Sufficient reasoning for legal classification in a criminal judgmentMotivación suficiente de la calificación jurídica en sentencia penal

**I.** Legal doctrine considers that the lack of legal reasoning or reasoning *in law*, among other cases, can consist of not legally justifying the legal characterization and thus, for example, for [Nombre1] : "...it is sufficient for the judge to specifically mention the articles of law he applies to the proven facts. This is enough to enable the legal review of cassation and fulfill the other purposes to which reasoning responds. The use of the *nomen iuris* of the crime, without citing the corresponding article of law, will not be sufficient when it is a doctrinal designation not contained in the law itself. It is not necessary to formulate special legal arguments to explain why the fact is framed within one criminal figure instead of another, or to justify the scope or interpretation of a particular precept. It is sufficient that the Court indicates specifically what the framing or interpretation it arrived at is, because it fulfills the duty to provide reasons by clearly stating its conclusion on the legal assessment of the case" [Nombre2] : *El Recurso de Casación*, Buenos Aires, [Nombre3] . , 1968, pp. 163 to 164) For [Nombre4]: "This [legal] reasoning is lacking if, first, the judgment had not raised or resolved a legal issue that it should have raised and resolved in accordance with the accusation or civil claim and its response, or because the treatment of an incidental issue had been deferred [...] A legal issue must be understood as that relating to the valuation or legal effects of the proven facts. The legal reasoning of the judgment is also lacking if, the respective issue having been raised, the Court had resolved it without indicating the precept or legal norm or principle that supports its decision. It is not necessary for the Court to explain for what reason, theory, or legal teaching it applies the precept, norm, or legal principle (see contrary, requiring the judge to expose the reasons for his legal conclusion, *Casación por nulidad de la sentencia*, Rapporteur Dr. [Nombre5] [...] The idea was questioned by us). It is for the challenger of the judgment, when questioning it for non-observance or erroneous application of the law, to expound the legal reasons contrary to the Court's legal decision [...] The legal reasoning of the judgment can be implicit..." ([Nombre6] : *Código Procesal Penal*, Córdoba, 1986, p. 393). On the same issue, [Nombre7] says that the reasoning: "Must also refer to the why, according to the proven facts, a specific legal norm should or should not be applied. To carry out the reasoning regarding the Law, it is generally sufficient to say that the facts held as proven constitute the crime 'x'. It is important that the crime attributed be identified; this could be done even using only the legal name of the crime, or else the article in which it is found, as long as it does not lend itself to confusion as to which crime the defendant is said to have committed..." The foregoing citations from [Nombre1] , [Nombre4] and [Nombre7], offered as mere illustration, must be taken with certain reservations, since it is evident that in our legal system the reasoning cannot be implicit or as parsimonious or succinct as these authors say. An ideal legal reasoning or reasoning *in law*, for example, would be that in which the judge followed the steps suggested by Professors [Nombre8] and Alfredo Chirino Sánchez, in their work "*Metodología de resolución de conflictos jurídicos en materia penal*" (San José, Costa Rica, Ilanud, p. 200), examining the problems of the action, the analysis of criminality, the search for the norm and the legal interest, the examination of permissions and the reproach, since this is how not only the formalities referred to in articles 6, 142, 363 subsection b) and 369 subsections d) and e) of the Código Procesal Penal are truly satisfied, but also it allows the control of the guarantees provided for in articles 39 and 41 of the Constitución Política, and conforms to the guidelines that the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional has given on the subject by stating, for example: "Within the obligation that judges have to ground and reason the judgment, there is framed the need for rulings to contain a legal analysis regarding the typical classification of the attributed facts, that is, once the proven facts have been established from the evidence received, it must be indicated whether those facts constitute one or more crimes and if there are several unlawful acts or diverse injured legal interests, the judge must establish the type of joinder that in his opinion should be applied in the specific case. If the proven facts are constitutive of a single crime and the judge convicts for two crimes, it is obvious that due process is violated because the judgment suffers from a defect in its reasoning as well as in the assessment of the evidentiary material" (Sala Constitucional, N° 8139-98 of 16:24 hours on November 17, 1998). This Court therefore considers that in order to determine minimal or sufficient reasoning regarding the legal characterization of the fact, the circumstances of each case must be considered, particularly the issues that have been raised or disputed in the debate for the Trial Court to rule on, but it can be said in general terms that reasoning regarding the legal characterization exists when the mention of the law or the *nomen iuris* allows for the substantive norm applied by the *a quo* to be undoubtedly individualized and —if applicable— it differentiates it, in a clear and express manner, from other alternative or subsidiary legal characterizations that may have been raised during the debate, which the judge must also do when giving the fact a legal characterization different from that of the accusation or complaint (cf. arts. 305 and 365 CPP), so that an objective reader of the judgment can corroborate that the decision was not arbitrary and judge for himself if the law was correctly applied to the case, just as from that minimal reasoning the aggrieved party may, for example, refute the legal reasoning or reasoning *in law* of the judgment (as error *in procedendo*) or challenge the erroneous application of the substantive law (as error *in iudicando*).

In the present case, the following facts were held as accredited: "1) Around eight o'clock on the morning of June second of the year two thousand, the defendant [Nombre9] with his Datsun vehicle, license plate [Placa1], was traveling West to East and the victim [Nombre10] was traveling East to West, in opposite directions, on the road that connects the sectors of La Valencia, [Dirección1] Heredia - La Uruca, and that of Santo Domingo de Heredia, specifically in the District of Santa Rosa of Santo Domingo de Heredia. 2) The victim was heading towards La Valencia while the defendant was heading towards the Cruz Roja of Santo Domingo de Heredia, the latter having to deviate from his route to the left, towards the North, to reach his destination. 3) Upon reaching the point where he had to cross to his left (towards the North), Mr. [Nombre11] did not see that the victim was coming towards him, on his motorcycle, in the corresponding right lane, making the turn imprudently because he cut off Mr. [Nombre12] , thereby causing the victim to impact the defendant's vehicle on the right front part. 4) Mr. [Nombre12] fell onto the public road suffering trauma to both legs with a fracture of the left knee and various blows that kept him incapacitated for two months for his usual tasks and caused him a permanent general organic disability of five percent" (judgment, pages 74 back to 75 front).

And in Recital III of the challenged judgment, as the reasoning *in law*, the following is recorded: "The facts proven in this judgment constitute the crime of negligent injury (lesiones culposas) provided for and penalized by Article 128 of the Código Penal, with imprisonment of up to one year or up to one hundred day-fines, in relation to the current Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) number 7331 of 1993 which, in the following articles, indicates how one must drive in relation to the case at hand: For example, Article 86 indicates that every change in speed must be signaled with due anticipation but that the [Placa2] does not grant the right to execute the maneuver if doing so endangers the safety of other vehicles or pedestrians. It is inferred from this norm that every driver has the obligation to maneuver with sufficient care so as not to endanger other vehicles. In this case, the defendant did not do so because he did not even realize that the victim was coming in the opposite direction with the right of way. Furthermore, and so the defendant stated, it was precisely for that reason and because no car was coming behind him that he did not signal to cross. Complementing the foregoing norm is Article 87 ibidem which obligates every driver who is going to change lanes or direction to make sure, before starting the maneuver, that he can execute it safely, which, as noted before, did not occur in this case. Finally, Article 92 subsection c) in fine of the same law indicates that, in cases such as the one we have been examining, the vehicle that is going to cross to the left must wait for an adequate gap between the vehicles of the oncoming traffic, so that there is no possibility of collision. In this case, Mr. Desanti did not even observe the motorcycle coming from ahead with the right of way, whereby it is clear that he did not take the measures required by law to avoid the collision" (judgment, page 77).

This Court considers that even though the reasoning of the judgment in relation to the legal characterization of the fact is laconic, it is duly related to the proven facts and is sufficient to guarantee due process and the right of defense of the accused, as he could have refuted the legal reasoning or reasoning *in law* of the judgment (as error *in procedendo*) or could have challenged the erroneous application of the substantive law (as error *in iudicando*). However, the challenger does not point out any error in the reasoning expressed by the *a quo*, nor does he specify in his claim that any issue was omitted in the reasoning such that, had it been expressly considered, could have given rise to a different decision regarding the legal characterization of the fact and, finally, neither has he claimed that —in relation to the proven facts— the substantive law was erroneously applied, so the existence of a concrete grievance that would reasonably justify granting his petition that the challenged judgment be annulled is not apparent. For all the foregoing, the claim is declared without merit.

**I.** Legal doctrine considers that the lack of legal motivation or motivation *in law* (*de derecho*), among other cases, may consist of failing to legally justify the legal classification and thus, for example, for [Nombre1]: "...it is sufficient for the judge to concretely mention the articles of law applied to the proven facts. This is sufficient to enable legal review through cassation and to fulfill the other purposes that motivation serves. The use of the *nomen iuris* of the crime, without citing the corresponding article of law, will not be sufficient when it is a doctrinal designation not contained in the law itself. It is not necessary to formulate special legal arguments to explain why the act fits one criminal provision instead of another, or to justify the scope or interpretation of a specific precept. It is enough that the Court concretely indicates the classification or interpretation it arrives at, because it fulfills the duty to state reasons by clearly indicating its conclusion on the legal assessment of the case" [Nombre2]: *El Recurso de Casación*, Buenos Aires, [Nombre3], 1968, pp. 163 to 164). For [Nombre4]: "This [legal] grounding is lacking if, firstly, the judgment did not raise or resolve a legal question that it should have raised and resolved in accordance with the indictment or the civil claim and its defense, or because the treatment of an incidental question was deferred [...] By legal question, one should understand that relating to the assessment or legal effects of the proven facts. The legal grounding of the judgment is also lacking if, having raised the respective question, the Court resolved it without indicating the precept, norm, or legal principle that supports its decision. It is not necessary for the Court to explain for what reason, theory, or legal teaching it applies the precept, norm, or legal principle (see contra, requiring the judge to state the reasons for his legal conclusion, *Casación por nulidad de la sentencia*, Rapporteur Dr. [Nombre5] [...] The idea was questioned by us). It is up to the challenger of the judgment, when questioning it for non-observance or erroneous application of the law, to set forth the legal reasons contrary to the Court's legal decision [...] The legal grounding of the judgment can be implicit..." ([Nombre6]: *Código Procesal Penal*, Córdoba, 1986, p. 393). On the same question, [Nombre7] states that the motivation: "Must also refer to why, in accordance with the proven facts, a specific legal norm should or should not be applied. To carry out the motivation regarding the Law, it is generally sufficient to say that the facts held as proven constitute the crime 'x'. It is important to identify the crime being attributed; this could be done even using only the legal name of the crime, or the article where it is found, as long as it does not lead to confusion about which crime the accused is said to have committed..." The preceding citations from [Nombre1], [Nombre4], and [Nombre7], offered as mere illustration, should be taken with certain reservations, since it is evident that in our legal system, the motivation cannot be implicit or as sparse or concise as these authors say. An ideal legal motivation, for example, would be one in which the judge followed the steps suggested by Professors [Nombre8] and Alfredo Chirino Sánchez, in their work "*Metodología de resolución de conflictos jurídicos en materia penal*" (San José, Costa Rica, Ilanud, p. 200), examining the problems of the action, the analysis of typicality, the search for the norm and the legal interest, the examination of permissions and reproach, for this is how one truly satisfies not only the formalities referred to in Articles 6, 142, 363 subsection b), and 369 subsections d) and e) of the Código Procesal Penal, but also allows for the control of the guarantees provided for in Articles 39 and 41 of the Political Constitution, and conforms to the guidelines that the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional has given on the subject by stating, for example: "Within the obligation that judges have to ground and motivate the judgment, there is the need for rulings to contain a legal analysis regarding the typical classification of the attributed acts, that is, once the proven facts are established based on the evidence received, it must be indicated whether those facts constitute one or more crimes and, in the event of multiple unlawful acts or various injured legal interests, the judge must establish the type of concurrence that, in his judgment, should be applied in the specific case. If the proven facts constitute a single crime and the judge convicts for two crimes, it is obvious that due process is violated because the judgment suffers from a defect in its grounding as well as in the assessment of the evidentiary material" (Sala Constitucional, No. 8139-98 of 4:24 p.m. on November 17, 1998). This Court therefore considers that, in order to determine a minimal or sufficient motivation regarding the legal classification of the act, the specific circumstances of each case must be considered, particularly the questions that were raised or contested in the debate for the Trial Court to rule on, but it can be said in general terms that grounding exists regarding the legal classification when the mention of the law or the *nomen iuris* allows the substantive norm applied by the *a quo* to be undoubtedly individualized and—if applicable—this clearly and expressly differentiates it from other alternative or subsidiary legal classifications that were raised in the debate, which the court must also do when giving the act a legal classification different from that of the indictment or complaint (cf. arts. 305 and 365 CPP), so that an objective reader of the judgment can corroborate that the decision was not arbitrary and judge for himself whether the law was correctly applied to the case, just as, based on that minimal motivation, the aggrieved party can, for example, refute the legal motivation of the judgment (as an error *in procedendo*) or challenge the erroneous application of the substantive law (as an error *in iudicando*). In the present case, the following facts were held as accredited: "1) Around eight o'clock on June 2, 2000, the accused [Nombre9] with his Datsun vehicle, license plate [Placa1], was traveling West to East, and the injured party [Nombre10] was traveling East to West, in the opposite direction, on the road connecting the sectors of La Valencia, [Dirección1] Heredia - La Uruca, and Santo Domingo de Heredia, specifically in the District of Santa Rosa de Santo Domingo de Heredia. 2) The injured party was heading toward La Valencia while the accused was heading toward the Cruz Roja of Santo Domingo de Heredia, the latter having to deviate from his route to the left, toward the North, to reach his destination. 3) Upon reaching the point where he had to cross to his left (toward the North), Mr. [Nombre11] did not see that the injured party was coming in front of him, on his motorcycle, in the corresponding right lane, making the turn imprudently because he crossed into the path of Mr. [Nombre12], thereby causing the injured party to impact the right front part of the accused's vehicle. 4) Mr. [Nombre12] fell onto the public road, suffering trauma to both legs with a fracture of the left knee and various blows that kept him incapacitated for two months from his usual duties and caused him a general organic permanent disability of five percent" (judgment, folios 74 verso to 75 recto). And in Considerando III of the challenged judgment, as legal motivation, the following is recorded: "The proven facts in this judgment constitute the crime of negligent injuries (*lesiones culposas*), provided for and sanctioned by Article 128 of the Código Penal, with imprisonment of up to one year or up to one hundred day-fines, in relation to the current Ley de Tránsito, number 7331 of 1993, which, in the following articles, indicates the manner in which one must drive in relation to the case at hand: For example, Article 86 states that any change in speeds must be signaled with due anticipation, but that the [Placa2] does not grant the right to execute the maneuver if it endangers the safety of other vehicles or pedestrians. It is inferred from this norm that every driver has the obligation to maneuver with sufficient care so as not to endanger other vehicles. In this case, the accused did not do so, because he did not even realize that the injured party was coming in the opposite direction with the right of way. Even, as the accused himself stated, it was precisely for that reason, and because no car was coming behind him, that he did not signal to cross. Complementing the previous norm is Article 87 ibidem, which obliges any driver who is going to change lanes or direction to ensure, before starting the maneuver, that he can execute it safely, which, as noted above, did not occur in this case. Finally, Article 92, subsection c) in fine of the same law indicates that, in cases such as the one we have been dealing with, the vehicle that is going to cross to the left must wait for an adequate space between vehicles in the oncoming traffic stream, so that there is no possibility of collision. In this case, Mr. Desanti did not even observe the motorcycle coming from the front with the right of way, making it clear that he did not take the measures required by law to avoid the collision" (judgment, folio 77). This Court considers that even though the motivation of the judgment regarding the legal classification of the act is laconic, it is duly related to the proven facts and is sufficient to guarantee due process and the defendant's right to defense, since he could have refuted the legal motivation of the judgment (as an error *in procedendo*) or could have challenged the erroneous application of the substantive law (as an error *in iudicando*). However, the challenger points out no error in the reasoning expressed by the *a quo*, nor does he specify in his claim that the grounding omitted to resolve any question such that, had it been expressly considered, could have led to a different decision regarding the legal classification of the act, and, finally, he has not claimed that—with respect to the proven facts—the substantive law was erroneously applied, and therefore the existence of a specific grievance that would reasonably justify addressing his petition to annul the challenged judgment is not appreciated. For all the foregoing, the claim is dismissed.

"I. La doctrina considera que la falta de motivación jurídica o de derecho, entre otros casos, puede consistir en no justificar legalmente la calificación jurídica y así, por ejemplo, para [Nombre1] : «...es bastante que el juez mencione concretamente los artículos de ley que aplica a los hechos comprobados. Esto es suficiente para posibilitar el control jurídico de la casación y cumplir con las demás finalidades a que la motivación responde. El empleo del nomen iuris del delito, sin citar el correspondiente artículo de ley, no será suficiente cuando se trate de una denominación doctrinaria no contenida en la propia ley. No es necesario que se formulen argumentaciones jurídicas especiales para explicar por qué se encuadra el hecho en una figura penal en lugar de otra, o para justificar el alcance o interpretación de un precepto determinado. Basta con que el Tribunal indique concretamente cuál es el encuadramiento o la interpretación a que él arriba, porque cumple con el deber de motivar señalando claramente su conclusión sobre la valoración jurídica del caso» [Nombre2] : El Recurso de Casación, Buenos Aires, [Nombre3] .  , 1968, págs. 163 a 164) Para [Nombre4]: «Esta fundamentación [jurídica] falta si, en primer lugar, la sentencia no hubiera planteado o resuelto una cuestión jurídica que debió plantear y resolver con arreglo a la acusación o a la demanda civil y a su contestación o por haberse diferido el tratamiento de una cuestión incidental [...] Por cuestión jurídica debe entenderse la relativa a la valorización o efectos legales de los hechos probados. La fundamentación jurídica de la sentencia también falta si, planteada la respectiva cuestión, el Tribunal la hubiera resuelto sin señalar el precepto o norma o principio legal que sustenta su resolución. No es necesario que el Tribunal explique por qué razón, teoría o enseñanza jurídica, aplica el precepto, norma o principio legal (véase en contra, exigiendo que el juez exponga las razones de su conclusión legal, Casación por nulidad de la sentencia, Relator Dr. [Nombre5] [...] La idea fue cuestionada por nosotros). Es al impugnante de la sentencia a quien le corresponde, al cuestionarla por inobservancia o errónea aplicación de la ley, exponer las razones jurídicas contrarias a la decisión jurídica del Tribunal [...] La fundamentación jurídica de la sentencia puede ser implícita...» ([Nombre6] : Código Procesal Penal, Córdoba, 1986, pág. 393). Sobre la misma cuestión dice [Nombre7] que la motivación: «Debe referirse además al por qué de acuerdo con los hechos probados, debe o no aplicarse una norma jurídica determinada. Para llevar a cabo la motivación en cuanto al Derecho, generalmente basta decir que los hechos tenidos por probados constituyen el delito "x". Es importante que se identifique el delito que se atribuye; esto podría hacerse inclusive usando solamente el nombre jurídico del delito, o bien el artículo en que se encuentra, siempre y cuando no se preste a la confusión cuál es el delito que se dice cometió el imputado...» Las anteriores citas de [Nombre1] , [Nombre4] y [Nombre7], ofrecidas como mera ilustración, deben tomarse con ciertas reservas, pues resulta evidente que en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico la motivación no puede ser implícita o tan parca o escueta como dicen estos autores. Una motivación jurídica o de derecho ideal, por ejemplo, sería aquella en que el juzgador siguiera los pasos sugeridos por los Profesores [Nombre8]   y Alfredo Chirino Sánchez, en su obra «Metodología de resolución de conflictos jurídicos en materia penal» (San José, Costa Rica, Ilanud, p. 200), examinando los problemas de la acción, el análisis de la tipicidad, la búsqueda de la norma y el bien jurídico, el examen de los permisos y el reproche, pues así es como se satisfacen realmente no solo las formalidades a que se refieren los artículos 6, 142, 363 inciso b) y 369 inciso d) y e) del Código Procesal Penal, sino que también se permite el control de los garantías previstas en los artículos 39 y 41 de la Constitución Política, y se ajusta a los lineamientos que la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional ha dado sobre el tema al decir, por ejemplo: «Dentro de la obligación que tienen los jueces de fundamentar y motivar la sentencia, se enmarca la necesidad de que los fallos contengan un análisis jurídico respecto de la adecuación típica de los hechos atribuidos, esto es, una vez establecidos los hechos probados a partir de las probanzas recibidas, debe indicarse si esos hechos constituyen uno o más delitos y en caso de que sean varios ilícitos o diversos bienes jurídicos lesionados, el juez debe establecer el tipo de concurso que a su criterio debe aplicarse en el caso concreto. Si los hechos probados son constitutivos de un sólo delito y el juez condena por dos delitos, es obvio que se vulnera el debido proceso por adolecer la sentencia de un defecto en su fundamentación así como en la valoración del material probatorio» (Sala Constitucional, N° 8139-98 de las 16:24 horas del 17 de noviembre de 1998). Este Tribunal considera entonces que para poder determinar una motivación mínima o suficiente en punto a la calificación jurídica del hecho deben considerarse las circunstancias propias de cada caso, particularmente las cuestiones que han sido planteadas o controvertidas en el debate para que el Tribunal de Juicio se pronuncie, pero puede decirse en términos generales que existe fundamentación en punto a la calificación jurídica cuando la mención de la ley o del nomen iuris permita individualizar indudablemente la norma sustantiva aplicada por el a quo y si fuere el caso este la diferencie, de modo claro y expreso, de otras calificaciones jurídicas alternativas o subsidiarias que se le hubieren planteado en el debate, lo que también deberá hacer el juzgador cuando de al hecho una calificación jurídica diferente de la de la acusación o querella (cfr. arts. 305 y 365 CPP), de modo que un lector objetivo de la sentencia pueda corroborar que la decisión no fue arbitraria y juzgar por sí mismo si la ley fue correctamente aplicada al caso, del mismo modo que a partir de esa motivación mínima la parte agraviada podrá, por ejemplo, refutar la motivación jurídica o de derecho de la sentencia (como error in procedendo) o acusar la errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva (como error in iudicando). En el presente caso se tuvieron por acreditados los siguientes hechos: «1) Alrededor de las ocho horas del dos de junio del año dos mil circulaban, en sentido contrario, el imputado [Nombre9] con su vehículo marca Datsun placa [Placa1] con dirección Oeste a Este y el ofendido [Nombre10] en sentido Este a Oeste, sobre la carretera que une los sectores de La Valencia, [Dirección1] Heredia - La Uruca, y el de Santo Domingo de Heredia, propiamente en el Dsitrito de Santa Rosa de Santo Domingo de Heredia. 2) El ofendido se dirigía hacia la Valencia mientras que el imputado lo hacía hacia la Cruz Roja de Santo Domingo de Heredia, debiendo este último desviarse de su ruta a mano izquierda, hacia el Norte, para llegar a su destino. 3) Al llegar al punto donde debía cruzar a su izquierda (hacia el Norte) don [Nombre11] no vio que el ofendido venía de frente a él, en su motocicleta, por el carril derecho correspondiente realizado el viraje en forma imprudente porque se interpuso al paso de don [Nombre12] , ocasionando con ello que el ofendido impactara el vehículo del imputado en la parte delantera derecha. 4) Don [Nombre12] cayó a la vía pública sufriendo traumas en ambas piernas con fractura de la rodilla izquierda y golpes varios que le mantuvieron incapacitado por dos meses para sus labores habituales y le ocasionaron una incapacidad permanente general orgánica de un cinco por ciento» (sentencia, folios 74 vuelto a 75 frente). Y en el Considerando III de la sentencia impugnada, como motivación de derecho, se consigna la siguiente: «Los hechos probados en esta sentencia configuran el delito de lesiones culposas que prevé y sanciona el artículo 128 del Código Penal, con prisión de hasta un año o hasta cien días multa, en relación con la Ley de Tránsito Vigente número 7331 de 1993 que, en los artículos siguientes, indica la forma en que se debe conducir en relación con el caso que nos ocupa: Por ejemplo, señala el artículo 86 que toda modificación en las velocidades debe señalarse en la debida anticipación pero que la [Placa2] no otorga derecho a ejecutar la maniobra si con ella se pone en peligro la seguridad de otros vehículos o peatones. Se colige de esa norma que todo conductor tiene la obligación de maniobrar con el suficiente cuidado para no poner en peligro los otros vehículos. En este caso, el imputado no lo hizo de esa manera porque ni siquiera se dio cuenta que en sentido contrario a él venía el ofendido con derecho a vía. Incluso, y así lo dijo el imputado, fue, precisamente, por esa razón y porque detrás de él no venía ningún auto, que no puso señales para cruzar. Complementando la norma anterior se encuentra el artículo 87 ibídem que obliga a todo conductor que va a cambiar de carril o de dirección a cerciorarse, antes de iniciar la maniobra, que puede ejecutarla con seguridad, lo cual, como se señaló atrás, no ocurrió en este caso. Finalmente el artículo 92 inciso c) in fine de la misma ley indica, que en casos como el que nos ha venido ocupando, el vehículo que va a cruzar a la izquierda debe esperar un espacio adecuado entre los vehículos de la corriente en sentido contrario, de manera que no existe posibilidad de colisión. En este caso el señor Desanti ni siquiera observó la motocicleta que venía de frente con vía, con lo cual queda claro que no tomó las medidas exigidas en la ley para evitar la colisión» (sentencia, folio 77). Considera este Tribunal que aun cuando la motivación de la sentencia en relación a la calificación jurídica del hecho es lacónica, está debidamente relacionada a los hechos probados y resulta suficiente para garantizar el debido proceso y el derecho de defensa del encartado, pues este podría haber refutado la motivación jurídica o de derecho de la sentencia (como error in procedendo) o podría haber acusado la errónea aplicación de la ley sustantiva (como error in iudicando). Sin embargo, el impugnante no señala error alguno en el razonamiento expresado por el a quo, ni precisa en su reclamo que en la fundamentación se hubiera omitido resolver alguna cuestión tal que, de haber sido expresamente considerada, hubiera podido dar lugar a una decisión diferente en punto a la calificación jurídica del hecho y, finalmente, tampoco ha reclamado que con relación a los hechos probados hubiera sido erróneamente aplicada la ley sustantiva, por lo que no se aprecia la existencia de un agravio concreto que justificara razonablemente atender a su petición de que se anule la sentencia impugnada. Por todo lo expuesto se declara sin lugar el reclamo."