Driving an unpowered motorcycle while intoxicated does not constitute an abstract-danger offenseConducción de motocicleta apagada en estado de ebriedad no configura delito de peligro abstracto

I.- […] For its part, the judgment states that the conduct is not criminal because, even though he was riding the motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, since it was turned off, there was no danger, interpreting that “driving” (conducir) necessarily requires that the movement be due to the engine. The two arguments provided by the lower court (a quo) are debatable. Article 254 bis of the Criminal Code (CP) orders punishment “[...] to anyone who drives drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages [...]” (fourth paragraph), it being accepted that we are in the presence of a crime of abstract danger (delito de peligro abstracto), in which the criminal offense merely requires the performance of the typical dangerous action. It is therefore at least curious that the judgment denies the existence of a danger to the legal interest (bien jurídico), based on the fact that the motorcycle was turned off, since the legislator has considered a priori (in the abstract) such conduct to be dangerous, which is why part of the doctrine even speaks of the existence of a statistical danger. Moreover, in principle, the assertion made in the ruling that “[...] the term driving implies precisely the activation of the motor vehicle [...]” does not seem acceptable either, because if we start from the first meaning of the word “to drive” (conducir), that is not required. In this regard, in a similar case, it has been said: “Therefore, the accused was indeed driving and steering the motorcycle, and although it was turned off, it is clear that he was mounted on it and guiding it, which is to drive (conducir), since there is no variant in driving a vehicle or motorcycle, with the engine off or on, because what the law punishes is driving it under the influence of alcohol, regardless of the way in which it is done” (Goicoechea Court of Cassation, V. 1044-10). Thus, as stated in the cited decision, in principle it can be affirmed that the criminal offense punishes driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and that this does not necessarily require that it be turned on. Furthermore, on the other hand, if we assume that what the legislator intended is the advancement of the protective barriers for legal interests –not Common Security, but specifically legal interests such as Life, Health, and Bodily Integrity– then a truck driven by a drunk person would be just as dangerous as the same vehicle being rolled while turned off on a slope under the same circumstances. However, it must also be noted that, in accordance with the principle of criminal legality, not every conduct that places a legal interest in (abstract) danger is punishable, but only those that specifically fall within the provisions of the criminal offense. Therefore, even when the application of the criminal offense may at first seem simple, it must be verified whether in the specific case the proven conduct actually falls within the typical provision of driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages (art. 254 bis, fourth paragraph, CP). To this end, one must start from the premise that “laws shall be interpreted according to the proper meaning of their words, in relation to the context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time in which they are to be applied, considering fundamentally their spirit and purpose” (Civil Code, art. 10). In accordance with the foregoing, an initial approach to what “to drive” (conducir) is is provided by the common definition of the term, and in that sense it is said to consist of: “1. tr. To carry, transport from one place to another. 2. tr. To guide or direct towards a place. 3. tr. To guide or direct towards an objective or a situation. U. t. c. intr. 4. tr. To guide or direct a business or the actions of a group. 5. tr. Esp. To steer an automobile. 6. tr. desus. To adjust, arrange for a price or salary. 7. intr. desus. To be suitable, to be appropriate for some end. 8. prnl. To manage oneself, to behave, to comport oneself, to proceed in one way or another, well or badly” (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, http://www.rae.es/rae.html, entry “conducir”). However, despite the fact that the first meanings of the word are generic, from the context of Article 254 bis CP and the Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres, it is clear that when the criminal offense in question refers to “to drive” (conducir), it specifically alludes to the meaning that defines it as “to steer an automobile”, referring thereby to a specific class of vehicles, those that move by virtue of a motor, generally an internal combustion engine (cfr. entry “automóvil” in Diccionario de la Lengua Española, http://www.rae.es/rae.html). This conclusion is reached not only because the various provisions contemplated in Article 254 bis CP show that it alludes to that type of means of transport, but mainly because the legislator has defined the concept of “driver” (conductor), classifying as such the “[...] person who has the mechanical control of a motor vehicle” (art. 235.27; Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). Therefore, even though the aforementioned Law regulates the circulation on land routes of all types of vehicles, with or without a motor (art. 1 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), it does not consider a person who rides a bicycle to be a driver (conductor), not only by defining said concept (as stated supra), but also because when referring to them, it simply calls them “cyclists” (ciclistas) (art. 105 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). Therefore, it can be concluded that not just any driving of a vehicle would fit within the criminal offense in question, but only that of self-propelled means of transport. A consequence of the above is that all driving under the influence of alcohol of non-self-propelled vehicles, such as bicycles, skateboards, horse-drawn carriages, etc., is excluded from the provisions of the offense in question, since, despite the fact that such conduct can be dangerous for legal interests, they would be excluded, as has been stated, from the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 254 CP. The above conclusion, for further support, can also be based on the reasons why driving motor vehicles under the influence of alcoholic beverages is specifically prohibited, rather than all types of vehicles in general. A priori, or if preferred in the abstract, the danger that motor vehicles represent for legal interests is greater than that of those that lack self-propulsion. Such means of transport (self-propelled) have greater mass and can travel at higher speeds than those that lack an engine, hence the force of their impact is greater than that of a vehicle that depends on human force or gravity for its movement. Such dangerousness, towards specific legal interests (not common security), is reflected in the obligation of every “motor vehicle” (automotor) to have mandatory insurance (art. 39 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). But, having restricted reckless driving (conducción temeraria) to motor vehicles, it must be noted that a motorcycle evidently falls within such category, since the capacity to move by means of an engine is what defines this type of vehicle, and this capacity is not lost because momentarily it is not this force that propels it. Thus, transport that is rolled in neutral or turned off would not cease to be considered a “motor vehicle” (automotor), because the existence of a motor grants it such condition. Only in cases where the motor is completely absent could we say that we are not in the presence of a “motor vehicle” (automotor), having lost the essential element that characterizes this type of vehicle. Therefore, driving a turned-off motorcycle fits within the objective type (“[...] to anyone who drives drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages [...],” 254 bis CP). A different issue is whether in the specific case the conduct placed any legal interest in abstract danger. It should be noted that the doctrinal objections that have been raised to the punishment of crimes of abstract danger (delitos de peligro abstracto), linked to compliance with the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad), only find a solution in the necessary impact on legal interests, and although the dangerousness that generally demonstrates that a certain type of actions may justify its prohibition, it must be reflected in the specific case. A conduct cannot be punished solely because it fits the formal type of abstract danger, if in the specific case no legal interest has been endangered, since materially the action must be unlawful. Thus, the basis for the criminal punishment of conduct is the necessary impact on legal interests, and in that sense the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has stated: “By constitutionally providing that ‘private actions that do not harm morality or public order, or that do not harm a third party, are beyond the reach of the law’ -Article 28- a limit is imposed on the so-called ius puniendi, because inherent to each criminal offense must be a precisely determined lesion or danger to a social ethical value; in other words, since it is not enough that a conduct or omission ‘fits’ abstractly within a type, a significant lesion of a legal interest is also necessary. Otherwise, we would have criminal conduct even though it does not harm morality or public order or harm a third party” (V. 525-93). Therefore, it can be affirmed that even if the specific act fits the typical provision and involves a crime of abstract danger, where what is punished is the performance of the dangerous action, if it is demonstrated that in the specific case there was absolutely no impact on the legal interest, the conduct would not be punishable. However, it should be noted that the determination of the dangerousness of the conduct cannot be assessed ex post, noting that the result of danger has not occurred, but rather ex ante, determining dangerousness as an attribute of the conduct. Therefore, even if the drunk driver encounters no one on his path, his conduct is, ex ante, dangerous. However, in the present case, it can be considered that there was no impact whatsoever on legal interests, and it can be stated that from the outset (ex ante) the action did not appear to be dangerous. As affirmed in the judgment, a matter that was not properly rebutted by the appellant, the accused was traveling on his motorcycle, which was turned off and therefore was moving at low speed, ending up falling onto the road shoulder. Under such conditions, his conduct from the outset did not pose any significant danger to legal interests, since “[...] the only harm that the defendant here could eventually cause with the motorcycle turned off would be to himself, obviously if he fell and said property injured some part of his integrity” (thus in the judgment), lacking in said conduct the material unlawfulness (antijuricidad material). In accordance with the foregoing, although driving a turned-off motorcycle while intoxicated indeed constitutes the criminal offense in question (“[...] to anyone who drives drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages [...],” 254 bis CP). However, in order to comply with the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad), the conduct must be ex ante dangerous. And due to the specific circumstances, it is considered that, as affirmed in the judgment, it did not present such a characteristic. Evidently, the same could not be said, for example, of someone who, under the influence of alcoholic beverages, drives a truck with the engine off on a slope, but the situation is different in the specific case. And since no danger to any legal interest was apparent, as stated supra, the punishment of the conduct could only be based on its formal fit within the criminal offense, which would contravene the principle of harmfulness (principio de lesividad), established by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as an inexcusable requirement. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal for cassation filed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) is dismissed. Judge Ulloa Ramírez issues a dissenting vote.” Thus, the foundation for the criminal punishment of conduct is the necessary harm to legal interests (bienes jurídicos), and in this regard, the Sala Constitucional has stated: "<i>By constitutionally providing that 'private actions that do not harm public morals or order, or that do not harm a third party, are outside the reach of the law' -Article 28- a limit is imposed on the so-called ius puniendi, since each criminal offense must inherently involve harm to or endangerment of a precisely determined social ethical value; in other words, since it is not enough for conduct or omission to abstractly 'fit' into a criminal offense, a significant harm to a legal interest (bien jurídico) is also necessary. Otherwise, we would have criminal conduct even though it does not harm public morals or order or harm a third party</i>" (V. 525-93). **Therefore, it can be affirmed that even if the specific facts fit the criminal offense and it is an abstract endangerment offense, where what is punished is the performance of the dangerous action, if it is demonstrated that in the specific case there was absolutely no harm to the legal interest (bien jurídico), the conduct would not be punishable**. However, it must be noted that the determination of the dangerousness of the conduct cannot be assessed *ex post*, pointing out that the dangerous result did not occur, but rather *ex ante*, determining the dangerousness as an attribute of the conduct. For this reason, even when the drunk driver encounters no one on his path, his conduct is, *ex ante*, dangerous. Nevertheless, in the present case, it can be considered that there has been no harm whatsoever to legal interests (bienes jurídicos), and it can be stated that from the beginning (*ex ante*) the action did not appear to be dangerous. As stated in the judgment, a matter that was not properly refuted by the appellant, the accused was traveling on his motorcycle, which was turned off and therefore traveling at low speed, eventually falling onto the road shoulder. Under such conditions, his conduct from the outset did not pose a significant danger to legal interests (bienes jurídicos), since «[...] <i>the only damage that the accused here could eventually cause with the motorcycle turned off would be to himself, obviously if he fell and said object were to injure some part of his physical integrity</i>» (as stated in the judgment), with the conduct lacking material unlawfulness (antijuricidad material). In accordance with the foregoing, even though driving a motorcycle with the engine off while intoxicated does indeed constitute the criminal offense in question ("<i>[...] whoever drives under the influence of alcoholic beverages [...], </i>254 bis CP). However, in order to comply with the harm principle (principio de lesividad), the conduct must be *ex ante* dangerous. And due to the specific circumstances, it is considered that, as stated in the judgment, it did not present such a characteristic. Obviously, the same could not be said, for example, of someone under the influence of alcoholic beverages who drives a truck with the engine off on a slope, but the situation is different in the specific case. And since no danger to any legal interest (bien jurídico) is evident, as stated *supra*, the punishment of the conduct could only be supported by its formal fit within the criminal offense, which would contravene the harm principle (principio de lesividad), established by the Sala Constitucional as an inexcusable requirement. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal in cassation filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office is dismissed. Judge Ulloa Ramírez records a dissenting vote." And since no danger to any legal interest is evident, as stated supra, the punishment of the conduct could only be supported by its formal fit within the criminal statute, which would contravene the principle of harm (lesividad), established by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) as an inexcusable requirement. For the foregoing reasons, the cassation appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público) is dismissed. Judge Ulloa Ramírez dissents."

“I.- […] Por su parte, en sentencia se dice que la conducta no es delictiva por cuanto, aún cuando llevase la motocicleta bajo los efectos del licor, al estar apagada, no existía peligro, interpretando que «conducir» requiere necesariamente que el movimiento se deba al motor. Los dos argumentos brindados por el a quo son discutibles. El artículo 254 bis CP ordena castigo "[...] a quien conduzca conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas [...]" (párrafo cuarto), siendo aceptado que estamos en presencia de un delito de peligro abstracto, en los cuales el tipo penal únicamente exige la realización de la acción típica peligrosa. Por ello resulta al menos curioso que en sentencia se niegue la existencia de un peligro para el bien jurídico, partiendo de que la motocicleta se encontraba apagada, pues el legislador ha estimado a priori (en abstracto) como peligrosas tales conductas, por lo que incluso parte de la doctrina habla de la existencia de un peligro estadístico. Por otra parte, en principio tampoco parece aceptable la afirmación que en el fallo se hace respecto a que «[...] el término conducción implica precisamente la activación del vehículo automotor [...]», pues si partimos de la primera acepción del vocablo «conducir» no se requiere ello. En tal sentido, en un caso similar, se ha dicho: "Entonces, el imputado sí iba conduciendo y dirigiendo la motocicleta, y aunque la misma fuese apagada, es claro que iba montado sobre ella y guiándola, lo cual es conducir, pues no existe variante en conducir un vehículo o motocicleta, con el motor apagado o encendido, pues lo que la ley sanciona, es conducirlo con licor, independientemente de la forma en que lo haga" (Tribunal de Casación Goicoechea, V. 1044-10). De tal manera que, tal como se hace en la resolución citada, en principio puede afirmarse que el tipo penal castiga la conducción de un vehículo bajo los efectos del licor y que ello no requiere necesariamente que el mismo se encuentre encendido. Además, por otra parte, si partimos de que lo pretendido por el legislador es la anticipación de las barreras de protección de bienes jurídicos –no de la Seguridad Común, sino específicamente de bienes tales como la Vida, Salud e Integridad Corporal-, entonces tan peligroso sería un camión conducido por un ebrio, como que en las mismas circunstancias el mismo vehículo se ruede apagado en una pendiente. Aunque también debe indicarse que, conforme al principio de legalidad criminal, no es punible toda conducta que ponga en peligro (abstracto) un bien jurídico, sino aquéllas que específicamente ingresen dentro de las previsiones del tipo penal. Por ello, aún cuando la aplicación del tipo penal puede en principio parecer sencilla, debe verificarse si efectivamente en el caso concreto la conducta acreditada ingresa dentro de la previsión típica de la conducción bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas (art. 254 bis, párrafo cuarto, CP). A tal efecto debe partirse de que "las normas se interpretarán según el sentido propio de sus palabras, en relación con el contexto, los antecedentes históricos y legislativos y la realidad social del tiempo en que han de ser aplicadas, atendiendo fundamentalmente al espíritu y finalidad de ellas" (Código Civil, art. 10). Conforme a lo anterior un primer acercamiento a lo que es «conducir» lo ofrece la definición común del término y en tal sentido se dice que consiste en: "1. tr. Llevar, transportar de una parte a otra. 2. tr. Guiar o dirigir hacia un lugar. 3. tr. Guiar o dirigir a un objetivo o a una situación. U. t. c. intr. 4. tr. Guiar o dirigir un negocio o la actuación de una colectividad. 5. tr. Esp. Guiar un vehículo automóvil. 6. tr. desus. Ajustar, concertar por precio o salario. 7. intr. desus. Convenir, ser a propósito para algún fin. 8. prnl. Manejarse, portarse, comportarse, proceder de una u otra manera, bien o mal" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, http://www.rae.es/rae.html, voz «conducir»). Sin embargo, a pesar de que las primeras acepciones del vocablo son genéricas, del contexto del artículo 254 bis CP y de la Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres se desprende que cuando el tipo penal en cuestión se refiere a «conducir» alude específicamente a la acepción que lo define como «guiar un vehículo automóvil», refiriéndose con lo anterior a una clase específica de vehículos, los que se mueven en virtud de un motor, generalmente de explosión (cfr. voz «automóvil» en Diccionario de la Lengua Española, http://www.rae.es/rae.html). A tal conclusión se llega, no solamente por cuanto de las distintas previsiones contempladas en el artículo 254 bis CP se desprende que se alude a ese tipo de medios de transporte, sino principalmente por cuanto el legislador ha definido el concepto de «conductor», catalogando como tal a la "[...] persona que tiene el control mecánico de un vehículo automotor" (art. 235.27; Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). Por ello, aún cuando se indica que la mencionada Ley regula la circulación por vías terrestres de todo tipo de vehículo, con motor o sin él (art. 1 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres), la misma no reputa como conductor a quien monta una bicicleta, no solamente al definir dicho concepto (conforme se dijo supra), sino también porque al referirse a los mismos, los denomina simplemente «ciclistas» (art. 105 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). Por ello puede concluirse que no toda conducción de un vehículo encajaría dentro del tipo penal en cuestión, sino únicamente la de los medios de transporte autopropulsados. Consecuencia de lo anterior es que se excluyen de lo previsto por la figura en cuestión, toda conducción bajo los efectos del licor de vehículos no autopropulsados, tales como bicicletas, patinetas, coches tirados por caballos, etc., pues, a pesar de que tales conductas pueden resultar peligrosas para bienes jurídicos, estarían excluídas, conforme se ha dicho, de lo previsto en el párrafo cuarto del artículo 254 CP. La anterior conclusión, a mayor abundamiento, puede también ampararse en las razones por las cuales se prohíbe concretamente la conducción bajo influencia de bebidas alcohólicas de vehículos automotores y no de todo tipo de vehículos en general. A priori, o si se prefiere en abstracto, es mayor el peligro que representan los vehículos automotores para bienes jurídicos, que aquéllos que carecen de autopropulsión. Tales medios de transporte (autopropulsados) tienen mayor masa y pueden desplazarse a más velocidad que aquellos que carecen de máquina, de allí que la fuerza de su impacto es superior a la de un vehículo que depende de la fuerza humana o gravedad para su desplazamiento. Tal peligrosidad, hacia bienes jurídicos concretos (no la seguridad común), se ve reflejada en la obligación de todo «automotor» de contar con un seguro obligatorio (art. 39 Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres). Pero, restringida la conducción temeraria a los vehículos automotores, debe indicarse que evidentemente una motocicleta cae dentro de tal categoría, dado que la capacidad de movilizarse mediante una máquina es lo que define a este tipo de vehículos y la misma no se pierde en razón de que momentáneamente no sea esta fuerza la que lo impulsa. Así entonces, no dejaría de considerarse «automotor» el transporte que es rodado en neutro o bien apagado, pues la existencia de un motor le otorga tal condición. Únicamente en casos en que se carezca del todo de motor, podríamos decir que no estamos en presencia de un «automotor», al haber perdido el elemento esencial que caracteriza a este tipo de vehículos. Por ello la conducción de una motocicleta apagada encaja dentro del tipo objetivo ("[...] a quien conduzca conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas [...], 254 bis CP). Cuestión diversa es si en el caso concreto la conducta puso en peligro abstracto algún bien jurídico. Debiendo indicarse que los reparos que doctrinalmente se han hecho al castigo de los delitos de peligro abstracto, vinculados con el cumplimiento del principio de lesividad, únicamente encuentran solución en la necesaria afectación de bienes jurídicos y si bien la peligrosidad que en general demuestra que un determinado tipo de acciones puede justificar su prohibición, la misma debe reflejarse en el caso concreto. No puede castigarse una conducta únicamente por su encaje en el tipo formal de peligro abstracto, si en el caso específico no se ha puesto en peligro algún bien jurídico, pues materialmente la acción ha de ser antijurídica. De tal manera, el fundamento para el castigo penal de las conductas, es la necesaria afectación de bienes jurídicos y en tal sentido ha señalado la Sala Constitucional: "Al disponerse constitucionalmente que «las acciones privadas que no dañen la moral o el orden público, o que no perjudiquen a tercero, están fuera de la acción de la ley» -artículo 28- se impone un límite al denominado ius puniendi, pues a cada figura típica ha de ser inherente una lesión o peligro de un valor ético social precisamente determinado; en otros términos, puesto que no basta que una conducta u omisión «encaje» abstractamente en un tipo, es también necesaria una lesión significativa de un bien jurídico. De lo contrario, tendríamos conductas delictivas pese a que no dañen la moral o el orden público o a que no perjudiquen a tercero" (V. 525-93). Por lo anterior puede afirmarse que aún encajando el hecho concreto en la previsión típica y tratándose de un delito de peligro abstracto, en donde lo castigado es la realización de la acción peligrosa, si se demuestra que en el caso concreto no hubo del todo afectación al bien jurídico, la conducta no sería punible. Aunque debe acotarse que la determinación de la peligrosidad de la conducta no puede ser valorada ex post, señalándose que no se ha producido el resultado de peligro, sino ex ante, determinándose la peligrosidad como atributo de la conducta. Por ello, aún cuando el automovilista ebrio no se encuentre con nadie en su camino, su conducta es, ex ante, peligrosa. Sin embargo, en el presente caso puede estimarse que no ha existido afectación alguna para bienes jurídicos, pudiendo indicarse que desde un principio (ex ante) la acción no se evidenciaba como peligrosa. Tal como se afirma en la sentencia, cuestión que no fue debidamente rebatida por el impugnante, el acusado transitaba sobre su motocicleta, la cual estaba apagada y por ende circulaba a escasa velocidad, terminando por caer sobre la ronda de la calle. En tales condiciones su conducta desde un inicio no ofrecía mayor peligro para bienes jurídicos, pues «[...] el único daño que eventualmente podía causar el aquí imputado con la motocicleta apagada sería a él mismo, obviamente si se cayera y dicho bien le lesionará alguna parte de su integridad» (así en sentencia), faltando en dicha conducta la antijuricidad material. Conforme a lo dicho, aunque efectivamente conducir una motocicleta apagada en estado de ebriedad configura el tipo penal en cuestión ("[...] a quien conduzca conduzca bajo la influencia de bebidas alcohólicas [...], 254 bis CP). No obstante, a efecto de cumplir con el principio de lesividad, la conducta ha de ser ex ante peligrosa. Y por las circunstancias concretas se estima que, tal como se afirma en sentencia, la misma no presentaba tal característica. Evidentemente no podría decirse lo mismo, por ejemplo, de quien bajo los efectos de bebidas alcohólicas conduce un camión sin el motor encendido en una pendiente, pero la situación es diversa en el caso concreto. Y al no evidenciarse peligro para algún bien jurídico, conforme se ha dicho supra, el castigo de la conducta únicamente podría ampararse su encaje formal en el tipo penal, lo cual contravendría el principio de lesividad, establecido por la Sala Constitucional como exigencia inexcusable. Por lo dicho se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación formulado por el Ministerio Público. La Jueza Ulloa Ramírez salva el voto.”