Cassation appeal rejected in contentious-administrative case on interim dismissal for sexual harassmentCasación rechazada en contencioso sobre cese interino por hostigamiento sexual

Document PJEDITOR  Res. 000024-A-TC-2026 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL TREASURY COURT OF APPEALS. San José, at nine hours sixteen minutes on the twenty-ninth of January, two thousand twenty-six.

Ordinary proceedings, established in the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, Second Judicial Circuit of San José, brought by Nelson Regalado Martínez, represented by his special judicial attorney Boris Molina Mathiew; against the State, represented by the prosecutor Carlos Adrián Valverde Arley. The plaintiff files an appeal in cassation (recurso de casación) against judgment no. 2024008600 issued at eleven hours thirty-one minutes on the twenty-first of November, two thousand twenty-four, signed by judges Lindsay Rodríguez Cubero (rapporteur), Karen Calderón Chacón, and judge Francisco José Chaves Torres.

Drafted by Magistrate Vargas Vásquez;

CONSIDERING

This process derives from the disciplinary administrative procedure processed by the Ministry of Public Education, file No. 0096-2020, followed against Nelson Regalado Martínez for alleged conduct that Law No. 7476, Law against Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching, classifies as sexual harassment. In substance, the plaintiff noted that, as of February 1, 2016, he worked as an Academic English teacher at the Samuel Sáenz Flores High School in Heredia and, subsequently, starting March 3, 2017, the Ministry of Public Education contacted him to provide his services in a differentiated position within the Conversational English Workshops program at the San José de Alajuela High School for seventh graders; upon joining this program, he held an interim position with successive renewals that, in practice, ensured continuity, so that from the beginning of 2017 he worked simultaneously at both educational centers. Later, the director of the San José de Alajuela High School, Allan Barboza Jiménez, requested the Ministry of Public Education to expand the Conversational English program for seventh, eighth, and ninth grades and he was offered 40 lessons at the San José de Alajuela High School, an offer he accepted and, therefore, from February 1, 2019, worked there full-time as a Conversational English teacher until his separation. He stated he maintained a satisfactory performance, with no disciplinary record. Regarding the workshop's dynamics, each group was divided by list into two subgroups that had to receive the class simultaneously in different spaces, but, for reasons beyond the teaching staff's control, the director arranged for both halves to receive the class together with the presence of two teachers. For the year 2017, the administration of the San José de Alajuela High School decided to form and divide the seventh-grade groups according to some particular characteristics of the students, so group 7-5 was mostly composed of students older than expected for that level, commonly because they were repeaters with one or more years of academic delay. Furthermore, it was a group with some students who, for some reason, tended to have constant behavioral problems; among them, student [Name 001], who used to have inappropriate behavior during Conversational English lessons, which greatly hindered the development of the class that, by its nature, must be fluid and in an environment of calm, silence, and concentration. He indicated that on February 25, 2020, during a lesson, the student shook a perfumed liquid that spilled on her classmates, became agitated, and left the classroom, without the teaching staff being able to locate her immediately, confirming later that she went to the Guidance office; on that occasion, a form was filed for "escape" and its return signed by the responsible person was required. He said that days later, three students reported that [Name 001] and other young women were collecting signatures to formulate an accusation and "remove him" from the position. He highlighted that on February 25, 2020, student [Name 001] went to the guidance office with two classmates and stated she did not want to return to classes and that the teacher touched her hair, back, and hand, in addition to hugging her, activating the Protocol for action in situations of violence; FILE 096-2020, in which it was recorded, among other things, that the advisory teacher indicated that student [Name 001] said she felt harassed and that, in conversation with the group, practically all the women expressed discomfort and their desire not to attend those classes; additionally, on February 28, 2020, it was documented that minor [Name 002] indicated that she was "uncomfortable in the conversational English lessons with the mentioned teachers, because she feels harassed, since they look at her maliciously and OBSERVES behaviors by the teachers towards other classmates that make her feel very bad." He referred that, through resolution No. 0887-2020, the MEP provisionally relocated him to the Regional Directorate of Alajuela; then, through resolution No. 2930-2020 of November 4, 2020, it was affirmed that he incurred in alleged facts related to inappropriate conduct of harassment and/or sexual harassment against student [Name 001], [Name 002], and [Name 003] and ordered the immediate cessation of the interim appointment, detailing, based on the minors' testimonies, touching and insinuations, known in part indirectly by the advisory teacher and the guidance counselor. According to the evidence minutes from the Department of Disciplinary Management, various statements were collected as detailed below: student [Name 001] indicated: "brushing, proximity of one centimeter" and conversation about the subject, in addition to noting that he "never" taught the lessons; [Name 002] affirmed there were no fixed seats, that the classroom was one of proximity, and that the events occurred in plain view of the class; [Name 003] referred to approaches and touches on the shoulder or back; for her part, [Name 004] Jimena Apú stated she did not observe inappropriate conduct; advisory teacher Adriana Gómez and guidance counselor Nancy Karina Torres declared they were not eyewitnesses and related what was known from the students, mentioning approaches and touches; Roxeri Agüero said she saw approaches and that the teacher touched [Name 001]'s hair, without observing conduct regarding [Name 002]; teacher Bryan Matarrita noted he had not noticed strange behaviors and described [Name 001]'s lateness, jokes, and disorder; and [Name 004] Pamela Sánchez indicated she had not observed inappropriate actions and described class dynamics that contradicted the assertion that the teacher "never" taught lessons. Faced with the resolution for the cessation of the interim appointment, on November 9, 2020, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) was filed alleging erroneous evidentiary assessment, pretermission of evidence, lack of reasoning, violation of due process and the presumption of innocence, disproportionality of the sanction, and violation of human rights with conventionality control. He emphasized that on November 16, 2020, Minister Guiselle Cruz Maduro issued resolution No. 3036-2020 which declared the reconsideration without merit and kept resolution No. 2930-2020 unaltered; from that moment, the administrative channel was deemed exhausted. Based on this relation of facts and adjustments made in the preliminary hearing held on June 29, 2023, they are for the judgment: "...1) that the lawsuit be declared WITH MERIT in all its aspects, and the damages and losses that proceed in favor of the plaintiff be granted, which are contained in section three of the lawsuit brief, with the clarification that what corresponds to moral damages would be subjective moral damages. / 2) that the absolute nullity be decreed, or else, the non-conformity with the legal system of resolutions 2930-2020 and 3036-2020 of the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, as well as the rest of the actions that occurred within administrative file 0096-2020 of the MEP, ordering the possibility for the plaintiff to be appointed at the Liceo San José de Alajuela or in any other institution of the MEP, whether in the teaching function or in the administrative function and that the State be ordered to pay the damages caused by its actions harmful to the rights of Mr. REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 3) Alternatively, in the event that the absolute nullity or the non-conformity of the indicated acts is not decreed, that the objective administrative liability of the STATE be decreed and it be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to Mr. REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 4) that the STATE be ordered to pay both costs generated by this action...". Given the legal transfer, the State negatively responded to the lawsuit. It requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit, the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) be accepted, and the plaintiff be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, with their legal interests. The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, by means of judgment no. 2024008600 issued at eleven hours thirty-one minutes on the twenty-first of November, two thousand twenty-four, ordered: “The defense of lack of right filed by the representation of the State is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its aspects. Plaintiff NELSON REGALADO MARTÍNEZ is ordered to pay the State both costs with their respective interests. These aspects will be liquidated in the execution of the judgment, once this ruling is final. THAT IS ALL.” Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal in cassation, which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution.

Preliminary question. Regarding the claim of unconstitutionality. The appellant requests that this Cassation Court "rule" on the unconstitutionality of articles 18, 22, and 33 of Law No. 7476 and that "processing be given in accordance with the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction." Such a claim is manifestly inadmissible in this venue: in accordance with article 10 of the Political Constitution and articles 73 and following of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the competence to hear, process, and resolve unconstitutionality actions rests exclusively with the Constitutional Chamber. The appropriate channel, therefore, is the unconstitutionality action before that body; this Chamber is not permitted to open, promote, or resolve such a proceeding, nor is it appropriate to defer the issuance of this resolution based on that claim. Moreover, what is alleged by the appellant merely objects to the interpretation and application that the lower court made of those norms, an issue that —if deemed so— must be articulated through the substantive grounds of article 138 CPCA. Consequently, the claim is rejected outright due to lack of functional competence of this Cassation Court and we proceed to hear the appeal in the strict terms of the CPCA.

Cassation for procedural reasons.

The appellant raises a grievance of this nature. He accuses lack of reasoning (falta de motivación), serious contradiction, and pretermission of evidence. He alleges the judgment suffers from serious contradiction and lack of reasoning, as the motivation does not conform to the constitutional and conventional standard, erroneously applies the rules of rational sound judgment (sana crítica) —especially logic and experience— and violates the principle of congruence and the correlation between accusation and judgment, as well as the right of defense and due process, by not resolving key aspects petitioned in the lawsuit and by incorporating and pretermitting evidence illegally; for this, he invokes articles 42, 57, 82 to 85, 111, 119 and concordant articles of the CPCA, in relation to articles 137.1 subsections c) and d) and 220 of the same body, articles 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 and 63 of the CPC, articles 11, 33, 39, 41, 56, 57 and 154 of the Political Constitution, and articles 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 and 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He affirms that the ruling eludes the specific points of the litigation through generalities about disciplinary procedures in sexual harassment and about differences between criminal law and administrative sanctioning law; furthermore, it acts as if it were the directing body of the procedure by fully accepting what was done in the administrative venue without immediacy or comprehensive assessment, dispensing with hearing witnesses and the accused, ignoring that disciplinary bodies are not usually composed of jurists, which —he adds— reverses the burden of proof and applies in fact an in dubio pro victim contrary to the presumption of innocence (art. 39 constitutional), even with reference to abuse of power (arts. 113.3 and 131.3 LGAP and art. 49, paragraph 2, constitutional). He alleges pretermission and erroneous assessment of essential evidence because administrative statements of the alleged victims are transferred to the trial as if they were testimonies, without cross-examination or immediacy, while the only testimony received at trial (Mónica Murillo) is barely mentioned without assessment, and the rules of sound judgment also provided for in arts. 18, 22, and 33 of the Law against Harassment are omitted. He maintains it is not enough to indicate where the evidence is, but rather to analyze it with rationality and proportionality, to contrast and weigh it, which —in his opinion— does not occur, generating an arbitrary, incongruent, and unreasoned resolution that causes defenselessness and also violates arts. 57, 111, and 119 of the CPCA in relation to 220 of the same and arts. 28.1, 58, and 61 of the CPC, along with arts. 11, 33, 39, 41, and 154 of the Constitution and 1, 8, and 24 of the ACHR. He requests that the ground be accepted, the judgment annulled, and the case remanded for a new hearing to be held and the issuance of a ruling duly founded and reasoned in all its aspects.

Regarding the ground of lack of motivation, the First Chamber has ruled on repeated occasions indicating: “(…) it arises when the judgment's rationale is omitted, either because it is totally absent, or else, because the development (contained therein) is extremely confusing or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the judgment, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that this is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it pertains to eventual non-compliance with the adjective provisions that regulate the procedural iter or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, and from which rights and obligations derive. Thus, this ground should not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of the Law or the assessment of the evidence carried out by the lower court in the considering part of the judgment, for which the procedural Code establishes autonomous grounds (article 138), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. The lack of motivation as a ground to quash the judgment, in the terms that have been discussed, occurs when the norm that provides for the judge's duty to analyze the substantive issues and questions raised by the parties is infringed (principle of procedural law, part of due process, and which, moreover, is materialized in ordinals 119 and 122, subsection m) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, as well as 155 of the Civil Procedural Code). It is not about determining whether the court ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process by the parties, but on the contrary, that the ruling has the grounds on which the corresponding decision was adopted…”. First Chamber, vote No. 126-F-S1-2009 of 15:40 hrs. on February 5, 2009 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-769260). In accordance with the cited jurisprudence, the appellant's reasoning is incorrect, as it is evident from reading the appealed ruling that the Court provided adequate reasoning and clearly determined the proven facts. Observe that, in considering paragraphs II.4 to II.6, it established the procedural iter, the admission of evidence (including the testimony of Mónica C. Murillo Salas), and the receipt of that deposition at trial, as well as the non-existence of nullities; in Considering IV “Proven Facts,” it established the factual aspects with express support from documents in administrative file 0096-2020 (appointments, complaint, provisional measures, notification of charges, administrative hearing, resolutions 2930-2020 and 3036-2020); in Considering V “Unproven Facts,” damages and losses were held as not proven; in Considering VI, it specified the methodology for assessing the body of evidence, under the principle of sound judgment 82.4 CPCA and the applicable regulations (arts. 3, 4, 5, 18, 21, 22, and 33 of Law 7476, and art. 297 LGAP), even enabling the use of circumstantial evidence (prueba indiciaria) when direct evidence is missing; subsequently, it addressed the dispute and resolved the annulment and compensation claims on the basis of the “community of evidence.” In Considering VII, the Court examined the defects alleged (charge, congruence, reasoning, and proportionality) and concluded that the challenged administrative acts were duly reasoned, that the notification of charges was clear and sufficient, and that the sanction of dismissal was in accordance with Law 7476; in Considering VIII, the Court specified that the evidentiary standard in matters of sexual harassment does not imply automatic credibility of the complainant, but rather assessment by sound judgment, and explained why, applying that parameter to the body of evidence (proceedings in file 0096-2020, criminal complaint 20-1198-0305-PE in the Adjacent Prosecutor's Office of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, and the testimony given by the victims), it gave greater evidentiary weight to the concordant and sufficient elements to consider the facts proven, discarding the existence of a reasonable doubt; and, finally, in Considering IX, it systematized the evidentiary and legal conclusions and recorded the final decision. In this way, the judgment clearly grounded the logical link between the established facts and the legal consequences (classification of the conduct, unlawfulness, and culpability in disciplinary matters) and resolved in a coherent, orderly, and exhaustive manner the actions that comprised the sanctioning administrative procedure. Consequently, and given that the lack of motivation is only configured in the absence of real reasons or insufficiency thereof—not to re-examine the correctness of the evidentiary weighing—, this Chamber does not find a lack of motivation in the ruling, much less pretermission of evidence. Moreover, the appellant maintains the violation of article 137 subsection c) of the CPCA. Regarding the procedural defect of lack of clear and precise determination, the First Chamber: “(…) has maintained that it consists of a confusing exposition of such a degree that it prevents certainty about the circumstance itself, or else, of a clear contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, that this procedural error must be distinguished from the pretermission or improper assessment of evidence that entails the non-observance of substantive rules. In this regard, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 of 8 hours 55 minutes on March 22, 2012, it was noted that the “intellectual work developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is subject to review from different perspectives in the cassation venue, which, moreover, should not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to diverse purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may be due to substantive aspects, when the factual framework that the Court considered proven is not consistent with the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or law, provided for in article 138 CPCA), or else, to procedural errors, whether for having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced illegally into the process or for a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This latter defect occurs when the Court, when establishing the relevant factual framework for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, in such a way that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of the factual situation it intends to explain, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of the assessment made by the judges upon deliberating. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, whose objective is to guarantee that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process has proceeded through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgment was issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable adjective norms (in this sense, vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 of 1:00 p.m. on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the determination of the facts made is in accordance with the evidence or not exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. […]”. Votes of the First Chamber no. 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), no. 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and no. 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the foregoing, this ground for cassation on adjective grounds occurs when the exposition of the facts is imprecise, which makes it impossible to have certainty of the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have an appropriate knowledge of the factual situation that is sought to be held as proven. It is equally produced when there is an evident contradiction between the different elements of fact, so the error must be of such magnitude that there can be no certainty of the assessment made by the Court. In the case under study, for this Chamber, the grievance essentially intends —under a procedural posture— to rewind the process to the trial phase to receive and hear more witnesses. Such a claim is manifestly inadmissible in this venue, because cassation is not a third instance nor a vehicle to reproduce the evidentiary debate already precluded, and because the appellant's arguments concern the weighing carried out by the Court of the body of evidence admitted in the process (substantive issues, not procedural defects). Furthermore, and in accordance with numerals 57, 111, 119, and 220 CPCA; 28.1, 58, and 61 CPC; 11, 33, 39, 41, and 154 of the Political Constitution; and 1, 8, and 24 of the ACHR, the motivation displayed in the appealed judgment is sufficiently reasonable and proportionate, as it analyzes all the disputed points and links, with sound judgment, the testimonial evidence received at trial and the documentary evidence from the administrative file with the decision-making conclusions; hence, evidentiary pretermission in a technical sense is not configured, since the appellant does not single out a specific, decisive, and omitted piece of evidence whose weighing could have varied the sense of the ruling (reiterated criterion by the First Chamber in votes no. 1710-F-S1-2020 of 10:35 a.m. on April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686)), nor does he demonstrate indetermination or clear contradiction in the factual list, vote no. 396-F-S1-2012 of 08:55 a.m. on March 22, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-766956); along the same line, a violation of due process or the right of defense alleged under art. 137 CPCA is not verified either, therefore the ground becomes inadmissible. Finally, regarding the analysis of the evidence in light of Law No. 7476 (Law against Sexual Harassment), the Court explained —as applicable methodology— the assessment criteria by sound judgment (arts. 22 and 33), the freedom of evidence and the admissibility of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence does not exist (arts. 18, 21, and 22), as well as the conceptual and classification framework of the conduct (arts. 3, 4, and 5), and the correlative disciplinary consequences, in harmony with art. 297 of the LGAP; based on those parameters, the motivation weighed the internal coherence of the accounts, their temporal consistency, and the documentary peripheral corroborations coming from administrative file 0096-2020. That motivation, based on Law 7476 and sound judgment, shows that the ruling was not based on automatic presumptions or unrestricted in dubio pro-victim, but on the reasoned articulation of evidence and documents legally incorporated, which satisfies the duties of clarity, congruence, and sufficiency required by arts. 57, 111, and 119 CPCA and rules out any violation of due process or the right of defense invoked. For the considerations stated, the grievance must be dismissed.

Cassation for substantive reasons.

The appellant formulates three substantive grounds. The first two will be analyzed jointly, given their close thematic connection. In the first, he accuses substantive violation of articles 138 subsections a) and b) of the CPCA —due to improper assessment and due to evidentiary pretermission— which would render the judgment null. He criticizes that the Court improperly analyzes the evidence and the object of the process, determining the proven and unproven facts in a manner alien to logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding, pretermitting the testimonial evidence offered, in violation of arts. 57, 82–85, 111, 119 and concordant CPCA, in relation to the cited 138 a) and b) and 220 CPCA, 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 and 63 CPC, 11, 28, 33, 39, 41, 45 and 154 of the Political Constitution, and 1, 2, 8 and 24 ACHR. He maintains that, although most of the aspects established as proven in Fact IV were uncontroversial, the Court selects them to support its conclusion and omits other central aspects of the dispute —in particular, the violation of labor rights—; he reproaches that Fact V (unproven) dismisses the damages and losses in a few lines without a reasoned explanation about the reasons why they are considered unproven, which —in his opinion— is equivalent to rejecting the entire lawsuit de facto. He expressly adds "lack of reasoning," "lack of motivation," and "violation of due process and the right of defense" (arts. 137.1.c) and d) CPCA) for not explaining the decision-making points. In support of his position, he cites part of the resolution of the First Chamber no. 000173-F-S1-2023 and formulates several questions: "What greater defenselessness than not knowing the arguments and grounds that support the unproven facts? Are those not precisely the ones that uphold the rejection of the lawsuit, especially one where there supposedly were annulment claims in the first place, and indemnification claims secondarily?" He maintains that the Court did not assess the testimony given at trial by Ms. Mónica C. Murillo —merely mentioning her in the resultandos—, which he qualifies as "lack of motivation" and a violation of due process. He affirms that such omission has caused him defenselessness and harms his right of defense, with significance both procedurally and substantively, as it prevents having a clear and precise judgment. He requests to annul and remand for a new trial hearing or, failing that, to rule on the merits. In the second ground, he alleges improper interpretation and application of substantive norms in accordance with art. 138 CPCA —in different passages he cites subsections c) and d), and in the section “Relevance of the grievance” he invokes also subsections a) and b)— and, at the same time, adduces procedural violations protected by art. 137.1.c) CPCA (lack of reasoning and breach of due process and the right of defense). He maintains that the Court, despite recognizing that the victim's statement is not automatic, takes as a major premise the statement made in the administrative venue by student [Name 001], found in administrative file No. 0096-2020 (folios 02, 38–41 and 43–45), where it is recorded that "during the 2020 school year —without specifying a date— he has touched her hair, back, grabbed her hand, and made insinuations"; he affirms that this deposition is given defining value by itself alone, without requiring temporal precision or peripheral corroboration, and without having been subjected to immediacy and cross-examination at trial, using it as if it were judicial testimony.

He adds that the valuation in the ruling departs from logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding; that the documentary evidence was analyzed superficially and the testimonial evidence —particularly the exculpatory evidence— was pretermitted; and that all of this leaves him defenseless due to lack of legal reasoning. He adds that the application of the in dubio pro-víctima principle entailed a reversal of the burden of proof and displaced the presumption of innocence of constitutional and conventional origin, harming the normative hierarchy (arts. 6, 11 and 18 LGAP; 18 and 22 Ley 7476; 7, 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Constitución Política; 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 and 26 CADH; and 57, 119 et seq. CPCA, in relation to art. 138 c) and d) of the CPCA. He reiterates that the testimonial evidence was not adequately assessed and that the “mere testimony” was sufficient to deem the elements of the offense proven; he announces a reservation of unconstitutionality regarding arts. 18, 22 and 33 of Ley 7476. He requests that the judgment be quashed with remand for a new trial hearing, or else that the matter be decided on the merits. In the third objection, he accuses improper application of Article 193 of the CPCA. He indicates that, in the event the judgment on appeal is upheld, the court should proceed in accordance with numerals 73.2.1 and 73.2.4 of the Código Procesal Civil and exempt him from the order to pay costs because he demonstrated good faith in the litigation, both in the first instance and in this challenge phase.

Regarding the first and second charges. In the specific case, the appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (like an apelación). Moreover, it is not sufficient to state a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. What is required is a contrast between what was decided and the infringement that, in his opinion, took place. In this regard, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides a necessary material requirement, both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent valuation on the merits. This involves the legal reasoning of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the precept under comment provides, the factual and legal grounding of the case. Factual, insofar as it shows disagreement with the facts that have been deemed proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of evidence), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it pertains to a problem that is presented concerning the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the body of law, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary infringement, the reasons of a factual nature may concur, together with the legal reasons (always necessary), and in that sense, the referenced grounds must be directed on both aspects, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the legal reasoning is exempted, by express legal mandate, from indicating those canons relating to the value of the poorly appreciated evidentiary element or elements. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the rules that the jurisdictional body of the instance mistakenly used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they are contained within the very ruling being appealed. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Before citing the latter, what is essential is that they be complied with, that they be put into practice at the moment of preparing and filing the cassation. Thus, the legal reasoning required by law may be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, intertwined or concatenated with each other and reasonably linked in a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or if applicable, a single one) is cited, pertinent and linked in a clear manner with the contested judgment (whether in the factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal reasoning. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, do not pertain to their essence. As the Sala Primera has already indicated interpreting the referenced Article 139, “it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal reasoning ... the reasons on which the action is based must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting out, at least, some normative reference that supports it”. Resolution no. 318-A-2008, at 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422284). The reasoning is, therefore, unrelated to the confused deployment of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions about the appropriateness or justice of the case, or else, to the recounting of errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is impertinent or manifestly and evidently unrelated to the case, it must be understood that it lacks “total legal reasoning” and, therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of Article 140 subsection c) of the same Procedural Code. Similarly, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that, for an appeal to pass the admissibility review, in addition to sufficient grounds, the corresponding mention and linkage with the contested judgment of the applicable rules deemed infringed is required. In this regard, one may consult, among others, resolutions of the Sala Primera nos. 677-A-S1-2021 at 09 hours 40 minutes on March 25, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1029345); no. 755-A-S1-2022 at 10 hours 55 minutes on March 29, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and no. 1663-A-S1-2022 at 10 hours 05 minutes on July 21, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340). In the case under examination, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the cassation appellant mixed dissimilar hypotheses and, by the way in which he structured the grievances, made them inseparable: he sets forth, in the first grievance, a supposedly erroneous valuation and interpretation of the evidence — which places his reproach under the grounds of art. 138 CPCA — but supports it with reproaches for lack of legal reasoning, lack of motivation, and violation of due process, which are grounds specific to art. 137 CPCA. Furthermore, he invokes a “preterition” of the testimony of Mónica C. Murillo, the use of incontrovertible portions of Considerando IV, and a laconic dismissal of the damages item in Considerando V, to conclude that the judgment is null. That confusion of planes (substance/procedure), without normative individualization or demonstration of the breach, infringes the technique of art. 139.3 CPCA: the appeal does not clearly identify which substantive rule of art. 138 would have been violated nor, as the case may be, which procedural rule of art. 137 and how it would have been transgressed, nor does it specify in which part of the judgment the omission or the logical inconsistency of the decision occurred. In the second grievance, the cassation appellant reiterates an abstract accusation of improper interpretation and application of substantive rules (art. 138 CPCA), accompanied by rhetorical categories (“non sequitur”, “fallacy of yes, but no”) and a thesis of reversal of the burden of proof due to acceptance of “in dubio pro-víctima”. However, he again does not identify which specific rule would have been misapplied nor explain why the application of the norm to the facts carried out by the Tribunal would be legally erroneous or decisive for the outcome (art. 138, capitis); and, again, he shifts the core of the grievance towards allegations of due process, lack of motivation, and evidentiary preterition — pathways of art. 137 CPCA —, persisting in the confusion of grounds and in the deficit of legal reasoning in the appeal itself, vices that art. 139.3 CPCA proscribes and that art. 140 subsection c) sanctions with outright rejection. Moreover, the claim in both grievances — “quash and remand for a new trial hearing” or even “quash and decide on the merits” — demonstrates that the appellant seeks to reopen the evidentiary debate and roll back the process to the trial phase to incorporate testimonial evidence, a remedy improper for contentious-administrative cassation, which does not constitute a third instance nor a vehicle to reproduce already precluded stages. As presented, both grievances suffer from poor cassation technique: (i) they confuse substantive grounds (art. 138 CPCA) with procedural grounds (art. 137 CPCA); (ii) they lack the clarity and precision required by art. 139.3 CPCA to link the judgment with the allegedly infringed norm and the specific grievance; and (iii) they propose a remedy incompatible with the nature of the cassation appeal. Consequently, by not satisfying the requirements of clarity and precision of Article 139.3 CPCA, their outright rejection is appropriate.

Regarding the third charge, numeral 193 of the CPCA establishes as a general rule the order to pay costs against the losing party and contemplates as possible exceptions to that order when: “a) The judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party could not credibly have known and, for that reason, that party's opposition was adjusted. b) Due to the nature of the debated issues, there existed, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate”. In the specific case, the appellant is limited solely to invoking his good faith in litigation, an argument that does not fit into any of the exceptive scenarios of Article 193 nor displaces the objective criterion of defeat. Nor was it proven that the controversy presented such normative complexity as to justify departing from the general rule, especially when the applicable legal framework and relevant jurisprudence are clear and were correctly applied. Thus, as the Tribunal correctly resolved, the appropriate course is the application of the order to pay costs to the losing party, as this is, as stated, the procedural rule. Therefore, no normative breach is observed in what was decided and, consequently, the objection must be denied.

By virtue of the foregoing, none of the reproaches having succeeded, the appeal must be dismissed. As indicated by Article 150.3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the payment of the costs generated by the exercise of this instance must be imposed on the cassation appellant.

POR TANTO

The plea of unconstitutionality raised is rejected as improper. The cassation appeal is dismissed. The costs caused by its exercise are borne by the party who brought it. CBE  DAMARIS MARIA VARGAS VASQUEZ - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE LEIVA POVEDA - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A 1 </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; color:#0b0e13">Drafted by Magistrate Vargas V</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; color:#0b0e13">á</span><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; color:#0b0e13">squez;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-size:12pt; background-color:#ffffff"><span style="font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:8pt; font-weight:bold; vertical-align:sub; color:#0b0e13">CONSIDERANDO</span></p><ol type="I" style="margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt"><li style="text-indent:35.5pt; text-align:justify; line-height:200%; widows:2; orphans:2; font-family:TAHOMA; font-size:12pt; font-weight:bold; background-color:#ffffff; list-style-position:inside; -aw-list-padding-sml:21.95pt"><span style="font:7pt 'Times New Roman'; -aw-import:ignore"> </span><span style="font-weight:normal">The present process derives from the disciplinary administrative procedure processed by the Ministerio de Educaci</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ó</span><span style="font-weight:normal">n P</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ú</span><span style="font-weight:normal">blica, file N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 0096-2020, brought against Nelson Regalado Mart</span><span style="font-weight:normal">í</span><span style="font-weight:normal">nez for alleged conduct that Law N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 7476, Ley contra el Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, classifies as sexual harassment (acoso sexual). In substance, the plaintiff stated that, from February 1, 2016, he worked as an Academic English teacher at the Liceo Samuel S</span><span style="font-weight:normal">á</span><span style="font-weight:normal">enz Flores in Heredia and, subsequently, starting March 3, 2017, the Ministerio de Educaci</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ó</span><span style="font-weight:normal">n P</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ú</span><span style="font-weight:normal">blica contacted him to provide his services in a differentiated position in the Conversational English Workshops program at the Liceo San Jos</span><span style="font-weight:normal">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> de Alajuela for seventh years; upon joining this program he occupied an interim position with successive renewals that, in practice, ensured continuity, such that from early 2017 he worked simultaneously at both educational centers. Later, the principal of the Liceo San Jos</span><span style="font-weight:normal">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> de Alajuela, Allan Barboza Jim</span><span style="font-weight:normal">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal">nez, requested that the Ministerio de Educaci</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ó</span><span style="font-weight:normal">n P</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ú</span><span style="font-weight:normal">blica expand the Conversational English program for seventh, eighth, and ninth years and he was offered 40 lessons at the Liceo San Jos</span><span style="font-weight:normal">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> de Alajuela, an offer he accepted and, therefore, from February 1, 2019, he worked there full-time as a Conversational English teacher until his separation. He stated that he maintained satisfactory performance, with no disciplinary record. Regarding the workshop dynamic, each group was divided by list into two subgroups that were supposed to receive the class simultaneously in different spaces, but, for reasons beyond the teaching staff's control, the principal arranged for both halves to receive the class together with two teachers present. For the 2017 year, the administration of the Liceo San Jos</span><span style="font-weight:normal">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> de Alajuela decided to form and divide the seventh-year groups according to certain particular characteristics of the students, so group 7-5 was composed mostly of students older than expected for that level, commonly because they were repeaters with one or more years of delay in their studies. Furthermore, it was a group with some students who, for some reason, constantly tended to have behavioral problems; among them, student [Name 001], who tended to have inappropriate behavior during the Conversational English lessons, which greatly hindered the development of the class, which by its nature must be fluid and in an environment of calm, silence, and concentration. He stated that, on February 25, 2020, during a lesson, the student shook a perfumed liquid that spilled onto her classmates, became upset, and left the classroom, without the teaching staff being able to locate her immediately, it being later verified that she went to the Guidance office; on that occasion a report was filed for </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal">absconding</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> (escape) and its return signed by the person in charge was demanded. He said, days later, three students reported that [Name 001] and other young women were collecting signatures to formulate an accusation and </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal">remove him</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> from his post. He highlighted that, on February 25, 2020, student [Name 001] went to the guidance office with two classmates and stated she did not want to return to classes and that the teacher touched her hair, back, and hand, in addition to hugging her, activating the Protocol for action in situations of violence (Protocolo de actuación en situaciones de violencia); FILE 096-2020, in said instrument it was recorded, among other things, that the homeroom teacher (docente guía) stated that student [Name 001] said she felt harassed and that, in conversation with the group, practically all the women expressed discomfort and their desire not to attend those classes; furthermore, on February 28, 2020, it was documented that the minor [Name 002], stated that she was </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">uncomfortable in the conversational English lessons with the mentioned teachers, because she feels harassed (hostigada), since they look at her with malice and OBSERVES conduct by the teachers towards other classmates that make her feel very bad</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal">. He related that, through resolution N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 0887-2020, the MEP provisionally reassigned him to the Dirección Regional de Alajuela; then, through resolution N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 2930-2020 of November 4, 2020, </span><span>it was affirmed that he incurred in alleged acts related to inappropriate conduct of sexual harassment (acoso) and/or stalking (hostigamiento sexual)</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> against student [Name 001]</span><span style="font-weight:normal">, [Name 002]</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> and [Name 003]</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> and the immediate cessation of his interim appointment was ordered, detailing, based on the minors' testimonies, touching and insinuations, known in part indirectly by the homeroom teacher and the guidance counselor. According to the evidentiary records from the Department of Disciplinary Management (Departamento de Gestión Disciplinaria), various statements were gathered, which are detailed below: student [Name 001] stated: </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">brushing, closeness</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">to a centimeter</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> and conversation about the subject matter, in addition to pointing out that he </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">never</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-weight:normal; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-weight:normal">taught the lessons; [Name 002] affirmed that there were no fixed seats, that the classroom was close-quarters and that the events occurred in full view of the class; [Name 003] referred to approaches and touches on the shoulder or back; for her part, [Name 004]</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> Jimena Ap</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ú</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> stated she had not observed inappropriate conduct; the homeroom teacher Adriana G</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ó</span><span style="font-weight:normal">mez and the guidance counselor Nancy Karina Torres declared they were not eyewitnesses and recounted what they learned from the students, mentioning approaches and touches; Roxeri Ag</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ü</span><span style="font-weight:normal">ero said she had seen approaches and that the teacher touched [Name 001]'s hair, without observing conduct regarding [Name 002]; teacher Bryan Matarrita indicated he had not noticed strange behavior and described [Name 001]'s tardiness, jokes, and disorderly conduct; and [Name 004]</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> Pamela S</span><span style="font-weight:normal">á</span><span style="font-weight:normal">nchez stated she had not observed inappropriate actions and described classroom dynamics that contradicted the claim that the teacher </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal">never</span><span style="font-weight:normal">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> taught lessons. In response to the resolution ceasing the interim appointment, on November 9, 2020, a motion for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) was filed, alleging erroneous evidentiary assessment, pretermission of evidence, lack of substantiation, violation of due process and the presumption of innocence, disproportionality of the sanction, and violation of human rights with conventionality control. He emphasized that, on November 16, 2020, Minister Guiselle Cruz Maduro issued resolution N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 3036-2020, which declared the reconsideration without merit and upheld resolution N</span><span style="font-weight:normal">°</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> 2930-2020 intact; from that moment, the administrative channel (vía administrativa) was considered exhausted. Based on that account of facts and adjustments made in the preliminary hearing held on June 29, 2023, they are such that in judgment: </span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">"...1) the claim be declared WITH MERIT (CON LUGAR) in all its aspects, and the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) that are applicable be granted in favor of the plaintiff, which are contained in section three of the complaint, with the clarification that what corresponds to moral damages (daño moral) would be subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). / 2) the absolute nullity, or alternatively, the non-conformity with the legal system of resolutions </span><span style="font-style:italic">2930-2020 and 3036-2020</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic"> of the MINISTERIO DE EDUCACI</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">Ó</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">N P</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">Ú</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">BLICA,</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic"> as well as the rest of the proceedings that occurred within administrative file 0096-2020 of the MEP, be decreed, ordering the possibility for the plaintiff to be appointed at the Liceo de San Jos</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">é</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic"> de Alajuela or in any other institution of the MEP, whether in a teaching or administrative role, and that the State be ordered to pay the damages caused by its actions injurious to the rights of Mr. REGALADO MART</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">Í</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">NEZ. / 3) In the alternative, should the absolute nullity or non-conformity of the indicated acts not be decreed, that the objective administrative liability of the STATE be declared and it be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to Mr. REGALADO MART</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">Í</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">NEZ. / 4) the STATE be ordered to pay both costs (costas) arising from this action...\". </span><span style="font-weight:normal">Having granted the statutory transfer, the State answered the claim negatively. It requested that the claim be declared without merit, that the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) be granted, and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay the personal and procedural costs, with their legal interest. The Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, through judgment no. </span><span>2024008600</span><span style="font-weight:normal"> issued at eleven hours and thirty-one minutes on November twenty-first, two thousand twenty-four, ordered</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">: </span><span style="font-weight:normal">“</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">The defense of lack of right filed by the State’s representation is granted. Consequently, </span><span style="font-style:italic">the claim is declared without merit in all its aspects</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">. The plaintiff NELSON REGALADO MART</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">Í</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">NEZ is ordered to pay, in favor of the State, both costs with their respective interest. These amounts shall be quantified in the execution of judgment phase, once this ruling is final. THAT IS ALL</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">”</span><span style="font-weight:normal; font-style:italic">.</span></li></ol> Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal for judicial review (recurso de casación), which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution. Preliminary question. Regarding the Claim of unconstitutionality. The appellant requests that this Court of Judicial Review (Tribunal de Casación) “rule on” the unconstitutionality of articles 18, 22, and 33 of Ley N° 7476 and that “the proceeding be conducted in accordance with the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction.” Such a claim is, in all respects, improper in this venue: pursuant to article 10 of the Political Constitution and articles 73 and following of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, the competence to hear, process, and resolve unconstitutionality claims lies exclusively with the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional). The appropriate remedy, therefore, is the unconstitutionality action before that body; it is not permissible for this Chamber to open, promote, or resolve such a proceeding, nor is it appropriate to defer the issuance of this resolution based on that allegation. Moreover, the appellant's argument merely objects to the interpretation and application that the lower court (a quo) made of those norms, a matter that—if deemed appropriate—must be articulated through the substantive grounds of article 138 CPCA. Consequently, the claim is rejected outright on the grounds of this Court of Judicial Review's lack of functional competence, and we proceed with the hearing of the appeal within the strict terms of the CPCA.

Judicial Review for procedural reasons. The appellant raises one grievance of this nature. He accuses the judgment of lack of reasoning, serious contradiction, and disregard of evidence (preterición). He argues that the judgment suffers from serious contradiction and lack of foundation, as the reasoning does not conform to constitutional and conventional standards, erroneously applies the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica racional)—especially logic and experience—and violates the principle of congruence and the correlation between accusation and judgment, as well as the right to defense and due process, by failing to resolve key aspects requested in the lawsuit and by illegally incorporating and disregarding evidence; for this, he invokes articles 42, 57, 82 to 85, 111, 119, and concordant articles of the CPCA, in relation to articles 137.1 subsections c) and d) and 220 of the same body of law, articles 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61, and 63 of the CPC, articles 11, 33, 39, 41, 56, 57, and 154 of the Political Constitution, and articles 1, 2, 8, 21, 24, and 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He asserts that the ruling avoids the specific points of the litigation through generalities about disciplinary procedures for sexual harassment and about differences between criminal law and administrative sanctioning law; furthermore, it acts as if it were the directing body of the procedure by fully accepting what was done in the administrative venue without immediacy (inmediación) or a comprehensive assessment, dispensing with hearing the witnesses and the accused, ignoring that disciplinary bodies are not usually composed of jurists, whereby—he adds—the burden of proof is inverted and an in dubio pro victima standard is applied in practice, contrary to the presumption of innocence (art. 39 of the Constitution), even with reference to deviation of power (arts. 113.3 and 131.3 LGAP and art. 49, para. 2, of the Constitution). He alleges a disregard and erroneous assessment of essential evidence because the administrative statements of the alleged victims are transferred to the trial as if they were testimonies, without contradiction or immediacy, while the only testimony received at trial (Mónica Murillo) is barely mentioned without any assessment, and the rules of sound criticism also provided for in arts. 18, 22, and 33 of the Law Against Sexual Harassment are omitted. He maintains that it is not enough to indicate where the evidence is, but rather it must be analyzed with rationality and proportionality, contrasted, and weighed, which—in his opinion—does not occur, generating an arbitrary, incongruent, and unreasoned resolution that causes defenselessness and also violates arts. 57, 111, and 119 of the CPCA in relation to 220 of the same and arts. 28.1, 58, and 61 of the CPC, together with arts. 11, 33, 39, 41, and 154 of the Constitution and 1, 8, and 24 of the ACHR. He requests that the ground be upheld and the judgment be annulled, ordering remand for the holding of a new hearing and the issuance of a ruling duly founded and reasoned in all its aspects.

Regarding the ground of lack of reasoning, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has repeatedly ruled, stating: “(…) it arises when the reasoning of the judgment is omitted, either because it is completely absent, or because the development (content therein) is extremely confusing or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the judgment, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, particularly due process. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that this is a procedural ground, meaning that it pertains to potential breaches of the adjective provisions that regulate the procedural process or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, and from which rights and obligations derive. Therefore, this ground should not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of law or the assessment of evidence carried out by the lower court in the recital section of the judgment, for which the procedural code establishes autonomous grounds (article 138), otherwise the specific appeal ground would be distorted. The lack of reasoning as a ground for quashing the judgment, in the terms discussed, occurs when the norm that provides for the judge's duty to analyze the procedural incidents and substantive issues raised by the parties (a principle of procedural law, part of due process, and which, moreover, is materialized in articles 119 and 122, subsection m) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code, as well as 155 of the Civil Procedural Code) is violated. It is not a question of determining whether the court ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process by the parties, but rather that the judgment contains the foundations upon which the corresponding decision was adopted…”. First Chamber, vote N° 126-F-S1-2009 of 3:40 p.m. on February 5, 2009. In accordance with the cited case law, the appellant is not correct, as it is evident from reading the appealed judgment that the Court provided adequate reasoning and clearly determined the proven facts. It is observed that in recitals (considerandos) II.4 to II.6, it recorded the procedural process (íter procesal), the admission of evidence (including the testimonial of Mónica C. Murillo Salas) and the receipt of that deposition at trial, as well as the non-existence of nullities; in Recital (Considerando) IV "Proven Facts" (Hechos probados), it established the factual matters with express support from documents in administrative file 0096-2020 (appointments, complaint, provisional measures, notification of charges, administrative hearing, resolutions 2930-2020 and 3036-2020); in Recital V "Unproven Facts" (Hechos no probados), the damages (daños y perjuicios) were deemed unproven; in Recital VI it specified the methodology for assessing the body of evidence, under the principle of sound criticism 82.4 CPCA and the applicable regulations (arts. 3, 4, 5, 18, 21, 22, and 33 of Law 7476, and art. 297 LGAP), even enabling the use of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is lacking; subsequently, it addressed the dispute and resolved the annulment and compensatory claims on the basis of the “community of evidence” (comunidad de la prueba). In Recital VII the Court examined the alleged defects (imputation, congruence, reasoning, and proportionality) and concluded that the challenged administrative acts were duly reasoned, that the notification of charges was clear and sufficient, and that the sanction of dismissal was in accordance with Law 7476; in Recital VIII the Court specified that the evidentiary standard in matters of sexual harassment does not imply automatic credibility of the complainant, but rather an assessment by sound criticism, and explained why, applying that standard to the body of evidence as a whole (proceedings of file 0096-2020, criminal complaint 20-1198-0305-PE in the Adjacent Prosecutor's Office of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela, and the testimony provided by the victims), it granted greater evidentiary weight to the concordant and sufficient elements to consider the facts proven, discarding the existence of a reasonable doubt; and, finally, in Recital IX, it systematized the evidentiary and legal conclusions and set forth the final decision. In this way, the judgment clearly established the logical link between the determined facts and the legal consequences (typicity, unlawfulness, and culpability in the disciplinary venue) and resolved the actions that comprised the administrative sanctioning procedure in a coherent, orderly, and exhaustive manner. Consequently, and given that a lack of reasoning is only configured in the face of a real absence or insufficiency of reasons—not to re-examine the correctness of the evidentiary assessment—this Chamber does not find a lack of reasoning in the ruling, much less disregard of evidence (preterición). On the other hand, the appellant maintains the violation of article 137 subsection c) of the CPCA.

Regarding the procedural defect of a lack of clear and precise determination, the First Chamber: "(...) has held that it consists of a confused exposition to such a degree that it prevents certainty about the circumstance itself, or, by a glaring contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, it has stated that this procedural error must be differentiated from the pretermission or improper weighing of evidence that entails the disregard of substantive rules. In this sense, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 of 8 hours 55 minutes on March 22, 2012, it was noted that the 'intellectual work developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is capable of being reviewed from different perspectives in a cassation setting, which, moreover, should not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to different purposes. In this sense, the disagreement may arise from substantial aspects, when the factual framework proven by the Tribunal does not match the reality derived from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, as provided for in Article 138 CPCA), or from procedural errors, whether by having been based on illegitimate evidentiary means or those illegally introduced into the process, or by a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Tribunal, in establishing the relevant factual framework for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confused manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation it intends to make explicit is, or, when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what assessment the judges made during deliberation. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to ensure that the handling of the different stages making up the jurisdictional process has followed the channels provided by the legal system, as well as that the judgment has been rendered in the form prescribed by the applicable procedural rules (in this sense, vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 of 13 hours on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the determination of facts made is in accordance with the evidence or not exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. [...]'". Votes of the First Chamber no. 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), no. 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and no. 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the foregoing, this ground for cassation on procedural grounds arises when the exposition of the facts is imprecise, making it impossible to have certainty about the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have an appropriate knowledge of the factual situation intended to be proven. It likewise occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different factual elements, such that the error must be of such magnitude that there can be no certainty as to what assessment the Tribunal made. In the case under study, for this Chamber, the grievance at its core attempts—under a procedural posture—to turn the process back to the trial phase to receive and hear more witnesses. Such a claim is, clearly, inadmissible in this venue, because cassation is neither a third instance nor a vehicle to reproduce a probative debate that has already closed, and because the appellant's arguments deal with the weighing of the body of evidence admitted in the process carried out by the Tribunal (substantive issues, not procedural defects). Furthermore, and in accordance with numerals 57, 111, 119 and 220 CPCA; 28.1, 58 and 61 CPC; 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Political Constitution; and 1, 8 and 24 of the CADH, the reasoning exhibited in the appealed judgment is sufficiently reasonable and proportional, since it analyzes all the disputed points and links, with sound criticism, the testimonial evidence received at trial and the documentary evidence from the administrative file with the decisive conclusions; hence, no evidentiary pretermission in a technical sense is configured, since the cassation appellant does not single out a specific, decisive, and omitted piece of evidence whose weighing could have changed the direction of the ruling (criteria reiterated by the First Chamber in votes no. 1710-F-S1-2020 of 10:35 hours on April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686)), nor does he demonstrate indeterminacy or glaring contradiction in the factual list, vote no. 396-F-S1-2012 of 08:55 hours on March 22, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-766956); along the same lines, no violation of due process or the right of defense alleged under Art. 137 CPCA is verified either, so the ground becomes inadmissible. Finally, regarding the analysis of the evidence in light of Law No. 7476 (Ley contra el Hostigamiento Sexual), the Tribunal made explicit—as the applicable methodology—the criteria for assessment by sound criticism (arts. 22 and 33), the freedom of proof and the admissibility of circumstantial evidence when no direct evidence exists (arts. 18, 21 and 22), as well as the conceptual framework and typification of the conduct (arts. 3, 4 and 5), and the correlative disciplinary consequences, in harmony with Art. 297 of the LGAP; based on these parameters, the reasoning weighed the internal coherence of the accounts, their temporal consistency, and the peripheral documentary corroborations from administrative file 0096-2020. That reasoning, grounded in Law 7476 and sound criticism, shows that the ruling was not based on automatic presumptions nor on an unrestricted in dubio pro-victim principle, but on the reasoned articulation of indicia and legally incorporated documents, which satisfies the duties of clarity, congruency, and sufficiency demanded by arts. 57, 111 and 119 CPCA and rules out any violation of due process or the right of defense invoked. For the reasons set forth, the grievance must be dismissed.

Cassation on substantive grounds.

The cassation appellant formulates three substantive grounds. The first two will be analyzed jointly, given their close thematic connection. In the first, he alleges a substantive violation of articles 138 subsections a) and b) of the CPCA —due to improper weighing of evidence and due to evidentiary pretermission— which would render the judgment null. He criticizes that the Tribunal improperly analyzes the evidence and the object of the process, determining the proven and unproven facts in a manner foreign to logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding, pretermitting the testimonial evidence offered, in violation of arts. 57, 82–85, 111, 119 and concordant CPCA, in relation to the cited 138 a) and b) and 220 CPCA, 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 and 63 CPC, 11, 28, 33, 39, 41, 45 and 154 of the Political Constitution and 1, 2, 8 and 24 CADH. He maintains that although most of the points set out as proven in Fact IV were undisputed, the Tribunal selects them to shore up its conclusion and omits other central aspects of the litigation —in particular, the violation of labor rights—; he reproaches that Fact V (unproven facts) dismisses the damages and losses in a few lines without a reasoned explanation about the reasons why they are considered unproven, which —in his opinion— is equivalent to rejecting the entire claim de facto. He expressly adds "lack of adequate reasoning", "lack of justification", and "violation of due process and the right of defense" (arts. 137.1.c) and d) CPCA) for not explaining the decisive points. In support of his position, he cites part of the resolution of the First Chamber no. 000173-F-S1-2023 and formulates several questions: "What greater defenselessness could there be than disregarding the arguments and foundations that support the unproven facts? Are they not the ones that sustain the rejection of the claim, especially one where there were supposedly annulment claims in the first place, and claims for damages secondarily?" He maintains that the Tribunal did not weigh the testimony given at trial by Mrs. Mónica C. Murillo —limiting itself to mentioning it in the resultandos—, which he qualifies as "lack of justification" and violation of due process. He affirms that such omission has caused him defenselessness and injures his right of defense, with both procedural and substantive significance, as it prevents having a clear and precise judgment. He requests to annul and remand for a new trial hearing or, failing that, to rule on the merits. In the second ground, he alleges improper interpretation and application of substantive rules in accordance with Art. 138 CPCA —in different passages he cites subsections c) and d), and in the "Relevance of the grievance" section he also invokes subsections a) and b)— and, at the same time, he alleges procedural violations covered by Art. 137.1.c) CPCA (lack of adequate reasoning and breach of due process and the right of defense). He maintains that the Tribunal, despite acknowledging that the victim's statement is not automatic evidence, takes as its major premise the statement given in the administrative venue by the student [Name 001], contained in administrative file No. 0096-2020 (folios 02, 38–41 and 43–45), where it is recorded that "during the 2020 school year —without specifying a date— he touched her hair, back, grabbed her hand, and made insinuations"; he affirms that this statement was given defining weight on its own, without requiring temporal precision or peripheral corroboration, and without having been subjected to immediate examination and cross-examination at trial, using it as if it were judicial testimony. He adds that the ruling's assessment departs from logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding, that the documentary evidence is analyzed superficially and the testimonial evidence —in particular the defense testimony— was pretermitted, and that all this causes him defenselessness due to a lack of adequate reasoning.

Additionally, the application of the principle *in dubio pro-víctima* entailed a reversal of the burden of proof and displaced the presumption of innocence of constitutional and conventional origin, harming the normative hierarchy (arts. 6, 11 and 18 LGAP; 18 and 22 Ley 7476; 7, 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Constitución Política; 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 and 26 CADH; and 57, 119 et seq. CPCA, in relation to art. 138 c) and d) of the CPCA. It reiterates that the testimonial evidence was not adequately assessed and that the "mere testimony" was sufficient to consider the typicality proven; it announces a reservation of unconstitutionality regarding arts. 18, 22 and 33 of Ley 7476. It requests that the judgment be quashed with remand for a new trial hearing, or that a decision be made on the merits. In the third objection, it accuses improper application of article 193 of the CPCA. It indicates that, should the appealed decision be upheld, proceedings should be in accordance with numerals 73.2.1 and 73.2.4 of the Código Procesal Civil and it be exempted from the order to pay costs for having demonstrated good faith in the litigation, both in the first instance and in this challenge phase.

Regarding the first and second grounds. In the specific case, the appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an apelación). Nor is it sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. The contrast of what was decided with the infringement that, in its opinion, took place is necessary. In this regard, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides for a necessary material requirement, both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent evaluation on the merits. This is the statement of grounds for the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as provided by the precept under comment, the factual and legal grounds of the case. Factual, to the extent that it disagrees with the facts that have been held to be proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of the evidence), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural rules. Legal, when it deals with a problem presented concerning the application, omission, or incorrect interpretation of any norm that forms part of the block of legality, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. In both procedural infringement and evidentiary infringement, factual grounds may concur, together with the legal reasons (always necessary), and, in that sense, the referenced grounds must be directed in both aspects, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that the indication of those canons relating to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exempted from the legal grounds, by express legal mandate. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the lower court erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the appealed pronouncement itself. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Before citing the latter, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice when drafting and filing the cassation appeal. Thus, the grounds required by law can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles, or legal rules intertwined or concatenated with each other, are mentioned and reasonably linked in a double perspective: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or, if applicable, a single one) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in the factual or legal support) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal grounds. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will occasionally reinforce the allegations made, but generally do not constitute their essence. As the Sala Primera has already indicated when interpreting the referenced article 139, "it is required that the appeal have a minimum legal grounds ... the reasons on which the action is based must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and recording, at least, some normative reference that gives it support." Resolution no. 318-A-2008, at 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422284). The grounds are, therefore, alien to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is impertinent or manifestly and evidently disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks "total legal grounds" and, therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, in accordance with the provisions of article 140 subsection c) of the same Procedural Code. Similarly, this Chamber has repeatedly pointed out that for an appeal to pass the admissibility control, in addition to the sufficient exposition of reasons, the corresponding mention and linkage of the applicable norms that are estimated infringed with the questioned judgment is required. In this regard, consult, among others, resolutions of the Sala Primera nos. 677-A-S1-2021 at 09 hours 40 minutes on March 25, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1029345); no. 755-A-S1-2022 at 10 hours 55 minutes on March 29, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and no. 1663-A-S1-2022 at 10 hours 05 minutes on July 21, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340). In the case under review, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the cassation appellant intermingled dissimilar hypotheses and, due to the way the grievances were structured, made them inseparable: in the first grievance, it presents a supposed erroneous assessment and interpretation of the evidence —which places its reproach under the ground of art. 138 CPCA— but supports it with reproaches of lack of grounds, lack of reasoning, and violation of due process, which are grounds proper to art. 137 CPCA. Furthermore, it invokes a "pretermission" of the testimony of Mónica C. Murillo, the use of uncontroverted points from Considerando IV, and a laconic dismissal of the damages heading in Considerando V, to conclude that the judgment is null. This confusion of planes (merits/procedural), without normative individualization or demonstration of the breach, infringes the technique of art. 139.3 CPCA: the appeal does not clearly identify which substantive rule of art. 138 would have been violated nor, as the case may be, which procedural provision of art. 137 and how it would have been transgressed, nor does it specify in which part of the judgment the omission or logical inconsistency of the decision occurred. In the second grievance, the cassation appellant reiterates an abstract accusation of incorrect interpretation and application of substantive norms (art. 138 CPCA), accompanied by rhetorical categories ("non sequitur", "yes, but no fallacy") and a thesis of reversal of the burden of proof due to acceptance of the "in dubio pro-víctima" principle. However, it again fails to individualize which specific rule would have been misapplied nor explain why the application of the norm to the facts carried out by the Tribunal would be legally erroneous or decisive for the outcome (art. 138, *capitis*); and, again, it shifts the core of the grievance towards allegations of due process, lack of reasoning, and evidentiary pretermission —channels of art. 137 CPCA—, persisting in the confusion of grounds and in the deficit of the appeal's own grounds, defects that art. 139.3 CPCA proscribes and that art. 140 subsection c) sanctions with outright rejection. Furthermore, the request in both grievances —"annul and remand for a new trial hearing" or even "annul and rule on the merits"— demonstrates that the appellant seeks to reopen the evidentiary debate and roll back the process to the trial phase to incorporate testimonial evidence, a remedy improper for contentious-administrative cassation, which does not constitute a third instance nor a vehicle to reproduce stages already precluded. As presented, both grievances suffer from poor cassation technique: (i) they confuse merits grounds (art. 138 CPCA) with procedural grounds (art. 137 CPCA); (ii) they lack the clarity and precision required by art. 139.3 CPCA to link the judgment with the rule allegedly infringed and the specific grievance; and (iii) they propose a remedy incompatible with the nature of the cassation appeal. Consequently, as they do not satisfy the requirements of clarity and precision of article 139.3 CPCA, their outright rejection is appropriate.

Regarding the third ground, numeral 193 of the CPCA establishes as a general rule the order to pay costs against the losing party and contemplates as possible exceptions to that order when: "a) The judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party credibly did not know and, because of this, the party's opposition was adjusted. b) Due to the nature of the issues debated, there existed, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate." In the specific case, the appellant merely limits itself to invoking its good faith in litigation, an argument that does not fit any of the exceptive scenarios of article 193 nor does it displace the objective criterion of defeat. Nor was it proven that the controversy presented such normative complexity as to justify departing from the general rule, especially when the applicable legal framework and relevant jurisprudence are clear and were correctly applied.

Thus, as the Court correctly resolved, the appropriate course is the application of the award of costs against the losing party, as this is, as stated, the procedural rule. Therefore, no breach of regulations is observed in what was decided and, consequently, the objection must be denied.

Based on the foregoing, none of the objections having succeeded, the appeal must be declared without merit. In accordance with Article 150.3 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs generated by the filing of this instance.

POR TANTO

The claim of unconstitutionality raised is rejected as inadmissible. The appeal is declared without merit.

The costs incurred by its exercise shall be borne by the party who promoted it. CBE

1

IV.As examined by the Chamber in its preparatory session for this matter, this appeal for cassation (recurso de casación) is inadmissible. The appealing party invokes the ground of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación), arguing that the judgment under appeal is unreasoned because it contains only a superficial analysis of the appeal grounds raised and fails to adequately address the issues concerning the valuation of the property to be expropriated. The claim is evidently ill-founded and reveals the appellant's real disagreement with the substantive outcome of the dispute. The judgment under appeal expressly states the grounds for rejecting the arguments set forth in the appeal brief. Specifically, it clarifies that the Tribunal upheld the land value determined by the administrative authority because the appellant failed to provide sufficient technical evidence to support its own valuation, which was based solely on a private topographic survey and omitted other relevant parameters required by the governing law. Consequently, the Chamber concludes that the appeal for cassation must be rejected on the grounds of its manifest inadmissibility, given the obvious inconsistency between the defect alleged and the actual content of the judgment, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 119 and 122(m) of the Código Procesal Contencioso-Administrativo (contentious-administrative procedure code).

Regarding the ground of **lack of reasoning** (falta de motivación), the First Chamber has repeatedly ruled, stating: “(…) it arises when the reasoning of the judgment is omitted, either because it is totally absent, or because its development (contained therein) is extremely confusing or contradictory, such that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the judgment, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that this is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it pertains to potential non-compliance with the adjective provisions that regulate the procedural process or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship binding the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, from which rights and obligations derive. Thus, this ground must not be confused with a mechanism to enter into a discussion of the application of the Law or the evaluation of the evidence carried out by the lower court (A quo) in the recitals section of the judgment, for which the Code of Procedure establishes autonomous grounds (article 138), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. The lack of reasoning as a ground for quashing the judgment, in the terms that have been discussed, occurs when the rule that establishes the judge’s duty to analyze the procedural issues and substantive questions raised by the parties is violated (a principle of procedural law, a component of due process, and which, furthermore, is materialized in sections 119 and 122, subsection m) of the Administrative Litigation Procedure Code, as well as 155 of the Civil Procedure Code). It is not a matter of determining whether the court ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process by the parties, but on the contrary, that the judgment contains the grounds upon which the corresponding decision was adopted…” First Chamber, Voto N° 126-F-S1-2009 of 15:40 hrs. on February 5, 2009 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-769260)." In this sense, the disagreement may stem from substantive aspects, when the factual scenario that the Court found to be proven does not align with the reality emerging from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or of law, as provided for in article 138 CPCA), or from procedural errors (yerros procesales), whether because the decision was based on illegitimate evidentiary means or means introduced into the process illegally, or due to a defective formulation (lack of a clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Court, in establishing the relevant factual scenario for the specific case, formulates one or more facts in a confusing manner, such that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what the factual situation it intends to set forth is, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the assessment (valoración) carried out by the judges during their deliberation was. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to ensure that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process has proceeded through the channels provided by the legal system, and that the judgment was issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable procedural rules (norms adjetivas) (in this regard, Voto no. 687-F-S1-2010 of 13:00 hours on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning regarding whether the determination of the facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the proper scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. […]”. Votos of Sala Primera no. 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), no. 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and no. 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the foregoing, this ground for cassation (casación) based on procedural grounds (motivos adjetivos) occurs when the exposition of the facts is imprecise, which makes it impossible to have certainty about the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have appropriate knowledge of the factual situation that is intended to be considered as accredited. It likewise occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different factual elements, so the error must be of such magnitude that one cannot be sure of what the assessment (valoración) carried out by the Court was." legal, when the issue raised concerns the application, omission, or incorrect interpretation of any norm that forms part of the body of legality, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or one that also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the appealed judgment are modified. In both procedural and evidentiary violations, factual reasons may concur, alongside the legal reasons (always necessary), and in that sense, the referenced grounds must be directed at both aspects, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that from the legal grounding, by express legislative mandate, the indication of those canons related to the value of the poorly assessed evidentiary element or elements is exempted. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the lower court erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they appear in the very ruling under appeal. And of course, it is by no means indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the basic requirements, time limits, and rules for the admission of the appeal. Rather than citing these latter precepts, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice at the time of drafting and filing the cassation appeal. Thus, the statutorily prescribed grounds can be understood, broadly speaking, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles or legal rules are mentioned, interwoven or concatenated among themselves and reasonably linked in a dual perspective: to the arguments of the appeal and to the judgment under attack. To the extent that a set of legal norms (or if appropriate, a single one) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the challenged judgment (whether in its factual or legal basis) and to the arguments of the appeal, there is legal grounding. Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will sometimes reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not constitute their essence. As the First Chamber has already indicated when interpreting the referenced article 139, "the appeal is required to have minimal legal grounding... the reasons on which the appellant bases its petition must be explained, contesting the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and recording at least some normative reference that supports it." Resolution no. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422284). The grounds are, therefore, alien to a confused display of norms and allegations; to a mixture of unintelligible arguments or to the simple exposition of opinions about the propriety or justice of the case, or, to the recounting of the errors considered to have been committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or if the one it carries out is manifestly and evidently impertinent or unrelated to the case, it must be understood to lack "total legal grounding" and, therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection, pursuant to the provisions of article 140, subsection c) of the same procedural code. Similarly, this Chamber has repeatedly indicated that for an appeal to pass the admission review, besides a sufficient exposition of reasons, the corresponding mention and linking of the applicable norms that are deemed infringed with the questioned judgment is required. In this regard, see, among others, the resolutions of the First Chamber, nos. 677-A-S1-2021 of 09 hours 40 minutes on March 25, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1029345); no. 755-A-S1-2022 of 10 hours 55 minutes on March 29, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and no.

1663-A-S1-2022 of 10:05 a.m. on July 21, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340). In the case under review, this Chamber reaches the conviction that the appellant has intermingled dissimilar hypotheses and, by the way he structured the grievances, has made them inseparable: he sets forth, in the first grievance, a supposed erroneous assessment and interpretation of the evidence —which places his objection under the ground of Art. 138 CPCA—, yet he supports it with objections of lack of substantiation, lack of reasoning, and violation of due process, which are grounds proper to Art. 137 CPCA. Moreover, he invokes an "pretermission (preterición)" of the testimony of Mónica C. Murillo, the use of uncontroverted points from Considerando IV, and a laconic dismissal of the damages category in Considerando V, to conclude that the judgment is null. That confusion of planes (substantive/procedural), without normative individualization or demonstration of the breach, infringes the technique of Art. 139.3 CPCA: the appeal does not clearly identify which substantive rule of Art. 138 would have been violated, nor, as the case may be, which procedural provision of Art. 137 and how it would have been transgressed; neither does it specify in which part of the judgment the omission or logical inconsistency of the decision occurred. In the second grievance, the appellant reiterates an abstract accusation of erroneous interpretation and application of substantive norms (Art. 138 CPCA), accompanied by rhetorical categories ("non sequitur," "fallacy of yes, but no") and a thesis of reversal of the burden of proof due to the acceptance of "in dubio pro-víctima." However, he again fails to individualize which specific rule would have been misapplied, nor does he explain why the application of the norm to the facts made by the Tribunal would be legally erroneous or decisive for the outcome (Art. 138, capitis)."; and, once again, he displaces the core of the grievance towards arguments of due process, lack of reasoning, and evidentiary pretermission —channels of Art. 137 CPCA—, persisting in the confusion of grounds and in the lack of substantiation of the appeal itself, defects that Art. 139.3 CPCA proscribes and that Art. 140 subsection c) sanctions with outright dismissal.

Furthermore, the claim in both grievances—“annul and remand for a new trial hearing” or, even, “annul and decide on the merits”—shows that the appellant seeks to reopen the evidentiary debate and roll back the proceeding to the trial phase in order to introduce testimonial evidence, a remedy improper for cassation, which does not constitute a third instance nor a vehicle for relitigating already precluded stages. As framed, both grievances suffer from defective cassation technique: (i) they confuse substantive grounds (art. 138 CPCA) with procedural grounds (art. 137 CPCA); (ii) they lack the clarity and precision required by art. 139.3 CPCA to link the judgment with the allegedly infringed provision and the specific harm; and (iii) they propose a remedy incompatible with the nature of the cassation appeal. Consequently, since they do not satisfy the clarity and precision requirements of article 139.3 CPCA, their summary rejection is appropriate."

VII.Regarding the third argument, article 193 of the CPCA establishes as a general rule the imposition of costs (costas) on the losing party and contemplates possible exceptions to that imposition when: “a) The judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party plausibly did not know and, because of that, the party's opposition was adjusted. b) By the nature of the issues debated there existed, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate.” In the specific case, the appellant merely limits itself to invoking its good faith in litigation (buena fe litigiosa), an argument that does not fit into any of the exceptions of article 193 nor displaces the objective criterion of the defeat. Nor was it demonstrated that the dispute presented such normative complexity as to justify departing from the general rule, especially when the applicable legal framework and the relevant case law are clear and were correctly applied. Thus, as the Court properly resolved, the appropriate course is the imposition of costs on the losing party, since, as stated, this is the procedural rule. Consequently, no normative breach is observed in what was resolved, and the objection must therefore be denied. In light of the foregoing, none of the objections having succeeded, the appeal must be declared without merit.

As indicated by Article 150.3 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs (costas) generated by the exercise of this instance".

He stated that, days later, three students reported that [Name 001] and other young women were collecting signatures to file a complaint and "remove him" from his position. He highlighted that, on February 25, 2020, the student [Name 001] went to the guidance office with two classmates and stated she did not want to return to classes and that the teacher touched her hair, back, and hand, in addition to hugging her, activating the Protocol for action in situations of violence; FILE 096-2020, in said instrument it was recorded, among other things, that the homeroom teacher (docente guía) indicated that the student [Name 001] said she felt harassed and that, in conversation with the group, practically all the women expressed discomfort and their desire not to attend those classes; furthermore, on February 28, 2020, it was documented that the minor [Name 002] indicated that she was "uncomfortable in the conversational English lessons with the mentioned teachers, because she feels harassed, since they look at her with malice and OBSERVES behaviors from the teachers towards other classmates that make her feel very bad". He stated that, through resolution No. 0887-2020, the MEP provisionally reassigned him to the Regional Directorate of Alajuela; later, through resolution No. 2930-2020 of November 4, 2020, it was affirmed that he incurred in alleged acts related to inappropriate behaviors of sexual harassment (acoso y/u hostigamiento sexual) against the student [Name 001], [Name 002] and [Name 003] and the immediate cessation of the interim appointment was ordered, detailing, based on the minors' testimonies, touching and insinuations, known in part indirectly by the homeroom teacher (docente guía) and the guidance counselor. According to the evidentiary records of the Department of Disciplinary Management, various statements were collected which are detailed below: the student [Name 001] indicated: "grazing, closeness to a centimeter" and conversation about the subject, in addition to pointing out that he "never" taught the lessons; [Name 002] affirmed that there were no fixed seats, that the classroom was one of proximity and that the events occurred in full view of the class; [Name 003] referred to approaches and touches on the shoulder or back; for her part, [Name 004] Jimena Apú stated she had not observed inappropriate behaviors; the homeroom teacher (docente guía) Adriana Gómez and the guidance counselor Nancy Karina Torres declared they were not eyewitnesses and related what was known by the students, mentioning approaches and touches; Roxeri Agüero said she had seen approaches and that the teacher touched [Name 001]'s hair, without observing behaviors regarding [Name 002]; teacher Bryan Matarrita pointed out he had not noticed strange behaviors and described lateness, jokes, and disorderliness from [Name 001]; and [Name 004] Pamela Sánchez indicated she had not observed inappropriate actions and described class dynamics that contradicted the claim that the teacher "never" taught lessons. Faced with the resolution of the cessation of the interim appointment, on November 9, 2020, an appeal for reconsideration (recurso de reconsideración) was filed alleging erroneous evidentiary assessment, pretermission of evidence, lack of reasoning, violation of due process and the presumption of innocence, disproportionality of the sanction, and violation of human rights with a conventionality check. He highlighted that, on November 16, 2020, Minister Guiselle Cruz Maduro issued resolution No. 3036-2020 which declared the reconsideration (reconsideración) without merit and upheld resolution No. 2930-2020; from that moment on, the administrative channel was deemed exhausted. Based on that account of facts and adjustments made at the preliminary hearing held on June 29, 2023, they are for judgment: "...1) that the lawsuit be declared WITH MERIT in all its extremes, and that the damages and losses that apply in favor of the plaintiff be granted, which are contained in section three of the complaint brief, with the clarification that what corresponds to moral damages (daño moral) would be subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo). / 2) that the absolute nullity be decreed, or alternatively, the non-conformity with the legal system of resolutions 2930-2020 and 3036-2020 of the MINISTRY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, as well as the rest of actions that occurred within administrative file 0096-2020 of the MEP, ordering the possibility for the plaintiff to be appointed at the Liceo de San José de Alajuela or any other MEP institution, whether in a teaching function or administrative function, and that the State be ordered to pay the damages caused by its harmful actions against the rights of Mr. REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 3) In the alternative, in the event that the absolute nullity or non-conformity of the indicated acts is not decreed, that the objective administrative liability of the STATE be decreed and that it be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused to Mr. REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 4) that the STATE be ordered to pay both costs for the generation of this action...". Once the legal transfer was granted, the State answered the lawsuit negatively. It requested that the lawsuit be declared without merit, that the defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) be accepted, and that the plaintiff be ordered to pay personal and procedural costs, with their legal interest. The Administrative and Civil Treasury Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda), through judgment no. 2024008600 issued at eleven thirty-one hours on November twenty-first, two thousand twenty-four, decided: "The defense of lack of right (excepción de falta de derecho) filed by the State's representation is accepted. Consequently, the lawsuit is declared without merit in all its extremes. The plaintiff NELSON REGALADO MARTÍNEZ is ordered to pay both costs in favor of the State with their respective interests. These items will be liquidated during the execution of the judgment, once this pronouncement is final. THAT IS ALL". Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), which was admitted by this Chamber on appeal for its resolution.

Preliminary question. Regarding the Claim of unconstitutionality. The appellant asks this Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación) to "rule" on the unconstitutionality of articles 18, 22, and 33 of Law No. 7476 and that "the processing be given in accordance with the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction". Such claim is clearly inadmissible at this venue: in accordance with article 10 of the Political Constitution and articles 73 and following of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction, the competence to hear, process, and resolve actions of unconstitutionality falls exclusively upon the Constitutional Chamber. The appropriate channel, therefore, is the action of unconstitutionality before that body; this Chamber is not authorized to open, promote, or resolve such a process, nor does it correspond to defer the issuance of this resolution based on that claim. Furthermore, what is alleged by the cassation-appellant (casacionista) does nothing but object to the interpretation and application that the a quo made of those norms, a matter that —if deemed relevant— must be articulated through the substantive grounds of article 138 CPCA. Consequently, the claim is rejected outright for lack of functional competence of this Court of Cassation (Tribunal de Casación), and we proceed with the consideration of the appeal under the strict terms of the CPCA.

Cassation on procedural grounds. The cassation-appellant (casacionista) raises one grievance of this nature. He accuses lack of reasoning, serious contradiction, and pretermission of evidence. He claims the judgment suffers from serious contradiction and lack of reasoning, because the reasoning does not conform to the constitutional and conventional standard, erroneously applies the rules of sound rational criticism —especially logic and experience— and violates the principle of congruence and the correlation between accusation and judgment, as well as the right of defense and due process, by not resolving key aspects requested in the lawsuit and by illegally incorporating and pretermitting evidence; for this, he invokes articles 42, 57, 82 to 85, 111, 119 and concordant of the CPCA, in relation to articles 137.1 subsections c) and d) and 220 of the same body, articles 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 and 63 of the CPC, articles 11, 33, 39, 41, 56, 57 and 154 of the Political Constitution, and articles 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 and 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights. He affirms the ruling evades the specific points of the litigation through generalities about disciplinary procedures in sexual harassment (hostigamiento sexual) and about differences between criminal law and administrative sanctioning law; in addition, it acts as if it were the directing body of the procedure by fully accepting what was done in the administrative venue without immediacy or comprehensive assessment, dispensing with hearing witnesses and the accused, ignoring that disciplinary bodies are not usually composed of jurists, with which —he adds— the burden of proof is reversed and an indubio pro v victim is applied in practice, contrary to the presumption of innocence (art. 39 constitutional), even with reference to deviation of power (deviation of power) (arts. 113.3 and 131.3 LGAP and art. 49, para. 2, constitutional).

Alleges preterition and erroneous assessment of essential evidence because administrative statements of the alleged victims are transferred to trial, as if they were testimonial evidence, without cross-examination or immediacy, while the only testimonial evidence received at trial (Mónica Murillo) is barely mentioned without assessment, and the rules of sound criticism (sana crítica) also provided for in arts. 18, 22 and 33 of the Law against Harassment are omitted. He maintains that it is not enough to indicate where the evidence is, but rather to analyze it with rationality and proportionality, to contrast and weigh it, which —in his opinion— does not occur, generating an arbitrary, incongruous and unmotivated decision that causes defenselessness and also violates arts. 57, 111 and 119 of the CPCA in relation to 220 of the same and arts. 28.1, 58 and 61 of the CPC, together with arts. 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Constitution and 1, 8 and 24 of the CADH. He requests that the ground be upheld and the judgment be annulled, ordering remand for the holding of a new hearing and issuance of a ruling duly grounded and reasoned in all its aspects.

Regarding the ground of lack of motivation (falta de motivación), the First Chamber has repeatedly ruled, stating: “(…) arises when the reasoning of the ruling is omitted, either because it is totally absent, or because the development (contained therein) is extremely confusing or contradictory, in such a way that it prevents clarity regarding the reasoning that led to the decision adopted in the operative part of the judgment, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that this is a ground of a procedural nature, which implies that it concerns possible non-compliance with the procedural provisions that regulate the procedural process or the judgment, as well as the legal relationship that binds the parties and the judge within the framework of a judicial process, and from which rights and obligations derive. Thus, this ground should not be confused with a mechanism to discuss the application of the Law or the assessment of the evidence carried out by the lower court (A quo) in the reasoning part of the judgment, for which the procedural code establishes autonomous grounds (article 138), since otherwise the specific cassation ground would be distorted. Lack of motivation as a ground for quashing the judgment, in the terms discussed, occurs when the rule that establishes the duty of the judge to analyze the incidents and substantive issues raised by the parties is violated (a principle of procedural law, an integral part of due process, and which, moreover, is materialized in ordinals 119 and 122, subsection m) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), as well as 155 of the Civil Procedure Code). It is not about determining whether the court ruled on all the claims incorporated into the process by the parties, but on the contrary, that the ruling contains the grounds on which the corresponding decision was adopted…”. First Chamber, vote No. 126-F-S1-2009 at 15:40 hrs. on February 5, 2009 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-769260). In accordance with the cited case law, the appellant is not correct, since it is evident from reading the appealed ruling that the Court provided adequate reasoning, and clearly determined the accredited facts. Note, in Recitals (Considerandos) II.4 to II.6, it established the procedural history (íter procesal), the admission of evidence (including the testimonial evidence of Mónica C. Murillo Salas) and the reception of that deposition at trial, as well as the absence of nullities; in Recital (Considerando) IV “Proven Facts”, it established the factual elements with express support from documents in administrative file 0096-2020 (appointments, complaint, provisional measures, statement of charges, administrative hearing, resolutions 2930-2020 and 3036-2020); in Recital (Considerando) V “Unproven Facts”, the damages (daños y perjuicios) were deemed not accredited; in Recital (Considerando) VI it specified the methodology for assessing the body of evidence, under the principle of sound criticism (sana crítica) 82.4 CPCA and the applicable regulations (arts. 3, 4, 5, 18, 21, 22 and 33 of Law 7476, and art. 297 LGAP), even enabling the use of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is lacking; subsequently, it addressed the dispute and resolved the annulment and compensation claims based on the “community of evidence”. In Recital (Considerando) VII the Court examined the alleged defects (imputation, consistency, motivation and proportionality) and concluded that the challenged administrative acts were duly motivated, that the statement of charges (intimación de cargos) was clear and sufficient, and that the sanction of dismissal was in accordance with Law 7476; in Recital (Considerando) VIII the Court specified that the evidentiary standard in matters of sexual harassment does not imply automatic credibility of the complainant, but rather assessment by sound criticism (sana crítica), and explained why, applying that parameter to the whole body of evidence (actions from file 0096-2020, criminal complaint 20-1198-0305-PE in the Adjunta Prosecutor's Office of the First Judicial Circuit of Alajuela (Fiscalía Adjunta del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela) and the testimony given by the victims), it gave greater probative weight to the concordant and sufficient elements to deem the facts proven, discarding the existence of reasonable doubt; and, finally, in Recital (Considerando) IX, it systematized the probative and legal conclusions and set forth the final decision. In this way, the judgment clearly grounded the logical link between the established facts and the legal consequences (criminality, unlawfulness and culpability in a disciplinary context) and resolved in a coherent, orderly and exhaustive manner the actions that made up the administrative sanctioning procedure. Consequently, and given that lack of motivation (falta de motivación) only arises in the face of a real absence or insufficiency of reasons —not to re-examine the correctness of the evidentiary weighing—, this Chamber does not perceive a lack of motivation in the ruling, much less probative preterition.

On the other hand, the appellant maintains the violation of article 137 subsection c) of the CPCA. Regarding the procedural defect of lack of clear and precise determination, the First Chamber: “(…) has held that it consists of a confusing exposition to such a degree that it prevents certainty of the circumstance itself, or else, of a clear contradiction between the different factual elements. Likewise, that this procedural error must be differentiated from the preterition or improper assessment of the evidence that entails non-observance of substantive rules. In this sense, in judgment no. 396-F-SI-2012 at 8:55 a.m. on March 22, 2012, it was indicated that the ‘intellectual work developed by the judges in relation to the facts of the case is susceptible to being reviewed from different perspectives in cassation, which, moreover, should not be confused, not only because they lead to different effects, but because they respond to different purposes. In this sense, the nonconformity may be due to substantial aspects, when the factual picture that the Court deemed proven does not match the reality that emerges from the evidence (in which case it is an error of fact or law, provided for in article 138 CPCA), or else, to procedural errors, either because it was based on illegitimate means of proof or means introduced illegally into the process or because of a defective formulation (lack of clear and precise determination of the facts). This last defect occurs when the Court, when establishing the relevant factual picture for the specific case, formulates one or several facts in a confusing manner, in such a way that it is not possible to have an adequate understanding of what factual situation it intends to make explicit, or when there is a contradiction in the list of proven facts of such magnitude that it is impossible to be certain of what the assessment carried out by the judges during deliberation was. This responds to the purpose of the procedural grounds that give rise to this extraordinary means of challenge, which aim to guarantee that the processing of the different stages that make up the jurisdictional process has proceeded through the channels provided for by the legal system, as well as that the judgment has been issued in the manner prescribed by the applicable procedural rules (in this sense, vote no. 687-F-S1-2010 at 1:00 p.m. on June 9, 2010). Therefore, any questioning relative to whether the determination of facts made is consistent or not with the evidence exceeds the scope of this ground, forming part, on the contrary, of one of a substantive nature. […]’”. Votes of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) no. 559-2024 of May 30, 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), no. 1710-2020 of April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), and no. 1444-2012 of October 30, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). In accordance with the foregoing, this ground for cassation on procedural grounds occurs when the exposition of the facts is imprecise, making it impossible to have certainty of the very circumstance being judged. That is, it is not feasible to have an appropriate knowledge of the factual situation that is intended to be deemed accredited. It also occurs when there is an evident contradiction between the different elements of fact, so the error must be of such magnitude that there can be no certainty of what the assessment made by the Court was. In the case under study, for this Chamber, the grievance essentially seeks —under a procedural posture— to roll the process back to the trial phase in order to receive and hear more witnesses. Such claim is, by all accounts, improper in this venue, because cassation is not a third instance or a vehicle to reproduce the evidentiary debate already precluded, and because the appellant's arguments concern the weighing of the body of evidence admitted in the process carried out by the Court (substantive issues, not procedural defects).

For greater clarity, and in accordance with numerals 57, 111, 119 and 220 CPCA; 28.1, 58 and 61 CPC; 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Political Constitution; and 1, 8 and 24 of the ACHR, the reasoning exhibited in the appealed judgment is sufficiently reasonable and proportional, as it analyzes all the disputed points and links, with sound criticism, the testimonial evidence received at trial and the documentary evidence from the administrative file with the decisory conclusions; hence, no evidentiary omission (preterición probatoria) in a technical sense is configured, since the cassation appellant does not identify concrete, decisive, and omitted evidence whose consideration could have varied the sense of the ruling (criteria reiterated by the First Chamber in votes no. 1710-F-S1-2020 at 10:35 hours on April 29, 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686)), nor does he demonstrate indeterminacy or patent contradiction in the factual findings, vote no. 396-F-S1-2012 at 08:55 hours on March 22, 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-766956); in that same vein, no violation of due process or the right of defense alleged under art. 137 CPCA is verified either, so the ground becomes inadmissible. Finally, regarding the analysis of the evidence in light of Law No. 7476 (Ley contra el Hostigamiento Sexual), the Court made explicit —as applicable methodology— the criteria for assessment by sound criticism (sana crítica) (arts. 22 and 33), freedom of proof and the admissibility of circumstantial evidence when no direct evidence exists (arts. 18, 21 and 22), as well as the conceptual framework and classification of the conduct (arts. 3, 4 and 5), and the correlative disciplinary consequences, in harmony with art. 297 of the LGAP; based on those parameters, the reasoning weighed the internal coherence of the accounts, their temporal consistency, and the peripheral documentary corroborations from administrative file 0096-2020. That reasoning, grounded in Law 7476 and in sound criticism (sana crítica), shows that the ruling was not based on automatic presumptions nor on an unrestricted in dubio pro-víctima, but on the reasoned articulation of circumstantial evidence and legally incorporated documents, which satisfies the duties of clarity, coherence, and sufficiency required by arts. 57, 111 and 119 CPCA and rules out any violation of due process or the right of defense invoked. For the considerations set forth, the grievance must be dismissed.

Cassation for substantive reasons.

The cassation appellant formulates three substantive grounds. The first two will be analyzed jointly, given their intimate thematic connection. In the first, he accuses a substantive violation of articles 138 subsections a) and b) of the CPCA —due to improper assessment and evidentiary omission (preterición probatoria)— which would render the judgment null. He criticizes that the Court improperly analyzes the evidence and the object of the process, determining the proven and unproven facts in a manner alien to logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding, omitting the testimonial evidence offered, in violation of arts. 57, 82–85, 111, 119 and concordant CPCA, in relation to the cited 138 a) and b) and 220 CPCA, 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 and 63 CPC, 11, 28, 33, 39, 41, 45 and 154 of the Political Constitution and 1, 2, 8 and 24 ACHR. He maintains that, although most of the points set as proven in Proven Fact IV were uncontroverted, the Court selects them to underpin its conclusion and omits other central aspects of the litigation —in particular, the violation of labor rights—; he reproaches that Unproven Fact V dismisses the damages and losses in a few lines without a substantiated explanation regarding the reasons why they are deemed unproven, which —in his view— is equivalent to de facto rejecting the entire claim. He expressly adds “lack of substantiation” (falta de fundamentación), “lack of reasoning” (falta de motivación), and “violation of due process and the right of defense” (arts. 137.1.c) and d) CPCA) for not explaining the decisory points. In support of his position, he cites part of the resolution of the First Chamber no. 000173-F-S1-2023 and poses several questions: “What greater defenselessness than ignoring the arguments and foundations that support the unproven facts? Are those not what sustain the rejection of the claim, especially one where there supposedly were annulment pretensions in the first place, and compensatory ones secondarily?”. He maintains that the Court did not assess the testimony given at trial by Mrs. Mónica C. Murillo —limiting itself to mentioning it in the recitals (resultandos)—, which he qualifies as “lack of reasoning” (falta de motivación) and a violation of due process. He affirms that such omission has caused him defenselessness (indefensión) and injures his right of defense, with significance both procedural and on the merits, as it prevents having a clear and precise judgment. He requests to annul and remand for a new trial hearing or, failing that, to rule on the merits. In the second ground, he alleges improper interpretation and application of substantive norms according to art. 138 CPCA —in different passages he cites subsections c) and d), and in the section “Relevance of the grievance” he also invokes subsections a) and b)— and, at the same time, adduces procedural violations protected under art. 137.1.c) CPCA (lack of substantiation (falta de fundamentación) and breach of due process and the right of defense). He maintains that the Court, despite recognizing that the victim's statement is not automatic, takes as its major premise the statement made in the administrative venue by the student [Name 001], contained in administrative file No. 0096-2020 (folios 02, 38–41 and 43–45), where it is recorded that “during the 2020 academic year —without specifying a date— he touched her hair, her back, grabbed her hand, and made insinuations”; he affirms that that deposition is given defining value on its own, without demanding temporal precision or peripheral corroboration, and without having been subjected to immediacy and cross-examination at trial, using it as if it were judicial testimony. He adds that the assessment in the ruling departs from logic, experience, science, and correct human understanding, that the documentary evidence is analyzed superficially and the testimonial evidence —in particular the defense evidence— was omitted (preterida), and that all of this causes him defenselessness (indefensión) due to lack of substantiation (falta de fundamentación). He adds that the application of the principle in dubio pro-víctima supposed an inversion of the burden of proof and displaced the presumption of innocence of constitutional and conventional roots, injuring the normative hierarchy (arts. 6, 11 and 18 LGAP; 18 and 22 Law 7476; 7, 11, 33, 39, 41 and 154 of the Political Constitution; 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 and 26 ACHR; and 57, 119 and ff. CPCA, in relation to art. 138 c) and d) of the CPCA. He reiterates that the testimonial evidence was not adequately assessed and that the “mere testimony” sufficed to deem the conduct classified; he announces a reservation of unconstitutionality regarding arts. 18, 22 and 33 of Law 7476. He requests that the judgment be cassated with remand for a new trial hearing, or else that a ruling be made on the merits. In the third censure, he accuses improper application of article 193 of the CPCA. He indicates that, should the appealed ruling be upheld, one should proceed in accordance with numerals 73.2.1 and 73.2.4 of the Civil Procedure Code and exempt him from the cost order for having demonstrated good faith in the litigation, both in the first instance and in this challenge phase.

Regarding the first and second charges. In the specific case, the appellant forgot that this procedural instance does not correspond to an ordinary appeal (such as an apelación). Nor is it sufficient to express a series of general and merely argumentative disagreements. The contrast between what was decided and the infraction that, in his view, took place is necessary. In this regard, numeral 139 subsection 3 of the CPCA provides for a necessary material requirement, both for the admissibility of the appeal and for its subsequent assessment on the merits. This is the reasoning of the appeal which, due to the characteristics of cassation, must be clear and precise. In this sense, it must contain, as the aforementioned precept provides, the factual and legal basis of the case. Factual, to the extent that one is dissatisfied with the facts that have been deemed proven or unproven (which leads to the weighing of evidence), or with the circumstances occurring in the violation of procedural norms. Legal, when dealing with a problem raised concerning the application, omission, or improper interpretation of any norm that makes up the block of legality, including, of course, principles of constitutional rank, or that which also operates by reflex or indirect effect, after the facts of the challenged judgment are modified. Both in the procedural infraction and in the evidentiary one, reasons of a factual nature can concur, along with the legal reasons (always necessary), and in that sense, the grounds of reference must be directed on both fronts, under penalty of inadmissibility. For its part, it is necessary to clarify that from the legal basis, by express legal mandate, the indication of those canons relating to the value of the poorly appreciated evidentiary element or elements is exempted. Likewise, it is unnecessary to cite the norms that the jurisdictional body of instance erroneously used and mentioned to issue and reason its decision, because they are stated in the appealed pronouncement itself. And of course, it is not at all indispensable to cite the precepts that establish the requirements, deadlines, and basic rules for the admission of the appeal. Before citing these latter, what is essential is that they be fulfilled, that they be put into practice at the moment of preparing and filing the cassation. Thus, the basis required by law can be understood, roughly, as that technical-legal argumentation in which a series of articles, or legal rules interwoven or concatenated among themselves and reasonably linked in a double perspective, are mentioned: with the arguments of the appeal and with the judgment being attacked.

To the extent that a set of legal norms (or, if applicable, a single one) is cited, pertinent and clearly linked to the contested judgment (whether in the factual or legal basis) and the arguments of the appeal, there is legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica). Jurisprudential additions or eventual doctrinal citations will occasionally reinforce the allegations made, but, generally, they do not constitute their essence. As the First Chamber (Sala Primera) has already indicated, interpreting Article 139 of reference, “the appeal must have a minimum legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica) ... the reasons on which it bases its action must be explained, combating the legal arguments of the appealed judgment and setting forth, at least, some normative reference that gives it support.” Resolution No. 318-A-2008, of 14 hours 25 minutes on May 8, 2008 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422284). The reasoning (fundamentación) is, therefore, alien to the confused display of norms and allegations; to the mixture of unintelligible arguments or the simple exposition of opinions on the appropriateness or justice of the case, or else, to the recounting of the errors considered committed in the appealed judgment, without support in legal norms or criteria. Hence, if the appeal completely omits that technical-normative relationship to which reference has been made, or the one it makes is manifestly and evidently impertinent or disconnected from the case, it must be understood that it lacks “total legal reasoning (fundamentación jurídica)” and, therefore, fails to comply with the necessary requirement established in numeral 139.3, which is sanctioned with outright rejection (rechazo de plano), pursuant to the provisions of Article 140, subsection c) of the same procedural code. Likewise, this Chamber (Cámara), repeatedly, has pointed out that for an appeal to pass the admission control, it is required, in addition to the sufficient statement of grounds, the corresponding mention and linking of the applicable norms deemed infringed with the questioned judgment. In this regard, one may consult, among others, the resolutions of the First Chamber (Sala Primera) Nos. 677-A-S1-2021 of 09 hours 40 minutes on March 25, 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1029345); No. 755-A-S1-2022 of 10 hours 55 minutes on March 29, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); and No. 1663-A-S1-2022 of 10 hours 05 minutes on July 21, 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340). In the case under examination, this Chamber (Cámara) reaches the conviction that the cassation appellant intermixed dissimilar hypotheses and, by the way in which they structured the grievances, made them inseparable: they expose, in the first grievance, a supposed erroneous assessment and interpretation of the evidence — which places their reproach under the ground of Art. 138 CPCA — but they support it with reproaches of lack of reasoning (fundamentación), lack of motivation (motivación), and violation of due process, which are grounds proper to Art. 137 CPCA. Furthermore, they invoke a “pretermission (preterición)” of the testimony of Mónica C. Murillo, the use of uncontested extremes from Considerando IV, and a laconic dismissal of the damages and losses (daños y perjuicios) item in Considerando V, to conclude that the judgment is null. This confusion of planes (substantive/procedural), without normative individualization or demonstration of the breach, infringes the technique of Art. 139.3 CPCA: the appeal does not clearly identify which substantive rule of Art. 138 would have been violated nor, as the case may be, which procedural provision of Art. 137 and how it would have been transgressed, nor does it specify in which part of the judgment the omission or logical inconsistency of the decision occurred. In the second grievance, the cassation appellant reiterates an abstract accusation of improper interpretation and application of substantive norms (Art. 138 CPCA), accompanied by rhetorical categories (“non sequitur”, “yes, but fallacy”) and a thesis of reversal of the burden of proof due to the acceptance of “in dubio pro-víctima”. However, again they do not individualize which concrete rule would have been misapplied nor explain why the application of the norm to the facts carried out by the Court (Tribunal) would be legally erroneous or decisive for the outcome (Art. 138, capitis); and, again, they shift the core of the grievance towards allegations of due process, lack of motivation (motivación), and evidentiary pretermission (preterición) — channels of Art. 137 CPCA —, persisting in the confusion of grounds and in the deficit of reasoning (fundamentación) of the appeal itself, defects that Art. 139.3 CPCA proscribes and that Art. 140 subsection c) sanctions with outright rejection (rechazo de plano). Moreover, the claim in both grievances — “annul and remand for a new trial hearing” or, even, “annul and rule on the merits” — shows that the appellant seeks to reopen the evidentiary debate and revert the process to the trial phase to incorporate testimonial evidence, a remedy improper for contentious cassation (casación contenciosa), which does not constitute a third instance nor a vehicle to replay stages already precluded. Thus presented, both grievances suffer from poor cassation technique: (i) they confuse substantive grounds (Art. 138 CPCA) with procedural grounds (Art. 137 CPCA); (ii) they lack the clarity and precision required by Art. 139.3 CPCA to link the judgment with the allegedly infringed norm and the concrete grievance; and (iii) they propose a remedy incompatible with the nature of the cassation appeal (recurso de casación). Consequently, failing to satisfy the requirements of clarity and precision of Article 139.3 CPCA, their outright rejection (rechazo de plano) is appropriate.

Regarding the third charge, numeral 193 of the CPCA establishes as a general rule the award of costs against the losing party and contemplates as possible exceptions to that award when: “a) The judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party plausibly did not know and, for this reason, the party's opposition was adjusted. b) Due to the nature of the issues debated, there existed, in the opinion of the Court (Tribunal), sufficient reason to litigate”. In the specific case, the appellant is limited solely to invoking their good faith in litigation, an argument that does not fit any of the exceptive scenarios of Article 193 nor displace the objective criterion of defeat. Nor was it accredited that the controversy presented such normative complexity as to justify departing from the general rule, especially when the applicable legal framework and relevant jurisprudence are clear and were correctly applied. Thus, as the Court (Tribunal) rightly decided, the appropriate course is the application of the award of costs against the losing party, as this is, as stated, the procedural rule. Therefore, no normative breach is observed in what was resolved and, consequently, the objection must be denied.

By virtue of the foregoing, none of the reproaches having prospered, the appeal must be declared without merit. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 150.3 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, the cassation appellant must be ordered to pay the costs generated by the exercise of this instance.

**POR TANTO** The claim of unconstitutionality raised is rejected as improper. The cassation appeal (recurso de casación) is declared without merit.

The costs incurred in its exercise are borne by the person who promoted it. CBE

Documento PJEDITOR  Res. 000024-A-TC-2026 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas dieciseis minutos del veintinueve de enero de dos mil veintiseis.

Proceso de conocimiento, establecido en el Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, promovido por Nelson Regalado Martínez, representado por su apoderado especial judicial Boris Molina Mathiew; contra el Estado, representado por el procurador Carlos Adrián Valverde Arley. La parte actora formula recurso de casación contra la sentencia no. 2024008600 dictada a las once horas con treinta y uno minutos del veintiuno de noviembre del dos mil veinticuatro, suscrita por las juezas Lindsay Rodríguez Cubero (ponente), Karen Calderón Chacón y el juez Francisco José Chaves Torres.

Redacta la Magistrada Vargas Vásquez;

CONSIDERANDO

El presente proceso deriva del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario tramitado por el Ministerio de Educación Pública, expediente N° 0096-2020, seguido contra Nelson Regalado Martínez por presuntas conductas que la Ley N° 7476, Ley contra el Hostigamiento Sexual en el Empleo y la Docencia, tipifica como acoso sexual. En lo sustancial, la parte actora señaló que, desde el 1 de febrero de 2016, se desempeñó como profesor de Inglés Académico en el Liceo Samuel Sáenz Flores de Heredia y, posteriormente, a partir del 3 de marzo de 2017, el Ministerio de Educación Pública lo contactó para brindar sus servicios en una plaza diferenciada del programa de Talleres de Inglés Conversacional en el Liceo San José de Alajuela para sétimos años; al incorporarse en este programa ocupó un puesto interino con renovaciones sucesivas que, en la práctica, le aseguraban continuidad, de modo que desde inicios de 2017 laboró simultáneamente en ambos centros educativos. Más adelante, el director del Liceo San José de Alajuela, Allan Barboza Jiménez, le solicita al Ministerio de Educación Pública ampliar el programa de Inglés Conversacional para séptimos, octavos y novenos años y se le ofrecieron 40 lecciones en el Liceo San José de Alajuela, oferta que aceptó y, por ello, desde el 1 de febrero de 2019 trabajó allí a tiempo completo como profesor de Inglés Conversacional hasta su separación. Manifestó haber mantenido un desempeño satisfactorio, sin antecedentes disciplinarios. En cuanto a la dinámica del taller, cada grupo se dividía por lista en dos subgrupos que debían recibir la clase simultáneamente en espacios distintos, pero, por razones ajenas al personal docente, el director dispuso que ambas mitades recibieran la clase juntas con presencia de dos profesores. Para el año 2017, la administración del Liceo San José de Alajuela decidió conformar y dividir los grupos de séptimo año de acuerdo con algunas características particulares de los estudiantes, por lo que el grupo 7-5 estaba conformado en su mayoría por estudiantes mayores de lo esperado para ese nivel, comúnmente debido a que eran repitentes con uno o más años de retraso en su estudio. Además, era un grupo con algunos estudiantes que, por alguna razón, solían tener problemas de conducta constantemente; entre ellos, la estudiante [Nombre 001], quien solía tener un comportamiento inadecuado durante las lecciones de Inglés Conversacional, que dificultaba enormemente el desarrollo de la clase que, por su naturaleza, debe ser fluida y en un ambiente de calma, silencio y concentración. Señaló, el 25 de febrero de 2020, durante una lección, la estudiante agitó un líquido perfumado que se derramó sobre los compañeros, se alteró y abandonó el aula, sin que el personal docente lograra ubicarla de inmediato, constatándose luego que acudió a la oficina de Orientación; en esa ocasión se levantó boleta por “escape” y se exigió su devolución firmada por la persona encargada. Dijo, días después, tres estudiantes informaron que [Nombre 001] y otras jóvenes estaban recolectando firmas para formular una acusación y “sacarlo” del puesto. Destacó, el 25 de febrero de 2020, la estudiante [Nombre 001] acudió a la oficina de orientación con dos compañeras y manifestó no querer volver a las clases y que el profesor le tocaba el cabello, la espalda y la mano, además, de abrazarla, activándose el Protocolo de actuación en situaciones de violencia; EXPEDIENTE 096-2020, en dicho instrumento se consignó, entre otros, que la docente guía indicó que la alumna [Nombre 001] dijo sentirse acosada y que, en conversación con el grupo, prácticamente todas las mujeres expresaron incomodidad y su deseo de no asistir a esas clases; además, el 28 de febrero de 2020, se documentó que la menor [Nombre 002], indicó que estaba “incómoda en las lecciones de inglés conversacional con los profesores mencionados, porque se siente hostigada, ya que la miran con malicia y OBSERVA conductas de los profesores hacia otras compañeras que la hacen sentir muy mal”. Refirió, mediante resolución N° 0887-2020, el MEP lo reubicó provisionalmente en la Dirección Regional de Alajuela; luego, mediante resolución N° 2930-2020 del 4 de noviembre de 2020, se afirmó que incurrió en presuntos hechos se relacionan con conductas inapropiadas de acoso y/o hostigamiento sexual contra de la estudiante [Nombre 001], [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 003] y se ordenó el cese inmediato del nombramiento interino, detallándose, con base en testimonios de las menores, tocamientos e insinuaciones, conocidos en parte de forma indirecta por la docente guía y la orientadora. Según las actas de prueba del Departamento de Gestión Disciplinaria, se recogieron diversas declaraciones que a continuación se detallan: la estudiante [Nombre 001] indicó: “roces, cercanía a un centímetro” y conversación sobre la materia, además de señalar que “nunca” impartía las lecciones; [Nombre 002] afirmó que no había asientos fijos, que el aula era de proximidad y que los hechos ocurrieron a la vista de la clase; [Nombre 003] refirió acercamientos y toques en hombro o espalda; por su parte, [Nombre 004] Jimena Apú manifestó no haber observado conductas inadecuadas; la docente guía Adriana Gómez y la orientadora Nancy Karina Torres declararon no ser testigos presenciales y relataron lo conocido por las estudiantes, mencionando acercamientos y toques; Roxeri Agüero dijo haber visto acercamientos y que el docente tocó el pelo a [Nombre 001], sin observar conductas respecto de [Nombre 002]; el profesor Bryan Matarrita señaló no haber advertido comportamientos extraños y describió tardanza, bromas y desorden de [Nombre 001]; y [Nombre 004] Pamela Sánchez indicó no haber observado actuaciones inadecuadas y describió dinámicas de clase que contradecían la afirmación de que el profesor “nunca” impartía lecciones. Frente a la resolución del cese del nombramiento interino, el 9 de noviembre de 2020, se interpuso recurso de reconsideración alegando errónea valoración probatoria, preterición de prueba, falta de fundamentación, violación al debido proceso y a la presunción de inocencia, desproporcionalidad de la sanción y violación de derechos humanos con control de convencionalidad. Resaltó, el 16 de noviembre de 2020, la ministra Guiselle Cruz Maduro dictó la resolución N° 3036-2020 que declaró sin lugar la reconsideración y mantuvo incólume la resolución N° 2930-2020; a partir de ese momento se tuvo por agotada la vía administrativa. Con base en esa relación de hechos y ajustes realizados en la audiencia preliminar celebrada el día 29 de junio de 2023, son para que en sentencia: "...1) se declare CON LUGAR la demanda en todos sus extremos, y se otorguen los daños y perjuicios que proceden en favor de la parte actora, los cuales se encuentran contenidos en el apartado tres del escrito de demanda, con la aclaración de que lo correspondiente al daño moral sería daño moral subjetivo. / 2) se decrete la nulidad absoluta, o bien, la disconformidad con el ordenamiento jurídico de las resoluciones 2930-2020 y 3036-2020 del MINISTERIO DE EDUCACIÓN PÚBLICA, así como del resto de actuaciones acaecidos dentro del expediente administrativo 0096-2020 del MEP, ordenando la posibilidad al actor de ser nombrado en el Liceo de San José de Alajuela o en cualquier otra institución del MEP, ya sea, en la función docente o en la función administrativa y que se condene al Estado al pago de los daños ocasionados con su actuar lesivo de los derechos del señor REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 3) Subsidiariamente, en caso de que no se decrete la nulidad absoluta o la disconformidad de los actos señalados, que se decrete la responsabilidad administrativa objetiva del ESTADO y se condene al pago de los daños y perjuicio ocasionados al señor REGALADO MARTÍNEZ. / 4) se condene al pago de ambas costas al ESTADO por lo que genere esta acción...". Conferido el traslado de ley, el Estado contestó negativamente la demanda. Solicitó, se declare sin lugar la demanda, se acoja la excepción de falta de derecho y se condene a la parte actora al pago de las costas personales y procesales, con sus intereses legales. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, mediante sentencia no. 2024008600 dictada a las once horas con treinta y uno minutos del veintiuno de noviembre del dos mil veinticuatro, dispuso: “Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por la representación del Estado. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. Se condena al actor NELSON REGALADO MARTÍNEZ a favor del Estado al pago de ambas costas con sus respectivos intereses. Estos extremos se liquidarán en ejecución de sentencia, una vez firme este pronunciamiento. ES TODO”. Disconforme con lo resuelto, la parte actora presentó recurso de casación, el cual fue admitido por esta Cámara en alzada para su resolución.

Cuestión preliminar. Sobre el Alegato de inconstitucionalidad. El recurrente solicita que este Tribunal de Casación “se pronuncie” sobre la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 18, 22 y 33 de la Ley N° 7476 y que “se dé la tramitación conforme a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional”. Tal pretensión, a todas luces, resulta improcedente en esta sede: conforme al artículo 10 de la Constitución Política y a los artículos 73 y siguientes de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la competencia para conocer, tramitar y resolver acciones de inconstitucionalidad recae de manera exclusiva en la Sala Constitucional. La vía idónea, por ende, es la acción de inconstitucionalidad ante ese órgano; a esta Cámara no le es dable abrir, impulsar ni resolver tal trámite, ni corresponde diferir el dictado de esta resolución con base en ese alegato. De otra parte, lo alegado por el casacionista no hace sino objetar la interpretación y la aplicación que el a quo hizo de esas normas, asunto que —de estimarse— debe articularse por las causales de fondo del artículo 138 CPCA. En consecuencia, se rechaza de plano el alegato por falta de competencia funcional de este Tribunal de Casación y se prosigue con el conocimiento del recurso en los estrictos términos del CPCA.

Casación por razones procesales.

El casacionista plantea un agravio de esta naturaleza. Acusa, falta de motivación, contradicción grave y preterición de prueba. Alega, la sentencia adolece de contradicción grave y falta de fundamentación, pues la motivación no se ajusta al parámetro constitucional y convencional, aplica erróneamente las reglas de la sana crítica racional —en especial lógica y experiencia— y vulnera el principio de congruencia y la correlación entre acusación y sentencia, así como el derecho de defensa y el debido proceso, al no resolver aspectos clave peticionados con la demanda e incorporar y preterir prueba en forma ilegal; para ello invoca los artículos 42, 57, 82 a 85, 111, 119 y concordantes del CPCA, en relación con los artículos 137.1 incisos c) y d) y 220 del mismo cuerpo, los artículos 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 y 63 del CPC, los artículos 11, 33, 39, 41, 56, 57 y 154 de la Constitución Política y los artículos 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 y 26 de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. Afirma, el fallo elude los puntos concretos del litigio mediante generalidades sobre procedimientos disciplinarios en hostigamiento sexual y sobre diferencias entre derecho penal y derecho administrativo sancionador; además, actúa como si fuera órgano director del procedimiento al acoger en su totalidad lo actuado en sede administrativa sin inmediación ni valoración integral, prescindiendo de oír a testigos y al denunciado, desconociendo que los órganos disciplinarios no suelen estar integrados por juristas, con lo que —añade— se invierte la carga de la prueba y se aplica en los hechos un indubio pro víctima contrario a la presunción de inocencia (art. 39 constitucional), incluso con referencia a desviación de poder (arts. 113.3 y 131.3 LGAP y art. 49, párr. 2°, constitucional). Alega, preterición y errónea valoración de prueba esencial porque se trasladan al juicio, como si fueran testimoniales, declaraciones administrativas de las presuntas ofendidas sin contradicción ni inmediación, mientras que la única testimonial recibida en juicio (Mónica Murillo) apenas se menciona sin valoración, y se omiten las reglas de la sana crítica previstas también en los arts. 18, 22 y 33 de la Ley contra el Hostigamiento. Sostiene, no basta indicar dónde está la prueba, sino analizarla con racionalidad y proporcionalidad, contraponerla y sopesarla, lo que —a su juicio— eso no ocurre, generándose una resolución arbitraria, incongruente y desmotivada que causa indefensión y vulnera, además, los arts. 57, 111 y 119 del CPCA en relación con el 220 del mismo y los arts. 28.1, 58 y 61 del CPC, junto con los arts. 11, 33, 39, 41 y 154 constitucionales y 1, 8 y 24 de la CADH. Solicita, se acoja el motivo y se anule la sentencia ordenándose el reenvío para la celebración de nueva audiencia y emisión del fallo debidamente fundado y motivado en todos sus extremos.

En lo tocante a la causal de falta de motivación, la Sala Primera se ha pronunciado en repetidas ocasiones indicando: “(…) surge cuando la motivación del fallo es omisa, ya sea porque esta se encuentra totalmente ausente, o bien, por cuanto el desarrollo (contenido en la misma) resulta en extremo confuso o contradictorio, de forma tal que se impida tener claridad en cuanto a los razonamientos que derivaron en la decisión adoptada en la parte dispositiva de la sentencia, lo que vulneraría los derechos procesales de las partes, en particular, del debido proceso. Asimismo, debe tenerse presente que se trata de un motivo de índole procesal, lo que implica que es atinente a eventuales incumplimientos de las disposiciones adjetivas que regulan el íter procesal o la sentencia, así como la relación jurídica que vincula a las partes y al juez en el marco de un proceso judicial, y de la cual derivan derechos y obligaciones. Así las cosas, no debe confundirse esta causal con un mecanismo para entrar a discutir la aplicación del Derecho o la valoración de la prueba realizada por el A quo en la parte considerativa de la sentencia, para lo cual el Código de rito establece causales autónomas (artículo 138), ya que de lo contrario se desnaturalizaría el motivo casacional específico. La falta de motivación como causal para casar la sentencia, en los términos en que se ha comentado, se da al conculcarse la norma que dispone el deber del juzgador de analizar las incidencias y cuestiones de fondo planteadas por las partes (principio de derecho procesal, integrante del debido proceso, y que, por demás, se encuentra materializado en los ordinales 119 y 122, inciso m) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, así como el 155 del Código Procesal Civil). No se trata de determinar si el juzgado se pronunció sobre todas las pretensiones incorporadas al proceso por las partes, sino por el contrario, que el fallo cuente con los fundamentos sobre los cuales se adoptó la decisión correspondiente…”. Sala Primera, voto N° 126-F-S1-2009 de las 15:40 hrs. del 5 de febrero de 2009 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-769260). De conformidad con la jurisprudencia citada, no lleva razón el casacionista, pues se constata de la lectura del fallo recurrido, que el Tribunal proporcionó una fundamentación adecuada, y determinó con claridad los hechos acreditados. Obsérvese, en los considerandos II.4 a II.6, dejó asentado el íter procesal, la admisión de la prueba (incluida la testimonial de Mónica C. Murillo Salas) y la recepción de esa deposición en juicio, así como la inexistencia de nulidades; en el Considerando IV “Hechos probados”, fijó los extremos fácticos con apoyo expreso en documentos del expediente administrativo 0096-2020 (nombramientos, denuncia, medidas provisionales, traslado de cargos, audiencia administrativa, resoluciones 2930-2020 y 3036-2020); en el Considerando V “Hechos no probados”, se tuvo por no acreditado los daños y perjuicios; en el Considerando VI precisó la metodología para la valoración del acervo probatorio, bajo el principio de la sana crítica 82.4 CPCA y la normativa aplicable (arts. 3, 4, 5, 18, 21, 22 y 33 de la Ley 7476, y art. 297 LGAP), habilitando incluso el uso de prueba indiciaria cuando falta prueba directa; seguidamente, atendió la litis y resolvió las pretensiones anulatorias y resarcitorias sobre la base de la “comunidad de la prueba”. En el Considerando VII el Tribunal examinó los vicios denunciados (imputación, congruencia, motivación y proporcionalidad) y concluyó que los actos administrativos impugnados se encontraban debidamente motivados, que la intimación de cargos fue clara y suficiente y que la sanción de cese resultó ajustada a la Ley 7476; en el Considerando VIII el Tribunal precisó que el estándar probatorio en materia de hostigamiento sexual no supone credibilidad automática de la denunciante, sino valoración por sana crítica, y explicó por qué, aplicando ese parámetro al conjunto probatorio (actuaciones del expediente 0096-2020, denuncia penal 20-1198-0305-PE en la Fiscalía Adjunta del Primer Circuito Judicial de Alajuela y el testimonio rendido por las ofendidas), otorgó mayor peso probatorio a los elementos concordantes y suficientes para tener por demostrados los hechos, descartando la existencia de una duda razonable; y, finalmente, en el Considerando IX, sistematizó las conclusiones probatorias y jurídicas y dejó plasmada la decisión final. De este modo, la sentencia fundamentó de forma clara el enlace lógico entre los hechos fijados y las consecuencias jurídicas (tipicidad, antijuridicidad y culpabilidad en sede disciplinaria) y resolvió de forma coherente, ordenada y exhaustiva las actuaciones que integraron el procedimiento administrativo sancionador. En consecuencia y dado que la falta de motivación solo se configura ante la ausencia real o insuficiencia de razones —no para reexaminar el acierto de la ponderación probatoria—, esta Cámara no advierte falta de motivación en el fallo, menos aún, preterición probatoria. Por otra parte, el recurrente sostiene la violación del artículo 137 inciso c) del CPCA. Sobre el vicio procesal de falta de determinación clara y precisa, la Sala Primera: “(…) ha sostenido que consiste en una exposición confusa de grado tal que impide tener certeza de la circunstancia misma, o bien, por una contradicción palmaria entre los distintos elementos fácticos. Asimismo, que debe diferenciarse este yerro procesal con la preterición o indebida valoración de las probanzas que apareja la inobservancia de normas de orden sustantivo. En este sentido, en la sentencia no. 396-F-SI-2012 de las 8 horas 55 minutos del 22 de marzo de 2012, se señaló que la “labor intelectiva desarrollada por los juzgadores en relación con los hechos del caso es pasible de ser revisada desde distintas ópticas en sede casacional, las cuales, además, no deben ser confundidas, no solo porque conducen a efectos distintos, sino porque responden a finalidades diversas. En este sentido, la inconformidad puede obedecer a aspectos sustanciales, cuando el cuadro fáctico que tuvo por demostrado el Tribunal no es conteste con la realidad que se desprende de las pruebas (en cuyo caso se trata de un error de hecho o de derecho, previstos en el artículo 138 CPCA), o bien, a yerros procesales, ya sea por haberse fundado en medios probatorios ilegítimos o introducidos en forma ilegal al proceso o por una defectuosa formulación (falta de determinación clara y precisa de los hechos). Este último vicio se produce cuando el Tribunal, al establecer el cuadro fáctico pertinente para el caso concreto, fórmula uno o varios hechos de manera confusa, de forma tal que no sea posible tener un adecuado entendimiento de cuál es la situación fáctica que pretende explicitar, o bien, cuando exista una contradicción en el elenco de hechos probados de tal envergadura que sea imposible tener certeza de cuál fue la valoración realizada por los juzgadores al deliberar. Esto responde a la finalidad de las causales procesales que dan cabida a este medio impugnaticio extraordinario, las cuales tienen por objetivo garantizar que la tramitación de las distintas etapas que conforman el proceso jurisdiccional haya discurrido por los cauces previstos por el ordenamiento jurídico, así como que la sentencia se haya dictado en la forma prescrita por las normas adjetivas aplicables (en este sentido, voto no. 687-F-S1-2010 de las 13 horas del 9 de junio de 2010). Por ello, cualquier cuestionamiento relativo a si la fijación de los hechos realizada resulta acorde o no a las pruebas excede el ámbito propio de esta causal, formando parte, por el contrario, de una de índole sustantivo. […]”. Votos de las Sala Primera no. 559-2024 del 30 de mayo de 2024 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1235325), no. 1710-2020 del 29 de abril de 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), y no. 1444-2012 del 30 de octubre de 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-767575). De conformidad con lo anterior, esta causal de casación por motivos adjetivos acaece cuando la exposición de los hechos es imprecisa, lo que imposibilita tener certidumbre de la propia circunstancia que se juzga. Sea, que no es factible tener un apropiado conocimiento de la situación fáctica que se pretende tener por acreditada. Igualmente se produce cuando existe una contradicción evidente entre los distintos elementos de hecho, por lo que el yerro debe ser de tal magnitud que no puede tenerse seguridad de cuál fue la valoración efectuada por el Tribunal. En el caso de estudio, para esta Cámara, el agravio en el fondo pretende —bajo una postura procesal— retrotraer el proceso a la fase de juicio para recibir y escuchar más testigos. Tal pretensión es, a todas luces, improcedente en esta sede, porque la casación no es una tercera instancia ni un vehículo para reproducir el debate probatorio ya precluido, y porque las argumentaciones del recurrente versan sobre la ponderación efectuada por el Tribunal del acervo probatorio admitido en el proceso (cuestiones de fondo, no vicios de forma). A mayor abundamiento, y conforme a los numerales 57, 111, 119 y 220 CPCA; 28.1, 58 y 61 CPC; 11, 33, 39, 41 y 154 de la Constitución Política; y 1, 8 y 24 de la CADH, la motivación exhibida en la sentencia recurrida es suficientemente razonable y proporcional, pues analiza todos los puntos controvertidos y enlaza, con sana crítica, la prueba testimonial recibida en juicio y la documental del expediente administrativo con las conclusiones decisorias; de ahí que no se configure preterición probatoria en sentido técnico, ya que el casacionista no individualiza una prueba concreta, decisiva y omitida cuya ponderación hubiera podido variar el sentido del fallo (criterio reiterado por la Sala Primera en los votos no. 1710-F-S1-2020 de las 10:35 horas del 29 de abril del 2020 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-990686), ni demuestra indeterminación o contradicción palmaria en el elenco fáctico, voto no. 396-F-S1-2012 de las 08:55 horas del 22 de marzo del 2012 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-766956); en esa misma línea, tampoco se verifica violación al debido proceso ni al derecho de defensa alegado bajo el art. 137 CPCA, por lo que el motivo deviene improcedente. Finalmente, en cuanto al análisis de las pruebas a la luz de la Ley N° 7476 (Ley contra el Hostigamiento Sexual), el Tribunal explicitó —como metodología aplicable— los criterios de valoración por la sana crítica (arts. 22 y 33), la libertad probatoria y la admisibilidad de la prueba indiciaria cuando no exista prueba directa (arts. 18, 21 y 22), así como el marco conceptual y de tipicidad de la conducta (arts. 3, 4 y 5), y las consecuencias disciplinarias correlativas, en armonía con el art. 297 de la LGAP; a partir de esos parámetros, la motivación ponderó la coherencia interna de los relatos, su consistencia temporal, las corroboraciones periféricas documentales provenientes del expediente administrativo 0096-2020. Esa motivación, asentada en la Ley 7476 y en la sana crítica, muestra que el fallo no se basó en presunciones automáticas ni en el in dubio pro-víctima irrestricto, sino en la articulación razonada de indicios y documentos legalmente incorporados, lo que satisface los deberes de claridad, congruencia y suficiencia exigidos por los arts. 57, 111 y 119 CPCA y descarta cualquier vulneración al debido proceso o al derecho de defensa invocados. Por las consideraciones expuestas, el agravio deberá desestimarse.

Casación por razones sustantivas.

El casacionista formula tres motivos de fondo. Los dos primeros serán analizados de manera conjunta, dada su íntima conexión temática. En el primero, acusa violación sustantiva de los artículos 138 incisos a) y b) del CPCA —por indebida valoración y por preterición probatoria— que tornaría nula la sentencia. Recrimina, el Tribunal analiza indebidamente la prueba y el objeto del proceso, determinando los hechos probados y no probados de forma ajena a la lógica, la experiencia, la ciencia y el correcto entendimiento humano, pretiriendo la prueba testimonial ofrecida, en violación de los arts. 57, 82–85, 111, 119 y concordantes CPCA, en relación con los citados 138 a) y b) y 220 CPCA, 28.1, 41.5, 58, 61 y 63 CPC, 11, 28, 33, 39, 41, 45 y 154 de la Constitución Política y 1, 2, 8 y 24 CADH. Sostiene, aunque la mayoría de los extremos fijados como probados en el Hecho IV eran incontrovertidos, el Tribunal los selecciona para apuntalar su conclusión y omite otros aspectos centrales de la litis —en particular, la violación de derechos laborales—; reprocha que el Hecho V (no probados) descarta en pocas líneas los daños y perjuicios sin explicación fundamentada acerca de las razones por las cuales se tienen por no probados, lo que —a su juicio— equivale a rechazar de facto toda la demanda. Agrega expresamente “falta de fundamentación”, “falta de motivación” y “violación al debido proceso y al derecho de defensa” (arts. 137.1.c) y d) CPCA) por no explicarse los puntos decisorios. En apoyo a su postura, cita parte de la resolución de la Sala Primera no. 000173-F-S1-2023 y formula varias interrogantes: “¿Qué más indefensión que desconocer los argumentos y fundamentos que sostienen los hechos no probados? ¿Acaso no son esos los que sostienen el rechazo de la demanda, máxime una donde se supone que había pretensiones anulatorias en primer lugar, e indemnizatorias de manera secundaria?”. Sostiene, el Tribunal no valoró el testimonio rendido en juicio por la señora Mónica C. Murillo —limitándose a mencionarlo en los resultandos—, lo que califica como “falta de motivación” y vulneración del debido proceso. Afirma, tal omisión le ha generado indefensión y lesiona su derecho de defensa, con trascendencia tanto procesal como de fondo, pues impide contar con una sentencia clara y precisa. Solicita, anular y reenviar para nueva audiencia de juicio o, en su defecto, fallar por el fondo. En el segundo motivo, alega indebida interpretación y aplicación de normas sustantivas conforme al art. 138 CPCA —en distintos pasajes cita los incisos c) y d), y en la sección “Relevancia del agravio” invoca además los incisos a) y b)— y, a la vez, aduce violaciones procesales amparadas en el art. 137.1.c) CPCA (falta de fundamentación y quebranto del debido proceso y del derecho de defensa). Sostiene, el Tribunal pese a reconocer que la declaración de la víctima no es automática, toma como premisa mayor la declaración rendida en sede administrativa por la estudiante [Nombre 001], obrante en el expediente administrativo N° 0096-2020 (folios 02, 38–41 y 43–45), donde se consigna que “durante el curso lectivo 2020 —sin precisar fecha— le ha tocado el cabello, la espalda, le ha agarrado la mano y le ha hecho insinuaciones”; afirma que a esa deposición se le confiere valor definitorio por sí sola, sin exigencia de precisión temporal ni corroboración periférica, y sin haber sido sometida a inmediación y contradicción en juicio, empleándola como si fuera testimonio judicial. Agrega, la valoración del fallo se aparta de la lógica, la experiencia, la ciencia y el correcto entendimiento humano, que la prueba documental se analiza someramente y la testimonial —en particular la de descargo— se pretirió, y que todo ello le causa indefensión por falta de fundamentación. Añade, la aplicación del principio in dubio pro-víctima supuso una inversión de la carga probatoria y desplazó la presunción de inocencia de raigambre constitucional y convencional con lesión de la jerarquía normativa (arts. 6, 11 y 18 LGAP; 18 y 22 Ley 7476; 7, 11, 33, 39, 41 y 154 de la Constitución Política; 1, 2, 8, 21, 24 y 26 CADH; y 57, 119 y ss. CPCA, en relación con el art. 138 c) y d) del CPCA. Reitera, no se valoró adecuadamente la prueba testimonial y que bastó el “mero testimonio” para tener por acreditada la tipicidad; anuncia reserva de inconstitucionalidad respecto de los arts. 18, 22 y 33 de la Ley 7476. Solicita, se case la sentencia con reenvío para nueva audiencia de juicio, o bien se falle por el fondo. En la tercera censura, acusa indebida aplicación del artículo 193 del CPCA. Indica, en caso de que se mantenga el fallo venido en alzada, se proceda de conformidad con los numerales 73.2.1 y 73.2.4 del Código Procesal Civil y se le exima de la condenatoria en costas por haber demostrado buena fe en el litigio, tanto en la primera instancia como en esta fase de impugnación.

Referente a los cargos primero y segundo. En el caso concreto, el recurrente olvidó que esta instancia procesal no corresponde a un recurso ordinario (como es el de apelación). Tampoco, resulta suficiente manifestar una serie de disconformidades generales y meramente argumentativas. Es menester el contraste de lo decidido con la infracción que, en su criterio, tuvo lugar. Al respecto, el numeral 139 inciso 3 del CPCA prevé un requerimiento de orden material necesario, tanto para la admisibilidad del recurso cuanto para su posterior valoración por el fondo. Se trata de la motivación del recurso que, por las características de la casación, ha de ser clara y precisa. En este sentido, debe contener, tal como lo dispone el precepto de comentario, la fundamentación fáctica y jurídica del caso. Fáctica, en la medida en que se muestre inconforme con los hechos que se han tenido por demostrados o por indemostrados (lo cual lleva a la ponderación de las probanzas), o con las circunstancias acaecidas en la violación de normas procesales. Jurídica, cuando se trata de un problema que se expone acerca de la aplicación, omisión o indebida interpretación de cualquier norma que integre el bloque de juridicidad, incluidos, por supuesto, los principios de rango constitucional, o aquella que también opera por efecto reflejo o indirecto, después de que se modifican los hechos de la sentencia impugnada. Tanto en la infracción procesal, como en la probatoria, puede concurrir, junto con las razones jurídicas (siempre necesarias), las de carácter fáctico y, en ese sentido, los fundamentos de referencia deberán ser dirigidos en ambas vertientes, so pena de inadmisibilidad. Por su parte, es necesario aclarar que de la fundamentación jurídica se exonera, por expreso mandato legal, la indicación de aquellos cánones relativos al valor del elemento o elementos probatorios mal apreciados. De igual forma, resulta innecesario citar las normas que equivocadamente utilizó y mencionó el órgano jurisdiccional de instancia para emitir y razonar su decisión, porque constan en el mismo pronunciamiento recurrido. Y desde luego, no es para nada indispensable citar los preceptos que establecen los requisitos, plazos y reglas básicas para la admisión del recurso. Antes que la cita de estas últimas, lo imprescindible es que se cumplan, que se pongan en práctica al momento de elaborar e interponer la casación. Así las cosas, la fundamentación dispuesta por ley, puede entenderse, grosso modo, como aquella argumentación técnico-jurídica en la que se mencionan una serie de artículos, o reglas jurídicas entrelazadas o concatenadas entre sí y vinculadas razonablemente en una doble perspectiva: con los argumentos del recurso y con la sentencia que se ataca. En la medida en que se cite un conjunto de normas jurídicas (o si es del caso, una sola de ellas), atinente y vinculada de manera clara con la sentencia combatida (ya sea en el sustento de hecho o derecho) y los argumentos del recurso, hay fundamentación jurídica. Los agregados jurisprudenciales o las eventuales citas doctrinales reforzarán en ocasiones las alegaciones efectuadas, pero, por lo general, no hacen a su esencia. Como ya lo ha indicado la Sala Primera interpretando el artículo 139 de referencia, “se requiere que el recurso cuente con una fundamentación jurídica mínima ... deben explicarse las razones en las cuales sustenta su gestión, combatiendo los argumentos de derecho de la sentencia recurrida y consignando, al menos, alguna referencia normativa que le dé sustento”. Resolución no. 318-A-2008, de las 14 horas 25 minutos del 8 de mayo del 2008 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0034-422284). La fundamentación es, por tanto, ajena al despliegue confuso de normas y alegatos; a la mezcla de argumentos ininteligibles o a la simple exposición de opiniones sobre la procedencia o justicia del caso, o bien, al recuento de los desaciertos que se consideran cometidos en la sentencia recurrida, sin respaldo en normas o criterios jurídicos. De allí que, si el recurso omite por completo esa relación técnico-normativa a la que se ha hecho referencia, o la que realiza, resulta impertinente o desvinculada al caso de manera manifiesta y evidente, habrá que entender que carece de “total fundamentación jurídica” y, por tanto, incumple el necesario requisito establecido en el numeral 139.3, que se sanciona con el rechazo de plano, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 140 inciso c) del mismo Código de rito. De igual manera, esta Cámara, en forma reiterada, ha señalado, para que un recurso pase el control de admisión, se precisa, además de la suficiente exposición de motivos, la correspondiente mención y vinculación con la sentencia cuestionada de las normas aplicables que se estimen infringidas. En este sentido pueden consultarse, entre otras, las resoluciones de la Sala Primera nos. 677-A-S1-2021 de las 09 horas 40 minutos del 25 de marzo de 2021 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1029345); no. 755-A-S1-2022 de las 10 horas 55 minutos del 29 de marzo de 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1082042); y no. 1663-A-S1-2022 de las 10 horas 05 minutos del 21 de julio de 2022 (https://nexuspj.poder-judicial.go.cr/document/sen-1-0004-1112340). En el caso de examen, esta Cámara arriba al convencimiento de que el casacionista entremezcló hipótesis disímiles y, por la forma en que estructuró los agravios, las tornó inseparables: expone, en el primer agravio, una supuesta errónea valoración e interpretación de la prueba —lo que sitúa su reproche en la causal del art. 138 CPCA—, pero lo sustenta con reproches de falta de fundamentación, falta de motivación y violación al debido proceso, que son causales propias del art. 137 CPCA. Además, invoca una “preterición” del testimonio de Mónica C. Murillo, el uso de extremos incontrovertidos del Considerando IV y una desestimación lacónica del rubro de daños y perjuicios en el Considerando V, para concluir que la sentencia es nula. Esa confusión de planos (fondo/formal), sin individualización normativa ni demostración del quebranto, infringe la técnica del art. 139.3 CPCA: el recurso no identifica con claridad qué regla sustantiva del art. 138 habría sido violentada ni, en su caso, cuál disposición adjetiva del art. 137 y cómo se habría transgredido, tampoco precisa en qué parte de la sentencia se produjo la omisión o la inconsistencia lógica de la decisión. En el segundo agravio, el casacionista reitera una acusación abstracta de indebida interpretación y aplicación de normas sustantivas (art. 138 CPCA), acompañada de categorías retóricas (“non sequitur”, “falacia del sí, pero no”) y de una tesis de inversión de la carga probatoria por acogimiento del “in dubio pro-víctima”. Sin embargo, nuevamente no individualiza qué regla concreta habría sido mal aplicada ni explica por qué la aplicación de la norma a los hechos que realizó el Tribunal sería jurídicamente errónea o decisiva para el resultado (art. 138, capitis).”; y, de nuevo, desplaza el núcleo del agravio hacia alegatos de debido proceso, falta de motivación y preterición probatoria —cauces del art. 137 CPCA—, persistiendo en la confusión de causales y en el déficit de fundamentación del propio recurso, vicios que el art. 139.3 CPCA proscribe y que el art. 140 inciso c) sanciona con el rechazo de plano. A mayor abundamiento, la pretensión en ambos agravios —“anular y reenviar para nueva audiencia de juicio” o, incluso, “anular y fallar por el fondo”— evidencia que el recurrente procura reabrir el debate probatorio y retrotraer el proceso a la fase de juicio para incorporar prueba testimonial, remedio impropio de la casación contenciosa, que no constituye una tercera instancia ni un vehículo para reproducir etapas ya precluidas. Así planteados, ambos agravios adolecen de mala técnica casacional: (i) confunden causales de fondo (art. 138 CPCA) con causales procesales (art. 137 CPCA); (ii) carecen de la claridad y precisión exigidas por el art. 139.3 CPCA para enlazar la sentencia con la norma presuntamente infringida y el agravio concreto; y (iii) proponen un remedio incompatible con la naturaleza del recurso de casación. En consecuencia, al no satisfacer las exigencias de claridad y precisión del artículo 139.3 CPCA, corresponde su rechazo de plano.

Respecto al tercer cargo, el numeral 193 del CPCA, establece como regla general la condenatoria en costas al vencido y contempla como excepciones posibles a esa condena cuando: “a) La sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia verosímilmente no haya conocido la contraria y, por causa de ello, se haya ajustado la oposición de la parte. b) Por la naturaleza de las cuestiones debatidas haya existido, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo bastante para litigar”. En el caso concreto, la parte recurrente se limita únicamente a invocar su buena fe litigiosa, argumento que no encuadra en ninguno de los supuestos exceptivos del artículo 193 ni desplaza el criterio objetivo del vencimiento. Tampoco se acreditó que la controversia presentara una complejidad normativa tal que justificara apartarse de la regla general, máxime cuando el marco legal aplicable y la jurisprudencia relevante resultan claros y fueron correctamente aplicados. Así, como bien resolvió el Tribunal, lo procedente es la aplicación de la condena en costas a la parte perdidosa, por ser, como se dijo, la regla procesal. Entonces, en lo resuelto no se observa quebranto normativo y, por consiguiente, el reparo debe denegarse.En mérito de lo expuesto, no habiendo prosperado ninguno de los reproches, el recurso deberá declararse sin lugar. Conforme a lo señalado por el artículo 150.3 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, deberá imponerse al casacionista el pago de las costas generadas con el ejercicio de esta instancia.

POR TANTO

Se rechaza el alegato de inconstitucionalidad planteado por improcedente. Se declara sin lugar el recurso de casación. Las costas causadas con su ejercicio corren a cargo de quien lo promovió. CBE  DAMARIS MARIA VARGAS VASQUEZ - MAGISTRADO/A  JORGE LEIVA POVEDA - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A 1