Gómez, of the company GEOTECNOLOGIA G Y C SOCIEDAD DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA." In addition, incidental claims for compensation were raised. </span></p> </div> <div style="background-color:#ffffff">...</div> </body> </html>
Documento PJEDITOR Res. 000568-F-S1-2025 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas cuarenta y uno minutos del veintisiete de marzo de dos mil veinticinco .
Proceso de ejecución de la sentencia emitida por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en recurso de amparo, establecido por LEONARDO GÓMEZ SALAZAR, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número 108760664 y del carné de colegiado número 17.049, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de ADRIÁN ALBERTO MORERA TREJOS, técnico en informática, portador de la cédula de identidad número 113750552 contra la CAJA COSTARRICENSE DE SEGURO SOCIAL, con cédula de persona jurídica número 4-000-042147, representada por su apoderada general judicial sin límite de suma, Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, abogada, portadora de la cédula de identidad número 603160877 y del carné de colegiada número 16.133. La apoderada general judicial del ente ejecutado formuló recurso de casación impugnando la sentencia número 2024001800 de las 16 horas 06 minutos del 18 de julio de 2024, emitida por el Juzgado Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, integrado por el juzgador Berny Solano Solano.
Redacta el magistrado Leiva Poveda
CONSIDERANDO
I.La Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante sentencia no. 2023000411 de las 09 horas 20 minutos del 11 de enero de 2023, acogió el recurso de amparo interpuesto por el licenciado Leonardo Gómez Salazar a favor de don Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos en contra de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS). El recurso, presentado ante esa Cámara el 28 de diciembre de 2022, se originó por la transgresión al derecho fundamental a la salud. Ello, en virtud de que el 06 de noviembre de 2019, el señor Morera Trejos fue valorado por una médica especialista en cirugía general del Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela, quien anotó como plan, orden para cirugía ambulatoria, en virtud del diagnóstico de hernia inguinal derecha. Ese día fue ingresado en lista de espera para la intervención quirúrgica con prioridad media. Debido a la interposición del amparo, las autoridades médicas de dicho nosocomio le programaron una cita de revaloración para el 02 de febrero de 2023 a las 18 horas. Al momento del dictado de ese fallo, el tutelado no contaba con fecha cierta para la intervención quirúrgica. Al respecto, y en lo de interés, señaló esa Cámara: “Del análisis de los autos, esta Sala tiene por demostrado que lo anterior resulta lesivo al derecho a la salud derivado del artículo 21, Constitucional, y contrario a los principios de eficiencia y eficacia en la prestación de los servicios públicos desarrollados en los considerandos anteriores, ya que, a pesar de que las autoridades médicas recurridas le programaron al amparado una cita de valoración; lo cierto es que dichos funcionarios médicos no le han brindado una fecha cierta para la cirugía que se encontraba prescrita desde el año 2019. / De lo anterior se evidencia que la autoridad recurrida sometió al tutelado a un estado de incertidumbre por el plazo aproximado de tres años y dos meses, tiempo que este Tribunal Constitucional considera inaceptable ya que su padecimiento le provoca dolores y complicaciones, lo que evidentemente afecta su calidad de vida. Además, considera esta Sala que no existe justificación alguna para el retardo u omisiones en la atención de salud de las personas, pues la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y sus centros de salud tienen la obligación de adoptar e implementar los cambios organizacionales con el fin de obtener los recursos necesarios para prestar los servicios de salud bajo los principios de obligatoriedad, universalidad, eficacia, celeridad y continuidad. / Así las cosas, al acreditarse la violación al derecho a la salud en los términos dichos, la Sala debe intervenir, provocando así, que el recurso sea declarado con lugar, con las consideraciones que se dirán en la parte dispositiva de esta Sentencia.” (Lo subrayado es suplido). En esa parte dispositiva del fallo, el Tribunal Constitucional le ordenó a la Directora General a.i. del indicado Hospital y a la Jefa del Servicio de Cirugía, que giren las órdenes pertinentes y lleven a cabo todas las actuaciones dentro del ámbito de sus competencias, para que, en el plazo de tres meses, contado a partir de la notificación de esa resolución, se le practique al amparado la cirugía requerida, bajo la estricta responsabilidad y supervisión de su médico tratante, siempre que una variación de las circunstancias no requiera otro tipo de atención. De igual manera, les ordenó comunicarle la fecha y hora de tal intervención; así como los requisitos preoperatorios establecidos para tales efectos. Les advirtió que, de conformidad con lo previsto en el artículo 71 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, se impondrá prisión de tres meses a dos años o de veinte a sesenta días multa, a quien recibiere una orden que deba cumplir o hacer cumplir, dictada dentro de un recurso de amparo y no la cumpliere o no la hiciere cumplir, siempre que el delito no esté más gravemente penado. De igual manera, condenó a la CCSS al pago de las costas, daños y perjuicios causados con los hechos que sirvieron de base a esa declaratoria, los cuales, dispuso, se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia de lo contencioso administrativo.
II.En escrito subido al expediente judicial electrónico el 16 de marzo de 2023 a las 10:14:39, imágenes de la 01 a la 26, el licenciado Gómez Salazar, en su condición de apoderado especial judicial de don Adrián Alberto, presentó a estrados la liquidación correspondiente. Solicitó se acogieran las siguientes partidas: 1) se condene al ente ejecutado al pago de las costas del proceso de ejecución de sentencia; 2) ₡181.500,00 por las costas personales del recurso de amparo; 3) ₡350.000,00 por el daño moral subjetivo; y 4) el pago de los intereses de ley, desde el momento de la firmeza de la sentencia y hasta su efectivo pago. Mediante resolución de las 10 horas 08 minutos del 20 de marzo de 2023 (imágenes 27 a 29), el Juzgador de Ejecución, Kenneth Arrones Morera, dio curso a la demanda. En escrito subido al expediente el día 03 de agosto de ese año a las 09:21:02, imágenes de la 33 a la 63, la apoderada general judicial sin límite de suma de la CCSS, licenciada Stephanie de los Ángeles Gazo Romero, se opuso a la ejecución. Formuló la defensa de falta de derecho. En la sentencia ahora cuestionada, el Juez, Berny Solano Solano, acogió parcialmente la liquidación en los siguientes términos. Condenó a la CCSS al pago de: 1) ₡181.500,00 por las costas personales del recurso de amparo; 2) ₡300.000,00 por el daño moral subjetivo; 3) le impuso a la institución ejecutada el reconocimiento de los réditos al tipo legal, únicamente sobre el monto concedido por el daño moral subjetivo; y 4) las costas del proceso de ejecución y sus intereses legales, desde la firmeza de la sentencia que las fije y hasta su efectivo pago. Disconforme, la apoderada general judicial de la CCSS formuló recurso de casación.
III.La primera censura, página dos del libelo, anunció la recurrente interponerla por el motivo casacional por quebranto de normas sustantivas previsto en el artículo 138 inciso a) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA): “También procederá el recurso de casación por violación de normas sustantivas del ordenamiento jurídico, en los siguientes casos: / a) Cuando se atribuya a la prueba una indebida valoración o se haya preterido.” Ello, dijo, por la indebida valoración de la ejecutoria de la sentencia constitucional. Alegó conculcado el ordinal 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP). El fallo cuestionado, anotó, no analizó las aristas contenidas en la línea de esta Sala, pese a habérselas puntualizado al Juzgador. Mencionó la sentencia de esta Cámara no. 297-F-S1-2024 de las 17 horas 27 minutos del 21 de marzo de 2024. Dentro de esos aspectos, citó la determinación de necesidad extrema del caso del paciente desde el punto de vista médico (urgencia), su consentimiento en estar en una lista de espera o, bien, la existencia de un daño físico. Aludió a las sentencias de esta Sala -según el orden de cita- nos.: 28-F-S1-2024 de las 11 horas 05 minutos del 11 de enero de 2024; 1502-F-S1-2022 de las 11 horas 24 minutos del 01 de setiembre; 1823-F-S1-2022 de las 14 horas 26 minutos del 04 de agosto; y 2429-F-S1-2022 de las 14 horas 16 minutos del 03 de noviembre; las tres del año 2022. Acorde con la sentencia impugnada, apuntó, solo se apreció, para otorgar el daño moral subjetivo, la ejecutoria del recurso de amparo. Reprodujo, en lo de su interés, lo considerado por el Juez de Ejecución en el apartado IV de la resolución objetada; así como los hechos probados del fallo en ejecución. No se tomaron en cuenta los factores de justicia restaurativa, urgencia, conformación del paciente, los cuales se hicieron ver en la contestación de la demanda. Incluso, agregó, el Juzgador adicionó más meses en lista de espera. La Sala Constitucional indicó que era de tres años y dos meses, siendo este el dato correcto; mientras que el Juez lo estableció en más de cuatro años. De igual manera, arguyó, en el análisis de fondo de la sentencia ejecutoria, se estimó que el amparo se declaró con lugar, porque se colocó al ejecutante en una lista de espera por ese plazo, sin mencionar aspecto alguno relacionado con la patología del paciente, o la necesidad de dar seguimiento de manera inmediata. Copió, en lo conducente, lo considerado en el apartado IV del fallo en ejecución. El Tribunal Constitucional, anotó, determinó que el referido plazo de espera era irrazonable. Transcribió otro fragmento del referido apartado IV de la sentencia objetada. Con una simple ejecutoria, manifestó, y sin ningún informe técnico médico, el Juez acreditó que el pasar del tiempo provocó molestias físicas. Solo tuvo dicha probanza, la de un derecho concedido en abstracto, para otorgar pretensiones indemnizatorias. No entiende, indicó, cómo llegó a la conclusión de que la espera fue de cuatro años. La resolución en ejecución, arguyó, tuvo claro que al ejecutante se le colocó en lista de espera quirúrgica el 06 de noviembre de 2019. Este elemento es lo único a lo que hizo referencia la sentencia cuestionada de lo valorado por la Sala Constitucional para declarar con lugar el recurso de amparo presentado. Sin embargo, alegó, el Juez, desde un punto de vista técnico-médico, desarrolló las supuestas patologías del paciente y que la colocación en una lista de espera le causó una prolongación de un daño moral por incertidumbre que debe ser indemnizado partiendo del principio “in re ipsa”, cuando del historial médico del paciente no se logra evidenciar dicha “incertidumbre”. La sentencia cuestionada, afirmó, quebrantó dicho canon -196 de la LGAP-, pues, partiendo de una ejecutoria no se tiene prueba de: 1) que la espera para la cirugía, en razón de que presentaba un diagnóstico de hernia inguinal unilateral, no urgente, le haya generado algún tipo complicaciones en el desarrollo normal de su vida cotidiana; 2) que se le haya negado el acceso a la salud, pues, en todo momento, tuvo acceso a los servicios que presta la Institución y nunca utilizó los servicios de emergencia, por lo que no hay un solo elemento que permita determinar el daño, sufrimiento o padecimiento asociado al servicio prestado (nexo causal entre el daño alegado y la conducta reprochada); y 3) la existencia de incertidumbre en el paciente, y su prolongación por un actuar de su representada. El Juez, alegó, sin prueba técnica, y sin que la ejecutoria del recurso de amparo mencione aspecto alguno desde el punto de vista médico, determinó elementos técnico-médicos complejos, para concluir la existencia de un daño efectivo e individualizado. Solo la ejecutoria de una sentencia constitucional, indicó, no tiene un matiz de tal magnitud como para concluir la existencia de un “sufrimiento emocional” o con “sentimientos de molestia, frustración y ansiedad”. Esta Sala, aseveró, estableció en la resolución no. 1502-F-S1-2022 que, en cuanto a indemnizaciones por recursos de amparo por colocación en listas de espera, resulta irracional imponerle al fondo de contribución tripartito de la seguridad social una indemnización. Sin embargo, anotó, el Juez, alejándose del criterio de este órgano decisor, acogió ese rubro. Si el Juzgador hubiera valorado adecuadamente la prueba, manifestó, la argumentación de la sentencia sería diferente. Habría determinado que resultaba insuficiente para evidenciar la existencia de un daño y su agravamiento por la colocación en una lista de espera. La sentencia objetada, alegó, violó dicha disposición legislativa, pues, partiendo de un fallo de un recurso de amparo por colocación en lista de espera, no se tiene prueba alguna de una afectación al fuero interno de la parte ejecutante. Se validó y determinó la existencia de “sentimientos de molestia, frustración y ansiedad” en el paciente, sin puntualizar de dónde se tomó esta valoración ni tener prueba técnica que así lo acreditara, lo cual, acotó, acarrea que el daño no sea real ni efectivo, violentando directamente dicha norma. Volvió a mencionar los fallos de esta Cámara (según el orden de cita) nos. 28-F-S1-2024, 297-F-S1-2024, 1502-F-S1-2022, 1823-F-S1-2022 y 2429-F-S1-2022. Agregó una tabla en donde expuso, en su criterio, lo puntualizado en cada una de esas resoluciones. Esa línea, indicó, le fue comunicada al Juez, quien debe conocer que la jurisprudencia es un medio para integrar, entender y aplicar el Derecho. Empero, anotó, la ignoró y decidió condenar a su representada por “molestia, frustración y ansiedad, incerteza angustia, dolor emocional, molestias físicas” a la parte ejecutante, según su entender, sin tener prueba. Es decir, señaló un tema de molestia física que nunca fue probado. Una ejecutoria, afirmó, es insuficiente para determinar la procedencia de un daño moral subjetivo. Además, la colocación de una persona en una lista de espera no es “per se” motivo suficiente para otorgar una indemnización. Esta Sala, concluyó, estableció en el fallo no. 1502-F-S1-2022 que, en cuanto a indemnizaciones por recursos de amparo por colocación en listas de espera, es irracional imponer una indemnización a quien ha consentido una espera y recibido la atención médica requerida.
IV.En torno a lo relacionado en el apartado anterior, precisa indicar lo siguiente. PRIMERO. La recurrente olvidó que esta instancia procesal no corresponde a un recurso ordinario (como es el de apelación). Tampoco resulta suficiente manifestar una serie de disconformidades generales y meramente argumentativas. Es menester el contraste de lo decidido con la infracción que, en su criterio, tuvo lugar. Al respecto, el numeral 139 inciso 3 del CPCA prevé un requerimiento de orden material necesario, tanto para la admisibilidad del recurso cuanto para su posterior valoración por el fondo. Se trata de la motivación del recurso que, por las características de la casación, ha de ser clara y precisa. En este sentido, debe contener, tal como lo dispone el precepto de comentario, la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso. Fáctica, en la medida en que se muestre inconforme con los hechos que se han tenido por demostrados o por indemostrados (lo cual lleva a la ponderación de las probanzas), o con las circunstancias acaecidas en la violación de normas procesales. Jurídica, cuando se trata de un problema que se expone acerca de la aplicación, omisión o indebida interpretación de cualquier norma que integre el bloque de juricidad, incluidos, por supuesto, los principios de rango constitucional, o aquella que también opera por efecto reflejo o indirecto, después de que se modifican los hechos de la sentencia impugnada. Tanto en la infracción procesal, como en la probatoria, puede concurrir, junto con las razones jurídicas (siempre necesarias), las de carácter fáctico y, en ese sentido, los fundamentos de referencia deberán ser dirigidos en ambas vertientes, so pena de inadmisibilidad. Por su parte, es necesario aclarar que de la fundamentación jurídica se exonera, por expreso mandato legal, la indicación de aquellos cánones relativos al valor del elemento o elementos probatorios mal apreciados. De igual forma, resulta innecesario citar las normas que equivocadamente utilizó y mencionó el órgano jurisdiccional de instancia para emitir y razonar su decisión, porque constan en el mismo pronunciamiento recurrido. Y desde luego, no es para nada indispensable citar los preceptos que establecen los requisitos, plazos y reglas básicas para la admisión del recurso. Antes que la cita de estas últimas, lo imprescindible es que se cumplan, que se pongan en práctica al momento de elaborar e interponer la casación. Así las cosas, la fundamentación dispuesta por ley, puede entenderse, grosso modo, como aquella argumentación técnico-jurídica en la que se mencionan una serie de artículos, o reglas jurídicas entrelazadas o concatenadas entre sí y vinculadas razonablemente en una doble perspectiva: con los argumentos del recurso y con la sentencia que se ataca. En la medida en que se cite un conjunto de normas jurídicas (o si es del caso, una sola de ellas), atinente y vinculada de manera clara con la sentencia combatida (ya sea en el sustento de hecho o derecho) y los argumentos del recurso, hay fundamentación jurídica. Los agregados jurisprudenciales o las eventuales citas doctrinales, reforzarán en ocasiones las alegaciones efectuadas, pero, por lo general, no hacen a su esencia. Como ya lo ha indicado esta Sala interpretando el artículo 139 de referencia, “se requiere que el recurso cuente con una fundamentación jurídica mínima ... deben explicarse las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión, combatiendo los argumentos de derecho de la sentencia recurrida y consignando, al menos, alguna referencia normativa que le dé sustento” (Resolución no. 318-A-2008, de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 8 de mayo del 2008). La fundamentación es, por tanto, ajena al despliegue confuso de normas y alegatos; a la mezcla de argumentos ininteligibles o a la simple exposición de opiniones sobre la procedencia o justicia del caso, o bien, al recuento de los desaciertos que se consideran cometidos en la sentencia recurrida, sin respaldo en normas o criterios jurídicos. De allí que, si el recurso omite por completo esa relación técnico-normativa a la que se ha hecho referencia, o la que realiza, resulta impertinente o desvinculada al caso de manera manifiesta y evidente, habrá que entender que carece de “total fundamentación jurídica”, y por tanto, incumple el necesario requisito establecido en el numeral 139.3, que se sanciona con el rechazo de plano, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso c) del mismo Código de rito. del mismo Código de referencia. De igual manera, esta Sala, en forma reiterada, ha señalado, para que un recurso pase el control de admisión, se precisa, además de la suficiente exposición de motivos, la correspondiente mención y vinculación con la sentencia cuestionada de las normas aplicables que se estimen infringidas. En este sentido pueden consultarse, entre otras resoluciones, las nos. 677-A-S1-2021 de las 09 horas 40 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2021 (); 755-A-S1-2022 de las 10 horas 55 minutos del 29 de marzo de marzo (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); y 1663-A-S1-2022 de las 10 horas 05 minutos del 21 de julio (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340) , ambas del año 2022.
V.Después del estudio concienzudo de la censura en análisis, esta Cámara arriba al convencimiento de que la recurrente entremezcló dos hipótesis disímiles entre sí, pero, por la manera cómo la estructuró resultan inseparables. Según se expuso, avisó interponerla por la indebida valoración de la sentencia ejecutoria, al haberse acreditado la existencia del daño moral subjetivo. Así fue desarrollado en las páginas 03, 04, 05, 06 y 09 del libelo. Tal línea de argumentación configuraría el motivo casacional por quebranto de normas sustantivas anunciado: el previsto en el inciso a) del canon 138 del CPCA. Empero, en las páginas 04, 05, 06, 07 y 09, afirmó: “[…] sin ningún informe técnico médico acredita que el pasar del tiempo provoca molestias físicas, siendo que ello incluso obedece a prueba técnica. Tal y como se mencionó con anterioridad, el juez solamente tuvo dicha prueba (la de un derecho concedido en abstracto) para otorgar pretensiones indemnizatorias. […] Entonces, no se entiende cómo el juez llega a la conclusión de que la espera fue de 4 años, cuando ni siquiera la Sala Constitucional dijo esto. […] Como se desprende, es incorrecto señalar que el tiempo de espera fue mayor a 4 años, como lo indicó el juez de primera instancia. […] la sentencia tiene plenamente claro que al actor [sic] se colocó [sic] en lista de espera quirúrgica el 06 de noviembre de 2019, y dicho elemento es a lo único a lo que se hace referencia (en la sentencia que se impugna) de lo valorado por la Sala Constitucional para declarar con lugar el Recurso de Amparo presentado, sin embargo, el juez, desde un punto de vista técnico-médico, desarrolla las supuestas patologías de la paciente [sic] y que la colocación en una lista de espera causó al actora [sic] una prolongación de un daño moral por incertidumbre, que, según la [sic] juez, debe ser indemnizado partiendo del principio in re ipsa, cuando del propio historial médico del paciente no se logra evidenciar dicha “incertidumbre”. […] El eje en cuestión, se agrava ya que el juez de primera instancia, sin prueba técnica alguna, y sin que la ejecutoria del Recurso de Amparo mencionare aspecto alguno desde el punto de vista médico, determina elementos técnico-médicos complejos, para concluir la existencia de un daño, efectivo e individualizado, con respecto al actor. / En ese sentido, no puede esta representación cohonestar dicho parecer del juez de primera instancia, toda vez que la serie de elementos que fueron tomados en consideración por la [sic] juez, no se desprenden de lo analizado por la Sala Constitucional para declarar con lugar el Recurso de Amparo, máxime y tomando en consideración que se remite a aspectos sumamente técnicos desde el punto de vista médico (con especialidades como la cirugía, por ejemplo), lo cual solo puede constatarse con dicho tipo de prueba (técnica). / Gradualmente, solo la ejecutoria de una sentencia constitucional no tiene un matiz de tal magnitud como para concluir la existencia de un “sufrimiento emocional” o con “sentimientos de molestia, frustración y ansiedad” máxime y tomando en consideración, se reitera, que no existía prueba técnica sobre ello. […] Es importante mencionar, como mero elemento aclaratorio, que ello le fue plenamente señalado al Juez de Ejecución de Sentencia, sin embargo, esta [sic], alejándose del criterio del Alto Tribunal, declara con lugar pretensiones, es decir, con lo anterior, denota respetuosamente esta representación que hay un animus de condenar a la CCSS a toda costa (y claro está, a los cotizantes), sin que medie claro está, sustento alguno desde el punto de vista probatorio. […] es decir, a todas luces el juez, de una simple ejecutoria de sentencia, valida y determina la existencia de “sentimientos de molestia, frustración y ansiedad” en el paciente, sin puntualizar de dónde toma esta valoración, ni tampoco tener prueba técnica que así lo acredite, desde ninguna arista, lo cual acarrea que el daño no sea ni real, ni efectivo, violentando directamente con ello el artículo 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. […] sin embargo, con un animus de condena, el mismo ignora toda la anterior línea, y decide condenar a mi representada, por incluso “molestia, frustración y ansiedad, incerteza angustia, dolor emocional, molestias físicas” a la parte actora, según su entender, sin tener prueba de ello. Es decir, el juez señala un tema de molestia física que nunca fue probado. […] Es importante mencionar, como mero elemento aclaratorio, que ello le fue plenamente señalado a la autoridad jurisdiccional, sin embargo, dado lo anterior, denota respetuosamente esta representación que hay un animus de condenar a la CCSS a toda costa (y claro está, a los cotizantes), sin que medie sustento alguno desde el punto de vista probatorio.” (Lo resaltado es del original). Lo ahora afirmado por la impugnante se enmarca en la causal por quebranto de normas procesales prevista en el inciso 1) punto d) del CPCA: falta de motivación. Empero, resulta informal lo alegado. Omitió señalar, con la claridad y precisión requeridas por la técnica casacional, conforme se indicó en el apartado anterior, al amparo de lo preceptuado en el ordinal 139 inciso 3) del CPCA, cuáles fueron las normas adjetivas vulneradas, brindando la explicación de cómo sucedió la transgresión. La ambigüedad reseñada riñe con la técnica de la casación, la cual impone que los motivos del recurso deben indicarse de manera clara y precisa, con la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso (precepto 139 inciso 3) del CPCA). Ergo, se impone el rechazo de plano del motivo de disconformidad en estudio.
VI.Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto en el apartado anterior y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, es menester apuntar lo siguiente. SEGUNDO. Debe recordarse que, en procesos de ejecución de sentencia en general y, principalmente, los emitidos por la Sala Constitucional, lo ejecutado debe, necesariamente, constreñirse a lo resuelto en la sentencia objeto de la ejecutoria. Esta Sala ha indicado, el proceso de ejecución de sentencia procura materializar la condena abstracta impuesta al perdidoso. De otorgarse aspectos diferentes -o contrarios- al pronunciamiento que da lugar a la ejecución o contra personas que no resultaron condenadas, se vulneraría la cosa juzgada. Ver, entre otros fallos de este órgano decisor los nos.: 383-F-S1-2019 de las 09 horas 50 minutos del 09 de mayo de 2019 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-925036) y 309-F-S1-2021 de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 11 de febrero de 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1024927). En consecuencia, la labor fiscalizadora de esta Cámara se constriñe a un cotejo objetivo entre la sentencia ejecutoria y el fallo recurrido. En este sentido, pueden consultarse, asimismo y entre muchas otras, las resoluciones de esta Cámara nos. 82-A-S1-22 de las 10 horas 06 minutos del 26 de enero (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1072742) y 1984-F-S1-2022 de las 11 horas 18 minutos del 08 de setiembre, ambas del año 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112319).
VII.Como ya se indicó en el apartado I de esta resolución, la Sala Constitucional, en el fallo en ejecución, acogió el recurso de amparo interpuesto a favor de don Adrián Alberto, al tenerse por acreditado que, pese a sufrir de una “hernia inguinal derecha”, el 06 de noviembre de 2019 fue ingresado en lista de espera de cirugía con prioridad media. No obstante, al momento del dictado del fallo constitucional, el 11 de enero de 2023, no contaba con fecha cierta para la intervención quirúrgica. Por ello, dicha Cámara estimó que el plazo de espera al que se le había sometido hasta ese momento, tres años y dos meses, conculcaba no solo del derecho fundamental a la salud; sino también, los principios de eficacia y eficiencia que deben predominar en los servicios públicos. En consecuencia, le ordenó a la Directora a.i y a la Jefa del Servicio de Cirugía, ambas del Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela que, giraran las órdenes pertinentes y llevaran a cabo todas las actuaciones que estuvieran dentro del ámbito de sus competencias para que, en el plazo de tres meses, contado a partir de la notificación de esa sentencia, se le realizara al amparado la cirugía pendiente. Como se colige con nitidez, la Sala Constitucional declaró con lugar el amparo porque estimó que el plazo que llevaba el paciente en lista de espera era desproporcionado y violatorio de su derecho fundamental a la salud, considerando su patología. En este sentido, como se expuso en dicho Considerando de esta sentencia, señaló dicha Cámara que la CCSS sometió al tutelado a un estado de incertidumbre por el plazo indicado, lo cual consideró inaceptable, pues su padecimiento le provoca dolores y complicaciones, afectándosele su calidad de vida. Además, señaló el Tribunal Constitucional, no existe justificación alguna para el retardo u omisiones en la atención de la salud de las personas, pues, dicha Institución, y sus centros de salud, tienen la obligación de adoptar e implementar los cambios organizacionales con el fin de obtener los recursos necesarios para prestar los servicios de salud bajo los principios de obligatoriedad, universalidad, eficacia celeridad y continuidad. Por su parte, el Juez de Ejecución, en el Considerando IV de la sentencia objetada, denominado “SOBRE LA PRETENDIDA INDEMNIZACIÓN POR DAÑO MORAL”, en lo de interés, señaló: “[…] En la especie, se tiene claridad de que la Sala Constitucional consideró improcedente que se le mantuviera en la indefinición de cuándo se le realizaría una cirugía por hernia inguinal desde el 06 de noviembre de 2019. Ahora bien, dado que la valoración del daño moral es in re ipsa, es decir, que implica una valoración de lo que un ser humano puede vivir con la situación descrita en el elenco de hechos probados del voto constitucional que se ejecuta, para este juzgador es lógico que cualquier persona a quien se le diga que requiere una cirugía por un problema de salud como una hernia inguinal y que se le haga esperar más de cuatro años sin que pueda, siquiera, saber una fecha cierta para la realización de su cirugía, va a sufrir emocionalmente con sentimientos de molestia, frustración y ansiedad por lo cual, en términos jurídicos, se considera procedente rechazar la excepción de falta de derecho y, en consecuencia, conceder una indemnización por daño moral subjetivo, que se fija prudencialmente en la suma de TRESCIENTOS MIL COLONES (¢300,000) a razón de doscientos mil colones por la espera e incerteza a la que, originalmente, se le ha sometido para saber la fecha de su cirugía y que se la practiquen efectivamente y cien mil colones más, porque con cada día que pasaba sin una atención oportuna, con el pasar de los minutos y días, la angustia y dolor emocional aumenta, porque es un padecimiento que implica molestias físicas y, en términos humanos, es inferible [sic] el sentimiento de mayor ansiedad y vulnerabilidad que ha vivido. […]” (Lo subrayado es suplido). Sin bien es cierto, el Juez de Ejecución indicó que el plazo de espera del amparado era de más de cuatro años; pese a que, cuando se emitió la sentencia constitucional era de tres años y dos meses, tal y como lo indicó expresamente el Tribunal Constitucional, ello obedece a que el Juzgador de Ejecución no tuvo por probado que, al momento de la emisión del fallo cuestionado en casación ya se le hubiese practicado la cirugía o, al menos, fijado fecha para practicarla. Es decir, cuando se emitió la sentencia cuestionada el plazo de espera había aumentado a más de cuatro años. No se acreditó, se insiste, que al momento de la emisión de esa sentencia ya se le hubiera practicado la cirugía al ejecutante. Sin embargo, la recurrente no cuestionó tal circunstancia en debida forma. Únicamente señaló que en esta lite existe justicia restaurativa porque al amparado se le realizó la intervención quirúrgica requerida, pero, sin indicar con cuál probanza se acredita su aserto; tampoco señaló cuándo se le practicó. En todo caso, como se aprecia sin dificultad de lo considerado en el fallo constitucional y en el ahora cuestionado, el Juez de Ejecución se ciñó a los hechos revisados en sede constitucional y a lo resuelto por esa Sala para acoger dicho rubro por daño moral subjetivo, sea, el atraso en la fijación de la fecha y práctica de la cirugía requerida por el amparado, por lo que no se observa transgresión al fallo ejecutorio.
VIII.TERCERO. Como se indicó, la casacionista manifestó que en el sub júdice operó lo que denominó “justicia restaurativa”. Al respecto, precisa señalar, esta Sala, en anteriores asuntos, reconoció su procedencia en materia de indemnización del daño moral subjetivo por la infracción al derecho fundamental a la salud (así reconocido por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia al acoger el respectivo recurso de amparo, debido al retardo de la CCSS en la prestación del servicio médico requerido por la persona administrada), cuando la CCSS presta el servicio dentro del plazo ordenado en sede constitucional. Al respecto, pueden consultarse las sentencias nos. 1502-S1-2022 de las 11 horas 24 minutos del 01 de setiembre (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112330), 2429-F-S1-2022 de las 14 horas 16 minutos del 03 de noviembre (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1123608), ambas del año 2022; 28-F-S1-2024 de las 11 horas 05 minutos del 11 de enero (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396), 297-F-S1-2024 de las 17 horas 27 minutos del 21 de marzo (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250), 901-F-S1-2024 de las 12 horas 31 minutos del 04 de julio (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1240015) y 937 de las 14 horas 51 minutos del 10 de julio (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925); todas del año 2024. Empero, la actual integración de esta Cámara, luego de un nuevo estudio, considera necesario reconsiderar esa posición. Sin duda, se trata de una reivindicación de la situación jurídica lesionada, por una falta de servicio, el que se suministre. Más aún, cuando resulte necesario, como ocurre con un servicio de salud pendiente. Sin embargo, dicha reparación no excluye que la persona perjudicada haya sufrido afectaciones en su esfera moral y patrimonial mientras la conducta anormal persistió por la disfunción administrativa. Si se demuestran menoscabos efectivos (preceptos 196 y 197 de la LGAP) propios del caso concreto y derivados de sus particulares características, coligiéndose su existencia, incluso, por medio del proceso intelectivo “in re ipsa”, pese haberse tutelado jurisdiccionalmente a la persona usuaria, procede su reparación. Es decir, la rectificación servicial no excluye que la persona perjudicada sufra afectaciones en su esfera moral y patrimonial mientras la conducta anormal persiste. Si eso ocurrió y así se acreditó, resulta obligado imponer la consecuencia resarcitoria correspondiente, si fue solicitado por quien vio su esfera jurídica damnificada. Esto es así conforme al principio de reparación integral del daño, el cual tiene raigambre constitucional y legal (cánones 9, 41, 49 constitucionales; 190 y 197 de la LGAP).
IX.Dentro de esta línea de pensamiento, y respecto a la existencia y cuantificación del daño moral subjetivo, esta Sala, desde vieja data, ha indicado que: “IV. [...] proviene de la lesión a un derecho extrapatrimonial. Sea, no repercute en el patrimonio de manera directa. Supone una perturbación injusta de las condiciones anímicas. No requiere de una prueba directa y queda a la equitativa valoración del Juez. Si se trata de daño moral subjetivo los tribunales están facultados para decretar y cuantificar la condena. La naturaleza jurídica de este tipo de daño no obliga al liquidador a determinar su existencia porque corresponde a su ámbito interno. Ello no es problema de psiquiatras o médicos. Se debe comprender su existencia o no porque pertenece a la conciencia. Se deduce a través de las presunciones inferidas de indicios, ya que, el hecho generador antijurídico pone de manifiesto el daño moral, pues cuando se daña la psiquis, la salud, la integridad física, el honor, la intimidad, etc., es fácil inferir el daño, por ello se dice que la prueba del daño moral existe “in re ipsa”. Tampoco se debe probar su valor porque no tiene un valor concreto. Se valora prudencialmente. No se trata, entonces, de cuantificar el sufrimiento, pues es inapreciable, sino de fijar una compensación monetaria a su lesión, único mecanismo al cual puede acudir el derecho, para así reparar, al menos en parte, su ofensa. Para mayor detalle sobre este aspecto, se pueden consultar, entre otros, de este órgano colegiado, los fallos no. 112 ya citado, no. 17 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 21 de febrero de 1996 y no. 41 de las 14 horas 40 minutos del 14 de mayo de 1997. Su otorgamiento no guarda una estrecha sujeción a factores probatorios (salvo que se refieran a la relación de causalidad), sino a la prudencia y objetivo arbitrio del juzgador. Sin embargo, su fijación está sujeta a los principios de razonabilidad y de proporcionalidad, los que deben ser valorados por la autoridad competente en cada caso, para que su cuantificación sea acorde a Derecho y no lleve a indemnizaciones excesivas que beneficien injustificadamente a una de las partes. Es decir, debe guardar un justo equilibrio derivado del cuadro fáctico específico, cuestión que ha de ponderarse dentro de los límites señalados.” (Entre muchas otras, puede consultarse la sentencia de esa Cámara no. 468-F-S1-19 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 30 de mayo de 2019). Acorde a lo expuesto, una vez establecida la existencia del daño moral y su nexo de causalidad con la causa de pedir alegada por la parte actora -lo cual, no es objetado por el casacionista-, la determinación del cuántum depende de la equitativa valoración del Juez; para lo cual, se deberá atender a las circunstancias especiales del caso, así como a los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.” Al respecto, puede consultarse, entre muchas otras, la sentencia no. 1098-F-S1-2023 de las 10 horas 09 minutos del 05 de julio de 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1170686). Es decir, es respecto al daño moral subjetivo que su demostración es “in re ipsa”, siempre y cuando sea como consecuencia de un hecho generador o motivo antijurídico.
X.En esta lite, la Sala Constitucional, según ya se ha indicado, determinó la conducta antijurídica de la CCSS al verificar el quebranto al derecho fundamental a la salud de don Adrián Alberto. La postergación de la cirugía requerida era, al momento del dictado de la sentencia constitucional de, aproximadamente, tres años y dos meses, pese a que su padecimiento, tal y como lo indicó dicha Cámara, le provocaba dolores y complicaciones, lo cual afectaba su calidad de vida. Tal situación -hecho antijurídico-, conforme a las máximas de la lógica, experiencia y correcto entendimiento humano, tal y como fue resuelto, es causa adecuada (nexo causal) de una aflicción moral, asociada a ansiedad, molestia, frustración y preocupación, por el tiempo excesivo de atención -así declarado, se insiste, en sede constitucional- de una situación de salud que, “per se”, es causa de preocupación para quien lo padece. Acorde con el correcto entendimiento humano y la experiencia, se insiste, se puede colegir, “in re ipsa”, tal y como lo hizo el Juzgador de Ejecución, la existencia de sentimientos como los antes descritos, sin que tuviera el deber jurídico de soportarlos, al derivar de un funcionamiento anormal de la Administración, así decretado, se repite una vez más, por la Sala Constitucional. Ergo, distinto a lo indicado por la recurrente, se determina su existencia y, por ende, la procedencia de su resarcimiento.
XI.CUARTO. Asimismo, la recurrente alegó que, en el caso del amparado, no existía urgencia en la práctica de la cirugía. Como se expuso en el apartado I de esta sentencia, fue la propia Sala Constitucional, en la sentencia ejecutoria, quien determinó la urgencia de que al ejecutante se le practicara el procedimiento quirúrgico requerido, disponiendo que debía efectuarse dentro del plazo de tres meses a partir de la notificación de ese fallo. Por consiguiente, dentro del cotejo objetivo que debe prevalecer en este tipo de procesos -ejecución de sentencia constitucional- el tema de la urgencia es un aspecto precluido, pues, se repite, así fue determinado y resuelto por el Tribunal Constitucional.
XII.QUINTO. La impugnante también indicó que el amparado se conformó o consintió en permanecer en la lista de espera. Diferente a lo alegado, en esta lite no puede estimarse la existencia de consentimiento o acto consentido tácito y, mucho menos, expreso por parte del señor Morera Trejos. El recurso de amparo fue interpuesto en tiempo. Tanto es así que la Sala Constitucional lo admitió para su trámite y, posteriormente, lo acogió. Esto, con independencia del plazo transcurrido entre el momento cuando la CCSS lo ingresó en lista de espera y la presentación del amparo. Por lo tanto, el ejecutante mostró su disconformidad con su permanencia en la lista de espera, dándole la razón dicho órgano jurisdiccional.
XIII.El segundo motivo de disconformidad, página nueve del libelo, anunció la recurrente interponerlo por el motivo casacional por quebranto de normas sustantivas previsto en el inciso c) del canon 138 del CPCA: “c) Cuando se haya aplicado o interpretado indebidamente una norma jurídica o se haya dejado de aplicar.” Invocó conculcado el ordinal 73.1 del Código Procesal Civil (CPC), por indebida aplicación. Se está, dijo, ante un proceso de ejecución de sentencia constitucional. La condenatoria realizada en esa sede fue en abstracto, manifestó, por lo que debe ejecutarse. Incluso, alegó, demostrarse en esta vía el derecho a recibir una indemnización por costas, daños y perjuicios. Reprodujo dicho precepto. Establece que se considerarán como costas: los honorarios de abogado, la indemnización de tiempo invertido y gastos indispensables del proceso. Se tiene claro, apuntó, que no se emitió factura electrónica, por lo que se cohonesta la solicitud de montos que no se comprueba haberse invertido y que se cancelarán sin prueba alguna. La parte ejecutante, alegó, no aportó medio de convicción alguno de que hubiese mediado inversión de dinero por concepto de honorarios de abogado. Por ello, acotó, el Juez tenía compelido otorgar monto alguno por concepto de costas del recurso de amparo, en la figura de honorarios. Bajo la premisa del Juez, aseveró, cualquier persona, a través de la acción vicaria, podría interponer recursos de amparo por tema de listas de espera y, a la hora de ejecutar la sentencia, recibiría como indemnización las costas del recurso, lo cual, en su criterio, sería un absurdo, pues, para recibir la indemnización plena de un gasto, debe demostrarse. Es ahí donde, indicó, se encuentra el yerro de la sentencia, toda vez que otorgó el monto por concepto de costas del recurso de amparo como si fueran por honorarios. Deben quedar claras las razones, señaló, por las cuales se otorgan las costas a una persona vencedora en un proceso judicial. Además, agregó, el magistrado de la Sala Constitucional, don Fernando Castillo Víquez, en múltiples ocasiones, ha sido claro en ordenar, tanto a la CCSS, cuando realiza la satisfacción extraprocesal de las condenas de la Sala Constitucional, como a la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa, de asegurarse que los importes otorgados, efectivamente, lleguen a manos de los amparados. Transcribió, en lo de su interés, lo expuesto en la nota separada que consta en el voto de la Sala Constitucional no. 2016-012528. La sentencia impugnada, concluyó, debió rechazar dicho extremo, pues, al no haberse aportado una factura electrónica, no se demostró que ningún profesional en Derecho hubiese brindado un servicio profesional y cobrado por el mismo.
XIV.En torno a lo expuesto en el apartado anterior, precisa apuntar lo siguiente. PRIMERO. En la página 10 del libelo, manifestó la impugnante: “Bajo la premisa del juez de primera instancia, cualquier persona, a través de la Acción Vicaria, podría interponer Recursos de Amparo por tema de listas de espera, y a la hora de ejecutar la sentencia, perfectamente recibiría como indemnización costas del recurso, lo cual, respetuosamente, sería un absurdo […]”. Distinto a lo indicado, esta Sala, desde vieja data, ha señalado la diferencia entre costas personales y honorarios de abogado, concluyendo que las costas personales le pertenecen a la parte, no al letrado. Al respecto, pueden consultare, mutatis mutandis, los fallos nos. 432-F-S1-2017 de las 09 horas 30 minutos del 20 de abril de 2017 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-950854); 515-F-S1-2018 de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 30 de mayo de 2018 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-892742); 28-F-S1-2024 de las 11 horas 05 minutos del 11 de enero (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1208396) y 297-F-S1-2024 de las 17 horas 27 minutos del 21 de marzo (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1221250); ambas del año 2024.
XV.SEGUNDO. En la página 10 del libelo afirmó la recurrente: “En ese sentido, nótese que el mismo contenido de la norma establece que se considerarán costas, los honorarios de abogado, la indemnización de tiempo invertido y gastos indispensables del proceso, pero la parte actora [sic], tal y como lo menciona el juez al tener plenamente claro que no se emitió factura electrónica alguna, cohonesta el solicitar montos que no se demuestran se invirtieron y se cancelaran [sic] sin prueba alguna, por un simple principio, que requiere precisamente, de la existencia de prueba. […] la parte actora [sic] no aporta prueba alguna de que haya mediado inversión de dinero por concepto de honorarios de abogado, es decir, al haber carencia de prueba en torno a ello, lo cierto del caso es que el juez tenía compelido el otorgar el monto por concepto de costas del Recurso de Amparo, en la figura de honorarios que no se tiene prueba, hayan sido cancelados, al no haber de por medio una factura electrónica de por medio. […] Por lo anterior, se tiene que la sentencia debió haber rechazado dicho extremo, toda vez que al no haberse aportado factura electrónica, no se demostró que ningún profesional en Derecho, hubiera brindado un servicio profesional y cobrado por el mismo.” (Lo resaltado es del original). Al respecto, se impone indicar, el CPCA, en el ordinal 193 regula, de manera expresa, la imposición de las costas, al igual que lo hace el canon 73.1 del CPC. Por consiguiente, es la norma del CPCA la aplicable a esta lite. No obstante, esta disposición no preceptúa, como sí lo hace la del CPC, qué se consideran costas. Ergo, este principio procesal, al igual que los contenidos en los ordinales 76.1 y 76.4 íbid, en virtud de la remisión efectuada por el artículo 220 del CPCA, es aplicable a esta lite. En este sentido, dispone el precepto 73.1 del CPC: “[…] Se considerarán costas los honorarios de abogado, la indemnización del tiempo invertido por la parte en asistir a los actos del procedimiento en que fuera necesaria su presencia y los demás gastos indispensables del proceso.” (Lo subrayado es suplido). En este mismo orden de ideas, los preceptos 76.1 y 76.4 íbid indican: “76.1 Derecho a honorarios y fijación. Los honorarios de abogado pertenecen a este, con las excepciones establecidas por ley. Cuando la parte fuera abogada y haya actuado personalmente tendrá derecho a ellos. Salvo pacto en contrario, se fijarán en atención al trabajo, al estado y la trascendencia económica del proceso, con base en lo dispuesto en la Ley N.° 13, Ley Orgánica del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas, de 28 de octubre de 1941, y el decreto de honorarios de abogados y notarios. […] 76.4 Fijación contractual de honorarios de abogado. Los abogados y sus clientes podrán fijar contractualmente el monto de los honorarios y sus modalidades de pago respetando los límites impuestos por la ley y el decreto respectivo. Dicha estipulación no afectará a las partes contrarias del proceso, para efectos de fijación de costas personales.” (Solo lo subrayado es suplido). A la luz de lo dispuesto en dichas normas, es claro que, para efectos de las costas, los honorarios de abogado deben calcularse con base en los límites legales y las tarifas establecidas en el Decreto respectivo, independientemente de cualquier acuerdo privado entre el abogado y su cliente. Esto implica que, en la liquidación de costas, no es necesario que la persona ejecutante demuestre el convenio que tiene con su abogado o el pago que le haya realizado, ya que la normativa prevé que el cálculo de ese extremo debe realizarse de acuerdo con el arancel o decreto respectivo, a fin de asegurar un criterio objetivo en la liquidación de costas. Así, si una parte contó con patrocinio letrado en la tramitación de una causa y obtuvo a su favor el pago de las costas, el importe que se reconocerá como honorarios de abogado será, necesariamente, el que se establezca en el “Arancel de Honorarios por Servicios Profesionales de Abogacía”, según las labores efectuadas. Consecuentemente, no resulta indispensable que se aporte una factura o comprobante de pago a favor del profesional en derecho para que proceda el reconocimiento de ese extremo. En esta lite, la objetante no acreditó que don Adrián Alberto hubiese carecido de patrocinio letrado durante la tramitación del proceso de amparo. Por el contrario, consta que su apoderado especial judicial en este proceso de ejecución fue quien presentó el recurso de amparo a su favor ante la Sala Constitucional. Esto permite colegir que dicho profesional defendió los intereses del amparado en sede constitucional. Ergo, la falta de presentación de la factura o comprobante de pago que reclamó la recurrente no es suficiente para demeritar o desestimar el rubro de costas personales liquidado por la parte y reconocido expresamente en el fallo ejecutorio. Se reitera, porque el ejecutante contó con patrocinio letrado durante la tramitación del amparo y obtuvo a su favor el pago de las costas. Es decir, tiene derecho a que se le reconozca como costas el monto que, por concepto de honorarios de abogado, establece el arancel aplicable. Corolario, esta Sala no observa la infracción legal aducida y, por consiguiente, se impondrá el rechazo del embate.
XVI.El tercer y último reproche a la sentencia cuestionada, página 11, anunció la casacionista interponerlo por el motivo casacional por quebranto de normas sustantivas previsto en el inciso d) del numeral 138 del CPCA: “d) Cuando la sentencia viole las normas o los principios del Derecho constitucional, entre otros, la razonabilidad, proporcionalidad, seguridad jurídica e igualdad.” Invocó infringido el postulado de razonabilidad. El Juez, manifestó, determinó la razonabilidad de la indemnización partiendo del principio “in re ipsa”, estableciendo el monto a indemnizar en ₡300.000,00. Reprodujo, en lo de su interés, lo considerado en el apartado IV de la sentencia cuestionada. Indicó el Juzgador, expuso, que con cada día que pasaba aumentaba la angustia y dolor emocional, pero esto no se pudo comprobar, pues, la prueba fue ayuna. La sentencia objetada, alegó, dejó abierta la posibilidad de buscar, de manera irrestricta, el obtener dobles indemnizaciones: 1) la de tipo material, al recibir la atención médica y 2) la de tipo pecuniaria, sin que medie prueba alguna sobre ello. Con ese análisis, aseveró, se quebrantó el señalado principio de razonabilidad. Si bien es cierto, anotó, existen listas de espera, otorgar una indemnización pecuniaria por colocar a una persona en una de ellas, sin que exista criterio médico de urgencia, según lo indicó esta Sala, implica que los montos destinados a garantizar los dos principales derechos fundamentales -vida y salud-, se vean mermados, lo cual es irracional, ya que las personas cotizantes para el Seguro de Enfermedad y Maternidad, lo hacen con el objetivo de que se brinde un servicio de salud y que se tengan recursos para garantizarlo. No para que se otorguen indemnizaciones por colocar a una persona en una lista de espera. El Juzgador, anotó, alejándose del indicado postulado, determinó, sin prueba alguna, que debe existir un resarcimiento económico, a pesar de que el ejecutante recibió justicia restaurativa, al realizarse la cirugía requerida, pese a que su padecimiento no fue catalogado de urgente. Es decir, determinó que debe mediar, en todo momento, la indicada doble indemnización cuando hay colocación de una persona en una lista de espera, lo cual genera un privilegio y un enriquecimiento sin causa alguna. El objetivo de quien recurre a la Sala Constitucional, para que se le realice un procedimiento quirúrgico o se le brinde atención médica, arguyó, es el restablecimiento de su salud, no obtener una indemnización. Se violó el referido principio al otorgarse un extremo indemnizatorio, pese a haberse realizado el procedimiento médico requerido. De igual modo, indicó, se conculcó ese postulado al no determinarse que la indemnización incluye la restauración, la cual se produjo por la resolución judicial, ya que el usuario del servicio de salud (que tiene recursos limitados), recibió la atención médica requerida, por lo que deviene contrario a derecho, especialmente a dicho principio, que además de la restauración recibida, se le otorgue un monto adicional, al haberse derogado, singularmente, la situación de estar en una lista de espera. El otorgar una suma por concepto de indemnización, dijo, adicional a haberse realizado el procedimiento médico requerido, le otorga un privilegio sobre los demás asegurados, que se vieron superados por la persona amparada. Dicha situación, arguyó, fue previamente analizada por esta Sala en las sentencias nos. 1502-F-S1-2022 y 297-F-S1-24, las cuales reprodujo en lo de su interés. Por lo anterior, concluyó, otorgar una indemnización por concepto de daño moral es violatorio del principio de razonabilidad.
XVII.En torno a lo señalado en el Considerando anterior, precisa indicar lo siguiente. PRIMERO. En la página 11 del recurso señaló la impugnante: “[…] si bien existen listas de espera, el otorgar una indemnización pecuniaria por colocar a una persona en una de estas, sin que exista criterio médico de urgencia, según lo indica la misma Sala Primera en las resoluciones arriba indicadas […]”. La remisión efectuada a otro reparo, como lo hizo la recurrente, no es de recibo. Tal y como se apuntó en el apartado V de esta sentencia, a tenor de lo indicado en el precepto 139 inciso 3) del CPCA, la técnica impone que los motivos de la casación se indiquen de manera clara y precisa, con la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso. SEGUNDO. Después de analizar pormenorizadamente el reparo en estudio, esta Cámara arriba al convencimiento de que la recurrente arguyó el quebranto del principio constitucional de razonabilidad por dos razones distintas: A) por el monto de ₡300.000,00 concedido como indemnización del daño moral subjetivo, pues, en su criterio, no se demostró la existencia de ese daño. Tal línea de argumentación, diferente a lo anunciado, de darse, configuraría el motivo casacional por violación de normas procesales previsto en el inciso 1) punto d) del artículo 137 del CPCA: falta de motivación. Empero, lo argüido es informal. La recurrente no indicó las normas adjetivas que resultaron vulneradas, con la explicación, clara y precisa, de cómo sucedió la infracción, tal y como la técnica de la casación lo impone, según se expuso en el apartado IV de esta sentencia, al amparo de lo preceptuado en el ordinal 139 inciso 3) del CPCA. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, es menester indicar, distinto a lo argumentado, en los apartados IX y X de esta sentencia, se brindaron los argumentos por los cuales esta Sala estima, avalando lo decidido por el Juzgador de Ejecución, que en esta lite se le produjo al ejecutante una lesión de ese tipo, por lo que resulta procedente su indemnización. Es decir, quedó plenamente evidenciada la existencia del daño moral subjetivo infligido al ejecutante por los hechos conocidos en la sede constitucional. Por otro lado, en cuanto al monto concedido, además de lo indicado en el Considerando IX de este fallo para su determinación, ha expuesto esta Cámara: “VIII. […] En otras oportunidades, este órgano de casación ha tenido oportunidad de resaltar la necesaria “razonabilidad jurídica” que deben guardar este tipo de indemnizaciones, para cuya verificación se debe constatar la observancia de una “razonabilidad de igualdad”, la que la Sala Constitucional ha definido como “…el tipo de valoración jurídica que parte de que ante iguales antecedentes deben haber iguales consecuencias, sin excepciones arbitrarias” (v.g., votos no. 5236-99 y 1354-2011). Es decir, para evitar tratamientos inequitativos e ilegítimos en los diversos asuntos en los que se discuta la indemnización de daños morales, resulta menester verificar que los montos reconocidos no resulten desproporcionados, al compararlos con los que fueron establecidos en otros asuntos similares. En ese orden de ideas, estima la Sala que la suma concedida se ajusta a la intensidad del daño causado.” Sentencia no. 760-F-S1-2023 de las 13 horas 24 minutos del 29 de mayo de 2023 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1157835). En igual sentido, pueden consultarse, entre otros, los fallos nos. 1934-F-S1-2022 de las 15 horas del 12 de agosto; 2654-F-S1-2022 de las 10 horas 10 minutos del 08 de diciembre https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1132117), ambas del año 2022 y 1087-F-S1-2023 de las 09 horas 36 minutos del 05 de julio de 2023 (). Estima esta Sala, la suma concedida por este concepto, ₡300.000,00, en atención a las circunstancias del caso -la patología padecida por el amparado y sus consecuencias señaladas por la propia Sala Constitucional; así como el tiempo de espera al que se le mantuvo hasta el dictado de la sentencia constitucional- y a casos similares, resulta razonable y proporcionada. En este sentido, a modo de ejemplo, se pueden señalar los siguientes precedentes, en donde, este órgano decisor no consideró irrazonables las sumas otorgadas por el atraso en la prestación del servicio público de salud, nos. 429-F-S1-2024 de las 10 horas 41 minutos del 03 de mayo (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1229475), en donde la persona Juzgadora otorgó ₡500.00,00; 937-F-S1-2024 de las 14 horas 51 minutos del 10 de julio, (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1239925), fijándose en ₡200.000,00; y 1302-F-S1-2024 de las 16 horas 14 minutos del 27 de setiembre, todas del año 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1253306), concediéndose la suma de ₡200.000,00. Esto impone el rechazo de esta parte de la objeción.
XVIII.B) al haberse concedido un extremo indemnizatorio -daño moral subjetivo-, pese a existir justicia restaurativa, pues, al amparado se le practicó la cirugía requerida. Es decir, por la supuesta existencia de una doble indemnización. No obstante, como se indicó en el apartado VII de este fallo, tal circunstancia fáctica, que al amparado se le efectuara la cirugía que requería y, por ende, que existiera “justicia restaurativa”, no fue acreditada por el Juzgador de Ejecución. En consecuencia, de darse lo recriminado se enmarcaría en la causal por quebranto de normas sustantivas prevista en el artículo 138 inciso a) de CPCA por indebida valoración probatoria. No obstante, lo argumentado también es informal. La objetante omitió indicar con cuál probanza se acredita su dicho y las normas sustantivas que resultaron violentadas por dicho desafuero, con la explicación, clara y precisa, de cómo fueron infringidas. Ergo, por las razones indicadas, se impone el rechazo del motivo de disconformidad en estudio. Sin perjuicio de lo indicado y, a mayor abundamiento de razones, es menester indicar, en el apartado VIII de esta resolución se brindaron las razones por las cuales esta Sala reconsideró su posición asumida en anteriores sentencias en torno al tema de la justicia restaurativa. Sosteniendo ahora la tesis de que, pese a que se brinde la asistencia médica requerida por el paciente, en virtud de la orden emanada de la Sala Constitucional, si la persona perjudicada sufre afectaciones en su esfera moral y patrimonial por la conducta anormal de la Administración debido al atraso en la prestación del servicio médico, coligiéndose su existencia, incluso, a través del proceso intelectivo “in re ipsa”, procede su reparación, si así fue requerido. Asimismo, en los Considerandos XI y XII, se expusieron las razones por las cuales se estima que los argumentos de la objetante, respecto a que no existía urgencia para la práctica de la cirugía al amparado y de su conformidad con el plazo de espera, no son de recibo. En consecuencia, a efecto de evitar reiteraciones innecesarias, se remite a lo ahí indicado. Consecuentemente, el Juzgador de Ejecución no ha infringido el principio constitucional de razonabilidad.
XIX.En mérito de las razones apuntadas, se impone el rechazo del recurso interpuesto. De conformidad con lo preceptuado en el numeral 150 inciso 3) del CPCA, al no considerar esta Sala que al ente casacionista le asista motivo suficiente para recurrir, por las razones expuestas al analizarse cada agravio, se le impondrá el reconocimiento de las costas del recurso de casación, las cuales deberán liquidarse en la fase de ejecución de la sentencia, a fin de garantizar el derecho de defensa de la parte ejecutada, dándosele la audiencia respectiva de la liquidación que se presente (artículos 41 y 153 de la Constitución Política).
XX.VOTO SALVADO DE LA MAGISTRADA ROJAS MORALES. Me apartó del criterio de mayoría, en cuanto estima procedente condenar a la demandada al pago del daño moral subjetivo. Respecto de los daños y perjuicios que se derivan de un fallo de la Sala Constitucional, al declarar con lugar un recurso de amparo, conviene tener presente que, dada su naturaleza este tipo de sentencias contienen una condenatoria en abstracto, sin ninguna consideración fáctica, no prejuzga, por no haber sido objeto de análisis, sobre su existencia, ni su nexo de causalidad o cuantificación. Dicho Tribunal se limita a determinar la violación constitucional. Al ejecutar esos extremos debe establecerse la relación de causalidad entre lo declarado en abstracto y el asunto concreto. Así las cosas, el hecho de que la Sala Constitucional condene en abstracto al pago de daños y perjuicios, no trae aparejada una condenatoria automática a ejecutar, como mal parece entenderlo el Juez Ejecutor. Corresponde a los jueces encargados de resolver sobre la liquidación, valorar en cada caso concreto la existencia de mérito suficiente para conceder la indemnización peticionada. En esa dirección han de analizarse: las circunstancias particulares del caso, la posición de las partes, naturaleza, objeto y finalidad del resarcimiento, así como, los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Además, cuando el asunto verse sobre un supuesto daño moral subjetivo sufrido por una persona que enfrenta una falta de atención médica, como sucede en la especie, deviene indispensable el examen de aristas adicionales. En primer término, ha de valorarse el factor: urgencia, pues resulta evidente que no se encuentra en igual situación quien requiere, una atención urgente por parte de la CCSS, por ejemplo: aquel administrado que padece de un cáncer el cual avanza de manera irremediable, a quien presenta una dolencia, le ha sido prescrita una intervención quirúrgica o una cita médica sin carácter apremiante, en ambos casos el tiempo de espera para recibir el servicio médico no tiene el mismo resultado. Así tampoco, la afectación moral será de igual intensidad. Por otra parte, debe analizarse la inactividad del paciente por el trascurso del tiempo en la lista de espera (canon 30 inciso ch) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional -LJC- y 38 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), la cual cesa cuando acude en amparo ante la Sala Constitucional o bien, a los tribunales de justicia, para reclamar la atención o el tratamiento médico que necesita (actividad administrativa). Tómese en cuenta, el trascurso del tiempo sin gestionar tiene en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense consecuencias claras sobre la caducidad de la acción, aspecto valorable de oficio. No puede derivarse una ventaja pecuniaria de la inactividad, pues ello se enfrenta al principio de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. En tercer lugar, ha de ponderarse la satisfacción que tiene la orden de un tribunal de justicia, mediante la cual se dispone la práctica de un acto médico o la entrega de medicamentos (aún sí surge en razón de una medida cautelar). Incluso, la más reciente jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional ha valorado, como atención oportuna, la satisfacción generada a partir de la notificación del curso del amparo. Se trata de aquellos casos en que, con ocasión del amparo y al margen del tiempo trascurrido entre la interposición del recurso y la respuesta administrativa recibida, la autoridad recurrida brinda al administrado la atención médica requerida (otorgando fecha cierta para una cirugía o consulta médica, brindando el medicamento necesitado, reprogramando una cita, etc). Casos, de última resolución que son vinculantes erga omnes (según ordinal 13 de la LJC). Los Juzgadores Constitucionales han considerado improcedente condenar en costas, daños y perjuicios; lo que debe ser valorado por esta Cámara al pronunciarse sobre los recursos de casación. En ese sentido pueden consultarse, entre otras, las sentencia números: 2024-000017 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 9 de enero de 2024, 2024-000026 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 9 de enero de 2024 y 2024-006673 de las 9 horas 15 minutos del 8 de marzo de 2024, todas de la Sala Constitucional. Valga destacar, otorgar el servicio médico requerido constituye una manifestación de justicia restaurativa, la que este Órgano Decisor debe valorar. La indemnización otorgada en infracción de los razonamientos enunciados se torna irrazonable y desproporcionada, máxime cuando en un sistema de seguridad social universal, como el costarricense, tales indemnizaciones las pagan todos los asegurados, inclusive aquellos desplazados por el ejecutante. Al examinar los aspectos descritos y el caso particular del señor Adrián Alberto Morera Trejos, deviene improcedente otorgar indemnización a la afectación anímica concedida en la sentencia recurrida. Consta en autos, el 6 de noviembre de 2019, el Hospital San Rafael de Alajuela le expidió a don Adrián orden de hospitalización para cirugía ambulatoria, sin fecha cierta y con prioridad media. El 28 de diciembre de 2022 acudió en amparo ante la Sala Constitucional, órgano jurisdiccional que ordenó, por resolución 2023-000411 de las 9 horas 20 minutos del 11 de enero de 2023, realizar la intervención quirúrgica dentro del plazo de tres meses, previo cumplimiento de los requisitos preoperatorios. Tengase en cuenta, la persona ejecutante se mantuvo durante aproximadamente tres años a la espera que se le practicara el procedimiento en el Servicio de Cirugía. Hay que tomar en cuenta las posibilidades de la seguridad social en un área como la de Cirugía General, en que no hay suficientes especialistas que atiendan la población, máxime que la cantidad de personas que requieren intervención en esa área va en aumento. Por otra parte, el señor Morera Trejos no acompañó con su gestión más datos que la ejecutoria, por lo que las afectaciones a su fuero interno no tienen más sustento que las apreciaciones subjetivas del juzgador, sin que se acredite ninguna relación causal. Consta en el expediente judicial, con motivo del amparo interpuesto, a la persona ejecutante le fue agendada cita de revalorización el 2 de febrero de 2023, a fin de conocer las condiciones actuales del paciente. Véase, el tiempo de espera que soportó don Adrián para recibir atención médica fue alrededor de un mes, contados desde que interpuso el recurso de amparo el 28 de diciembre de 2022 y hasta que fue valorado en la especialidad de Cirugía el 2 de febrero de 2023. Incluso, el plazo es menor si se toma en cuenta que el fallo ejecutoriado se notificó el 12 de enero de 2023. Plazos de suyos razonables desde el punto de vista de la prestación de un servicio no urgente. Téngase presente, a partir de la interposición del amparo el ejecutante nunca fue sometido a una espera prolongada o indefinida. La atención médica la recibió en un plazo más que razonable (inclusive menor a los periodos de atención en la medicina privada). Lo anterior dice de la inexistencia del daño liquidado. Valga acotar, en casos como el de estudio, no cabe duda, la satisfacción del usuario ya se generó, por lo tanto, deviene contrario a derecho otorgar una indemnización adicional a la recibida (valoración médica en derogación singular de la lista de espera). Lo anterior, lejos de causarle una afectación moral al ejecutante, le otorgó un privilegio sobre los demás asegurados, lo cual desmerece el reclamo por daño moral otorgado. Resulta irracional, en las condiciones citadas, imponerle al fondo de contribución tripartito de la seguridad social y, a los demás asegurados beneficiados con dichos fondos, una indemnización adicional a quien ha recibido por tutela judicial la atención médica requerida. Por las razones indicadas, la indemnización concedida no se ajusta a criterios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad (fijados por la propia Sala Constitucional). En mérito de lo expuesto, estima la suscrita, lo procedente es acoger los agravios del recurso relacionados con este extremo y, en consecuencia, anular el fallo impugnado -solo- en cuanto reconoció el monto de ¢300.000,00 por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, para en su lugar, fallando por el fondo, rechazar dicho extremo.
POR TANTO
Por mayoría, se declara sin lugar el recurso, con sus costas a cargo del ente casacionista, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, las cuales se liquidarán en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia. La magistrada Rojas Morales salva el voto para acoger el recurso en virtud de haberse configurado la justicia restaurativa.
Luis Guillermo Rivas Loaiciga Rocío Rojas Morales Damaris Vargas Vásquez Jorge Leiva Poveda Carlos Guillermo Zamora Campos Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador --
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