Agrarian jurisdiction over private land within a wildlife refugeCompetencia agraria sobre fundo privado dentro de refugio de fauna silvestre

**Dissenting Vote of Magistrate Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández I.- With due respect to the decision of the other Members, the undersigned judge dissents from the conclusions reached by the majority ruling, specifically in the recital (considerando) identified as II, which is why she departs from that criterion and issues a dissenting vote based on the following considerations.

II.- The conflict presented is eminently agrarian in nature, given that it involves a rural property (fundo), known as “la isla”; dedicated to cattle raising, as well as agriculture. The co-plaintiffs state that their father acquired it through a verbal purchase in 1985 and it appears registered in the name of Geiner and Randall Artavia Montenegro in the respective Registry. But since they are located within a wildlife refuge created by Decreto Ejecutivo 16358 of June 4, 1985, the majority vote deems it to be within the jurisdiction of the administrative litigation venue.

III.- This matter was initiated in 2008, before the Juzgado Agrario of the Second Judicial Circuit of the Atlantic Zone (folio 60 1st volume), it is not even necessary to consider the properties in dispute as part of the Barra del Colorado National Wildlife Refuge, even though the land in litigation lies within its boundaries, because it cannot be inferred from the case file that it has been expropriated to date.

IV.- Article 22 subsection ch) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (hereinafter LJA) provides: *“In matters under the jurisdiction of the agrarian jurisdiction, the following are parties: ch) The Procuraduría General de la República, in all matters relating to the protection of the public domain (tutela del dominio público) and the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by law in this area. The courts shall examine ex officio, or at the request of the plaintiff or defendant, whether the aforementioned direct interest actually exists. Thus amended by article 2 of law No. 6815 of September 27, 1982).”* (The highlighted portion does not correspond to the original). Subsection ch) is clear in establishing that in every case the existence of this aforementioned interest must be examined. And in this litigation, the direct interest of the State has not been alleged, because it involves a property that is part of a farm that is still under private ownership. In accordance with articles 22 of the recently transcribed LJA and… this matter falls under agrarian jurisdiction, based on the functional, objective, and subjective criteria. The State does not yet have the direct interest to be considered a party within this agrarian proceeding; this is because it involves a farm registered in the National Property Registry (Registro Nacional de la Propiedad Inmueble), and therefore, they are still under private ownership. Consequently, jurisdiction lies with the agrarian courts, since there is no probative evidence showing that the real estate legally forms part of the refuge. While it is true that this member shares the view that protected wild areas are State property and therefore form part of the public domain, this is only the case when they have already been expropriated. In addition to the foregoing, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent the matter, given the specialized nature of the subject, from being discussed in a specialized venue such as the agrarian one if it involves rural properties (fundos) of such nature, regardless of the obligated parties that must be deemed as such, in this case the State given the interests it may have. The reproduced rule 22 subsection ch) foresees situations such as those under review, where in an agrarian venue the State can be considered a legally obligated party, in matters relating to the protection of the public domain, without it having to be adjudicated in the administrative litigation jurisdiction (jurisdicción contenciosa).

V.- Nor is there any record in this case that the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines is exercising any administration over the rural property (fundo) that is the subject of the dispute, registered as a private domain asset in the Public Registry, which reinforces agrarian jurisdiction, pursuant to the provisions of article 108 of the Ley de Biodiversidad. The claims in this proceeding are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act, for which reason I respectfully consider that the declared nullity is without merit.

VI.- In addition to the foregoing, it should be considered that this litigation began in 2008, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been taken and first and second instance judgments have already been issued, in the specialized agrarian venue. In this case, the file already contains irreproducible facts, which, upon being annulled, will practically leave the parties, who provided said evidence, defenseless. Hence, I do not agree with what the majority has decided to annul everything done and resolved from the order issued at 7 hours 5 minutes on May 8, 2008, ordering the case file to be sent to the Administrative Litigation Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo) for it to process and conclude the matter in accordance with the prevailing procedural rules. (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that this Chamber is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this deciding body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by the majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, since the majority vote remands it to the administrative litigation venue, given that this Chamber is the superior court for that subject matter in ordinary proceedings such as the one under review, it would be anticipating a criterion because if it later comes back as an administrative litigation proceeding, the point would already have been resolved regarding the merits of the dispute.

The claims of this proceeding are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act whatsoever; therefore, I respectfully consider that the decreed nullity is not appropriate.

VI.- In addition to the foregoing, it should be taken into consideration that this litigation began in 2008, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been taken, as well as the first and second instance judgments having been issued, in the specialized agrarian venue. In this case, the case file (expediente) already contains irreproducible facts, which, upon annulment, will practically leave the parties, who contributed said evidence, defenseless. Hence, I do not share what was ordered by the majority to annul everything that has been done and resolved as of the order of 7 hours 5 minutes on May 8, 2008, ordering the referral of the case records to the Administrative Litigation Court (Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo) so that it may process and conclude it in accordance with the procedural regulations in force. (Administrative Litigation Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo)). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that the Chamber (Sala) is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by majority so prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to analyze the merits of the matter, since in the majority opinion the case is referred to the administrative litigation venue (sede contenciosa), this Chamber being the superior of said subject matter in ordinary proceedings such as the one under analysis, it would be to advance a criterion because if it later comes as an administrative litigation proceeding (proceso contencioso), the point regarding the merits of the dispute would already have been resolved.” While it is true that this member shares the criterion that protected wilderness areas (áreas silvestres protegidas) are State property (bienes del Estado) and therefore form part of the public domain (dominio público), this is only the case once they have been expropriated. Added to the above, based on the transcribed provision, this does not prevent the matter, due to its specialized nature, from being discussed in a specialized venue such as the agrarian venue if it concerns parcels of such nature, regardless of the legally obligated parties that must be considered as such, in this case the State given the interests it may have. The reproduced rule 22 subsection ch) foresees situations such as the one under study, where in the agrarian venue the State can be considered a legally obligated party in matters relating to the protection of the public domain, without this having to be aired in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction (jurisdicción contenciosa).

V.- Neither is it established in this case that the Dirección General de Vida Silvestre of the Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas is exercising any administration over the parcel subject to the dispute, registered as private property (bien de dominio privado) in the Registro Público, which reinforces the agrarian jurisdiction (competencia agraria), pursuant to the provisions of Article 108 of the Ley de Biodiversidad. The claims of this process are eminently private, without challenging or questioning any administrative act whatsoever, so I respectfully consider that the declared nullity is not applicable.

VI.- Added to the above, take into consideration that this litigation began in 2008, where the evidence offered by the parties has already been practiced, and first and second instance judgments have already been issued, in the specialized agrarian venue. In this case, there are already irreproducible facts in the case file (expediente), which, upon being annulled, will practically leave the parties defenseless, those who provided said evidence. Hence, I do not share the majority decision to annul all proceedings and decisions issued after the order of 7 hours 5 minutes on May 8, 2008, ordering the case file to be sent to the Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo so that it may process and conclude it in accordance with current procedural rules. (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). Consequently, the undersigned votes against the nullity, considering that the Sala is competent to hear the merits of the appeal filed before this decision-making body; which is omitted because the nullity decreed by majority prevents it. Furthermore, if this judge were to proceed to analyze the merits of the matter, since the majority vote sends it to the contentious venue, and this Sala is the superior of said matter in ordinary processes such as the one under analysis, it would be to advance a criterion because if it later comes as a contentious process, the point regarding the merits of the dispute would have already been resolved.”

“Voto salvado de la Magistrada Carmenmaría Escoto Fernández I.- Con el respeto debido a la decisión de los demás Integrantes, la suscrita juzgadora disiente de las conclusiones a que arriba el fallo de mayoría, propiamente en el considerando identificado como II, razón por la cual se separa de ese criterio y salva el voto con fundamento en las siguientes estimaciones.

II.- El conflicto que se presenta es eminentemente de naturaleza agraria, al estar de por medio un fundo, conocido como “la isla”; dedicado a ganado vacuno, así como a la agricultura. Manifiestan los codemandantes, su padre lo adquirió mediante compra verbal desde 1985 y aparece inscrito a nombre de Geiner y Randall de apellidos Artavia Montenegro en el respectivo Registro. Pero al estar localizados dentro de un refugio de fauna silvestre creado mediante Decreto Ejecutivo 16358 del 4 de junio de 1985, se estima en el voto de mayoría ser del conocimiento de la sede contencioso administrativa.

III.- Este asunto se inició en el año 2008, ante el Juzgado Agrario del Segundo Circuito Judicial de la Zona Atlántica (folio 60 1er. tomo), ni siquiera se tiene que considerar los predios en contienda como parte del Refugio Nacional de Fauna Silvestre de Barra del Colorado, aunque el terreno en litigio esté dentro de sus límites, porque no se colige de los autos a la fecha se haya expropiado.

IV.- Dispone el ordinal 22 inciso ch) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Agraria (en adelante LJA): “En los negocios de conocimiento de la jurisdicción agraria, son partes: ch) La Procuraduría General de la República, en todos los asuntos relativos a la tutela del dominio público y al ejercicio de las atribuciones que la ley le confiere en esta materia. Los tribunales examinarán de oficio, o a petición del actor o demandado, si en realidad existe el interés directo aludido. Así reformado por el artículo 2º de la ley No. 6815 del 27 de septiembre de 1982 )”. (Lo destacado no responde al original). El inciso ch) es claro al establecer que en todo caso se debe examinar la existencia de este interés aludido. Y en este litigio no se ha alegado el interés directo del Estado, porque se trata de un predio parte de una finca que aún está en dominio privado. De acuerdo con los artículos 22 de la LJA de reciente transcripción y… este asunto es de competencia agraria, tanto por los criterios funcional, como el objetivo y el subjetivo. El interés directo del Estado a la fecha aún no lo tiene para tenerle como parte dentro de este proceso agrario; ello, porque se trata de una finca inscrita en el Registro Nacional de la Propiedad Inmueble, por lo cual aún se encuentran en dominio privado. Consecuentemente, la competencia es agraria, pues no existen elementos probatorios donde se acredite que los inmuebles jurídicamente forman parte del refugio. Si bien es cierto que esta integrante comparte el criterio de que las áreas silvestres protegidas son bienes del Estado y por ende forman parte del dominio público, esto lo es sólo cuando ya han sido expropiadas. Aunado a lo anterior con base en la disposición transcrita, ello no obsta para que por la especialidad de la materia el asunto se discuta en una sede especializada como la agraria si se está ante fundos de tal naturaleza, independientemente de las partes obligadas que haya que tener como tales, en este caso al Estado dados los intereses que pueda tener. La norma reproducida 22 inciso ch) prevé situaciones como las de estudio, donde en sede agraria se puede tener como parte obligada legalmente al Estado, en asuntos relativos a la tutela del dominio público, sin que por ello deba ventilarse en la jurisdicción contenciosa.

V.- Tampoco consta en este caso que la Dirección General de Vida Silvestre del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, esté ejerciendo administración alguna sobre el fundo objeto de contienda inscrito como bien de dominio privado en el Registro Público, lo cual refuerza la competencia agraria, a tenor de lo dispuesto por el ordinal 108 de la Ley de Biodiversidad. Las pretensiones de este proceso son eminentemente privadas sin impugnar o cuestionar acto administrativo alguno por lo que respetuosamente estimo, no cabe la nulidad decretada.

VI.- Aunado a lo anterior, tómese en consideración que este litigio se inició en el año 2008, donde ya se practicó la prueba ofrecida por las partes así como se han dictado las sentencias de primera y segunda instancia, en sede especializada agraria. En este caso en el expediente existen ya hechos irreproductibles, que al anularse prácticamente quedarán en indefensión las partes, quienes aportaron dicha prueba. De ahí que no se comparta lo dispuesto por mayoría de anular todo lo actuado y resuelto a partir del auto de las 7 horas 5 minutos del 8 de mayo de 2008, ordenándose remitir los autos al Juzgado de lo Contencioso Administrativo para que lo tramite y fenezca conforme a la normativa procesal vigente. (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo). En consecuencia, la suscrita vota en contra de la nulidad, estimándose que la Sala es competente para entrar a conocer del fondo del recurso interpuesto ante este órgano decisor; lo cual se omite por cuanto la nulidad decretada por mayoría así lo impide. Además, si esta juzgadora entrara a analizar el fondo del asunto, como en voto de mayoría se remite a la sede contenciosa, al ser esta Sala el superior de dicha materia en procesos ordinarios como el de análisis, sería adelantar criterio pues si viene luego como proceso contencioso ya habría resuelto el punto en cuanto al fondo de la contienda.”