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Res. 00239-2008 Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón · Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón · 28/05/2008
OutcomeResultado
The San Ramón Criminal Cassation Court denied the appeal regarding the challenge to the validity of the video evidence, upholding the conviction for pornography diffusion.El Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón declaró sin lugar el recurso de casación interpuesto en cuanto al cuestionamiento de la validez del video como prueba, confirmando la condena por difusión de pornografía.
SummaryResumen
The Criminal Cassation Court of San Ramón ruled on a cassation appeal against a conviction for pornography diffusion. The appellant argued that the key video evidence was unlawful because it was taken by one of the minor victims from the accused's office without a judicial warrant, allegedly violating the Law on Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents. The Chamber rejected this claim. It held that the minor acted in legitimate self-help, believing she and other schoolmates had been filmed in sexual acts without consent. The court found that the taking of the video was justified by a state of necessity and to prevent further crimes. It also validated the subsequent handling of the evidence by the Public Prosecutor's Office, which included a request for judicial opening. The court concluded that the evidence was lawful and that the substantive interest in protecting the minor victims prevailed over the attempt to exclude the video, which was the corpus delicti. The appeal on this point was denied.El Tribunal de Casación Penal de San Ramón resolvió un recurso de casación interpuesto por la defensa contra una condena por difusión de pornografía. El recurrente alegaba que el video usado como prueba era espurio, ya que fue sustraído por una de las víctimas (una menor de edad) del despacho del acusado sin autorización judicial, en violación de la Ley de Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados. La Cámara rechazó este argumento. Sostuvo que la menor actuó en legítima autotutela, al creer que ella y otras compañeras habían sido filmadas en actos sexuales sin consentimiento. El tribunal consideró que la extracción del video se justificó por un estado de necesidad y para evitar la comisión de nuevos delitos. También validó el manejo posterior de la evidencia por parte del Ministerio Público, que incluyó una solicitud de apertura con intervención judicial. Se concluyó que la prueba era lícita y que el interés sustantivo de protección de las víctimas menores de edad prevalecía sobre la pretensión de excluir el video, por tratarse del cuerpo del delito. La casación fue declarada sin lugar en este punto.
Key excerptExtracto clave
This Chamber does not share the thesis initially advanced in the judgment to consider the challenged evidence lawful. The lower court assumes that the Law on Registration, Seizure, and Examination of Private Documents and Interception of Communications imposes obligations to which the minor was not bound at the time she obtained the video, since they concern the judicial authority. This perspective is not correct. Our Constitution establishes as a principle the inviolability of documents and communications, but it also states that the law shall determine the cases in which the courts may order the seizure, registration, or examination of such documents (art. 24). Thus, the seizure, registration, or examination of documents may only be ordered by the jurisdictional authority within the limits of the cited law. Therefore, it is only the competent judge who, ex officio or at the request of "the police authority in charge of the investigation, the Public Prosecutor's Office, or any of the parties to the proceedings" (art. 2 of said law), may authorize such action. From this it cannot be concluded that only the competent judge is obliged to respect that procedure and the other subjects are not; it is a law designed to protect a constitutional guarantee, which means that only through the procedure provided by law and by the authorized judge can such documents be accessed. However, the lower court is correct in stating that the evidence in question is not unlawful because both the minor xxxx and xxxx were victims of the crime of Production of Pornography. From this perspective, when the minor xxxx takes possession of the video, she would not be committing an unlawful removal, and therefore the evidence does not derive from an unlawful act, as the appellant claims. The foregoing means that the taking of possession is not unlawful, as a ground for justification is present. Such a situation is expressly provided for by the legislator with regard to communications, since article 29 of Law 7425 states that "when a person who participates in an oral, written, or other type of communication through which a crime defined by law is committed records or keeps it, such communication may be presented by the offended person before the judicial or police authorities for the corresponding investigation." Although this is not specifically established for documents such as video tapes, this does not prevent the application of the general rules on necessity contained in our legislation (art. 27 Criminal Code). It is not a matter of protecting a procedural risk and claiming that the minor's action is correct because it leads to the investigation of a criminal act, since the search for the truth must be carried out in accordance with procedural law, which means that the seizure, registration, or examination of documents must be done in conformity with Law 7425. Rather, the danger that legitimizes the minor's action, taking the tape, consists of the possibility that the pornographic material, in which she believed her image and that of other minors had been captured, would be disseminated or copied. In conclusion, the obtaining of the questioned video tape is not unlawful, since it contained images of minors in sexual acts, a fact for which the defendant was convicted, and therefore the action of the minor xxxx in taking it avoided the serious risk that the recording would be shown or copies made of it, which also constitutes a separate crime (arts. 173 and 174 Criminal Code). She exercised self-help both in the firm belief that her image appeared in the film, which turned out to be mistaken, and in the confirmation that other minors had also been recorded in sexual acts.No comparte esta Cámara la tesis que inicialmente se esgrime en sentencia para considerar lícita la prueba cuestionada. Parte el a quo de que la Ley de Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervenciones de las Comunicaciones, establece obligaciones a las que no se encontraba vinculada la menor al momento en que obtiene el video, pues las mismas atañen a la autoridad jurisdiccional. Tal perspectiva no es la correcta. Nuestra Constitución establece como principio la inviolabilidad de documentos y comunicaciones, pero también se indica que por ley se determinará los casos en que los Tribunales de Justicia podrán ordenar el secuestro, registro o examen de dichos documentos (art. 24). Así entonces, el secuestro, registro o examen de documentos, sólo podrá ordenarse por la autoridad jurisdiccional en los límites de la citada Ley. Por ello es únicamente el Juez competente quien de oficio o ante la petición de “la autoridad policial a cargo de la investigación, del Ministerio Público o de alguna de las partes del proceso” (art. 2 de dicha Ley), puede autorizar dicha actuación. De ello no puede desprenderse que únicamente el Juez competente se encuentra obligado a respetar dicho procedimiento y los restantes sujetos no; pues se trata de una ley dispuesta en función de tutelar una garantía constitucional y ello implica que es únicamente mediante el procedimiento dispuesto por Ley y por el Juez autorizado que se puede acceder a tales documentos. Sin embargo, sí lleva razón el a quo al afirmar que la prueba de marras no resulta ilícita por cuanto tanto la menor xxxx como xxxx fueron víctimas de un delito de Fabricación de Pornografía. Desde tal perspectiva cuando la menor xxxx se apodera del video no estaría cometiendo una sustracción ilegítima y por ende la prueba no deriva de un acto ilícito, como sostiene el demandante. Lo anterior hace que el apoderamiento no sea ilícito, al concurrir una causa de justificación. Tal situación se encuentra expresamente prevista por el legislador en lo concerniente a las comunicaciones, pues en el artículo 29 de la Ley 7425 se indica que “cuando la persona que participa en una comunicación oral, escrita o de otro tipo, mediante la cual se comete un delito tipificado por la ley, la registre o la conserve, esta podrá ser presentada por la persona ofendida, ante las autoridades judiciales o policiales, para la investigación correspondiente”. Si bien lo anterior no esta específicamente establecido respecto de documentos, tales como cintas de video, ello no impide la aplicación de las normas generales que respecto al estado de necesidad contiene nuestra legislación (art. 27 CP). No se trata de que se este tutelando un riesgo procesal y se afirme que la actuación de la menor es correcta por conducir a la averiguación de un hecho delictivo, pues la averiguación de la verdad real debe realizarse respetando la ley procesal y ello conlleva que el secuestro, registro o examen de documentos, debe hacerse conforme a la Ley 7425. Si no que el peligro que legítima la actuación de la menor, el apoderarse de la cinta, consiste en la posibilidad de que el material pornográfico, en el cual creía había sido captada su imagen y la de otras menores, fuera difundido o copiado. En conclusión, no resulta ilícita la obtención de la cinta de video cuestionada, pues la misma contenía imágenes de menores de edad en actos sexuales, hecho por el cual fue condenado el imputado, razón por la cual la actuación de la menor xxxx al tomarla evitaba el grave riesgo de que la filmación fuese exhibida o bien que se hicieran copias de la misma, lo cual también constituye un delito autónomo (arts. 173 y 174 CP). Autotutela que ejerció tanto en la firme creencia de que su imagen aparecía en la película, la cual resulto errónea, como en la constatación de que otras menores de edad también fueron captadas en actos sexuales.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"No resulta ilícita la obtención de la cinta de video cuestionada, pues la misma contenía imágenes de menores de edad en actos sexuales, hecho por el cual fue condenado el imputado, razón por la cual la actuación de la menor xxxx al tomarla evitaba el grave riesgo de que la filmación fuese exhibida o bien que se hicieran copias de la misma, lo cual también constituye un delito autónomo (arts. 173 y 174 CP)."
"The obtaining of the questioned video tape is not unlawful, since it contained images of minors in sexual acts, a fact for which the defendant was convicted, and therefore the action of the minor xxxx in taking it avoided the serious risk that the recording would be shown or copies made of it, which also constitutes a separate crime (arts. 173 and 174 Criminal Code)."
Ratio decidendi conclusión
"No resulta ilícita la obtención de la cinta de video cuestionada, pues la misma contenía imágenes de menores de edad en actos sexuales, hecho por el cual fue condenado el imputado, razón por la cual la actuación de la menor xxxx al tomarla evitaba el grave riesgo de que la filmación fuese exhibida o bien que se hicieran copias de la misma, lo cual también constituye un delito autónomo (arts. 173 y 174 CP)."
Ratio decidendi conclusión
"Lo anterior hace que el apoderamiento no sea ilícito, al concurrir una causa de justificación. Tal situación se encuentra expresamente prevista por el legislador en lo concerniente a las comunicaciones, pues en el artículo 29 de la Ley 7425 se indica..."
"The foregoing means that the taking of possession is not unlawful, as a ground for justification is present. Such a situation is expressly provided for by the legislator with regard to communications, since article 29 of Law 7425 states..."
Argumentación justificación
"Lo anterior hace que el apoderamiento no sea ilícito, al concurrir una causa de justificación. Tal situación se encuentra expresamente prevista por el legislador en lo concerniente a las comunicaciones, pues en el artículo 29 de la Ley 7425 se indica..."
Argumentación justificación
"Lo dicho apunta a la existencia de una colisión de intereses, la cual no puede ser resuelta mediante la tutela de un interés ilícito –el del imputado en conservar el video pornográfico- y si en la tutela de la intimidad de varias menores de edad."
"The foregoing indicates the existence of a conflict of interests, which cannot be resolved by protecting an unlawful interest—that of the defendant in keeping the pornographic video—but rather by protecting the privacy of several minors."
Colisión de intereses
"Lo dicho apunta a la existencia de una colisión de intereses, la cual no puede ser resuelta mediante la tutela de un interés ilícito –el del imputado en conservar el video pornográfico- y si en la tutela de la intimidad de varias menores de edad."
Colisión de intereses
Full documentDocumento completo
III.- The **third section** of the appeal consists of the claim regarding the spurious nature of the video submitted as evidence and the illegitimacy of its incorporation into the trial. Articles 24, 39, 41 of the Political Constitution are listed as violated; as well as 1, 2, 6, 9, 142, 175, 176, 178 subsection a), 180, 181, 182, 184, 369 subsections c) and j) and 450 of the CPP; also 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Ley 7425 and its reforms. The appellant indicates that the video was fundamental evidence to convict his client, a video that was taken by the victim xxxx from his client's office, later taking it to the school and becoming aware of its content together with the counselors of that institution, a place from which it was collected by the Public Prosecutor's Office. Therefore, he affirms that “in this specific case, not only was the collection of the video at the Alajuela Institute School illegitimate for lacking a jurisdictional order to carry out said diligence, since the Public Prosecutor's Office contented itself with drawing up a mere finding report, but they also became aware of the content of the evidence without an order from a Competent Judge” (folio 478). The petitioner finds it "curious" that the Public Prosecutor's Office did request the intervention of the Guarantee Judge for the opening of the evidence. The complainant deduces that before said opening, they had already become aware of the content, a conclusion drawn from the request made by the Prosecutor to the Criminal Judge for the opening of the evidence. **The claim is not upheld**. The issue had already been raised during the trial, and the Trial Court resolved it as follows: “It is important to address at this point the thesis of the defense counsel in the sense that this [Placa1] is spurious evidence due to the way it was obtained, referring to its taking by the minor xxxx, requesting its declaration as such as well as all acts and proceedings derived from it. The defense counsel invokes in his favor a series of procedural provisions on illegal evidence and on the Registration and Seizure of Private Communications, relying on the special law governing the matter. However, the Court considers that said thesis has no place whatsoever in this process because the defense counsel's claims are directed at an action carried out by the minor Xxxx, who effectively took (sic) said material evidence from the accused's office. But in that action, there is no participation whatsoever by any jurisdictional, police, or Public Prosecutor's Office authority, to whom respect for the established procedures is indeed required so that the seized evidence can be validly used in the trial and in the judgment, not of a minor who, outside any investigative scope, obtains evidence and delivers it to the counseling department of an educational institution. It concerns an action by a private individual outside any investigative process and therefore cannot be required to respect the procedure and grant the respective guarantees to the accused. The truth of the matter is that, once said evidence reaches the competent authorities, it is given appropriate handling because the Prosecutor's Office draws up (sic) the Finding Report on folio 1, which should actually have been a Seizure Report, which is of no importance whatsoever. Subsequently, said evidence is taken to the Criminal Court before which a Request for Opening of Evidence is filed, which appears on folio 5, and finally, a session is held for the opening of said evidence with the due participation of the accused and his defense counsel, of which the Evidence Opening Report on folio 13 is drawn up. So the handling of the evidence from its arrival into the judicial stream is correct and in accordance with the law, therefore there is no breach of procedure or of the defendant's rights. The opposite would happen if it were the police or the Public Prosecutor's Office who proceeds to take that evidence from the accused's office because, from that moment on, said evidence would be tainted by a judgment of total and absolute invalidity and would have to be declared as such, but that does not occur in this case. If the accused believes he was the victim of a criminal act due to the taking or the alleged extortion he suffered at the hands of Xxxx, he could have reported it, however he did not. By virtue of the foregoing, the defense's thesis must be rejected, and the Court maintains the full validity and legitimacy of that material evidence, as well as the jurisdictional acts derived from it, it being a base and essential piece of evidence for the resolution of this process and particularly for the crime provided for by ordinal 173 of the Criminal Code, which includes both xxxx and Xxxx as victims. To conclude with the case of xxxx, we must indicate that the Court also has full and absolute conviction that in her case, the minor was also a victim of a crime of Dissemination of Pornography” (folios 410 to 411). In summary, the *a quo* considers that the video is not illegal evidence, as the minor cannot be required to respect the procedure established in the Law for the seizure of documents, being subject only to the responsibility derived from her act; likewise that both she and the victim xxxx were victims of a crime of Dissemination of Pornography. As for the subsequent handling of the evidence, it is indicated in the judgment that no irregularity is found. Confronting such reasons with the arguments offered by the Defense, it is possible to point out that we are indeed not in the presence of prohibited evidence for the reasons to be stated. This Chamber does not share the thesis initially put forward in the judgment to consider the questioned evidence lawful. The *a quo* starts from the premise that the Ley de Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervenciones de las Comunicaciones establishes obligations to which the minor was not bound at the time she obtained the video, as they concern the jurisdictional authority. Such a perspective is not correct. Our Constitution establishes as a principle the inviolability of documents and communications, but it is also indicated that the law shall determine the cases in which the Courts of Justice may order the seizure, registration, or examination of said documents (art. 24). Thus, the seizure, registration, or examination of documents may only be ordered by the jurisdictional authority within the limits of the cited Law. Therefore, it is solely the competent Judge, acting ex officio or upon the request of “the police authority in charge of the investigation, the Public Prosecutor's Office, or any of the parties to the process” (art. 2 of said Law), who can authorize such action. From this, it cannot be inferred that only the competent Judge is obliged to respect said procedure and the remaining subjects are not; because it is a law designed to protect a constitutional guarantee, and this implies that it is solely through the procedure established by Law and by the authorized Judge that access to such documents can be obtained. However, the *a quo* is correct in affirming that the evidence in question is not illegal because both the minor xxxx and xxxx were victims of a crime of Production of Pornography. From such a perspective, when the minor xxxx takes possession of the video, she would not be committing an illegitimate taking and, therefore, the evidence does not derive from an illicit act, as the petitioner maintains. When testifying in trial, xxxx stated: “...I stayed and turned on the TV.
and the VCR was on and had a tape inside; I played it and saw that it was a porn movie, but I fast-forwarded it and saw that it was [Nombre1] and then I saw two girls wearing the Instituto de Alajuela uniform; I kept fast-forwarding to see what I would see and I thought I saw myself the day he gave me the reducing massages, so I took it out and kept it, meaning the cassette. I kept it in a yellow purse that [Nombre1] gave me that day” (CED1 ). It is clearly evident from the foregoing that the deponent takes the video because she believes she was filmed in acts of a sexual nature and also upon recognizing two students from the Instituto de Alajuela who were also captured in a similar situation. Although the aforementioned tape had been produced by the accused [Nombre2] and was therefore his property, the taking of it by xxxx, without the accused's consent, is not unlawful. The referenced video had been recorded without the minors' consent, a fact that in any case did not justify the act, capturing scenes of an undoubtedly intimate nature, as they were filmed in sexual acts. Therefore, the aforementioned minor, by taking the video and removing it, performed an act of self-help (autotutela), both in the belief that she herself had been recorded in a sexual act, and concerning the other two girls, whose status as minors was evident to her both by knowing them and by their school uniforms. Under the specific circumstances, the minor could not be required to leave the referenced tape in the hands of the accused, which implied a serious risk of its dissemination and the evident harm to her right to privacy (intimidad) and that of the other minors. Nor can the accused now come to claim protection of his right to the property of that video, neither then nor now, as it was and is criminal material and affected the rights of minors. It could be argued that the minor xxxx should have resorted to the appropriate legal channels to seize the video and prevent its exhibition. However, it would not be correct to impose such a course of action on her, as it placed her at a risk she had no reason to assume, since the tape could well be exhibited or hidden, and both situations would cause irreparable harm to the rights of minors. The foregoing points to the existence of a collision of interests, which cannot be resolved by protecting an unlawful interest—that of the accused in keeping the pornographic video—but rather by protecting the privacy of several minors. This means the taking is not unlawful, as a justification (causa de justificación) exists. Such a situation is expressly provided for by the legislator regarding communications, as Article 29 of Law 7425 states that “when the person who participates in an oral, written, or other type of communication, through which an offense defined by law is committed, records or conserves it, this may be presented by the offended person before the judicial or police authorities for the corresponding investigation”. Although the foregoing is not specifically established regarding documents, such as video tapes, this does not prevent the application of the general rules that our legislation contains regarding the defense of necessity (estado de necesidad) (art. 27 CP). It is not a matter of protecting a procedural risk and asserting that the minor's action is correct because it leads to the investigation of a criminal act, since the investigation of the real truth must be conducted respecting procedural law, and this entails that the seizure, search, or examination of documents must be done in accordance with Law 7425. Rather, the danger that legitimizes the minor's action, taking the tape, consists of the possibility that the pornographic material, in which she believed her image and that of other minors had been captured, would be disseminated or copied. The foregoing implies not only the defense of one's own right and that of third parties (privacy), but also preventing the commission of a criminal act (Dissemination of Pornography, art. 174 CP). Although it ultimately was determined that the minor xxxx did not appear in the referenced video, the foregoing does not change what has been stated. As the mentioned minor related, she believed she observed herself on the video and also identified two other minor students; such an error, as it was later proven that she did not appear in the film, implies the assumption of a situation that required the aforementioned action. It must be taken into account that the effect of the aforementioned justification is the elimination of the wrongfulness of the act (cfr. among others: [Nombre3]. Curso de Derecho Penal, 1996, pp. 622-623). But furthermore, when the offended xxxx takes the tape, she also does so upon recognizing two other minor students, who also appear in erotic scenes, and this implies the defense of another's legal interest (bien jurídico). Although the Defense has speculated that the referenced minor's intention was to extort the accused, the judgment holds it as certain that this was not her purpose. In the aforementioned sense, the resolution states: “We shall see how Xxxx is clear in indicating how she goes directly to the Instituto de Alajuela once she observes the video and the participation of schoolgirls in it, and we firmly believe that, if the minor had truly asked for the sum of fifty thousand colones to return that video, the accused would have gladly paid it, aware of the enormous responsibility that derived from it” (pages 396 to 397). This is later reaffirmed by the a quo when stating: “The Court has been broad and explicit in indicating the reasons why it considers that said evidence does not bear any illegality or unlawfulness. The minor, in a spontaneous act, upon seeing that there are schoolgirls on the cassette and even thinking she sees herself, opts to take it to the Instituto de Alajuela, where she hands it over to one of the counselors. The Court has already been broad and decisive in indicating that the entire procedure for the seizure and intervention of private documents is not applicable to this action, as it is an action carried out outside any participation of jurisdictional authorities. We consider that, far from having intended to extort the accused with that CED2, the minor Xxxx takes it to said institution, and on that point she is clear and forceful, and there is no element whatsoever to consider the contrary. Moreover, with complete certainty we can state that if that minor had asked the accused for money for delivering that evidence, he would have had no qualms about giving it, aware of the enormous responsibility that said evidence represented for him. The Court considers that there was never that extortion attempt; however, even if it had hypothetically occurred, it would not introduce any variable to this factual picture held as proven, nor would it have caused the judges' conviction to vary in the slightest” (pages 438 to 439). In conclusion, the obtention of the questioned video tape is not unlawful, as it contained images of minors in sexual acts, a fact for which the accused was convicted, for which reason the action of the minor xxxx in taking it avoided the serious risk that the recording would be exhibited or that copies would be made of it, which also constitutes an autonomous offense (arts. 173 and 174 CP). Self-help (Autotutela) that she exercised both in the firm belief that her image appeared in the film, which turned out to be erroneous, and in the verification that other minors were also captured in sexual acts. It must be reiterated that it was not exigible for the mentioned young woman to leave the tape in the hands of the accused, exposing herself to the indicated danger, nor was it expected that she would resort to legal channels to prevent the commission of the possible indicated offenses, since due to the minor's age and the specific circumstances, it was not duly guaranteed that the eventual commission of the mentioned offenses would be prevented. On the other hand, this Chamber considers, sharing the arguments of the a quo, that the minor's intention was the indicated one and not to extort the accused. Finally, it must be emphasized that the thesis of the a quo is accepted, insofar as it considers the evidence valid because the video tape is the corpus delicti, not being able to directly protect possession or property over goods of this nature, although indirectly yes, since otherwise a criminal action would be protected. This leads to pointing out that what is preponderant in the present matter has been the protection of a substantive interest, to avoid the serious danger that new criminal acts would be committed to the detriment of minors, not a matter of a procedural nature. Now, regarding the subsequent handling of the video tape, an aspect that is also criticized by the petitioner, there are also no irregularities in it. As is held as certain, and is not questioned, the minor xxxx took the recording to the school where she handed it to an official of said institution, they watched it and, upon noting its content, brought the facts to the attention of the Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministerio Público). The petitioner specifically questions that the Public Prosecutor's Office did not request a Judge's order to pick up the video at the school. Such an order was not essential. Procedural formalities do not constitute mere requirements devoid of all content; rather, they respond to specific purposes. From that perspective, the participation of the competent Judge in the acquisition of a specific private document is a guarantee provided to protect a constitutional right (art. 24 Constitución Política). In the specific case, the pornographic video tape had already been taken by the young woman xxxx, as has been stated, in a lawful manner since it prevented the commission of criminal acts to her detriment and that of other minors; therefore, the Public Prosecutor's Office was not seizing the item from the hands of the accused, but receiving it from the person who had taken it. It must be kept in mind that the seizure of the document constitutes an act of procedural coercion entrusted to the Judge (art. 2, Law 7425); doctrine has defined it thus, indicating: “It is the apprehension and retention of the thing or effects related to the fact under investigation, limiting the right of use and enjoyment over them for evidentiary purposes” ([Nombre4], Derecho Procesal Penal, t. II, 2004, p. 386). Therefore, a coercive action was not required, as precisely the item was not in the hands of the accused [Nombre2], but rather was voluntarily handed over by the person who at that moment had it; for this reason, the Judge's participation, as the challenger intends, made no sense at that moment. Later, upon request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judge does participate at the moment the pornographic video is watched by the judicial authorities. The judgment provides notice of this, recording: “Subsequently, said evidence is taken to the Criminal Court (Juzgado Penal) before which an Evidence Opening Request (Solicitud de Apertura de Evidencia) is filed, which appears on page 5, and finally, a session is held for the opening of said evidence with the due participation of the accused and his defense counsel, of which the Evidence Opening Minutes (Acta de Apertura de Evidencia) on page 13 is drawn up” (page 411). There is no indication, contrary to what the Defense insinuates, that before the Judge's intervention the Public Prosecutor's Office had become aware of the content of the video tape. For the reasons stated, the argument raised is dismissed.
The aforementioned video had been recorded without the consent of the minors, which in any case did not justify the act, capturing scenes of an undoubtedly intimate nature, as they were filmed in sexual acts. For this reason, the referred minor, upon taking the video and removing it, carried out an act of self-help, both inasmuch as she believed she had been recorded in a sexual act, and concerning the other two girls, whose status as minors was evident to her because she knew them and from their school uniforms. Under the specific circumstances, the minor could not be required to leave the tape in the hands of the accused, which entailed a serious risk of its dissemination with the evident harm to her right to privacy and that of the other minors. Nor can the accused now claim protection of his right to property over that video, neither then nor now, as it was and is criminal material and affected the rights of minors. It could be argued that the minor xxxx should have resorted to the corresponding legal channels to seize the video and prevent its exhibition. However, it would not be correct to impose such a course of action on her, as it placed her at a risk she had no reason to assume, since the tape could well be exhibited or hidden, and both situations caused irreparable harm to the rights of minors. The foregoing points to the existence of a collision of interests, which cannot be resolved by protecting an unlawful interest—that of the accused in keeping the pornographic video—but rather by protecting the privacy of several minors. The foregoing means that the taking was not unlawful, as a justification defense was present. Such a situation is expressly provided for by the legislator with regard to communications, since Article 29 of Law 7425 states that “*when a person participating in an oral, written, or other type of communication, through which a crime defined by law is committed, records or preserves it, such recording may be presented by the offended person before judicial or police authorities for the corresponding investigation*”. Although the foregoing is not specifically established regarding documents, such as video tapes, this does not prevent the application of the general rules contained in our legislation regarding necessity (Art. 27 PC). It is not a matter of protecting a procedural risk and asserting that the minor's action is correct because it leads to the investigation of a criminal act, since the investigation of the real truth must be carried out respecting procedural law, which entails that the seizure, search, or examination of documents must be done in accordance with Law 7425. Rather, the danger that legitimizes the minor's action, taking possession of the tape, consists of the possibility that the pornographic material, in which she believed her image and that of other minors had been captured, would be disseminated or copied. The foregoing not only implies the defense of her own right and that of third parties (privacy), but also preventing the commission of a criminal act (Dissemination of Pornography, Art. 174 PC). Although it was finally determined that the minor xxxx did not appear in the referred video, the foregoing does not change what has already been stated. As the aforementioned minor related, she believed she saw herself in the video and also identified two other minor students; such an error, since it was later proven that she did not appear in the film, implies the assumption of a situation that demanded said course of action. It must be taken into account that the effect of the referenced justification defense is the elimination of the disvalue of the act (cfr., among others: [Name3]. *Curso de Derecho Penal*, 1996, pp. 622-623). But also, when the offended party xxxx takes the tape, she also does so because she recognized two other minor students, who also appear in erotic scenes, and this implies the defense of a third party's legal interest. Although the Defense has speculated that the intention of the referred minor was to extort the accused, the judgment finds it established that this was not her purpose. In the foregoing sense, the ruling states: "*We shall see how Xxxx is clear in indicating how she goes directly to the Alajuela Institute once she observes the video and the participation of schoolgirls in it, and we firmly believe that, if the minor had truly asked for the sum of fifty thousand colones to recover that video, the accused would have gladly paid it, aware of the enormous responsibility that was derived from it*" (folios 396 to 397). This is subsequently reaffirmed by the *a quo* court by stating: "*The Court has already been extensive and explicit in indicating the reasons why it considers that such evidence does not present any illegality or unlawfulness. The minor, in a spontaneous act, upon seeing that there are schoolgirls on the cassette and she even thinks she sees herself, decides to take it to the Alajuela Institute, where she delivers it to one of the counselors. This Court has already been extensive and decisive in indicating that the entire procedure for the seizure and intervention of private documents is not applicable to this action because it is an action carried out outside of any participation by jurisdictional authorities. We consider that, far from having intended to extort the accused with that CED2, the minor Xxxx takes it to said institution, and in this she is clear and conclusive, and there is no element whatsoever to consider the contrary. Moreover, we can state with all certainty that if that minor had asked the accused for money for delivering that evidence, he would have had no qualms in giving it, knowing the enormous responsibility that such evidence represented for him. The Court considers that there was never such an extortion attempt; however, even if it hypothetically had occurred, this would not introduce any variable into this factual picture held as proven, nor would it have changed the judges' conviction in the slightest*" (folios 438 to 439). In conclusion, obtaining the questioned video tape was not unlawful, because it contained images of minors in sexual acts, a fact for which the accused was convicted, which is why the action of the minor xxxx in taking it averted the serious risk that the film would be exhibited or that copies would be made of it, which also constitutes an independent crime (Arts. 173 and 174 PC). Self-help that she exercised both in the firm belief that her image appeared in the film, which turned out to be erroneous, and in the verification that other minors were also captured in sexual acts. It must be reiterated that the aforementioned young woman could not be required to leave the tape in the hands of the accused, exposing herself to the indicated danger, nor could it be expected that she resort to legal channels to prevent the commission of the possible crimes indicated, because, given the minor's age and the specific circumstances, it was not duly guaranteed that the eventual commission of the mentioned crimes would be prevented. On the other hand, this Chamber considers, sharing the arguments of the *a quo* court, that the minor's intention was as indicated, and not to extort the accused. Finally, it must be emphasized that the thesis of the *a quo* court is adopted, insofar as it considers the evidence valid because the video tape is the corpus delicti, and the possession or ownership of property of this nature cannot be directly protected, although indirectly so, since otherwise a criminal action would be protected. This leads to pointing out that, in this matter, the protection of a substantive interest—averting the serious danger that new criminal acts would be committed to the detriment of minors—has been the predominant issue, not a matter of a procedural nature. Now, regarding the subsequent handling of the video tape, an aspect also criticized by the claimant, there are no irregularities in it either. As is held as proven, which is not questioned, the minor xxxx took the film to the school where she delivered it to an official of said institution; they observed it and, upon noting its content, they brought the facts to the attention of the Public Prosecutor's Office. The claimant specifically questions that the Public Prosecutor's Office did not request a Judge's order to collect the video at the school. Such an order was not essential. Procedural formalities do not constitute mere requirements lacking all content, but rather respond to specific purposes. From such a perspective, the participation of the competent Judge in the acquisition of a specific private document is a guarantee established to protect a constitutional right (Art. 24 Constitución Política). In the specific case, the pornographic video tape had already been taken by the young woman xxxx, as has been stated, lawfully because it prevented the commission of criminal acts to her detriment and that of other minors; therefore, the Public Prosecutor's Office was not seizing the property from the hands of the accused, but rather receiving it from the person who had taken it. It must be kept in mind that the seizure of the document constitutes an act of procedural coercion entrusted to the Judge (Art. 2, Law 7425); thus, doctrine has defined it indicating: "*It is the apprehension and retention of the thing or effects related to the fact under investigation, limiting the right of use and enjoyment over them for evidentiary purposes*" ([Name4], *Derecho Procesal Penal*, Vol. II, 2004, p. 386). Therefore, a coercive action was not required, precisely because the property was not in the hands of the accused [Name2], but rather was voluntarily delivered by the person who had it at that time; for this reason, the participation of the Judge, as intended by the appellant, made no sense at that moment. Then, at the request of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judge did participate at the time the pornographic video was observed by the judicial authorities. The judgment gives notice of this, recording: "*Subsequently, said evidence is taken to the Criminal Court before which a Request for the Opening of Evidence verifiable at folio 5 is filed, and finally, a session is held for the opening of said evidence with the due participation of the accused and his defender, from which the Record of Opening of Evidence at folio 13 is drawn up*" (folio 411). There is no indication whatsoever, contrary to what the Defense insinuates, that before the Judge's intervention, the Public Prosecutor's Office had taken cognizance of the content of the video tape. For the reasons stated, the claim put forward is declared without merit."
III.- El tercer acápite de la impugnación lo constituye el reclamo sobre el carácter espurio del video aportado como prueba y la ilegítimidad de su incorporación al debate. Se enlistan como infringidos los artículos 24, 39, 41 de la Constitución Política; así como 1, 2, 6, 9, 142, 175, 176, 178 inciso a), 180, 181, 182, 184, 369 inciso c) y j) y 450 del CPP; también 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 de la Ley 7425 y sus reformas. Indica el impugnante que el video fue prueba fundamental para condenar a su representado, video que fue sustraído por la ofendida xxxx de la oficina de su representado, llevándolo posteriormente al colegio e imponiéndose de su contenido conjuntamente con las orientadoras de dicha institución, lugar del cual fue recogido por el Ministerio Público. Por ello afirma que “en el caso concreto no solo la recolección del video en el Colegio del Instituto de Alajuela, resultó ilegítima por no contar con orden jurisdiccional para llevar a cabo dicha diligencia, ya que el Ministerio Público se contentó con levantar una simple acta de hallazgo, sino que también se impusieron del contenido de la prueba sin que mediara orden de Juez Competente” (folio 478). Resultando «curioso» para el demandante que el Ministerio Público sí haya solicitado la intervención del Juez de Garantías para la apertura de la evidencia. Deduciendo el quejoso que antes de dicha apertura ya se habían impuesto del contenido, conclusión que desprende de la solicitud que formula la Fiscal al Juez Penal para la apertura de la evidencia. No se acoge el reclamo. La cuestión había sido ya propuesta durante el debate, resolviéndola el Tribunal de Juicio de la siguiente manera: “Es importante abordar en este momento, la tesis del señor defensor en el sentido de que ese [Placa1] es una prueba espuria por la forma en que fue obtenido, haciendo referencia a la sustracción que del mismo hiciera la menor xxxx, solicitando su declaratoria en ese sentido así como todos los actos y diligencias que del mismo se desprendan. El señor defensor invoca en su favor una serie de articulaciones procesales sobre la prueba ilícita y sobre el Registro y Secuestro de las Comunicaciones Privadas, amparándose en la ley especial que rige la materia. Sin embargo el Tribunal estima que dicha tesis no tiene la menor cabida en este proceso pues, los reclamos del señor defensor se dirigen a una acción que ejecuta la menor Xxxx, la cual efectivamente sustraé (sic) de la oficina del acusado dicha evidencia material. Pero en esa acción no existe ninguna participación de ninguna autoridad jurisdiccional, policial o del Ministerio Público a quienes si les es exigible el respeto de los procedimientos establecidos a fin de que la evidencia incautada pueda ser válidamente utilizada en el debate y en la sentencia, no a una menor que fuera de todo ámbito de investigación, se hace de una evidencia y la entrega en la orientación de una institución de enseñanza. Se trata de una acción de una particular al margen de todo proceso de investigación y por tanto no le puede ser exigible que respete el procedimiento y otorgue las garantías respectivas al acusado. Lo cierto del caso es que, una vez que dicha evidencia llega a manos de las autoridades competentes, se le brinda el manejo adecuado pues la Fiscalía levante (sic) el Acta de Hallazgo de folio 1, que en realidad debió ser un Acta de Decomiso, lo cual no tiene la menor importancia. Posteriormente se lleva dicha evidencia al Juzgado Penal ante el cual se plantea una Solicitud de Apertura de Evidencia que rola a folio 5 y, finalmente se realiza una sesión para la apertura de dicha evidencia con la debida participación del acusado y su defensor y de lo cual se levanta el Acta de Apertura de Evidencia de folio 13. De manera que el manejo de la evidencia a partir de su llegada a la corriente judicial, es correcta y ajustada a derecho, por lo que no existe ningún quebranto al procedimiento ni a los derechos del encartado. Lo contrario sucedería si es la policía o el Ministerio Público quien procede a la sustracción de esa evidencia de la oficina del acusado pues, a partir de ese momento dicha prueba estaría afectada por un juicio de total y absoluta invalidez y así tendría que ser declarada, pero ello no ocurre en este caso. Si el acusado estima que fue objeto de un hecho delictivo por la sustracción o por la supuesta extorsión que sufrió a manos de Xxxx, pudo haberlo denunciado, sin embargo no lo hizo. En virtud de lo expuesto, debe rechazarse la tesis de la defensa y el Tribunal mantiene la plena validez y legitimidad de esa evidencia material, así como de los actos jurisdiccionales que del mismo se desprenden, tratándose de una prueba base y esencial para la resolución de este proceso y en particular del delito previsto por el ordinal 173 del Código Penal y que incluye como ofendidas tanto a xxxx como a Xxxx. Para finalizar con el caso de xxxx , debemos indicar que igualmente el Tribunal tiene una plena y absoluta convicción que en su caso, la menor también fue víctima de un delito de Difusión de Pornografía” (folios 410 a 411). En síntesis, el a quo considera que el video no es prueba ilícita, pues a la menor no se le puede exigir que respete el procedimiento establecido en la Ley para la incautación de documentos, quedando sujeta únicamente a la responsabilidad que deriva de su acto; así mismo que tanto ella como la ofendida xxxx fueron víctimas de un delito de Difusión de Pornografía. Ya en cuanto al posterior manejo de la evidencia, se indica en sentencia que no se haya irregularidad alguna. Confrontadas tales razones con los argumentos que ofrece la Defensa es posible señalar que efectivamente no estamos en presencia de prueba prohibida por las razones que se dirán. No comparte esta Cámara la tesis que inicialmente se esgrime en sentencia para considerar lícita la prueba cuestionada. Parte el a quo de que la Ley de Registro, Secuestro y Examen de Documentos Privados e Intervenciones de las Comunicaciones, establece obligaciones a las que no se encontraba vinculada la menor al momento en que obtiene el video, pues las mismas atañen a la autoridad jurisdiccional. Tal perspectiva no es la correcta. Nuestra Constitución establece como principio la inviolabilidad de documentos y comunicaciones, pero también se indica que por ley se determinará los casos en que los Tribunales de Justicia podrán ordenar el secuestro, registro o examen de dichos documentos (art. 24). Así entonces, el secuestro, registro o examen de documentos, sólo podrá ordenarse por la autoridad jurisdiccional en los límites de la citada Ley. Por ello es únicamente el Juez competente quien de oficio o ante la petición de “la autoridad policial a cargo de la investigación, del Ministerio Público o de alguna de las partes del proceso” (art. 2 de dicha Ley), puede autorizar dicha actuación. De ello no puede desprenderse que únicamente el Juez competente se encuentra obligado a respetar dicho procedimiento y los restantes sujetos no; pues se trata de una ley dispuesta en función de tutelar una garantía constitucional y ello implica que es únicamente mediante el procedimiento dispuesto por Ley y por el Juez autorizado que se puede acceder a tales documentos. Sin embargo, sí lleva razón el a quo al afirmar que la prueba de marras no resulta ilícita por cuanto tanto la menor xxxx como xxxx fueron víctimas de un delito de Fabricación de Pornografía. Desde tal perspectiva cuando la menor xxxx se apodera del video no estaría cometiendo una sustracción ilegítima y por ende la prueba no deriva de un acto ilícito, como sostiene el demandante. Al declarar en debate xxxx manifestó: “...yo me quedé y prendí el tv. y estaba el vh. puesto y con una película dentro, lo puse y vi que era una película porno, pero lo adelanté y vi que era [Nombre1] y luego vi a dos muchachas con uniforme del Instituto de Alajuela, lo seguí adelantando para ver que veía y me pareció verme a mí el día que me hizo los masajes reductivos, entonces lo saqué y me lo dejé, sea el casete. Lo guardé en una cartera amarilla que me regaló [Nombre1] ese día” (CED1 ). Se desprende claramente de lo anterior que la deponente toma el video por cuanto cree haber sido filmada en actos de naturaleza sexual y también al reconocer a dos alumnas del Instituto de Alajuela que también fueron captadas en similar situación. Aunque la referida cinta había sido elaborada por el encartado [Nombre2] y por ende era de su propiedad, el apoderamiento que de la misma realiza xxxx , sin el consentimiento del acusado, no es ilegítimo. El referido video había sido grabado sin el consentimiento de las menores, mismo que en todo caso no justificaba el hecho, captándose escenas de carácter indudablemente íntimas, pues fueron filmadas en actos sexuales. Por ello la referida menor al tomar el video y llevárselo realizó un acto de autotutela, tanto en cuanto creía que ella había sido grabada en un acto sexual, como en lo concerniente a las otras dos muchachas, cuya condición de menores le constaba por conocerlas y por su uniforme de colegio. En las circunstancias concretas no podía exigírsele a la menor que dejase en manos del encartado la referida cinta, lo cual implicaba el grave riesgo de difusión de la misma con el evidente perjuicio del derecho a la intimidad de ella y las otras menores. Tampoco puede venir el encartado a reclamar la tutela de su derecho a la propiedad de ese video, ni en ese entonces ni ahora, pues era y es material delictivo y afectaba los derechos de menores de edad. Podría replicarse que la menor xxxx debió acudir a las vías legales correspondientes para incautar el video e impedir su exhibición. Sin embargo no sería correcto imponerle tal proceder, pues el mismo le colocaba en un riesgo que no tenía por que asumir, pues bien podía la cinta ser exhibida u ocultada y ambas situaciones provocaban un perjuicio no reparable para los derechos de menores de edad. Lo dicho apunta a la existencia de una colisión de intereses, la cual no puede ser resuelta mediante la tutela de un interés ilícito –el del imputado en conservar el video pornográfico- y si en la tutela de la intimidad de varias menores de edad. Lo anterior hace que el apoderamiento no sea ilícito, al concurrir una causa de justificación. Tal situación se encuentra expresamente prevista por el legislador en lo concerniente a las comunicaciones, pues en el artículo 29 de la Ley 7425 se indica que “cuando la persona que participa en una comunicación oral, escrita o de otro tipo, mediante la cual se comete un delito tipificado por la ley, la registre o la conserve, esta podrá ser presentada por la persona ofendida, ante las autoridades judiciales o policiales, para la investigación correspondiente”. Si bien lo anterior no esta específicamente establecido respecto de documentos, tales como cintas de video, ello no impide la aplicación de las normas generales que respecto al estado de necesidad contiene nuestra legislación (art. 27 CP). No se trata de que se este tutelando un riesgo procesal y se afirme que la actuación de la menor es correcta por conducir a la averiguación de un hecho delictivo, pues la averiguación de la verdad real debe realizarse respetando la ley procesal y ello conlleva que el secuestro, registro o examen de documentos, debe hacerse conforme a la Ley 7425. Si no que el peligro que legítima la actuación de la menor, el apoderarse de la cinta, consiste en la posibilidad de que el material pornográfico, en el cual creía había sido captada su imagen y la de otras menores, fuera difundido o copiado. Lo anterior no solamente implica la defensa de un derecho propio y de terceros (intimidad), sino también el evitar la comisión de un hecho delictivo (Difusión de Pornografía, art. 174 CP). Aunque finalmente resultó que la menor xxxx no aparecía en el referido video, lo anterior no modifica lo ya dicho. Conforme relató la mencionada menor, ella creyó observarse en el video y también identificó a otras dos menores estudiantes; tal error, pues luego se comprobó que ella no figuraba en la película, implica la suposición de una situación que le exigía el proceder dicho. Debiendo tomarse en cuenta que el efecto de la justificante aludida es la eliminación del desvalor de acción (cfr. entre otros: [Nombre3] . Curso de Derecho Penal, 1996, pp. 622-623). Pero además, cuando la ofendida xxxx toma la cinta, también lo hace en razón de haber reconocido a otras dos estudiantes menores de edad, las cuales también aparecen en escenas eróticas y ello implica la defensa de un bien jurídico ajeno. Aunque se ha especulado por parte de la Defensa que la intención de la referida menor era extorsionar al encartado, en sentencia se tiene por cierto que ese no fue su propósito. En el anterior sentido se dice en la resolución: “Veremos como Xxxx es clara al indicar como se dirige directamente el Instituto de Alajuela una vez que observa el video y la participación de colegialas en el mismo y creemos firmemente que, si la menor hubiese realmente pedido la suma de cincuenta mil colones por recuperar ese video, el acusado gustoso los habría pagado consiente de la enorme responsabilidad que a partir del mismo se desprendía” (folios 396 a 397). Lo anterior es posteriormente reafirmado por el a quo al señalar: “El Tribunal ya fue amplio y explícito al indicar las razones por las cuales estima que dicha prueba no reviste ninguna ilegalidad ni ilicitud. La menor, en un acto espontáneo, al ver que en el casete hay colegialas y hasta le parece verse a sí misma, opta por llevarse el mismo hacia el Instituto de Alajuela, donde lo entrega a una de las orientadoras. Ya el Tribunal ha sido amplio y determinante al indicar que a esta actuación no le es aplicable todo el procedimiento para el secuestro e intervención de documentos privados pues, se trata de una acción que se realiza al margen de toda participación de autoridades jurisdiccionales. Consideramos, que muy lejos de haber pretendido extorsionar al encartado con ese CED2, la menor Xxxx lo que hace es llevarlo a la institución dicha y en eso ella es clara y contundente y no existe elemento alguno para considerar lo contrario. Es mas, con toda certeza podemos indicar que si esa menor le hubiese pedido dinero al encartado por entregarle esa evidencia, éste no hubiere tenido reparo en darlo conocedor de la enorme responsabilidad que dicha prueba le representaba. El Tribunal estima que no hubo nunca ese intento de extorsión, sin embargo aún y cuando hipotéticamente se hubiese dado, ello no introduciría ninguna variable a este cuadro fáctico tenido por acreditado ni hubiera hecho variar en lo más mínimo el ánimo de los juzgadores” (folios 438 a 439). En conclusión, no resulta ilícita la obtención de la cinta de video cuestionada, pues la misma contenía imágenes de menores de edad en actos sexuales, hecho por el cual fue condenado el imputado, razón por la cual la actuación de la menor xxxx al tomarla evitaba el grave riesgo de que la filmación fuese exhibida o bien que se hicieran copias de la misma, lo cual también constituye un delito autónomo (arts. 173 y 174 CP). Autotutela que ejerció tanto en la firme creencia de que su imagen aparecía en la película, la cual resulto errónea, como en la constatación de que otras menores de edad también fueron captadas en actos sexuales. Debiendo reiterarse que no le era exigible a la mencionada joven que dejase la cinta en manos del encartado exponiéndose al peligro señalado, como tampoco cabía esperar que acudiese a las vías legales para evitar la comisión de los posibles delitos señalados, pues por la edad de la menor y las circunstancias concretas no quedaba debidamente garantizado que se impediría la eventual comisión de los delitos mencionados. Por otra parte, considera esta Cámara, compartiendo los argumentos del a quo, que la intención de la menor fue la indicada y no la de extorsionar al encartado. Finalmente, debe recalcarse que se acoge la tesis del a quo, en cuanto considera valida la prueba por ser la cinta de video el cuerpo del delito, no pudiendo tutelarse directamente la posesión o propiedad sobre bienes de esta naturaleza, aunque sí indirectamente, ya que de otra manera se protegería una acción delictiva. Ello conduce a señalar que lo preponderante en el presente asunto ha sido la protección de un interés sustantivo, evitar el grave peligro de que se cometieran nuevos hechos delictivos en perjuicio de menores de edad, no una cuestión de carácter procesal. Ya en cuanto al posterior manejo de la cinta de video, aspecto que también es criticado por el demandante, tampoco existen irregularidades en el mismo. Según se tiene por cierto, lo cual no es cuestionado, la menor xxxx llevó la filmación al colegio donde la entregó a una funcionaria de dicha institución, observaron la misma y al notar su contenido pusieron los hechos en conocimiento del Ministerio Público. El demandante cuestiona concretamente que el Ministerio Público no haya solicitado la orden de un Juez para recoger el video en el colegio. No era imprescindible tal orden. Las formalidades procesales no constituyen meras exigencias carentes de todo contenido, sino que obedecen a determinadas finalidades. Desde tal perspectiva la participación del Juez competente en la adquisición de un determinado documento privado es una garantía dispuesta en tutela de un derecho constitucional (art. 24 Constitución Política). En el caso concreto la cinta de video pornográfico ya había sido tomada por la joven xxxx, como se ha dicho de manera lícita pues evitaba la comisión de hechos delictivos en su perjuicio y de otras menores, por ello no estaba el Ministerio Público incautando el bien de manos del encartado, sino recibiéndolo de quien lo había tomado. Debe tenerse presente que el secuestro del documento constituye una actividad de coerción procesal encomendada al Juez (art. 2, Ley 7425); así lo ha definido la doctrina indicando: “Es la aprehensión y retención de la cosa o efectos relacionados con el hecho que se investiga, limitando el derecho de uso y goce sobre ellos con finales de prueba” ([Nombre4] , Derecho Procesal Penal, t. II, 2004, p. 386). Por ello, no se requería de una actuación coercitiva, pues precisamente el bien no se encontraba en manos del encartado [Nombre2] , sino que el mismo le fue entregado voluntariamente por la persona que en ese momento lo tenía; por ello la participación del Juez, según lo pretende el impugnante, no tenía ningún sentido en ese momento. Ya luego, ante petición del Ministerio Público, sí participa el Juez al momento en que se observa por las autoridades judiciales el video pornográfico. De ello da noticia la sentencia, consignándose: “Posteriormente se lleva dicha evidencia al Juzgado Penal ante el cual se plantea una Solicitud de Apertura de Evidencia que rola a folio 5 y, finalmente se realiza una sesión para la apertura de dicha evidencia con la debida participación del acusado y su defensor y de lo cual se levanta el Acta de Apertura de Evidencia de folio 13” (folio 411). No existe ningún indicio, contrario a lo que insinúa la Defensa, que antes de la intervención del Juez el Ministerio Público se haya impuesto del contenido de la cinta de video. Por las razones dichas se declara sin lugar el alegato esgrimido.”
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