Promissory sale with pledge: illegitimate possession of sharesContrato de opción de compraventa con garantía prendaria: poseción ilegítima de acciones

**Review of the Document** **Exp. 02-160069-0465-AG** **Res. 002010-F-S1-2020** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at eleven hours ten minutes on the eighteenth of June of two thousand twenty.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone by the ESTATE OF RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, represented by its executor Lidiette Porras González, widow, does not indicate occupation or domicile; against RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, civil engineer, in his personal capacity and as unlimited general proxy of COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, CARLOS SOLÍS RODRÍGUEZ, RODRIGO ALBERTO ARREA GROBLAD, does not indicate occupation. Appearing as special judicial attorneys, for the plaintiff, Álvaro José Meza Lazarus; for the defendant Arrea Escalante, Johnny Jiménez Oconitrillo, single, resident of Limón; and for the defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, Federico José Solís Montero, Eduardo Augusto Cordero Sibaja. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers and residents of San José.

Drafted by Judge Molinari Vílchez

I.In separate lawsuits (filed on June 5, 2002, and July 17, 2006), Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (now his estate) stated that Cocomar Sociedad Anónima is the owner of the farm in the province of Limón, registration number 32236-000, located in the Matina district, Matina canton, whose nature is coconuts and trees, with boundaries north: Urpiano S.A., south: Laguna de Urpiano; east: Laguna de Urpiano and west: artificial canal of Matina, with an area of 95 hectares 4,355 square meters, cadastral map L-0395724-1980. He indicated that during 1992 he was the owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A., and was also its president with the powers of unlimited general proxy from September 17, 1986, until August 24, 1992, when he was removed by a supposed extraordinary assembly. He stated that on March 11, 1992, in a "personal capacity and as owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A.", he agreed with Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante on an option to sell farm 7-32236-000 for the sum of ¢9,000,000.00, to be paid as follows: a) ¢2,175,000.00 with Mr. Arrea Escalante assuming the debt that Cocomar S.A. had with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, guaranteed by a first-degree mortgage on the same property over which he granted that option; b) ¢500,000.00 intended to pay an indemnity to Mrs. Juana Aguilar for improvements due to occupation of a portion of the property; c) ¢1,000,000.00 through the delivery of 10% of the shares of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.; and d) the balance, which would not accrue interest, from the proceeds of 25% of the sales made of parts of the property or from any profit that Cocomar S.A. might produce for any reason. He detailed that the agreement was an offer to sell property 7-32236-000; however, for "practical and fiscal reasons, at the convenience of the buyer," they determined that this transaction could be carried out by purchasing the property – it is understood, through the corresponding deed of sale – or through the transfer of the shares that made up the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., which at that time was ¢100,000.00, represented by 100,000 shares of ¢1.00 each. He noted that this option had no term. Said document, he said, was signed at the Facio y Cañas law firm, where the office of Mr. Arrea Escalante's lawyer, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, was located. He added that, as "has been indicated in several criminal proceedings," at the same time the option was negotiated, Mr. Arrea Escalante lent him, without a term, the sum of ¢100,000.00, which he guaranteed through "the issuance and delivery" of the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A. He maintained that in September 1992, considering that Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in bad faith by including "in the literal wording of the purchase-sale option words and phrases by which his right could be limited and devalued in complete dissonance with the spirit of the purchase-sale option agreement," he notified him that he was rendering the option void, leaving the property "free." He recounted that Mr. Arrea Escalante's reaction was to amend the bylaws of Cocomar S.A. and replace him as the legal representative, taking advantage of the fact that he held the share certificate. He explained that when the option was negotiated, Mr. Arrea Escalante lent him ¢100,000.00, for which he issued and delivered as collateral the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A., which he signed on the back. Mr. Arrea Escalante proceeded to "fill out the blank share certificate in his name," such that he "did not exercise his guarantee right but illegally appropriated the shares of Cocomar S.A.," which he should have auctioned. He continued that on August 24, 1992, Mr. Arrea Escalante "constituted an Extraordinary Assembly (...) without complying with the prior call procedures (for supposedly the entire capital stock being present)" and, among other agreements, removed him (Rigoberto Mohs) as president. He expressed that on September 16, 1992, without respecting the prior call procedures, Mr. Arrea Escalante again constituted an extraordinary shareholders' assembly and authorized the opening of checking accounts in banks of the National Banking System. He referred that on December 21, 1994, Mr. Arrea Escalante appeared at a supposed extraordinary shareholders' assembly, called through publication in the official gazette La Gaceta of December 7, 1994. On that occasion, he describes, it was recorded that Mr. Arrea Escalante exhibited a certificate for 100,000 shares and it was noted that of that certificate, only 90%, equivalent to 90,000 shares, belonged to him, as the remaining 10% – he explained – belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs Villalta). In that assembly, the capital stock was increased by the sum of ¢19,900,000.00, which was supposedly paid by the same shareholder Arrea Escalante as follows: a) ¢15,000,000.00 "capitalizing the accumulated surplus that has been produced by the contributions he has made on different dates, as recorded in the duly legalized accounting books kept by the company"; and b) ¢4,900,000.00 through "a sight draft signed by him [Mr. Arrea Escalante] in favor of the company, duly accepted by the debtor"; whereby the new capital stock was ¢20,000,000.00. Likewise, the fifth clause of the corporate bylaws was amended so that the capital stock would henceforth be represented by 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00 each. He added that curiously, the notary who recorded the minutes, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, who also held the position of secretary, attested that the entire capital stock had attended, which is not true as was stated in that same assembly. The plaintiff emphasized that in the previous assemblies, Mr. Arrea Escalante presented himself as the owner of all the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., but in the one just referred to, namely that of December 21, 1994, he presented himself as holder of 90%. Thus, he acted in a contradictory manner, at times as the owner of the entirety "as a result of them having been given to him as collateral (not as property)," or as the owner of 90% of the shares "by virtue of applying the signed purchase-sale option." He asserted that with this behavior of December 21, 1994, Mr. Arrea Escalante distorted the purchase-sale option they had signed, because (although) in that assembly he warned that he was the owner of 90% of the shares and that 10% belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs), by increasing the capital stock he rendered his right (that of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta) to the "ten percent of the price of the farm that was agreed upon in the purchase-sale option contract" null, since – he specified – the 10% of the shares that corresponded to him was in relation to a capital stock of ¢100,000.00, that is, 10,000 shares of ¢1.00; but from then on, he is the owner of the same 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 but in relation to a total of 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00. He considered that this rendered his right to the price agreed upon in the purchase-sale option of farm 7-32236-000 null, in clear abuse of his right and in overt bad faith. He insisted that the capital increase was not possible by virtue of the proportion of shares of Cocomar S.A. that formed part of the price of the option. He reiterated that in the purchase-sale option contract "which has not been executed," they also determined that the price (part of it) would be paid by allocating 25% of the profits that Cocomar S.A. produced for any reason. Thus, he emphasized that when in that assembly of December 21, "1992" (it is understood to be a material error and refers to 1994, as he had previously indicated) the capital stock was increased, the ¢15,000,000.00 "that were capitalized and that were produced from contributions" turned out to be an accumulated surplus, that is, a profit of Cocomar S.A. for any reason. Hence, he highlighted that 25% of that profit belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs) according to the option. He asserted that it cannot be considered that the sums that Mr. Arrea Escalante "may have spent on the company or on the farm (...) allowed a capital increase in said company because in the option contract (...) it is clear that the price to be paid for the related farm did not have a term nor did it generate interest" and part of it would be paid with 10% of "the shares of the property, which meant in other words that ten percent of the price of the property was reserved for the undersigned, amen (sic), also determining that twenty-five percent of the profits generated by the company from sales of the property would be paid to the undersigned, no matter how much was obtained from the sales and if it exceeded the nine million agreed upon." He reproached that to date (filing of the first lawsuit June 5, 2002; July 17, 2006, the second) he has not received any sum of the ¢9,000,000.00 and the ¢100,000.00 he received was as a loan and not as a down payment on the amount owed for the sale. He stated that from Mr. Arrea Escalante's declarations in the criminal proceedings in which he questioned the actions the latter carried out (he did not specify which proceedings he was referring to) and from the option itself, it is clear that the agreed form of payment "has been totally breached by the defendant, completely affecting the nature and the will that led me to contract with him." He continued that Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the contract that "is still in force and without its effects having been deployed to this date." In the lawsuit filed on July 17, 2006, following the order from the Agrarian Tribunal to integrate the Litis, he pointed out that with his lawsuit in June 2002 he requested the exhibition of the minutes books and shareholders' registry books and the annotation of this lawsuit in these books. He described that on June 6, 2002, the Agrarian Court of Limón issued an order to the secretary of Cocomar S.A., Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, to annotate the lawsuit in the shareholders' registry book. By April 2003, Mr. Solís Rodríguez had not reported to the Court in this regard. He related that it was not until April 23, 2003, that the Office of Legalization of Books of the Tax Administration authorized the shareholders' registry book of Cocomar S.A., because the first one was lost; therefore – he explained – Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez did not present said book and the general assembly book to this proceeding until March 11, 2004. He highlighted that the shareholders' registry book of Cocomar S.A. has the following entries: the first dated April 30, 2003, recording the initial capital stock; the second, also dated April 30, 2003, recording the amendment to the third clause through which the bearer shares were converted into registered shares, indicating that this occurred on September 17, 1986; the third, recording that at the shareholders' assembly of December 21, 1994, the capital was increased as indicated above and that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the owner of 19,990,000 shares; the fourth, dated May 21, 2003, recording the supposed transfer of shares made on May 20, 2001, by Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante to Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad of 9,995,000 shares each; and one unnumbered entry, dated May 25, 2003, which records the annotation ordered by the Agrarian Court of Limón. He emphasized that this transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer – who was the one who recorded all the shareholders' assembly agreements in which Mr. Arrea Escalante abused his right to his detriment – is simulated, as it was done with a view to avoiding the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholders knew "the details of the way in which the actions were carried out through which the breach of the option contract occurred" and that "the share" (it is understood the share certificate) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante as collateral for a loan of ¢100,000.00. He added that this transfer of shares is invalid and ineffective because "it could never have been registered in the shareholders' registry book of the company given that on the date it is recorded as made, May 20, 2001, said book did not exist." He insisted that the book was not replaced until April 23, 2003, and Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, on pages 519 to 521, in a confessional statement, said that the books remained for a long time in the criminal court, an entity that informed him much later that they had been lost, so since the book did not exist, the proportion of the capital stock that he owned was not recorded.

II.Claims of the lawsuit. By virtue of the foregoing, Mr. Mohs Villalta first sued Mr. Arrea Escalante, later integrating the litis by order of the Agrarian Tribunal against Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad. He principally requested that the judgment declare: "a- That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor and appears as the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. without having a legal right to be so given that the share certificate was never transferred to him but was given to him as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, (sic) a loan that had no term. b- That as a possessor and illegitimate holder of the share certificate representing the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., all assignments of shares in property made by Mr. Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendants (sic) Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, and whoever possesses them must return them to the undersigned. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the purchase-sale option contract (sic) dated March 13, 1992, by taking actions that tended to distort the right of the undersigned in (sic) relation to the agreed price, when taking advantage of the fact that he had possession of the share certificate representing the capital stock of the company Cocomar S.A., he increased the capital stock of the same (sic) by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus and through a bill of exchange for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones, (sic) whereby part of the price given in the purchase-sale option (sic) was rendered null when the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colon (sic) in relation to a capital of one hundred thousand shares of one colon (sic) to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colon (sic) in relation to twenty million shares of one colon (sic). d- That likewise, upon increasing the capital stock of the company Cocomar S.A (sic), its sole shareholder, the defendant here Arrea Escalante, did so capitalizing a supposed surplus (sic) of said company without respecting the right to 25 percent of any profit as determined in the breached purchase-sale option contract (sic). e- That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant (sic) Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendant (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Groblant (sic) are null because they are simulated, lack cause, and because they cannot be set up against the undersigned, so all shares must be returned to the undersigned (sic). f- That both costs of this action are to be borne by the defendants." As a first group of subsidiary claims, he requested that it be declared: "a- That Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the purchase-sale option contract (sic) through which he acquired the farm of the Partido de Limón registration number 32236-000 by abusing his right, rendering the right of the undersigned to obtain a fair price null (sic). b- That the option contract for purchase-sale (sic) of the farm subject to litis must be declared terminated due to the serious breach by the defendant Arrea Escalante. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante, in his capacity as unlimited general proxy of the company Cocomar S.A., is obliged to return the property subject to the purchase-sale option contract (sic) to the undersigned (sic). d- That the company Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed in which it also returns the registered ownership of the property subject to litis to the undersigned (sic). e- That the costs are to be borne by the defendant Arrea Escalante (sic)." As second subsidiary claims, he requested that it be decreed: "a- That the contract signed between Arrea Escalante and Rodrigo Mohs Villalta, which is a purchase-sale option (sic) of the farm of the Partido de Limón 32236-000, is null because it was carried out by Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the state of need of the undersigned and because it contains clauses that by themselves determine total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith and contractual cooperation, constituting an abuse of right (sic). b- That the purchase-sale option contract (sic) is null because it (sic) has no term, the term being essential in option contracts, and the term provided by law has expired in the event the parties did not stipulate otherwise. c- That since the purchase-sale option contract (sic) is null, so too is any act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a shareholder in the company Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as a shareholder, including the share transfers made to the co-defendants (sic) Arrea Groblant (sic) and Carlos Solís Rodríguez (sic). d- That since the purchase-sale option contract (sic) is null, the property must return to the undersigned, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the one who signed the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. e- That the costs are to be borne by the defendants (sic)."

III.Answers. Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad answered the lawsuits negatively and raised all the same defenses, namely, prescription, res judicata, lack of right, and "lack of passive standing and the reciprocal (sic) active standing." The company and Mr. Arrea Escalante did so jointly; Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad each individually.

IV.Counterclaims. Likewise, Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Gronblad individually counterclaimed against Mr. Mohs Villalta. They coincided in the facts they alleged. Thus, they maintained that the negotiations that resulted in Mr. Arrea Escalante acquiring 90% of the shares of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A. through a sale by Rigoberto Mohs, then the owner of 100%, were due to an initial contact that Mr. Mohs Villalta had with Mr. Carlos Lara Hine, to whom he offered to sell property 7-32236-000, owned by Cocomar S.A., which was about to be lost in a foreclosure sought by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in an executive mortgage proceeding against the company. They continued that Mr. Lara Hine proposed to Mr. Arrea Escalante that they become partners and acquire the property together, to which the latter agreed. They related that the negotiations between Messrs. Mohs Villalta, Lara Hine, and Arrea Escalante were finalized in the office of Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez; on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta, who appeared accompanied by Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, granted an option to purchase the farm to Mr. Arrea Escalante with the conditions stated in that document, among which – they highlighted – were that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the rights of the option by acquiring the property or by purchasing the shares of the capital stock; that the price was ¢9,000,000.00, payable as follows: 1) ¢2,175,000.00 by taking over payment of a credit operation that Cocomar S.A. had with Banco Nacional, guaranteed by a first-degree mortgage on the property in question, 2) ¢500,000.00 in payment of indemnity claimed by Mrs. Juana Aguilar, squatter, 3) ¢1,000,000.00 by delivering to the optionor-seller 10% of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., and 4) the balance of ¢5,325,000.00, which would not accrue interest, from the proceeds of 25% of the sales of parts or lots of the property or from any profit that Cocomar S.A. might produce in the future; also, that for the exercise of the option rights, an indispensable condition precedent was that Mr. Arrea Escalante regularize the credit situation with Banco Nacional. They described that when they reached the agreement, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez dictated it aloud to his secretary, Jeannette Viales Segura, so that those present would be aware of the content the document would have; she took the draft and later returned with the completed document. Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez proceeded to read it aloud, everyone indicated their agreement, and the offeror, Mr. Mohs Villalta, signed it, without having requested any change or correction. They noted that on this same date when he granted the option (March 11, 1992), Mr. Mohs Villalta requested a loan of ¢100,000.00 from Mr. Arrea Escalante, which the latter granted; upon receiving the money, Mr. Mohs Villalta signed the receipt and stated "those one hundred thousand colones were given as a loan but 'eventually applicable to the sale price of a farm…'" They added that on March 13, 1992, two days after Mr. Mohs Villalta signed the option, another meeting was held with the same participants; there, Mr. Mohs Villalta was made aware that the bylaws would be amended and a new board of directors would be appointed, which would be composed of the members of the "Grupo Cocomar," to which he agreed. They highlighted that Mr. Mohs Villalta recognized this in his statement before the Fourth Criminal Court of San José, document number 3 submitted by Mr. Arrea Escalante with his answer, where he also indicated that since he had signed the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A. in blank, that signature would be used to record the legend of transfer in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante, who in turn would sign as a sign of approval; thus – they said – "the transfer –brevi manu– of the 90% of the shares covered by the transaction timely agreed upon between the parties was made effective." They expressed that Mr. Arrea Escalante fulfilled the condition precedent of the option satisfactorily by paying the overdue installments, default interest, and costs of the mortgage proceeding on April 2, 1992. At that moment, they argued, the option was finalized and became definitively effective. They highlighted that to make that payment to the Bank, Mr. Arrea Escalante reached an understanding with the Bank official, Mr. German Cuevillas, in charge of the branch administration office; an agreement according to which Mr. Arrea Escalante would normalize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. and would pay the future installments or payments until total cancellation; which he also fulfilled, and thus the Bank granted him the deed of mortgage cancellation. They mentioned that Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante obtained the approval of the Banco Nacional official for Mr. Arrea Escalante, without needing a novation of debtor, to take charge of normalizing and bringing current the credit operation of Cocomar S.A. Then, they noted, Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante invited one of their respective sons to participate with them in the purchase of the property, so that Mr. Carlos Lara Hine and his son Carlos Lara Guardia acquired 35% of the shares, and Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and his son Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad another 35%; likewise, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Escalante's son-in-law, Mr. Fernando del Barco Garrón, were invited to participate in the purchase, each with 10%. In this way, they explained, the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acquired was distributed; Mr. Mohs Villalta retained the remaining 10%. They asserted that although Mr. Mohs Villalta did not know the percentage form in which the capital stock was finally distributed, he was aware that the buyers were "a group of friends among ourselves that, to simplify, if necessary, I will continue identifying as the 'Grupo Cocomar' who had agreed to pool our economic resources and our effort, to launch a tourism project on the property." They assured that the group of friends decided that in all the negotiations, operations, and procedures, Mr. Arrea Escalante would continue as the sole shareholder of 90% of the capital stock, with the shares in his name, by virtue of the fact that he was the one who committed to Banco Nacional. Only the counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez narrated that on March 26, 1998, he agreed with Messrs. Carlos Lara Hine and Carlos Lara Guardia to purchase the shares of Cocomar S.A. belonging to them, for the price of ¢9,225,000.00, which he would pay "as soon as Banco Nacional de Costa Rica paid an indemnity to a company of mine named Hacienda Choluteca Limitada, which occurred on January 21, 2000. I made that payment in two installments, one on February 21 and the other on March 26, both in the year two thousand, all as can be seen from the group of documents that I submit with this brief with the answer to the lawsuit marked with the letter A. In this way, and after the capital increase was carried out, adding the ones I had originally purchased, I reached the number of shares of which I am the owner today, being nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand (9,995,000) shares, as recorded in the Shareholders' Registry book itself and the corresponding title which I jointly submit marked with the number I." Only Mr. Arrea Gronblad specified that the transfer of the 9,995,000 shares belonging to him, equivalent to what was originally 45% of the capital stock, although it appears as having been made in his favor by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the truth is that he acquired them from a portion originally purchased by his brother-in-law, Fernando del Barco Garrón, who decided to leave Cocomar S.A., and the rest he acquired from his father, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, through "a swap that I made with him of the Cocomar S.A. shares for others that I had in a company now solely his, called Constructora Agro Dam S.A." They explained that within the group of friends "Grupo Cocomar," share negotiations took place that could not be timely recorded in the corresponding book, as it was in the Criminal Court; an entity that when they finally requested its return told them it had been lost. They mentioned that the current shareholders of Cocomar S.A. have faced economic risk and have strived to keep the farm "safeguarded from squatters and with its boundaries well maintained and identified." They continued that since the expenses and investments required by Cocomar S.A. had to be covered by shareholder contributions, because the company had not produced anything, and since the books and reality reported the amount of ¢15,000,000.00 received by the company in that capacity, at the general shareholders' assembly of December 21, 1994, it was agreed to increase the capital stock to the sum of ¢20,000,000.00, which were paid by capitalizing the aforementioned shareholder contributions, and ¢4,900,000.00 through a bill of exchange signed by shareholder Arrea Escalante in favor of Cocomar S.A., which "in a short time was paid off by the debtor."

They explained, "This operation and capital increase, absolutely legitimate by all means, is very common in the business world and is carried out, among other reasons, when there is a very disproportionate gap between the company's capital and the debt it has to its partners, motivated by contributions those partners have made to cover the cash needs required for its normal operation." Hence –they explained– it is precisely in the accounting records of Cocomar S.A., which has produced nothing, that new partner contributions in the amount of ¢20,669,581.76 are recorded (document II). They detailed that the naive manner in which the meeting of March 13, 1992, was conducted provided the basis for Mr. Mohs Villalta to denounce all the directors of Cocomar S.A. and the prosecutor before the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), which filed charges for the crimes of document forgery, ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud to the detriment of Mr. Mohs Villalta; from that accusation they were dismissed, and subsequently Mr. Mohs Villalta and his wife were convicted for the crimes of slanderous accusation and false testimony (documents 13, 14, and 15 submitted by Mr. Arrea Escalante upon answering the complaint). They emphasized that Mr. Mohs Villalta never paid Mr. Arrea Escalante the money he lent him, "which implicitly means he applied it to the price of the deal." In fact, they stressed, in his confession (within this proceeding), Mr. Mohs Villalta was asked (as number 11) whether he never paid the defendant Arrea Escalante the ¢100,000.00 because he applied it to the price of the deal he had made with him, to which he responded that it was true; thereby he expressly accepted that he closed the negotiation for the sale of shares. They concluded that when Mr. Arrea Escalante acquired 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., these had no economic value, as the company had already lost its sole asset through judicial auction and adjudication by the Banco Nacional; the shares regained value when Mr. Arrea Escalante normalized the situation of default and non-compliance of Cocomar S.A. with the Banco Nacional, and even more so when he paid the squatter (precarista) Juana Aguilar. At that point, the value of the shares was restored, a value that has risen due to inflation, the maintenance and protection of the property, and the country's tourism boom regarding the natural beauty of the land; it was the economic effort and participation of the members of "Grupo Cocomar" that rescued the company.

V.Claims of the counterclaims. The counterclaimants also agreed on the claims, petitioning primarily for the following to be declared in the judgment: "1) That the negotiation that occurred, relative to the transfer of 90% of the shares that at that time comprised the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., between its owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and my predecessor in title, from whom the ones I own today come, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, occurred in a legitimate manner and was therefore translative of ownership of the transferred shares. 2) That the acquisition, made in due course, of the (sic) nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand shares (9,995,000) that today belong [to them] of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. was equally legitimate, real, and for consideration (a título oneroso). 3) That the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at the Extraordinary General Meeting held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the corporate capital to the sum of seven million colones, was also legitimate and binding for all shares. 4) That as of the date on which the counter-defendant Mohs Villalta transferred 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole, main, and fundamental economic backing, having likewise lost, through judicial auction and adjudication already carried out by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the sole property of which (sic) it was the owner, being the farm registered under real folio number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX of the District (Partido) of the Province of Limón. 5) That consequently, from what is noted in the immediately preceding item, any value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. have today or may come to have in the future is or shall be due to the economic and other efforts made by the partners who acquired from the counter-defendant Mohs 90% of the corporate capital of that company (sic), since the latter, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company." As their sole alternative claim, they requested that if the plaintiff's claim were to be upheld, in the sense that the shares of Cocomar S.A. must be returned to him, and with them the ownership of farm 7-32236-000, given that such a return of shares and property would cause the unjust and illegitimate enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) of the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to prevent this, it be declared that Mr. Mohs Villalta must pay them, the counterclaimants, 50% of the value of the farm at the time of effective payment, according to a valuation to be determined by an expert in the enforcement phase.

VI.Mr. Mohs Villalta opposed both counterclaims and raised the defenses of lack of standing (legitimación) both active and passive, and lack of right (falta de derecho).

VII.Rulings of first and second instance. In judgment 12-2013 of 10:42 a.m. on February 25, 2013, the Agrarian Court (Juzgado Agrario) of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone ordered: "(…) the present ordinary lawsuit of RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, (sic) RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, (sic) AND (sic) RODRIGO ARREA GRONBLAT (sic) AND CARLOS SOLIS (sic) RODRÍGUEZ is declared partially with merit (parcialmente con lugar), declaring with respect to this as follows: 1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is a illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) having no legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but was delivered (sic) to him as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan with no term.- (sic) 2) It is declared with merit with respect (sic) to declaring (sic) that as illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) therefore (sic) all transfers of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, and consequently they must return ninety percent of the shares to the current estate (sucesión) of the plaintiff in favor of his executor (albacea).- (sic) 3) That Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE [has] severely breached the purchase option contract dated March 13, 1992, by carrying out actions that tended to distort the right of the undersigned in relation to the agreed price, when, taking advantage of the fact that he was in possession of a share certificate representing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) he increased (sic) its corporate capital (sic) by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus and through a promissory note for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones, thereby part of the price given in the purchase option became (sic) nugatory as the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in (sic) relation to a capital of one hundred thousand shares of one colón, to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in relation to twenty million shares of one colón.-(sic) 4) That likewise, by increasing the corporate capital of the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) its sole partner, the defendant here ARREA ESCALANTE, did so by capitalizing a surplus of said company without respecting the right to twenty-five percent of any profit as established (sic) in the breached purchase option contract.- (sic) 5) That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null and void for being simulated, lacking valid cause, and because they cannot be enforced against the plaintiff's estate, and must therefore (sic) be returned to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) 6) That both costs (costas) of this action are to be borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) .- (sic) Alternatively, it is declared: a) That Mr. Arrea Escalante [has] breached the purchase option contract by abusing his right, rendering the right of the plaintiff's estate to obtain a fair price nugatory, and the part of this petition by which it states that [the] defendant Arrea acquired the farm of the District of Limón registration number 32236-000 is denied.- (sic) b) That the resolution (resolución) of the purchase option contract for the farm subject to this litigation must be declared, as the breach by the defendant Arrea is severe.- (sic) c) It is rejected regarding declaring that Mr. Arrea Escalante is (sic) obligated to return the property subject to the purchase option contract to the plaintiff's estate.- (sic)d) It is also rejected regarding that the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) must execute a public deed by which it returns the registered ownership of the property subject to this litigation to the plaintiff's estate.- (sic) e) No further ruling on costs is made as unnecessary, this extreme having been awarded in the main claim.- (sic) Regarding the second alternative claim: The claims a, b (sic) [and] d of this section are rejected. Claim c) is upheld, which reads: That the purchase option contract being null and void (sic), therefore so is every act by means of which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a shareholder, including the share transfers made (sic) to the co-defendants Arrea Groblant (sic) and Carlos Solís Rodríguez. Regarding the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of right, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing raised by the defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. Regarding the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing, upholding the defense of lack of right, and regarding this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim raised by the co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its extremes, thereby upholding the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right raised by the plaintiff.- (sic) The payment of procedural and personal costs is imposed on the remaining defendants and co-defendants[,] that is, Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic)Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic) The parties are advised of the right they have to appeal this ruling.-". In ruling 25-2013 of 10:14 a.m. on April 4, 2013, the Court rejected the motion for addition and clarification filed by the co-defendant counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez against the judgment. By virtue of the appeal filed by the co-defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, in ruling 608-F-2016 of 11:51 a.m. on June 28, 2016, the Agrarian Tribunal of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José ordered: "The request to bring ad effectum videndi case number zero two- zero zero four- five hundred four-CI is rejected. The two interlocutory motions (incidentes) of new facts (hechos nuevos) raised by Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, and Carlos Solís Rodríguez are rejected. The appealed judgment is partially revoked as follows: a) In point two of the operative part , (sic) only insofar as it orders the return of shares in favor of the executor. b) Points three and four, for not technically being claims but rather facts and justifications for such or for other claims of the complaint. c) Partially point five, only insofar as it declares null due to sham (simulación) the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad. d) What was granted alternatively. In place of what is revoked, the following is ordered: 1) The return of shares granted in point two is ordered in favor of the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. 2) The sale and purchase contract concluded between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the basis of which was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of fixed date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared resolved. The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the celebration of the resolved negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books, to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. The said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven, for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the price of the sale. In all other respects that were the subject of the appeal, it is confirmed." In ruling 675-F-2016 of 4:58 p.m. on July 18, 2016, that Tribunal added: "3) The defense or action raised by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad, and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property (venta de cosa ajena) is rejected as inadmissible. The material error in point five of the judgment is corrected so that after the word \"Rodríguez\" it reads \"the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad\" and not the expression \"his son.\" This extreme is declared final." Thus, what was ultimately ordered in this matter was: "1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) having no legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but was delivered (sic) to him as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan with no term.- (sic) 2) It is declared with merit with respect (sic) to declaring (sic) that as illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) therefore (sic) all transfers of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, and consequently they must return ninety percent of the shares to the current estate of the plaintiff. 5) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 3] That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null and void for lacking valid cause and because they cannot be enforced against the plaintiff's estate, and must therefore (sic) be returned to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 4] The sale and purchase contract concluded between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the basis of which was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of fixed date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared resolved. [Following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 5] The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the celebration of the resolved negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books, to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. The said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven, for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the price of the sale. [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 6] The defense or action raised by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad, and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property is rejected as inadmissible. 6) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 7] That both costs of this action are to be borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic).- (sic) Regarding the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of right, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing raised by the defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. Regarding the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing, upholding the defense of lack of right, and regarding this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim raised by the co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its extremes, thereby upholding the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right raised by the plaintiff.- (sic) The payment of procedural and personal costs is imposed on the remaining defendants and co-defendants[,] that is, Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic)Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic) The parties are advised of the right they have to appeal this ruling.-".

VIII.Dissatisfied, the co-defendants Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad jointly filed an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación). It is advisable to state from the outset that this matter is resolved based on the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil), Law 7130 of August 16, 1989, the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria), Law 6734, and Chapter V, Title VII of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), Law 2 of August 27, 1943, the latter with the wording prior to the reform enacted by Law 9343 of January 25, 2016. This is because, having decreed this Chamber that this matter falls under the competence of the agrarian jurisdiction, it was processed under the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction, Law 6734, in force since March 29, 1982, whose Article 61, regarding the appeal before this Chamber, refers to Chapter V, Title VII of the Labor Code. Although that legal body, at the date this ruling is issued, was reformed by Law 9343, Labor Procedural Reform (in force since July 25, 2017); the fact is that the same Reform Law provided, in Transitory Provision I, that it would apply to proceedings initiated before its entry into force, except for those in which rulings had already been issued, which would maintain the means of challenge (medios de impugnación) of the repealed laws (subsection 3). From this transitory provision, this Chamber infers that by enabling the appellate regime in force at the time of the judgment's issuance, the legislator concomitantly enabled that the ruling on said challenge also be based, both in form and content, on the legal precepts in force on that date. It could not be otherwise, since to resolve the dispute the judges applied the procedural rules in force at that time, meaning the correctness or incorrectness of their decisions could not be examined according to a then-nonexistent regulation. Precisely, canon 452 of the Labor Code, prior to the amendment by Law 9343, established that "Insofar as they do not contradict the text and procedural principles contained in this Title, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código de Procedimientos Civiles) shall be applied suppletorily." In turn, the Civil Procedure Code, Law 9342 of February 3, 2016, in force since October 8, 2018, provided in its Transitory Provision II that against rulings issued at the time of its entry into force, the remedies authorized by the legal provisions in force at the time they were issued would be available. Precisely, the Civil Procedure Code, Law 7130 of 1989, was the one in force at the time the judgments of the Court and the Tribunal were issued in this matter, and it is to these that the cassation appeal under analysis and resolution consequently refers. Therefore, hereinafter, any reference made to the Civil Procedure Code refers to Law 7130 of August 16, 1989, and any reference to the Labor Code refers to Law 2, with its wording prior to Law 9343. Now, by way of introduction, it is advisable to point out the characteristics of the appeal in cassation in agrarian matters as defined by this Chamber. In ruling 213-F-S1-2019 of 2:15 p.m. on March 20, 2019, this Chamber reiterated—as it does now—the criterion expressed in ruling 505-F-SI-2011 of 8:45 a.m. on April 14, 2011, which states: "Appeal in cassation in agrarian matters. Regarding this extreme, this Chamber has ordered: "(…) among the characteristics of the appeal in cassation in agrarian matters is that it must be technically structured. The criticisms of the judgment must be enumerated and organized, and their lack of legality must be substantiated. The appellant has the duty to explain, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons upon which their motion is based. They must systematically combat the legal foundations of the appealed judgment. They are exempted only from expressly indicating the violated legal norms or the type of infraction committed. In relation, see, among many others, judgment number 892 of 9:00 a.m. on November 25, 2005." (Vote 596-f-06 of 2:55 p.m. on August 30, 2006). Therefore, despite the fact that the appeal in agrarian matters is governed by the Labor Code and has been considered a third rogated instance, this does not exempt the appellant from the duty to express clearly and precisely the aspects of the second-instance judgment they are challenging, explaining in every case what the alleged errors consist of." No. 300 of 10:00 a.m. on April 25, 2008. As stated, although the agrarian cassation appeal does not require special formalities, this does not mean it is entirely informal, as the objections to the ruling must be technically structured. Thus, the reasons supporting it must be set out clearly and precisely, and the only thing from which it is exempt is indicating the violated provisions of the legal system or the type of infraction committed" (underlining not in the original). It is thus observed that this is a criterion adopted by this Chamber long ago and has been consistently reproduced in case law. In what concerns this matter, it is noted first that the challenge is extremely extensive; it does not list grievances (agravios) concretely, but rather, following the structure and titles used in the ruling under appeal, proceeds to formulate a series of complaints separated by sections, each with titles. Indeed, the attention of the appellants' attorney is called to the fact that a clear and precise substantiation of an appeal (in any matter) is not constituted by the literal transcription of any of the documents submitted in the instances, as verified in this case. Even more reprehensible is such a textual quotation, without properly highlighting it in some way that allows it to be easily identified, precisely because it causes a delay in the ruling on the challenge. Hence, regarding this exceedingly lengthy segment, this Chamber will simply omit any reference or ruling, as it does not properly constitute cassation grievances. Furthermore, in the sections separated by titles, drafted specifically for this appellate phase, it is observed that in some the appellants do formulate a grievance (for example, some of those they identify as procedural). However, in others, they group various complaints under the same title or constitute simple opinions on the specific case or on the judgment of the Court, without challenging the ruling that is the object of the cassation appeal; or else, they are unclear and imprecise. In this vein, for lack of clarity and precision they would be dismissed according to the criterion repeatedly reiterated by this Chamber, in the sense that these are minimum requirements of the appeal in cassation in agrarian matters. Also, in some of the sections that could or seem to constitute grievances of a substantive nature, the appellants interject, mixing them in, procedural criticisms as well. In these cases, for the identical reason (imprecision), the complaints would meet the same fate (rejection). For the sake of order in the decision of this matter, this Chamber enumerates each of the sections or titles used by the appeal and reorders them according to their nature (procedural or substantive). Subsequently, the decision on each will proceed, taking as a premise in the examination the already expressed requirement of clarity and precision.

Cassation on procedural grounds

IX.Before reviewing the procedural claims made in the appeal, it is essential to note that mandate 559 of the Labor Code (with the wording prior to the reform of said legal body enacted by Law 9343, Labor Procedural Reform), applicable to this proceeding as provided by Article 61 of the Law of Agrarian Jurisdiction, read: "Once the case file is received, the Chamber shall summarily reject the appeal if it has been filed against the provisions of Articles 556 and 557. It shall do the same when the appeal solely requests the correction, reinstatement, or performance of procedural steps (trámites procesales)" (underlining not in the original). Regarding this norm, since ruling 583-F-2004 of 11:35 a.m. on July 14, 2004, this Chamber has indicated that: "(…) Procedural doctrine has indicated that the grounds for cassation for procedural reasons, set forth in Article 594 of the Civil Procedure Code, can occur in the three phases of the proceeding: 1) In the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship, for example, what is regulated by the first subsection, regarding lack of service of process (emplazamiento) or defective notification thereof. 2) Those referring to the abnormal development of that relationship. Such is the case of the second subsection, on the denial of admissible evidence or the failure to summon for some evidentiary diligence during the proceeding. And, 3) Those produced at the time of the decision of the dispute, that is, upon issuing the corresponding judgment; the typical example is incongruence, set forth in the third subsection. The expression 'reinstatement or performance of procedural steps' according to the provision of the labor regulations does not cover all the scenarios in which formal defects or 'in procedendo' defects may arise. The case law of this Court, up to now, has equated the concepts of 'formal defects' with those of 'procedural steps,' despite them being different. It can be stated that there is a genus-to-species relationship, where the latter constitute a species of the former. Errors regarding procedural steps refer to non-compliances originating exclusively during the procedural iter, and can be framed within points 1 and 2 mentioned above. Therefore, the limitation on filing an appeal in cassation for procedural reasons, contained in the article under commentary, is not applicable to all scenarios in which it would be appropriate. It is not contemplated for defects referring to the constitution of procedural acts that are subject to that appeal, according to the provisions of the indicated Article 594 of the Civil Procedural Code. Thus, within this new approach, the ruling issued in the agrarian jurisdiction is reviewable through this avenue when the alleged defect is that of incongruence, (…)" (underlining and bold added). In this line, it has been the criterion of this Chamber that the exclusion of procedural grievances in the appeal in cassation in agrarian matters is limited to those related to "procedural steps" according to the letter of canon 559 of the Labor Code; that is, to those referring to the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship (point 1) and to the normal development of the procedural legal relationship (point 2).

That exclusion or limitation shall not extend to those procedural errors that occur when the judgment is issued (point 3), as happens -for example- with inconsistency (referred to in that same precedent), with amendment to the detriment (analyzed in resolution 1074-F-04 of 11:20 a.m. on December 16, 2004), and the deficiency in the composition of the Litis “due to its impact on the efficacy and effectiveness of the ruling” (resolution 1425-F-SI-2013 of 9:50 a.m. on October 24, 2013). As matters stand, this is the framework governing the analysis and ruling on the procedural claims that follow.

X.First. They indicate that Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the minimum requirements that the final decision in a proceeding must contain. They state that, in the challenged judgment, the Court established that the factual framework of the Trial Court's judgment may, without violating due process, comprise “in a single list, the facts alleged in the complaint and in the counterclaim; it is not required that they be set out separately.” They assert that they may agree with that statement by the Court, but what they cannot accept is that “in the factual framework of the first-instance judgment, which the Court finds correct (sic) to a very high percentage, the outrage was committed of not including, within its factual framework, even the slightest reference to the facts supporting the two counterclaims (…) It simply, radically and absolutely disregarded the factual grounds supporting those two counterclaims,” which—they characterize—is a very serious violation of procedure. They state that the mandate of 155 subsection ch) was infringed “in that, despite being proven in the case file, it did not hold any of the facts of the counterclaims to be proven”; likewise, subsection d) “in that not a single one of the facts of the counterclaims was held to be not proven.” Thus, they conclude, it was ruled “as if no counterclaim had been filed and consequently no claim.” They assert that this was what was opportunely alleged in the appeal (recurso de apelación). Their disagreement “was not because the proven facts were in a single list, but because they do not appear at all, in any list.”

XI.It is observed that in the appeal (recurso de apelación), the now petitioners in cassation (casacionistas) maintained that: “REGARDING THE NOT PROVEN FACTS. (…) this section of the judgment, it is necessary to note, is entirely omitted, since like the section on proven facts, it failed to include a good number that should have been included in that section, and while we do so with greater thoroughness and specification, we point out that here no mention is made of the factual framework of the counterclaim, as if that event had not occurred, which constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of the aforementioned Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (…) as we already stated when referring to the ELEVENTH section, while it is true that clause five of the purchase option at issue refers to an alleged lease agreement being processed over a section of beachfront land, about which nothing was said in the facts of the complaint or in its prayers for relief, which the Trial Court did (sic) for the purpose indicated” (folios 2301 to 2302). On this matter, the Court stated: “3.c. Regarding the not proven facts: (…) It says [the appellant] that this list is omitted and refers to the closing arguments brief, a document that was not considered. 3.d. It adds that there is no factual framework for the counterclaim, alleging this as a violation of Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reiterates the allegations concerning the lease of proven fact 11, arguing that the statement by the plaintiff-counter-defendant Mohs regarding the contract for that zone different from the property in litis was not included.” In this regard, it held: “d. absence of a factual framework for the counterclaim: The aforementioned numeral 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the matter establishes in subsection 3.ch. that the judgment shall contain a specific declaration of the facts the court holds to be proven, with citation of the evidence demonstrating them and the respective folios of the case file. The judgment shall comprise the resolution of all points submitted to debate—Article 54 of the Agrarian Procedural Law—; this implies that when formulating the syllabus of events held to be proven, it is a single list, and it is not admissible to establish one factual framework for the complaint and another for the counterclaim, as alleged by the appellant. In this case, the complaint and the counterclaim have been processed jointly due to the connection of elements they possess and that make it possible to issue a judgment with a single body of proven and unproven facts.”

XII.As the petitioners in cassation (casacionistas) reiterate before this Chamber the disagreement they raised against the Trial Court’s judgment—and therefore object to the Court's reasoning—, it is noted that in the factual framework of a judgment, the adjudicating body shall record those circumstances that, in its view, are drawn from the evidence provided and practiced during the proceeding, which are relevant to the acceptance or rejection of the claims asserted in the complaint and in the counterclaim (counterclaims in the sub lite), as well as the defenses raised in the answers. Similarly, in the section on not proven facts, the adjudicating body shall only include those it deems do not arise from the elements of conviction, but which—in its judgment—deserve to be highlighted because they configure a fundamental basis of the parties' theories and therefore determine or reinforce the denial decreed. Having said this, this Chamber shares, albeit for a different reason, the Court’s rejection of the objection. This is in addition to confirming that the operative part of the Trial Court’s judgment did expressly refer to the counterclaims. Consequently, this ground for cassation is denied.

XIII.Second. They assert that, according to the Court, they did not challenge the way in which the Trial Court resolved the main and subsidiary claims of the complaint. They emphasize that this is false, since in the brief of February 28, 2013, they requested the Trial Court for an addition precisely to explain why it accepted absolutely all the main claims as well as all the first and second subsidiary claims of the plaintiff, an inexplicable phenomenon. They add that this issue was raised before the Court in the document of April 12, 2013 [which is their appeal (recurso de apelación)], at folio 57, to the effect that they requested clarification because all the main claims had been accepted and were supplemented by other subsidiary ones.

XIV.In this regard, the Court held: “the appellants say that the operative part is a product of all the errors of the recitals when referring to the claims of Mohs' complaint against the co-defendants. There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims. However, this Chamber makes the following observation. In this matter, the following were set forth: a main claim, a first subsidiary, and a second subsidiary in Mohs' complaint (folios 141-142 volume I, joinder of litis pages 1064 to 1065 volume III). In the decision under appeal, the claims were treated as if they were a single list of requests, when there is a main one and then two subsidiary ones (sic), with claims that are mutually exclusive between one group and another. This implies that the judge, at the time of resolving the matter on the merits, would assume some claims of only one group, and not all those deemed procedurally appropriate, even when they exclude one another. This procedure is contrary to judgment drafting technique; however, the appellants do not show disagreement with that procedure, so it is not appropriate to decree the nullity of the judgment. At this instance, it will be resolved, in accordance with that grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests from the complaint that are procedurally appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court.”

XV.In the first place, it is noted that, in a technical sense, what the now petitioners in cassation allege does not constitute a grievance, since they merely describe that they filed a request for addition and/or clarification before the Trial Court and detail that they inserted a complaint about this in their appeal (recurso de apelación), for which they transcribed what was said at that time: “We requested clarification, because despite the main claims having been accepted, other subsidiary claims were also accepted, or rather supplemented.” In this way, they only recount what happened in the case file, without specifying a particular complaint against the judgment, beyond the fact that they filed that request for addition; this Chamber cannot supply that lack of argument. Furthermore, it is evident that to deny the objection, the Court indicated as grounds that “There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims” (the same defect this Chamber finds but regarding that phase). The cassation petitioners do not directly contest that assertion; which by itself also required the dismissal of the procedural ground in this venue. Moreover, it is noted that the Court indicated as an additional ground for the denial that, although the Trial Court untechnically accepted main and subsidiary claims, this was not challenged by the party that was then the appellant. The cassation petitioners contest this last assertion; however, they do not directly attack the first one (namely, that there is no specific grievance), which would therefore remain untouched. In any case, besides the fact that the circumstance that Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez indeed filed a request for clarification on this point with the Trial Court (folios 2267 to 2270) is irrelevant, the truth is that the Court itself, upon verifying indeed the Trial Court's technical error, held that “At this instance, it will be resolved, in accordance with that grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests from the complaint that are procedurally appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court.” In this way, despite rejecting the objection for the first ground it indicated, the Court corrected the Trial Court’s error, since it finally revoked—among other aspects—“That granted subsidiarily,” as was outlined in recital VII. Thus, the recrimination would lack interest and would be useless to overturn the judgment. In sum, for the foregoing reasons, it is rejected.

XVI.Third. They detail that in their appeal (recurso de apelación), they appealed the denial of the incident of new facts promoted by Mr. Solís and Mr. Arrea Gronblad. They say the Court corrected it “by supplementing the denial,” understanding that the rejection was because the criminal accusation against the plaintiff herein for the crime of perjury did not reach a final judgment due to the death of Mr. Mohs Villalta, with which the criminal action was extinguished. They disagree, since the fact of the accusation by the Public Prosecutor’s Office against Mr. Mohs Villalta for the crime of perjury occurring in the confession given precisely within this agrarian proceeding is a new fact that must be assessed, in accordance with the rules of sound criticism, such that the content of that confession would have to raise enormous doubt about its “real and effective certainty” and relate this circumstance to the rest of the evidence. They insist, it is a new fact that must be assessed as such.

XVII.The appellant party is not precise in its claim. On the one hand, it seems to refer to an omission by the Trial Court to resolve the incident of new facts (since it alleges the Court corrected it “by supplementing the denial”), but on the other hand, it seems to recriminate the Court's reasons for denying the incident of new facts. Then, that lack of clarity also requires its dismissal. In any case, the confession of all parties will be assessed together with the remaining elements of conviction when hearing the substantive grounds.

Cassation for Substantive Grounds

XVIII.It is convenient, in order to frame and begin the resolution of the multiple allegations included in the cassation appeal (recurso de casación), to reiterate the main claim framework of the complaint that was ultimately accepted by the Court (and by the Trial Court), since it is this last that had to be attacked by the cassation appeal. Against the 4 defendants, Mr. Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Mr. Solís Rodríguez, and Mr. Arrea Gronblad, in essence and as cited supra, the main claims of Mr. Mohs Villalta were that it be declared: 1) Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate because it was given to him as a guarantee; 2) therefore, the share assignments that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Gronblad are null and void, therefore they are not enforceable against him and all shares must be returned to him; 3) Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the purchase option contract of March 11, 1992, because by increasing the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.: 3.1) he distorted Mr. Mohs Villalta's right to the agreed price, rendering it nugatory, since he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ₡1.00 in relation to a capital of 100,000 shares of ₡1.00 to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ₡1.00 in relation to 20,000,000 shares of ₡1.00 colón), and 3.2) he did so by capitalizing an alleged surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit; 4) the share assignments that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Gronblad are null and void, for being simulated and lacking just cause, so they are not enforceable against him and must be returned to him (Mr. Mohs Villalta, now his estate); and 5) the defendants must bear both sets of costs of this proceeding. On those claims, as indicated, the judgments issued by the Trial Court and the Court decreed: 1) Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., since the share certificate was given to him as collateral for a loan (which has no term), it was not transferred to him; 2) (therefore) the assignments of ownership shares made by Mr. Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void; 3) (therefore) they must return 90% of the shares to the plaintiff's estate; 4) the purchase agreement [it is understood it deemed said contract dealt with the real property, as will be seen] entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (whose basis was the purchase option of March 11, 1992) is terminated; 5) the parties must restore the situation to the moment of the terminated transaction, so Mr. Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., as well as the legal books, to the estate of Mr. Mohs Villalta; and this estate must return the sums partially received for the purchase to Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for a total of ₡2,675,000.00, comprising: the amount paid to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operations number 6036 and 6037 for the amount of ₡2,175,000.00 and ₡500,000.00 paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar; 6) the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendant counterclaimants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad must bear the costs of this proceeding; and 7) the complaint against Cocomar S.A. was declared without merit for lack of right, and the losing plaintiff party was exonerated from costs. This is the framework that the appellant party had to attack in its cassation appeal (recurso de casación), and this Chamber will limit itself to this. All other statements inserted by the cassation party but not encompassed by or linked to what was held by the adjudicating bodies on the accepted main claims of Mr. Mohs Villalta will be dismissed as not useful to overturn the judgment, since even though they may attack statements that the Court, or even the Trial Court, may have incorporated into their resolutions, regardless of their correctness or incorrectness, they ultimately do not affect the decision adopted regarding those accepted main claims.

XIX.Regarding the referred framework, among the numerous arguments of the appellants in their appeal, they disagree with the Court in that it shared the Trial Court's estimation that Mr. Arrea Escalante illegitimately appropriated the entirety of the shares of Cocomar S.A. They assert that the option materialized, became definitively effective when Mr. Arrea Escalante fulfilled the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of regularizing the credit situation with the Banco Nacional and paid all overdue installments, default interest, and costs, thereby perfecting the purchase agreement for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., in accordance with the evidence they identify therein. They further disagree with the statement in the judgment that Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, in order to exercise shareholder rights, first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze how he would carry out the previously agreed contract. They emphasize that the acquisition of 90% of the shares by Mr. Arrea Escalante materialized when he managed to normalize the credit situation. They question: what execution of the guarantee? Mr. Rigoberto Mohs himself, they assert, accepted that he did not pay the ₡100,000.00, because he applied them “as earnest money, -eventually applicable- to the price of the transaction.”

XX.To resolve this first ground, it is appropriate to outline the thesis maintained in its considerations by the Court in relation to what it established in the operative part of its judgment. The first thing to note is that the Ad quem endorsed all the proven facts of the Trial Court, with the exception of number 13, which it considered irrelevant to the resolution of this matter and therefore eliminated. It also shared the list of facts not proven. Now, turning to the substantive considerations, it is understood that for that body, on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta signed a purchase option contract for property 7-32236-000, with an “indispensable” condition, which consisted of the arrangement with the Banco Nacional, besides stipulating the possibility that the option would be executed by becoming a partner of Cocomar S.A. or through the conveyance of the real property. In that purchase option contract, it detailed, the transfer of the shares of Cocomar S.A. was not agreed upon. In its view, the possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante was by virtue of the loan of ₡100,000.00 that the latter granted to Mr. Mohs Villalta, who guaranteed it with that share certificate, for which he endorsed it in blank. Likewise, that despite the blank endorsement being as a guarantee, Mr. Arrea Escalante filled it in as a transfer of ownership of the share certificate, when the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of the purchase agreement had not yet been fulfilled, which occurred on April 2, 1992, when Mr. Arrea Escalante reached a payment agreement with the Bank as stated in the receipt on page 229, volume I. It was at that moment that “the conditions agreed therein [“in the purchase option that prepared the contract”] formed the main contract.” In the Court's view, Mr. Arrea Escalante executed an implicit commissory pact in violation of the legal system (and hence he could not participate in the extraordinary meetings). Therefore, it concluded, Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the certificate. It determined that to exercise the shareholder rights, Mr. Arrea Escalante should have exercised the guarantee and then analyzed how he would carry out the agreed purchase. Insofar as Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., it held, his actions as a partner in the meetings and in the transfer of the capital stock become vitiated in accordance with Article 701 of the Commercial Code, which had repercussions on the negotiations with the persons to whom he transferred the shares, Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Escalante, who, with respect to Mr. Mohs Villalta, are not in good faith “since they knew of the vitiated negotiation, according to the evidence outlined and in the answers to the complaint at folios 1136 and 1256 of the respective co-defendants, this being a spontaneous confession by acknowledging knowledge of the dynamics of the entire negotiation, applying Article 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure of supplementary application to the matter, for which reason the provisions of Article 678 of the Commercial Code are in (sic) applicable.” That body determined that in the counterclaim [understood to mean in the counterclaims of each of them] “there is no action directed against Arrea Escalante, for which reason, if those co-defendants wish to bring an action to recover their investment, they must do so in a separate proceeding.” Specifically, regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, it is appropriate to specify that for the Court, Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante agreed on the purchase of property 7-32236-000 (this is drawn from the operative part where it declared “resolved the purchase agreement entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta whose basis was the purchase option of March 11, 1992” and from point a of recital VII precisely titled “legal situation of the property object of the contract”). Now, in recital VII.c titled “On the breach of contract by Arrea Escalante,” the Court pointed out that in the appeal (recurso de apelación), it was recriminated that the breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante was held to be proven when he appropriated all the shares of Cocomar S.A. Regarding this complaint, it held: “(…) As is clearly denoted at the time of executing the purchase option under comment, there was no specific agreement on the transfer of the shares, only that a portion of the capital stock held by Mohs at that time was part of the price. (…) As observed, Mr. Arrea Escalante's holding of the certificates did not arise from the legal transaction herein debated, but from another transaction related to a money loan and its collateral.” This adjudicating body continued: “(…) the certificate representing the capital stock at that time was in his possession due to another agreement, which this Chamber considers was duly weighed by the judgment, without violating numeral 54 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law. Consent, according to Article 1008 of the Civil Code, must be freely and clearly manifested. Expression may be by word, in writing, or by acts from which it can be inferred, the referred norm dictates. It has been repeatedly indicated that the transfer of the shares was not agreed upon in the purchase option; from the way events unfolded, it is inferred that Arrea Escalante chose to become a partner of Cocomar and not that the real property be transferred to his name. The possession of the capital stock of Cocomar in the hands of Arrea Escalante was due to a credit agreement entered into between Mohs and Arrea Escalante: a loan of one hundred thousand colones as explained and substantiated with the pertinent evidence in prior segments. (…) Arrea Escalante, to exercise shareholder rights, first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze how he would carry out the previously agreed contract. Furthermore, by virtue of what is held to be proven in the challenged judgment, the loan had no term” (recital VIII).

XXI.It becomes necessary, then, to analyze first, both the document identified by both parties as the “option,” and the loan, and the link between those two legal transactions. The document of March 11, 1992, visible at folios 212 to 213, reads: “The undersigned, RODRIGO MOHS VILLALTA, elder, married, businessman, resident of Limón, with identification number seven – zero thirty – seven hundred sixty-nine, hereby attests: [.-] 1.- That he is the owner of all the shares that make up the capital stock of the company “COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA”, with legal entity identification number three – one hundred one – forty-three two hundred fifty-seven (3-101-4325). [.-] 2.- That the aforementioned company owns the property registered in the Public Registry, District of Limón, under Real Folio Registration Number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX – ZERO ZERO ZERO, with the nature, situation, size, boundaries, and liens as indicated by the Public Registry. [.-] 3.- That he grants a purchase option in favor of Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, elder, married, civil engineer, resident of San José, with identification number one – two hundred eighty-eight four hundred eighty-seven [,] regarding the real property cited in number 2) immediately above, under the following conditions: [.-] a.- The price of the real property is the sum of nine million colones, which would be paid as follows: two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones by taking charge of paying, under the terms and conditions established in the respective document, a credit operation with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica charged to Cocomar S.A., which is guaranteed by a first-degree mortgage on the property cited above; five hundred thousand colones which would be used to pay the compensation claimed by Mrs. Juana Aguilar, currently an occupier at will [occupante en precario of a] portion of land of the real property [co]vered by this [transac]tion; [one] million colones by deliv[ering] ten p[er c]ent of the shares of the capital stock of COCOMAR S.A. and the resulting remaining balance, which shall not accrue interest of any kind, from the proceeds of twenty-five percent of the sales made of parts of the real property referred to in this document or of any future profit that COCOMAR S.A. may produce, for any reason. . (sic)[.-] 4.- Mr. Arrea Escalante is authorized to exercise the rights granted by this option through the purchase of the shares that make up the capital stock of Cocomar S.A. or through the purchase of the referenced real property, as best suits his interests. [.-] 5.- Both the price and the object of this option include the assignment and transfer in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante or of Cocomar S.A., as the latter directs, of the lease right, in the process of legalization, over a beach section, located in front of the real property indicated above, which has an approximate area of twenty-six hectares and which is pending grant before the Municipality of the Canton of Matina in the name of the undersigned. [.-] 6.- It shall be an indispensable condition for exercising the rights granted by this option that Mr. Arrea timely regularizes the credit situation in favor of the Banco Nacional referred to above, which is in judicial collection proceedings before the Agrarian Court of Limón. [.-] 7.- IN WITNESS of compliance with the foregoing, I sign this document in San José, on the eleventh day of March of nineteen ninety-two” (underlining and bold added; folios 212 in accordance with folios 40 and 41, fact 3 of the complaints (both), accepted verbatim by the 3 defendant subjects). From the literal text of the document just reproduced, as will be explained below, this Chamber draws that the object of that transaction was the shares of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A. (in addition to an alleged “lease” right—which at this point is not relevant—, and not the real property as understood by the A quo and the Ad quem). Although in the third clause, Mr. Mohs Villalta stated that he “grants a purchase option” over the estate, given that he acted in his personal capacity and by the way he stated the price was to be paid in accordance with clause 4, one can only conclude that the transaction had as its object the shares of Cocomar S.A. It is striking that the plaintiff was not clear in his complaint about the capacity in which he signed the document of March 11, 1992 (at one point he referred to having done so in his personal capacity; at another, as the representative of Cocomar S.A., as at folios 129 and 130). However, from the very reading of the instrument, it is understood he did so in his personal capacity, and not as the representative of Cocomar S.A. See, thus, that in the introduction he did not expressly state he was acting as president of that company; furthermore, in the second stipulation he described himself as “owner of the shares that make up the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.”; and in the third stipulation he indicated that Cocomar S.A. “owns the property.” Later, as a matter of principle, Mr. Mohs in his personal capacity was not the one who could sell the land because he was not its owner (and an analysis from the perspective of an agreement or promise regarding the act of a third party is not significant (as it was not alleged as such by any of the parties); nor is one regarding the ownership of the thing or another's property (at least at this stage where the factual basis for which the main claims of the plaintiff party were accepted is being examined). Added to this is that, as of that date, November 11, 1992, the real property had been awarded to the Banco Nacional through a public auction held on December 4, 1991 and approved on January 15, 1992, so it did not belong to Cocomar S.A. either.

(proven fact 5 of the Trial Court endorsed by the Tribunal and not contested, which –furthermore– was known to Mr. Mohs Villalta as president of the company (despite having denied it in the confessional evidence), as well as to Mr. Arrea Escalante (folios 223 to 224 and 183 corresponding to the answer to the complaint)). Consequently, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante's primary interest was to acquire property 7-32236-000 and that such was the initial offer of the negotiation by Mr. Mohs Villalta (both parties denote this from the complaint and the answer), since the property belonged at that time to the Banco Nacional, the only way to satisfy that interest of Mr. Arrea Escalante was to agree with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the acquisition of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to ensure that the adjudicated Bank would desist from the registry inscription of the property in its name, by accepting that Mr. Arrea Escalante would instead regularize the company's debt in its entirety and continue paying it. Likewise, it is observed that Mr. Mohs Villalta established that part of the price (¢1,000,000.00) was to be paid to him by the delivery of 10% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., thus stipulation 3. This particular clause merits a detailed analysis. It must be understood by logic that, in the first place, it was not possible for Mr. Arrea Escalante to pay that part of the price in that manner, if he was not the owner of the shares; how could he transfer ownership of shares that did not belong to him? To elucidate that particular stipulation, one must turn to the rest of the provisions set forth therein. In number 4, it was established that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the "rights of the option" through the acquisition of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., or through the purchase of the property. Now, by that particular way of conceiving the payment of a part of the price (that delivery of 10% of the then shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.), it must be concluded that what was provided for in clause 4 undoubtedly did not actually constitute an alternative obligation at the buyer's choice (much less a facultative one for the seller). That form implied –at least in initial thesis– that Mr. Arrea Escalante necessarily had to be the holder of shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., in order to pay with 10% of them. Therefore, from all the previous considerations, the object of the contract was necessarily the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. and not the property as the Tribunal (and the Trial Court) assessed. Having reached this point, it is worth asking, if a part of the payment was to be made by delivering a portion of the same purchased object, is it not then that the transaction actually concerned a portion of that object and not its entirety? In other words, did it then concern 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. at that time, and not its entirety? The answer is necessarily affirmative, because under no circumstances could the buyer Arrea Escalante obligate himself to partially pay the price by delivering an object of which he was not the holder and which belonged precisely to the seller. But then, why did Mr. Mohs Villalta set down as part of the price payment the delivery of 10% of the shares, if it was he who until then was the owner of the entirety and possessed them? Could Mr. Mohs deliver only 90% of the shares? To answer these questions, it is necessary to note that at that time there existed a single share certificate comprising the entirety of the shares that (at that time) constituted the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. (this is a circumstance referred to by both Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante). In this way, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante's interest was to acquire the corporation since it, until before the public auction (proven fact 5 of the Trial Court adopted by the Tribunal), had been the owner of property 7-32236-000 and that the initial negotiation revolved around that property (it is denoted from the complaint itself folios 129 to 129, and from Arrea Escalante's answer, folios 178 to 180 and 182 to 183), he agreed with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) contained in clause 6, according to which –it is reiterated– it was essential that Mr. Arrea Escalante timely regularize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. with the Banco Nacional, by virtue of which the judicial collection proceeding existed in which the property had been auctioned. With that stipulation, Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante made the effectiveness of the purchase-sale depend –in the terms of articles 681 and 685 of the Civil Code– on the will of a third party, the Banco Nacional (which had been adjudicated the property that previously belonged to that company). As long as that condition was not verified, in principle, Mr. Mohs Villalta was to retain the alienated shares at his own account and risk (canon 685 of the Civil Code). Thus, it is by this condition precedent that it can be understood that Mr. Mohs Villalta did not request the company (which he in turn represented as president and of which he was the sole shareholder) to issue individual shares or one certificate for 90% and another for 10% in order to comply with the delivery of the object of the purchase-sale (the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.), but rather that he kept the single certificate for the entirety of the shares. In sum, as indicated, from the same provisions set forth in the "option" document detailing the conditions of the agreement regarding object and price, it follows that the object of the purchase-sale was 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., but due to the condition precedent, Mr. Mohs Villalta was to maintain –in initial thesis– the sold object in his possession, which was contained within the single share certificate corresponding to the entirety.

XXII.Up to this point, it is thus established that, as the Tribunal indicated, there was an agreement between Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante (it is not questioned in the appeal) but regarding the price not of the property, but of 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., and that subject to a condition precedent, the one contained in stipulation 6. Now, for the appellate body in the case, first, on April 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta granted a purchase-sale option to Mr. Arrea Escalante with a condition precedent, upon the verification of which, on April 2, 1992 –he said– "the conditions agreed upon therein formed the principal contract," that is, the purchase-sale contract (see thus considering XI of the appealed ruling). This Chamber does not agree with that conclusion. In the case at hand, what occurred on that date was not a "purchase option," but a perfected purchase-sale. On numerous occasions, this Chamber has held that the distinction between the figure of the purchase-sale and the figure of the option or promise of sale or purchase-sale, is precisely the full existence of an agreement regarding object and price, for in that case the purchase-sale has been configured in accordance with canon 1049 of the Civil Code. Thus, in judgment 1313-F-S1-2013 of 14 hours 25 minutes of October 1, 2013, it was indicated: "For the purpose of properly addressing the objections under study, the nature of those agreements must be clarified. To that effect, this Chamber has referred to the difference between a sale and any other prior negotiation. In this sense, in judgment number 1015 of 16 hours 30 minutes of December 21, 2006, echoing what was already stated in vote number 80 of 15 hours 30 minutes of November 30, 1993, cited in resolution number 55 of 11 hours of January 28, 2004, it stated: \"V.- Modern doctrine, to refer to preliminary or preparatory contractual types for other contracts, has used the expression pre-contract, defining it as that convention by which two or more persons commit to making effective in the future the conclusion of a contract that, at that moment, they do not wish or cannot enter into definitively. The pre-contract, strictly speaking, is a contract through which an obligation to do arises: the execution of the future contract, which in turn constitutes its object or purpose. Pre-contracts, having as their purpose the realization of another contract, are the unilateral promise of sale and the reciprocal promise of sale …\"VIII.- It is important to clearly establish when one is facing a pre-contract whose object is a purchase-sale contract and when one is facing a purchase-sale proper, it being necessary to bear in mind that both the sale option and the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, being pre-negotial figures, contain the essential elements of the projected negotiation. For this reason, the pre-contract is considered a \"base contract\" in which the characteristics of the definitive contract are projected, such that once the respective offers are accepted, a new declaration of intent is not necessary. In the option –or promise of sale– and in the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, it suffices that, within the term, the acceptance of the offeree operates in the first case, or of either of the two parties in the second, so that, as has been pointed out, the purchase-sale is perfected. It is clear, then, that the difference between the pre-negotial figure and the definitive purchase-sale transaction is the definitive agreement of object and price manifested, precisely, in the acceptance of the offerees. That is, the pre-negotial contractual relationship designs the definitive contract referring to the essential elements of which it is composed, but without there being a definitive agreement on object and price, which occurs with the acceptance of the offers. In the option and in the reciprocal promise of purchase-sale, because their object is the future stipulation of a purchase-sale contract, their effects can never coincide with those of the sale, being unable to derive either the transmission of property or the obligation of the seller to deliver the object or of the buyer to pay the price, because even though in the pre-contract the object and the price are determined, the promisors only obligate themselves to respect the term and to carry out the definitive contract if consent mediates on the price and the object just as it was foreseen. Hence, if from a determined contract it follows that the phase of simple offers –unilateral or reciprocal, as the case may be– has been surpassed because in reality there is nothing pending acceptance, the definitive purchase-sale has been consummated with all its legal effects, independently of its eventual inscription in the Public Registry, for this is not a requirement ad substantiam for its perfectioning, leaving for the execution phase of the contract as an obligation of the seller the granting of the public deed and the delivery of the good.\" (The highlighting is from the original). In the same sense, see judgment of this Chamber number 507 of 9 hours 35 minutes of July 20, 2007. In this order of ideas, canon 1049 of the Civil Code prescribes: "The sale is perfected between the parties from the moment they agree on object and price." Following this line of thought, in judgment number 69 of 9 hours 50 minutes of February 2, 2007, this jurisdictional body indicated: "VII.- Of the purchase-sale contract. The purchase-sale is the definitive agreement of object and price manifested in the acceptance of the offerees. In this sense, that legal transaction does not come into existence as long as a firm agreement on object and price does not mediate, for it only comes to have legal validity when the acceptance of the offers operates. […] In this regard, consult the resolution of this Chamber no. 713 of 16 hours 10 minutes of September 18, 2002." In this same order of ideas, the Tribunal, in considering X of the contested judgment, an aspect that was not questioned by the cassation appellant, pointed out: "X.- The appellant is right in the fourth grievance. Analyzing both documents, it follows that their object was the sale of the six properties described in them, there being an agreement of [sic] object and price from the beginning, the initial price being the sum of $1,125,000 for a term of six months, with an advance of $50,000 to be delivered, leaving a total of $1,075,000 payable at the end of the negotiation. The second document was signed for the sum of $1,077-000 [sic] for a term of three months, with an advance of $36,364. From the breakdown of the previous sums, it is observed that indeed from the initial negotiation the $50,000 given as an advance was deducted to establish the sum of the second contract, which reflects that the intent of the parties was to continue with the initial negotiation to obtain the sale of the properties, varying only as to the term of the contracts and the dates of the money advances, so it is not proper to see such actions as the constitution of two different contracts, but rather, as a contractual unity that had the object of the sale of the properties." Therefore, it is clear that what was agreed between the parties was a sale contract, with its necessary elements: agreement between object and price, for nothing remained pending acceptance. However, as will be set forth below, that agreement was conditioned upon the fulfillment of several conditions. Hence, it is a sale subject to conditions precedent." In the present matter, it is observed that in the document in question, Mr. Mohs Villalta set down granting a "purchase option" to Mr. Arrea Escalante. The object, despite the complex manner in which it was referred to, was finally –as indicated– 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. He also set down the price and the concrete manner in which it would be paid by the latter. From the very literalness of that document, it can be concluded that Mr. Arrea Escalante fully agreed to acquire the said good and the price, with the manner in which it would be paid, and with the condition precedent. That document is, on the contrary, proof of that full agreement, since it denotes there was no element whose definition was deferred; what it sets down is a condition precedent to the effects of that purchase-sale in the terms of canons 678, 681 and 685 of the Civil Code, and because no acceptance period was expressly established for Mr. Arrea Escalante. That detail of the form of payment and that condition precedent are indicators of the intent of both Mr. Mohs who initialed the document, and of Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, who –furthermore– never denied that this had been his intent, quite the opposite. Even if one were to assume it was an option, the acceptance of the Banco Nacional that same day would have to be taken as an indication that Mr. Arrea Escalante accepted the offer during the time elapsed between the act in which Mr. Mohs initialed it and the acceptance of the financial entity. Additionally, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself, in his complaints, insisted that he had reached that agreement with Arrea Escalante, thus he mentioned: "On March 11, 1992, the undersigned, in my personal capacity and as owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A., proceeded to agree with Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE on a SALE OPTION of property of the District of Limón number 32236-000 for the sum of nine million colones which would be paid according to the document signed at the Facio y Cañas Law Firm, where attorney Arrea, Licenciado Carlos Solís, had his office, in the following manner: (…)" (underscoring added, folios 129 and 1051). In the third and fourth facts, he also maintained that on March 11, 1992, in his personal capacity, he agreed with Mr. Arrea Escalante on a sale option of property 7-32236-000, setting down there the price and the form of payment that –he affirmed– they agreed upon, as well as the agreement to the effect that the sale of the property could be carried out, at the buyer's convenience for fiscal reasons, through the transfer of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. (folios 129 to 130). In those same terms (of the existence of an agreement and its detail), Mr. Arrea Escalante accepted that third fact when answering the complaint: "It is true. The terms of that contracting appear with all clarity from the document (…)" (folio 179, the underscoring is added). Specifically, regarding the third and fourth facts of the complaint, he stated that it was in principle a purchase option related to property 7-32236, but in the document it was established, in part 4, that he could exercise the rights of that option through the purchase of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., which he decided upon; it was –he continued– an alternative offer, in which he chose the purchase of the shares, the contract was closed, and he acquired 90% of the shares of the corporate capital (folios 179 to 180). Thus, it is clear that what occurred was not a unilateral promise of sale, but rather that on that March 11, 1992, a perfected agreement of purchase-sale of object and price occurred with a condition precedent, which –furthermore– was verified on that same date. Furthermore, the claimant's attention is drawn to the fact that it is absolutely contradictory that he has as the premise of his primary thesis that in this case what he granted was a sale option over a property, but that he requests that his counterpart's breach be declared, for this makes it appear that there was an agreement and not that a pre-contract occurred.

XXIII.Now, in addition to that purchase-sale agreement for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., subsequently, practically simultaneously, Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante agreed on a loan, in which the latter gave the former the sum of ¢100,000.00 on credit, and Mr. Mohs Villalta, now as debtor, delivered as guarantee the single share certificate, for which he endorsed it in blank (both subjects acknowledge this). This loan is the exclusive reason why the Tribunal understood that Mr. Arrea Escalante had possession of the share certificate and analyzed it completely in isolation from the purchase-sale contract. However, since the object of the purchase-sale was the shares of the company (and not the property), the correlation of this agreement with that of the loan that was guaranteed with that same object, at that same time, cannot be denied. Note that logically, Mr. Mohs Villalta's action on that March 11, 1992, of endorsing in blank as a guarantee for the loan can only be understood in accordance with that first agreement of purchase-sale of the shares and with the condition precedent itself. It is not logical for the members of this Chamber that a debtor endorses a share title in blank if his exclusive intent is to give it as a guarantee (with the requisite displacement). It is not logical that he decides not to set down that circumstance of guarantee. He signed the share certificate for the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. on the back in blank as a guarantee, yes, but with a view to the condition precedent of the purchase-sale carried out being fulfilled, so that Mr. Arrea Escalante would become the owner of 90% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. and he would remain with the remaining 10%. It is from this that it can be understood that in the "purchase option" document Mr. Mohs Villalta stipulated that Mr. Arrea Escalante was to deliver 10% of those shares to him, for despite the agreed purchase-sale with condition precedent of 90% of the shares, which would have determined –in initial thesis– that Mr. Mohs Villalta maintain the object (that 90% of the shares) in his power until such time as that condition was fulfilled (canon 685 of the Civil Code); Mr. Mohs Villalta, seller, would no longer have the single share certificate, for he would immediately thereafter deliver it as a guarantee to that same buyer for this second transaction. Thus, Mr. Mohs Villalta gave as a guarantee the single share certificate, which contained the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that he had sold with a condition precedent. Upon verification of that condition, the purchase-sale would take full effect, and that is why he stipulated the delivery of 10% of the totality of the shares comprised in that title, actually by way of return –as stated– and not as part of the price. In this order of things, although he initially endorsed the title in blank as a guarantee, this –it is insisted– was with a view to the verification of the condition precedent and, therefore, of the effectiveness of the agreed purchase-sale. These conclusions necessarily drawn from the literalness of the "option" document in relation to the loan and the blank endorsement of the share certificate (accepted by both Mr. Mohs and Mr. Arrea), are furthermore reinforced by the document on folio 227, in which Mr. Mohs Villalta indicated: "By this means I hereby certify that I received from Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢100,000.00) as a loan, eventually applicable to the price of the sale of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option. As a payment guarantee I delivered to him a certificate for one hundred thousand shares of one colón each of the company 'COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA'. [.-] San José, March 11, 1992" (the underscoring is added). This document was not disowned by the claimant Mohs Villalta; he did not refer to it in the reply to Mr. Arrea Escalante's answer (nor did he do so in the reply to those made by the co-defendants reconvenors). Likewise, in the notarial certification of the testimonial statements of Mr. Rafael Ángel Mazanares and Mrs. Jeannette Viales Segura, assistant and secretary to Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, given in November 1997 before the Juzgado Primero de Instrucción San José, within the criminal proceeding against the defendant Arrea Escalante, these deponents stated: "At some point, I believe in the month of March 1992, Don Carlos Lara, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Carlos Solís were meeting in the office. Don Rodrigo was happy because the Bank, I do not recall exactly which one, had accepted the settlement proposal, so the deal was effectively going to happen. I remember that it was even decided to do it via the acquisition of the shares (…) Don Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón arrived, with a gentleman whom I later learned was Don Rigoberto Mohs (…) a moment later they met and Don Carlos Solís asked me to dictate to Jeannette, his secretary, the legend of assignment and transfer, on the share of the Compañía Cocomar S.A. that Jeannette had kept in her file, this in the form and style we always used, and so I did. We subsequently entered Don Carlos's office, both Jeannette and I, and I proceeded to read the legend to everyone present, who stated their agreement. Don Rodrigo Arrea proceeded to sign the title as a sign of acceptance and gave it to Jeannette, for her to keep it (…)" (folios 233 to 234, the underscoring is not the original). This corresponds to the testimony of Mr. Manzanares. In a similar sense, Mrs. Jeannette Viales stated: "on March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, the sale option and the share to which this matter refers were signed in Don Carlos's office. Two days later, Don Rigoberto Mohs, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Luis Fernando del Barco, among other gentlemen whose names I do not specify at this moment, appeared at the office, and on that occasion Don Rafael Manzanarez (sic), and myself, entered Don Carlos's office. Rafael read them the legend, and they stated they were in agreement. Then Don Rodrigo signed the assignment (sic), and when he had signed, he told me to keep the share, and Don Rodrigo Mohs also asked me to keep the minute book so that they could draw up the pertinent minutes" (folio 235, the underscoring is added). This certification and its content were not objected to, disowned, or even referred to by the claimant Mohs Villalta; they set down the statement of subjects who witnessed, and moreover, carried out, at the instruction of the interested parties, the insertion of the legend next to the blank signature and perceived the consent of the seller and buyer of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Thus, it is clear that the loan agreement, its particularities, cannot be separated under any circumstances from the purchase-sale contract.

XXIV.From what has been stated at this point, it is absolutely relevant to determine whether the condition precedent of the purchase-sale occurred and if so, on what date, for this would in turn determine the correctness or incorrectness of the Tribunal's conclusion (which confirmed that of the Trial Court) to the effect that Mr. Arrea Escalante "is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., (sic) without having a legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but rather was delivered (sic) to him as a guarantee for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that has no term" (first provision), as well as the direct consequences derived therefrom according to what was principally sought by the claimant (also confirming the Trial Court), namely, that "as an illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate (…) all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, for which reason they must restore ninety percent of the shares to the claimant's succession" (second provision), and that "the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez [and] the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo (sic) Arrea (sic) Gronblat (sic) are null and void for lacking just cause and because they cannot be opposed to the claimant's succession, for which reason they must (sic) be restored to the aforementioned succession" (third provision). For the Tribunal, the condition precedent of the option occurred on April 2, 1992. This Chamber notes that on this aspect, when answering the complaint, Mr. Arrea Escalante related: "(…) On the same date and occasion in which, as said, in Mohs's presence, the purchase option document that he granted me was drafted, he asked me to advance him one hundred thousand colones, but knowing how things really stood, I agreed to give them to him as a loan, but also, eventually applicable to the payment of the price of the deal, in case the contracting finally took place. Against the delivery of that money, Mohs signed the corresponding receipt for me (…) in which it can clearly be read '…eventually applicable to the price of the sale of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option…' He also delivered to me, as a payment guarantee on that same occasion, the sole share certificate of the cited company (…) although in the commented receipt it says that Mohs delivers that certificate to me as a guarantee" (folios 186 to 189). Mr. Arrea Escalante further stated that "this circumstance of endorsement as guarantee was not set down on the back of that document, and Mohs, who of course was also aware that this share title was worth nothing, agreed to sign it in blank, so that if the negotiation with the bank turned out positive and the operation was normalized, I would keep that share certificate in my power, now as co-owner with him, of ninety percent of the shares, and in that way take control of the company (…). That same day, (…) in the company of Don Carlos Lara, I went to negotiate the settlement with bank officials (…) we dealt with the branch manager, whose surname was Cuevillas, who agreed that I would take charge of paying Cocomar S.A.'s account, also paying the default interest, the personal and procedural costs of the mortgage enforcement proceeding, a payment I made on April 2, 1992 (…) With that settlement with the bank and the payment made, I fulfilled the condition precedent contained in the purchase offer, by regularizing the credit (…). In other words, on that date of payment, the negotiation relating to ninety percent of the share capital of Cocomar, which occurred between Mohs Villalta and the undersigned, was concretized and perfected. Subsequently, without being obligated to do so, three more payments were made to Mohs or his wife, on dates July 7, 14, and 27, 1992, upon delivery of the corresponding receipt, in which it clearly reads that they are installments toward the obligation for the sale of shares (…). This demonstrates that Mohs was always aware and under the understanding that what he had sold me (sic) was ninety percent of Cocomar S.A. and that in that sense we were co-partners in the company" (folios 182 to 186). The defendant Arrea Escalante continued in his answer: "(…) on the day that Mr. Lara and the undersigned went to the Banco Nacional (…) Mohs accompanied us, waiting for us outside Mr. Cuevillas's office. For this reason, once the meeting concluded, we informed the claimant of the good disposition of the bank officials, to the effect that I would take charge of continuing to pay Cocomar S.A.'s account (…) we continued making certain inquiries around the cited negotiation, such as the outstanding balance for payment, the de facto situation of the squatter Doña Juana Aguilar, whom I duly paid off (…).

As everything seemed reasonably normal, I again summoned Mohs to a meeting at the office of Licenciado Solís (…) Which took place two days later, that is, on March 13, 1992 (…) I informed the plaintiff formally and in detail of the changes I intended to make to the bylaws, the board of directors, and the administration of the property (…) Also on that occasion we took the opportunity to formalize the share transfer that the plaintiff was to make to me of ninety percent of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. (sic) Since there was only one certificate representing that share capital (…) and given that the purchase option document stated very clearly that what I was acquiring, should the deal go through, would be ninety percent of the shares of Cocomar S.A., Mohs agreed that it be recorded on the back of said document, as was in fact done, that he assigned and transferred to me the entirety of the certificate (…)” (emphasis added, folios 186 to 189). For his part, Mr. Mohs Villalta in his reply omitted to refer to the preceding allegations of Mr. Arrea Escalante in the reply, simply stating that this defendant knew “the problems of the property and that it had been auctioned,” hence the price of the deal and hence why he asked him for the share certificate as loan collateral “knowing that it was worthless at that moment” (folios 410 to 416). Now, in his confessional statement, he was questioned as to whether Mr. Arrea Escalante had regularized the default situation of Cocomar S.A. with the Banco Nacional by making the corresponding payments, to which he responded: if it were true, “I was a close friend of Arturo Cuevillas, General Manager of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and his brother German Cuevillas manager of branches of the bank, prior to negotiating with Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Escalante, the Cuevillas brothers agreed that I should negotiate in the most convenient way for me and not for the Bank as they were not interested in the property and that because of the friendship they had with me since childhood. In the office of Mr. German Cuevillas, the gentleman signed a check for the amount of one million and something colones and brought current an operation that I had or rather Cocomar had with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. I must add that I was the one who saved the property and not them (…) The property was not awarded.” From this statement, first, the contradiction of Mr. Mohs is observed between what he stated in the reply (that Arrea Escalante knew that the property had been auctioned, and therefore that fact was also within his personal knowledge) and what he expressed in the confessional (“The property was not awarded”). Second, it is clear from this that Mr. Mohs Villalta was aware of the acceptance by the Banco Nacional for Mr. Arrea Escalante to regularize the credit operation of Cocomar S.A., he even affirmed that it was thanks to him that Arrea Escalante obtained—to paraphrase his confessional statement—that agreement “by which the property was saved.” Although the exact date on which he became aware of the Bank's acceptance cannot be extracted from that confessional, the truth is that in the notarial certification of the inquiry of Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta of April 1994, before the Juzgado Cuarto de Instrucción de San José (provided by Mr. Arrea Escalante when answering the complaint), he stated: “(…) they summoned me again to the Facio-Cañas law firm, to inform me that (…) therefore I had to assign the shares of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima to him, to appoint a new board of directors, a thing to which I agreed because of the honorability that for me (sic) at that time those persons represented” (emphasis added, folio 220). Mr. Mohs Villalta did not refer in his reply to this meeting of March 13, 1992, pointed out by Mr. Arrea Escalante, nor did he question the validity of that certification, much less its content. Likewise, from the already referenced notarial certification of the testimonial statements of Messrs. Rafael Ángel Manzanares and Jeannette Viales Segura, in November 1997 (before the Juzgado Primero de Instrucción San José, within a criminal case pursued against the defendant Arrea Escalante), it is shown that in effect Mr. Mohs Villalta was aware of the acceptance by the Banco Nacional at least on March 13, 1992, and that he even agreed, it was his will, to assign the share certificate through the introduction of the legend to that effect. From the preceding documents in concordance with the cited confessional statement, this Chamber concludes that the Bank accepted the regularization of the credit of Cocomar S.A. and this occurred on March 11, 1992 itself, whereby the condition precedent of the purchase-sale contract for 90% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. was fulfilled. Likewise, that, in effect, at least by March 13, 1992 (and it is even indicative that since March 11 of that same year, as Arrea Escalante alleged), Mr. Mohs Villalta knew of that acceptance by the Banco Nacional and therefore, of the occurrence of the condition precedent. Otherwise, it is not logical that Mr. Mohs Villalta would have agreed to formalize the assignment of the share certificate, a fact that he himself acknowledged in the criminal venue. It is additionally emphasized that from this evidence, not only is the condition precedent deemed fulfilled on March 11, 1992 itself, but also this Chamber deduces precisely that on March 13, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta accepted the inclusion of the assignment legend on the face of the share certificate of Cocomar S.A., next to the signature he had affixed in blank two days earlier, with the original intention of guaranteeing the loan, but with an eye towards the fulfillment of the condition precedent, of whose occurrence—once again—he was already apprised at that time. Mr. Mohs Villalta thus agreed to transfer the totality of the shares to facilitate the necessary corporate changes. In this way, by the will of both contracting parties, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not have to concretely deliver 90% of the shares and himself materially retain only 10%, because by that same agreement he had the clarity that, despite not having immediate possession, he was indeed the owner of 10% of the then shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., contained in that certificate. This—needless to say—coincides with the supposed part of the payment of the purchase-sale price set forth in the “option” document, which in reality—it is insisted—was not such payment of the price, but the way they devised to ensure that Mr. Mohs Villalta would remain as the owner of 10% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. at that moment (and that if so demanded, it would eventually be delivered to him), since he would immediately endorse the sole share certificate for the entire share capital, first as collateral but with an eye towards ownership in execution of the purchase-sale. See in this sense that the plaintiff did not even allege, much less seek in his complaint a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante had failed to deliver physically or materially the 10% of the shares of the then share capital of Cocomar S.A. On the contrary, from the perspective of his main claims, his thesis starts from the premise that he is the owner of that 10% of the then share capital corresponding to 10,000 shares of one colón (his claim is rather that he is no longer the holder of 10,000 shares relative to a capital of ¢100,000.00, but rather relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00; that is where the first breach he alleged of the purchase-sale contract resides).

XXV.Consequently, in view of what has been stated thus far, Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an unlawful possessor (poseedor ilegítimo) of the share certificate for the entirety of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. as the Tribunal and the Juzgado understood, because the purchase-sale contract with a condition precedent of March 11, 1992, had as its object 90% of the shares of the then share capital of Cocomar S.A., and by virtue of this, even after said condition precedent occurred on that same date, Mr. Mohs Villalta, moreover, on March 13, 1992, completed (indirectly through Messrs. Manzanares and Viales) as an assignment the blank endorsement he had made in guarantee days before, precisely with an eye towards that realization of the condition precedent. In this order of things, it is clear that the appellant is right, and therefore the judgment of the Tribunal must be overturned, as well as that of the Juzgado, since both have as the premise of their operative part that the object of the transaction (of purchase-sale, in the case of the first, of option, in the case of the second) was the property, and that the share certificate of the then capital of Cocomar S.A. was delivered to him only in guarantee, whereby, consequently, they considered that Mr. Arrea Escalante was an unlawful possessor of this.

XXVI.Based on what has been established thus far, in accordance with canon 610 subsection 2) of the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 of 1989, it is imperative to issue a ruling on the claims of the plaintiff, the defenses of the defendants Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A. and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as with respect to the counterclaims. As has been insistently stated, as his main claims, the plaintiff Rigoberto Mohs Villalta sought a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante was an unlawful possessor of the share certificate because it was delivered to him in guarantee (1). As indicated in the preceding considerandos, he has no right in this claim: Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an unlawful possessor of the share certificate of Cocomar S.A. Consequently, his claim for nullity of the share assignments that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad and which are unenforceable against him (2) is also not admissible, because the grounds for that invalidity were identified precisely in the unlawful possession of the share certificate. Nor is the claim that all the shares must be restituted admissible since it also had as its premise the rejected declaration of unlawful possession and the consequent nullity of the assignments. Thus, with respect to these claims, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the defendants with respect to Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad is upheld; with respect to Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is declared ex officio, this being a substantive prerequisite of any claim that must be verified by the adjudicating body.

XXVII.Regarding the claim for a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the “purchase option contract” of March 11, 1992, because by increasing the share capital of Cocomar S.A. he denatured his right to the agreed price, rendering it nugatory, as he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to a capital of 100,000 shares to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to 20,000,000 shares (3.1), this Chamber concludes that he also has no right for the following reasons. First, as stated supra, the agreement did not concern property 7-32236-000 as is the premise of the plaintiff, but rather the object of the negotiation was ultimately 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Second, what occurred was not a “purchase option” as the plaintiff has maintained, but a perfected purchase-sale as already indicated. Third, of overriding relevance, the first breach whose declaration the plaintiff seeks was specified with respect to the portion of the price corresponding to the delivery of 10% of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. on March 11, 1992, which was ¢100,000.00 (an uncontroverted aspect), which was equivalent to 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 out of a capital of ¢100,000.00 (referred to by both contracting parties). His claim therefore has as its premise that he is the owner of 10% (it has also already been said that the plaintiff does not base his complaint on the material or physical non-delivery of 10% of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. on that March 11, 1992, nor in the days thereafter, something which in any case he accepted as deduced from his own behavior already described in relation to the loan contract), but it is directed at the fact that—it is reiterated—his 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 are no longer relative to the share capital of ¢100,000.00, but rather are now relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00, whereby—in his judgment—the agreed price was disrespected by Mr. Arrea Escalante. On this particular, this Chamber observes that there was no express agreement between Mr. Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea to the effect that the share capital of Cocomar S.A. could not be increased, varied, throughout the entire remaining corporate term, nor that if it were, the 10% proportion would be maintained for Mr. Mohs Villalta. This is not evident from the literal wording of the document of March 11, 1992, signed by Mohs; the clause set forth therein reads only: “(…) [o]ne million colones through [deliv]er[y] of ten p[er c]ent of the[ ]shares of the share capital of COCOMAR S.A. (…)”. Nor can it be deduced from any other evidence. An agreement of that type, at least in the sense that the share capital would not be increased once the condition precedent of validity was fulfilled, would necessarily have to be expressly recorded in some medium or proven, since it would imply a limitation on the growth of the company which is to some extent contrary to commercial logic itself. Furthermore, it is clear to this Chamber that from the moment Mr. Arrea Escalante acquired knowledge that the property was auctioned in the mortgage enforcement proceeding brought by the Banco Nacional, his interest changed to becoming a partner of Cocomar S.A. in the event that the credit situation of that company with the Bank could be regularized and that said property returned to its patrimony; hence the agreement they reached for the purchase-sale of its shares subject to that condition precedent. As of March 11, 1992, the property was not in the assets of Cocomar S.A., such that for Mr. Mohs Villalta, personally, maintaining 10% of the shares of the then share capital of Cocomar S.A. in the event that the Bank might accept the regularization of the credit of that same company and would not proceed with the registration of the property that had been awarded to it, was an absolutely advantageous situation compared to the possibility of maintaining 100% of the shares of the company that had already lost ownership of that property, which both he (today his succession) and the co-defendants considered and consider valuable, hence their dispute and the appellant's diversion of arguments towards this. Fourth. The increase of share capital occurred on December 21, 1994 (as reported by the plaintiff and the co-defendants, and as observed in the notarial certifications of folios 1258 to 1259, 1260 to 1261, 1325 to 1326 and 1327 to 1328, which correspond to the share certificates with the assignment legend and the entry in the shareholders' book of Cocomar S.A.). That is, it was carried out 1 year and 9 months after the purchase-sale of shares with a condition precedent and the loan itself were agreed upon (it is true that they were not registered in the relevant registry until May 21, 2003, which was because said book was a replacement for the previous one that was lost by the criminal court authorities within proceeding 94-001943-0204-PE, the cause pursued against the co-defendants here and others, to the detriment of Mohs Villalta, as recorded in the certification of the book itself issued by the Juzgado Agrario (494 to 499) and the notarial certification of the ruling of the Juzgado Penal (folios 1243 to 1244). Therefore, it cannot even be affirmed that the capital increase was made within a period that might indicate an original and concealed intention of Mr. Arrea Escalante to decrease the corporate participation of Mr. Mohs Villalta with the intent of harming him. It is logical that a partner in a position to invest in the legal entity of which he is the owner would do so. In this sense, mandate 30 of the Código de Comercio establishes that share capital may be increased through contribution or by capitalizing reserves and special funds that appear on the balance sheet. It is worth highlighting at this point that the plaintiff (principally) argues that the increase of share capital of December 21, 1994, violated the “purchase option” contract. The validity or invalidity of that shareholders' meeting agreement is a matter outside this proceeding, because regardless of the fact that the plaintiff insistently alluded to defects in that meeting (and in others), the truth is that in his complaints he did not seek—principally or subsidiarily—the nullity of that shareholders' agreement, nor of any other (the plaintiff even expressly acknowledged this in his reply to the exceptions raised by the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, folios 1354 to 1356). In accordance with the claim framework of the complaints, the Litis was joined over the lawful possession of the share certificate, the nullity of the subsequent share assignments, and the breach of the “purchase option” contract, thus the main claims and the first subsidiary petitions; and finally, over the invalidity of that agreement, according to the second subsidiary claims. It goes without saying at this point that this structuring of the main and subsidiary claims is incoherent in the opinion of this Chamber, and the plaintiff's attention is drawn to this, since, however much he may have established subsidiarity, the petitions for contractual breach contained in the main framework and the first subsidiary one have as their premise the existence of a valid agreement. From a logical standpoint, the validity of any contract is a matter for prior examination to that of its breach. In sum, this Chamber does not find that the capital increase of December 21, 1994, determined or constituted a breach of the purchase-sale contract by Mr. Arrea Escalante, whereby the defense of lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante with respect to this claim must also be upheld, and ex officio, the lack of passive standing is declared with respect to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as Cocomar S.A.

XXVIII.The main claim for a declaration (that Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the “option” contract of March 11, 1992, by increasing the share capital of Cocomar S.A., capitalizing a surplus of that company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit (3.2), must also be dismissed for the following reasons. In addition to the first two reasons indicated with respect to the preceding claim that are applicable to this one (namely, that it was a purchase-sale agreement, which concerned 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., and not an option to sell the property, as the plaintiff has maintained), it is clear that the underlying premise in this petition has been that Cocomar S.A. produced a profit over which he had a concrete right, not as a partner, but by the agreement with Mr. Arrea Escalante. However, the plaintiff did not prove this premise. He relied on his mere statement, without presenting suitable evidence on the matter. He only requested the exhibition of the company's accounting books (thus, the respective complaints are read at folios 139 to 140 and 1061: “(…) I request that the exhibition of the accounting books kept by the Company Cocomar S.A. be ordered for the purpose of verifying the supposed surplus that the company had”). This was ordered by the Juzgado in the rulings of March 16 and 30, 2004 (folio 521 and 539 to 540). The defendant produced said books. In the ruling of April 13, 2004, a hearing was granted to the plaintiff regarding them (folio 547), who referred to them and provided a document issued by a certified public accountant hired by him, while at the same time requesting an expert accounting report (folios 565 to 577). On this evidentiary request and on this documentary evidence, which—it is understood—was of a “for better resolution” (mejor resolver) nature (given the stage the proceeding was at that moment), the Juzgado Agrario did not rule; whereby they are deemed denied. Subsequently, on June 22, 2006, when joining Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad to the Litis as ordered by the Tribunal Agrario, the plaintiff did not request said technical evidence nor offer the documentary evidence issued by the accountant hired by him and which he had offered as “for better resolution” (thus folios 1085 to 1087)). In sum, the plaintiff did not timely provide the technical elements of conviction that would conclude that Cocomar S.A. produced a profit that was not distributed, from which it could subsequently be deduced that the purchase-sale agreement in question was disrespected. It is worth noting that the document issued by the accountant provided for better resolution (not admitted), is in any event not conclusive on the existence of an undistributed profit capitalized in the capital increase of December 21, 1994; quite the contrary, the professional indicated he required more information, vouchers, or supporting documents for the entries in order to issue an opinion (folio 577). In the ruling of April 22, 2004, the Juzgado requested that the plaintiff provide a certified copy of the accounting books, since they had to be returned to the defendant for having been so ordered—it is understood—within a criminal proceeding (folio 578). In the record at folio 587, it is consigned that the accounting books were delivered to the special judicial representative of Cocomar S.A.: Diario de Auxiliar, Diario, Mayor, and de Inventarios y Balances. The case file contains the certifications issued by the Juzgado Agrario of the books Mayor (folios 583 to 604), Inventarios y Balances (folios 605 to 642), Diario (folios 643 to 671), and Diario Auxiliar (folios 672 to 677) of Cocomar S.A. Likewise, the notarial certification of the accounting books of Cocomar S.A. provided by the plaintiff is found in the case file (from folios 689 to 772, specifically the Diario (folios 689 to 717), Mayor (folios 718 to 744), Inventarios y Balances (folios 745 to 765) and Registro Auxiliar (folios 766 to 772). From the review of these certifications of the accounting books, this Chamber cannot extract with certainty that Cocomar S.A. had generated a profit; that determination required a technical examination by an expert accountant, which—as recounted—was not timely requested by the plaintiff. Such was the evidentiary burden that, in accordance with canon 317 of the Código Procesal Civil, corresponded to him insofar as he affirmed from this main claim under analysis, that the capital increase of Cocomar S.A. was done by capitalizing a surplus, whereby Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the “purchase option” contract, according to which he would have the right to 25% of any profit as part of the payment of the balance of the price (see also in this sense fact 12 of the complaint, at folios 134 and 1080). Again, it is convenient to highlight at this point that all the remaining allegations of the plaintiff about the accounting and other details of the capital increase in question fall outside the scope of this debate which was defined by his claims, within which—it is repeated—he did not include the nullity of that shareholders' meeting agreement of December 21, 1994, nor of any other earlier or later one. This being the case, with respect to this particular petition, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendant Arrea Escalante is also upheld, and the lack of passive standing of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as Cocomar S.A., is decreed.

XXIX.Finally, regarding the plaintiff's petition that the nullity of the share assignments that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad be decreed because they are simulated and lack just cause, that they are unenforceable against him, and that the shares must be restituted to him (4), it is observed that in his complaint he specified the transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer is simulated because it was intended to evade the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholders knew “the details of the manner in which the actions were carried out by means of which the breach of the option contract occurred” and that “the action” (understood as the share certificate) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante in guarantee for a loan of ¢100,000.00, and not in ownership. He added, that share transfer is invalid and ineffective because “it could never be recorded in the shareholders' book of the company given that on the date it is consigned as carried out, May 20, 2003, the cited book did not exist.” On this point, it is noted that the share certificates and the shareholders' book record that the transfer occurred on May 20, 2001 (notarial certifications of folios 1258 to 1259 and 1325 to 1329 and certifications of the Juzgado and notarial ones of folios 498 to 499, 1260 to 1261 and 1327 to 1328). What the plaintiff claims with respect to both assignments is simulation to impede or avoid the consequences of this proceeding. The date of the assignments (May 20, 2001) is prior to the filing of this proceeding, which was initiated on June 5, 2002. Therefore, the denial of the claim is imperative, because Mr. Arrea could not have anticipated in May 2001 the consequences of a proceeding that at that time had not even been filed. Furthermore, it is clear that if Arrea Escalante's intention had simply been to dissipate the asset (as might seem inferable from the plaintiff's allegation, though he does not expressly state it as such), that is, to dissipate the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., he would logically have made the assignments in a reasonably shorter time and closer to the moment he became the holder of them, either in 1992 or at least after the capital increase in December 1994. However, he made them 6 years after the capital increase; 8 years after the purchase-sale agreement. In any event, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad knew the details of the transactions (purchase-sale and loan) between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (thus it is extracted from their answers to the complaint and their counterclaims), for which reason they could not have been considered third-party acquirers in good faith in the event that the first 2 claims of the complaints and/or the breach of the purchase-sale contract by Arrea Escalante had been upheld, for the purpose of preventing the consequent restitutions of shares petitioned for. What is more, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad did not characterize themselves in this manner in their actions in this proceeding. Lastly, regarding the plaintiff's argument within the facts—not in the claim—of the nullity of the share assignments for not having been recorded in the shareholders' book—it seems immediately at the moment they occurred (May 20, 2001)—the truth is that such assignments were in fact consigned, albeit at a later time, precisely in the referenced entry 4. Now, mandate 140 of the Código de Comercio established that “The company shall consider as a partner whoever is registered as such in the shareholders' registers, if the shares are nominative; and the bearer of these, if they are bearer shares” (wording prior to the reform made through Ley 9068 of September 10, 2012, applicable to this matter). This was not a rule that established recording in the shareholders' register as a requirement for the validity of a transfer, but rather regulated the internal relationship between the partner and the company, configuring a condition of efficacy with respect to the latter. In the same sense, canon 687 ibidem stipulates that in nominative instruments, as shares are, “(…) No act or operation referring to this class of instruments shall have effect against the issuer or against third parties, if it is not recorded on the instrument and in the register.” Again, the legislator did not stipulate a condition of validity, but rather of efficacy now also, particularly, with respect to third parties. Therefore, this claim of nullity due to simulation based on that specific cause of action is also dismissed for lack of right with respect to Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad; in the case of Cocomar S.A. for lack of passive standing.

XXX.Regarding the defenses raised by the defendants. Of the statute of limitations (prescripción). The defendants raised the defense of statute of limitations; they alleged that in accordance with mandate 984 of the Código de Comercio all claims are time-barred because more than 4 years have elapsed since the events supporting them occurred. Likewise, they maintained, the objections to the agreements of the shareholders' meetings are time-barred according to subsection a) of that same precept. They concluded, the claims for “invalidity and effectiveness” of the “option” contract are also time-barred under that canon because it was signed on March 11, 1992, and the complaint was filed on “June 4, 2002”, which would even be the case if the ten-year prescriptive period of article 868 of the Código Civil were applied. It is observed that this challenge is directed against the entire claim framework of the complaint; that is, against the main claims and against the subsidiary claims without having specified any one or some.

The defense regarding the principal claims is resolved immediately; as for the remaining ones, a ruling will be issued further on as they are analyzed. The agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (whose breach is claimed) is—as indicated—a sale and purchase agreement, the nature of which, by virtue of its object, is commercial in accordance with provision 438(c) of the Code of Commerce. The share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Arrea Gronblad (whose nullity is sought) are also commercial. Consequently, the statute of limitations for the principal claims relating to the enforcement of the first contract and the nullity of the latter ones follows the rules of that Code, particularly norms 968 and 984. Having defined this regulatory framework applicable to the sub lite case, it is noted first that in this proceeding, the plaintiff did not assert a claim seeking the annulment of any shareholders' meeting resolution of Cocomar S.A.—despite insistent assertions of defects therein—; that is, this was not the subject of discussion as a principal (or subsidiary) claim. Consequently, the statute of limitations is denied insofar as it is directed against that supposed claim, since it does not exist from the standpoint of the claims upon which the litis was joined. Second, regarding the statute of limitations for the claims seeking a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante's possession of the share certificate is illegitimate because it was delivered to him as collateral, and the consequent nullity of the share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, the impossibility of these being enforced against him, and the restitution of all shares (1 and 2), the following must be highlighted. The first of the lawsuits, filed solely against Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A., was submitted on June 5, 2002 (folio 144), was deemed filed by a resolution at 8:00 a.m. the following day (folio 145), and was served on Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. on the 14th of the same month (folio 158). In it, clearly, given his unawareness of the share transfers from Mr. Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Solís and Rodríguez, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not seek the nullity of those agreements. It is observed that the co-defendants at that time (solely Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A.), when answering the lawsuit and raising exceptions, made no reference to those share transfers. Irrespective of the reason why the then co-defendants made no statement regarding that circumstance, the fact is that said information appeared in the case file starting from the submission of the shareholder register on March 15, 2004 (folios 494 to 499), and it was precisely these transfers that constituted the reason why the Agrarian Tribunal, in resolution 513-F-06 at 3:20 p.m. on May 29, 2006, annulled the judgment issued at 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 2004, by the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone and, on its own motion, ordered the joinder of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad (see folios 1022 to 1025 in conjunction with folios 856 to 885 where the annulled judgment appears). Starting from March 15, 2004 (when the shareholder register was submitted to the Court), the action for nullity of the share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is not time-barred, as that date would be the moment from which the plaintiff became aware of them and was able to enforce his right in accordance with precept 969 of the Code of Commerce. The joinder was submitted on June 22, 2006 (folio 1093), was deemed effected by a resolution at 2:00 p.m. on September 21 of the same year (folio 1098), was served on Mr. Solís Rodríguez on November 30, 2006 (folio 1131), and the first written submission by Mr. Arrea Gronblad was filed on the following December 6 (folio 1134), by which he was deemed served. Thus, the four-year period established by the first paragraph of rule 984 did not elapse, as the computation began on March 15, 2004. Regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, apart from the fact that it was an issue whose ruling on the merits was necessary by virtue of the resolution and subsequent granting of the cassation appeal, it is also deemed that the statute of limitations did not operate, since the possession alleged to be illegal would have had a continuous effect, formally until the date of issuance of the share certificates that Mr. Arrea later transferred to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, but were known to the plaintiff only as of said March 15, 2004 (when the shareholder register was submitted to the Court). Regarding the claim seeking a declaration of Mr. Arrea Escalante's serious breach of the “option” contract (3), note that one of the breaches was supported by Mr. Mohs Villalta in relation to the non-payment of the remaining agreed price (capitalization of a supposed surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit), a balance that, according to what can be read—and the contracting parties affirmed—has no term but is subject to a condition precedent. The co-defendant Arrea Escalante himself—who was the proper passive party regarding this claim (unlike the remaining co-defendants, as indicated supra)—stated when answering: “a form of payment was also established that I have fulfilled as to what I was obligated, and the balance, as I have already said, is subject to a condition precedent, and I will make it once that condition precedent is fulfilled,” that condition being that portions or the entirety of the property are sold or that Cocomar S.A. generates profits (folios 197 to 198). Therefore, since the contract is still in the execution phase, said action is not time-barred. Finally, the statute of limitations did not operate regarding the nullity of share transfers for being simulated and lacking a just cause (4), for the same reasons noted regarding the invalidity of that transaction by virtue of the illegitimate possession (2).

Regarding the Exception of Res Judicata. The co-defendants pointed out that in the criminal proceeding for the crimes of fraud (estafa) and ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), in which the members of the board of directors of Cocomar S.A., among them Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad, were accused by Mr. Mohs Villalta, "the issue" of the nullity of the transfer between the former and Mohs Villalta was raised, which is sought herein; specifically, they said, it was raised in the expansion of the prosecutorial requirement against Arrea Escalante and Solís Rodríguez for the crimes of fraud and ideological falsehood "due to the content given to the transfer and assignment note appearing on the back of said instrument." That criminal proceeding, they affirmed, for the crimes of ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud, concluded with a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) in favor of all the accused. The defense was clearly raised only regarding the principal claim 1), namely, the illegitimate possession of the share certificate (although it would have an impact on 2), concerning the subsequent transfers to Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad), but not in relation to the contractual breaches requested or the nullity of the transfers for simulation (3 and 4)). In the sub lite case, as the cause of action for that claim of illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the plaintiff did not allege the use of a false document, the introduction of false statements into a public or authentic document (ideological falsehood, according to canon 367 of the Penal Code), much less a fraud; so the definitive dismissal in relation to the crimes of forgery of an equivalent document, ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud decreed in the criminal proceeding (folios 274 to 277 and folios 1236 to 1242) did not produce the effect of res judicata. Therefore, the defense is denied.

XXXI.In order, based on what has been set forth to this point, Mr. Mohs Villalta's claim regarding his principal claims is deemed denied. Now, with respect to the first subsidiary claims framework of the complaint, it is reiterated, Mr. Mohs Villalta requested a declaration that: 1) “Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the purchase option contract through which he acquired the property of the Partido de Limón, registration number 32236-000, by abusing his right, rendering the undersigned's right to obtain a fair price nugatory,” 2) the rescission of the purchase option contract for the property due to serious breach by the defendant Arrea Escalante, and that “in his capacity as unrestricted general power of attorney without limit of sum of the company Cocomar S.A., he is obligated to return the property that is the object of the purchase option contract,” and 3) that “Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed in which it also returns the registered title of the property that is the object of this litis to the undersigned.” He has no right to these claims, as what ultimately occurred in the case under consideration was a sale and purchase agreement for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., not an option on the property. As for the abuse of right and the breach of the agreement, in addition to being incorrect regarding the nature and the object, the plaintiff did not specify it concretely as something distinct from what he alleged in relation to the principal claims (see, for instance, fact 11 of the complaint, folios 134 and 1080, where he specifies the abuse of right in the capital increase by which he is the owner of 10,000 shares with respect to a share capital of ₡20,000,000.00 and not ₡100,000.00), so in the same way, as it consists essentially of a reiteration of those, they are denied. Consequently, the lack of right (falta de derecho) is also upheld in relation to Mr. Arrea Escalante regarding the first subsidiary claims 1) and 2), and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is decreed against Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad regarding these claims. In relation to 3), the lack of right is upheld regarding Cocomar S.A. and the lack of standing of the remaining co-defendants. Concerning the defense of the statute of limitations, it is denied with respect to the first subsidiary claims 1) and 2) as they relate to the breach of contract by Mr. Arrea Escalante, just as it was dismissed supra in relation to the principal claims. Regarding 3), no assertion was made by any of the co-defendants, so it is deemed not raised. In any case, it is noted that this request by the plaintiff makes no sense, as it relates directly to the return of the real property 7-32236-000 to his estate, when that property was never under his ownership.

XXXII.Regarding the second subsidiary claims, it has already been indicated supra that there is no logical connection to the principal claims and the first subsidiary claims (in order, essentially, the rescission of the agreement between Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante, then the nullity of that same agreement). Now, disregarding that argumentative problem, it is noted that Mr. Mohs Villalta requested a decree that: 1) the purchase option contract for the property 7-32236-000 is null for “having been executed by Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the undersigned's state of necessity and for containing clauses that in themselves determine a total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith and contractual cooperation, constituting an abuse of right” and because it does not contain a term, which is essential in option contracts “and the term indicated by law in the event the parties do not provide otherwise has expired”; and 2) since the purchase option contract is null, so too is any act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a partner of Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as a shareholder, including the share transfers made to the co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and that the property must “return to the undersigned as Mr. Arrea Escalante is the one who signed the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A.” The co-defendants raised the defense of the statute of limitations specifically against the invalidity claim (1). It is reiterated, they maintained that since the contract was signed on March 11, 1992, and the complaint was filed on “June 4, 2002,” the four-year statute of limitations of precept 984 of the Code of Commerce operated, as well as the ten-year statute of Article 868 of the Civil Code. Indeed, from the time Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed on the sale and purchase of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., on March 11, 1992, to the date of filing the complaint, June 5, 2002 (folio 144), more than 4 years elapsed. Even if one were to assert that the starting point for calculating the statute of limitations is the moment from which Mr. Mohs Villalta became aware of the facts he alleges as the cause of action for that nullity, that would have been September 25, 1992. Note, in fact, that after the condition precedent of the sale and purchase had already occurred (acceptance of the regularization by Banco Nacional, that same March 11, 1992), when he had even formalized the share transfer and had been informed of the changes in the appointment of the board of directors that would be made (on the following 13th), after Mr. Arrea Escalante had already paid Banco Nacional (on April 2, 1992, according to the provisional receipt issued by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, at folio 229, and the statement of Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, at folio 510), and after he had personally received 2 sums of money—and one to his wife—precisely for the purchase of Cocomar S.A. shares (on July 4, 14, and 27, 1992, as observed at folios 230 to 231), Mr. Mohs Villalta sent a note to Mr. Arrea Escalante informing him of the “EXPIRATION of the option.” In that document, it is read that the reason for that supposed “withdrawal of the option” was that: “(...) it has no term or fixed time, and due to the time elapsed—more than six months—and the abrupt changes occurring both in the financial markets and in the real estate market” (folios 214 to 218). However, when filing the complaint, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself detailed: “In the month of September 1992, considering that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acted in bad faith, including in the literal wording of the purchase option words and phrases by which my right could be limited and devalued in complete dissonance with the spirit of the purchase option agreement, the undersigned communicated to Mr. Arrea Escalante that the option was being rendered without effect (…)” (folios 131 and 1077, fact 5 of the complaint). Thus, from his own statement, it is established that from September 25, 1992, he felt aggrieved by the clauses of the document he signed and which has served as evidentiary support for the sale and purchase agreement whose nullity he seeks. In this vein, manifestly, the complaint filed on June 5, 2002, as to this second subsidiary claim 1), is time-barred in accordance with rule 984 of the Code of Commerce, since from the date of the agreement, and even from September 25, 1992, more than 4 years elapsed to the date of filing the complaint, and even more so with respect to its service. Furthermore, it is noted that regarding his request for a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante took advantage of his state of necessity, the plaintiff did not even bother to describe it, much less prove it. He did not specify that alleged state of necessity he claimed, much less which clauses were supposedly included but not agreed upon. Moreover, it is noted that as of September 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta had no possibility whatsoever of withdrawing a supposed offer to sell, since—it is reiterated—what was agreed by him and Mr. Arrea Escalante on March 11, 1992, was the sale and purchase of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. with a condition precedent, which was even verified on that same date. In any case, even if it were considered that what occurred was a promise of sale without a term stipulated by the contracting parties (which it is not, as already stated), in accordance with canon 1055 of the Civil Code, the term for its acceptance would have been one month, and that acceptance would have occurred that same March 11, 1992, a fact known to Mr. Mohs Villalta himself at least by March 13, 1992 (as referred to supra); it being the case, moreover, that a part of the price, namely, the payment of what Cocomar S.A. owed to Banco Nacional, was made on April 2, 1992. Nor did the plaintiff specify in his complaints which of the agreed clauses were contrary, in and of themselves, to the principles of good faith and contractual cooperation. This Chamber could not have supposed it, besides the fact that, as already mentioned, it is deemed that as of March 11, 1992, it was beneficial for Mr. Mohs Villalta to remain as owner of 10% of the then share capital of Cocomar S.A., in the event that Banco Nacional accepted Mr. Arrea Escalante's proposal to regularize that company's credit and did not register the property that had been awarded to it, so that said company would remain the owner of that property. He would not have been correct either in requesting the nullity of the agreement for the non-stipulation of a term. It is repeated, it was not a promise of sale without a term, but a sale and purchase subject to a condition precedent. Even if one started from the premise that it was one, rule 1055 of the Civil Code would have been applicable—as already said—so that this would not have been verified as a defect that would invalidate it. On the other hand, regarding his claim for nullity "since the term indicated by law in the event the parties do not provide otherwise has expired," it is noted, first, that this would not constitute a ground for nullity, but rather refers to the execution phase (expiration of the term and its consequence). Then, this argument does not fit within an annulment claim such as the one under analysis. Second, the reference to an acceptance term (now statutory) for a promise has no application whatsoever when what occurred was a sale and purchase contract subject to a condition precedent, as was determined to have occurred in the sub lite case. It goes without saying that the intricacy of this claim in itself draws this Chamber’s attention, as on the one hand it requests the invalidity of an “option” contract due to the nonexistence of a term, but, immediately thereafter, it requests it for breach of the statutory term provided for cases where no expiration has been stipulated. Likewise, what draws attention, now generally regarding the conduct of Mr. Mohs Villalta, is that once the condition precedent of the sale and purchase was verified on that March 11, 1992, having himself formalized the share transfer on the 13th, being informed on that same date of the appointments to the board of directors to be made, after Mr. Arrea Escalante had paid Banco Nacional on April 2 of the same year, after he received sums of money for the share purchase on July 4, 14, and 27, also of 1992, in addition to the note of September 25 “withdrawing” the supposed option, Mr. Mohs Villalta sold, on October 22, 1992, representing Cocomar S.A., to Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., the property 7-32236-000, for the sum of ₡11,000,000.00 (notarial certifications at folios 89 to 103 and 1245 to 1257). Although that sale and purchase between Cocomar S.A. and Servicentro Los Yoses S.A. was declared null by the Fifth Civil Court of San José (judgment 25-94 of March 24, 1994), it is noted that precisely the ground for nullity was that the contract was executed by “Mr. Rodrigo Mohs Villalta when he no longer held the representation of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima” (operative part, folio 1236); and that even Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., then purchaser and defendant, acquiesced (folio 1251). It is thus clear that Mr. Mohs Villalta has attempted by various non-jurisdictional means to render void the contract for the sale and purchase of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to dispose of the property owned by that company. Indeed, it is noted that the first of the lawsuits was filed after Banco Nacional, on February 4, 1999, had canceled the mortgage on the estate 7-32236-000 of Cocomar S.A., (as observed in the notarial certification of the deed testimony at folios 270 to 273, in conjunction with that of folios 222 to 225, regarding the approval of the public auction). From which it is undeniable that he filed this action after Cocomar S.A. had finished paying the debt it had with that financial institution and the property had been released. Finally, insofar as he seeks the nullity of all acts through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a partner of Cocomar S.A., including the share transfers made to the co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and that the property must be returned to him (2), it is dismissed. This request is based on or premises on the granting of the previous one (the nullity of the “option” contract that was already denied due to the statute of limitations); that is, it is accessory to it, and therefore shares its same fate. In this manner, the defense of the statute of limitations raised by the defendant Arrea Escalante is upheld, and the lack of passive standing of Cocomar S.A. and of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is decreed. In sum, the second subsidiary claims are also declared without merit.

XXXIII.Thus, the complaints filed by Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., and Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad are declared without merit in all their aspects. In accordance with precept 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, personal and procedural costs are imposed on the unsuccessful plaintiff, as this Chamber does not find that a sufficient reason to litigate existed in the terms repeatedly defined by this Chamber (namely, that it does not consist of mere conviction in the thesis one supports, but that the conviction in one’s own thesis must necessarily respond to objective data in the proceedings that allow deducing the soundness of one's claims or defenses, among which the subtlety of the “legal question” has been identified, which, for example, occurs when what is discussed is based on a pure interpretation of legal norms, the factual framework not being controversial (in this sense, see resolutions 1692-F-SI-2012, 1307-F-SI-2014, and 222-F-SI-2019)). Neither is it found that the claims of the successful party, in this case, the exceptions they raised, were disproportionate.

XXXIV.Regarding the Counterclaims. Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad seek a declaration that the negotiation between their owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, their predecessor in interest, relating to the transfer of 90% of the shares that then comprised the share capital of Cocomar S.A., is legitimate and transferred ownership of the shares (1). The exception of lack of active standing raised by the counter-defendant is upheld. It is true that Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad would have an interest in the nullity of the agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante not being declared, since it is as a result of this that Mr. Arrea Escalante became the holder of the Cocomar S.A. shares of which they are now the owners. However, neither of them was a party to such agreement, so they lack standing to request the declaration of validity; Mr. Arrea Escalante had to request it. In any case, that specific request by the counterclaimants would lack current interest due to the manner in which the principal and subsidiary claims of the complaint were resolved, in particular the dismissal of the annulment claim relating to such agreement (second subsidiary 1). On the other hand, the counterclaimants request that it be decreed equally that the acquisitions that each of them (Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad) made of 9,995,000 shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. were legitimate, real, and for valuable consideration (2). In relation to this request, the lack of passive standing raised by the plaintiff/counter-defendant is upheld, as he is in turn a third party with respect to the legal transactions through which Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad became holders of the Cocomar S.A. shares. Moreover, due to the manner in which the complaint was resolved, it would also lack interest, as the invalidity of such transfers sought by the plaintiff was denied. They further seek a declaration that “the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at the Extraordinary General Meeting held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the share capital to the sum of seven million colones, was legitimate and binding on all shares” (3). The request lacks current interest. It is reiterated that the plaintiff, despite constant references to illegalities in that and other shareholders’ meetings, did not seek the invalidity of that meeting held on December 21, 1994, at which the capital of Cocomar S.A. was increased. Insofar as the validity of that meeting was not questioned, it is presumed valid, so this claim leads nowhere. Finally, the counterclaimants requested that it be established that “As of the date on which the counter-defendant Mohs Villalta made the transfer of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole or principal and fundamental economic backing, having likewise lost, by way of judicial public auction and award that Banco Nacional de Costa Rica had already made, the sole real property it owned” (4) and consequently, that “the value that the Cocomar S.A. shares have today or may come to have in the future is or shall be due to the economic and other efforts made by the partners who acquired from the counter-defendant Mohs 90% of the share capital of that company, since he, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company” (5). It is observed that the counterclaimants did not timely provide any technical evidence to demonstrate their statement as was their burden according to rule 317 of the Procedural Code; they did not attach any convincing element comparing the value of the Cocomar S.A. shares before the public auction of the property 7-32236-000, the value after that circumstance, the value they acquired when the Bank accepted the credit regularization, and the various values they have had since then. Even less could the claim be granted as it refers to a future and uncertain event (“the value that the Cocomar S.A. shares (…) may come to have in the future (shall be) due to the economic and other efforts made by the partners who acquired from the counter-defendant Mohs 90% of the share capital”), regarding which it is even unknown whether making projections is technically feasible. Therefore, they have no right to this. As a sole subsidiary claim, the counterclaimants requested that if the plaintiff's claim were granted, requiring that the Cocomar S.A. shares be returned to him, and with them the ownership of the property 7-32236-000, insofar as that return of shares and the property would cause an unjust and illegitimate enrichment of the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to avoid this, the plaintiff must be ordered to pay them 50% of the value of the property at the time of effective payment, according to an appraisal defined by an expert in the execution phase. Insofar as this request is premised on the complaint being granted, since this did not occur, it lacks current interest and must be denied. In sum, the counterclaims filed by Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad against Mr. Mohs Villalta (now his estate) are declared without merit. Both costs are to be borne by the unsuccessful counterclaimants in accordance with rule 55 of the Agrarian Jurisdiction Law, as this Chamber does not find that they had a sufficient reason to litigate.

POR TANTO

The appeal is granted. The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, ruling on the merits, the trial court judgment is likewise revoked. Regarding the complaint by Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations are partially upheld, and the lack of passive and active standing, as well as the lack of interest, are decreed on its own motion. Thus, in relation to the principal claims: “a”, “b”, and “e”, the lack of right raised by Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad is upheld, and regarding Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive standing is upheld on its own motion; and regarding claims “c” and “d”, the lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante is upheld, and the lack of passive standing of the remaining co-defendants is decreed on its own motion. As for the first subsidiary claims, lack of right and lack of passive standing are decreed. Thus, in relation to “a”, “b”, and “c”, the lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante is upheld, and the lack of passive standing of the remaining co-defendants is declared on its own motion; regarding claim “d”, the lack of right regarding Cocomar S.A. is upheld, and the lack of passive standing of the remaining co-defendants is upheld.

As for the second set of subsidiary claims, the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) raised by the co-defendants is upheld with respect to claims "a" and "b", and claims "c" and "d", which are accessory to them, are denied. Thus, the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects, both principal and subsidiary, and personal and procedural costs are imposed on the defeated plaintiff. Regarding the counterclaims of Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad against Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing (falta de legitimación activa y pasiva) and lack of right (falta de derecho) are partially upheld, and the lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is also declared by the court’s own motion. Consequently, in relation to the principal claims: “1)”, the lack of active standing (falta de legitimación activa) raised by the counterclaim-defendant is upheld; “2)”, the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) also raised by the counterclaim-defendant is declared; “3)”, the lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is declared by the court’s own motion; and “4)” and “5)”, the lack of right (falta de derecho) is upheld. As for the subsidiary claims, the lack of current interest (falta de interés actual) is declared by the court’s own motion. The counterclaims are declared without merit in all their aspects, both principal and subsidiary; both costs are the responsibility of the defeated counterclaimants.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez MACUNAQ He asserted that it cannot be considered that the sums that Mr. Arrea Escalante “might have spent on the company or on the farm (…) allowed an increase of capital in said company because in the option contract (…) it is clear that the price to be paid for the related farm had no term and did not generate interest” and part of it would be paid with 10% of “the shares of the property which meant in other words that ten percent of the price of the property was reserved for the undersigned, besides (sic) the fact that it was also determined that twenty-five percent of the profits generated by the company from sales of the property would be paid to the undersigned, regardless of how much (sic) was obtained from the sales and whether it exceeded the nine million agreed upon.” He reproached that, as of the date (filing of the first lawsuit June 5, 2002; July 17, 2006, the second), of the ¢9,000,000.00 he has not received any sum and the ¢100,000.00 he received was as a loan and not as a credit against the amount owed for the sale. He stated that, from the declarations of Mr. Arrea Escalante in the criminal proceedings in which he questioned the actions the former carried out (he did not specify which proceedings he was referring to) and from the option itself, it follows that the agreed-upon form of payment “has been totally breached by the defendant, completely affecting the nature and the will that led me to contract with him.” He continued, Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the contract which “even (sic) is still in force and without its effects having been deployed to this date.” In the lawsuit filed on July 17, 2006, following the order to join the litis by the Agrarian Court, he pointed out that with his lawsuit in June 2002 he requested the exhibition of the minute books and shareholder register and the annotation of this lawsuit in these books. He described that, on June 6, 2002, the Agrarian Court of Limón issued an order to the secretary of Cocomar S.A., Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, to annotate the lawsuit in the shareholder register. By April 2003, Mr. Solís Rodríguez had not indicated anything to the Court in this regard. He related that it was not until April 23, 2003, that the Office of Legalization of Tax Books authorized the shareholder register of Cocomar S.A., by virtue of the fact that the first one was lost; therefore –he explained– Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez presented to this proceeding, only on March 11, 2004, said book and the general assembly book. He highlighted that the shareholder register of Cocomar S.A. has the following entries: the first dated April 30, 2003, where it records the initial share capital; the second, also dated April 30, 2003, where the amendment to the third clause is recorded, by means of which the bearer shares were converted into nominative shares, with the indication that this occurred on September 17, 1986; the third, which records that at the shareholders’ assembly of December 21, 1994, the capital was increased as indicated above and that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the owner of 19,990,000 shares; the fourth, dated May 21, 2003, where the supposed transfer of shares carried out on May 20, 2001, by Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad of 9,995,000 shares to each one was recorded; and an unnumbered entry, dated May 25, 2003, which records the annotation ordered by the Agrarian Court of Limón. He emphasized that this transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer –who was the one who formalized all the shareholders’ assembly agreements in which Mr. Arrea Escalante abused his right to his detriment– is simulated, since it was done with a view to evading the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholder holders knew “the details of the manner in which the actions were carried out through which the breach of the option contract occurred” and that “the share” (the share certificate is understood) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante as security for a loan of ¢100,000.00. He added that this transfer of shares is invalid and ineffective because “it could never be registered in the company’s shareholder register given that on the date it is recorded as having been carried out, May 20, 2001, said book did not exist.” He insisted that the book was not replaced until April 23, 2003, and Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, on folios 519 to 521, in a confessional statement said that the books remained for a long time in the criminal court, an entity that informed him much later that they had been lost, so since the book did not exist, the proportion of the share capital he owned was not recorded.

**II. Claims of the lawsuit**. By virtue of the foregoing, Mr. Mohs Villalta sued firstly Mr. Arrea Escalante, and subsequently joined the litis by order of the Agrarian Court against Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad. **As main claims**, he sought that the judgment declare: “a- That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor and appears as the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. without having the legal right to be so given that the share certificate was never transferred to him but was given to him as security for a loan of one hundred thousand colones , (sic) a loan that had no term. b- That as an illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A., all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendants (sic) Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void and whoever possesses them must return them to the undersigned. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the purchase option contract (sic) dated March 13, 1992, by carrying out actions that tended to denature the right of the undersigned in (sic) relation to the agreed price when, taking advantage of the fact that he had possession of the share certificate representing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A., he increased the share capital of the same (sic) by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus and through a bill of exchange for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones , (sic) with which part of the price given in the purchase option (sic) became (sic) nugatory when the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colon (sic) in relation to a capital of one hundred thousand shares of one colon (sic) to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colon (sic) in relation to twenty million shares of one colon (sic). d- That likewise, when increasing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A (sic), its sole partner, the defendant herein Arrea Escalante, did so by capitalizing a supposed surplus (sic) of said company without respecting the right to 25 percent on any profit as determined in the breached purchase option contract (sic). e- That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant (sic) Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendant (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Groblant (sic) are null and void for being simulated, lacking cause, and because they cannot be asserted against the undersigned, therefore all shares must be returned to the undersigned (sic). f- That both costs of this action are to be borne by the defendants.” As the **first group of subsidiary claims**, he requested that it be declared: “a- That Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the purchase option contract (sic) through which he acquired the farm of the Partido de Limón, registration number 32236-000, by abusing his right, rendering the undersigned’s right to obtain a fair price nugatory (sic). b- That the resolution of the purchase option contract (sic) for the farm subject to litis must be declared, given that the breach by the defendant Arrea Escalante is serious. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact without limit of sum of the company Cocomar S.A., is obligated to return the property subject to the purchase option contract (sic) to the undersigned (sic). d- That the company Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed in which it also returns the registered ownership of the property subject to litis to the undersigned (sic). e- That costs are to be borne by the defendant Arrea Escalante (sic).” As the **second subsidiary claims**, he requested that it be decreed: “a- That the contract entered into between Arrea Escalante and Rodrigo Mohs Villalta, which is a purchase option (sic) for the farm of the Partido de Limón 32236-000, is null and void because it was entered into with Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the state of necessity of the undersigned and because it contains clauses that in themselves determine total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith and contractual cooperation constituting an abuse of right (sic). b- That the purchase option contract (sic) is null and void inasmuch as the same (sic) has no term, the term being essential in option contracts and the term indicated by law having expired in the event that the parties do not provide in this regard. c- That since the purchase option contract (sic) is null and void, so too is every act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as partner in the company Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as shareholder, including the transfers of shares made to the co-defendants (sic) Arrea Groblant (sic) and Carlos Solís Rodríguez (sic). d- That since the purchase option contract (sic) is null and void, the property must return to the undersigned, Mr. Arrea Escalante being the one who entered into the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. e- That costs are to be borne by the defendants (sic).”

**III. Statements of defense**. Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad answered the lawsuits negatively and all raised the same defenses, namely, statute of limitations, res judicata, lack of right, and “lack of passive standing and the reciprocal (sic) active standing.” The company and Mr. Arrea Escalante did so jointly, while Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad each did so individually.

**IV. Counterclaims**. Likewise, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad individually counterclaimed against Mr. Mohs Villalta. They coincided in the facts they alleged. Thus they maintained that the negotiations that resulted in Mr. Arrea Escalante acquiring 90% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. through sale by Rigoberto Mohs, then owner of 100%, were due to an initial contact that Mr. Mohs Villalta had with Mr. Carlos Lara Hine, to whom he offered to sell property 7-32236-000, owned by Cocomar S.A., which was about to be lost in a public auction requested by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in a mortgage enforcement proceeding against the company. They continued, Mr. Lara Hine proposed to Mr. Arrea Escalante to become partners and acquire the property together, to which the latter agreed. They related that the negotiations among Messrs. Mohs Villalta, Lara Hine, and Arrea Escalante materialized at the office of Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez; on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta, who attended accompanied by Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, granted a purchase option for the farm to Mr. Arrea Escalante with the conditions that are recorded in that document, among which –they highlighted– were that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the rights of the option through the acquisition of the property or through the purchase of the shares of the share capital; that the price was ¢9,000,000.00 to be paid as follows: 1) ¢2,175,000.00 by taking charge of paying a credit operation that Cocomar S.A. had with the Banco Nacional, secured by a first-degree mortgage on the property in question, 2) ¢500,000.00 in settlement of compensation claimed by Mrs. Juana Aguilar, a squatter (precarista), 3) ¢1,000,000.00 by delivery to the selling optionor of 10% of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., and 4) the balance of ¢5,325,000.00, which would not bear interest, from the proceeds of 25% of the sales to be made of parts or lots of the property or from any profit that Cocomar S.A. might produce in the future; likewise, that for the exercise of the rights of the option, it was a suspensive condition, indispensable, that Mr. Arrea Escalante regularize the credit situation with the Banco Nacional. They described that when they reached the agreement, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez dictated it to his secretary Jeannette Viales Segura, aloud so that those present would be aware of the content the document would have; she took the draft away and then returned with the prepared document. Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez proceeded to read it aloud, everyone showed their agreement, and the offeror, Mr. Mohs Villalta, signed it, without having requested any change or correction. They noted that on this same date on which he granted the option (March 11, 1992), Mr. Mohs Villalta requested a loan of ¢100,000.00 from Mr. Arrea Escalante, which the latter granted him; Mr. Mohs Villalta, upon receiving the money, signed the receipt and recorded “those one hundred thousand colones were given as a loan but ‘eventually applicable to the price of the sale of a farm…’.” They added that on March 13, 1992, two days after Mr. Mohs Villalta signed the option, another meeting took place with the same participants; there Mr. Mohs Villalta was informed that the bylaws would be amended and a new board of directors would be appointed, which would be comprised of the members of the “Cocomar Group,” and he agreed. They highlighted that Mr. Mohs Villalta acknowledged this in his declaration before the Fourth Examining Court of San José, document number 3 presented by Mr. Arrea Escalante with his statement of defense, where he also indicated that since he had signed the single share certificate of Cocomar S.A. in blank, that signature would be used to record the transfer legend in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante, who in turn would sign as a sign of approval; thus –they said– “the transfer –brevi manu– of 90% of the shares comprising the business duly agreed upon between the parties was made effective.” They expressed that Mr. Arrea Escalante fulfilled the suspensive condition of the option by satisfactorily paying the past-due installments, the default interest, and the costs of the mortgage proceeding on April 2, 1992. At that moment, they argued, the option materialized and became effective with definitive character. They highlighted that to make that payment to the Bank, Mr. Arrea Escalante reached an understanding with the bank official, Mr. German Cuevillas, in charge of the branch administration office; an agreement according to which Mr. Arrea Escalante would normalize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. and pay the future installments or payments until total cancellation; which he also fulfilled and thus the Bank granted him the mortgage release deed. They mentioned that Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante obtained the approval of the Banco Nacional official for Mr. Arrea Escalante, without needing a novation of debtor, to take charge of normalizing and bringing up to date the credit operation of Cocomar S.A. Then, they remarked, Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante invited one of their respective children to participate with them in the purchase of the property, so that Mr. Carlos Lara Hine and his son Carlos Lara Guardia acquired 35% of the shares, and Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and his son Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad another 35%; likewise, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Escalante’s son-in-law, Mr. Fernando del Barco Garrón, were invited to participate in the purchase, each with 10%. In this way, they explained, the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acquired was distributed; Mr. Mohs Villalta retained the remaining 10%. They asserted that although Mr. Mohs Villalta did not know the percentage form in which the share capital was finally distributed, he was aware that the buyers were “a group of friends among us, which, to simplify, if necessary, I will continue to identify as ‘Cocomar Group’ who had agreed to combine our economic resources and our effort to launch a tourism project on the property.” They assured that the group of friends decided that in all the negotiation, operations, and procedures, Mr. Arrea Escalante would continue as the sole partner of 90% of the share capital, with the shares in his name, by virtue of the fact that he was the one who committed to the Banco Nacional. Only the counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez narrated that on March 26, 1998, he agreed with Messrs. Carlos Lara Hine and Carlos Lara Guardia on the purchase of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that belonged to them, for the price of ¢9,225,000.00, which he would pay “as soon as the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica paid compensation to a company of mine called Hacienda Choluteca Limitada, which occurred on January 21, 2000. I made that payment in two installments, one on February 21 and the other on March 26, both of the year two thousand, all as can be seen from the group of documents that I present with this brief with the answer to the lawsuit marked with the letter A. In this way and after the capital increase was carried out, adding those that I had originally purchased, I came to own the amount of which I am the proprietor today, in the number of nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand (9,995,000) shares, as recorded in the Shareholder Registry book itself and the corresponding certificate that I present jointly marked with the number I).” Mr. Arrea Gronblad only clarified that the transfer of the 9,995,000 shares belonging to him, equivalent to what was originally 45% of the share capital (capital social), although it appears to have been made in his favor by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the truth is that he acquired them from a portion originally purchased by his brother-in-law, Fernando del Barco Garrón, who decided to withdraw from Cocomar S.A., and the rest he acquired from his father, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, through “a trade I made with him of the Cocomar S.A. shares for others I held in a company now solely his, called Constructora Agro Dam S.A.” They explained that, within the group of friends “Grupo Cocomar,” share negotiations occurred, which could not be timely recorded in the corresponding book, as it was at the Criminal Court; an entity that finally, when they requested its return, indicated it had been lost. They mentioned that the current partners of Cocomar S.A. have faced economic risk and have strived to keep the property (finca) “safeguarded from squatters (precaristas) and with its boundaries well maintained and identified.” They continued that, as the expenses and investments required by Cocomar S.A. had to be covered by contributions from the partners, since the company had produced nothing and as the books and reality reported the amount of ¢15,000,000.00 received by the company in that capacity, at the general assembly of partners (asamblea general de socios) of December 21, 1994, it was agreed to increase the share capital to the sum of ¢20,000,000.00, which was paid by capitalizing the referred partner contributions, and ¢4,900,000.00 through a bill of exchange signed by partner Arrea Escalante in favor of Cocomar S.A., which “was shortly canceled by the debtor.” They stated, “This operation and capital increase, absolutely legitimate by the way, is very common in the business world and is carried out, among other reasons, when there is a very disproportionate gap between the company's capital and the debt it has with its partners arising from contributions those partners have made to cover cash needs required for its normal operation.” Hence, they explained, it is precisely in the accounting records of Cocomar S.A., which has produced nothing, that new partner contributions for the amount of ¢20,669,581.76 are recognized (document II). They detailed that the naive way in which the meeting of March 13, 1992, was conducted gave basis for Mr. Mohs Villalta to denounce all the directors of Cocomar S.A. and the legal representative before the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), which filed an accusation for the crimes of document falsification (falsificación de documento), ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), use of a false document, and fraud (estafa) to the detriment of Mr. Mohs Villalta; they were dismissed from said accusation and subsequently Mr. Mohs Villalta and his wife were convicted for the crimes of slanderous denunciation (denuncia calumniosa) and false testimony (falso testimonio) (documents 13, 14, and 15 presented by Mr. Arrea Escalante upon answering the lawsuit). They extolled that Mr. Mohs Villalta never paid Mr. Arrea Escalante the money he lent him, “which implicitly means he applied it to the price of the deal.” In fact, they emphasized, in his confession (within this proceeding), Mr. Mohs Villalta was asked (as number 11) if he never paid the defendant Arrea Escalante the ¢100,000.00 because he applied them to the price of the deal he had made with him, to which he answered it was true; thereby expressly accepting that he closed the share sale negotiation. They concluded that when Mr. Arrea Escalante acquired 90% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., these had no economic value, since the company had already lost the only asset (bien patrimonial) through judicial auction (remate judicial) and adjudication (adjudicación) by Banco Nacional; the shares regained value when Mr. Arrea Escalante normalized the situation of default and non-compliance of Cocomar S.A. with Banco Nacional, and even more so when he paid the squatter Juana Aguilar. There, the value of the shares was restored, which has risen due to inflation, the maintenance and protection of the property (inmueble), the country's tourism boom regarding the natural beauty of the land; it has been the economic effort and participation of the members of “Grupo Cocomar” that rescued the company.

**V. Claims of the counterclaims.** The counterclaimants also coincided in their claims, in this way they **petitioned as a principal matter** that it be declared in the judgment: “*1) That the negotiation that occurred, regarding the transfer of 90% of the shares that at that time made up the share capital of Cocomar S.A., between its owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and my transferor, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, from whom those that belong to me today derive, occurred legitimately and therefore was a transfer of ownership of the transferred shares. 2) That the acquisition that they [made] in due course of the (sic) nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand shares (9,995,000) that today belong [to them] of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. was equally legitimate, real, and for valuable consideration. 3) That the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at an Extraordinary General Assembly held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the share capital to the sum of seven million colones, was also legitimate and binding for all the shares. 4) That on the date on which the counter-defendant Mohs Villalta transferred 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole, main, and fundamental economic backing, having equally lost through judicial auction and adjudication that had already been carried out by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the sole property (bien inmueble) of (sic) which it was owner, being the property registered at real estate folio number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX of the Registry of the Province of Limón. 5) That consequently to what is noted in the immediately preceding numeral, any value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. have today or may come to have in the future, is or shall be due to the economic and other efforts made by the partners who acquired 90% of the share capital of that company (sic) from the counter-defendant Mohs, since he, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company*.” As a **sole subsidiary claim**, they requested that if the plaintiff's claim that the shares of Cocomar S.A., and with them the ownership of property 7-32236-000, must be returned to him were upheld, inasmuch as that return of shares and the property would cause an unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) and illegitimate gain for the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to avoid it, it be declared that Mr. Mohs Villalta must pay them, the counterclaimants, 50% of the value of the property at the time of effective payment, according to a fair valuation (justiprecio) defined by an expert in the enforcement phase.

**VI.** Mr. Mohs Villalta opposed both counterclaims and filed the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación pasiva y activa) and lack of right.

**VII. First and second instance resolutions.** In judgment 12-2013 of 10 hours 42 minutes of February 25, 2013, the Agrarian Court (Juzgado Agrario) of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, ordered: “(…) *the present ordinary lawsuit of RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, (sic) RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, (sic) AND (sic) RODRIGO ARREA GRONBLAT (sic) AND CARLOS SOLIS (sic) RODRÍGUEZ is partially granted, declaring regarding this the following: 1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) without having the legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but was given to him (sic) as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that has no term.- (sic) 2) It is granted as to (sic) declare (sic) that as illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) for (sic) which (sic) all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, for which reason they must restore ninety percent of the shares to the estate (sucesión) of the plaintiff in favor of its executor (albacea).- (sic) 3) That Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE [has] seriously breached the option to purchase agreement (contrato de opción de compraventa) dated March 13, 1992, by performing actions that tended to distort the right of the undersigned in relation to the agreed price, when taking advantage of having in possession a share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) he increased (sic) the share capital thereof (sic) by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus (superávit) and through a bill of exchange for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones, thereby rendering part of the price given in the option to purchase (sic) nugatory as the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in (sic) relation to a capital of one hundred thousand shares of one colón, to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in relation to twenty million shares of one colón.- (sic) 4) That likewise upon increasing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) its sole partner, the defendant herein ARREA ESCALANTE, did so by capitalizing a surplus of said company without respecting the right to twenty-five percent of any profits as determined (sic) in the breached option to purchase agreement.- (sic) 5) That the assignments or transfers of shares carried out by co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null for being simulated, lacking just cause (justa causa), and because they cannot be opposed to the estate of the plaintiff, for which reason they must (sic) be restored to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) 6) That both costs (costas) of this action are borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) .- (sic) Subsidiarily, it is declared: a) That Mr. Arrea Escalante [has] breached the option to purchase agreement by abusing his right, rendering the plaintiff estate's right to obtain a fair price nugatory, and the part of this petition stating that [the] defendant Arrea acquired the property of the Registry of Limón registration number 32236-000 is denied.- (sic) b) That the resolution (resolución) of the option to purchase agreement for the property subject to this litigation must be declared, the breach by defendant Arrea being serious.- (sic) c) It is rejected as to declaring that Mr. Arrea Escalante is (sic) obligated to return the property (inmueble) subject to the option to purchase agreement to the estate of the plaintiff.- (sic) d) It is also rejected as to requiring the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) to execute a public deed (escritura pública) in which it returns the registered title of the property subject to this litigation to the estate of the plaintiff.- (sic) e) Any other pronouncement on costs is omitted as unnecessary, this aspect having been granted in the principal claim.- (sic) Regarding the second subsidiary claim: Claims a, b (sic) [and] d of this section are rejected. Claim c) is granted, which reads: That being null the (sic) option to purchase agreement, it is (sic) also so any act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as shareholder, including the transfers of shares made (sic) to co-defendants Arrea Groblant (sic) and Carlos Solís Rodríguez. Regarding the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de personalidad pasiva) of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing defense filed by defendant Arrea Escalante and co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. Regarding the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing, granting the defense of lack of right, and regarding this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim filed by co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its aspects, thereby granting the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right filed by the plaintiff.- (sic) The payment of procedural and personal costs is imposed on the other defendants and co-defendants[,] being Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic) .- (sic) The parties are made aware of the right they have to appeal this ruling.-*” In resolution 25-2013 of 10 hours 14 minutes of April 4, 2013, the Court rejected the request for addition and clarification filed by the co-defendant counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez against the judgment. By virtue of the appeal filed by co-defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, in resolution 608-F-2016 of 11 hours 51 minutes of June 28, 2016, the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, ordered: “*It is rejected to bring ad effectum videndi case number zero two- zero zero zero four- five hundred four-CI. The two incidents of new facts promoted by Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Carlos Solís Rodríguez are rejected.*” The appealed judgment is partially overturned as follows: a) In point two of the operative part , (sic) only insofar as it orders the restitution of the shares in favor of the executor. b) Points three and four because they are not technically claims but rather facts and justifications for such claims or other claims in the lawsuit. c) Partially point five, only insofar as it declares null due to simulation the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad. d) What was granted subsidiarily. In place of what is overturned, it is ordered: 1) The restitution of shares granted in point two is ordered in favor of the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. 2) The sales contract entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, whose basis was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of certain date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared terminated. The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the conclusion of the terminated negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. Said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the sale price. In all other respects that have been the subject of appeal, the judgment is affirmed”. In resolution 675-F-2016 of 16:58 on July 18, 2016, that Court added: “3) The exception or action filed by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property is rejected as inadmissible. The material error in point five of the judgment is corrected so that after the word 'Rodríguez' it reads 'the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad' and not the expression 'his son'. This point is declared final”. In this way, what was finally ordered in this matter was: “1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) without having a legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but rather was given (sic) as guarantee for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that has no term.- (sic) 2) It is declared with merit as to (sic) declaring (sic) that as possessor and illegitimate holder of the share certificate representing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) therefore (sic) all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null, so they must return ninety percent of the shares to the current estate of the plaintiff. 5) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 3] That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null for lacking just cause and because they cannot be opposed to the plaintiff's estate, so they must (sic) be returned to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 4] The sales contract entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, whose basis was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of certain date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared terminated. [Following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 5] The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the conclusion of the terminated negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. Said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the sale price [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 6] The exception or action filed by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property is rejected as inadmissible 6) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 7] That both costs of this action are borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic).- (sic) As for the exceptions of statute of limitations, lack of right, lack of passive standing of the defendants and the reciprocal active standing exception filed by the defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. As for the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the exceptions of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants and the reciprocal active standing exception, upholding the exception of lack of right and as to this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim filed by the co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its aspects, thus upholding the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right filed by the plaintiff.- (sic) The remaining defendants and co-defendants are ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs, that is, Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic) The parties are informed of the right they have to appeal this judgment.-”.

**VIII.** Dissatisfied, the co-defendants Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. and the co-defendants counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad jointly filed a cassation appeal. It is appropriate to indicate from the outset that this matter is resolved based on the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 of August 16, 1989, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734 and Chapter V, Title VII of the Código de Trabajo, Ley 2 of August 27, 1943, the latter with the wording prior to the reform operated by Ley 9343 of January 25, 2016. This is because, having this Chamber decreed that this matter falls under the jurisdiction of the agrarian jurisdiction, it was substantiated with the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734, in force since March 29, 1982, whose precept 61, with respect to the appeal before this Chamber, refers to Chapter V, Title VII of the Código de Trabajo. Although that legal body, at the date this judgment is issued, was reformed by Ley 9343, Reforma Procesal Laboral (in force since July 25, 2017); the truth is that the same reforming Law provided, in Transitory Provision I, that it would apply to proceedings initiated before its effectiveness with the exception of those in which resolutions had been issued, which would maintain the means of challenge of the repealed laws (subsection 3). From this transitory provision, this Chamber infers that by enabling the appellate regime in force at the time the judgment was issued, the legislator concomitantly enabled that the ruling on said challenge is also based, both in form and content, on the legal precepts in force at that date. It could not be otherwise, since to resolve the controversy the judges applied the procedural regulations in force at that time, so the correctness or incorrectness of their decisions could not be examined according to regulations that were non-existent at that time. Precisely, in canon 452 of the Código de Trabajo, prior to the modification by Ley 9343, it was established that “To the extent they do not contradict the text and procedural principles contained in this Title, the provisions of the Código de Procedimientos Civiles shall be applied supplementarily”. In turn, the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 9342 of February 3, 2016, in force since October 8, 2018, provided in its Transitory Provision II that against resolutions that were issued upon its entry into force, the remedies authorized by the legal provisions in force at the time they were issued would be admissible. Precisely, the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 of 1989, was the one in force at the time the judgments of the Court and the Tribunal were issued in this matter, and it is to which the cassation appeal analyzed and resolved refers –consequently-. Consequently, henceforth, any reference made to the Código Procesal Civil is to Ley 7130 of August 16, 1989, as well as to the Código de Trabajo, Ley 2, with its wording prior to Ley 9343. Now, by way of introduction, it is appropriate to point out the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters that this Chamber has defined. In resolution 213-F-S1-2019 of 14:15 on March 20, 2019, this Chamber reiterated -as it does now- the criterion expressed in judgment 505-F-SI-2011 of 8:45 on April 14, 2011, which reads: “Cassation appeal in agrarian matters. Regarding this point, this Chamber has ordered: “(…) among the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is that it must be technically ordered. The objections to the judgment must be enumerated and structured, and their lack of juridicity must be substantiated. The appellant has the duty to explain, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons on which their action is based. They must combat, systematically, the legal foundations of the appealed judgment. They are only exempt from expressly indicating the violated legal norms, or the type of infringement committed. In relation, see, among many others, judgment number 892 of 9:00 on November 25, 2005.” (Voto 596-f-06 of 14:55 on August 30, 2006). Therefore, despite the fact that the appeal in agrarian matters is governed by the Código de Trabajo, and has been considered as a rogated third instance, this does not exempt the appellant party from the duty to express clearly and precisely the aspects of the second instance judgment that it challenges, explaining in any case what the alleged errors consist of”. No. 300 of 10:00 on April 25, 2008. According to what has been stated, although no special formalities are required in the agrarian cassation appeal, it does not mean it is completely informal, since the objections to the judgment must be structured technically. Thus, the reasons that support it must be set out clearly and precisely, and the only thing from which it is exempt is indicating the provisions of the legal system violated or the type of infringement committed” (the underlining is not from the original). It is thus observed that this is a criterion adopted by this Chamber long ago and that has been constantly reproduced in the jurisprudence. With respect to what is relevant to this matter, it is noted first of all that the challenge is extremely extensive, does not enumerate grievances in a concrete manner, but rather, following the structure and the titles used in the judgment it appeals, proceeds to formulate a series of complaints that it separates into sections each with titles. In fact, attention is already called to the appellants' lawyer, in the sense that the literal transcription of some of the documents presented in the instances does not constitute clear and precise substantiation of an appeal (in any subject matter), as is verified in this case. Even more reprehensible is a textual quote of that type, without properly highlighting it in any way that allows it to be easily identified, precisely because it causes a delay in the ruling on the challenge. Hence, regarding this extremely extensive segment, this Chamber will simply omit reference and ruling because it does not properly constitute cassation grievances. On the other hand, already in the sections separated by titles, drafted indeed for this appellate phase, it is observed that in some the appellants do formulate a grievance (for example, some of those they identify as procedural). However, in others, they group under the same title various claims or they become simple opinions on the specific case or on the Court's judgment, without challenging the resolution subject to the cassation appeal; or they are unclear and imprecise. In that vein, due to lack of clarity and precision, they would be dismissed according to the criterion so many times reiterated by this Chamber, in the sense that such are minimum requirements of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters. Also, in some of the sections that could or seem to constitute grievances of a substantive nature, the appellants insert, mixing in, procedural criticisms as well. In these cases, for the same reason (imprecision), the claims would suffer the same fate (rejection). For the purpose of order in the decision of this matter, this Chamber lists each of the sections or titles used by the appeal and reorders them according to their nature (procedural or substantive). Next, the decision on each will proceed, having as a premise in the examination the already expressed requirement of clarity and precision.

**Cassation on procedural grounds** **IX.** Prior to outlining the procedural claims formulated in the appeal, it is essential to warn that mandate 559 of the Código de Trabajo (with the wording prior to the reform to said legal body operated by Ley 9343 Reforma Procesal Laboral) applicable to this process as provided by precept 61 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, stated: “Once the case file is received, the Chamber shall flatly reject the appeal if it has been filed against the provisions of articles 556 and 557. It shall do the same when the appeal solely requests the correction, replacement, or execution of procedural steps” (the underlining is not from the original).

Regarding this rule, since resolution 583-F-2004 of 11 hours 35 minutes on July 14, 2004, this Chamber has indicated that: "(...) The procedural doctrine has indicated that the grounds for cassation for procedural reasons, set forth in Article 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can occur in the three phases of the process: 1) In the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship, for example, what is regulated by the first subsection, relating to the lack of service of process or its defective notification. 2) Those referring to the abnormal development of that relationship. Such is the case of the second subsection, regarding the denial of admissible evidence or the failure to summon for some evidentiary proceeding during the proceedings. And, 3) Those produced at the time of deciding the litigation, that is, upon issuing the corresponding judgment, the typical example being incongruence, set forth in the third subsection. The expression 'reposición o práctica de trámites procesales' according to the provisions of labor regulations, does not encompass all the cases in which formal defects or 'in procedendo' errors may arise. The jurisprudence of this Court, to date, has equated the concepts of 'vicios de forma' with those of 'trámite procesal', despite their being different. It can be affirmed that this is a genus-to-species relationship, where the latter constitute a species of the former. The errors regarding procedural steps refer to breaches originating, exclusively, during the procedural iter, and may be framed within points 1 and 2 mentioned above. Therefore, the limitation for filing the appeal for cassation for procedural reasons, contained in the article under discussion, is not applicable to all cases in which it would proceed. It is not contemplated for defects relating to the constitution of procedural acts that are subject to that appeal, according to the provisions of the aforementioned Article 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, within this new approach, the judgment issued in the agrarian jurisdiction is reviewable via this recourse, when what is alleged is the defect of incongruence, (...)" (underlining and boldface added). Along these lines, it has been the criterion of this Chamber that the exclusion of procedural grievances in the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is limited to those relating to 'trámites procesales' according to the letter of canon 559 of the Labor Code; that is, to those referring to the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship (point 1) and to the normal development of the procedural legal relationship (point 2). Without that exclusion or limitation being extendable to those procedural errors that occur upon issuing the judgment (point 3), as happens -for example- with incongruence (referred to in that same precedent), with reform in harm (analyzed in resolution 1074-F-04 of 11 hours 20 minutes on December 16, 2004) and the deficiency in the composition of the Litis "due to its incidence on the efficacy and effectiveness of the judgment" (resolution 1425-F-SI-2013 of 9 hours 50 minutes on October 24, 2013). This being the case, this is the framework governing the analysis and ruling on the procedural claims that follow.

**X. First.** They indicate that Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the minimum requirements that the final decision of a process must contain. They state that, in the contested judgment, the Court established that the factual findings of the trial court's judgment can, without violating due process, comprise "in a single one, the facts alleged in the complaint and in the counterclaim; that it is not required that they be made separately." They assert that they may agree with that statement of the Court, but what they cannot accept is that "in the factual findings of the first instance judgment, which the Court finds correct (sic) in a very high percentage, committed the outrage of not recording, within its factual findings, not even the slightest reference to the facts supporting the two counterclaims (...) It simply, radically and absolutely, disregarded the factual basis supporting those two counterclaims," which - they qualify - is a very serious violation of the procedure. They state that mandate 155 subsection ch) was infringed "in that, despite being proven in the expediente, none of the facts of the counterclaims were taken as proven"; likewise, subsection d) "in that not a single one of the facts of the counterclaims was taken as not proven." Thus, they conclude, judgment was rendered "as if no counterclaim had been filed and consequently no claim." They assure that this was what was opportunely alleged in the appeal. Their disagreement "was not because the proven facts were in a single list, but because they do not appear at all, in any list." **XI.** It is observed that in the appeal, the current cassation appellants maintained that: "REGARDING THE UNPROVEN FACTS. (...) this chapter of the judgment must be noted, it is totally omitted, since just like the proven facts, it failed to record a good number that should have been included in that chapter, and while we do so with greater detail and specification, we point out that here no mention is made of the factual findings of the counterclaim, as if that event had not occurred, which constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of the aforementioned Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (...) as we have already stated when referring to the ELEVENTH section, while it is true that the fifth clause of the purchase option in question refers to an alleged lease contract in process over a section of land facing the sea, of which nothing was said in the facts of the complaint or in its petitions, what the Court did (sic) for the purpose we have pointed out" (folios 2301 to 2302). On this particular, the Court indicated: "3.c. Relating to the unproven facts: (...) [the appellant] says that list is omitted and refers to the closing argument, a document which was not given consideration. 3.d. It adds, there is no factual finding for the counterclaim which it alleges as an infraction of Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reiterates the allegations concerning the lease of proven fact 11, arguing that the plaintiff-counter-defendant Mohs's claim about the contract for that different zone from the property in litis was not included." In this regard, it resolved: "d. absence of factual findings for the counterclaim: The aforementioned Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the matter, establishes in subsection 3.ch., the judgment shall contain a concrete declaration of the facts that the court holds as proven, citing the items of evidence demonstrating them and the respective folios of the expediente. The judgment shall comprise the resolution of all points submitted to debate -Article 54 of the agrarian procedural law-; this implies that when formulating the syllabus of events taken as proven, it is a single list, and it is not admissible to establish a factual finding for the complaint and another for the counterclaim, as the appellant alleges. In this case, the complaint and the counterclaim have been processed jointly due to the connectedness of elements they possess, making it possible to issue a judgment with a single body of proven and unproven facts." **XII.** As the cassation appellants reiterate before this Chamber the disagreement they raised against the trial court's judgment -and therefore, object to the Court's reasoning-, it is noted that in the factual findings of a judgment, the adjudicating body shall record those circumstances that, in its view, are extracted from the evidence provided and practiced during the process, which are relevant for the granting or dismissal of the claims asserted in the complaint and in the counterclaim (counterclaims for this case), as well as the defenses raised in the replies. Similarly, in the section on unproven facts, the adjudicating body shall include only those it deems do not arise from the elements of conviction, but which - in its judgment - deserve to be highlighted because they constitute the fundamental basis of the parties' theories and therefore determine or reinforce the denial ordered. That said, this Chamber shares, although for a different reason, the rejection of the disagreement by the Court. This, in addition to verifying that in the operative part of the trial court's judgment, express reference was indeed made to the counterclaims. Consequently, this cassation charge is denied.

**XIII. Second.** They assert that, according to the Court, they did not protest the way the trial court resolved the main and subsidiary claims of the complaint. They emphasize that this is false, because in the brief of February 28, 2013, they requested an addition from the trial court precisely to explain why it absolutely granted all the main claims as well as all the first and second subsidiary claims of the plaintiff, an inexplicable phenomenon. They add that they raised this issue before the Court in the document of April 12, 2013 [which is their appeal], at folio 57, in the sense that they requested clarification because all the main claims had been granted and were complemented by other subsidiary ones.

**XIV.** In this regard, the Court ordered: "the appellants say that the operative part is a product of all the errors in the considerandos when referring to Mohs's claims against the co-defendants. There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims. Nevertheless, this Chamber makes the following observation. In this matter, there were set out: a main claim, first subsidiary, and second subsidiary claim in Mohs's complaint (folios 141-142 tome I, integration of litis pages 1064 to 1065 tome III). In the decision under appeal, the claims were treated as if they were a single list of requests, when there is a main one, and then two subsidiary ones, (sic) with claims that are mutually exclusive between one group and the other. This implies that the judge, at the time of resolving the matter on the merits, should assume some claims from a single group, and not all those deemed to be appropriate even if they exclude one another. This proceeding is contrary to the judgment-drafting technique; however, the appellants are not in disagreement with that proceeding, and therefore it is not appropriate to decree the nullity of the judgment. In this instance, it will be resolved, according to what is grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests in the complaint that are appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court." **XV.** In the first place, it is noted that in a technical sense, what the current cassation appellants allege does not constitute a grievance, because they simply describe that before the trial court they filed a motion for addition and/or clarification and detail that they inserted a claim about this in their appeal, for which they transcribed what was said at that time: "We asked that it be clarified, because despite the main claims having been granted, others of the subsidiary ones were also granted, or rather complemented." In this way, they only recount what happened in the expediente, without specifying a particular claim against the judgment, beyond having filed that motion for addition; without this Chamber being able to supply that argumentative deficiency. Moreover, it is evident that to deny the disagreement, the Court indicated as a reason that "There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims" (the same defect this Chamber finds but regarding that phase). The cassation appellants do not directly combat that assertion; which by itself also required the dismissal of the procedural charge in this venue. Furthermore, it is observed that the Court indicated as an additional reason for the denial that, although the trial court technically improperly granted main and subsidiary claims, this was not claimed by the then-appellant party. The cassation appellants combat this last assertion; however, they do not directly attack the first one (namely, that there is no specific grievance), which would therefore remain unassailable. In any case, in addition to the circumstance that Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez indeed filed a motion for clarification on this point before the trial court being irrelevant (folios 2267 to 2270), the fact is that the Court itself, upon indeed verifying the trial court's technical incorrectness, ordered that "In this instance, it will be resolved, according to what is grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests in the complaint that are appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court." In this way, despite rejecting the disagreement for the first reason it indicated, the Court corrected the trial court's error, since it finally revoked -among other aspects- "What was granted subsidiarily," as was reviewed in Considerando VII. In this way, the recrimination would lack interest and would be useless to overturn the judgment. In summary, for the above, it is rejected.

**XVI. Third.** They detail that, in their appeal, they claimed the denial of the incident of new facts brought by Mr. Solís and Mr. Arrea Gronblad. They say the Court corrected this "by expanding the denial," understanding that the rejection was because the criminal accusation against the plaintiff here for the crime of perjury did not reach a final judgment due to the death of Mr. Mohs Villalta, with which the criminal action was extinguished.

They disagree, since the fact of the accusation by the Public Prosecutor's Office against Mr. Mohs Villalta for the crime of perjury occurring in the confession given precisely within this agrarian proceeding is a new fact that must be assessed, according to the rules of sound criticism, such that the content of that confession would have to merit enormous doubt regarding the "real and effective certainty" and relate this circumstance to the rest of the evidence. They insist, it is a new fact that must be appreciated as such.

**XVII.** The appellant is not precise in its claim. On one hand, it seems to refer to an omission by the Trial Court in resolving the motion of new facts (since it alleges the Appellate Court corrected it by "supplementing the denial"), but on the other hand, it seems to reproach the Appellate Court's reasons for denying the motion of new facts. Therefore, this lack of clarity also mandates its dismissal. In any case, the confession of all parties will be assessed together with the remaining elements of conviction when the grounds are heard on the merits.

**Cassation on substantive grounds** **XVIII.** In order to frame and begin the resolution of the multiple arguments included in the cassation appeal, it is convenient to reiterate the main pretensive framework of the complaint that was ultimately upheld by the Appellate Court (and by the Trial Court), since it is the latter that had to be challenged by the cassation appeal. Against the 4 defendants, Mr. Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Mr. Solís Rodríguez, and Mr. Arrea Gronblad, in substance and as cited supra, **the main claims** of Mr. Mohs Villalta were that it be declared: **1)** Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate because it was delivered to him as a guarantee; **2)** therefore, the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null, so they are not enforceable against him and all the shares must be returned to him; **3)** Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the purchase option contract of March 11, 1992, because by increasing the share capital of Cocomar S.A.: **3.1)** he distorted Mr. Mohs Villalta's right to the agreed price, rendering it nugatory, since he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to a capital of 100,000 shares of ¢1.00 to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00 colón), and **3.2)** he did so by capitalizing a supposed surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit; **4)** the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null, for being simulated and lacking just cause, so they are not enforceable against him and must be returned to him (Mr. Mohs Villalta, today his estate); and **5)** the defendants must pay both costs of this proceeding. Regarding those claims, as noted, **in the judgments issued by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, it was decreed**: **1)** Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., since the share certificate was given to him as a guarantee for a loan (which has no term), it was not transferred to him; **2)** (therefore) the share transfers in ownership made by Mr. Arrea Escalante in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null; **3)** (as a result) they must return 90% of the shares to the plaintiff's estate; **4)** the purchase and sale contract [it is understood it deemed this contract concerned the real property, as will be seen] entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (the basis of which was the purchase option of March 11, 1992) is resolved; **5)** the parties must return the situation to the moment of the execution of the resolved negotiation, for which Mr. Arrea Escalante must reimburse the entirety of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., as well as the legal books, to the estate of Mr. Mohs Villalta; and this estate must return the sums partially received for the purchase and sale to Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for a total of ¢2,675,000.00, which comprises: the amount paid to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operations number 6036 and 6037 for the amount of ¢2,175,000.00 and ¢500,000.00 paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar; **6)** defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants counterclaimants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad must pay the costs of this proceeding; and **7)** the claim against Cocomar S.A. was declared without merit for lack of standing and the losing plaintiff was exonerated from costs. **This is the framework that the appellant had to challenge in its cassation appeal, and this Chamber will be limited to this.** All other statements inserted by the cassation appellant but not covered by or linked to what was ordered by the adjudicating bodies regarding the upheld main claims of Mr. Mohs Villalta will be dismissed for not being useful to overturn the judgment, since even if they could attack statements that the Appellate Court, or even the Trial Court, may have incorporated into their resolutions, regardless of their correctness or incorrectness, they ultimately do not affect the decision adopted regarding those upheld main claims.

**XIX.** Regarding the referred framework, among the numerous arguments of the appellants in their appeal, it is noted that they disagree with the Appellate Court insofar as it shared the Trial Court's assessment that Mr. Arrea Escalante illegitimately appropriated all the shares of Cocomar S.A. They assert that the option was concretized, made effective definitively when Mr. Arrea Escalante fulfilled the condition precedent of regularizing the credit situation with the Banco Nacional and paid all the overdue installments, default interest, and costs, thereby perfecting the purchase and sale contract for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., in accordance with the evidence they identify there. They also disagree with the judgment's assertion that Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, in order to exercise shareholder rights, first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze the manner in which he would carry out the previously agreed-upon business. They emphasize that the acquisition of 90% of the shares by Mr. Arrea Escalante was concretized when he managed to normalize the credit situation. They question: what execution of the guarantee? Rigoberto Mohs himself, they assure, accepted that he did not pay the ¢100,000.00, because he applied it "as a down payment -eventually applicable- to the price of the negotiation." **XX.** In order to resolve this first charge, it is appropriate to review the thesis maintained by the Appellate Court in its considerations regarding what it established in the operative part of its judgment. The first thing that must be noted is that the Ad quem adopted all the proven facts of the Trial Court, with the exception of number 13, as it considered it irrelevant for the resolution of this matter, and therefore eliminated it. Likewise, it shared the list of non-proven facts. Now, as for the substantive considerations, for that body, on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta signed a purchase option contract for property 7-32236-000, with an "indispensable" condition, which consisted of the settlement with the Banco Nacional, in addition to stipulating the possibility that the option be executed by becoming a shareholder of Cocomar S.A. or through the transfer of the real property. In that purchase option contract, it detailed, the transfer of the shares of Cocomar S.A. was not agreed upon. In its view, Mr. Arrea Escalante's possession of the share certificate was by virtue of the loan of ¢100,000.00 that he granted to Mr. Mohs Villalta, who guaranteed it with that share certificate, for which he endorsed it in blank. Likewise, that despite the blank endorsement being for guarantee, Mr. Arrea Escalante completed it as a transfer of ownership of the share certificate, when the condition precedent of the purchase and sale contract had not yet been fulfilled, which happened on April 2, 1992, when Mr. Arrea Escalante reached a payment agreement with the Banco according to the receipt on page 229 volume I. It was at that moment that "the conditions agreed therein [in the purchase option that prepared the contract] formed the principal contract." In the Appellate Court's opinion, Mr. Arrea Escalante executed a tacit commissory pact in contravention of the legal system (and hence could not participate in the extraordinary shareholders' meetings). Therefore, it concluded, Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the certificate. It determined that to exercise shareholder rights, Mr. Arrea Escalante had to execute the guarantee and then analyze how he would carry out the agreed purchase and sale. Since Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., it held, his actions as a shareholder in the meetings and in the transfer of the share capital are voidable in accordance with Article 701 of the Código de Comercio, which affected the negotiations with the persons to whom he transferred the shares, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Escalante, who regarding Mr. Mohs Villalta are not in good faith "since they knew of the voidable negotiation, according to the evidence reviewed and in the answers to the complaint on pages 1136 and 1256 of both co-defendants, being spontaneous confession by recognizing knowledge of the dynamics of the entire negotiation, applying Article 341 of the Código Procesal Civil of supplementary application to the matter, for which reason the provisions of Article 678 of the Código de Comercio are not (sic) applicable." That body determined that in the counterclaim [it is understood as the counterclaims of each of them] "there is no action directed against Arrea Escalante, for which reason, if those co-defendants wish to bring an action to recover their investment, they must do so in a separate proceeding." Specifically, regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, it is pertinent to specify that for the Appellate Court, Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed upon the purchase and sale of property 7-32236-000 (this is extracted from the operative part where it declared "the purchase and sale contract entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the basis of which was the purchase option of March eleven, nineteen ninety-two, is resolved" and from point a of Considerando VII precisely named "legal situation of the property subject to the contract"). Now, in Considerando VII.c titled "On the breach of contract by Arrea Escalante," the Appellate Court indicated that the appeal reproached the fact that the breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante had been considered proven when he appropriated all the shares of Cocomar S.A. Regarding this claim it ordered: "(...) As is clearly denoted, at the time of executing the purchase option in question, there was no specific agreement on the transfer of the shares, only that a portion of the share capital that Mohs held at that time was part of the price. (...) As observed, Mr. Arrea Escalante's holding of the certificates did not result from the legal transaction debated here, but from another negotiation related to a loan of money and its guarantee." This adjudicating body continued "(...) the certificate representing the share capital at that time was in his possession by reason of another agreement, which for this Chamber was duly weighed by the judgment, without violating the 54th ordinal of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Consent, according to Article 1008 of the Código Civil, must be freely and clearly manifested. Expression can be by word, in writing, or by acts from which it can be deduced, dictates the referred norm. It has been repeatedly indicated, the transfer of the shares was not agreed upon in the purchase option; from the way events unfolded, it is inferred that Arrea Escalante opted to become a shareholder of Cocomar and not for the real property to be transferred to his name. The possession of the share capital of Cocomar in the hands of Arrea Escalante was by reason of a credit agreement agreed upon between Mohs and Arrea Escalante: a loan of one hundred thousand colones as was explained and substantiated with pertinent evidence in previous segments. (...) In order to exercise shareholder rights, Arrea Escalante first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze the way in which he would carry out the previously agreed-upon business. Furthermore, by virtue of what is considered proven in the challenged judgment, the loan had no term" (Considerando VIII).

**XXI.** It therefore becomes necessary to analyze, in the first place, both the document identified by both parties as an "option," and the loan, and the link between those two legal transactions. The document of March 11, 1992, visible on pages 212 to 213, reads: "The undersigned, RODRIGO MOHS VILLALTA, older, married, businessman, resident of Limón, with identity card number seven – zero thirty – seven hundred sixty-nine, hereby declares: [.-] 1.- That he is the owner of all the shares that constitute the share capital of the company 'COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA', with legal entity identification number three- one zero one- forty-three two hundred fifty-seven (3-101-4325). [.-] 2.- That the aforementioned company is the owner of the property registered in the Registro Público, Partido de Limón, under Real Folio Registration Number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX – ZERO ZERO ZERO, with the nature, situation, area, boundaries, and encumbrances (sic) indicated by the Registro Público. [.-] 3.- That he grants a purchase option in favor of Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, older, married, civil engineer, resident of San José, with identity card number one – two hundred eighty-eight, four hundred eighty-seven [,] regarding the real property cited in number 2) immediately preceding, under the following conditions: [.-] a.- The price of the real property is the sum of nine million colones, which would be paid in the following manner: two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones by undertaking to pay, under the terms and conditions established in the respective document, a credit operation with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica held by Cocomar S.A., which is secured by a first-degree mortgage on the property cited above; five hundred thousand colones that would be used to pay the compensation claimed by Mrs. Juana Aguilar, currently occupying precariously a portion of the land of the real property that comprises this negotiation; one million colones by delivering ten percent of the shares of the share capital of COCOMAR S.A. and the resulting balance, which will not accrue interest of any nature, from the proceeds of twenty-five percent of the sales made of parts of the real property referred to in this document or of any profit that COCOMAR S.A. may produce in the future for any cause. (sic)[.-] 4.- Mr. Arrea Escalante is authorized to exercise the rights granted to him by this option through the purchase of the shares that constitute the share capital of Cocomar S.A. or by means of the purchase of the real property in reference, as best suits his interests. [.-] 5.- Both the price and the object of this option include the assignment and transfer in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante or of Cocomar S.A., as the latter may decide, of the lease right, in the process of legalization, over a section of beach, located in front of the real property indicated above, which has an approximate area of twenty-six hectares (sic) and which is pending issuance before the Municipalidad del Cantón de Matina in the name of the declarant. [.-] 6.- It will be an indispensable condition for the exercise of the rights that this option grants him, that Mr. Arrea opportunely regularize the credit situation in favor of the Banco Nacional referred to above, which is in judicial collection before the Juzgado Agrario de Limón. [.-] 7.- IN WITNESS WHEREOF of compliance with the foregoing, I sign this document in San José, on the eleventh day of March, nineteen hundred ninety-two" (underlining and bold added; pages 212 in concordance with pages 40 and 41, fact 3 of the complaints (both), accepted literally by the 3 defendant subjects). From the literal wording of the document just reproduced, as will be explained below, this Chamber extracts that **the object of that transaction was the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A.** (in addition to an alleged "lease" right – which is not relevant at this stage –, and not the real property as the A quo and the Ad quem understood).

Although, in the third clause, Mr. Mohs Villalta stated that he </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">grants a purchase option</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> over the estate, </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">having acted in his personal capacity and by the manner in which he stated the price was to be paid in accordance with clause 4</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, it can only be concluded that the transaction had as its object the shares of Cocomar S.A. It is striking that the plaintiff was not clear in his complaint about the capacity in which he signed the document of March 11, 1992 (at one point he referred to having done so in a personal capacity; at another, as the representative of Cocomar S.A., thus folios 129 and 130). However, from the reading of the instrument itself, it is clear that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">it was in his personal capacity</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, and not as the representative of Cocomar S.A. See thus that in the introduction he did not expressly state that he was acting in his capacity as president of that corporation; furthermore, in the second stipulation he described himself as </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">owner of the shares that make up the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">; and in the third stipulation he indicated that Cocomar S.A. </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">is the owner of the property</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">. </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">Therefore</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, in principle, Mr. Mohs in his personal capacity </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">was not the one who could sell the land because he was not its owner</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (and an analysis from the perspective of an agreement or promise regarding the act of a third party is not relevant (as it was not so alleged by any of the parties); nor is one relating to the ownership of the thing or of another's thing (at least at this stage where the factual basis on which the main claims of the plaintiff were upheld is being examined)). Added to this is the fact that, as of that date, November 11, 1992, the real property had been awarded to Banco Nacional through a public auction that took place on December 4, 1991, and was approved on January 15, 1992, so it did not belong to Cocomar S.A. either (proven fact 5 of the Trial Court endorsed by the Appellate Court and not disputed, which </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">incidentally- was known to Mr. Mohs Villalta as president of the corporation (despite his having denied it in the confessional evidence), as well as to Mr. Arrea Escalante (folios 223 to 224 and 183 corresponding to the response to the complaint)). Consequently, since Mr. Arrea Escalante's primary interest was to acquire property 7-32236-000 and that such was the initial offer of the negotiation by Mr. Mohs Villalta (both parties denote this from the complaint and the response), as the property at that time belonged to Banco Nacional, the only way to satisfy that interest of Mr. Arrea Escalante was to agree with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the acquisition of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to get the awarded Bank to desist from the registration of the property in its name, by agreeing that in its place Mr. Arrea Escalante would fully regularize the company's debt and continue paying it. Likewise, it is observed that Mr. Mohs Villalta </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">established that part of the price (¢1,000,000.00) was to be paid to him with the delivery of 10% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, thus stipulation 3. This particular clause deserves a detailed analysis. It must be understood logically that, in the first place, it was not possible for Mr. Arrea Escalante to pay that part of the price in that manner if he was not the owner of the shares; how could he transfer the ownership of shares that did not belong to him? To elucidate that particular stipulation, one must turn to the rest of the provisions set forth therein. In number 4 it was established that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">rights of the option</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> through the acquisition of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., or through the purchase of the property. Now, due to that particular way of conceiving the payment of a part of the price (that delivery of 10% of the then shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.), it must be concluded that what was provided for in clause 4 undoubtedly did not constitute in reality an alternative obligation at the buyer's choice (much less a facultative one for the seller). </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">That form implied </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">at least in initial theory- that Mr. Arrea Escalante necessarily had to be the holder of shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., so that he could pay with 10% of them</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">. </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Therefore, from all the foregoing considerations, the object of the contract was necessarily the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. and not the property</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> as the Appellate Court (and the Trial Court) appreciated. Having reached this point, it is worthwhile to question, </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">if a part of the payment was to be made by delivering a portion of the same purchased object, is it not then that in reality the transaction was about a portion of that object and not its entirety?</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> Put another way, </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">did it then deal with 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. at that time, and not its entirety?</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">The answer is necessarily affirmative, because under no circumstances could the buyer, Mr. Arrea Escalante, obligate himself to partially pay the price by delivering an object of which he was not the holder and that precisely belonged to the seller</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">. But then, why did Mr. Mohs Villalta state the delivery of 10% of the shares as part of the price payment, if he was the one who until then was the owner of the entirety and possessed them? Could Mr. Mohs deliver only 90% of the shares? To answer these questions, it is necessary to note that at that time there existed </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">a single share certificate that comprised the entirety of the shares that (at that time) constituted the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (it is a circumstance referred to by both Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante). In this way, since Mr. Arrea Escalante's interest was to acquire the corporation because it, until before the public auction (proven fact 5 of the Trial Court endorsed by the Appellate Court), had been the owner of property 7-32236-000</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">and the initial negotiation revolved around that property (it is denoted from the complaint itself folios 129 to 129, and from Arrea Escalante's response, folios 178 to 180 and 182 to 183), </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">he agreed with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the condition precedent contained in clause 6, according to which </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">it is reiterated- it was essential that Mr. Arrea Escalante timely regularize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. with Banco Nacional</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, by virtue of which the judicial collection proceeding existed in which the property had been auctioned. With that stipulation, Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante made the effectiveness of the sale depend </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">under the terms of Articles 681 and 685 of the Civil Code- on the will of a third party, Banco Nacional (which had been awarded the property that previously belonged to that corporation). </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">So long as that condition was not verified, in principle, Mr. Mohs Villalta was to retain, for his own account and risk, the transferred shares </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">(canon 685 of the Civil Code). Thus, it is from this condition precedent that it can be understood why Mr. Mohs Villalta did not request the corporation (which he in turn represented as president and of which he was the sole shareholder) to issue individual shares or one certificate for 90% and another for 10% to comply with the delivery of the object of the sale (90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.), but rather kept the single certificate for the entirety of the shares. In summary, as indicated, by the very provisions set forth in the </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">option</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> document that detail the conditions of the agreement regarding object and price, it follows that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">the object of the sale was 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. but due to the condition precedent, Mr. Mohs Villalta was to keep </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">in initial theory- the sold object in his possession, which was comprised in the single share certificate corresponding to the entirety</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.4pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">XXII.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> Up to here, it is thus established that, as the Appellate Court indicated, there was an agreement between Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante (it is not questioned in the appeal) but regarding the price, not of the property, but of 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., and that subject to a condition precedent, the one contained in stipulation 6. Now, for the appellate body in this case, first, on April 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta granted a sale option to Mr. Arrea Escalante with a condition precedent, upon the verification of which, on April 2, 1992 -he said- </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">the conditions agreed upon therein formed the main contract</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, that is, the sale contract (see thus the recital XI of the appealed ruling). This Chamber does not agree with that conclusion. In the case at bar, what happened on that date was not a </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">purchase option</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">, but a perfected sale. In numerous occasions, this Chamber has ruled that the distinction between the figure of a sale and the figure of an option or promise of sale or purchase, is precisely the full existence of an agreement regarding object and price, since in this case the sale has been configured in accordance with canon 1049 of the Civil Code. Thus, in judgment 1313-F-S1-2013 of 14 hours 25 minutes of October 1, 2013, it was stated: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">With the aim of properly addressing the criticisms under study, the nature of those agreements must be clarified. For that purpose, this Chamber has referred to the difference between a sale and any other prior negotiation. In this sense, in judgment number 1015 of 16 hours 30 minutes of December 21, 2006, echoing what was already set forth in vote number 80 of 15 hours 30 minutes of November 30, 1993, cited in resolution number 55 of 11 hours of January 28, 2004, it pointed out: \"</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">V.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">Modern doctrine, to refer to preliminary or preparatory contractual types of other contracts, has used the expression pre-contract, defining it as that convention through which two or more persons commit to making effective in the future the conclusion of a contract that, at that moment, they do not want or cannot definitively enter into.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The pre-contract, strictly speaking, is a contract by means of which an obligation to do arises: the entering into of the future contract, which in turn constitutes its object or purpose. Pre-contracts, having as their purpose the realization of another contract, are the unilateral promise to sell and the reciprocal promise to sell</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">…“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">It is important to clearly establish when one is facing a pre-contract whose object is a sale contract and when one is facing a sale itself, it being necessary to bear in mind that both the sale option and the reciprocal promise to sell, being pre-transactional figures, contain the essential elements of the projected negotiation. That is why the pre-contract is considered a \"base contract\" in which the characteristics of the definitive contract are projected, in such a way that once the respective offers are accepted, a new declaration of will is not necessary. In the option -or promise to sell- and in the reciprocal promise to sell, it is sufficient that, within the term, the acceptance of the option-holder operates in the first case, or of either of the two parties in the second for, as has been pointed out, the sale to be perfected. It is clear, then, that the difference between the pre-transactional figure and the definitive sale transaction is the definitive agreement on object and price manifested, precisely, in the acceptance of the option-holders. That is, the pre-transactional contractual relationship designs the definitive contract by referring to the essential elements that compose it, but without there being a definitive agreement on object and price, which occurs with the acceptance of the offers. In the option and in the reciprocal promise to sell, as their object is the future stipulation of a sale contract, their effects can never coincide with those of the sale, and they cannot derive the transfer of ownership nor the seller's obligation to deliver the thing nor the buyer's to pay the price, because even though in the pre-contract the object and the price are determined, the promisors only obligate themselves to respect the term and to carry out the definitive contract upon consent regarding the price and the object as it was foreseen. Hence, if from a given contract it follows that the phase of simple offers -unilateral or reciprocal, as the case may be- has been overcome because in reality nothing is pending acceptance, the definitive sale has been consummated with all its legal effects, independently of its eventual registration in the Public Registry, since this is not a requirement ad substantiam for its perfection, leaving for the execution phase of the contract as an obligation of the seller the granting of public deed and the delivery of the good.\"</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">(Emphasis is from the original). In the same sense, one can consult judgment of this Chamber number 507 of 9 hours 35 minutes of July 20, 2007. In this line of thought, canon 1049 of the Civil Code prescribes: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The sale is perfect between the parties from the moment they agree on object and price.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> Following this line of thought, in judgment number 69 of 9 hours 50 minutes of February 2, 2007, this jurisdictional body indicated: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">VII.- Of the sale contract.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The sale is the definitive agreement on object and price manifested in the acceptance of the option-holders. In this sense, that legal transaction does not come into existence while there is no firm agreement on object and price, since that one only becomes legally valid when the acceptance of the offers operates.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">In this regard, consult the resolution of this Chamber No. 713 of 16 hours 10 minutes of September 18, 2002.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> In this same line of thought, the Appellate Court, in recital X of the contested judgment, an aspect that was not questioned by the cassation appellant, pointed out: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">X.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The appellant is correct in the fourth grievance.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Analyzing both documents, it follows that their object was the sale of the six properties described in them, there being agreement on</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[sic]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">object and price from the beginning, the initial price being the sum of $1,125,000 for a term of six months, a down payment of $50,000 having to be delivered, leaving a total of $1,075,000 payable upon completion of the negotiation. The second document was signed for the sum of $1,077-000</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[sic]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">for a term of three months, with a down payment of $36,364</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">. From the breakdown of the above sums, it is observed that effectively the $50,000 given as a down payment was subtracted from the initial negotiation to establish the sum of the second contract, which reflects that the parties' will was to continue with the initial negotiation to obtain the sale of the properties, only varying with respect to the term of the contracts and the dates of the money down payments, so it is not appropriate to see those actions as the constitution of two different contracts, but rather, as a contractual unit that had the object of the sale of the properties.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> Ergo, it is clear that what was agreed upon between the parties was a sale contract, with its necessary elements: agreement on object and price, since nothing remained pending acceptance. However, as will be set forth further on, that agreement was subject to the fulfillment of several conditions. Therefore, it is a sale subject to conditions precedent</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">. In the present case, it is found that in the document in question Mr. Mohs Villalta stated he was granting a </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">purchase option</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> to Mr. Arrea Escalante. The object, despite the complex way in which he referred to it, was finally </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">as indicated- 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. He also stated the price and the specific manner in which it would be paid by the latter. From the very literalness of that document, it can be concluded that Mr. Arrea Escalante was fully in agreement with acquiring the said good and the price, with the manner in which it would be paid, and with the condition precedent. That document is, on the contrary, proof of that full agreement, since it denotes that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">there was no element whose definition was deferred</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">; what it sets forth is </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">a condition precedent to the effects of that sale</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> under the terms of canons 678, 681, and 685 of the Civil Code, and because a term for acceptance was not expressly established for Mr. Arrea Escalante. That detail of the form of payment and that condition precedent are indicators of the will of both Mr. Mohs, who signed the document, and of Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, who </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">incidentally- never denied that this had been his will, quite the opposite. Even if one were to start from the premise that it was an option, the acceptance of Banco Nacional on that same day would have to be taken as the indication that Mr. Arrea Escalante accepted the offer during the time elapsed between the act in which Mr. Mohs signed it and the acceptance by the financial entity. Additionally, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself from his complaints insisted that he had reached that agreement with Arrea Escalante, thus he mentioned: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">On March 11, 1992, the undersigned, in my personal capacity and as owner of the entirety of the shares of Cocomar S.A., </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">proceeded to agree with Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> a SALE OPTION</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">of property of the Partido de Limón number 32236-000 for the sum of nine million colones that would be paid according to the document signed at the Facio y Cañas Law Firm, where Attorney Arrea Licenciado Carlos Solís had his office, in the following way:</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">)</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (underlining added, folios 129 and 1051). In the third and fourth facts, he also maintained that on March 11, 1992, in his personal capacity, he <span style="text-decoration:underline">agreed</span> with Mr. Arrea Escalante on a sale option for property 7-32236-000; he stated therein the price and the form of payment that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">he affirmed- they <span style="text-decoration:underline">agreed upon</span>, as well as the <span style="text-decoration:underline">agreement</span> to the effect that the sale of the property could be carried out, at the buyer's convenience for tax reasons, through the transfer of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. (folios 129 to 130). In those same terms (of the existence of an agreement and its details), Mr. Arrea Escalante accepted that third fact upon responding to the complaint: </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">“</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">It is true. The terms of that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">contracting</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> are clearly stated in the document </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">(</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">)</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">”</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (folio 179, underlining is added). Specifically, regarding the third and fourth facts of the complaint, he expressed that in principle it was a purchase option related to property 7-32236, but in the document it was established, in subsection 4, that he could exercise the rights of that option through the purchase of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">which he decided upon</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">; it was -he continued- an alternative offer, in which he chose the purchase of the shares, the contract was closed, and he </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">acquired</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> 90% of the shares of the corporate capital (folios 179 to 180). Thus, it is clear that what happened was not a unilateral promise to sell, but rather that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">on that March 11, 1992, a perfect sale agreement on object and price was reached, with a condition precedent, which </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">incidentally- was verified on that same date</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">. Furthermore, the attention of the plaintiff is called to the fact that it is absolutely contradictory that the premise of his main thesis is that in this case what he granted was a sale option over a property, but that he requests that his counterpart's breach be declared, since that implies that there was an agreement and not that a pre-contract occurred.

**XXIII.** Now, in addition to that agreement for the purchase and sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., immediately thereafter, practically simultaneously, **Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed to a loan**, in which the latter gave the former a credit of the sum of ¢100,000.00, **and Mr. Mohs Villalta, now as debtor, delivered the sole share certificate as collateral, for which purpose he endorsed it in blank** (both parties acknowledge this). This loan is the exclusive reason why the Trial Court understood that Mr. Arrea Escalante had possession of the share certificate and analyzed it completely in isolation from the purchase agreement. However, **since the object of the purchase was the company's shares** (and not the property), **the correlation of this agreement with the loan agreement that was secured by that same object, at that same time, cannot be denied**. Note that logically, **Mr. Mohs Villalta's action on that March 11, 1992, of endorsing in blank as loan collateral can only be understood in accordance with that first agreement for the purchase of shares and with the condition precedent itself**. It is not logical for the members of this Chamber that a debtor would endorse a share certificate in blank if his sole intention is to give it as collateral (with the corresponding dispossession). It is not logical that he would decide not to record that circumstance of collateral. **He signed the share certificate for the entire capital stock of Cocomar S.A. in blank on the back as collateral, yes, but with a view to the fulfillment of the condition precedent of the purchase agreement executed, so that Mr. Arrea Escalante would become the owner of 90% of the shares of the then capital stock of Cocomar S.A. and he would keep the remaining 10%**. Hence, it can be understood why in the "purchase option" (opción de compra) document, Mr. Mohs Villalta stipulated that Mr. Arrea Escalante had to deliver 10% of those shares to him, because **despite the agreed purchase with a condition precedent for 90% of the shares**, which would have determined –in principle– that Mr. Mohs Villalta maintain the thing (that 90% of the shares) in his possession until that condition was fulfilled (Canon 685 of the Civil Code); **Mr. Mohs Villalta, the seller, would no longer have the sole share certificate, since he would immediately deliver it as collateral to that same buyer through this second transaction**. Thus, Mr. Mohs Villalta **gave as collateral the sole share certificate, which contained the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that he had sold under a condition precedent. If that condition were verified, the purchase would take full effect**, and that is why he stipulated the delivery of 10% of the total shares comprised in that title, actually as a return –as stated– and not as part of the price. In this context, **although he initially endorsed the title in blank as collateral, this –it is insisted– was with a view to the verification of the condition precedent and, therefore, the effectiveness of the agreed purchase**. These conclusions, which are necessarily drawn from the literal wording of the "option" (opción) document in relation to the credit and the blank endorsement of the share certificate (accepted by both Mr. Mohs and Mr. Arrea), are further reinforced by the document on folio 227, in which Mr. Mohs Villalta stated: "*By this means I attest that I received from Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢100,000.00) as a loan, eventually applicable to the sale price of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option. As a guarantee* of payment I delivered a *certificate for one hundred thousand shares of one colón each of the company* "*COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA*" [.-] *San José, March 11, 1992*" (underline added). This document was not disavowed by the plaintiff Mohs Villalta; he did not refer to it in his response to Mr. Arrea Escalante's answer (nor did he do so in his response to those filed by the co-defendants/counterclaimants). Likewise, in the notarial certification of the witness statements of Mr. Rafael Ángel Mazanares and Ms. Jeannette Viales Segura, assistant and secretary to Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, respectively, given in November 1997 before the First Examining Magistrate's Court of San José, within a criminal case against defendant Arrea Escalante, these deponents stated: "*At some point, I believe in the month of March 1992, Don Carlos Lara, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Carlos Solís were meeting in the office, Don Rodrigo was happy because the Bank, I do not remember exactly which one, had accepted the settlement proposal, so the transaction was effectively going to happen, I remember it was even decided to do it via the acquisition of shares* (...) *Don Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón arrived, with a gentleman whom I later learned was Don Rigoberto Mohs* (...) *a moment later they met and Don Carlos Solís asked me to dictate to Jeannette, his secretary, the legend of assignment and transfer on the share certificate of the Company Cocomar S.A. that Jeannette kept in her file*, this in the form and style we always used, *and so I did. Subsequently, both Jeannette and I entered Don Carlos's office, and I proceeded to read the legend to everyone present, who expressed their agreement. Don Rodrigo Arrea proceeded to sign the certificate in acceptance and gave it to Jeannette*, to keep it (...)" (folios 233 to 234, the underline is not original). This corresponds to Mr. Manzanares's testimony. In a similar vein, Ms. Jeannette Viales stated "*on March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, the purchase option and the share certificate* to which this matter refers *were signed* in Don Carlos's office, *two days later, Don Rigoberto Mohs, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Luis Fernando del Barco* presented themselves at the office, among other gentlemen whose names I do not specify at this moment, and *on that occasion, Don Rafael Manzanarez* (sic) *and I, entered Don Carlos's office, Rafael read the legend to them, and they expressed their agreement, then Don Rodrigo signed the assignment*, (sic) *and when he had signed, he told me to keep the share, and Don Rodrigo Mohs also asked me to keep the minute book for them to draft the pertinent minutes*" (folio 235, underline added). This certification and its content were not objected to, disavowed, or even referred to by the plaintiff Mohs Villalta; it records the declaration of individuals who witnessed, indeed carried out under the instruction of the interested parties, the insertion of the legend next to the blank signature and perceived the consent of the seller and buyer of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Thus, clearly, the loan agreement and its particularities cannot be dissociated under any circumstance from the purchase agreement.

**XXIV.** Given what has been stated up to this point, it is absolutely essential to determine whether the condition precedent of the purchase occurred, and if so, on what date, as this would in turn determine the correctness or incorrectness of the Trial Court's conclusion (which confirmed that of the Lower Court) that Mr. Arrea Escalante "*is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A* (sic) *without having a legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but rather was delivered to him* (sic) *as collateral* *for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan with no term*" (first provision), as well as the direct consequences derived therefrom according to what was primarily sought by the plaintiff (also confirming the Lower Court), namely, that "*as an illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate* (...) *all share assignments in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, and therefore they must return ninety percent of the shares to the plaintiff's succession*" (second provision), and that "*the assignments or share transfers carried out by co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo* (sic) *Arrea* (sic) *Gronblat* (sic) *are null and void for lacking just cause and because they cannot be asserted against the plaintiff's succession, and therefore they must* (sic) *be returned to the aforementioned succession*" (third provision). For the Trial Court, the condition precedent of the option occurred on April 2, 1992. This Chamber observes that regarding this aspect, when answering the lawsuit, Mr. Arrea Escalante related: "(...) *On the same date and occasion on which, as stated, in Mohs's presence, the purchase option document he granted me was drafted, he asked me to advance him one hundred thousand colones, but knowing how things really were, I agreed to give it to him as a loan, but also, eventually applicable to the payment of the transaction price, should the contract ultimately be executed. Against the delivery of that money, Mohs signed the corresponding receipt for me* (...) *in which one can clearly read* '*...eventually applicable to the sale price of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option...*' *He also handed over to me, as a payment guarantee at that same time, the sole share certificate of the aforementioned company* (...) *although the aforementioned receipt states that Mohs gives me that certificate as collateral*" (folios 186 to 189). Mr. Arrea Escalante also stated that "*that circumstance of collateral endorsement was not recorded on the back of that document, and Mohs, who of course was also aware that this share certificate was worthless, agreed to sign it in blank, so that if the negotiation with the bank was successful and the operation was normalized, I would keep that share certificate in my possession, now as co-owner with him, of ninety percent of the shares, and in that way take control of the company* (...). *That same day*, (...) *in the company of Don Carlos Lara, I went to negotiate the settlement with bank officials* (...) *we dealt with the head of branches, surnamed Cuevillas, who agreed that I would take charge of paying the account of Cocomar S.A., also paying the late interest, the personal and procedural costs* (sic) *of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding, a payment I made on April 2, 1992* (...) *With that settlement with the bank and the payment made, I fulfilled the condition precedent contained in the purchase offer, by regularizing the credit* (...). *In other words, on that date of payment, the negotiation regarding ninety percent of the share capital of Cocomar, which was carried out between Mohs Villalta and the undersigned, was finalized and perfected. Subsequently, without being obliged to do so, three more payments were made to Mohs or his wife,* (sic) *on July 7, 14, and 27, 1992, through the delivery of the corresponding receipt, in which it can clearly be read that they are installments towards the obligation for the sale of shares* (...). *This demonstrates that Mohs was always aware of and operated under the idea that what he had sold me,* (sic) *was ninety percent of Cocomar S.A. and that in that sense we were co-partners in the company*" (folios 182 to 186). The defendant Arrea Escalante continued in his answer, "(...) *the day that Mr. Lara and the undersigned went to Banco Nacional* (...) *Mohs accompanied us, waiting for us outside Mr. Cuevillas's office*. *For this reason, once the meeting concluded, we informed the plaintiff of the goodwill disposition of the bank officials, in the sense that I would take charge of continuing to pay the account of Cocomar S.A.* (...) *we continued making certain inquiries regarding the said negotiation, such as the outstanding payment balance, the de facto situation of the unlawful occupier Ms. Juana Aguilar, whom* (sic) *I promptly paid off* (...). *Since everything seemed reasonably normal, I again called Mohs to a meeting in the office of Mr. Solís* (...) *which was held two days later, that is, on March 13, 1992* (...) *I informed the plaintiff formally and in detail, of the changes I planned to make to the bylaws, the board of directors, and the administration of the property* (...) *Also on that occasion, we took the opportunity to formalize the share transfer that the plaintiff had to make to me of ninety percent of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.* (sic) *Since there was only one certificate representing that capital stock* (...) *and given that the purchase option document very clearly established that what I was acquiring, if the transaction were to go through, would be ninety percent of the shares of Cocomar S.A., Mohs agreed that it be recorded on the back of the said document, as it effectively was, that he assigned and transferred the entirety of the certificate to me* (...)" (underline added, folios 186 to 189). For his part, Mr. Mohs Villalta in his reply omitted referring to the previous allegations of Mr. Arrea Escalante; he simply stated that this defendant knew "*the problems of the property and that it had been auctioned*", hence the transaction price, and that is why he asked for the share certificate as loan collateral "*knowing that it was worthless at that moment*" (folios 410 to 416). Now, in his deposition, he was asked whether Mr. Arrea Escalante had regularized the default situation of Cocomar S.A. with Banco Nacional by making the corresponding payments, to which he replied: it was true, "*I was a close friend of Arturo Cuevillas, General Manager of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and his brother German Cuevillas, head of bank branches*, prior to negotiating with Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Escalante, *the Cuevillas brothers agreed that I should negotiate in the most convenient way for me* and not for the Bank, which was not interested in the property, and that due to the friendship they had with me since childhood. In Mr. German Cuevillas's office, *the gentleman* signed a check for the amount of one million and something colones and *brought an operation that I had, or rather Cocomar, with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica up to date. I must add that it was I who saved the property, and not them* (...) *The property was not awarded*". From this statement, first, Mr. Mohs's contradiction is observed between what he stated in the reply (that Arrea Escalante knew the property had been auctioned off, and therefore that fact was also of his personal knowledge) and what he expressed in the deposition ("*The property was not awarded*").

Second, it is clear from this that **Mr. Mohs Villalta was aware of the Banco Nacional's acceptance for Mr. Arrea Escalante to regularize the credit operation of Cocomar S.A.**, and he even affirmed that it was thanks to him that Arrea Escalante obtained –to paraphrase his confessional statement– that agreement "by which the property was saved." Although the exact date on which he became aware of the Bank's acceptance cannot be extracted from that confessional statement, the truth is that in the notarial certification of the investigatory statement of Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta from April 1994, before the Fourth Examining Court of San José (submitted by Mr. Arrea Escalante when answering the complaint), he stated: "(...) I was summoned again to the Facio-Cañas law firm, to be informed that (...) therefore I had to transfer the shares of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima to appoint a new board, which I agreed to because of the honorability that those persons represented to me (sic) at that time" (emphasis added, folio 220). In his reply, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not refer to this meeting of March 13, 1992, pointed out by Mr. Arrea Escalante, nor did he question the validity of that certification, much less its content. Likewise, from the aforementioned notarial certification of the witness statements of Messrs. Rafael Ángel Manzanares and Jeannette Viales Segura, given in November 1997 (before the First Examining Court of San José, within criminal proceedings against the defendant Arrea Escalante), it is established that Mr. Mohs Villalta was indeed aware of the acceptance by the Banco Nacional at least by March 13, 1992, and that he even agreed, it was his will, to transfer the share certificate through the inclusion of the legend to that effect. From the foregoing documents, in agreement with the cited confessional statement, **this Chamber concludes that the Bank accepted the regularization of Cocomar S.A.'s credit, and this occurred on March 11, 1992, itself, thereby fulfilling the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of the contract for the sale of 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.** Likewise, that, **indeed, at least by March 13, 1992** (and it is even indicative that it was as of that same day, March 11 of that year, as alleged by Arrea Escalante), **Mr. Mohs Villalta knew of that acceptance by the Banco Nacional and, therefore, of the occurrence of the condition precedent (condición suspensiva)**. Otherwise, it is not logical that Mr. Mohs Villalta would have agreed to formalize the transfer of the share certificate, a fact that he himself acknowledged in the criminal venue. It is additionally emphasized that from this evidence, not only is the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) considered fulfilled on March 11, 1992, itself, but this Chamber also precisely infers that **on March 13, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta accepted the inclusion of the transfer legend on the face of the share certificate of Cocomar S.A., next to the signature he had placed in blank two days earlier, with the original intent to guarantee the loan, but with a view toward fulfilling the condition precedent (condición suspensiva), of whose occurrence –again– he was already aware by that moment**. Mr. Mohs Villalta thus agreed to transfer all of the shares to facilitate the necessary corporate changes. In this way, by the will of both contracting parties, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not have to concretely deliver 90% of the shares and materially retain only 10% himself, because by that same agreement he had the clarity that, despite not having immediate possession, he was indeed the owner of 10% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.'s corporate capital at that time, contained in that certificate. This –it is superfluous to point out– coincides with the supposed partial payment of the sale price set forth in the "option" document, which in reality –it is insisted– was not such a price payment, but rather the way they devised to ensure that Mr. Mohs Villalta would remain the owner of 10% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.'s corporate capital at that moment (and that if he so demanded, it would eventually be delivered to him), since he would immediately endorse the sole share certificate for the entirety of the corporate capital, first as a guarantee but with a view toward ownership in execution of the sale. See in this regard that the plaintiff did not even allege, much less seek in his complaint, a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante had breached the physical or material delivery of 10% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.'s corporate capital at that time. On the contrary, from the standpoint of his main claims, his thesis is based on being the owner of that 10% of the then share capital corresponding to 10,000 shares of one colón (his claim is rather that he is no longer the holder of 10,000 shares relative to a capital of ¢100,000.00, but relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00; therein lies the first breach he alleged of the sale contract).

**XXV.** **Consequently**, from what has been stated thus far, **Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate for the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.** as the Trial Court and the Court of First Instance understood, because **the sale contract with a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of March 11, 1992, had as its object 90% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., and by virtue thereof, even after said condition precedent (condición suspensiva) occurred on that same date, Mr. Mohs Villalta, moreover, on March 13, 1992**, **completed** (indirectly through Messrs. Manzanares and Viales) **by way of transfer the blank endorsement he had made days earlier as a guarantee, precisely with a view toward that realization of the condition precedent (condición suspensiva)**. In this order, it is clear that the appellant party is correct, and therefore **the judgment of the Trial Court, as well as that of the Court of First Instance, must be reversed**, since both have as a premise of their operative part that the object of the transaction (a sale, in the case of the former; an option, in the case of the latter) was the real property, and that the share certificate for the then capital of Cocomar S.A. was delivered to him solely as a guarantee, with which, consequently, they considered that Mr. Arrea Escalante was an illegitimate possessor of it.

**XXVI.** Based on what has been established so far, in accordance with canon 610 subsection 2) of the Civil Procedure Code, Law 7130 of 1989, it is imperative to issue a ruling on the claims of the plaintiff party, the defenses of the defendants Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as appropriately regarding the counterclaims. As has been insistently pointed out, as **main claims**, the plaintiff Rigoberto Mohs Villalta requested that Mr. Arrea Escalante be declared an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate because it was delivered to him as a guarantee **(1)**. As indicated in the preceding recitals, he has no right to this petition: Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate of Cocomar S.A. Consequently, his claim for nullity of the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, and that they are unenforceable against him **(2)**, is also untenable, since the reason for that invalidity was identified precisely as the illegitimate possession of the share certificate. Neither is the petition that all shares must be restored, as its premise was also the rejected declaration of illegitimate possession and the consequent nullity of the transfers. Thus, regarding these claims, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendants against Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad is granted; in relation to Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) is declared ex officio, as this is a substantive prerequisite of any claim that must be verified by the adjudicating body.

**XXVII.** Regarding the claim for a declaration of a material breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante of the "option to purchase contract" dated March 11, 1992, on the grounds that by increasing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., he distorted his right to the agreed price, rendering it worthless, since he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to a capital of 100,000 shares to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to 20,000,000 shares **(3.1)**, this Chamber concludes that he also has no right for the following reasons. **First**, as indicated above, the agreement did not concern property 7-32236-000, as is the plaintiff's premise, but rather the object of the negotiation was ultimately 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. **Second**, what occurred was not a "purchase option" as the plaintiff has maintained, but a completed sale, as already pointed out. **Third**, of preponderant relevance, the first breach whose declaration the plaintiff party seeks was specified regarding the portion of the price corresponding to the delivery of 10% of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. on March 11, 1992, which was ¢100,000.00 (an uncontroverted aspect), which was equivalent to 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 out of a capital of ¢100,000.00 (referred to by both contracting parties). His claim, then, has as its premise that he is the owner of 10% (it has also been said that the plaintiff party does not base his claim on the non-physical or material delivery of 10% of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. on that March 11, 1992, or in the following days, which in any case he accepted, as can be inferred from his own behavior already described regarding the loan contract), but it is directed in the sense that –it is reiterated– his 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 are no longer relative to the corporate capital of ¢100,000.00, but are now relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00, whereby –in his judgment– the agreed price was disrespected by Mr. Arrea Escalante. In this regard, this Chamber observes that **there was no express agreement between Mr. Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea to the effect that the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. could not be increased or varied throughout the remainder of the corporate term, nor that if it were, the 10% proportion would be maintained for Mr. Mohs Villalta**. This does not emerge from the literal text of the document of March 11, 1992, signed by Mohs; the clause contained therein reads only: "(...) [one] million colones through the deliver[y] of ten percent of the shares of the corporate capital of COCOMAR S.A. (...)." Nor can it be inferred from any other evidence. An agreement of that type, at least in the sense that the corporate capital would not be increased once the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of effectiveness was verified, would necessarily have to be expressly recorded in some support or be demonstrated, as it would imply a limitation on the company's growth which is somewhat contrary to commercial logic itself. Furthermore, it is clear to this Chamber that from the moment Mr. Arrea Escalante learned that the real property was auctioned off in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding brought by the Banco Nacional, his interest shifted to becoming a partner of Cocomar S.A. for the event that the corporate credit situation with the Bank could be regularized and said property returned to its assets; hence the agreement they reached for the sale of its shares subject to that condition precedent (condición suspensiva). **As of March 11, 1992, the property was not in the assets of Cocomar S.A., so for Mr. Mohs Villalta, personally, maintaining 10% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. in the event that the Bank might accept** the regularization of the credit of the same company and not proceed with the registry inscription of the property that had been awarded to it, **was an absolutely advantageous situation compared to the possibility of maintaining 100% of the shares of the company that had already lost ownership of that real property**, which both he (now his estate) and the co-defendants considered and consider valuable, hence their dispute and the recurrent argumentative deflection toward this. **Fourth**. The corporate capital increase occurred on December 21, 1994 (according to information from the plaintiff party and the co-defendants, and as observed in the notarial certifications from folios 1258 to 1259, 1260 to 1261, 1325 to 1326, and 1327 to 1328, which correspond to the share certificates with the transfer legend and the entry in the shareholder register of Cocomar S.A.). That is, it was carried out 1 year and 9 months after the share sale with condition precedent (condición suspensiva) and the loan itself were agreed upon (it is true that they were not registered in the relevant registry until May 21, 2003, which was due to the fact that said book was a replacement of the previous one that was lost by the criminal jurisdictional authorities within proceeding 94-001943-0204-PE, a case against the co-defendants herein and others, to the detriment of Mohs Villalta, as stated in the certification of the book itself issued by the Agrarian Court (494 to 499) and the notarial certification of the Criminal Court's resolution (folios 1243 to 1244). Then, it cannot even be affirmed that the capital increase was made within a period that could indicate an original and hidden intention by Mr. Arrea Escalante to reduce the corporate participation of Mr. Mohs Villalta with intent to harm him. It is logical that a partner in a position to invest in the legal entity of which they are the owner does so. In this sense, mandate 30 of the Commercial Code establishes that corporate capital may be increased through contributions or by capitalizing reserves and special funds that appear on the balance sheet. It is worth noting at this point that the plaintiff party (principally) argues that the corporate capital increase of December 21, 1994, constitutes a violation of the "option to purchase contract." The validity or invalidity of that shareholders' meeting agreement is a matter that falls outside this present proceeding, because aside from the plaintiff party having insistently alluded to defects in that meeting (and in others), the truth is that in their complaints, they did not seek –neither primarily nor subsidiarily– the nullity of that shareholder agreement, nor of any other (indeed, the plaintiff party expressly acknowledged this in their reply to the defenses raised by the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, folios 1354 to 1356). In accordance with the claim framework of the complaints, the dispute was joined over the legitimate possession of the share certificate, the nullity of the subsequent share transfers, and the breach of the "option to purchase" contract, thus the main claims and the first subsidiary petitions; and finally, over the invalidity of that agreement, according to the second subsidiary claims. It is unnecessary to point out at this juncture that this structuring of the main and subsidiary claims is, in the opinion of this Chamber, inconsistent, and attention is drawn to the plaintiff party regarding this, since, however much subsidiarity was established, the petitions for contractual breach contained in the main framework and in the first subsidiary framework have as their premise the existence of a valid agreement. From a logical point of view, the validity of any contract is a matter for examination prior to that of its breach. In sum, this Chamber does not find that the capital increase of December 21, 1994, determined or constituted a breach of the sale contract by Mr. Arrea Escalante, whereby the lack of right defense raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante regarding this claim must also be granted, and ex officio, the lack of passive standing (legitimación pasiva) is declared in relation to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as Cocomar S.A.

**XXVIII.** The main claim seeking a declaration of (a material breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante of the "option" contract of March 11, 1992, by increasing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., capitalizing a surplus of that company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit **(3.2)**, must also be dismissed for the following reasons. In addition to the first two reasons mentioned regarding the previous claim that are applicable to this one (namely, that it was a sale agreement, which concerned 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., and not an option to sell the real property, as the plaintiff party has maintained), it is clear that the underlying premise in this petition has been that Cocomar S.A. produced a profit to which he had a specific right, not as a partner, but by the agreement with Mr. Arrea Escalante. However, the plaintiff party did not demonstrate that premise. It relied on its mere assertion, without presenting suitable evidence thereof. It only requested the exhibition of the company's accounting books (thus, both complaints are read at folios 139 to 140 and 1061: "(...) I request that the exhibition of the accounting books kept by the Company Cocomar S.A. be ordered for the purpose of verifying the supposed surplus the company had"). This was ordered by the Court of First Instance in resolutions of March 16 and 30, 2004 (folio 521 and 539 to 540). The defendant party presented said books. In a resolution of April 13, 2004, a hearing was granted to the plaintiff party regarding them (folio 547), who referred to them and submitted a document issued by a certified public accountant contracted by him, while also requesting an expert accounting examination (folios 565 to 577). Regarding this evidentiary request and that documentary evidence, which –it is understood– was offered as being for better provision (given the stage at which the proceeding was at that moment), the Agrarian Court did not rule; therefore, they are deemed denied. Subsequently, on June 22, 2006, upon joining Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad to the dispute as ordered by the Agrarian Trial Court, the plaintiff party did not request said technical evidence nor offer the documentary evidence issued by the accountant contracted by him, which he had offered as being for better provision (thus folios 1085 to 1087). In sum, the plaintiff party did not timely provide the technical evidentiary elements that would conclude that Cocomar S.A. produced an undistributed profit, from which it could later be deduced that there was a disrespect of the sale agreement in question. It is worth noting that the document issued by the accountant submitted for better provision (not admitted) is, in any case, not conclusive regarding the existence of an undistributed profit capitalized in the capital increase of December 21, 1994; quite the opposite, the professional indicated he required more information, vouchers, or supporting documents for the entries to be able to issue an opinion (folio 577). In a resolution of April 22, 2004, the Court of First Instance requested the plaintiff party to provide a certified copy of the accounting books, as they had to be returned to the defendant party because –it is understood– a criminal proceeding had so ordered (folio 578). The record at folio 587 states that the following accounting books were delivered to the special judicial representative of Cocomar S.A.: Auxiliary Journal, Journal, Ledger, and Inventories and Balance Sheets. In the case file, the certifications issued by the Agrarian Court from Cocomar S.A.'s Ledger (folios 583 to 604), Inventories and Balance Sheets (folios 605 to 642), Journal (folios 643 to 671), and Auxiliary Journal (folios 672 to 677) are included. Also found in the file is the notarial certification of the accounting books of Cocomar S.A. submitted by the plaintiff party (from folios 689 to 772, specifically the Journal (folios 689 to 717), Ledger (folios 718 to 744), Inventories and Balance Sheets (folios 745 to 765), and Auxiliary Register (folios 766 to 772). From reading these certifications of the accounting books, this Chamber cannot extract with certainty that Cocomar S.A. had generated a profit; that determination required a technical examination by an expert accountant, which –as related– was not timely petitioned by the plaintiff party. That was the evidentiary burden that, in accordance with canon 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, corresponded to it, given that in this main claim under analysis, it affirmed that the capital increase of Cocomar S.A.

was done by capitalizing a surplus, whereby Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the "purchase option (opción de compra venta)" contract, according to which he would be entitled to 25% of any profit as part of the payment of the balance of the price (see also in this regard fact 12 of the complaint, at folios 134 and 1080). Again, it is worth emphasizing at this point that all the remaining allegations of the plaintiff regarding the accounting and other details of the capital increase in question fall outside the scope of this debate, which was defined by his claims, within which –it is repeated– he did not include the nullity of that shareholders' meeting agreement of December 21, 1994, or of any other prior or subsequent one. This being the case, with respect to this particular claim, the lack of right (falta de derecho) asserted by the defendant Arrea Escalante is also upheld, and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as Cocomar S.A., is decreed.

**XXIX.** Finally, regarding the plaintiff's request that the nullity of the share assignments made by Mr. Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad be decreed *because they are simulated and lack just cause (justa causa)*, that they are not enforceable against him, and that the shares must be restored to him **(4)**, it is observed that in his complaint he specified *the transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer is simulated as it was done with a view to evading the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholder holders knew "the details of how the actions through which the breach of the option contract occurred were carried out" and that "the action" (meaning the share certificate) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante as collateral for a loan of ₡100,000.00, and not as property*. He added that this share transfer is invalid and ineffective since *"it could never be registered in the company's shareholder record book given that on the date it is recorded as having been made, May 20, 2003, said book did not exist"*. Regarding this particular point, it is noted that the share certificates and the shareholder record book state that the transfer occurred on May 20, 2001 (notarial certifications at folios 1258 to 1259 and 1325 to 1329, and court and notarial certifications at folios 498 to 499, 1260 to 1261, and 1327 to 1328). What the plaintiff claims in relation to both assignments is simulation to impede or avoid the consequences of this proceeding. The date of the assignments (May 20, 2001) is prior to the filing of this proceeding, which was initiated on June 5, 2002. Therefore, the denial of this claim is imperative, as Mr. Arrea could not have anticipated in May 2001 the consequences of a proceeding that had not even been filed at that time. Furthermore, it is clear that if Arrea Escalante's intention had merely been to divert the asset (as it might seem could be inferred from the plaintiff's allegation, although he does not expressly state it so), that is, to divert the shares of the share capital (capital social) of Cocomar S.A., logically he would have made the assignments in a reasonably shorter time and closer to the moment he became the holder of them, either in 1992 or at least after the capital increase in December 1994. However, he made them 6 years after the capital increase; 8 years after the purchase-sale agreement. In any case, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad were aware of the details of the businesses (of purchase-sale and loan) between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (as can be inferred from their answers to the complaint and their counterclaims), so they could not have been considered third-party acquirers in good faith (terceros adquirentes de buena fe) in the event that the first 2 claims of the complaints and/or the breach of the purchase-sale contract by Arrea Escalante had been upheld, for the purpose of preventing the consequent restitution of shares requested. Moreover, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad did not claim this status in their actions in this proceeding. Finally, as for the facts—not in the claim—where the plaintiff alleged the nullity of the share assignments for not having been registered in the shareholder record book –apparently immediately at the time they occurred (May 20, 2001)–, the truth is that such assignments were indeed recorded, although subsequently, precisely in the aforementioned entry 4. Now, mandate 140 of the Commercial Code (Código de Comercio) established that *"The company shall consider as a partner the person registered as such in the shareholder records, if the shares are nominative; and the holder thereof, if they are bearer shares"* (wording prior to the reform by Law 9068 of September 10, 2012, applicable to this matter). This was not a rule that established registration in the shareholder record as a validity requirement for a transfer, but rather regulated the internal relationship between the partner and the company, configuring a condition of effectiveness with respect to the latter. In the same vein, canon 687 ibidem stipulates that in nominative instruments, as shares are, *"( ... ) No act or operation referring to this class of instruments shall have effect against the issuer or against third parties, if it is not registered on the instrument and in the record"*. Again, the legislator did not provide a condition of validity, but of effectiveness, now also, in particular, in relation to third parties. Therefore, this claim of nullity for simulation based on that specific cause of action is also dismissed for lack of right (carecer de derecho) in relation to Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad; in the case of Cocomar S.A., for lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva).

**XXX. Of the defenses asserted by the defendants. Of the statute of limitations (prescripción).** The defendants raised the defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción); they alleged that in accordance with mandate 984 of the Commercial Code, all claims are time-barred because more than 4 years have elapsed since the events supporting them occurred. Likewise, they maintained, the objections to the shareholders' meeting agreements are time-barred according to subsection a) of the same precept. They concluded, the claims for *"invalidity and effectiveness"* of the *"option"* contract are also time-barred according to that canon because it was signed on March 11, 1992, and the complaint was filed on *"June 4, 2002"*, even if the ten-year prescriptive period of Article 868 of the Civil Code (Código Civil) were applied. It is observed that the argument is directed against the entire framework of claims of the complaint; that is, against the main claims and against the subsidiary ones, without having specified any one or some of them. The *defense regarding the main claims* is resolved immediately; regarding the remaining ones, a pronouncement will be issued further on as they are analyzed. The agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (the breach of which is claimed) is –as indicated– a purchase-sale, whose nature, by virtue of its object, is commercial in accordance with provision 438 subsection c) of the Commercial Code. The share assignments between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Arrea Gronblad (the nullity of which is requested) are also commercial. Consequently, the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the main claims relating to the execution of the first contract and the nullity of the second ones follows the rules of the Code of that subject matter, particularly norms 968 and 984. Having defined that regulatory framework applicable to the case at hand (sublite), it is noted first, that in this proceeding the plaintiff did not assert a claim for annulment of any shareholders' meeting agreement of Cocomar S.A. –despite the insistent assertions of defects therein–; that is, this was not the subject of discussion in a main (or subsidiary) manner. Consequently, the statute of limitations (prescripción) is denied insofar as it is directed against that supposed claim, because it does not exist from the standpoint of the claim upon which the Litis was joined. Second, regarding the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the claims to declare the possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante illegitimate because it was delivered to him as collateral, and the consequent nullity of the share assignments between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, the impossibility of them being enforced against him, and the restitution of all the shares **(1 and 2)**, the following must be highlighted. The first of the complaints, filed solely against Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A., was presented on June 5, 2002 (folio 144), was deemed established by resolution at 8:00 a.m. the following day (folio 145), and was notified to Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. on the 14th of the same month (folio 158). In it, clearly, given his lack of knowledge of the share transfers from Mr. Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Solís and Rodríguez, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not request the nullity of those agreements. It is observed that the co-defendants at that time (only Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A.), when answering the complaint and raising defenses, did not refer to those share transfers. Regardless of the reason why the co-defendants at that time did not make any statement regarding that circumstance, the fact is that said information became part of the case file (expediente) starting from the presentation of the shareholder record book on March 15, 2004 (folios 494 to 499), and it was precisely these transfers that were the reason why the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario), in resolution 513-F-06 at 3:20 p.m. on May 29, 2006, annulled the judgment issued at 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 2004, by the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone (Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica) and *sua sponte (de oficio)* ordered the joinder (integración) of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad (thus folios 1022 to 1025 in conjunction with folios 856 to 885 where the annulled judgment is located). Starting from March 15, 2004 (when the shareholder record was presented to the Court), the action for nullity of the share assignments between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is not time-barred, because that date would be the moment from which the plaintiff became aware of them and could enforce his right in accordance with precept 969 of the Commercial Code. The joinder (integración) was presented on June 22, 2006 (folio 1093), was deemed completed by resolution at 2:00 p.m. on September 21 of the same year (folio 1098), was notified to Mr. Solís Rodríguez on November 30, 2006 (folio 1131), and the first written submission of Mr. Arrea Gronblad was filed on the following December 6 (folio 1134), with which he was considered notified. Thus, the four-year period established by the first paragraph of mandate 984 did not elapse, because the calculation began on March 15, 2004. Regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, aside from the fact that it was a matter on which a ruling on the merits was necessary by virtue of the resolution and consequent granting of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación), it is considered that the statute of limitations (prescripción) also did not operate, since the alleged illegal possession would have had a continuous effect, formally until the date of issuance of the share certificates that Mr. Arrea later transferred to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, but which came to the plaintiff's knowledge only on that same March 15, 2004 (when the shareholder record was presented to the Court). With regard to the claim to declare Mr. Arrea Escalante's serious breach of the *"option"* contract **(3)**, see that one of the breaches was supported by Mr. Mohs Villalta in relation to the non-payment of the balance of the agreed price (capitalization of a supposed surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% on any profit), a balance which –as can be read– and as the contracting parties affirmed– does not have a term but is subject to a condition precedent (condición suspensiva). The co-defendant Arrea Escalante himself –who was the proper defendant (legitimado pasivo) with respect to this claim (not the remaining co-defendants, as indicated supra)– stated in his answer: *"a form of payment was also established which I have fulfilled as to what I was obligated, and the balance, as I already said, is subject to a condition precedent (condición suspensiva), and I will make it once that condition precedent is fulfilled"*, which is that portions or all of the farm are sold or that Cocomar S.A. produces profits (folios 197 to 198). Therefore, as the contract is still in execution, said action is not time-barred. Lastly, the statute of limitations (prescripción) did not operate regarding the nullity of share assignments for being simulated and lacking just cause (justa causa) **(4)** for the same reasons noted regarding the invalidity of that transaction by virtue of the illegitimate possession (2). **Of the res judicata (cosa juzgada) defense.** The co-defendants pointed out that in the criminal proceeding for the crimes of fraud (estafa) and ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), in which the members of the board of directors of Cocomar S.A., among them Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad, were accused by Mr. Mohs Villalta, *"the matter"* of the nullity of the transfer between the former and Mohs Villalta was raised, which is requested in the case at hand (subjúdice); specifically, they said, it was raised in the expansion of the prosecutorial request against Arrea Escalante and Solís Rodríguez for the crimes of fraud and ideological falsehood *"due to the content given to the legend of assignment and transfer that appears recorded on the back of the mentioned instrument"*. That criminal proceeding, they affirmed, for the crimes of ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud, ended with a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) in favor of all the accused (encartados). The defense was clearly raised only with respect to main claim 1), namely, the illegitimate possession of the share certificate (although it would have an impact on 2), the subsequent assignments to Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad), and it was not so raised in relation to the claimed contractual breaches or the nullity of the assignments for simulation (3 and 4)). In the case at hand (sublite), as the cause of action for that claim of illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the plaintiff did not allege the use of a false document, the introduction of false statements into a public or authentic document (ideological falsehood, according to canon 367 of the Penal Code (Código Penal)), and even less so a fraud; so that the definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) in relation to the crimes of forgery of an equivalent document, ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud decreed in the criminal proceeding (folios 274 to 277 and folios 1236 to 1242) did not produce the effect of res judicata (cosa juzgada). Therefore, the defense is denied.

**XXXI.** In order, from what has been pointed out up to here, **Mr. Mohs Villalta's complaint is deemed denied in its main claims**. Now, regarding the **first subsidiary claim framework** of the complaint, it is reiterated that Mr. Mohs Villalta requested it be declared that: **1)** *"Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the purchase option (opción de compra venta) contract through which he acquired the farm of the Partido de Limón, registration number 32236-000, by abusing his right (abuso del derecho), rendering the undersigned's right to obtain a fair price nugatory"*; **2)** the resolution of the purchase option (opción de compraventa) contract of the farm for serious breach by the defendant Arrea Escalante, and that *"in his capacity as generalísimo attorney-in-fact (apoderado generalísimo) without limit of sum of the company Cocomar S.A., he is obligated to return the real estate (inmueble) object of the purchase option (opción de compraventa) contract"*; and **3)** that *"Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed (escritura pública) in which it also returns the registry title (titularidad registral) of the real estate (inmueble) object of this litis to the undersigned"*. He lacks right in these claims, because what ultimately happened in the case under examination (subexamine) was a contract for the purchase-sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., not an option on the real estate (inmueble). Regarding the abuse of right (abuso del derecho) and the breach of the agreement, in addition to being incorrect regarding the nature and the object, the plaintiff did not specify it concretely as something different from what he alleged in relation to the main claims (even see thus fact 11 of the complaint, folios 134 and 1080, where he specifies the abuse of right in the capital increase by which he is the owner of 10,000 shares with respect to a share capital of ₡20,000,000.00 and not of ₡100,000.00), so that in the same way, as it consists, in essence, of a reiteration of those, they are denied. Consequently, the lack of right (falta de derecho) in relation to Mr. Arrea Escalante is also upheld for the first subsidiary claims **1)** and **2)**, and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is decreed against Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad in relation to these claims. Regarding claim **3)**, the lack of right (falta de derecho) with respect to Cocomar S.A. is upheld, and the lack of standing (falta de legitimación) of the remaining co-defendants is upheld. With respect to the **defense of statute of limitations (prescripción)**, it is denied regarding the first subsidiary claims **1)** and **2)**, because they concern the breach of contract by Mr. Arrea Escalante, just as it was dismissed supra in relation to the main claims. Regarding claim **3)**, no assertion was made by any of the co-defendants, so it is deemed not raised. In any case, it is noted that this request by the plaintiff is meaningless because it directly concerns the return of the real estate (bien inmueble) 7-32236-000 to his assets, when that property was never under his ownership.

**XXXII.** Regarding the **second subsidiary claims**, it was already indicated supra that there is no logical coherence in relation to the main claims and the first subsidiary claims (in order, essentially, for resolution of the agreement between Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante, then for nullity of that same agreement). Now, disregarding this argumentative problem, it is noted that Mr. Mohs Villalta requested it be decreed that: **1)** the purchase option (opción de compraventa) contract for farm 7-32236-000 is null for *"having been carried out with Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the undersigned's state of necessity (estado de necesidad) and for containing clauses that in themselves determine a total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith (buena fe) and contractual cooperation, constituting an abuse of right (abuso de derecho)"* and because it does not contain a term, which is essential in option contracts *"and since the term indicated by law has expired in the event that the parties do not provide otherwise"*; and **2)** since the purchase option contract is null, so too is any act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as partner of Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as shareholder, including the share transfers made to the co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, as well as that the real estate (inmueble) must *"return to the undersigned, it being that Mr. Arrea Escalante is who signed the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A."*. The co-defendants raised the defense of statute of limitations (prescripción) specifically against the invalidity claim **(1)**. It is reiterated, they maintained that since the contract was signed on March 11, 1992, and the complaint was filed on *"June 4, 2002"*, the four-year statute of limitations (prescripción) of precept 984 of the Commercial Code operated, as well as the ten-year period of Article 868 of the Civil Code. In effect, from when Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed on the purchase-sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., on March 11, 1992, to the filing date of the complaint, June 5, 2002 (folio 144), more than 4 years elapsed. Even if one were to assert that the starting point for calculating the statute of limitations (prescripción) is the moment from which Mr. Mohs Villalta became aware of the facts he alleges as the cause of action for that nullity, that would have been September 25, 1992. See thus that, once the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) of the purchase-sale had occurred (acceptance of the regularization by the National Bank (Banco Nacional), on March 11, 1992), when he had even formalized the share transfer and had been informed of the changes in the appointment of the board of directors that would be made (on the following 13th), with Mr. Arrea Escalante having already paid the National Bank (on April 2, 1992, according to the provisional receipt issued by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, at folio 229, and the statement of Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, at folio 510) and having received personally 2 sums of money –and his wife one– precisely for the purchase of shares of Cocomar S.A. (on July 4, 14, and 27, 1992, as observed in folios 230 to 231), *Mr. Mohs Villalta sent a note to Mr. Arrea Escalante informing him of the "PRESCRIPTION (PRESCRIPCIÓN) of the option"*.

In said document, it reads that the reason for that supposed "withdrawal of the option" was that: "(...) it has no fixed term or time, and by reason of the time elapsed –more than six months– and the abrupt changes that have occurred both in the financial markets and in the real estate market" (folios 214 to 218). However, when filing the lawsuit, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself detailed: "In the month of September 1992, considering that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acted in bad faith, including in the literal wording of the purchase-sale option words and phrases in which my right could be seen as limited and devalued in complete dissonance with the spirit of the purchase-sale option agreement, the undersigned communicated to Mr. Arrea Escalante that the option was being rendered without effect (...)" (folios 131 and 1077, fact 5 of the lawsuit). Thus, from his own statement, it is established that since September 25, 1992, he felt aggrieved by the clauses of the document he signed and which has served as evidentiary support for the purchase-sale agreement whose nullity he seeks. In this line, quite clearly, the lawsuit filed on June 5, 2002, regarding this **second subsidiary claim 1)**, is time-barred in accordance with mandate 984 of the Commercial Code because, from the date of the agreement, even from September 25, 1992, more than 4 years elapsed to the date of filing the lawsuit, even more so with respect to its notification. Furthermore, it is noted that insofar as he requests a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante took advantage of his state of necessity, the plaintiff did not even bother to describe it, much less prove it. He did not specify that alleged state of necessity he argued, even less what clauses were supposedly included but not agreed upon. Moreover, it is noted that as of September 1992, there was no possibility whatsoever for Mr. Mohs Villalta to withdraw an alleged sales offer, since –it is reiterated– what was agreed upon by him and Mr. Arrea Escalante on March 11, 1992, was the purchase-sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. with a condition precedent, which was even fulfilled on that same date. In any case, even if it were considered that what occurred was a promise of sale without a stipulated term by the contracting parties (which it is not, as already stated), in accordance with canon 1055 of the Civil Code, the term for its acceptance would have been one month, and that acceptance would have occurred on that same March 11, 1992, a fact known to Mohs Villalta himself at least by March 13, 1992 (as referred to supra); in addition to the fact that a part of the price, namely, the payment of what was owed by Cocomar S.A. to Banco Nacional, was made on April 2, 1992. The plaintiff also did not specify in his lawsuits which of the agreed clauses were in themselves contrary to the principles of good faith and contractual cooperation. This Chamber could not have supposed it, besides the fact that, as already mentioned, it is considered that as of March 11, 1992, it was beneficial for Mr. Mohs Villalta to remain as owner of 10% of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. for the event in which Banco Nacional accepted Mr. Arrea Escalante's proposal to regularize that company's credit and did not register the property that had been awarded to it, so that this company would remain as owner of that real estate. He also would not have been correct in requesting the nullity of the agreement for the non-stipulation of a term. It is repeated, it was not a promise of sale without a term, but a purchase-sale subject to a condition precedent. Even if one were to start from the premise that it was, mandate 1055 of the Civil Code would have been applicable –as already stated–, such that this would not have been verified as a defect that invalidates it. On the other hand, insofar as he seeks nullity "upon the expiration of the term indicated by law in the event that the parties do not provide otherwise", it is noted, first, that this would not constitute a ground for nullity, but rather refers to the execution phase (expiration of the term and its consequence). Then, this argument does not fall within a nullification claim like the one under analysis. Second, there is no basis whatsoever for the reference to a (now legal) acceptance period for a promise when what occurred was a purchase-sale contract subject to a condition precedent, just as was determined to have occurred in the sub lite. It goes without saying that this Chamber finds the intricacy of this claim in itself striking, because on one hand it petitions the invalidity of an "option" contract for the non-existence of a term, but, immediately thereafter, requests it for non-compliance with the legal term provided for cases in which no expiration was stipulated. Likewise, what draws attention, but now generally regarding the conduct of Mr. Mohs Villalta, is that once the condition precedent of the purchase-sale was fulfilled on that March 11, 1992, having formalized the transfer of the shares on the following 13th, being made aware on that same date of the appointments to the board of directors to be made, having paid Mr. Arrea Escalante to Banco Nacional on April 2 of the same year, having received sums of money for the concept of the share purchase on July 4, 14, and 27 also of 1992, in addition to the note of September 25 "withdrawing" the supposed option, Mr. Mohs Villalta sold on October 22, 1992, in representation of Cocomar S.A., to Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., property 7-32236-000, for the sum of ¢11,000,000.00 (notarial certifications from folios 89 to 103 and 1245 to 1257). Although that purchase-sale between Cocomar S.A. and Servicentro Los Yoses S.A. was decreed null by the Fifth Civil Court of San José (judgment 25-94 of March 24, 1994), it is noted that the very reason for nullity was that the contract was executed by "Mr. Rodrigo Mohs Villalta when he no longer held the representation of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima" (operative part, folio 1236); and that even Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., then acquirer and defendant, acquiesced (folio 1251). It is thus clear that Mr. Mohs Villalta has attempted by various non-jurisdictional means to render without effect the purchase-sale contract for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to dispose of the property owned by that company. Indeed, it is noted that he filed the first of the lawsuits after Banco Nacional, on February 4, 1999, had cancelled the mortgage on estate 7-32236-000 of Cocomar S.A., (as observed in the notarial certification of the deed testimony from folios 270 to 273, in concordance with that of folios 222 to 225, regarding the approval of the public auction). From which it is undeniable that he brought this action after Cocomar S.A. had finished paying the debt it had with that financial entity and the property had been released. Finally, regarding his request for the nullity of all acts through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as partner of Cocomar S.A., including the share transfers made to co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and that the real estate must be returned to him **(2)**, it is dismissed. This petition has as its basis or premise the acceptance of the prior one (the nullity of the "option" contract, which was already denied due to the statute of limitations); that is, it is accessory to it, and therefore meets the same fate. In this manner, the defense of statute of limitations raised by defendant Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of Cocomar S.A. and of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is decreed. In sum, the second subsidiary claims are also declared without merit.

**XXXIII.** This being the case, the lawsuits filed by Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad are declared without merit in all their aspects. In accordance with precept 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, personal and procedural costs are imposed on the defeated plaintiff, as it is not found that in this instance a sufficient reason to litigate was verified in the terms that have been repeatedly defined by this Chamber (namely, that it does not consist of the mere conviction of the thesis one supports, but necessarily the conviction of one's own thesis must respond to objective data from the proceeding that allow one to deduce the soundness of their claims or defenses, among which the subtlety in the "legal question" has been identified, which, for example, occurs when what is discussed is based on a pure interpretation of legal norms, as the factual picture is not controverted (in this sense, resolutions 1692-F-SI-2012, 1307-F-SI-2014, and 222-F-SI-2019 may be consulted)). Nor is it found that the claims of the prevailing party, in this case, the exceptions opposed by it, were disproportionate.

**XXXIV. Regarding the counterclaims**. Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad seek a declaration that the negotiation between their owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, their transferor, regarding the transfer of 90% of the shares that then constituted the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., is legitimate and transferred ownership of the shares **(1)**. The exception of lack of active legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant is accepted. It is true that Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad would have an interest in the invalidity of the agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante not being declared, since it is as a result of this that Mr. Arrea Escalante became the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. of which they are now the owners. However, neither of them was a party to such agreement, and therefore they lack standing to petition the declaration of validity; this had to be requested by Mr. Arrea Escalante. In any case, that specific petition of the counterclaimants would lack current interest due to the manner in which the main and subsidiary claims of the lawsuit were resolved, in particular the dismissal of the annulment claim against that agreement (second subsidiary 1). On the other hand, the counterclaimants request that it be decreed that the acquisitions made by each of them (Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad) of 9,995,000 shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. were likewise legitimate, real, and for valuable consideration **(2)**. In relation to this petition, the lack of passive legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is accepted, as he is in turn a third party with respect to the legal transactions by which Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad became holders of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Moreover, due to the way the lawsuit was resolved, it would also lack interest, since the invalidity of such transfers requested by the plaintiff was denied. They further seek a declaration that "the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at an extraordinary General Assembly held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the corporate capital to the sum of seven million colones, was legitimate and binding for all shares" **(3)**. The request lacks current interest. It is reiterated that the plaintiff, despite the constant references to illegalities in that and other shareholder assemblies, did not seek the invalidity of that held on December 21, 1994, in which the capital of Cocomar S.A. was increased. Insofar as the validity of that assembly was not questioned, it is presumed valid, therefore this claim leads nowhere. Finally, the counterclaim plaintiffs requested that it be established that "[A]s of the date on which the counterclaim defendant Mohs Villalta made the transfer of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole or main and fundamental economic backing, having equally lost, by way of judicial public auction and adjudication that had already been made, by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, of the sole real property owned" **(4)** and consequently, that "the value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. have today or may come to have in the future is due or shall be due to the economic effort and of other nature that the partners who acquired 90% of the corporate capital of that company from the counterclaim defendant Mohs have carried out (sic) since the latter, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company" **(5)**. It is observed that the counterclaimants did not timely provide any technical evidence to demonstrate their statement as corresponded to them according to mandate 317 of the Procedural Code; they did not attach any element of conviction that compared the value of the shares of Cocomar S.A. before the public auction of property 7-32236-000, the value after that circumstance, the value they acquired when the Bank accepted the regularization of the credit, and the various values they have had since then. Even less could one accede to what refers to a future and uncertain fact ("the value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. (...) may come to have in the future (...) shall be due to the economic effort and of other nature that the partners who acquired 90% of the corporate capital from the counterclaim defendant Mohs have carried out"), about which it is even unknown if it is technically feasible to make projections. Therefore, they have no right. As a **sole subsidiary claim**, the counterclaimants requested that if the plaintiff's claim is accepted in the sense that the shares of Cocomar S.A. must be returned to him and with them the ownership of property 7-32236-000, insofar as that return of shares and the real estate would cause an enrichment without cause and illegitimate of the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to avoid it, the plaintiff must be ordered to pay them 50% of the value of the property at the time of effective payment, according to a fair appraisal defined by an expert in the execution phase. Insofar as this petition has as its premise the acceptance of the lawsuit, as this did not occur, it lacks current interest and must be denied. In sum, the counterclaims filed by Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad against Mr. Mohs Villalta (today his succession) are declared without merit. Both costs are borne by the defeated counterclaimants in accordance with mandate 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, since this Chamber does not find they had a sufficient reason to litigate.

**POR TANTO** The appeal is declared admissible. The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is likewise revoked. Regarding the **lawsuit** of Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations are partially accepted, and the lack of passive and active legitimation, as well as lack of interest, are decreed ex officio. Thus, with respect to the **main claims**: "a", "b" and "e", the lack of right raised by Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad is accepted; regarding Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive legitimation is accepted ex officio; and regarding claims "c" and "d", the lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining co-defendants is decreed ex officio. As for the **first subsidiary claims**, lack of right and lack of passive legitimation are decreed. Thus, with respect to "a", "b" and "c", the lack of right formulated by Mr. Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining co-defendants is declared ex officio; regarding claim "d", the lack of right with respect to Cocomar S.A. is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining parties. As for the **second subsidiary claims**, the defense of statute of limitations raised by the co-defendants is accepted regarding "a" and "b", and "c" and "d" which are accessory to them are denied. Thus, **the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects, both main and subsidiary, and personal and procedural costs are imposed on the defeated plaintiff**. With respect to the **counterclaims** of Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad against Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the exceptions of lack of active and passive legitimation, lack of right, are partially accepted, and the lack of current interest is likewise decreed ex officio. Thus, with respect to the **main claims**: "1)", the lack of active legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is accepted; "2)", the lack of passive legitimation also formulated by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is decreed; "3)", the lack of current interest is decreed ex officio; and "4)" and "5)", lack of right. As for the subsidiary claims, the lack of current interest is decreed ex officio.

The counterclaims are dismissed in their entirety, both in the principal claim and in the subsidiary claim; both sets of costs are borne by the unsuccessful counterclaimants.

MACUNAQ In the present matter, it is clear that what occurred was not a unilateral promise of sale, but rather a perfected agreement of purchase and sale between a thing and a price (90% of the shares of the corporate capital (capital social) of a sociedad anónima) subject to a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) —which occurred— (articles 678, 681 and 685 of the Código Civil) (vote 2010-F-2020).

An agreement to the effect that the corporate capital (capital social) would not be increased would necessarily have to be expressly stated in some medium or demonstrated, as it would imply a limitation on the growth of the sociedad anónima which is, to some extent, contrary to commercial logic itself. On the other hand, it is logical that a shareholder in a position to invest in the legal entity of which he is the owner, does so (article 30 of the Código de Comercio) (vote 2010-F-2020).

Article 140 of the Código de Comercio established: "The corporation shall consider as a shareholder the person registered as such in the shareholder registry (registros de accionistas), if the shares are registered (nominativas); and the holder thereof, if they are bearer shares" (wording prior to the reform enacted by Ley 9068, applicable to this matter). This was not a rule that established entry in the shareholder registry (registro de accionistas) as a requirement for the validity of a transfer, but rather it regulated the internal relationship between the shareholder and the corporation, establishing a condition of effectiveness with respect to the latter. In the same sense, canon 687 thereof provides that, in nominative instruments, as shares are, "No act or operation relating to this class of instruments shall have effect against the issuer or against third parties, if it is not recorded on the instrument and in the registry." Again, the legislator did not establish a condition of validity, but rather of effectiveness, now also, in particular, in relation to third parties (vote 2010-F-2020).

The agreement between the parties is a purchase and sale (compraventa), whose nature, by virtue of its object, is commercial in accordance with cardinal 438.c of the Código de Comercio. So are the assignments of shares (whose nullity is sought). Consequently, the statute of limitations (prescripción) for the main claims relating to the execution of the first contract and the nullity of the latter ones follows the rules of articles 968 and 984 thereof (vote 2010-F-2020).

In the case of a promise of sale without a term stipulated by the contracting parties for its acceptance, the term would be one month (provision 1055 of the Código Civil) (vote 2010-F-2020).

In accordance with precept 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, personal and procedural costs are imposed on the losing plaintiff, since it is not found in this case that a sufficient reason to litigate was verified, namely: that it does not consist of the mere conviction of the thesis they sustain, but necessarily the conviction of one's own thesis must respond to objective data from the proceedings that allow deducing the soundness of their claims or defenses, among which the subtlety in the "legal question" has been identified, which, for example, occurs when what is disputed is based on a pure interpretation of the legal norms, as the factual framework is not controverted. See resolutions 1692-2012, 1307-2014 and 222-2019.

**Exp. 02-160069-0465-AG** **Res. 002010-F-S1-2020** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE**. San José, at eleven hours ten minutes on the eighteenth of June two thousand twenty.

Ordinary proceeding established in the Agrarian Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone by the **ESTATE OF RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA**, represented by its executor Lidiette Porras González, widow, does not indicate occupation or domicile; against **RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE**, civil engineer, in his personal capacity and as unlimited general power of attorney of **COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA**, **CARLOS SOLÍS RODRÍGUEZ**, **RODRIGO ALBERTO ARREA GROBLAD**, does not indicate occupation. Appearing as special judicial attorneys, for the plaintiff, Álvaro José Meza Lazarus; for the defendant Arrea Escalante, Johnny Jiménez Oconitrillo, single, resident of Limón; and for the defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, Federico José Solís Montero, Eduardo Augusto Cordero Sibaja. The natural persons are of legal age, and with the exceptions noted, married, lawyers, and residents of San José.

**Drafted by Magistrate Molinari Vílchez** **I.** In separate lawsuits (filed on June 5, 2002, and July 17, 2006), Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (now his estate) stated that Cocomar Sociedad Anónima is the owner of the property in the province of Limón, registration number 32236-000, located in the Matina district, Matina canton, whose nature is coconuts and trees, with boundaries north: Urpiano S.A., south: Laguna de Urpiano; east: Laguna de Urpiano and west: Matina artificial canal, with a measurement of 95 hectares 4,355 square meters, cadastral map L-0395724-1980. He indicated that during 1992, he was the owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A., of which he was also the president with powers as unlimited general power of attorney from September 17, 1986, until August 24, 1992, when he was removed by means of an alleged extraordinary assembly. He stated that on March 11, 1992, in a "personal capacity and as owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A.", he agreed with Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante on a purchase option for property 7-32236-000 for the sum of ¢9,000,000.00, which would be paid as follows: a) ¢2,175,000.00 with Mr. Arrea Escalante assuming the debt that Cocomar S.A. had with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, guaranteed by a first-degree mortgage on the same estate over which he granted that option; b) ¢500,000.00 intended to pay an indemnity to Mrs. Juana Aguilar for improvements due to occupation of a portion of the property; c) ¢1,000,000.00 through the delivery of 10% of the shares of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.; and d) the balance, which would not accrue interest, from the proceeds of 25% of the sales made of parts of the land or any profit that Cocomar S.A. might produce for any reason. He detailed that the agreement was an offer to sell the property 7-32236-000; however, for "practical and fiscal reasons, at the buyer's convenience," they determined that this business could be carried out through the purchase of the property—it is understood, through the corresponding purchase-sale deed—or through the transfer of the shares that constituted the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., which at that time was ¢100,000.00, represented by 100,000 shares of ¢1.00 each. He noted that this option had no term. This document, he said, was signed at the Facio y Cañas law firm, where the office of Mr. Arrea Escalante's lawyer, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, was located. He added that, as "has been indicated in several criminal proceedings," at the same time the option was negotiated, Mr. Arrea Escalante lent him, without a term, the sum of ¢100,000.00, which he guaranteed through "the issuance and delivery" of the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A. He maintained that in September 1992, considering that Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in bad faith by including "in the literal wording of the purchase-sale option words and phrases in which his right could be limited and devalued in complete dissonance with the spirit of the purchase-sale option agreement," he communicated to him that he was rendering the option without effect, with which the property remained "free." He recounted that Mr. Arrea Escalante's reaction was to modify the bylaws of Cocomar S.A. and replace him as legal representative, taking advantage of the fact that he had the share certificate in his possession. He explained that upon negotiating the option, Mr. Arrea Escalante lent him ¢100,000.00, for which reason he issued and delivered as collateral the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A., which he signed on the back. Mr. Arrea Escalante proceeded to "fill in the blank share certificate in his name," such that he "did not exercise his guarantee right but illegally appropriated the shares of Cocomar S.A.," and that he should have auctioned them. He continued that thus, on August 24, 1992, Mr. Arrea Escalante "constituted himself in an Extraordinary Assembly (…) without complying with prior notice procedures (because supposedly all of the capital stock was gathered)" and, among other agreements, removed him (Rigoberto Mohs) as president. He expressed that on September 16, 1992, without respecting prior notice procedures, Mr. Arrea Escalante again constituted himself in an extraordinary shareholders' assembly and was authorized to open checking accounts in the banks of the National Banking System. He referred that on December 21, 1994, Mr. Arrea Escalante appeared at an alleged extraordinary shareholders' assembly, convened by publication in the official gazette La Gaceta of December 7, 1994. On that occasion, he describes, it was recorded that Mr. Arrea Escalante exhibited a certificate for 100,000 shares, and it was noted that of that certificate, only 90% belonged to him, equivalent to 90,000 shares, since the remaining 10%—he stated—belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs Villalta). At that assembly, the capital stock was increased by the sum of ¢19,900,000.00, which was supposedly paid by the same partner Arrea Escalante as follows: a) ¢15,000,000.00 "capitalizing the accumulated surplus that has been produced by the contributions he has made on different dates, as recorded in the duly legalized accounting records kept by the company"; and b) ¢4,900,000.00 through a "sight bill of exchange signed by him [Mr. Arrea Escalante] in favor of the company, duly accepted by the debtor"; with which the new capital stock was ¢20,000,000.00. Likewise, the fifth clause of the corporate bylaws was modified so that the capital stock would henceforth be represented by 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00 each. He added that curiously, the notary who notarized the minutes, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, who also held the position of secretary, attested that all of the capital stock had been present, which is not true as was affirmed in that same assembly. The plaintiff highlighted that in the previous assemblies, Mr. Arrea Escalante presented himself as the owner of all of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A., but in the one just referred to, namely that of December 21, 1994, he presented himself as the holder of 90%. Thus, he contradictorily acted at times as the owner of the entirety "because they were given to him as collateral (not in ownership)," or as the owner of 90% of the shares "by virtue of the application of the signed purchase-sale option." He affirmed that *with said conduct on December 21, 1994, Mr. Arrea Escalante denatured the purchase-sale option they had signed*, since (although) at that assembly he warned he was the owner of 90% of the shares and that 10% belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs), *by increasing the capital stock, he rendered his right (that of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta) nugatory to the "ten percent of the price of the property that was agreed upon in the purchase-sale option contract,"* for he specified that the 10% of the shares corresponding to him was in relation to a capital stock of ¢100,000.00, that is, to 10,000 shares of ¢1.00; but from then on, he is the owner of the same 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 but in relation to a total of 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00. He deemed that this rendered nugatory his right to the price agreed upon in the purchase-sale option for property 7-32236-000, in clear abuse of his right and in open bad faith conduct. He insists, *the capital increase was not possible by virtue of the proportion of shares of Cocomar S.A. that formed part of the price of the option.* He reiterated that *in the purchase-sale option contract* "which has not been executed," *they also determined that the price (part of it) would be paid by allocating 25% of the profits that Cocomar S.A. produced for any reason*. Thus, he emphasized, *when at that assembly* of December 21, "1992" (it is understood to be a material error and refers to 1994, as he had previously indicated) *the capital stock was increased, the ¢15,000,000.00 "that were capitalized and produced by contributions" turned out to be an accumulated surplus, that is, a profit of Cocomar S.A. for any reason. Hence, he highlighted that 25% of that profit belonged to him (Rigoberto Mohs) according to the option.* He asserted that it cannot be considered that the sums that Mr. Arrea Escalante "might have spent in the company or on the farm (...) allowed an increase of capital in said company since in the option contract (...) it is clear that the price to be paid for the related farm had no term and did not generate interest" and part of it would be paid with 10% of "the shares of the property, which meant in other words that ten percent of the price of the property was reserved for the undersigned, apart from the fact that it was also determined that twenty-five percent of the profits generated by the company from sales of the property would be paid to the undersigned, regardless of how much was obtained from the sales and whether it exceeded the agreed nine million." He reproached that, to date (filing of the first lawsuit June 5, 2002; July 17, 2006, the second), of the ₡9,000,000.00 he has not received any sum and the ₡100,000.00 he received was as a loan and not as a credit against what was owed for the purchase-sale. He stated, from the declarations of Mr. Arrea Escalante in the criminal proceedings in which he questioned the actions the former carried out (he did not specify which proceedings he was referring to) and from the option itself, it is evident that the agreed form of payment "has been totally breached by the defendant, completely affecting the nature and the will that led me to contract with him." He continued, Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the contract which "is still in force and without its effects having materialized to this date." In the lawsuit filed on July 17, 2006, following the order to integrate the Litis by the Agrarian Court, he indicated that with his lawsuit in June 2002 he requested the exhibition of the minute books and shareholder registry books and the annotation of this lawsuit in these books. He described that on June 6, 2002, the Agrarian Court of Limón issued an order to the secretary of Cocomar S.A., Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, to annotate the lawsuit in the shareholder registry book. As of April 2003, Mr. Solís Rodríguez had not informed the Court in this regard. He related that it was not until April 23, 2003, that the Office of Legalization of Books of the Tax Authority authorized the shareholder registry book of Cocomar S.A., by virtue of the fact that the first one was lost; therefore, he explained, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez presented said book and the general assembly minutes book to this proceeding only on March 11, 2004. He highlighted that the shareholder registry book of Cocomar S.A. contains the following entries: the first dated April 30, 2003, recording the initial share capital; the second, also dated April 30, 2003, recording the amendment to clause three whereby bearer shares were converted into nominative shares, with the indication that this occurred on September 17, 1986; the third, recording that at the shareholders’ assembly of December 21, 1994, the capital was increased as indicated supra and that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the owner of 19,990,000 shares; the fourth, dated May 21, 2003, recording the supposed transfer of shares carried out on May 20, 2001, by Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad of 9,995,000 shares each; and an unnumbered entry, dated May 25, 2003, which records the annotation ordered by the Agrarian Court of Limón. He emphasized that this transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer – who was the one who notarized all the shareholders’ assembly agreements in which Mr. Arrea Escalante abused his right to his detriment – is simulated, as it was done with a view to evading the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholder titleholders knew "the details of the manner in which the actions were carried out through which the breach of the option contract occurred" and that "the share certificate" (meaning the share certificate) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante as collateral for a loan of ₡100,000.00. He added that this transfer of shares is invalid and ineffective because "it could never have been registered in the company's shareholder registry book given that on the date it is recorded as having been carried out, May 20, 2001, said book did not exist." He insisted that the book was replaced only on April 23, 2003, and Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, on folios 519 to 521, in a confessional declaration said that the books remained for a long time in the criminal court, an entity that informed him much later that they had been lost, so since the book did not exist, the proportion of the share capital of which he was the owner was not recorded.

**II. Claims of the Lawsuit.** By virtue of the foregoing, Mr. Mohs Villalta sued primarily Mr. Arrea Escalante, and subsequently integrated the litis by order of the Agrarian Court against Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad. He claimed as his main claim that the judgment declare: "a- That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor and appears as the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. without having the legal right to be so given that the share certificate was never transferred to him but was delivered to him as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that had no term. b- That as an illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A., all transfers of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea Escalante in favor of co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void and whoever possesses them must return them to the undersigned. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the option to purchase-sale contract dated March 13, 1992, by performing actions that tended to denature the right of the undersigned in relation to the agreed price when, taking advantage of the fact that he had possession of the share certificate representing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A., he increased its share capital by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus and through a bill of exchange for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones, whereby part of the price given in the option to purchase-sale was rendered nugatory when the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand one-colon shares in relation to a capital of one hundred thousand one-colon shares to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand one-colon shares in relation to twenty million one-colon shares. d- That equally, upon increasing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A., its sole shareholder, the defendant here Arrea Escalante, did so by capitalizing a supposed surplus of said company without respecting the right to 25 percent of any profit as determined in the breached option to purchase-sale contract. e- That the transfers or conveyances of shares made by co-defendant Arrea Escalante in favor of co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Groblant are null and void for being simulated, lacking cause, and because they cannot be asserted against the undersigned, so all the shares must be returned to the undersigned. f- That both costs of this action are to be borne by the defendants." As the first group of subsidiary claims, he requested that it be declared: "a- That Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the option to purchase-sale contract by means of which he acquired the farm of the Partido de Limón registry number 32236-000 by abusing his right, rendering the undersigned’s right to obtain a fair price nugatory. b- That the termination of the option to purchase-sale contract for the farm under litigation must be declared, as the breach by defendant Arrea Escalante is serious. c- That Mr. Arrea Escalante, in his capacity as unlimited general agent without limit of sum of the company Cocomar S.A., is obliged to return the property subject to the option to purchase-sale contract to the undersigned. d- That the company Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed in which it also returns the registered ownership of the property under litigation to the undersigned. e- That the costs are to be borne by defendant Arrea Escalante." As second subsidiary claims, he requested that it be decreed: "a- That the contract entered into between Arrea Escalante and Rodrigo Mohs Villalta, which is an option to purchase-sale of the farm of the Partido de Limón 32236-000, is null and void for having been entered into with Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the undersigned’s state of necessity and for containing clauses that in themselves determine a total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith and contractual cooperation, constituting an abuse of right. b- That the option to purchase-sale contract is null and void because it has no term, the term being essential in option contracts, and the term established by law has expired in the event that the parties have not made provisions in this regard. c- That since the option to purchase-sale contract is null and void, so too is every act by means of which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a partner in the company Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as a shareholder, including the transfers of shares made to co-defendants Arrea Groblant and Carlos Solís Rodríguez. d- That since the option to purchase-sale contract is null and void, the property must return to the undersigned, it being that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the one who entered into the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. e- That the costs are to be borne by the defendants." **III. Statements of Defense.** Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad filed negative responses to the lawsuits and all raised the same defenses, namely, statute of limitations, res judicata, lack of right, and "lack of passive capacity and the reciprocal lack of active capacity." The company and Mr. Arrea Escalante did so jointly, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad each individually.

**IV. Counterclaims.** Likewise, individually, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad counterclaimed against Mr. Mohs Villalta. They coincided in the facts they alleged. Thus, they maintained that the negotiations that resulted in Mr. Arrea Escalante acquiring 90% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. through a sale by Rigoberto Mohs, then owner of 100%, were due to an initial contact that Mr. Mohs Villalta had with Mr. Carlos Lara Hine, to whom he offered to sell property 7-32236-000, owned by Cocomar S.A., which was about to be lost in a public auction requested by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding against the company. They continued that Mr. Lara Hine proposed to Mr. Arrea Escalante that they become partners and both acquire the property, to which the latter agreed. They related that the negotiations between Messrs. Mohs Villalta, Lara Hine, and Arrea Escalante took shape in the office of Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez; on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta, who appeared accompanied by Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, granted an option to purchase the farm to Mr. Arrea Escalante with the conditions stated in that document, among which – they highlighted – were that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the rights of the option through the acquisition of the property or through the purchase of the shares of the share capital; that the price was ₡9,000,000.00 which was to be paid as follows: 1) ₡2,175,000.00 by taking charge of paying a credit operation that Cocomar S.A. had with Banco Nacional, secured by a first-degree mortgage on the property in question, 2) ₡500,000.00 in payment of an indemnification claimed by Mrs. Juana Aguilar, a squatter, 3) ₡1,000,000.00 through the delivery to the seller optionor of 10% of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., and 4) the balance of ₡5,325,000.00, which would not bear interest, from the proceeds of 25% of the sales that would be made of parts or lots of the property or from any profit that Cocomar S.A. might produce in the future; likewise, that for the exercise of the rights of the option, it was a suspensive condition, indispensable, that Mr. Arrea Escalante regularize the credit situation with Banco Nacional. They described that when they reached the agreement, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez dictated it to his secretary Jeannette Viales Segura, aloud so that those present would be aware of the content the document would have; she took away the draft and later returned with the finalized document. Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez proceeded to read it aloud, everyone showed their agreement, and the offeror, Mr. Mohs Villalta, signed it, without having requested any change or correction. They noted that on this same date when he granted the option (March 11, 1992), Mr. Mohs Villalta requested a loan of ₡100,000.00 from Mr. Arrea Escalante, which the latter granted him; upon receiving the money, Mr. Mohs Villalta signed the receipt and recorded "those one hundred thousand colones were given as a loan but 'eventually applicable to the price of the sale of a farm…'" They added that on March 13, 1992, two days after Mr. Mohs Villalta signed the option, another meeting took place with the same participants; there, Mr. Mohs Villalta was informed that the bylaws would be modified and a new board of directors would be appointed, which would be composed of the members of the "Grupo Cocomar"; he agreed. They highlighted that Mr. Mohs Villalta acknowledged this in his declaration before the Fourth Examining Court of San José, document number 3 presented by Mr. Arrea Escalante with his statement of defense, where he also indicated that since he had signed the sole share certificate of Cocomar S.A. in blank, that signature would be used to record the legend of transfer in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante, who in turn would sign as a sign of approval; thus – they said – "the transfer –brevi manu– of 90% of the shares comprising the deal opportunely agreed upon between the parties was made effective." They stated that Mr. Arrea Escalante complied with the suspensive condition of the option by satisfactorily paying the overdue installments, the default interest, and costs of the foreclosure proceeding on April 2, 1992. At that moment, they argued, the option materialized and became effective definitively. They highlighted that to make that payment to the Bank, Mr. Arrea Escalante reached an understanding with the Bank official, Mr. German Cuevillas, in charge of the Branch Administration office; an agreement according to which Mr. Arrea Escalante would normalize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. and would pay the future installments or payments until total cancellation; which he also complied with, and thus the Bank granted him the deed of cancellation of mortgage. They mentioned that Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante obtained the approval of the Banco Nacional official for Mr. Arrea Escalante, without the need for a substitution of debtor, to take charge of normalizing and bringing up to date the credit operation of Cocomar S.A. Then, they noted, Messrs. Lara Hine and Arrea Escalante invited one of their respective sons to participate with them in the purchase of the property, so that Mr. Carlos Lara Hine and his son Carlos Lara Guardia acquired 35% of the shares, and Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and his son Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad another 35%; likewise, Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Escalante's son-in-law, Mr. Fernando del Barco Garrón, were invited to participate in the purchase, each with 10%. In this way, they explained, the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acquired was distributed; Mr. Mohs Villalta retained the remaining 10%. They asserted that although Mr. Mohs Villalta did not know the percentage form in which the share capital was ultimately distributed, he was aware that the buyers were "a group of friends among us, which, to simplify, if necessary, I will continue to identify as 'Grupo Cocomar' who had agreed to combine our financial resources and our effort to launch a tourism project on the property." They assured that the group of friends decided that in the entire negotiation, operations, and procedures, Mr. Arrea Escalante would continue as the sole partner of 90% of the share capital, with the shares in his name, by virtue of the fact that it was he who committed to Banco Nacional. Only the counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez narrated that on March 26, 1998, he agreed with Messrs. Carlos Lara Hine and Carlos Lara Guardia to purchase the shares of Cocomar S.A. that belonged to them, for the price of ₡9,225,000.00, which he would pay "as soon as Banco Nacional de Costa Rica paid an indemnification to a company of mine called Hacienda Choluteca Limitada, which occurred on January 21, 2000. I made that payment in two installments, one on February 21 and the other on March 26, both of the year two thousand, all as can be seen from the group of documents that I submit with this brief of statement of defense marked with the letter A. In this way, and after the capital increase was carried out, adding those I had originally purchased, I came to accumulate the number of which I am today the owner, in the amount of nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand (9,995,000) shares, as stated in the Shareholder Register book itself and the corresponding title which I present jointly marked with the number I)." Mr. Arrea Gronblad only clarified that the transfer of the 9,995,000 shares belonging to him, equivalent to what was originally 45% of the share capital (capital social), although it appears to have been made in his favor by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the truth is that he acquired them from a portion originally purchased by his brother-in-law, Fernando del Barco Garrón, who decided to withdraw from Cocomar S.A., and the rest he acquired from his father, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, through “a trade I made with him of the Cocomar S.A. shares for others I held in a company now solely his, called Constructora Agro Dam S.A.” They explained that, within the group of friends “Grupo Cocomar,” share negotiations occurred, which could not be timely recorded in the corresponding book, as it was at the Criminal Court; an entity that finally, when they requested its return, indicated it had been lost. They mentioned that the current partners of Cocomar S.A. have faced economic risk and have strived to keep the property (finca) “safeguarded from squatters (precaristas) and with its boundaries well maintained and identified.” They continued that, as the expenses and investments required by Cocomar S.A. had to be covered by contributions from the partners, since the company had produced nothing and as the books and reality reported the amount of ¢15,000,000.00 received by the company in that capacity, at the general assembly of partners (asamblea general de socios) of December 21, 1994, it was agreed to increase the share capital to the sum of ¢20,000,000.00, which was paid by capitalizing the referred partner contributions, and ¢4,900,000.00 through a bill of exchange signed by partner Arrea Escalante in favor of Cocomar S.A., which “was shortly canceled by the debtor.” They stated, “This operation and capital increase, absolutely legitimate by the way, is very common in the business world and is carried out, among other reasons, when there is a very disproportionate gap between the company's capital and the debt it has with its partners arising from contributions those partners have made to cover cash needs required for its normal operation.” Hence, they explained, it is precisely in the accounting records of Cocomar S.A., which has produced nothing, that new partner contributions for the amount of ¢20,669,581.76 are recognized (document II). They detailed that the naive way in which the meeting of March 13, 1992, was conducted gave basis for Mr. Mohs Villalta to denounce all the directors of Cocomar S.A. and the legal representative before the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público), which filed an accusation for the crimes of document falsification (falsificación de documento), ideological falsehood (falsedad ideológica), use of a false document, and fraud (estafa) to the detriment of Mr. Mohs Villalta; they were dismissed from said accusation and subsequently Mr. Mohs Villalta and his wife were convicted for the crimes of slanderous denunciation (denuncia calumniosa) and false testimony (falso testimonio) (documents 13, 14, and 15 presented by Mr. Arrea Escalante upon answering the lawsuit). They extolled that Mr. Mohs Villalta never paid Mr. Arrea Escalante the money he lent him, “which implicitly means he applied it to the price of the deal.” In fact, they emphasized, in his confession (within this proceeding), Mr. Mohs Villalta was asked (as number 11) if he never paid the defendant Arrea Escalante the ¢100,000.00 because he applied them to the price of the deal he had made with him, to which he answered it was true; thereby expressly accepting that he closed the share sale negotiation. They concluded that when Mr. Arrea Escalante acquired 90% of the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., these had no economic value, since the company had already lost the only asset (bien patrimonial) through judicial auction (remate judicial) and adjudication (adjudicación) by Banco Nacional; the shares regained value when Mr. Arrea Escalante normalized the situation of default and non-compliance of Cocomar S.A. with Banco Nacional, and even more so when he paid the squatter Juana Aguilar. There, the value of the shares was restored, which has risen due to inflation, the maintenance and protection of the property (inmueble), the country's tourism boom regarding the natural beauty of the land; it has been the economic effort and participation of the members of “Grupo Cocomar” that rescued the company.

**V. Claims of the counterclaims.** The counterclaimants also coincided in their claims, in this way they **petitioned as a principal matter** that it be declared in the judgment: “*1) That the negotiation that occurred, regarding the transfer of 90% of the shares that at that time made up the share capital of Cocomar S.A., between its owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and my transferor, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, from whom those that belong to me today derive, occurred legitimately and therefore was a transfer of ownership of the transferred shares. 2) That the acquisition that they [made] in due course of the (sic) nine million nine hundred ninety-five thousand shares (9,995,000) that today belong [to them] of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. was equally legitimate, real, and for valuable consideration. 3) That the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at an Extraordinary General Assembly held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the share capital to the sum of seven million colones, was also legitimate and binding for all the shares. 4) That on the date on which the counter-defendant Mohs Villalta transferred 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole, main, and fundamental economic backing, having equally lost through judicial auction and adjudication that had already been carried out by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, the sole property (bien inmueble) of (sic) which it was owner, being the property registered at real estate folio number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX of the Registry of the Province of Limón. 5) That consequently to what is noted in the immediately preceding numeral, any value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. have today or may come to have in the future, is or shall be due to the economic and other efforts made by the partners who acquired 90% of the share capital of that company (sic) from the counter-defendant Mohs, since he, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company*.” As a **sole subsidiary claim**, they requested that if the plaintiff's claim that the shares of Cocomar S.A., and with them the ownership of property 7-32236-000, must be returned to him were upheld, inasmuch as that return of shares and the property would cause an unjust enrichment (enriquecimiento sin causa) and illegitimate gain for the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to avoid it, it be declared that Mr. Mohs Villalta must pay them, the counterclaimants, 50% of the value of the property at the time of effective payment, according to a fair valuation (justiprecio) defined by an expert in the enforcement phase.

**VI.** Mr. Mohs Villalta opposed both counterclaims and filed the defenses of lack of passive and active standing (falta de legitimación pasiva y activa) and lack of right.

**VII. First and second instance resolutions.** In judgment 12-2013 of 10 hours 42 minutes of February 25, 2013, the Agrarian Court (Juzgado Agrario) of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone, ordered: “(…) *the present ordinary lawsuit of RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, (sic) RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, (sic) AND (sic) RODRIGO ARREA GRONBLAT (sic) AND CARLOS SOLIS (sic) RODRÍGUEZ is partially granted, declaring regarding this the following: 1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) without having the legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but was given to him (sic) as collateral for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that has no term.- (sic) 2) It is granted as to (sic) declare (sic) that as illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) for (sic) which (sic) all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, for which reason they must restore ninety percent of the shares to the estate (sucesión) of the plaintiff in favor of its executor (albacea).- (sic) 3) That Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE [has] seriously breached the option to purchase agreement (contrato de opción de compraventa) dated March 13, 1992, by performing actions that tended to distort the right of the undersigned in relation to the agreed price, when taking advantage of having in possession a share certificate representing the share capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) he increased (sic) the share capital thereof (sic) by nineteen million nine hundred thousand colones through the capitalization of a surplus (superávit) and through a bill of exchange for the sum of four million nine hundred thousand colones, thereby rendering part of the price given in the option to purchase (sic) nugatory as the undersigned went from supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in (sic) relation to a capital of one hundred thousand shares of one colón, to supposedly being the holder of ten thousand shares of one colón in relation to twenty million shares of one colón.- (sic) 4) That likewise upon increasing the share capital of the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) its sole partner, the defendant herein ARREA ESCALANTE, did so by capitalizing a surplus of said company without respecting the right to twenty-five percent of any profits as determined (sic) in the breached option to purchase agreement.- (sic) 5) That the assignments or transfers of shares carried out by co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null for being simulated, lacking just cause (justa causa), and because they cannot be opposed to the estate of the plaintiff, for which reason they must (sic) be restored to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) 6) That both costs (costas) of this action are borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) .- (sic) Subsidiarily, it is declared: a) That Mr. Arrea Escalante [has] breached the option to purchase agreement by abusing his right, rendering the plaintiff estate's right to obtain a fair price nugatory, and the part of this petition stating that [the] defendant Arrea acquired the property of the Registry of Limón registration number 32236-000 is denied.- (sic) b) That the resolution (resolución) of the option to purchase agreement for the property subject to this litigation must be declared, the breach by defendant Arrea being serious.- (sic) c) It is rejected as to declaring that Mr. Arrea Escalante is (sic) obligated to return the property (inmueble) subject to the option to purchase agreement to the estate of the plaintiff.- (sic) d) It is also rejected as to requiring the company Cocomar S.A, (sic) to execute a public deed (escritura pública) in which it returns the registered title of the property subject to this litigation to the estate of the plaintiff.- (sic) e) Any other pronouncement on costs is omitted as unnecessary, this aspect having been granted in the principal claim.- (sic) Regarding the second subsidiary claim: Claims a, b (sic) [and] d of this section are rejected. Claim c) is granted, which reads: That being null the (sic) option to purchase agreement, it is (sic) also so any act through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as shareholder, including the transfers of shares made (sic) to co-defendants Arrea Groblant (sic) and Carlos Solís Rodríguez. Regarding the defenses of statute of limitations (prescripción), lack of right, lack of passive standing (falta de personalidad pasiva) of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing defense filed by defendant Arrea Escalante and co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. Regarding the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the defenses of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants, and the reciprocal active standing, granting the defense of lack of right, and regarding this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim filed by co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its aspects, thereby granting the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right filed by the plaintiff.- (sic) The payment of procedural and personal costs is imposed on the other defendants and co-defendants[,] being Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic) .- (sic) The parties are made aware of the right they have to appeal this ruling.-*” In resolution 25-2013 of 10 hours 14 minutes of April 4, 2013, the Court rejected the request for addition and clarification filed by the co-defendant counterclaimant Solís Rodríguez against the judgment. By virtue of the appeal filed by co-defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendant counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, in resolution 608-F-2016 of 11 hours 51 minutes of June 28, 2016, the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) of the Second Judicial Circuit of San José, ordered: “*It is rejected to bring ad effectum videndi case number zero two- zero zero zero four- five hundred four-CI. The two incidents of new facts promoted by Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Carlos Solís Rodríguez are rejected.*” The appealed judgment is partially overturned as follows: a) In point two of the operative part , (sic) only insofar as it orders the restitution of the shares in favor of the executor. b) Points three and four because they are not technically claims but rather facts and justifications for such claims or other claims in the lawsuit. c) Partially point five, only insofar as it declares null due to simulation the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and his son Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad. d) What was granted subsidiarily. In place of what is overturned, it is ordered: 1) The restitution of shares granted in point two is ordered in favor of the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. 2) The sales contract entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, whose basis was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of certain date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared terminated. The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the conclusion of the terminated negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. Said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the sale price. In all other respects that have been the subject of appeal, the judgment is affirmed”. In resolution 675-F-2016 of 16:58 on July 18, 2016, that Court added: “3) The exception or action filed by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property is rejected as inadmissible. The material error in point five of the judgment is corrected so that after the word 'Rodríguez' it reads 'the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad' and not the expression 'his son'. This point is declared final”. In this way, what was finally ordered in this matter was: “1) That the defendant ARREA ESCALANTE is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A, (sic) without having a legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but rather was given (sic) as guarantee for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan that has no term.- (sic) 2) It is declared with merit as to (sic) declaring (sic) that as possessor and illegitimate holder of the share certificate representing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A, (sic) therefore (sic) all assignments of shares in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null, so they must return ninety percent of the shares to the current estate of the plaintiff. 5) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 3] That the assignments or transfers of shares made by the co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez the co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) are null for lacking just cause and because they cannot be opposed to the plaintiff's estate, so they must (sic) be returned to the aforementioned estate.- (sic) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 4] The sales contract entered into between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, whose basis was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, with certification of certain date granted before Notary Public Carlos Solís Rodríguez at eight o'clock on October twenty-first, nineteen ninety-two, deed number thirty-eight, on folio forty-eight of volume sixteenth, is declared terminated. [Following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 5] The parties are ordered to return the situation to the moment of the conclusion of the terminated negotiation, for which Rodrigo Arrea Escalante must return the entirety of the corporate capital of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, as well as the legal books to the estate of Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. Said estate must return the sums partially received for the sale contained in the cited document, which comprise: the amount paid to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit operation number six thousand thirty-six and six thousand thirty-seven for two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones; five hundred thousand colones paid to Mrs. Juana Aguilar. In total, the estate must return the sum of two million six hundred seventy-five thousand colones in favor of Rodrigo Arrea Escalante for sums partially paid as part of the sale price [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 6] The exception or action filed by the defendants Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad and Rodríguez Solís regarding the sale of another's property is rejected as inadmissible 6) [following the corresponding numbering, this would be point number 7] That both costs of this action are borne by the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic).- (sic) As for the exceptions of statute of limitations, lack of right, lack of passive standing of the defendants and the reciprocal active standing exception filed by the defendant Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblant (sic), the same (sic) are rejected. As for the co-defendant COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, the present lawsuit is declared without merit, rejecting the exceptions of statute of limitations, lack of passive standing of the defendants and the reciprocal active standing exception, upholding the exception of lack of right and as to this, it is exonerated from the payment of costs. With respect to the counterclaim filed by the co-defendants Arrea Gronblant (sic) and Solís Rodríguez , (sic) it is declared without merit in all its aspects, thus upholding the exceptions of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right filed by the plaintiff.- (sic) The remaining defendants and co-defendants are ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs, that is, Messrs. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic) The parties are informed of the right they have to appeal this judgment.-”.

**VIII.** Dissatisfied, the co-defendants Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. and the co-defendants counterclaimants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad jointly filed a cassation appeal. It is appropriate to indicate from the outset that this matter is resolved based on the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 of August 16, 1989, the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734 and Chapter V, Title VII of the Código de Trabajo, Ley 2 of August 27, 1943, the latter with the wording prior to the reform operated by Ley 9343 of January 25, 2016. This is because, having this Chamber decreed that this matter falls under the jurisdiction of the agrarian jurisdiction, it was substantiated with the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734, in force since March 29, 1982, whose precept 61, with respect to the appeal before this Chamber, refers to Chapter V, Title VII of the Código de Trabajo. Although that legal body, at the date this judgment is issued, was reformed by Ley 9343, Reforma Procesal Laboral (in force since July 25, 2017); the truth is that the same reforming Law provided, in Transitory Provision I, that it would apply to proceedings initiated before its effectiveness with the exception of those in which resolutions had been issued, which would maintain the means of challenge of the repealed laws (subsection 3). From this transitory provision, this Chamber infers that by enabling the appellate regime in force at the time the judgment was issued, the legislator concomitantly enabled that the ruling on said challenge is also based, both in form and content, on the legal precepts in force at that date. It could not be otherwise, since to resolve the controversy the judges applied the procedural regulations in force at that time, so the correctness or incorrectness of their decisions could not be examined according to regulations that were non-existent at that time. Precisely, in canon 452 of the Código de Trabajo, prior to the modification by Ley 9343, it was established that “To the extent they do not contradict the text and procedural principles contained in this Title, the provisions of the Código de Procedimientos Civiles shall be applied supplementarily”. In turn, the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 9342 of February 3, 2016, in force since October 8, 2018, provided in its Transitory Provision II that against resolutions that were issued upon its entry into force, the remedies authorized by the legal provisions in force at the time they were issued would be admissible. Precisely, the Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 of 1989, was the one in force at the time the judgments of the Court and the Tribunal were issued in this matter, and it is to which the cassation appeal analyzed and resolved refers –consequently-. Consequently, henceforth, any reference made to the Código Procesal Civil is to Ley 7130 of August 16, 1989, as well as to the Código de Trabajo, Ley 2, with its wording prior to Ley 9343. Now, by way of introduction, it is appropriate to point out the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters that this Chamber has defined. In resolution 213-F-S1-2019 of 14:15 on March 20, 2019, this Chamber reiterated -as it does now- the criterion expressed in judgment 505-F-SI-2011 of 8:45 on April 14, 2011, which reads: “Cassation appeal in agrarian matters. Regarding this point, this Chamber has ordered: “(…) among the characteristics of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is that it must be technically ordered. The objections to the judgment must be enumerated and structured, and their lack of juridicity must be substantiated. The appellant has the duty to explain, in a clear and precise manner, the reasons on which their action is based. They must combat, systematically, the legal foundations of the appealed judgment. They are only exempt from expressly indicating the violated legal norms, or the type of infringement committed. In relation, see, among many others, judgment number 892 of 9:00 on November 25, 2005.” (Voto 596-f-06 of 14:55 on August 30, 2006). Therefore, despite the fact that the appeal in agrarian matters is governed by the Código de Trabajo, and has been considered as a rogated third instance, this does not exempt the appellant party from the duty to express clearly and precisely the aspects of the second instance judgment that it challenges, explaining in any case what the alleged errors consist of”. No. 300 of 10:00 on April 25, 2008. According to what has been stated, although no special formalities are required in the agrarian cassation appeal, it does not mean it is completely informal, since the objections to the judgment must be structured technically. Thus, the reasons that support it must be set out clearly and precisely, and the only thing from which it is exempt is indicating the provisions of the legal system violated or the type of infringement committed” (the underlining is not from the original). It is thus observed that this is a criterion adopted by this Chamber long ago and that has been constantly reproduced in the jurisprudence. With respect to what is relevant to this matter, it is noted first of all that the challenge is extremely extensive, does not enumerate grievances in a concrete manner, but rather, following the structure and the titles used in the judgment it appeals, proceeds to formulate a series of complaints that it separates into sections each with titles. In fact, attention is already called to the appellants' lawyer, in the sense that the literal transcription of some of the documents presented in the instances does not constitute clear and precise substantiation of an appeal (in any subject matter), as is verified in this case. Even more reprehensible is a textual quote of that type, without properly highlighting it in any way that allows it to be easily identified, precisely because it causes a delay in the ruling on the challenge. Hence, regarding this extremely extensive segment, this Chamber will simply omit reference and ruling because it does not properly constitute cassation grievances. On the other hand, already in the sections separated by titles, drafted indeed for this appellate phase, it is observed that in some the appellants do formulate a grievance (for example, some of those they identify as procedural). However, in others, they group under the same title various claims or they become simple opinions on the specific case or on the Court's judgment, without challenging the resolution subject to the cassation appeal; or they are unclear and imprecise. In that vein, due to lack of clarity and precision, they would be dismissed according to the criterion so many times reiterated by this Chamber, in the sense that such are minimum requirements of the cassation appeal in agrarian matters. Also, in some of the sections that could or seem to constitute grievances of a substantive nature, the appellants insert, mixing in, procedural criticisms as well. In these cases, for the same reason (imprecision), the claims would suffer the same fate (rejection). For the purpose of order in the decision of this matter, this Chamber lists each of the sections or titles used by the appeal and reorders them according to their nature (procedural or substantive). Next, the decision on each will proceed, having as a premise in the examination the already expressed requirement of clarity and precision.

**Cassation on procedural grounds** **IX.** Prior to outlining the procedural claims formulated in the appeal, it is essential to warn that mandate 559 of the Código de Trabajo (with the wording prior to the reform to said legal body operated by Ley 9343 Reforma Procesal Laboral) applicable to this process as provided by precept 61 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, stated: “Once the case file is received, the Chamber shall flatly reject the appeal if it has been filed against the provisions of articles 556 and 557. It shall do the same when the appeal solely requests the correction, replacement, or execution of procedural steps” (the underlining is not from the original).

Regarding this rule, since resolution 583-F-2004 of 11 hours 35 minutes on July 14, 2004, this Chamber has indicated that: "(...) The procedural doctrine has indicated that the grounds for cassation for procedural reasons, set forth in Article 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can occur in the three phases of the process: 1) In the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship, for example, what is regulated by the first subsection, relating to the lack of service of process or its defective notification. 2) Those referring to the abnormal development of that relationship. Such is the case of the second subsection, regarding the denial of admissible evidence or the failure to summon for some evidentiary proceeding during the proceedings. And, 3) Those produced at the time of deciding the litigation, that is, upon issuing the corresponding judgment, the typical example being incongruence, set forth in the third subsection. The expression 'reposición o práctica de trámites procesales' according to the provisions of labor regulations, does not encompass all the cases in which formal defects or 'in procedendo' errors may arise. The jurisprudence of this Court, to date, has equated the concepts of 'vicios de forma' with those of 'trámite procesal', despite their being different. It can be affirmed that this is a genus-to-species relationship, where the latter constitute a species of the former. The errors regarding procedural steps refer to breaches originating, exclusively, during the procedural iter, and may be framed within points 1 and 2 mentioned above. Therefore, the limitation for filing the appeal for cassation for procedural reasons, contained in the article under discussion, is not applicable to all cases in which it would proceed. It is not contemplated for defects relating to the constitution of procedural acts that are subject to that appeal, according to the provisions of the aforementioned Article 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, within this new approach, the judgment issued in the agrarian jurisdiction is reviewable via this recourse, when what is alleged is the defect of incongruence, (...)" (underlining and boldface added). Along these lines, it has been the criterion of this Chamber that the exclusion of procedural grievances in the cassation appeal in agrarian matters is limited to those relating to 'trámites procesales' according to the letter of canon 559 of the Labor Code; that is, to those referring to the very constitution of the procedural legal relationship (point 1) and to the normal development of the procedural legal relationship (point 2). Without that exclusion or limitation being extendable to those procedural errors that occur upon issuing the judgment (point 3), as happens -for example- with incongruence (referred to in that same precedent), with reform in harm (analyzed in resolution 1074-F-04 of 11 hours 20 minutes on December 16, 2004) and the deficiency in the composition of the Litis "due to its incidence on the efficacy and effectiveness of the judgment" (resolution 1425-F-SI-2013 of 9 hours 50 minutes on October 24, 2013). This being the case, this is the framework governing the analysis and ruling on the procedural claims that follow.

**X. First.** They indicate that Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the minimum requirements that the final decision of a process must contain. They state that, in the contested judgment, the Court established that the factual findings of the trial court's judgment can, without violating due process, comprise "in a single one, the facts alleged in the complaint and in the counterclaim; that it is not required that they be made separately." They assert that they may agree with that statement of the Court, but what they cannot accept is that "in the factual findings of the first instance judgment, which the Court finds correct (sic) in a very high percentage, committed the outrage of not recording, within its factual findings, not even the slightest reference to the facts supporting the two counterclaims (...) It simply, radically and absolutely, disregarded the factual basis supporting those two counterclaims," which - they qualify - is a very serious violation of the procedure. They state that mandate 155 subsection ch) was infringed "in that, despite being proven in the expediente, none of the facts of the counterclaims were taken as proven"; likewise, subsection d) "in that not a single one of the facts of the counterclaims was taken as not proven." Thus, they conclude, judgment was rendered "as if no counterclaim had been filed and consequently no claim." They assure that this was what was opportunely alleged in the appeal. Their disagreement "was not because the proven facts were in a single list, but because they do not appear at all, in any list." **XI.** It is observed that in the appeal, the current cassation appellants maintained that: "REGARDING THE UNPROVEN FACTS. (...) this chapter of the judgment must be noted, it is totally omitted, since just like the proven facts, it failed to record a good number that should have been included in that chapter, and while we do so with greater detail and specification, we point out that here no mention is made of the factual findings of the counterclaim, as if that event had not occurred, which constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of the aforementioned Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (...) as we have already stated when referring to the ELEVENTH section, while it is true that the fifth clause of the purchase option in question refers to an alleged lease contract in process over a section of land facing the sea, of which nothing was said in the facts of the complaint or in its petitions, what the Court did (sic) for the purpose we have pointed out" (folios 2301 to 2302). On this particular, the Court indicated: "3.c. Relating to the unproven facts: (...) [the appellant] says that list is omitted and refers to the closing argument, a document which was not given consideration. 3.d. It adds, there is no factual finding for the counterclaim which it alleges as an infraction of Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reiterates the allegations concerning the lease of proven fact 11, arguing that the plaintiff-counter-defendant Mohs's claim about the contract for that different zone from the property in litis was not included." In this regard, it resolved: "d. absence of factual findings for the counterclaim: The aforementioned Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the matter, establishes in subsection 3.ch., the judgment shall contain a concrete declaration of the facts that the court holds as proven, citing the items of evidence demonstrating them and the respective folios of the expediente. The judgment shall comprise the resolution of all points submitted to debate -Article 54 of the agrarian procedural law-; this implies that when formulating the syllabus of events taken as proven, it is a single list, and it is not admissible to establish a factual finding for the complaint and another for the counterclaim, as the appellant alleges. In this case, the complaint and the counterclaim have been processed jointly due to the connectedness of elements they possess, making it possible to issue a judgment with a single body of proven and unproven facts." **XII.** As the cassation appellants reiterate before this Chamber the disagreement they raised against the trial court's judgment -and therefore, object to the Court's reasoning-, it is noted that in the factual findings of a judgment, the adjudicating body shall record those circumstances that, in its view, are extracted from the evidence provided and practiced during the process, which are relevant for the granting or dismissal of the claims asserted in the complaint and in the counterclaim (counterclaims for this case), as well as the defenses raised in the replies. Similarly, in the section on unproven facts, the adjudicating body shall include only those it deems do not arise from the elements of conviction, but which - in its judgment - deserve to be highlighted because they constitute the fundamental basis of the parties' theories and therefore determine or reinforce the denial ordered. That said, this Chamber shares, although for a different reason, the rejection of the disagreement by the Court. This, in addition to verifying that in the operative part of the trial court's judgment, express reference was indeed made to the counterclaims. Consequently, this cassation charge is denied.

**XIII. Second.** They assert that, according to the Court, they did not protest the way the trial court resolved the main and subsidiary claims of the complaint. They emphasize that this is false, because in the brief of February 28, 2013, they requested an addition from the trial court precisely to explain why it absolutely granted all the main claims as well as all the first and second subsidiary claims of the plaintiff, an inexplicable phenomenon. They add that they raised this issue before the Court in the document of April 12, 2013 [which is their appeal], at folio 57, in the sense that they requested clarification because all the main claims had been granted and were complemented by other subsidiary ones.

**XIV.** In this regard, the Court ordered: "the appellants say that the operative part is a product of all the errors in the considerandos when referring to Mohs's claims against the co-defendants. There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims. Nevertheless, this Chamber makes the following observation. In this matter, there were set out: a main claim, first subsidiary, and second subsidiary claim in Mohs's complaint (folios 141-142 tome I, integration of litis pages 1064 to 1065 tome III). In the decision under appeal, the claims were treated as if they were a single list of requests, when there is a main one, and then two subsidiary ones, (sic) with claims that are mutually exclusive between one group and the other. This implies that the judge, at the time of resolving the matter on the merits, should assume some claims from a single group, and not all those deemed to be appropriate even if they exclude one another. This proceeding is contrary to the judgment-drafting technique; however, the appellants are not in disagreement with that proceeding, and therefore it is not appropriate to decree the nullity of the judgment. In this instance, it will be resolved, according to what is grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests in the complaint that are appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court." **XV.** In the first place, it is noted that in a technical sense, what the current cassation appellants allege does not constitute a grievance, because they simply describe that before the trial court they filed a motion for addition and/or clarification and detail that they inserted a claim about this in their appeal, for which they transcribed what was said at that time: "We asked that it be clarified, because despite the main claims having been granted, others of the subsidiary ones were also granted, or rather complemented." In this way, they only recount what happened in the expediente, without specifying a particular claim against the judgment, beyond having filed that motion for addition; without this Chamber being able to supply that argumentative deficiency. Moreover, it is evident that to deny the disagreement, the Court indicated as a reason that "There is no specific grievance regarding the way the judgment treats the claims" (the same defect this Chamber finds but regarding that phase). The cassation appellants do not directly combat that assertion; which by itself also required the dismissal of the procedural charge in this venue. Furthermore, it is observed that the Court indicated as an additional reason for the denial that, although the trial court technically improperly granted main and subsidiary claims, this was not claimed by the then-appellant party. The cassation appellants combat this last assertion; however, they do not directly attack the first one (namely, that there is no specific grievance), which would therefore remain unassailable. In any case, in addition to the circumstance that Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez indeed filed a motion for clarification on this point before the trial court being irrelevant (folios 2267 to 2270), the fact is that the Court itself, upon indeed verifying the trial court's technical incorrectness, ordered that "In this instance, it will be resolved, according to what is grieved, to revoke or confirm those requests in the complaint that are appropriate according to the reasoning of this Court." In this way, despite rejecting the disagreement for the first reason it indicated, the Court corrected the trial court's error, since it finally revoked -among other aspects- "What was granted subsidiarily," as was reviewed in Considerando VII. In this way, the recrimination would lack interest and would be useless to overturn the judgment. In summary, for the above, it is rejected.

**XVI. Third.** They detail that, in their appeal, they claimed the denial of the incident of new facts brought by Mr. Solís and Mr. Arrea Gronblad. They say the Court corrected this "by expanding the denial," understanding that the rejection was because the criminal accusation against the plaintiff here for the crime of perjury did not reach a final judgment due to the death of Mr. Mohs Villalta, with which the criminal action was extinguished.

They disagree, since the fact of the accusation by the Public Prosecutor's Office against Mr. Mohs Villalta for the crime of perjury that occurred in the confession given precisely within this agrarian proceeding is a new fact that must be assessed, according to the rules of sound criticism, such that the content of that confession would have to merit enormous doubt regarding the “real and effective certainty” and relate this circumstance to the rest of the evidence. They insist, it is a new fact that must be evaluated as such.

XVII.The appellant is not precise in its claim. On the one hand, it seems to refer to an omission by the Trial Court in resolving the motion regarding new facts (since it alleges the Tribunal corrected it by “supplementing the denial”), but on the other hand it seems to criticize the Tribunal's reasons for denying the motion regarding new facts. Therefore, this lack of clarity also mandates its dismissal. In any event, the confession of all the parties will be assessed together with the remaining elements of conviction when the substantive grounds are heard.

Cassation on substantive grounds

XVIII.In order to frame and begin resolving the multiple allegations included in the cassation appeal, it is appropriate to reiterate the main claim framework of the complaint that was ultimately upheld by the Tribunal (and by the Trial Court), since it is this latter aspect that must be attacked by the cassation appeal. Against the 4 defendants, Mr. Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Mr. Solís Rodríguez, and Mr. Arrea Gronblad, at its core and as cited supra, the main claims of Mr. Mohs Villalta were for a declaration that: 1) Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate because it was delivered to him as a guarantee; 2) due to the foregoing, the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Gronblad are null, therefore they are not enforceable against him and all shares must be returned to him; 3) Mr. Arrea Escalante seriously breached the purchase option contract of March 11, 1992, because by increasing the share capital of Cocomar S.A.: 3.1) he distorted Mr. Mohs Villalta's right to the agreed price, rendering it nugatory, since he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 in relation to a capital of 100,000 shares of ¢1.00 to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 in relation to 20,000,000 shares of ¢1.00 colón), and 3.2) he did so by capitalizing a supposed surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit; 4) the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Gronblad are null, for being simulated and lacking just cause, therefore they are not enforceable against him and must be returned to him (Mr. Mohs Villalta, today his estate); and 5) the defendants must bear both cost awards of this proceeding. Regarding those claims, as noted, in the judgments issued by the Trial Court and the Tribunal it was decreed: 1) Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., since the share certificate was given to him as a guarantee for a loan (which has no term), it was not transferred to him; 2) (therefore) the share transfers in ownership that Mr. Arrea Escalante made in favor of the co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null; 3) (therefore) they must return 90% of the shares to the plaintiff's estate; 4) the sales contract [it is understood that it considered this contract concerned the real property, as will be seen] concluded between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (whose basis was the purchase option of March 11, 1992) is resolved; 5) the parties must return the situation to the moment of the conclusion of the resolved negotiation, so Mr. Arrea Escalante must reimburse the entirety of the share capital of Cocomar S.A., as well as the legal books to the estate of Mr. Mohs Villalta; and this estate must return the sums partially received for the sale to Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante totaling ¢2,675,000.00, which comprises: the amount paid to the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica for credit transaction number 6036 and 6037 in the amount of ¢2,175,000.00 and ¢500,000.00 paid to Ms. Juana Aguilar; 6) the defendant Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and the co-defendants/counterclaimants Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad must bear the cost awards of this proceeding; and 7) the claim against Cocomar S.A. was dismissed due to lack of right and the losing plaintiff was exonerated from the cost awards. This is the framework that the appellant had to attack in its cassation appeal, and this Chamber will limit itself to this. All other statements inserted by the appellant but not covered by or linked to the provisions of the adjudicating bodies regarding the upheld main claims of Mr. Mohs Villalta will be dismissed as not being useful to overturn the ruling, since even if they may attack statements that the Tribunal, or even the Trial Court, may have incorporated into their decisions, regardless of their correctness or incorrectness, they ultimately do not affect the decision adopted regarding those upheld main claims.

XIX.With respect to the referenced framework, among the numerous arguments of the appellants in their appeal, they disagree with the Tribunal insofar as it shared the Trial Court's assessment to the effect that Mr. Arrea Escalante illegitimately appropriated the entirety of the shares of Cocomar S.A. They assert that the option was realized, became definitively effective when Mr. Arrea Escalante fulfilled the condition precedent of regularizing the credit situation with the Banco Nacional and paid all the overdue installments, default interest, and costs, thereby perfecting the sales contract for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., in accordance with the evidence they identify therein. They also disagree with the judgment's statement to the effect that Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, in order to exercise shareholder rights, first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze the manner in which he would carry out the previously agreed business. They emphasize, the acquisition of 90% of the shares by Mr. Arrea Escalante was concretized when he managed to normalize the credit situation. They question, what execution of guarantee? Rigoberto Mohs himself, they assert, accepted that he did not pay the ¢100,000.00, because he applied them “as earnest money, -eventually applicable- to the negotiation price.”

XX.In order to resolve this first charge, it is appropriate to outline the thesis maintained by the Tribunal in its considerations in relation to what it established in the operative part of its ruling. The first notice is that the Ad quem endorsed all the proven facts of the Trial Court, with the exception of number 13, as it considered it irrelevant for the resolution of this matter, so it eliminated it. Likewise, it shared the list of unproven facts. Now, from its substantive considerations, it emerges that for said body, on March 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta entered into a purchase option contract for farm 7-32236-000, with an “indispensable” condition, which consisted of the arrangement with the Banco Nacional, in addition to stipulating the possibility of executing the option by becoming a partner of Cocomar S.A. or through the transfer of the real property. In said purchase option contract, it detailed, the transfer of Cocomar S.A.'s shares was not agreed upon. In its view, Mr. Arrea Escalante's possession of the share certificate was by virtue of the loan of ¢100,000.00 that he granted to Mr. Mohs Villalta, who guaranteed it with that share certificate, for which purpose he endorsed it in blank. Likewise, that despite the endorsement in blank being in guarantee, Mr. Arrea Escalante completed it as a transfer of ownership of the share certificate, when the condition precedent of the sales contract had not yet been fulfilled, which occurred on April 2, 1992, when Mr. Arrea Escalante reached a payment agreement with the Bank, as recorded in the receipt on sheet 229, volume I. It was at that moment that “the conditions agreed therein [“in the purchase option that prepared the contract”] formed the main contract.” In the Tribunal's view, Mr. Arrea Escalante executed a tacit commissory pact in contravention of the legal system (and hence he could not participate in the extraordinary meetings). Therefore, it concluded, Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the certificate. It determined that in order to exercise the shareholder rights, Mr. Arrea Escalante should have exercised the guarantee and then analyzed the manner in which he would carry out the agreed sale. Insofar as Mr. Arrea Escalante is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A., it held, his actions as a partner in the meetings and in the transfer of the share capital are consequently vitiated pursuant to Article 701 of the Code of Commerce, which had repercussions on the negotiations with the persons to whom he transferred the shares, Mr. Solís Rodríguez and Mr. Arrea Escalante, who with respect to Mr. Mohs Villalta are not in good faith “because they knew of the vitiated negotiation, according to the evidence outlined and in the answers to the complaint on sheets 1136 and 1256 of both co-defendants, being a spontaneous confession for acknowledging knowledge of the dynamics of the entire negotiation, applying Article 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of supplementary application to this matter, which is why the provisions of Article 678 of the Code of Commerce are in (sic) applicable.” Said body determined, in the counterclaim [it is understood, in the counterclaims of each of them] “there is no action directed against Arrea Escalante, which is why, if it is the desire of those co-defendants to bring an action to recover their investment, they must do so in a separate proceeding.” Specifically, regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, it is appropriate to specify that for the Tribunal, Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante agreed upon the sale of farm 7-32236-000 (this is extracted from the operative part where it declared “resolved the sales contract concluded between Rodrigo Arrea Escalante and Rigoberto Mohs Villalta whose basis was the purchase option of March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two” and from point a of Considerando VII precisely titled “legal situation of the farm object of the contract”). Now, in Considerando VII.c titled “Of the breach of contract by Arrea Escalante,” the Tribunal pointed out that in the appeal, it was criticized that the breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante had been deemed demonstrated when he appropriated the entirety of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Regarding this complaint, it ruled: “(…) As is clearly denoted, at the time of executing the purchase option under discussion, there was no specific agreement on the transfer of the shares, only insofar as a portion of the share capital that Mohs held at that time was part of the price. (…) As observed, the tenancy of the certificates by Arrea Escalante was not due to the legal transaction debated here, but to another negotiation related to a loan of money and its guarantee.” This adjudicating body continued: “(…) the certificate that at that time represented the share capital was in his possession due to another agreement, which for this Chamber was duly weighed by the judgment, without violating section 54 of the Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. Consent according to Article 1008 of the Civil Code must be free and clearly manifested. The expression may be verbal, in writing, or by acts from which it can be deduced, the referenced norm dictates. It has been repeatedly indicated, the transfer of the shares was not agreed upon in the purchase option; by the way in which events developed, it is inferred that Arrea Escalante chose to become a partner of Cocomar and not that the real property be transferred to his name. The possession of the share capital of Cocomar in the hands of Arrea Escalante was due to a credit contract agreed between Mohs and Arrea Escalante: a loan of one hundred thousand colones as explained and substantiated with the pertinent evidence in previous segments. (…) Arrea Escalante, to exercise the shareholder rights, first had to execute the guarantee and then analyze the manner in which he would carry out the previously agreed business. Furthermore, by virtue of what is held as proven in the appealed judgment, the loan had no term” (Considerando VIII).

XXI.It then becomes necessary to analyze, in the first instance, both the document identified by both parties as the “option,” and the loan, and the link between these two legal transactions. The document of March 11, 1992, visible on sheets 212 to 213, reads: “The undersigned, RODRIGO MOHS VILLALTA, of legal age, married, businessman, resident of Limón, with identity card number seven – zero thirty – seven hundred sixty-nine, by this means declares: [.-] 1.- That he is the owner of all the shares that make up the share capital of the company “COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA,” with legal entity identification number three- one hundred one- forty-three two hundred fifty-seven (3-101-4325). [.-] 2.- That the cited company is the owner of the farm registered in the Public Registry, Canton of Limón, under Real Folio Registration Number THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX – ZERO ZERO ZERO, with the nature, situation, measurements, boundaries and encumbrances (sic) that the Public Registry indicates. [.-] 3.- That he grants a purchase option in favor of Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, of legal age, married, civil engineer, resident of San José, with identity card number one – two hundred eighty-eight, four hundred eighty-seven [,] regarding the real property cited in number 2) immediately preceding, under the following conditions: [.-] a.- The price of the real property is the sum of nine million colones, which would be paid in the following manner: two million one hundred seventy-five thousand colones by taking charge of paying, under the terms and conditions established in the respective document, a credit transaction with the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica in the name of Cocomar S.A., which is guaranteed by a first-degree mortgage on the aforementioned farm; five hundred thousand colones that would be allocated to paying the compensation claimed by Ms. Juana Aguilar, currently occupying [a] portion of land of the real property that comprises this negotiation; one million colones through the delivery of ten percent of the shares of the share capital of COCOMAR S.A. and the resulting balance, which will not accrue interest of any nature, from the product of twenty-five percent of the sales made of parts of the real property to which this document refers or of any profit that COCOMAR S.A. may produce in the future, for any cause. (sic)[.-] 4.- Mr. Arrea Escalante is authorized to exercise the rights granted to him by this option through the purchase of the shares that make up the share capital of Cocomar S.A. or through the purchase of the real property in reference, whichever better suits his interests. [.-] 5.- Both the price and the object of this option include the assignment and transfer in favor of Mr. Arrea Escalante or of Cocomar S.A., as the latter may arrange, of the lease right, in the process of being legalized, over a section of beach, situated in front of the aforementioned real property, which has an approximate measure of twenty-six hectares (sic) and which is pending granting before the Municipality of the Canton of Matina in the name of the signatory. [.-] 6.- It will be an indispensable condition for the exercise of the rights that this option grants him, that Mr. Arrea opportunely regularize the situation of the credit in favor of the Banco Nacional referred to above, which is in judicial collection before the Agrarian Court of Limón. [.-] 7.- IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this document in San José, on the eleventh day of March, nineteen ninety-two” (underlining and bold added; sheets 212 in conjunction with sheets 40 and 41, fact 3 of the complaints (both), literally accepted by the 3 sued subjects). From the literalness of the document just reproduced, as will be explained below, this Chamber extracts that the object of that transaction was the shares of the share capital of Cocomar S.A. (in addition to an alleged “lease” right – which at this point is not relevant), and not the real property as the A quo and the Ad quem understood.

Although, in the third clause, Mr. Mohs Villalta stated that he "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">grants a purchase option</span>" over the property, <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">by having acted in his personal capacity and by the way in which he stated the price was to be paid in accordance with clause 4</span>, it can only be concluded that the transaction had as its object the shares of Cocomar S.A. It is striking that the plaintiff was not clear in his complaint about the capacity in which he signed the document of March 11, 1992 (at one point he referred to having done so in a personal capacity; at another, as the representative of Cocomar S.A., as seen at folios 129 and 130). However, from the reading of the instrument itself, it is clear that <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">he did so in his personal capacity</span>, and not as the representative of Cocomar S.A. See thus that in the introduction he did not expressly state that he was acting in his capacity as president of that company; furthermore, in the second stipulation he described himself as "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">owner of the shares that make up the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span>"; and in the third stipulation he indicated that Cocomar S.A. "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">is the owner of the farm</span>". <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">Therefore</span>, in principle, Mr. Mohs in his personal capacity <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">was not the one who could sell the land since he was not its owner</span> (and an analysis from the perspective of an agreement or promise regarding the act of a third party is not relevant (as it was not alleged by any of the parties); nor is one regarding ownership of the thing or of another's property (at least at this stage where the factual basis upon which the main claims of the plaintiff were upheld is being examined). Added to this is the fact that, on that date, November 11, 1992, the real property had been awarded to the Banco Nacional by a public auction that took place on December 4, 1991, and approved on January 15, 1992, so it no longer belonged to Cocomar S.A. either (proven fact 5 of the Trial Court endorsed by the Appellate Court and not disputed, which –furthermore– was known to Mr. Mohs Villalta as president of the company (despite having denied it in the confessional evidence), as well as to Mr. Arrea Escalante (folios 223 to 224 and 183 corresponding to the statement of defense)). Consequently, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante's primary interest was to acquire farm 7-32236-000 and that this was the initial offer of the negotiation by Mr. Mohs Villalta (both parties denote this from the complaint and the statement of defense), as the property belonged at that time to the Banco Nacional, the only way to satisfy that interest of Mr. Arrea Escalante was to agree with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the acquisition of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to get the awarded Bank to desist from the registry inscription of the property in its name, by accepting that Mr. Arrea Escalante would instead regularize the company's debt in its entirety and continue paying it. Also, it is observed that Mr. Mohs Villalta <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">established that part of the price (¢1,000,000.00) was to be paid to him by the delivery of 10% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span>, as per stipulation 3. This particular clause deserves a detailed analysis. It must be understood by logic that, first, it was not possible for Mr. Arrea Escalante to pay that part of the price in that way, if he was not the owner of the shares; how could he transfer ownership of shares that did not belong to him? To elucidate that particular stipulation, one must resort to the rest of the provisions set forth therein. In number 4, it was established that Mr. Arrea Escalante could exercise the "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">rights of the option</span>" by acquiring the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., or by purchasing the property. Now, because of that particular way of conceiving the payment of part of the price (that delivery of 10% of the then shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.), it must be concluded that what was provided for in clause 4 undoubtedly did not actually constitute an alternative obligation at the buyer's choice (even less a facultative one for the seller). <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">That form implied </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">at least in the initial thesis– that Mr. Arrea Escalante necessarily had to be the holder of shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., so that he could pay with 10% of them</span>. <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Then, from all the previous considerations, the object of the contract was necessarily the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. and not the property</span> as the Appellate Court (and the Trial Court) appreciated. Having reached this point, it is appropriate to ask, <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">if a part of the payment was to be made through the delivery of a portion of the same purchased object, is it then not true that the transaction actually dealt with a portion of that object and not its entirety?</span> In other words, <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">did it then deal with 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. at that time, and not its entirety?</span> <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">The answer is necessarily affirmative, because under no circumstances could the buyer, Mr. Arrea Escalante, obligate himself to partially pay the price by delivering an object of which he was not the owner and which belonged precisely to the seller</span>. But then, why did Mr. Mohs Villalta state as part of the price payment the delivery of 10% of the shares, if he was the one who until then was the owner of all of them and possessed them? Could Mr. Mohs deliver only 90% of the shares? To answer these questions, it is necessary to note that at that time there was <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">a single share certificate that comprised all the shares that (at that time) constituted the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span> (this is a circumstance referred to by both Mr. Mohs Villalta and Mr. Arrea Escalante). In this way, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante's interest was to acquire the corporation since it, up until before the public auction (proven fact 5 of the Trial Court endorsed by the Appellate Court), had been the owner of farm 7-32236-000 and that the initial negotiation revolved around that property (it is denoted from the complaint itself, folios 129 to 129, and from the statement of defense of Arrea Escalante, folios 178 to 180 and 182 to 183), <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">he agreed with Mr. Mohs Villalta on the condition precedent (condición suspensiva) contained in clause 6, according to which </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">it is reiterated– it was essential that Mr. Arrea Escalante timely regularize the credit situation of Cocomar S.A. with the Banco Nacional</span>, by virtue of which the judicial collection process in which the farm had been auctioned existed. With that stipulation, Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante made the effectiveness of the sale depend <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">on the will of a third party, the Banco Nacional (which had been awarded the farm that previously belonged to that company).</span> The effectiveness of the sale thus depended on a third party, the Banco Nacional (which had been awarded the farm that previously belonged to that company). <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">As long as that condition was not fulfilled, in principle, Mr. Mohs Villalta was to retain, at his own account and risk, the shares sold</span> (canon 685 of the Civil Code). Thus, it is from this condition precedent (condición suspensiva) that it can be understood why Mr. Mohs Villalta did not request the company (which he in turn represented as president and of which he was the sole shareholder) to issue individual shares or one certificate for 90% and another for 10% to comply with the delivery of the object of the sale (90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A.), but rather kept the single certificate for all the shares. In summary, as indicated, from the very provisions set forth in the "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">option</span>" document that detail the conditions of the agreement between thing and price, it is inferred that <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">the object of the sale was 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. but due to the condition precedent (condición suspensiva), Mr. Mohs Villalta was to maintain </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">in the initial thesis– the sold object in his possession, which was comprised in the single share certificate corresponding to the entirety</span>.

<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">XXII.</span> Up to this point, then, it is established that, as the Appellate Court indicated, there was an agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (it is not questioned in the appeal) but not on the price of the property, but on 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., and this subject to a condition precedent (condición suspensiva), the one contained in stipulation 6. Now, for the appellate body in the case, first, on April 11, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta granted a purchase option to Mr. Arrea Escalante with a condition precedent, upon fulfillment of which, on April 2, 1992 –it said– "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">the conditions agreed therein formed the main contract</span>", that is, the sales contract (see thus Considerando XI of the appealed ruling). This Panel does not agree with that conclusion. In the matter sub lite, what happened on that date was not a "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">purchase option</span>", but a perfected sale. On numerous occasions, this Chamber has held that the distinction between the figure of a sale and the figure of an option or promise of sale or to sell, is precisely the full existence of an agreement between thing and price, because in this case the sale has been configured in accordance with canon 1049 of the Civil Code. Thus, in ruling 1313-F-S1-2013 of 2:25 p.m. on October 1, 2013, it was indicated: "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">In order to properly address the objections under study, the nature of those agreements must be clarified. For this purpose, this Panel has referred to the difference between a sale and any other preliminary negotiation. In this sense, in ruling number 1015 of 4:30 p.m. on December 21, 2006, echoing what was already set forth in vote number 80 of 3:30 p.m. on November 30, 1993, cited in resolution number 55 of 11:00 a.m. on January 28, 2004, it stated: "</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">V.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">Modern doctrine, to refer to preliminary or preparatory contractual types for other contracts, has used the expression pre-contract, defining it as that convention through which two or more persons commit to making effective in the future the conclusion of a contract that, at that moment, they do not want or cannot definitively enter into.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">The pre-contract, strictly speaking, is a contract through which an obligation to do arises: the execution of the future contract, which in turn constitutes its object or purpose. Pre-contracts, having the execution of another contract as their purpose, are the unilateral promise of sale and the reciprocal promise of sale</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">…"</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">It is important to clearly establish when one is facing a pre-contract whose object is a sales contract and when one is facing a sale proper, being necessary to keep in mind that both the option to sell and the reciprocal promise to buy and sell, being pre-transactional figures, contain the essential elements of the projected negotiation. For this reason, the pre-contract is considered a 'base contract' in which the characteristics of the definitive contract are projected, such that once the respective offers are accepted, a new declaration of will is not necessary. In the option -or promise of sale- and in the reciprocal promise to buy and sell, it is enough that, within the term, the acceptance of the option holder operates in the first case, or of either of the two parties in the second, so that, as has been pointed out, the sale is perfected. It is clear, then, that the difference between the pre-transactional figure and the definitive transaction of sale is the definitive agreement on thing and price, manifested precisely in the acceptance of the option holders. That is, the pre-transactional contractual relationship designs the definitive contract by referring to the essential elements of which it is composed, but without there being a definitive agreement on thing and price, which occurs with the acceptance of the offers. In the option and in the reciprocal promise to buy and sell, since their object is the future stipulation of a sales contract, their effects can never coincide with those of the sale, not being able to derive either the transfer of ownership or the obligation of the seller to deliver the thing or of the buyer to pay the price, because even though the thing and the price are determined in the pre-contract, the promisors only obligate themselves to respect the term and to execute the definitive contract upon consent on the price and the thing as it was foreseen. Hence, if from a given contract it is inferred that the phase of simple offers -unilateral or reciprocal, as the case may be- has been surpassed because there is actually nothing pending acceptance, the definitive sale has been consummated with all its legal effects, independently of its eventual registration in the Public Registry, since this is not an ad substantiam requirement for its perfection, leaving for the execution phase of the contract the obligation of the seller to grant the public deed and deliver the good.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">(The highlighting is from the original). In the same sense, one can consult ruling number 507 of 9:35 a.m. on July 20, 2007, of this Chamber. In this order of ideas, canon 1049 of the Civil Code prescribes: "</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The sale is perfected between the parties from the moment they agree on thing and price.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">" Following this line of thought, in ruling number 69 of 9:50 a.m. on February 2, 2007, this jurisdictional body indicated: "</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">VII.- Of the sales contract.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The sale is the definitive agreement on thing and price manifested in the acceptance of the option holders. In this sense, that legal transaction does not come into existence as long as a firm agreement on thing and price is not made, because the former only acquires legal validity when the acceptance of the offers operates.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">In this regard, consult resolution no. 713 of 4:10 p.m. on September 18, 2002, of this Panel.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">" In this same order of ideas, the Appellate Court, in Considerando X of the contested judgment, an aspect that was not questioned by the appellant in cassation, stated: "</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">X.-</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">The appellant is correct in the fourth grievance.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Analyzing both documents, it is inferred that their object was the sale of the six farms described in them, with an agreement on</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[sic]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">thing and price existing from the beginning, the initial price being the sum of $1,125,000 for a term of six months, an advance of $50,000 having to be delivered, leaving a total of $1,075,000 payable at the end of the negotiation. The second document was subscribed for the sum of $1,077,000</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">[sic]</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">for a term of three months, with an advance of $36,364</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">. From the breakdown of the above sums, it is observed that the $50,000 given as an advance was effectively deducted from the initial negotiation to establish the sum of the second contract, which reflects that the will of the parties was to continue with the initial negotiation to obtain the sale of the properties, varying only with respect to the term of the contracts and the dates of the money advances, so it is not appropriate to see those actions as the constitution of two different contracts, but rather, as a contractual unity whose object was the sale of the properties.</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">" Ergo, it is clear that what was agreed between the parties was a sales contract, with its necessary elements: agreement between thing and price, because nothing was left pending acceptance. However, as will be set forth later, that agreement was conditioned upon the fulfillment of several conditions. Thus, it is a sale subject to conditions precedent (condiciones suspensivas)</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">"</span>. In the present matter, it is shown that in the document in question, Mr. Mohs Villalta stated he granted a "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">purchase option</span>" to Mr. Arrea Escalante. The object, despite the complex manner in which he referred to it, was finally <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">as indicated– 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.</span> He also stated the price and the specific form in which it would be paid by the latter. From the very literal wording of that document, it can be concluded that Mr. Arrea Escalante fully agreed to acquire the said good and the price, with the form in which it would be paid, and with the condition precedent (condición suspensiva). That document is, on the contrary, proof of that full agreement, since it denotes that <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">no element whose definition was deferred existed</span>; what it sets forth is <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">a condition precedent (condición suspensiva) on the effects of that sale</span> in the terms of canons 678, 681, and 685 of the Civil Code, and because an acceptance period for Mr. Arrea Escalante was not expressly established. That detail of the form of payment and that condition precedent are indicators of the will of both Mr. Mohs, who signed the document, and of Mr. Arrea Escalante himself, who <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">furthermore– never denied that this had been his will, quite the opposite.</span> Even if it were assumed that it was an option, the acceptance by the Banco Nacional on that same day would have to be taken as an indication that Mr. Arrea Escalante accepted the offer during the time elapsed between the act in which Mr. Mohs signed it and the acceptance by the financial institution. Additionally, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself, from his complaints onward, insisted that he had reached that agreement with Arrea Escalante, thus mentioning: "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">On March 11, 1992, the undersigned, in my personal capacity and as owner of all the shares of Cocomar S.A., </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">proceeded to agree with Mr. ARREA ESCALANTE</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> on an OPTION TO SELL</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">of the farm from the Partido de Limón number 32236-000 for the sum of nine million colones that would be paid as per the document signed at the Facio y Cañas Law Firm, where the lawyer Mr. Carlos Solís’s office was located, in the following manner:</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA"> (</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">)</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">"</span> (underlining added, folios 129 and 1051). In the third and fourth facts, he also maintained that on March 11, 1992, in his personal capacity, he <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">agreed</span> with Mr. Arrea Escalante on an option to sell farm 7-32236-000, stating there the price and the form of payment that <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">he affirmed– they agreed</span> on, as well as <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">the agreement</span> to the effect that the sale of the property could be carried out, at the buyer's convenience for tax reasons, through the transfer of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. (folios 129 to 130). In those same terms (of the existence of an agreement and its details), <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">Mr. Arrea Escalante</span> accepted that third fact when contesting the claim: "<span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic">It is true. The terms of that </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">contracting</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-style:italic"> appear with complete clarity from the document </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">(</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">…</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">)</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA">"</span> (folio 179, underlining added). Specifically, regarding the third and fourth facts of the complaint, he expressed that, in principle, it was a purchase option related to farm 7-32236, but it was established in the document, in part 4, that he could exercise the rights of that option through the purchase of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">which he decided</span>; it was –he continued– an alternative offer, in which he chose the purchase of the shares, the contract was closed, and he <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; text-decoration:underline">acquired</span> 90% of the shares of the corporate capital (folios 179 to 180). Thus, it is clear that what occurred was not a unilateral promise of sale, but rather <span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">that on March 11, 1992, there was a perfected sales agreement between thing and price with a condition precedent (condición suspensiva), which </span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">–</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-weight:bold">furthermore– was fulfilled on that same date</span>. Moreover, the plaintiff's attention is drawn to the fact that it is absolutely contradictory that he assumes as a premise of his primary thesis that what he granted in this case was an option to sell a property, but that he requests that his counterparty's breach be declared, since with this he implies that there was an agreement and not a pre-contract.

**XXIII.** Now, in addition to that agreement for the purchase and sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., immediately thereafter, practically simultaneously, **Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed to a loan**, in which the latter gave the former a credit of the sum of ¢100,000.00, **and Mr. Mohs Villalta, now as debtor, delivered the sole share certificate as collateral, for which purpose he endorsed it in blank** (both parties acknowledge this). This loan is the exclusive reason why the Trial Court understood that Mr. Arrea Escalante had possession of the share certificate and analyzed it completely in isolation from the purchase agreement. However, **since the object of the purchase was the company's shares** (and not the property), **the correlation of this agreement with the loan agreement that was secured by that same object, at that same time, cannot be denied**. Note that logically, **Mr. Mohs Villalta's action on that March 11, 1992, of endorsing in blank as loan collateral can only be understood in accordance with that first agreement for the purchase of shares and with the condition precedent itself**. It is not logical for the members of this Chamber that a debtor would endorse a share certificate in blank if his sole intention is to give it as collateral (with the corresponding dispossession). It is not logical that he would decide not to record that circumstance of collateral. **He signed the share certificate for the entire capital stock of Cocomar S.A. in blank on the back as collateral, yes, but with a view to the fulfillment of the condition precedent of the purchase agreement executed, so that Mr. Arrea Escalante would become the owner of 90% of the shares of the then capital stock of Cocomar S.A. and he would keep the remaining 10%**. Hence, it can be understood why in the "purchase option" (opción de compra) document, Mr. Mohs Villalta stipulated that Mr. Arrea Escalante had to deliver 10% of those shares to him, because **despite the agreed purchase with a condition precedent for 90% of the shares**, which would have determined –in principle– that Mr. Mohs Villalta maintain the thing (that 90% of the shares) in his possession until that condition was fulfilled (Canon 685 of the Civil Code); **Mr. Mohs Villalta, the seller, would no longer have the sole share certificate, since he would immediately deliver it as collateral to that same buyer through this second transaction**. Thus, Mr. Mohs Villalta **gave as collateral the sole share certificate, which contained the 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. that he had sold under a condition precedent. If that condition were verified, the purchase would take full effect**, and that is why he stipulated the delivery of 10% of the total shares comprised in that title, actually as a return –as stated– and not as part of the price. In this context, **although he initially endorsed the title in blank as collateral, this –it is insisted– was with a view to the verification of the condition precedent and, therefore, the effectiveness of the agreed purchase**. These conclusions, which are necessarily drawn from the literal wording of the "option" (opción) document in relation to the credit and the blank endorsement of the share certificate (accepted by both Mr. Mohs and Mr. Arrea), are further reinforced by the document on folio 227, in which Mr. Mohs Villalta stated: "*By this means I attest that I received from Mr. RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND COLONES (¢100,000.00) as a loan, eventually applicable to the sale price of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option. As a guarantee* of payment I delivered a *certificate for one hundred thousand shares of one colón each of the company* "*COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA*" [.-] *San José, March 11, 1992*" (underline added). This document was not disavowed by the plaintiff Mohs Villalta; he did not refer to it in his response to Mr. Arrea Escalante's answer (nor did he do so in his response to those filed by the co-defendants/counterclaimants). Likewise, in the notarial certification of the witness statements of Mr. Rafael Ángel Mazanares and Ms. Jeannette Viales Segura, assistant and secretary to Mr. Carlos Solís Rodríguez, respectively, given in November 1997 before the First Examining Magistrate's Court of San José, within a criminal case against defendant Arrea Escalante, these deponents stated: "*At some point, I believe in the month of March 1992, Don Carlos Lara, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Carlos Solís were meeting in the office, Don Rodrigo was happy because the Bank, I do not remember exactly which one, had accepted the settlement proposal, so the transaction was effectively going to happen, I remember it was even decided to do it via the acquisition of shares* (...) *Don Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón arrived, with a gentleman whom I later learned was Don Rigoberto Mohs* (...) *a moment later they met and Don Carlos Solís asked me to dictate to Jeannette, his secretary, the legend of assignment and transfer on the share certificate of the Company Cocomar S.A. that Jeannette kept in her file*, this in the form and style we always used, *and so I did. Subsequently, both Jeannette and I entered Don Carlos's office, and I proceeded to read the legend to everyone present, who expressed their agreement. Don Rodrigo Arrea proceeded to sign the certificate in acceptance and gave it to Jeannette*, to keep it (...)" (folios 233 to 234, the underline is not original). This corresponds to Mr. Manzanares's testimony. In a similar vein, Ms. Jeannette Viales stated "*on March eleventh, nineteen ninety-two, the purchase option and the share certificate* to which this matter refers *were signed* in Don Carlos's office, *two days later, Don Rigoberto Mohs, Don Rodrigo Arrea, and Don Luis Fernando del Barco* presented themselves at the office, among other gentlemen whose names I do not specify at this moment, and *on that occasion, Don Rafael Manzanarez* (sic) *and I, entered Don Carlos's office, Rafael read the legend to them, and they expressed their agreement, then Don Rodrigo signed the assignment*, (sic) *and when he had signed, he told me to keep the share, and Don Rodrigo Mohs also asked me to keep the minute book for them to draft the pertinent minutes*" (folio 235, underline added). This certification and its content were not objected to, disavowed, or even referred to by the plaintiff Mohs Villalta; it records the declaration of individuals who witnessed, indeed carried out under the instruction of the interested parties, the insertion of the legend next to the blank signature and perceived the consent of the seller and buyer of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Thus, clearly, the loan agreement and its particularities cannot be dissociated under any circumstance from the purchase agreement.

**XXIV.** Given what has been stated up to this point, it is absolutely essential to determine whether the condition precedent of the purchase occurred, and if so, on what date, as this would in turn determine the correctness or incorrectness of the Trial Court's conclusion (which confirmed that of the Lower Court) that Mr. Arrea Escalante "*is an illegitimate possessor of the shares of Cocomar S.A* (sic) *without having a legal right to be so, given that the share certificate was never transferred, but rather was delivered to him* (sic) *as collateral* *for a loan of one hundred thousand colones, a loan with no term*" (first provision), as well as the direct consequences derived therefrom according to what was primarily sought by the plaintiff (also confirming the Lower Court), namely, that "*as an illegitimate possessor and holder of the share certificate* (...) *all share assignments in ownership made by Mr. Arrea in favor of co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad are null and void, and therefore they must return ninety percent of the shares to the plaintiff's succession*" (second provision), and that "*the assignments or share transfers carried out by co-defendant Carlos Solís Rodríguez and co-defendant Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo* (sic) *Arrea* (sic) *Gronblat* (sic) *are null and void for lacking just cause and because they cannot be asserted against the plaintiff's succession, and therefore they must* (sic) *be returned to the aforementioned succession*" (third provision). For the Trial Court, the condition precedent of the option occurred on April 2, 1992. This Chamber observes that regarding this aspect, when answering the lawsuit, Mr. Arrea Escalante related: "(...) *On the same date and occasion on which, as stated, in Mohs's presence, the purchase option document he granted me was drafted, he asked me to advance him one hundred thousand colones, but knowing how things really were, I agreed to give it to him as a loan, but also, eventually applicable to the payment of the transaction price, should the contract ultimately be executed. Against the delivery of that money, Mohs signed the corresponding receipt for me* (...) *in which one can clearly read* '*...eventually applicable to the sale price of a property for which on this date I granted a purchase option...*' *He also handed over to me, as a payment guarantee at that same time, the sole share certificate of the aforementioned company* (...) *although the aforementioned receipt states that Mohs gives me that certificate as collateral*" (folios 186 to 189). Mr. Arrea Escalante also stated that "*that circumstance of collateral endorsement was not recorded on the back of that document, and Mohs, who of course was also aware that this share certificate was worthless, agreed to sign it in blank, so that if the negotiation with the bank was successful and the operation was normalized, I would keep that share certificate in my possession, now as co-owner with him, of ninety percent of the shares, and in that way take control of the company* (...). *That same day*, (...) *in the company of Don Carlos Lara, I went to negotiate the settlement with bank officials* (...) *we dealt with the head of branches, surnamed Cuevillas, who agreed that I would take charge of paying the account of Cocomar S.A., also paying the late interest, the personal and procedural costs* (sic) *of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding, a payment I made on April 2, 1992* (...) *With that settlement with the bank and the payment made, I fulfilled the condition precedent contained in the purchase offer, by regularizing the credit* (...). *In other words, on that date of payment, the negotiation regarding ninety percent of the share capital of Cocomar, which was carried out between Mohs Villalta and the undersigned, was finalized and perfected. Subsequently, without being obliged to do so, three more payments were made to Mohs or his wife,* (sic) *on July 7, 14, and 27, 1992, through the delivery of the corresponding receipt, in which it can clearly be read that they are installments towards the obligation for the sale of shares* (...). *This demonstrates that Mohs was always aware of and operated under the idea that what he had sold me,* (sic) *was ninety percent of Cocomar S.A. and that in that sense we were co-partners in the company*" (folios 182 to 186). The defendant Arrea Escalante continued in his answer, "(...) *the day that Mr. Lara and the undersigned went to Banco Nacional* (...) *Mohs accompanied us, waiting for us outside Mr. Cuevillas's office*. *For this reason, once the meeting concluded, we informed the plaintiff of the goodwill disposition of the bank officials, in the sense that I would take charge of continuing to pay the account of Cocomar S.A.* (...) *we continued making certain inquiries regarding the said negotiation, such as the outstanding payment balance, the de facto situation of the unlawful occupier Ms. Juana Aguilar, whom* (sic) *I promptly paid off* (...). *Since everything seemed reasonably normal, I again called Mohs to a meeting in the office of Mr. Solís* (...) *which was held two days later, that is, on March 13, 1992* (...) *I informed the plaintiff formally and in detail, of the changes I planned to make to the bylaws, the board of directors, and the administration of the property* (...) *Also on that occasion, we took the opportunity to formalize the share transfer that the plaintiff had to make to me of ninety percent of the capital stock of Cocomar S.A.* (sic) *Since there was only one certificate representing that capital stock* (...) *and given that the purchase option document very clearly established that what I was acquiring, if the transaction were to go through, would be ninety percent of the shares of Cocomar S.A., Mohs agreed that it be recorded on the back of the said document, as it effectively was, that he assigned and transferred the entirety of the certificate to me* (...)" (underline added, folios 186 to 189). For his part, Mr. Mohs Villalta in his reply omitted referring to the previous allegations of Mr. Arrea Escalante; he simply stated that this defendant knew "*the problems of the property and that it had been auctioned*", hence the transaction price, and that is why he asked for the share certificate as loan collateral "*knowing that it was worthless at that moment*" (folios 410 to 416). Now, in his deposition, he was asked whether Mr. Arrea Escalante had regularized the default situation of Cocomar S.A. with Banco Nacional by making the corresponding payments, to which he replied: it was true, "*I was a close friend of Arturo Cuevillas, General Manager of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, and his brother German Cuevillas, head of bank branches*, prior to negotiating with Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Escalante, *the Cuevillas brothers agreed that I should negotiate in the most convenient way for me* and not for the Bank, which was not interested in the property, and that due to the friendship they had with me since childhood. In Mr. German Cuevillas's office, *the gentleman* signed a check for the amount of one million and something colones and *brought an operation that I had, or rather Cocomar, with Banco Nacional de Costa Rica up to date. I must add that it was I who saved the property, and not them* (...) *The property was not awarded*". From this statement, first, Mr. Mohs's contradiction is observed between what he stated in the reply (that Arrea Escalante knew the property had been auctioned off, and therefore that fact was also of his personal knowledge) and what he expressed in the deposition ("*The property was not awarded*").

Second, it is therefore clear that **Mr. Mohs Villalta was aware of the Banco Nacional's acceptance for Mr. Arrea Escalante to regularize the credit transaction of Cocomar S.A.**, and he even affirmed that it was thanks to him that Arrea Escalante obtained –to paraphrase his confessional statement– that agreement *"by which the property was saved"*. Although the exact date on which he became aware of the Bank's acceptance cannot be extracted from that confessional statement, the truth is that in the notarial certification of Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta's investigative statement of April 1994, before the Fourth Criminal Court of Instruction of San José (provided by Mr. Arrea Escalante when answering the lawsuit), he stated: "(...) *they summoned me again to the Facio-Cañas law firm, to inform me that (...) therefore* ***I had to transfer the shares of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima to him, to appoint a new board again, which I agreed to*** *because of the honorability that for me* (sic) *at that time those persons represented*" (underlining added, folio 220). Mr. Mohs Villalta did not refer in his reply to this meeting of March 13, 1992, pointed out by Mr. Arrea Escalante, nor did he question the validity of that certification, much less its content. Likewise, from the aforementioned notarial certification of the witness statements of Messrs. Rafael Ángel Manzanares and Jeannette Viales Segura, in November 1997 (before the First Criminal Court of Instruction of San José, within the criminal case brought against the defendant Arrea Escalante), it is established that indeed Mr. Mohs Villalta was aware of the Banco Nacional's acceptance at least by March 13, 1992, and that he even agreed, it was his will, to transfer the share certificate through the introduction of the legend to that effect. From the foregoing documents in conjunction with the cited confessional statement, **this Chamber concludes that the Bank accepted the regularization of the Cocomar S.A. credit and this occurred on that same March 11, 1992, thereby fulfilling the condition precedent of the purchase agreement for 90% of the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.** Likewise, that, **indeed, at least by March 13, 1992** (and it is even indicative that since that very March 11 of that year, as Arrea Escalante alleged), **Mr. Mohs Villalta knew of that acceptance by the Banco Nacional and, therefore, of the fulfillment of the condition precedent**. Otherwise, it is not logical that Mr. Mohs Villalta would have agreed to formalize the transfer of the share certificate, a fact he himself acknowledged in the criminal venue. It is additionally emphasized that from this evidence, not only is the condition precedent considered fulfilled on that same March 11, 1992, but also this Chamber infers precisely that **on March 13, 1992, Mr. Mohs Villalta accepted the inclusion of the endorsement legend on the face of the Cocomar S.A. share certificate, next to the signature he had placed two days earlier in blank, with the original intent to guarantee the loan, but with a view toward the fulfillment of the condition precedent, of whose occurrence** **–** **again, by that moment he was already aware**. Mr. Mohs Villalta thus agreed to transfer all the shares to facilitate the necessary corporate changes. In this way, by the will of both contracting parties, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not have to physically deliver 90% of the shares and retain materially only 10%, because through that same agreement he had the clarity that, despite not having immediate possession, he was indeed the owner of 10% of the then shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., contained in that certificate. This –it goes without saying– coincides with the supposed part of the purchase price payment set forth in the "option" document, which in reality –it is insisted– was not such a price payment, but rather the way they devised to ensure that Mr. Mohs Villalta would remain the owner of 10% of the shares of the, at that time, corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. (and that if so required, it would be eventually delivered to him), since he would then endorse the sole share certificate for the entire corporate capital, first as a guarantee but with a view toward ownership in execution of the purchase. See in this regard that the plaintiff did not even allege, much less claim in his lawsuit, that it be declared that Mr. Arrea Escalante had breached the physical or material delivery of 10% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. On the contrary, from the standpoint of his main claims, his thesis is based on the fact that he is the owner of that 10% of the then share capital corresponding to 10,000 shares of one colón (his claim is rather that he is no longer the holder of 10,000 shares relative to a capital of ¢100,000.00, but rather relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00; the first breach he alleged to the purchase agreement resides therein).

**XXV. Consequently**, based on what has been stated so far, **Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate for the entire corporate capital of Cocomar S.A.** as the Trial Court and the Court of First Instance understood, since **the purchase agreement with a condition precedent of March 11, 1992, had as its object 90% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., and by virtue thereof, even after** **said condition precedent occurred on that same date, Mr. Mohs Villalta, furthermore, on March 13, 1992**, **filled in** (indirectly through Messrs. Manzanares and Viales) **as an endorsement the blank endorsement he had made days earlier as a guarantee, precisely with a view toward that realization of the condition precedent**. In this regard, it is clear that the appellant party is correct, and therefore **the judgment of the Trial Court, as well as that of the Court of First Instance, must be overturned**, since both have as a premise for their operative part that the object of the transaction (a purchase, in the case of the first, an option, in the case of the second) was the real property, and that the share certificate for the then capital of Cocomar S.A. was delivered to him only as a guarantee, whereby, consequently, they considered that Mr. Arrea Escalante was an illegitimate possessor thereof.

**XXVI.** Based on what has been established up to this point, in accordance with canon 610 subsection 2) of the Civil Procedure Code, Law 7130 of 1989, it is imperative to issue a ruling on the claims of the plaintiff, the defenses of defendants Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., and the counterclaiming co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as in what is pertinent regarding the counterclaims. As has been insistently noted, as **main claims**, plaintiff Rigoberto Mohs Villalta requested that Mr. Arrea Escalante be declared an illegitimate possessor of the share certificate because it was delivered to him as a guarantee **(1)**. As indicated in the preceding recitals, he has no right to this petition: Mr. Arrea Escalante was not an illegitimate possessor of the Cocomar S.A. share certificate. Consequently, his claim for nullity of the share transfers that Mr. Arrea Escalante made to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, and that they are not enforceable against him **(2)**, is also not receivable, since the reason for that invalidity was identified precisely in the illegitimate possession of the share certificate. Nor is the petition that all shares must be restituted receivable, since it also had as a premise the rejected declaration of illegitimate possession and the consequent nullity of the transfers. Thus, concerning these claims, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendants regarding Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad is upheld; regarding Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive standing is declared ex officio, as this is a substantive prerequisite of any claim that must be verified by the adjudicating body.

**XXVII.** Regarding the claim to declare the serious breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante of the "option to purchase agreement" of March 11, 1992, in that by increasing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. he distorted his right to the agreed price, rendering it nugatory, since he went from being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to a capital of 100,000 shares to supposedly being the holder of 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 relative to 20,000,000 shares **(3.1)**, this Chamber concludes that he has no right for the following reasons. **First**, as indicated supra, the agreement did not concern property 7-32236-000 as is the premise of the plaintiff, but rather the object of the negotiation was ultimately 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. **Second**, what occurred was not an "option to purchase" as the plaintiff has maintained, but a perfected purchase as already noted. **Third**, of paramount relevance, the first breach whose declaration the plaintiff seeks was specified regarding the portion of the price corresponding to the delivery of 10% of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. on March 11, 1992, which was ¢100,000.00 (a non-controversial aspect), which was equivalent to 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 out of a capital of ¢100,000.00 (referred to by both contracting parties). *His claim therefore has as its premise that he is the owner of 10%* (it was also already stated that the plaintiff does not base his lawsuit on the non-material or non-physical delivery of 10% of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. on that March 11, 1992, or in the days thereafter, which in any case he accepted as inferred from his own conduct already described in relation to the loan agreement), *but is directed in the sense that –it is reiterated– his 10,000 shares of ¢1.00 are no longer so relative to the corporate capital of ¢100,000.00, but rather are so relative to a capital of ¢20,000,000.00*, whereby –in his judgment– the agreed price was disrespected by Mr. Arrea Escalante. On that particular, this Chamber observes that **there was no express agreement between Mr. Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea to the effect that the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. could not be increased, varied, throughout the rest of the corporate term, nor that if so, the 10% proportion would be maintained for Mr. Mohs Villalta**. This cannot be inferred from the literal wording of the March 11, 1992 document signed by Mohs; the clause set forth there reads only: "(...) *[an]* ***[o]ne million colones through** __[deliv]**er[ed] ten p***[ercent]** of the shares of the corporate capital of COCOMAR S.A.** (...)". Nor can it be inferred from any other evidence. An agreement of that type, at least to the effect that the corporate capital would not be increased once the condition precedent for effectiveness was fulfilled, would necessarily have to be expressly stated in some medium or be proven, as it would imply a limitation on the growth of the company that is to some extent contrary to commercial logic itself. Furthermore, it is clear to this Chamber that from the moment Mr. Arrea Escalante learned that the real property was auctioned in the mortgage enforcement proceeding brought by the Banco Nacional, his interest shifted to becoming a partner of Cocomar S.A. in the event that the company's credit situation with the Bank could be regularized and said property could return to its equity; hence the agreement they reached for the purchase of its shares subject to that condition precedent. **As of March 11, 1992, the property was not among the assets of Cocomar S.A., so for Mr. Mohs Villalta, personally, maintaining 10% of the shares of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. in the event that the Bank were to accept** the regularization of the credit of the same company and not proceed with the registry inscription of the property that had been awarded to it, **was an absolutely advantageous situation compared to the possibility of maintaining 100% of the shares of a company that had already lost title to that real property**, which both he (today his estate) and the co-defendants considered and consider valuable, hence their dispute and the recurring argumentative diversion toward it. **Fourth**. The capital increase occurred on December 21, 1994 (as reported by the plaintiff and the co-defendants, and as observed in the notarial certifications from folios 1258 to 1259, 1260 to 1261, 1325 to 1326, and 1327 to 1328, which correspond to the share certificates with the endorsement legend and to the entry in the shareholders' registry book of Cocomar S.A.). That is, it was carried out 1 year and 9 months after the share purchase with condition precedent and the loan itself were agreed upon (it is true that they were only registered in the corresponding registry until May 21, 2003, which was due to the fact that said book was a replacement for the previous one that was lost by the criminal jurisdictional authorities within proceeding 94-001943-0204-PE, a case brought against the co-defendants herein and others, to the detriment of Mohs Villalta, as stated in the certification of the book itself issued by the Agrarian Court (folios 494 to 499) and in the notarial certification of the Criminal Court's ruling (folios 1243 to 1244)). Therefore, it cannot even be stated that the capital increase was made within a period that could indicate an original and hidden intent on the part of Mr. Arrea Escalante to diminish the corporate participation of Mr. Mohs Villalta with the intent to harm him. It is logical that a partner in a position to invest in the legal entity he owns would do so. In this sense, mandate 30 of the Commerce Code establishes that corporate capital may be increased through contributions or by capitalizing reserves and special funds that appear on the balance sheet. It is worth noting at this point that the plaintiff (principally) argues that the corporate capital increase of December 21, 1994, violates the "option to purchase" agreement. *The validity or invalidity of that shareholders' assembly agreement is an issue beyond the scope of this proceeding*, since regardless of whether the plaintiff insistently alluded to defects in that assembly (and in others), *the truth is that in his lawsuits he did not claim* *–* *principally or subsidiarily– the nullity of that shareholders' agreement, nor of any other* (even the plaintiff expressly acknowledged this in his reply to the defenses raised by co-defendants Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, folios 1354 to 1356). In accordance with the claims framework of the lawsuits, the *Litis* was joined over the legitimate possession of the share certificate, the nullity of the subsequent share transfers, and the breach of the "option to purchase" agreement, thus the main claims and the first subsidiary petitions; and lastly, over the invalidity of said agreement, according to the second subsidiary claims. It is unnecessary to point out at this point that this structuring of the main and subsidiary claims is incoherent in the opinion of this Chamber, and the plaintiff's attention is drawn to this, since, however much subsidiarity was established, the petitions for contractual breach contained within the main and first subsidiary framework have as their premise the existence of a valid agreement. From a logical standpoint, the validity of any contract is a matter of examination prior to its breach. In summary, this Chamber does not find that the capital increase of December 21, 1994, determined or constituted a breach of the purchase agreement by Mr. Arrea Escalante, whereby the lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante regarding this claim must also be upheld, and ex officio, the lack of passive standing is declared with respect to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as Cocomar S.A.

**XXVIII.** The main claim to declare (the serious breach by Mr. Arrea Escalante of the "option" agreement of March 11, 1992, by increasing the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., capitalizing a surplus of that company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit **(3.2)**, must also be dismissed for the following reasons. In addition to the first two reasons referred to regarding the prior claim which are applicable to this one (namely, that it was a purchase agreement that concerned 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., and not an option for sale regarding the real property, as the plaintiff has maintained), it is clear that *the underlying premise of this petition has been that Cocomar S.A. generated a profit over which he had a specific right, not as a partner, but due to the agreement with Mr. Arrea Escalante. However, the plaintiff did not prove that premise*. He relied on his mere say-so, without presenting suitable evidence on the matter. He only requested the exhibition of the company's accounting books (thus, both lawsuits are read at folios 139 to 140 and 1061: "(...) *I request that the exhibition of the accounting books kept by the Company Cocomar S.A. be ordered so that the supposed surplus the company had can be verified*"). This was ordered by the Court of First Instance in rulings of March 16 and 30, 2004 (folio 521 and 539 to 540). The defendant party presented said books. In a ruling of April 13, 2004, the plaintiff was granted an audience regarding them (folio 547), who commented and submitted a document issued by a certified public accountant hired by him, while also requesting an accounting expert opinion (folios 565 to 577). Regarding this evidentiary request and that documentary evidence, which –it is understood– was offered for a better ruling (given the stage of the proceeding at that time), the Agrarian Court did not rule; therefore, they are understood to be denied. Subsequently, on June 22, 2006, when integrating Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad into the *Litis* as ordered by the Agrarian Tribunal, the plaintiff did not request said technical evidence nor offer the documentary evidence issued by the accountant he had hired and which he had offered for a better ruling (thus folios 1085 to 1087)). In sum, the plaintiff did not timely provide the technical elements of conviction that would conclude that Cocomar S.A. generated an undistributed profit, from which it could later be deduced that there was a disregard for the purchase agreement in question. It is worth noting that the document issued by the accountant submitted for better ruling (not admitted), in any case, is not conclusive as to the existence of an undistributed profit capitalized in the capital increase of December 21, 1994; quite the opposite, the professional indicated he required more information, supporting documents, or justifications for the entries to be able to issue an opinion (folio 577). In a ruling of April 22, 2004, the Court of First Instance requested the plaintiff to provide a certified copy of the accounting books, since they had to be returned to the defendant party because –it is understood– it had been so ordered within a criminal proceeding (folio 578). In the certification at folio 587, it is recorded that the accounting books: Auxiliary Journal, General Journal, General Ledger, and Inventories and Balances were delivered to the special judicial representative of Cocomar S.A. The file contains the certifications issued by the Agrarian Court of the General Ledger books (folios 583 to 604), Inventories and Balances (folios 605 to 642), General Journal (folios 643 to 671), and Auxiliary Journal (folios 672 to 677) of Cocomar S.A. Likewise, the file contains the notarial certification of the accounting books of Cocomar S.A. provided by the plaintiff (from folios 689 to 772, specifically the General Journal (folios 689 to 717), General Ledger (folios 718 to 744), Inventories and Balances (folios 745 to 765), and Auxiliary Records (folios 766 to 772). *From the reading of these certifications of the accounting books, this Chamber cannot extract with certainty that Cocomar S.A. generated a profit; that determination required a technical examination by an accounting expert, which* *–* *as recounted– was not timely requested by the plaintiff*. Such was the evidentiary burden that, in accordance with canon 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, corresponded to him insofar as he affirmed, from this main claim under analysis, that the capital increase of Cocomar S.A.

was made by capitalizing a surplus, whereby Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the "option to purchase-sale" contract, according to which he would be entitled to 25% of any profit as part of the payment of the balance of the price (see also in this regard fact 12 of the complaint, at folios 134 and 1080). Again, it is worth emphasizing at this point that all the remaining allegations of the plaintiff regarding the accounting and other details of the capital increase in question fall outside the scope of this debate, which was defined by its claims, within which –it is repeated– it did not include the nullity of that shareholders' meeting resolution of December 21, 1994, or of any other prior or subsequent one. Thus, regarding this particular petition, the lack of right asserted by the defendant Arrea Escalante is also upheld, and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, as well as of Cocomar S.A., is decreed.

**XXIX.** Finally, insofar as the plaintiff petitions that the nullity of the share transfers made by Mr. Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad be decreed *because they are simulated and lack just cause*, that they are not enforceable against him, and that the shares must be returned to him **(4)**, it is observed that in his complaint he specified that *the transfer of shares in favor of his son and his lawyer is simulated as it was aimed at evading the consequences of this proceeding; the new shareholders knew "the details of how the actions through which the breach of the option contract occurred were carried out" and that "the share" (understood as the share certificate) was delivered to Mr. Arrea Escalante as collateral for a loan of ¢100,000.00, and not as property*. He added that this share transfer is invalid and ineffective because *"it could never be recorded in the company's shareholders' register given that on the date it is recorded as having been completed, May 20, 2003, said register did not exist"*. In this regard, it is noted that the share certificates and the shareholders' register record that the transfer took place on May 20, 2001 (notarial certifications at folios 1258 to 1259 and 1325 to 1329, and court and notarial certifications at folios 498 to 499, 1260 to 1261, and 1327 to 1328). What the plaintiff claims regarding both transfers is simulation to impede or avoid the consequences of this proceeding. The date of the transfers (May 20, 2001) predates the filing of this proceeding, which was initiated on June 5, 2002. Therefore, the denial of the claim is mandatory, since Mr. Arrea could not have anticipated in May 2001 the consequences of a proceeding that had not even been filed at that time. Furthermore, it is clear that if Arrea Escalante's intention had simply been to divert the asset (as might be inferred from the plaintiff's allegation, although it is not expressly stated as such), that is, to divert the shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., he would logically have made the transfers within a reasonably shorter time and closer to the moment he became the holder of them, either in 1992 or at least after the capital increase in December 1994. However, he made them 6 years after the capital increase; 8 years after the purchase-sale agreement. In any event, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad were aware of the details of the transactions (purchase-sale and loan) between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (as is evident from their answers to the complaint and their counterclaims), so they could not have been considered third-party purchasers in good faith in the event that the first 2 claims of the complaint and/or the breach of the purchase-sale contract by Arrea Escalante had been upheld, in order to prevent the consequent restitution of shares sought. Moreover, Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad did not characterize themselves as such in their actions in this proceeding. Finally, regarding the fact that the plaintiff alleged in the facts—but not in the claim—the nullity of the share transfers due to their not having been recorded in the shareholders' register—apparently immediately at the time they occurred (May 20, 2001)—the truth is that such transfers were recorded, albeit at a later date, precisely in entry 4 referenced. Now, precept 140 of the Commercial Code established that *"The company shall consider as a partner the person registered as such in the shareholders' registers, if the shares are nominative; and the bearer thereof, if they are to the bearer"* (wording prior to the reform operated by Law 9068 of September 10, 2012, applicable to this matter). This was not a rule that established registration in the shareholders' register as a validity requirement for a transfer, but rather it regulated the internal relationship between the partner and the company, constituting a condition of effectiveness regarding the latter. In the same vein, canon 687 ibidem stipulates that in nominative instruments, as shares are, *"(...) No act or operation relating to this class of instruments shall have effect against the issuer or against third parties, if it is not recorded on the instrument and in the register"*. Again, the legislator did not provide a condition of validity, but of effectiveness now also, in particular, in relation to third parties. Therefore, this claim for nullity based on simulation, based on that specific cause of action, is also dismissed for lacking right in relation to Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez, and Arrea Gronblad; in the case of Cocomar S.A., for lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva).

**XXX.** **Regarding the defenses raised by the defendants. The statute of limitations (prescripción).** The defendants raised the defense of the statute of limitations; they alleged that in accordance with precept 984 of the Commercial Code, all claims are time-barred because more than 4 years have elapsed since the events supporting them occurred. Likewise, they maintained, the challenges to the shareholders' meeting resolutions are time-barred according to subsection a) of the same precept. They concluded that the claims of *"invalidity and effectiveness"* of the *"option"* contract are also time-barred under that canon because it was signed on March 11, 1992, and the complaint was filed on *"June 4, 2002"*; even if the ten-year statute of limitations period of Article 868 of the Civil Code is applied, it would be time-barred. It is observed that the argument is directed against the entire claim framework of the complaint; that is, against the main claims and against the subsidiary ones, without them having specified any one or some. An immediate ruling is made on *the defense regarding the main claims*; regarding the remaining ones, a ruling will be issued later as they are analyzed. The agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante (whose breach is petitioned) is—as indicated—a purchase-sale, whose nature, by virtue of its object, is commercial in accordance with provision 438, subsection c) of the Commercial Code. So too are the share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Mr. Arrea Gronblad (whose nullity is sought). Consequently, the statute of limitations for the main claims relating to the execution of the first contract and the nullity of the second ones follows the rules of the Code of that field, in particular rules 968 and 984. Having defined that regulatory framework applicable to the case at hand, it is first noted that in this proceeding, the plaintiff did not assert a claim for annulment of any shareholders' meeting resolution of Cocomar S.A.—despite the insistent assertions of defects in them—; that is, that was not the subject of discussion in a principal (or subsidiary) manner. Consequently, the statute of limitations defense is denied insofar as it is directed against that supposed claim, since it does not exist from the standpoint of the claim upon which the litis was joined. Second, regarding the statute of limitations for the claims that the possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante be declared illegitimate because it was delivered to him as collateral, and the consequent nullity of the share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, the impossibility of them being enforceable against him, and the restitution of all the shares **(1 and 2)**, the following must be highlighted. The first of the complaints filed solely against Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. was presented on June 5, 2002 (folio 144), was admitted into process by a resolution at 8:00 a.m. the following day (folio 145), and was notified to Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A. on the 14th of the same month (folio 158). In it, clearly, due to the lack of knowledge about the share transfers from Mr. Arrea Escalante to Messrs. Solís and Rodríguez, Mr. Mohs Villalta did not petition for the nullity of those agreements. It is observed that the co-defendants at that time (only Mr. Arrea Escalante and Cocomar S.A.), when answering the complaint and raising exceptions, made no reference to those share transfers. Regardless of the reason why the then co-defendants did not make any statement about that circumstance, the truth is that said information was in the case file starting from the presentation of the shareholders' register on March 15, 2004 (folios 494 to 499), and it was precisely these transfers that were the reason why the Agricultural Tribunal, in resolution 513-F-06 at 3:20 p.m. on May 29, 2006, annulled the judgment at 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 2004, issued by the Agricultural Court of the First Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone and, *sua sponte (de oficio)*, ordered the joinder of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad (as per folios 1022 to 1025 in accordance with folios 856 to 885 where the annulled judgment is located). Starting from March 15, 2004 (when the partner register was presented to the Court), the nullity action regarding the share transfers between Mr. Arrea Escalante and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is not time-barred, as that date would be the moment from which the plaintiff became aware of them and was able to enforce his right in accordance with precept 969 of the Commercial Code. The joinder was presented on June 22, 2006 (folio 1093), was deemed effected by a resolution at 2:00 p.m. on September 21 of the same year (folio 1098), was notified to Mr. Solís Rodríguez on November 30, 2006 (folio 1131), and the first submission by Mr. Arrea Gronblad was filed on December 6 following (folio 1134), whereby he was deemed notified. In this way, the four-year period provided by the first paragraph of precept 984 did not elapse, as the computation began on March 15, 2004. Regarding the illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, aside from the fact that it was an issue whose decision on the merits was necessary by virtue of the resolution and consequent granting of the cassation appeal, it is deemed that the statute of limitations also did not operate, since the alleged illegal possession would have had a continued effect, formally until the date of issuance of the share certificates that Mr. Arrea later transferred to Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, but which became known to the plaintiff only on that same March 15, 2004 (when the partner register was presented to the Court). Regarding the claim for a declaration of Mr. Arrea Escalante's serious breach of the *"option"* contract **(3)**, see that one of the breaches was supported by Mr. Mohs Villalta in relation to the non-payment of the balance of the agreed price (capitalization of a supposed surplus of the company, without respecting the right to 25% of any profit), a balance that—according to what is read—and the contracting parties affirmed—has no term but is subject to a condition precedent. The co-defendant Arrea Escalante himself—who was the party with passive standing regarding this claim (not so the remaining co-defendants, as indicated supra)—stated upon answering: *"a form of payment was also established which I have fulfilled regarding what I was obligated to do, and the balance, as I have already said, is subject to a condition precedent, and I will make it once that condition precedent is met"*, which is that portions or the totality of the estate are sold or that Cocomar S.A. produces profits (folios 197 to 198). Therefore, as the contract is still in execution, said action is not time-barred. Finally, the statute of limitations did not operate regarding the nullity of the share transfers for being simulated and lacking just cause **(4)**, for the same reasons noted about the invalidity of that transaction by virtue of the illegitimate possession (2). **Regarding the res judicata (cosa juzgada) exception.** The co-defendants pointed out that in the criminal proceeding for the crimes of fraud and ideological falsehood, in which the members of the board of directors of Cocomar S.A., among them Messrs. Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad, were accused by Mr. Mohs Villalta, *"the topic"* of the nullity of the transfer between the former and Mohs Villalta was raised, which is sought in the case at hand; specifically, they said, it was raised—in the expansion of the prosecutorial complaint against Arrea Escalante and Solís Rodríguez for the crimes of fraud and ideological falsehood *"due to the content given to the legend of transfer and conveyance that appears recorded on the back of the mentioned instrument"*. That criminal proceeding, they affirmed, for the crimes of ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud, ended with a definitive dismissal in favor of all the accused. The defense was clearly raised only regarding main claim 1), namely, the illegitimate possession of the share certificate (although it would have an incidence on claim 2), concerning the subsequent transfers to Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad); it was not so with respect to the contractual breaches petitioned or the nullity of the transfers due to simulation (3 and 4). In the case at hand, as the cause of action for that claim of illegitimate possession of the share certificate by Mr. Arrea Escalante, the plaintiff did not allege the use of a false document, the introduction into a public or authentic document of false declarations (ideological falsehood, according to canon 367 of the Penal Code), let alone a fraud; so that the definitive dismissal regarding the crimes of forgery of an equivalent document, ideological falsehood, use of a false document, and fraud decreed in the criminal proceeding (folios 274 to 277 and folios 1236 to 1242) did not produce the effect of res judicata. Therefore, the defense is denied.

**XXXI.** In order, based on what has been stated up to this point, **the complaint of Mr. Mohs Villalta in its main claims is deemed denied.** Now, with respect to the **first subsidiary claim framework** of the complaint, it is reiterated, Mr. Mohs Villalta petitioned that it be declared that: **1)** *"Mr. Arrea Escalante breached the option to purchase-sale contract through which he acquired the estate of the Partido de Limón under registration number 32236-000 by abusing his right, rendering the undersigned's right to obtain a fair price nugatory"*; **2)** the resolution of the option to purchase-sale contract for the estate due to the serious breach by the defendant Arrea Escalante and that *"in his capacity as unlimited general power of attorney of the company Cocomar S.A., he is obligated to return the property subject to the option to purchase-sale contract to the undersigned"*; and **3)** that *"Cocomar S.A. must execute a public deed in which it also returns the registered ownership of the property subject of this litis to the undersigned"*. He is not entitled to these claims, as what ultimately occurred in the matter under review was a purchase-sale contract for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., not an option on the property. Regarding the abuse of right and the breach of the agreement, besides not being correct concerning the nature and object, the plaintiff did not specifically define it as something distinct from what he alleged in relation to the main claims (see even thus fact 11 of the complaint, folios 134 and 1080 where he materializes the abuse of right in the capital increase by which he is the owner of 10,000 shares relative to a corporate capital of ¢20,000,000.00 and not ¢100,000.00), so that in the same way, since essentially it is a reiteration of those, they are denied. Consequently, the lack of right regarding Mr. Arrea Escalante for the first subsidiary claims **1)** and **2)** is also upheld, and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) is decreed against Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad in relation to these claims. Regarding **3)**, the lack of right regarding Cocomar S.A. and the lack of standing of the remaining co-defendants is upheld. Concerning the **defense of the statute of limitations (prescripción)** , it is denied with respect to the first subsidiary claims **1)** and **2)** because they concern the breach of the contract by Mr. Arrea Escalante, just as it was dismissed supra in relation to the main claims. Regarding **3)** , no assertion was made by any of the co-defendants, so it is deemed not to have been raised. In any case, it is pointed out that this petition by the plaintiff lacks sense as it deals directly with the return of the real estate 7-32236-000 to his patrimony, when that property was never in his ownership.

**XXXII.** Concerning the **second subsidiary claims**, it was already indicated supra that there is no logic in relation to the main claims and the first subsidiary claims (in order, at their core, resolution of the agreement between Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante, then nullity of that same agreement). Now, disregarding this argumentative problem, it is noted that Mr. Mohs Villalta requested that it be decreed that: **1)** the option to purchase-sale contract for estate 7-32236-000 is null because *"it was carried out by Mr. Arrea taking advantage of the undersigned's state of need and because it contains clauses that inherently determine total dissonance with the contractual principles of good faith and contractual cooperation, constituting an abuse of right"* and because it lacks a term, which is essential in option contracts *"and the term stipulated by law, in the event that the parties do not provide otherwise, having expired"*; and **2)** since the option to purchase-sale contract is null, so too is every act by which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as a partner of Cocomar S.A. and in his capacity as a shareholder, including the share transfers made to the co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, as well as that the property must *"return to the undersigned, given that Mr. Arrea Escalante is the one who signed the contract with the undersigned and is the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A."*. The co-defendants established the defense of the statute of limitations specifically against the claim of invalidity **(1)** . It is reiterated, they maintained that since the contract was signed on March 11, 1992, and since the complaint was filed on *"June 4, 2002"*, the four-year statute of limitations under precept 984 of the Commercial Code, as well as the ten-year statute under Article 868 of the Civil Code, operated. Indeed, from the time Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante agreed on the purchase-sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., on March 11, 1992, and to the date of filing of the complaint, June 5, 2002 (folio 144), more than 4 years elapsed. Even if one were to assert that the starting point for computing the statute of limitations is the moment from which Mr. Mohs Villalta became aware of the facts he alleges as the cause of action for that nullity, that would have been September 25, 1992. See thus that, the condition precedent for the purchase-sale already having occurred (acceptance of the regularization by the Banco Nacional, that same March 11, 1992), when he had even formalized the share transfer and had been informed of the changes in the appointment of the board of directors that would be made (the following 13th), Mr. Arrea Escalante having already paid the Banco Nacional (on April 2, 1992, according to the provisional receipt issued by the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, from folio 229, and the statement of Mr. Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, at folio 510), and he personally having received 2 sums of money—and his wife one—precisely for the purchase of shares of Cocomar S.A. (on July 4, 14, and 27, 1992, as seen at folios 230 to 231), *Mr. Mohs Villalta sent a note to Mr. Arrea Escalante informing him of the "STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS of the option"*.

In said document, it reads that the reason for that supposed "withdrawal of the option" was that: "(...) it has no fixed term or time, and by reason of the time elapsed –more than six months– and the abrupt changes that have occurred both in the financial markets and in the real estate market" (folios 214 to 218). However, when filing the lawsuit, Mr. Mohs Villalta himself detailed: "In the month of September 1992, considering that Mr. Arrea Escalante had acted in bad faith, including in the literal wording of the purchase-sale option words and phrases in which my right could be seen as limited and devalued in complete dissonance with the spirit of the purchase-sale option agreement, the undersigned communicated to Mr. Arrea Escalante that the option was being rendered without effect (...)" (folios 131 and 1077, fact 5 of the lawsuit). Thus, from his own statement, it is established that since September 25, 1992, he felt aggrieved by the clauses of the document he signed and which has served as evidentiary support for the purchase-sale agreement whose nullity he seeks. In this line, quite clearly, the lawsuit filed on June 5, 2002, regarding this **second subsidiary claim 1)**, is time-barred in accordance with mandate 984 of the Commercial Code because, from the date of the agreement, even from September 25, 1992, more than 4 years elapsed to the date of filing the lawsuit, even more so with respect to its notification. Furthermore, it is noted that insofar as he requests a declaration that Mr. Arrea Escalante took advantage of his state of necessity, the plaintiff did not even bother to describe it, much less prove it. He did not specify that alleged state of necessity he argued, even less what clauses were supposedly included but not agreed upon. Moreover, it is noted that as of September 1992, there was no possibility whatsoever for Mr. Mohs Villalta to withdraw an alleged sales offer, since –it is reiterated– what was agreed upon by him and Mr. Arrea Escalante on March 11, 1992, was the purchase-sale of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. with a condition precedent, which was even fulfilled on that same date. In any case, even if it were considered that what occurred was a promise of sale without a stipulated term by the contracting parties (which it is not, as already stated), in accordance with canon 1055 of the Civil Code, the term for its acceptance would have been one month, and that acceptance would have occurred on that same March 11, 1992, a fact known to Mohs Villalta himself at least by March 13, 1992 (as referred to supra); in addition to the fact that a part of the price, namely, the payment of what was owed by Cocomar S.A. to Banco Nacional, was made on April 2, 1992. The plaintiff also did not specify in his lawsuits which of the agreed clauses were in themselves contrary to the principles of good faith and contractual cooperation. This Chamber could not have supposed it, besides the fact that, as already mentioned, it is considered that as of March 11, 1992, it was beneficial for Mr. Mohs Villalta to remain as owner of 10% of the then corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. for the event in which Banco Nacional accepted Mr. Arrea Escalante's proposal to regularize that company's credit and did not register the property that had been awarded to it, so that this company would remain as owner of that real estate. He also would not have been correct in requesting the nullity of the agreement for the non-stipulation of a term. It is repeated, it was not a promise of sale without a term, but a purchase-sale subject to a condition precedent. Even if one were to start from the premise that it was, mandate 1055 of the Civil Code would have been applicable –as already stated–, such that this would not have been verified as a defect that invalidates it. On the other hand, insofar as he seeks nullity "upon the expiration of the term indicated by law in the event that the parties do not provide otherwise", it is noted, first, that this would not constitute a ground for nullity, but rather refers to the execution phase (expiration of the term and its consequence). Then, this argument does not fall within a nullification claim like the one under analysis. Second, there is no basis whatsoever for the reference to a (now legal) acceptance period for a promise when what occurred was a purchase-sale contract subject to a condition precedent, just as was determined to have occurred in the sub lite. It goes without saying that this Chamber finds the intricacy of this claim in itself striking, because on one hand it petitions the invalidity of an "option" contract for the non-existence of a term, but, immediately thereafter, requests it for non-compliance with the legal term provided for cases in which no expiration was stipulated. Likewise, what draws attention, but now generally regarding the conduct of Mr. Mohs Villalta, is that once the condition precedent of the purchase-sale was fulfilled on that March 11, 1992, having formalized the transfer of the shares on the following 13th, being made aware on that same date of the appointments to the board of directors to be made, having paid Mr. Arrea Escalante to Banco Nacional on April 2 of the same year, having received sums of money for the concept of the share purchase on July 4, 14, and 27 also of 1992, in addition to the note of September 25 "withdrawing" the supposed option, Mr. Mohs Villalta sold on October 22, 1992, in representation of Cocomar S.A., to Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., property 7-32236-000, for the sum of ¢11,000,000.00 (notarial certifications from folios 89 to 103 and 1245 to 1257). Although that purchase-sale between Cocomar S.A. and Servicentro Los Yoses S.A. was decreed null by the Fifth Civil Court of San José (judgment 25-94 of March 24, 1994), it is noted that the very reason for nullity was that the contract was executed by "Mr. Rodrigo Mohs Villalta when he no longer held the representation of Cocomar Sociedad Anónima" (operative part, folio 1236); and that even Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., then acquirer and defendant, acquiesced (folio 1251). It is thus clear that Mr. Mohs Villalta has attempted by various non-jurisdictional means to render without effect the purchase-sale contract for 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A. and to dispose of the property owned by that company. Indeed, it is noted that he filed the first of the lawsuits after Banco Nacional, on February 4, 1999, had cancelled the mortgage on estate 7-32236-000 of Cocomar S.A., (as observed in the notarial certification of the deed testimony from folios 270 to 273, in concordance with that of folios 222 to 225, regarding the approval of the public auction). From which it is undeniable that he brought this action after Cocomar S.A. had finished paying the debt it had with that financial entity and the property had been released. Finally, regarding his request for the nullity of all acts through which Mr. Arrea Escalante acted in his capacity as partner of Cocomar S.A., including the share transfers made to co-defendants Arrea Gronblad and Carlos Solís Rodríguez, and that the real estate must be returned to him **(2)**, it is dismissed. This petition has as its basis or premise the acceptance of the prior one (the nullity of the "option" contract, which was already denied due to the statute of limitations); that is, it is accessory to it, and therefore meets the same fate. In this manner, the defense of statute of limitations raised by defendant Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of Cocomar S.A. and of Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad is decreed. In sum, the second subsidiary claims are also declared without merit.

**XXXIII.** This being the case, the lawsuits filed by Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Mr. Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A. and Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad are declared without merit in all their aspects. In accordance with precept 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, personal and procedural costs are imposed on the defeated plaintiff, as it is not found that in this instance a sufficient reason to litigate was verified in the terms that have been repeatedly defined by this Chamber (namely, that it does not consist of the mere conviction of the thesis one supports, but necessarily the conviction of one's own thesis must respond to objective data from the proceeding that allow one to deduce the soundness of their claims or defenses, among which the subtlety in the "legal question" has been identified, which, for example, occurs when what is discussed is based on a pure interpretation of legal norms, as the factual picture is not controverted (in this sense, resolutions 1692-F-SI-2012, 1307-F-SI-2014, and 222-F-SI-2019 may be consulted)). Nor is it found that the claims of the prevailing party, in this case, the exceptions opposed by it, were disproportionate.

**XXXIV. Regarding the counterclaims**. Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad seek a declaration that the negotiation between their owner Rigoberto Mohs Villalta and Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, their transferor, regarding the transfer of 90% of the shares that then constituted the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A., is legitimate and transferred ownership of the shares **(1)**. The exception of lack of active legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant is accepted. It is true that Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad would have an interest in the invalidity of the agreement between Messrs. Mohs Villalta and Arrea Escalante not being declared, since it is as a result of this that Mr. Arrea Escalante became the holder of the shares of Cocomar S.A. of which they are now the owners. However, neither of them was a party to such agreement, and therefore they lack standing to petition the declaration of validity; this had to be requested by Mr. Arrea Escalante. In any case, that specific petition of the counterclaimants would lack current interest due to the manner in which the main and subsidiary claims of the lawsuit were resolved, in particular the dismissal of the annulment claim against that agreement (second subsidiary 1). On the other hand, the counterclaimants request that it be decreed that the acquisitions made by each of them (Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad) of 9,995,000 shares of the corporate capital of Cocomar S.A. were likewise legitimate, real, and for valuable consideration **(2)**. In relation to this petition, the lack of passive legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is accepted, as he is in turn a third party with respect to the legal transactions by which Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad became holders of the shares of Cocomar S.A. Moreover, due to the way the lawsuit was resolved, it would also lack interest, since the invalidity of such transfers requested by the plaintiff was denied. They further seek a declaration that "the capital increase agreed upon by the partners of Cocomar S.A. at an extraordinary General Assembly held on December twenty-first, nineteen ninety-four, which brought the corporate capital to the sum of seven million colones, was legitimate and binding for all shares" **(3)**. The request lacks current interest. It is reiterated that the plaintiff, despite the constant references to illegalities in that and other shareholder assemblies, did not seek the invalidity of that held on December 21, 1994, in which the capital of Cocomar S.A. was increased. Insofar as the validity of that assembly was not questioned, it is presumed valid, therefore this claim leads nowhere. Finally, the counterclaim plaintiffs requested that it be established that "[A]s of the date on which the counterclaim defendant Mohs Villalta made the transfer of 90% of the shares of Cocomar S.A., those shares had lost their sole or main and fundamental economic backing, having equally lost, by way of judicial public auction and adjudication that had already been made, by Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, of the sole real property owned" **(4)** and consequently, that "the value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. have today or may come to have in the future is due or shall be due to the economic effort and of other nature that the partners who acquired 90% of the corporate capital of that company from the counterclaim defendant Mohs have carried out (sic) since the latter, as he has admitted, has never contributed a single cent to the company" **(5)**. It is observed that the counterclaimants did not timely provide any technical evidence to demonstrate their statement as corresponded to them according to mandate 317 of the Procedural Code; they did not attach any element of conviction that compared the value of the shares of Cocomar S.A. before the public auction of property 7-32236-000, the value after that circumstance, the value they acquired when the Bank accepted the regularization of the credit, and the various values they have had since then. Even less could one accede to what refers to a future and uncertain fact ("the value that the shares of Cocomar S.A. (...) may come to have in the future (...) shall be due to the economic effort and of other nature that the partners who acquired 90% of the corporate capital from the counterclaim defendant Mohs have carried out"), about which it is even unknown if it is technically feasible to make projections. Therefore, they have no right. As a **sole subsidiary claim**, the counterclaimants requested that if the plaintiff's claim is accepted in the sense that the shares of Cocomar S.A. must be returned to him and with them the ownership of property 7-32236-000, insofar as that return of shares and the real estate would cause an enrichment without cause and illegitimate of the plaintiff Mohs Villalta, to avoid it, the plaintiff must be ordered to pay them 50% of the value of the property at the time of effective payment, according to a fair appraisal defined by an expert in the execution phase. Insofar as this petition has as its premise the acceptance of the lawsuit, as this did not occur, it lacks current interest and must be denied. In sum, the counterclaims filed by Messrs. Solís Rodríguez and Arrea Gronblad against Mr. Mohs Villalta (today his succession) are declared without merit. Both costs are borne by the defeated counterclaimants in accordance with mandate 55 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, since this Chamber does not find they had a sufficient reason to litigate.

**POR TANTO** The appeal is declared admissible. The appealed judgment is revoked. In its place, ruling on the merits, the judgment of the Trial Court is likewise revoked. Regarding the **lawsuit** of Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta against Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, the defenses of lack of right and statute of limitations are partially accepted, and the lack of passive and active legitimation, as well as lack of interest, are decreed ex officio. Thus, with respect to the **main claims**: "a", "b" and "e", the lack of right raised by Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad is accepted; regarding Cocomar S.A., the lack of passive legitimation is accepted ex officio; and regarding claims "c" and "d", the lack of right raised by Mr. Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining co-defendants is decreed ex officio. As for the **first subsidiary claims**, lack of right and lack of passive legitimation are decreed. Thus, with respect to "a", "b" and "c", the lack of right formulated by Mr. Arrea Escalante is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining co-defendants is declared ex officio; regarding claim "d", the lack of right with respect to Cocomar S.A. is accepted, and the lack of passive legitimation of the remaining parties. As for the **second subsidiary claims**, the defense of statute of limitations raised by the co-defendants is accepted regarding "a" and "b", and "c" and "d" which are accessory to them are denied. Thus, **the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects, both main and subsidiary, and personal and procedural costs are imposed on the defeated plaintiff**. With respect to the **counterclaims** of Messrs. Carlos Solís Rodríguez and Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad against Mr. Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, the exceptions of lack of active and passive legitimation, lack of right, are partially accepted, and the lack of current interest is likewise decreed ex officio. Thus, with respect to the **main claims**: "1)", the lack of active legitimation raised by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is accepted; "2)", the lack of passive legitimation also formulated by the counterclaim defendant plaintiff is decreed; "3)", the lack of current interest is decreed ex officio; and "4)" and "5)", lack of right. As for the subsidiary claims, the lack of current interest is decreed ex officio.

The counterclaims are dismissed in their entirety, both on the principal claim and on the subsidiary claim; both awards of costs are to be borne by the unsuccessful counterclaimants.

| Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga | | | | | | Román Solís Zelaya | Rocío Rojas Morales | | | | | | William Molinari Vílchez | Damaris Vargas Vásquez | | MACUNAQ

Revisión del Documento  Res. 002010-F-S1-2020 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas diez minutos del dieciocho de junio de dos mil veinte.

Proceso ordinario establecido en el Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica por la SUCESIÓN DE RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, representada por su albacea Lidiette Porras González, viuda, no indica ocupación ni domicilio; contra RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, ingeniero civil, en su condición personal y como apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, CARLOS SOLÍS RODRÍGUEZ, RODRIGO ALBERTO ARREA GROBLAD, no indica ocupación. Figuran como apoderados especiales judiciales, de la actora, Álvaro José Meza Lazarus; por el demandado Arrea Escalante, Johnny Jiménez Oconitrillo, soltero, vecino de Limón; y por los demandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, Federico José Solís Montero, Eduardo Augusto Cordero Sibaja. Las personas físicas son mayores de edad, y con las salvedades hechas, casados, abogados y vecinos de San José.

Redacta el magistrado Molinari Vílchez

I.En sendas demandas (presentadas el 5 de junio de 2002 y el 17 de julio de 2006), el señor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (hoy su sucesión) señaló que Cocomar Sociedad Anónima es propietaria de la finca de la provincia de Limón, matrícula 32236-000, situada en el distrito Matina, cantón Matina, cuya naturaleza es cocos y árboles, con linderos norte: Urpiano S.A., sur: Laguna de Urpiano; este: Laguna de Urpiano y oeste: canal artificial de Matina, con una medida de 95 hectáreas 4.355 metros cuadrados, plano catastrado L-0395724-1980. Indicó, durante el año 1992 fue dueño de la totalidad de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., de quien además fue el presidente con facultades de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma desde el día 17 de setiembre de 1986, hasta el 24 de agosto de 1992, cuando mediante una supuesta asamblea extraordinaria fue cesado. Manifestó, en fecha 11 de marzo de 1992, en “condición personal y como dueño de la totalidad de las acciones de Cocomar S.A.”, convino con el señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante una opción de venta de la finca 7-32236-000 por la suma de ¢9.000.000,00, los cuales se pagarían de la siguiente forma: a) ¢2.175.000,00 asumiendo el señor Arrea Escalante la deuda de tenía Cocomar S.A. con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, garantizada con hipoteca de primer grado sobre la misma heredad sobre la que otorgó esa opción; b) ¢500.000,00 destinados a pagar una indemnización a la señora Juana Aguilar por concepto de mejoras en virtud de ocupación sobre una porción del inmueble; c) ¢1.000.000,00 mediante la entrega del 10% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A.; y d) el saldo, que no devengaría intereses, con el producto del 25% de las ventas que se realizaran de partes del predio o de cualquier utilidad que llegara a producir por cualquier causa Cocomar S.A. Detalló, el acuerdo fue una oferta de venta del inmueble 7-32236-000, sin embargo, por “razones prácticas y fiscales, a conveniencia del comprador” determinaron que ese negocio podría realizarse mediante la compra de la propiedad –se entiende, mediante la escritura de compraventa correspondiente- o bien mediante el traspaso de las acciones que conformaban el capital social de Cocomar S.A., que para entonces era de ¢100.000,00, representados por 100.000 acciones de ¢1,00 cada una. Acotó, esa opción no tenía plazo. Dicho documento, dijo, lo suscribieron en el bufete Facio y Cañas, donde tenía su oficina el abogado del señor Arrea Escalante, señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez. Agregó, tal y como “En varios procesos penales se ha indicado”, en el mismo en que se negoció la opción, el señor Arrea Escalante le prestó, sin sujeción a plazo, la suma de ¢100.000,00, lo cual él garantizó a través de “la emisión y entrega” del único certificado de acciones de Cocomar S.A. Sostuvo, en el mes de setiembre de 1992, al considerar que el señor Arrea Escalante actuó de mala fe al incluir “en la redacción literal de la opción de compra venta palabras y frases en las cuales su derecho se podía ver limitado y desvalorizado en completa disonancia con el espíritu del acuerdo de opción de compra venta”, le comunicó a este que dejaba sin efecto la opción, con lo cual el inmueble quedó en “libertad”. Relató, la reacción del señor Arrea Escalante fue modificar los estatutos de Cocomar S.A. y sustituirle a él como representante legal, aprovechando que tenía en su poder el certificado de acciones. Explicó, al momento de negociarse la opción, el señor Arrea Escalante le prestó ¢100.000,00, por lo cual él emitió y entregó en calidad de garantía el único certificado accionario de Cocomar S.A., el cual firmó en el dorso. El señor Arrea Escalante procedió a “llenar el certificado de acciones en blanco a su nombre”, de manera que “no ejerció su derecho de garantía sino que se apropió ilegalmente de las acciones de Cocomar S.A.”, y que debió haber rematado. Prosiguió, así el 24 de agosto de 1992, el señor Arrea Escalante “se constituyó en Asamblea Extraordinaria (…) sin cumplir los trámites de convocatoria previa (por supuestamente estar reunido la totalidad del capital social)” y, entre otros acuerdos, le destituyó a él (Rigoberto Mohs) como presidente. Expresó, el 16 de setiembre de 1992, sin respetar los trámites de convocatoria previa, el señor Arrea Escalante nuevamente se constituyó en asamblea extraordinaria de accionistas y se autorizó a abrir cuentas corrientes en los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional. Refirió, el 21 de diciembre de 1994, el señor Arrea Escalante se presentó a una supuesta asamblea extraordinaria de accionistas, convocada mediante publicación en el diario oficial La Gaceta del 7 de diciembre de 1994. En esa oportunidad, describe, se consignó que el señor Arrea Escalante exhibía un certificado por 100.000 acciones y se advirtió que de ese certificado únicamente le pertenecía el 90%, equivalente a 90.000 acciones, pues el restante 10% -expuso- pertenecía a él (Rigoberto Mohs Villalta). En esa asamblea se aumentó el capital social en la suma de ¢19.900.000,00, los que supuestamente pagó el mismo socio Arrea Escalante de la siguiente manera: a) ¢15.000.000,00 “capitalizando el superávit acumulado y que se ha producido por los aportes que él ha realizado en distintas fechas, según consta en los registros contables debidamente legalizados que lleva la sociedad”; y b) ¢4.900.000,00 mediante “letra de cambio a la vista suscrita por él [señor Arrea Escalante] a favor de la sociedad, debidamente aceptada por el deudor”; con lo cual el nuevo capital social fue de ¢20.000.000,00. Asimismo, se modificó la cláusula quinta del estatuto social a efecto de que el capital social se representase en adelante mediante 20.000.000 de acciones de ¢1,00 cada una. Agregó, curiosamente el notario que protocolizó el acta, Carlos Solís Rodríguez, quien además ocupaba el cargo de secretario, dio fe de que había concurrido todo el capital social, lo cual no es cierto tal y como se afirmó en esa misma asamblea. Destacó el demandante, en las anteriores asambleas, el señor Arrea Escalante se presentó como el dueño de la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar S.A., pero en la recién referida, a saber, la del 21 de diciembre de 1994, se presentó como titular del 90%. Así, de forma contradictoria en ocasiones ejerció como dueño de la totalidad “producto de que le fueron dados en garantía (no en propiedad)”, o bien como dueño del 90% de las acciones “por concepto de aplicación de la opción de compra venta firmada”. Aseguró, con dicho proceder del 21 de diciembre de 1994, el señor Arrea Escalante desnaturalizó la opción de compraventa que habían suscrito, pues (si bien) en esa asamblea advirtió era dueño del 90% de las acciones y que 10% le pertenecían a él (Rigoberto Mohs), al aumentar el capital social hizo nugatorio su derecho (el de Rigoberto Mohs Villalta) al “diez por ciento del precio de la finca que fue convenido en el contrato de opción de compra venta”, pues –precisó- el 10% de las acciones que le correspondía era con relación a un capital social de ¢100.000,00, es decir, a 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00; pero a partir de allí es dueño de las mismas 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 pero con relación a un total de 20.000.000 de acciones de ¢1,00. Estimó, eso hizo nugatorio su derecho al precio convenido en la opción de compraventa de la finca 7-32236-000, en claro abuso de su derecho y en abierta actuación de mala fe. Insiste, no era posible el aumento de capital en virtud de la proporción de acciones de Cocomar S.A. que formaba parte del precio de la opción. Reiteró, en el contrato de opción de compraventa “que no se ha llegado a ejecutar”, determinaron también que el precio (parte de él) se pagaría destinando el 25% de las utilidades que por cualquier causa produjera Cocomar S.A. Así, recalcó, cuando en esa asamblea del 21 de diciembre de “1992” (se entiende es un error material y se refiere a 1994, como había indicado previamente) se aumentó el capital social, los ¢15.000.000,00 “que se capitalizaron y que se produjeron por aportes”, resultaban ser un superávit acumulado, es decir, una utilidad de Cocomar S.A. por cualquier causa. De ahí que, resaltó, el 25% de esa utilidad le pertenecía a él (Rigoberto Mohs) según la opción. Aseveró, no puede considerarse que las sumas que el señor Arrea Escalante “hubiese gastado en la sociedad o en la finca (…) permitiera un aumento de capital en la sociedad dicha pues en el contrato de opción (…) es claro que el precio a pagar por la finca relacionada no tenía un plazo ni generaba un interés” y parte de él se pagaría con el 10% de “las acciones del inmueble lo que significaba en otras palabras que el diez por ciento del precio del inmueble se reservaba al suscrito, amen (sic) de que también se determinaba que el veinticinco por ciento de las utilidades que generara la compañía por ventas del inmueble se cancelarían al suscrito, sin importar cuanto (sic) se obtenía por las ventas y si ello superaba los nueve millones pactados”. Recriminó, a la fecha (interposición de la primer demanda 5 de junio de 2002; 17 de julio de 2006, la segunda) de los ¢9.000.000,00 no ha recibido suma alguna y los ¢100.000,00 que recibió lo fueron en calidad de préstamo y no como abono de lo adeudado por la compraventa. Enunció, de las declaraciones del señor Arrea Escalante en los procesos penales en los cuales él cuestionó las actuaciones que el primero realizó (no precisó a qué procesos se refería) y de la propia opción, se tiene que la forma de pago acordada “ha sido totalmente incumplida por el demandado, afectando totalmente la naturaleza y la voluntad que me llevó a contratar con él”. Continuó, el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió gravemente el contrato que “aun (sic) se encuentra vigente y sin que hasta ésta fecha se hayan desplegado sus efectos”. En la demanda presentada el 17 de julio de 2006, ante la orden de integrar la Litis por parte del Tribunal Agrario, señaló que con su demanda en junio de 2002 solicitó la exhibición de los libros de actas y de accionistas y la anotación de esta demanda en estos libros. Describió, el 6 de junio de 2002, el Juzgado Agrario de Limón emitió orden al secretario de Cocomar S.A., señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez, de anotar la demanda en el libro de accionistas. Para abril de 2003, el señor Solís Rodríguez no había indicado al Juzgado al respecto. Relató, hasta el 23 de abril de 2003 la Oficina de Legalización de Libros de Tributación autorizó el libro de accionistas de Cocomar S.A., en virtud de que el primero fue extraviado; por lo que –explicó- el señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez presentó a este proceso hasta el 11 de marzo de 2004 dicho libro y el de asamblea general. Destacó, el libro de accionistas de Cocomar S.A. tiene los siguientes asientos: el primero de fecha 30 de abril de 2003, donde consigna el capital social inicial; el segundo, también de fecha 30 de abril de 2003, donde consta la reforma a la cláusula tercera por medio de la cual las acciones al portador se transformaron en nominativas, con la indicación de que ello acaeció el 17 de setiembre de 1986; el tercero, que consigna en asamblea de accionistas del 21 de diciembre de 1994 se aumentó el capital conforme se indicó supra y que el señor Arrea Escalante es dueño de 19.990.000 acciones; el cuarto, de fecha 21 de mayo de 2003, donde se consignó el supuesto traspaso de acciones realizado el 20 de mayo de 2001 por parte del señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante a los señores Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad de 9.995.000 acciones a cada uno; y uno asiento sin número, de fecha 25 de mayo de 2003, el cual consigna la anotación ordenada por el Juzgado Agrario de Limón. Enfatizó, es simulado este traspaso de acciones a favor de su hijo y de su abogado –quien fue quien protocolizó todos los acuerdos de asamblea de accionistas en los cuales el señor Arrea Escalante abusó de su derecho en perjuicio suyo, pues lo fue con miras a evadir las consecuencias del presente proceso; los nuevos titulares accionarios conocían “los detalles de la forma en que se realizaron las acciones por medio de las cuales se produjo el incumplimiento del contrato de opción” y que “la acción” (se entiende el certificado accionario) fue entregada al señor Arrea Escalante en garantía de un préstamo de ¢100.000,00. Añadió, ese traspaso de acciones es inválido e ineficaz pues “nunca pudo ser inscrito en el libro de accionistas de la sociedad dado que a la fecha en que se consigna como realizado, 20 de mayo de 2001, no existía el citado libro”. Insistió, el libro fue repuesto hasta el 23 de abril de 2003 y el propio señor Arrea Escalante, a folios 519 a 521, en declaración confesional dijo que los libros permanecieron por mucho tiempo en el juzgado penal, órgano que le informó mucho tiempo después que se habían perdido, por lo que al no existir el libro, no fue consignado la proporción del capital social del que era dueño.

II.Pretensiones de la demanda. En virtud de lo anterior, el señor Mohs Villalta demandó en primer término al señor Arrea Escalante, posteriormente integró la litis por orden del Tribunal Agrario contra Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad. Pretendió de forma principal en sentencia se declare: “a- Que el demandado ARREA ESCALANTE es un poseedor ilegítimo y aparece como titular de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. sin tener derecho legal para serlo dado que el certificado de acciones nunca le fue traspasado sino que se le entregó como garantía de un préstamo por cien mil colones , (sic) préstamo que no tenía plazo. b- Que como poseedor y titular ilegitimo del certificado de acciones que representa el capital social de Cocomar S.A. son nulas todas las cesiones de acciones en propiedad realizadas por el señor Arrea Escalante a favor de los co demandados (sic) Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad y deben restituirlas al suscrito quienes las posean. c- Que el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió en forma grave el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) de fecha 13 de marzo de 1992 al realizar acciones que tendieron a desnaturalizar el derecho del suscrito en (sic) relación al precio convenido cuando aprovechándose de que tenía la posesión del certificado de acciones que representan el capital social de la sociedad Cocomar S.A. aumentó el capital social de la misma (sic) en diecinueve millones novecientos mil colones mediante la capitalización de un superávit y mediante una letra de cambio por la suma de cuatro millones novecientos mil colones , (sic) con lo que parte del precio dado en la opción de compra venta (sic) se torno (sic) nugatorio al pasar el suscrito de ser supuestamente titular de diez mil acciones de un colon (sic) con relación aun capital de cien mil acciones de un colon (sic) a ser supuestamente titular de diez mil acciones de un colon (sic) con relación a veinte millones de acciones de un colon (sic) d- Que igualmente al aumentar el capital social de la sociedad Cocomar S.A (sic), su único socio, el aquí demandado Arrea Escalante lo hizo capitalizando un supuesto superavit (sic) de la sociedad dicha sin que se respetara el derecho al 25 por ciento sobre cualquier utilidad conforme se determinó en el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) incumplido. e- Que las cesiones o traspasos de acciones realizados por el co demandado (sic) Arrea Escalante a favor del co demandado (sic) Carlos Solís Rodríguez y de su hijo Rodrigo Arrea Groblant (sic) son nulas por ser simuladas, carecer de causa y porque no pueden oponerse al suscrito por lo que deben ser restituidas todas las acciones al suscrito (sic) f- Que son ambas costas de esta acción a cargo de los demandados”. Como primer grupo de pretensiones subsidiarias, pidió se declare: “a- Que el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) por medio del cual adquirió la finca del Partido de Limón matrícula 32236-000 al abusar de su derecho tornando el derecho del suscrito a obtener un precio justo en nugatorio (sic) b- Que debe declararse la resolución del contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) de la finca objeto de litis al ser el incumplimiento del demandado Arrea Escalante, grave. c- Que el señor Arrea Escalante en su condición de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Cocomar S.A. está obligado a devolver el inmueble objeto del contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) al suscrito (sic) d- Que la sociedad Cocomar S.A. debe realizar escritura pública en la cual retorna también la titularidad registral del inmueble objeto de litis al suscrito (sic) e- Que son las costas a cargo del demandado Arrea Escalante (sic)”. Como pretensiones subsidiarias segundas, solicitó se decrete: “a- Que el contrato suscrito entre Arrea Escalante y Rodrigo Mohs Villalta, que es opción de compra venta (sic) de la finca del Partido de Limón 32236-000 es nula por haberse realizado aprovechándose el señor Arrea del estado de necesidad del suscrito y por contener cláusulas que de por si determinan la total disonancia con los principios contractuales de buena fe y cooperación contractual constituyendo un abuso de derecho (sic) b- Que el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) es nulo por cuanto el mismo (sic) no tiene plazo siendo el plazo esencial en los contratos de opción y al haber vencido el plazo que señala la ley en el caso de que las partes no dispongan al respecto. c- Que siendo nulo el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) también lo es todo acto por medio del cual el señor Arrea Escalante actuó en su condición de socio en la sociedad Cocomar S.A. y en su condición de accionista incluyendo los traspasos de acciones realizados a los co demandados (sic) Arrea Groblant (sic) y Carlos Solís Rodríguez (sic) d- Que siendo nulo el contrato de opción de compra venta (sic) debe el inmueble retornar al suscrito siendo que el señor Arrea Escalante es quien suscribió el contrato con el suscrito y es el titular de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. e- Que son las costas a cargo de los demandados (sic)”.

III.Contestaciones. Cocomar S.A. y los señores Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad contestaron negativamente las demandas y plantearon todos las mismas defensas, a saber, prescripción, cosa juzgada, falta de derecho y “falta de personalidad pasiva y la reciproca (sic) de activa”. La sociedad y el señor Arrea Escalante lo hicieron en conjunto, los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad cada uno de manera individual.

IV.Contrademandas. Asimismo, de forma individual los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad contrademandaron al señor Mohs Villalta. Coincidieron en los hechos que alegaron. Así sostuvieron, la negociaciones que dieron como resultado que el señor Arrea Escalante adquiriese el 90% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. mediante venta por parte de Rigoberto Mohs, entonces propietario del 100%, obedecieron a un primer contacto que tuvo el señor Mohs Villalta con el señor Carlos Lara Hine, a quien le ofreció vender el inmueble 7-32236-000, propiedad de Cocomar S.A., el cual estaba a punto de perderse en remate solicitado por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, en juicio ejecutivo hipotecario contra la empresa. Continuaron, el señor Lara Hine planteó al señor Arrea Escalante asociarse y adquirir ambos el inmueble, a lo cual accedió el segundo. Relataron, las negociaciones entre los señores Mohs Villalta, Lara Hine y Arrea Escalante se concretaron en la oficina del señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez; el 11 de marzo de 1992 el señor Mohs Villalta, quien acudió en compañía del señor Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, otorgó opción de compra de la finca al señor Arrea Escalante con las condiciones que en ese documento constan, entre las que –destacaron- se encontraban que el señor Arrea Escalante podía ejercer los derechos de la opción mediante la adquisición del inmueble o mediante la compra de las acciones del capital social; que el precio era de ¢9.000.000,00 que debía pagar de la siguiente forma: 1) ¢2.175.000,00 haciéndose cargo de pagar una operación de crédito que Cocomar S.A. tenía con el Banco Nacional, garantizada con hipoteca en primer grado sobre el predio en cuestión, 2) ¢500.000,00 en cancelación de indemnización reclamada por la señora Juana Aguilar, precarista, 3) ¢1.000.000,00 mediante la entrega al optante vendedor del 10% del capital social de Cocomar S.A., y 4) el saldo de ¢5.325.000,00, que no devengaría intereses, con el producto del 25% de las ventas que se realizarían de partes o lotes del inmueble o de cualquier utilidad que en el futuro llegara a producir Cocomar S.A.; asimismo, que para el ejercicio de los derechos de la opción, era condición suspensiva, indispensable, que el señor Arrea Escalante regularizara la situación de crédito con el Banco Nacional. Describieron, cuando ellos llegaron al acuerdo, el señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez lo dictó a su secretaria Jeannette Viales Segura, en voz alta a fin de que los presentes estuvieran al tanto del contenido que tendría el documento; ella se llevó el borrador y luego regresó con el documento confeccionado. El señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez procedió a leerlo en voz alta, todos mostraron su acuerdo y el proponente, señor Mohs Villalta lo firmó, sin que hubiese solicitado cambio o corrección. Apuntaron, en esta misma fecha en que otorgó la opción (11 de marzo de 1992), el señor Mohs Villalta solicitó al señor Arrea Escalante un préstamo por ¢100.000,00, que el último le concedió; el señor Mohs Villalta al recibir el dinero firmó el recibo y consignó “esos cien mil colones se le daban en calidad de préstamo pero “eventualmente aplicable al precio de la venta de una finca…””. Agregaron, el 13 de marzo de 1992, dos días después de que el señor Mohs Villalta firmara la opción, se dio otra reunión con los mismos participantes; allí se le hizo saber al señor Mohs Villalta que se modificarían los estatutos y se nombraría nueva junta directiva que sería integrada con los miembros del “Grupo Cocomar”, él estuvo de acuerdo. Destacaron, así lo reconoció el señor Mohs Villalta en su declaración ante el Juzgado Cuarto de Instrucción de San José, documento número 3 presentado por el señor Arrea Escalante con su contestación, donde además indicó que como él había firmado en blanco el único certificado accionario de Cocomar S.A., se aprovecharía esa firma para consignar la leyenda de traspaso a favor del señor Arrea Escalante, quien a su vez firmaría en señal de aprobación; así –dijeron- “se hizo efectivo el traspaso –brevi mano- del 90% de las acciones que comprendía el negocio oportunamente convenido entre las partes”. Expresaron, el señor Arrea Escalante cumplió con la condición suspensiva de la opción satisfactoriamente cancelando las cuotas atrasadas, los intereses moratorios y costas del proceso hipotecario el día 2 de abril de 1992. En ese momento, arguyeron, la opción se concretó y se hizo efectiva con carácter definitivo. Destacaron, para hacer ese pago al Banco, el señor Arrea Escalante llegó a un entendimiento con el funcionario del Banco, señor German Cuevillas, a cargo de la oficina de Administración de sucursales; acuerdo según el cual el señor Arrea Escalante normalizaría la situación crediticia de Cocomar S.A. y pagaría las cuotas o abonos futuros hasta la cancelación total; lo que también cumplió y así el Banco le otorgó la escritura de cancelación de hipoteca. Mencionaron, los señores Lara Hine y Arrea Escalante obtuvieron el visto bueno del funcionario del Banco Nacional a que el señor Arrea Escalante, sin necesidad de novación de deudor, se hiciera cargo de normalizar y poner al día la operación crediticia de Cocomar S.A. Luego, acotaron, los señores Lara Hine y Arrea Escalante invitaron a uno de sus respectivos hijos a participar con ellos en la compra del inmueble, de modo que el señor Carlos Lara Hine y su hijo Carlos Lara Guardia adquirieron el 35% de las acciones, y el señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y su hijo Rodrigo Alberto Arrea Gronblad otro 35%; asimismo, fueron invitados a participar de la compra el señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez y el yerno de Arrea Escalante, señor Fernando del Barco Garrón, cada uno con 10%. De esta manera, explicaron, quedó distribuido el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. que había adquirido el señor Arrea Escalante; el señor Mohs Villalta conservó el 10% restante. Aseveraron, si bien el señor Mohs Villalta no conocía la forma porcentual en que finalmente quedó distribuido el capital social, sí estaba al tanto de que los compradores eran “un grupo de amigos entre nosotros, el que, para simplificar, en caso de ser necesario, continuaré identificando como “Grupo Cocomar” que había convenido en unir nuestros recursos económicos y nuestro esfuerzo, para echar a andar un proyecto de carácter turístico en el inmueble”. Aseguraron, el grupo de amigos decidió que en toda la negociación, operaciones y trámites continuara el señor Arrea Escalante como único socio del 90% del capital social, con las acciones a su nombre, en virtud de que era él quien se comprometió con el Banco Nacional. Narró solamente el reconventor Solís Rodríguez que el 26 de marzo de 1998, él acordó con los señores Carlos Lara Hine y Carlos Lara Guardia la compra de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. que les pertenecían, por el precio de ¢9.225.000,00, el cual pagaría “tan pronto el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica le pagara una indemnización a una sociedad mía denominada Hacienda Choluteca Limitada, lo cual ocurrió el 21 de enero de 2000. Ese pago lo efectué en dos tractos, uno el 21 de febrero y el otro el 26 de marzo ambos del año dos mil, todo según se ve del grupo de documentos que presento con este memorial con la contestación de demanda marcados con la letra A. De esta manera y después de que se realizó el aumento de capital, agregándole las que había comprado originalmente, llegué a sumar la cantidad de que hoy soy propietario en número de nueve millones novecientos noventa y cinco mil (9.995.000) acciones, según consta del propio libro de Registro de Accionistas y del título correspondiente que presento conjuntamente marcados con el número I)”. Precisó únicamente el señor Arrea Gronblad que el traspaso de las 9.995.000 acciones que le pertenecen, equivalente a lo que originalmente era el 45% del capital social, si bien a aparece como hecho a su favor por el señor Arrea Escalante, lo cierto es que las adquirió de una porción que originalmente había comprado su cuñado, Fernando del Barco Garrón, quien decidió salirse de Cocomar S.A., y el resto las adquirió de su padre, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante mediante “un trueque que hice con él de las acciones Cocomar S.A. por otras que yo tenía de una empresa hoy solo suya, denominada Constructora Agro Dam S.A.”. Explicaron, dentro del grupo de amigos “Grupo Cocomar” se dieron negociaciones de acciones, que no pudieron ser asentadas oportunamente en el libro correspondiente, pues este se encontraba en el Juzgado Penal; órgano que finalmente cuando solicitaron su devolución les indicó se había extraviado. Mencionaron, los actuales socios de Cocomar S.A. han afrontado un riesgo económico y se han esforzado por mantener la finca “a buen recaudo de precaristas y con sus linderos bien cuidados e identificados”. Prosiguieron, como los gastos e inversiones requeridos por Cocomar S.A. tenían que ser cubiertos por aportes de los socios, ya que la compañía no había producido nada y como en los libros y realidad se reportaba el monto de ¢15.000.000,00 recibidos por la empresa en esa calidad, en asamblea general de socios del 21 de diciembre de 1994 se acordó aumentar el capital social a la suma de ¢20.000.000,00, los que se pagaron capitalizando los referidos aportes de socios, y ¢4.900.000,00 mediante una letra de cambio suscrita por el socio Arrea Escalante a favor de Cocomar S.A., la que “en poco tiempo fue cancelada por el deudor”. Expusieron, “Esta operación y aumento de capital, por demás absolutamente legítimo, es muy común en el mundo de los negocios y se realiza, entre otras razones, cuando se presenta en alcance muy desproporcionado entre el capital de la compañía y la deuda que esta tenga para con los socios motivada en aportes que esos socios hayan efectuado para cubrir necesidades de efectivo que requiera su normal operación”. De ahí es que –explicaron- justamente en los registros contables de Cocomar S.A., que no ha producido nada, se acusen nuevos aportes de los socios por el importe de ¢20.669.581,76 (documento II). Detallaron, la forma ingenua en que se procedió en la reunión 13 de marzo de 1992, dio base al señor Mohs Villalta para denunciar a todos los directores de Cocomar S.A. y al fiscal ante el Ministerio Público, el cual formuló acusación por los delitos de falsificación de documento, falsedad ideológica, uso de documento falso y estafa en perjuicio del señor Mohs Villalta; de dicha acusación fueron sobreseídos y posteriormente resultaron condenados el señor Mohs Villalta y su esposa por los delitos de denuncia calumniosa y falso testimonio (documentos 13, 14 y 15 presentados por el señor Arrea Escalante al contestar la demanda). Exaltaron, el señor Mohs Villalta nunca pagó al señor Arrea Escalante el dinero que le prestó, “lo que implícitamente significa que la aplicó al precio del negocio”. Incluso, recalcaron, en su confesión (dentro de este proceso), al señor Mohs Villalta se le preguntó (como número 11) que si nunca pagó al demandado Arrea Escalante los ¢100.000,00 pues los aplicó al precio del negocio que había hecho con él, a lo que respondió era cierto; con lo cual aceptó expresamente que él cerró la negociación de venta de acciones. Finalizaron, cuando el señor Arrea Escalante adquirió el 90% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., estas no tenían ningún valor económico, pues la empresa ya había perdido el único bien patrimonial por remate judicial y adjudicación por parte del Banco Nacional; las acciones volvieron a adquirir valor cuando el señor Arrea Escalante normalizó la situación de mora e incumplimiento de Cocomar S.A. con el Banco Nacional, y más aún cuando pagó a la precarista Juana Aguilar. Allí se restituyó el valor de las acciones, el que ha subido por efecto de la inflación, el mantenimiento y protección del inmueble, el auge turístico del país respecto de la belleza natural del terreno; ha sido el esfuerzo económico y participación de los integrantes de “Grupo Cocomar” el que rescató a la compañía.

V.Pretensiones de las reconvenciones. También coincidieron los reconventores en las pretensiones, de esta manera peticionaron de manera principal se declare en sentencia: “1) Que la negociación que se produjo, relativa al traspaso del 90% de las acciones que para ese entonces conformaban el capital social de Cocomar S.A., entre su dueño Rigoberto Mohs Villalta y mi causahabiente de las que hoy me pertenecen Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, se dio de modo legítimo y por ello traslativo de propiedad de las acciones traspasadas. 2) Que igualmente fue legítima, real y a título oneroso la adquisición que en su oportunidad [hicieron] de las (sic) nueve millones novecientos noventa y cinco mil acciones (9.995.000) que hoy [les] pertenecen del capital social de Cocomar S.A. 3) Que también fue legítimo y obligante para todas las acciones, el aumento de capital acordado por los socios de Cocomar S.A. en Asamblea General extraordinaria celebrada el veintiuno de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, que llevó el capital social a la suma de siete millones de colones. 4) Que a la fecha en que el contrademandado Mohs Villalta hizo traspaso del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., esas acciones habían perdido su único y principal y fundamental respaldo económico al haber igualmente perdido por vía de remate judicial y adjudicación que ya se había hecho el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica del único bien inmueble de (sic) que era dueña, sea la finca inscrita al folio real matrícula TREINTA Y DOS MIL DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS del Partido de la Provincia de Limón. 5) Que en consecuencia de lo apuntado en el numeral inmediato anterior, cualquier valor que las acciones de Cocomar S.A. tengan hoy o puedan llegar a tener en el futuro, se debe o deberá al esfuerzo económico y de otra naturaleza que han realizado los socios que adquirieron del contrademandado Mohs el 90% del capital social de esa compañis (sic), ya que éste, como lo tiene admitido, nunca le ha aportado a la empresa ni un solo centavo”. Como pretensión subsidiaria única, pidieron que de acogerse la pretensión del actor en el sentido de que deben devolvérsele las acciones de Cocomar S.A. y con ellas el dominio de la finca 7-32236-000, en el tanto esa devolución de acciones y el inmueble provocarían un enriquecimiento sin causa e ilegítimo del actor Mohs Villalta, para evitarlo, se declare que el señor Mohs Villalta debe pagarles a ellos reconventores el 50% del valor de la finca al momento del efectivo pago, según justiprecio que defina un perito en la fase de ejecución.

VI.El señor Mohs Villalta se opuso a ambas reconvenciones y formuló las excepciones de falta de legitimación pasiva y activa y de derecho.

VII.Resoluciones de primera y segunda instancia. En sentencia 12-2013 de las 10 horas 42 minutos del 25 de febrero de 2013, el Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica, dispuso: “(…) se declara parcialmente con lugar la presente demanda ordinaria de RIGOBERTO MOHS VILLALTA, (sic) RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, (sic) Y (sic) RODRIGO ARREA GRONBLAT (sic) Y CARLOS SOLIS (sic) RODRÍGUEZ declarándose en cuanto a este lo siguiente: 1) Que el demandado ARREA ESCALANTE es un poseedor ilegítimo de las acciones de Cocomar S.A,(sic) sin tener derecho legal para serlo, dado que el certificado de acciones nunca fue traspasado, sino que se le entrego (sic) como garantía de un préstamo por cien mil colones, préstamo que no tiene plazo.- (sic) 2) Se declara con lugar en cuando (sic) a declarar (sic) que como poseedor y titular ilegítimo del certificado de acciones que representa el capital social de Cocomar S.A, (sic) por (sic) lo (sic) que (sic) son nulas todas las cesiones de acciones en propiedad realizadas por el señor Arrea a favor de los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad por lo que deben restituir el noventa por ciento de las acciones a la hoy sucesión del actor en favor de su albacea.- (sic) 3) Que el señor ARREA ESCALANTE ha incumplido en forma grave el contrato de opción de compraventa de fecha 13 de marzo de 1992 al realizar acciones que tendieron a desnaturalizar el derecho del suscrito en relación con el precio convenido, cuando aprovechándose que tenía en posesión un certificado de acciones que representa el capital social de Cocomar S.A, (sic) aumento (sic) el capital social de la misma (sic) en diecinueve millones novecientos mil colones mediante la capitalización de un superávit y mediante una letra de cambio por la suma de cuatro millones novecientos mil colones, con lo que parte del precio dado en la opción de compraventa se torno (sic) nugatorio al pasar el suscrito de ser supuestamente titular de diez mil acciones de un colón en (sic) relación a un capital de cien mil acciones de un colón a ser supuestamente titular de diez mil acciones de un colón con relación a veinte millones de acciones de un colón.-(sic) 4) Que igualmente al aumentar el capital social de la sociedad Cocomar S.A,(sic) su único socio, el aquí demandado ARREA ESCALANTE, lo hizo capitalizando un superávit de la sociedad dicha sin que se respetara el derecho de un veinticinco por ciento sobre cualquier utilidad conforme se determino (sic) en el contrato de opción de compraventa incumplido.- (sic) 5) Que las cesiones o traspasos de acciones realizados por el codemandado Carlos Solís Rodríguez y de su hijo Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) son nulas por ser simuladas, carecer de justa causa y porque no pueden oponerse al sucesorio del actor por lo que debe (sic) restituirse al sucesorio antes indicado.- (sic) 6) Que son ambas costas de esta acción a cargo del demandado Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y los codemandados Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) .- (sic) Subsidiariamente se declara: a) Que el señor Arrea Escalante haincumplido el contrato de opción de compra venta al abusar de su derecho tornando el derecho del sucesorio actor a obtener un precio justo en nugatorio y se deniega la parte de ésta petitoria por medio de la cual señala que el demandado Arrea adquirió la finca del Partido de Limón matrícula número 32236-000.- (sic) b) Que debe declararse la resolución del contrato de opción de compra venta de la finca objeto de esta litis al ser el incumplimiento del demando Arrea grave.- (sic) c) Se rechaza en cuanto a declarar que el señor Arrea Escalante esta (sic)obligado a devolver el inmueble objeto del contrato de opción de compraventa al sucesorio del actor.- (sic)d) Se rechaza también en cuanto a que la sociedad Cocomar S.A,(sic) debe realizar escritura pública en la cual retorna la titularidad registral del inmueble objeto de esta litis al sucesorio del actor.- (sic) e) Se omite hacer otro pronunciamiento sobre costas por innecesario al haberse acogido este extremo en la pretensión principal.- (sic) En cuanto a la pretensión subsidiaria segunda: Se rechazan las pretensiones a, b (sic)yd de éste apartado. Se acoge la pretensión c) que dice: Que siendo nulo en (sic) contrato de opción de compra venta es (sic) también lo es todo acto por medio del cual el señor Arrea Escalante actuó en su condición de accionista incluyendo los traspasos de acciones realizadas (sic) a los codemandados Arrea Groblant (sic) y Carlos Solís Rodríguez. En cuanto a las excepciones de prescripción, falta de derecho, falta de personalidad pasiva de los demandados y la recíproca de activa interpuesta por el demandado Arrea Escalante y los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblant (sic) las mismas (sic) se rechazan. En cuanto a la codemandada COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, la presente demanda se declara sin lugar, rechazándose las excepciones de prescripción, falta de personalidad pasiva de los demandados y la recíproca de activa, acogiendo la excepción de falta de derecho y en cuanto a ésta se exonera del pago de las costas. Con respecto a la contrademanda planteada por los codemandados Arrea Gronblant (sic) y Solís Rodríguez , (sic) se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos acogiendo de esta forma las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho interpuesta por la parte actora.- (sic) Se condena al pago de las costas procesales y personales a los demás demandados y codemandados,sea los señores Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic)Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic)Se le hace saber a las partes el derecho que le asiste de recurrir el presente fallo.-”. En resolución 25-2013 de las 10 horas 14 minutos del 4 de abril de 2013, el Juzgado rechazó la gestión de adición y aclaración formulada por el codemandado reconventor Solís Rodríguez contra la sentencia. En virtud del recurso de apelación presentado por el codemandado Arrea Escalante y los codemandados reconventores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, en resolución 608-F-2016 de las 11 horas 51 minutos del 28 de junio de 2016, el Tribunal Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, dispuso: “Se rechaza traer ad effectum videndi el proceso número cero dos- cero cero mil cuatro- quinientos cuatro-CI. Se rechazan los dos incidentes de hechos nuevos promovidos por Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y Carlos Solís Rodríguez. Se revoca parcialmente la sentencia recurrida en lo siguiente: a) En el punto dos de la parte dispositiva , (sic) únicamente en cuanto ordena restituir las acciones a favor del albacea. b) Los puntos tres y cuatro por no ser técnicamente pretensiones sino hechos y justificaciones de tales o de otras pretensiones de la demanda. c) Parcialmente el punto cinco, únicamente en cuanto declara nulas por simulación las cesiones o traspasos de acciones realizados por el codemandado Carlos Solís Rodríguez y de su hijo Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad. d) Lo concedido subsidiariamente. En lugar de lo revocado se ordena: 1) La restitución de acciones concedida en el punto dos se ordena a favor del sucesorio de Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. 2) Se declara resuelto el contrato de compraventa celebrado entre Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y Rigoberto Mohs Villalta cuya base fue la opción de compraventa del once de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, con razón de fecha cierta otorgada ante el Notario Público Carlos Solís Rodríguez de las ocho horas del veintiuno de octubre de mil novecientos noventa dos, escritura número treinta y ocho, a folio cuarenta y ocho del tomo décimo sexto. Se ordena a las partes devolver la situación al momento de la celebración de la negociación resuelta, por lo que deberá Rodrigo Arrea Escalante reintegrar la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, así como los libros legales a la sucesión de Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. El sucesorio dicho deberá devolver las sumas recibidas parcialmente por la compraventa contenida en el documento citado, que comprenden: el monto pagado al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por concepto de la operación crediticia número seis mil treinta y seis y seis mil treinta y siete por dos millones ciento setenta y cinco mil colones; quinientos mil colones cancelados señora a Juana Aguilar. En total el sucesorio debe devolver la suma de dos millones seiscientos setenta y cinco mil colones a favor de Rodrigo Arrea Escalante por concepto de sumas parcialmente pagadas como parte del precio de la compraventa. En lo demás que ha sido objeto de apelación se confirma”. En resolución 675-F-2016 de las 16 horas 58 minutos del 18 de julio de 2016, ese Tribunal adicionó: “3) De la excepción o acción interpuesta por los demandados Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad y Rodríguez Solís de venta de cosa ajena se rechaza por improcedente. Se corrige el error material en el punto cinco de la sentencia para que después de la palabra "Rodríguez" se lea "el codemandado Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad" y no la expresión "de su hijo". Se declara firme este extremo”. De esta manera, se tiene que lo dispuesto finalmente en este asunto fue: “1) Que el demandado ARREA ESCALANTE es un poseedor ilegítimo de las acciones de Cocomar S.A,(sic) sin tener derecho legal para serlo, dado que el certificado de acciones nunca fue traspasado, sino que se le entrego (sic) como garantía de un préstamo por cien mil colones, préstamo que no tiene plazo.- (sic) 2) Se declara con lugar en cuando (sic) a declarar (sic) que como poseedor y titular ilegítimo del certificado de acciones que representa el capital social de Cocomar S.A, (sic) por (sic) lo (sic) que (sic) son nulas todas las cesiones de acciones en propiedad realizadas por el señor Arrea a favor de los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad por lo que deben restituir el noventa por ciento de las acciones a la hoy sucesión del actor. 5) [siguiendo la numeración que correspondería, sería el punto número 3] Que las cesiones o traspasos de acciones realizados por el codemandado Carlos Solís Rodríguez el codemandado Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic) son nulas por carecer de justa causa y porque no pueden oponerse al sucesorio del actor por lo que debe (sic) restituirse al sucesorio antes indicado.- (sic) [siguiendo la numeración que correspondería, sería el punto número 4] Se declara resuelto el contrato de compraventa celebrado entre Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y Rigoberto Mohs Villalta cuya base fue la opción de compraventa del once de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, con razón de fecha cierta otorgada ante el Notario Público Carlos Solís Rodríguez de las ocho horas del veintiuno de octubre de mil novecientos noventa dos, escritura número treinta y ocho, a folio cuarenta y ocho del tomo décimo sexto. [Siguiendo la numeración que correspondería, sería el punto número 5] Se ordena a las partes devolver la situación al momento de la celebración de la negociación resuelta, por lo que deberá Rodrigo Arrea Escalante reintegrar la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, así como los libros legales a la sucesión de Rigoberto Mohs Villalta. El sucesorio dicho deberá devolver las sumas recibidas parcialmente por la compraventa contenida en el documento citado, que comprenden: el monto pagado al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por concepto de la operación crediticia número seis mil treinta y seis y seis mil treinta y siete por dos millones ciento setenta y cinco mil colones; quinientos mil colones cancelados señora a Juana Aguilar. En total el sucesorio debe devolver la suma de dos millones seiscientos setenta y cinco mil colones a favor de Rodrigo Arrea Escalante por concepto de sumas parcialmente pagadas como parte del precio de la compraventa [siguiendo la numeración que correspondería, sería el punto número 6] De la excepción o acción interpuesta por los demandados Arrea Escalante, Arrea Gronblad y Rodríguez Solís de venta de cosa ajena se rechaza por improcedente 6) [siguiendo la numeración que correspondería, sería el punto número 7] Que son ambas costas de esta acción a cargo del demandado Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y los codemandados Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblat (sic).- (sic) En cuanto a las excepciones de prescripción, falta de derecho, falta de personalidad pasiva de los demandados y la recíproca de activa interpuesta por el demandado Arrea Escalante y los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblant (sic) las mismas (sic) se rechazan. En cuanto a la codemandada COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA, la presente demanda se declara sin lugar, rechazándose las excepciones de prescripción, falta de personalidad pasiva de los demandados y la recíproca de activa, acogiendo la excepción de falta de derecho y en cuanto a ésta se exonera del pago de las costas. Con respecto a la contrademanda planteada por los codemandados Arrea Gronblant (sic) y Solís Rodríguez , (sic) se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos acogiendo de esta forma las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho interpuesta por la parte actora.- (sic) Se condena al pago de las costas procesales y personales a los demás demandados y codemandados,sea los señores Rodrigo Arrea Escalante , (sic)Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblant (sic).- (sic) Se le hace saber a las partes el derecho que le asiste de recurrir el presente fallo.-”.

VIII.Inconformes plantearon en forma conjunta recurso de casación los codemandados Arrea Escalante y Cocomar S.A. y los codemandados reconventores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad. Conviene indicar desde ya que el presente asunto se resuelve con fundamento en el Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 del 16 de agosto de 1989, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734 y el capítulo V, título VII del Código de Trabajo, Ley 2 del 27 de agosto de 1943, último con la redacción anterior a la reforma que operó por Ley 9343 del 25 de enero de 2016. Esto por cuanto, al haber decretado esta Sala que el presente asunto es competencia de la jurisdicción agraria, se sustanció con la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, Ley 6734, vigente desde el 29 de marzo de 1982, cuyo precepto 61, en lo que al recurso ante esta Sala se refiere, remite al capítulo V, título VII del Código de Trabajo. Si bien ese cuerpo legal, a la fecha en que se emite este fallo fue reformado mediante Ley 9343, Reforma Procesal Laboral (vigente desde el 25 de julio de 2017); lo cierto es que esa misma Ley de reforma dispuso, en el transitorio I, que aplicaría a los procesos iniciados antes de su vigencia con la salvedad de aquellos en los que se hubieren dictado las resoluciones, las cuales mantendrían los medios de impugnación de las leyes derogadas (inciso 3). De esta disposición transitoria, esta Sala infiere que al habilitar el régimen recursivo vigente al momento del dictado de la sentencia, concomitantemente el legislador habilitó que el pronunciamiento sobre dicha impugnación se funde también, tanto en la forma como en cuanto a contenido, en los preceptos legales vigentes en esa data. No podría ser de otra manera, ya que para la solución de la controversia los juzgadores aplicaron la normativa procesal vigente en aquel momento, de manera que no podría examinarse la corrección o incorrección de sus decisiones con arreglo a una normativa para entonces inexistente. Precisamente, en el canon 452 del Código de Trabajo, con anterioridad a la modificación por la Ley 9343, se establecía que “En cuanto no contraríen el texto y los principios procesales que contiene este Título, se aplicarán supletoriamente las disposiciones del Código de Procedimientos Civiles”. A su vez el Código Procesal Civil, Ley 9342 del 3 de febrero de 2016, vigente desde el 8 de octubre de 2018, dispuso en su transitorio II que contra las resoluciones que estuvieran dictadas a la entrada en vigencia, cabrían los recursos autorizados por las disposiciones legales vigentes al momento en que se dictaron. Precisamente, el Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 de 1989, fue el que se encontraba vigente para el momento que fueron dictadas las sentencias del Juzgado y el Tribunal en este asunto, y es a los cuales hace referencia –consecuentemente- el recurso de casación que se analiza y resuelve. Por consiguiente, en lo sucesivo, toda referencia que se haga al Código Procesal Civil, lo es sobre la Ley 7130 del 16 de agosto de 1989, así como al Código de Trabajo, Ley 2, con su redacción anterior a la Ley 9343. Ahora, a modo de introducción, es conveniente señalar las características del recurso de casación en materia agraria que ha definido esta Sala. En la resolución 213-F-S1-2019 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 20 de marzo de 2019, esta Cámara reiteró -como hace ahora- el criterio externado en el fallo 505-F-SI-2011 de las 8 horas 45 minutos del 14 de abril de 2011, el cual reza: “Recurso de casación en materia agraria. En lo tocante a este extremo esta Sala ha dispuesto: “(…) dentro de las características del recurso de casación en materia agraria está la de que debe ordenarse técnicamente. Se han de enumerar y estructurar los reproches a la sentencia y fundamentar su falta de juridicidad. El recurrente tiene el deber de explicar, de manera clara y precisa, las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión. Ha de combatir, de modo sistemático, los fundamentos jurídicos de la sentencia recurrida. Sólo se le exime de señalar, en forma expresa, las normas jurídicas violadas, o el tipo de infracción cometida. En relación, véase, entre muchas otras, la sentencia número 892 de las 9 horas del 25 de noviembre del 2005.” (Voto 596-f-06 de las 14 horas 55 minutos del 30 de agosto del 2006). Entonces, pese a que el recurso en materia agraria se rige por el Código de Trabajo, y se ha considerado como tercera instancia rogada, ello no exime a la parte recurrente del deber de expresar de manera clara y precisa los aspectos de la sentencia de segunda instancia que combate, explicando en todo caso en qué consisten los yerros alegados”. No. 300 de 10 horas del 25 de abril de 2008. Según lo enunciado, aunque en el recurso de casación agrario no se exigen formalidades especiales, no significa que sea por completo informal, ya que los reparos al fallo deben estructurarse de modo técnico. Así, habrá de exponerse con claridad y precisión los motivos que lo fundamentan, y lo único de lo que está exento es de señalar las disposiciones del ordenamiento jurídico conculcadas o el tipo de infracción cometida” (el subrayado no es del original). Se observa así que este es un criterio adoptado por esta Cámara en vieja data y que ha sido constantemente reproducido en la jurisprudencia. En lo que ha este asunto interesa, se advierte en primer término que la impugnación es sumamente extensa, no enumera agravios de forma concreta, sino que, siguiendo la estructura y los títulos empleados en el fallo que recurre, procede a formular una serie de denuncias que separa por apartados cada uno con títulos. Incluso, desde ya se llama la atención al abogado de los recurrentes, en el sentido de que no constituye fundamentación clara y precisa de un recurso (en cualquier materia), la trascripción literal de alguno de los documentos presentados en las instancias, tal cual se verifica en este caso. Más reprochable aún es una cita textual de ese tipo, sin destacarla propiamente de alguna forma que permita identificarla con facilidad, precisamente por configurar un retraso en el pronunciamiento sobre la impugnación. De ahí que, sobre este segmento harto extenso, simplemente esta Sala omitirá referencia y pronunciamiento por no constituir agravios de casación propiamente. Por otra parte, ya en los apartados separados por títulos, redactados sí para esta fase recursiva, se observa que en algunos los recurrentes sí formulan un agravio (así por ejemplo alguno de los que identifican como procesales). No obstante, en otros, agrupan bajo el mismo título diversas reclamaciones o se constituyen en simples opiniones sobre el caso concreto o sobre la sentencia del Juzgado, sin que se combata la resolución objeto del recurso de casación; o bien, son poco claras e imprecisas. En esa línea, por falta de claridad y precisión serían desestimadas conforme al criterio tantas veces reiterado de esta Sala, en el sentido de que tales son exigencias mínimas del recurso de casación en materia agraria. También en algunos de los apartados que sí podrían o parecen constituirse en agravios de índole sustantiva, los recurrentes insertan, mezclando, a su vez censuras procesales. En estos casos, por idéntica razón (imprecisión), las reclamaciones correrían la misma suerte (rechazo). Para efecto de orden en la decisión de este asunto, esta Sala enumera cada uno de los apartados o títulos que utiliza el recurso y los reordena según la naturaleza (procesal o sustantiva) de ellos. De seguido, se proseguirá con la decisión de cada uno teniendo como premisa en el examen la exigencia ya expresada de claridad y precisión.

Casación por motivos procesales

IX.De previo a la reseña de las reclamaciones procesales formuladas en el recurso, resulta indispensable advertir que el mandato 559 del Código de Trabajo (con la redacción anterior a la reforma a dicho cuerpo legal operada mediante Ley 9343 Reforma Procesal Laboral) de aplicación a este proceso por así disponerlo el precepto 61 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, versaba: “Recibidos los autos, la Sala rechazará de plano el recurso si se ha interpuesto contra lo que disponen los artículos 556 y 557. Lo mismo hará cuando en el recurso se pida únicamente la corrección, reposición o práctica de trámites procesales” (el subrayado no es del original). Sobre esta norma, desde la resolución 583-F-2004 de las 11 horas 35 minutos del 14 de julio de 2004, esta Sala ha señalado que: “(…) La doctrina procesalista ha indicado que los motivos de casación por razones de índole procesal, dispuestos en el artículo 594 del Código Procesal Civil, pueden darse en las tres fases del proceso: 1) En la constitución misma de la relación jurídico procesal, verbigracia, lo regulado por el inciso primero, relativo a la falta de emplazamiento o notificación defectuosa de éste. 2) Los referidos al anormal desenvolvimiento de esa relación. Tal es el caso del inciso segundo, sobre la denegación de pruebas admisibles o la falta de citación para alguna diligencia probatoria durante la tramitación. Y, 3) Los producidos al momento de la decisión del litigio, es decir, al dictarse la sentencia correspondiente, el ejemplo típico es la incongruencia, dispuesta en el inciso tercero. La expresión “reposición o práctica de trámites procesales” según lo dispuesto por la normativa laboral, no abarca la totalidad de los supuestos en que pueden presentarse los vicios de forma o “in procedendo”. La jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, hasta el momento, ha equiparado los conceptos de “vicios de forma” con los de “trámite procesal”, a pesar de ser diferentes. Se está, puede afirmarse, ante una relación de género a especie, en donde los segundos configuran una especie de los primeros. Los yerros por trámites procesales se refieren a incumplimientos originados, de manera exclusiva, durante el íter procesal, pudiendo enmarcarse en los puntos 1 y 2 antes señalados. Por ello, la limitación para interponer el recurso de casación por razones procesales, contenida en el artículo de comentario, no es aplicable a todos los supuestos en que proceda. No está contemplada para las faltas referidas a la constitución de los actos procesales que sean pasibles de ese recurso, a tenor de lo dispuesto por el indicado artículo 594 del Código de rito civil. De tal manera, dentro de este nuevo enfoque, sí resulta revisable en esta vía el fallo dictado en la jurisdicción agraria, cuando lo alegado es el vicio de incongruencia, (…)” (el subrayado y la negrita se añaden). En esta línea, ha sido el criterio de esta Sala que la exclusión de los agravios procesales en el recurso de casación en materia agraria está circunscrita a aquellos relativos a “trámites procesales” según la letra del canon 559 del Código de Trabajo; es decir, a aquellos referidos a la constitución misma de la relación jurídico procesal (punto 1) y al normal desenvolvimiento de la relación jurídico procesal (punto 2). Sin que esa exclusión o limitación sea extensible a aquellos yerros procesales que se producen al dictarse la sentencia (punto 3), tal cual acontece -por ejemplo- con la incongruencia (referido en ese mismo precedente), con la reforma en perjuicio (analizado en la resolución 1074-F-04 de las 11 horas 20 minutos del 16 de diciembre de 2004) y la deficiencia en la composición de la Litis “por su incidencia en la eficacia y efectividad del fallo” (resolución 1425-F-SI-2013 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 24 de octubre de 2013). Así las cosas, es este el marco que rige el análisis y pronunciamiento sobre las reclamaciones de índole procesal que sigue.

X.Primero. Señalan, el artículo 155 del Código Procesal Civil estatuye los requerimientos mínimos que debe contener la decisión final de un proceso. Expresan, en el fallo impugnado, el Tribunal estableció que el cuadro fáctico de la sentencia del Juzgado puede, sin violentar el debido proceso, comprender “en uno solo, los hechos alegados en la demanda y en la contrademanda; que no se requiere que se hagan por separado”. Aseveran, pueden estar de acuerdo con esa afirmación del Tribunal, pero lo que no pueden aceptar es que “en el cuadro fáctico de la sentencia de primera instancia, que el Tribunal encuentra correcta (sic) en altísimo porcentaje, cometió el atropello de no consignar, dentro de su cuadro fáctico, ni siquiera la menor referencia a los hechos que sustentan las dos contrademandas (…) Simplemente, desconoció de modo radical y absoluto los fundamentos de hecho que sustentan esas dos contrademandas ”, lo que -califican- es una gravísima violación al procedimiento. Manifiestan, se infringió el mandato 155 inciso ch) “en cuanto, no obstante estar probados en el expediente, no tuvo por demostrados ninguno de los hechos de las contrademandas”; asimismo, el inciso d) “en cuanto ni uno sólo de los hechos de las contrademandas se tuvo por no demostrado”. Así, finalizan, se falló “como si no se hubiese planteado ninguna contrademanda y consecuentemente ninguna pretensión”. Aseguran, esto fue lo alegado oportunamente en el recurso de apelación. Su disconformidad “no era porque estuvieran en una sola lista los hechos probados, sino porque no parecen del todo, en ningún enlistado”.

XI.Se observa que en el recurso de apelación sostuvieron los ahora casacionistas que: “EN CUANTO A LOS HECHOS NO PROBADOS. (…) este capítulo de la sentencia es necesario advertir, que es totalmente omiso, pues al igual que el de los hechos probados, dejó de consignar en él una buena cantidad que debieron incluirse en ese capítulo y mientras lo hacemos con mayor detenimiento y especificación, apuntamos que aquí no se hace ninguna mención al cuadro fáctico de la contrademanda, como si ese evento no hubiera ocurrido, lo que constituye una clara violación a las disposiciones del arriba citado artículo 155 del Código Procesal Civil. (…) como ya lo dejamos dicho al referirnos al aparte DECIMO PRIMERO, si bien es cierto que la cláusula quinta de la opción de venta de que se trata, hace referencia a un supuesto contrato de arrendamiento en trámite sobre una sección de terreno con frente al mar, de lo que nada se dijo en los hechos de la demanda ni en sus petitorias, lo que el Juzgado realizo (sic) con el propósito que dejamos apuntado” (folios 2301 a 2302). Sobre este particular, el Tribunal señaló: “3.c. Relativo a los hechos no probados: (…) Dice la parte apelante, ese elenco es omiso y remite al alegato de conclusiones, documento al cual no se le dio consideración. 3.d. Agrega, no hay un cuadro fáctico de la contrademanda lo cual alega como una infracción al artículo 155 del Código Procesal Civil. Reitera los alegatos concernientes al arrendamiento del hecho probado 11, aduciendo no se incluyó la afirmación del actor contrademandado Mohs sobre el contrato de esa zona diferente a la finca en litis”. Al respecto, resolvió: “d. ausencia de cuadro fáctico de la contrademanda: El ya citado numeral 155 del Código Procesal Civil de empleo a la materia, establece en el inciso 3.ch., la sentencia contendrá una declaración concreta de los hechos que el tribunal tiene por probados, con cita de los elementos de prueba que los demuestren y de los folios respectivos del expediente. La sentencia comprenderá la resolución de todos los puntos sometidos a debate -artículo 54 de la ley procesal agraria-; esto implica que al formular el sílabo de eventos tenidos por demostrados es una única lista, y no es admisible se establezca un cuadro fáctico para la demanda y otro para la contrademanda, como lo alega el recurrente. En este caso la demanda y la contrademanda se han tramitado en conjunto por la conexidad de elementos que poseen y hacen posible la emisión de una sentencia con un único cuerpo de hechos probados e indemostrados”.

XII.En cuanto los casacionistas reiteran ante esa Sala la disconformidad que plantearon contra la sentencia del Juzgado -y por ende, objetan el razonamiento del Tribunal-, se advierte que en el cuadro fáctico de una sentencia, el órgano juzgador consignará aquellas circunstancias que en su parecer se extraen de las probanzas aportadas y practicadas durante el proceso, que sean relevantes para el acogimiento o desestimación de las pretensiones esgrimidas en la demanda y en la reconvención (reconvenciones para el sublite), así como de las defensas opuestas en las contestaciones. De la misma forma, en el apartado de hechos no probados el órgano juzgador incluirá únicamente aquellos que estima no se desprenden de los elementos de convicción, pero que -a su juicio- merecen destacarse por configurar base fundamental de las tesis de las partes y que por lo tanto determinan o refuerzan la denegatoria que decreta. Dicho esto, comparte esta Cámara, aunque por una razón diversa, el rechazo de la inconformidad por parte del Tribunal. Ello además de constatarse que en la parte dispositiva de la sentencia del Juzgado sí se hizo referencia expresa a las contrademandas. En consecuencia, se deniega este cargo de casación.

XIII.Segundo. Aseveran, según el Tribunal ellos no protestaron la forma en que el Juzgado resolvió las pretensiones principal y subsidiarias de la demanda. Enfatizan, ello es falso, pues en el escrito del 28 de febrero de 2013 pidieron adición al Juzgado precisamente para que explicara por qué acogió absolutamente todas las pretensiones principales así como todas las subsidiarias primera y segunda de la parte actora, fenómeno inexplicable. Agregan, esta cuestión la plantearon ante el Tribunal en documento del 12 de abril de 2013 [es su recurso de apelación], a folio 57, en el sentido de que pidieron se aclarara pues se habían acogido todas las pretensiones principales y se complementaron con otras subsidiarias.

XIV.Al respecto, dispuso el Tribunal: “los apelantes dicen que la parte dispositiva es producto de todos los desaciertos de los considerandos al referirse a las pretensiones de la demanda de Mohs contra los codemandados. No hay un agravio específico sobre la manera en que la sentencia le da tratamiento a las pretensiones. No obstante, esta Cámara hace la siguiente observación. En este asunto se plasmaron: una pretensión principal, subsidiaria y subsidiaria segunda en la demanda de Mohs (folios 141-142 tomo I, integración de litis páginas 1064 a 1065 tomo III). En la decisión objeto de recurso se procedió a dar un tratamiento a las pretensiones como si se tratará de un solo elenco de pedidos, cuando existe una principal, y luego dos subsidarias, (sic) con pretensiones excluyentes entre un grupo y otro. Lo cual implica que la persona juzgadora al momento de resolver el asunto por el fondo, asumirá algunas pretensiones de un solo grupo, y no todas aquellas que estime sean procedentes aun cuando se excluyan unas y otras. Este proceder es contrario a la técnica de redacción de la sentencia, no obstante, los recurrentes no se muestran disconformes con ese proceder por lo que no resulta decretar la nulidad del fallo. En esta instancia se resolverá, al tenor de lo agraviado, a revocar o confirmar aquellos pedidos de la demanda que sean procedentes según las motivaciones de este Tribunal”.

XV.En primer lugar se advierte que en sentido técnico lo alegado por los ahora casacionistas no constituye un agravio, pues simplemente describen que ante el Juzgado interpusieron gestión de adición y/o aclaración y detallan insertaron un reclamo sobre esto en su recurso de apelación, para lo cual trascribieron lo dicho en esa oportunidad: “Pedimos que se aclarara, en razón de que no obstante haber sido acogidas las pretensiones principales, se acogieron también o más bien se complementaron, acogiendo otras de las subsidiarias”. De este modo, relatan únicamente lo acontecido en el expediente, sin puntualizar un reclamo en particular contra la sentencia, más allá de que presentaron esa gestión de adición; sin que pueda esta Sala suplir esa carencia argumentativa. A mayor abundamiento, se denota que para denegar la inconformidad, el Tribunal señaló como motivo el que “No hay un agravio específico sobre la manera en que la sentencia le da tratamiento a las pretensiones” (mismo vicio que encuentra esta Sala pero respecto de aquella fase). Los casacionistas no combaten directamente esa aseveración; lo que por sí también imponía la desestimación del cargo procesal en esta sede. Por demás, se tiene que el Tribunal señaló como motivo adicional de la denegatoria el que, si bien el Juzgado de manera atécnica acogió pretensiones principales y subsidiarias, ello no fue reclamado por la parte en ese momento apelante. Los casacionistas combaten esta última aseveración; sin embargo, no atacan directamente la primera (a saber, que no hay un agravio específico), que por lo tanto se mantendría incólume. En todo caso, además de que resulta irrelevante la circunstancia de que en efecto el señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez planteó gestión de aclaración sobre este punto al Juzgado (folios 2267 a 2270), lo cierto es que el propio Tribunal al verificar en efecto la incorrección técnica del Juzgado, dispuso que “En esta instancia se resolverá, al tenor de lo agraviado, a revocar o confirmar aquellos pedidos de la demanda que sean procedentes según las motivaciones de este Tribunal”. De esta manera, a pesar de rechazar la disconformidad por el primer motivo que indicó, el Tribunal enmendó el yerro del Juzgado, pues revocó finalmente -entre otros aspectos- “Lo concedido subsidiariamente”, tal y como se reseñó en el considerando VII. De esta manera, la recriminación carecería de interés y sería inútil para quebrar el fallo. En suma, por lo dicho, se rechaza.

XVI.Tercero. Detallan, en su recurso de apelación, reclamó la denegatoria del incidente de los hechos nuevos promovidos por los señores Solís y Arrea Gronblad. Dicen, el Tribunal corrigió “adicionando la denegatoria”, entendiendo que el rechazo obedeció a que la acusación en sede penal contra el aquí actor por el delito de perjurio no llegó a sentencia definitiva ante el fallecimiento del señor Mohs Villalta, con lo que se extinguió la acción penal. Discrepan, ya que el hecho de la acusación por parte del Ministerio Público contra el señor Mohs Villalta por el delito de perjurio ocurrido en la confesión dada precisamente dentro este proceso agrario, es un hecho nuevo que debe ser valorado, conforme a las reglas de la sana crítica, de manera que el contenido de esa confesión tendría que merecer una enorme duda sobre la “certeza real y efectiva” y relacionar esta circunstancia con el resto de las probanzas. Insisten, es un hecho nuevo que debe ser apreciado así.

XVII.La parte recurrente no es precisa en su reclamo. Por una parte parece referir existió una omisión del Juzgado en resolver el incidente de hechos nuevos (pues alega el Tribunal corrigió “adicionando la denegatoria”), pero por otra parece recriminar las razones del Tribunal para denegar el incidente de hechos nuevos. Luego, esa falta de claridad impone también su desestimación. En todo caso, la confesional de todas las partes será valorada en conjunto con los restantes elementos de convicción al conocerse los motivos por el fondo.

Casación por motivos sustantivos

XVIII.Conviene a efecto de enmarcar e iniciar la resolución de los múltiples alegatos incluidos en el recurso de casación, reiterar el cuadro pretensivo principal de la demanda que fue el finalmente acogido por el Tribunal (y por el Juzgado), pues es esto último lo que debía ser atacado por el recurso de casación. Contra los 4 demandados, señor Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., señor Solís Rodríguez y señor Arrea Gronblad, en lo medular y según se citó supra, las pretensiones principales del señor Mohs Villalta fueron se declare: 1) poseedor ilegítimo del certificado de acciones al señor Arrea Escalante por cuanto le fue entregado en garantía; 2) por lo anterior son nulas las cesiones de acciones que el señor Arrea Escalante hizo a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, por lo que no le son oponibles y todas las acciones deben serle restituidas; 3) el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió en forma grave el contrato de opción de compraventa del 11 de marzo de 1992 por cuanto al aumentar el capital social de Cocomar S.A.: 3.1) desnaturalizó el derecho del señor Mohs Villalta al precio convenido, tornándolo nugatorio, pues pasó de ser titular de 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 con relación a un capital de 100.000 acciones de ¢1,00 a ser supuestamente titular de 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 con relación a 20.000.000 de acciones de ¢1.00 colón), y 3.2) lo hizo capitalizando un supuesto superávit de la sociedad, sin respetar el derecho al 25% sobre cualquier utilidad; 4) son nulas, por ser simuladas y carecer de justa causa, las cesiones de acciones que el señor Arrea Escalante hizo a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, por lo que no son le son oponibles y deben serle restituidas al él (señor Mohs Villalta, hoy su sucesorio); y 5) los demandados deben sufragar ambas costas de este proceso. Sobre esas pretensiones, como se señaló, en las sentencias emitidas por el Juzgado y el Tribunal se decretó: 1) el señor Arrea Escalante es poseedor ilegítimo de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., pues el certificado accionario le fue dado en garantía de un préstamo (que no tiene plazo), no se le traspasó; 2) (por tanto) son nulas las cesiones de acciones en propiedad que realizó el señor Arrea Escalante a favor de los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad; 3) (por lo que) deben restituir el 90% de las acciones a la sucesión del actor; 4) resuelto el contrato de compraventa [se entiende que estimó tal contrato versó sobre el inmueble, como se verá] celebrado entre Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y Rigoberto Mohs Villalta (cuya base fue la opción de compraventa del 11 de marzo de 1992); 5) las partes han de devolver la situación al momento de la celebración de la negociación resuelta, por lo que deberá el señor Arrea Escalante reintegrar la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar S.A., así como los libros legales a la sucesión del señor Mohs Villalta; y este sucesorio deberá devolver las sumas recibidas parcialmente por la compraventa al señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante para un total de ¢2.675.000,00, lo que comprende: el monto pagado al Banco Nacional de Costa Rica por concepto de la operación crediticia número 6036 y 6037 por el monto de ¢2.175.000,00 y ¢500.000,00 cancelados señora a la Juana Aguilar; 6) el demandado Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y los codemandados reconventores Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad deben sufragar las costas de este proceso; y 7) la demanda contra Cocomar S.A. fue declarada sin lugar por falta derecho y se exoneró de las costas a la parte actora vencida. Este es el marco que debía combatir la parte recurrente en su recurso de casación, y a esto se limitará esta Sala. Todas las otras manifestaciones insertadas por la parte casacionista pero no cobijadas o vinculadas con lo dispuesto por los órganos sentenciadores sobre las pretensiones principales del señor Mohs Villalta acogidas, se desecharán por no ser útiles para quebrar el fallo, pues aún y cuando puedan atacar manifestaciones que el Tribunal, o incluso, el Juzgado hubiesen incorporado en sus resoluciones, al margen de su corrección o incorrección, no afectan finalmente la decisión adoptada respecto aquellas pretensiones principales acogidas.

XIX.Respecto del marco referido, entre los numerosos argumentos de los recurrentes en su recurso, se tiene que discrepan con el Tribunal en cuanto compartió la estimación del Juzgado en el sentido de que el señor Arrea Escalante se apropió ilegítimamente de la totalidad de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Aseguran, la opción se concretó, se hizo efectiva con carácter definitivo cuando el señor Arrea Escalante cumplió con la condición suspensiva de regularizar la situación de crédito con el Banco Nacional y pagó todas las cuotas atrasadas, intereses moratorios y costas, con lo cual se perfeccionó el contrato de compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., de conformidad con las pruebas que allí identifican. Discrepan además con la afirmación del fallo en el sentido de que el señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante para ejercer derechos accionarios primero debía ejecutar la garantía y luego analizar la forma en que realizaría el negocio previamente pactado. Enfatizan, la adquisición del 90% de las acciones por parte del señor Arrea Escalante se concretó cuando él logró normalizar la situación crediticia. Cuestionan ¿cuál ejecución de garantía? El propio Rigoberto Mohs, aseguran, aceptó que no pagó los ¢100.000,00, porque los aplicó “en calidad de arras, -eventualmente aplicables- al precio de la negociación”.

XX.A efecto de resolver este primer cargo, conviene reseñar la tesis que mantuvo en sus consideraciones el Tribunal con relación a lo que estableció en la parte dispositiva de su fallo. Lo primero que ha de advertirse es que el Ad quem prohijó todos los hechos probados del Juzgado, con excepción del número 13, pues lo consideró irrelevante para la resolución del presente asunto, por lo que le eliminó. Asimismo, compartió el elenco de hechos no demostrados. Ahora bien, ya de las consideraciones de fondo se tiene que para dicho órgano, el día 11 de marzo de 1992, el señor Mohs Villalta suscribió un contrato de opción de compraventa de la finca 7-32236-000, con una condición “indispensable”, la cual consistía en el arreglo con el Banco Nacional, además de estipular la posibilidad de que se ejecutase la opción convirtiéndose en socio de Cocomar S.A. o mediante la transmisión del inmueble. En dicho contrato de opción de compraventa, detalló, no se pactó la transmisión de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. En su criterio, la posesión del certificado accionario por parte del señor Arrea Escalante fue en virtud del préstamo de ¢100.000,00 que este otorgó al señor Mohs Villalta, quien lo garantizó con ese título accionario para lo cual lo endosó en blanco. Asimismo, que a pesar de que el endoso en blanco fue en garantía, el señor Arrea Escalante lo llenó como transmisión de la titularidad del certificado accionario, cuando aún no se había cumplido la condición suspensiva del contrato de compraventa, lo que aconteció el 2 de abril de 1992, cuando el señor Arrea Escalante llegó a un acuerdo de pago con el Banco según consta en el recibo de hoja 229 tomo I. Fue en ese momento que “las condiciones ahí pactadas [“en la opción de compraventa que preparó el contrato”] formaron el contrato principal”. En parecer del Tribunal, el señor Arrea Escalante ejecutó un pacto comisorio tácito en contravención del ordenamiento jurídico (y de ahí que no podía participar en las asambleas extraordinarias). Por ende, concluyó, el señor Arrea Escalante es poseedor ilegítimo del título. Determinó que para ejercer los derechos accionarios, el señor Arrea Escalante debió ejercer la garantía y luego analizar la forma en que realizaría la compraventa pactada. En el tanto el señor Arrea Escalante es poseedor ilegítimo de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., sostuvo, sus actuaciones como socio en las asambleas y en la transmisión del capital social deviene viciado conforme al artículo 701 del Código de Comercio, lo que repercutió en las negociaciones con las personas a quienes le transmitió las acciones, señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Escalante, quienes respecto del señor Mohs Villalta no son de buena fe “pues conocían de la negociación viciada, según las probanzas reseñadas y en las contestaciones de la demanda de folios 1136 y 1256 de sendos codemandados, siendo confesión espontánea por reconocer el conocimiento de la dinámica de toda la negociación, aplicando el artículo 341 del Código Procesal Civil de aplicación supletoria a la materia, motivo por el cual es in (sic) aplicable lo establecido en el artículo 678 del Código de Comercio”. Determinó dicho órgano, en la contrademanda [se entiende en las reconvenciones de cada uno de ellos] “no hay acción dirigida contra Arrea Escalante, motivo por el cual, si es deseo de esos codemandados accionar para recuperar su inversión, deberán hacerlo en vía separada”. En concreto, sobre la posesión ilegítima del certificado accionario por parte del señor Arrea Escalante, conviene especificar que para el Tribunal los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante acordaron la compraventa de la finca 7-32236-000 (así se extrae de la parte dispositiva donde declaró “resuelto el contrato de compraventa celebrado entre Rodrigo Arrea Escalante y Rigoberto Mohs Villalta cuya base fue la opción de compraventa del once de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos” y del punto a del considerando VII precisamente denominado “situación jurídica de la finca objeto del contrato”). Ahora, en el considerando VII.c titulado “Del incumplimiento del contrato de Arrea Escalante”, el Tribunal señaló que en el recurso de apelación se recriminó se hubiera tenido por demostrado el incumplimiento del señor Arrea Escalante cuando se apropió de la totalidad de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Sobre este reclamo dispuso: “(…) Como se denota de manera diáfana en el momento de realizar la opción de compraventa en comentario, no había un pacto específico sobre la transmisión de las acciones, únicamente en cuanto a que era parte del precio una porción del capital social que ostentaba Mohs para aquel momento. (…) Como se observa, la tenencia de los títulos por parte de Arrea Escalante no obedeció al negocio jurídico aquí debatido, sino a otra negociación relacionada con un préstamo de dinero y su garantía”. Continuó este órgano juzgador “(…) el título que representaba en aquel momento el capital accionario estaba en su posesión en razón de otro acuerdo, lo cual para esta Cámara fue debidamente ponderado por la sentencia, sin que se violentara el ordinal 54 de la Ley de Jurisdicción Agraria. El consentimiento de acuerdo al artículo 1008 del Código Civil, debe ser libre y claramente manifestado. La expresión puede ser de palabra, por escrito o por hechos de los cuales se pueda deducir, dicta la norma referida. Se ha indicado reiteradamente, la transmisión de las acciones no fue pactada en la opción de compraventa; por la forma en que se desarrollaron los sucesos, se infiere que Arrea Escalante optó por convertirse en socio de Cocomar y no que se le trasmitiera el inmueble a su nombre. La posesión del capital accionario de Cocomar en manos de Arrea Escalante fue en razón de un contrato de crédito pactado en Mohs y Arrea Escalante: un préstamo de cien mil colones según se explicó y fundamentó con la prueba pertinente en segmentos anteriores. (…) Arrea Escalante para ejercer los derechos accionarios, primero debía ejecutar la garantía y luego analizar la forma en que realizaría el negocio previamente pactado. Además, en virtud de lo que se tiene por probado en la sentencia impugnada, el préstamo no tenía plazo” (considerando VIII).

XXI.Se torna necesario entonces analizar en primer término, tanto el documento identificado por ambas partes como “opción”, como el préstamo, y el vínculo entre esos dos negocios jurídicos. El documento del 11 de marzo de 1992, visible a folios 212 a 213, se lee: “El suscrito, RODRIGO MOHS VILLALTA, mayo casado, empresario, vecino de Limón, con cédula número siete – cero treinta – setecientos sesenta y nueve, por el presente medio hace constar: [.-] 1.- Que es dueño de la totalidad de las acciones que integran el capital social de la compañía “COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANONIMA”, con cédula de persona jurídica número tres- ciento uno- cuarenta y tres doscientos cincuenta y siete (3-101-4325). [.-] 2.- Que la citada compañía es dueña de la finca inscrita en el Registro Público, Partido de Limón, al Folio Real Matrícula Número TREINTA Y DOS MIL DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS – CERO CERO CERO, con la naturaleza, situación, medida, linderos y gravamenes (sic) que indica el Registro Público. [.-] 3.- Que otorga opción de compra a favor del señor RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, mayor casado, ingeniero civil, vecino de San José, con cédula número uno – doscientos ochenta y ocho, cuatrocientos ochenta y siete [,] respecto del inmueble citado en el numero 2) inmediato anterior, bajo las siguientes condiciones: [.-] a.- El precio del inmueble es la suma de nueve millones de colones, que sería cancelado de la siguiente manera: dos millones ciento setenta y cinco mil colones haciéndose cargo de pagar, en los términos y condiciones establecidos en el respectivo documento, una operación crediticia con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica a cargo de Cocomar S.A., la cual se encuentra garantizada con una hipoteca de primer grado sobre la finca arriba citada; quinientos mil colones que serían destinados a cancelar la indemnización que reclama la señora Juana Aguilar, actualmente ocup[ante] en precario [de una] porción de terreno del inmueble que co[mpren]de esta [negoci]ación; [un]millón de colones mediante entr[ega d]el diez p[or cien]to de la[s] acciones del capital social de COCOMAR S.A. y el saldo q[ue] resulte, que no devengará intereses de ninguna naturaleza, con el producto del veinticinco por ciento de las ventas que se realicen de partes del inmueble a que se refiere este documento o de cualquier utilidad que en futuro llegue a producir, por cualquier causa, COCOMAR S.A. . (sic)[.-] 4.- El señor Arrea Escalante queda autorizado para ejercer los derechos que le otorga esta opción mediante la compra de las acciones que componen en capital social de Cocomar S.A. o por medio de la compra del inmueble en referencia, según mejor convenga a sus intereses. [.-] 5.- Tanto el precio, como el objeto de esta opción comprende la cesión y traspaso a favor del señor Arrea Escalante o de Cocomar S.A., según este último los disponga, del derecho de arrendamiento, en trámite de legalización, sobre una sección de playa, situada al frente del inmueble arriba indicado, que tiene una medida aproximada de veintiséis hectareas (sic) y que está pendiente de otorgamiento ante la Municipalidad del Cantón de Matina a nombre del exponente. [.-] 6.- Será condición indispensable para el ejercicio de los derechos que esta opción le otorga, que el señor Arrea regularice oportunamente la situación del crédito a favor del Banco Nacional a que arriba se hace referencia, el cual se encuentra en cobro judicial ante el Juzgado Agrario de Limón. [.-] 7.- EN FE de cumplimiento con lo anterior, suscribo este documento en San José, el día once de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos” (el subrayado y negrita se añaden; folios 212 en concordancia con los folios 40 y 41, hecho 3 de las demandas (ambas), aceptado literalmente por los 3 sujetos demandados). De la literalidad del documento recién reproducido, como se explicará de seguido, esta Cámara extrae que el objeto de ese negocio fueron las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. (además de un supuesto derecho de “arrendamiento” –que a esta altura no resulta relevante-, y no el inmueble como entendieron el A quo y el Ad quem). Si bien, en la cláusula tercera, el señor Mohs Villalta consignó que “otorga opción de compra” sobre la heredad, al haber actuado en su condición personal y por la forma en que consignó habría de ser pagado el precio en concordancia con la cláusula 4, únicamente puede concluirse que el negocio tuvo por objeto las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Llama la atención que el actor no haya sido claro en su demanda sobre la condición en la cual suscribió el documento del 11 de marzo de 1992 (en algún momento refirió lo fue en condición personal; en otro, como representante de Cocomar S.A., así los folios 129 y 130). Sin embargo, de la lectura misma del instrumento se tiene que lo fue en su condición personal, y no como representante de Cocomar S.A. Véase así que en la introducción no estableció expresamente que actuaba en calidad de presidente aquella sociedad; además en la estipulación segunda se describió como “dueño de las acciones que integran el capital social de Cocomar S.A.”; y en la estipulación tercera indicó que Cocomar S.A. “es dueña de la finca”. Luego, en tesis de principio, el señor Mohs en condición personal no era quien podía vender el fundo pues no era su propietario (y no es trascendente un análisis desde la perspectiva de un convenio o promesa sobre el hecho de un tercero (por no haber sido así alegado por ninguna de las partes); ni tampoco uno relativo a la titularidad de la cosa o de cosa ajena (por lo menos a esta altura en la que se examina el sustento fáctico por el cual fueron acogidas las pretensiones principales de la parte actora). Se suma a esto, el que para esa data, 11 de noviembre de 1992, el bien inmueble había sido adjudicado al Banco Nacional por remate acontecido el 4 de diciembre de 1991 y aprobado el 15 de enero de 1992, de manera que no pertenecía tampoco a Cocomar S.A. (hecho probado 5 del Juzgado avalado por el Tribunal y no controvertido, lo que –por demás- era de conocimiento del señor Mohs Villalta como presidente de la sociedad (a pesar de que lo haya negado en la prueba confesional), así como del señor Arrea Escalante (folios 223 a 224 y 183 correspondientes a la contestación de la demanda)). Consecuentemente, siendo que el interés primigenio del señor Arrea Escalante fue adquirir la finca 7-32236-000 y que tal fue el ofrecimiento inicial de la negociación por parte del señor Mohs Villalta (ambas partes así lo denotan desde la demanda y la contestación), al pertenecer el inmueble en ese momento al Banco Nacional, la única manera de satisfacer ese interés del señor Arrea Escalante era acordar con el señor Mohs Villalta la adquisición de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. y lograr que el Banco adjudicado desistiere de la inscripción registral del predio a su nombre, al aceptar que en su lugar el señor Arrea Escalante regularizara en su totalidad la deuda de la empresa y continuase pagándola. Asimismo, se observa que el señor Mohs Villalta estableció que parte del precio (¢1.000.000,00) habría de serle pagado con la entrega del 10% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., así la estipulación 3. Esta particular cláusula merece un análisis pormenorizado. Ha de entenderse por lógica que, en primer lugar, no era posible que el señor Arrea Escalante pagase esa parte del precio de esa manera, si no era él el propietario de las acciones, ¿cómo podría transmitir la titularidad de unas acciones que no le pertenecían? Para dilucidar esa particular estipulación, ha de recurrirse al resto de las disposiciones allí consignadas. En la número 4 se estableció que el señor Arrea Escalante podía ejercer los “derechos de la opción” mediante la adquisición del capital social de Cocomar S.A., o bien mediante la compra del inmueble. Ahora, por aquella forma particular de concebir el pago de una parte el precio (esa entrega del 10% de las entonces acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A.), ha de concluirse que lo previsto en la cláusula 4 indudablemente no constituía en realidad una prestación alternativa a elección del comprador (menos aún una facultativa para el vendedor). Esa forma implicaba –al menos en tesis de inicio- que necesariamente el señor Arrea Escalante fuese titular de acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., para que pagara con el 10% de ellas. Luego, de todas las consideraciones previas, necesariamente el objeto del contrato eran las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. y no el inmueble como apreció el Tribunal (y el Juzgado). Llegados a este punto, conviene cuestionarse, si una parte del pago habría de ser mediante la entrega de una porción del mismo objeto comprado, ¿no es entonces que en realidad el negocio versó sobre una porción de ese objeto y no sobre su totalidad? Dicho de otro modo, si ¿versó entonces sobre el 90% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. en ese momento, y no de su totalidad? La respuesta necesariamente es afirmativa, pues bajo ninguna circunstancia podría el comprador Arrea Escalante obligarse a pagar parcialmente el precio mediante la entrega de un objeto del cual no era titular y pertenecía precisamente al vendedor. Pero entonces ¿por qué motivo consignó el señor Mohs Villalta como parte del pago del precio la entrega del 10% de las acciones, si era él quién hasta entonces era el dueño de la totalidad y las poseía? ¿Podía entregar el señor Mohs solamente el 90% de las acciones? Para responder a estas interrogantes, es necesario advertir que en aquel momento existía un único certificado accionario que comprendía la totalidad de las acciones que (para entonces) constituían el capital social de Cocomar S.A. (es una circunstancia referida tanto por el señor Mohs Villalta como por el señor Arrea Escalante). De esta manera, siendo que el interés del señor Arrea Escalante era adquirir la sociedad anónima por cuanto ésta, hasta antes del remate (hecho probado 5 del Juzgado prohijado por el Tribunal), había sido la dueña de la finca 7-32236-000 y que la negociación inicial giró en torno a ese inmueble (se denota de la demanda misma folios 129 a 129, y de la contestación de Arrea Escalante, folios 178 a 180 y 182 a 183), pactó con el señor Mohs Villalta la condición suspensiva contenida en la cláusula 6, según la cual –se reitera- era indispensable que el señor Arrea Escalante regularizara oportunamente la situación de crédito de Cocomar S.A. con el Banco Nacional, en virtud de la cual existía el proceso de cobro judicial en el que se había rematado la finca. Con esa estipulación, los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante, hicieron pender –en los términos de los artículos 681 y 685 del Código Civil- la eficacia de la compraventa de la voluntad de un tercero, el Banco Nacional (quien se había adjudicado la finca que anteriormente pertenecía a esa sociedad). Mientras esa condición no se verificase, en tesis de principio, el señor Mohs Villalta habría de conservar por su cuenta y riesgo las acciones enajenadas (canon 685 del Código Civil). Así, es de esta condición suspensiva que puede entenderse el que el señor Mohs Villalta no solicitara a la sociedad (que a su vez representaba como presidente y de la cual era el único accionista) la emisión de acciones individuales o de un certificado por el 90% y otro por el 10% para cumplir con la entrega de la cosa objeto de la compraventa (el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A.), sino que mantuviese el certificado único por la totalidad de las acciones. En suma, conforme se indicó, por las mismas disposiciones consignadas en el documento “opción” que detallan las condiciones del acuerdo entre cosa y precio, se desprende que el objeto de la compraventa fue el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. pero por la condición suspensiva, el señor Mohs Villalta habría de mantener –en tesis de inicio- el objeto vendido en su posesión, el cual se encontraba comprendido en el único certificado accionario correspondiente a la totalidad.

XXII.Hasta aquí se tiene entonces que, conforme indicó el Tribunal, hubo acuerdo de los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante (no es cuestionado en el recurso) pero sobre el precio no del inmueble, sino del 90% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., y ello con sujeción a una condición suspensiva, la contenida en la estipulación 6. Ahora, para el órgano de apelación en la especie, primero, el 11 de abril de 1992 el señor Mohs Villalta otorgó opción de compraventa al señor Arrea Escalante con una condición suspensiva, verificada la cual, el 2 de abril de 1992 -dijo- “las condiciones ahí pactadas formaron el contrato principal”, esto es, el contrato de compraventa (véase así el considerando XI del fallo recurrido). No concuerda esa Sala con esa conclusión. En el sub lite lo acontecido en esa data no fue una “opción de compra”, sino una compraventa perfecta. En numerosas ocasiones esta Cámara ha dispuesto que la distinción entre la figura de la compraventa y la figura de la opción o promesa de venta o de compraventa, es precisamente la existencia plena de un acuerdo entre cosa y precio, pues en este caso la compraventa se ha configurado de conformidad con el canon 1049 del Código Civil. Así en la sentencia 1313-F-S1-2013 de las 14 horas 25 minutos del primero de octubre de 2013, se indicó: “Con la finalidad de abordar en debida forma las censuras en estudio, debe aclararse la naturaleza de esos acuerdos. Para ese efecto, esta Sala se ha referido a la diferencia entre una venta y cualquier otra negociación previa. En este sentido, en la sentencia número 1015 de las 16 horas 30 minutos del 21 de diciembre de 2006, haciendo eco de lo ya expuesto en el voto número 80 de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 30 de noviembre de 1993, citado en la resolución número 55 de las 11 horas del 28 de enero de 2004, señaló: "V.- La doctrina moderna para referirse a los tipos contractuales preliminares o preparatorios de otros contratos ha usado la expresión de precontrato, definiéndola como aquella convención mediante la cual dos o más personas se comprometen a hacer efectiva en el futuro la conclusión de un contrato que, en ese momento, no quieren o no pueden celebrar en forma definitiva. El precontrato, en rigor, es un contrato por medio del cual surge una obligación de hacer: la celebración del futuro contrato, que a su vez constituye su objeto o finalidad. Son precontratos, por tener como finalidad la realización de otro contrato, la promesa unilateral de venta y la promesa recíproca de venta …“VIII.- Es importante establecer con claridad cuándo se está frente a un precontrato cuyo objeto es un contrato de compraventa y cuándo se está frente a compraventa propiamente dicha, siendo necesario tener presente que tanto la opción de venta como la promesa recíproca de compraventa, por ser figuras prenegociales, contienen los elementos esenciales de la negociación proyectada. Por eso se considera al precontrato como un "contrato base" en el cual se proyectan las características del contrato definitivo, de tal forma que aceptadas las ofertas respectivas, no es necesaria una nueva declaración de voluntad. En la opción -o promesa de venta- y en la promesa recíproca de compraventa, basta que, dentro del plazo, opere la aceptación del optante en el primer caso, o de cualquiera de las dos partes en el segundo para que, como se ha señalado, se perfeccione la compraventa. Resulta claro, entonces, que la diferencia entre la figura prenegocial y el negocio definitivo de compraventa es el acuerdo definitivo de cosa y precio manifestado, precisamente, en la aceptación de los optantes. Es decir, la relación contractual prenegocial diseña el contrato definitivo haciendo referencia a los elementos esenciales de que se compone aquél, pero sin que haya acuerdo definitivo sobre cosa y precio, que se da con la aceptación de las ofertas. En la opción y en la promesa recíproca de compraventa por ser su objeto la futura estipulación de un contrato de compraventa, sus efectos nunca pueden coincidir con los de la venta, no pudiendo derivar ni la transmisión de propiedad ni la obligación del vendedor de entregar la cosa ni del comprador de pagar el precio, porque aun cuando en el precontrato se determina la cosa y el precio, los promitentes sólo se obligan a respetar el plazo y a realizar el contrato definitivo de mediar consentimiento sobre el precio y la cosa tal y como fue previsto. De allí que si en un determinado contrato se desprende que la fase de las simples ofertas -unilateral o recíproca, según el caso- ha sido superada pues en realidad no hay nada pendiente de aceptación, la compraventa definitiva se ha consumado con todos sus efectos jurídicos, en forma independiente de su eventual inscripción en el Registro Público, pues ésta no es un requisito ad substantiam para su perfeccionamiento, quedando para la fase de ejecución del contrato como una obligación del vendedor el otorgamiento de escritura pública y la entrega del bien." (Lo resaltado es del original). En igual sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia de esta Cámara número 507 de las 9 horas 35 minutos del 20 de julio de 2007. En este orden de ideas, el canon 1049 del Código Civil preceptúa: “La venta es perfecta entre las partes desde que convienen en cosa y precio.” Siguiendo esta línea de pensamiento, en la sentencia número 69 de las 9 horas 50 minutos del 2 de febrero de 2007, este órgano jurisdiccional indicó: “VII.- Del contrato de compra venta. La compra venta es el acuerdo definitivo de cosa y precio manifestado en la aceptación de los optantes. En este sentido, ese negocio jurídico no llega a existir mientras no medie convenio firme sobre cosa y precio, pues aquella solo llega a tener validez jurídica cuando opera la aceptación de las ofertas. […] Al respecto, consúltese la resolución de esta Sala no. 713 de las 16 horas 10 minutos del 18 de setiembre del 2002.” En este mismo orden de ideas, el Tribunal, en el considerando X de la sentencia combatida, aspecto que no fue cuestionado por el casacionista, señaló: “X.- Lleva razón el recurrente en el cuarto agravio. Analizando ambos documentos se desprende que tenían por objeto la venta de las seis fincas descritas en ellos, existiendo acuerdo de [sic] cosa y precio desde un inicio siendo el precio inicial la suma de $1.125.000 por el plazo de seis meses, debiéndose entregar un adelanto de $50.000, quedando un total de $1.075.000 pagaderos al finalizar la negociación. El segundo documento se suscribió por la suma de $1.077-000 [sic] por el plazo de tres meses, con un adelanto de $36.364. Del desglose de las sumas anteriores, se observa que efectivamente de la negociación inicial se rebajó los $50.000 dados como adelanto para establecer la suma del segundo contrato, lo que refleja que la voluntad de las partes fue continuar con la negociación inicial para obtener la venta de las propiedades, variándose únicamente en cuanto al plazo de los contratos y las fechas en los adelantos de dinero, por lo que no procede ver dichas actuaciones como la constitución de dos contratos diferentes, sino más bien, como una unidad contractual que tenía el objeto de la venta de las propiedades.” Ergo, es claro que lo pactado entre las partes fue un contrato de venta, con sus elementos necesarios: acuerdo entre cosa y precio, pues no quedó nada pendiente de aceptación. Sin embargo, según se expondrá más adelante, ese acuerdo se supeditó al cumplimiento de varias condiciones. Por ende, se trata de una venta sujeta a condiciones suspensivas”. En el presente asunto, se tiene que en el documento en cuestión el señor Mohs Villalta consignó otorgar “opción de compra” al señor Arrea Escalante. El objeto, a pesar de la forma compleja en la que lo refirió, fue finalmente –según se indicó- el 90% las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. Consignó además el precio y la forma concreta en que sería pagado por el segundo. Por la literalidad misma de ese documento se puede concluir que el señor Arrea Escalante estaba de acuerdo plenamente con adquirir el bien dicho y el precio, con la forma en que sería pagado y con la condición suspensiva. Ese documento es, por el contrario, prueba de ese acuerdo pleno, ya que denota no existía ningún elemento cuya definición quedase diferida; lo que consigna es una condición suspensiva de los efectos de esa compraventa en los términos de los cánones 678, 681 y 685 del Código Civil, y por cuanto no se estableció expresamente un plazo de aceptación para el señor Arrea Escalante. Ese detalle de la forma de pago y esa condición suspensiva son indicadores de la voluntad tanto del señor Mohs que rubricó el documento, como del mismo Arrea Escalante, quien –por demás- nunca negó esa hubiese sido su voluntad, todo lo contrario. Incluso, aún si se partiera de que se trató de una opción, habría de tomarse la aceptación del Banco Nacional ese mismo día como el indicativo de que el señor Arrea Escalante aceptó la oferta durante el tiempo transcurrido entre el acto en que la rubricó el señor Mohs y la aceptación de la entidad financiera. Adicionalmente, el propio señor Mohs Villalta desde sus demandas insistió que había llegado a ese acuerdo con Arrea Escalante, así mencionó: “El 11 de marzo de 1992, el suscrito, en mi condición personal y como dueño de la totalidad de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. procedí a convenir con el señor ARREA ESCALANTE una OPCIÓN DE VENTA de la finca del Partido de Limón número 32236-000 por la suma de nueve millones de colones que serían pagados conforme el documento suscrito en el Bufete Facio y Cañas, donde tenía su oficina [d]el abogado Arrea Licenciado Carlos Solís, de la siguiente forma: (…)” (subrayado se añade, folios 129 y 1051). En los hechos tercero y cuarto, sostuvo también que el 11 de marzo de 1992, en su condición personal convino con el señor Arrea Escalante una opción de venta de la finca 7-32236-000, consignó allí el precio y la forma de pago que –afirmó- acordaron, así como, el acuerdo en el sentido de que la venta del inmueble podría realizarse, a conveniencia del comprador por razones fiscales, mediante el traspaso de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. (folios 129 a 130). En esos mismos términos (de existencia de un acuerdo y su detalle), aceptó ese hecho tercero el señor Arrea Escalante al contestar la demanda: “Es cierto. Los términos de esa contratación constan con toda claridad del documento (…)” (folio 179, el subrayado se agrega). En concreto, sobre los hechos tercero y cuarto de la demanda, expresó en principio se trataba de una opción de compra relacionada con la finca 7-32236, pero en el documento se estableció, en el aparte 4, que podía ejercer los derechos de esa opción mediante la compra de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., lo cual decidió; era -prosiguió- una oferta alternativa, en la que escogió la compra de las acciones, se cerró el contrato y adquirió el 90% de las acciones del capital social (folios 179 a 180). Así las cosas, se tiene claro que lo acontecido no se trató de una promesa unilateral de venta, sino que ese 11 de marzo de 1992 se dio un acuerdo perfecto de compraventa entre cosa y precio con condición suspensiva, la cual –por demás- se verificó en esa misma fecha. Es más, se llama la atención a la parte actora en el sentido de que resulta absolutamente contradictorio que tenga por premisa de su primordial tesis que en este caso lo que otorgó fue una opción de venta sobre un inmueble, pero que solicite se declare el incumplimiento de su contraparte, pues con ello hace ver que hubo acuerdo y no que se dio un precontrato.

XXIII.Ahora, además de ese convenio de compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., de seguido, prácticamente de manera simultánea, convinieron los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante un préstamo, en el cual el segundo dio en crédito al primero la suma ¢100.000,00, y el señor Mohs Villalta, ahora como deudor, entregó en garantía el único certificado accionario, para lo cual lo endosó en blanco (lo reconocen ambos sujetos). Este préstamo es el exclusivo motivo por el cual el Tribunal entendió que el señor Arrea Escalante tenía la posesión del certificado accionario y lo analizó de forma completamente aislada del contrato de compraventa. Sin embargo, al ser el objeto de la compraventa las acciones de la empresa (y no el inmueble), no puede negarse la correlación de este convenio con el de préstamo que fue garantizado con ese mismo objeto, en esa misma oportunidad. Nótese que por lógica, la actuación del señor Mohs Villalta ese 11 de marzo de 1992 de endosar en blanco como garantía del préstamo solo puede entenderse con arreglo a ese primer acuerdo de compraventa de las acciones y a la condición suspensiva misma. No es lógico para los integrantes de esta Cámara que un deudor endose en blanco un título accionario si su exclusiva voluntad es darlo en garantía (con el desplazamiento de rigor). No es lógico que decida no consignar esa circunstancia de garantía. Firmó en blanco el certificado de acciones de la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar S.A. al dorso como garantía, sí, pero con miras a que se cumpliera la condición suspensiva del contrato de compraventa efectuado, de manera que el señor Arrea Escalante se tornase en dueño del 90% de las acciones del entonces capital social de Cocomar S.A. y él quedase con el 10% restante. De ahí es que se pueda entender que en el documento “opción de compra” estipulara el señor Mohs Villalta que el señor Arrea Escalante debía entregarle el 10% de esas acciones, pues a pesar de la compraventa con condición suspensiva del 90% de las acciones pactada, la cual habría determinado –en tesis de principio- que el señor Mohs Villalta mantuviera la cosa (ese 90% de las acciones), en su poder hasta tanto no se cumpliese esa condición (canon 685 del Código Civil); no tendría más el señor Mohs Villalta, vendedor, el único certificado accionario, pues acto seguido lo entregaría en garantía a ese mismo comprador por este segundo negocio. Así, el señor Mohs Villalta dio en garantía el único certificado accionario, el cual contenía el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. que había vendido con condición suspensiva. De verificarse esa condición, la compraventa surtiría efecto pleno, y por ello fue que estipuló la entrega del 10% de la totalidad de las acciones comprendidas en ese título, en realidad a modo de devolución –como se dijo- y no como parte del precio. En este orden, si bien endosó el título en blanco inicialmente en garantía, ello –se insiste- fue con miras a la verificación de la condición suspensiva y, por ende, de la eficacia de la compraventa pactada. Estas conclusiones que se extraen necesariamente de la literalidad del documento “opción” con relación al crédito y al endoso en blanco del certificado accionario (aceptado tanto por el señor Mohs como por el señor Arrea), se ven además reforzadas por el documento de folio 227, en el cual el señor Mohs Villalta indicó: “Por el presente medio hago constar que recibí del señor RODRIGO ARREA ESCALANTE, la suma de CIEN MIL COLONES (¢100.000.00) en calidad de préstamo, eventualmente aplicable al precio de la venta de una finca que en esta fecha otorgué en opción de compra. Como garantía de pago le entregué un certificado por cien mil acciones de un colón cada una de la compañía “COCOMAR SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA”. [.-] San José, 11 de marzo de 1992” (el subrayado se añade). Este documento no fue desconocido por el actor Mohs Villalta, no se refirió a él en la réplica a la contestación del señor Arrea Escalante (ni lo hizo en la réplica a las efectuadas por los codemandados reconventores). Asimismo, en la certificación notarial de las declaraciones testimoniales de los señores Rafael Ángel Mazanares y Jeannette Viales Segura, asistente y secretaria del señor Carlos Solís Rodríguez, rendidas en noviembre de 1997 ante el Juzgado Primero de Instrucción San José, dentro de causa penal seguida contra el demandado Arrea Escalante, estos deponentes manifestaron: “En algún momento creo que en el mes de marzo de 1992 estaban reunidos en la oficina don Carlos Lara, don Rodrigo Arrea y don Carlos Solís, don Rodrigo estaba contento porque el Banco no recuerdo exactamente cuál había aceptado la propuesta de arreglo, por lo que el negocio efectivamente se iba a dar, recuerdo que incluso se decidió hacerlo vía la adquisición de las acciones (…) llegó don Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, con un señor que luego me enteré era don Rigoberto Mohs (…) un momento después se reunieron y don Carlos Solís me pidió que le dictara a Jeannette su secretaria la leyenda de cesión y traspaso, en la acción de la Compañía Cocomar S.A. que Jeannette tenía guardada en su archivo, esto en la forma y estilo que siempre acostumbrábamos hacer, y así lo hice. Posteriormente ingresamos a la oficina de don Carlos tanto Jeannette como yo, y procedí a leer la leyenda a todos los presentes, quienes manifestaron su conformidad. Don Rodrigo Arrea procedió a firmar el título en señal de aceptación y se lo dio a Jeannette, para que lo guardara (…)” (folios 233 a 234, el subrayado no es el original). Esto corresponde al testimonio del señor Manzanares. En similar sentido, la señora Jeannette Viales refirió “el once de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, fue que se firmó en la oficina de don Carlos, la opción de venta y la acción a que este asunto se refiere, dos días después se presentó a la oficina don Rigoberto Mohs, Don Rodrigo Arrea y don Luis Fernando del Barco, entre otros señores cuyos nombres no preciso en este momento, y en esa ocasión don Rafael Manzanarez, (sic) y mi persona, entramos a la oficina de don Carlos, Rafael les leyó la leyenda, y ellos se manifestaron conformes, entonces don Rodrigo firmó la ceción, (sic) y cuando había firmado me dijo que guardara la acción, y don Rodrigo Mohs también me pidió que guardara el libro de actas para que ellos hicieron las actas que fueran pertinentes” (folio 235, el subrayado se agrega). Esta certificación y su contenido no fueron objetadas, desconocidas o siquiera referidas por el actor Mohs Villalta; consignan la declaración de sujetos que presenciaron, es más, efectuaron por instrucción de los interesados, la introducción de la leyenda al lado de la rúbrica en blanco y percibieron la anuencia del vendedor y comprador de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Así las cosas, claramente el convenio de préstamo, sus particularidades, no pueden desligarse bajo ninguna circunstancia del contrato de compraventa.

XXIV.Por lo referido a esta altura, resulta absolutamente relevante determinar si la condición suspensiva de la compraventa acaeció y si fue así, en qué fecha, pues ello determinaría a su vez la corrección o incorrección de la conclusión del Tribunal (que confirmó la del Juzgado) en el sentido de que el señor Arrea Escalante “es un poseedor ilegítimo de las acciones de Cocomar S.A, (sic) sin tener derecho legal para serlo, dado que el certificado de acciones nunca fue traspasado, sino que se le entrego (sic) como garantía de un préstamo por cien mil colones, préstamo que no tiene plazo” (primera disposición), así como de las consecuencias directas que de ello derivó conforme a lo pretendido principalmente por el actor (también confirmando al Juzgado), a saber, que “como poseedor y titular ilegítimo del certificado de acciones (…) son nulas todas las cesiones de acciones en propiedad realizadas por el señor Arrea a favor de los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad por lo que deben restituir el noventa por ciento de las acciones a la hoy sucesión del actor” (segunda disposición), y que “las cesiones o traspasos de acciones realizados por el codemandado Carlos Solís Rodríguez el codemandado Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad Rodrigo (sic) Arrea (sic) Gronblat (sic) son nulas por carecer de justa causa y porque no pueden oponerse al sucesorio del actor por lo que debe (sic) restituirse al sucesorio antes indicado” (disposición tercera). Para el Tribunal la condición suspensiva de la opción se dio el 2 de abril de 1992. Observa esta Cámara que sobre este aspecto, al contestar la demanda, el señor Arrea Escalante, relató: “(…) En la misma fecha y oportunidad en que, como se dijo, en presencia de Mohs, se redactó el documento de opción de compra que él me otorgó, éste me pidió que le adelantara cien mil colones, pero sabiendo yo realmente como estaban las cosas, estuve de acuerdo en dárselos en calidad de préstamo, pero también, eventualmente aplicables al pago del precio de negocio, en caso de que finalmente la contratación se efectuara. Contra la entrega de ese dinero, Mohs me firmó el recibo correspondiente (…) en el que claramente se puede leer “…eventualmente aplicable al precio de la venta de una finca en que es esta fecha otorgué opción de compra…” También me entregó, como garantía de pago en esa misma oportunidad, el único certificado de acciones de la citada compañía (…) aunque en el comentado recibo se dice que Mohs me entrega en garantía ese certificado” (folios 186 a 189). Manifestó además el señor Arrea Escalante que “no se consignó al dorso de ese documento esa circunstancia de endoso en garantía y Mohs, que desde luego también estaba enterado de que ese título accionario nada valía, estuvo de acuerdo en firmarlo en blanco, de modo que si la negociación con el banco resultaba positiva y se normalizaba la operación, yo mantuviera en mi poder ese certificado de acciones, ahora como codueño con él, en el noventa por ciento de las acciones y de esa manera tomara el control de la compañía (…). Ese mismo día, (…) en compañía de don Carlos Lara fui a negociar el arreglo con personeros del banco (…) tratamos con el jefe de sucursales de apellido Cuevillas, quien estuvo de acuerdo en que yo me hiciera cargo de pagar la cuenta de Cocomar S.A., cancelando además, los intereses moratorios, las costas personales y procésales (sic) del juicio ejecutivo hipotecario, pago que hice con fecha 2 de abril de 1992 (…) Con ese arreglo con el banco y el pago efectuado, cumplí con la condición suspensiva contenida en la oferta de compra, al regularizar el crédito (…). En otras palabras, en esa fecha del pago se concretó y perfeccionó la negociación relativa al noventa por ciento del capital accionario de Cocomar, que se dio entre Mohs Villalta y el exponente. Posteriormente, sin estar obligado a ello, a Mohs o a su esposa se hicieron tres pagos mas, (sic) en fechas 7, 14 y 27 de julio de 1992 mediante la entrega del recibo correspondiente, en los que claramente se lee que son abonos a la obligación por venta de acciones (…). Esto demuestra que Mohs siempre estuvo al tanto y en la idea de que lo que me había vendido, (sic) era el noventa por ciento de Cocomar S.A. y que en ese sentido éramos consocios en la empresa” (folios 182 a 186). Continuó el demandado Arrea Escalante en su contestación, “(…) el día en que el señor Lara y el exponente fuimos al Banco Nacional (…) Mohs nos acompañó, esperándonos fuera del despacho del señor Cuevillas. Por este motivo una vez concluida la reunión, hicimos saber al actor la buena disposición en que estaban los personeros del banco, en el sentido de que yo me hiciera cargo de seguir pagando la cuenta de Cocomar S.A. (…) continuamos haciendo ciertas averiguaciones alrededor de la citada negociación, como el saldo pendiente de pago, situación de hecho de la precarista doña Juana Aguilar, a quién (sic) cancelé oportunamente (…). Como todo parecía estar razonablemente normal, cité nuevamente a Mohs a una reunión en el despacho del licenciado Solís (…) La cual se llevó a cabo dos días después, esto es el 13 de marzo de 1992 (…) le informé al actor de modo formal y pormenorizado, los cambios que pensaba realizar en los estatutos, en la junta directiva y en la administración del inmueble (…)También en esa ocasión aprovechamos para formalizar el traspaso accionario que el demandante debía hacer a mi favor del noventa por ciento del capital social de Cocomar S.A.. (sic) Como sólo había un título representativo de ese capital social (…) y siendo que en el documento de opción de compra aparecía muy claramente establecido que lo que yo adquiría, en caso de hacerse el negocio, sería el noventa por ciento de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., Mohs estuvo de acuerdo en que se consignara al dorso del citado documento, como efectivamente se hizo, que él me cedía y traspasaba la totalidad el título (…)” (el subrayado se añade, folios 186 a 189). Por su parte, el señor Mohs Villalta en su réplica omitió referirse a las anteriores alegaciones del señor Arrea Escalante en la réplica, simplemente afirmó que ese demandado conocía “los problemas de la finca y que la misma había sido rematada”, por ello el precio del negocio y por ello fue que le pidió como garantía del préstamo el certificado accionario “a sabiendas de que no valía nada en ese momento” (folios 410 a 416). Ahora, en su declaración confesional, fue interrogado sobre si el señor Arrea Escalante había regularizado la situación de mora de Cocomar S.A. con el Banco Nacional haciendo las correspondientes cancelaciones, a lo que respondió: si era cierto, “Yo era íntimo amigo de Arturo Cuevillas, Gerente General del Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, y su hermano German Cuevillas gerente de sucursales del banco, previamente a negociar con Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Escalante, los señores Cuevillas estuvieron de acuerdo en que yo negociara de la forma más conveniente para mí y no para el Banco que no les interesaba la finca y eso por la amistad que tenían conmigo desde la infancia. En la oficina del señor German Cuevillas, el señor firmó un cheque por el monto de un millón y algo de colones y puso al día una operación que yo tenía o mejor dicho Cocomar con el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. Debo agregar que fui yo quien salvó la finca y no ellos (…) La finca no fue adjudicada”. De esta afirmación, primero, se observa la contradicción del señor Mohs entre lo que manifestó en la réplica (que Arrea Escalante conocía que el inmueble había sido rematado, y por lo tanto ese hecho también era de su conocimiento personal) y lo que expresó en la confesional (“La finca no fue adjudicada”). Segundo, de ello es claro que el señor Mohs Villalta estuvo enterado de la aceptación del Banco Nacional para que el señor Arrea Escalante regularizara la operación crediticia de Cocomar S.A., incluso afirmó que fue gracias a él que Arrea Escalante obtuvo –si se parafrasea su declaración confesional- ese acuerdo “por el que se salvó la finca”. Si bien, de esa confesional no se extrae la data exacta en que tuvo conocimiento de la aceptación del Banco, lo cierto es que en la certificación notarial de la indagatoria del señor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta de abril de 1994, ante el Juzgado Cuarto de Instrucción de San José (aportada por el señor Arrea Escalante al contestar la demanda), él manifestó: “(…) me volvieron a citar al bufete Facio-Cañas, para comunicarme que (…) por lo tanto debía yo cederle las acciones de Cocomar Sociedad Anónima, para nombrar nuevamente directiva, cosa que yo accedí por la honorabilidad que para mi (sic) en ese entonces esas personas representaban” (el subrayado se añade, folio 220). El señor Mohs Villalta no refirió en su réplica a esta reunión del 13 de marzo de 1992 señalada por el señor Arrea Escalante, ni cuestionó la validez de aquella certificación, menos aún su contenido. Asimismo, de la ya referida certificación notarial de las declaraciones testimoniales de los señores Rafael Ángel Manzanares y Jeannette Viales Segura, en noviembre de 1997 (ante el Juzgado Primero de Instrucción San José, dentro de causa penal seguida contra el demandado Arrea Escalante), se tiene que en efecto el señor Mohs Villalta estuvo enterado de la aceptación del Banco Nacional al menos el 13 de marzo de 1992, y que incluso que accedió, fue su voluntad, ceder el certificado de acciones a través de la introducción de la leyenda en ese sentido. De los anteriores documentos en concordancia con la declaración confesional citada, concluye esta Sala que el Banco aceptó la regularización del crédito de Cocomar S.A. y ello aconteció el mismo 11 de marzo de 1992, con lo cual se verificó la condición suspensiva del contrato de compraventa del 90% de las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. Asimismo, que, en efecto, al menos para el 13 de marzo de 1992 (e incluso es indicativo de que desde el mismo día 11 de marzo de ese año, como alegó Arrea Escalante), el señor Mohs Villalta conocía de esa aceptación por parte del Banco Nacional y por ende, del acaecimiento de la condición suspensiva. De lo contrario, no resulta lógico que el señor Mohs Villalta hubiere accedido a formalizar la cesión del certificado accionario, hecho que él mismo reconoció en la sede penal. Se enfatiza adicionalmente que de estas probanzas no solo se tiene entonces por cumplida la condición suspensiva el mismo 11 de marzo de 1992, sino que además esta Cámara desprende precisamente que el día 13 de marzo de 1992, el señor Mohs Villalta aceptó la inclusión de la leyenda de cesión en el anverso del certificado accionario de Cocomar S.A., al lado de la firma que había estampado dos días antes en blanco, con voluntad originaria de garantizar el préstamo, pero con miras al cumplimiento de la condición suspensiva, de cuyo acaecimiento –de nuevo- para ese momento ya estaba impuesto. Accedió así el señor Mohs Villalta a traspasar la totalidad de las acciones para facilitar los cambios sociales necesarios. De esta manera, por voluntad de ambos contratantes, no tuvo el señor Mohs Villalta que entregar concretamente el 90% de las acciones y mantener él materialmente solo el 10%, pues por ese mismo acuerdo tuvo la claridad de que, pese a no tener la posesión inmediata, sí era el dueño del 10% de las entonces acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., contenido en aquel certificado. Esto –sobra señalar- coincide con la supuesta parte del pago del precio de la compraventa consignado en el documento “opción”, que en realidad –se insiste- no era tal pago de precio, si no la forma en que idearon asegurar que el señor Mohs Villalta se mantendría como el dueño del 10% de las acciones del en aquel momento, capital social de Cocomar S.A. (y que de exigirlo así se le entregaría eventualmente), pues de seguido endosaría el único certificado accionario de la totalidad del capital social, primero en garantía pero con miras a titularidad en ejecución de la compraventa. Véase en este sentido que incluso el actor no alegó, mucho menos pretendió en su demanda que se declarara que el señor Arrea Escalante había incumplido con la entrega física o material del 10% de las acciones del entonces capital social de Cocomar S.A. Por el contrario, desde el punto de vista de su pretensiones principales, su tesis parte de que es dueño de aquel 10% del entonces capital accionario correspondiente a 10.000 acciones de un colón (su reclamo es más bien que no es más titular de 10.000 acciones respecto de un capital de ¢100.000,00, sino respecto de un capital de ¢20.000.000,00; en ello reside el primer incumplimiento que adujo al contrato de compraventa).

XXV.Consecuentemente, por lo dicho hasta aquí, el señor Arrea Escalante no era poseedor ilegítimo del certificado accionario de la totalidad del capital social de Cocomar S.A. como entendieron el Tribunal y el Juzgado, pues el contrato de compraventa con condición suspensiva del 11 de marzo de 1992, tuvo por objeto el 90% de las acciones del entonces capital social de Cocomar S.A., y en virtud de éste, luego incluso de acaecida dicha condición suspensiva en esa misma data, el señor Mohs Villalta, además, en fecha 13 de marzo de 1992, llenó (indirectamente a través de los señores Manzanares y Viales) en cesión el endoso en blanco que días atrás había efectuado en garantía, precisamente con miras a aquella realización de la condición suspensiva. En este orden, resulta claro que lleva razón la parte recurrente, y por ello deberá casarse la sentencia del Tribunal, así como la del Juzgado, pues ambas tienen como premisa de su parte dispositiva que el objeto del negocio (de compraventa, en el caso del primero, de opción, en el caso del segundo) fue el bien inmueble, y que el certificado accionario del entonces capital de Cocomar S.A. le fue entregado en garantía únicamente, con lo cual, consecuentemente, estimaron que el señor Arrea Escalante era un poseedor ilegítimo de este.

XXVI.Por lo establecido hasta aquí, de conformidad con el canon 610 inciso 2) del Código Procesal Civil, Ley 7130 de 1989, resulta imperioso emitir pronunciamiento sobre las pretensiones de la parte actora, las defensas de los demandados Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A. y de los codemandados reconventores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, así como en lo propio con relación a las reconvenciones. Tal y como se ha señalado insistentemente, como pretensiones principales, el actor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta pidió se declarase poseedor ilegítimo del certificado de acciones al señor Arrea Escalante por cuanto le fue entregado en garantía (1). Conforme se indicó en los considerandos precedentes, no le asiste derecho en este pedimento: el señor Arrea Escalante no era poseedor ilegítimo del certificado accionario de Cocomar S.A. Consecuentemente, tampoco es de recibo su pretensión de nulidad de las cesiones de acciones que el señor Arrea Escalante hizo a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad y que no le son oponibles (2), pues el motivo de esa invalidez lo identificó precisamente en la posesión ilegítima del certificado accionario. Tampoco lo es el pedimento de que todas las acciones deben ser restituidas pues tenía como premisa también la declaratoria de posesión ilegítima rechazada y la nulidad consecuente de las cesiones. Así, respecto de estas pretensiones se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por los demandados respecto de los señores Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad; con relación a Cocomar S.A. se declara de oficio la falta de legitimación pasiva, por ser este un presupuesto de fondo de toda pretensión que debe ser constatado por el órgano juzgador.

XXVII.En lo tocante a la pretensión para que se declarase el incumplimiento grave del señor Arrea Escalante al “contrato de opción de compraventa” del 11 de marzo de 1992, por cuanto al aumentar el capital social de Cocomar S.A desnaturalizó su derecho al precio convenido, tornándolo nugatorio, pues pasó de ser titular de 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 con relación a un capital de 100.000 acciones a ser supuestamente titular de 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 con relación a 20.000.000 de acciones (3.1), concluye esta Cámara que tampoco le asiste derecho por las razones que siguen. Primero, según se indicó supra, no versó el convenio sobre la finca 7-32236-000 como es la premisa de la parte actora, sino que el objeto de la negociación fue finalmente el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Segundo, lo acontecido no fue una “opción de compra” como ha sostenido el actor, sino una compraventa perfecta según ya se señaló. Tercero, de relevancia preponderante, el primer incumplimiento cuya declaratoria pretende la parte actora, lo especificó respecto de la porción del precio que correspondía a la entrega del 10% del capital social de Cocomar S.A. el 11 de marzo de 1992, que era de ¢100.000,00 (aspecto no controvertido), lo cual equivalía a 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 de un capital de ¢100.000,00 (referido por ambos contratantes). Su reclamo entonces tiene como premisa el que es dueño del 10% (ya se dijo también que la parte actora no sustenta su demanda en la no entrega material o física del 10% del capital social de Cocomar S.A. aquel 11 de marzo de 1992, ni en los días posteriores, lo que en todo caso aceptó según se deduce de su propio comportamiento ya descrito con relación al contrato de préstamo), pero se dirige en el sentido de que -se reitera- sus 10.000 acciones de ¢1,00 no lo son más respecto del capital social de ¢100.000,00, sino que ahora lo son respecto de un capital de ¢20.000.000,00, con lo cual –a su juicio- el precio convenido fue irrespetado por el señor Arrea Escalante. Sobre ese particular, observa esta Cámara que no existió pacto expreso entre el señor Mohs Villalta y Rodrigo Arrea en el sentido de que el capital social de Cocomar S.A. no podría ser aumentado, variado, en todo el resto del plazo social, ni que de serlo se mantendría la proporción del 10% al señor Mohs Villalta. Así no se desprende de la literalidad del documento del 11 de marzo de 1992 suscrito por Mohs; la cláusula allí consignada únicamente se lee: “(…) [un]millón de colones mediante entr[egad]el diez p[or cien]to de la[s] acciones del capital social de COCOMAR S.A. (…)”. Tampoco puede desprenderse de alguna otra probanza. Un acuerdo de ese tipo, cuando menos en el sentido de que el capital social no sería aumentado una vez verificada la condición suspensiva de la eficacia, habría necesariamente de constar de manera expresa en algún soporte o demostrarse, pues implicaría una limitante al crecimiento de la sociedad que es en alguna medida contrario a la lógica comercial misma. Además, resulta claro a esta Cámara que desde el momento en que el señor Arrea Escalante adquirió el conocimiento de que el bien inmueble fue rematado en el proceso ejecutivo hipotecario establecido por el Banco Nacional, su interés mutó a convertirse en socio de Cocomar S.A. para el evento en que pudiera regularizarse la situación crediticia de esa sociedad con el Banco y que dicho bien retornara al patrimonio de esta; de ahí el acuerdo al que arribaron de compraventa de sus acciones sujeto a esa condición suspensiva. Al 11 de marzo de 1992, la finca no se encontraba en el haber de Cocomar S.A., de modo que para el señor Mohs Villalta, en lo personal, el mantener el 10% de las acciones del entonces capital social de Cocomar S.A. para el evento de que el Banco llegase a aceptar la regularización del crédito de la misma empresa y que no procediese a la inscripción registral de la finca que le había sido adjudicada, era una situación absolutamente provechosa frente a la posibilidad de mantener el 100% de las acciones de la sociedad que había perdido ya la titularidad de ese inmueble, que tanto él (hoy su sucesión) como el los codemandados estimaban y estiman valioso, de ahí su contienda y el recurrente desvió argumentativo hacia este. Cuarto. El aumento de capital social aconteció el 21 de diciembre de 1994 (según informan la parte actora y los codemandados, y se observa en las certificaciones notariales de folios 1258 a 1259, 1260 a 1261, 1325 a 1326 y 1327 a 1328, que corresponden a los títulos accionarios con la leyenda de cesión y al asiento del libro de accionistas de Cocomar S.A.). Es decir, fue realizado 1 año y 9 meses después de que fueron acordadas la compraventa de acciones con condición suspensiva y el préstamo mismo (es cierto que se inscribieron en el registro de rigor hasta el 21 de mayo de 2003, lo cual obedeció a que dicho libro fue reposición del anterior que fue extraviado por las autoridades jurisdiccionales penales dentro del proceso 94-001943-0204-PE, causa seguida contra los aquí codemandados y otros, en perjuicio de Mohs Villalta, según consta en la propia certificación del libro emitida por el Juzgado Agrario (494 a 499) y de la certificación notarial de la resolución del Juzgado Penal (folios 1243 a 1244). Luego, ni siquiera puede llegar a afirmarse que el aumento de capital se hizo en un plazo que podría indicar una intención originaria y oculta del señor Arrea Escalante de disminuir la participación societaria del señor Mohs Villalta con el ánimo de perjudicarle. Resulta lógico que un socio en posición de invertir en la persona jurídica de la cual es dueño, así lo haga. En este sentido, el mandato 30 del Código de Comercio establece que el capital social puede aumentarse mediante aporte o capitalizando las reservas y los fondos especiales que aparezcan en el balance. Interesa rescatar en este punto que la parte actora (de forma principal) arguye como violatorio del contrato de “opción de compraventa” el aumento de capital social del 21 de diciembre de 1994. La validez o invalidez de ese acuerdo de asamblea de accionistas es un extremo que escapa al presente proceso, pues al margen de que la parte actora insistentemente hubiere hecho alusión a vicios en esa asamblea (y en otras), lo cierto es que en sus demandas no pretendió –de forma principal ni subsidiaria- la nulidad de ese acuerdo de accionistas, así como de ningún otro (incluso así expresamente lo reconoció la parte actora en su replica a las excepciones planteadas por los codemandados Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, folios 1354 a 1356). De conformidad con el cuadro pretensivo de las demandas, la Litis se trabó sobre la posesión legítima del certificado accionario, la nulidad de las cesiones de acciones posteriores y el incumplimiento del contrato de “opción de compraventa”, así las pretensiones principales y los pedimentos subsidiarios primeros; y por último, sobre la invalidez de ese convenio, según las pretensiones subsidiarias segundas. Demás está señalar en este punto que esta estructuración de las pretensiones principales y subsidiarias resulta incoherente en criterio de esta Sala, y sobre ello se llama la atención de la parte actora, ya que, por más que haya establecido subsidiariedad, las petitorias de incumplimiento contractual contenidas en el marco principal y en el subsidiario primero tienen como premisa la existencia de un convenio válido. Desde el punto de vista lógico la validez de un contrato cualquiera es tema de examen previo al de su incumplimiento. En suma, no encuentra esta Cámara que el aumento de capital del 21 de diciembre de 1994 determinara o constituyera un incumplimiento del contrato de compraventa por parte del señor Arrea Escalante, con lo cual deberá acogerse también la falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Arrea Escalante respecto de esta pretensión, y de oficio, se declara la falta de legitimación pasiva con relación a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, así como de Cocomar S.A.

XXVIII.La pretensión principal para que se declarase (el incumplimiento grave del señor Arrea Escalante al contrato de “opción” del 11 de marzo de 1992 al aumentar el capital social de Cocomar S.A., capitalizando un superávit de esa empresa, sin respetar el derecho al 25% sobre cualquier utilidad (3.2), también deberá desestimarse por los motivos que siguen. Además de las dos primeras razones referidas respecto de la anterior pretensión que resultan aplicables a esta (a saber, que se trató de un acuerdo de compraventa, el cual versó sobre el 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., y no de una opción de venta sobre el inmueble, como ha sostenido la parte actora), es claro que la premisa subyacente en este pedimento ha sido que Cocomar S.A. produjo una utilidad sobre la cual tenía un derecho concreto, no como socio, sino por el acuerdo con el señor Arrea Escalante. No obstante, la parte demandante no demostró esa premisa. Se valió de su simple dicho, sin presentar pruebas idóneas sobre ello. Únicamente solicitó la exhibición de los libros contables de la sociedad (así, se leen sendas demandas a folios 139 a 140 y 1061: “(…) solicito que se ordene la exhibición de los libros contables que lleva la Sociedad Cocomar S.A a efectos de que se pueda constatar el supuesto superávit con que contaba la sociedad”). Ello fue ordenado por el Juzgado en las resoluciones del 16 y 30 de marzo de 2004 (folio 521 y 539 a 540). La parte demandada presentó dichos libros. En resolución del 13 de abril de 2004, sobre ellos le fue concedida audiencia a la parte actora (folio 547), quien se refirió y aportó documento emitido por un contador público autorizado por él contratado, al tiempo que solicitó una prueba pericial contable (folios 565 a 577). Sobre esta solicitud probatoria y sobre esa documental, que –se entiende- lo fue en carácter de mejor resolver (por la etapa en que se encontraba el proceso para ese momento), el Juzgado Agrario no se pronunció; por lo cual se entienden por denegadas. Posteriormente, el 22 de junio de 2006, al integrar a la Litis a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad conforme ordenó el Tribunal Agrario, la parte actora no solicitó dicha probanza técnica ni ofreció la documental emitida por el contador por él contratado y que había ofrecido en carácter de mejor resolver (así los folios 1085 a 1087)). En suma, la parte actora no aportó oportunamente los elementos de convicción técnicos que concluyeran que Cocomar S.A. produjo una utilidad que no fue distribuida, de lo que luego pudiera deducirse hubo un irrespeto al convenio de compraventa en cuestión. Valga señalar que el documento emitido por el contador aportado para mejor resolver (no admitido), en todo caso no es concluyente sobre la existencia de una utilidad no distribuida y capitalizada en el aumento de capital del 21 de diciembre de 1994; todo lo contrario, el profesional indicó requería de mayor información, comprobantes o justificantes de los asientos para poder emitir un criterio (folio 577). En resolución del 22 de abril de 2004, el Juzgado solicitó a la parte actora aportar copia certificada de los libros de contabilidad, ya que debían ser devueltos a la parte demandada por haber así ordenado –se entiende- dentro de un proceso penal (folio 578). En constancia de folio 587 se consigna que fueron entregados al apoderado especial judicial de Cocomar S.A. los libros contables: Diario de Auxiliar, Diario, Mayor y de Inventarios y Balances. En el expediente rolan las certificaciones emitidas por el Juzgado Agrario de los libros Mayor (folios 583 a 604), Inventarios y Balances (folios 605 a 642), Diario (folios 643 a 671) y Diario Auxiliar (folios 672 a 677) de Cocomar S.A. Asimismo se halla en el expediente la certificación notarial de los libros de contabilidad de Cocomar S.A. aportada por la parte actora (de folios 689 a 772, concretamente del Diario (folios 689 a 717), Mayor (folios 718 a 744), Inventarios y Balances (folios 745 a 765) y Registro Auxiliar (folios 766 a 772). De la lectura de estas certificaciones de los libros contables, esta Cámara no puede extraer con certeza que Cocomar S.A. hubiese generado una utilidad; esa determinación requería de un examen técnico por parte de un perito contador, lo cual –como se relató- no fue peticionado oportunamente por la parte actora. Tal era la carga probatoria que, de conformidad con el canon 317 del Código Procesal Civil, le correspondía en el tanto afirmó desde esta pretensión principal objeto de análisis, que el aumento de capital de Cocomar S.A. se hizo capitalizando un superávit, con lo cual el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió el contrato de “opción de compra venta”, según el cual tendría derecho al 25% de cualquier utilidad como parte del pago del saldo del precio (véase además en este sentido el hecho 12 de la demanda, a folios 134 y 1080). De nuevo, conviene resaltar en este punto que todas las restantes alegaciones de la parte actora sobre la contabilidad y sobre otros detalles del aumento de capital en cuestión, escapan al objeto de este debate que fue definido por sus pretensiones, dentro de las cuales –se repite- no incluyó la nulidad de ese acuerdo de asamblea de accionistas del 21 de diciembre de 1994, ni de ninguno otro anterior o posterior. Así las cosas, respecto de este particular pedimento, también se acoge la falta de derecho opuesta por el demandado Arrea Escalante, y se decreta la falta de legitimación pasiva de los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, así como de Cocomar S.A.

XXIX.Por último, en cuanto peticiona la parte actora se decrete la nulidad de las cesiones de acciones que el señor Arrea Escalante hizo a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad por ser simuladas y carecer de justa causa, que no le son oponibles y que deben serle restituidas las acciones (4), se observa en su demanda precisó el traspaso de acciones a favor de su hijo y de su abogado es simulado pues lo fue con miras a evadir las consecuencias del presente proceso; los nuevos titulares accionarios conocían “los detalles de la forma en que se realizaron las acciones por medio de las cuales se produjo el incumplimiento del contrato de opción” y que “la acción” (se entiende el certificado accionario) fue entregada al señor Arrea Escalante en garantía de un préstamo de ¢100.000,00, y no en propiedad. Añadió, ese traspaso de acciones es inválido e ineficaz pues “nunca pudo ser inscrito en el libro de accionistas de la sociedad dado que a la fecha en que se consigna como realizado, 20 de mayo de 2003, no existía el citado libro”. Sobre este particular, se tiene que los certificados accionarios y el libro de accionistas consignan que el traspaso se dio el 20 de mayo de 2001 (certificaciones notariales de folios 1258 a 1259 y 1325 a 1329 y certificaciones del Juzgado y notariales de folios 498 a 499, 1260 a 1261 y 1327 a 1328). La parte actora lo que reclama con relación a ambas cesiones es simulación para impedir o evitar las consecuencias del presente proceso. La data de las cesiones (20 de mayo de 2001) es anterior al establecimiento de este proceso, el cual fue incoado el 5 de junio de 2002. Luego, se impone la denegatoria de la pretensión, pues no podía el señor Arrea anticipar en mayo de 2001 las consecuencias de un proceso que para entonces no había sido siquiera presentado. Además, es claro que si la intención de Arrea Escalante hubiese sido simplemente distraer el bien (como pareciera podría inferirse de la alegación de la parte actora, aunque expresamente no lo indique así), es decir, distraer las acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A., por lógica habría efectuado las cesiones en un tiempo razonablemente menor y más cercano al momento en que se hizo titular de ellas, bien en 1992 o al menos luego del aumento de capital en diciembre de 1994. No obstante, las efectuó 6 años después del aumento de capital; 8 años después del acuerdo de compraventa. En todo caso, los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad conocían los pormenores de los negocios (de compraventa y préstamo) entre los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante (así se extrae de sus contestaciones de demanda y de sus reconvenciones), por lo que no podrían haber sido considerados terceros adquirentes de buena fe en el evento de que se hubiesen acogido las primeras 2 pretensiones de las demandas y/o el incumplimiento del contrato de compraventa por parte de Arrea Escalante, a efecto de impedir la consecuente restitución de acciones peticionada. Es más, los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad no se tildaron de esta manera en sus actuaciones en este proceso. Por último, en cuanto dentro de los hechos -que no en la pretensión- adujo la parte actora la nulidad de las cesiones de acciones por no haber sido inscritas en el libro de accionistas –parece que de forma inmediata al momento en que se dieron (20 de mayo de 2001)-, lo cierto es que tales cesiones sí fueron consignadas, aunque de forma posterior, precisamente en el asiento 4 referido. Ahora, el mandato 140 del Código de Comercio establecía que “La sociedad considerará como socio al inscrito como tal en los registros de accionistas, si las acciones son nominativas; y al tenedor de éstas, si son al portador” (redacción anterior a la reforma operada mediante Ley 9068 del 10 de setiembre de 2012, de aplicación a este asunto). No era esta una norma que estableciere la consignación en el registro de accionistas como requisito de validez de un traspaso, sino que regulaba la relación interna entre el socio y la sociedad, configurando una condición de eficacia respecto de la última. En el mismo sentido, estatuye el canon 687 ibídem que en los títulos nominativos, como lo son las acciones, “(…) Ningún acto u operación referente a esta clase de títulos surtirá efecto contra el emisor o contra terceros, si no se inscribe en el título y en el registro”. De nuevo, no dispuso el legislador una condición de validez, sino de eficacia ahora además, en particular, con relación a terceros. Por lo que esta pretensión de nulidad por simulación con base en esa concreta causa de pedir también se desestima por carecer de derecho con relación a los señores Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad; en el caso de Cocomar S.A. por falta de legitimación pasiva.

XXX.De las defensas opuestas por los demandados. De la prescripción. Los demandados opusieron la defensa de prescripción; alegaron que de conformidad con el mandato 984 del Código de Comercio todas las reclamaciones están prescritas por haber transcurrido más de 4 años desde que ocurrieron los hechos que las sustentan. Asimismo, sostuvieron, están prescritas las protestas a los acuerdos de asambleas de accionistas según el inciso a) del mismo precepto. Finalizaron, también están prescritas de acuerdo con ese canon las pretensiones de “invalidez y efectividad” del contrato “de opción” pues se firmó el 11 de marzo de 1992 y la demanda se presentó el “4 de junio de 2002”, incluso lo estaría si se aplica el plazo prescriptivo decenal del artículo 868 del Código Civil. Se observa que el planteamiento se dirige contra todo el marco pretensivo de la demanda; esto es, contra las pretensiones principales y contras las subsidiarias sin que hubiesen precisado alguna o algunas. Se resuelve de inmediato la defensa en cuanto a las pretensiones principales; respecto de las restantes, se emitirá pronunciamiento adelante según se vayan analizando. El convenio entre los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante (cuyo incumplimiento se peticiona) es –según se indicó- una compraventa, cuya naturaleza, en virtud de su objeto, es mercantil con arreglo a la disposición 438 inciso c) del Código de Comercio. También lo son las cesiones de acciones entre el señor Arrea Escalante y los señores Arrea Gronblad (cuya nulidad se pide). Por consiguiente, la prescripción de las pretensiones principales relativas a la ejecución del primer contrato y la nulidad de los segundos sigue las reglas del Código de esa materia, en particular las normas 968 y 984. Definido ese marco regulatorio de aplicación al sublite, se advierte primero, en este proceso no esgrimió la parte actora pretensión anulatoria de ningún acuerdo de asamblea de accionistas de Cocomar S.A. –a pesar de las insistentes aseveraciones a vicios en ellas-; es decir, ello no fue objeto de discusión de forma principal (ni subsidiaria). En consecuencia, se deniega la prescripción en cuanto dirigida contra ese supuesto reclamo, pues no existe desde el punto de vista pretensivo sobre el cual se trabó la Litis. Segundo, en cuanto a la prescripción de las pretensiones para que se declare ilegítima la posesión del certificado de acciones por parte del señor Arrea Escalante al haberle sido entregado en garantía y la consecuente nulidad de las cesiones de acciones entre el señor Arrea Escalante y los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, la imposbilidad de serle opuestas y la restitución de todas las acciones (1 y 2), ha de destacarse lo siguiente. La primera de las demandas incoada únicamente contra el señora Arrea Escalante y Cocomar S.A. fue presentada el 5 de junio de 2002 (folio 144), se tuvo por establecida en resolución de las 8 horas del día siguiente (folio 145) y fue notificada al señor Arrea Escalante y Cocomar S.A. el 14 de del mismo mes (folio 158). En ella claramente, ante el desconocimiento de los traspasos de acciones del señor Arrea Escalante a los señores Solís y Rodríguez, el señor Mohs Villalta no peticionó la nulidad de esos acuerdos. Se observa que los codemandados en ese momento (únicamente el señor Arrea Escalante y Cocomar S.A.), al contestar la demanda y oponer excepciones no hicieron referencia a esos traspasos accionarios. Al margen del motivo por el cual los entonces codemandados no hicieron manifestación alguna sobre esa circunstancia, lo cierto es que dicha información constó en el expediente a partir de la presentación del libro de accionistas el día 15 de marzo de 2004 (folios 494 a 499), y fueron precisamente estos traspasos la razón por la cual el Tribunal Agrario, en resolución 513-F-06 de las 15 horas 20 minutos del 29 de mayo de 2006, anuló la sentencia de las 9 horas del 5 de agosto de 2004 emitida por el Juzgado Agrario del Primer Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica y de oficio ordenó la integración de los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad (así los folios 1022 a 1025 en concordancia con los folios 856 a 885 donde rola la sentencia anulada). Partiendo del 15 de marzo de 2004 (cuando fue presentado el registro de socios al Juzgado), no está prescrita la acción de nulidad de las cesiones de acciones entre señor Arrea Escalante y los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, pues esa data sería el momento a partir del cual la parte actora tuvo conocimiento de ellas y pudo hacer valer su derecho de conformidad con el precepto 969 del Código de Comercio. La integración fue presentada el 22 de junio de 2006 (folio 1093), se tuvo por efectuada en resolución de las 14 horas del 21 de setiembre del mismo año (folio 1098), fue notificada al señor Solís Rodríguez el 30 de noviembre de 2006 (folio 1131) y el primer escrito del señor Arrea Gronblad fue planteado el 6 de diciembre siguiente (folio 1134), con lo que se dio por notificado. De este modo no transcurrió el plazo cuatrienal dispuesto por el párrafo primero del mandato 984, pues el cómputo inició el 15 de marzo de 2004. En cuanto a la posesión ilegítima del certificado de acciones por parte del señor Arrea Escalante, al margen de que fue un extremo cuyo pronunciamiento por el fondo fue necesario en virtud de la resolución y consecuente acogimiento del recurso de casación, se estima tampoco operó la prescripción, ya que la posesión alegada de ilegal habría tenido efecto continuado, formalmente hasta la data de emisión de los certificados accionarios que luego el señor Arrea traspasó a los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, pero de conocimiento de la parte actora hasta el mismo 15 de marzo de 2004 (cuando fue presentado el registro de socios al Juzgado). En lo tocante a la pretensión para que se declarara el incumplimiento grave del señor Arrea Escalante al contrato “de opción” (3), véase que uno de los incumplimientos fue sustentado por el señor Mohs Villalta con relación al no pago del saldo del precio acordado (capitalización de un supuesto superávit de la sociedad, sin respetar el derecho al 25% sobre cualquier utilidad), saldo que según se lee –y afirmaron los contratantes- no tiene plazo sino que está sujeto a condición suspensiva. El propio codemandado Arrea Escalante –quien era el legitimado pasivo respecto de esta pretensión (no así los restantes codemandados, como se indicó supra)- señaló al contestar: “se estableció también una forma de pago que he cumplido en cuanto a lo que estaba obligado y el saldo, como ya dije, está sujeto a condición suspensiva, y lo efectuaré una vez que se cumpla esa condición suspensiva”, cual es que se vendan porciones o la totalidad de la finca o que Cocomar S.A. produzca utilidades (folios 197 a 198). Luego, al estar el contrato aún en ejecución, no está prescrita dicha acción. Por último, no operó la prescripción en lo relativo a la nulidad de cesiones de acciones por ser simuladas y carecer de justa causa (4) por las mismas razones apuntadas sobre la invalidez de ese negocio en virtud de la posesión ilegítima (2). De la excepción de cosa juzgada. Los codemandados señalaron que en el proceso penal por los delitos de estafa y falsedad ideológica, en el cual fueron denunciados por el señor Mohs Villalta los integrantes de la junta directiva de Cocomar S.A., entre ellos, los señores Arrea Escalante, Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad, se planteó “el tema” de la nulidad del traspaso entre el primero y Mohs Villalta, lo cual se pide en el subjúdice; concretamente se planteó -dijeron- en la ampliación de requerimiento fiscal contra Arrea Escalante y Solís Rodríguez por los delitos de estafa y falsedad ideológica “por el contenido que se le dio a la leyenda de cesión y traspaso que aparece consignada al dorso del mencionado título”. Ese proceso penal, afirmaron, por los delitos de falsedad ideológica, uso de documento falso y estafa, finalizó con sobreseimiento definitivo a favor de todos los encartados. La defensa claramente fue opuesta solo respecto de la pretensión principal 1), a saber, la posesión ilegítima del certificado accionario (aunque tendría incidencia sobre la 2), de las cesiones posteriores a Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad), no lo fue así con relación a los incumplimientos contractuales pedidos ni a la nulidad de la cesiones por simulación (3 y 4)). En el sublite, como causa de pedir de esa pretensión de posesión ilegítima del certificado accionario por parte del señor Arrea Escalante, no alegó la parte actora el uso de un documento falso, la introducción en un documento público o auténtico de declaraciones falsas (falsedad ideológica, según el canon 367 del Código Penal), menos aún de una estafa; de manera que el sobreseimiento definitivo con relación a los delitos de falsificación de documento equiparado, falsedad ideológica, uso de documento falso y estafa decretados en proceso penal (folios 274 a 277 y folios 1236 a 1242) no produjo el efecto de cosa juzgada. Por lo que la defensa se deniega.

XXXI.En orden, por lo hasta aquí señalado, se tiene por denegada la demanda del señor Mohs Villalta en sus pretensiones principales. Ahora, en lo que respecta al primer cuadro pretensivo subsidiario de la demanda, se reitera, el señor Mohs Villalta pidió se declare que: 1) “el señor Arrea Escalante incumplió el contrato de opción de compra venta por medio del cual adquirió la finca del Partido de Limón matrícula 32236-000 al abusar de su derecho tornando el derecho del suscrito a obtener un precio justo en nugatorio”, 2) la resolución del contrato de opción de compraventa de la finca por incumplimiento grave del demandado Arrea Escalante y que “en su condición de apoderado generalísimo sin límite de suma de la sociedad Cocomar S.A. está obligado a devolverle el inmueble objeto del contrato de opción de compraventa”, y 3) que “Cocomar S.A. debe realizar escritura pública en la cual retorna también la titularidad registral del inmueble objeto de esta litis al suscrito”. No le asiste derecho en estas pretensiones, pues lo acontecido finalmente en el subexamine fue un contrato de compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., no una opción sobre el inmueble. En cuanto al abuso del derecho y el incumplimiento del convenio, además de no tener razón en cuanto a la naturaleza y el objeto, la parte actora no lo precisó concretamente como algo distinto a lo que alegó con relación a las pretensiones principales (incluso véase así el hecho 11 de la demanda, folios 134 y 1080 donde concreta el abuso de derecho en el aumento de capital con el cual es dueño de 10.000 acciones respecto de un capital social de ¢20.000.000,00 y no de ¢100.000,00), por lo que de igual forma, al consistir en lo medular en una reiteración de aquellas, se deniegan. En consecuencia, se acoge asimismo la falta de derecho con relación al señor Arrea Escalante de las pretensiones subsidiarias primeras 1) y 2) y se decreta la falta de legitimación pasiva contra Cocomar S.A. y los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad con relación a estas pretensiones. Con relación a la 3), se acoge la falta de derecho respecto de Cocomar S.A. y la falta de legitimación de los restantes codemandados. En lo concerniente a la defensa de prescripción, se deniega con respecto a las pretensiones subsidiarias primeras 1) y 2) pues versan sobre el incumplimiento del contrato por parte del señor Arrea Escalante, tal cual fue desestimada supra con relación a las pretensiones principales. En lo relativo a la 3) no fue realizada ninguna aseveración por ninguno de los codemandados, de modo que se tiene por no puesta. En todo caso, se hace ver carece de sentido ese pedimento de la parte actora pues versa directamente sobre la devolución de el bien inmueble 7-32236-000 a su patrimonio, cuando ese bien nunca fue de su titularidad.

XXXII.En lo tocante a las pretensiones subsidiarias segundas, ya se indicó supra no hay logicidad con relación a las pretensiones principales y las primeras subsidiarias (en orden, en lo medular, de resolución del acuerdo entre Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante, luego de nulidad de ese mismo convenio). Ahora, abstrayéndose de esa problemática argumentativa, se tiene que el señor Mohs Villalta solicitó se decrete que: 1) el contrato de opción de compraventa de la finca 7-32236-000 es nulo por “haberse realizado aprovechándose el señor Arrea del estado de necesidad del suscrito y por contener cláusulas que de por si determinan la total disonancia con los principios contractuales de buena fe y cooperación contractual constituyendo un abuso de derecho” y por cuanto no contiene plazo, lo cual es esencial en los contratos de opción “y al haber vencido el plazo que señala la ley en el caso de que las partes no dispongan al respecto”; y 2) al ser nulo el contrato de opción de compraventa, también lo es todo acto por medio del cual el señor Arrea Escalante actuó en su condición de socio de Cocomar S.A. y en su condición de accionista incluyendo los traspasos de acciones realizados a los codemandados Arrea Gronblad y Carlos Solís Rodríguez, así como que el inmueble debe “retornar al suscrito siendo que el señor Arrea Escalante es quien suscribió el contrato con el suscrito y es el titular de las acciones de Cocomar S.A.”. Los codemandados establecieron la defensa de prescripción en concreto contra la pretensión de invalidez (1). Se reitera, sostuvieron que al haberse firmado el contrato el día 11 de marzo de 1992 y al presentarse la demanda el “4 de junio de 2002”, operó la prescripción cuatrienal del precepto 984 del Código de Comercio, así como la decenal del artículo 868 del Código Civil. En efecto, desde que los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante acordaron la compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., el 11 de marzo de 1992, y a la fecha de presentación de la demanda, el 5 de junio de 2002 (folio 144), transcurrieron más de 4 años. Incluso, si se quisiera afirmar que el punto de partida del cómputo de la prescripción es el momento a partir del cual el señor Mohs Villalta tuvo conocimiento de los hechos que alega como causa de pedir de esa nulidad, ello habría sido el 25 de setiembre de 1992. Véase así que, ya acaecida la condición suspensiva de la compraventa (aceptación de la regularización por el Banco Nacional, el mismo 11 de marzo de 1992), cuando incluso había formalizado el traspaso de acciones y había sido enterado de los cambios en el nombramiento de la junta directiva que se harían (el día 13 siguiente), habiendo ya pagado el señor Arrea Escalante al Banco Nacional (el 2 de abril de 1992, según recibo provisional emitido por el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, de folio 229 y declaración del señor Luis Fernando del Barco Garrón, a folio 510) y de que había recibido él en lo personal 2 sumas dinerarias –y una su esposa- precisamente por concepto de la compra de acciones de Cocomar S.A. (los días 4, 14 y 27 de julio de 1992, según se observa en los folios 230 a 231), el señor Mohs Villalta envió una nota al señor Arrea Escalante donde le informaba la “PRESCRIPCIÓN de la opción”. En dicho documento se lee que el motivo de ese supuesto “retiro de la opción” era el que: “(…) no tiene plazo o tiempo fijo, y en razón del tiempo transcurrido –más de seis meses- y de los cambios bruscos ocurridos tanto en los medios financieros, como en el mercado de inmuebles” (folios 214 a 218). No obstante, al plantear la demanda, el mismo señor Mohs Villalta detalló: “En el mes de septiembre del año 1992 por considerar que el señor Arrea Escalante había actuado de mala fe, incluyendo en la redacción literal de la opción de compra venta palabras y frases en las cuales mi derecho se podía ver limitado y desvalorizado en completa disonancia con el espíritu del acuerdo de la opción de compra venta, el suscrito comunicó al señor Arrea Escalante que se dejaba sin efecto la opción (…)” (folios 131 y 1077, hecho 5 de la demanda). Así, de su propio dicho, se tiene que desde el 25 de setiembre de 1992, se sentía agraviado por el clausulado del documento que suscribió y que ha servido de sustento probatorio al acuerdo de compraventa cuya nulidad pretende. En esta línea, a todas luces, la demanda establecida el 5 de junio de 2002, en cuanto a esta pretensión 1) subsidiaria segunda, está prescrita de conformidad con el mandato 984 del Código de Comercio pues, desde la data del acuerdo, incluso desde el 25 de setiembre de 1992, transcurrieron más de 4 años a la fecha de interposición de la demanda, más aún con respecto a su notificación. Por demás, se denota que en cuanto pide se declare que el señor Arrea Escalante se aprovechó de su estado de necesidad, ni siquiera se molestó la parte actora en describirlo, menos aún demostrarlo. No precisó ese supuesto estado de necesidad que alegó, menos aún cuáles son cláusulas que fueron supuestamente incluidas pero no acordadas. Por demás, se advierte que para setiembre de 1992 no existía para el señor Mohs Villalta posibilidad alguna de retirar una supuesta oferta de venta, pues –se reitera- lo acordado por él y el señor Arrea Escalante el 11 de marzo de 1992 fue la compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. con una condición suspensiva, la que incluso se verificó en esa misma data. En todo caso, aún si se estimara que lo acontecido fue una promesa de venta sin plazo estipulado por los contratantes (que no lo es, como ya se dijo), de conformidad con el canon 1055 del Código Civil, para su aceptación el plazo habría sido de un mes, y esa aceptación habría acontecido el mismo 11 de marzo de 1992, hecho de conocimiento del propio Mohs Villalta al menos para el 13 de marzo de 1992 (conforme se refirió supra); siendo además que una parte del precio, a saber, el pago de lo adeudado por Cocomar S.A. al Banco Nacional, fue el 2 de abril de 1992. Tampoco puntualizó la parte actora en sus demandas qué de las cláusulas convenidas eran por sí mismas contrarias a los principios de buena fe y cooperación contractual. No habría podido esta Cámara suponerlo, además de que, según ya se mencionó, se estima que para el 11 de marzo de 1992, era provechoso para el señor Mohs Villalta mantenerse como dueño del 10% del entonces capital social de Cocomar S.A. para el evento en el que el Banco Nacional aceptara la propuesta del señor Arrea Escalante de regularizar el crédito de esa empresa y no inscribiera la finca que le había sido adjudicada, de manera que esa sociedad se mantuviera como propietaria de aquel inmueble. Tampoco habría llevado razón en cuanto pide la nulidad del convenio por la no estipulación de plazo. Se repite, no se trató de una promesa de venta sin plazo, sino de una compraventa sujeta a condición suspensiva. Incluso si se partiera de que lo fue, habría resultado de aplicación –como ya se dijo- el mandato 1055 del Código Civil, de manera que no se habría verificado ello como un vicio que la invalidase. Por otra parte, en cuanto pretende la nulidad “al haber vencido el plazo que señala la ley en el caso de que las partes no dispongan al respecto”, se advierte, primero, ello no constituiría un motivo de nulidad, sino que está referido a la fase de ejecución (vencimiento del plazo y su consecuencia). Luego, este alegato no se enmarca dentro de una pretensión anulatoria como la objeto de análisis. Segundo, no tiene cabida alguna la referencia a un plazo de aceptación (ahora legal) de una promesa cuando lo acontecido fue un contrato de compraventa sujeto a condición suspensiva, tal cual se determinó se dio en el sublite. Sobra señalar que llama la atención de esta Sala lo intrincado de esta pretensión por sí misma, pues por un lado peticiona la invalidez de un contrato de “opción” por la inexistencia de plazo, pero, de seguido, la pide por incumplimiento del plazo legal dispuesto para los casos en que no se haya estipulado vencimiento. Asimismo, llama la atención, pero ya en general sobre la actuación del señor Mohs Villalta, que una vez verificada la condición suspensiva de la compraventa aquel 11 de marzo de 1992, habiendo formalizado él el traspaso de las acciones el día 13 siguiente, siendo enterado en esa misma data de los nombramientos en junta directiva por realizarse, habiendo pagado el señor Arrea Escalante al Banco Nacional el 2 de abril del mismo año, recibido él sumas dinerarias por concepto de la compra de acciones los días 4, 14 y 27 de julio también de 1992, en adición a la nota del 25 de setiembre “retirando” la supuesta opción, el señor Mohs Villalta haya vendido el día 22 de octubre de 1992, en representación de Cocomar S.A., a Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., la finca 7-32236-000, por la suma de ¢11.000.000,00 (certificaciones notariales de folios 89 a 103 y 1245 a 1257). Si bien esa compraventa entre Cocomar S.A. y Servicentro Los Yoses S.A. fue decretada nula por el Juzgado Quinto Civil de San José (sentencia 25-94 del 24 de marzo de 1994), se advierte que precisamente el motivo de nulidad fue que el contrato lo efectuó “el señor Rodrigo Mohs Villalta cuando ya no ostentaba la representación de Cocomar Sociedad Anónima” (parte dispositiva, folio 1236); y que incluso Servicentro Los Yoses S.A., entonces adquirente y demandada, se allanó (folio 1251). Es claro así que el señor Mohs Villalta ha intentado por diversos medios no jurisdiccionales dejar sin efecto el contrato de compraventa del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. y disponer de la finca que es propiedad de esa empresa. Incluso, se denota que la primera de las demandas la formuló con posterioridad a que el Banco Nacional, el 4 de febrero de 1999, hubiese cancelado la hipoteca sobre la heredad 7-32236-000 de Cocomar S.A., (como se observa en la certificación notarial del testimonio de escritura de folios 270 a 273, en concordancia con la de folios 222 a 225, de la aprobación del remate). De lo cual resulta innegable que interpuso esta acción luego de que Cocomar S.A. hubiese finalizado con el pago de la deuda que tenía con aquella entidad financiera y se hubiese liberado la finca. Por último, en cuanto pretende la nulidad de todos los actos por medio de los cuales el señor Arrea Escalante actuó en su condición de socio de Cocomar S.A., incluyendo los traspasos de acciones realizados a los codemandados Arrea Gronblad y Carlos Solís Rodríguez, y que el inmueble debe ser le retornado (2), se desestima. Este pedimento tiene como base o premisa el acogimiento de la anterior (la nulidad del contrato de “opción” que ya fue denegada por prescripción); es decir, le es accesoria, por lo que corre su misma suerte. De esta manera, se acoge la defensa de prescripción opuesta por el demandado Arrea Escalante, y se decreta la falta de legitimación pasiva de Cocomar S.A. y de los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad. En suma, se declaran entonces sin lugar también las pretensiones subsidiarias segundas.

XXXIII.Así las cosas, las demandas formuladas por el señor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta contra el señor Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A. y los señores Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad se declaran sin lugar en todos sus extremos. De conformidad con el precepto 55 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, se imponen las costas personales y procesales a la parte actora vencida, pues no se encuentra que en la especie se haya verificado un motivo suficiente para litigar en los términos en que reiteradamente ha sido definido por esta Sala (a saber, que no consiste en la mera convicción de la tesis que sustenta, sino que necesariamente el convencimiento de la propia tesis ha de responder a datos objetivos del proceso que permitan deducir la bondad de sus pretensiones o defensas, entre los cuales se ha identificado la sutileza en la “cuestión legal”, que, por ejemplo, acontece cuando lo discutido se funde en una interpretación pura de las normas jurídicas, al no resultar controvertido el cuadro fáctico (en este sentido puede consultarse las resoluciones 1692-F-SI-2012, 1307-F-SI-2014 y 222-F-SI-2019)). Tampoco se halla que las pretensiones de la parte vencedora, en este caso, las excepciones por ella opuestas, fuesen desproporcionadas.

XXXIV.Sobre las reconvenciones. Pretenden los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad se declare que la negociación entre su dueño Rigoberto Mohs Villalta y Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, su causahabiente, relativa al traspaso del 90% de las acciones que para entonces conformaban el capital social de Cocomar S.A., es legítima y trasladó la propiedad de las acciones (1). Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación activa opuesta por el contrademandado. Es cierto que los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad tendrían interés en que no se declarase la invalidez del convenio entre los señores Mohs Villalta y Arrea Escalante, pues es a raíz de este que el señor Arrea Escalante se hizo titular de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. de las que ahora ellos son dueños. Sin embargo, ninguno de ellos fue parte de tal convenio, por lo que no están legitimados para peticionar la declaratoria de validez; ello debía solicitarlo el señor Arrea Escalante. En todo caso, ese concreto pedimento de los reconventores carecería de interés actual por la forma en que fueron resueltas las pretensiones principales y subsidiarias de la demanda, en particular la desestimación de la pretensión anulatoria de tal convenio (subsidiaria segunda 1). Por otra parte, piden los reconventores se decrete igualmente fueron legítimas, reales y a título oneroso las adquisiciones que hicieron cada uno de ellos (Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad) de 9.995.000 acciones del capital social de Cocomar S.A. (2). Con relación a este pedimento, se acoge la falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por la parte actora reconvenida, por ser a su vez un tercero con relación a los negocios jurídicos por los cuales los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad se tornaron en titulares de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. Por demás, por la forma en que fue resuelta la demanda, también carecería de interés, pues la invalidez de tales traspasos solicitada por la parte actora fue denegada. Pretenden además se declare “fue legítimo y obligante para todas las acciones, el aumento de capital acordado por los socios de Cocomar S.A. en Asamblea General extraordinaria celebrada el veintiuno de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, que llevó el capital social a la suma de siete millones de colones” (3). La solicitud carece de interés actual. Se reitera que la parte actora, pese a las constantes referencias sobre ilegalidades en esa y otras asambleas de accionistas, no pretendió la invalidez de aquella celebrada el 21 de diciembre de 1994, en la cual se aumentó el capital de Cocomar S.A. En el tanto la validez de esa asamblea no fue cuestionada, ésta se presume válida, luego a nada conduce esta pretensión. Finalmente, pidieron los contrademandantes que se establezca que “[A] la fecha en que el contrademandado Mohs Villalta hizo el traspaso del 90% de las acciones de Cocomar S.A., esas acciones habían perdido su único o principal y fundamental respaldo económico al haber igualmente perdido por vía del remate judicial y adjudicación que ya se había hecho el Banco Nacional de Costa Rica del único bien inmueble de que era dueña” (4) y consecuentemente, que “el valor que las acciones de Cocomar S.A. tengan hoy o puedan llegar a tener en el futuro se debe o deberá al esfuerzo económico y de otra naturaleza que han realizado los socios que adquirieron del contrademandado Mohs el 90% del capital social de esa compañís (sic) ya que éste, como lo tiene admitido, nunca le ha aportado a la empresa ni un solo centavo” (5). Se observa que los reconventores no aportaron oportunamente prueba técnica alguna que demuestre su dicho conforme les correspondía según el mandato 317 del Código Procesal, no adjuntaron algún elemento de convicción que comparara el valor de las acciones de Cocomar S.A. antes del remate de la finca 7-32236-000, el valor luego de esa circunstancia, el valor que adquirieron cuando el Banco aceptó la regularización del crédito y los diversos valores que han tenido desde entonces. Menos aún podría accederse en cuanto refiere a un hecho futuro e incierto (“el valor que las acciones de Cocomar S.A. (…) puedan llegar a tener en el futuro se (…) deberá al esfuerzo económico y de otra naturaleza que han realizado los socios que adquirieron del contrademandado Mohs el 90% del capital social”), de lo cuál incluso se desconoce si técnicamente es factible realizar proyecciones. Luego, no les asiste derecho. Como pretensión subsidiaria única, pidieron los reconventores que de acogerse la pretensión del actor en el sentido de que deben devolvérsele las acciones de Cocomar S.A. y con ellas el dominio de la finca 7-32236-000, en el tanto esa devolución de acciones y el inmueble provocarían un enriquecimiento sin causa e ilegítimo del actor Mohs Villalta, para evitarlo, debe condenarse a la parte actora a pagarles el 50% del valor de la finca al momento del efectivo pago, según justiprecio que defina un perito en la fase de ejecución. En el tanto este pedimento tiene como premisa el acogimiento de la demanda, al no verificarse esta, carece de interés actual y deberá denegarse. En suma, se declaran sin lugar las reconvenciones presentadas por los señores Solís Rodríguez y Arrea Gronblad contra el señor Mohs Villalta (hoy su sucesión). Son ambas costas a cargo de los reconventores vencidos de conformidad con el mandato 55 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria, ya que no encuentra esta Cámara hayan tenido un motivo suficiente para litigar.

POR TANTO

Se declara con lugar el recurso. Se revoca la sentencia impugnada. En su lugar, fallando por el fondo, se revoca de igual manera la sentencia del Juzgado. En cuanto a la demanda del señor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta contra Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Cocomar S.A., Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, se acogen parcialmente las defensas de falta de derecho y prescripción y se decreta de oficio la falta de legitimación pasiva y activa, así como la falta de interés. Así, con relación a las pretensiones principales: “a”, “b” y “e” se acoge la falta de derecho opuesta por Rodrigo Arrea Escalante, Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad, respecto de Cocomar S.A, de oficio se acoge la falta de legitimación pasiva; y respecto de las pretensiones “c” y “d” se acoge la falta de derecho opuesta por el señor Arrea Escalante y de oficio se decreta la falta de legitimación pasiva de los restantes codemandados. En cuanto a las pretensiones subsidiarias primeras, se decretan la falta de derecho y de legitimación pasiva. Así, con relación a las “a”, “b” y “c” se acoge la falta de derecho formulada por el señor Arrea Escalante y de oficio se declara la falta de legitimación pasiva de los restantes codemandados; respecto de la pretensión “d” se acoge la falta de derecho con respecto de Cocomar S.A. y la falta de legitimación pasiva de los restantes. En cuanto a las pretensiones subsidiarias segundas, se acoge la defensa de prescripción opuesta por los codemandados respecto de las “a” y “b”, y se deniega las “c” y “d” que les son accesorias. Así, se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, tanto principales como subsidiarios, y se imponen las costas personales y procesales a la parte actora vencida. En lo que respecta a las reconvenciones de los señores Carlos Solís Rodríguez y Rodrigo Arrea Gronblad contra el señor Rigoberto Mohs Villalta, se acogen parcialmente las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva, falta de derecho y se decreta asimismo de oficio la falta de interés actual. Así, con relación a las pretensiones principales: “1)” se acoge la falta de legitimación activa opuesta por la parte actora reconvenida; “2)”, se decreta la falta de legitimación pasiva también formulada por la parte actora reconvenida; “3)”, de oficio la falta de interés actual; y “4)” y “5)”, la falta de derecho. En cuanto a las pretensiones subsidiarias se decreta de oficio la falta de interés actual. Se declaran sin lugar en todos sus extremos las contrademandas, tanto en lo principal como en lo subsidiario; son ambas costas a cargo de los reconventores vencidos.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez MACUNAQ