Loss of Chance from Registry Error in Usufruct ReservationPérdida de oportunidad por error registral en reserva de usufructo

RES. 002975-F-S1-2020 FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at ten hours five minutes on December seventeenth, two thousand twenty.

Pure legal proceeding established by JESUS MARÍA LEÓN VALERIO; against the STATE represented by the procurator Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, the JUNTA ADMINISTRADORA DEL REGISTRO NACIONAL and JOSE EDUARDO DE JESUS ALFARO CHAVARRÍA and MARÍA DEL CARMEN ALFARO CHAVARRÍA. Appearing as special judicial attorneys for the plaintiff, Luis Antonio Álvarez Chaves; for the aforementioned Board, Luis Castro Fonseca and Gabriela Carranza Araya; for Mr. Alfaro Chavarría, Damián Alfaro Carvajal. Ms. María del Carmen was declared in default. The plaintiff and the co-defendant Board file an appeal in cassation against judgment no. 60-2017-II of 8 hours 10 minutes on September 28, 2017, issued by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda.

Magistrate Rojas Morales authors the opinion.

CONSIDERANDO

I.Mr. Jesús María León Valerio sued the State, the Junta Administradora del Registro Nacional and José Eduardo and María del Carmen, both with surnames Alfaro Chavarría. According to the case record, on May 30, 2014, Mr. León Valerio entered into a commercial loan contract with Ms. María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría, for the sum of ¢21,000,000.00, payable one year from that date. As security, a first-degree mortgage was constituted on the property registered under folio 4-119399-000. The credit was registered in the Registro Nacional on June 9, 2014. Due to non-compliance with the credit obligations, on August 11 of the same year, Mr. Jesús filed a judicial collection proceeding before the Juzgado de Cobro de Heredia (file 14-006163-1158-CJ). On July 20, 2014, the auction of the property took place, which was awarded to Mr. León Valerio. By resolution of August 4 following, the Juzgado de Cobro approved the initial liquidation, pending the formal awarding of the auctioned property and the approval of the final liquidation. On July 22, 2015, Mr. José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría—brother of Ms. Carmen María—reported to the Registro Nacional that, through public deed no. 28 of July 20, 2011 (registered on July 29 following), he donated property 4-11399-000 to his sister; however, the assigned registrar omitted to record the reservation of usufruct (reserva de usufructo) in his favor (administrative proceeding processed under file no. 1675-2015-RIM). Due to the foregoing, by resolution of July 23, 2015, the Registry noted an administrative warning on the property. Meanwhile, the Juzgado de Cobro reserved the auction conducted to be addressed once the administrative file was resolved (resolution of August 10 following). By resolution of March 1, 2016, the Registro Nacional ordered the immobilization of the property. Likewise, the Juzgado de Cobro disapproved the auction held (resolution of October 21 of the same year). Deeming that the described registry error—failure to register the reservation of usufruct—has caused him damages and losses, he requested in the judgment (claims adjusted in the preliminary hearing): “1. That the Registro Nacional be ordered to pay the damages, losses, and subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), the reason and estimate of which were detailed in the second section of the complaint, namely: 1.1 Principal due under the mortgage credit, ¢21,000,000 colones (TWENTY-ONE MILLION COLONES). 1.2 Interest generated by this credit from June 30, 2014 (the date Ms. ALFARO CHAVARRÍA defaulted) to June 30, 2016 (EXACTLY TWO YEARS), which is liquidated in this act for the sum of: ¢16,380,000.00 colones (SIXTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND COLONES WITH ZERO CENTS), calculated at the rate of 3.25% monthly (39% annual), which is the agreed interest for the LATE PAYMENT INTEREST, as well as future interest until its effective payment at the rate of 3.25% monthly (39% annual), which is the agreed interest for the LATE PAYMENT INTEREST. 1.3 Costs of the judicial collection proceeding, file number 14-006163-1158-CJ, ¢3,178,500 colones (THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED COLONES), an amount established on the total principal owed and the liquidated interest, which yields an amount of ¢37,380,000.00, on which the costs of the judicial collection proceeding are liquidated. 1.4 Moral damages: the sum of twenty million colones. 2. That all sums of money ordered to be paid be indexed until their effective payment. 3. That the defendants be ordered to pay the costs generated by that (SIC) proceeding and the interest generated by said sums until their effective payment.” The co-defendants answered negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The case management judge declared the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría in default. Regarding Mr. José Eduardo, the complaint was deemed withdrawn. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Second Section, composed of judges Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, Eduardo González Segura, and Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, in resolution 60-2017-II of 8 hours 10 minutes on September 28, 2017, ordered: “The defense of lack of right is denied as to what is granted and is admitted as to what is rejected. The complaint is declared partially admissible, being understood as denied as to what is not granted, as follows: The Junta Administrativa del Registro—and subsidiarily the State—is ordered to pay ¢5,000,000 in favor of the plaintiff, as subjective moral damages. As well as to pay both costs of this action and legal interest on them, from their determination until their effective payment. The matter is resolved without a special order as to costs with respect to the co-defendant, María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría.” Dissatisfied, the plaintiff and the co-defendant Board file an appeal in cassation for violation of substantive norms, which were admitted by this Chamber.

Appeal of the plaintiff

II.In total, he raises three grievances. First, improper evidentiary assessment. He argues that from the comprehensive analysis of the complaint, the evidence in the record (he lists the registry certifications provided), and the facts deemed proven (he transcribes those numbered: 1, 2, 3, 6, and 17), it follows that the claimed damages and losses originate in the omission and failure of the duty of care by the official of the Registro Nacional, who registered the donation deed without recording the reservation of usufruct in favor of Mr. José Eduardo. A situation, he states, that triggered a direct impact on his interests, by being unable to enforce the collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee, hence the causal link between the Registry's action and the claimed damages. He asserts that, contrary to the Court's assessment, the evidence contributed to the proceeding supports the indemnification claims and proves that the improper action of a Registry employee was the cause of all the reported acts (granting of the loan, the judicial collection proceeding, the administrative proceeding before the Registry, the administrative warning and immobilization, the non-approval of the auction, and the impossibility of recovering his money). He says the Judges are not correct in denying the requested material damages for the alleged lack of proof, since such item is demonstrated by the mere existence of the file processed in the Juzgado de Cobro de Heredia (where the enforcement instrument for ¢21,000,000.00, the quantification of interest, and the corresponding item for costs of its processing appear). He argues that the Registry's action caused damage to his assets, by being unable to recover the money given as a loan to the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría. He considers the evaluation of the evidence by the Judges to be contradictory and poorly assessed, acknowledging the existence of subjective moral damages and denying material damages, even though both are products of the same actions (an interlinked sequence of events, the origin of which is the fault committed by the Registry and its official). Second, improper application of norms. He transcribes articles: 22 of the Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, 1 of the Ley de Inscripción de Documentos en el Registro Público, 190, 191, and 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Publica (LGAP), and 41 of the Constitución Política. Norms, he notes, that regulate the issue of Administrative responsibility, when through its normal or abnormal action or that of its officials, it causes damage to a third party who had no duty to bear it and which must be compensated, as happens in the specific case. In support, he cites and transcribes judgments numbers: 000275 of 13 hours 40 minutes on February 13, 2014, from this Chamber, and 00027 of 13 hours 40 minutes on February 19, 2014, issued by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. In the matter under study, he reproaches that, upon demonstrating that the conduct demonstrated by an employee of the Registro Nacional caused him harm (moral and patrimonial), it was appropriate to order that Institution to pay the totality of the claimed damages and losses. However, he criticizes, the appealed ruling disregards such norms and reaches an erroneous conclusion, which was to exempt the Registry from paying the reproached sums (material damages), to the detriment of his interests. He highlights that the claimed damage is certain, assessable, and indemnifiable, without any exemption from liability intervening. Third, violation of the principle of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica). He states that the appealed judgment generates legal uncertainty by allowing reported, demonstrated, and even accepted conduct by the participants to go unpunished, coupled with the erroneous analysis made of the factual situation, the evidence provided, and the existing legislation. He says, as a matter of legal certainty, the Court cannot assert facts not discussed in the proceeding (specifically: that Ms. María del Carmen heard what the Notary Public stated when drafting the document containing the donation and reservation of usufruct) and on which no evidence was provided, much less grant them absolute certainty. Sufficient reason to question the substantive analysis carried out in the challenged resolution. Another aspect that generates legal certainty, he says, is the fact that the Judges indicate that the mortgage deed retains the condition of an enforcement instrument susceptible to pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor. He asserts that this cannot be fulfilled in this case, since what was executed was a mortgage credit and not another type of enforcement instrument, where both parties accepted that, if necessary, property 4-119399-000 (the sole asset of the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría) would be executed to recover the amount owed. A property, he adds, which has a registry immobilization, placing it outside commerce among men, preventing recovery of the money lent (due to the Registry's responsibility). This situation, he reproaches, implies the loss of the sole guarantee he had to back the credit. He argues there is no legal remedy allowing recovery of the money owed, as no further assets exist to pursue. He criticizes that the appealed judgment does not provide a clear solution nor establish the corresponding responsibilities regarding the requested compensation, which generates legal uncertainty. He adds that attempting to modify the will of the parties, by suggesting collection of the debt through other assets, which do not exist, becomes an attribution the Court cannot take (due to the uncertainty generated and because it does not resolve the problem caused by the Registry nor the plaintiff's right to recover what is owed and execute the guarantee under the agreed terms).

III.At its core, the objections invoked by the plaintiff revolve around the denial of the claimed material damages. Regarding the issue, the Judges considered that, while it is true that upon registering the donation, the registrar did not make the reservation of usufruct in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, leaving property 4-119399-000 entirely registered in the name of Ms. María del Carmen, it is also true that the notary authorizing and responsible for the registration of that deed did not notice the situation. In addition to the foregoing, they stated: “(…) there is also no doubt that MARÍA DEL CARMEN heard what the Notary wrote—in the acquisition document—and expressed her conformity and approval. Without being unaware, consequently, of the legal situation of the property: Her condition as bare owner (nudataria), by virtue of the right of usufruct of Mr. EDUARDO, reserved in the same acquisition document. Despite which, and apparently, she did not inform Jesús María León Valerio, her creditor—the plaintiff herein, nor Notary Salazar Fonseca, authorizing the loan with mortgage deed, of that situation. Which fostered—together with the error and inaccuracy of the registry publicity—the registration—on June 9, 2014—of the loan with mortgage on property 4-119399-000, (…)”. The Court added that no imputation of liability can be made against Mr. León Valerio or Notary Salazar Fonseca—for not reviewing the preceding registry situation—since, according to the legal framework referred to in Considerando VII of the challenged ruling, it is the Registrar who must take into account for qualification, what results from the title, books, real folios, and in general the information recorded in the Registry. Likewise, it referred that it is evident and notorious that the breach of credit obligations by Ms. María del Carmen was what gave rise to the mortgage foreclosure proceeding, without being able to attribute responsibility to the State and the Registro Nacional for that breach and the consequent collection proceeding (as they are functions alien to the administrative and registry functions). The Judges stated that the failure to register the reservation of usufruct and inaccuracy of the registry publicity, coupled with the oversight by the notary responsible for its registration and the conduct of Ms. María del Carmen, contributed to the non-approval of the auction in favor of the creditor—the plaintiff herein—until the legal situation was resolved. They considered: “But that is one thing, that is, the ineffectiveness of the mortgage privilege in no way is the object—in and of itself—of the economic material claim, and another, distinct thing is the extinguishment or disappearance of the debt, a credit which subsists. Without it having been proven, reliably, in this ordinary proceeding, beyond all doubt, the existence of material damages, and consequent responsibility for collection—and payment—charged to the State and the Registry for the damages and losses consisting—according to the claim of the complaint—of the Principal due under the credit, the Interest generated by that credit, the Costs of the Judicial Collection Proceeding and their indexation (doctrine of article 317 of the CPC). Indeed, regarding the claimed objective liability for such economic damages, for illegal or abnormal activity, the same, we repeat, is not receivable. (…) In the present case, as we already pointed out, the warning and immobilization note causing the disapproval of the auction—is the final consequence of several subjects and singular conducts that concurred in its production. Aside from that, as we pointed out, the invalidity or invalidity and eventual cancellation order of the registration entry of the property in the name of María del Carmen, as owner of full ownership (dominio pleno), has not been declared, nor ordered, in an ordinary judicial proceeding. Much less, consequently, the nullity and cancellation of the mortgage registration in favor of the plaintiff herein, Mr. León Valerio. Without having news of its filing. Without being able—nor should—anything be resolved in this regard within the present Civil de Hacienda proceeding. Despite the immobilization note, the efficacy of the credit right subsists. In this sense, the documented legal act retains the condition of an enforcement instrument susceptible to pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor, in the same proceeding or through the order for payment (proceso monitorio) procedure.” They cite as an example the possibility of pursuing the ownership of the right to the bare ownership (nuda propiedad) that Ms. María del Carmen holds over the property in question. On the other hand, the Judges assessed that the judicial collection proceeding is not suspended, but inactive, without the creditor—the plaintiff herein—having attempted—and exhausted—the possibility of requesting the attachment and auction of other assets or rights of the debtor, among them, the right of bare ownership cited. In short, without it being proven—to date—the existence of an uncollectible debt. By virtue of which, they concluded, there is doubt about the ineffectiveness of his credit right; and, therefore, about the existence of effective, economically evaluable, individualized damage, that is, the material or economic damage consisting of the loss of the principal owed, credit interest, and costs of the judicial collection proceeding. Extremes that, for the reasons indicated, they deemed inadmissible.

IV.This Deciding Body does not share the conclusion reached by the Court, for the following reasons. As this Chamber has stated, the liability analyzed herein (articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP and 41 of the Constitución Política) is applicable, provided there is proven impairment attributable to a specific subject. Thus, the principle is that the Administration is liable if, by acting, it causes damage, deriving three basic requirements: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective damage, and between both, a cause-and-effect link, or causal link (nexo de causalidad). All these specifications are essential to conclude that not every illegitimate or irregular functioning of the State would generate its liability, given that the interested party must prove, in addition to the effective damage, the cause-and-effect relationship between them. In other words, even if the Administration's irregular conduct is demonstrated, the duty to indemnify does not proceed automatically, since it is a consequence of reliable proof of the alleged detriments, as derived from that atypical or abnormal action. (Sala Primera, resolution no. 869-2012 of 9 hours 30 minutes on July 27, 2012). In the specific case, the record shows, by public deed no. 28 executed before a Notary Public on July 20, 2011, Mr. José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría appeared to donate the property he owned, no. 4-119399, to María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría (his sister). In that same act, Mr. José Eduardo reserved for life the rights of usufruct, use, and habitation (derechos de usufructo, uso y habitación) over the property. The donation was registered in the Registro Nacional on July 29, 2011; however, by mistake, the assigned registrar did not complete the reservation of usufruct (thus registering it entirely in favor of his sister). Furthermore, following the order of events, it is deemed proven that, since said reservation did not appear in the registry information of the property, Mr. Jesús granted a credit loan to the mentioned lady, with a mortgage guarantee over the property. Faced with the breach of the obligation contracted, Mr. León Valerio filed a judicial collection proceeding, within which the auction was held and the property was awarded in his favor. However, given the complaint filed by Mr. José Eduardo before the Registry, where he objected to having the right of usufruct over the property subject to the collection proceeding, the Administration ordered the immobilization of the property and the Juzgado de Cobro ordered the non-approval of the auction. From that perspective, it becomes evident that the actions of the registry body constitute abnormal functioning. The Registro Nacional violated the powers that are its own in the qualification and registration of documents, disregarding the real will of the parties. Such carelessness was effectively recognized by the Dirección del Registro Inmobiliario in the resolution of 11 hours on March 1, 2016 (fact deemed proven no. 15 of the questioned ruling) when stating: “Due to registry error, the right of usufruct in favor of Mr. Alfaro Chavarría was not reserved at the time; leaving property 4-119399 entirely registered in the name of Ms. María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría”. Let it be clear, the inexcusable error in the registration of all the stipulations contained in the public document submitted for its qualification (donation deed), a source of patrimonial injuries. In that direction, as relevant, the plaintiff claims the economic damages derived from the oversight incurred by the Registry when registering the donation deed, omitting the reservation of usufruct in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, which led to the inability to enforce collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee under the agreed terms (with the consequent impediment to recovering the money owed to him). Specifically, he petitioned for the payment of the principal due under the mortgage credit, interest, and costs of the judicial collection proceeding. Contrary to the reasoning of the Judges, this Collegiate Body considers that the abnormal functioning of the Registro Nacional did cause material damage to Mr. Jesús (which he does not have to bear), specifically the loss or impairment of the mortgage privilege, understood as the possibility of enforcing the real guarantee over the full ownership (pleno dominio) of property 4-119399-000, to which the plaintiff would be entitled, were it not for the registry error under examination. Effective, assessable, and individualizable damage (according to numeral 196 of the LGAP), which, in line with the principles of public responsibility, must be protected through this avenue. In this case, it is reiterated, the registry error has led to the impairment of Mr. León Valerio's credit right, turning it into a debt that, while counting on an enforcement instrument enabling him to resort to other legal mechanisms to recover the amount owed, the truth of the matter is that the particular and specific conditions of this case, that is, of the credit, as agreed. Observe that the Registry's breach of the duty of care deprived the plaintiff of a mortgage advantage and placed him in a litigious condition. Therefore, by the Court denying compensation for damage whose existence is evident, it violated numerals 190 and 196 of the LGAP; and consequently, the appeal of the plaintiff must be admitted, with the clarifications that will be stated. As indicated, in this case there is damage due to the impairment of the credit right; however, it is inappropriate to order compensation under the terms sought by the plaintiff (total amount of the principal of the guaranteed debt), given that the possibility of collecting the credit obligation subsists. Despite the immobilization note on the property, a debt exists (without privilege, but existing) and a valid enforcement instrument to proceed with its collection. Just as the Judges reasoned, Mr. Jesús has legal mechanisms to enforce his credit rights, and due to the plaintiff's own decisions he has not chosen to exercise them. Mr. León Valerio retains the possibility of demanding fulfillment of the debt since the assets are the common pledge of creditors (whether by pursuing: other assets of Ms. Alfaro Chavarría in case they exist or come to exist, award himself the bare ownership of the property, among other options). Thus, even though in the sub judice the damage implies the loss of the mortgage privilege, this does not entail the extinguishment of the debt, much less compensation under the terms sought. This Chamber has previously referred to this type of patrimonial damage called loss of opportunity or loss of chance (pérdida de oportunidad o pérdida de chance), such is the case of resolution 371-F-S1-2009 of 11 hours on April 16, 2009, in which it is stated: “X.- The appellant bases his claim on the theory of loss of opportunity. At a doctrinal level, it is stated that this postulate originates from an illicit conduct that results in the impact on a real and serious possibility of obtaining a benefit or future advantage, regarding which a probability threshold greater than that of mere expectation is determined, where compensation is awarded to that subject of law who sees a chance to receive a patrimonial advantage, characterized by a high degree of certainty regarding its materialization, severed from their legal sphere. In this sense, authors indicate that causality must be assessed based on the existence of a real opportunity, and not as a mechanism by which the loss of a patrimonial benefit not received is imputed, so the eventual compensation corresponds to the quantification of the lost “chance”.” In specific application of that theory, this Chamber proceeded to recognize compensation resulting from the loss of a future advantage, as follows from judgment 478-S1-12 of 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, in which it is stated: “(…) this Chamber considers there is room for compensation for the patrimonial injury originating from an illicit conduct, which resulted in the impact on a real and serious possibility of obtaining a future benefit or advantage, based not on a mere probability, a hypothesis, or a mere risk, as was said, but on a consolidated probability, on a high degree of certainty for the materialization of the final energy supply contract. However, that real and effective patrimonial injury caused to the plaintiff by this frustrated opportunity is not equivalent to, nor can it be equated with, the full consideration they would have obtained in the event of the complete execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated. This, as is obvious, would imply unjust and illicit enrichment of the claimant, since, without having delivered any energy, they would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract. In these cases, the fair compensation for what was not born or was frustrated is not equivalent to the complete and full performance established in the contract. The damages (daños y perjuicios) are not synonymous here with the original agreed performance, or as in this case, with the one that would have been achieved. It is about providing patrimonial reparation for the primary or initial injury (loss of an opportunity), but not for the damages or losses of that final factual-legal circumstance that was not achieved. They could, there indeed, take into consideration the probable economic factors of the last situation, to use them as one of the prudential parameters when establishing the amount of the order. Thus, for its determination in cases such as this, one must resort to reasonable, restrained, prudential, and objective jurisdictional discretion, in which, as will be done in this case, the relevance of the circumstances for the parties; the degree of certainty for achieving the final result or advantage; the conditions of the injured party or victim; the concurrence of eventual beneficiaries; when an agreement mediates, the amount of that lost opportunity; etc., be weighed.” In the matter under study, the existence of the damage caused being deemed proven, but not its quantum, in accordance with canon 122 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), the declaration of this in the abstract is appropriate, so that it may be quantified in the judgment enforcement stage, on the understanding that this patrimonial injury caused is not equivalent to the complete and full performance established in the mortgage (¢21,000,000 as guaranteed principal) and also, taking into consideration the probable economic factors of the situation of the loss of the mortgage privilege, as well as the current state of the obligation, for which purpose expert assistance may be used if deemed necessary. Moreover, the exemption from liability due to the act of a third party, indicated by the Judges (consisting of the default on the obligation by Ms. Alfaro Chavarría), is not shared. Certainly, the breach of the obligation causes the plaintiff's assets to be affected, who, within the mortgage relationship, holds a privilege. However, even with this indifference of the debtor, the real guarantee assured the plaintiff the ability to recover his credit in case of breach, in an expedited manner, which could not be achieved due to the registry deficiency commented upon. It should be considered that the damage does not arise from the lack of payment (as the Judges incorrectly assessed), but rather from the impossibility of enforcing the mortgage, due to the lack of registration incurred by the Registry and thereby the impairment of the guarantee conditions that Mr. León Valerio had.

To consider that the debtor's non-compliance exempts from administrative liability would lead to denying the existence of the registry error and the consequences it has generated in the claimant's legal sphere, setting aside the dysfunction incurred by the National Registry. In another vein, regarding the non-observance or carelessness in the function of the notary before whom the donation deed was executed, in which the reservation of usufruct (reserva de usufructo) was constituted in favor of Don José Eduardo, an inscription that was not completed, it must be noted that the Court is not correct. It is indisputable that the events did not take place due to non-observance or carelessness in the specific function of the professional in question. While as a notary public it was his responsibility to carry out the necessary steps for the authorized documents to be registered (article 38, subsection h of the Notarial Code), it is the task of the Public Registry to perform the "registration" of such contracts (precept 1 of the Public Registry Regulation No. 26771-J) and of the registrars in particular, "the qualification and inscription of the documents submitted for their study, which they shall do by the means available to them in coordination with the directorate, with the obligation to provide an efficient service" (numeral 9 ibidem). To suppose, as is intended, that the notary is obligated to detect registry errors as an element without which the Registry is exonerated from its own errors, implies ignoring the principle of efficiency that must safeguard the performance of every public service (rule 269.1 of the LGAP), as well as the specific obligations of the registrars. In addition to the above, it is important to note that the lack of filing collection actions cannot be considered as a cause of the damage, nor as a fault of the victim that could have the effect of breaking the causal link (nexo causal) that exists between the public indolence and the analyzed patrimonial damages. To consider the contrary would be to condone the total disengagement of the Administration which, with its defective provision of a public service that is understood to be specialized, has caused injury to third parties. A public dysfunction that produces registry insecurity. Finally, the notation of immobilization (consigna de inmovilización) of the property given in mortgage, contrary to what is argued, does not lead to denying the existence of damage in the terms already explained. Certainly, as long as that registry note remains in effect, the property cannot be judicially executed, but this does not mean that the plaintiff could eventually exercise his real guarantee right over that property (at least regarding the bare ownership (nuda propiedad)) and thereby obtain satisfaction of his credit. In the terms indicated, regarding the required material damage (daño material), it will be appropriate to uphold the objections and revoke the contested judgment (with the legal consequences that will be stated).

Appeal of the co-defendant Administrative Board (Junta Administradora)

V.The appellant raises two grievances for violation of substantive norms. First, improper application of articles 22 of the Law of Creation of the National Registry and 190, 192, 194, and 197 of the LGAP, with the consequent lack of application of canons 20, 21, 22, 701, 1020, 1022, and 1025 of the Civil Code (CC). It points out that, contrary to the Court's criterion, the granted subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) does not arise or originate directly from what occurred in the registry sphere, but from the personal action of Mrs. Alfaro Chavarría, in giving property 119399-00 as a mortgage guarantee knowing that she did not hold full title (titularidad plena). Such action, it affirms, constitutes what in doctrine is known as "fraudulent reticence" (reticencia dolosa), that is, the existence of a defect in consent, specifically fraud (dolo), which results in an exemption from administrative liability due to the action of a third party (pursuant to numeral 190 of the LGAP), with the consequent breaking of the causal link attributed in the judgment. Second, improper application of mandates 82.4 of the CPCA and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as lack of application of ordinals 41 of the Political Constitution, 704 of the CC, and 16 of the LGAP. It indicates that neither from the statement of claim nor from the evidence in the record is it possible to determine the content of the granted moral damage and the elements of conviction based on which the Judges formed the value judgment to award the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 under that concept. An amount it deems excessive. It explains that a large part of the invoked suffering derives, according to the plaintiff’s own statement, from the non-payment of the original obligation assumed by the debtor, in addition to an inadequate use of existing legal procedures and tools to assert his right. It highlights that if the plaintiff had requested to put the property up for auction and be awarded only the bare ownership, he could well have collected the sum owed to him, such that the emotional affectation (afectación anímica) would be considerably less.

VI.Regarding the subjective moral damage, the Judges reasoned: "(…) the existence—in re ipsa—of subjective moral damage is considered. Indeed, as the plaintiff indicates, the serious omission and breach of the duty of care (falta al deber de cuidado) of the registrar at the time, as well as the negligence of the Registry in monitoring the actions of its officials, were the triggers that allowed—concurrently with other subjects and conduct—another series of already mentioned events to be unleashed, which today are the cause of the situation in which the plaintiff finds himself. It being reasonable to presume, then, that over these years the feelings provoked by all those actions have represented for Mr. León Valerio a wear on his person, great anger, and a sea of negative emotions, such as disappointment, frustration, rage, helplessness, desperation, anguish, and loss of confidence in public institutions. However, the payment of ¢20,000,000.00, the sum in which the plaintiff quantifies the claim for moral damage, is rejected, and in its place, it is fixed and granted in the equitable, reasonable, and proportionate sum, by reason of the circumstances, of ¢5,000,000.00, by reason of the existence, in this case, of Concurrence of Causes (Concurrencia de Causas)."

VII.This Chamber shares the condemnation imposed for subjective moral damage, but not the sum granted. The effect on the internal sphere (fuero interno) that registry errors such as the one examined in this matter can generate in any person is possible, especially when these compromise their patrimony. Contrary to the objections raised, it is undeniable that the abnormal functioning of the Administration triggered an unjust disturbance in the emotional conditions of the plaintiff, which he had no duty to bear. In that direction, it is possible to presume the anguish, sadness, uncertainty, unease, anger, and in general, the emotional affectation that Don Jesús felt upon losing the mortgage privilege on the full domain (pleno dominio) of the property given in guarantee, as well as the immediate ease he had to collect what was owed, which, due to the error of the National Registry, now becomes litigious for him. The administrative error (desacierto administrativo) is sufficient cause to directly link the moral damage that the plaintiff petitions, that is, it operates as a causal link generating administrative liability (article 190 LGAP), in application of the constitutional principle of the right to good public service. However, the extent of the damage is different from that ordered by the contested judgment, as the appellant rightly claims. As indicated in Considering IV of this judgment, in this specific case what occurs is a loss or deterioration of the guarantee conditions that the plaintiff had; however, he maintains the possibility of demanding compliance with the mortgage obligation. Although it is true that the expectation of recovering what was owed quickly was affected by the examined registry error, which had an impact on the emotional sphere of Mr. León Valerio, there is no probative element in the record that determines the impediment to recovering the money given as a loan (a possibility he still maintains and has not been disproven in this process). In those terms, this Chamber considers that it will be appropriate to revoke the appealed ruling regarding the amount granted for subjective moral damage, to instead fix it at the figure of ¢2,500,000.00. Such sum compensates the suffering generated by the omission, inactivity, and breach of the duty of care of the National Registry, by depriving Don Jesús of a mortgage advantage and placing him in a litigious condition.

VIII.In accordance with what has been reasoned and set forth, it will be appropriate to accept both cassation appeals. Consequently, the contested judgment shall be annulled to the extent that: it denied the claimed material damage and awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective moral damage. In its place, ruling on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (and subsidiarily the State) is condemned in abstracto to pay the economic loss suffered due to the abnormal conduct of the Administration, as well as the legal interest left unearned, which will run from the inscription of the public deed of donation (without the reservation of usufruct) until its effective payment and of the amount defined in the execution stage. The subjective moral damage is set at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. For the loss of the privilege that does not equal the amount of the debt. It will be resolved without condemnation of costs for the cassation, pursuant to canon 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO) Both cassation appeals are declared admissible. Consequently, the contested judgment is annulled to the extent that it denied the claimed material damage and awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective moral damage. In its place, ruling on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (and subsidiarily the State) is condemned in abstracto to pay the caused damage, as well as the legal interest left unearned from the loss of the mortgage privilege until effective payment, of what is quantified in the stage of execution of judgment, in the terms set forth in considering IV of this judgment. The subjective moral damage is set at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. It is resolved without condemnation of costs for the cassation.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vasquez cchavesv Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected] **1.3** Costs of the judicial collection process, case file number 14-006163-1158-CJ, ¢3,178,500 colones (THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED COLONES), an amount established on the total of the principal owed and the liquidated interest, which yields an amount of ¢37,380,000.00 on which the costs of the judicial collection process are liquidated. **1.4** Moral damages: the sum of twenty million colones. **2.** That all sums of money ordered to be paid be indexed until their effective payment. **3.** That the defendants be ordered to pay the costs generated by this (SIC) process and the interest generated by said sums until their effective payment." The co-defendants answered in the negative and raised the defense of lack of right. The case-managing judge declared co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría in default. Regarding Mr. José Eduardo, the lawsuit was deemed withdrawn. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Second Section, composed of Judges Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, Eduardo González Segura, and Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, in ruling 60-2017-II at 8:10 a.m. on September 28, 2017, ordered: "The defense of lack of right is denied in what is granted and upheld in what is rejected. The lawsuit is declared partially admissible, being understood as denied in what is not granted, as follows: The Junta Administrativa del Registro -and subsidiarily the State- is ordered to pay ₡5,000,000 to the plaintiff, for subjective moral damages. As well as to pay both sets of costs of this action, and legal interest thereon, from their determination until their effective payment. It is resolved without a special award of costs regarding the co-defendant, María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría." Dissatisfied, the plaintiff and the co-defendant Board filed an appeal in cassation for violation of substantive norms, which were admitted by this Chamber.

**Appeal of the plaintiff** **II.** In total, he formulates **three** grievances. **First**, improper evidentiary assessment. He argues that, from the comprehensive analysis of the lawsuit, the evidence in the case file (he lists the registry certifications provided), and the facts deemed proven (he transcribes the numbered items: 1, 2, 3, 6, and 17), it follows that the damages claimed originate in the omission and breach of the duty of care by the official of the National Registry, who registered the donation deed without noting the lifetime tenure (reserva de usufructo) in favor of Mr. José Eduardo. A situation, he affirms, which triggered the direct impact on his interests, by being unable to execute the collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee, hence the causal link between the Registry's action and the damages sought. He asserts that, contrary to the Tribunal's assessment, the evidence provided in the proceeding supports the indemnification claims and proves that the improper conduct of a Registry official was the cause of all the reported acts (granting of the loan, the judicial collection process, the administrative procedure before the Registry, the administrative warning and immobilization, the non-approval of the auction, and the impossibility of recovering his money). He states that the Judges are not correct in denying the material damage claimed due to the alleged lack of evidence, since this item is demonstrated by the mere existence of the case file processed in the Juzgado de Cobro of Heredia (where the executory title for ₡21,000,000.00, the quantification of interest, and the item corresponding to costs for its processing are recorded). He argues that the Registry's action caused damage to his estate, by preventing him from recovering the money lent to co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría. He considers the Judges' recognition of the existence of subjective moral damages and their denial of material damages to be contradictory and poorly assessed evidence, despite both being products of the same actions (a sequence of intertwined events, whose origin is the fault committed by the Registry and its official). **Second**, improper application of the law. He transcribes articles: 22 of the Law Creating the National Registry, 1 of the Law for the Registration of Documents in the Public Registry, 190, 191, and 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Publica (LGAP), and 41 of the Political Constitution. Regulations, he points out, that govern the issue of Administrative liability, when its normal or abnormal conduct, or that of its officials, causes harm to a third party who had no duty to bear it and which must be compensated, as happens in the present case. He cites and transcribes in support judgments numbers: 000275 at 1:40 p.m. on February 13, 2014, of this Chamber, and 00027 at 1:40 p.m. on February 19, 2014, issued by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. In the matter under study, he recriminates, upon demonstrating that the conduct displayed by an official of the National Registry caused him harm (moral and patrimonial), the proper course was to order that Institution to pay the totality of the damages sought. Nevertheless, he criticizes, the appealed decision sets aside such regulations and reaches an erroneous conclusion, which was to exempt the Registry from paying the reproached sums (material damages), to the detriment of his interests. He emphasizes that the damage claimed is certain, assessable, and compensable, without any exemption from liability intervening. **Third**, violation of the principle of legal certainty. He affirms that the appealed judgment generates legal uncertainty by allowing reported, demonstrated, and even accepted conduct by the parties to go unpunished, coupled with the erroneous analysis made of the factual picture, the evidence provided, and the existing legislation. He states that, as a matter of legal certainty, the Tribunal cannot affirm facts not discussed in the proceeding (specifically: that Ms. María del Carmen heard what the Notary Public stated when drafting the document containing the donation and lifetime tenure) and on which no evidence was provided, much less endow them with absolute certainty. A sufficient reason to question the substantive analysis carried out in the challenged resolution. Another aspect that generates legal uncertainty, he says, is the fact that the Judges indicate that the mortgage deed retains the condition of an executory title capable of pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor. He asserts that this cannot be fulfilled in this case, since what was entered into was a mortgage loan and not another type of executory title, where both parties agreed that, if necessary, property 4-119399-000 (the sole asset of co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría) would be executed to recover what was owed. An immovable property, he adds, which has a registry immobilization, which places it outside commerce, preventing recovery of the money lent (due to the Registry's responsibility). That situation, he reproaches, implies the loss of the only guarantee he had to back the credit. He argues that there is no legal remedy that allows recovery of the money owed, as there are no more assets to pursue. He criticizes that the appealed judgment does not provide a clear solution nor does it establish the corresponding responsibilities regarding the requested compensation, which generates legal uncertainty. He adds that attempting to modify the will of the parties, by suggesting collection of the debt through other assets, which do not exist, becomes an attribution the Tribunal cannot take (due to the uncertainty generated and by not solving the problem caused by the Registry nor the plaintiff's right to recover what is owed and execute the guarantee under the agreed terms).

**III.** In essence, the objections raised by the plaintiff revolve around the rejection of the material damages sought. Regarding the issue, the Judges considered that, while it is true that upon registering the donation, the registrar did not record the lifetime tenure in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, leaving property 4-119399-000 registered entirely in the name of Ms. María del Carmen, it is also true that the authorizing notary responsible for the registration of that deed did not notice the situation. In addition to the foregoing, they stated: "(…) there is also no doubt that MARÍA DEL CARMEN heard what was written by the Notary -in the acquisition document-, and expressed her conformity and approval. Without being unaware, consequently, of the legal situation of the property: Her condition as bare owner, by virtue of the lifetime tenure right of Don EDUARDO, reserved in the same acquisition document. Despite which, and apparently, she did not inform Jesús María León Valerio, her creditor -plaintiff here, or Notary Salazar Fonseca, authorizing officer of the loan with mortgage deed, of that situation. Which led -together with the error and inaccuracy of the registry publicity-, to the registration -on June 9, 2014-, of the loan with mortgage on property 4-119399-000, (…)." The Tribunal added that no imputation of liability can be made against Mr. León Valerio or notary Salazar Fonseca -for not reviewing the prior registry situation-, since according to the legal framework referred to in Recital VII of the challenged decision, it is the Registrar who must take into account for qualification what results from the title, books, real folios, and in general the information recorded in the Registry. Likewise, it stated that it is evident and notorious that the breach of credit obligations by Ms. María del Carmen was what gave rise to the mortgage foreclosure proceeding, without there being any way to attribute responsibility to the State and the National Registry for that breach and the consequent collection process (as these are functions foreign to the administrative and registry functions). The Judges affirmed that the failure to register the lifetime tenure and the inaccuracy of the registry publicity, together with the inadvertence by the notary responsible for its registration, and the conduct of Ms. María del Carmen, contributed to the non-approval of the auction in favor of the creditor -plaintiff here- until the legal situation was resolved. They considered: "But one thing is that, that is to say, the ineffectiveness of the mortgage privilege in no way forms the object -in and of itself- of the economic material claim, and quite another, distinct, is the extinction or disappearance of the debt, an indebtedness which subsists. Without it having been reliably demonstrated, in this ordinary proceeding, beyond all doubt, the existence of material damage, and consequent liability for the collection -and payment- to be borne by the State and the Registry for the damages consisting -according to the lawsuit's claim- of the Principal owed under the credit, the Interest generated by that credit, the Costs of the Judicial Collection Proceeding and their indexation (doctrine of article 317 of the CPC). Indeed, regarding the alleged strict liability, for such economic damages, from illicit or abnormal activity, the same, we repeat, is not admissible. (…) In the present case, as we have already noted, the warning and immobilization notice causing the non-approval of the auction- are the final consequence of several subjects and singular conducts that concurred in its production. Besides, as we note, the invalidity or nullity and eventual order for cancellation of the registration entry of the property in the name of María del Carmen, as owner of the full domain, has not been declared, nor ordered, in an ordinary judicial proceeding. Much less, consequently, the nullity and cancellation of the registration of the mortgage in favor of the plaintiff here, Mr. León Valerio. Without there being any notice of its filing. Nor can -nor should- anything be resolved in this regard, within the present Civil Hacienda proceeding. Despite the immobilization notice, the effectiveness of the credit right subsists. In this sense, the documented legal act retains the condition of an executory title capable of pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor, in the same proceeding or through the payment order procedure (proceso monitorio)." They cite as an example, the possibility of pursuing the ownership of the right to the bare ownership (nuda propiedad) that Ms. María del Carmen holds over the property in question. On the other hand, the Judges assessed that the judicial collection process is not suspended, but inactive, without the creditor -plaintiff here- having attempted -and exhausted- the possibility of requesting the seizure and auction of other assets or rights of the debtor, among them, the cited right of bare ownership. In short, without it being accredited -to date-, the existence of an uncollectible debt. By virtue of which, they concluded, there is doubt about the ineffectiveness of his credit right; and, therefore, of the existence of an effective, economically assessable, individualized damage, that is, of the material or economic damage consisting of the loss of the principal owed, credit interest, and costs of the judicial collection process. Extremes that, for the reasons indicated, they deemed inadmissible.

**IV.** This Deciding Body does not share the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, for the following reasons. As this Chamber has stated, the liability analyzed here (articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP and 41 of the Political Constitution) is applicable, provided there is proven harm attributable to a specific subject. Thus, the principle is that the Administration is liable if upon acting it causes harm, deriving three basic requirements: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective harm, and between both a cause-and-effect link, or nexus of causality. All these precisions are indispensable in order to conclude that not all illegitimate or irregular functioning of the State would generate its liability, given that the interested party must also prove, in addition to the effective harm, the cause-and-effect relationship between both. Stated another way, even if the irregular conduct of the Administration is demonstrated, the duty to indemnify does not proceed automatically, since this is a consequence of the reliable proof of the detriments alleged, as derived from that atypical or abnormal conduct. (First Chamber, ruling no. 869-2012 at 9:30 a.m. on July 27, 2012). In the present case, it is recorded in the case file, by public deed no. 28 granted before a Notary Public on July 20, 2011, Mr. José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría appeared to donate his property no. 4-119399 to María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría (his sister). In that same act, Mr. José Eduardo reserved for life the rights of lifetime tenure (usufructo), use, and habitation over the property. The donation was registered in the National Registry on July 29, 2011; however, by error, the assigned registrar did not record the lifetime tenure (leaving it registered entirely in favor of his sister). Furthermore, following the order of events, it is deemed proven that, since such reservation did not appear in the registry information of the property, Mr. Jesús granted a credit loan to the aforementioned lady, with a mortgage guarantee on the property. Given the breach of the contracted obligation, Mr. León Valerio filed a judicial collection process, within which the auction was held, and the property was awarded in his favor. However, given the complaint filed by Mr. José Eduardo before the Registry, where he reproached having the lifetime tenure right over the property subject to the collection process, the Administration ordered the immobilization of the property, and the Juzgado de Cobro ordered the non-approval of the auction. From that angle, it becomes evident that the actions of the registry body constitute abnormal functioning. The National Registry violated the powers inherent to it in the qualification and registration of documents, disregarding the real will of the parties. Such carelessness was effectively recognized by the Dirección del Registro Inmobiliario in the resolution at 11:00 a.m. on March 1, 2016 (fact deemed proven no. 15 of the questioned decision) by stating: "Due to a registry error, the lifetime tenure right in favor of Mr. Alfaro Chavarría was not reserved at that time; leaving property 4-119399 registered entirely in the name of Ms. María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría." Let it be clear, the inexcusable error in the registration of the totality of the stipulations contained in the public title submitted for its qualification (donation deed), the source of patrimonial injuries. In that direction, of interest here, the plaintiff claims the economic damages derived from the inadvertence incurred by the Registry when registering the donation deed, omitting the lifetime tenure in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, which led to not being able to execute the collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee under the agreed terms (with the consequent impediment to recovering the money owed to him). Specifically, he petitioned for payment of the principal owed under the mortgage credit, interest, and costs of the judicial collection process. Contrary to the reasoning of the Judges, this Collegiate Body considers that the abnormal functioning of the National Registry did cause material damage to Mr. Jesús (which he does not have to bear), specifically the loss or impairment of the mortgage privilege, understood as the possibility of executing the real guarantee over the full domain of property 4-119399-000, to which the plaintiff would be entitled, but for the registry error under examination. Effective, assessable, and individualizable damage (pursuant to numeral 196 of the LGAP), which, in line with the principles of public liability, must be protected in this venue. In this case, it is insisted, the registry error has led to impairing Mr. León Valerio's credit right, converting it into a debt that, while backed by an executory title, which enables him to resort to other legal mechanisms to recover what is owed, the truth of the matter is the particular and specific conditions of this case, namely the credit, as agreed upon. See, the Registry's breach of the duty of care deprived the plaintiff of a mortgage advantage and put him in a litigious condition. Therefore, when the Tribunal denied compensation for damage whose existence is evident, it violated numerals 190 and 196 of the LGAP; and consequently, the plaintiff's appeal must be upheld, with the clarifications to be stated. As indicated, in this case, there is damage from the impairment of the credit right; however, it becomes inadmissible to order an indemnity in the terms sought by the plaintiff (total amount of the principal of the guaranteed debt), given that the possibility of collecting the credit obligation subsists. Despite the immobilization notice on the property, a constituted debt exists (without privilege, but existing) and a valid executory title to proceed with its collection. As the Judges reasoned, Mr. Jesús has legal mechanisms to enforce his credit rights, it being that, by decisions of the plaintiff himself, he has not chosen to exercise them. Mr. León Valerio retains the possibility of demanding fulfillment of the debt, given that the estate is the common pledge of creditors (whether pursuing: other assets of Ms. Alfaro Chavarría should they exist or come to exist, adjudicating the bare ownership of the property, among other options). So, even though in the sub-judice the damage involves the loss of the mortgage privilege, that does not bring about the extinction of the debt, much less, an indemnity in the terms sought. This Chamber has previously referred to this type of patrimonial damage called loss of opportunity or loss of chance, such is the case of ruling 371-F-S1-2009 at 11:00 a.m. on April 16, 2009, in which it is stated: "X.- The appellant bases his claim on the theory of loss of opportunity. At a doctrinal level, it is affirmed that said postulate originates from an illicit act that has the consequence of affecting a real and serious possibility of obtaining a future benefit or advantageous situation, regarding which a probability threshold greater than that of mere expectation is determined, where compensation is awarded to that subject of law who sees an opportunity to receive a patrimonial advantage, characterized by a high degree of certainty as to its materialization, cut off from their legal sphere. In this sense, authors indicate that causality must be assessed based on the existence of a real opportunity, and not as a mechanism through which the loss of a patrimonial benefit not received is imputed, so the eventual indemnity corresponds to the quantification of the lost 'chance'." In specific application of that theory, this Chamber proceeded to recognize an indemnity resulting from the loss of a future advantage, as can be deduced from judgment 478-S1-12 at 2:30 p.m. on April 12, 2012, in which it is pointed out: "(…) this Chamber considers that there is room for compensation for the patrimonial injury originating from an illicit act, which had the consequence of affecting a real and serious possibility of obtaining a future benefit or advantage, based not on a mere probability, a hypothesis, or a mere risk, as stated, but on a strengthened probability, on a high degree of certainty for the materialization of the final energy supply contract. However, that real and effective patrimonial injury caused to the plaintiff by this frustrated opportunity is not equivalent to, nor can it be equated with, the fullness of the consideration that it would have obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated. This, as is obvious, would imply an unjust and illicit enrichment of the petitioner, since, without having delivered any energy, it would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract. In these cases, the fair compensation for what did not arise or was frustrated is not equivalent to the full and complete performance established in the contract. Damages here are not synonymous with the original agreed-upon performance, or as in this case, with what would have been achieved. It is a matter of providing patrimonial reparation for the primary or initial injury (loss of an opportunity), but not for the damages or losses from that final factual-legal circumstance that was not achieved. There, the probable economic factors of the final situation could be taken into consideration, to be used as one of the prudential parameters when establishing the amount of the award. In this way, for its determination in cases such as this, resort must be had to reasonable, measured, prudential, and objective judicial discretion, in which, as will be done in this case, the relevance of the circumstances for the parties; the degree of certainty for achieving the final result or advantage; the conditions of the injured party or victim; the concurrence of eventual beneficiaries; when an agreement exists, the amount of that lost opportunity; etc. are weighed." In the matter under study, having proven the existence of the damage caused, but not its amount, in accordance with canon 122 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), the declaration of this damage in the abstract is appropriate, so that it may be quantified in the sentence execution stage, on the understanding that this patrimonial injury caused is not equivalent to the full and complete performance established in the mortgage (₡21,000,000 for guaranteed principal) and also, taking into consideration the probable economic factors of the situation of loss of the mortgage privilege, as well as the current status of the obligation, for which purpose expert assistance may be relied upon if deemed necessary. On the other hand, the exemption from liability due to the act of a third party, pointed out by the Judges (consisting of the failure to pay the obligation by Ms. Alfaro Chavarría), is not shared. Certainly, the breach of the obligation results in harm to the plaintiff's estate, who, within the mortgage relationship, holds a privilege.

Nevertheless, even with that indolence on the part of the debtor, the real guarantee (garantía real) assured the plaintiff of being able to recover his credit in the event of non-performance, in an expeditious manner, which could not be achieved due to the aforementioned registration deficiency. It must be considered that the damage is not caused by the lack of payment (as the Judges wrongly assessed), but rather by the impossibility of enforcing the mortgage, given the lack of registration incurred by the Registry and, with it, the deterioration of the guarantee conditions that Mr. León Valerio had. To consider that the debtor’s non-performance exempts the administrative liability would lead to denying the existence of the registry error and the consequences it has generated in the claimant's legal sphere, leaving aside the dysfunction incurred by the National Registry (Registro Nacional). In another vein, regarding the failure to observe or negligence in the function of the notary before whom the deed of gift was granted, in which the reservation of usufruct (reserva de usufructo) was established in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, an entry that was not completed, it must be noted that the Court is not correct. It is indisputable that the events did not occur due to failure to observe or negligence in the proper function of the professional in question. Although as a public notary it was his responsibility to carry out the necessary steps for the authorized documents to be registered (article 38 subsection h of the Notarial Code), it is the task of the Public Registry (Registro Público) to “register” such contracts (precept 1 of the Public Registry Regulation no. 26771-J) and of the registrars in particular, “the qualification and registration of the documents submitted for their study, which they shall do by the means they have available in coordination with the management, with the obligation to provide an efficient service.” (numeral 9 ibidem). To suppose, as is intended, that the notary is obliged to detect registry errors as an element without which the Registry is exonerated from its own mistakes, implies ignoring the principle of efficiency that must safeguard the performance of every public service (rule 269.1 of the LGAP), as well as the specific obligations of the registrars. In addition to the foregoing, it is important to point out that the failure to file collection actions cannot be considered as a cause of the damage, nor as a fault of the victim that could have the effect of breaking the causal link that exists between the public indolence and the patrimonial injuries analyzed. To deem otherwise would be to condone the total disengagement of the Administration that, with its defective provision of a public service that is understood to be specialized, has caused injury to third parties. Public dysfunction that produces registry insecurity. Finally, the annotation of immobilization of the property given in mortgage, contrary to what is argued, does not lead to denying the existence of damage in the terms already explained. Certainly, as long as that registry note remains in force, the property cannot be judicially executed; this does not mean that the plaintiff may eventually exercise his real guarantee right over that asset (at least regarding the bare ownership (nuda propiedad)) and thereby obtain the satisfaction of his credit. In the terms indicated, regarding the material damage requested, it is appropriate to uphold the objections and revoke the contested judgment (with the legal consequences that will be stated).

**Appeal of the co-defendant Administrative Board** **V.** The appellant raises **two** grievances for violation of substantive rules. **First,** improper application of articles 22 of the Law of Creation of the National Registry and 190, 192, 194, and 197 of the LGAP, with the consequent failure to apply canons 20, 21, 22, 701, 1020, 1022, and 1025 of the Civil Code (CC). She points out that, contrary to the Court's criterion, the subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) awarded does not arise or originate directly from what occurred in the registry sphere, but rather from the personal conduct of Mrs. Alfaro Chavarría, in giving property 119399-00 as a mortgage guarantee knowing that she did not hold full ownership. Such conduct, she affirms, constitutes what in doctrine is known as “fraudulent concealment (reticencia dolosa)”, that is, the existence of a defect in consent, specifically fraud (dolo), which becomes an exemption from administrative liability due to the action of a third party (pursuant to numeral 190 of the LGAP), with the consequent breaking of the causal link attributed in the judgment. **Second,** improper application of mandates 82.4 of the CPCA and 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, as well as failure to apply ordinals 41 of the Political Constitution, 704 of the CC, and 16 of the LGAP. She indicates that neither the statement of claim nor the evidence on record makes it possible to determine the content of the moral damages awarded and the elements of conviction based on which the Judges formed the value judgment to award the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 under that concept. An amount she deems excessive. She explains that a large part of the suffering invoked derives, according to the plaintiff's own statement, from the non-payment of the original obligation assumed by the debtor, and additionally, from an inappropriate use of existing legal procedures and tools to enforce his right. She highlights that if the plaintiff had requested to bring the property to auction and be awarded only the bare ownership, he could very well have collected the sum owed to him, so that the emotional impact would be considerably less.

**VI.** Regarding subjective moral damages, the Judges reasoned: “(…) the existence—in re ipsa—of subjective moral damages is deemed. Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, the serious omission and breach of the duty of care of the registrar at the time, as well as the Registry's negligence in supervising the actions of its officials, were the triggers that allowed—concurrently with other subjects and conducts—a series of other already mentioned events to be unleashed, and which are today the cause of the situation in which the plaintiff finds himself. It being reasonable to presume, then, that over these years the feelings caused by all these actions have represented in Mr. León Valerio a wear and tear on his person, great anger, and a sea of negative emotions, such as disappointment, frustration, rage, impotence, despair, anguish, and loss of confidence in public institutions. However, the payment of ¢20,000,000.00 is rejected, a sum in which the plaintiff quantifies the claim for moral damages and instead, it is fixed and granted, in the equitable, reasonable, and proportionate sum, in light of the circumstances, of ¢5,000,000.00, due to the existence, in this case, of Concurrence of Causes.” **VII.** This Chamber shares the sentence imposed as subjective moral damages, but not the sum awarded. The impact on the inner sphere that registry errors such as the one examined in this matter can generate in any person is possible, especially when they compromise their patrimony. Contrary to the objections raised, it is undeniable that the abnormal functioning of the Administration triggered an unjust disturbance in the plaintiff's emotional conditions, which he had no duty to bear. In that direction, it is possible to presume the anguish, sadness, uncertainty, unease, anger, and in general, the emotional impact that Mr. Jesús felt upon losing the mortgage privilege over the full ownership (pleno dominio) of the property given as guarantee, as well as the immediate ease he had to collect what was owed, which, due to the error of the National Registry, now becomes litigious for him. The administrative mistake is sufficient cause to directly link the moral damages that the plaintiff petitions, that is, it operates as a causal link generating administrative liability (article 190 LGAP), in application of the constitutional principle of the right to good public service. However, the extent of the damage is different from that set by the contested judgment, as the appellant rightly claims. As indicated in Considering IV of this judgment, in the specific case what occurs is a loss or deterioration of the guarantee conditions that the plaintiff had, however, he still maintains the possibility of demanding compliance with the mortgage obligation. While it is true that the expectation of quickly recovering what was owed was affected by the registry error under examination, which had an impact on the emotional sphere of Mr. León Valerio, there is no probative element in the record that determines an impediment to recovering the money given as a loan (a possibility he still has and has not been disproved in this proceeding). In these terms, this Chamber considers that the appropriate action is to revoke the appealed decision regarding the amount awarded as subjective moral damages, and instead set it at the figure of ¢2,500,000.00. Such sum compensates the suffering generated by the omission, inactivity, and breach of the duty of care of the National Registry, by depriving Mr. Jesús of a mortgage advantage and placing him in a litigious condition.

**VIII.** In accordance with what has been reasoned and set forth, the appropriate action is to uphold both cassation appeals. Consequently, the contested judgment is annulled insofar as: it denied the material damage sought, and awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective moral damages. In its place, deciding on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional) (and subsidiarily the State) is ordered in the abstract to pay the economic loss suffered due to the abnormal conduct of the Administration, as well as the legal interest left unearned, which shall run from the registration of the public deed of gift (without the reservation of usufruct) until its effective payment and of the amount defined in the execution stage. The subjective moral damages shall be set at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. For the loss of the privilege, which is not equivalent to the amount of the debt. It is decided without an award of costs for the cassation proceeding, pursuant to canon 150 subsection 3) of the CPCA.

**THEREFORE** Both cassation appeals are declared with merit. Consequently, the contested judgment is annulled insofar as it denied the material damage sought and awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective moral damages. In its place, deciding on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (and subsidiarily the State) is ordered in the abstract to pay the damage caused, as well as the legal interest left unearned from the loss of the mortgage privilege until the effective payment, of what is quantified in the sentence execution stage, under the terms set forth in considering IV of this judgment. The subjective moral damages are set at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. It is decided without an award of costs for the cassation proceeding.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vasquez** cchavesv See resolutions 371-2009 and 478-2012 (voto 2975-F-2020).

In the case under study, having proven the existence of the damage caused, but not its amount, in accordance with canon 122 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the declaration of this in the abstract is appropriate, so that it may be quantified in the sentence execution stage (voto 2975-F-2020).

It is the notary public's responsibility to carry out the necessary steps for the authorized documents to be registered (article 34.h Código Notarial), with the task of the Registro Público being the "registration" (registración) of such contracts (precept 1 Reglamento del Registro Público n° 26771) and of the registrars in particular "the qualification and inscription of the documents submitted for their study, which they shall do by the means available to them in coordination with the management, with the obligation to provide efficient service" (numeral 9 ibidem). To assume that the notary is obligated to detect registry errors, without which the Registro is exonerated from its own mistakes, implies ignoring the principle of efficiency that must safeguard the performance of every public service (rule 269.1 Ley General de la Administración Pública), as well as the specific obligations of the registrars (voto 2975-F-2020).

This Chamber agrees with the condemnation imposed as subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo), but not with the amount awarded. The disruption to one's inner peace that registry errors like the one examined in this case can cause in any person is a possibility, especially when they compromise their assets. The abnormal functioning of the Administration triggered an unjust disturbance in the plaintiff's emotional state, which he had no duty to bear. In that direction, it is possible to presume the anguish, sadness, uncertainty, unease, anger, and in general, the emotional distress he felt upon losing the mortgage privilege over the full ownership of the property given as guarantee, as well as the immediate facility he had to collect the debt, which, due to the error of the Registro Nacional, now becomes litigious for him. The administrative error is sufficient cause to directly link the moral damages that the plaintiff claims, that is, it operates as a causal link generating administrative liability (article 190 Ley General de la Administración Pública), in application of the constitutional principle of the right to good public service. However, the extent of the damage is different from that set forth in the appealed ruling, as the appellant rightly claims. What has occurred is a loss or worsening of the guarantee conditions the claimant had, nevertheless, he retains the possibility of demanding the fulfillment of the mortgage obligation. While it is true that the expectation of swiftly recovering what was owed was affected by the registry error under examination, which had an impact on the plaintiff's emotional sphere, there is no evidentiary element in the case file that determines an impediment to recovering the money provided as a loan (a possibility he still retains and has not been disproven in this process) (voto 2975-F-2020).

The plaintiff and the co-defendant Board file an appeal in cassation against judgment no. 60-2017-II of 8:10 a.m. on September 28, 2017, issued by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal.

**Drafted by Judge Rojas Morales** **CONSIDERING** **I.** Mr. Jesús María León Valerio sued the State, the Administrative Board of the National Registry, and Mr. José Eduardo and Mrs. María del Carmen, both with surnames Alfaro Chavarría. As indicated in the case file, on May 30, 2014, Mr. León Valerio entered into a commercial loan agreement with Mrs. María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría, for the sum of ¢21,000,000.00, payable one year from that date. As security, a first-degree mortgage was constituted over property registration number 4-119399-000. The credit was registered at the National Registry on June 9, 2014. Due to the breach of the credit obligations, on August 11 of the same year, Mr. Jesús initiated a judicial collection process before the Collection Court of Heredia (expediente 14-006163-1158-CJ). On July 20, 2014, the auction of the property was held, and it was awarded to Mr. León Valerio. By resolution of the following August 4, the Collection Court approved the initial liquidation, leaving pending the formal award of the auctioned property and the approval of the final liquidation. On July 22, 2015, Mr. José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría—brother of Mrs. Carmen María—reported to the National Registry that, through public deed no. 28 of July 20, 2011 (registered on the following July 29), he donated property 4-11399-000 to his sister; however, the assigned registrar omitted to record the reservation of usufruct (reserva de usufructo) in his favor (administrative procedure processed under expediente no. 1675-2015-RIM). Due to the foregoing, by resolution of July 23, 2015, the Registry recorded an administrative notice on the property. For its part, the Collection Court reserved the auction held to be addressed once the administrative expediente was resolved (resolution of the following August 10). Through a resolution of March 1, 2016, the National Registry ordered the immobilization of the property. Likewise, the Collection Court disapproved the auction held (resolution of October 21 of the same year). Considering that the described registration error—the non-registration of the usufruct reservation—has caused him damages and losses, he requested in the judgment (claims adjusted in the preliminary hearing): *"**1.** That the National Registry be ordered to pay the damages, losses, and subjective moral damages, whose grounds and estimation were detailed in the second section of the complaint, namely: **1.1** Principal due under the mortgage credit ¢21,000,000 colones (TWENTY-ONE MILLION COLONES). **1.2** Interest generated by this credit from June 30, 2014 (date on which Mrs. ALFARO CHAVARRÍA defaulted) to June 30, 2016 (EXACTLY TWO YEARS), which are hereby liquidated in the sum of: ¢16,380,000.00 colones (SIXTEEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND COLONES WITH ZERO CENTS) calculated at the rate of 3.25% monthly (39% annually), which is the interest agreed upon for DEFAULT INTEREST, as well as future interest until its effective payment at the rate of 3.25% monthly (39% annually), which is the interest agreed upon for DEFAULT INTEREST. **1.3** Costs of the judicial collection process, expediente number 14-006163-1158-CJ ¢3,178,500 colones (THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED COLONES), an amount established on the total principal owed and the interest liquidated, giving us an amount of ¢37,380,000.00, upon which the costs of the judicial collection process are liquidated. **1.4** Moral damages: the sum of twenty million colones. **2.** That all sums of money ordered to be paid be indexed until their effective payment. **3.** That the defendants be ordered to pay the costs generated by this (SIC) process and the interest generated by said sums until their effective payment."* The co-defendants responded negatively and raised the defense of lack of right. The Court declared the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría in default. Regarding Mr. José Eduardo, the claim was deemed withdrawn. The Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal, Second Section, composed of Judges Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, Eduardo González Segura, and Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, in resolution 60-2017-II of 8:10 a.m. on September 28, 2017, ordered: *"The defense of lack of right is denied in what is granted and accepted in what is rejected. The claim is declared partially admissible, being understood as denied in what is not granted, as follows: The Administrative Board of the Registry—and subsidiarily the State—is ordered to pay ¢5,000,000, in favor of the plaintiff, for subjective moral damages. As well as to pay both costs of this action, and legal interest, on the same, from their determination until their effective payment. It is resolved without special condemnation in costs, with respect to the co-defendant, María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría."* Dissatisfied, the plaintiff and the co-defendant Board file an appeal in cassation for violation of substantive norms, which were admitted by this Chamber.

**Appeal of the plaintiff** **II.** In total, he formulates **three** grievances. **First**, improper evidentiary assessment. He argues that from the comprehensive analysis of the complaint, the evidence in the case file (he lists the registration certifications provided), and the facts held as proven (he transcribes those numbered: 1, 2, 3, 6, and 17), it follows that the damages and losses claimed originate from the omission and breach of the duty of care of the National Registry official, who registered the donation deed without recording the usufruct reservation in favor of Mr. José Eduardo. A situation, he affirms, that triggered the direct impact on his interests, by being unable to enforce collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee, hence the causal link between the Registry's action and the damages sought. He asserts, contrary to the Tribunal's assessment, the evidence provided to the process supports the claims for compensation and proves that the improper action of a Registry servant was the cause of all the denounced acts (granting of the loan, the judicial collection process, the administrative procedure before the Registry, the administrative notice and immobilization, the non-approval of the auction, and the impossibility of recovering his money). He states the Judges are wrong to deny the material damage requested for the alleged lack of proof, since such an item is demonstrated by the mere existence of the expediente processed in the Collection Court of Heredia (which includes the executory title for ¢21,000.00,00, the quantification of interests, and the item corresponding to costs for its processing). He argues that the Registry's action caused damage to his assets, by preventing him from recovering the money given as a loan to the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría. He considers the evidence contradictory and poorly assessed by the Judges, to recognize the existence of subjective moral damage and deny material damage, even though both are the product of the same actions (a sequence of intertwined facts, whose origin is the fault committed by the Registry and its official). **Second**, improper application of norms. He transcribes articles: 22 of the National Registry Creation Law, 1 of the Law on Registration of Documents in the Public Registry, 190, 191, and 196 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP), and 41 of the Political Constitution. Regulations, he points out, that govern the subject of Administrative responsibility, when through its normal or abnormal actions or those of its officials, it causes damage to a third party who had no duty to bear it and which must be compensated, as happens in the specific case. He cites and transcribes in support judgments numbers: 000275 of 1:40 p.m. on February 13, 2014, from this Chamber, and 00027 of 1:40 p.m. on February 19, 2014, issued by the Administrative and Civil Treasury Tribunal. In the matter under study, he reproaches, when it is demonstrated that the conduct displayed by a National Registry servant caused him harm (moral and financial), the appropriate course was to order that Institution to pay the entirety of the damages and losses claimed. However, he criticizes, the appealed decision disregards such regulations and reaches an erroneous conclusion, which was to exempt the Registry from paying the sums claimed (material damages), to the detriment of his interests. He highlights that the damage claimed is certain, assessable, and compensable, with no ground for exemption from liability. **Third**, violation of the principle of legal certainty. He affirms that the appealed judgment generates legal uncertainty by allowing conduct that was denounced, proven, and even accepted by the participants to go unpunished, along with the erroneous analysis of the factual picture, the evidence provided, and existing legislation. He says, as a matter of legal certainty, the Tribunal cannot affirm facts not discussed in the process (specifically: that Mrs. María del Carmen heard what the Notary Public stated when drafting the document containing the donation and usufruct reservation) and on which no evidence was presented, much less endow them with absolute certainty. Sufficient reason to question the substantive analysis carried out in the challenged resolution. Another aspect that generates legal uncertainty, he says, is the fact that the Judges indicate that the mortgage deed retains the status of an executory title capable of pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor. He asserts that this cannot be fulfilled in this case, because what was signed was a mortgage credit and not another type of executory title, where both parties accepted that if necessary, property 4-119399-000 (the only asset of the co-defendant Alfaro Chavarría) would be executed to recover what was owed. A property, he adds, which has a registration immobilization, which means it is out of commerce, preventing the recovery of the money lent (due to the Registry's responsibility). That situation, he reproaches, implies the loss of the only guarantee he had to back the credit. He argues that there is no legal remedy to recover the owed money, as there are no further assets to pursue. He criticizes that the appealed judgment does not provide a clear solution nor establish the corresponding responsibilities regarding the requested compensation, which generates legal uncertainty. He adds that attempting to modify the will of the parties, by suggesting collection of the debt through other assets, which do not exist, becomes an attribution the Tribunal cannot make (due to the uncertainty generated and by not resolving the problem caused by the Registry nor the plaintiff's right to recover what was owed and execute the guarantee under the agreed terms).

**III.** At its core, the objections raised by the plaintiff revolve around the rejection of the material damage claimed. Regarding the issue, the Judges estimated that while it is true that when the donation was registered, the registrar did not make the usufruct reservation in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, leaving property 4-119399-000 entirely registered in the name of Mrs. María del Carmen, it is also true that the authorizing notary responsible for registering that deed did not notice the situation. In addition to the foregoing, they stated: *"(…) there is also no doubt that MARÍA DEL CARMEN heard what was written by the Notary—in the acquisition document—and expressed her agreement and approval. Without being unaware, consequently, of the legal situation of the property: Her condition as bare owner (nudataria), by virtue of Mr. EDUARDO's usufruct right, reserved in the same acquisition document. Despite which, and apparently, she did not inform Jesús María León Valerio, her creditor—the plaintiff here, nor Notary Salazar Fonseca, authorizer of the loan with mortgage deed, of that situation. Which led—along with the error and inaccuracy of the registry publicity—to the registration—dated June 9, 2014—of the loan with mortgage on property 4-119399-000, (…)"*. The Tribunal added that no attribution of liability arises against Mr. León Valerio or notary Salazar Fonseca—for not reviewing the prior registry situation—because according to the legal framework referenced in Considering VII of the challenged judgment, it is the Registrar who must consider, for qualification, the results of the title, books, real folios, and in general the information contained in the Registry. Likewise, it stated that it is evident and notorious that the breach of credit obligations by Mrs. María del Carmen gave rise to the mortgage foreclosure process, without being able to attribute responsibility to the State and the National Registry for that breach and the consequent collection process (as they are functions outside the administrative and registry scope). The Judges affirmed that the lack of registration of the usufruct reservation and inaccuracy of the registry publicity, coupled with the oversight by the notary responsible for its registration and the conduct of Mrs. María del Carmen, contributed to the non-approval of the auction in favor of the creditor—the plaintiff here—until the legal situation was resolved. They estimated: *"But one thing is that, that is to say, the ineffectiveness of the mortgage privilege, which in no way is the object—in and of itself—of the material economic claim, and another, different, is the extinction or disappearance of the debt, a credit which subsists. Without it having been demonstrated, conclusively, in this ordinary process, beyond all doubt, the existence of material damage, and consequent liability for collection—and payment—on the part of the State and the Registry for the damages and losses consisting—according to the claim of the complaint—of the Principal due under the credit, the Interest generated by that credit, the Costs of the Judicial Collection Process and their indexation (doctrine of article 317 of the CPC). In effect, regarding the claimed strict liability, for such economic damages, due to illicit or abnormal activity, the same, we repeat, is not admissible. (…) In the present case, as we already noted, the warning notice and immobilization causing the disapproval of the auction—are the final consequence of several subjects and singular conducts that converged in its production. Furthermore, as we noted, the invalidity and eventual order for cancellation of the registration entry of the property, in the name of María del Carmen, as owner of the full domain, has not been declared, nor ordered, in an ordinary judicial process. Even less, consequently, the nullity and cancellation of the registration of the mortgage in favor of the plaintiff here, Mr. León Valerio. Without there being news of its filing. Nor can—nor should—anything be resolved in this regard, within this present Civil Treasury Process. Despite the immobilization notice, the effectiveness of the credit right subsists. In this sense, the documented legal act retains the condition of an executory title capable of pursuing other assets or rights of the debtor, in the same process or through the payment order (monitorio) process."* They cite, as an example, the possibility of pursuing the ownership of the right to the bare ownership (nuda propiedad) that Mrs. María del Carmen retains over the property in question. On the other hand, the Judges assessed that the judicial collection process is not suspended, but inactive, without the creditor—the plaintiff here—having attempted—and exhausted—the possibility of requesting the seizure and auction of other assets or rights of the debtor, among them, the aforementioned right of bare ownership. In short, without it being proven—to date—the existence of an uncollectible debt. By virtue of which, they concluded, there is doubt about the ineffectiveness of his credit right; and, therefore, about the existence of effective, economically assessable, individualized damage, that is, material or economic damage consisting of the loss of the principal due, credit interest, and costs of the judicial collection process. Extremes that, for the reasons indicated, they deemed inadmissible.

**IV.** This Deciding Body does not share the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, for the following reasons. As this Chamber has stated, the liability analyzed here (articles 190 et seq. of the LGAP and 41 of the Political Constitution) is applicable, provided there is a proven harm attributable to a determined subject. Thus, the principle is that the Administration is liable if, when acting, it causes damage, deriving three basic prerequisites: administrative conduct (active or omissive), effective damage, and between both, a cause-and-effect link, that is, a causal nexus. All these precisions are indispensable to conclude that not all illegitimate or irregular State functioning would generate its liability, given that the interested party must prove, in addition to the effective damage, the causal link between both. In other words, even when the irregular conduct of the Administration is demonstrated, the duty to compensate does not proceed automatically, as this is a consequence of the conclusive proof of the alleged harm, as derived from that atypical or abnormal action. (First Chamber, resolution no. 869-2012 of 9:30 a.m. on July 27, 2012). In the specific case, it is evident in the case file, through public deed no. 28 executed before a Notary Public on July 20, 2011, Mr. José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría appeared to donate his property no. 4-119399 to María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría (his sister). In that same act, Mr. José Eduardo reserved for life the rights of usufruct (usufructo), use, and habitation over the property. The donation was registered at the National Registry on July 29, 2011; however, due to an error, the assigned registrar did not make the usufruct reservation (leaving it registered entirely in favor of his sister). Moreover, following the order of events, it is held as proven that since such reservation did not appear in the registry information for the property, Mr. Jesús granted a credit loan to the aforementioned lady, with a mortgage guarantee on the property. Due to the breach of the contracted obligation, Mr. León Valerio filed a judicial collection process, within which the auction was held and the property was awarded in his favor. However, given the complaint filed by Mr. José Eduardo before the Registry, where he claimed to have the usufruct right over the property subject to the collection process, the Administration ordered the immobilization of the property, and the Collection Court ordered the non-approval of the auction. From this perspective, it becomes evident that the actions of the registry body constitute abnormal functioning. The National Registry violated the powers inherent to it in the qualification and registration of documents, disregarding the real will of the parties. Such carelessness was effectively recognized by the Directorate of the Real Estate Registry in the resolution of 11:00 a.m. on March 1, 2016 (fact held as proven no. 15 of the challenged judgment) by stating: *"Due to a registry error, the right of usufruct was not reserved at the time in favor of Mr. Alfaro Chavarría; leaving property 4-119399 entirely registered in the name of Mrs. María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría."* Let it be clear, the inexcusable error in registering all the stipulations included in the public title submitted for its qualification (donation deed), a source of financial injuries. In this direction, of interest here, the plaintiff claims the economic damages derived from the oversight incurred by the Registry when registering the donation deed, omitting the usufruct reservation in favor of Mr. José Eduardo, which resulted in the inability to enforce collection of the debt or the mortgage guarantee under the agreed terms (with the consequent impediment to recovering the money owed to him). Specifically, he petitioned for payment of the principal due under the mortgage credit, interest, and costs of the judicial collection process. Contrary to the reasoning of the Judges, this Collegiate Body estimates that the abnormal functioning of the National Registry did cause material damage to Mr. Jesús (which he has no duty to bear), specifically the loss or deterioration of the mortgage privilege, understood as the possibility of executing the real guarantee over the full domain of property 4-119399-000, to which the plaintiff would be entitled, were it not for the registry error under examination. Effective, assessable, and individualizable damage (pursuant to numeral 196 of the LGAP), which in line with the principles of public liability, must be protected in this venue. In the specific case, it is insisted, the registry mistake has led to deterioration of Mr. León Valerio's credit right, turning it into a debt that, while it does have an executory title, enabling him to resort to other legal mechanisms to recover what is owed, the truth of the matter is that the particular and specific conditions of this case, as originally agreed upon, have been altered, changing naturally from a guaranteed credit—mortgage—to a common one, that is, without real guarantee, which, in attention to the special circumstances of the debtor (the one required to pay), evidently diminishes the ability to achieve the intended collection. See, the breach of the Registry's duty of care deprived the plaintiff of a mortgage advantage and placed him in a litigious condition. Therefore, by having the Tribunal deny compensation for damage whose existence is evident, it violated numerals 190 and 196 of the LGAP; and consequently, the appeal of the plaintiff must be accepted, with the clarifications to be stated. As indicated, in the specific case, there is damage due to the deterioration of the credit right; however, ordering compensation under the terms sought by the plaintiff (the total principal amount of the guaranteed debt) is inadmissible, given that the possibility of collecting the credit obligation subsists. Despite the immobilization notice on the property, a debt exists (without privilege, but existent) and a valid executory title to proceed with its collection. As the Judges reasoned, Mr. Jesús has legal mechanisms to enforce his credit rights, it being that by decisions of the plaintiff himself he has not chosen to exercise them. Mr. León Valerio maintains the possibility of demanding fulfillment of the debt given that the assets are the common pledge of creditors (be it by pursuing: other assets of Mrs. Alfaro Chavarría in case they exist or come to exist, to adjudicate the bare ownership of the property, among other options). Therefore, even though in the case before us the damage entails the loss of the mortgage privilege, this does not bring with it the extinction of the debt, and even less, compensation under the terms claimed. This Chamber has previously referred to this type of financial damage called loss of opportunity (pérdida de oportunidad) or loss of chance, such is the case of resolution 371-F-S1-2009 of 11:00 a.m. on April 16, 2009, in which it is noted: *"X.- The appellant bases his claim on the theory of loss of opportunity. At the doctrinal level, it is affirmed that said postulate originates from an illicit conduct that results in the impairment of a real and serious possibility of obtaining a future benefit or advantage, regarding which a probability threshold greater than mere expectation is determined, where compensation is awarded to that subject of law who sees an opportunity to receive a financial advantage, characterized by a high degree of certainty regarding its materialization, cut off from their legal sphere."* In this sense, the authors indicate that causation must be assessed based on the existence of a real opportunity, and not as a mechanism by which the loss of an unperceived patrimonial benefit is attributed, so that the eventual compensation corresponds to the quantification of the "lost chance" (pérdida del "chance" perdido). In concrete application of that theory, this Chamber proceeded to recognize compensation resulting from the loss of a future advantage, as can be deduced from judgment 478-S1-12 of 14 hours 30 minutes on April 12, 2012, in which it is stated: "(...) this Chamber considers that there is room for compensation for patrimonial injury originating from an unlawful act, which had as a consequence the affectation of a real and serious possibility of obtaining a future benefit or advantageous situation, based not on a mere probability, a hypothesis, or a mere risk, as stated, but on a consolidated probability, on a high degree of certainty for the materialization of the final energy supply contract. However, that real and effective patrimonial injury caused to the plaintiff by this frustrated opportunity is not equivalent to, nor can it be equated with, the full consideration that would have been obtained in the event of the full execution of the unsigned contract, nor the profit that the prevented contractual relationship could have generated. This, as is obvious, would imply an unjust and illicit enrichment of the petitioner, since, without having delivered any energy, they would obtain all the benefits derived from the contract. In these cases, fair compensation for what did not arise or was frustrated is not equivalent to the full and complete performance established in the contract. Damages are not synonymous here with the original agreed performance, or, as in this case, the one that would have been achieved. It is a matter of compensating patrimonially for the primary or initial injury (loss of a chance), but not for the damages or losses of that final factual-legal circumstance that was not achieved. There, the probable economic factors of the final situation could be taken into consideration, to use them as one of the prudential parameters when establishing the amount of the judgment. Thus, for its determination in cases such as this, one must resort to reasonable, restrained, prudential, and objective jurisdictional discretion, in which, as will be done in this case, the relevance of the circumstances for the parties; the degree of certainty in achieving the final result or advantage; the conditions of the injured party or victim; the concurrence of eventual beneficiaries; when there is an agreement, the amount of that lost opportunity; etc., must be weighed." In the matter under study, having demonstrated the existence of the damage caused, but not its amount, in accordance with canon 122 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA), its declaration in the abstract is appropriate, so that it may be quantified in the judgment enforcement stage, on the understanding that this patrimonial injury caused is not equivalent to the full and complete performance established in the mortgage (¢21,000,000 by way of guaranteed principal) and also, taking into consideration the probable economic factors of the situation of loss of the mortgage privilege, as well as the current status of the obligation, for which it may rely on expert assistance if deemed necessary.

On the other hand, the exemption from liability due to the act of a third party, pointed out by the Judges (consisting of the non-payment of the obligation by Mrs. Alfaro Chavarría), is not shared. Certainly, the breach of the obligation affects the plaintiff's patrimony, who, within the mortgage relationship, holds a privilege. However, even with that carelessness of the debtor, the real guarantee (garantía real) ensured the plaintiff could recover their credit in case of default, in an expeditious manner, which could not be achieved due to the mentioned registry deficiency. It should be noted that the damage did not arise from the lack of payment (as the Judges wrongly assessed), but from the impossibility of enforcing the mortgage, given the failure to register by the Registry and with it, the deterioration of the guarantee conditions that Mr. León Valerio had. To consider that the debtor's breach exonerates administrative responsibility would lead to denying the existence of the registration error and the consequences it has generated in the claimant's legal sphere, disregarding the dysfunction incurred by the National Registry (Registro Nacional). In another vein, regarding the disregard or negligence in the function of the notary before whom the donation deed was granted, in which the reservation of lifetime tenure (reserva de usufructo) in favor of Don José Eduardo was constituted, an inscription that was not completed, it must be pointed out that the Court is not correct. It is indisputable that the events did not occur due to disregard or negligence of the specific function of the professional in question. Although as a notary public it was incumbent upon them to carry out the necessary steps for the authorized documents to be registered (article 38 subsection h of the Notarial Code), it is the task of the Public Registry (Registro Público) to carry out the "registration" (registración) of such contracts (precept 1 of the Public Registry Regulations no. 26771-J) and of the registrars in particular, "the qualification and registration of the documents submitted for their study, which they shall do by the means available in coordination with management, with the obligation to provide efficient service" (numeral 9 ibidem). To suppose, as is intended, that the notary is obliged to detect registration errors as an element without which the Registry is exonerated from its own mistakes, implies ignoring the principle of efficiency that must safeguard the performance of all public service (rule 269.1 of the LGAP), as well as the specific obligations of registrars. In addition to the above, it is important to note that the failure to file collection actions cannot be considered as a cause of the damage, nor as a fault of the victim that might have the effect of breaking the causal link (nexo causal) that exists between the public negligence and the analyzed patrimonial injuries. To consider the contrary would be to collude with the total disassociation of the Administration, which with its defective performance in a public service that is understood to be specialized, has caused injury to third parties. A public dysfunction that produces legal uncertainty in the registry (inseguridad registral). Finally, the note immobilizing the mortgaged property, unlike what is argued, does not lead to denying the existence of damage in the terms already explained. Certainly, as long as that registry note remains in force, the property cannot be judicially foreclosed; this does not mean that the plaintiff may be able to exercise their right of real guarantee over that property (at least regarding the bare ownership (nuda propiedad)) and thereby obtain satisfaction of their credit. In the terms indicated, regarding the requested material damage, it shall be appropriate to uphold the objections and overturn the contested judgment (with the legal consequences that will be stated).

**Appeal of the co-defendant Administrative Board (Junta Administrativa)** **V.** The appellant raises **two** grievances for violation of substantive rules. **First,** improper application of articles 22 of the Law of Creation of the National Registry and 190, 192, 194, and 197 of the LGAP, with the consequent lack of application of canons 20, 21, 22, 701, 1020, 1022, and 1025 of the Civil Code (Código Civil, CC). It points out that, contrary to the Court's criterion, the granted subjective non-material damage (daño moral subjetivo) does not arise or originate directly from what occurred in the registry sphere, but from the personal action of Mrs. Alfaro Chavarría, in giving property 119399-00 as mortgage guarantee knowing that she did not hold full title. Such action, it affirms, configures what in doctrine is known as "fraudulent reticence" (reticencia dolosa), that is, the existence of a defect in consent, specifically fraud (dolo), which results in an exemption from administrative responsibility due to the action of a third party (under the terms of numeral 190 of the LGAP), with the consequent breaking of the causal link attributed in the judgment. **Second,** improper application of mandates 82.4 of the CPCA and 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), as well as lack of application of ordinals 41 of the Political Constitution, 704 of the CC, and 16 of the LGAP. It points out that neither from the complaint nor from the evidence in the record is it possible to determine the content of the granted non-material damage and the elements of conviction on the basis of which the Judges formed the value judgment to award the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for that concept. An amount it deems excessive. It explains that a large part of the invoked suffering derives, according to the plaintiff's own words, from the non-payment of the original obligation assumed by the debtor, in addition to an inadequate use of the existing legal procedures and tools to enforce their right. It highlights that if the plaintiff had requested to bring the property to auction and be awarded only the bare ownership, they could well have collected the sum owed to them, so that the emotional affectation would be considerably lower.

**VI.** Regarding the subjective non-material damage, the Judges reasoned: "(...) the existence -in re ipsa- of subjective non-material damage is estimated. Indeed, as the plaintiff points out, the serious omission and breach of the duty of care by the registrar at the time, as well as the negligence of the Registry in overseeing the actions of its officials, were the triggers that allowed -concurrently with other subjects and conducts- another series of already mentioned events to be unleashed, which today are the cause of the situation in which the plaintiff finds themselves. It is therefore reasonably presumed that over these years the feelings caused by all these actions have represented for Mr. León Valerio a personal drain, great anger, and a sea of negative emotions, such as disappointment, frustration, rage, impotence, desperation, anguish, and loss of trust in public institutions. However, the payment of ¢20,000,000, the sum in which the plaintiff quantifies the claim for non-material damage, is rejected, and in its place, it is fixed and granted, in the equitable, reasonable, and proportionate sum, in light of the circumstances, of ¢5,000,000, due to the existence, in this case, of Concurrence of Causes." **VII.** This Chamber shares the condemnatory order imposed for subjective non-material damage, but not the sum awarded. The affectation to the inner sphere that registration errors like the one examined in this matter can generate in any person is possible, especially when they compromise their patrimony. Contrary to the complaints raised, it is undeniable that the abnormal functioning of the Administration triggered an unjust disturbance in the plaintiff's emotional conditions, which they had no duty to bear. In that direction, it is possible to presume the anguish, sadness, uncertainty, unease, anger, and in general, the emotional affectation that Don Jesús felt upon losing the mortgage privilege over the full ownership (pleno dominio) of the property given as guarantee, as well as the immediate facility he had to collect what was owed, which, due to the error of the National Registry, now becomes litigious for him. The administrative error is sufficient cause to directly link the non-material damage that the plaintiff claims, that is, it operates as a causal link generating administrative responsibility (article 190 LGAP), in application of the constitutional principle of the right to good public service. However, the extent of the damage differs from that ordered by the contested judgment, as the appellant rightly claims. As indicated in Considering IV of this judgment, in the specific case what occurred is a loss or deterioration of the guarantee conditions that the plaintiff had; however, he still maintains the possibility of demanding compliance with the mortgage obligation. While it is true that the expectation of quickly recovering what was owed was affected by the registry error under examination, which had an impact on Mr. León Valerio's emotional sphere, there is no evidence in the record that determines an impediment to recovering the money given as a loan (a possibility he still maintains and has not been disproven in this proceeding). In those terms, this Chamber considers that it shall be appropriate to overturn the appealed decision regarding the amount awarded for subjective non-material damage, and in its place, fix it at the figure of ¢2,500,000.00. That sum compensates for the suffering generated by the omission, inactivity, and breach of the duty of care by the National Registry, in depriving Don Jesús of a mortgage advantage and putting him in a litigious condition.

**VIII.** In accordance with what has been reasoned and stated, it shall be appropriate to uphold both cassation appeals. Consequently, the contested judgment shall be annulled insofar as it: denied the material damage sought and, awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective non-material damage. In its place, deciding on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (and subsidiarily the State) is condemned in the abstract to pay the economic loss suffered due to the abnormal conduct of the Administration, as well as the legal interest lost, which shall run from the registration of the public deed of donation (without the reservation of lifetime tenure) until its effective payment and of the amount to be defined in the enforcement stage. The subjective non-material damage shall be fixed at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. For the loss of the privilege, which does not equal the amount of the debt. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs of the cassation, according to canon 150 subsection 3) of the CPCA.

**POR TANTO** Both cassation appeals are declared with merit. Consequently, the contested judgment is annulled insofar as it denied the material damage sought and awarded the sum of ¢5,000,000.00 for subjective non-material damage. In its place, deciding on the merits, the Administrative Board of the National Registry (and subsidiarily the State) is condemned in the abstract to pay the damage caused, as well as the legal interest lost from the loss of the mortgage privilege until effective payment, of what is quantified in the judgment enforcement stage, under the terms set forth in considering IV of this judgment. The subjective non-material damage is fixed at the amount of ¢2,500,000.00. It is resolved without special condemnation for costs of the cassation.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vasquez** cchavesv

20170004001226-3084931-1.rtf  RES. 002975-F-S1-2020 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las diez horas cinco minutos del diecisiete de diciembre de dos mil veinte.

Proceso de puro derecho establecido por JESUS MARÍA LEÓN VALERIO; contra el ESTADO representado por la procuradora Magda Inés Rojas Chaves, la JUNTA ADMINISTRADORA DEL REGISTRO NACIONAL y los señores JOSE EDUARDO DE JESUS ALFARO CHAVARRÍA y MARÍA DEL CARMEN ALFARO CHAVARRÍA. Figuran como apoderados especiales judiciales de la parte actora, Luis Antonio Álvarez Chaves; de la referida Junta, Luis Castro Fonseca y Gabriela Carranza Araya; del señor Alfaro Chavarría, Damián Alfaro Carvajal. Doña María del Carmen fue declarada en rebeldía. La parte actora y la Junta co-demandada formulan recurso de casación contra la sentencia no. 60-2017-II de las 8 horas 10 minutos del 28 de setiembre de 2017, emitida por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda.

Redacta la magistrada Rojas Morales

CONSIDERANDO

I.El señor Jesús María León Valerio demandó al Estado, a la Junta Administradora del Registro Nacional y a los señores José Eduardo y María del Carmen, ambos de apellidos Alfaro Chavarría. Según consta en autos, el 30 de mayo de 2014 el señor León Valerio celebró un contrato de préstamo mercantil con la señora María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría, por la suma de ¢21.000.000,00, a pagar en un año a partir de esa fecha. En garantía se constituyó hipoteca de primer grado sobre el inmueble matrícula 4-119399-000. Crédito inscrito en el Registro Nacional el 9 de junio de 2014. Ante el incumplimiento de las obligaciones crediticias, el 11 de agosto del mismo año don Jesús interpuso proceso de cobro judicial ante el Juzgado de Cobro de Heredia (expediente 14-006163-1158-CJ). En fecha 20 de julio de 2014 se llevó a cabo el remate del bien, el cual fue adjudicado al señor León Valerio. Por resolución del 4 de agosto siguiente, el Juzgado de Cobro aprobó la liquidación inicial, quedando pendiente la adjudicación formal del bien rematado y la aprobación de la liquidación final. El 22 de julio de 2015, Don José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría -hermanó de doña Carmen María- denunció ante el Registro Nacional que, mediante escritura pública no. 28 del 20 de julio de 2011 (inscrita el 29 de julio siguiente), le donó a su hermana el inmueble 4-11399-000, no obstante, el registrador asignado omitió consignar la reserva de usufructo a su favor (procedimiento administrativo tramitado bajo expediente no. 1675-2015-RIM). En razón de lo anterior, por resolución del 23 de julio de 2015, el Registro consignó advertencia administrativa sobre el inmueble. Por su parte, el Juzgado de Cobro reservó el remate efectuado para ser conocido una vez resuelto el expediente administrativo (resolución del 10 de agosto siguiente). Mediante resolución del 1° de marzo de 2016, el Registro Nacional dispuso la inmovilización de la finca. Asimismo, el Juzgado de Cobro improbó el remate celebrado (resolución del 21 de octubre del mismo año). Al estimar que el error registral descrito -no inscripción de la reserva de usufruto- le ha generado daños y perjuicios, solicitó en sentencia (pretensiones ajustadas en la audiencia preliminar): “1. Se condene al Registro Nacional al pago de los daños, perjuicios y daño moral subjetivo, cuyo motivo y estimación se detallaron en el apartado segundo de la demanda, a saber: 1.1 Capital debido según el crédito hipotecario ¢21.000.000 colones (VEINTIÚN MILLONES DE COLONES). 1.2 Intereses generados por este crédito desde el día 30 de junio del año 2014 (fecha en que la señora ALFARO CHAVARRÍA entró en mora) al 30 de junio del año 2016 (DOS AÑOS EXACTOS) que se liquidan en este acto en la suma de: ¢16.380.000.00 colones (DIECISÉIS MILLONES TRESCIENTOS OCHENTA MIL COLONES CON CERO CÉNTIMOS) calculados al tipo del 3.25% mensual (39% anual) que es el interés pactado por los INTERESES MORATORIOS, así como los intereses futuros hasta su efectivo pago al tipo del 3.25% mensual (39% anual) que es el interés pactado para los INTERESES MORATORIOS. 1.3 Costas del proceso de cobro judicial, expediente número 14-006163-1158-CJ ¢3.178.500 colones (TRES MILLONES CIENTO SETENTA Y OCHO MIL QUINIENTOS COLONES), monto establecido sobre la totalidad del capital adeudado y los intereses liquidados, lo que nos arroja un monto de ¢37.380.000.00 y sobre el cual se liquidan las costas del proceso de cobro judicial. 1.4 Daño moral: la suma de veinte millones de colones. 2. Que se indexen todas las sumas de dinero condenadas a pagar hasta el efectivo pago de las mismas. 3. Se condene a los demandados al pago de las costas que genere ese (SIC) proceso y los intereses que generen dichas sumas hasta su efectivo pago". Los co-accionados contestaron de forma negativa y opusieron la excepción de falta de derecho. El Juez tramitador declaró en rebeldía a la co-demandada Alfaro Chavarría. Respecto a don José Eduardo se tuvo por desistida la demanda. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Segunda, integrado por los jueces Bernardo Rodríguez Villalobos, Eduardo González Segura y Ronaldo Hernández Hernández, en resolución 60-2017-II de las 8 horas 10 minutos del 28 de setiembre de 2017, dispuso: “Se deniega la excepción de falta de derecho en lo que se concede y se acoge en lo que se rechaza. Se declara parcialmente procedente la demanda, entendiéndose denegada en lo que no se concede, así: Se condena a la Junta Administrativa del Registro -y subsidiariamente al Estado-, al pago de ¢5.000.000, en favor del actor, por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. Así como al pago de ambas costas de esta acción, y los intereses legales, sobre las mismas, a partir de su determinación y hasta su efectivo pago. Se resuelve sin especial condenatoria en costas, respecto de la codemandada, María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría”. Inconformes el actor y la Junta co-demandada plantean recurso de casación por violación de normas sustantivas, los cuales fueron admitidos por esta Sala.

Recurso de la parte actora

II.En total formula tres agravios. Primero, indebida valoración probatoria. Aduce, del análisis integral de la demanda, la prueba constante en autos (enlista las certificaciones registrales aportadas) y los hechos tenidos por demostrados (trascribe los numerados: 1, 2, 3, 6 y 17), se desprende que los daños y perjuicios reclamados tiene su origen en la omisión y falta al deber de cuidado del funcionario del Registro Nacional, quien inscribió la escritura de donación sin consignar la reserva de usufructo a favor de don José Eduardo. Situación, afirma, que desencadenó en la afectación directa a sus intereses, al no poder ejecutar el cobro de la deuda ni de la garantía hipotecaria, de ahí el nexo causal entre la actuación del Registro y los daños pretendidos. Asevera, contrario a la valoración del Tribunal, la prueba aportada al proceso respalda los pedimentos indemnizatorios y acredita que la actuación indebida de un servidor del Registro fue la causante de todos los actos denunciados (otorgamiento del préstamo, el proceso de cobro judicial, el procedimiento administrativo ante el Registro, la advertencia e inmovilización administrativas, la no aprobación del remate y, la imposibilidad de recuperar su dinero). Dice, no llevan razón los Jueces al denegar el daño material requerido por la supuesta falta de prueba, pues tal rubro se demuestra con la sola existencia del expediente tramitado en el Juzgado de Cobro de Heredia (donde consta el título ejecutivo por ¢21.000.00,00, la cuantificación de intereses y el rubro correspondiente a costas por su tramitación). Arguye, con la actuación del Registro se le causó un daño a su patrimonio, al no poder recuperar el dinero dado en calidad de préstamo a la co-demandada Alfaro Chavarría. Considera contradictorio y mal valorada la prueba por parte de los Juzgadores, el reconocer la existencia del daño moral subjetivo y denegar el daño material, a pesar de que ambos son producto de las mismas acciones (secuencia de hechos entrelazados, cuyo origen es la falta cometida por el Registro y su funcionario). Segundo, indebida aplicación normativa. Trascribe los artículos: 22 de la Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional, 1° de la Ley de Inscripción de Documentos en el Registro Público, 190, 191 y 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Publica (LGAP) y, 41 de la Constitución Política. Normativa, apunta, que regula el tema de la responsabilidad Administrativa, cuando con su actuar normal o anormal o la de sus funcionarios, causa un daño a un tercero que no tenía el deber de soportarlo y el cual, ha de ser resarcido, como sucede en el caso concreto. Cita y trascribe en respaldo las sentencias números: 000275 de las 13 horas 40 minutos del 13 de febrero de 214 de esta Sala y la 00027 de las 13 horas 40 minutos del 19 de febrero de 2014 emitida por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda. En el asunto de estudio, recrimina, al demostrarse que la conducta desplegada por un servidor del Registro Nacional le causó una afectación (moral y patrimonial), lo procedente era condenar a esa Institución al pago de la totalidad de los daños y perjuicios pretendidos. No obstante, critica, el fallo recurrido deja de lado tal normativa y arriba a una conclusión errada, cual fue eximir al Registro de cancelar las sumas reprochadas (daños materiales), en detrimentos de sus intereses. Resalta, el daño reclamado es cierto, evaluable e indemnizable, sin que medie eximente de responsabilidad. Tercero, violación del principio de seguridad jurídica. Afirma, la sentencia recurrida genera inseguridad jurídica al permitir que conductas denunciadas, demostradas e incluso aceptadas por los intervinientes, queden impunes, aunado al erróneo análisis que se hace del cuadro factico, la prueba aportada y la legislación existente. Dice, por una cuestión de seguridad jurídica el Tribunal no puede afirmar hechos no discutidos en el proceso (en concreto: que doña María del Carmen escuchó lo manifestado por el Notario Público al redactar el documento donde consta la donación y reserva de usufruto) y sobre los cuales no se aportaron pruebas, mucho menos dotarlos de certeza absoluta. Motivo suficiente para cuestionar el análisis de fondo efectuado en la resolución impugnada. Otro aspecto que genera inseguridad jurídica dice, es el hecho de que los Juzgadores indiquen que la escritura de hipoteca conserva la condición de título ejecutivo susceptible de perseguir otros bienes o derechos de la deudora. Asevera, ello no puede cumplirse en este caso, pues lo suscrito fue un crédito hipotecario y no otro tipo de título ejecutivo, donde ambas partes aceptaron que de ser necesario la finca 4-119399-000 (único bien de la co-demandada Alfaro Chavarría) sería ejecutada para recuperar lo adeudado. Inmueble, añade, el cual tiene una inmovilización registral, lo que hace que se encuentre fuera del comercio de los hombres, impidiendo recuperar el dinero dado en préstamo (por responsabilidad del Registro). Esa situación, reprocha, implica la pérdida de la única garantía que tenía para respaldar el crédito. Arguye, no hay remedio legal que permita recuperar el dinero adeudado, al no existir más bienes que perseguir. Critica, la sentencia recurrida no da una solución clara y tampoco sienta las responsabilidades correspondientes respecto a la indemnización solicitada, lo que genera inseguridad jurídica. Agrega, pretender modificar la voluntad de las partes, al sugerir el cobro de la deuda a través de otros bienes, los cuales no existen, deviene en una atribución que no puede tomar el Tribunal (por la inseguridad generada y al no resolver el problema ocasionado por el Registro ni el derecho del actor de recuperar lo adeudado y ejecutar la garantía en los términos pactados).

III.En lo medular, los reparos invocados por la parte actora giran en torno al rechazo del daño material pretendido. Referente al tema, estimaron los Juzgadores, si bien es cierto al inscribirse la donación el registrador no realizó la reserva de usufructo a favor de don José Eduardo, quedando la finca 4-119399-000 en su totalidad inscrita a nombre de doña María del Carmen, también lo es que el notario autorizante y responsable de la inscripción de esa escritura no advirtió la situación. Aunado a lo anterior, manifestaron: “(…) tampoco cabe duda de que MARÍA DEL CARMEN escuchó lo escrito por el Notario -en el documento de adquisición-, y manifestó su conformidad y aprobación. Sin que desconociera, en consecuencia, la situación jurídica de la finca: Su condición de nudataria, en virtud del derecho de usufructo de Don EDUARDO, reservado en el mismo documento de adquisición. Pese a lo cual, y por lo visto, no informó de esa situación a Jesús María León Valerio, su acreedor -aquí actor, ni al Notario Salazar Fonseca, autorizante de la escritura de préstamo con hipoteca. Lo cual propició -junto con el error e inexactitud de la publicidad registral-, la inscripción -con fecha 9 de junio del 2014-, del préstamo con hipoteca sobre la finca 4-119399-000, (…)”. Agregó el Tribunal, ninguna imputación de responsabilidad cabe contra el señor León Valerio ni el notario Salazar Fonseca -por no revisar la situación registral antecedente-, pues de acuerdo con el marco jurídico referido en el Considerando VII del fallo impugnado, es el Registrador quien ha de tener en cuenta para la calificación, lo resultante del título, libros, folios reales, y en general la información que conste en el Registro. Asimismo, refirió, es evidente y notorio que el incumplimiento de las obligaciones crediticias por parte de doña María del Carmen, fue lo que dio lugar al proceso de ejecución hipotecaria, sin que se pueda endilgar responsabilidad al Estado y al Registro Nacional de ese incumplimiento y del consecuente proceso de cobro (por tratarse de funciones ajenas a la administrativa y registral). Afirmaron los Jueces, la falta de inscripción de la reserva de usufructo e inexactitud de la publicidad registral, aunado a la inadvertencia por el notario responsable de su inscripción y, la conducta de doña María del Carmen, contribuyeron a la no aprobación del remate a favor del acreedor -aquí actor- hasta tanto no se resolviera la situación legal. Estimaron: “Más una cosa es eso, vale decir, la ineficacia del privilegio hipotecario en modo alguno objeto -en sí y por sí-, de la pretensión material económica, y otra, distinta la extinción o desaparición de la deuda, acreencia la cual subsiste. Sin que se haya demostrado, fehacientemente, en este proceso ordinario, más allá de toda duda, la existencia del daño material, y consecuente responsabilidad del cobro -y pago-, a cargo del Estado y del Registro de los daños y perjuicios consistentes -según la pretensión de demanda-, en el Capital debido según el crédito, los Intereses generados por ese crédito, de las Costas de Proceso de Cobro Judicial y su indexación (doctrina del artículo 317 del CPC). En efecto, en cuanto a la pretendida responsabilidad objetiva, de tales daños económicos, por actividad ilícita o anormal, la misma, repetimos, no es de recibo. (…) En el caso presente, como ya señalamos, la nota de advertencia e inmovilización causantes de la improbación del remate-, son consecuencia final de varios sujetos y conductas singulares que concurrieron en su producción. Aparte, como señalamos, la invalidez o invalidez y eventual orden de cancelación del asiento de inscripción de la finca, a nombre de María del Carmen, como dueña del dominio pleno, no ha sido declarada, ni ordenada, en proceso judicial ordinario. Menos, en consecuencia, la nulidad y cancelación de la inscripción de la hipoteca a favor del aquí actor, señor León Valerio. Sin que se tenga noticia de su interposición. Sin que tampoco se pueda -ni deba- resolver nada al respecto, dentro del presente proceso Civil de Hacienda. Pese a la nota de inmovilización, subsiste la eficacia del derecho de crédito. En este sentido, el acto jurídico documentado conserva la condición de título ejecutivo susceptible de perseguir otros bienes o derechos de la deudora, en el mismo proceso o por la vía del proceso monitorio”. Citan como ejemplo, la posibilidad de perseguir la titularidad del derecho a la nuda propiedad que mantiene sobre el inmueble en cuestión doña María del Carmen. Por otra parte, valoraron los Juzgadores, el proceso de cobro judicial no está suspendido, sino inactivo, sin que el acreedor -aquí accionante- haya intentado -y agotado- la posibilidad de pedir el embargo y remate de otros bienes o derechos de la deudora, entre ellos, el derecho de nuda propiedad citado. En fin, sin que se acredite -a la fecha-, la existencia de una deuda incobrable. En virtud de lo cual, concluyeron, existe duda sobre la ineficacia de su derecho de crédito; y, por ende, de la existencia de daño, efectivo, evaluable económicamente, individualizado, esto es, del daño material o económico consistente en la pérdida del capital debido, intereses del crédito y costas del proceso de cobro judicial. Extremos que, por las razones indicadas, estimaron improcedentes.

IV.No comparte esta Órgano Decisor la conclusión a la que arriba el Tribunal, por las siguientes razones. Según lo ha manifestado esta Cámara, la responsabilidad que aquí se analiza (artículos 190 y siguientes de la LGAP y 41 de la Constitución Política) resulta aplicable, siempre y cuando exista un menoscabo comprobado e imputable a un sujeto determinado. Así, el principio es que la Administración responde si al actuar causa un daño, derivándose tres presupuestos básicos: conducta administrativa (activa u omisiva), daño efectivo y entre ambos un vínculo de causa-efecto, o bien, nexo de causalidad. Todas estas precisiones son indispensables a fin de concluir que no todo el funcionamiento ilegítimo o irregular del Estado generaría su responsabilidad, dado que el interesado debe acreditar, además del daño efectivo, la relación de causa-efecto entre ambos. Dicho de otro modo, aún demostrada la conducta irregular de la Administración, el deber de indemnizar no procede de forma automática, pues este es consecuencia de la acreditación fehaciente de los deterioros alegados, como derivados de aquella actuación atípica o anormal. (Sala Primera, resolución no. 869-2012 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 27 de julio de 2012). En el caso concreto, consta en autos, por escritura pública no. 28 otorgada ante Notario Público el 20 de julio de 2011, compareció don José Eduardo Alfaro Chavarría a donar la finca de su propiedad no. 4-119399 a María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría (hermana). En ese mismo acto, don José Eduardo se reservó de por vida los derechos de usufructo, uso y habitación sobre el inmueble. La donación fue inscrita en el Registro Nacional el 29 de julio de 2011, no obstante, por error, el registrador asignado no realizó la reserva de usufructo (quedando inscrita en su totalidad a favor de su hermana). Además, siguiendo el orden de lo acontecido, se tiene por acreditado que al no constar tal reserva en la información registral de la finca, don Jesús otorgó un préstamo crediticio a la referida señora, con garantía hipotecaria sobre el inmueble. Ante el incumplimiento de la obligación contraída, el señor León Valerio planteó proceso de cobro judicial, dentro del cual se celebró el remate y se adjudicó el bien a su favor. Sin embargo, dada la denuncia formulada por don José Eduardo ante el Registro, donde reprochó tener el derecho de usufructo sobre la finca objeto del proceso de cobro, la Administración ordenó la inmovilización del bien y el Juzgado de Cobro dispuso la no aprobación del remate. Desde esa arista, deviene evidente que las actuaciones del órgano registral son constitutivas de un funcionamiento anormal. El Registro Nacional vulneró las competencias que le son propias en la calificación e inscripción de documentos, dejando de lado la voluntad real de las partes. Tal descuido fue efectivamente reconocido por la Dirección del Registro Inmobiliario en la resolución de las 11 horas del 1° de marzo de 2016 (hecho tenido por demostrado no. 15 del fallo cuestionado) al indicar: “Por error registral no se reservó en su oportunidad el derecho de usufructo a favor del señor Alfaro Chavarría; quedando la finca 4-119399 en su totalidad inscrita a nombre de la señora María del Carmen Alfaro Chavarría”. Téngase claro, el error inexcusable en la inscripción de la totalidad de las estipulaciones comprendidas en el título público sometido a su calificación (escritura de donación), fuente de lesiones patrimoniales. En esa dirección, en lo de interés, reclama el accionante los daños económicos derivados de la inadvertencia en que incurrió el Registro al momento de inscribir la escritura de donación, omitiendo la reserva de usufructo a favor de don José Eduardo, lo que conllevó no poder ejecutar el cobro de la deuda ni de la garantía hipotecaria en los términos acordados (con el consecuente impedimento para recuperar el dinero que se le adeuda). En concreto, peticionó el pago del capital debido según el crédito hipotecario, intereses y costas del proceso de cobro judicial. Contrario al razonamiento de los Juzgadores, estima este Órgano Colegiado, el funcionamiento anormal del Registro Nacional sí causó un daño material a don Jesús (que no tiene por qué soportar), específicamente la pérdida o desmejoramiento del privilegio hipotecario, entendido como la posibilidad de ejecutar la garantía real sobre el pleno dominio del inmueble 4-119399-000, al cual tendría derecho el actor, sino fuera por el error registral de examen. Daño efectivo, evaluable e individualizable (al tenor del numeral 196 de la LGAP), el cual a tono con los principios de responsabilidad pública, ha de ser tutelado en esta vía. En la especie, se insiste, el yerro registral ha llevado a desmejorar el derecho de crédito del señor León Valerio, para convertirlo en una deuda que si bien cuenta con un título ejecutivo, que le posibilita acudir a otros mecanismos legales para recuperar lo adeudado, lo cierto del caso es que las condiciones particulares y propias de este caso, sea de crédito, según lo pactado. Véase, la falta al deber de cuidado del Registro privó al demandante de una ventaja hipotecaria y lo puso en una condición litigiosa. Por lo anterior, al denegar el Tribunal la indemnización de un daño cuya existencia resulta evidente, conculcó los numerales 190 y 196 de la LGAP; y en consecuencia, el recurso de la parte accionante deberá ser acogido, con las precisiones que se dirán. Como se indicó, en la especie existe un daño por el desmejoramiento del derecho de crédito, sin embargo, deviene improcedente disponer una indemnización en los términos pretendidos por el accionante (monto total del principal de la deuda garantizada), dado que la posibilidad de cobrar la obligación crediticia subsiste. Pese a la nota de inmovilización del inmueble, existe una deuda constituida (sin privilegio, pero existente) y un título ejecutivo válido para proceder a su cobro. Tal y como razonaron los Jueces, don Jesús cuenta con mecanismos legales para hacer valer sus derechos de crédito, siendo que por decisiones del propio actor no ha optado por ejercitarlos. El señor León Valerio mantiene la posibilidad de exigir el cumplimiento de la deuda dado que el patrimonio es prenda común de los acreedores (sea persiguiendo: otros bienes de la señora Alfaro Chavarría en caso de que existan o lleguen a existir, adjudicarse la nuda propiedad de la finca, entre otras opciones). Entonces, aún y cuando en el subjúdice el daño supone la pérdida del privilegio hipotecario, ello no trae aparejado la extinción de la deuda y menos, una indemnización en los términos pretendidos. Esta Sala ya con anterioridad se ha referido a este tipo de daño patrimonial denominado pérdida de oportunidad o pérdida de chance, tal es el caso de la resolución 371-F-S1-2009 de las 11 horas del 16 de abril de 2009, en que se señala: “X.- El recurrente funda su reclamo en la teoría de la pérdida de la oportunidad. A nivel doctrinal, se afirma que dicho postulado se origina a partir de una conducta ilícita que tiene como consecuencia la afectación de una posibilidad, real y seria, de obtener un beneficio o situación de ventaja futura, respecto del cual, se determina un umbral de probabilidad mayor que el de la mera expectativa, en donde se indemniza a aquél sujeto de derecho que ve cercenado, de su esfera jurídica, una oportunidad de recibir una ventaja patrimonial, caracterizada por un alto grado de certeza en cuanto a su materialización. En este sentido, los autores indican que la causalidad debe ser valorada a partir de la existencia de una oportunidad real, y no como un mecanismo mediante el cual se impute la pérdida de un beneficio patrimonial dejado de percibir, por lo que la eventual indemnización corresponde a la cuantificación del “chance” perdido”. En aplicación concreta de esa teoría, esta Cámara procedió al reconocimiento de indemnización producto de la perdida de una ventaja futura, como se desprende de la sentencia 478-S1-12 de las 14 horas 30 minutos del 12 de abril de 2012, en la que se señala: “(…) considera esta Sala que hay cabida para una indemnización de la lesión patrimonial originada a partir de una conducta ilícita, que tuvo como consecuencia la afectación de una posibilidad, real y seria, de obtener un beneficio o situación futura de ventaja, acentada no en una mera probabilidad, una hipótesis o un mero riesgo, como quedó dicho, sino en una afianzada probabilidad, en un alto grado de certeza para la materialización del contrato final de suministro de energía. Sin embargo, esa real y efectiva lesión patrimonial que se ocasionó a la parte actora con esta frustrada oportunidad, no equivale, ni puede equipararse, con la plenitud de la contraprestación que hubiera obtenido en el supuesto de la ejecución plena del contrato no firmado, ni la utilidad que le pudo generar la relación contractual impedida. Esto, como es obvio, implicaría un enriquecimiento injusto e ilícito de la petente, pues, sin haber entregado energía alguna, obtendría todos los beneficios derivados del contrato. En estos supuestos, la indemnización justa por lo que no nació o se frustró, no es equivalente a la prestación cabal y plena establecida en el contrato. Los daños y perjuicios no son sinónimo aquí de la prestación original pactada, o como en este caso, de la que se hubiere alcanzado. Se trata de reparar patrimonialmente por la lesión primaria o inicial (pérdida de una oportunidad), pero no por los perjuicios o daños de aquella circunstancia final fáctico-jurídica que no se logró alcanzar. Podrían, allí sí, tomarse en consideración los probables factores económicos de la situación última, para utilizarlos como uno de los parámetros prudenciales al momento de establecer el monto de la condena. De esta manera, para su fijación en supuestos como este, habrá de acudirse a la razonable, comedida, prudencial y objetiva discrecionalidad jurisdiccional, en la que, como se hará en este caso, se pondere la relevancia de las circunstancias para las partes; el grado de certidumbre para alcanzar el resultado o ventaja final; las condiciones delperjudicado o víctima; la concurrencia de eventuales beneficiarios; cuando medie convenio, el monto de aquella oportunidad perdida; etc”. En el asunto de estudio, teniéndose por demostrada la existencia del daño causado, pero no su cuantía, de conformidad con el canon 122 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), procede la declaratoria de este en abstracto, para que sea cuantificado en etapa de ejecución de sentencia, en el entendido de que esa lesión patrimonial que se ocasionó no es equivalente a la prestación cabal y plena establecida en la hipoteca (¢21.000.000 por concepto de capital garantizado) y además, tomando en consideración los probables factores económicos de la situación de pérdida del privilegio hipotecario, así como el estado actual de la obligación, para lo cual podrá contar con el auxilio pericial de estimarse necesario. Por otra parte, la eximente de responsabilidad por hecho de un tercero, señalado por los Juzgadores (consistente en la falta de pago de la obligación por parte de la señora Alfaro Chavarría), no se comparte. Ciertamente, el incumplimiento de la obligación produce que se afecte el patrimonio del accionante, quien dentro de la relación hipotecaria, ostenta un privilegio. No obstante, aún esa indolencia de la deudora, la garantía real aseguraba al accionante poder recuperar su crédito en caso de incumplimiento, la forma expedita, lo que no se pudo alcanzar por la deficiencia registral comentada. Tómese en cuenta, el daño no se produce por la falta de pago (como mal valoraron los Juzgadores), sino por la imposibilidad de hacer exigible la hipoteca, dada la falta de inscripción en que incurrió el Registro y con ello, el desmejoramiento de las condiciones de garantía con que contaba el señor León Valerio. Considerar que el incumplimiento de la deudora exime la responsabilidad administrativa, llevaría a negar la existencia del error registral y las consecuencias que ha generado en la esfera jurídica del reclamante, dejando de lado la disfunción en que ha incurrido el Registro Nacional. En otro orden de ideas, respecto a la inobservancia o descuido en la función del notario ante quien se otorgó la escritura de donación, en la cual se constituyó la reserva de usufructo a favor de don José Eduardo, inscripción que no fue completada, debe señalarse, no lleva razón el Tribunal. Resulta indiscutible, los hechos no tuvieron lugar por inobservancia o descuido de la función propia del profesional en cuestión. Si bien como notario público le correspondía realizar las diligencias necesarias para que se inscribieran los documentos autorizados (artículo 38 inciso h del Código Notarial), es labor del Registro Público la “registración” de tales contratos (precepto 1 del Reglamento del Registro Público no. 26771-J) y de los registradores en particular, “la calificación e inscripción de los documentos sometidos a su estudio, lo cual harán por los medios que dispongan en coordinación con la dirección, con la obligación de brindar un eficiente servicio.” (numeral 9 ibídem). Suponer, como se pretende, que el notario esté obligado a detectar los errores registrales como elemento sin el cual el Registro queda exonerado de sus propios yerros, implica desconocer el principio de eficiencia que debe resguardar el desempeño de todo servicio público (regla 269.1 de la LGAP), así como las obligaciones puntuales de los registradores. Aunado a lo anterior, interesa señalar, la falta de formulación de acciones cobratorias no puede considerarse como causa del daño, ni como una culpa de la víctima que puedan tener como efecto la ruptura del nexo causal que se presenta entre la indolencia pública y las lesiones patrimoniales analizadas. Estimar lo contrario sería cohonestar la desvinculación total de la Administración que con su prestación defectuosa en un servicio público que se entiende especializado, ha ocasionado una lesión a terceros. Disfunción pública que produce inseguridad registral. Por último, la consigna de inmovilización del inmueble dado en hipoteca, a diferencia de lo que se arguye, no lleva a negar la existencia de un daño en los términos ya explicados. Ciertamente en tanto esa nota registral se mantenga vigente, la finca no puede ejecutarse judicialmente, ello no se traduce en que el accionante pueda llegar a ejercer su derecho de garantía real sobre ese bien (al menos en cuanto a la nuda propiedad) y con ello, obtener la satisfacción de su crédito. En los términos indicados, respecto al daño material requerido procederá acoger las censuras y revocar el fallo impugnado (con las consecuencias jurídicas que se dirán).

Recurso de la Junta Administradora co-demandada

V.La casacionista plantea dos agravios por violación de normas sustantivas. Primero, indebida aplicación de los artículos 22 de la Ley de Creación del Registro Nacional y 190, 192, 194 y 197 de la LGAP, con la consecuente falta de aplicación de los cánones 20, 21, 22, 701, 1020, 1022 y 1025 del Código Civil (CC). Apunta, contrario al criterio del Tribunal, el daño moral subjetivo concedido no nace o se origina de forma directa en lo acaecido en el ámbito registral, sino en la actuación personal de la señora Alfaro Chavarría, al dar en garantía hipotecaria el inmueble 119399-00 sabiendo que no ostentaba la titularidad plena. Tal actuación, afirma, configura lo que en doctrina se conoce como “reticencia dolosa”, sea la existencia de un vicio en el consentimiento, en concreto del dolo, lo que deviene en una eximente de responsabilidad administrativa por la acción de un tercero (al tenor del numeral 190 de la LGAP), con el consecuente rompimiento del nexo causal atribuido en sentencia. Segundo, indebida aplicación de los mandatos 82.4 del CPCA y 317 del Código Procesal Civil, así como, falta de aplicación de los ordinales 41 de la Constitución Política, 704 del CC y 16 de la LGAP. Señala, ni del escrito de demanda o de la prueba constante en autos, es posible determinar el contenido del daño moral concedido y los elementos de convicción con base en los cuales los Jueces formaron el juicio de valor para otorgar en tal concepto la suma de ¢5.000.00,00. Monto que estima excesivo. Explica, gran parte del sufrimiento invocado deriva, según el propio dicho del actor, del no pago de la obligación originaria asumida por la deudora, además, de un inadecuado uso de los procedimientos y herramientas jurídicas existentes para hacer valer su derecho. Destaca, sí el accionante hubiese solicitado sacar a remate y adjudicarse únicamente la nuda propiedad, bien habría podido cobrar la suma que le adeudaban, de manera que, la afectación anímica sería considerablemente inferior.

VI.Sobre el daño moral subjetivo razonaron los Juzgadores: “(…) se estima la existencia-in re ipsa-, de daño moral subjetivo. En efecto, como señala la parte actora, la grave omisión y falta al deber de cuidado del registrador en su momento, así como la negligencia del Registro a la hora de vigilar las actuaciones de sus funcionarios, fueron los detonantes que permitieron -concurrentemente con otros sujetos y conductas-, que se desencadenasen otra serie de hechos ya mencionados, y que a hoy son los causantes de la situación en que se encuentra, el actor. Siendo de presumir, entonces, razonablemente, que en estos años los sentimientos provocados por todas esas actuaciones han representado en el señor León Valerio un desgaste en su persona, un gran enojo, y un mar de emociones negativas, tales como decepción, frustración, rabia, impotencia, desesperación, angustia, y pérdida de confianza en las instituciones públicas. Sin embargo, se rechaza el pago de ¢20.000.000., suma en que la parte actora cuantifica el cobro del daño moral y en su lugar, se fija y concede, en la suma, equitativa, razonable y proporcionada, en razón de las circunstancias, de ¢5.000.000, en razón de la existencia, en este caso, de Concurrencia de Causas”.

VII.Comparte esta Sala la condenatoria impuesta a título de daño moral subjetivo, más no la suma otorgada. Es posible la afectación al fuero interno que puede generar en cualquier persona los errores registrales como el examinado en este asunto, máxime cuando éstos comprometen su patrimonio. Contrario a las censuras esgrimidas, es innegable que el funcionamiento anormal de la Administración desencadenó una perturbación injusta en las condiciones anímicas del actor, que no tenía el deber de soportar. En esa dirección, es posible presumir la angustia, tristeza, incertidumbre, desazón, enojo y en general, la afectación emocional que sintió don Jesús al perder el privilegio hipotecario sobre el pleno dominio del inmueble dado en garantía, así como, la facilidad inmediata que tenía para cobrar lo adeudado, la cual, por el error del Registro Nacional, ahora se le turna litigiosa. El desacierto administrativo es causa suficiente para vincular de forma directa el daño moral que el actor peticiona, es decir, opera como nexo causal generador de responsabilidad administrativa (artículo 190 LGAP), en aplicación del principio constitucional del derecho al buen servicio público. No obstante, la extensión del daño es diversa de la dispuesta por el fallo impugnado, como bien reclama la casacionista. Según se indicó en el Considerando IV de esta sentencia, en el caso concreto lo que ocurre es una pérdida o desmejoramiento de las condiciones de garantía con que contaba el accionante, no obstante, éste mantiene la posibilidad de exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación hipotecaria. Si bien es cierto, la expectativa de recuperar de manera célere lo adeudado se vio afectada por el yerro registral de examen, la cual tuvo un impacto en la esfera emocional del señor León Valerio, no consta en autos ningún elemento probatorio que determine el impedimento para recuperar el dinero dado en calidad de préstamo (posibilidad que aún mantiene y no ha sido desvirtuada en este proceso). En esos términos, considera esta Sala, lo procedente será revocar la resolución recurrida en cuanto el monto otorgado a título de daño moral subjetivo, para en su lugar fijarlo en la cifra de ¢2.500.000,00. Tal suma compensa el sufrimiento generado por la omisión, inactividad y falta al deber de cuidado del Registro Nacional, al privar a don Jesús de una ventaja hipotecaria y ponerlo en una condición litigiosa.

VIII.Conforme a lo razonado y expuesto, lo procedente será acoger ambos recursos de casación. En consecuencia, se anulará la sentencia combatida en cuanto: denegó el daño material pretendido y, otorgó la suma de ¢5.000.000,00 por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. En su lugar, fallando por el fondo, se condenará en abstracto a la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional (y subsidiariamente al Estado) al pago de la pérdida económica sufrida por la conducta anormal de la Administración, así como los intereses de ley dejados de percibir, que correrán desde la inscripción de la escritura pública de donación (sin la reserva de usufruto) y hasta su efectivo pago y del monto que se defina en la etapa de ejecución. Se fijará el daño moral subjetivo en el monto de ¢2.500.000,00. Por la pérdida del privilegio que no equivale al monto de la deuda. Se resolverá sin condenatoria en costas de la casación, conforme al canon 150 inciso 3) del CPCA.

POR TANTO

Se declaran con lugar ambos recursos de casación. En consecuencia, se anula la sentencia combatida en cuanto denegó el daño material pretendido y otorgó la suma de ¢5.000.000,00 por concepto de daño moral subjetivo. En su lugar, fallando por el fondo, se condena en abstracto a la Junta Administrativa del Registro Nacional (y subsidiariamente al Estado) al pago del daño causado, así como los intereses de ley dejados de percibir desde la pérdida del privilegio hipotecario hasta el efectivo pago, de lo cuantificado en la etapa de ejecución de sentencia, en los términos dispuestos en el considerando IV de esta sentencia. Se fija el daño moral subjetivo en el monto de ¢2.500.000,00. Se resuelve sin condenatoria en costas de la casación.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vasquez cchavesv