Effectiveness and legal nature of land-use certificates after the repeal of a regulatory planEficacia y naturaleza jurídica de los certificados de uso de suelo ante la derogatoria del plan regulador

**160121091027CA*** **Exp: 16-012109-1027-CA** **Res. 001960-F-S1-2020** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the third of June of two thousand twenty.

Contentious-administrative ordinary proceeding filed by FIDUCIARIA AML S.A., FINCA DE CAMPO S.A., ROM DE TURRIALBA S.A., and INVERSIONES LA QUINTA DE CENTROAMÉRICA S.A., represented by Néstor José Mata Solano, of legal age, married once, identity card number 3-0222-0598, and Attorney Alejandro Monge Ariño, of legal age, lawyer, license number 13023, against the MUNICIPALITY OF CARTAGO, represented by Attorney Wilbert Quesada Garita, of legal age, lawyer, license number 8790, and against the STATE, represented by Attorney Maureen Medrano Brenes, of legal age, lawyer, license number 9599.

Judge Rivas Loáiciga writes; **WHEREAS** **I.-** The Tribunal, without the parties contesting it, held the following factual situations as proven. Finca de Campo Sociedad Anónima, ROM de Turrialba Sociedad Anónima, and Inversiones La Quinta de Centro América Sociedad Anónima requested land use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) from the Municipality of Cartago, which were granted on September 12, 2007, based on the 1974 Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador). By agreement taken at the session held on September 13, 2007, the aforementioned Regulatory Plan was repealed. On February 26, 2008, the new Regulatory Plan entered into force. These companies asked the Cartago City Council to update the mentioned land uses. This procedure was denied in a resolution at 10:00 a.m. on August 19, 2015. Against this action, they filed a motion for reconsideration with a subsidiary appeal, as well as nullity; which were denied by resolution at 8:40 a.m. on November 23, 2015. In a brief filed on November 30, 2015, before the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal—acting as an improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio)—they expressed their grievances. In resolution no. 235-2016 at 1:30 p.m. on May 31, 2016, that Section rejected the appeal and confirmed the challenged administrative act. Due to the foregoing, these companies filed a lawsuit against the Municipality of Cartago and the State, where they requested a declaration that: the administrative act consisting of the resolution at 1:30 p.m. on May 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal—acting as a two-phase improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio bifásico)—is absolutely null. In which it confirmed the act of the Mayor's Office of the Municipality of Cartago at 8:43 a.m. on November 23, 2015, where the current validity of the land use certificates was rejected; the current validity of such land uses, under the same conditions in which they had been approved for a construction permit for R-700 purposes. Furthermore, they requested that the defendant be ordered to pay consequential damages (daño emergente) under the terms of subsection m. ii) of rule 122 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA), so that its quantification be reserved for the judgment execution phase. Likewise, that interest be ordered on the approved amounts from the date the judgment becomes final until its effective payment. The defendant City Council answered negatively and raised the defenses of lack of: right, active standing (legitimación activa), and passive standing (legitimación pasiva). For its part, the State representation opposed the plaintiff's claims and raised the defenses of lack of standing in both aspects, as well as lack of right. The Tribunal, by majority, upheld the exception of lack of passive standing raised by the State and rejected that invoked by the Municipality. Similarly, it rejected the defense of lack of standing alleged by the co-defendants. It upheld the exception of lack of right, consequently declaring the lawsuit without merit (sin lugar), with costs to be borne by the losing plaintiff companies. Disagreeing with this, the losing parties file a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) where they develop one procedural grievance and three substantive ones.

**II.-** Before proceeding to the presentation and consideration of the charges, it is necessary to explain that the cassation appellants, in a final section—after setting forth their procedural and substantive grievances—which they call "COROLLARIES," refer to the conclusions issued by the Tribunal, which they cite or transcribe. In essence, they dedicate themselves to criticizing what the judges decided, regarding that the land uses lost effectiveness when the regulatory plan according to which they had been approved was repealed. They allude to what was stated by the Mayor of Cartago in the administrative venue and finally accuse that, in the sub examine, the jurisprudence was not applied. Regarding what was decided concerning that the rule used when granting the land uses had been repealed and could not be updated. They argue that among their claims is not that of "updating" Cartago's urban regulations. What was requested, they state, was that the land uses approved when the repealed regulatory plan was in force be recognized as having current validity. They similarly allude to the endorsement granted by the Tribunal to what was decided by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal when hearing their appeal. However, they claim, the judges contradict themselves, since, in recital IV, they agreed with them in establishing that the land uses did not expire after one year. They challenge what was decided by the improper hierarchical superior on this point, as it was held as not proven that "correlative procedures" aimed at translating such acts into construction permits had been carried out. They emphasize that this Section of the Tribunal modified the administrative conduct and ventured into extremes that were not challenged, so what was decided by it was not merely confirmatory, but fully impacted the criterion issued when exhausting administrative remedies. Therefore, they estimate, the State is responsible given that the improper hierarchy overstepped its functions. Thus, they argue, there is an evident unreasonable disproportionality in being ordered to pay costs, since they litigated in good faith, not in a reckless manner. They add that the fact that arguments different from those debated in the municipal venue were made before the improper hierarchical superior does not justify that they were left unresolved, "...because if it is a legality controller, precisely its function is to detect and rule ex officio on any administrative conduct contrary to the Law, even regardless of whether or not it was based on discussed arguments." Nor, they point out, is it justified that the evident errors incurred by the Third Section when resolving their allegations—debated in the municipal venue—were ignored. Even less, they note, that it ruled on an aspect where the Mayor decided that the "...land uses do generate subjective rights and consequently cannot be rendered ineffective without a prior lesivity proceeding…". They insist that the improper hierarchical superior overstepped its functions, as it modified the Mayor's criterion, by establishing that, "...when a Regulatory Plan changes, the land uses are rendered ineffective (the same substantive stance that the Tribunal has now applied in the judgment at hand)…". They state that the improper superior is a legality controller, but regarding the aspects discussed, not over what had already been granted, given that this would entail accepting the substitution of administrative conduct, to the detriment of recognized rights, which threatens legal certainty. The improper hierarchical superior, they indicate, "...is for the purpose of avoiding arbitrariness by the municipal administration against the administered party, but not to 'recklessly straighten out' the municipality's possible or eventual errors... in favor of the administered party." They reprove that the City Council could also have avoided this through "tolerated non-conforming use," given that in its agreements numbers 49-06 of December 18, 2006, and 106-07 of September 13, 2007, it committed to respecting those land uses that had been requested before the new regulatory plan entered into force. The foregoing, they point out, without distinguishing between uses processed and not yet resolved and those requested and already approved. Consequently, they state that a difference cannot be made where the law does not make one, and that such agreements must be applied in all cases, "...without exclusions by way of bifurcation, as the Tribunal erroneously did." They reprove what the judges concluded regarding that the land uses issued by the Municipality in 2007 lost effectiveness with the repeal of the 1974 regulatory plan. Likewise, they censure what was decided regarding that the actions and procedures carried out by them under the land use certificate before other entities and institutions do not have the effect intended by them, since they did not materialize the expectations of right they had. They object that the Tribunal disdained the documentation provided, which it did not even analyze. It limited itself to discrediting its probative value, due to not having obtained the construction permit. Hence, they state, if such a permit was not achieved, it was not due to their idleness, abandonment, or negligence, but due to material impossibility. This is because INVU refused to continue with the processing upon realizing, in February 2008, that the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 was published. Furthermore, the municipality did not want to continue them, arguing that it was applying supplementary regulations linked to INVU, which they consider a contradiction by those institutions. The judges, they point out, held the view that land uses do not confer subjective rights, which is contrary to constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Chamber. They note that the Tribunal considered that the land uses became ineffective one calendar day after being approved, or at most, four and a half months later when the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan was published in La Gaceta. Consequently, it was impossible to obtain construction permits in such a short time, due to the number and complexity of necessary procedures. Therefore, they affirm, "no one is obliged to do the impossible." Next, they reproduce in its entirety the dissenting vote (voto salvado) and request that it be considered an integral part of the grounds of their cassation appeal. It is clear that the objection is merely expository, without a legal foundation directly related to the debated judgment. It is limited to making generic statements not aimed at attacking what the Tribunal decided on the extremes to which it alludes. It must be emphasized that it restricts itself to pointing out its disagreement in this regard without citing the substantive right violated. Thus, as observed, it does not refute or dispute, legally, the judges' considerations regarding what was decided. Moreover, they refer indistinctly to what was decided by the improper hierarchy and the Tribunal, it being clear that at this procedural stage, only what was decided by the Tribunal can be attacked. What the cassation appellants should have done in their challenge was to provide the grounds why what was decided was incorrect, that is, expose the factual and legal reasons that evidenced the error committed in the appealed judgment, which is lacking. Nor is the request admissible concerning that the dissenting vote be considered an integral part of their appeal. This is because it is their obligation to clearly and precisely set forth the reasoning through which they challenge what the judges decided. Furthermore, some of their criticisms are reiterated in their substantive grievances, therefore they will be examined when these are considered. Consequently, the arguments they develop in this section which they called "corollaries" cannot be considered by this Chamber due to their informality.

**Cassation appeal for procedural reasons** **III.-** Sole grievance: Accuses lack of or improper reasoning (fundamentación) in the Tribunal's judgment. They allege that in this type of proceeding, when an administrative act is challenged, the judge is obliged to analyze its subjective and material elements, to determine, they point out, even ex officio, that it substantially conforms to the legal system. In their opinion, not performing this exercise entails "an absence of descriptive reasoning, since all the factual or legal situations that, for example, make up the grounds (motivo) of the act were not taken into account…". They note that such reasoning is a right of the parties and constitutes an unavoidable requirement for the validity of the judgment. In support, they reproduce an excerpt from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber. In the case under examination, they argue, the Tribunal incurred the defect of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) given that it considered in isolation the minutes of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, and set aside minute no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007. In which, they state, it was agreed that the effects of the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 did not affect the use applications submitted before it was repealed. This, they point out, is what occurred in this case. They explain that the repeal entered into force when it was published in La Gaceta in February 2008, while the land uses were approved for them on September 12, 2007, one calendar day before the agreement taken by the Municipal Council that agreed to repeal it. They censure that the judges completely ignored minute no. 106 of September 13, 2007. The foregoing, they affirm, since it did not explain in any way why what was stated in that agreement does not lead to considering the cited transitional rule for land uses as "included," beyond how it should have been interpreted, that is, regarding its scope in the specific case, which, they accept, is a substantial aspect they will address later. They reiterate that "there was an incomplete assessment or reading of the documentary evidence." They add that the majority vote did not consider the City Council agreement of September 13, 2007, which they claim expressly referred to the application of the municipal agreement of December 18, 2006. Finally, they cite jurisprudence from this Decision-Making Body on the lack of reasoning.

**IV.-** Regarding the defect of lack of reasoning, this Decision-Making Body has determined that it occurs when the reasoning of the ruling does not exist, or its development is extremely confused or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part. By virtue of this, reasoning is not only mandatory, according to precept 57 of the CPCA, but also constitutes a requirement within a State of Law in accordance with what is prescribed in article 137, subsection d) of the CPCA. Likewise, as a reproach susceptible to being reviewed through the extraordinary cassation appeal, under the terms of the cited canon, it should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal grounds of the judgment. It is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process, but rather, that the ruling contains the grounds on which the corresponding decision was adopted. As can be deduced from the charge developed by the cassation appellants, the complaint does not relate to a procedural aspect but to a substantive one related to the examination of the elements of the administrative act. Also regarding evidentiary assessment, since they argue that the judges set aside a minute of the Municipal Council of Cartago. Although they allege that what was decided does not address the manner in which the transitional rule contained in the mentioned act (no. 106 of September 13, 2007, of the Municipal Council) should be interpreted, nor did the Tribunal set forth why what is regulated in said agreement does not include land uses. However, later, they point out that the documentary evidence was not assessed or read, which evidences an indirect error that escapes the procedural error of lack of reasoning. Given that such arguments are reiterated when developing the substantive grievances, their study will be undertaken when considering those reproaches.

**Cassation appeal for substantive reasons** **V.-** First: Alleges that the Tribunal incurred improper evidentiary assessment. They refer to what this Chamber has decided on this defect, and state that it is configured, among other things, when judges grant an element of conviction the "...accreditation of a different fact, than what it actually contains." They add that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Chamber, evidence must be assessed according to the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica)—experience, logic, and psychology. They refute that a decision was omitted on their main argument: "...recognizing current validity for the several land uses granted to my represented parties on September 12, 2007, and the consequent administrative liability for it became an inevitable violation of the principle of Intangibility of One's Own Acts…". The foregoing, because the Municipal Council, when repealing the regulatory plan of 1974, provided that it did so based on the totality of prior agreements, therefore, in their view, the rules contained in transitional provision 2 of minute 49 of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, apply. They reproduce what was agreed: "Second: Applications for land use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that may have been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal shall be resolved based on the rules that are being repealed here." They censure what the Tribunal decided regarding that said administrative decision was not issued as a transitional provision in the regulatory body of the Regulatory Plan, and therefore was not part of the administrative legal system applicable when resolving this matter. They add that the Tribunal expressed that this was due to a requirement of the Municipal Council, which, to have general scope and regulatory effects, should have been incorporated into the cited Regulation. The foregoing, they indicate, without considering what was expressly stated in the mentioned agreement, where the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 was provided—article 2 of minute no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007—which they transcribe in the relevant part, and where they point out that minute no. 49 of December 18, 2006, is cited—issuance of the transitional rule, referring to land uses processed before the final repeal of September 13, 2007—. They object that what was decided by the judges finds no support in any legal rule, and therefore brand what was decided as "formalistic." They state that it was indeed included, "...not directly but indirectly by express REFERRAL, since the Municipal Council of Cartago was clear in indicating in its final repeal agreement that the decision to suppress the 1974 Regulatory Plan was based on ALL its ANTECEDENTS… the first antecedent was precisely the agreement contained in Minute 49-06 of December 18, 2006, where the process aimed at the repeal was opened…". In their opinion, this led to disallowing current effectiveness to land uses that were issued in light of such a regulatory plan. They emphasize that if the repeal did not affect the land use applications made before the cited repeal, with even greater reason it could not affect land uses approved prior to being repealed. Hence, they argue, if it was forbidden to disavow the land uses processed, with even greater reason or logic, a land use approved previously cannot be disavowed, since the latter possesses greater certainty or legal security than the one requested, in accordance with what is regulated in article 34 of the Political Constitution—non-retroactivity to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations. Second: Refutes what was decided in the majority vote, regarding that land uses are merely "declaratory" and therefore do not generate subjective rights. They affirm that this position is contrary to the jurisprudence of this Decision-Making Body and that of the Constitutional Chamber. They refute that the Tribunal eluded the cited jurisprudential contradiction, arguing its "inapplicability," although without explaining why those rulings are not applicable in the sub examine. Regarding ruling no. 1285-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber, they explain that it resolved that land uses grant acquired rights; furthermore, it maintained the validity of acts of that nature, which had been granted based on a decree that was declared unconstitutional. They claim that for this reason, what the Tribunal decided contradicts the cited jurisprudence, since it expressed that, upon the repeal in 2008 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, the land uses granted to them on September 12, 2007, were rendered "ineffective." They highlight what they call "the senselessness" of the thesis endorsed by the judges, given that if the ineffectiveness of those resolutions occurred upon the declaration of that Regulatory Plan, it means, "...they became ineffective barely ONE CALENDAR DAY after they were granted…". This, because the municipal agreement that repealed it was adopted on September 13, 2007, although it was published in La Gaceta in February 2008. They object that the Tribunal used as a basis a legal opinion from the PGR, despite it being part of the process as the legal representative of the State. Hence, they point out, it used legal "doctrine" emanating from one of the parties to the litigation, which they brand as "improper… not very transparent or ethical from the standpoint of technical reasoning of the judgment…". They mention that ruling no. 9565 (case file no. 17-004467-0007-CO) of the Constitutional Chamber confirmed the judiciary's thesis in the sense that land uses generate subjective rights. In support, they partially reproduce judgments of the Constitutional Body and of this Chamber, related to land uses. They argue that in those rulings, it is verified that these acts are not "declaratory," as the Tribunal erroneously decided, but rather grant subjective rights, which the Municipality cannot disavow, unless it resorts to a lesivity proceeding [precept 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP]). Likewise, they refer that it could resort to revocation, when it intends to disavow the continuity of the effects of the acts, for reasons of convenience or opportunity, in accordance with what is prescribed in article 152 et seq. ibid. Regarding this latter point, they point out that the judges were mistaken in understanding that its issuance constitutes a "regulated act" (acto reglado) and therefore cannot be revoked in accordance with what is stipulated in cited canon 156.1. Contrary to what was decided, they state that there were three discretionary acts that justify or compel the revocation of the land uses. Namely, the one that repealed the 1974 regulatory plan; the one that approved the new regulatory plan, where a different land use—agricultural—was established for their properties, on which residential use had been approved; the one that refused to recognize the current validity of such certificates. They insist that the City Council has alleged that said land uses—validly granted and in accordance with the legal system—became "ineffective" when the regulatory plan based on which they had been approved was repealed. They emphasize that the defendant municipality decided to repeal the 1974 regulatory plan, which they qualify as a "discretionary decision," so, in their opinion, revocation was possible, if what was sought was to disavow such acts, based on which they carried out various procedures and even gave their properties as guarantee for a trust (fideicomiso), due to the residential potential (vocación residencial) of their real estate. They state that their value decreased when they were destined for agricultural uses, as testified by witness Óscar Calderón, who explained the difference in the value of the properties according to their possible use. Which, they claim, constitutes the technical basis of their patrimonial damage. They note that jurisprudence, in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code (Código Civil, CC), fulfills an integrating function of the law, and thus allows for supplementing the absence or insufficiency of the law. Thus, it acquires the same rank as the rule it integrates, interprets, or delimits. Consequently, "...as there is no law in Costa Rica that states what happens with conforming land uses when the regulatory plan with which they were approved is repealed or when a new one that contradicts them is approved, then the jurisprudence came to fill that normative 'void'…". Third: Accuses "breach of the principles of reasonableness and legal proportionality." They argue that, in the event the procedural and substantive grounds asserted in this appeal are denied, they request "...that the judgment brought on appeal be overturned regarding that (which) ordered them… to pay both costs of the action." Precept 193, subsection b) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (CPCA), they say, provides the possibility of exempting the losing party when, due to the nature of the issues debated, there was sufficient reason (motivo bastante) to litigate. They affirm that the judge must weigh factors of reasonableness when evaluating whether a party resorted justifiably to the judicial apparatus, or if, on the contrary, they did so recklessly and boldly. In the matter under analysis, they indicate that what was debated was based on reasonable arguments and evidence, which, they say, the Tribunal itself qualified as "respectable," which the counterparty also did in the oral trial. Hence, in their view, it is burdensome, even in the eventual rejection of their claims, to be ordered to pay costs, since they litigated under the protection of the national jurisprudence, which coincides with their thesis or theory of the case. Even, they state, with support from municipal agreements that established that the "...previous conforming land uses prior to the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 under which they had been granted could not be disavowed…". They argue that, in accordance with "...detectable reasonableness, and based on a premise of proportionality and even legal certainty, is why they request..." to be exempted from paying costs, having had sufficient reason to litigate and having done so in good faith.

**VI.-** The crux of what is challenged lies in what the Tribunal decided regarding the non-validity of the land uses obtained by the co-plaintiffs, based on the 1974 Regulatory Plan. This is due to the enactment of the new urban planning of the Municipality of Cartago, which entered into force in February 2008. Because the first and second grievances relate to aspects regarding the legal nature and scope of land use, these reproaches will be considered together. Regarding the relevant part, the Tribunal decided: 2) The cessation of the effects of land use certificates that have lost validity and effectiveness by virtue of a new applicable zoning regulation does not require initiating any administrative or judicial proceeding. …the plaintiff argues… in their view, since a subjective right exists granted by a favorable administrative act, in accordance with what is provided by the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, even when the regulations change or are repealed, in this case the Regulatory Plan, said act remains in force and to be able to suppress it… it is necessary to resort to the revocation procedure contemplated in article 152 et seq. of the General Law of Public Administration. Tribunal's Criterion. …urban planning regulations translate into limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the owners (sic) over the property, insofar as they determine land use and how that utilization must occur. This task is materialized through the administrative act called land use certification, which due to its importance is qualified as a declaratory administrative act (in the sense that it is limited to certifying a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it), but they are not constitutive acts of rights per se, since they do not create or modify previously established legal situations… Land use certificates have been understood as acts through which the Local Corporation communicates the conformity or not of the land use with what is established in the respective zoning for that historical moment; as provided in article 28 of the Urban Planning Law… Thus, through the 'land use certificate,' it is not decided what the permitted use is, since this is a different situation insofar as it has already been previously determined in the respective zoning regulation, which integrates the local regulatory plan; it simply certifies what the permitted use is according to what was previously established by the latter two. The doctrine has indicated that urban plans are acts of authority with which the land is disciplined, in a way that affects private rights (property rights) by predetermining the permitted modes of enjoyment and use of the property… The land use certification is merely descriptive regarding a factual situation determined in relation to what is provided under a legal rule, by reason of which, through it, a pre-existing legal situation is not consolidated prior to the certifying act.

From the foregoing citations and from the development that has been carried out on this topic by case law and doctrine, the conclusion is clearly reached that the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) does not confer a subjective right to build or subdivide (fraccionar), but rather constitutes a prerequisite that any interested party must fulfill in order to obtain a construction license or permit… it is clear to this Court that in the case under examination we are in the… scenario where at the time the plaintiff filed applications for land use (uso de suelo) (2006), which were granted in accordance with the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) in force at that time, this manifestation by the Administration being a formal conduct that simply delimited the use of the property at the time of issuance of the certificate and as long as the regulatory body that supported said information was in force. Now, having this premise clear, we must address the plaintiff's argument regarding the necessity or not, of initiating… a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad) or an administrative revocation procedure (procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria), as a prerequisite for considering the effects of a land use (uso de suelo) certified prior to the modification or enactment of a regulatory plan (plan regulador) to have ceased… the Constitutional Chamber in Vote No. 755-95 of 12:12 p.m. on February 4, 1994, regarding the annulment of administrative acts: “...the Administration is prohibited from suppressing by its own action those acts it has issued that confer subjective rights on individuals[...]. The only avenue the State has to eliminate one of its acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional lesivity process (proceso jurisdiccional de lesividad)… when the Administration deems that it must render an administrative act declaratory of subjective rights ineffective in the administrative venue, considering that a defect exists in one or some elements of the administrative act that causes its absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, it must observe the Administrative Procedure contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration, in order to guarantee Due Process to the parties whose subjective rights or legitimate interests may be harmed… it is clear that to render an administrative act declaratory of a subjective right ineffective, due process must be observed; however, the defendants on this point have been in agreement in indicating that in this case we are not in the presence of an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, because the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) does not suffer from any defect, a thesis that this Court shares... In any case, we must warn that this Chamber of Judges, in light of what was set forth above, holds the thesis that the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) does not constitute any right, but rather has declaratory and not constitutive effects of rights, such that the procedure for evident and manifest nullity is inappropriate.

b.2. With respect to the viability of exercising a judicial action aimed at the declaration of nullity of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo), the same outcome applies. A lesivity process, like that indicated in the procedure for evident and manifest nullity, must be based on the review of a declaratory act of rights. As indicated supra, the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) is not one, nor does it exhibit defects in its elements that would lead to its declaration of nullity. That being the case, this argument is also rejected.

b.3. Finally, regarding the procedure for revocation of the act (land use), it is also inapplicable in the specific case, given that the revocation of administrative acts by the Administration only operates when dealing with discretionary, not regulated, acts, as happens in this case and we explain below. The revocation of a valid and effective administrative act occurs in three scenarios: 1. It is an act issued under the protection of administrative discretion using the criteria of opportunity, convenience, or merit, in accordance with ordinal 153 paragraph 3 of the LGAP, such that the revocation of valid administrative acts is possible, that is, those substantially in conformity with the legal systems and that are producing effects… According to the opinion of the plaintiff's representation, in order to render ineffective the administrative act called "land use (uso de suelo)" granted to its represented parties, the defendant Municipality had to resort to this procedure because it is not possible to go back on its own acts unless the Law authorizes it; in this sense, this Court considers that while the plaintiff's arguments are respectable, they are not shared by virtue of the fact that although Articles 152 and 153 of the General Law of Public Administration grant the Administration the power to eliminate favorable acts from the legal world through the institute of revocation, under penalty of nullity for not following the procedures or the scenarios listed therein, it is necessary to take into account for the case at hand what is provided in subsection 1) of Article 156 of the same regulatory body, which provides: “… Article 156.- 1. Revocation of regulated acts shall not be possible…” …for acts of a regulated type, the institute of revocation is not possible, because the revocation procedure is provided for discretionary acts since the exercise of regulated powers limits the action of the Public Administration to verifying that the requirements established by the legal system are met and to establishing the corresponding legal consequence… In summary, this Court considers that the revocation procedure is not applicable to the present case by virtue of the fact that the “land uses (usos de suelo)” are regulated and not discretionary administrative acts; the defendant administration would have been wrong to resort to revocation as the plaintiff argued. 3)… we will address… the argument concerning the validity and effectiveness of the land uses (usos de suelo) with reference to the repealed regulatory plan (plan regulador) and the effects that what was ordered by the Municipality in Article 3 of Minutes 49 of December 18, 2006, could have had… Regarding the validity of land uses (usos de suelo) and their effectiveness as a formal administrative act creating favorable rights. Among the arguments raised in this venue by the municipal representation, we have that it argues that the land-use certificates (certificados de usos de suelo) granted to the plaintiff lost their validity and effectiveness with the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was repealed and consequently it is legally impossible to grant the land uses (usos de suelo) at this moment because in the place where the properties are located, with the new regulatory plan currently in force, they cannot be granted. To counter-argue this idea, the plaintiff indicated that the Municipality disregards its own acts such as the second transitional provision contained in Minutes 49 of December 18, 2006… regarding what is provided in agreement III of Minutes 49 of December 18, 2006, we have that it literally provides: "...Second. applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that had been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal shall be resolved based on the regulation that is hereby repealed...". This Chamber considers that the plaintiff is not correct in the effect that it seeks to give to said municipal agreement, that being, that if it provided that the mere submission of applications must be processed under the repealed regulation, with much more reason the rights obtained in favorable acts must be respected and given the same effect. This Court considers that its argument lacks merit, since the administrative decision under analysis, -as correctly indicated by the Municipality's representation- has a transitional connotation and aims to avoid harmful effects on those who have formulated an "Application" for a land-use certificate (certificación de uso de suelo) and is not directed at those who have land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) issued previously, much less, so many years before. In any case, note that that administrative decision as such, was not assumed as a transitional provision within the regulatory body of the Regulatory Plan, and therefore it cannot be understood as part of the administrative legal system applicable when resolving the matter, as it responds to a requirement of the Municipal Council, which, in order to have effects of general scope and a normative nature, had to have been incorporated within the Regulation called the Regulatory Plan… In conclusion, in the specific case, that non-normative administrative act, in this Court's opinion, is not applicable, since we are in the presence of land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) granted under repealed regulations, ergo, they lose effectiveness and not validity, with the enactment of the new regulations, as we explain below.- b.1.2. Being clear that the core issue up to this point, as it has been developed, is that favorable administrative acts indeed exist issued by the Municipality, but that said acts (land use) were granted according to the regulations contained in the repealed regulatory plan of 1974, this Panel of Judges proceeds to hear and delimit whether their effectiveness indeed persists despite the repeal, either by reason of the nature of the right or due to any action taken by the plaintiffs aimed at consolidating said right. First, it is clear to this Chamber of Judges from what has been stated, that in the present case, we are faced with the issuance of land-use certificates (certificados de usos de suelos) that are understood as administrative acts that simply delimit the use or uses that can be given to the property or real estate, and consequently, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice cited by the plaintiff in support of its action, regarding the recognition of the right even when the regulation upon which they were granted has changed, are not applicable to the case under study. Second, regarding the evidence provided by the plaintiff both in the administrative venue (evidence for better resolution before the Third Section, visible on folios 72 of the administrative file) and in this venue with which it is intended to demonstrate that there were indeed actions on its part aimed at exercising the right derived from the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo), we must warn that upon a review of the evidence alluded to by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that it is insufficient to materialize the right that would effectively allow the survival of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) even if the regulations changed. Note that from folio 71 to 76 (evidence number 6 to 10 of the administrative file) are the land use (uso de suelo) applications in which it indicates in the requested use box "construction (construcción)", however, there is no other reliable evidentiary element that demonstrates the materialization of said right, such as a construction license. The issue of construction receipts or procedures before other authorities would not be sufficient to prove said right, as they are procedures that must be carried out aimed at the erection of civil works but are not capable of creating any subjective right that lasts beyond the change of regulation, much less, when the Municipality has not received, approved, and authorized them through an administrative act that grants subjective rights, we insist, such as a construction license. It is not unnecessary to indicate that the party did not demonstrate with reliable evidence that it obtained a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) for residential use with which to claim damages in this matter. Consequently, there is no valid element that obliges the Municipality to recognize the effectiveness of the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) granted prior to the reforms.” VII.- As the Court, as well as the appellants themselves, made evident, the Constitutional Chamber and this decision-making Body have referred to the concept, legal nature, and scope of land uses (usos de suelo). This Chamber has determined that in said certificate, the use that can be given to real estate is recorded in accordance with urban planning regulations. Furthermore, its effects are related to a piece of land and are produced mediately in the legal sphere of the property owner. This is consistent with what is regulated in Article one of the Urban Planning Law (LPU) insofar as land use (uso del suelo) ("tierra") “…is the utilization of a terrain, of the physical structure settled on or incorporated into it, or both cases, regarding class, form, or intensity of its use…”. Hence, it stands as the fundamental instrument relative to the destination intended to be given to the real estate, as it must be reserved for that established in urban planning. This is also in accordance with what is stipulated in the LPU since the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) issued by the municipalities is what certifies the conformity of use according to zoning requirements. Hence, in this understanding, canon 28 ibid establishes the prohibition of designating lands, buildings, or structures for any use that is non-conforming with the established planning. Furthermore, at this point, what is stipulated in the Political Constitution (CP) must be taken into account regarding the right to health (precept 21); limitations on property for reasons of public interest (cardinal 45); the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (canon 69); the requirement for rational exploitation of the land (stipulation 69); and the protection of natural beauties (disposition 89). Hence, these regulations constitute the constitutional framework of urban planning, aimed at safeguarding said fundamental rights and likewise the quality of life of the inhabitants, as regulated by Article 28 of the Organic Law of the Environment. Although the Constitutional Chamber at some point expressed “the land-use certificates (constancias de uso de suelo) have the virtue of conferring subjective rights on the individual…”. Judgment no. 2006-4715 of 11 hours 39 minutes on March 31, 2006 (also consult resolution no. 1098 of 16 hours 40 minutes on February 11, 2003). The truth is that later it has conceptualized it as a favorable act, by providing: “…this land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) is a favorable act by virtue of enabling the administered party to manage a construction permit and, eventually, request another type of licenses…”. Ruling no. 12815 of 9 hours 23 minutes on July 30, 2010; likewise, in this regard, judgment 4161 of 12 hours 8 minutes on February 26, 2010, can be consulted. It is thus that this Chamber has determined: “The land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) consists of the instrument where the uses to which a terrain can be destined are recorded, that is, what it certifies, -with declaratory character-, is the utilization that can be given to it according to the regulations in force. Hence, it may happen that what is set forth in it is not what interests the administered party, since the use they intended to give it, could not be in conformity with the regulatory plan (plan regulador)… the Constitutional Chamber has expressed that said certificate, although declaratory in nature, stands as a fundamental act, because its content and function is to record factual or legal states that enable the making of resolutions that create, modify, or extinguish legal situations, such as construction permits or business licenses, for the granting of which said document is required, as a means to verify that what is requested conforms to the utilization approved in the corresponding regulatory plan. (Judgment no. 798-F-2012 of 9 hours 45 minutes on July 4, 2012)”. Ruling no. 866 of 9 hours 55 minutes on July 11, 2013. In the matter under examination, the Municipality of Cartago granted the co-plaintiffs a land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) in accordance with their request, specifically with agricultural residential use R-700, in agreement with what was prescribed in canon 4-3 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan. Consequently, in said documents it was recorded that, in accordance with the regulations in force at that time, the terrains were suitable for that purpose. Hence, it enabled them to carry out the indispensable procedures to, once the necessary requirements were met and their viability verified, obtain the corresponding construction permit. However, when such companies requested the municipal corporation of Cartago that said certifications be updated, -since supposedly, it had been required of them when carrying out some of their procedures-, said update was denied, in an act at 10:00 a.m. on August 19, 2015. Note that the action taken by the co-plaintiffs is one more element to ratify what was determined by this decision-making Body regarding the fact that land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) do not confer subjective rights in favor of the administered parties. If that were so, there would have been no need to approach the municipal corporation to request their ratification. As expressed, what this type of certification records is that real estate, in conformity with what is stipulated in the regulatory plan in force, can be destined -at that moment- for a certain use. But its content is merely declaratory, since, for the purpose of obtaining a construction permit, or some other license, the citizen must comply with the requirements that the legal system demands for each case. According to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, these certificates constitute a fundamental act, because they reflect factual and legal situations that allow acts to be issued that can create, modify, or extinguish legal situations. As explained supra, for example, construction permits or business licenses, for which it is indispensable to have them in order to certify that what is requested is consistent with the use provided in the corresponding regulatory plan. Hence, they do not grant subjective rights nor constitute a consolidated legal situation. Consequently, contrary to what was argued by the challengers, the violation of precept 34 of the CP does not occur, because in this instance we are not faced with a retroactive application of the legal system since the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) do not constitute acquired rights nor consolidated legal situations, as was explained. That would only occur once a permit or license is obtained based on those certifications, which does not happen in the case under examination. On the other hand, distinct from what the cassation appellants accused, the case law, both constitutional and that of this decision-making Body, does not conceive of land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) as acquired rights, nor consolidated legal situations, which is why the infringement of canon 9 of the CC also does not occur. The Constitutional Chamber, since ancient times (ruling 7331 of 15 hours 24 minutes on October 31, 1997) and likewise more recently (consult judgments numbers 799 of 14 hours 35 minutes on July 1, 2010, 761 of 11 hours 7 minutes on January 23, 2009, 2877 of 19 hours 52 minutes on February 27, 2007, and 7642 of 11 hours 39 minutes on June 17, 2005) has determined that no one has the right to the immutability of the legal system. This with the exception of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, which are protected for reasons of legal certainty and equity, given that the legal system safeguards whoever obtained the right or enjoys the situation. Only in such cases does the non-retroactivity of the law operate, so that a modification in the legal system does not result in the subtraction of the good or the acquired right from the personal patrimony. Nor would it affect when the factual prerequisite occurred before the regulatory change, the advantageous consequence is not produced in favor of the interested party according to the consolidated legal situation. In all other circumstances, like the one under examination, the application of the rules in force operates, it is reiterated, because as indicated, the legal system is not immutable, and the co-plaintiffs do not possess any acquired right, nor any consolidated legal situation. The foregoing, because they did not materialize the use declared in the certificate through obtaining the construction permit. Observe, as noted, once the 1974 Regulatory Plan was repealed, -according to which they obtained the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo)-, and the new plan being in force that entered into force in February 2008, in 2015, they requested that such certifications be updated, according to the repealed planning. However, in agreement with what was stated, it was not appropriate, since the land-use certificates (certificados de uso) issued on September 12, 2007, were issued in agreement with what was established in the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was not in force in 2015, -since seven years before-, as it is emphasized, new regulations had been enacted that began to govern in February 2008. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the grievance as far as this point is concerned.

VIII.- In another order of ideas, concerning the transitional regulation referring to land-use applications (solicitudes de uso de suelo), this decision-making Body agrees with what was resolved by the Court, although with the following clarifications. This point refers to agreement III of Minutes 49 of December 18, 2006, which stated: “…applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that had been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal shall be resolved based on the regulation that is hereby repealed…”. It must be clear that the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Cartago in force, entered into force only in February 2008 and had been enacted on September 17, 2007. In said regulation, the cited transitional provision was not introduced, therefore that agreement prior to the issuance of the new planning can be considered as a background document, where the need or possibility of it forming part of such Plan was discussed at some point, but it was not done. Consequently, what was decided by the judges is consistent with what happened, because that transitional provision was not introduced into the text in force. Thus, it is evident that it was not the will of those who issued it to introduce it as a transitional provision. In this understanding, what the appellants sought cannot be acceded to, in terms of it being considered as part of the Regulatory Plan in force, since the Municipal Council did not include it when enacting it. Therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the discussion about whether that 2006 agreement, despite the fact that it only referred to land-use applications (solicitudes de uso de suelo), even so, or with greater reason, encompassed the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) issued when the 1974 Regulatory Plan was in force, is sterile. For that same reason, nothing would be gained by determining whether said act referred only to the processing phase, or if it also included the substantive aspect. It is insisted, because at the time it only responded to a requirement of the Municipal Council, but one that was finally not reflected when the new regulation was issued, which is why it cannot be applied. As the cassation appellants themselves point out, that agreement is part of the background of the plan in force, but only that. As such it cannot be applied, because it was issued when the new Regulatory Plan had not yet come into legal existence, so it cannot be considered a transitional rule, nor have effects of general scope. Consequently, the charge on this point must be dismissed.

IX.- Regarding what was alleged by the challengers concerning that land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) grant subjective rights, and therefore they cannot be disregarded without resorting to the lesivity process, or revocation. Likewise, regarding the fact that we are not dealing with a regulated act, -as the Court determined-, but rather three discretionary resolutions, it is clear that they are not correct in their assertions, as will be set forth below. Concerning the first point, as set forth in considerando VII, land uses (usos de suelo) do not grant subjective rights. It is an act of a declaratory nature, where the possible use of the land is indicated according to the urban planning in force. Which is materialized upon fulfillment of the requirements to obtain a license, a permit, or authorization, without any of these having been obtained in this instance. Regarding the second, it is unquestionable that the judges, when referring to the fact that we are dealing with a regulated act, were referring to the land-use certification (certificación de uso de suelo), and specifically explained the reasons why revocation is not applicable in its case. It is only at this procedural moment that the co-defendants argue that there were three discretionary acts that oblige the revocation of the land uses (usos de suelo). They point out that these are the following: the one that repealed the 1974 Regulatory Plan; approved the new Planning; denied recognizing current validity to the certifications issued in September 2007. Which they qualify as discretionary, therefore in their opinion, the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) should then have been revoked. The ruling of the judges, as can be seen from what was reproduced, was that such certifications constitute regulated acts, meaning that the Administration's discretion is not applicable, and therefore, in accordance with the legal system, their revocation is not appropriate, -cardinal 156 of the LGAP, which, on the point of interest, provides: “1. Revocation of regulated acts shall not be possible…”. This point should have been contested by the appellants, but they do not do so, instead resorting to novel issues, not proposed nor debated during the process. The foregoing, without clearly and specifically explaining why the land-use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) are not regulated acts, which was the basis used by the Court when issuing its judgment. Hence, what is appropriate is to reject the charge.

X.- In the third of the reproaches, it argues that it should have been exonerated from the payment of costs, because it had sufficient reason to litigate and moreover did so in good faith. Canon 193 of the CPCA, with respect to the economic effects of the process, stipulates: “In judgments and orders with the character of judgment, the losing party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a pronouncement that must be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when: a) The judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party verisimilarly could not have known about, and, because of this, the party's opposition was in accordance therewith. b) By the nature of the issues debated there existed, in the Court’s judgment, sufficient reason to litigate.” Hence, in principle, costs are of mandatory imposition on the losing party. However, there are prerequisites for exoneration that are optional for the Judge, so to apply them, the conduct of the losing party must be analyzed, with the purpose of establishing if it fits into one of the hypotheses provided in the reproduced precept. As can be seen, it claims that it had sufficient reason to litigate, and therefore the Court erred in ordering it to pay costs, thus claiming lack of application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as well as cardinal 193 of the CPCA. It is observed that what the appellants reproached is an improper application of norms and constitutional principles, because in their view, the Court should have exempted them from paying the costs of the process. It is necessary to point out that merely citing the causes for its appropriateness is not sufficient, but rather it is indispensable to clearly and precisely explain the reasons that substantiate their statement, that is, to contrast the alleged error against what was decided, in a concatenated and logical manner. Observe, it limits itself to arguing that in its opinion it is burdensome, even though its petitions were rejected, because it litigated under the protection of national case law. However, when resolving the merits of the matter, as was noted, the case law does not support what was argued by the companies in the process. Thus, the certainty of the plaintiff party regarding having litigated in good faith is not sufficient. It must be noted that the Court, regarding this point, ordered to accept the exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) asserted by the State, and to dismiss the lawsuit against the Municipality of Cartago.

Therefore, the objection must be dismissed.

XI.- By virtue of the reasons set forth and given that the alleged objections do not occur, it is necessary to dismiss the appeal filed, with costs payable by the party who filed it [article 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA].

THEREFORE

The cassation appeal is declared without merit, with costs payable by the appellant.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Iris Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez HBRENES Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected] He insists that the improper superior exceeded his functions, since he modified the Mayor’s criterion by establishing, “…when a Regulatory Plan changes, the land uses become ineffective (the same underlying position that the Trial Court has now applied in the judgment before us)…”. He states that the improper superior is a controller of legality, but only regarding matters under discussion, not regarding what has already been granted, since that would entail accepting the substitution of administrative conduct, to the detriment of recognized rights, which undermines legal certainty. The improper superior, he points out, “…is for the purpose of preventing arbitrariness by the municipal administration against the administered party, and not for ‘straightening out’ the municipality’s possible or eventual errors with impunity… in favor of the administered party”. He reproaches that the City Council could also have avoided that through “tolerated non-conforming use (uso no conforme tolerado)”, given that in its agreements numbers 49-06 of December 18, 2006, and 106-07 of September 13, 2007, it committed to respecting those land uses that had been requested before the new regulatory plan came into effect. He notes that this was expressed without distinguishing between uses that were filed and not yet resolved and those that were requested and already approved. Consequently, he states, no distinction can be made where the law does not make one, and those agreements must be applied in all cases, “…without exclusions by way of bifurcation, as the Trial Court erratically did”. He reproaches what the judges concluded regarding the land uses issued by the Municipality in 2007 losing effectiveness with the repeal of the 1974 regulatory plan. Likewise, he recriminates the decision regarding the actions and procedures carried out by them under the land-use certificate before other entities and institutions, stating they do not have the effect intended by them, since they did not materialize the expectations of right they had. He objects that the Trial Court disregarded the documentation provided, which it did not even begin to analyze. It limited itself to discrediting its probative value, due to not having obtained the construction permit (permiso de construcción). Hence, he does not understand; if such a permit was not obtained, it was not due to their neglect, abandonment, or negligence, but due to material impossibility. The foregoing, because INVU refused to continue with the processing upon realizing, in February 2008, that the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 was published. Furthermore, the municipality did not want to continue them, arguing that supplementary regulations linked to INVU applied, which he considers a contradiction by those institutions. The judges, he points out, were of the opinion that land uses do not entail subjective rights, which is contrary to constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Chamber. He notes that the Trial Court considered that the land uses became ineffective one calendar day after being approved, or at most, four and a half months later when the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan was published in La Gaceta. Consequently, it was impossible to obtain construction permits in such a short time, due to the quantity and complexity of necessary procedures. Therefore, he affirms, “no one is obliged to do the impossible”. He then reproduces the dissenting vote (voto salvado) in its entirety and requests that it be taken as an integral part of the grounds for his cassation appeal. It is clear that the objection is merely expository, without a legal foundation directly related to the debated judgment. It confines itself to making generic assertions not aimed at attacking what the Trial Court decided on the points to which he refers. It must be emphasized that he restricts himself to pointing out his disagreement in this regard without citing the substantive right violated. Thus, as can be seen, he does not refute or legally dispute the judges’ considerations regarding the ruling. Furthermore, they refer indistinctly to what was decided by the improper hierarchy and the Trial Court, it being clear that at this procedural stage, only what was decided by the Trial Court can be challenged. What the cassation appellants should have done in their challenge was to provide the grounds for why what was ordered was incorrect, that is, to set forth the factual and legal reasons that evidenced the error committed in the appealed judgment, which is lacking. Nor is the request concerning taking the dissenting vote as an integral part of their appeal admissible. This is because it is their obligation to clearly and precisely set forth the reasoning through which they combat what was ordered by the judges. Moreover, some of their recriminations are reiterated in their substantive grievances, therefore their examination will be undertaken when these are addressed. Therefore, the arguments they develop in this section they called “corollaries (corolarios)” cannot be heard by this Chamber due to their informality.

**Cassation appeal on procedural grounds** **III.- Sole ground:** He alleges a lack of or inadequate reasoning of the Trial Court’s judgment. He argues that in this type of proceeding when an administrative act is challenged, the judge is obliged to analyze its subjective and material elements, to determine, he points out, even ex officio, that it substantially conforms to the legal order. In his opinion, failing to carry out this exercise entails “an absence of descriptive reasoning, since all the factual or legal situations that, for example, constitute the grounds for the act were not taken into account…”. He notes that such reasoning is a right of the parties and constitutes an unavoidable requirement for the validity of the judgment. In support, he reproduces an excerpt from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber. In the case under examination, he argues, the Trial Court incurred the defect of lack of reasoning because it considered in isolation the minutes of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, and set aside minute no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007. In which, he states, it was agreed that the effects of the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 did not affect the use applications submitted before it was repealed. This, he points out, is what occurred in this case. He explains that the repeal came into effect when it was published in La Gaceta, in February 2008, while the land uses were approved for them on September 12, 2007, one calendar day before the agreement taken by the Municipal Council that agreed to repeal it. He recriminates that the judges completely ignored minute no. 106 of September 13, 2007. He affirms this, since they did not explain in any way why what was expressed in that agreement does not lead to considering the cited transitional rule on land uses as “included”, beyond how it should have been interpreted, that is, its scope in the specific case, which, he accepts, is a substantive aspect he will address later. He reiterates, “there was an incomplete assessment or reading of the documentary evidence”. He adds that the majority vote did not consider the City Council’s agreement of September 13, 2007, which, he asserts, expressly referred to the application of the municipal agreement of December 18, 2006. Finally, he cites jurisprudence from this Deciding Body on the lack of reasoning.

**IV.-** Regarding the defect of lack of reasoning, this Deciding Body has ruled that it occurs when the reasoning of the judgment does not exist, or else, its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part. By virtue of this, reasoning is not only mandatory, in accordance with precept 57 of the CPCA, but also constitutes a requirement within a Rule of Law State in accordance with the provisions of article 137, subsection d) of the CPCA. Likewise, as a reproach susceptible to review through the extraordinary cassation appeal, under the terms of the indicated canon, it should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal foundations of the judgment. It is not about determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process, but rather, on the contrary, that the judgment has the foundations on which the corresponding decision was adopted. As can be deduced from the charge developed by the cassation appellants, the claim addresses not a procedural aspect but a substantive one related to the examination of the elements of the administrative act. Also regarding evidentiary assessment, since they argue that the judges set aside a minute of the Municipal Council of Cartago. Although they allege that the decision does not address how the transitional rule contained in the mentioned act (no. 106 of September 13, 2007, of the Municipal Council) should be interpreted, nor did the Trial Court explain why what is regulated in that agreement does not include land uses. However, they later point out that the documentary evidence was not assessed or read, which demonstrates an indirect error that escapes the procedural error of lack of reasoning. Given that such arguments are reiterated when developing the substantive grievances, then their study will be undertaken upon addressing those reproaches.

**Cassation appeal on substantive grounds** **V.- First ground:** He alleges that the Trial Court incurred an improper evidentiary assessment (indebida valoración probatoria). He refers to what this Chamber has decided regarding that defect, and states that it arises, among other things, when the judges grant an evidentiary element the “…accreditation of a different fact from the one it actually contains”. He adds that, according to the jurisprudence of this Chamber, evidence must be assessed in accordance with the rules of sound judgment (sana crítica)—experience, logic, and psychology. He refutes that their principal argument was omitted from the decision: “…recognizing current validity of the several land uses granted to my represented parties on September 12, 2007, and the consequent administrative responsibility for this, inevitably violated the principle of intangibility of One’s Own Acts (intangibilidad de los Actos Propios)…”. This is because, he states, when the Municipal Council repealed the 1974 regulatory plan, it ordered that it did so based on all previous agreements, therefore, in his opinion, the rules contained in transitional provision 2 of minute 49 of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, apply. He reproduces what was agreed: “Second: Applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that may have been submitted prior to the entry into effect of this repeal, shall be resolved based on the rules that are hereby repealed”. He reproaches the Trial Court’s ruling regarding that administrative decision not having been issued as a transitional provision within the regulatory body of the Regulatory Plan, and therefore it was not part of the applicable administrative legal order when resolving this matter. He adds that the Trial Court stated this was due to a request by the Municipal Council, which, to have effects of general scope and normative order, should have been incorporated into the cited Regulation. He points out that this was stated without considering what was expressly said in the mentioned agreement, where the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 was ordered—article 2 of minute no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007—which he transcribes in the pertinent part, and where, he points out, minute no. 49 of December 18, 2006 is cited—the issuance of the transitional rule referring to land uses filed before the final repeal of September 13, 2007. He objects that the decision by the judges finds no support in any legal norm, therefore he brands what was ordered as “formalistic (formalista)”. He states that it was indeed included, “…not directly but indirectly by express REFERENCE, since the Municipal Council of Cartago was clear in indicating in its final repeal agreement that the decision to suppress the 1974 Regulatory Plan was based on ALL its ANTECEDENTS… the first antecedent was precisely the agreement contained in Minute 49-06 of December 18, 2006, where the process tending toward the repeal was opened…”. In his opinion, that led to disregarding the current effectiveness of land uses that were issued in light of such a regulatory plan. He stresses that if the repeal did not affect the land-use applications made before the cited repeal, with greater reason it could not affect the land uses approved prior to being repealed. Hence, he argues, if it was prohibited to disregard the land uses filed, with even greater reason or logic, an approved land use cannot be disregarded, as the latter possesses greater certainty or legal security than the one merely requested, in accordance with what is regulated in article 34 of the Political Constitution—non-retroactivity to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations.

Second: It refutes the provisions of the majority vote, regarding the assertion that land uses are merely “declaratory” and therefore do not generate subjective rights. It affirms that this position is contrary to the jurisprudence of this deciding Body and to that of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). It refutes that the Court avoided the cited jurisprudential contradiction, alleging its “inapplicability,” although without explaining why such rulings are not applicable in the sub examine. Regarding ruling no. 1285-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber, it explains that it resolved that land uses grant acquired rights; furthermore, it maintained the validity of acts of such nature, which had been granted based on a decree that was declared unconstitutional. It complains that, for this reason, what was resolved by the Court contradicts the cited jurisprudence, since it stated that, upon the repeal in 2008 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, the land uses granted to it on September 12, 2007, were left without “efficacy.” It highlights what it calls “the nonsense” of the thesis endorsed by the judges, given that, if the inefficacy of said resolutions occurred with the declaration of that Regulatory Plan, it means, “…they became inefficacious barely ONE CALENDAR DAY after they were granted….” This is because the municipal agreement that repealed it was adopted on September 13, 2007, although it was published in La Gaceta in February 2008. It objects that the Court used as a basis a legal opinion from the PGR, despite it being a party to the process as the legal representative of the State. Hence, it points out, it used legal “doctrine” emanating from one of the litigating parties, which it brands as “improper… not very transparent or ethical from the point of view of the technical basis of the judgment….” It mentions that ruling no. 9565 (expediente no. 17-004467-0007-CO) of the Constitutional Chamber confirmed the judiciary’s thesis in the sense that land uses generate subjective rights. In its support, it partially reproduces judgments of the Constitutional Body and of this Chamber, related to land uses. It argues that in said rulings it is verified that these acts are not “declaratory,” as the Court erroneously provided, but rather grant subjective rights, which the Municipality cannot disregard, unless it resorts to the lesivity process [precept 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP)]. Likewise, it refers, it could resort to revocation, when it is going to disregard the continuity of the effects of the acts, for reasons of convenience or opportunity, in accordance with the provisions of article 152 and following ibid. Regarding the latter, it points out, the judges were mistaken in understanding that its issuance constitutes a “regulated act,” for which reason it is not appropriate to revoke it in accordance with the provisions of cited canon 156.1. Contrary to what was resolved, it expresses, there were three discretionary acts that justify or obligate the revocation of the land uses. Namely, the one that repealed the 1974 regulatory plan; the one that approved the new regulatory plan, where a different land use -agricultural- was provided for its farms, on which residential use had been approved; the one that refused to recognize current validity to such certificates. It insists, the Municipality has alleged that said land uses, -validly granted and in accordance with the legal system-, were left “inefficacious” upon the repeal of the regulatory plan based on which they had been approved. It emphasizes, the defendant municipality decided to repeal the 1974 regulatory plan, which it qualifies as a “discretionary decision,” so that, in its opinion, revocation was appropriate, if what was sought was to disregard such acts, based on which it carried out various procedures and even gave its properties as guarantee for a trust, due to the residential vocation of its properties. It states that their value decreased when they were destined for agricultural uses, as explained by the witness Óscar Calderón, who explained the difference in value of the farms according to their possible use. Which, it asserts, constitutes the technical basis of its patrimonial damage. It notes, jurisprudence in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code (Código Civil, CC) fulfills an integrating function of the law, so it allows for supplementing the absence or insufficiency of the law. Thus, it acquires the same rank as the norm it integrates, interprets, or delimits. Consequently, “…as there is no law in Costa Rica that says what happens with compliant land uses when the regulatory plan with which they were approved is repealed or if a new one is approved that contradicts them, then jurisprudence came to fill that normative ‘gap’…”.

Third: it accuses, “rupture of the principles of reasonableness and juridical proportionality.” It alleges, in the event that the procedural and substantive grounds set forth in this appeal are denied, it requests “…that the judgment submitted on appeal be cassated insofar as (it) condemned… to the payment of both costs of the action.” Precept 193, subsection b) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, CPCA), it says, provides the possibility of exonerating the losing party when, due to the nature of the debated issues, there has been sufficient reason to litigate. It affirms, the judge must weigh reasonableness factors when evaluating whether a subject came before the jurisdictional apparatus in a justified manner, or if on the contrary they did so in a reckless and daring way. In the matter under analysis, it indicates, what was debated was sustained on reasonable arguments and evidence, which, it says, the Court itself described as “respectable,” which the counterpart also did in the oral trial. Hence, in its opinion it is burdensome, even in the eventual rejection of its claims, to be condemned to pay costs, since they litigated under the protection of national jurisprudence, which coincides with their thesis or theory of the case. Furthermore, it expresses, with support in municipal agreements that established, the “land uses compliant prior to the repeal of the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974 under the protection of which they had been given” could not be disregarded. It argues, in accordance with the “detectable reasonableness, and based on a premise of proportionality and including legal certainty, it is requested…” that it be exonerated from the payment of costs, having sufficient reason to litigate and having done so in good faith.

VI.- The crux of what is challenged lies in what was resolved by the Court regarding the non-validity of the land uses obtained by the co-plaintiffs, based on the 1974 Regulatory Plan. This is due to the issuance of the new urban planning for the Municipality of Cartago, which came into force in February 2008. Because the first and second grievances address aspects related to the legal nature and scope of land use, such reproaches will be heard jointly. In the pertinent part, the Court provided: 2) The cessation of the effects of land use certificates that have lost validity and efficacy by virtue of a new applicable zoning regulation does not require initiating any administrative or judicial procedures. …the plaintiff party argues… in its opinion, given that a subjective right exists provided by a favorable administrative act, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, even when the regulations change or are repealed, in this case the Regulatory Plan, said act remains in force and in order to suppress it… it is necessary to resort to the revocation procedure contemplated in article 152 and following of the General Law of Public Administration.- Court’s Criterion. …the urban planning regulations result in limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the owners (sic) over the property, insofar as they determine the land use and how said utilization must occur.

This work is materialized through the administrative act called <span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">land-use certification (certificación de uso de suelo)</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">, which due to its importance is classified as a </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">declaratory administrative act, </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">(in the sense that it is limited to attesting to a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it), but they are not acts that constitute rights per se, since they do not create or modify previously established legal situations</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> Land-use certificates have been understood as acts through which the Local Corporation communicates the conformity or non-conformity of the land use with what is established in the respective zoning for that historical moment; as provided in Article 28 of the Urban Planning Law</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Therefore, through the “land-use certificate”, it is not decided what the permitted use is, since this is a different situation in that it has already been previously determined in the respective zoning regulation, which forms part of the local regulatory plan; it simply certifies what the permitted use is according to what was previously established by the latter two. The doctrine has pointed out that urban plans are acts of authority with which the land is disciplined, such that they affect private rights (property rights) by predetermining the permitted modes of enjoyment and use of the property</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">The land-use certification is merely descriptive regarding a specific factual situation in relation to what is provided under a legal norm, for which reason, through it, a legal situation pre-existing the certifying act is not consolidated. From the foregoing citations and the development that has been carried out on this subject by jurisprudence and doctrine, the conclusion is clearly reached that the land-use certificate does not confer a subjective right to build or subdivide, but rather constitutes a prior requirement that any interested party must fulfill in order to obtain a construction license or permit</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">it is clear to this Court that in the case under review we are in the</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> scenario where, at the time, the plaintiff filed land-use applications (2006) which were granted in accordance with the Regulatory Plan in force at that moment, this manifestation by the Administration being a formal conduct that simply delimited the use of the property for the time of issuance of the certificate and as long as the regulatory body that supported said information remained in force. Now, having this premise clear, we must address the plaintiff's argument regarding the need or not, to initiate</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> a lesividad process or an administrative revocation procedure, as a requirement to consider the effects of a land-use certified prior to the modification or enactment of a regulatory plan to have ceased</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> the Constitutional Chamber in Voto Nº 755-95 of 12:12 hours on February 4, 1994, on the annulment of administrative acts: </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">“</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">...the Administration is prohibited from suppressing, by its own action, those acts it has issued that confer subjective rights to individuals[...]. The only avenue the State has to eliminate one of its acts from the legal system is the jurisdictional lesividad process</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> when the Administration deems that it must render without effect, against a </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">declaratory administrative act of subjective rights </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">in the administrative venue, considering that there is a defect in one or some elements of the administrative act that causes its absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, it must observe the Administrative Procedure contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration, in order to guarantee Due Process to the parties whose subjective rights or legitimate interests may be harmed</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> it is clear that to render without effect a declaratory administrative act of a subjective right, due process must be observed; however, the defendant parties on this point have been in agreement in indicating that in this case we are not in the presence of an absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, since the land-use certificate does not suffer from any defect, a thesis that this Court shares... In any case, we must note that this Panel of Judges, in light of what was set forth above, holds the thesis that the land-use certificate does not constitute any right, but rather has declaratory effects and not constitutive of a right, such that the procedure of evident and manifest nullity is improper. b.2. Regarding the viability of exercising in a judicial venue an action tending towards the declaration of nullity of the land-use certificate, we meet the same fate. A lesividad process, as indicated in the procedure of evident and manifest nullity, must be based on the review of a declaratory act of rights. As indicated supra, the land-use certificate is not one, nor does it exhibit defects in its elements that would lead to its declaration of nullity. Thus, this argument is also rejected. b.3. Finally, regarding the revocation procedure of the act (land use), it is also inapplicable in the specific case, given that the revocation of administrative acts by the Administration only operates when it concerns discretionary acts, not regulated ones, as is the case here and we explain below. The revocation of a valid and effective administrative act occurs in three scenarios: 1. It concerns an act issued under administrative discretion using criteria of opportunity, convenience, or merit, in accordance with Article 153, paragraph 3, of the General Law of Public Administration, such that the revocation of valid administrative acts is possible, that is, those substantially in conformity with the legal systems and that are producing effects</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> In the opinion of the plaintiff's representation, in order to render without effect the administrative act called “land use” granted to their represented parties, the defendant Municipality should have resorted to this procedure because it is not possible to go back on one's own acts unless the Law authorizes it; in that sense, this Court considers that while the plaintiff's arguments are respectable, they are not shared by virtue of the fact that although Articles 152 and 153 of the General Law of Public Administration grant the Administration the power to suppress favorable acts from the legal world through the institution of revocation under penalty of nullity if the procedures or the scenarios listed therein are not followed, it is necessary to consider for the case at hand what is provided in subsection 1) of Article 156 of the same normative body which provides: </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">“…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> Article 156.- 1. The revocation of regulated acts shall not be possible</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…”</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">for those acts of a regulated type, the institution of revocation is not possible, because the revocation procedure is provided for discretionary acts since </span><span style="color:#333333; display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">the exercise of regulated powers limits the action of the Public Administration to verifying that the requirements established by the legal system are met and to establishing the corresponding legal consequence</span><span style="color:#333333; display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="color:#333333; display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> In summary, this Court considers that the revocation procedure is not applicable to the present case by virtue of the fact that the "land uses" are regulated administrative acts and not discretionary ones; the defendant administration would have been wrong to resort to revocation as argued by the plaintiff. </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">3)</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">we will address</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> the allegation regarding the validity and effectiveness of land uses with reference to the repealed regulatory plan and the effects that the Municipality's provisions in Article 3 of minute 49 of December 18, 2006, may have had, </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Regarding the validity of land uses and their effectiveness as a formal administrative act creating favorable rights. Among the arguments raised in this venue by the municipal representation, we have that it argues that the land-use certificates granted to the plaintiff lost their validity and effectiveness with the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was repealed and consequently it is legally impossible to grant land uses at this time because in </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">(sic)</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> the place where the properties are located, with the new regulatory plan currently in force, they cannot be granted. To counter-argue this idea, the plaintiff indicated that the Municipality disregards its own acts, such as the second transitional provision contained in minute 49 of December 18, 2006</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">regarding what is provided in agreement III of minute 49 of December 18, 2006, we have that it literally states: </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">"...Second. applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that have been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal will be resolved based on the regulations being repealed here...". </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">This Chamber considers that the plaintiff is not correct in the effect she intends to give to said municipal agreement, that is, regarding whether, if it provided that the mere submission of applications must be processed with the repealed norm, with much more reason, the rights obtained in favorable acts must be respected and given the same effect. This Court considers that she is not correct in her allegation, since the administrative decision under analysis—as correctly indicated by the Municipality's representation—has a transitional connotation and seeks to avoid harmful effects to those who have filed an "Application" for land-use certification and is not directed at those who have land-use certificates issued previously, much less, so many years ago. In any case, note that that administrative decision as such was not assumed as a transitional provision within the normative body of the Regulatory Plan, so it cannot be understood as part of the applicable administrative legal system when resolving the matter, since it obeys a requirement of the Municipal Council, which, in order to have effects of general scope and of a normative nature, had to have been incorporated within the Regulation called the Regulatory Plan</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline"> In conclusion, in this specific case, such a non-normative administrative act, in the opinion of this Court, is not applicable to it, since we are in the presence of land-use certificates granted under repealed regulations, ergo, they lose effectiveness and not validity, with the enactment of the new rules, as we explain below.</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">- b.1.2. </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">Having it clear that the core issue up to this point, as it has been developing, is that there indeed exist favorable administrative acts issued by the Municipality, but that said acts (land use) were granted in accordance with the regulations contained in the repealed 1974 regulatory plan, this Panel of Judges proceeds to hear and delimit whether their effectiveness indeed remains despite the repeal, either due to the nature of the right or due to any action carried out by the plaintiffs aimed at consolidating said right. First, it is clear to this Panel of Judges, based on the foregoing, that in the present case, we find ourselves before the issuance of land-use certificates that are understood as administrative acts that simply delimit the use or uses that can be given to the property, and consequently, the rulings of the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice cited by the plaintiff in support of her action are not applicable to the case under study, regarding the recognition of the right even when there is a variation of the norm on which they were granted. Second, regarding the evidence provided by the plaintiff both in the administrative venue (evidence for better resolution before the Third Section, visible at folio 72 of the administrative file) and in this venue, with which it is intended to demonstrate that there were actions on her part aimed at exercising the right derived from the land-use certificates, we must note that from a review of the evidence alluded to by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that it is not sufficient to materialize the right that would effectively allow the survival of the land-use certificate even when the regulations changed; see that from folio 71 to 76 (evidence number 6 to 10 of the administrative file) there are the land-use applications in which it indicates in the box for requested use "construction", however, there is no other reliable evidentiary element that demonstrates the materialization of said right, such as a construction license. The matter of work receipts or actions before other authorities would not be sufficient to prove said right, as they are procedures that must be carried out aimed at the erection of civil works but are not capable of creating any subjective right that endures beyond the change of regulation, much less when the Municipality has not received, approved, and authorized them through an administrative act that grants subjective rights, we insist, such as a construction license; it is not superfluous to indicate that the party did not demonstrate with reliable evidence that it had obtained a land-use certificate for residential use with which to claim damages in this matter. Consequently, there is no valid element that obligates the Municipality to recognize the effectiveness of the land-use certificate granted prior to the reforms</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">”</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">.</span> <span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">VII.- </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:normal; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">As the Court made clear, as well as the appellants themselves, the Constitutional Chamber and this Decision-making Body have referred to the concept, legal nature, and scope of land uses. This Chamber has provided that in said certificate, the use that can be given to a property is recorded in accordance with urban planning regulations. Furthermore, its effects are referred to a plot of land and are produced mediately in the legal sphere of the property owner. This is in agreement with what is regulated in Article One of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana) in that the use of land (tierra) </span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">“…</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">is the utilization of a terrain, of the physical structure settled or incorporated into it, or of both cases, regarding the class, form, or intensity of its exploitation</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">…”</span><span style="display:inline; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-style:italic; font-variant:normal; font-weight:normal; text-decoration:none; text-transform:none; vertical-align:baseline">.</span> Thus, it stands as the fundamental instrument regarding the intended use of the property, since it must be reserved for the use established in urban planning. This is also in accordance with the stipulations of the LPU, since the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) issued by the municipalities is what certifies conformity of use according to zoning requirements. Hence, in this understanding, canon 28 ibid establishes the prohibition of allocating lands, buildings, or structures to any use that is non-conforming with the established planning. Furthermore, at this point, the provisions of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política, CP) must be taken into account regarding the right to health (precept 21); limitations on property for reasons of public interest (cardinal 45); the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (canon 69); the requirement for rational exploitation of the land (stipulation 69); and the protection of natural beauties (provision 89). Hence, these regulations constitute the constitutional framework for urban planning, aimed at safeguarding said fundamental rights and, likewise, the quality of life of the inhabitants, as regulated by Article 28 of the Organic Environmental Law (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente). Although the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) at some point expressed “the land-use certificates have the virtue of conferring subjective rights upon the individual…”. Judgment no. 2006-4715 of 11 hours 39 minutes of March 31, 2006 (also consult resolution no. 1098 of 16 hours 40 minutes of February 11, 2003). The fact is that subsequently it has conceptualized it as a favorable act, when it provided: “…this conforming land-use certificate is a favorable act by virtue of the fact that it enables the administered party to process a construction permit and, eventually, request other types of licenses…”. Ruling no. 12815 of 9 hours 23 minutes of July 30, 2010; likewise, in this respect, judgment 4161 of 12 hours 8 minutes of February 26, 2010 can be consulted. This is how this Chamber has provided: “The land-use certificate consists of the instrument where it is recorded to what uses a piece of land can be destined, that is, what it certifies, -with a declaratory character-, is the utilization that can be given to it according to the regulations in force. Hence, it may happen that what is stated in it is not what interests the administered party, given that, the one they intended to give it, could result non-conforming with the regulatory plan... the Constitutional Chamber has expressed that said certificate, although of a declaratory nature, stands as a fundamental act, due to the fact that its content and function is to record factual or legal states that make it possible to make resolutions that create, modify, or extinguish legal situations, such as construction permits or business licenses, for the granting of which said document is required, as a means to verify that what is requested conforms to the utilization approved in the corresponding regulatory plan. (Judgment no. 798-F-2012 of 9 hours 45 minutes of July 4, 2012).” Ruling no. 866 of 9 hours 55 minutes of July 11, 2013. In the matter under examination, the Municipality of Cartago granted the co-plaintiffs a land-use certificate in accordance with their request, specifically with R-700 agricultural residential use, in accordance with the provisions of canon 4-3 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan. Consequently, in said documents it was recorded that, in accordance with the norms in force at that time, the lands were suitable for that purpose. Hence, it empowered them to carry out the necessary procedures so that, once the necessary requirements were met and their viability verified, they could obtain the corresponding construction permit. However, when such companies requested those certifications from the municipal corporation of Cartago to be updated, -since supposedly, they had been so required when carrying out one of their procedures-, said update was denied to them, in an act at 10 hours on August 19, 2015. It should be noted, the actions of the co-defendants constitute one more element to ratify what was provided by this Decision-making Body regarding the fact that land-use certificates do not confer subjective rights in favor of the administered parties. If that were the case, there would have been no need to go to the municipal corporation to request its ratification. As expressed, what this type of certification records is, that a property, in accordance with what is stipulated in the regulatory plan in force, can be destined –at that moment– for a certain use. But its content is merely declaratory, since, with the purpose of obtaining the construction permit, or any other license, the municipal resident must comply with the requirements that the legal system demands for each case. In accordance with what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, these certificates constitute a fundamental act, because they reflect factual and legal situations that allow for the issuance of acts that can create, modify, or extinguish legal situations. As explained supra, for example, construction permits or business licenses, for which it is indispensable to have them in order to be able to prove that what is requested is consistent with the use provided in the corresponding regulatory plan. Hence, they do not grant subjective rights nor do they constitute a consolidated legal situation. Consequently, contrary to what was argued by the appellants, there is no violation of precept 34 of the CP, because in this case we are not facing a retroactive application of the legal system, since land-use certificates do not constitute acquired rights or consolidated legal situations, as explained. That would occur only once a permit or license is obtained based on those certifications, which does not happen in the case under examination. On the other hand, as opposed to what was alleged by the cassation appellants, both constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Decision-making Body do not conceive land-use certificates as acquired rights, nor consolidated legal situations, which is why no infringement of canon 9 of the CC occurs either. The Constitutional Chamber, since time immemorial (ruling 7331 of 15 hours 24 minutes of October 31, 1997) and likewise more recently (consult judgments numbers 799 of 14 hours 35 minutes of July 1, 2010, 761 of 11 hours 7 minutes of January 23, 2009, 2877 of 19 hours 52 minutes of February 27, 2007, and 7642 of 11 hours 39 minutes of June 17, 2005) has provided that no one has a right to the immutability of the legal system. This is with the exception of acquired rights and consolidated legal situations, which are protected for reasons of legal certainty and equity, given that the legal system protects whoever obtained the right or enjoys the situation. Only in such cases does the non-retroactivity of the law operate, so that a modification in the legal system does not result in the removal of the asset or the acquired right from the personal patrimony. Nor would it have an impact when, the factual presupposition having occurred before the normative change, the beneficial consequence in favor of the interested party is not produced according to the consolidated legal situation. In all other circumstances, like the one under examination, the application of the rules in force applies, it is reiterated, since as indicated, the legal system is not immutable, and the co-plaintiffs do not possess any acquired right, nor any consolidated legal situation. The foregoing, since they did not materialize the use declared in the certificate through the obtaining of the construction permit. It should be observed, as pointed out, once the 1974 Regulatory Plan was repealed, -according to which they obtained the land-use certificates-, and the new plan that entered into force in February 2008 being in effect, in 2015, they requested that such certifications be updated, according to the repealed planning. However, in accordance with the foregoing it was not appropriate, since the use certificates issued on September 12, 2007, were issued in accordance with what was established in the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was not in force in 2015, -since seven years prior-, because it is emphasized, a new regulation had been enacted that began to govern in February 2008. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the grievance regarding this point.

**VIII.-** In another order of ideas, concerning the transitional regulation referring to land-use requests, this Decision-making Body agrees with what was resolved by the Court, although with the following clarifications. This point pertains to agreement III of minute 49 of December 18, 2006, which expressed: “…applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that had been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal will be resolved based on the norm that is repealed herein…”. It must be clearly understood that the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Cartago in force entered into force only in February 2008 and had been enacted on September 17, 2007. In said regulation, the cited transitional provision was not introduced, whereby that agreement prior to the issuance of the new planning can be considered as a background record, where the need or possibility for it to form part of said Plan was discussed at some point, but it was not done. Consequently, what was decided by the judges is consistent with what happened, because that transitional provision was not introduced in the text in force. Thus, it is evident that it was not the will of those who issued it to introduce it as a transitional provision. In that understanding, it is not possible to grant what is sought by the appellants, in terms of having it considered as forming part of the Regulatory Plan in force, since the Municipal Council, upon enacting it, did not include it. Therefore, in the opinion of this Chamber, the discussion about whether that 2006 agreement, despite referring only to land-use applications, still, or with greater reason, encompassed the land-use certificates issued when the 1974 Regulatory Plan was in force, is sterile. For that same reason, determining whether said act referred only to the procedural phase, or if it also included the substantive aspect, would lead nowhere. It is reiterated, because in its opportunity it was solely in response to a requirement of the Municipal Council, but that it ultimately was not embodied when the new regulation was enacted, for which reason it cannot be enforced. According to the cassation appellants themselves, that agreement forms part of the background records of the plan in force, but only that. As such it cannot be applied, because it was issued when the new Regulatory Plan had not yet been born into legal life, so it cannot be considered a transitional norm, nor have effects with general scope. Consequently, the charge on this point must be dismissed.

**IX.-** Regarding the allegations of the appellants concerning that land-use certificates grant subjective rights, for which reason they cannot be disregarded without resorting to a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad), or to revocation. Likewise, regarding that we are not faced with a regulated act, -as the Court provided-, but rather with three discretionary resolutions, it is clear, they are not correct in their assertions, as will be stated below. Concerning the first point, as set forth in Considerando VII, land-use certificates do not grant subjective rights. They are an act of a declaratory nature, where the possible use of the land is indicated according to the urban planning in force. This is materialized with the fulfillment of the requirements to obtain, be it a license, a permit or authorization, without, in this case, any of these having been obtained. Regarding the second point, it is unquestionable that the judges, when alluding to being faced with a regulated act, were referring to the land-use certification, and specifically explained the reasons why revocation does not apply in their case. It is only at this procedural moment that the co-defendants argue that there had been three discretionary acts that obligate the revocation of the land-use certificates. They point out that these are the following: the one that repealed the 1974 Regulatory Plan; approved the new Planning; denied recognizing current validity to the certifications issued in September 2007. Which they classify as discretionary, so in their opinion, then the land-use certificates should have been revoked. What was decided by the judges, as can be seen from what has been reproduced, was that such certifications constitute regulated acts, that is, the Administration’s discretion is not applicable, so in accordance with the legal system, their revocation is not appropriate, -cardinal 156 of the LGAP, which, in relevant part, provides: “1. Revocation of regulated acts shall not be possible…”. This point should have been challenged by the appellants, but they do not do so, instead resorting to novel issues, not proposed or debated during the process. The foregoing, without clearly and specifically exposing why the land-use certificates are not regulated acts, which was the basis used by the Court in issuing its judgment. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the charge.

**X.-** In the third of the criticisms, they argue that they should have been exonerated from paying costs, because they had sufficient reason to litigate and also did so in good faith. Canon 193 of the CPCA, regarding the economic effects of the process, stipulates: “In judgments and decisions having the nature of judgments, the losing party shall be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, a ruling that must be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the losing party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when: a) The judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party could plausibly not have known and, because of this, the party’s opposition was merited. b) Due to the nature of the issues debated, there existed, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate.” Hence, in principle, costs are a mandatory imposition on the losing party. However, there are assumptions for exoneration that are optional for the Judge, so in order to apply them, they must analyze the conduct of the losing party, with the purpose of establishing whether it falls within one of the hypotheses provided in the reproduced precept. As can be seen, they claim they had sufficient reason to litigate, so the Court erred in ordering them to pay costs, for which reason they claim lack of application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as well as of cardinal 193 of the CPCA. What has been criticized by the appellants is an improper application of regulations and constitutional principles, because in their view, the Court should have exempted them from paying the costs of the process. It is necessary to point out that the mere citation of the grounds for their origin is not sufficient, but that it is essential to explain clearly and precisely the reasons that support their claim, that is, to contrast the alleged error against what was decided, in a concatenated and logical manner. It is observed that they confine themselves to arguing that, in their opinion, it is burdensome, even though their petitions were rejected, since they litigated under the protection of national jurisprudence. However, when resolving the merits of the matter, as noted, the jurisprudence does not support what was argued by the companies in the process. Thus, the certainty of the plaintiff party concerning that they litigated in good faith is not sufficient. It must be noted, the Court, regarding this point, provided, to uphold the exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) filed by the State, and, to declare without merit the claim against the Municipality of Cartago.

Therefore, the objection must be dismissed.

**XI.-** By virtue of the reasons set forth and given that the alleged objections do not arise, it is necessary to dismiss the appeal filed, with costs to be borne by the party who filed it [article 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA].

**POR TANTO** The appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) is dismissed, with costs to be borne by the moving party.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Iris Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** HBRENES See votes 7331-1997, 799-2010, 761-2009, 2877-2007 and 7642-2005 (vote 1960-F-2020).

**Exp: 16-012109-1027-CA** **Res. 001960-F-S1-2020** **FIRST CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.** San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the third of June, two thousand twenty.

Contentious-administrative proceeding filed by **FIDUCIARIA AML S.A.**, **FINCA DE CAMPO S.A.**, **ROM DE TURRIALBA S.A.**, and **INVERSIONES LA QUINTA DE CENTROAMÉRICA S.A.** represented by Néstor José Mata Solano, of legal age, married once, identity card number 3-0222-0598 and Lic. Alejandro Monge Ariño, of legal age, attorney, bar card number 13023 against the **MUNICIPALITY OF CARTAGO**, represented by Lic. Wilbert Quesada Garita, of legal age, attorney, bar card number 8790, and against the **STATE**, represented by Licda. Maureen Medrano Brenes, of legal age, attorney, bar card number 9559.

**Magistrate Rivas Loáiciga writes;** **CONSIDERING** **I.-** The Tribunal, without the parties contesting it, deemed the following factual situations proven. Finca de Campo Sociedad Anónima, ROM de Turrialba Sociedad Anónima and Inversiones La Quinta de Centro América Sociedad Anónima requested land use certificates (certificados de uso de suelo) from the Municipality of Cartago, which were granted on September 12, 2007, based on the 1974 Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador). By agreement taken in the session held on September 13, 2007, the aforementioned Regulatory Plan was repealed. On February 26, 2008, the new Regulatory Plan entered into force. These companies requested the Cartago City Council update the mentioned land uses. This management was denied in a resolution at 10:00 hours on August 19, 2015. Against that act, they filed a motion for reconsideration (recurso de revocatoria) with a subsidiary appeal (apelación en subsidio), as well as a motion for annulment (nulidad); which were denied by a resolution at 8:40 hours on November 23, 2015. In a brief filed on November 30, 2015, before the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, -as an improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio)-, they expressed their grievances. In resolution no. 235-2016 at 13:30 hours on May 31, 2016, that Section rejected the appeal and confirmed the appealed administrative act. Due to the foregoing, these companies filed a lawsuit against the Municipality of Cartago and the State, where they requested the following be declared: absolutely null the administrative act comprised of the resolution at 13:30 hours on May 31, 2016, issued by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal, -acting as a two-phase improper hierarchical superior (jerarca impropio bifásico)-. In which it confirmed the act of the Mayor's Office of the Municipality of Cartago at 8:43 hours on November 23, 2015, where the current validity of the land use certificates was rejected; the current validity of such land uses, under the same conditions in which they had been approved for a construction permit with R-700 purposes. Furthermore, they requested the defendant be ordered to pay consequential damages (daño emergente) under the terms of subsection m. ii) of rule 122 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA), so that its quantification be reserved for the sentence execution phase. Likewise, on the approved amounts, payment be ordered from the date the judgment becomes final and until its effective payment. The defendant City Council responded negatively and raised the exceptions of lack of: right, active standing (legitimación activa), and passive standing (legitimación pasiva). For its part, the state representation opposed the plaintiff's claims and formulated the defenses of lack of standing in its two aspects, as well as lack of right. The Tribunal, by a majority, upheld the exception of lack of passive standing raised by the State and rejected the one invoked by the Municipality. Similarly, it rejected the defense of lack of standing alleged by the co-defendants. It upheld the exception of lack of right, consequently declared the lawsuit without merit, with costs charged to the losing plaintiff companies. Dissatisfied, the losing parties file a cassation appeal (recurso de casación) where they develop one procedural grievance and three substantive ones.

**II.-** Before entering into the presentation and examination of the charges, it is necessary to explain that the cassation appellants, in a final section, -after presenting their procedural and substantive grievances-, which they call **"COROLLARIES"**, refer to the conclusions issued by the Tribunal, which they cite or transcribe. In essence, they dedicate themselves to criticizing what was ordered by the judges, regarding that the land uses lost effectiveness when the regulatory plan under which they had been approved was repealed. They allude to what was stated by the Mayor of Cartago in the administrative venue and finally accuse that, in the sub examine, jurisprudence was not applied. Regarding what was resolved concerning that the rule used when granting the land uses had been repealed and could not be updated. They argue that among their claims is not that of "updating" the urban regulations of Cartago. What was requested, they state, was that the land uses approved when the repealed regulatory plan was in force be recognized as currently valid. They likewise allude to the endorsement granted by the Tribunal to what was ordered by the Third Section of the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal when hearing their appeal. Nevertheless, they allege, the judges contradict themselves, since, in Considering IV, they agreed with them in establishing that the land uses did not expire after one year. They challenge what was resolved by the improper hierarchical superior on the matter, by having deemed it not proven that "correlative procedures" had been carried out aimed at translating such acts into construction permits. They emphasize that that Section of the Tribunal modified the administrative conduct and ventured into extremes that were not appealed, so what was resolved by it was not merely confirmatory, but rather fully influenced the criteria issued upon exhausting the administrative channel. Therefore, they estimate that the State is responsible given that the improper hierarchy exceeded its function. Thus, they argue, there is an evident unreasonable disproportion in being ordered to pay costs, since they litigated in good faith, not in a reckless manner. They add that the fact that different arguments were formulated before the improper hierarchical superior than those debated in the municipal venue does not justify their not being resolved, "*...since if it is a legality controller, precisely its function is to detect and rule ex officio on any administrative conduct contrary to the Law, even regardless of whether it was based on discussed arguments or not*". Nor, they point out, is it justified that the evident errors incurred by the Third Section when resolving their allegations, -debated in the municipal venue-, were ignored.

Less, he notes, it would have resolved an aspect where the Mayor provided that the “land uses do generate individual rights and consequently cannot be rendered ineffective without a prior lesividad proceeding.” He insists, the improper superior exceeded his functions, since he modified the Mayor's criterion by establishing, “when a Regulatory Plan changes, the land uses are rendered ineffective (the same underlying approach the Trial Court has now applied in the judgment before us).” He states that the improper superior is a controller of legality, but only regarding matters under discussion, not matters already granted, since this would entail accepting the substitution of administrative conduct, to the detriment of recognized rights, which violates legal certainty. The improper superior, he points out, “…is for the purpose of preventing arbitrariness by the municipal administration against the administered party, and not for ‘straightening out’ the municipality's possible or eventual errors in favor of the administered party with impunity.” He reproaches that the Town Council could also have avoided this through “tolerated non-conforming use,” given that in its agreements number 49-06 of December 18, 2006, and 106-07 of September 13, 2007, it committed to respecting those land uses that had been requested before the new Regulatory Plan came into effect. The foregoing, he notes, without distinguishing between uses applied for and not yet resolved, and those requested and already approved. Therefore, he states, no difference can be made where the law does not make one, and those agreements must be applied in all cases, “…without exclusions by way of bifurcation, as the Trial Court erratically did.” He reproaches what the judges concluded regarding the land uses issued by the Municipality in 2007 losing efficacy with the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan. Likewise, he criticizes the ruling regarding the fact that the actions and procedures carried out by them under the protection of the land-use certificate before other entities and institutions do not have the effect they intended, since they did not materialize the expectations of right they held. He objects that the Trial Court disregarded the documentation provided, which it did not even begin to analyze. It limited itself to discrediting its evidentiary value, due to not having obtained the construction permit. Hence, he did not understand; if such a permit was not obtained, it was not due to their negligence, abandonment, or carelessness, but due to material impossibility. The foregoing, because INVU refused to continue with the processing upon noticing, in February 2008, the publication of the repeal of the 1974 Cartago Regulatory Plan. Furthermore, the municipality did not wish to continue them, arguing that supplementary regulations linked to INVU applied, which he considers a contradiction by those institutions. The judges, he points out, were of the opinion that land uses do not entail individual rights, which is contrary to constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Chamber. He notes that the Trial Court considered that the land uses became ineffective one calendar day after being approved, or at most, four and a half months later when the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan was published in La Gaceta. Consequently, it was impossible to obtain construction permits in such a short time, due to the quantity and complexity of necessary procedures. Therefore, he affirms, “no one is obligated to the impossible.” He then reproduces in its entirety the dissenting vote, and requests that it be considered an integral part of the grounds for his cassation appeal. It is clear that the objection is merely expository, without any legal foundation directly related to the debated judgment. It limits itself to making generic statements not aimed at attacking what the Trial Court resolved on the points to which it alludes. It must be emphasized that it confines itself to pointing out its disagreement in this regard without citing the substantive law violated. Thus, as can be seen, it does not legally refute or dispute the judges’ considerations regarding the ruling. Furthermore, they refer indistinctly to what was resolved by the improper superior and the Trial Court, it being clear that at this procedural stage, only the Trial Court's ruling can be attacked. What the cassation appellants should have done in their challenge was to provide the grounds for why the ruling was incorrect, that is, to set out the factual and legal reasons that demonstrated the error committed in the appealed judgment, which is found lacking. The request concerning the dissenting vote being considered an integral part of their appeal is also not addressable. This is because it is their obligation to clearly and precisely set forth the reasoning by which they combat the judges' ruling. Moreover, some of their reproaches are reiterated in their substantive grounds for appeal, so they will be examined when those are addressed. Therefore, the arguments developed in this section he called “corollaries” cannot be heard by this Chamber due to their informality.

**Cassation Appeal on Procedural Grounds** **III.- Single:** It alleges a lack of or inadequate reasoning in the Trial Court's judgment. It claims that in this type of proceeding when an administrative act is challenged, the judge is obligated to analyze its subjective and material elements, to determine, it points out, even sua sponte, that it substantially conforms to the legal system. In its opinion, not performing this exercise entails “an absence of descriptive reasoning, since not all the factual or legal situations that, for example, constitute the grounds for the act were taken into account…" It notes that such motivation is a right of the parties and constitutes an unavoidable requirement for the validity of the ruling. In support, it reproduces an excerpt from a ruling of the Constitutional Chamber. In the case under review, it argues, the Trial Court incurred the defect of lack of reasoning because it considered the minutes of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, in isolation, and disregarded minutes no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007. In which, it states, it was agreed that the effects of the repeal of the 1974 Cartago Regulatory Plan would not affect land-use applications submitted before it was repealed. This, it notes, is what occurred in the instant case. It explains that the repeal came into effect when published in La Gaceta, in February 2008, while the land uses were approved for it on September 12, 2007, one calendar day before the agreement taken by the Municipal Council that agreed to repeal it. It reproaches that the judges completely ignored minutes no. 106 of September 13, 2007. The foregoing, it affirms, because it did not explain in any way why what was stated in that agreement does not lead to considering the aforementioned transitional rule on land uses as “included,” beyond how it should be interpreted, i.e., its scope in the specific case, which, it accepts, is a substantive aspect it will address later. It reiterates, “there was an incomplete assessment or reading of the documentary evidence.” It adds that the majority vote did not consider the Town Council's agreement of September 13, 2007, which, it asserts, expressly referred to the application of the municipal agreement of December 18, 2006. Finally, it cites jurisprudence from this Deciding Body on lack of reasoning.

**IV.-** Regarding the defect of lack of reasoning, this Deciding Body has established that it occurs when the reasoning of the judgment is non-existent, or its development is extremely confusing or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part. Therefore, reasoning is not only mandatory, according to article 57 of the CPCA, but also constitutes a requirement within a State Governed by the Rule of Law in accordance with the provisions of article 137, subsection d) of the CPCA. Likewise, as a reproach susceptible to being reviewed through the extraordinary cassation appeal, under the terms of the aforementioned canon, it should not be understood as a mechanism to question the legal grounds of the judgment. It is not a matter of determining whether the judge ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process, but rather, that the judgment contains the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was adopted. As can be inferred from the charge developed by the cassation appellants, the complaint concerns not a procedural aspect but rather a substantive one related to the examination of the elements of the administrative act. Also regarding evidentiary assessment, since it argues that the judges disregarded a set of minutes of the Cartago Municipal Council. Although it alleges that the ruling does not address the manner in which the transitional rule contained in the mentioned act (no. 106 of September 13, 2007, of the Municipal Council) should be interpreted, nor did the Trial Court set forth why what is regulated in said agreement does not include land uses. Nevertheless, it then points out that the documentary evidence was not assessed or read, which demonstrates an indirect error that falls outside the procedural error of lack of reasoning. Given that it reiterates such arguments when developing the substantive grounds for appeal, they will then be examined when those reproaches are addressed.

**Cassation Appeal on Substantive Grounds** **V.- First:** It alleges that the Trial Court incurred an inadequate assessment of evidence. It refers to what this Chamber has resolved regarding said defect, and states that it is configured, among other things, when judges grant a piece of evidence the “…proof of a fact different from the one it actually contains.” It adds that, according to the jurisprudence of this Chamber, evidence must be assessed in accordance with the rules of sound criticism—experience, logic, and psychology. It refutes that a ruling was omitted on its principal argument: “…recognizing current validity of the various land uses granted to my clients on September 12, 2007, and the consequent administrative responsibility for this, inevitably violated the principle of the inviolability of one's own acts…” The foregoing, because the Municipal Council, upon repealing the 1974 Regulatory Plan, established that it did so based on all prior agreements, and therefore, in its opinion, the rules contained in Transitional Provision 2 of minutes 49 of the municipal session of December 18, 2006, apply. It reproduces what was agreed: “Second: The applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that may have been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal shall be resolved based on the norms hereby repealed.” It reproaches the Trial Court's ruling regarding the fact that said administrative decision was not issued as a transitional provision in the regulatory body of the Regulatory Plan, and therefore it did not form part of the applicable administrative legal order when resolving this matter. It adds that the Trial Court stated that this was due to a requirement of the Municipal Council, which, in order to have effects of general scope and a normative nature, should have been incorporated into the cited Regulation. The foregoing, it indicates, without considering what was stated expressly in the mentioned agreement, where the repeal of the 1974 Cartago Regulatory Plan was established—article 2 of minutes no. 106 of the municipal session of September 13, 2007—which it transcribes in relevant part, and where, it points out, minutes no. 49 of December 18, 2006, is cited—the issuance of the transitional rule referring to land uses processed before the final repeal of September 13, 2007. It objects that the judges' ruling finds no protection in any legal norm, and brands what was established as “formalistic.” It states that it was indeed included, “…not directly but indirectly by express REFERENCE, since the Cartago Municipal Council was clear in indicating in its final repeal agreement that the decision to abolish the 1974 Regulatory Plan was based on ALL its ANTECEDENTS… the first antecedent was precisely the agreement contained in Minutes 49-06 of December 18, 2006, where the process tending toward repeal was opened…” In its opinion, this led to the current validity of land uses issued under that Regulatory Plan being disregarded. It emphasizes that if the repeal did not affect the land-use applications submitted before the cited repeal, all the more reason it could not affect the land uses approved prior to being repealed. Hence, it argues, if it was prohibited to disregard the land uses that were processed, with greater reason or logic, one cannot disregard a land use approved previously, since the latter possesses greater certainty or legal security than the one requested, in accordance with what is regulated in article 34 of the Political Constitution—non-retroactivity to the detriment of acquired rights or consolidated legal situations.

**Second:** it refutes what was set forth in the majority vote, regarding that land uses are merely "declaratory," for which reason they do not generate subjective rights. It affirms that this position is contrary to the jurisprudence of this decision-making Body and to that of the Constitutional Chamber. It refutes that the Court avoided the cited jurisprudential contradiction, alleging its "inapplicability," although without explaining why such rulings are not applicable in the sub examine. Regarding **ruling no. 1285-2010 of the Constitutional Chamber**, it explains that it resolved that land uses grant acquired rights; furthermore, it maintained the validity of acts of such nature, which had been granted based on a decree that was declared unconstitutional. It claims that, for this reason, what was ruled by the Court contradicts the cited jurisprudence, since it expressed that, upon the repeal in 2008 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, the land uses that were granted to it on September 12, 2007, were left without "effect." It highlights what it calls "the nonsense" of the thesis endorsed by the judges, given that if the ineffectiveness of those resolutions occurred with the declaration of that regulatory plan, it means *“…they became ineffective just ONE CALENDAR DAY after they were granted…”*. This is because the municipal agreement repealing it was adopted on September 13, 2007, although it was published in La Gaceta in February 2008. It objects that the Court used an opinion from the PGR as a basis, despite it being a party to the process as the legal representative of the State. Hence, it points out, it used legal "doctrine" emanating from one of the parties in litigation, which it brands as *“improper… not very transparent or ethical from the point of view of the technical reasoning of the judgment…”*. It mentions that ruling no. 9565 (file no. 17-004467-0007-CO) of the Constitutional Chamber confirmed the thesis of the judiciary in the sense that land uses generate subjective rights. In support, it partially reproduces judgments from the Constitutional Body and from this Chamber, regarding land uses. It argues that in those rulings it is verified that these acts are not "declaratory," as the Court erroneously ordered, but rather they grant subjective rights, which the Municipality cannot disregard, unless it resorts to the lesivity process [precept 173 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP)]). Likewise, it refers that it could resort to revocation, when it is going to disregard the continuity of the effects of the acts, for reasons of convenience or opportunity, in accordance with the provisions in cardinal 152 and following ibid. Regarding the latter, it points out that the judges were mistaken in understanding that its issuance constitutes a "regulated act," which is why it is not appropriate to revoke it in accordance with the stipulations of canon 156.1 cited. Contrary to what was decided, it states that three discretionary acts were what justify or obligate the revocation of the land uses. Namely, the one that repealed the 1974 regulatory plan; the one that approved the new regulatory plan, where a different land use—agricultural—was assigned to its properties, on which residential use had been approved; the one that refused to recognize current validity to such certificates. It stresses that the Town Council has alleged that those land uses—validly granted in conformity with the legal system—were left "ineffective" upon repealing the regulatory plan based on which they had been approved. It emphasizes that the defendant municipality decided to repeal the 1974 regulatory plan, which it classifies as a *“discretionary decision”*, and thus, in its opinion, revocation was appropriate, if what was sought was to disregard such acts, based on which it carried out various procedures and even gave its properties as collateral for a trust, due to the residential vocation of its properties. It states that their value decreased when they were allocated to agricultural uses, as stated by the witness Óscar Calderón, who explained the difference in the value of the properties according to their possible use. This, it asserts, constitutes the technical basis of its pecuniary damage. It notes that the jurisprudence, in accordance with article 9 of the Civil Code (CC), fulfills an integrating function of law, thus allowing the absence or insufficiency of law to be supplemented. Thus, it acquires the same rank as the norm it integrates, interprets, or delimits. Consequently, *“…since in Costa Rica there is no law that says what happens to conforming land uses when the regulatory plan under which they were approved is repealed, or if a new one is approved that contradicts them, jurisprudence came to fill that normative ‘gap’…”*. **Third:** it accuses *“breach of the principles of reasonableness and legal proportionality”*. It alleges that, in the event that the adjective and substantive grounds set forth in this appeal are denied, it requests *“…that the appealed judgment be quashed insofar as (it) **condemned**… **to the payment of costs of the action**”*. Precept 193, subsection b) of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (CPCA), it says, provides for the possibility of exonerating the defeated party when, due to the nature of the debated questions, there had been sufficient reason to litigate. It affirms that the judge must weigh reasonableness factors when evaluating whether a party appeared before the jurisdictional apparatus in a justified manner, or if, on the contrary, it did so in a reckless and daring manner. In the matter under analysis, it indicates that what was debated was based on reasonable arguments and evidence, which, it says, the Court itself classified as *“respectable”*, something the opposing party also did in the oral trial. Hence, in its view, it is burdensome, even in the eventual rejection of its claims, to be condemned to the payment of costs, since they litigated under the protection of national jurisprudence, which coincides with its thesis or case theory. Indeed, it states, based on municipal agreements that established that *“…prior conforming land uses granted under the Cartago Regulatory Plan of 1974, which were given under its protection, could not be disregarded before its repeal…”*. It argues that, in accordance with *“…detectable reasonableness, and based on a premise of proportionality and even legal certainty, is why it requests…”* to be exonerated from the payment of costs, having sufficient reason to litigate and having done so in good faith.

**VI.-** The crux of what is being challenged lies in what was decided by the Court regarding the non-validity of the land uses obtained by the co-plaintiffs, based on the 1974 Regulatory Plan. This is due to the issuance of the new urban planning of the Municipality of Cartago, which came into effect in February 2008. Because the **first** and **second** objections address aspects related to the legal nature and scope of land use, such grievances will be heard together. What is of interest, the Court ordered: **2) The cessation of the effects of the land-use certificates that have lost validity and effectiveness by virtue of a new applicable zoning regulation does not require initiating any administrative or judicial procedures.** *…the plaintiff argues… in its opinion, since a subjective right exists given by a favorable administrative act, in accordance with what is set forth by the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, even if the regulation, in this case the Regulatory Plan, changes or is repealed, said act remains in effect, and to be able to suppress it… is to resort to the revocation procedure provided for in article 152 and following of the General Law of Public Administration.- **Court’s Opinion.** …the urban planning regulations translate into limitations and detractions of uses and powers of the property owner over the property, insofar as it determines the land use and how that utilization must occur.* This work is carried out through the administrative act known as a land-use certificate (certificación de uso de suelo), which, due to its importance, is classified as a declaratory administrative act (acto administrativo declarativo) (in the sense that it is limited to certifying a fact or legal situation without creating, modifying, or extinguishing it), but these are not acts that constitute rights per se, since they do not create or modify previously established legal situations… Land-use certificates have been understood as acts through which the Local Corporation communicates the conformity or non-conformity of the land use with what is established in the respective zoning for that historical moment; as provided in article 28 of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana)… Therefore, through the “land-use certificate,” it is not decided what the permitted use is, since this is a different situation insofar as it has already been previously determined in the respective zoning regulation, which forms part of the local regulatory plan (plan regulador); it simply certifies what the permitted use is according to what was previously established by the latter two. The doctrine has indicated that urban plans are acts of authority with which the land is disciplined, in such a way that they affect private rights (property rights) by predetermining the permitted modes of enjoyment and use of the property… The land-use certification is merely descriptive regarding a specific factual situation in relation to what is provided under a legal norm, for which reason, through it, a pre-existing legal situation is not consolidated by the certifying act. From the foregoing citations and the development that has been carried out on this topic by jurisprudence and doctrine, the conclusion is clearly reached that the land-use certificate does not confer a subjective right to build or subdivide (fraccionar), but rather constitutes a prerequisite that any interested party must fulfill in order to obtain a construction license or permit… it is clear to this Tribunal that in the case under examination we are in the… scenario where, at the time, the plaintiff filed land-use applications (2006) which were granted in accordance with the Regulatory Plan (Plan Regulador) in force at that moment, this manifestation by the Administration being a formal conduct that simply delimited the use of the property at the time of issuance of the certificate and as long as the regulatory body that supported said information remained in force. Now, having this premise clear, we must address the plaintiff's argument regarding the necessity or not of initiating… a lesivity proceeding (proceso de lesividad) or an administrative revocation procedure, as a prerequisite to consider the effects of a land use certified prior to the modification or enactment of a regulatory plan as having ceased… the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in Vote No. 755-95 of 12:12 p.m. on February 4, 1994, regarding the annulment of administrative acts: “...the Administration is prohibited from suppressing by its own action those acts it has issued that confer subjective rights upon individuals [...]. The only avenue the State has to eliminate one of its acts from the legal order is the jurisdictional lesivity proceeding (proceso jurisdiccional de lesividad)… when the Administration considers it must render ineffective, against a declaratory administrative act of subjective rights (acto administrativo declarativo de derechos subjetivos) in the administrative venue, considering that there is a defect in one or some elements of the administrative act that causes its absolute, evident, and manifest nullity, it must observe the Administrative Procedure contemplated in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), in order to guarantee Due Process to the parties whose subjective rights or legitimate interests may be harmed… it is clear that to render ineffective a declaratory administrative act of a subjective right, due process must be observed; however, the defendant parties on this point have been consonant in indicating that in this case we are not in the presence of an evident and manifest absolute nullity, because the land-use certificate does not suffer from any defect, a thesis this Tribunal shares... In any case, we must warn that this Chamber of Judges, in light of what was stated above, holds the thesis that the land-use certificate does not constitute any right, but rather has declaratory effects and not constitutive of rights, so that the procedure of evident and manifest nullity is inappropriate. b.2. Regarding the feasibility of exercising a judicial action tending to the declaration of nullity of the land-use certificate, we meet the same fate. A lesivity proceeding, like what was indicated in the procedure of evident and manifest nullity, must have as its basis the review of a declaratory act of rights. As indicated supra, the land-use certificate is not such, and it does not exhibit defects in its elements that would lead to its declaration of nullity. This being the case, this argument is also rejected. b.3. Finally, regarding the procedure for the revocation of the act (land use), it is also inapplicable in the specific case, given that the revocation of administrative acts by the Administration only operates when it concerns discretionary acts, not regulated ones, as happens in this case and we explain below. The revocation of a valid and effective administrative act occurs in three scenarios: 1. It concerns an act issued under the protection of administrative discretion using criteria of opportunity, convenience, or merit, in accordance with article 153, paragraph 3 of the LGAP, in such a way that the revocation of valid administrative acts is possible, that is, acts substantially in conformity with the legal systems and that are producing effects… In the opinion of the plaintiff's representation, in order to render ineffective the administrative act called “land use” granted to their represented parties, the defendant Municipality had to resort to this procedure because it is not possible to go back on its own acts unless the Law authorizes it; in that sense, this Tribunal considers that although the plaintiff's arguments are respectable, they are not shared by virtue of the fact that although articles 152 and 153 of the General Law of Public Administration grant the Administration the power to suppress favorable acts from the legal world through the institution of revocation under penalty of nullity if the procedures or the scenarios listed therein are not followed, it is necessary to take into account for the case at hand what is provided in subsection 1) of article 156 of the same normative body which provides: “… Article 156.- 1. The revocation of regulated acts shall not be possible…” …for those acts of a regulated type, the institution of revocation is not possible, this is because the revocation procedure is provided for discretionary acts since the exercise of regulated powers limits the action of the Public Administration to verifying that the requirements established by the legal system are met and to establishing the corresponding legal consequence… In summary, this Tribunal considers that the revocation procedure is not applicable to the present case by virtue of the fact that the “land uses” are regulated administrative acts and not discretionary ones; the defendant administration would have been wrong to resort to revocation as argued by the plaintiff. 3)… we will address… the argument regarding the validity and effectiveness of land uses with reference to the repealed regulatory plan and the effects that the provisions of the Municipality in article 3 of minutes 49 of December 18, 2006, may have had… Regarding the validity of land uses and their effectiveness as a formal administrative act creating favorable rights. Among the arguments raised in this venue by the municipal representation, we have that it argues that the land-use certificates that were granted to the plaintiff lost their validity and effectiveness with the repeal of the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was repealed, and consequently, it is legally impossible to grant land uses at this moment because in (sic) the place where the properties are located, with the new regulatory plan currently in force, they cannot be granted. To counter-argue this idea, the plaintiff indicated that the Municipality ignores its own acts, such as the second transitional provision contained in minutes 49 of December 18, 2006… in reference to what is provided in agreement III of minutes 49 of December 18, 2006, we have that it literally provides: "...Second. the applications for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses, and others that had been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal shall be resolved based on the rule that is hereby repealed...". This Chamber considers that the plaintiff is not correct in the effect that she intends to give to said municipal agreement, namely that if it was provided that the mere submission of applications must be processed with the repealed rule, with much more reason must the rights obtained in favorable acts be respected and given the same effect. This Tribunal considers that the reason is not with her in her argument, since the administrative decision under analysis—as correctly indicated by the Municipality's representation—has a transitional connotation and aims to prevent harmful effects to those who have submitted an "Application" for land-use certification and is not directed at those who have land-use certificates issued previously, much less, so many years ago. In any case, note that this administrative decision as such was not assumed as a transitional provision within the normative body of the Regulatory Plan, so it cannot be understood as part of the administrative legal system applicable when resolving the matter, since it responds to a requirement of the Municipal Council, which, to have effects of a general scope and a normative nature, had to have been incorporated into the Regulation called the Regulatory Plan… In conclusion, for the specific case, this non-normative administrative act, in the opinion of this Tribunal, is not applicable, since we are in the presence of land-use certificates granted under repealed regulations, ergo, they lose effectiveness and not validity, with the enactment of the new rules, as we explain below. - b.1.2. Having it clear that the core issue up to this moment, as has been developed, is that there effectively exist favorable administrative acts issued by the Municipality, but that said acts (land use) were granted in accordance with the regulations contained in the repealed 1974 regulatory plan, this Panel of Judges proceeds to hear and delimit whether their effectiveness effectively persists despite the repeal, either by reason of the nature of the right or because of some action carried out by the plaintiffs tending to consolidate said right. First, it is clear to this Chamber of Judges, from the foregoing, that in the present case, we find ourselves before the issuance of land-use certificates that are understood as administrative acts that simply delimit the use or uses that can be given to the property or real estate, and consequently, the votes of the Constitutional Chamber and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice that the plaintiff cites in support of her action are not applicable to the case under study, with respect to the recognition of the right even when there has been a variation of the norm on the basis of which they were granted. Second, regarding the evidence provided by the plaintiff both in the administrative venue (evidence for better resolution before the Third Section, visible on pages 72 of the administrative file) and in this venue, with which it is intended to demonstrate that there were actions on her part aimed at exercising the right derived from the land-use certificates, we must warn that from a review of the evidence alluded to by the plaintiff, this Chamber considers that it is insufficient to materialize the right that would effectively permit the survival of the land-use certificate even when the regulations changed. See that from pages 71 to 76 (evidence number 6 to 10 of the administrative file) are the land-use applications in which it indicates in the box requested use "construction," however, there is no other reliable evidentiary element that demonstrates the materialization of said right, as such, a construction license. The matter of work receipts or procedures before other authorities would not be sufficient to prove said right, since they are procedures that must be carried out tending to the raising of civil works but are not capable of creating any subjective right that endures beyond the change of norm, much less, when the Municipality has not received, approved, and authorized them through an administrative act that grants subjective rights, we insist, such as a construction license. It is not superfluous to indicate that the party did not demonstrate with reliable evidence that she has obtained a land-use certificate for residential use with which to claim damages and losses in this matter. Consequently, there is no valid element that obliges the Municipality to recognize the effectiveness of the land-use certificate granted prior to the reforms.” **VII.-** As the Tribunal, as well as the appellants themselves, made clear, the Constitutional Chamber and this deciding Body have referred to the concept, legal nature, and scope of land uses. This Chamber has provided that in said certificate, the use that can be given to a property is recorded in accordance with urban planning norms. Furthermore, its effects are referred to a piece of land and are produced mediately in the legal sphere of the property owner. This is consistent with what is regulated in article one of the Urban Planning Law (Ley de Planificación Urbana, LPU) in that land use (uso del suelo) *“...is the utilization of a piece of land, of the physical structure seated on or incorporated into it, or of both cases, in terms of class, form, or intensity of its exploitation…”* Hence, it stands as the fundamental instrument regarding the intended destination to be given to the property, since it must be reserved to what is established in urban planning. This is also in accordance with what is stipulated in the LPU, since the land-use certificate (certificado de uso de suelo) issued by the municipalities is what certifies conformity of use according to zoning requirements. Hence, in this understanding, canon 28 ibid establishes the prohibition of destining lands, buildings, or structures to any use that is non-conforming with the established planning. Furthermore, at this point, what is mandated in the Political Constitution (CP) must be taken into account regarding the right to health (precept 21); limitations on property for reasons of public interest (cardinal 45); the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment (canon 69); the requirement for rational exploitation of the land (stipulation 69); and the protection of natural beauties (disposition 89). Hence, these regulations constitute the constitutional framework for urban planning law (ordenamiento urbanístico), aimed at safeguarding said fundamental rights and likewise the quality of life of the inhabitants, as regulated by article 28 of the Organic Environmental Law. Although the Constitutional Chamber at some point expressed “… the certificates of land use have the virtue of conferring subjective rights upon the individual…” Judgment no. 2006-4715 of 11 hours 39 minutes of March 31, 2006 (consult also ruling no. 1098 of 16 hours 40 minutes of February 11, 2003). The truth is that subsequently it has conceptualized it as a favorable act, by ordering: “… this conforming land-use certificate is a favorable act by virtue that it enables the administered party to process a construction permit and, eventually, request another type of licenses…” Ruling no. 12815 of 9 hours 23 minutes of July 30, 2010; likewise, in that regard judgment 4161 of 12 hours 8 minutes of February 26, 2010 can be consulted. This is how this Chamber has ordered: “The land-use certificate consists of the instrument where it is recorded to what uses a piece of land may be destined, that is, what it certifies, -with declaratory character-, is the utilization that can be given to it according to the regulations in force. Hence, it may happen that what is set forth in it is not what interests the administered party, since the one they intended to give it might not be in conformity with the regulatory plan… the Constitutional Chamber has expressed that said certificate, although of a declaratory nature, stands as a fundamental act, because its content and function is to record factual or legal states that make it possible to make resolutions that create, modify or extinguish legal situations, such as construction permits or licenses (patentes), for whose granting said document is required, as a means of verifying that what is requested conforms to the use approved in the corresponding regulatory plan. (Judgment no. 798-F-2012 of 9 hours 45 minutes of July 4, 2012)” Ruling no. 866 of 9 hours 55 minutes of July 11, 2013. In the matter under examination, the Municipality of Cartago granted the co-plaintiffs a land-use certificate according to their request, specifically with agricultural residential use R-700, in accordance with what is prescribed in canon 4-3 of the 1974 Regulatory Plan. Consequently, in said documents it was recorded, in accordance with the rules in force at that time, that the lands were suitable for that purpose. Hence, it empowered them to carry out the indispensable procedures so that, once the necessary requirements were met and their viability verified, they could obtain the corresponding construction permit. However, when such companies requested that the municipal corporation of Cartago update said certifications for them, -since supposedly they had been required to do so when carrying out one of their procedures-, said update was denied to them, in an act of 10 hours of August 19, 2015. Note, what was acted upon by the co-claimants is one more element to ratify what was ordered by this Deciding Body in that land-use certificates do not confer subjective rights in favor of the administered parties. If it were so, there would have been no need to go to the municipal corporation to request their ratification. As expressed, what this type of certification records is that a property, in accordance with what is stipulated in the regulatory plan in force, can be destined -at that moment- to a certain use. But, its content is merely declaratory, since, for the purpose of obtaining a construction permit, or some other license, the municipal resident must comply with the requirements that the legal system demands for each case. According to what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber, these certificates constitute a fundamental act, because they reflect factual and legal situations that allow for the dictation of acts that can create, modify or extinguish legal situations. As explained supra, for example, construction permits or licenses, for which it is indispensable to have them for the purpose of being able to certify that what is requested is consistent with the use set forth in the corresponding regulatory plan. Hence, they do not grant subjective rights nor constitute a consolidated legal situation. Consequently, contrary to what was argued by the challengers, the breach of precept 34 of the CP does not occur, because in this instance we are not facing a retroactive application of the legal system since, as explained, land-use certificates do not constitute vested rights nor consolidated legal situations. That would occur only once a permit or license is obtained based on those certifications, which does not happen in the case under examination. On the other hand, different from what was accused by the cassation appellants, both constitutional jurisprudence and that of this Deciding Body do not conceive of land-use certificates as vested rights, nor consolidated legal situations, for which reason the infringement of canon 9 of the CC is also not produced. The Constitutional Chamber, from old date (ruling 7331 of 15 hours 24 minutes of October 31, 1997) and equally more recently (consult judgments numbers 799 of 14 hours 35 minutes of July 1, 2010, 761 of 11 hours 7 minutes of January 23, 2009, 2877 of 19 hours 52 minutes of February 27, 2007 and 7642 of 11 hours 39 minutes of June 17, 2005) has ordered that no one has a right to the immutability of the legal system. This with the exception of vested rights and consolidated legal situations, which are protected for reasons of legal certainty and equity, given that the legal system safeguards whoever acquired the right or enjoys the situation. Only in such cases does the non-retroactivity of the law operate, so that a modification in the legal system does not result in the removal of the asset or the vested right from the personal patrimony. Nor would it have an impact when, the factual presupposition having occurred before the regulatory change, the advantageous consequence in favor of the interested party according to the consolidated legal situation is not produced. In all other circumstances, as in the subexamine, the application of the rules in force operates, it is reiterated, because as indicated, the legal system is not immutable, and the co-plaintiffs do not possess any vested right, nor any consolidated legal situation. The foregoing, since they did not materialize the use declared in the certificate by obtaining the construction permit. Observe, as noted, once the 1974 Regulatory Plan was repealed, -pursuant to which they obtained the land-use certificates-, and the new plan that came into force in February 2008 being in effect, in 2015, they requested that such certifications be updated, according to the repealed planning. However, in accordance with the foregoing, it was not procedurally appropriate, since the land-use certificates issued on September 12, 2007, were issued in accordance with what was established in the 1974 Regulatory Plan, which was not in force in 2015, -since seven years prior-, since, it is stressed, new regulations had been promulgated that began to govern in February 2008. Hence, it is appropriate to reject the grievance regarding this extreme point.

**VIII.-** In another order of ideas, regarding the transitory regulation referring to land-use requests, this Deciding Body agrees with what was resolved by the Tribunal, although with the following clarifications. This extreme point addresses agreement III of act 49 of December 18, 2006, which expressed: “… requests for land-use certificates for different purposes, construction licenses and others that had been submitted prior to the entry into force of this repeal will be resolved based on the rule that is repealed here…”. It must be clear, the Regulatory Plan of the Municipality of Cartago in force, came into force not until February 2008 and had been promulgated on September 17, 2007. In said regulation, the cited transitory provision was not introduced, whereby that agreement prior to the dictation of the new planning can be considered as a background record, where the need or possibility of it forming part of such Plan was discussed at some point, but it was not done. Consequently, what was ruled by the judges is consistent with what happened, since that transitory provision was not introduced into the text in force. Thus, it is evident that it was not the will of those who issued it to introduce it as a transitory provision. In that understanding, what is sought by the appellants cannot be acceded to, in that it be considered a component part of the Regulatory Plan in force, since the Municipal Council, upon promulgating it, did not include it. Then, in the opinion of this Chamber, the discussion is sterile as to whether that 2006 agreement, despite the fact that it only referred to land-use requests, even so, or with greater reason, encompassed the land-use certificates issued when the 1974 Regulatory Plan was in force. For that same reason, determining whether said act referred only to the procedural phase, or whether it also included the substantive aspect would lead nowhere. It is insisted, because in its time it only obeyed a requirement of the Municipal Council, but which ultimately was not embodied when dictating the new regulation, whereby it cannot be acted upon. According to what the cassation appellants themselves indicate, that agreement forms part of the background records of the plan in force, but only that. As such it cannot be applied, because it was dictated when the new Regulatory Plan had not yet been born into legal life, so it cannot be regarded as a transitory rule, nor have effects of general scope. Consequently, the charge on this point must be dismissed.

**IX.-** Regarding what was alleged by the challengers concerning that land-use certificates grant subjective rights, for which reason they cannot be disregarded without resorting to a lesivity procedure (proceso de lesividad), or to revocation. Likewise regarding that we are not facing a regulated act (acto reglado), -as the Tribunal ordered-, but rather three discretionary resolutions, it is clear that they are not correct in their assertions as will be explained next. Concerning the first point, as set forth in considerando VII, land uses do not grant subjective rights. It is an act of a declaratory nature, which indicates the possible use of the land according to the urban planning in force. Which materializes upon compliance with the requirements to obtain a license, a permit or authorization, without any of these having been obtained in this instance. As for the second point, it is indubitable that the judges, in referring to the fact that we are facing a regulated act, were referring to the land-use certification, and in a concrete manner explained the reasons why in such a case revocation is not applicable. It is not until this procedural moment that the co-claimants argue that there were three discretionary acts that oblige the revocation of the land uses. They point out that it concerns the following acts, the one that: repealed the 1974 Regulatory Plan; approved the new Planning, and denied recognizing current validity of the certifications issued in September 2007. Which they qualify as discretionary, whereby in their opinion, the land-use certificates therefore should have been revoked. What was ruled by the judges, as appreciated from what was reproduced, was that such certifications constitute regulated acts, that is, the Administration's discretion does not apply, so that in accordance with the legal system their revocation does not proceed, -cardinal 156 of the LGAP, which in its relevant part, orders: “1. The revocation of regulated acts will not be possible…”. This extreme point should have been challenged by the appellants, but they do not do so, instead resorting to novel questions, not proposed nor debated during the process. What was expressed, without exposing in a diaphanous and concrete manner why the land-use certificates are not regulated acts, which was the basis used by the Tribunal in dictating its judgment. Hence, the appropriate action is to reject the charge.

**X.-** In the third of the reproaches, it argues that it should have been exonerated from the payment of costs, because it had sufficient reason to litigate and furthermore did so in good faith. Canon 193 of the CPCA, in what refers to the economic effects of the process, stipulates: “In judgments and orders having the character of a judgment, the unsuccessful party shall be condemned to the payment of personal and procedural costs, a pronouncement that shall be made ex officio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the unsuccessful party may be exonerated from the payment of costs, when: a) The judgment is dictated by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party plausibly could not have known and, for this reason, the opposition of the party was justified. b) Due to the nature of the debated questions, there has existed, in the judgment of the Tribunal, sufficient reason to litigate”. Hence, in principle, costs are of obligatory imposition upon the unsuccessful party. However, there exist presuppositions for their exoneration that are optional for the Judge, so that to apply them, the judge must analyze the conduct of the unsuccessful party, with the purpose of establishing whether it fits into one of the hypotheses set forth in the reproduced precept. As can be appreciated, it accuses that it had sufficient reason to litigate, whereby the Tribunal erred in condemning it to pay costs, for which it accuses a lack of application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as well as of cardinal 193 of the CPCA. It is appreciated that what was objected to by the appellants is an improper regulatory and constitutional principles application, because in their criterion, the Tribunal should have exempted them from the payment of the costs of the process. It is necessary to point out that a simple citation of the grounds for its provenance is not enough, but it is indispensable to explain in a clear and precise manner the reasons that underpin their statement, that is, to make a contrast of the alluded error against what was decided, in a concatenated and logical way. Observe, they confine themselves to arguing that in their opinion it is burdensome, even though their petitions were rejected, since they litigated under the protection of the national jurisprudence. However, upon resolving the merits of the matter, as was noted, the jurisprudence does not support what was argued by the companies in the process. Thus, the certainty of the plaintiff party concerning that they litigated in good faith is not sufficient. It must be noted that the Tribunal, regarding what this extreme point entails, ordered to accept the exception of lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) filed by the State, and declare without merit the lawsuit against the Municipality of Cartago.

Therefore, the objection must be dismissed.

**XI.-** In light of the reasons stated and given that the alleged objections did not occur, the appeal filed must be dismissed, with its costs to be borne by the party who filed it [Article 150, subsection 3) of the CPCA].

**POR TANTO** The cassation appeal is declared without merit, with its costs to be borne by the appellant.

**Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga** **Román Solís Zelaya** **Iris Rocío Rojas Morales** **William Molinari Vílchez** **Damaris Vargas Vásquez** HBRENES

20180004001208-2491218-1.rtf *160121091027CA* Res. 001960-F-S1-2020 SALA PRIMERA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del tres de junio de dos mil veinte.

Proceso de conocimiento contencioso administrativo interpuesto por FIDUCIARIA AML S.A., FINCA DE CAMPO S.A., ROM DE TURRIALBA S.A., e INVERSIONES LA QUINTA DE CENTROAMÉRICA S.A. representadas por Néstor José Mata Solano, mayor, casado una vez, cédula de identidad número 3-0222-0598 y Lic. Alejandro Monge Ariño, mayor, abogado, carnet número 13023 contra la MUNICIPALIDAD DE CARTAGO , representada Lic. Wilbert Quesada Garita, mayor, abogado, carnet número 8790, y contra el ESTADO, representado por la Licda. Maureen Medrano Brenes, mayor, abogada, carnet número 9559.

Redacta el Magistrado Rivas Loáiciga;

CONSIDERANDO

I.- El Tribunal sin que las partes lo combatan, tuvo por probadas las siguientes situaciones fácticas. Finca de Campo Sociedad Anónima, ROM de Turrialba Sociedad Anónima e Inversiones La Quinta de Centro América Sociedad Anónima solicitaron en la Municipalidad de Cartago certificados de uso de suelo, los cuales se otorgaron el 12 de setiembre de 2007, con sustento en el Plan Regulador de 1974. Mediante acuerdo tomado en la sesión efectuada el 13 de setiembre de 2007, se derogó el citado Plan Regulador. El 26 de febrero de 2008, entró en vigor el nuevo Plan Regulador. Dichas compañías pidieron al Ayuntamiento Cartaginés la actualización de los mencionados usos de suelo. Tal gestión fue denegada en resolución de 10 horas del 19 de agosto de 2015. Contra dicho acto formularon recurso de revocatoria con apelación en subsidio, así como nulidad; los cuales fueron denegados mediante resolución de 8 horas 40 minutos del 23 de noviembre de 2015. En escrito formulado el 30 de noviembre de 2015, ante la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, -como jerarca impropio-, expresaron agravios. En resolución no. 235-2016 de 13 horas 30 minutos del 31 de mayo de 2016, esa Sección rechazó la apelación y confirmó el acto administrativo impugnado. Debido a lo expuesto, tales empresas interpusieron demanda contra la Municipalidad de Cartago y el Estado, donde solicitaron se declarara: absolutamente nulo el acto administrativo conformado por la resolución de las 13 horas 30 minutos del 31 de mayo de 2016, dictada por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, -actuando como jerarca impropio bifásico-. En la cual confirmó el acto de la Alcaldía de la Municipalidad de Cartago de 8 horas 43 minutos del 23 de noviembre de 2015, donde se rechazó la vigencia actual de los certificados de uso de suelo; la vigencia actual de tales usos de suelo, en las mismas condiciones en las cuales habían sido aprobados para permiso de construcción con finalidades R-700. Además, pidieron, se condenara a la parte demandada al pago de daño emergente en los términos del inciso m. ii) de la norma 122 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), de forma que se reservara su cuantificación para la fase de ejecución de sentencia. Asimismo, sobre los montos aprobados se ordenara el pago desde la fecha de la firmeza del fallo y hasta su efectivo pago. El Ayuntamiento demandado contestó negativamente y opuso las excepciones de falta de: derecho, legitimación activa y pasiva. Por su lado, la representación estatal se opuso a las pretensiones de la parte actora y formuló las defensas de falta de legitimación en sus dos vertientes, así como la falta de derecho. El Tribunal por mayoría, acogió la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva interpuesta por el Estado y rechazó la invocada por la Municipalidad. De igual forma, rechazó la defensa de falta de legitimación alegada por los codemandados. Acogió la excepción de falta de derecho, consecuentemente declaró sin lugar la demanda, con sus costas a cargo de las compañías accionantes vencidas. Inconformes, las perdidosas formulan recurso de casación donde desarrollan un agravio adjetivo y tres sustanciales.

II.- De previo a ingresar a la exposición y conocimiento de los cargos, es necesario explicar, las casacionistas en un último apartado, -después de exponer sus agravios procesales y de fondo-, al que denomina “COLORARIOS”, se refiere a las conclusiones emitidas por el Tribunal, las cuales cita o transcribe. En esencia se dedica a criticar lo dispuesto por los jueces, en cuanto a que los usos de suelo perdieron eficacia al derogarse el plan regulador de acuerdo con el cual habían sido aprobados. Alude a lo expuesto por el Alcalde de Cartago en sede administrativa y finalmente acusa, en el subexamine, se dejó de actuar la jurisprudencia. Sobre lo resuelto en lo concerniente a que la norma usada al otorgar los usos de suelo había sido derogada y no se podía actualizar. Aduce, entre sus pretensiones no se encuentra la de “actualizar” la normativa urbana de Cartago. Lo solicitado, expresa, fue se reconociera vigencia actual a los usos de suelo aprobados cuando estaba vigente el plan regulador derogado. Alude de igual forma al aval concedido por el Tribunal a lo dispuesto por la Sección Tercera del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo al conocer su recurso de apelación. No obstante, alega, los juzgadores se contradicen, pues, en el considerando IV, le otorgó la razón a ella al establecer, los usos de suelo no caducaban al año. Combate, lo resuelto por el jerarca impropio sobre el particular, al tener por no acreditado, se hubieran realizado “trámites correlativos” tendientes a traducir tales actos en permisos de construcción. Enfatiza, esa Sección del Tribunal modificó la conducta administrativa, e incursionó en extremos que no fueron impugnados, por lo que lo resuelto por ella no fue tan solo confirmatoria, sino que incidió de forma plena en el criterio emitido al agotar la vía administrativa. Por ende, estima, el Estado resulta responsable dado que la jerarquía impropia se extralimitó en el ejercicio de su función. Así, arguye, existe una evidente desproporción irrazonable al condenárseles al pago de las costas, ya que litigaron de buena fe, no de modo temerario. Adiciona, el hecho que ante el jerarca impropio se formularan argumentos distintos a los debatidos en sede municipal, no justifica se dejaran de resolver, “…ya que si es contralora de legalidad precisamente su función es detectar y dictaminar de oficio toda conducta administrativa contraria a Derecho inclusive con prescindencia de que haya sido o no con base en argumentos discutidos”. Tampoco, apunta, se justifica, se soslayaran los evidentes errores en los que incurrió la Sección Tercera al resolver sus alegatos, -debatidos en sede municipal-. Menos, acota, resolviera sobre un aspecto donde el Alcalde dispuso los“…usos de suelo sí generan derechos subjetivos y que consecuentemente no se pueden dejar sin efecto sin un previo proceso de lesividad…”. Insiste, el jerarca impropio se extralimitó en sus funciones, ya que modificó el criterio del Alcalde, al establecer, “…cuando cambia un Plan Regulador quedan sin efecto los usos de suelo (misma tesitura de fondo que ahora ha aplicado el Tribunal en la sentencia que nos ocupa)…”. Manifiesta, el superior impropio es contralor de legalidad, pero, sobre los aspectos discutidos, no sobre lo ya concedido, dado que esto conllevaría aceptar la sustitución de la conducta administrativa, en perjuicio de derechos reconocidos, lo cual atenta contra la seguridad jurídica. El jerarca impropio, señala, “…es para efectos de evitar arbitrariedad de la administración municipal frente al administrado, más no para “enderezarle” impunemente al municipio los posible o eventuales errores… a favor del administrado”. Reprocha, el Ayuntamiento también podía evitar eso mediante el “uso no conforme tolerado”, dado que en sus acuerdos números 49-06 del 18 de diciembre de 2006 y 106-07 de 13 de setiembre de 2007, se comprometió a respetar aquellos usos de suelo que se hubiesen peticionado antes de la entrada en vigencia del nuevo plan regulador. Lo expresado, apunta, sin distinguir entre los usos gestionados y no resueltos y los pedidos, ya aprobados. Por consiguiente, manifiesta, no se puede hacer diferencia, donde la ley no lo hace, debiendo aplicar tales acuerdos en todos los casos, “…sin exclusiones por vía de bifurcación, como erráticamente lo hizo el Tribunal”. Reprocha, lo concluido por los jueces en cuanto a que los usos de suelo expedidos por la Municipalidad en el año 2007, perdieron eficacia con la derogatoria del plan regulador del año 1974. Asimismo, recrimina lo resuelto en lo tocante a que las actuaciones y trámites efectuados por ellas al amparo del certificado de uso de suelo ante otras entidades e instituciones, no tienen el efecto pretendido por ellas, ya que no materializaron las expectativas de derecho que tenían. Objeta, el Tribunal desdeño la documentación aportada, la cual ni siquiera ingresó a analizar. Se limitó a desacreditar su valor probatorio, debido a no haber obtenido el permiso de construcción. De ahí, no comprendió, tal permiso si no se alcanzó, no se debió a su desidia, abandono o negligencia, sino por imposibilidad material. Lo anterior, porque el INVU se negó a continuar con la tramitación al percatarse, en febrero de 2008 se publicó la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de Cartago de 1974. Además, el municipio no quiso continuarlos, al aducir, aplicaba normativa supletoria vinculada con el INVU, lo cual estima, una contradicción de dichas instituciones. Los juzgadores, señala, fueron del criterio, los usos de suelo no comportan derechos subjetivos, lo cual resulta contrario a la jurisprudencia constitucional y de esta Cámara. Hace notar, el Tribunal consideró, los usos de suelo quedaron ineficaces un día natural después de aprobados, o a lo sumo, cuatro meses y medio después al publicarse en La Gaceta la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de 1974. Consecuentemente, resultaba imposible obtener permisos de construcción en tan poco tiempo, debido a la cantidad y complejidad de trámites necesarios. Por ende, afirma, “nadie está obligado a lo imposible”. De seguido reproduce en su totalidad del voto salvado, y pide, se le tenga como parte integral de los fundamentos de su recurso de casación. Es claro, la objeción es tan solo expositiva, sin una fundamentación jurídica en relación directa a la sentencia debatida. Se circunscribe a realizar afirmaciones genéricas no dirigidas a atacar lo resuelto por el Tribunal en los extremos a los que alude. Se ha de recalcar, se constriñe a señalar su inconformidad al respecto sin citar el derecho de fondo conculcado. Así, según se aprecia, no refuta o disputa, jurídicamente, las consideraciones delos jueces en torno a lo fallado. Además se refieren de modo indistinto a lo resuelto por la jerarquía impropia y el Tribunal, siendo claro, en esta fase procesal únicamente puede atacarse lo fallado por el Tribunal. Las casacionistas, lo que debieron realizar en su impugnación fue brindar los fundamentos por los cuales lo dispuesto era incorrecto, sea, exponer las razones fácticas y jurídicas que evidenciaban el yerro cometido en la sentencia recurrida, lo cual se echa de menos. Tampoco, resulta atendible la solicitud concerniente a que se tenga al voto salvado como parte integral de su recurso. Ello dado que es su obligación exponer de forma clara y precisa los razonamientos mediante los cuales combate lo dispuesto por los juzgadores. Además, algunas de sus increpaciones las reitera en sus agravios sustantivos, por lo cual se ingresará a su examen cuando se conozcan estos. Por ende, los alegatos que desarrolla en este aparte al que denominó “corolarios”, no pueden ser conocidos por esta Sala debido a su informalidad.

Recurso de casación por razones procesales III.- Único: acusa falta o indebida fundamentación de la sentencia del Tribunal. Alega, en este tipo de proceso cuando se impugna un acto administrativo, el juzgador está obligado a analizar sus elementos subjetivos y materiales, para determinar, señala, incluso de oficio que se conforme sustancialmente al ordenamiento jurídico. En su opinión, no realizar dicho ejercicio conlleva “una ausencia de fundamentación descriptiva, pues no se tuvo en cuenta todas las situaciones fácticas o jurídicas que por ejemplo, conforman el motivo del acto…”. Acota tal motivación es un derecho de las partes y constituye un requisito insoslayable para la validez del fallo. En su apoyo reproduce un extracto de un fallo de la Cámara Constitucional. En el caso de examen, aduce, el Tribunal incurrió en el vicio de falta de motivación dado que consideró aisladamente el acta de la sesión municipal del 18 de diciembre de 2006, y dejó de lado el acta no. 106 de la sesión municipal del 13 de setiembre de 2007. En la cual, manifiesta, se acordó los efectos de la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de Cartago de 1974, no afectaba las solicitudes de uso presentadas antes de ser derogado, Ello, apunta, fue lo acaecido en la especie. Explica, la derogatoria entró a regir cuando se publicó en La Gaceta, en febrero de 2008, mientras que los usos de suelo le fueron aprobados el 12 de setiembre de 2007, un día natural antes del acuerdo tomado por el Concejo municipal que acordó derogarlo. Recrimina, los jueces obviaron por completo el acta no. 106 del 13 de setiembre de 2007. Lo expuesto, afirma, ya que no explicó de modo alguno, porqué lo expresado en ese acuerdo, no conduce a tener por “incluida” la citada regla de transitoriedad de los usos de suelo, más allá de cómo debía ser interpretada, sea, de sus alcances al caso concreto, lo cual, acepta, resulta un aspecto sustancial que abordará más adelante. Reitera, “hubo una incompleta valoración o lectura de la probanza documental”. Agrega, el voto de mayoría no consideró el acuerdo del Ayuntamiento del 13 de setiembre de 2007, que asevera, remitió de forma expresa a la aplicación del acuerdo municipal del 18 de diciembre de 2006. Por último, cita jurisprudencia de este Órgano decisor, sobre la falta de motivación.

IV.- Sobre el vicio de falta de motivación, este Órgano decisor ha dispuesto, se produce cuando la motivación del fallo no existe, o bien, su desarrollo resulta en extremo confuso o contradictorio, de forma tal que impide tener claridad en cuanto a los razonamientos que derivaron en la decisión adoptada en la parte dispositiva. En esa virtud, la motivación no sólo deviene obligatoria, conforme al precepto 57 del CPCA, sino que constituye, además, un requisito dentro de un Estado de Derecho de conformidad con lo preceptuado en el artículo 137 inciso d) del CPCA. Asimismo, como reproche susceptible de ser revisado mediante el recurso extraordinario de casación, en los términos del canon señalado, no debe entenderse como un mecanismo para cuestionar los fundamentos jurídicos de la sentencia. No se trata de determinar si el juzgador se pronunció sobre todas las pretensiones incorporadas al proceso, sino por el contrario, que el fallo cuente con los fundamentos sobre los cuales se adoptó la decisión correspondiente. Según se desprende del cargo desarrollado por las casacionistas, lo reclamado atiende no a un aspecto adjetivo si no a uno de fondo relacionado con el examen de los elementos del acto administrativo. También en cuanto apreciación probatoria, ya que aduce, los jueces dejaron de lado un acta del Concejo Municipal de Cartago. Aunque alega, lo resuelto no atiende a la manera cómo debe interpretarse la norma transitoria contenida en el mencionado acto (no. 106 del 13 de setiembre de 2007 del Concejo Municipal), tampoco el Tribunal expuso porqué lo regulado en dicho acuerdo no incluye a los usos de suelo. No obstante, luego, apunta, se dejó de apreciar o leer la probanza documental, lo cual evidencia un error indirecto que escapa al yerro procesal por falta de motivación. Dado que tales argumentos los reitera al desarrollar los agravios sustanciales, entonces se ingresará a su estudio al conocer dichos reproches.

Recurso de casación por razones de fondo V.- Primero: alega, el Tribunal incurrió en indebida valoración probatoria. Refiere a lo resuelto por esta Sala sobre dicho vicio, y expresa, se configura entre otras cosas, cuando los jueces le otorguen a un elemento de convicción la “…acreditación de un hecho diverso, al que realmente contiene”. Adiciona, de acuerdo con la jurisprudencia de esta Cámara, la prueba debe apreciarse de conformidad con las reglas de la sana crítica, -experiencia, lógica y psicología-. Refuta, se omitió resolver sobre su principal argumento: “…reconocer vigencia actual a los varios usos de suelo otorgados a mis representadas el 12 de setiembre de 2007 y la consecuente responsabilidad administrativa por ello devenía en inevitable violación del principio de intangibilidad de los Actos Propios…”. Lo expresado, porque el Concejo municipal al derogar el plan regulador de 1974, dispuso, lo hizo con sustento en la totalidad de acuerdos previos, por lo cual, en su criterio, aplican las reglas contenidas en el transitorio 2 del acta 49 de la sesión municipal del 18 de diciembre de 2006. Reproduce, lo acordado: “Segundo: Las solicitudes de certificado de uso de suelo para distintos fines, licencias de construcción y otros que hubieren sido presentados con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de esta derogatoria, serán resueltas con base en las normas que aquí se derogan”. Reprocha, lo fallado por el Tribunal en lo tocante a que dicha decisión administrativa no fue dictada como un transitorio en el cuerpo normativo del Plan Regulador, por lo que no formaba parte del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo aplicable al resolver este asunto. Agrega, el Tribunal expresó, ello obedeció a un requerimiento del Concejo Municipal, el cual para tener efectos de alcance general y de orden normativo debió incorporarse en el citado Reglamento. Lo expuesto, indica, sin estimar lo dicho de modo expreso en el mencionado acuerdo, donde se dispuso la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de Cartago de 1974, -artículo 2 del acta no. 106 de la sesión municipal del 13 de setiembre de 2007-, el cual transcribe en lo que interesa, y donde señala, se cita el acta no. 49 del 18 de diciembre de 2006, -dictado de la regla transitoria, referida a los usos de suelo gestionados antes de la derogatoria final del 13 de setiembre de 2007-.Objeta, lo resuelto por los juzgadores no encuentra amparo en ninguna norma jurídica, por lo que tilda de “formalista” lo dispuesto. Manifiesta, sí quedó incluida, “…no en forma directa pero sí en forma indirecta por REMISIÓN expresa, pues el Concejo Municipal de Cartago, fue claro en indicar en su acuerdo final de derogatoria que la decisión de suprimir el Plan Regulador de 1974 era con base en TODOS sus ANTECEDENTES… el primer antecedente fue precisamente el acuerdo contenido en el Acta 49-06 del 18 de diciembre de 2006, donde se abrió el proceso tendiente a la derogatoria…”. En su opinión, eso condujo a desconocer eficacia actual a usos de suelo que se emitieron de acuerdo a la luz de tal plan regulador. Recalca, si la derogatoria no afectó las solicitudes de usos de suelo efectuadas antes de la citada derogatoria, con mayor razón no podía afectar los usos de suelo aprobados de previo a ser derogado. De ahí, arguye, si era prohibido desconocer los usos de suelo gestionados, con mayor razón o lógica, no se puede desconocer un uso de suelo aprobado con anterioridad, ya que este último, posee certeza o seguridad jurídica mayor que el solicitado, de consuno con lo regulado en el artículo 34 de la Constitución Política, -irretroactividad en perjuicio de derechos adquiridos o situaciones jurídicas consolidadas-. Segundo: refuta lo dispuesto en el voto de mayoría, en lo atinente a que los usos de suelo son tan solo “declarativos” por lo cual no generan derechos subjetivos. Afirma, dicha posición resulta contraria a la jurisprudencia de este Órgano decisor y a la de la Sala Constitucional. Refuta, el Tribunal eludió la citada contradicción jurisprudencial, aduciendo su “inaplicabilidad”, aunque sin explicar, porqué tales fallos no resultan aplicables en el subexamine. En cuanto al fallo no. 1285-2010 de la Sala Constitucional, expone, resolvió, los usos de suelo otorgan derechos adquiridos; además, mantuvo la vigencia a actos de dicha índole, los cuales habían sido concedidos con sustento en un decreto que fue declarado inconstitucional. Reclama, por esto lo fallado por el Tribunal se contrapone a la jurisprudencia de cita, ya que expresó, al haberse derogado en 2008 el Plan Regulador de 1974, quedaron sin “eficacia” los usos de suelo que le fueron otorgados el 12 de setiembre de 2007. Resalta, lo que denomina “el sin sentido” de la tesis avalada por los jueces dado que, si la ineficacia de dichas resoluciones ocurrió con la declaratoria de aquel Plan regulador, significa, “…quedaron ineficaces apenas UN DÍA NATURAL después de que fueron otorgados…”. Ello, pues el acuerdo municipal que lo derogó se adoptó el 13 de setiembre de 2007, aunque se publicó en La Gaceta en febrero de 2008. Objeta, el Tribunal utilizara como base un dictamen de la PGR, pese a ser parte del proceso como representante legal del Estado. De ahí, señala, utilizó “doctrina” jurídica emanada de una de las partes en litigio, lo cual, tilda de “impropio… poco transparente o ético desde el punto de vista de fundamentación técnica de la sentencia…”.Menciona, el fallo no. 9565 (expediente no. 17-004467-0007-CO) de la Cámara Constitucional confirmó la tesis de la judicatura en el sentido que los usos de suelo generan derechos subjetivos. En su apoyo, reproduce de forma parcial sentencias del Órgano Constitucional y de esta Sala, relativos a los usos de suelo. Arguye, en dichos fallos se constata, esos actos no son “declarativos”, como erróneamente lo dispuso el Tribunal, sino que otorgan derechos subjetivos, los cuales la Municipalidad no puede desconocer, a menos que acuda al proceso de lesividad [precepto 173 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP)]). Igualmente, refiere, podría acudir a la revocatoria, cuando vaya a desconocer la continuidad de los efectos de los actos, por razones de conveniencia u oportunidad, de acuerdo con lo preceptuado en el cardinal 152 y siguientes ibid. En cuanto a esto último, apunta, los juzgadores se equivocaron al entender, su dictado constituye un “acto reglado” por lo cual no procede revocarlo de consuno con lo estipulado en el canon 156.1 de cita. Contrario a lo resuelto, expresa, fueron tres actos discrecionales los que justifican u obligan a la revocación de los usos de suelo. A saber, el que derogó el plan regulador de 1974; el que aprobó el nuevo plan regulador, donde se dispuso un uso de suelo distinto -agrícola- a sus fincas, en las cuales se había aprobado el uso residencial; el que negó reconocer vigencia actual a tales certificados. Insiste, el Ayuntamiento ha alegado que dichos usos de suelo, -otorgados válidamente y de conformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico-, quedaron “ineficaces” al derogarse el plan regulador con sustento en el cual se habían aprobado. Recalca, el municipio demandado decidió derogar el plan regulador de 1974, lo cual califica de “decisión discrecional”, por lo que, en su opinión, cabía la revocatoria, si lo perseguido era desconocer tales actos, con fundamento en los cuales realizó diversos trámites e incluso dio sus propiedades en garantía de un fideicomiso, por la vocación residencial de sus inmuebles. Manifiesta, su valía disminuyó al destinárseles a usos agrícolas, según lo expuso el testigo Óscar Calderón, quien explicó la diferencia de valor de las fincas de acuerdo con su posible uso. Lo cual, asevera, constituye la base técnica de su afectación patrimonial. Acota, la jurisprudencia de consuno con el artículo 9 del Código Civil (CC) cumple una función integradora del derecho, por lo que permite suplir la ausencia o insuficiencia de la ley. Así, adquiere el mismo rango de la norma que integran, interpreta o delimita. En consecuencia, “…al no haber en Costa Rica una ley que diga qué pasa con los usos de suelo conformes cuando se deroga el plan regulador con el que fueron aprobados o bien si se aprueba uno nuevo que los contraríe, entonces la jurisprudencia vino a llenar ese “vacío” normativo…”. Tercero: acusa, “ruptura a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad jurídica”. Aduce, en caso de que se denieguen los motivos adjetivos y de fondo esgrimidos en este recurso, solicita “…se case la sentencia venida en alzada en cuanto (la) condenó… al pago de ambas costas de la acción”. El precepto 193, inciso b) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (CPCA), dice, dispone la posibilidad de exonerar al vencido cuando por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas, haya existido, motivo bastante para litigar. Afirma, el juez debe ponderar factores de razonabilidad al evaluar si un sujeto acudió en forma justificada ante el aparato jurisdiccional, o si por el contrario lo hizo de modo temerario y atrevido. En el asunto de análisis, indica, lo debatido se sustentó en argumentos y pruebas razonables, las cuales, dice, el propio Tribunal calificó de “respetables”, lo cual también hizo la contraparte en el juicio oral. De ahí, en su criterio resulta gravoso, aún en el eventual rechazo de sus pretensiones, se le condene al pago de las costas, pues, litigaron al amparo de la jurisprudencia patria, que coincide con su tesis o teoría del caso. Incluso, expresa, con apoyo en acuerdos municipales que establecieron, no se podían desconocer los “…usos de suelo conforme anteriores a la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de Cartago de 1974 al amparo del cual habían sido dados…”. Argumenta, de conformidad a la “…razonabilidad detectable, y con base en una premisa de proporcionalidad e inclusive de seguridad jurídica, es que solicita…” se le exonere del pago de las costas, al tener motivo suficiente para litigar y haberlo hecho de buena fe.

VI.- El quid de lo impugnado radica en lo resuelto por el Tribunal en cuanto a la no vigencia de los usos de suelo obtenidos por las codemandantes, con sustento en el Plan Regulador de 1974. Esto debido al dictado del nuevo planeamiento urbano de la Municipalidad de Cartago, el cual entró a regir en febrero de 2008. Debido a que las inconformidades primera y segunda atienden a aspectos referidos a la naturaleza jurídica y alcances del uso de suelo, tales reproches se conocerán en conjunto. En lo de interés el Tribunal dispuso: 2) La cesación de los efectos de los certificados de uso de suelo que han perdido vigencia y eficacia en virtud de una nueva regulación de zonificación aplicable, no exige incoar procedimientos administrativo o judicial alguno. …argumenta la parte actora… a su criterio al existir un derecho subjetivo dado por un acto administrativo favorable, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por la Sala Constitucional y la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia aun y cuando cambie o se derogue la normativa, en este caso el Plan Regulador, dicho acto sigue vigente y para poder suprimirlo… es acudir al procedimiento de revocatoria contemplado en el artículo 152 y siguientes de la Ley General de Administración Pública.- Criterio del Tribunal. …la normativa urbanística se traduce en limitaciones y detracciones de usos y potestades del propietarios (sic) sobre el inmueble, en tanto determina el uso del suelo y cómo debe de darse esa utilización. Esta labor se materializa por medio del acto administrativo denominado certificación de uso de suelo, el cual por su importancia, se califica como acto administrativo declarativo, (en el sentido de que se limita a acreditar un hecho o situación jurídica sin crearla, modificarla o extinguirla), pero no son actos constitutivos de derechos per se, ya que no crean ni modifican situaciones jurídicas previamente establecidas… Los certificados de uso de suelo, se han entendido como actos mediante los cuales la Corporación Local comunica la conformidad o no del uso del suelo con lo establecido en la zonificación respectiva para ese momento histórico; conforme lo dispone el artículo 28 de la Ley de Planificación Urbana… Entonces, por medio del “certificado de uso del suelo", no se decide cuál es el uso permitido, ya que esto es una situación diferente en tanto éste ya ha sido previamente determinado en el respectivo reglamento de zonificación, que integra el plan regulador local; simplemente se acredita cuál es el uso permitido según lo establecido previamente por estos dos últimos. La doctrina ha señalado que los planes urbanísticos son actos de autoridad con los cuales se disciplina el suelo, de manera que inciden sobre los derechos privados (derecho de propiedad)predeterminando los modos de goce y de utilización del bien permitidos…La certificación de uso de suelo es meramente descriptiva respecto de una situación fáctica determinada en relación con lo dispuesto bajo norma legal, en razón de lo cual, por su medio, no se consolida una situación jurídica preexistente al acto certificante. De las anteriores citas y del desarrollo que se ha realizado en este tema por la jurisprudencia y la doctrina, se arriba claramente a la conclusión que el certificado de uso de suelo no confiere derecho subjetivo para edificar o fraccionar, sino que constituye un requisito previo que debe cumplir cualquier interesado en obtener una licencia o permiso de construcción…es claro para este Tribunal que en el caso de examen estamos en el… supuesto en donde en su momento la parte actora presentó solicitudes de uso de suelo (2006) los cuales fueron dado conforme al Plan Regulador Vigente a ese momento, siendo esta manifestación de la Administración una conducta formal que simplemente delimitó el uso de la finca para el momento de expedición del certificado y en el tanto se encontrara vigente el cuerpo normativo que amparara dicha información. Ahora bien, teniendo clara esta premisa, debemos abordar el argumento de la parte actora relativo a la necesidad o no, de incoar… un proceso de lesividad o un procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria, como requisito para tener por cesados los efectos de un uso de suelo certificado de forma previa a la modificación o promulgación de un plan regulador… la Sala Constitucional en el Voto Nº 755-95 de las 12:12 horas del4 de febrero de 1994, sobre la anulación de los actos administrativos: “...a la Administración le está vedado suprimir por su propia acción aquellos actos que haya emitido que confieran derechos subjetivos a los particulares[...]. La única vía que el Estado tiene para eliminar un acto suyo del ordenamiento es el proceso jurisdiccional de lesividad… cuando la Administración estima que debe dejar sin efecto contra un acto administrativo declarativo de derechos subjetivos en sede administrativa, al considerar que existe un vicio en algún o algunos elementos del acto administrativo que provoca su nulidad absoluta, evidente y manifiesta, debe observar el Procedimiento Administrativo contemplado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a efecto de garantizar el Debido Proceso a las partes que puedan ver lesionados sus derechos subjetivos o intereses legítimos… resulta claro que para dejar sin efecto un acto administrativo declarativo de un derecho subjetivo, debe observarse el debido proceso; sin embargo, las partes demandadas en este punto han sido contestes en indicar que en este caso no estamos en presencia de una nulidad absoluta evidente y manifiesta, por cuanto el certificado de uso de uso de suelo no adolece de ningún vicio, tesis que este Tribunal comparte... En todo caso, debemos advertir que esta Cámara de Jueces a la luz de lo expuesto líneas atrás, sostiene la tesis que el certificado de uso de suelo, no constituye derecho alguno, sino que tiene efectos declarativos y no constitutivos de derecho, de suerte que el procedimiento de nulidad evidente y manifiesta es improcedente.b.2. Con respecto a la viabilidad de ejercer en sede judicial una acción tendiente a la declaratoria de nulidad del certificado de uso de suelo, corremos la misma suerte. Un proceso de lesividad al igual que lo indicado en el procedimiento de nulidad evidente y manifiesta debe tener como base la revisión de un acto declarativo de derechos. Tal y como se indicó supra, el certificado de uso de suelo no lo es y tampoco observa vicios en sus elementos que conduzcan a su declaratoria de nulidad. Así las cosas, este argumento también se rechaza.b.3. Por último, en cuanto al procedimiento de revocatoria del acto (uso de suelo), también resulta inaplicable en el caso concreto, dado que la revocatoria de los actos administrativos por parte de la Administración, solo opera cuando se trata de actos discrecionales, no reglados, tal cual sucede en este caso y explicamos a continuación. La revocación del acto administrativo válido y eficaz, se da en tres supuestos: 1. Se trata de un acto emitido al amparo de la discrecionalidad administrativa en uso de los criterios de oportunidad, conveniencia o mérito, de conformidad con el ordinal 153 párrafo 3 de LGAP, de esta forma que cabe la revocación de actos administrativos válidos, esto es, sustancialmente conformes con el ordenamientos jurídicos y que se encuentran produciendo efectos… A criterio de la representación de la parte actora para poder dejar sin efectos el acto administrativo denominado “uso de suelo” otorgados a su representadas, la Municipalidad demandada debió a acudir a este procedimiento pues no es posible volver sobre sus propios actos a menos que la Ley le autorice; en ese sentido considera este Tribunal que si bien los argumentos de la parte actora son respetables no son compartidos en virtud de que si bien los artículo 152 y 153 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública concede la potestad a la Administración de suprimir del mundo jurídico actos favorables por medio del instituto de la revocación bajo pena de nulidad de no seguir los procedimientos o los supuestos que en ellos se enlistan, hay que tomar en cuenta para el caso que nos ocupa lo que dispone el inciso 1) del artículo 156 del mismo plexo normativo que dispone: “… Artículo 156.- 1. No será posible la revocación de actos reglados…” …para aquellos actos de tipo reglados no es posible el instituto de la revocación, ello porque el procedimiento de revocación se encuentra previsto para los actos discrecionales ya que el ejercicio delas potestades regladas limita la actuación de la Administración Pública a comprobar que se cumple con los requisitos establecidos por el ordenamiento jurídico y a establecer la correspondiente consecuencia jurídica… En resumen considera este Tribunal que el procedimiento de revocación no es aplicable al presente caso en virtud de que los “uso de suelo” son actos administrativos reglados y no discrecionales, mal hubiera hecho la administración demandada recurrir a la revocatoria como lo argumentó la parte actora. 3)… abordaremos… el alegato en torno a la vigencia y eficacia de los usos de suelo con referente al plan regulador derogado y los efectos que pudieron tener lo dispuesto por la Municipalidad en el artículo 3° del acta 49 del 18 de diciembre de 2006, …En cuanto a la vigencia de los usos de suelo y su eficacia como acto administrativo formal creador de derechos favorables. Dentro de los argumentos planteados en esta sede por la representación municipal, tenemos que ésta argumenta que los certificados los usos de suelo que se le otorgaron a la parte actora perdieron su vigencia y eficacia con la derogatoria del Plan Regulador de 1974, que fue derogado y por consiguiente es imposible legalmente otorgar los usos de suelo en este momento porque en (sic) lugar donde se ubican las propiedades con el nuevo plan regulador vigente en este momento no se pueden otorgar. Para contra argumentar esta idea la parte actora indicó que la Municipalidad desconoce sus propios actos como es el transitorio segundo contenido en el acta 49 del 18 de diciembre de 2006… en referente a lo dispuesto en el acuerdo III del acta 49 del 18 de diciembre de 2006, tenemos que éste dispone literalmente: "...Segundo. las solicitudes de certificados de uso de suelo para distintos fines, licencias de construcción y otras que hubieren sido presentadas con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de esta derogatoria serán resuelto con base en la norma que aquí se derogan...". Considera esta Cámara que no lleva razón la parte actora en el efecto que ella pretende darle a dicho acuerdo municipal, sea en cuanto que si en él se dispuso que la sola presentación de solicitudes se debe de tramitar con la norma derogada, con mucho más razón se deben de respetar y dar el mismo efecto a los derechos obtenidos en actos favorables. Este Tribunal considera que no le asiste la razón en su alegato, toda vez que la decisión administrativa de análisis, -tal y como correctamente lo indicó la representación de la Municipalidad- tiene una connotación transitoria y pretende evitar efectos nocivos a quienes han formulado "Solicitud" de certificación de uso de suelo y no se encuentra dirigida a quienes tienen certificados de uso de suelo emitidos previamente y mucho menos, tantos años atrás. En todo caso, nótese que esa decisión administrativa como tal, no fue asumida como un transitorio dentro del cuerpo normativo del Plan Regulador, por lo que no puede entenderse como parte del ordenamiento jurídico administrativo aplicable al resolver el asunto, ya que obedece a un requerimiento del Concejo Municipal, el cual, para tener efectos de alcance general y de orden normativo tuvo que haber sido incorporado dentro de Reglamento denominado Plan Regulador… En conclusión, al caso concreto dicho acto administrativo no normativo, a criterio de este Tribunal no le es aplicable, puesto que estamos en presencia de certificados de uso de suelo otorgados al amparo de normativa derogada, ergo, pierden eficacia y no validez, con la promulgación de las nuevas normas, tal y como lo explicamos a continuación.- b.1.2. Teniendo claro que el tema medular hasta este momento como se ha venido desarrollando es que efectivamente existen actos administrativos favorables dictados por la Municipalidad, pero que dichos actos (uso de suelo) fueron otorgados conforme al a normativa contenida en el plan regulador derogado de 1974, procede este Colegio de Jueces a conocer y delimitar si efectivamente su eficacia permanece pese la derogatoria ya sea en razón de la naturaleza del derecho o por alguna gestión realizada por las actoras tendientes a consolidar dicho derecho. Primero, es claro para esta Cámara de Jueces a partir de lo expuesto, que en el presente caso, nos encontramos ante la emisión de certificados de usos de suelos que son entendidos como actos administrativos que simplemente delimitan el uso o usos que se le puede dar a la finca o inmueble, y por consiguiente no es aplicable al caso de estudio los votos de la Sala Constitucional y de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que cita la parte actora en sustento de su acción, en lo que respecta al reconocimiento del derecho aun y cuando haya variación de la norma con fundamento en la cual fueron otorgados. Segundo, con relación con la prueba aportada por la parte actora tanto en sede administrativa (prueba para mejor resolver ante la Sección Tercera, visible a folios72 expediente administrativo) y en esta sede con la cual se pretende demostrar que si hubo actuaciones de su parte encaminadas a ejercer el derecho derivado de los certificados de uso de suelo, debemos advertir que de una revisión de la prueba aludida por el actor considera esta Cámara que la misma no alcanza para materializar el derecho que le permitiría efectivamente la supervivencia del certificado de uso desuelo aun y cuando cambiare la normativa véase que de folio 71 a 76 (prueba número 6 a 10 del expediente administrativo) se encuentra las solicitudes del uso de suelo en la cual indica en la casilla uso solicitado "construcción", sin embargo, no existe ningún otro elemento probatoria fehaciente que demuestre la materialización de dicho derecho, tal cual es, una licencia de construcción. El tema de los recibos de obra o gestiones antes otras autoridades no alcanzarían para probar dicho derecho, pues son trámites que se debe de realizar tendientes al levantamiento de obras civiles pero no son capaces de crear algún derecho subjetivo que perdure más allá del cambio de norma, mucho menos, cuando la Municipalidad no los ha recibido, aprobado y autorizado mediante un acto administrativo que conceda derechos subjetivos, insistimos, como lo es una licencia constructiva, no está de más indicar que la parte no demostró con prueba fehaciente que haya obtenido un certificado de uso de suelo para uso residencial con el cual reclamar daños y perjuicios en este tema. En consecuencia, no existe ningún elemento válido que obligue al Municipio a reconocer la eficacia del certificado de uso de suelo otorgado previo a las reformas”.

VII.- Como lo hizo patente el Tribunal, así como las propias recurrentes, la Sala Constitucional y este Órgano decisor se han referido al concepto, naturaleza jurídica y alcances de los usos de suelo. Esta Cámara ha dispuesto, en dicho certificado se consigna el uso que puede darse a un inmueble de conformidad con las normas urbanísticas. Además, sus efectos se encuentran referidos a un terreno y se producen de forma mediata en la esfera jurídica del propietario del bien. Esto resulta conteste con lo regulado en el artículo primero de la Ley de Planificación Urbana (LPU) en cuanto a que el uso del suelo (tierra) “…es la utilización de un terreno, de la estructura física asentada o incorporada a él, o de ambos casos, en cuanto a clase, forma o intensidad de su aprovechamiento…”. De ahí, se erige en el instrumento fundamental relativo al destino que se le pretenda dar al inmueble, pues se debe reservar al establecido en el planeamiento urbano. Esto también de acuerdo con lo estipulado en la LPU ya que el certificado de uso de suelo emitido por las municipalidades es el que acredita la conformidad de uso de acuerdo con los requerimientos de la zonificación. De ahí, en esta inteligencia, el canon 28 ibid establece la prohibición de destinar terrenos, edificaciones o estructuras a todo uso que resulte disconforme con la planificación dispuesta. Además, en este punto ha de tomarse en cuenta lo normado en la Constitución Política (CP) en lo atinente al derecho a la salud (precepto 21); limitaciones a la propiedad por razones de interés público (cardinal 45); derecho a una ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado (canon 69); la exigencia de una explotación racional de la tierra (estipulación 69); y la protección de las bellezas naturales (disposición 89). De ahí, estas regulaciones constituyen el marco constitucional del ordenamiento urbanístico, dirigido a salvaguardar dichos derechos fundamentales y del mismo modo la calidad de vida de los habitantes, como lo regula el artículo 28 de la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente. Aunque la Sala Constitucional en algún momento expresó “las constancias de uso de suelo tienen la virtud de conferir derechos subjetivos al particular…”. Sentencia no. 2006-4715 de 11 horas 39 minutos del 31 de marzo de 2006 (consúltese también la resolución no. 1098 de 16 horas 40 minutos del 11 de febrero de 2003). Lo cierto es que con posterioridad lo ha conceptualizado como un acto favorable, al disponer: “…este certificado de uso de suelo conforme es un acto favorable en virtud que habilita al administrado para gestionar un permiso de construcción y, eventualmente, solicitar otro tipo de licencias…”. Fallo no. 12815 de 9 horas 23 minutos del 30 de julio de 2010; igualmente, a ese respecto puede consultarse la sentencia 4161 de 12 horas 8 minutos del 26 de febrero de 2010. Es así como esta Sala ha dispuesto: “El certificado de uso de suelo consiste en el instrumento donde consta a qué usos puede destinarse un terreno, sea, lo que acredita, -con carácter declarativo-, es la utilización que se le puede dar según las regulaciones vigentes. De ahí, puede suceder que lo plasmado en él no sea lo que interese al administrado, puesto que, el que le pretendía dar, podría no resultar conforme con el plan regulador… la Sala Constitucional ha expresado que dicho certificado, aunque de naturaleza declarativa, se erige en un acto fundamental, en razón de que su contenido y función es hacer constar estados fácticos o legales que posibilitan la toma de resoluciones que crean, modifican o extinguen situaciones jurídicas, como son los permisos de construcción o patentes, para cuyos otorgamientos se requiere de dicho documento, como medio para verificar que, lo solicitado se conforma con la utilización aprobada en el correspondiente plan regulador. (Sentencia no. 798-F-2012 de las 9 horas 45 minutos del 4 de julio de 2012)”. Fallo no. 866 de 9 horas 55 minutos del 11 de julio de 2013. En el asunto de examen, la Municipalidad de Cartago otorgó a las coactoras certificado de uso de suelo de acuerdo con su pedido, específicamente con uso residencial agrícola R-700, de consuno con lo preceptuado en el canon 4-3 del Plan Regulador de 1974. Por consiguiente, en dichos documentos se consignó de conformidad con las normas vigentes a dicho momento, los terrenos eran aptos para ese propósito. De ahí, las facultaron a efectuar los trámites indispensables para una vez cumplidos los requisitos necesarios y verificada su viabilidad, obtener el correspondiente permiso de construcción. Sin embargo, cuando tales empresas solicitaron a la corporación municipal de Cartago dichas certificaciones le fueran actualizadas, -ya que supuestamente, así se lo habían requerido al realizar alguno de sus trámites-, les fue denegada dicha actualización, en acto de 10 horas del 19 de agosto de 2015. Nótese, lo actuado por las codemandantes es un elemento más para ratificar lo dispuesto por este Órgano decisor en cuanto a que los certificados de uso de suelo no confieren derechos subjetivos en favor de los administrados. De ser así, no habría existido la necesidad de acudir a la corporación municipal a solicitar su ratificación. Como se expresó, este tipo de certificación lo que consigna es, un inmueble de conformidad con lo estipulado en el plan regulador vigente, puede ser destinado -en ese momento- a cierto uso. Pero, su contenido es meramente declarativo, ya que, con el propósito de conseguir el permiso de construcción, o alguna otra licencia, el munícipe deberá cumplir con los requisitos que el ordenamiento jurídico exija para cada caso. De acuerdo con lo resuelto por la Cámara Constitucional, estos certificados constituyen un acto fundamental, porque refleja situaciones de hecho y jurídicas que permiten dictar actos que pueden crear, modificar o extinguir situaciones jurídicas. Según se explicó supra, por ejemplo, permisos de construcción o patentes, para las cuales resulta indispensable contar con ellos con el propósito de poder acreditar lo pedido es conteste con el uso dispuesto en el correspondiente plan regulador. De ahí, no otorgan derechos subjetivos ni constituyen una situación jurídica consolidada. En consecuencia, contrario a lo argüido por las impugnantes no se produce el quebranto del precepto 34 de la CP, porque en la especie no se está frente una aplicación retroactiva del ordenamiento jurídico pues, los certificados de uso de suelo no constituyen derechos adquiridos ni situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, según se explicó. Ello acaecería hasta que se consiga un permiso o licencia con sustento en esas certificaciones, lo cual no sucede en el caso de examen. Por otro lado, distinto a lo acusado por las casacionistas, la jurisprudencia tanto constitucional, como la de este Órgano decisor, no conciben a los certificados de uso de suelo como derechos adquiridos, ni situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, razón por la cual tampoco se produce la infracción del canon 9 del CC. La Sala Constitucional desde antigua data (fallo 7331 de 15 horas 24 minutos del 31 de octubre de 1997) y de igual forma más recientemente (consúltense las sentencias números 799 de 14 horas 35 minutos del primero de julio de 2010, 761 de 11 horas 7 minutos del 23 de enero de 2009, 2877 de 19 horas 52 minutos del 27 de febrero de 2007 y 7642 de 11 horas 39 minutos del 17 de junio de 2005) ha dispuesto, nadie tiene derecho a la inmutabilidad del ordenamiento. Esto con la salvedad de los derechos adquiridos y situaciones jurídicas consolidadas, los que se protegen por motivos de certeza jurídica y equidad, dado que el ordenamiento jurídico resguarda a quien consiguió el derecho o goza de la situación. Únicamente en tales casos opera la irretroactividad de la ley, de modo que una modificación en el ordenamiento no tiene como resultado la sustracción del bien o del derecho adquirido en el patrimonio personal. Tampoco incidiría cuando producido el presupuesto fáctico antes del cambio normativo, no se produzca la consecuencia provechosa en favor del interesado de acuerdo con la situación jurídica consolidada. En todas las demás circunstancias, como la del subexamine, opera la aplicación de las reglas en vigor, se reitera, pues como se indicó, el ordenamiento no es inmutable, y las coactoras no poseen ningún derecho adquirido, ni situación jurídica consolidada alguna. Lo anterior, ya que no materializaron el uso declarado en el certificado mediante la obtención del permiso de construcción. Obsérvese, como se señaló, una vez derogado el Plan Regulador de 1974, -conforme al cual obtuvieron los certificados de uso de suelo-, y estando vigente el nuevo plan que entró en vigor en febrero de 2008, en 2015, solicitaron se actualizaran tales certificaciones, de acuerdo con el planeamiento derogado. Sin embargo, de consuno con lo expuesto no resultaba procedente, ya que los certificados de uso emitidos el 12 de setiembre de 2007, lo fueron de consuno con lo establecido en el Plan Regulador de 1974, el cual no se encontraba vigente en el 2015, - desde siete años atrás-, pues se recalca, se había promulgado una nueva normativa que empezó a regir en febrero de 2008. De ahí, procede rechazar el agravio en lo que a este extremo se refiere.

VIII.- En otro orden de ideas, en lo concerniente a la regulación transitoria referida a las solicitudes de uso de suelo, este Órgano decisor concuerda con lo resuelto por el Tribunal, aunque con las siguientes precisiones. Este extremo atiende al acuerdo III del acta 49 del 18 de diciembre de 2006, el cual expresó: “…las solicitudes de certificados de uso de suelo para distintos fines, licencias de construcción y otras que hubieren sido presentadas con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de esta derogatoria serán resueltos con base en la norma que aquí se derogan…”. Ha de tenerse claro, el Plan Regulador de la Municipalidad de Cartago vigente, entró en vigor hasta en febrero de 2008 y se había promulgado el 17 de setiembre de 2007. En dicha regulación no se introdujo el citado transitorio, por lo cual aquel acuerdo previo al dictado del nuevo planeamiento, puede considerarse como un antecedente, donde se discutió en algún momento sobre la necesidad o posibilidad de que formara parte de tal Plan, pero no se hizo. En consecuencia, lo fallado por los juzgadores resulta conteste con lo sucedido, por cuanto, esa disposición transitoria no se introdujo en el texto vigente. Así, es evidente, no fue voluntad de quienes lo emitieron introducirlo como una disposición transitoria. En dicha inteligencia, no puede accederse a lo pretendido por las recurrentes, en cuanto a que se tenga como conformante del Plan Regulador vigente, pues el Consejo Municipal al promulgarlo no lo incluyó. Entonces, en opinión de esta Cámara, resulta estéril la discusión sobre si aquel acuerdo de 2006, pese a que aludió solo a las solicitudes de uso de suelo, aún así, o con mayor razón, abarcó los certificados de uso de suelo expedidos cuando estaba vigente el Plan Regulador de 1974. Por esa misma razón a nada conduciría determinar si dicho acto aludía tan solo a la fase de trámite, o si también incluía el aspecto de fondo. Se insiste, debido a que en su oportunidad obedeció únicamente a un requerimiento del Consejo Municipal, pero que finalmente no se plasmó al dictar la nueva regulación, por lo cual no puede ser actuada. Según las propias casacionistas lo señalan, ese acuerdo forma parte de los antecedentes del plan vigente, pero tan solo eso. Como tal no puede ser aplicado, porque se dictó cuando aún no había nacido a la vida jurídica el nuevo Plan Regulador, por lo que no puede tenerse como una norma transitoria, ni tener efectos con alcance general. Por consiguiente, el cargo sobre este particular debe ser desestimado.

IX.- Sobre lo alegado por las impugnantes en lo tocante a que los certificados de uso de suelo conceden derechos subjetivos, por lo que no pueden desconocerse sin acudir al proceso de lesividad, o a la revocación. Asimismo en cuanto a que no se está ante un acto reglado, -como lo dispuso el Tribunal-, si no ante tres resoluciones discrecionales, es claro, no llevan razón en sus asertos como de seguido se expondrá. En lo concerniente a lo primero, según se expuso en el considerando VII los usos de suelo no otorgan derechos subjetivos. Se trata de un acto de carácter declarativo, donde se indica el uso posible de la tierra de acuerdo a la planificación urbana vigente. El cual se materializa con el cumplimiento de los requisitos para obtener sea una licencia, un permiso o autorización, sin que en la especie se hubiere conseguido ninguno de estos. En cuanto a lo segundo, resulta indudable, los jueces al aludir a que se está ante un acto reglado, lo fue refiriéndose a la certificación de uso de suelo, y de modo concreto explicó los motivos por los cuales en su caso no cabe la revocación. Es hasta en este momento procesal que las codemandantes arguyen, habían sido tres actos discrecionales los que obligan a revocar los usos de suelo. Apunta, se trata de los siguientes, el que: derogó el Plan Regulador de 1974; aprobó el nuevo Planeamiento, negó reconocer vigencia actual a las certificaciones expedidas en setiembre de 2007. Las cuales califica de discrecionales, por lo que en su opinión, entonces los certificados de uso de suelo debieron ser revocados. Lo fallado por los juzgadores, según se aprecia de lo reproducido, fue tales certificaciones constituyen actos reglados, sea, no cabe la discrecionalidad de la Administración, por lo que de conformidad con el ordenamiento no procede su revocación, -cardinal 156 de la LGAP, que en lo de interés, dispone: “1. No será posible la revocación de actos reglados…”. Este extremo debió ser combatido por las recurrentes, pero no lo hacen, si no que recurren a cuestiones novedosas, no propuestas ni debatidas durante el proceso. Lo expresado, sin exponer de forma diáfana y concreta porqué los certificados de uso de suelo no son actos reglados, que fue el sustento utilizado por el Tribunal al dictar su sentencia. De ahí, lo procedente es rechazar el cargo.

X.- En el tercero de los reproches, argumenta, se le debió exonerar del pago de las costas, porque tuvo motivo bastante para litigar y además lo hizo de buena fe. El canon 193 del CPCA en lo que a los efectos económicos del proceso se refiere, estipula: “En las sentencias y los autos con carácter de sentencia, se condenará al vencido al pago de las costas personales y procesales, pronunciamiento que deberá hacerse de oficio. No obstante lo anterior, la parte vencida podrá ser exonerada del pago de las costas, cuando: a) La sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia verosímilmente no haya conocido la contraria y, por causa de ello, se haya ajustado la oposición de la parte. b) Por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo bastante para litigar”. De ahí, en principio, las costas son de obligada imposición a la parte vencida. Sin embargo, existen presupuestos para su exoneración que resultan facultativos al Juez, de manera que para aplicarlos debe analizar la conducta del vencido, con el propósito de establecer si se enmarca en alguna de las hipótesis dispuestas en el precepto reproducido. Según se aprecia, acusa, tuvo motivo bastante para litigar, por lo que el Tribunal erró al condenarlo a pagar las costas, por lo cual acusa falta de aplicación de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, así como del cardinal 193 del CPCA. Se aprecia, lo increpado por las recurrentes es una indebida aplicación normativa y de principios constitucionales, porque en su criterio, el Tribunal debió eximirle del pago de las costas del proceso. Es menester, señalar, no basta con la simple cita de las causales para su procedencia, sino que se hace indispensable explicar de forma clara y precisa las razones que fundamentan su dicho, sea, realizar un contraste del aludido yerro contra lo decidido, de una manera concatenada y lógica. Obsérvese, se constriñe a argumentar, en su opinión resulta gravoso, aunque se rechazaran sus pedimentos, pues, litigó al amparo de la jurisprudencia patria. Sin embargo, al resolver el fondo del asunto, como se apuntó la jurisprudencia no sustenta lo argüido por las empresas en el proceso. Así, no resulta suficiente, la certeza de la parte demandante en lo concerniente a que litigó de buena fe. Ha de hacerse notar, el Tribunal en lo que a este extremo comporta, dispuso, acoger la excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva formulada por el Estado, y, declarar sin lugar la demanda contra la Municipalidad de Cartago. Por ende, la inconformidad debe desestimarse.

XI.- En mérito de las razones expuestas y dado que no se producen las inconformidades acusadas, se impone desestimar el recurso planteado, con sus costas a cargo de quien lo formuló [artículo 150, inciso 3) del CPCA].

POR TANTO

Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación, son sus costas a cargo de la promovente.

Luis Guillermo Rivas Loáiciga Román Solís Zelaya Iris Rocío Rojas Morales William Molinari Vílchez Damaris Vargas Vásquez HBRENES