Distinction between objective and subjective liability in traffic accidentsDistinción entre responsabilidad objetiva y subjetiva en accidentes de tránsito

II.—The list of unproven facts is also endorsed, since there was certainly no satisfactory demonstration that the traffic accident in which Mr. [Nombre1] died occurred due to a cause attributable to the driver of the vehicle with license plate [Placa1] (), the co-defendant [Nombre2], while he was driving it to subject it to tests on the public roadway, following repairs ordered from the company “Lachner y Sáenz” by its registered owner, “American Flower Corporation,” in Spanish “Corporación Americana de Flores, Sociedad Anónima,” also sued here. As was noted in the “Proven Facts,” the corresponding criminal proceedings concluded with a mandatory dismissal (sobreseimiento obligatorio) in favor of Mr. [Nombre2] due to a lack of sufficient evidence to attribute any responsibility to him for the events. The demonstration of this matter, so important for the merits of the case, for reasons that will be explained, was the responsibility of the plaintiff, under the terms of Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil), but it lacks evidentiary support. Likewise, it must also be considered unproven that in the days prior to the accident reported, Mr. [Nombre1] was working as a mechanic’s helper with an average weekly salary of between twenty and twenty-five thousand colones. As the Court notes, the evidence on this particular point comes from persons related by kinship to Mr. [Nombre1] and with an evident interest in the outcome of the case, so their testimony is not very credible, and rather contradicts the documentary evidence from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), according to which he had ceased to appear on payrolls as an active worker one year before the accident.

III.—Mrs. [Nombre1], in her personal capacity and as Provisional Executor of the succession of her son, who in life was called [Nombre1], deceased in the mentioned accident, directs her claim against the person who was driving the vehicle with license plate [Placa2] at the time of the accident, Mr. [Nombre2], and the company that owned the motor vehicle, “American Flower Corporation,” in Spanish “Corporación Americana de Flores, S.A.” She bases her claim, for what is now relevant, “... on Articles 1048, and following and concordant articles of the Civil Code, as well as on Articles 187, subsection b) 189, and following and concordant articles of the Ley de Tránsito.” She relies, “...also on the dominant doctrinal criteria and on the reiterated and abundant national jurisprudence that has developed the concept of Extracontractual Civil Liability,” as can be seen from folio 31. All of this, to request that the judgment jointly and severally condemn the co-defendants to pay five million colones for moral damages (daño moral), one million one hundred one thousand four hundred colones for damages (daños y perjuicios) as well as for “lost profits (beneficios dejados de percibir),” in addition to the corresponding interest and both sets of costs of the action. The Court, for its part, denied the claim in its entirety because it considered that although there was a traffic accident that resulted in the death of Mr. [Nombre1], there was no demonstration whatsoever that this death was due to the fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) of the driver of the vehicle at that time, the co-defendant [Nombre2], as was extensively examined in the criminal jurisdiction. Furthermore, because when the accident occurred, the vehicle that [Nombre2] was driving was not engaged in commercial activities typical of its registered owner, the co-defendant “American Flower Corporation,” but rather in tests being carried out by a third party contracted by it for its repair. Also, because Mr. [Nombre1] had stopped working approximately one year before his death, so he could hardly have been responsible for the maintenance of his mother, Mrs. [Nombre1], who furthermore received approximately five hundred thousand colones in compensation derived from the compulsory automobile insurance (seguro obligatorio de vehículos automotores), administered by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros).

IV.—The plaintiff’s attorney appeals the judgment because he mainly considers that, in this case, there is no subordination to what may have been decided in the criminal jurisdiction since, in his view, Article 1048 of the Civil Code establishes a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) that excludes the notions of culpability and unlawfulness in the conduct of the tortfeasor and replaces them with the notion of risk, which means that whoever, in seeking a benefit or profit, creates a risk that is potentially harmful to third parties, by the mere fact of creating it, must assume its financial consequences, unless the damage is the result of force majeure (fuerza mayor) or the victim’s own fault (propia falta de la víctima). He believes that because the co-defendants did not prove force majeure or the victim’s own fault, as he considers was their duty, none of the exemptions from liability provided for in Article 1048 of the cited Code occurred, and that, because it also concerns a vehicle destined for the “operation of a business structure,” they must be ordered to pay the claimed compensation.

V.—The Tribunal considers that, in our legal context, the liability system applicable to the circulation of motor vehicles on land routes is both “strict (objetiva)” and “subjective (subjetiva),” depending on their different areas of application. Indeed, the Ley de Tránsito provides in Article 38, “A compulsory insurance (seguro obligatorio), ..., is established for motor vehicles. ... ” whose administration shall be the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), which must be understood in harmony with the provisions of Article 48 of the same Law, under the terms of which “The compulsory insurance of vehicles covers the injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not there is subjective liability of the driver.” It adds that it also “...covers accidents produced with civil liability, derived from the possession, use, or maintenance of the vehicle. In this latter case, this liability must be determined through the established procedures and before the competent courts.”[....]. That is, in the case of injury and death of persons, the liability system derived from compulsory vehicle insurance is completely “strict (objetivo)” because it does not rest on the concepts of fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) with which the tortfeasor may have acted, but rather is based on the notion of “created risk,” that is, of imminent danger to others by the mere fact of the vehicle’s circulation, for reasons of social solidarity and with criteria of universality, as is characteristic of obligations imposed by law (ex lege). A different situation occurs when it is not a case of injury or death of persons but of other accidents that also generate civil liability, derived from the possession, use, or maintenance of the vehicle, because in such cases the liability ceases to be “strict (objetivo)” and becomes “subjective (subjetivo),” as established by the final phrase when it says that “...this liability must be determined through the established procedures and before the competent courts.,” as seen. And, obviously, the only way to “establish” or “determine” liability must be through the application of the principles typical of “subjective (subjetiva)” liability, which begin by examining, in advance, whether there was fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) in the conduct of the tortfeasor or, on the contrary, an act of the victim themselves, a fortuitous event (caso fortuito), or force majeure (fuerza mayor), which gave rise to that damage, since these are the general exemptions from contractual and extracontractual liability, in application of the idea that “no one is obligated to the impossible,” as is well known.

VI.—But, returning to the problem of injury or death of persons, and outside the scope of application of the “compulsory insurance (seguro obligatorio)” of the discussed Articles 38 and 48 of the cited law, it must be said that the liability system for the driver and the company owning the vehicle is entirely “subjective (subjetivo).” Article 186 of that same Law states, in what is relevant, that “The driver of a vehicle, passengers, pedestrians, and third parties shall be civilly liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) resulting from a traffic accident that is attributable to them.” [...] And “to be attributable to them,” obviously, is nothing other than the result of establishing, in advance, whether there was harmful conduct, whether damage was actually produced, whether there is a causal link between the examined conduct and the damage claimed by the victim, and, lastly, whether that conduct is attributable to the author of the conduct as a consequence of their acting with fault or with willful misconduct (culpa o dolo). All of this is typical and characteristic of so-called “subjective (subjetiva)” liability and not of “strict (objetiva)” liability, since the only thing that matters to the latter is the determination of the damage because, in principle, it lacks exemptions from liability. Only in the manner described can the rules of Articles 38 and 48, on one hand, and 186, on the other, of the Ley de Tránsito be harmonized, in order to avoid the contrary interpretation, which would force the conclusion that they are mutually exclusive and antagonistic norms. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that, according to subsection “b)” of Article 187 of the same Law, “The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ...b) Individuals or legal entities that, by any title, operate vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. ...” among others, which must be understood as meaning that persons who use vehicles for their business activities shall be jointly and severally liable to third parties only when it concerns liability derived from an accident that is attributable to the driver due to fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo). They could not be liable in all cases or under any circumstances, because in the matter of obligations, for there to be joint and several liability, there must be, in the first place, a “principal” obligor and, by legal extension, another person who must also answer to the creditor, even if there was no harmful conduct on their part or enrichment at the creditor’s expense, according to the doctrine of Article 637 of the Civil Code. Again, it is not, then, a “strict (objetiva)” liability for the mere fact of being the owner or “operator” of a vehicle, but rather a “subjective (subjetiva)” liability derived from having entrusted the property to a driver who was found civilly liable due to fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo), who is the “principal” obligor for the compensation. As is understood, therefore, the general rule of the fifth paragraph of Article 1048 of the Civil Code was profoundly modified by the norms of the Ley de Tránsito noted, whose specific character makes them prevail over the general ones. These rules of Article 1048, it must be recognized, were never truly ones of “strict (objetiva)” liability either, since they admit force majeure (fuerza mayor) or the victim’s own fault (propia falta de la víctima) as an exemption from liability, which in principle is incompatible with a system based on the notion of “created risk” that is, moreover, excessively dangerous for other persons.

VII.—Now then. Always situated within the system of so-called “subjective (subjetiva)” liability, because it depends on the examination of the conduct of the “subject” author of the damage in order to establish whether they acted with fault or with willful misconduct (culpa o dolo), it is well known that the drafters of the French Civil Code, from which ours derives, in matters of liability for “things” only provided for that resulting from damage caused by animals or by the poor state of buildings. This, for the simple reason that at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, these were the most frequent cases of liability, and motor vehicles were barely experimental curiosities whose gigantic subsequent development was not even suspected. Hence, doctrine and civil legislation initially did not even consider the need for particular rules for damage caused by vehicles. It was not until much later, when traffic accidents proliferated to alarming figures, that specific solutions began to be outlined that, without sacrificing the basic principles of liability, would also take into account the extreme situations in which damage had been produced but was not attributable to the owner of the property because there was no fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) on their part. Specifically, it concerned the problem derived from liability arising from an event that occurred when the property was not in the custody or under the supervision or control of its owner, having been stolen or being in the charge of a third party responsible for its maintenance or repair. It was then established in France, at the beginning of the 1930s, the famous principle that “there is no liability when the owner of the vehicle is unable to exercise supervision and control over the vehicle and its use,” due to theft or maintenance work. The evolution continued in the sense that, in reality, a distinction also had to be made between damage caused when the owner was unable to supervise and control the property, and that arising from damage due to inherent or hidden defects of the motor vehicle, because in this latter case, it did not matter to distinguish whether it occurred while in the owner’s possession or not, since the damage would have occurred anyway. Such is the historical origin of the distinction between “behavioral guardianship (guardia de comportamiento)” (for when the owner cannot control the use) and “structural guardianship (guardia de estructura)” (for when the damage would have occurred anyway because it derives from an inherent defect of the thing while in the possession of any person). On this particular point, see GHESTIN, J., Droit Civil, II, [Dirección1], [Dirección2], 1967/68, page 201 and following. A distinction that, moreover, the Judge also invokes to exempt the co-defendant “American Flower Corporation” from liability, since the events under examination occurred when the vehicle it owned was in the possession of a third party entrusted by it with a repair, from which it follows that it could not then exercise any control over its correct use. All of this is nothing more than another application of the already cited principle that “no one is obligated to the impossible,” because impossible it would be, as is obvious, to hold someone who is lawfully deprived of the control and supervision of a thing at the time a harmful event occurs liable for the consequences of such an event, within a coherent system of “subjective (subjetiva)” liability.

VIII.—It follows from the foregoing, consequently, that the judgment must be confirmed. No compensation whatsoever is claimed under the compulsory vehicle insurance, and, as explained, the liability under examination is what is called “subjective (subjetiva),” for the success of which the prior verification of fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) in the driver’s behavior is indispensable, which the plaintiff did not do, as was her duty, according to Article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). A verification that, in reality, was made in the sense that there was no fault or willful misconduct (culpa o dolo) since the matter was heard in the criminal jurisdiction, as noted in the “Proven Facts,” and it has the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) that prevails over the civil matter, as Article 164 of that same Code mandates observance. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that it would not make much sense to obligate the defendants to demonstrate that everything was due to the act of the victim themselves, as seems to emerge from the appeal brief according to the literal wording of Article 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code (folio 875), because the issue was clear from the criminal jurisdiction. Consequently, in the absence of the indispensable demonstration of harmful conduct attributable to the defendant [Nombre2] and, on the contrary, with sufficient proof that when the accident occurred, the other defendant, “American Flower Corporation,” was unable to exercise any control and supervision over the vehicle, the appropriate course was to uphold the defenses raised by them in the same manner as the Court did and to dismiss the claim in all its aspects (sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos), with both sets of costs charged to the plaintiff, in observance of Article 221 of the procedural Code of merit.

And, obviously, the only way to "establish" or "determine" liability must be through the application of the principles of "subjective" liability, which begin by first examining whether there was fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) in the conduct of the author of a harm or, on the contrary, an act of the victim themselves, a fortuitous event (caso fortuito), or force majeure (fuerza mayor), which could have given rise to that harm, since these are the general exemptions from contractual and extracontractual liability, in application of the well-known idea that "no one is obliged to do the impossible." VI.- But, returning to the problem of personal injury or death, and outside the scope of application of the "mandatory insurance (seguro obligatorio)" of the aforementioned articles 38 and 48 of the cited law, it must be said that the liability system for the driver and the company that owns the vehicle is entirely "subjective." Article 186 of that same Law states, in relevant part, that "The driver of a vehicle, passengers, pedestrians, and third parties shall be civilly liable for the damages and losses arising from a traffic accident that is attributable to them." [...] And "being attributable to them," obviously, is nothing other than the result of first establishing whether there was harmful behavior, whether harm was effectively produced, whether there is a causal link (nexo causal) between the conduct examined and the harm claimed by the victim, and, finally, whether that behavior is attributable to the author of the conduct because it is a consequence of their acting with fault (culpa) or intent (dolo). All of this is typical and characteristic of so-called "subjective" liability and not "objective" liability, since the only thing that matters to the latter is the determination of the harm because, in principle, it lacks exemptions from liability. Only in this manner can the rules of articles 38 and 48, on the one hand, and 186, on the other, of the Ley de Tránsito be harmonized, in order to avoid the contrary interpretation, which would force the conclusion that they are mutually exclusive and antagonistic norms. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that, pursuant to subsection "b)" of article 187 of the same Law, "The following shall be jointly and severally liable (solidariamente) with the driver: ...b) Natural or legal persons who, by any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transportation. ..." among others, which must be understood as meaning that persons who use vehicles for their business activities shall be jointly and severally liable to third parties only when the liability arises from an accident that is attributable to the driver through fault (culpa) or intent (dolo). It could not be liable in all cases or under any circumstance, because in matters of obligations, for there to be joint and several liability (solidaridad), there must be, in the first place, a "principal" obligor and, by legal extension, another person who must also answer to the creditor, even if there has been no harmful conduct on their part or enrichment at the expense of the creditor, according to the doctrine of article 637 of the Civil Code (Código Civil). Again, this is not, therefore, an "objective" liability arising from the mere fact of being the owner or "operator" of a vehicle, but rather a "subjective" one stemming from having entrusted the asset to a driver who turned out to be civilly liable due to fault (culpa) or intent (dolo), who is the "principal" obligated to pay compensation. As is understood, then, the general rule of the fifth paragraph of article 1048 of the Civil Code was profoundly modified by the norms of the Ley de Tránsito that have been discussed, whose specific nature makes them prevail over the general ones. These rules of article 1048, it must be recognized, were never truly "objective" liability either, since they admit force majeure or the victim's own fault as an exemption from liability, which is in principle incompatible with a system based on the notion of "created risk (riesgo creado)," which is also excessively dangerous for other persons. VII.- Now then. Always situated within the system of so-called "subjective" liability, because it depends on examining the conduct of the "subject" who caused the harm to establish whether they acted with fault (culpa) or intent (dolo), it is well known that the drafters of the French Civil Code, from which ours derives, concerning liability for "things," only provided for that resulting from harm caused by animals or by the poor state of buildings. This, for the simple reason that at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, these were the most frequent cases of liability, and motor vehicles were merely experimental curiosities whose gigantic subsequent development was not even suspected. Hence, doctrine and civil legislation at first did not even pose the need for particular rules for harm caused by vehicles. It was not until much later, when traffic accidents proliferated to alarming numbers, that specific solutions began to be outlined which, without sacrificing the basic principles of liability, also took into account extreme situations where harm had occurred but was not attributable to the owner of the property because there was no fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) on their part. Specifically, it concerned the problem derived from liability arising from an event occurring when the property was not in the custody or under the supervision or control of its owner, due to having been stolen or being in the charge of a third party entrusted with its maintenance or repair. The celebrated principle was then established in France, at the beginning of the 1930s, that "there is no liability when the owner of the vehicle finds it impossible to exercise supervision and control over the vehicle and its use," by reason of theft or maintenance work. The evolution continued in the sense that, in reality, it was also necessary to distinguish between harm caused when the owner was unable to supervise and control the property, and that arising from harm due to inherent or hidden defects (vicios propios u ocultos) of the motor vehicle, because in this latter case it did not matter whether it occurred while in the possession of the owner or not, since it would have occurred anyway. Such is the historical origin of the distinction between "guardianship of behavior (guardia de comportamiento)" (for when the owner cannot control the use) and "guardianship of structure (guardia de estructura)" (for when the harm would have occurred anyway because it stemmed from an inherent defect of the thing while under the power of any person). See, on this matter, GHESTIN, J., Droit Civil, II, [Dirección1], [Dirección2], 1967/68, page 201 et seq. A distinction which, moreover, the Judge also invokes to exempt the co-defendant "American Flower Corporation" from liability insofar as the facts under examination occurred when the vehicle it owned was in the possession of a third party entrusted by it with a repair, from which it follows that it could not then exercise any control over its correct use. All of this is nothing more than another application of the principle, already cited, that "no one is obliged to do the impossible," because it would be impossible, as is obvious, to hold liable someone who is legitimately deprived of the control and supervision of a thing at the moment a harmful event occurs, for the results of such an event, within a coherent system of "subjective" liability. VIII.- It follows from the foregoing, consequently, that the judgment must be affirmed. No compensation is claimed under the concept of mandatory vehicle insurance and, as stated, the liability under examination is of the so-called "subjective" kind, for the viability of which prior proof of fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) in the driver's behavior is indispensable, which the plaintiff did not do, as was their duty, in accordance with article 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil). Proof which, in reality, was rendered in the sense that there was no fault (culpa) or intent (dolo) since the matter was heard in the criminal court, as recounted in the "Proven Facts (Hechos Probados)," and has the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) that prevails over the civil matter, as article 164 of that same Code mandates to observe. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that there would be little sense in compelling the defendants to demonstrate that everything was due to the act of the victim themselves, as seems to emerge from the appeal brief according to the literal wording of article 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code (folio 875), because the issue was clear from the criminal jurisdiction. So that, in the absence of the indispensable demonstration of harmful conduct attributable to the defendant [Nombre2] and, on the contrary, sufficient proof that when the accident occurred, the other defendant, "American Flower Corporation," found itself unable to exercise any control and supervision over the vehicle, the proper course was to admit the defenses (excepciones) raised by them in the same manner as the Court did and to dismiss the lawsuit in all its aspects, with both costs (costas) borne by the plaintiff, in observance of article 221 of the aforementioned Procedural Code." III.- Mrs. [Nombre1], acting in her personal capacity and as Provisional Executor of the succession of her son, who in life was known as [Nombre1], deceased in the accident in question, directs her claim against the person who was driving the vehicle with license plate [Placa2] at the time of the accident, Mr. [Nombre2], and the company that owns the motor vehicle, "American Flower Corporation" in Spanish "Corporación Americana de Flores, S.A." It is based, in what is relevant now, "... on articles 1048, following and concordant of the Civil Code, as well as on articles 187, subsection b) 189 following and concordant of the Transit Law." It is supported, "...furthermore by the dominant doctrinal criteria and by the reiterated and abundant national jurisprudence that has developed the figure of Extracontractual Civil Liability," as can be seen from folio 31. All of this, to request that the judgment jointly and severally condemn the co-defendants to pay five million colones for moral damages, one million one hundred one thousand four hundred colones for damages and losses as well as for "lost earnings," in addition to the corresponding interest and both sets of costs of the action. The Court, for its part, denied the claim in its entirety because it considered that although there was a traffic accident resulting in the death of Mr. [Nombre1], there was no demonstration whatsoever that this death was due to fault or fraud (culpa o dolo) on the part of the vehicle's driver at that time, the co-defendant [Nombre2], as was extensively examined in the criminal venue. Furthermore, because when the accident occurred, the vehicle driven by [Nombre2] was not operating in commercial activities proper to its registered owner, the co-defendant "American Flower Corporation," but rather in tests being carried out by a third party contracted by it for its repair. Likewise, because Mr. [Nombre1] had stopped working approximately one year before his death, such that he could hardly have been in charge of supporting his mother, Mrs. [Nombre1], who moreover received approximately five hundred thousand colones from indemnities derived from the mandatory motor vehicle insurance, managed by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). IV.- The plaintiff's legal representative appeals the judgment because he considers, principally, that in this case there is no subordination to what was resolved in the criminal jurisdiction since, in his opinion, article 1048 of the Civil Code establishes a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) that excludes the notions of culpability and unlawfulness in the conduct of the tortfeasor and replaces them with the notion of risk, which leads to the conclusion that whoever, in seeking a benefit or profit, creates a risk potentially harmful to third parties, by the mere fact of creating it must assume its patrimonial consequences, unless the damage is the result of force majeure or the victim's own fault (propia falta de la víctima). He considers that because the co-defendants did not prove force majeure or the victim's own fault, which he considers was their duty, none of the exemptions from liability provided for in article 1048 of the cited Code occurred and that, because it also involved a vehicle destined for the "exploitation of a business structure," they must be ordered to pay the claimed indemnities. V.- The Tribunal considers that, in our environment, the liability system applicable to the circulation of motor vehicles on land routes is both "strict" ("objetiva") and "subjective" ("subjetiva"), depending on their different areas of application. In effect, the Transit Law provides in article 38: "A mandatory insurance is established, ..., for motor vehicles. ..." whose administration shall be the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute, which must be understood in harmony with the provisions of numeral 48 of the same Law, according to which "The mandatory vehicle insurance covers the injury and death of persons, victims of a traffic accident, whether or not subjective liability exists on the part of the driver." It adds that it also "...covers accidents produced with civil liability, derived from the possession, use or maintenance of the vehicle. In this latter case, this liability must be determined through established procedures and before competent courts."[....]. That is, in the case of injury and death of persons, the liability system derived from mandatory vehicle insurance is completely "strict" because it does not rest on the concepts of fault or fraud with which the tortfeasor may have acted, but rather is based on the notion of "created risk," that is, of imminent danger to others by the simple fact of the vehicle's circulation, for reasons of social solidarity and with criteria of universality as is characteristic of obligations imposed by law (ex lege). A different matter arises when it does not concern the injury or death of persons but other accidents that also generate civil liability, derived from the possession, use or maintenance of the vehicle, because in such cases the liability ceases to be "strict" and becomes "subjective," as provided by the final phrase stating that "...this liability must be determined through established procedures and before competent courts," as was seen. And, obviously, the only way to "establish" or "determine" liability must be through the application of the principles proper to "subjective" liability, which begin by examining, beforehand, whether there was fault or fraud (culpa o dolo) in the conduct of the tortfeasor or, on the contrary, an act of the victim themselves, fortuitous event or force majeure, which gave rise to that damage, since such are the general exemptions from contractual and extracontractual liability, applying the idea that "no one is obligated to do the impossible" as is well known. VI.- But, returning to the problem of injury or death of persons, and outside the scope of application of the "mandatory insurance" of the aforementioned articles 38 and 48 of the cited law, it is worth saying that the liability system for the driver and the company owning the vehicle is entirely "subjective." Article 186 of that same Law states, in what is relevant, that "The driver of a vehicle, passengers, pedestrians and third parties, shall be civilly liable for the damages and losses derived from a traffic accident that is attributable to them." [...]. And "being attributable to them," obviously, is nothing other than the result of establishing, beforehand, whether there was harmful behavior, whether a damage was effectively produced, whether there is a causal link (nexo causal) between the conduct examined and the damage claimed by the victim, and, finally, whether that behavior is attributable to the author of the conduct because it is a consequence of their acting with fault or with fraud. All of this is typical and characteristic of the liability called "subjective" and not of "strict" liability, since the only thing that matters to the latter is the determination of damage because in principle it lacks exemptions from liability. Only in the manner set forth can the rules of articles 38 and 48, on the one hand, and 186, on the other, of the Transit Law be harmonized, in order to avoid a contrary interpretation, which would force the conclusion that they are mutually exclusive and antagonistic norms. On the other hand, it is appropriate to highlight that, according to subsection "b)" of article 187 of the same Law, "The following shall be jointly and severally liable with the driver: ...b) The natural or juridical persons who, under any title, exploit vehicles for commercial or industrial purposes, including public transport. ..." among others, which must be understood as meaning that persons who use vehicles for their business activities shall be jointly and severally liable (responderán solidariamente) to third parties only when it concerns liability derived from an accident that is attributable to the driver through fault or fraud. They could not be liable in all cases or in any circumstance, because in matters of obligations, for there to be joint and several liability (solidaridad), there must be, in the first place, a "principal" obligor and, by legal extension, another person who must also answer to the creditor, even if there was no harmful conduct on their part or enrichment at the creditor's expense, according to the doctrine of article 637 of the Civil Code. Again, this is not, then, a matter of "strict" liability for the mere fact of being the owner or "exploiter" of a vehicle, but rather of "subjective" liability arising from having entrusted the asset to a driver who proved to be civilly liable through fault or fraud, who is the "principal" obligor to pay indemnification. As is understood, then, the general rule of the fifth paragraph of article 1048 of the Civil Code was profoundly modified by the rules of the Transit Law that were noted, whose specific character makes them prevail over the general ones. These rules of article 1048 which, it must be recognized, were never truly those of "strict" liability either, since they admit force majeure or the victim's own fault as an exemption from liability, which in principle is incompatible with a system based on the notion of "created risk" that is, moreover, disproportionately dangerous for other persons. VII.- Now then. Situated always within the system of liability called "subjective," because it depends on the examination of the conduct of the "subject" author of the damage in order to establish whether they acted with fault or with fraud, it is well known that the drafters of the French Civil Code, from which ours originates, in matters of liability for "things" only provided for that resulting from damages caused by animals or by the poor state of buildings. This, for the simple reason that at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, such were the most frequent cases of liability, and motor vehicles were barely experimental curiosities whose gigantic later development was not even suspected. Hence, initially, civil doctrine and legislation did not even contemplate the need for particular rules for damages caused by vehicles. It was not until much later, when traffic accidents proliferated to alarming numbers, that specific solutions began to be sketched out which, without sacrificing the basic principles of liability, also took into account extreme situations in which damage had been produced but was not attributable to the property owner because there was no fault or fraud on their part. Specifically, it concerned the problem derived from liability arising from an event that occurred when the asset was not in the custody or under the supervision or control of its owner, due to having been stolen or being in the charge of a third party responsible for its maintenance or repair. The celebrated principle was then established in France, at the beginning of the thirties, that "there is no liability when the owner of the vehicle finds it impossible to exercise supervision and control over the vehicle and its use," due to a theft or maintenance work. Evolution continued in the sense that, in reality, one had to also distinguish between the damage caused when the owner was unable to supervise and control the asset, and that arising from damages due to inherent or hidden defects of the motor vehicle, because in this latter case it did not matter to differentiate if it occurred while in the possession of the owner or not, since the damages would have been produced in any case. Such is the historical origin of the distinction between "behavioral guardianship" (guardia de comportamiento) (for when the owner cannot control the use) and "structural guardianship" (guardia de estructura) (for when the damage would have been produced in any case because it originates from an inherent defect in the thing while under the power of any person). See, on this matter, GHESTIN, J., Droit Civil, II, [Dirección1], [Dirección2], 1967/68, page 201ff. A distinction which, moreover, the Judge also invokes to exempt the co-defendant "American Flower Corporation" from liability insofar as the events under examination occurred when the vehicle owned by it was in the power of a third party charged by it with a repair, from which it follows that it could not then exercise any control over its correct use. Everything is nothing more than another application of the already cited principle that "no one is obligated to do the impossible" because it would be impossible, as is obvious, to hold liable someone who is legitimately deprived of the control and supervision of a thing at the moment a harmful event occurs, for the consequences of such event, within a coherent system of "subjective" liability. VIII.- It follows from the foregoing, consequently, that the judgment must be confirmed. No indemnification whatsoever is claimed under the concept of mandatory vehicle insurance and, as was set forth, the liability under examination is of the so-called "subjective" type, for the admissibility of which the prior verification of fault or fraud in the driver's behavior is indispensable, which the plaintiff did not do, as was her duty, according to article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code (Código Procesal Civil). Verification which, in reality, was made in the sense that there was no fault or fraud since the matter was heard in the criminal venue, as was noted in the "Proven Facts" (Hechos Probados), and has the character of res judicata (cosa juzgada) which prevails over the civil, as article 164 of that same Code mandates observance. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that it would not make much sense to oblige the defendants to demonstrate that everything was due to the victim's own act, as seems to emerge from the appeal memorial according to the literal wording of article 1048, fifth paragraph, of the Civil Code (folio 875), because the question was clear from the repressive jurisdiction. So that, lacking the indispensable demonstration of harmful conduct attributable to the defendant [Nombre2] and, on the contrary, with sufficient proof that when the incident occurred, the other defendant, "American Flower Corporation," was unable to exercise any control and supervision over the vehicle, the appropriate course was to accept the defenses (excepciones) opposed by them in the same manner as the Court did and to declare the claim without merit in all its aspects, with both sets of costs charged to the plaintiff, in observance of article 221 of the pertinent Procedural Code."

"II.- La relación de hechos no probados también se suscribe, pues ciertamente, no hubo demostración satisfactoria de que el accidente de tránsito en que se produjo el fallecimiento del señor [Nombre1] hubiera acontecido por causa imputable al conductor del vehículo placas [Placa1] (), el codemandado [Nombre2] , mientras lo conducía para someterlo a pruebas en la vía pública, a raíz de reparaciones ordenadas a la empresa "Lachner y Sáenz" por su propietaria registral, "American Flower Corporation", en español "Corporación Americana de Flores, Sociedad Anónima", aquí también accionada. Como se puntualizó en los "Hechos Probados", las correspondientes diligencias penales concluyeron con sobreseimiento obligatorio a favor del señor [Nombre2] por falta de pruebas suficientes para atribuirle responsabilidad alguna en los hechos. La demostración de tan importante cuestión para el fondo del proceso, por las razones que se dirán, corría a cargo de la accionante, al tenor del artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil, pero carece de respaldo probatorio. Del mismo modo, debe tenerse también como falto de prueba que en los días previos al accidente de que se dio cuenta, el señor [Nombre1] estuviera laborando como ayudante de mecánica con un salario semanal promedio de entre veinte y veinticinco mil colones. Como lo hace ver el Juzgado, la prueba en ese particular proviene de personas ligadas por parentesco con el señor [Nombre1] y con interés evidente en las resultas del proceso, por lo que su testimonio es poco creíble, y más bien contradice la documental proveniente de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, según la cual había dejado de figurar en planillas como trabajador activo desde un año antes del accidente. III.- La señora [Nombre1] , en su carácter personal y como Albacea Provisional de la sucesión de su hijo, quien en vida se llamó [Nombre1] , fallecido en el accidente en mención, endereza su demanda contra la persona que conducía el vehículo placas [Placa2] al momento del accidente, el señor [Nombre2] , y la empresa propietaria del automotor, "American Flower Corporation" en español "Corporación Americana de Flores, S.A.". Se funda, en lo que interesa ahora, "... en los artículos 1048, siguientes y concordantes del Código Civil, así como en los artículos 187, inciso b) 189 siguientes y concordantes de la Ley de Tránsito.". Se ampara, "...además en los criterios doctrinales dominantes y en la reiterada y abundante jurisprudencia nacional que ha desarrollado la figura de la Responsabilidad Civil Extracontractual.", según puede verse del folio 31. Todo, para pedir que en sentencia se condene solidariamente a los coaccionados al pago de cinco millones de colones por concepto de daño moral, de un millón ciento un mil cuatrocientos colones por daños y perjuicios así como por "beneficios dejados de percibir", además de los intereses correspondientes y ambas costas de la acción. El Juzgado, por su parte, denegó la demanda en su totalidad porque estimó que aunque hubo un accidente de tránsito del que resultó la muerte del señor [Nombre1] , no hubo demostración alguna de que ese fallecimiento se hubiera debido a culpa o dolo del conductor del vehículo en ese momento, el coaccionado [Nombre2] , según se examinó con amplitud en sede penal. Además, porque al ocurrir el accidente, el vehículo que conducía [Nombre2] no circulaba en labores mercantiles propias de su propietaria registral, la codemandada "American Flower Corporation", sino más bien en pruebas que realizaba un tercero contratado por ella para su reparación. Asimismo, porque el señor [Nombre1] había dejado de trabajar aproximadamente un año antes de su fallecimiento, por lo que mal podría haber estado a cargo de la manutención de su señora madre doña [Nombre1] , quien por lo demás recibió aproximadamente quinientos mil colones por indemnizaciones derivadas del seguro obligatorio de vehículos automotores, a cargo del Instituto Nacional de Seguros. IV.- El apoderado de la actora se alza de la sentencia porque considera, principalmente, que en la especie no hay subordinación a lo que se hubiere resuelto en la jurisdicción penal ya que, en su criterio, en el artículo 1048 del Código Civil se establece un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva que excluye las nociones de culpabilidad y de antijuricidad en la conducta del autor del daño y los reemplaza por la noción de riesgo, lo que lleva a que quien al buscar un beneficio o lucro crea un riesgo eventualmente dañoso para terceros, por el solo hecho de crearlo debe asumir sus consecuencias patrimoniales, salvo que el daño sea el resultado de fuerza mayor o de la propia falta de la víctima. Estima que por no haber probado los codemandados la fuerza mayor ni la propia falta de la víctima, como considera que era su deber, no se dio ninguno de los eximentes de responsabilidad previstos en el artículo 1048 del citado Código y que, por tratarse también de un vehículo destinado a la "explotación de una estructura empresarial", debe condenárseles al pago de las indemnizaciones reclamadas. V.- Estima el Tribunal que, en nuestro medio, el sistema de responsabilidad aplicable a la circulación de vehículos automotores por vías terrestres es tanto "objetiva" como "subjetiva", según sean sus diferentes ámbitos de aplicación. En efecto, la Ley de Tránsito dispone en el artículo 38 "Establécese un seguro obligatorio, ..., para los vehículos automotores. ... " cuya administración estará a cargo del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, lo cual debe entenderse en armonía con lo dispuesto en el numeral 48 de la misma Ley, a cuyo tenor "El seguro obligatorio de los vehículos cubre la lesión y la muerte de las personas, víctimas de un accidente de tránsito, exista o no responsabilidad subjetiva del conductor.". Agrega que también "...cubre los accidentes producidos con responsabilidad civil, derivados de la posesión, uso o mantenimiento del vehículo. En este último caso, esta responsabilidad debe ser fijada mediante los procedimientos establecidos y ante los tribunales competentes."[....]. O sea, tratándose de la lesión y muerte de personas, el sistema de responsabilidad derivado del seguro obligatorio de vehículos es completamente "objetivo" porque no reposa sobre los conceptos de culpa o dolo con que pudo haber actuado el autor del daño, sino que se apoya en la noción de "riesgo creado", es decir, de peligro inminente para los demás por el simple hecho de la circulación del vehículo, por razones de solidaridad social y con criterios de universalidad como es lo propio de las obligaciones impuestas por ley (ex lege). Cosa diferente se da cuando no se trate de la lesión o muerte de personas sino de otros accidentes que también generen responsabilidad civil, derivados de la posesión, uso o mantenimiento del vehículo, porque en tales supuestos la responsabilidad deja de ser "objetiva" para tornarse en "subjetiva", por así disponerlo la frase final al decir que "...esta responsabilidad debe ser fijada mediante los procedimientos establecidos y ante los tribunales competentes.", según se vio. Y, obviamente, el único modo para "establecer" o "fijar" una responsabilidad tiene que ser mediante la aplicación de los principios propios de la responsabilidad "subjetiva", que comienzan por examinar, de previo, si hubo culpa o dolo en la conducta del autor de un daño o, por el contrario, hecho de la propia víctima, caso fortuito o fuerza mayor, que hubieran dado lugar a ese daño, pues tales son los eximentes generales de responsabilidad contractual y extracontractual, en aplicación de la idea de que "nadie está obligado a lo imposible" como bien se sabe. VI.- Pero, volviendo al problema de la lesión o muerte de personas, y fuera del ámbito de aplicación del "seguro obligatorio" de los comentados artículos 38 y 48 de la ley citada, cabe decir que el sistema de responsabilidad para el conductor y la empresa dueña del vehículo es enteramente "subjetivo". Señala el artículo 186 de esa misma Ley, en lo que interesa, que "El conductor de un vehículo, los pasajeros, los peatones y los terceros, serán civilmente responsables por los daños y perjuicios que se deriven de un accidente de tránsito que les sea imputable. " [...]. Y "serles imputable", obviamente, no es otra cosa que el resultado de establecer, de previo, si hubo comportamiento dañoso, si se produjo efectivamente un daño, si hay nexo causal entre la conducta examinada y el daño que reclama la víctima y, por último, si ese comportamiento es imputable al autor de la conducta por ser consecuencia de su obrar con culpa o con dolo. Todo ello es típico y propio de la responsabilidad llamada "subjetiva" y no de la "objetiva", ya que lo único que interesa a esta última es la determinación del daño porque en principio carece de eximentes de responsabilidad. Sólo del modo expuesto pueden armonizarse las reglas de los artículos 38 y 48, por un lado, y el 186, por el otro, de la Ley de Tránsito, a fin de evitar la interpretación contraria, que obligaría a concluir que se trata de normas excluyentes y antagónicas. Por otra parte, conviene poner de relieve que, conforme al inciso "b)" del artículo 187 de la misma Ley, "Responderán solidariamente con el conductor: ...b) Las personas físicas o jurídicas que, por cualquier título, exploten vehículos con fines comerciales o industriales, incluyendo el transporte público. ..." entre otras, lo cual debe entenderse como que las personas que se sirven de vehículos para sus actividades empresariales responderán solidariamente ante terceros únicamente cuando se trate de la responsabilidad derivada de un accidente que sea imputable al conductor por culpa o por dolo. No podría ser responsable en todos los casos ni en cualquier circunstancia, porque en materia de obligaciones para que haya solidaridad debe haber, en primer término, un obligado "principal" y por extensión legal, otra persona que también deba responder ante el acreedor, aunque no haya habido conducta dañosa de su parte o enriquecimiento suyo en perjuicio del acreedor, según la doctrina del artículo 637 del Código Civil. De nuevo, no se trata entonces de una responsabilidad "objetiva" por el mero hecho de ser propietario o "explotador" de un vehículo, sino de la "subjetiva" proveniente de haber confiado el bien a un conductor que resultó civilmente responsable por culpa o por dolo, que es el "principal" obligado a la indemnización. Como se comprende, entonces, la regla general del párrafo quinto del artículo 1048 del Código Civil quedó profundamente modificada por las normas de la Ley de Tránsito de que se dio cuenta, cuyo carácter de específicas las hace prevalecer sobre las generales. Reglas éstas del artículo 1048 que, debe reconocerse, nunca fueron tampoco de una verdadera responsabilidad "objetiva", puesto que admiten como eximente de responsabilidad la fuerza mayor o la propia falta de la víctima, lo cual en principio es incompatible con un sistema basado en la noción de "riesgo creado" que es, además, desmedidamente peligroso para las otras personas. VII.- Ahora bien. Situados siempre dentro del sistema de la responsabilidad llamada "subjetiva", porque depende del examen de la conducta del "sujeto" autor del daño a fin establecer si actuó con culpa o con dolo, es bien sabido que los redactores del Código Civil Francés, del que proviene el nuestro, en materia de responsabilidad por "cosas" sólo previeron la resultante de daños causados por los animales o por el mal estado de las edificaciones. Ello, por la sencilla razón de que a fines del siglo XVIII y comienzos del XIX, tales eran los casos más frecuentes de responsabilidad, y los vehículos automotores eran apenas curiosidades experimentales cuyo gigantesco desarrollo posterior ni siquiera se sospechaba. De ahí que la doctrina y la legislación civil en un principio no se planteaba siquiera la necesidad de reglas particulares para los daños causados por los vehículos. No fue sino mucho más adelante, cuando los accidentes de tránsito proliferaron hasta cifras alarmantes, que comenzaron a esbozarse soluciones específicas que, sin sacrificar los principios básicos de la responsabilidad, tuvieran también en cuenta las situaciones extremas en que se había producido un daño pero no le era imputable al propietario del bien porque no había de su parte culpa o dolo. Específicamente, se trataba del problema derivado de la responsabilidad nacida de un hecho ocurrido cuando el bien no estaba en custodia o bajo la vigilancia o control de su propietario, por haber sido robado o estar a cargo de un tercero encargado de su mantenimiento o reparación. Se estableció entonces en Francia, a comienzos de los años treinta, el célebre principio de que "no hay responsabilidad cuando el propietario del vehículo se encuentre en la imposibilidad de ejercer vigilancia y control sobre el vehículo y su uso", en razón de un robo o de labores de mantenimiento. La evolución continuó en el sentido de que, en realidad, había que distinguir también entre el daño causado cuando el propietario estaba en imposibilidad de vigilar y controlar el bien, y la que nacía de los daños debidos a vicios propios u ocultos del automotor, porque en este último caso no interesaba diferenciar si se produjo estando o no en poder del dueño, ya que de todos modos se habrían producido. Tal es el origen histórico de la distinción entre "guardia de comportamiento" (para cuando el propietario no puede controlar el uso) y la "guardia de estructura" (para cuando de todos modos se habría producido el daño por provenir de un vicio propio de la cosa estando bajo el poder de cualquier persona). Ver, sobre el particular, GHESTIN, J., Droit Civil, II, [Dirección1], [Dirección2], 1967/68, pàgina 201 y siguientes. Distinción que, por lo demás, también invoca el señor Juez para eximir de responsabilidad a la codemanda "American Flower Corporation" por cuanto los hechos en examen se produjeron cuando el vehículo de su propiedad estaba en poder de un tercero encargado por ella de una reparación, de donde resulta que no podía ejercer entonces ningún control sobre su correcto uso. Todo, no es más que otra aplicación del principio, ya citado, de que "nadie está obligado a lo imposible" porque imposible sería, como es obvio, responsabilizar a quien está privado legítimamente del control y vigilancia de una cosa al momento de ocurrir un hecho dañoso, de las resultas de tal hecho, dentro de un sistema coherente de responsabilidad "subjetiva". VIII.- Viene de lo expuesto, en consecuencia, que la sentencia deberá ser confirmada. No se reclama indemnización alguna por concepto de seguro obligatorio de vehículos y, como se expuso, la responsabilidad en examen es de la llamada "subjetiva", para la procedencia de la cual es indispensable la comprobación previa de culpa o dolo en el comportamiento del conductor, lo que no hizo la accionante, como era su deber, conforme al artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil. Comprobación que, en realidad, quedó hecha en el sentido de que no hubo culpa ni dolo desde que el asunto fue conocido en sede penal, según se dio cuenta en los "Hechos Probados", y tiene el carácter de cosa juzgada que prevalece sobre la civil, como manda observar el artículo 164 de ese mismo Código. Por ello, encuentra el Tribunal que no tendría mayor sentido obligar a los accionados a la demostración de que todo se debió al hecho de la propia víctima, como parece desprenderse del memorial de apelación según la literalidad del artículo 1048, párrafo quinto, del Código Civil (folio 875), porque la cuestión quedó clara desde la jurisdicción represiva. De manera que, a falta de la indispensable demostración de conducta dañosa imputable al accionado [Nombre2] y, por el contrario, prueba suficiente de que al ocurrir el siniestro la otra accionada, "American Flower Corporation", estaba en imposibilidad de ejercer sobre el vehículo control y vigilancia alguna, lo procedente era acoger las excepciones opuestas por ellos en la misma forma que lo hizo el Juzgado y declarar sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, con ambas costas a cargo de la actora, en observancia del artículo 221 del Código Procesal de mérito."