Condemnation of Property in Inalienable Zone by the State as Natural HeritageExpropiación de inmueble en zona inalienable por el Estado como parte del Patrimonio Natural

Res. 000314-F-S1-2021 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven forty-five hours on February eleventh, two thousand twenty-one.

Ordinary proceeding filed in the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal by Sara Aguilar Artavia, identity card number 1-408-992, against the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, the State, and the National System of Conservation Areas. Attorneys Otto Giovanni Ceciliano Mora, as special judicial representative of the plaintiff; Ricardo Jiménez Bonilla, as State Attorney; and Gidgett Ramírez Hernández, as special judicial representative of SINAC, participate. The municipal government files a cassation appeal against judgment 14-2018-II, handed down by Section II of the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal at eleven hours on February twenty-seventh, two thousand eighteen, composed of Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, and Eduardo González Segura.

Judge Rojas Morales writes

CONSIDERING

I.- From the facts held as proven in the judgment, it is established that on June 1, 2006, the property of the province of Heredia, registration number 106755-000, cadastral map number H-1053299-2006, lot E30-C, located in the district of Los Ángeles, canton of San Rafael, province of Heredia, was registered in the National Registry in the name of Mrs. Sara Aguilar Artavia. Property 106755-000 originated on December 17, 1976, as a result of the segregation of registration 80622, which in turn was registered on August 10, 1976, resulting from the division of property 59835. Property 59835 was registered on February 18, 1970, and was born from the consolidation of properties 2992, 4130, 8524, 15065, 6554, 21819, 2988, 26407, 9761, 26798, 33617, 40510, 18557, 22162, 22602, 22659, and 33869. The aforementioned properties were born from the consolidation of other properties that were registered between the years 1867 and 1942. On June 2, 2006, the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia granted its approval (visado) to cadastral map No. H-1053299-2006. Subsequently, on May 4, 2009, Mrs. Aguilar Artavia requested land use (uso de suelo) for her property from the Municipality, which was denied by official letter No. MSRH-DCU-332-2009, dated May 22, 2009, stating: "Therefore, it is not possible to grant land uses for projects on properties affected by the inalienable line." As part of the basis for the aforementioned act, the defendant Municipality stated: "...According to the cartographic location, the property under study is within the inalienable protection zone, established by Decree No. LXV dated July 30, 1888, which states the following: 'Art. 1.- A zone of land two kilometers wide is declared inalienable, on both sides of the summit of the mountain known as Montaña del Volcán de Barba, from the hill called Zurquí to the one known as Concordia, whether said zone is national or municipal property.'" On the following November 21, 2011, the plaintiff requested the municipal entity to clarify the reason why map H-1053299-2006 was approved but, contradictorily, the land use was denied. This was answered by official letter No. MSRH-DCU-1332-2011 dated December 6, 2011, reiterating the reasons stated in the original denial. On December 10, 2014, Mrs. Aguilar Artavia again requested the land use from the defendant Municipality to build a house on her property. Therefore, by official letter No. DPUS-MUNISRH-1154-2014 dated December 12, 2014, the Urban Planning Department of the Municipality again denied the request, maintaining the grounds previously expressed by the municipal entity. On January 9, 2015, Mrs. Sara Aguilar Artavia filed a motion for reversal (revocatoria) with subsidiary appeal against the aforementioned administrative act. By administrative resolution No. 02-DPU-MUNISRH-2015 at 12:00 hours on January 15, 2015, the Urban Planning Department rejected the motion for reversal and elevated the appeal to the Mayor's Office. Finally, by administrative resolution No. 0184-2015-AMSRH at 8:00 hours on February 12, 2015, the subsidiary appeal was rejected and official letter No. DPUS-MUNISRH-1154-2014 was confirmed. By reason of the foregoing, Mrs. Aguilar Artavia sued the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia, requesting the following: "1) To grant this lawsuit in all its terms. 2) To annul the administrative act of resolution number 0184-2015-AMSRH. 3) That since there is no reason whatsoever, and all legal requirements are met for its denial, to order the defendant to grant the land use requested for the property in dispute. 4) To compel the defendants to compensate for the damage caused by disregarding the acquired rights at the time of purchasing the property, by reason of the approval granted by the Municipality of San Rafael. 5) To order the defendant to pay the procedural and personal costs of this action." The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia answered the lawsuit and raised the defenses of lack of standing (falta de legitimación) and lack of right (falta de derecho), requesting that it be declared without merit and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of this proceeding. The preliminary hearing was held on April 6, 2016, and the plaintiff expanded the claim, including a subsidiary one in the following terms: "That the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia be ordered to pay its represented party the just price of the property registered in the Heredia registry, registered folio number 106135-00, either through direct purchase or expropriation, granting the Municipality a period of one month once the judgment is final; it must also pay damages assessed from October 14, 2010, until the day the just price is paid, damages to be liquidated in the sentence execution phase." The Processing Judge suspended the hearing and granted a period of five working days to the defendant Municipality to respond to the expansion of the claim. The local Government answered the granted hearing and raised the defenses of exhaustion of administrative remedies (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) and failure to join a necessary passive litisconsortium (falta de integración de la litisconsorcio pasivo necesaria). By resolution No. 2163-2016, at 15 hours 30 minutes on September 26, 2016, the Processing Judge dismissed the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Furthermore, it joined the National System of Conservation Areas of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (hereinafter SINAC), which answered the lawsuit and raised the defense of lack of right, and the State, which raised the preliminary defenses of formal defects preventing a ruling on the merits (defectos formales que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo) and statute of limitations (prescripción), as well as the defenses of lack of active and passive standing and lack of right. Both requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit in all its terms, with costs to be borne by the plaintiff. The preliminary hearing was held again on April 18, 2017, where the defense of defects preventing a ruling on the merits was dismissed. Furthermore, the representative of SINAC presented the defense of statute of limitations at said hearing, which was reserved for the issuance of the final judgment. The matter was declared one of pure law and the parties submitted their conclusions. By judgment No. 14-2018-II at eleven hours on February twenty-seventh, two thousand eighteen, the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, composed of judges Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, and Eduardo González Segura, resolved: "The defense of lack of passive ad causam standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the State is granted, and the lack of passive ad causam standing of the National System of Conservation Areas is declared ex officio. The defense of lack of right raised by the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is partially granted. Consequently, the lawsuit is partially granted, understanding it to be denied in what is not expressly granted. The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is ordered to pay Mrs. Sara Aguilar Artavia the just price of the property registered in the Heredia registry, registration 106755-00, cadastral map number H-1053299-2006, which it shall do either through purchase or through expropriation, having to make the necessary and pertinent budgetary arrangements for such purposes. The purchase or expropriation procedure must be initiated within the period of one month from the finality of this judgment. The defendant Municipality is ordered to pay Mrs. Aguilar Artavia the sum of two million colones for subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo), with its respective legal interest from the finality of the judgment and until its effective payment. The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is ordered to pay both costs of this action. It is resolved with no special order as to costs in relation to the State and the National System of Conservation Areas." Disagreeing, the municipal entity appeals in cassation, raising four grievances.

II.- First: It challenges the reasoning given by the Tribunal regarding the fact that, since the plaintiff's property is located on inalienable land by provision of Law 65 of 1888, the Municipality was legally prevented from granting any type of authorization, license, or permit, so it should never have granted licenses for urbanistic subdivisions (fraccionamientos urbanísticos) in that territory, impediments it failed to comply with, in view of map H-10532992006, approved by the Municipality, which describes a lot assignment typical of an urbanistic subdivision, for the purpose of adapting the property to urban services. In its challenge, the defendant Municipality states that although, by provision of article 169 of the Political Constitution, Local Governments are responsible for the administration of local interests, the truth is that this norm finds limitations in another significant amount of regulations referring to urban, environmental, and social matters. Thus, it mentions, the Urban Planning Law assigns municipalities the obligation to have a regulatory plan (plan regulador) that defines the land uses in their canton, and for those municipalities that do not have a regulatory plan, as is the case of San Rafael de Heredia, it assigns the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Greater Metropolitan Area Plan (Plan de la Gran Área Metropolitana, GAM), which is supported by article 63 of the Urban Planning Law. For its part, it states, the Construction Law and the National Regulation for the Control of Urbanizations and Subdivisions provide that the National Institute of Housing and Urban Development (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo) will be responsible for authorizing subdivisions in the first instance, and the Local Government, once these have the Approval (Visto Bueno) of the Institute of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter INVU), will proceed to authorize them. This, it indicates, is very important, since the subdivisions authorized by the Municipal Council, in which the plaintiff's property is located, were issued in 1976, as stated in the Proven Facts of the challenged judgment. Regarding these powers, it refers to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment No. 420596 at 14:33 hours on August 20, 1996. For its part, it explains, article 13 of the Municipal Code orders that among the powers of the Council is that of "Issuing urban planning measures." Meanwhile, the Organic Law of the INVU (Law number 1788) in articles 4 and 5 provides that said institution has the residual competence to plan the development and growth of cities and to prepare regulatory plans. This, it indicates, has been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in vote 5305-93 at 10:06 hours on October 22, 1993. Without this implying that urban planning ceases to be the competence of local governments. In the same sense, it refers to consultation C06196 of May 3, 1996, of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic. The foregoing, it indicates, establishes that the administration of local interests corresponds by constitutional norm to the Municipalities. However, it says, there is a residual competence of INVU, which must contribute, advise, so that all plans are appropriately integrated. In this matter, it argues, there is abundant constitutional jurisprudence that delimits each of the faculties and competencies of autonomous institutions and municipalities. It concludes, despite this large amount of regulations, the Tribunal considers that the Municipality, by granting the land use and the approval of the maps, conferred a kind of "trust" (confianza) to the plaintiff so that she would acquire her property. However, it points out, the plaintiff never consulted or requested information from SINAC to determine if the property she was thinking of buying was in a protection zone, which is widely known, so it cannot be argued that the law is unknown. In that line of thought, it explains, as the Canton of San Rafael lacks a Regulatory Plan, the competence of INVU and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions, as well as the GAM Plan, comes into force, which previously grant the Approval in these types of cases. This, it says, has not been taken into account by the Tribunal, which is why an improper interpretation of the regulations is identified as the first criticism, for which reason it is requested to grant the filed cassation appeal.

III.- The appellant Municipality challenges the Tribunal's reasoning insofar as it considered that by granting the municipal approval, it gave the plaintiff legitimate trust (confianza legítima) to acquire the property described in this litigation. It seeks to divert responsibility for such conduct by alleging that there is a significant amount of regulations referring to the obligation to have a regulatory plan and the residual participation of INVU in the control of subdivisions, although it emphasizes in the challenge itself that urban planning is the competence of local governments. In the opinion of this Chamber, the arguments presented in the first claim fail to refute the fact that the Municipality granted the approval of cadastral map H-1053299-2006, which in turn permitted the subdivision that gave rise to property 106755-000 acquired by the plaintiff. The foregoing is in accordance with the provisions of article 33 of the Urban Planning Law, which reads: "Article 33.- For any subdivision of land or properties located in urban districts and other areas subject to urban control, it shall be essential to have previously approved, in the authorized municipal office, the map indicating the location and area of the resulting portions and, furthermore, that the notary or authorized public official attests in the act of issuing or executing the respective document that the division coincides with that expressed in said map (...)". It is of utmost knowledge to local governments that subdivisions can be controlled both through regulatory plans and through municipal approval; therefore, by granting the latter, the Municipality authorized the subdivision, with the consequent sale of the property, which indeed created a legitimate trust in the plaintiff to acquire the property, which she then could not use for urban purposes. To this must be added the registry publicity (publicidad registral) enjoyed by the property, which is the means available to individuals to learn about the characteristics and limitations of properties. Therefore, the argument that the plaintiff should have gone to SINAC to verify whether the property to be acquired was in an inalienable protection zone is not acceptable. In sum, regardless of the residual competence that the appellant claims INVU has regarding subdivisions and regulatory plans, the legitimate trust lies in the approval granted by the municipal entity, an aspect that the local government has not been able to refute.

IV.- In the second criticism, it accuses inadequate assessment of the evidence in the case file regarding the chronology in which the events claimed by the plaintiff occurred, namely: a) the canton of San Rafael was created on May 28, 1885; b) Decree Law No. 65 dates from 1888; c) the Municipality of San Rafael does not have a Regulatory Plan; d) the Greater Metropolitan Area plan dates from June 22, 1982; and, e) the subdivision to which the plaintiff's property belongs was authorized on November 10, 1975. It opines that until that date, the Municipality and INVU did not apply Decree No. 65 of 1888, as it was considered tacitly repealed. Therefore, it states, the Constitutional Chamber was asked to determine and dimension its validity. It is for that reason, it continues, that judgment 2008-12109 of the Constitutional Court is issued, which, as the A-quo points out, "[...] is the basic legal parameter that allows guiding the solution of the conflict (...)". The foregoing, it says, is of special importance given that it was not until 2007 and 2008 that two fundamental acts for the resolution of this matter are issued; these are: a) Legal Opinion number OJ-118-2004 of the PGR, according to which there is no Law that expressly repeals Law No. LXV of July 30, 1888, -therefore it is in force-. b) By provision of the Municipal Council of San Rafael, agreement No. 18 taken in ordinary session No. 103-2007 of July 9, 2007, it was decided not to grant permits for any type of urban development in the canton of San Rafael, within the area described by the cited Executive Decree. c) It explains, resolution No. DGT-437-08 of June 16, 2008, of the National Geographic Institute (hereinafter IGN), revealed cadastral errors in sheet No. 14154, which were clarified and the inalienable zone was delimited until 2014 and 2015, as stated in the documentation of the case file. d) It partially transcribes the judgment of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2008-12109 at 15:16 hours on August 5, 2008, which in its Therefore, establishes: "(...) The appeal is granted, solely with respect to the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health and the Municipalities (...) San Rafael (...). Roberto Dobles Mora, or whoever holds his position as Minister of the Environment and Energy, is ordered as follows: a) Within the period of seven months counting from the notification of this judgment, to carry out the actions within the scope of his competencies so that the zone established by Law number 65 of 1888 is physically delimited, and after doing so, to initiate the recovery processes for the lands located in said sector that are being occupied by private individuals, (...) to (...) whoever holds the position as Mayor (...) both of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia [...]: a] To immediately refrain from granting any type of permit within the zone established by Law number 65 of 1888 (...)". Regarding the above, it stated, the judges are mistaken in indicating that the Constitutional Chamber ordered the State and the Municipalities to initiate recovery processes for the lands located in the inalienable zone that are being occupied by private individuals. It indicates that the Tribunal did not consider that the municipality, as a public entity, is subject to the principle of legality, and, consequently, compelled to carry out the expropriation or purchase ordered. It transcribes articles 13 and 18 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). For its part, it points out, the Constitutional Chamber has defined the concept of Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), indicating that it is a public domain asset whose conservation and administration are entrusted by Law to MINAE, through the National System of Conservation Areas (hereinafter SINAC). Likewise, it outlines that the Constitutional Court has said that it is made up of Protected Wildlife Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), whatever their management category, declared by Law or Executive Decree: forest reserves, protected zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments. Likewise, it refers to the other forests and forest lands or lands of forest aptitude of the State and public institutions that have an immediate legal affectation. It states that this category includes the rest of the forested areas and lands of forest aptitude on the coastlines, which are also under the administration of MINAE and are governed by their specific regulations. It comments, in strict consequence of the above, it is not the municipality that is responsible for expropriating lands for protection zones that are not under its administration. It maintains that by denying the land use, the Municipality is merely applying and "operationalizing" what is established in the legal system. It concludes that the lands would be property of the State. However, it concludes, the appealed judgment relieves the State and SINAC of their own responsibilities contrary to the law, for which reason it requests that this appeal be granted.

V.- To consider who is responsible for the expropriation of the property in question, it is necessary to delimit the normative concept of natural heritage of the State (hereinafter PNE), in order to establish whether or not it is part of this heritage. In this regard, this Chamber has reiterated that: "(…) Pursuant to article 13 of the Forestry Law 'The natural heritage of the State shall consist of the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the properties registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for properties that guarantee credit operations with the National Banking System and become part of its heritage...' Thus, there are three possibilities provided by the norm regarding the assets that make up said heritage: a) forests and forest lands of the national reserves; b) forests and forest lands of areas declared inalienable, and c) forests and forest lands of properties registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for properties that guarantee credit operations with the National Banking System and become part of its heritage." (In this regard, see judgments number 1070 at 9 hours 45 minutes on September 3, 2010, and 1088 at 8 hours 55 minutes on August 8, 2011). From the foregoing, the opinion expressed by the appellant Municipality, to the effect that the property subject to this process must be considered part of the PNE, since it is located within a zone declared inalienable (Decree Law LXV of July 30, 1888, and judgment 2008-12109 of the Constitutional Chamber), arises from an adequate interpretation of article 13 of the Forestry Law. Indeed, mandate 13 ibidem is clear in determining that a parcel located in a zone declared inalienable, for the purpose of protecting the water resources of the area, forms part of the PNE. In the present case, it is an uncontroverted fact that the land subject to this process is located within a strip declared inalienable. Likewise, that the Constitutional Chamber considered (judgment 2008-12109) that these are properties that are part of the public domain. Now, the grievance revolves around the alleged error of the judges in condemning it to expropriate lands that are part of the PNE, regarding which it argues it lacks ownership. On this subject, it should be noted that, through resolution No. 2163-2016, at 15 hours 30 minutes on September 26, 2016, the Processing Judge joined the State and SINAC to the litis. However, the judgment appealed in cassation resolved to grant the defense of lack of passive ad causam standing raised by the State and, ex officio, declared the lack of passive ad causam standing of the National System of Conservation Areas, even though what is discussed refers to a property located in an inalienable zone (which constitutes an uncontroverted fact), since, due to its characteristics as an aquifer recharge zone, it forms part of the Natural Heritage of the State. By reason of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that the Tribunal did not analyze that the asset under examination forms part of the PNE, whose administration corresponds to MINAE through SINAC (First Chamber, No. 19776-2014 at 10 hours 30 minutes on December 3, 2014). As this is a property located in a water recharge zone, part of a strip declared inalienable since ancient times, it is clear that the State is responsible for the expropriation of the asset in dispute, as it has the ex lege responsibility for the management and control of those areas. Added to the foregoing, it is worth noting that since resolution No. 2008-12109 at 15 hours and 16 minutes on August 5, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber had ordered the respondent Ministry to coordinate accordingly with the National Geographic Institute to physically delimit the area covered by Law 65 of 1888, and then recover the lands included therein that are occupied by private individuals. In accordance with the foregoing, it is not the responsibility of the Municipality of San Rafael to proceed with the expropriation of an asset whose administration, according to the legal system, would correspond to MINAE through SINAC; therefore, with respect exclusively to that claim, it is appropriate to declare the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of the local government and, consequently, to order the State, as the Constitutional Chamber ordered in vote 2008-12109, to initiate the expropriation process to pay the just price of the property discussed in this litigation, within a period of two months counted from the finality of this judgment. For this purpose, MINAE through SINAC must make the corresponding budget provisions for the next fiscal period.

VI.- Third: The appellant begins by transcribing part of the appealed judgment, stating that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any municipal conduct that caused her damages, and what was granted is based on discretionary and interpretive criteria of the judges. It alleges that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a real, effective, and certain impairment occurred, aspects that, according to the principle of the burden of proof, are fundamental for the granting of damages. Its assessments, it says, are subjective and simple assumptions without any evidentiary support. There is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function or conduct and the unlawful injury that demonstrates the existence of reparable damage such as that granted. The claim does not comply with article 58 of the Administrative Litigation Procedural Code. To order subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo), it says, the plaintiff had to demonstrate the causal link between the municipal conduct and the existence of an injury or unlawful damage. It concludes that we are faced with conduct that requires a restrictive interpretation by the judges under the principles of equity and justice, for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of the damages under the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, it requests that the appeal be granted on this criticism as well.

VII.- In the case at hand, the Tribunal recognizes compensation for the plaintiff for subjective non-material damage consisting of ₡2,000,000.00, based on the fact that the conduct of the defendant entity notoriously must have caused the plaintiff an impact on her psychological conditions, due to frustration, anxiety, and anger at not being able to exercise her property rights, despite having acquired it validly under the protection of registry publicity as if it were a completely available asset, when in reality it was an inalienable and therefore non-buildable asset. In the face of such circumstances, the judges considered that any person would suffer feelings of grief and distress, disturbances that undoubtedly have a negative impact on the emotional sphere. This Chamber agrees with the reasoning of the judges. Applying human presumptions, it is possible to directly infer that the local government's action in granting the municipal approval, without greater care or study of the involved area, and then denying the land use – now complying with the legal system – produces unjust disturbance in the plaintiff's psychological conditions, such as anger, helplessness, or frustration; detriment that she was not obligated to bear and for which she must be compensated. This Chamber, in several pronouncements, has established that the Judge, based on their experience, common sense, equity, and general principles of law, sets the amount for non-material damage with some margin of discretion; that is, it is "in re ipsa." Based on these determination parameters, it is natural to estimate and logical to deduce that the situation experienced by the plaintiff could have caused her emotional alterations such as those indicated, which undoubtedly reveal the clear existence of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). The situation in which the plaintiff was placed by the local government is considered sufficiently serious to justify the amount awarded for moral damages. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the grievance must be rejected, as this Chamber does not share the position that the inferred and alleged damage did not occur. Consequently, this Chamber estimates that the sum of ¢2,000,000.00 is commensurate with the injury caused to the plaintiff's internal well-being.

VIII.- Fourth: The appellant states that the appealed judgment indicates: "(...) The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action. (...). The foregoing is not proportional to the operative part of the same resolution, where the exception of lack of right is partially upheld, nor with the principles of a litigant in good faith, since the Municipality has been brought mandatorily into this process and, in accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it should be exonerated from the payment of both sets of costs of this action. It argues that it has acted by mandate of law and in strict application of Ley 65 of 1888. It adds that it cannot and must not accede to what is requested by the plaintiff. It is not due to acts that have been generated in the municipal sphere that it must apply this Decreto Ley. It concludes that the acts have originated in different administrative spheres and, for these reasons, the principle of good faith must be applied and it must be exempted from the payment of costs, the same as the State and the SINAC.

IX.- The judges, resorting to what is regulated in Article 193 of the CPCA, estimated that personal and procedural costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so and their dispensation only proceeds according to subsections a) and b) of the indicated numeral, without there being reasons given by the defendant entity or determined by the Court that justify its exoneration. In relation to the State and the SINAC, it ruled without a special award of costs. Now, by virtue of the manner in which the matter is being resolved, a new pronouncement on costs must be made, insofar as both the Municipality and the State and the SINAC, as the entity in charge of the conservation areas (áreas de conservación), are now the losing parties. According to the article just cited, this Chamber estimates that the imposition of costs on both losing parties is appropriate, without it being appreciated that any of the grounds that the rule enables to exonerate them from costs exists.

X.- In view of the foregoing, it will be appropriate to declare the appeal partially granted, whereby the appealed judgment must be partially annulled, only insofar as it declared a lack of standing (falta de legitimación) of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price for the plaintiff's land, which constitutes natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), and therefore, it is incumbent upon the latter to expropriate the property within a period of two months from the date this judgment becomes final. The MINAE, through the SINAC, must make the corresponding budgetary provisions. Consequently, a lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia must be declared regarding that claim, the local government being obliged to bear only the payment of the moral damages caused to the plaintiff for having approved the map (plano) that gave rise to the property object of this litigation, when it was an inalienable asset since 1888. The Municipality, the State, and the SINAC are ordered to pay the costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

POR TANTO

The appeal is partially granted. The appealed judgment is partially annulled insofar as it declared a lack of standing of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price for the plaintiff's land, which constitutes natural heritage of the State, and therefore, it is incumbent upon the latter to expropriate the property with the resources that the MINAE will budget through the SINAC for the next fiscal year. The lack of passive standing of the local Government regarding that claim is declared, it being obliged to bear only the payment of the moral damages caused to the plaintiff. The Municipality, the State, and the SINAC are ordered to pay the costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez HGarcíaCh It is resolved without special ruling on costs in relation to the State and the National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación)." The municipal entity, dissatisfied, appeals to cassation, raising four grievances.

II.- First: It challenges the grounds given by the Tribunal, referring to the fact that since the plaintiff's property is located on land made inalienable (terreno inalienable) by provision of Law 65 of 1888, the Municipality was legally prevented from granting any type of authorization, license, or permit, and therefore should never have issued licenses to carry out urban subdivisions (fraccionamientos urbanísticos) in that territory, impediments which it breached, in view of plan H-10532992006, approved (visado) by the Municipality, which describes a lot layout typical of an urban subdivision (fraccionamiento urbanístico), with the purpose of adapting the property to urban services. In its objection, the defendant Municipality argues that although by provision of numeral 169 of the Political Constitution, Local Governments are responsible for the administration of local interests, the truth is that this rule finds limitations in another significant body of regulations referring to urban planning, environmental, and social matters. Thus, it mentions, the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) assigns municipalities the obligation to have a regulatory plan (plan regulador) that defines land uses (usos de suelo) in their canton, and for those municipalities that do not have a regulatory plan, as is the case of San Rafael de Heredia, it assigns the obligation to attend to what is provided in the Greater Metropolitan Area Plan (Plan de la Gran Área Metropolitana, GAM), which finds its basis in Article 63 of the Urban Planning Law. For its part, it argues, the Construction Law (Ley de Construcciones) and the National Regulation for the Control of Urbanizations and Subdivisions (Reglamento Nacional para el Control de Urbanizaciones y Fraccionamientos) provide that the National Institute of Housing and Urbanism (Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo) is responsible for authorizing subdivisions (fraccionamientos), in the first instance, and the Local Government, once they have the Approval (Visto Bueno) of the Institute of Housing and Urbanism (INVU), shall proceed to authorize them. This, it indicates, is very important, because the subdivisions (fraccionamientos) authorized by the Municipal Council, in which the plaintiff's property is located, were issued in the year 1976, as stated in the Proven Facts (Hechos Probados) of the challenged resolution. Regarding these competencies, it refers to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment No. 420596 at 2:33 p.m. on August 20, 1996. For its part, it states, Article 13 of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal) orders that among the attributions of the Council is that of "Issuing urban planning measures." While the Organic Law of the INVU (Law number 1788) in numerals 4 and 5 provides that said institution has the residual competence to plan the development and growth of cities and prepare regulatory plans (planes reguladores). Which, it indicates, has been recognized by the Constitutional Chamber in decision (voto) 5305-93 at 10:06 a.m. on October 22, 1993. Without this implying that urban planning ceases to be the competence of local governments. In the same sense, it refers to consultation C06196 of May 3, 1996, of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República). The foregoing, it indicates, establishes that the administration of local interests corresponds, by constitutional norm, to the Municipalities. However, it says, there is a residual competence of the INVU, which must contribute, advise, in order for all plans to be properly integrated. In this matter, it argues, there is abundant constitutional jurisprudence that delimits each of the powers and competencies of the autonomous institutions and the municipalities. It concludes that, despite this vast amount of regulations, the Tribunal considers that the Municipality, by granting the land use (uso de suelo) and the approval (visado) of the plans, conferred a sort of "confidence" to the plaintiff so that she would acquire her property. However, it points out, the plaintiff never consulted or required from SINAC information that would allow her to determine if the property she intended to buy was located in a protection zone (zona de protección), which is widely known, so it cannot be argued that the law is unknown. In this vein, it states that since the Canton of San Rafael lacks a Regulatory Plan, the competence of the INVU and the Regulation for the National Control of Subdivisions (Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos), as well as the GAM Plan, which previously grant the Approval (Visto Bueno) in this type of case, comes into effect. This, it says, has not been taken into account by the Tribunal, so an improper interpretation of the regulations is identified as the first reproach, for which reason it is requested that the cassation appeal filed be upheld.

III.- The appellant Municipality challenges the Tribunal's reasoning in that it considered that, with the municipal approval (visado municipal), it granted the plaintiff a legitimate expectation (confianza legítima) to acquire the property described in this litigation. It seeks to divert responsibility for said conduct by alleging that there is a significant body of regulations referring to the obligation to have a regulatory plan (plan regulador) and the residual participation of the INVU in the control of subdivisions (fraccionamientos), even though it emphasizes in the objection itself that urban planning is the competence of local governments. In the opinion of this Chamber, the arguments presented in the first claim fail to disprove the fact that the Municipality granted the approval (visado) of the cadastral plan H-1053299-2006, which in turn allowed the subdivision (fraccionamiento) that gave life to property 106755-000 acquired by the plaintiff. The foregoing in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana), which reads: "Article 33.- For any subdivision (fraccionamiento) of land or real estate located in urban districts and other areas subject to urban control, it will be indispensable to have previously approved (visado), in the authorized municipal office, the plan indicating the location and capacity of the resulting portions and that, in addition, the notary or authorizing public official, attests in the act of issuance or granting of the respective document, that the division coincides with that expressed in said plan (...)". It is well known to local governments that subdivisions (fraccionamientos) can be controlled both through regulatory plans (planes reguladores) and through municipal approval (visado municipal), so by granting the latter, the Municipality authorized the subdivision (fraccionamiento), with the consequent sale of the property, which indeed created a legitimate expectation (confianza legítima) in the plaintiff to acquire the property, which she could not later use for urban development purposes. To this must be added the registry publicity enjoyed by the property, which is the means available to people to learn about the characteristics and limitations of real estate. Therefore, the argument that the plaintiff should have gone to SINAC to verify if the property to be acquired was in an inalienable protection zone (zona de protección inalienable) is not acceptable. In short, regardless of the residual competence that the appellant claims the INVU has in the matter of subdivisions (fraccionamientos) and regulatory plans (planes reguladores), the legitimate expectation (confianza legítima) lies in the approval (visado) granted by the municipal entity, an aspect that the local government has been unable to disprove.

IV.- In the second reproach, it alleges an inadequate assessment of the evidence in the file against the chronology in which the facts claimed by the plaintiff arise, namely: a) the canton of San Rafael was created on May 28, 1885; b) Decree Law No. 65 dates from the year 1888; c) the Municipality of San Rafael does not have a Regulatory Plan; d) the Greater Metropolitan Area plan dates from June 22, 1982; and, e) the subdivision (fraccionamiento) to which the plaintiff's property belongs was authorized on November 10, 1975. It opines that until that date, the Municipality and the INVU did not apply Decree No. 65 of 1888, since it was deemed tacitly repealed. Therefore, it refers, the Constitutional Chamber was asked to determine and dimension its validity. It is for that reason, it continues, that decision 2008-12109 of the Constitutional Tribunal was issued, which as the lower court (A-quo) points out "[...] is the basic legal parameter that allows guiding the solution to the conflict (...)". The foregoing, it says, is of special importance given that until 2007 and 2008, two fundamental acts were issued for the resolution of this matter; these are: a) Legal Opinion number OJ-118-2004 of the PGR, according to which there is no Law that expressly repeals Law No. LXV of July 30, 1888—so it is in force. b) By provision of the Municipal Council of San Rafael, agreement No. 18 taken in ordinary session No. 103-2007 of July 9, 2007, it was decided not to grant permits for any type of urban development in the canton of San Rafael, included in the area described by the cited Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo). c) It explains that resolution No. DGT-437-08 of June 16, 2008, of the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional, IGN), revealed cadastral errors in sheet No. 14154, which were elucidated and the inalienable zone was delimited until the years 2014 and 2015, as stated in the documentation of the file. d) It partially transcribes the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber No. 2008-12109 at 3:16 p.m. on August 5, 2008, which in its Therefore (Por Tanto) section, establishes: "(...) The appeal is granted, only with respect to the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the Ministry of Health and the Municipalities (...) San Rafael (...). It is ordered to Roberto Dobles Mora, or whoever holds his position as Minister of Environment and Energy, the following: a) That within the term of seven months counted from the notification of this judgment, carry out the actions within the scope of his competencies so that the zone established by Law number 65 of 1888 is physically delimited, and after that, initiate the recovery processes for the lands that are located in said sector and that are being occupied by private individuals, (...) to (...) whoever holds the position of Mayor (...) both of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia [...]: a] That they immediately refrain from granting any type of permit within the zone established by Law number 65 of 1888 (...)". Regarding the above, it stated that the judges are mistaken in indicating that the Constitutional Chamber ordered the State and the Municipalities to initiate the recovery processes for the lands located in the inalienable zone (zona inalienable) that are being occupied by private individuals. It indicates that the Tribunal did not consider that the municipality, as a public entity, is subject to the principle of legality, and, consequently, compelled to carry out the expropriation or purchase that is ordered. It transcribes Articles 13 and 18 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). For its part, it points out that the Constitutional Chamber has defined the concept of Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), indicating that it is a public domain asset whose conservation and administration are entrusted by Law to MINAE, through the National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC). Likewise, it outlines that the Constitutional Tribunal has said that it is composed of Protected Wilderness Areas (Áreas Silvestres Protegidas), whatever their management category, declared by Law or Executive Decree: forest reserves, protection zones (zonas protectoras), national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments. Likewise, it refers to the other forests and forest lands or lands of forest suitability (terrenos de aptitud forestal) of the State and public institutions that have an immediate legal affectation. It states that it includes within that category the rest of the forested areas and lands of forest suitability of the coastlines, which are also under the administration of MINAE and are governed by their specific regulations. It comments that in strict consequence of the above, it is not the municipality that is responsible for expropriating lands for protection zones (zonas de protección) that are not under its administration. It maintains that the Municipality, by denying the land use (uso de suelo), is merely applying and "operationalizing" what is set forth in the legal system. It concludes that the lands would be property of the State. However, it concludes, the appealed resolution relieves the State and SINAC of their own responsibilities against the law, for which reason it requests that this appeal be upheld.

V.- In order to consider to whom the expropriation of the property in question corresponds, it is necessary to delimit the normative concept of natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado, PNE), with the purpose of establishing whether or not it is part of this heritage. In this regard, this Chamber has reiterated that: "(...) According to numeral 13 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) 'The natural heritage of the State shall be constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable (áreas declaradas inalienables), of the properties registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration, except real estate that guarantees credit operations with the National Banking System and becomes part of their heritage...' In this way, there are three possibilities that the norm provides, regarding the assets that make up said heritage: a) forests and forest lands of the national reserves; b) forests and forest lands of the areas declared inalienable (áreas declaradas inalienables), and c) forests and forest lands of the properties registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions and other bodies of the Public Administration, except real estate that guarantees credit operations with the National Banking System and becomes part of their heritage." (In this regard, judgments numbers 1070 at 9:45 a.m. on September 3, 2010, and 1088 at 8:55 a.m. on August 8, 2011, can be consulted). From the foregoing, the opinion expressed by the appellant Municipality to the effect that the property subject to this process must be considered part of the PNE, since it is located within a zone declared inalienable (zona declarada inalienable) (Decree Law LXV of July 30, 1888, and ruling 2008-12109 of the Constitutional Chamber) arises from an adequate interpretation of ordinal 13 of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal). Indeed, mandate 13 ibidem is clear in determining that a parcel located in a zone declared inalienable (zona declarada inalienable), with the aim of protecting the water resources (recurso hídrico) of the area, forms part of the PNE. In the present case, it is an uncontested fact that the land subject to this process is located within a strip declared inalienable (franja declarada inalienable). Likewise, that the Constitutional Chamber considered (ruling 2008-12109) that these are properties that form part of the public domain (dominio público). Now then, the charge revolves around the alleged error of the judges in condemning it to expropriate lands that are part of the PNE, regarding which it argues it lacks ownership. On this subject, it should be noted that through resolution No. 2163-2016, at 3:30 p.m. on September 26, 2016, the Processing Judge joined the State and SINAC to the litis. However, the judgment challenged in cassation resolved to grant the exception of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the State and, ex officio, declared the lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) of the National System of Conservation Areas, despite the fact that what is discussed refers to a property located in an inalienable zone (zona inalienable) (which constitutes an uncontested fact), since due to its characteristics as an aquifer recharge zone (zona de recarga acuífera) it forms part of the Natural Heritage of the State (Patrimonio Natural del Estado). By reason of the above, this Chamber considers the Tribunal did not analyze that the asset under examination forms part of the PNE, whose administration corresponds to MINAE through SINAC (First Chamber, No. 19776-2014 at 10:30 a.m. on December 3, 2014). As it is a property located in a water recharge zone (zona de recarga hídrica), part of a strip declared inalienable (franja declarada inalienable) since time immemorial, it is clear that the expropriation of the asset in litigation corresponds to the State, which has the ex lege responsibility for the management and control of those areas. In addition to the foregoing, it is worth noting that since resolution No. 2008-12109 at 3:16 p.m. on August 5, 2008, the Constitutional Chamber had ordered the respondent Ministry to coordinate accordingly with the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional) to physically delimit the zone comprised by Law 65 of 1888, and then to recover the lands that it included and that are occupied by private individuals. In accordance with the above, the Municipality of San Rafael is not responsible for proceeding to the expropriation of an asset whose administration, according to the legal system, would correspond to MINAE through SINAC; therefore, with respect exclusively to that claim, it is appropriate to declare the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of the local government and, consequently, to order the State, as the Constitutional Chamber ordered in decision (voto) 2008-12109, to initiate the expropriation process to pay the fair price for the property discussed in this litigation, all within a term of two months counted from the finality of this judgment. For this purpose, MINAE through SINAC must make the corresponding budgetary provisions for the next fiscal period.

VI.- Third: The appellant begins by transcribing part of the challenged resolution, stating that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any municipal conduct that caused her damages, and what was granted is based on discretionary and interpretive criteria of the judges. It alleges that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a detriment occurred in a real, effective, and certain manner, aspects that, according to the principle of the burden of proof, are a fundamental part for the granting of damages.

His assessments, he says, are subjective and simple suppositions without any evidentiary support. There is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function or conduct and the unlawful injury that demonstrates the existence of a reparable damage such as the one awarded. The request does not comply with article 58 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. To proceed in decreeing subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), he says, the plaintiff had to demonstrate the causal link between the municipal conduct and the existence of an unlawful injury or damage. He concludes that we are faced with conduct that requires a restrictive interpretation by the judges under the principles of equity and justice, for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of damages under the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, he requests that the appeal be upheld on this objection as well.

**VII.-** In the case at hand, the Court recognized in favor of the plaintiff compensation for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) consisting of ¢2,000,000.00, based on the fact that the conduct of the defendant entity must have notoriously caused the plaintiff an impact on her emotional conditions, due to the frustration, anxiety, and anger from not being able to dispose of her property right, despite having validly acquired it under the protection of registry publicity as if it were an absolutely available asset, when in reality it was an inalienable asset and, therefore, not buildable. Faced with such circumstances, the judges estimated, any person would suffer feelings of affliction and distress, disturbances that undoubtedly have a negative impact on the emotional sphere. This Chamber agrees with the reasoning of the judges. Applying human presumptions, it is possible to directly infer that the action of the local government in granting the municipal approval (visado municipal), without greater care or study of the involved area, to then deny the land use—now conforming to the legal system—produces unjust disturbance in the plaintiff's emotional well-being, such as anger, impotence, or frustration; an impairment she was not obligated to bear and for which she must be compensated. This Chamber has established in several rulings that the Judge, based on his experience, common sense, equity, and general principles of law, sets the amount for moral damages (daño moral) with some margin of discretion, that is, it is "in re ipsa". Based on these parameters of determination, it is natural to estimate and logical to deduce that the situation experienced by the plaintiff could have caused her emotional alterations such as those indicated, which undoubtedly reveal the clear existence of subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). The situation in which the plaintiff was placed by the local government is considered sufficiently serious to justify the amount granted for moral damages (daño moral). This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the grievance must be dismissed, since this Chamber does not share the position that the inferred and alleged damage did not occur. Consequently, this Chamber considers that the sum of ¢2,000,000.00 conforms to the injury caused to the plaintiff's inner peace.

**VIII.-** **Fourth:** He states that the appealed judgment indicates: *"(...) The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is ordered to pay both costs of this action.(...)."* The foregoing is not proportionate to the operative part of the same resolution, where the defense of lack of right is partially upheld, nor with the principles of a litigant in good faith, since the Municipality has been brought mandatorily to this process and, under the terms of numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, it should be exonerated from the payment of both costs of this action. He accuses that it has acted by mandate of law and in strict application of Ley 65 of 1888. He adds that it cannot, nor should it, grant what was requested by the plaintiff. It was not for acts generated within the municipal sphere that this Decree Law must be applied. He concludes that the acts originated in different administrative spheres and for these reasons the principle of good faith must be applied and it must be exempted from the payment of costs, as should the State and SINAC.

**IX.-** The judges estimated, resorting to what is regulated in article 193 of the CPCA, that personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so, and their dispensation only proceeds according to subsections a) and b) of the indicated numeral, without there being reasons given by the defendant entity or determined by the Court that justify their exoneration. Regarding the State and SINAC, it resolved without a special award of costs (sin especial condenatoria en costas). Now, by virtue of the way in which this is being resolved, a new ruling on costs must be made, insofar as both the Municipality and the State and SINAC, as the entity in charge of conservation areas, are now the losing parties. According to the recently cited article, this Chamber considers that the imposition of costs on both losing parties is appropriate, without appreciating that any of the reasons exist that the norm enables to exonerate them from costs.

**X.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal filed will be partially granted, and the appealed judgment must be partially annulled, only insofar as it declared a lack of standing (falta de legitimación) of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price of the plaintiff's land, which is the natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), and therefore, it corresponds to the latter to expropriate the property within the period of two months counted from the finality of this judgment. MINAE, through SINAC, must make the corresponding budgetary provisions. Consequently, a lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia must be declared with respect to that claim, and the local government must bear only the payment of the moral damages (daño moral) caused to the plaintiff for having approved the plan that gave rise to the property subject to this litis, when it was an inalienable asset since 1888. The Municipality, the State, and SINAC are ordered to pay costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is partially granted. The appealed judgment is partially annulled insofar as it declared a lack of standing (falta de legitimación) of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price of the plaintiff's land, which is the natural heritage of the State (patrimonio natural del Estado), and therefore, it corresponds to the latter to expropriate the property with the resources that MINAE will budget through SINAC for the next fiscal year. The lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) of the local Government is declared with respect to that claim, and it must bear only the payment of the moral damages (daño moral) caused to the plaintiff. The Municipality, the State, and SINAC are ordered to pay costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez** HGarcíaCh This situation is sufficiently serious to justify the amount awarded for moral damages (voto 314-F-2021).

Without this implying that urban planning ceases to be the responsibility of local governments. In the same vein, it refers to consultation C06196 of May 3, 1996, from the Procuraduría General de la República. The foregoing, it indicates, establishes that the administration of local interests corresponds by constitutional norm to the Municipalities. However, it says, there is a residual competence of the INVU, which must contribute and advise, so that all plans are properly integrated. In this matter, it argues, there is abundant constitutional jurisprudence that delimits each of the powers and competencies of the autonomous institutions and the municipalities. It concludes, notwithstanding this large amount of regulations, the Tribunal considers that the Municipality, by granting the land use (uso de suelo) and the approval (visado) of the plans, conferred a kind of "trust" (confianza) to the plaintiff for her to acquire her property. However, it points out, the plaintiff never consulted or requested from SINAC information that would allow delimiting whether the property she intended to buy was in a protection zone, which is widely known, so it cannot be argued that the law was unknown. In that line of thought, it expounds, since the Canton of San Rafael lacks a Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador), the competence of the INVU and the Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos come into effect, as well as the Plan GAM, which previously grant the Approval (Visto Bueno) in this type of case. This, it says, has not been taken into account by the Tribunal, so an improper interpretation of the regulations is identified as the first reproach, which is why it is requested that the filed cassation appeal be granted.

III.- The appellant Municipality contests the foundation of the Tribunal regarding its estimation that with the municipal approval (visado), it granted the plaintiff a legitimate trust to acquire the property described in this litigation. It intends to divert responsibility for said conduct by alleging that there is a significant amount of regulations referring to the obligation to have a regulatory plan and the residual participation of the INVU in the control of subdivisions (fraccionamientos), although it emphasizes in the same reproach that urban planning is the responsibility of local governments. In the opinion of this Chamber, the arguments presented in the first claim fail to disprove the fact that the Municipality granted the approval (visado) of the cadastral plan H-1053299-2006, which in turn allowed the subdivision (fraccionamiento) that gave life to farm 106755-000 acquired by the plaintiff. The foregoing is in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Ley de Planificación Urbana, which reads: "Artículo 33.- For any subdivision (fraccionamiento) of lands or immovables located in urban districts and other areas subject to urban control, it will be indispensable to have previously approved (visado), in the authorized municipal office, the plan that indicates the situation and capacity of the resulting portions and that, moreover, the notary or authorizing public official attests in the act of extension or granting of the respective document that the division coincides with that expressed in said plan (...) ". It is of utmost knowledge of local governments that subdivisions (fraccionamientos) can be controlled both through regulatory plans and through municipal approval (visado), so by granting the latter, the Municipality authorized the subdivision (fraccionamiento), with the consequent sale of the property, which indeed created a legitimate trust in the plaintiff to acquire the good, which she later could not use for urban purposes. To this must be added the registry publicity enjoyed by the farm, which is the means available to individuals to learn about the characteristics and limitations of immovables. Therefore, the argument that the plaintiff should have gone to SINAC to verify whether the property to be acquired was in an inalienable protection zone is not admissible. In short, regardless of the residual competence that the appellant claims the INVU has regarding subdivisions (fraccionamientos) and regulatory plans, the legitimate trust lies in the approval (visado) granted by the municipal entity, an aspect that the local government has not been able to disprove.

IV.- In the second reproach, it claims inadequate assessment of the evidence in the file regarding the chronology in which the events claimed by the plaintiff arise, namely: a) the canton of San Rafael was created on May 28, 1885; b) Decreto Ley no. 65 dates from the year 1888; c) the Municipality of San Rafael does not have a Regulatory Plan; d) the plan of the Gran Área Metropolitana dates from June 22, 1982; and, e) the subdivision (fraccionamiento) to which the plaintiff's property belongs was authorized on November 10, 1975. It opines that up to that date, the Municipality and the INVU did not apply Decreto no. 65 of 1888, as it was deemed tacitly repealed. Therefore, it refers, the Sala Constitucional was asked to determine and dimension its validity. For this reason, it continues, ruling 2008-12109 of the Constitutional Court is produced, which as indicated by the A-quo "[...] is the basic legal parameter that allows guiding the resolution of the conflict (...)". The foregoing, it says, is of special importance given that it is not until 2007 and 2008 that two fundamental acts for the resolution of this matter are issued; these are: a) Legal Opinion number OJ-118-2004 of the PGR, according to which there is no Law that expressly repeals Law no. LXV of July 30, 1888, -so it is in force-. b) By provision of the Municipal Council of San Rafael, agreement no. 18 taken in ordinary session no. 103-2007 of July 9, 2007, it was decided not to grant permits for any type of urban development in the canton of San Rafael, comprised within the area described by the cited Decreto Ejecutivo. c) It explains, resolution no. DGT-437-08 of June 16, 2008, of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional (hereinafter IGN), revealed cadastral errors in sheet no. 14154, which were elucidated and the inalienable zone was delimited until the year 2014 and 2015, as recorded in the documentation of the file. d) It partially transcribes the ruling of the Sala Constitucional No. 2008-12109 of 3:16 p.m. on August 5, 2008, which in its Por Tanto, establishes: "(...) The appeal is granted, solely with respect to the Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, the Ministerio de Salud and the Municipalities (...) San Rafael (...). Roberto Dobles Mora, or whoever occupies his position as Ministro del Ambiente y Energía, is ordered the following: a) That within the period of seven months from the notification of this judgment, he carry out the efforts within the scope of his competencies so that the zone established by law number 65 of 1888 is physically delimited, and after that, initiate the recovery processes for the lands located in said sector that are being occupied by private parties, (...) to (...) whoever occupies the position as Alcalde (...) both of the Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia [...]: a] That they immediately refrain from granting any type of permit within the zone established by law number 65 of 1888 (...)" . Regarding the foregoing, it stated that the judges are mistaken in indicating that the Sala Constitucional ordered the State and the Municipalities to initiate the recovery processes for lands located in the inalienable zone that are being occupied by private parties. It indicates that the Tribunal did not consider that the municipality, as a public entity, is subject to the principle of legality and, consequently, compelled to carry out the expropriation or purchase that is ordered. It transcribes Articles 13 and 18 of the Ley Forestal. For its part, it points out, the Sala Constitucional has defined the concept of State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado), indicating it is a public domain asset whose conservation and administration are entrusted by Law to MINAE, through the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (hereinafter SINAC). It also outlines that the Constitutional Court has said that it is formed by the Protected Wild Areas, whatever their management category, declared by Law or Decreto Ejecutivo: forest reserves, protective zones, national parks, biological reserves, national wildlife refuges, wetlands, and natural monuments. Likewise, it refers to other forests and forest lands or lands of forest aptitude of the State and public institutions that have an immediate legal affectation. It states that it includes within that category the rest of the forested areas and lands of forest aptitude of the coastlines, which are also under the administration of MINAE and are governed by their specific regulations. It comments that, in strict consequence of the foregoing, it is not the municipality that is responsible for expropriating lands for protection zones that are not under its administration. It maintains that the Municipality, by denying the land use (uso de suelo), only does what is to apply and "operationalize" what is embodied in the legal system. It concludes that the lands would be property of the State. However, it concludes, the appealed resolution relieves the State and SINAC of their own responsibilities against the law, which is why it is requested that this appeal be granted.

V.- In order to consider who is responsible for the expropriation of the property in question, it is necessary to delimit the regulatory concept of State Natural Heritage (patrimonio natural del Estado, hereinafter PNE), with the aim of establishing whether or not it is part of this heritage. In this regard, this Chamber has reiterated that: "(...) Pursuant to numeral 13 of the Ley Forestal, 'The State natural heritage (patrimonio natural del Estado) will be constituted by the forests and forest lands of the national reserves, of the areas declared inalienable, of the farms registered in its name, and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for immovables that guarantee credit operations with the Sistema Bancario Nacional and become part of its heritage...' In this way, there are three possibilities provided by the norm regarding the assets that make up said heritage: a) forests and forest lands of the national reserves; b) forests and forest lands of the areas declared inalienable, and c) forests and forest lands of the farms registered in its name and of those belonging to municipalities, autonomous institutions, and other bodies of the Public Administration, except for immovables that guarantee credit operations with the Sistema Bancario Nacional and become part of its heritage." (Regarding this, judgments numbers 1070 of 9:45 a.m. on September 3, 2010, and 1088 of 8:55 a.m. on August 8, 2011, can be consulted). From the foregoing, the criterion expressed by the appellant Municipality that the farm object of this process should be considered part of the PNE, since it is located within a zone declared inalienable (Decreto Ley LXV of July 30, 1888, and ruling 2008-12109 of the Sala Constitucional) arises from an adequate interpretation of ordinal 13 of the Ley Forestal. In effect, mandate 13 ibidem is clear in determining that a plot located in a zone declared inalienable, in order to protect the water resource of the area, is part of the PNE. In the species, it is an uncontroverted fact that the land object of this process is located within a strip declared inalienable. Likewise, that the Sala Constitucional considered (ruling 2008-12109) that these are properties that are part of the public domain. However, the charge revolves around the alleged error of the judges in condemning it to expropriate lands that are part of the PNE, regarding which it argues it lacks ownership. On this subject, it is worth noting that through resolution No. 2163-2016, of 3:30 p.m. on September 26, 2016, the Processing Judge integrated the State and SINAC into the litis. Nevertheless, the judgment challenged in cassation resolved to grant the exception of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) filed by the State and, ex officio, declared the lack of passive legal standing of the Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, despite the fact that what is discussed refers to a property located in an inalienable zone (which constitutes an uncontroverted fact), since due to its characteristics as an aquifer recharge zone, it is part of the State Natural Heritage (Patrimonio Natural del Estado). Due to the foregoing, this Chamber considers the Tribunal did not analyze that the asset under examination is part of the PNE, whose administration corresponds to MINAE through SINAC (Sala Primera, no. 19776-2014 of 10:30 a.m. on December 3, 2014). Being a property located in a water recharge zone, part of a strip declared inalienable for a long time, it is clear that the expropriation of the asset in litigation corresponds to the State, which has the ex lege responsibility in the management and control of those areas. In addition to the foregoing, it is worth noting that since resolution no. 2008-12109 of 3:16 p.m. on August 5, 2008, the Sala Constitucional had ordered the defendant Ministry to coordinate accordingly with the Instituto Geográfico Nacional to physically delimit the zone encompassed by law 65 of 1888, and then recover the lands that it encompassed and that are occupied by private parties. Pursuant to the foregoing, it does not correspond to the Municipality of San Rafael to proceed with the expropriation of an asset whose administration, according to the legal system, would correspond to MINAE through SINAC; therefore, with respect exclusively to that claim, the appropriate action is to declare a lack of passive standing of the local government and, consequently, order the State, as the Sala Constitucional ordered in vote 2008-12109, to initiate the expropriation process to pay the fair price for the asset discussed in this litigation, within the period of two months from the finality of this judgment. For this purpose, MINAE through SINAC must make the corresponding budgetary provisions for the next fiscal period.

VI.- Third: The appellant begins by transcribing part of the challenged resolution, that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any municipal conduct that generates damages and what was granted is based on discretionary and interpretive criteria of the judges. It alleges that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that a detriment was produced in a real, effective, and certain manner, aspects that, according to the principle of the burden of proof, are a fundamental part of the granting of damages. Its appreciations, it says, are subjective and simple assumptions without any evidentiary support. There is no cause-and-effect relationship between the specific manifestation of the administrative function or conduct and the unlawful injury that demonstrates that there is a reparable damage like the one granted. The request does not comply with Article 58 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. To agree to decree subjective moral damages, it says, the plaintiff had to demonstrate the causal link between the municipal conduct and the existence of an unlawful injury or damage. It concludes that we are faced with conducts that require a restrictive interpretation by the judges under the principles of equity and justice, for the purposes of determining the origin of the damages under the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, it requests that the appeal be granted for this reproach as well.

VII.- In the sub lite, the Tribunal recognizes the plaintiff compensation for subjective moral damages consisting of ¢2,000,000.00, based on the fact that the conduct of the defendant entity notoriously must have caused the plaintiff an affectation in her mood conditions, due to frustration, anxiety, and anger at not being able to dispose of her property right, despite having acquired it validly under the protection of registry publicity as if it were an absolutely available asset, when in reality it was an inalienable asset and, therefore, not buildable. Faced with such circumstances, the judges estimated that any person would suffer feelings of affliction and distress, disturbances that undoubtedly have a negative impact on the emotional sphere. This Chamber agrees with the reasoning of the judges. Applying human presumptions, it is possible to infer directly that the actions of the local government in granting the municipal approval (visado), without greater care or study of the involved area, and then denying the land use (uso de suelo) – now indeed conforming to the legal system – produces unjust disturbance in the appellant's mood conditions, such as anger, impotence, or frustration; a detriment that she was not obliged to bear and for which she must be compensated. This Chamber, in several pronouncements, has established that the Judge, based on his experience, common sense, equity, and the general principles of law, sets the amount for moral damages with some margin of discretion, that is, it is "in re ipsa". Based on these determination parameters, it is natural to estimate and logical to deduce that the situation experienced by the plaintiff could have caused her emotional alterations such as those indicated, which undoubtedly reveal the clear existence of subjective moral damages. The situation in which the plaintiff was placed by the local government is considered sufficiently serious to justify the amount granted for moral damages. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the grievance must be rejected, since this Chamber does not share the position that the inferred and alleged damage did not occur.

Consequently, this Chamber considers that the sum of ¢2,000,000.00 is commensurate with the injury caused to the plaintiff’s inner personal sphere.

**VIII.-** **Fourth**: The appellant states that the appealed judgment indicates: *"(...) The Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia is ordered to pay both sets of costs of this action. (...). The foregoing is not proportionate to the operative part of the same resolution, where the objection of lack of right is partially upheld, nor with the principles of a good-faith litigant, since the Municipality has been brought into this proceeding on a mandatory basis and, under the terms of Article 193 of the Administrative Litigation Procedural Code, it should be exonerated from paying both sets of costs of this action. It argues that it has acted by operation of law and in strict application of Ley 65 of 1888. It adds that it cannot and must not accede to what was requested by the plaintiff. It is not because of acts generated at the municipal level that it must apply this Decree-Law. It concludes that the acts originated in different administrative spheres and for these reasons the principle of good faith should be applied and it should be exempted from the payment of costs, just like the State and SINAC.* **IX.-** The judges, relying on the provisions of Article 193 of the CPCA, considered that personal and procedural costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so, and their waiver only proceeds in accordance with subsections a) and b) of the article indicated, with no reasons given by the defendant entity or determined by the Tribunal to justify its exoneration. In relation to the State and SINAC, it ruled without a special award of costs. However, by virtue of the manner in which this is being resolved, a new ruling on costs must be made, to the extent that both the Municipality and the State and SINAC, as the entity responsible for the conservation areas, are now the losing parties. In accordance with the article just cited, this Chamber considers that the imposition of costs on both losing parties is appropriate, without it appearing that any of the grounds exist that the norm provides to exonerate them from costs.

**X.-** Based on the foregoing, the appeal filed will be partially upheld, and the appealed judgment must be partially annulled, only insofar as it declared a lack of standing of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price for the plaintiff's land, which constitutes natural heritage of the State, and therefore, it is up to the latter to expropriate the property within a period of two months from the date this judgment becomes final. MINAE, through SINAC, must make the corresponding budgetary provisions. Consequently, the passive lack of standing of the Municipality of San Rafael de Heredia must be declared with respect to that claim, with the local government only having to bear the payment for the non-material damages caused to the plaintiff for having approved the map that gave rise to the property subject to this litigation, when it was an inalienable asset since 1888. The Municipality, the State, and SINAC are ordered to pay costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is partially upheld. The appealed judgment is partially annulled insofar as it declared a lack of standing of the State regarding the order to pay the fair price for the plaintiff's land, which constitutes natural heritage of the State, and therefore, it is up to the latter to expropriate the property with the resources that MINAE will budget through SINAC for the next fiscal year. The passive lack of standing of the local Government is declared with respect to that claim, it having to bear only the payment for the non-material damages caused to the plaintiff. The Municipality, the State, and SINAC are ordered to pay costs in accordance with canon 193 of the CPCA.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** HGarcíaCh

20180004000376-3141178-1.rtf  Res. 000314-F-S1-2021 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del once de febrero de dos mil veintiuno.

Proceso de conocimiento interpuesto en el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, por Sara Aguilar Artavia, cédula de identidad número 1-408-992; contra la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia; el Estado y; el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. Intervienen los abogados Otto Giovanni Ceciliano Mora, en calidad de apoderado especial judicial de la actora; Ricardo Jiménez Bonilla, en condición de Procurador y, Gidgett Ramírez Hernández, en su condición de apoderada especial judicial del SINAC. El gobierno municipal presenta recurso de casación contra la sentencia 14-2018-II, dictada por la Sección II del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, a las once horas del veintisiete de febrero de dos mil dieciocho, integrado Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos y Eduardo González Segura.

Redacta la magistrada Rojas Morales

CONSIDERANDO

I.- De los hechos tenidos por probados en el fallo, se tiene que el 1 de junio de 2006, fue inscrita en el Registro Nacional, la finca de la provincia de Heredia matrícula número 106755-000, plano catastrado número H-1053299-2006, lote E30-C, ubicado en el distrito de Los Ángeles, cantón de San Rafael, provincia de Heredia a nombre de la señora Sara Aguilar Artavia. La finca 106755-000 se originó el 17 de diciembre de 1976, producto de la segregación de la matrícula 80622 que a su vez fue inscrita el 10 de agosto de 1976, resultante de la división de la finca 59835. La heredad 59835 fue inscrita el 18 de febrero de 1970 y nació de la reunión de las fincas 2992, 4130, 8524, 15065, 6554, 21819, 2988, 26407, 9761, 26798, 33617, 40510, 18557, 22162, 22602, 22659, 33869. Las anteriores propiedades nacieron de la reunión de otras fincas que fueron inscritas entre los años 1867 y 1942. El 2 de junio de 2006, la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia otorgó el visado al plano catastrado N°H-1053299-2006. Posteriormente el 4 de mayo de 2009, la señora Aguilar Artavia solicitó ante la Municipalidad, el uso de suelo para su propiedad, el cual fue denegado por oficio N°MSRH-DCU-332-2009, del 22 de mayo de 2009, indicando: "Por tanto, no es posible otorgar usos de suelo para proyectos en propiedades afectadas por la línea inalienable". Como parte del fundamento del mencionado acto, la Municipalidad demandada señaló: "...Según ubicación cartográfica los (sic) predio en estudio se encuentra dentro de la zona de protección inalienable, establecida según Decreto N°LXV de fecha 30 de julio de 1888, el cual indica lo siguiente: "Art. 1°.- Se declara inalienable una zona de terreno de dos kilómetros de ancho, a uno y otro lado de la cima de la montaña conocida con el nombre de Montaña del Volcán de Barba, desde el cerro llamado Zurquí hasta el que se conoce con el nombre de Concordia, ya sea dicha zona de propiedad nacional o municipal.". El 21 de noviembre de 2011 siguiente, la actora solicitó al ente municipal aclaración del motivo por el cual le fue visado el plano H-1053299-2006, pero contradictoriamente se le denegó el uso de suelo. Lo cual fue contestado por oficio N°MSRH-DCU-1332-2011 del 6 de diciembre de 2011, reiterando los motivos expuestos en el rechazo original. El 10 de diciembre de 2014, la señora Aguilar Artavia solicitó nuevamente a la Municipalidad demandada el uso de suelo para construir una vivienda en su finca. Por lo que, por oficio N°DPUS-MUNISRH-1154-2014 del 12 de diciembre de 2014, el Departamento de Planificación Urbana de la Municipalidad le contestó nuevamente denegando la solicitud manteniendo los fundamentos previamente expresados por el ente municipal. El 9 de enero de 2015, la señora Sara Aguilar Artavia interpuso recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio contra el acto administrativo indicado anteriormente. Por resolución administrativa N°02-DPU-MUNISRH-2015 de las 12:00 horas del 15 de enero de 2015, el Departamento de Planificación Urbana rechazó el recurso de revocatoria y elevó la apelación ante la Alcaldía. Finalmente por resolución administrativa N°0184-2015-AMSRH de las 8:00 horas del 12 de febrero de 2015, se rechazó la apelación en subsidio y se confirmó el oficio N°DPUS-MUNISRH-1154-2014. En razón de lo expuesto, la señora Aguilar Artavia demandó a la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia solicitando lo siguiente: “1) Con lugar en todos sus extremos la presente demanda. 2) Se anule el acto administrativo de resolución número 0184-2015-AMSRH. 3) Que por no existir motivo alguno, y cumplir todos los requisitos de ley, para su negativa se condene a la accionada el uso de suelo solicitado ante la propiedad en conflicto. 4) Que se obligue a los accionados a indemnizar el daño causado por obviar los derechos adquiridos a la hora de realizar la compra del bien en razón del visado otorgado por la Municipalidad de San Rafael. 5) Que se condene a la accionada al pago de las costas procesales y personales de esta acción.”. La Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia contestó la demanda y opuso las excepciones de falta de legitimación y falta de derecho, solicitando que se declare sin lugar y se condene a la actora al pago de ambas costas de este proceso. La audiencia preliminar se realizó el 6 de abril de 2016, y la parte actora amplió la pretensión, incluyendo una subsidiaria en los siguientes términos: "Que se ordene a la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia a pagarle a su representada el justo precio de la finca inscrita en el partido de Heredia, matrícula de folio real 106135-00 ya sea por medio de compra directa o expropiación, otorgando a la Municipalidad el plazo de un mes una vez firme la resolución, deberá además pagar daños y prejuicios estimados desde el 14-10-2010 hasta el día que se cancele el justo precio, daños y perjuicios que se deberán liquidar en la fase de ejecución de sentencia". El Juez Tramitador suspendió la audiencia y otorgó el plazo de cinco días hábiles a la Municipalidad demandada para que refiriera a la ampliación de la pretensión. El Gobierno local contestó la audiencia otorgada y opuso las defensas de agotamiento de la vía administrativa y falta de integración de la litisconsorcio pasivo necesaria. Por resolución N° 2163-2016, de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 26 de setiembre de 2016, el Juez Tramitador declaró sin lugar la defensa de falta de agotamiento de la vía administrativa. Por otro lado, integró al Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (en adelante SINAC) quien contestó la demanda y opuso la excepción de falta de derecho, y al Estado quien interpuso las defensas previas de defectos formales que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo y prescripción, así como las excepciones de falta de legitimación activa y pasiva y falta de derecho. Ambos solicitan se declare sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, con las costas a cargo de la parte actora. La audiencia preliminar se realizó nuevamente el día 18 de abril de 2017, donde se desestimó la defensa de defectos que impiden verter pronunciamiento sobre el fondo. Por otro lado, el representante del SINAC presentó en dicha audiencia la defensa de prescripción, la cual fue reservada para el dictado de la resolución final. El asunto fue declarado de puro derecho y las partes rindieron sus conclusiones. Mediante fallo no. 14-2018-II de las once horas del veintisiete de febrero de dos mil dieciocho, el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, integrado por los jueces Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos y Eduardo González Segura resolvió “Se acoge la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva interpuesta por el Estado y de oficio se declara la falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. Se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia. En consecuencia, se declara parcialmente con lugar la demanda, entendiéndose denegada en lo que no se concede expresamente. Se ordena a la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia pagarle a la señora Sara Aguilar Artavia el justo precio de la finca inscrita en el partido de Heredia, matrícula 106755-00, plano catastrado número H-1053299-2006, lo cual hará ya sea mediante compra o mediante expropiación, debiendo hacer las gestiones presupuestarias necesarias y pertinentes para tales efectos. El procedimiento de compra o de expropiación deberá iniciarse en el plazo de un mes a partir de la firmeza del presente fallo. Se condena a la Municipalidad demandada a pagar a la señora Aguilar Artavia la suma de dos millones de colones por concepto de daño moral subjetivo, con sus respectivos intereses legales desde la firmeza de la sentencia y hasta su efectiva cancelación. Se condena a la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia a pagar ambas costas de esta acción. Se resuelve sin especial condena en costas en relación con el Estado y el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación.”. Inconforme el ente municipal acude a casación planteando cuatro agravios.

II.- Primero: Combate las fundamentaciones dadas por Tribunal referidos a que al estar la finca de la actora ubicada en terreno inalienable por disposición de la Ley 65 de 1888, la Municipalidad estaba legalmente impedida de otorgar cualquier tipo de autorización, licencia o permiso por lo que nunca debió dar licencias para realizar fraccionamientos urbanísticos en ese territorio, impedimentos que incumplió, con vista en el plano H-10532992006, visado por la Municipalidad, el cual describe una lotificación propia de un fraccionamiento urbanístico, con el fin de adaptar el fundo a los servicios urbanos. En el reparo, la Municipalidad demandada refiere que si bien por disposición del numeral 169 de la Constitución Política le corresponderá a los Gobiernos Locales la administración de los intereses locales, lo cierto es que esta norma encuentra limitaciones, en otra cantidad importante de normativa que se refiere a materia urbanística, ambiental y social. Así, menciona, la Ley de Planificación Urbana le asigna a los municipios la obligación de contar con un plan regulador que defina los usos de suelo en su cantón, y para aquellos municipios que no cuentan con plan regulador, como es el caso de San Rafael de Heredia, se le asigna la obligación de atender lo dispuesto en el Plan de la Gran Área Metropolitana (GAM) el cual encuentra sustento en el artículo 63 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana. Por su parte, refiere, la Ley de Construcciones y el Reglamento Nacional para el Control de Urbanizaciones y Fraccionamientos dispone que le corresponderá al Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo autorizar los fraccionamientos, en primera instancia y al Gobierno Local, una vez que éstos cuenten con el Visto Bueno del Instituto de Vivienda y Urbanismo (en adelante INVU), procederán a autorizar los mismos. Esto, indica, es muy importante, por cuánto los fraccionamientos autorizados por el Concejo Municipal, en los cuales se encuentra la propiedad de la actora, fueron emitidos en el año 1976 según consta en los Hechos Probados de la resolución impugnada. Sobre esas competencias refiere a lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional en sentencia No 420596 de las 14:33 horas del 20 de agosto de 1996. Por su parte, expone, el artículo 13 del Código Municipal, ordena que dentro de las atribuciones del Concejo, se encuentra la de "Dictar las medidas de ordenamiento urbano". Mientras que la Ley Orgánica del INVU (Ley número 1788) en los numerales 4 y 5 dispone que dicha institución tiene la competencia residual de planear el desarrollo y el crecimiento de las ciudades y preparar planes reguladores. Lo cual, indica, ha sido reconocido por la Sala Constitucional en el voto 5305-93 de 10:06 horas del 22 de octubre de 1993. Sin que ello implique que la planificación urbana deje de ser competencia de los gobiernos locales. En igual sentido, refiere a la consulta C06196 de 3 de mayo de 1996 de la Procuraduría General de la República. Lo anterior, indica, deja por establecido que la administración de los intereses locales le corresponde por norma constitucional a las Municipalidades. Sin embargo, dice, existe una competencia residual del INVU quien debe contribuir, asesorar, con el fin de que todos los planes sean integrados apropiadamente. En esta materia, arguye, existe abundante jurisprudencia constitucional que delimita cada una de las facultades y competencias de las instituciones autónomas y de los municipios. Concluye, no obstante esta gran cantidad de normativa, el Tribunal estima que la Municipalidad al otorgar el uso de suelo y el visado de los planos, confirió una especie de "confianza" a la parte actora para que ésta adquiriera su propiedad. Sin embargo, señala, la parte actora nunca consultó ni requirió del SINAC información que permitiera delimitar si la propiedad que pensaba comprar se encontraba en zona de protección, lo cual es harto conocido, por lo que no puede argumentarse que se desconoce la ley. En ese orden de ideas, expone, al carecer el Cantón de San Rafael de Plan Regulador, entra a regir la competencia del INVU y el Reglamento para el Control Nacional de Fraccionamientos, así como el Plan GAM quienes en forma previa otorgan el Visto Bueno, en este tipo de casos. Esto, dice, no ha sido tomado en cuenta por el Tribunal por lo que se identifica como primer reproche una interpretación indebida de la normativa motivo por el cual se solicita acoger el recurso de casación incoado.

III.- La Municipalidad recurrente combate el fundamento del Tribunal en cuanto a que estimó que con el visado municipal, le otorgó a la actora una confianza legítima para adquirir el bien descrito en este litigio. Pretende desviar la responsabilidad en dicha conducta alegando que existe una cantidad importante de normativa que refiere a la obligación de contar con plan regulador y la participación residual del INVU en el control de los fraccionamientos, pese que recalca en el propio reparo, que la planificación urbana es competencia de los gobiernos locales. En criterio de esta Cámara, los alegatos presentados en el primer reclamo, no logran desvirtuar el hecho de que la Municipalidad otorgó el visado del plano catastrado H-1053299-2006, lo que a su vez permitió el fraccionamiento que dio vida a la finca 106755-000 adquirida por la actora. Lo anterior de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 33 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana que reza: “Artículo 33.- Para todo fraccionamiento de terrenos o inmuebles situados en distritos urbanos y demás áreas sujetas a control urbanístico, será indispensable haber visado antes, en la oficina municipal autorizada, el plano que indique la situación y cabida de las porciones resultantes y que, además, el notario o funcionario público autorizante, dé fe en el acto de extensión u otorgamiento del documento respectivo, de que la división coincide con la que exprese dicho plano (...)”. Es de sumo conocimiento de los gobiernos locales, que los fraccionamientos se pueden controlar tanto por medio de los planes reguladores, como por medio del visado municipal, por lo que al otorgarse el último, la Municipalidad autorizó el fraccionamiento, con la consecuente venta del inmueble, lo que en efecto creó una confianza legítima en la actora para adquirir el bien, que luego no pudo utilizar con fines urbanísticos. A esto debe aunarse la publicidad registral de la que gozaba la finca, que es el medio con que cuentan las personas para enterarse de las características y limitaciones que gozan los inmuebles. Por ello, no es de recibo el argumento de que la actora debió acudir al SINAC a constatar si el bien a adquirir estaba en zona de protección inalienable. En suma, independientemente de la competencia residual que acusa el recurrente tiene el INVU en el tema de fraccionamientos y los planes reguladores, la confianza legítima radica en el visado otorgado por el ente municipal, aspecto que no ha podido desvirtuar el gobierno local.

IV.- En el segundo reproche, acusa, inadecuada valoración de la prueba que consta en el expediente frente a la cronología en que se suscitan los hechos que reclama la actora, a saber: a) el cantón de San Rafael fue creado el 28 de mayo de 1885; b) el Decreto Ley no 65 data del año 1888; c) la Municipalidad de San Rafael no cuenta con Plan Regulador; d) el plan de la Gran Área Metropolitana data del 22 de junio de 1982; y, e) el fraccionamiento al que pertenece el inmueble de la actora fue autorizado el 10 de noviembre de 1975. Opina, hasta esa data la Municipalidad y el INVU no aplicaban el Decreto no. 65 de 1888, por cuanto se reputaba como derogado en forma tácita. Por lo tanto, refiere, se solicitó a la Sala Constitucional determinar y dimensionar su vigencia. Es por esa razón, continúa, se produce el fallo 2008-12109 del Tribunal Constitucional, que como señala el A-quo "[...] es el parámetro jurídico de base que permite orientar la solución del conflicto (...)". Lo anterior, dice, reviste especial importancia dado que hasta el 2007 y 2008 que se emiten dos actos fundamentales para la resolución de este asunto; estos son: a) la Opinión Jurídica número OJ-118-2004 de la PGR, según la cual no existe una Ley que en forma expresa derogue la Ley no. LXV de 30 de julio de 1888, -por lo que está vigente-. b) Por disposición del Concejo Municipal de San Rafael, acuerdo no. 18 tomado en la sesión ordinaria no. 103-2007 del 9 de julio del 2007, se decidió no otorgar permisos para ningún tipo de desarrollo urbanístico en el cantón de San Rafael, comprendido en el área descrita por el Decreto Ejecutivo citado. c) Explica, la resolución no. DGT-437-08 del 16 de junio del 2008 del Instituto Geográfico Nacional (en lo que sigue IGN), puso en evidencia errores catastrales en la hoja no. 14154, los cuales fueron dilucidados y fue delimitada la zona inalienable hasta el año 2014 y 2015, tal y como consta en la documentación del expediente. d) Transcribe parcialmente el fallo de la Sala Constitucional No. 2008-12109 de las 15:16 horas del 5 de agosto del 2008, el cual en su Por Tanto, establece: "(...) Se declara con lugar el recurso, únicamente en cuanto al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, el Ministerio de Salud y las Municipalidades (...) San Rafael (...). Se ordena a Roberto Dobles Mora, o a quien ocupe su cargo como Ministro del Ambiente y Energía lo siguiente: a) Que dentro del plazo de siete meses contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia, realice las gestiones que estén dentro del ámbito de sus competencias para que se delimita físicamente la zona establecida por la ley número 65 de 1888, y luego de ello inicie los procesos de recuperación de los terrenos que se ubican en dicho sector y que están siendo ocupados por particulares, (...) a (...) quien ocupe el cargo como Alcalde (...) ambos de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia [...]: a] Que de inmediato se abstengan de otorgar cualquier tipo de permiso dentro de la zona establecida por la ley número 65 de 1888 (...)”. Respecto a lo anterior, expuso, los jueces se equivocan al indicar que la Sala Constitucional ordenó al Estado y a las Municipalidades iniciar los procesos de recuperación de los terrenos ubicados en la zona inalienable que estén siendo ocupados por particulares. Indica, el Tribunal no consideró que la municipalidad, como ente público se encuentra sometido al principio de legalidad, y, en consecuencia, compelida de realizar la expropiación o compra que se ordena. Trascribe los artículos 13 y 18 de la Ley Forestal. Por su parte, apunta, la Sala Constitucional ha definido el concepto de Patrimonio Natural del Estado, indicando, se trata de un bien de dominio público cuya conservación y administración están encomendadas por la Ley al MINAE, mediante el Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (en lo que sigue SINAC). Asimismo esboza, ha dicho el Tribunal Constitucional que está conformado por las Áreas Silvestres Protegidas, cualquiera sea su categoría de manejo, declaradas por Ley o Decreto Ejecutivo: reservas forestales, zonas protectoras, parques nacionales, reservas biológicas, refugios nacionales de vida silvestre, humedales y monumentos naturales. Asimismo, refiere por los demás bosques y terrenos forestales o de aptitud forestal del Estado e instituciones públicas que tienen una afectación legal inmediata. Manifiesta, incluye dentro de esa categoría al resto de áreas boscosas y terrenos de aptitud forestal de los litorales, los cuales están también bajo administración del MINAE y se rigen por su normativa específica. Comenta, en estricta consecuencia con lo anterior, no es al municipio a quien le corresponde expropiar terrenos para zonas de protección que no están bajo su administración. Sostiene, la Municipalidad al negar el uso de suelo, lo único que hace es aplicar y “operativizar” lo que se encuentra plasmado en el ordenamiento jurídico. Finaliza, los terrenos serían propiedad del Estado. Sin embargo, concluye, la resolución recurrida releva al Estado y al SINAC de sus propias responsabilidades en contra de la ley, razón por la cual solicita se acoja el presente recurso.

V.- Para efectos de considerar a quien corresponde la expropiación del inmueble en mención, resulta necesario delimitar el concepto normativo de patrimonio natural del Estado (en adelante PNE), con la finalidad de establecer si es o no parte de este patrimonio. Al respecto, esta Sala ha reiterado que: “(…) Conforme al numeral 13 de la Ley Forestal “El patrimonio natural del Estado estará constituido por los bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales, de las áreas declaradas inalienables, de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias con el Sistema Bancario Nacional e ingresen a formar parte de su patrimonio... ”. De esta forma, son tres posibilidades las que brinda la norma, respecto a los bienes que integran dicho patrimonio: a) bosques y terrenos forestales de las reservas nacionales; b) bosques y terrenos forestales de las áreas declaradas inalienables, y c) bosques y terrenos forestales de las fincas inscritas a su nombre y de las pertenecientes a municipalidades, instituciones autónomas y demás organismos de la Administración Pública, excepto inmuebles que garanticen operaciones crediticias con el Sistema Bancario Nacional e ingresen a formar parte de su patrimonio.” (Al respecto pueden consultarse las sentencias números 1070 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 3 de setiembre de 2010 y 1088 de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 8 de agosto de 2011). De lo expuesto, el criterio externado por la Municipalidad recurrente en el sentido de que la finca objeto de este proceso debe considerarse parte del PNE, ya que se localiza dentro de una zona declarada inalienable (Decreto Ley LXV de 30 de julio de 1888 y fallo 2008-12109 de la Sala Constitucional) surge de una adecuada interpretación del ordinal 13 de la Ley Forestal. En efecto, el mandato 13 ibídem es claro al determinar, que una parcela ubicada en zona declarada inalienable, con el fin de proteger el recurso hídrico de la zona, forma parte del PNE. En la especie, es un hecho no controvertido, el terreno objeto de este proceso se localiza dentro de una franja declarada inalienable. Asimismo, que la Sala Constitucional consideró (fallo 2008-12109), se trata de propiedades que hacen parte del dominio público. Ahora bien, el cargo gira en torno al alegado error de los juzgadores al condenarle a expropiar terrenos parte del PNE, respecto de los cuales argumenta, carece de titularidad. Sobre esta temática, cabe indicar, mediante la resolución N°2163-2016, de las 15 horas 30 minutos del 26 de setiembre de 2016, el Juez Tramitador, integró a la litis al Estado y al SINAC. No obstante, el fallo impugnado en casación resolvió declarar con lugar la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva interpuesta por el Estado y, de oficio, declaró la falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva del Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, a pesar de que lo discutido refiere a un inmueble ubicado en una zona inalienable (lo cual constituye un hecho no controvertido), ya que por sus características de zona de recarga acuífera forma parte del Patrimonio Natural del Estado. En razón de lo expuesto, considera esta Cámara el Tribunal no analizó, que el bien bajo examen forma parte del PNE, cuya administración corresponde al MINAE a través del SINAC (Sala Primera, no. 19776-2014 de las 10 horas 30 minutos del 3 de diciembre de 2014). Tratándose de un inmueble ubicado en una zona de recarga hídrica, parte de una franja declarada inalienable desde vieja data, es claro que corresponde al Estado la expropiación del bien en litigio quien tiene la responsabilidad ex legge en el manejo y control de esas áreas. Aunado a lo anterior, merece la pena indicar que desde la resolución no. 2008-12109 de las 15 horas y 16 minutos del 5 de agosto de 2008, la Sala Constitucional había ordenado al Ministerio recurrido coordinar lo correspondiente con el Instituto Geográfico Nacional para delimitar físicamente la zona comprendida por la ley 65 de 1888, para luego recuperar los terrenos que los comprendía y que están ocupados por particulares. Conforme con lo anterior, no le corresponde a la Municipalidad de San Rafael proceder a la expropiación de un bien, cuya administración conforme al ordenamiento, correspondería al MINAE a través del SINAC, por ende, con respecto exclusivamente a esa pretensión lo procedente es declarar falta de legitimación pasiva del gobierno local y, en consecuencia, ordenar al Estado, tal y como lo dispuso la Sala Constitucional en el voto 2008-12109 a que inicie el proceso de expropiación para pagar el justo precio del bien discutido en este litigio, ello dentro del plazo de dos meses contados a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia. Con tal propósito el MINAE a través del SINAC deberá hacer las previsiones presupuestarias correspondientes para el próximo periodo fiscal.

VI.- Tercero: Inicia el recurrente trascribiendo parte de la resolución impugnada, que la actora no logró demostrar conducta alguna municipal que le genere daños y lo concedido es con fundamento en criterios discrecionales e interpretativos de los jueces. Alega, la actora no demostró que se produjera un menoscabo de manera real, efectivo y cierto, aspectos que conforme al principio de la carga de la prueba son parte fundamental para el otorgamiento de los daños. Sus apreciaciones, dice, son subjetivas y simples suposiciones sin sustento probatorio alguno. No existe una relación de causa efecto entre la manifestación específica de la función o conducta administrativa y la lesión antijurídica que demuestre que exista un daño reparable como el otorgado. La solicitud no cumple con el artículo 58 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo. Para acceder a decretar un daño moral subjetivo, dice, la actora debió demostrar el nexo causal entre la conducta municipal y la existencia de una lesión o daño antijurídico. Concluye, se está frente a conductas que requieren de los juzgadores una interpretación restrictiva bajo los principios de equidad y justicia, a los fines de determinar la procedencia de los daños bajo los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. En consecuencia solicita se acoja el recurso por este reproche también.

VII.- En el sublite, el Tribunal le reconoce a la actora un resarcimiento por daño moral subjetivo consistente en ¢2.000.000,00, basado en que la conducta del ente demandado notoriamente debió provocar a la actora una afectación en sus condiciones anímicas, por la frustración, la zozobra y el enojo por no poder disponer de su derecho de propiedad, a pesar de haberlo adquirido válidamente al amparo de la publicidad registral como si fuera un bien absolutamente disponible, cuando en realidad era un bien inalienable y, por tanto, no edificable. Frente a tales circunstancias, estimaron los jueces, cualquier persona, sufriría sentimientos de aflicción y desconsuelo, perturbaciones que no cabe duda tienen un impacto negativo en la esfera emocional. Coincide esta Sala con lo fundamentado por los jueces. Aplicando presunciones humanas, es posible inferir de manera directa que el accionar del gobierno local al conceder el visado municipal, sin mayor cuidado ni estudio del área involucrada, para luego, negar el uso de suelo -ahora si ajustándose al ordenamiento jurídico- produce perturbación injusta en las condiciones anímicas de la accionante, como ira, impotencia o frustración; detrimento que no estaba obligada a soportar y por el cual debe ser indemnizada. Esta Cámara en varios pronunciamientos ha establecido que el Juez con base en su experiencia, el sentido común, la equidad y los principios generales del derecho, fija el importe por daño moral con algún margen de discrecionalidad es decir es “in re ipsa”. Con base en esos parámetros de determinación es natural estimar y lógico deducir, que la situación vivida por la actora, pudo ocasionarle alteraciones emocionales como las indicadas, las cuales sin lugar a dudas revelan la clara existencia de un daño moral subjetivo. La situación en la que fue puesta la actora por el gobierno local, se considera, es suficientemente grave para justificar el monto concedido por daño moral. Ese razonamiento lleva a concluir que el agravio debe ser rechazado, ya que esta Sala no comparte la posición de que no se produjo el daño inferido y alegado. En consecuencia, estima esta Sala, la suma de ¢2.000.000,00 se ajusta a la lesión ocasionada en el fuero interno de la actora.

VIII.- Cuarto: Expresa, la sentencia recurrida indica: "(...)Se condena a la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia la pago de ambas costas de esta acción.(...). Lo anterior no guarda proporción con la parte resolutiva de la misma resolución, en donde se acoge parcialmente la excepción de falta de derecho ni con los principios de litigante de buena fe, pues la Municipalidad ha sido traída en forma obligatoria al presente proceso y al tenor del numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo debería ser exonerada del pago de ambas costas de esta acción. Acusa, se ha actuado por imperio de la ley y en estricta aplicación de la Ley 65 de 1888. Agrega, no puede ni debe acceder a lo solicitado por la parte actora. No ha sido por actos que se hayan generado en el ámbito municipal que debe aplicar este Decreto Ley. Concluye, los actos se han originado en esferas administrativas diferentes y por estas razones debe aplicarse el principio de buena fe y eximirle del pago de costas, al igual que al Estado y al SINAC.

IX.- Los jueces estimaron acudiendo a lo regulado en el artículo 193 del CPCA, que las costas personales y procesales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo y sólo procede su dispensa conforme los incisos a) y b) del numeral indicado, sin que medien razones dadas por el ente demandado o determinadas por el Tribunal, que justifiquen su exoneración. En relación con el Estado y el SINAC resolvió sin especial condenatoria en costas. Ahora bien, en virtud de la forma en la que se está resolviendo, debe hacerse un nuevo pronunciamiento en costas, en el tanto resultan vencidos ahora tanto la Municipalidad como el Estado y el SINAC como encargado de las áreas de conservación. Conforme el artículo recién citado, estima esta Sala, procede la imposición de las costas a ambos vencidos, sin que se aprecie que exista alguno de los motivos que habilita la norma para exonerarlos en costas.

X.- En mérito de lo expuesto, procederá declarar parcialmente con lugar el recurso planteado, debiendo anularse parcialmente la sentencia recurrida, únicamente en cuanto declaró una falta de legitimación del Estado respecto de la condena de pagar el justo precio del terreno de la actora, que resulta patrimonio natural del Estado, y por ende, corresponde a este último expropiar el bien dentro del plazo de dos meses contados a partir de la firmeza de esta sentencia. El MINAE a través del SINAC deberá hacer las previsiones presupuestarias correspondientes. En consecuencia, deberá declararse falta de legitimación pasiva de la Municipalidad de San Rafael de Heredia respecto de esa pretensión, debiendo el gobierno local cargar únicamente con el pago del daño moral ocasionado a la actora por haber visado el plano que dio nacimiento a la finca objeto de esta litis, cuando era un bien inalienable desde 1888. Se condena a la Municipalidad, al Estado y al SINAC al pago de las costas conforme al canon 193 de CPCA.

POR TANTO

Se declara parcialmente con lugar el recurso planteado. Se anula parcialmente la sentencia recurrida en cuanto declaró una falta de legitimación del Estado respecto de la condena de pagar el justo precio del terreno de la actora, que resulta patrimonio natural del Estado, y por ende, corresponde a este último expropiar el bien con los recursos que presupuestará el MINAE a través del SINAC para el próximo ejercicio fiscal. Se declara falta de legitimación pasiva del Gobierno local respecto de esa pretensión, debiendo cargar únicamente con el pago del daño moral ocasionado a la actora. Se condena a la Municipalidad, al Estado y al SINAC al pago de las costas conforme al canon 193 de CPCA.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez HGarcíaCh