Cassation Court annuls lower ruling for lack of reasoning in INCOPESCA director dismissal caseAnulación de sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso por falta de motivación en caso de destitución de directora de INCOPESCA

Document PJEDITOR  Res. 000202-F-TC-2024 CONTENTIOUS-ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL FINANCIAL COURT OF CASSATION. San José, at nine forty-six hours on the nineteenth of December, two thousand twenty-four.

Proceedings for a declaratory judgment established by ANITA YORLEYNY MC DONALD RODRÍGUEZ, represented by her special judicial attorney, Licenciado Álvaro Enrique Moreno Gómez; against THE STATE, represented by Deputy Attorney General, Irene Bolaños Salas, and against Mr. JOSÉ JULIO SAAVEDRA CHACÓN, represented by his special judicial attorney, Licenciado Luis Dobles Ramírez. The plaintiff files a cassation appeal against Judgment No. 005-2019-I at 11:25 hours on January 29, 2019, issued by the Contentious-Administrative and Civil Financial Court, First Section.

Drafted by Judge Rojas Morales:

CONSIDERANDO

I.- Mrs. Anita Yorleny Mc Donald Rodríguez filed a contentious-administrative claim against the State and Mr. José Julio Saavedra Chacón, requesting a declaration that: “…1. The disciplinary procedure carried out by the Secretariat of the Government Council, under file number 002-08-2015, be annulled, as this body is legally incompetent to gather said information according to the express provisions of Articles 9 and 16 of the Organic Law for the Creation of INCOPESCA. / 2. That the final resolution adopted in Article 4 of Ordinary Session of the Government Council No. 69 of December 15, 2015, according to Certification No. CERT-379-15, be partially annulled, only insofar as it orders the dismissal of the plaintiff, then a member of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, this being a resolution contrary to law adopted under non-existent grounds for dismissal. / 3. That her immediate reinstatement be ordered, for the remaining term of her appointment as a member of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA. 4. That the State be ordered to pay the damages and losses caused, as well as the interest determined in the judgment, from the moment they were caused until their effective payment. For damages and losses from the moment they were caused until their effective payment: a) Subjective moral damages ₡50,000,000.00, b) Objective moral damages ₡10,000,000.00, c) Material damages: i. Unreceived per diem payments ₡500,000.00, ii. Medical expenses ₡1,000,000.00. And finally, that the State be ordered to pay the amount of both costs…”. The State filed a negative response to the claim and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive legal standing in relation to the damages and losses. Likewise, it requested that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of the proceedings and their respective interest. The co-defendant Julio Saavedra Chacón raised the exception he termed lack of legality and lack of legal standing in both senses, and requests that the claim filed by the plaintiff be rejected in all its aspects and that she be ordered to pay procedural costs. The Contentious-Administrative Court, upon issuing the challenged judgment, found it proven that on August 19, 2015, then-Congressman Rolando González Ulloa, in Plenary Session No. 58, questioned that days before the conclusion of the Ministry of Public Security operation regarding the encroachment of public domain property on Portete beach in the province of Limón, the then-Minister of Labor, the then-president of JAPDEVA, and the plaintiff here, Mc Donald Rodríguez, in her former capacity as Director of the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA, hereinafter), had met. Consequently, he requested that the actions of these public servants be investigated and that the corresponding disciplinary sanctions be eventually applied, which he also requested, on August 21, 2015, through a communication sent to the then-President of the Republic, Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera. On August 26, 2015, various print media outlets published information concerning the meeting held by the aforementioned officials with Mr. Gilberth Bell, supposed owner of the dock located on Portete beach in Limón, and who was apparently linked to drug trafficking. The Government Council delegated the instruction (instrucción) of the disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff to the Secretariat of that collegial body. The Directing Body (Órgano Director) informed her that the objective of the procedure would be to verify the truth of the facts previously denounced by Congressman Rolando González Ulloa and others that were published by the media, related to the apparent attendance of Mrs. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, at a meeting with fishermen's organizations at the facilities of a dock located in Portete, province of Limón, and to determine the supposed existence of facts that could have generated some administrative responsibility for her. On November 4, 2015, the Government Council agreed to request the Secretariat of the Government Council, in its capacity as Directing Body of the disciplinary procedure, to expand the investigation, by virtue of the knowledge of new facts that could be related to the investigations being conducted. On November 12, 2015, the Secretariat of the Government Council, in its capacity as Directing Body of the disciplinary procedure, communicated the expansion of the charges imputed to the plaintiff in relation to the search and seizure conducted at the house of Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández by the Judicial Investigation Organization (OIJ, hereinafter) on October 6, 2015, and who was linked to an organization dedicated to national drug trafficking and money laundering; she was attributed with having, despite her condition as Director of INCOPESCA and member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen's and aquaculturists' organizations of the province of Limón, and acting as a lawyer, proceeded to authenticate the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, for the permit application the latter made before the National Animal Health Service (SENASA). They clarified to her that this was the application for an operating permit for the dock located on Portete beach in the province of Limón, on July 28, 2015, and that she did not mention this situation in her appearance before the Security and Drug Trafficking Commission of the Legislative Assembly, a body investigating the matter of the dock in Portete. Furthermore, she was imputed with the recommendation of Mr. Bell Fernández, in February 2015, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA and president of the Association of Limón Leaders of the Fishing Sector (Asolipes), before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, for him to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón, a position from which he was subsequently removed. The Court found it proven, in summary, that the Directing Body determined that the actions attributed to the investigated party could have been contrary to what is prescribed in numeral 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (LCCEI, hereinafter), and Article 1.14 of its Regulation, also, Article 1.4, p. 17 of Directive No. D-2-2004-CO, eventually constituting grounds for administrative responsibility in accordance with what is indicated in the LCCEI, concluding that such legal classification could merit the administrative responsibility stipulated in Articles 4 and 39 ibid, as well as in numerals 211 and 213 of the General Public Administration Law (LGAP), that is, separation from the position without employer liability. The Government Council, in Article IV of Session No. 79, held on December 15, 2015, agreed to dismiss from the position of Director before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, Mrs. Anita Yorleny Mc Donald Rodríguez, cc. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, in her capacity as a member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen's or aquaculturists' organizations of the province of Limón, insofar as her actions, "(...) especially those referring to the authentication of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and her recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, are contrary to the duties of Probity and Abstention, constituting grounds for administrative responsibility, and according to the legal system (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service), the breach of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the procedure carried out, constitutes cause for the separation from the public office without administrative responsibility (...)". Said resolution was notified on January 15, 2016, to the electronic account of the plaintiff's special administrative attorney. The Contentious-Administrative and Civil Financial Court, First Section, comprising Judge Claudia Bolaños Salazar, Judges Billy Araya Olmos and Carlos Espinoza Salas, in Judgment No. 005-2019-I at 11:25 hours on January 29, 2019, unanimously resolved on the merits: “…By virtue of the foregoing, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendants is upheld, and the lack of passive legal standing raised by the State and the lack of legal standing in both senses alleged by Mr. Julio Saavedra Chacón are rejected. Consequently, THE CLAIM IS DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. The personal and procedural costs are borne by the plaintiff, jointly with the legal interest on said award from the finality of this pronouncement until its respective payment, in favor of the State, and the costs in favor of the co-defendant José Julio Saavedra Chacón...”. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiff filed a cassation appeal, which was admitted by this Court of Cassation.

II.- The plaintiff raises three grievances of a substantive nature. First: She alleges a violation of Articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) and 83 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (CPCA, hereinafter), because the Court did not take into account that, within the disciplinary procedure followed against the plaintiff, the Directing Body and the Government Council concluded that it was not possible to associate her with accusations of serious misconduct, as director of INCOPESCA, for activities supposedly illicit and unknown to her by Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández. They also concluded that she could not be blamed for having knowledge of them before the meeting with fishermen at the Portete dock, on July 16, 2015, nor of the search and seizure of the entire fishing facilities complex, on August 18, 2016. However, she maintains, the judgment reproached her for actions prior to those dates and the chronological order of dates was inverted to indicate, improperly, that Licenciada Mc Donald Rodríguez first authenticated the signature of Gilberth Bell Fernández in a proceeding before SENASA on July 20, 2015, and that upon becoming her client, she should have foreseen that situation in advance, therefore she should have abstained from signing in February 2015, as president of the organization she represented (ASOLIPES), a list of 4 candidates so that INCOPESCA could choose one of them to form the Caribbean Fisheries Advisory Commission, among whom the name of Gilberth Bell Fernández was included, which demonstrates that there is improper and speculative reasoning by the Court. She discourses, it is impossible that the plaintiff, in February 2015, signed a recommendation as president of ASOLIPES before INCOPESCA and in her capacity as director of the Board of Directors of said institution, with full knowledge and interest that, subsequently, on July 20, 2015 (5 months later), one of those 4 persons nominated in the recommendation would come to request her professional services for signature authentication. She adds, it was also impossible that in February 2015 she had knowledge that Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández was going to be investigated by the Public Ministry as of August 18, 2015. She argues that the judgment reproached her for not mentioning this situation in her appearance before the Security and Drug Trafficking Commission of the Legislative Assembly, however, this does not constitute any anomaly, since no one asked her about that fact, nor has she been questioned for perjury, indeed, such facts have not been denied by her, and she always defended herself and gave a logical and real explanation in the administrative investigation and before the Contentious-Administrative Court. She questions that the judgment does not justify what "the breach of such magnitude" was that placed her in contradiction with "the postulates of transparency, accountability, honesty, rectitude, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, good faith in the exercise of her position". She contests that the Court's assertion that the director of INCOPESCA recommended a client of hers to join a commission formed by that same Institute is also not true, because: 1- In February 2015, Mr. Bell Fernández was not a client of the plaintiff, nor before that date had she provided him any professional service. 2- She never recommended anyone specifically, in her capacity as president of ASOLIPES, because the list contained the names of 4 fishermen, not just that of Gilberth Bell Fernández. 3- As Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, she did not make any recommendation. She clarifies, the only thing she did was sign, in her capacity as president of the organization ASOLIPES, a nomination with 4 names of fishermen sent to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, so that the latter could appoint an ad honorem Caribbean fisheries advisory commission, therefore there was no conflict of interest, nor a serious breach of the duty of probity or the duty of abstention by the plaintiff. She discourses, Article 23 of the INCOPESCA Creation Law establishes that among the competencies and duties of the Board of Directors is to appoint advisory commissions, and that these commissions carry out their work ad honorem, meaning that for the directors of INCOPESCA there is no personal or economic benefit, nor is there a benefit for the members of the commissions, since the vocation of service and the duty to serve the country and the fishing sector prevail. She points out, Article 19 of that same law determines that when any of the attendees at the sessions of the Board of Directors has a personal interest in the processing of any matter, or their partners or relatives up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity do, the interested attendee must withdraw from the respective session while the case is discussed and resolved, under penalty of absolute nullity, whose rectification will correspond to the Auditor. She adds, in this case, having voted for Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández to be appointed is not a breach of the duty of abstention, nor is it synonymous with a personal interest of said official, since neither of them benefited from it. She argues that the auditor of INCOPESCA is the legally competent authority to determine if there was any personal interest, which is why opening an administrative proceeding, specially designed for the plaintiff, for an action that the Auditor of INCOPESCA, the only one competent to evaluate these cases, had considered normal and legal, was acting arbitrarily against her fundamental rights and a violation of due process. She explains, neither the Auditor of INCOPESCA, Rafael Antonio Abarca, nor the technical secretary of the Board of Directors, Guillermo Ramírez Gatgens, being present at the session where the questioned agreement was made, denounced a personal interest on the part of the plaintiff. She discourses, the judgment incorrectly assumes that ASOLIPES and Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez are the same person, and that the collective and diffuse interest of ASOLIPES is the same personal interest of the plaintiff, which is incorrect, and evidences a lack of knowledge of the law, since the plaintiff, upon signing as president of ASOLIPES (a non-profit association) the recommendation of 4 fishermen, was not doing so in her personal capacity. She alleges, the auditor, in almost 20 years of INCOPESCA’s existence, has never questioned or annulled any appointment agreement because any director of the Board of Directors, representative of the organizations from their province, voted for a similar agreement. She reproaches, the witnesses offered to demonstrate that there was no conflict of interest were rejected by the Court from the preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar), despite the fact that the right to defense and due process were thereby violated. She claims it is serious that the Court, losing all objectivity and impartiality, sought to improperly associate the plaintiff with the activities under investigation of Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández. She reproaches the Court’s lack of respect in transcribing in the judgment a question of its own making, of an injurious nature, in the following sense: "Did the plaintiff perhaps expect any reward for such irregular conduct?" This, despite the fact that there is no evidence in the record that, as of February 27, 2015, Mr. Bell was her client, nor that they maintained a commercial relationship with each other.

III- The grievance raised alleges improper evaluation of the evidence and violation of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional). However, this Chamber observes that a lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) is also alleged. This is inferred when the cassation appellant alleges confusion in the judgment regarding the chronological order of the facts attributed to her in the disciplinary procedure and when she points out a lack of clarity in the judgment in indicating the seriousness of the misconduct she was accused of, in the same way when she questions the subjective competence to initiate the sanctioning procedure, therefore this ground will be examined as a lack of reasoning.

IV- Second: She reproaches a violation of Articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) and 83 of the CPCA, because the judgment establishes that damages and losses were not proven, which – she maintains – is false, since the case file contains documentary evidence regarding the medical care discharge summary (epicrisis) she received, as a result of her mental and physical state, after her illegitimate dismissal. She argues, the judgment makes no mention of this, only concluding that as there is no causal link, no loss arises for the plaintiff, however, the cassation appellant considers that there is a causal link, since there is nullity due to the illegitimate conduct of the State. She points out, the only testimonial evidence accepted by the Court was, precisely, the witness Angie Gutiérrez Cartín, who indicated the existence of the damages and losses suffered by the plaintiff. She alleges, the Court rejected all her testimony without greater substantiation, only indicating that the witness does not deserve credibility, since, when questioned by the Panel of Judges, she was evasive, imprecise, and speculative in her answers, this without making the minimum effort to screen her testimony, to the point that the reasoning remained absolutely devoid of any intellectual analysis. Third: She alleges, in the award of costs in favor of the State and Mr. José Julio Saavedra, no distinction is made regarding the proportionality of the costs in relation to the claims of the action. She claims she has not litigated recklessly or in bad faith, but rather with just cause and with fair claims for damages and losses, coupled with the fact that the pecuniary claims were all against the State and that Mr. José Julio Saavedra was joined to this litigation by order of the Court and over the plaintiff's opposition, in response to the exception of improper joinder of parties raised by the State. She requests that she be exempted from the payment of costs, in the event that this cassation appeal is rejected, for having litigated in good faith, or, failing this, that the specific costs be established individually for the parties.

V.- Given that this Cassation Body considers that the defect of lack of reasoning is alleged, based on what was set forth by the cassation appellant, we proceed to analyze that procedural grievance first. Regarding the disciplinary procedure administratively followed against the plaintiff and the sanction of dismissal, the Contentious-Administrative Court ruled: “…the defendant is correct, since the duty of probity implies that the conduct of the person exercising a public function must adhere at all times - and not only during the fulfillment of a specific workday, or indeed, of a session as a member of a Board of Directors, as the plaintiff erroneously reasons - to the postulates of transparency, accountability, honesty, rectitude, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, good faith, in the exercise of their position. In this context, this Court is also clear that the verification of a breach of such magnitude - as was configured in the sub lite case - can entail, not only the material exercise of administrative ius puniendi, through the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanction, but also, as is well known, the eventual imposition of a specific criminal sanction, given that by disregarding the duty of abstention, that single fact could constitute the crime of 'breach of duties' as prescribed by numeral 332 of the Penal Code, Law (No. 4573) of May 4, 1970. That is, the sanction of disqualification from one to four years. This is because, without making any disquisition on the matter, the respectable legal counsel of the plaintiff must remember that three clearly defined responsibilities fall upon the shoulders of the public servant, each one being exclusive of the other (administrative, criminal, and civil or pecuniary). Thus, the norms of public order and mandatory compliance erga omnes are not trivial, as applicable to section 129 of the Political Constitution, insofar as numerals 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, (…) the ordinary legislator synthesized values and ethical principles that the public administrator must weigh, being transcendental precepts that, at the time, enshrine the duty of probity, an inseparable construct of the Ethics of Public Service. It is thus that said regulations are applicable to all, we insist, without making any subjective discrimination and in relation to a specific public office, and regardless of the notoriety in the public and commercial sphere that someone who attacks such sacred precepts, constitutive of a Social and Democratic State of Law, and its corollaries, among others, that of the trust of the social collective in the exercise of public service (doctrine of numeral 140.8 of the Political Constitution), might have. Evidently, it is a matter of common sense, and it is also not trivial the fact that the plaintiff, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA, recommended a client of hers to join a Commission that forms part of that same Institute. In this sense, did the plaintiff perhaps expect any reward for such irregular conduct? Evidently, the Administration acted in accordance with the applicable legal regime, and there is not even a hint of abuse of power, as was timely indicated. In this context, even when the offer concerning the evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver) which the plaintiff expressly mentioned - up to the oral and public trial hearing (audiencia del juicio oral y público), held on the 8th of the current month -, despite the fact that the preliminary hearing held in the criminal venue (see image 294) dates back to September 19, 2018, it is rejected as irrelevant, by virtue of the fact that it is duly proven in the record, besides proven fact 7), that the sanction agreed upon by the Government Council, in Article IV of Session No. 79 held on December 15, 2015, is based on " (...) especially those referring to the authentication of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and her recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, results contrary to the duties of Probity and Abstention, constituting grounds for administrative liability, given that according to the legal system (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service), the breach of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the procedure carried out, constitutes cause for the separation from the public office without administrative responsibility (...)". In such a way that, despite the fact that the plaintiff seeks to divert this Court's attention from the facts for which she was actually sanctioned, and to justify the remote estimation of her claims, in the dismissal of the person with whom she was linked, that is, Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández, the truth is that, as the defendant categorically stated, the plaintiff was sanctioned with dismissal by virtue of the breach of the duty of probity, since she prioritized her personal interests, that is, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the many Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, given that this person had previously been her client, months earlier, on account of the application for a health permit that he made before SENASA, insofar as she had proceeded to authenticate his signature in said proceeding. She was absolutely not sanctioned because Mr. Bell Fernández had been investigated by the OIJ, due to the alleged links with drug trafficking or other matters. Furthermore, let it be clear that the plaintiff is not correct in justifying the above, i.e., ad extra of INCOPESCA she materially no longer functioned as an official, such that she had the duty to attend to those who came to her law firm, given that such is her modus vivendi, and this, moreover, did not constitute a prohibition for her to exercise her legal profession, regardless of who her client was. To that extent, the plaintiff might perhaps be partially correct, i.e., her main income is from the exercise of her activity as an independent professional, however, she should have refrained from recommending a client of hers for a position in a public entity in which she acted as the supreme head. This, evidently, in any sphere, contrasts with a sort of conflict of interest, even though it is not proven that she had maintained any sentimental link with Mr. Bell, but the truth is that there was a relationship, at least commercial, according to the case file. Without a doubt, the intelligence intrinsic to numeral 38 subsection b) of the LCCEI emerges as substantial…”. On the other hand, regarding the lack of subjective competence that the plaintiff alleged in relation to the Secretariat of the Government Council, the judgment stated: “…note, numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law establishes that the instruction of the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Board of Directors of the aforementioned Institute. However, the plaintiff does not take into account that the designation of said collegial body for such task is imposed if and only if, one is facing the grounds regulated therein in concordance with Article 9 ibid, verbi gratia, when the members of the Board of Directors are in default, are in bankruptcy or in a state of insolvency, are convicted of crimes against property, embezzlement, or misappropriation of funds, or, are in default before state entities, or are linked by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree with another member of said collegial body, and, even, with the institutional Auditor. Also, for being employees of the Institute, likewise, for the grounds contemplated in numeral 16 ejusdem (…) the plaintiff’s legal situation did not fall within any of the aforementioned assumptions. In such a way that, it was not necessary to designate the instruction of the disciplinary procedure to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, since, it is reiterated, the efficient and adequate cause for which the plaintiff was dismissed from her position as Director of INCOPESCA was, precisely, having incurred in actions that in turn breached the duty of probity in public service, contrary to the precepts of canons 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, as anticipated above. Added to this, the plaintiff must take into consideration two important aspects, first, 'To determine the other types of competence, the specific pertinent rules shall be followed' (Art. 61.3 LGAP), since in the specific case there underlies a power - duty vested in the Government Council to delegate the instruction of procedures to its Secretariat, as follows from the aforementioned norm 33 ibid. And, '1. The rules of this law [LGAP] that regulate the activity of the State shall also apply to the other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for the latter (Art. 2.1 LGAP).

… the Administration acted in complete adherence to the Principle of Legality or Specificity, that is, it sanctioned whoever through their culpable conduct breached the duty of probity, placing personal interests ahead of the general interest; moreover, the person who conducted the investigation was absolutely competent for that task, given that the directing body did not even resolve the merits of the matter, since that competence is legally assigned to the Superior Council, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…”.

VI.- In order to resolve the procedural grievance of lack of motivation, it must be noted that, for a long time, both the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation have specified that the motivation of a judgment consists of setting forth or making manifest the reasons or grounds, both factual and legal, for which the decision is adopted. Hence, its absence is noted under two hypotheses: the first, when it is nonexistent, since the judge omits stating the foundations of their decision; the second, when the argumentative exposition of the deciding body proves confusing or exhibits contradictions that become an obstacle to clearly determining the motives on which it is based, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, the right to due process (as can be seen in resolution No. 184-F-S1-2009 at 13 hours on February 23, 2009, issued by the First Chamber). It has therefore been said that a specific lack of motivation can be understood as that related to the factual circumstances of the judgment (resolution 1444-F-S1-2012 at 9 hours 10 minutes on October 30, 2012, of the First Chamber). This Chamber observes that the challenged judgment lacks motivation, in that the chronological thread of the facts attributed to the plaintiff in the disciplinary proceeding is lost, as pointed out by the appellant, such that the judgment attributes facts in a chronological order different from that proven in the administrative venue and attributes a different cause constituting a serious fault, which constitutes, in and of itself, a defect in the motivation of the judgment. In that regard, the judgment indicated that the cause for the plaintiff’s dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity, by placing her personal interests first, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, despite the fact that this person had been her client months earlier, given that she authenticated Mr. Bell’s signature on the application for a sanitary permit he filed with SENASA. Such reasoning contradicts what was proven in the Established Facts of the same judgment and in the administrative proceeding, since these established that the plaintiff, Director of INCOPESCA, in her capacity as president of the Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero (ASOLIPES), recommended to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, in February 2015, that Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández join the INCOPESCA Advisory Commission in Limón. It was also held as proven that, on July 28, 2015, acting as an attorney, she authenticated the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, in relation to the application he filed with the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (SENASA), dealing with the application for an operating permit for the dock located at Playa Portete in the province of Limón. Thus, according to the chronological order that was proven in the judgment, the plaintiff is correct when she alleges that, in February 2015, when she recommended the members of the aforementioned commission, Mr. Bell Fernández was not her client; therefore, the basis for the dismissal indicated by the Court is incompatible with the chronology of the proven facts and is different from the grounds established in the administrative act of dismissal, so the lack of motivation of the judgment is configured, by departing from the evidence on record and the facts that were proven in the administrative venue. On the other hand, deficiencies and contradictions are also observed in the analysis of the subjective competence of the body directing the administrative proceeding and of the body that issued the final dismissal resolution. In the fragment of the judgment transcribed in the preceding Considerando, it is observed that, initially, the judgment invoked Article 16 of the Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA as the rule establishing that the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Administrative Board of INCOPESCA; however, it then dismissed the application of said law and held as proven that the cause for dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity in the public function, according to Articles 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, indicating therefore that the subjective competence, for this specific case, was determined according to Articles 2.1, 33, and 61.3 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (hereinafter LGAP), according to which a power-duty exists vested in the Government Council, which could delegate the conduct of proceedings to its Secretariat. However, contradictorily, the judgment reached the conclusion that the competence was correct, because it is assigned to the “…Superior Council, according to the provisions of numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…”. It can be observed that after having indicated the inapplicability of said article, in the end it contradicts itself and invokes it again to establish the subjective competence of the body it calls the “Superior Council.” Given such contradictions, the judgment shows great confusion among three normative bodies (the Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA, the Ley Contra la Corrupción e Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, and the Ley General de la Administración Pública), without a guiding thread in its reasoning, which also violates the rules of sound rational criticism, by entering into contradictions that defy logic. Ultimately, the challenged judgment failed to motivate, in a clear manner, the facts attributed to the plaintiff in accordance with the evidence provided in the record, nor the application of the specific rules establishing the grounds for sanctions, nor the rules determining the body competent to conduct the sanctioning procedure. Neither did it explain why it refrained from applying the special rule of INCOPESCA, and then cited, in a confusing manner, the general rules of the LGAP, and then applied Article 16 of the Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA once more, without providing logical reasoning; therefore, such confusions and contradictions in the motivation constitute grounds for nullifying the appealed judgment. Indeed, the judgment omits developing the type of relationship between the plaintiff and the Public Administration, also the applicable regime for the position she held, nor does it define the body that legally appointed Ms. Mc Donald Rodríguez, nor did it analyze, according to the principle of parallelism of forms, who had the competence to remove her from her functions as Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, aspects that were fundamental for resolving the present litigation and which are sorely missed in the challenged judgment. Given such defects in the motivation of the judgment, this Chamber is prevented from reviewing the present matter on its merits, so the aforementioned procedural grievance must be upheld, and the case will be remanded to the Trial Court, so that a new judgment may be issued in accordance with the law. Due to the manner of resolution, it is unnecessary to analyze the other grievances of a substantive nature raised by the appellant.

VII.- By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal on cassation filed by the plaintiff shall be upheld. Consequently, the challenged judgment shall be quashed. Since Article 150, subsection 1) of the CPCA so orders, and since it is not possible to rule on the parties' allegations in a single instance, the case shall be remanded to the court of origin so that the Trial Court may issue a new judgment as required by law. Given the manner of resolution, a ruling shall be omitted on the appellant’s remaining grievances.

POR TANTO

The appeal filed is declared with merit. The challenged judgment is quashed. The case is remanded to the court of origin so that the Trial Court may issue a new judgment as required by law.

DESPINOZAC  IRIS ROCIO ROJAS MORALES - MAGISTRADO/A  CARLOS GUILLERMO ZAMORA CAMPOS - MAGISTRADO/A  DAMARIS MARIA VARGAS VASQUEZ - MAGISTRADO/A Medical expenses ₡1,000,000.00. And finally, that the State be ordered to pay the amount of both costs...". The State answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive legal standing in relation to the damages. Likewise, the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding and their respective interest. The co-defendant Julio Saavedra Chacón raised the exception he called lack of legality and lack of legal standing in both senses and requests that the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff be rejected in all its extremes and that she be ordered to pay procedural costs. The Contentious Administrative Court, when issuing the challenged judgment, considered it proven that on August 19, 2015, then-deputy Rolando González Ulloa, in Plenary Session No. 58, questioned that days before the end of the Ministry of Public Security operation against the usurpation of public domain property on Playa Portete in the province of Limón, a meeting had been held between the then Minister of Labor, the then president of JAPDEVA, and the plaintiff herein, Ms. McDonald Rodríguez, in her former capacity as Director of the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura, INCOPESCA, hereinafter). Consequently, he requested that the actions of these public servants be investigated and eventually the corresponding disciplinary sanctions be applied, which he also requested on August 21, 2015, through a communication sent to the then President of the Republic, Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera. On August 26, 2015, various print media outlets published information concerning the meeting that the aforementioned officials held with Mr. Gilberth Bell, alleged owner of the dock located on Playa Portete in Limón, and who was apparently linked to drug trafficking. The Governing Council delegated the instruction of the disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff to the Secretariat of that collegiate body. The Investigating Body informed her that the objective of the procedure would be to verify the truth of the facts previously denounced by deputy Rolando González Ulloa and others that were published by the media, related to the apparent attendance of Ms. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, at a meeting with fishermen's organizations at the facilities of a dock located in Portete, province of Limón, and to determine the alleged existence of facts that could have generated some administrative liability for her. On November 4, 2015, the Governing Council agreed to request the Secretariat of the Governing Council, as the Investigating Body of the disciplinary procedure, to expand the investigation, by virtue of knowledge of new facts that could be related to the investigations carried out. On November 12, 2015, the Secretariat of the Governing Council, as the Investigating Body of the disciplinary procedure, communicated the expansion of the charges imputed to the plaintiff in relation to the raid carried out at the home of Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial, hereinafter OIJ) on October 6, 2015, who is linked to an organization dedicated to national drug trafficking and money laundering; it was attributed to her that, despite her condition as Director of INCOPESCA and member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen's and aquaculture organizations of the province of Limón and, acting as a lawyer, she proceeded to authenticate the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, in relation to the permit application made by the latter before the National Animal Health Service (SENASA). They clarified that this involved an application for an operating permit for the dock located on Playa Portete in the province of Limón, on July 28, 2015, and that she did not mention this situation during her appearance before the Legislative Assembly's Security and Drug Trafficking Commission, the body investigating the Portete dock matter. Furthermore, she was imputed with the recommendation of Mr. Bell Fernández, in February 2015, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA and president of the Association of Limón Leaders of the Fishing Sector (Asolipes), before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, for him to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón, a position from which he was later removed. The Court considered it proven, in summary, that the Investigating Body determined that the actions attributed to the investigated person could have been contrary to the provisions of numeral 3 of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office (Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, hereinafter LCCEI), and Article 1.14 of its Regulation, as well as Article 1.4, paragraph 17 of Directive No. D-2-2004-CO, eventually constituting grounds for administrative liability as indicated in the LCCEI, concluding that such legal classification could warrant the administrative liability stipulated in Articles 4 and 39 ibid, as well as in numerals 211 and 213 of the LGAP, that is, removal from the position without employer liability. The Governing Council, in Article IV of Session No. 79, held on December 15, 2015, agreed to dismiss from the position of Director before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, Ms. Anita Yorleny Mc Donal Rodríguez, ID. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, in her capacity as a member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen's or aquaculture organizations of the province of Limón, since her actions, "(...) especially those referring to the authentication of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and her recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, are contrary to the duties of Probity and Abstention, constituting a ground for administrative liability, and in accordance with the regulations (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b of the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office), the violation of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the developed procedure, constitutes cause for removal from the public position without administrative liability (...)". This resolution was notified on January 15, 2016, to the electronic account of the plaintiff's special administrative attorney. The Contentious Administrative and Civil Treasury Court, First Section, composed of Judge Claudia Bolaños Salazar, Judges Billy Araya Olmos and Carlos Espinoza Salas, in judgment No. 005-2019-I of 11 hours and 25 minutes on January 29, 2019, unanimously resolved on the merits: "...By virtue of the foregoing, the defense of lack of right raised by the defendants is accepted, and the lack of passive legal standing raised by the State is rejected, as well as the lack of legal standing in both senses alleged by Mr. Julio Saavedra Chacón.

Consequently, THE CLAIM IS DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Personal and procedural costs are charged to the plaintiff, jointly with legal interest on said award from the finality of this ruling until its respective payment, in favor of the State, and costs in favor of the co-defendant José Julio Saavedra Chacón...” Dissatisfied with the ruling, the plaintiff filed a cassation appeal, which was admitted by this Cassation Court.

II.- The plaintiff raises three substantive grievances. First: It alleges a violation of articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) and 83 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (hereinafter CPCA), because the Court did not take into account that, within the disciplinary procedure brought against the plaintiff, the Órgano Director and the Consejo de Gobierno concluded that it was not possible to associate her with accusations of serious misconduct, as director of INCOPESCA, for supposedly illicit activities unknown to her by Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández. It also concluded that it could not be attributed to her that she had knowledge of them before the meeting with fishermen at the Portete dock, on July 16, 2015, nor of the raid on the entire fishing facilities complex, on August 18, 2016. However, it argues, the judgment reproached her for actions prior to those dates and inverted the order of the dates to improperly indicate that Ms. Mc Donald Rodríguez first authenticated the signature of Gilberth Bell Fernández in a filing before SENASA dated July 20, 2015, and that upon becoming his client, she had to have foreseen that situation beforehand, for which reason she should have abstained from signing in February 2015, as president of the organization she represented (ASOLIPES), a list of 4 candidates for INCOPESCA to choose one of them to form the Comisión Asesora Pesquera del Caribe, among which was included the name of Gilberth Bell Fernández, which demonstrates that there is an improper and speculative reasoning on the part of the Court. It disserts, it is impossible for the plaintiff, in February 2015, to have signed a recommendation as president of ASOLIPES before INCOPESCA and in her capacity as director of the Junta Directiva of said institution, with full knowledge and interest, subsequently, on July 20, 2015 (5 months later), for one of those 4 persons nominated in the recommendation, to come to request her professional signature authentication services. It adds, it was also impossible for her in February 2015 to have known that Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández was going to be investigated by the Ministerio Público starting August 18, 2015. It asserts, in the judgment she was reproached for not mentioning such a situation in her appearance before the Comisión de Seguridad y Narcotráfico of the Asamblea Legislativa, however, this does not constitute any anomaly, since no one asked her about that fact, nor has she been questioned for perjury, indeed, such facts have not been denied by her and she always defended herself and gave a logical and real explanation in the administrative investigation and before the Contencioso Court. It questions, the judgment does not provide reasons as to what was "the breach of such depth" that placed her in contradiction with "the postulates of transparency, accountability, honesty, rectitude, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, good faith in the exercise of her position". It contests, the Court's statement that the director of INCOPESCA recommended a client of hers to join a commission formed by that same Institute is also not true, because: 1- In February 2015, Mr. Bell Fernández was not a client of the plaintiff, nor before that date had she provided any professional service to him. 2- She never specifically recommended anyone, in her capacity as president of ASOLIPES, because the list contained the name of 4 fishermen, not only that of Gilberth Bell Fernández. 3- As Director of the Junta Directiva of INCOPESCA, she did not make any recommendation. It clarifies, the only thing she did was sign, in her capacity as president of the organization ASOLIPES, a nomination with 4 names of fishermen sent to the Junta Directiva of INCOPESCA, so that it could appoint an ad honorem fisheries advisory commission for the Caribbean, for which reason there existed no conflict of interest, nor serious breach of the duty of probity or the duty of abstention on the part of the plaintiff. It disserts, article 23 of the Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA, establishes that among the competencies and duties of the Junta Directiva is to appoint advisory commissions, and that these commissions carry out their work ad honorem, so for the directors of INCOPESCA there is no patrimonial or personal benefit, nor is there benefit for the members of the commissions, since the vocation of service and the duty to serve the country and the fishing sector prevails. It points out, article 19 of that same law, determines that when any of the attendees at the sessions of the Junta Directiva has a personal interest in the processing of any matter or their partners or relatives up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity have such an interest, the interested attendee must withdraw from the respective session while the case is discussed and resolved, under penalty of absolute nullity, the rectification of which shall correspond to the Auditor. It adds, in this case, having voted for Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández to be appointed, is not a breach of the duty of abstention, nor is it synonymous with a personal interest of said official, since neither of the two benefited from it. It argues, it is the auditor of INCOPESCA who is legally competent to determine if there existed any personal interest, for which reason, opening an administrative procedure, specially designed for the plaintiff, for an action that the Auditor of INCOPESCA, the only one competent to evaluate these cases, had considered normal and legal, was to act arbitrarily against her fundamental rights and a violation of due process. It explains, neither the Auditor of INCOPESCA, Rafael Antonio Abarca, nor the technical secretary of the Junta Directiva, Guillermo Ramírez Gatgens, being present at the session where the questioned agreement was taken, denounced a personal interest of the plaintiff. It disserts, the judgment incorrectly assumes that ASOLIPES and Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez are one and the same person, and that the collective and diffuse interest of ASOLIPES is the same personal interest of the plaintiff, which is incorrect, and demonstrates a lack of knowledge of the law, since, the plaintiff, when signing as president of ASOLIPES (a non-profit association) the recommendation of 4 fishermen, did not do so in her personal capacity. It accuses, Mr. Auditor, in almost 20 years that INCOPESCA has existed, has never questioned or annulled any appointment agreement because any director of the Junta Directiva, representative of the organizations of their province, had voted on a similar agreement. It reproves, the witnesses offered to prove that there was no conflict of interest were rejected by the Court from the preliminary hearing, despite the fact that this violated the right of defense and due process. It alleges, it is serious that the Court, losing all objectivity and impartiality, wanted to improperly associate the plaintiff with the activities investigated regarding Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández. It reproves, the lack of respect of the Court in transcribing in the judgment a question of its own making, of an injurious nature, in the following sense: "Did the plaintiff perhaps expect some prize for such irregular conduct?". This, despite the fact that the record does not show that, as of February 27, 2015, Mr. Bell was her client, nor that they maintained a commercial relationship between them.

III- In the grievance raised, improper assessment of the evidence and violation of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional) are alleged. However, this Chamber observes that a lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) is also challenged. This is inferred when the appellant alleges confusion in the judgment regarding the chronological order of the facts attributed to her in the disciplinary procedure and when she points out a lack of clarity in the judgment when indicating the seriousness of the faults she was charged with, likewise when she questions the subjective competence to initiate the sanctioning procedure, so this ground will be addressed as lack of reasoning (falta de motivación).

IV- Second: She reproaches a violation of articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4), and 5), and 83 of the CPCA, because the judgment establishes that damages (daños y perjuicios) were not proven, which – she argues – is false, since the case file contains documentary evidence regarding the epicrisis of medical care she received as a result of her mental and physical state after her illegitimate dismissal. She argues that the judgment makes no mention of this; it only concludes that since there is no causal nexus, no injury to the plaintiff underlies it either. However, the appellant considers that there is a causal nexus since there is nullity due to the State's illegitimate conduct. She points out that the only testimonial evidence accepted by the Court was precisely that of witness Angie Gutiérrez Cartín, who indicated the existence of the damages (daños y perjuicios) suffered by the plaintiff. She challenges that the Court dismissed her entire testimony without adequate substantiation, merely stating that the witness lacked credibility because, when questioned by the Chamber of Judges, she was evasive, imprecise, and speculative in her answers, without making the slightest effort to sift through her testimony, to such an extent that the reasoning was left completely devoid of any intellectual reasoning. Third: She challenges that in the award of costs (condenatoria en costas) in favor of the State and Mr. José Julio Saavedra, no distinction is made regarding the proportionality of the costs in relation to the claims of the lawsuit. She alleges that she has not litigated recklessly or in bad faith, but rather with just cause and with just claims for damages (daños y perjuicios), coupled with the fact that all pecuniary claims were against the State and that Mr. José Julio Saavedra was joined to this litigation by order of the Court and with opposition from the plaintiff, given the defense of improper joinder of the litigation (indebida integración de la litis) raised by the State. She requests to be exempted from the payment of costs if this cassation appeal is rejected, for having litigated in good faith, or failing that, that the specific costs be established individually for the parties.

V.- Given that this Cassation Body considers that the defect of lack of reasoning (falta de motivación) is being challenged, according to the appellant's statements, we proceed to analyze, first, that procedural grievance. Regarding the disciplinary procedure administratively pursued against the plaintiff and the sanction of dismissal, the Contentious-Administrative Court ruled: “…the defendant is correct, since the duty of probity implies that the conduct of the person exercising the public function must at all times adhere—and not only during the fulfillment of a specific workday, or even a session as a member of a Board of Directors, as the plaintiff erroneously argues—to postulates of transparency, accountability, honesty, righteousness, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, and good faith, in the exercise of their position. In this context, this Court is also clear that the verification of a breach of such caliber—as configured in the sub-lite—can entail not only the material exercise of the administrative ius puniendi, by virtue of the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanction, but also, as is well known, the eventual imposition of a specific criminal sanction, since by failing to observe the duty of abstention, that single fact could constitute the crime of ‘breach of duties’ set forth in article 332 of the Penal Code, Law (No. 4573) of May 4, 1970. That is to say, the sanction of disqualification from one to four years. This is because, without making any disquisition on the matter, the plaintiff's respected legal counsel must remember that three clearly defined responsibilities fall upon the shoulders of the public servant, each being mutually exclusive of the other (administrative, criminal, and civil or pecuniary). Thus, the public-order norms of mandatory erga omnes compliance, as regards section 129 of the Political Charter and articles 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, are not trivial. (…) In summary, in said legal body the ordinary legislator synthesized ethical values and principles that the public administrator must weigh, transcendent precepts that, in due course, enshrine the duty of probity, an inseparable construct of the Ethics of the Public Function. This is how said regulation is applicable to everyone, we insist, without making any subjective discrimination and in relation to a specific public position, and irrespective of the notoriety in the public and commercial sphere that the person who goes against such sacred precepts – constitutive of a Social and Democratic State of Law and its corollaries, among others, the confidence of the social collective in the exercise of the public function (doctrine of article 140.8 of the Political Charter) – might have. Evidently, it is a matter of common sense, and it is also not trivial that the plaintiff, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA, recommended one of her clients to join a Commission formed by that same Institute. In this sense, did the plaintiff expect some reward for such irregular behavior? Evidently, the Administration acted in accordance with the applicable legal regime, and not a single trace of abuse of power, as was timely indicated. In this context, even though the offer concerning the evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver) that the plaintiff expressly mentioned—until the oral and public trial hearing held on the 8th of the current month—despite the preliminary hearing held in the criminal venue (see image 294), dates back to September 19, 2018, is rejected as irrelevant, by virtue of the fact that it is duly accredited in the case file, in accordance with proven fact 7), that the sanction agreed upon by the Governing Council, in Article IV of Session No. 79 held on December 15, 2015, is based on "(...) especially those referring to the authentication of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and his recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, are contrary to the duties of Probity and Abstention, constituting grounds for administrative liability, being that according to the legal system (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service), the violation of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the procedure carried out, constitutes cause for separation from the public office without administrative liability (...)". In such a way that, despite the fact that the plaintiff intends to divert this Court's attention from the facts for which she was actually sanctioned, and justify the remote estimation of her claims, in the dismissal of the person with whom she was linked, that is, Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández, the truth is that, as the defendant categorically stated, the plaintiff was sanctioned with dismissal, thanks to the breach of the duty of probity, since she put her personal interests first, that is, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the many Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, given that this person had previously been her client, months before, due to a request for a sanitary permit that he made before Senasa, while she had proceeded to authenticate his signature in that procedure. She was absolutely not sanctioned because Mr. Bell Fernández had been investigated by the OIJ, due to alleged links to drug trafficking or others. For greater abundance, let it be clear that the plaintiff is not correct in justifying the foregoing, that is, outside of INCOPESCA she materially no longer served as an official, as such she had the duty to attend to those who came to her law firm, since that is her modus vivendi, and this, furthermore, she did not perceive a prohibition to be able to exercise her legal function, regardless of who her client was. In this regard, the plaintiff could perhaps be partially correct, that is, her main income is the exercise of her activity as a liberal professional, however, she should have recused herself from recommending a client of hers, for a position in a public entity in which she figured as the supreme head. This, evidently, in any sphere, contrasts with a sort of conflict of interest, despite the fact that it is not accredited that she had maintained any sentimental link with Mr. Bell, but the truth is that there was a relationship, at least commercial, according to the case file. Without a doubt, the intelligence inherent to numeral 38 subsection b) of the LCCEI emerges with entity…”. On the other hand, regarding the subjective lack of jurisdiction that the plaintiff accused in relation to the Secretariat of the Governing Council, the judgment indicated: “…notes, numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law establishes that the instruction of the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Board of Directors of the referred Institute. However, the plaintiff does not take into account that the designation of said collegiate body for such a task is imposed if and only if, one is facing the grounds regulated therein in accordance with article 9 ibid, e.g., when the members of the Board of Directors are in default, are in bankruptcy or in a state of insolvency, are convicted of crimes against property, embezzlement, or misappropriation of funds, or, in default before state entities, or linked by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree, with another member of said collegiate body, and, even, with the institutional Auditor. Furthermore, because they are employees of the Institute, likewise, for the grounds contemplated in numeral 16 eiusdem (…) the legal situation of the plaintiff was not found in any of the previously indicated circumstances. In such a way that, it was not necessary to designate the instruction of the disciplinary procedure in the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, since, it is insisted, the efficient and adequate cause for which the plaintiff was dismissed from her position as Director of INCOPESCA, was, precisely, for having incurred in actions that in turn violated the duty of probity in public service, contrary to the precepts in canons 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, as anticipated, previously. Added to this, the plaintiff must take into consideration two aspects of entity, in the first place, "To determine the other types of jurisdiction, what the pertinent specific rules provide shall be observed" (art. 61.3 LGAP), given that in the specific case there is an underlying power-duty on the part of the Governing Council with a view to delegating the instruction of the procedures to its Secretariat, as evidenced by the aforementioned supra norm 33 ibid. And, "1. The rules of this law [LGAP] that regulate the activity of the State shall also apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them (art. 2.1 LGAP). (…) the Administration acted in total adherence to the Principle of Legality or Strict Legality, that is, it sanctioned the person who with her culpable conduct violated the duty of probity, putting personal interests before the general interest, but, furthermore, that the person who instructed the procedure was absolutely competent for such a task, given that the directing body did not even resolve the merits of the matter, since said jurisdiction is legally attributed to the Superior Council, in order to what is prescribed in numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…”.

**VI.-** In order to resolve the procedural grievance of lack of reasoning, it is necessary to indicate that, for a long time, both the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation have specified that the reasoning of a judgment consists of capturing or making manifest the reasons or grounds, both factual and legal, for which the decision is adopted.

Thus, its absence is noted in two hypotheses: the first, when it is non-existent, as the adjudicator omits to record the foundations of their decision; the second, when the argumentative exposition of the decision-making body proves confusing or exhibits contradictions that stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the reasons serving as its basis, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process (as can be observed in resolution No. 184-F-S1-2009 of 13:00 hours on February 23, 2009, issued by the First Chamber). For this reason, it has been said, a specific lack of reasoning can be understood as that relating to the factual circumstances of the judgment (resolution 1444-F-S1-2012 of 9:10 hours on October 30, 2012, of the First Chamber).

This Chamber observes that there is no reasoning in the challenged judgment, inasmuch as the chronological thread of the facts attributed to the plaintiff in the disciplinary procedure is lost, as the appellant points out, such that the judgment attributes facts to her in a chronological order different from that proven in the administrative proceeding and attributes a different cause for serious misconduct, which, by itself, constitutes a flaw in the reasoning of the judgment. In that sense, the judgment indicated that the cause for the plaintiff's dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity, by placing her personal interests first, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, despite the fact that this person had been her client months earlier, since she authenticated Mr. Bell's signature on the application for a sanitary permit filed before SENASA. Such reasoning is contradictory to what was proven in the Proven Facts of the same judgment and in the administrative procedure, since these established that the plaintiff, Director of INCOPESCA, in her capacity as president of the Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero (ASOLIPES), recommended Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, in February 2015, to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón. It was also proven that, on July 28, 2015, acting as a lawyer, she authenticated the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, in connection with the application he filed before the National Animal Health Service (SENASA), regarding the application for an operating permit for the dock located on Playa Portete in the province of Limón. This being the case, according to the chronological order proven in the judgment, the plaintiff is correct when she alleges that, in February 2015, upon recommending the members of the aforementioned commission, Mr. Bell Fernández was not her client, therefore the grounds for the dismissal indicated by the Tribunal are incompatible with the chronology of the proven facts and are different from the grounds established in the administrative act of dismissal, which constitutes a lack of reasoning in the judgment, by departing from the evidence in the record and the facts proven in the administrative proceeding.

Furthermore, shortcomings and contradictions are also observed in the analysis of the subjective competence of the directing body of the administrative procedure and the body that issued the final dismissal resolution. In the fragment of the judgment transcribed in the preceding recital, it is observed that, initially, the judgment invoked Article 16 of the INCOPESCA Creation Law as the rule establishing that the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Administrative Board of INCOPESCA; however, it later discarded the application of said law and affirmed that the cause for the dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity in the public function, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, for which reason it indicated that the subjective competence, for this specific case, was determined according to Articles 2.1, 33, and 61.3 of the General Public Administration Law (hereinafter LGAP), according to which a power-duty underlies, vested in the Government Council, which could delegate the instruction of the procedures to its Secretariat. However, contradictorily, the judgment reached the conclusion that the competence was correct, since it is attributed to the "…Consejo Superior, according to the provisions of numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…". It can be observed that after having indicated the non-application of said article, it contradicts itself at the end and invokes it again to establish the subjective competence of the body it calls "Consejo Superior". Given such contradictions, the judgment displays great confusion among three normative bodies (the INCOPESCA Creation Law, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, and the General Public Administration Law), without a common thread in its reasoning, which also transgresses the rules of sound rational criticism, by incurring contradictions that go against logic. Ultimately, the challenged judgment failed to clearly reason the facts attributed to the plaintiff according to the evidence submitted to the record, nor the application of the specific rules establishing the grounds for sanction, nor the rules determining the body competent to instruct the sanctioning procedure. It also failed to explain why it ceased to apply the special rule of INCOPESCA, only to then cite, in a confusing manner, the general rules of the LGAP and, subsequently, apply Article 16 of the INCOPESCA Creation Law again, without providing logical reasoning, such that these confusions and contradictions in the reasoning constitute grounds for nullity of the appealed decision. The judgment even fails to develop the type of relationship between the plaintiff and the Public Administration, also the applicable regime for the position she held, nor does it define the body that legally appointed Mrs. Mc Donald Rodríguez, nor did it carry out the analysis, according to the principle of parallelism of forms, to determine who had the competence to remove her from her functions as Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, aspects which were fundamental to resolve the present litigation and which are noticeably absent from the challenged judgment.

Given such flaws in the reasoning of the judgment, this Chamber is unable to review the merits of the present matter, therefore the aforementioned procedural grievance must be upheld, and the referral of the case back to the Trial Court will be ordered, so that it may issue a new judgment in accordance with the law.

Given the manner in which this is resolved, it is unnecessary to examine the remaining substantive grievances raised by the appellant.

**VII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the plaintiff shall be granted. Consequently, the contested judgment shall be overturned. As stipulated in Article 150, subsection 1) of the CPCA, and since it is not possible to rule on the parties’ allegations in a sole instance, the case shall be remanded (reenvío) to the court of origin so that the lower court (Tribunal de Instancia) may issue a new judgment in accordance with the law. Given the manner in which this is resolved, a ruling on the appellant’s remaining grievances shall be omitted.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is granted. The contested judgment is overturned.

The process is ordered to be remanded to the court of origin so that the Trial Court issues a new judgment in accordance with the law.

DESPINOZAC

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VI.- In order to resolve the procedural grievance of lack of reasoning, it is necessary to indicate that, for a long time, both the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation have specified that the reasoning of a judgment consists of expressing or setting forth the reasons or grounds, both factual and legal, by which the decision is adopted. Hence, its absence is noted in two hypotheses: the first, when it is nonexistent, as the judge omits to set down the foundations of their decision; the second, when the argumentative display of the deciding body proves confusing or exhibits contradictions that stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the motives that serve as its basis, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, the right to due process (as can be observed in resolution No. 184-F-S1-2009 of 13 hours on February 23, 2009, issued by the First Chamber). Therefore, it has been said, a specific lack of reasoning can be understood as that relating to the factual circumstances of the judgment (resolution 1444-F-S1-2012 of 9 hours 10 minutes on October 30, 2012, of the First Chamber). This Chamber observes that there is no reasoning in the contested judgment, because the chronological thread of the facts attributed to the plaintiff in the disciplinary proceeding is lost, as the appellant points out, such that the judgment attributes facts to her in a chronological order different from that proven in the administrative venue and attributes a different cause of serious misconduct to her, which, in and of itself, constitutes a defect in the reasoning of the judgment. In that sense, the judgment indicated that the cause of the plaintiff's dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity, by putting her personal interests first, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, despite this person having been her client, months before, since she authenticated the signature of Mr. Bell on the application for a sanitary permit that he filed before SENASA. Such reasoning is contradictory to what was proven in the Proven Facts of the same judgment and in the administrative proceeding, since in these it was established that the plaintiff, Director of INCOPESCA, in her capacity as president of the Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero (ASOLIPES), recommended before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández, in February 2015, to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón. It was also proven that, on July 28, 2015, acting as a lawyer, she authenticated the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, regarding the application that he made before the Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (SENASA), this being the application for an operating permit for the dock located at Playa Portete in the province of Limón.

Thus, according to the chronological order that was proven in the judgment, the plaintiff is correct in claiming that, in February 2015, when recommending to the members of the aforementioned commission, Mr. Bell Fernández was not her client, so the grounds for dismissal indicated by the Trial Court are incompatible with the chronology of the proven facts and are different from the grounds established in the administrative act of dismissal, which constitutes a lack of proper reasoning in the judgment, by departing from the evidence in the case file and the facts proven in the administrative proceedings. On the other hand, deficiencies and contradictions are also observed in the analysis of the subjective competence (competencia subjetiva) of the directing body of the administrative procedure and the body that issued the final dismissal resolution. In the excerpt of the judgment transcribed in the previous Recital, it is observed that, initially, the judgment invoked Article 16 of the INCOPESCA Creation Law as the rule establishing that the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, however, it later discarded the application of said law and proved that the cause of the dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity in public office, according to Articles 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, thus indicating that the subjective competence, for this specific case, was determined according to Articles 2.1, 33, and 61.3 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP), according to which a power-duty underlies in the Government Council, which could delegate the instruction of the procedures to its Secretariat. However, contradictorily, the judgment reached the conclusion that the competence was correct, since it is attributed to the “…Superior Council (Consejo Superior), according to what is prescribed in numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…”. It can be observed that after having indicated the non-application of said article, in the end it contradicts itself and invokes it again to establish the subjective competence of the body it names as “Superior Council”. Given such contradictions, a great confusion is visualized in the judgment among three regulatory bodies (the INCOPESCA Creation Law, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, and the General Law of Public Administration), without there being a connecting thread in its reasoning, which also transgresses the rules of sound critical reasoning (sana crítica racional), by entering into contradictions that go against logic.

In the final analysis, the contested judgment failed to state reasons, in a clear manner, for the facts attributed to the plaintiff based on the evidence provided in the case file, nor did it state reasons for the application of the specific rules that establish the grounds for sanction, nor the rules that determine the competent body to conduct the sanctioning proceeding. Nor did it explain why it failed to apply the special rule of INCOPESCA, only to then cite, in a confusing manner, the general rules of the LGAP and then apply Article 16 of the Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA again, without providing logical reasoning, such that these confusions and contradictions in the statement of reasons constitute grounds for nullity of the appealed ruling. Indeed, the judgment omits to develop the type of relationship the plaintiff had with the Public Administration, as well as the applicable regime for the position she held, nor does it define the body that legally appointed Mrs. Mc Donald Rodríguez, nor did it perform the analysis, according to the principle of parallelism of forms, to determine who had the jurisdiction to remove her from her duties as Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, aspects that were fundamental to resolving the present litigation and which are found to be missing from the contested judgment. Given such defects in the statement of reasons of the judgment, this Chamber is unable to review the present matter on its merits, and therefore the aforementioned procedural grievance must be upheld and the case will be remanded to the Trial Court, so that it may issue a new judgment in accordance with the law. Due to the manner in which it is resolved, it is of no interest to analyze the remaining substantive grievances raised by the cassation appellant".

Drafted by Magistrate Rojas Morales:

CONSIDERING

I.- Mrs. Anita Yorleny Mc Donald Rodríguez filed a contentious-administrative lawsuit against the State and Mr. José Julio Saavedra Chacón, in which she requests that the following be declared: *“…1. The annulment of the disciplinary procedure carried out by the Secretariat of the Government Council under case file number 002-08-2015, because it is a Body legally incompetent to conduct such an investigation according to express provisions in Articles 9 and 16 of the Organic Law Creating Incopesca. / 2. The partial annulment of the final resolution adopted in Article 4 of Ordinary Session of the Government Council No. 69 of December 15, 2015, according to Certification No. CERT-379-15, solely insofar as it orders the dismissal of the plaintiff, then a member of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, this being a Resolution contrary to law adopted under non-existent grounds for dismissal. / 3. The ordering of her immediate reinstatement, for the remainder of her term as a member of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA. 4. That the State be obligated to pay the damages caused, as well as the interest determined in the judgment, from the moment they were caused until their effective payment. For damages from the moment they were caused until their effective payment: a) Subjective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral subjetivo) ₡50,000,000.00, b) Objective non-pecuniary damage (daño moral objetivo) ₡10,000,000.00, c) Pecuniary damage (daño material): i. Lost per diems (dietas) ₡500,000.00, ii. Medical expenses ₡1,000,000.00. And finally, that the State be obligated to pay the amount of both costs…”*. The State answered the lawsuit negatively and raised the defenses of lack of right and lack of passive standing in relation to the damages. Likewise, it requested that the plaintiff be ordered to pay both costs of the proceeding and their respective interest. Co-defendant Julio Saavedra Chacón raised the exception he termed lack of legality and lack of standing in both senses and requested that the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff be dismissed in all its aspects and that she be ordered to pay procedural costs. The Contentious-Administrative Court, when issuing the appealed judgment, deemed it proven that on August 19, 2015, then-deputy Rolando González Ulloa, in Plenary Session No. 58, questioned that days before the conclusion of the Ministry of Public Security's operation against the encroachment on public domain property on Playa Portete in the province of Limón, a meeting had taken place between the then-Minister of Labor, the then-president of JAPDEVA, and the plaintiff here, Mc Donald Rodríguez, in her former capacity as Director of the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA, hereinafter). Consequently, he requested that the actions of these public servants be investigated and that the corresponding disciplinary sanctions eventually be applied, a request that he also made on August 21, 2015, through a communication to the then-President of the Republic, Luis Guillermo Solís Rivera. On August 26, 2015, several print media outlets published information concerning the meeting held by the aforementioned officials with Mr. Gilberth Bell, alleged owner of the pier located on Playa Portete in Limón, who was apparently linked to drug trafficking. The Government Council delegated the instruction of the disciplinary procedure against the plaintiff to the Secretariat of that collegiate body. The Directing Body informed her that the objective of the procedure would be to verify the truth of the facts previously denounced by deputy Rolando González Ulloa and others that were published by the media, related to the apparent attendance of Mrs. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, at a meeting with fishermen's organizations at the facilities of a pier located in Portete, province of Limón, and to determine the alleged existence of acts that could have generated some administrative responsibility for her. On November 4, 2015, the Government Council agreed to request the Secretariat of the Government Council, in its capacity as the Directing Body of the disciplinary procedure, to expand the investigation by virtue of becoming aware of new facts that could be related to the investigations underway. On November 12, 2015, the Secretariat of the Government Council, in its capacity as the Directing Body of the disciplinary procedure, communicated the expansion of the charges imputed to the plaintiff concerning the search carried out at the home of Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández by the Judicial Investigation Agency (hereinafter OIJ) on October 6, 2015, and who is linked to an organization dedicated to national drug trafficking and money laundering; she was attributed that, despite her position as Director of INCOPESCA and member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen and aquaculturists' organizations of the province of Limón, and acting as a lawyer, she proceeded to authenticate the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández on a permit application made by the latter before the National Animal Health Service (SENASA). They clarified that it concerned an application for an operating permit for the pier located on Playa Portete in the province of Limón, dated July 28, 2015, and that she failed to mention this situation during her appearance before the Security and Drug Trafficking Commission of the Legislative Assembly, a body investigating the issue of the pier in Portete. Additionally, she was accused of recommending Mr. Bell Fernández in February 2015, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA and president of the Association of Limón Fishing Sector Leaders (Asolipes), before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón, a position from which he was subsequently removed. The Court, in summary, deemed it proven that the Directing Body determined that the actions attributed to the investigated person could have been contrary to the provisions of Article 3 of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service (hereinafter LCCEI), and Article 1.14 of its Regulations, as well as Article 1.4, p. 17 of Directive No.

D-2-2004-CO, eventually constituting grounds for administrative liability as indicated in the LCCEI, concluding that such legal characterization could merit the administrative liability stipulated in Articles 4 and 39 ibid, as well as in numerals 211 and 213 of the LGAP, that is, separation from the position without employer liability. The Government Council, in Article IV of Session No. 79, held on December 15, 2015, agreed to dismiss from the position of Director before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, Ms. Anita Yorleny Mc Donal Rodríguez, ID. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, in her capacity as a member of the fishing sector, representative of the fishermen's or aquaculturists' organizations of the province of Limón, because her actions, "(...) especially those referring to the authentication (autenticación) of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and her recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, are contrary to the Duties of Probity (Deberes de Probidad) and Abstention (Abstención), constituting grounds for administrative liability, and in accordance with the legal system (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function), the breach of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the developed procedure, constitutes cause for separation from the public position without administrative liability (...)". Said resolution was notified on January 15, 2016, to the electronic mailbox of the plaintiff's special administrative attorney. The Administrative and Civil Tax Court, First Section, composed of Judge Claudia Bolaños Salazar, Judges Billy Araya Olmos and Carlos Espinoza Salas, in judgment No. 005-2019-I of 11:25 a.m. on January 29, 2019, unanimously resolved on the merits: "...By virtue of the foregoing, the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the defendants is upheld, and the lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación pasiva) raised by the State and the lack of standing (falta de legitimación) in both meanings alleged by Mr. Julio Saavedra Chacón are rejected. Consequently, THE CLAIM IS DECLARED WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS EXTREMES. Personal and procedural costs (costas personales y procesales) are borne by the plaintiff, jointly with the legal interest on said award from the finality of this pronouncement until its respective cancellation, in favor of the State, and the costs in favor of the co-defendant José Julio Saavedra Chacón...". Disagreeing with the decision, the plaintiff filed an appeal for cassation (recurso de casación), which was admitted by this Court of Cassation.

**II.-** The plaintiff raises three substantive grievances. **First:** She alleges violation of Articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) and 83 of the Administrative Contentious Procedure Code (CPCA), because the Court did not take into account that, within the disciplinary proceeding followed against the plaintiff, the Directing Body and the Government Council concluded that it was not possible to associate her with accusations of serious misconduct, as director of INCOPESCA, for allegedly illegal activities of Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández that were unknown to her. They also concluded that she could not be blamed for having knowledge of them before the meeting with fishermen at the Portete dock, on July 16, 2015, nor before the raid on the entire fishing facilities complex, on August 18, 2016. However, she maintains, the judgment reproached her for actions prior to those dates and inverted the order of the dates to indicate, improperly, that Ms. Mc Donald Rodríguez first authenticated the signature of Gilberth Bell Fernández in a procedure before SENASA on July 20, 2015, and that upon becoming her client, she should have foreseen that situation beforehand, so she should have abstained from signing in February 2015, as president of the organization she represented (ASOLIPES), a list of 4 candidates so that INCOPESCA could choose one of them to form the Caribbean Fisheries Advisory Commission, among which the name of Gilberth Bell Fernández was included, which shows that there is improper and speculative reasoning on the part of the Court. She expounds, it is impossible that the plaintiff, in February 2015, signed a recommendation as president of ASOLIPES before INCOPESCA and in her capacity as director of the Board of Directors of said institution, with full knowledge and interest, and that subsequently, on July 20, 2015 (5 months later), one of those 4 persons postulated in the recommendation came to request her professional services for signature authentication (autenticación de firma). She adds, it was also impossible for her in February 2015 to have knowledge that Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández was going to be investigated by the Public Ministry starting August 18, 2015. She argues, the judgment reproached her for not mentioning such situation during her appearance before the Security and Drug Trafficking Commission of the Legislative Assembly; however, this does not constitute any anomaly, since no one asked her about that fact, nor has she been questioned for perjury; indeed, such facts have not been denied by her and she always defended herself and gave a logical and real explanation in the administrative investigation and before the Contentious Court. She questions, the judgment does not provide reasons for what was "the degree of such breach" that put her in contradiction with "the postulates of transparency, accountability (rendición de cuentas), honesty, rectitude, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, good faith in the exercise of her position". She contests, the Court's statement that the director of INCOPESCA recommended a client of hers to join a commission formed by that same Institute is also not true, because: 1- In February 2015, Mr. Bell Fernández was not the plaintiff's client, nor had she provided him any professional service before that date. 2- She never recommended anyone specifically, in her capacity as president of ASOLIPES, because the list contained the names of 4 fishermen, not only that of Gilberth Bell Fernández. 3- As Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, she did not make any recommendation. She clarifies, the only thing she did was sign, in her capacity as president of the ASOLIPES organization, a nomination (postulación) with 4 names of fishermen sent to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, so that it could appoint an ad honorem Caribbean fisheries advisory commission, therefore there was no conflict of interest (conflicto de intereses), nor serious misconduct against the duty of probity or the duty of abstention on the part of the plaintiff. She expounds, Article 23 of the Law Creating INCOPESCA establishes that within the powers and duties of the Board of Directors is to appoint advisory commissions, and that these commissions carry out their work ad honorem, so for the directors of INCOPESCA there is no personal or patrimonial benefit, nor is there any benefit for the members of the commissions, since the spirit of service and the duty to serve the country and the fishing sector prevail.

It indicates that Article 19 of that same law determines that when any of the attendees at the sessions of the Board of Directors has a personal interest in the processing of any matter, or their partners or relatives up to the third degree of consanguinity or affinity have such an interest, the interested attendee must withdraw from the respective session while the case is discussed and resolved, under penalty of absolute nullity, the rectification of which shall correspond to the Auditor. It adds, in this case, that having voted for Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández to be appointed is not a breach of the duty to abstain, nor is it synonymous with a personal interest of said official, since neither of the two benefited from it. It argues that the auditor of INCOPESCA is the legally competent authority to determine if any personal interest existed, which is why opening an administrative procedure, specially designed for the plaintiff, for an action that the Auditor of INCOPESCA, the only one competent to evaluate these cases, had considered normal and legal, was acting arbitrarily against her fundamental rights and a violation of due process. It explains that neither the Auditor of INCOPESCA, Rafael Antonio Abarca, nor the technical secretary of the Board of Directors, Guillermo Ramírez Gatgens, being present at the session where the questioned agreement was made, reported a personal interest of the plaintiff. It discourses that the judgment incorrectly assumes that ASOLIPES and Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez are the same person, and that the collective and diffuse interest of ASOLIPES is the same as the personal interest of the plaintiff, which is incorrect, and evidences a lack of knowledge of the law, since, when the plaintiff signed as president of ASOLIPES (a non-profit association) the recommendation of 4 fishermen, she did not do so in her personal capacity. It accuses that the auditor, in the almost 20 years that INCOPESCA has existed, has never questioned or annulled any appointment agreement because a director of the Board of Directors, representing the organizations of his province, had voted on a similar agreement. It reproaches that the witnesses offered to prove that there was no conflict of interest were rejected by the Court from the preliminary hearing, despite the fact that this violated the right of defense and due process. It alleges that it is serious that the Court, losing all objectivity and impartiality, wanted to improperly associate the plaintiff with the activities investigated concerning Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández. It reproaches the Court's lack of respect in transcribing in the judgment a question of its own invention, of an injurious nature, as follows: “Did the plaintiff perhaps expect some reward for such irregular conduct?”. This, despite the fact that the record does not show that, as of February 27, 2015, Mr. Bell was her client, nor that they maintained a commercial relationship with each other.

**III-** The grievance raised alleges improper valuation of evidence and violation of sound rational criticism. However, this Chamber observes that a lack of proper reasoning is also alleged. This is inferred when the appellant alleges confusion in the judgment regarding the chronological order of the facts attributed to her in the disciplinary procedure and when she points out a lack of clarity in the judgment when indicating the seriousness of the offenses charged to her, in the same way as when she questions the subjective competence to initiate the sanctioning procedure, so said ground will be heard as a lack of proper reasoning.

**IV- Second:** It reproaches a violation of Articles 82, subsections 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) and 83 of the CPCA, since the judgment establishes that damages (daños y perjuicios) were not proven, which – it maintains – is false, as the file contains documentary evidence regarding the epicrisis of medical care she received, as a result of her mental and physical state, after her illegitimate dismissal. It argues that the judgment makes no mention of this, and only concludes that since there is no causal link, there is also no underlying harm for the plaintiff; however, the appellant considers that there is a causal link, since there is nullity due to the State's unlawful conduct. It points out that the only testimonial evidence accepted by the Court was, precisely, the witness Angie Gutiérrez Cartín, who indicated the existence of the damages suffered by the plaintiff. It accuses that the Court rejected her entire statement without greater substantiation, only indicating that the witness does not deserve credibility, since, when questioned by the Chamber of Judges, she was evasive, imprecise, and speculative in her answers, without making the slightest effort to filter her statement, to such an extent that the reasoning remained completely devoid of any intellectual process. **Third:** It accuses that, in the order of costs in favor of the State and Mr. José Julio Saavedra, no distinction is made regarding the proportionality of the costs in relation to the claims of the lawsuit. It alleges that she has not litigated recklessly or in bad faith, but rather with just cause and just claims for damages, coupled with the fact that all pecuniary claims were against the State and that Mr. José Julio Saavedra was joined to this litigation by order of the Court and with the plaintiff's opposition, in light of the exception of improper joinder of parties raised by the State. She requests to be exonerated from the payment of costs, in the event that this appeal for cassation is rejected, for having litigated in good faith, or, failing that, that the specific costs be established individually for the parties.

**V.-** Given that this Cassation Body considers that the defect of lack of proper reasoning is alleged, according to what was stated by the appellant, it proceeds to analyze, first, that procedural grievance. Regarding the administrative disciplinary procedure brought against the plaintiff and the sanction of dismissal, the Contentious-Administrative Court ordered: *“…the defendant is correct since the duty of probity implies that the conduct of the person exercising the public function must adhere at all times - and not only during the fulfillment of a specific working day, or even a session as a member of a Board of Directors, as the plaintiff erroneously reasons - to postulates of transparency, accountability, honesty, rectitude, respect, discretion, integrity, impartiality, loyalty, spirit of service, good faith, in the exercise of their position. In this context, this Court is also clear that the verification of a breach of such depth - as was configured in the sub lite - can entail not only the material exercise of the administrative ius puniendi, by virtue of the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanction, but also, as is well known, the eventual imposition of a specific criminal sanction, since by failing to observe the duty to abstain, that sole fact could constitute the crime of "breach of duties" provided for in the letter of numeral 332 of the Penal Code, Law (No. 4573) of May 4, 1970.* That is, the sanction of disqualification (inhabilitación) of one to four years. This is because, without making any disquisition on the matter, the respectable legal counsel of the plaintiff must recall that on the shoulders of the public servant rest three clearly defined responsibilities, each one excluding the other (administrative, criminal, and civil or pecuniary). Thus, it is not trivial that the norms of public order and mandatory compliance erga omnes, as pertinent to Article 129 of the Political Constitution (Carta Política), insofar as numerals 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, (…) the ordinary legislator synthesized ethical values and principles that the public administrator must weigh, being transcendental precepts that, at the same time, enshrine the duty of probity (deber de probidad), an inseparable construct of the Ethics of the Public Function (Ética de la Función Pública). This is how said regulation is applicable to everyone, we insist, without carrying out any subjective discrimination and in relation to a specific public office, and regardless of the notoriety in the public and commercial sphere that someone who attempts against such sacred precepts, constitutive of a Social and Democratic State of Law (Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho), and its corollaries, among others, the trust of the social collective in the exercise of the public function (doctrine of numeral 140.8 of the Political Constitution). Evidently, it is a matter of common sense, and neither is it trivial the fact that the plaintiff, in her capacity as Director of INCOPESCA, recommended one of her clients to join a Commission that makes up that same Institute. In this regard, did the plaintiff perhaps expect some prize for such irregular behavior? Evidently, the Administration acted in accordance with the applicable legal regime, and not a single hint of abuse of power, as was timely pointed out. In that context, even though the offer concerning the evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor resolver) whose express mention the plaintiff made -up until the public oral trial hearing, held on the 8th of the current month-, despite the fact that the preliminary hearing held in criminal court (see image 294) dates back to September 19, 2018, it is rejected as irrelevant, by virtue of the fact that it is duly accredited in the record, in addition to proven fact 7), that the sanction agreed to by the Governing Council (Consejo de Gobierno), in Article IV of Session No. 79 held on December 15, 2015, is based on " (...) especially those that refer to the certification of the signature of Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández and his recommendation before the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, are contrary to the duties of Probity (Deber de Probidad) and Abstention (Deber de Abstención), constituting grounds for administrative liability, it being that according to the legal system (Articles 4 and 38 subsection b) of the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function [Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, LCCEI]), the breach of the duty of probity, duly proven as it was in the developed procedure, constitutes cause for the removal from public office (separación del cargo público) without administrative liability (...)". In such a way that, despite the fact that the plaintiff intends to divert this Court's attention from the facts for which she was actually sanctioned, and to justify the remote estimation of her claims, in the acquittal (sobreseimiento) of the person with whom she was linked, that is, Mr. Gilbert Bell Fernández, the truth is that as the defendant categorically stated, the plaintiff was sanctioned with dismissal (destitución), thanks to the breach of the duty of probity, since she put her personal interests first, that is, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the many Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, given that previously this person had been her client, months before, taking into account the request for a sanitary permit that he made before Senasa, while she had proceeded to certify his signature in said process. She was absolutely not sanctioned because Mr. Bell Fernández had been investigated by the OIJ, due to the alleged links with drug trafficking or others. Furthermore, let it be clear that the plaintiff is not correct in justifying the above, that is, outside of INCOPESCA she materially no longer acted as an official, such being the case, she had the duty to attend to those who came to her firm, since that is her modus vivendi, and this, moreover, she did not perceive any prohibition to be able to exercise her legal function, regardless of who her client was. In that respect, perhaps the plaintiff could be partially right, that is, her main income is the exercise of her activity as a liberal professional; however, she should have recused herself from recommending a client of hers for a position in a public entity in which she figured as the supreme head. This, evidently, in any sphere, contrasts with a sort of conflict of interests (conflicto de intereses), even though it is not proven that she had maintained any sentimental bond with Mr. Bell, but the truth is that there was indeed a relationship, at least commercial, in view of the record. Without a doubt, the intelligence inherent to numeral 38 subsection b) of the LCCEI emerges in substance…”. On the other hand, regarding the subjective incompetence that the plaintiff alleged in relation to the Secretariat of the Governing Council, the judgment stated: “…notes that numeral 16 of the Law of INCOPESCA establishes that the instruction of the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Board of Directors of the referred Institute. However, the plaintiff does not take into account that the designation of said collegiate body for such task is imposed if and only if, one is facing the grounds regulated therein in accordance with article 9 ibid, v. gr, when the members of the Board of Directors are in default of payment, are bankrupt or in a state of insolvency, are convicted of crimes against property, embezzlement, or misappropriation of funds, or, in default before state entities, or bound by consanguinity or affinity up to the third degree, with another member of said collegiate body, and, even, with the institutional Auditor. Moreover, for being Institute employees, likewise, for the grounds contemplated in numeral 16 ibid (…) the legal situation of the plaintiff was not found in any of the previously indicated circumstances.

Thus, it was not necessary to designate the initiation of the disciplinary procedure to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, since, it is reiterated, the efficient and adequate cause for which the plaintiff was dismissed from her position as Director of INCOPESCA was, precisely, having incurred in actions that in turn violated the duty of probity in public function, contrary to the provisions of canons 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, as previously anticipated. Added to this, the plaintiff must take into consideration two substantive aspects, first, "To determine other types of competence, the pertinent specific rules shall govern" (art. 61.3 LGAP), given that for the specific case there is an underlying power - duty in the hands of the Government Council with a view to delegating the instruction (instrucción) of the procedures to its Secretariat, as it draws from the aforementioned rule 33 ibid. And, "1. The rules of this law [LGAP] that regulate the activity of the State shall also apply to other public entities, in the absence of a special rule for them (art. 2.1 LGAP). (…) the Administration acted in total adherence to the Principle of Legality or Specificity, that is, it sanctioned whoever with their culpable conduct violated the duty of probity, placing personal interests before the general interest, as well as that whoever instructed the procedure was absolutely competent for such task, given that the directing body did not even resolve the merits of the matter, since said competence is legally attributed to the Superior Council, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…".

VI.- In order to resolve the procedural grievance of lack of reasoning (motivación), it is necessary to indicate that, for a long time, both the First Chamber and this Court of Cassation have specified that the reasoning (motivación) of a judgment consists of expressing or making manifest the reasons or grounds, both factual and legal, for which the decision is adopted. Hence, its absence is noted in two hypotheses: the first, when it is non-existent, as the judge omits to record the foundations of their decision; the second, when the argumentative display of the deciding body is confusing or exhibits contradictions that stand as an obstacle to clearly determining the motives serving as its basis, which would violate the procedural rights of the parties, in particular, due process" (as can be observed in Resolution No. 184-F-S1-2009 of 1:00 p.m. on February 23, 2009, issued by the First Chamber). Therefore, it has been said, a specific lack of reasoning (motivación) can be understood as that relating to the factual circumstances of the judgment (Resolution 1444-F-S1-2012 of 9:10 a.m. on October 30, 2012, of the First Chamber). This Chamber observes that there is no reasoning (motivación) in the contested judgment, inasmuch as the chronological thread of the facts that were attributed to the plaintiff in the disciplinary procedure is lost, as the appellant points out, such that the judgment attributes facts to her in a chronological order different from that accredited in the administrative venue and attributes a different cause for serious misconduct, which constitutes, in and of itself, a defect in the reasoning (motivación) of the judgment. In that sense, the judgment indicated that the cause for the plaintiff's dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity, by placing her personal interests first, recommending Mr. Bell Fernández to join one of the Commissions that make up INCOPESCA, despite the fact that this person had been her client, months earlier, since she authenticated Mr. Bell's signature on the request for a sanitary permit filed before SENASA. Such foundation is contradictory to what was accredited in the Proven Facts of the same judgment and in the administrative procedure, since in these it was established that the plaintiff, Director of INCOPESCA, in her capacity as president of the Limón Fishing Sector Leaders Association (Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero, ASOLIPES), recommended to the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, Mr. Gilberth Bell Fernández, in February 2015, to join the Advisory Commission of INCOPESCA in Limón. It was also considered as proven that, on July 28, 2015, acting as an attorney, she authenticated the signature of Mr. Bell Fernández, regarding the request he made before the National Animal Health Service (Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal, SENASA), pertaining to the request for an operating permit for the dock located at Portete beach in the province of Limón. That being the case, according to the chronological order that was accredited in the judgment, the plaintiff is correct when she alleges that, in February 2015, when recommending the members of the aforementioned commission, Mr. Bell Fernández was not her client, and therefore the basis for the dismissal indicated by the Court is incompatible with the chronology of the proven facts and is different from the grounds established in the administrative act of dismissal, thus configuring the lack of reasoning (motivación) of the judgment, by departing from the evidence in the record and the facts that were accredited in the administrative venue. Furthermore, shortcomings and contradictions are also observed in the analysis of the subjective competence of the directing body of the administrative procedure and the body that issued the final dismissal resolution. In the fragment of the judgment transcribed in the previous Recital (Considerando), it is observed that, initially, the judgment invoked Article 16 of the Law Creating INCOPESCA as the rule establishing that the sanctioning procedure must be carried out by the Administrative Board of INCOPESCA; however, it later discarded the application of said law and accredited that the cause of the dismissal was the breach of the duty of probity in public function, according to Articles 3 and 4 of the LCCEI, for which it indicated that subjective competence, for this specific case, was determined according to Articles 2.1, 33, and 61.3 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública, hereinafter LGAP), according to which there is an underlying power - duty in the hands of the Government Council, which could delegate the instruction (instrucción) of the procedures to its Secretariat. However, contradictorily, the judgment reached the conclusion that the competence was correct, since it is attributed to the "…Superior Council, according to the provisions of numeral 16 of the INCOPESCA Law…". It can be observed that after having indicated the non-application of said article, in the end it contradicts itself and invokes it again to establish the subjective competence of the body it designates as the "Superior Council".

Faced with such contradictions, the judgment reveals a profound confusion among three normative bodies (the INCOPESCA Creation Law, the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Service, and the General Public Administration Law), without a common thread in its reasoning, which also violates the rules of sound rational criticism (sana crítica racional), by falling into contradictions that defy logic. Ultimately, the challenged judgment failed to provide clear reasoning regarding the facts attributed to the plaintiff based on the evidence submitted to the case file, nor the application of the specific norms establishing the grounds for sanction, nor the norms determining the competent body to conduct the sanctioning procedure. Nor did it explain why it refrained from applying the special norm of INCOPESCA, only to then cite, in a confusing manner, the general norms of the LGAP and, later, apply Article 16 of the INCOPESCA Creation Law again, without providing a logical rationale, such that these confusions and contradictions in the reasoning constitute grounds for nullity of the appealed decision. Even the judgment omits developing the type of relationship the plaintiff had with the Public Administration, as well as the applicable regime for the position she held; it also fails to define the body that legally appointed Mrs. Mc Donald Rodríguez, nor did it perform the analysis, according to the principle of parallelism of forms, to determine who had the competence to remove her from her functions as Director of the Board of Directors of INCOPESCA, aspects that were fundamental to resolving the present litigation and are conspicuously absent from the challenged judgment. Given such defects in the judgment's reasoning, this Chamber is unable to review the merits of the present matter, so the aforementioned procedural grievance must be upheld and the remand (reenvío) of the proceedings to the Trial Court will be ordered, for it to issue a new judgment according to law. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, it is unnecessary to analyze the other grievances of a substantive nature raised by the appellant (casacionista).

**VII.-** By virtue of the foregoing, the appeal (recurso de casación) filed by the plaintiff will be upheld. Consequently, the challenged decision will be overturned (casado). As provided by Article 150, subsection 1) of the CPCA and since it is not possible to rule on the parties' allegations in a single instance, the remand (reenvío) of the proceedings to the court of origin will be ordered so that the Trial Court issues a new judgment as is legally appropriate. Due to the manner in which this is resolved, a ruling regarding the other grievances of the appellant (casacionista) will be omitted.

**POR TANTO** The appeal filed is declared with merit. The challenged decision is overturned (casado).

The remittal of the proceeding to the court of origin is ordered so that the trial court may issue a new judgment in accordance with the law.

DESPINOZAC Telephones: (506) 2295-3658 or 2295-3659, email [email protected]

Documento PJEDITOR  Res. 000202-F-TC-2024 TRIBUNAL DE CASACIÓN DE LO CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. San José, a las nueve horas cuarenta y seis minutos del diecinueve de diciembre de dos mil veinticuatro.

Proceso de conocimiento establecido por ANITA YORLEYNY MC DONALD RODRÍGUEZ, representada por su apoderado especial judicial Licenciado Álvaro Enrique Moreno Gómez; contra EL ESTADO, representado por la Procuradora Adjunta, Irene Bolaños Salas, y contra el señor JOSÉ JULIO SAAVEDRA CHACÓN, representado por su apoderado especial judicial Licenciado Luis Dobles Ramírez. La actora plantea Recurso de Casación contra la Sentencia N° 005-2019-I de las 11 horas con 25 minutos del 29 de enero de 2019, dictada por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera.

Redacta la Magistrada Rojas Morales:

CONSIDERANDO

I.- La señora Anita Yorleny Mc Donald Rodríguez formuló demanda contenciosa contra el Estado y el señor José Julio Saavedra Chacón, en la que solicita que se declare: “…1. Se anule el procedimiento disciplinario llevado a cabo por la Secretaría del Consejo de Gobierno cuyo expediente es el número 002-08-2015, por ser este un Órgano legalmente incompetente para levantar dicha información según disposición expresa en los artículos 9 y 16 de la Ley Orgánica de Creación de Incopesca. / 2. Que se anule parcialmente la resolución final tomada en el artículo 4 de la Sesión Ordinaria del Consejo de Gobierno No. 69 del 15 de diciembre de 2015, según Certificación No. CERT-379-15. únicamente en cuanto ordena la destitución de la actora, entonces integrante de la Junta Directiva de INCOPESCA, al ser esta una Resolución contraria a derecho adoptada bajo causales de destitución inexistentes. / 3. Que se ordene la reinstalación inmediata a su favor, por el plazo que le queda de su nombramiento como integrante de la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA. 4. Que se le obligue al Estado al pago de los daños y perjuicios causados, así como los intereses determinados en sentencia, desde el momento en que se causaron hasta su efectivo pago. Por concepto de daños y perjuicios desde el momento en que se le causaron hasta su pago efectivo: a) Daño moral subjetivo ₡50,000,000.00, b) Daño moral objetivo ₡10,000,000.00, c) Daño material: i. Dietas dejadas de percibir ₡500,000.00, ii. Gastos médicos ₡1,000,000.00. Y finalmente, que se obligue al Estado a cancelar el monto de ambas costas…”. El Estado contestó negativamente la demanda y opuso las defensas de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación pasiva en relación con los daños y perjuicios. Asimismo, se condene a la actora al pago de ambas costas del proceso y sus respectivos intereses. El codemandado Julio Saavedra Chacón, opuso la excepción que denominó falta de legalidad y de falta de legitimación en sendas acepciones y solicita que se rechace en todos sus extremos la demanda interpuesta por la actora y se le condene en costas procesales. El Tribunal Contencioso, al emitir la sentencia impugnada, tuvo por demostrado que el 19 de agosto de 2015, el entonces diputado Rolando González Ulloa, en la Sesión Plenaria N° 58, cuestionó que días antes de culminar el operativo del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública frente a la usurpación de bienes de dominio público, sobre playa Portete en la provincia de Limón, se habían reunido, el entonces Ministro de Trabajo, la entonces presidente de JAPDEVA, y la aquí actora, Mc Donald Rodríguez, en su otrora condición de Directora del Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura (INCOPESCA, en lo sucesivo). Consecuentemente, solicitó se investigaran las actuaciones de estos servidores públicos y eventualmente se aplicaran las sanciones disciplinarias correspondientes, lo cual también solicitó, el 21 de agosto de 2015, mediante comunicación realizada al, entonces, Presidente de la República, Luis Guillermo Solis Rivera. El 26 de agosto de 2015, varios medios de prensa escrita publicaron lo concerniente a la reunión que sostuvieron los funcionarios antes citados, con el Señor Gilberth Bell, supuesto dueño del muelle, situado en la playa Portete de Limón, y a quien aparentemente se le vinculaba con el narcotráfico. El Consejo de Gobierno delegó la instrucción del procedimiento disciplinario en contra de la actora, en la Secretaría de ese órgano colegiado. El Órgano Director le informó que el objetivo del procedimiento sería verificar la verdad de los hechos denunciados previamente por el diputado Rolando González Ulloa y otros que fueron publicados por los medios de comunicación, relacionados con la aparente asistencia de la señora Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, Directora de la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, a una reunión con organizaciones de pescadores en las instalaciones de un muelle localizado en Portete, provincia de Limón y determinar la supuesta existencia de hechos que pudieron haberle generado alguna responsabilidad administrativa. El 4 de noviembre de 2015, el Consejo de Gobierno acordó solicitar a la Secretaría del Consejo de Gobierno, en su condición de Órgano Director del procedimiento disciplinario, ampliar la investigación, en virtud del conocimiento de nuevos hechos que podrían estar relacionados con las investigaciones desarrolladas. El 12 de noviembre de 2015, la Secretaría del Consejo de Gobierno, en su condición de Órgano Director del procedimiento disciplinario, comunicó la ampliación de los cargos imputados a la actora con relación al allanamiento realizado en la casa del señor Gilberth Bell Fernández por parte del Organismo de Investigación Judicial (en adelante OIJ) el 6 de octubre de 2015, y a quien se le vincula dentro de una organización dedicada al tráfico nacional de drogas y al lavado de dinero; se le atribuyó que, pese a su condición de Directora de INCOPESCA y miembro del sector pesquero, representante de las organizaciones de pescadores y acuacultores de la provincia de Limón y, actuando como abogada, procedió a autenticar la firma del señor Bell Fernández, frente a la solicitud de permiso que realizara este último ante el Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (SENASA). Le aclararon que se trataba de la solicitud de un permiso de operación para el muelle ubicado en playa Portete de la provincia de Limón, el 28 de julio de 2015, y que no mencionó dicha situación en su comparecencia ante la Comisión de Seguridad y Narcotráfico de la Asamblea Legislativa, órgano que investiga el tema del muelle en Portete. Además, se le imputó la recomendación del señor Bell Fernández, en febrero de 2015, en su condición de Directora del INCOPESCA y presidenta de la Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero (Asolipes), ante la Junta Directiva de INCOPESCA, para que integrara la Comisión Asesora de INCOPESCA en Limón, puesto del que fue separado posteriormente. El Tribunal tuvo por probado, en síntesis, que el Órgano Director determinó que, las actuaciones atribuidas a la investigada, podrían haber sido contrarias a lo preceptuado en el numeral 3 de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública (en adelante LCCEI), y el artículo 1.14 de su Reglamento, asimismo, artículo 1.4, p. 17 de la Directriz No. D-2-2004-CO, constituyendo eventualmente causales de responsabilidad administrativa conforme a lo señalado en la LCCEI, concluyendo que tal calificación legal podría ameritar la responsabilidad administrativa estipulada en los artículos 4 y 39 ibid, así como en los numerales 211 y 213 de la LGAP es decir, la separación del cargo sin responsabilidad del patrono. El Consejo de Gobierno, en el artículo IV de la Sesión N° 79, celebrada el 15 de diciembre de 2015, acordó destituir del cargo de Directora ante la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, a la señora Anita Yorleny Mc Donal Rodríguez, cc. Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez, en su calidad de miembro del sector pesquero, representante de las organizaciones de pescadores o acuacultores de la provincia de Limón, por cuanto sus actuaciones, "(...) en especial las que se refieren a la autenticación de la firma del señor Gilbert Bell Fernández y su recomendación ante la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, resultan contrarias a los deberes de Probidad y de Abstención, constituyendo causal de responsabilidad administrativa, y conforme al ordenamiento (Artículos 4 y 38 inciso b de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento ilícito en la Función Pública), la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada como lo fue en el procedimiento desarrollado, constituye causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad administrativa (...)". Dicha resolución fue notificada el 15 de enero de 2016, en la cuenta electrónica del apoderado especial administrativo de la actora. El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Sección Primera, integrado por la Jueza Claudia Bolaños Salazar, los Jueces Billy Araya Olmos y Carlos Espinoza Salas, en sentencia N° 005-2019-I de las 11 horas con 25 minutos del 29 de enero de 2019, de manera unánime, resolvió por el fondo: “…En mérito de lo expuesto, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho interpuesta por los demandados, y se rechaza la falta de legitimación pasiva opuesta por el Estado y la falta de legitimación en sendas acepciones alegadas por el señor Julio Saavedra Chacón. Consecuentemente, SE DECLARA SIN LUGAR LA DEMANDA EN TODOS SUS EXTREMOS. Son las costas personales y procesales a cargo de la parte actora, conjuntamente con los intereses legales sobre dicha condena a partir de la firmeza de este pronunciamiento y hasta su respectiva cancelación, a favor del Estado, y las costas a favor del co-demandado José Julio Saavedra Chacón...”. Inconforme con lo resuelto, la parte actora presentó recurso de casación, el cual fue admitido por este Tribunal de Casación.

II.- La parte actora plantea tres agravios de índole sustantivo. Primero: Acusa, violación a los artículos 82, incisos 1), 2), 3), 4) y 5) y 83 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (en adelante CPCA), por cuanto el Tribunal no tomó en cuenta que, dentro del procedimiento disciplinario seguido contra la actora, el Órgano Director y el Consejo de Gobierno concluyeron que no era posible asociarla con acusaciones por faltas graves, como directora del INCOPESCA, por actividades supuestamente ilícitas y desconocidas para ella del señor Gilberth Bell Fernández. También concluyó que tampoco podía endilgarle que tenía conocimiento de ellas antes de la reunión con pescadores en el muelle de Portete, el 16 de julio de 2015, ni del allanamiento a todo el complejo de instalaciones pesqueras, el 18 de agosto de 2016. Sin embargo, sostiene, en la sentencia se le reprocharon actuaciones anteriores a esas fechas y se invirtió el orden de las fechas para indicar, indebidamente, que la licenciada Mc Donald Rodríguez, primero autenticó la firma de Gilberth Bell Fernández en una gestión ante SENASA con fecha 20 de julio de 2015 y que al convertirse en cliente suyo, tenía que haber previsto esa situación de antemano, por lo que debió haberse abstenido de firmar en febrero de 2015, como presidente de la organización que representaba (ASOLIPES), una lista de 4 candidatos para que INCOPESCA escogiera a uno de ellos para conformar la Comisión Asesora Pesquera del Caribe, entre los que estaba incluido el nombre del Gilberth Bell Fernández, lo que evidencia que existe un razonamiento improcedente y especulativo de parte del Tribunal. Diserta, es imposible que la actora, en febrero de 2015, haya firmado una recomendación como presidente de ASOLIPES ante el INCOPESCA y en su calidad de directora de la Junta Directiva de dicha institución, con pleno conocimiento e interés, posteriormente, el 20 de julio de 2015 (5 meses después), una de esas 4 personas postuladas en la recomendación, le llegara a solicitar sus servicios profesionales de autenticación de firma. Agrega, también era imposible que en febrero de 2015 tuviera conocimiento de que el señor Gilberth Bell Fernández iba a ser investigado por el Ministerio Público a partir del 18 agosto de 2015. Aduce, en la sentencia se le reprochó que no mencionó tal situación en su comparecencia ante la Comisión de Seguridad y Narcotráfico de la Asamblea Legislativa, sin embargo, ello no constituye ninguna anomalía, ya que, nadie le preguntó sobre ese hecho, ni ha sido cuestionada por perjurio, incluso, tales hechos no han sido negados por ella y siempre se defendió y dio una explicación lógica y real en la investigación administrativa y ante el Tribunal Contencioso. Cuestiona, la sentencia no motiva cuál fue "el incumplimiento de tal calado" que la pusiera en contradicción con "los postulados de transparencia, rendición de cuentas, honradez, rectitud, respeto, discreción, integridad, imparcialidad, lealtad, espíritu de servicio, buena fe en el ejercicio de su cargo". Combate, tampoco es cierta la afirmación del Tribunal de que la directora del INCOPESCA recomendase a un cliente suyo para integrar una comisión que conforma ese mismo Instituto, porque: 1- En febrero de 2015 el señor Bell Fernández no era cliente de la actora, ni antes de esa fecha le había brindado algún servicio profesional. 2- Ella nunca recomendó a nadie en específico, en su condición de presidenta de ASOLIPES, porque la lista contenía el nombre de 4 pescadores, no solo el de Gilberth Bell Fernández. 3- Como Directora de la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, ella no realizó ninguna recomendación. Aclara, lo único que hizo fue firmar, en su condición de presidente de la organización ASOLIPES, una postulación con 4 nombres de pescadores enviada a la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, para que ésta nombrara una comisión asesora pesquera ad honorem del Caribe, por lo que no existió ningún conflicto de interés, ni falta grave al deber de probidad o al deber de abstención por parte de la actora. Diserta, el artículo 23 de la Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA, establece que dentro de las competencias y los deberes de la Junta Directiva está nombrar comisiones asesoras, y que estas comisiones realicen su trabajo ad honorem, por lo que para los directores del INCOPESCA no existe ningún beneficio patrimonial o personal, tampoco existe beneficio para los miembros de las comisiones, ya que, prevalece la vocación de servicio y el deber de servir al país y al sector pesquero. Señala, el artículo 19 de esa misma ley, determina que cuando alguno de los asistentes a las sesiones de la Junta Directiva tenga interés personal en el trámite de algún asunto o lo tengan sus socios o parientes hasta el tercer grado por consanguinidad o afinidad, el asistente interesado deberá retirarse de la respectiva sesión mientras se discute y se resuelve el caso, so pena de nulidad absoluta, cuya rectificación corresponderá al Auditor. Agrega, en este caso, el haber votado para que fuera nombrado el señor Gilberth Bell Fernández, no es una falta al deber de abstención, ni es sinónimo de un interés personal de dicha funcionaria, ya que ninguno de los dos se beneficiaba con ello. Arguye, es el auditor del INCOPESCA el competente legalmente para determinar si existió algún interés personal, motivo por el cual, abrir un procedimiento administrativo, especialmente diseñado para la actora, por una acción que el Auditor del INCOPESCA, único competente para evaluar estos casos, lo había considerado normal y legal, fue actuar arbitrariamente contra sus derechos fundamentales y una violación al debido proceso. Explica, ni el Auditor del INCOPESCA, Rafael Antonio Abarca, ni el secretario técnico de la Junta Directiva, Guillermo Ramírez Gatgens, estando presentes en la sesión donde se tomó el cuestionado acuerdo, denunciaron un interés personal de la actora. Diserta, en la sentencia se asume, equivocadamente, que ASOLIPES y Anita Mc Donald Rodríguez son una misma persona, y que el interés colectivo y difuso de ASOLIPES es el mismo interés personal de actora, lo que es incorrecto, y evidencia un desconocimiento de la ley, ya que, la actora al firmar como presidenta de ASOLIPES (asociación sin fines de lucro) la recomendación de 4 pescadores, no lo hacía en su carácter personal. Acusa, el señor auditor, en casi 20 años que tiene de existir el INCOPESCA, nunca ha cuestionado o anulado ningún acuerdo de nombramiento porque algún director de la Junta Directiva, representante de las organizaciones de su provincia, haya votado un acuerdo similar. Reprocha, los testigos ofrecidos para acreditar que no existió conflicto de intereses, fueron rechazados por el Tribunal desde la audiencia preliminar, a pesar de que con ello se violentaba el derecho de defensa y el debido proceso. Alega, es grave que Tribunal, perdiendo toda objetividad e imparcialidad, haya querido asociar indebidamente a la actora con las actividades investigadas al señor Gilberth Bell Fernández. Reprocha, la falta de respeto del Tribunal al transcribir en la sentencia una pregunta de su propia cosecha, de carácter injurioso, en el sentido siguiente: “¿Acaso la parte actora esperaba algún premio por tan irregular proceder?”. Ello, a pesar de que no consta en autos que, para el 27 de febrero de 2015, el señor Bell fuera cliente suyo, ni que mantuvieran una relación comercial entre sí.

III- En el agravio planteado se alega indebida valoración de la prueba y violación a la sana crítica racional. Sin embargo, esta Cámara observa que también se acusa falta de motivación. Así se infiere cuando la casacionista alega confusión de la sentencia respecto al orden cronológico de los hechos que se le atribuyeron en el procedimiento disciplinario y cuando señala falta de claridad de la sentencia al señalar gravedad de las faltas que se le endilgaban, del mismo modo cuando cuestiona la competencia subjetiva para iniciar el procedimiento sancionatorio, por lo que dicho motivo se conocerá como falta de motivación.

IV- Segundo: Reprocha, violación a los artículos 82, incisos 1), 2), 3), 4) y 5) y 83 del CPCA, por cuanto la sentencia establece que no se acreditaron daños y perjuicios, lo cual – sostiene – es falso, pues, en el expediente consta prueba documental con respecto a la epicrisis de atención médica que recibió, producto de su estado mental y físico, después de su ilegítima destitución. Aduce, la sentencia no hace mención de ello, solamente concluye que al no haber nexo causal tampoco subyace perjuicio para la actora, sin embargo, la casacionista considera que sí hay nexo causal, ya que, hay nulidad por la conducta ilegítima del Estado. Señala, la única prueba testimonial aceptada por el Tribunal fue, precisamente, la testigo Angie Gutiérrez Cartín, quien indicó la existencia de los daños y perjuicios que sufrió la actora. Acusa, el Tribunal rechazó toda su declaración sin mayor fundamentación, solamente indicó que la testigo no merece credibilidad, ya que, al ser interrogada por la Cámara de Jueces, fue esquiva, imprecisa y especulativa en sus respuestas, ello sin hacer el mínimo esfuerzo por tamizar su declaración, a tal punto que la motivación quedó absolutamente ayuna de cualquier razonamiento intelectivo. Tercero: Acusa, en la condenatoria en costas a favor del Estado y del señor José Julio Saavedra no se hace una distinción en cuanto a la proporcionalidad de las costas en relación con las pretensiones de la demanda. Alega, no ha litigado de forma temeraria ni de mala fe, sino más bien con justa causa y con justas pretensiones de daños y perjuicios, aunado a que las pretensiones pecuniarias todas fueron contra el Estado y que el señor José Julio Saavedra fue integrado a esta litis por orden del Tribunal y con oposición de la actora, ante la excepción de indebida integración de la litis opuesta por el Estado. Solicita se le exonere del pago de costas, en caso de que este recurso de casación sea rechazado, por haber litigado de buena fe o, en su defecto, se establezcan las costas específicas en forma individual para las partes.

V.- En vista de que este Órgano Casacional estima que se acusa el vicio de falta de motivación, según lo expuesto por la casacionista, se procede a analizar, primero, ese agravio procesal. Respecto al procedimiento disciplinario seguido administrativamente contra la actora y la sanción de despido, el Tribunal Contencioso dispuso: “…lleva razón el demandado ya que el deber de probidad implica que la conducta de la persona quien ejerce la función pública debe estarse en todo momento -y no tan sólo durante el cumplimiento de una determinada jornada, o, incluso, de una sesión como integrante de una Junta Directiva, como equivocadamente lo razona la accionante- a postulados de transparencia, rendición de cuentas, honradez, rectitud, respeto, discreción, integridad, imparcialidad, lealtad, espíritu de servicio, buena fe, en el ejercicio de su cargo. En ese contexto, tiene claro, además, este Tribunal que la comprobación de un incumplimiento de tal calado -tal y como se configuró en el sub liten- puede aparejar consigo, no sólo el ejercicio material del ius puniendi administrativo, merced de la imposición de la correspondiente sanción administrativa, sino, además, como es de todos sabido, la eventual imposición de una determinada sanción penal, en tanto que al inobservar el deber de abstención, ese solo hecho, podría configurar el delito de "incumplimiento de deberes" receptado a la letra del numeral 332 del Código Penal, Ley (N° 4573) del 4 de mayo de 1970. Esto es, la sanción de inhabilitación de uno a cuatro años. Ello, por cuanto, sin hacer ninguna disquisición al respecto, debe recordar el respetable patrocinio letrado de la accionante que sobre las espaldas de la persona servidora pública recaen tres responsabilidades claramente definidas, siendo cada una de ellas excluyentes de la otra (administrativa, penal y civil o pecuniaria) Así pues, no es baladí las normas de orden público y de acatamiento obligatorio erga omnes, en lo conducente al apartado 129 de la Carta Política, en tanto que los numerales 3 y 4 de la LCCEI, (…) el legislador ordinario sintetizó valores y principios éticos que debe ponderar el administrador público, siendo trascendentales preceptos que, a la sazón, entronizan el deber de probidad, constructo inescindible de la Ética de la Función Pública. Es así como dicha normativa es aplicable para todos, insistimos, sin realizar ninguna discriminación subjetiva y en relación con un determinado cargo público, y al margen de la notoriedad en el ámbito público y comercial, que pudiera tener quien atenta contra tan sagrados preceptos, constitutivos de un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, y a sus corolarios, entre otros. el de la confianza del colectivo social en el ejercicio de la función pública (doctrina del numeral 140.8 de la Carta Política). Evidentemente, es una cuestión de sentido común, y tampoco es baladí el hecho de que la actora en su condición de Directora del INCOPESCA, recomendase a un cliente suyo para integrar una Comisión que conforma ese mismo Instituto. En tal sentido, ¿Acaso la parte actora esperaba algún premio por tan irregular proceder? Evidentemente, la Administración actuó apegada al régimen jurídico aplicable, y ni un solo viso de abuso de poder, como oportunamente se indicara. En ese contexto, aún y cuando el ofrecimiento concerniente a la prueba para mejor resolver cuya mención expresa hizo la parte actora -hasta la audiencia del juicio oral y público, celebrado el 8 de los corrientes-, pese a que la audiencia preliminar celebrada en sede penal (v. imagen 294), se remonta al 19 de setiembre de 2018, se rechaza por inconducente, en virtud de que está debidamente acreditado en autos, amén del hecho probado 7), que la sanción acordada por el Consejo de Gobierno, en el Articulo IV de la Sesión N° 79 celebrada el 15 de diciembre de 2015, se finca en “ (...) especial las que se refieren a la autenticación de la firma del señor Gilbert Bell Fernández y su recomendación ante la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, resultan contrarias a los deberes de Probidad y de Abstención, constituyendo causal de responsabilidad administrativa, siendo que conforme al ordenamiento (Artículos 4 y 38 inciso b) de la Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública), la infracción del deber de probidad, debidamente comprobada como lo fue en el procedimiento desarrollado, constituye causa para la separación del cargo público sin responsabilidad administrativa (...)". De manera tal que, pese a que la parte actora pretende desviar la atención de este Tribunal de los hechos por los cuales realmente se le sancionó, y justificar la remota estimación de sus pretensiones, en el sobreseimiento de la persona con la que se le ligaba, es decir, el señor Gilbert Bell Fernández, lo cierto es que como, categóricamente lo manifestó el demandado, a la actora se le sancionó con la destitución, merced del quebranto al deber de probidad, pues antepuso sus intereses personales, es decir, recomendando al señor Bell Fernández, para integrar una de las tantas Comisiones que conforman el INCOPESCA, siendo que de previo esta persona había sido cliente suya, meses atrás, habida cuenta de la solicitud de un permiso sanitario que efectuara aquel ante Senasa, en tanto aquella había procedido a autenticar su firma en dicha gestión. En lo absoluto se le sancionó porque el señor Bell Fernández, había sido investigado por el OIJ, debido a los presuntos nexos con el narcotráfico u otros. A mayor abundamiento, quede claro, que no lleva razón la parte actora al justificar lo anterior, es decir, ad extra del INCOPESCA materialmente no fungía ya como funcionaria, tal es así tenía el deber de atender a quienes asistiesen a su bufete, puesto que tal es su modus vivendi siendo esto, además no percibía prohibición para poder ejercer su función abogadil, indistintamente quien fuese su cliente. En ese tanto, quizá podría tener razón parcialmente la actora, es decir, su principal ingreso lo es el ejercicio de su actividad como profesional liberal, sin embargo, debió inhibirse de recomendar a un cliente suyo, ante un cargo para un ente público en el que esta figuraba como jerarca suprema. Ello, evidentemente, en cualquier orbe, contrasta con una suerte de conflicto de intereses, pese a que no está acreditado que ella hubiese mantenido algún vínculo sentimental con el señor Bell, pero lo cierto es que sí había una relación, cuando menos comercial, habida cuenta de los autos. Sin lugar a dudas, emerge de entidad la inteligencia ínsita al numeral 38 inciso b) de la LCCEI…”. Por otra parte, respecto a la incompetencia subjetiva que la parte actora acusaba en relación con la Secretaría del Consejo de Gobierno, la sentencia indicó: “…advierte, el numeral 16 de la Ley del INCOPESCA, establece que la instrucción del procedimiento sancionatorio debe realizarla la Junta Directiva del referido Instituto. Empero, no toma en cuenta la parte actora, que la designación de dicho órgano colegiado para tal menester, se impone si y solo si, se está frente a las causales ahí reguladas en concordancia con el articulo 9 ibid, v. gr, cuando los miembros de la Junta Directiva se hallen morosos, se encuentren en quiebra o en estado de insolvencia, se les condene por delitos contra la propiedad, peculado, o malversación de fondos, o, morosos frente a los entes estatales, o ligados por consanguinidad o afinidad hasta el tercer grado, con otro integrante de dicho órgano colegiado, e, incluso, con el Auditor institucional. Además, por ser empleados del Instituto, asimismo, por las causales contempladas en el numeral 16 ejúsdem (…) la situación jurídica de la accionante no se hallaba en ninguna de los presupuestos anteriormente indicados. De tal manera que, no era de menester designar la instrucción del procedimiento disciplinario en la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, toda vez que, se insiste, la causa eficiente y adecuada por la cual se destituyó a la actora de su puesto como Directoria del INCOPESCA, fue, precisamente, haber incurrido en acciones que a su vez quebrantaron el deber de probidad en la función pública, a contrapelo de lo preceptuado en los cánones 3 y 4 de la LCCEI, según se anticipó, anteriormente. Sumado a esto, debe tomar en consideración la parte actora dos aspectos de entidad, en primer lugar, "Para determinar los otros tipos de competencia se estará a lo que dispongan las reglas específicas pertinentes" (art. 61,3 LGAP), siendo que para el caso concreto subyace un poder - deber en cabeza del Consejo de Gobierno con miras a delegar la instrucción de los procedimientos en su Secretaría, según abreva de la supra mencionada norma 33 ibíd. Y, "1. Las reglas de esta ley [LGAP] que regulan la actividad del Estado se aplicarán también a los otros entes públicos, en ausencia de norma especial para éstos (art. 2.1 LGAP). (…) la Administración actuó en total apego al Principio de Legalidad o de Taxatividad, es decir, sancionó a quien con su actuar culposo quebrantó el deber de probidad, anteponiendo intereses personales al interés general, sino, además, que quien instruyó el procedimiento era absolutamente competente para tal menester, habida cuenta de que el órgano director ni siquiera resolvió el fondo del asunto, puesto que dicha competencia está atribuida legalmente al Consejo Superior, en orden a lo preceptuado en el numeral 16 de la Ley del INCOPESCA…”.

VI.- Con el fin de resolver el agravio procesal de falta de motivación, es necesario indicar que, desde vieja data, tanto la Sala Primera como este Tribunal de Casación han precisado que la motivación de un fallo consiste en plasmar o poner en manifiesto las razones o fundamentos, tanto fácticos como jurídicos, por los que se adopta la decisión. De ahí que su ausencia se advierte en dos hipótesis: la primera, cuando es inexistente, pues, el juzgador o juzgadora omite consignar los cimientos de su decisión; la segunda, cuando el despliegue argumentativo del órgano decisor resulta confuso o exhibe contradicciones que se erigen como obstáculo para determinar de forma diáfana los motivos que le sirven de base, lo que vulneraría los derechos procesales de las partes, en particular, del debido proceso” (así puede observarse la resolución N° 184-F-S1-2009 de las 13 horas del 23 de febrero de 2009 dictada por la Sala Primera). Por ello, se ha dicho, puede entenderse como una concreta falta de motivación, la relativa a las circunstancias fácticas del fallo (resolución 1444-F-S1-2012 de las 9 horas 10 minutos del 30 de octubre de 2012, de la Sala Primera). Esta Cámara observa que no hay motivación en la sentencia impugnada, por cuanto, se pierde el hilo cronológico de los hechos que se le endilgaron a la actora en el procedimiento disciplinario, tal y como lo hace ver la casacionista, de tal forma que la sentencia le atribuye hechos en un orden cronológico distinto al acreditado en sede administrativa y le endilga una causal de falta grave distinta, lo cual, se configura, por sí solo, en un vicio en la motivación de la sentencia. En ese sentido, la sentencia indicó que la causa de destitución de la actora fue el quebranto al deber de probidad, al anteponer sus intereses personales, recomendando al señor Bell Fernández para integrar una de las Comisiones que conforman el INCOPESCA, a pesar de que esta persona había sido cliente suya, meses atrás, ya que, ella autenticó la firma del señor Bell en la solicitud de un permiso sanitario que efectuara ante SENASA. Tal fundamentación es contradictoria con lo acreditado en los Hechos Probados de la misma sentencia y en el procedimiento administrativo, ya que en éstos se estableció que la actora, Directora del INCOPESCA, en su calidad de presidente de la Asociación de Líderes Limonenses del Sector Pesquero (ASOLIPES), recomendó ante la Junta Directiva de INCOPESCA, al señor Gilberth Bell Fernández, en febrero de 2015, para que integrara la Comisión Asesora de INCOPESCA en Limón. También tuvo por acreditado que, el 28 de julio de 2015, actuando como abogada, autenticó la firma del señor Bell Fernández, frente a la solicitud que éste realizara ante el Servicio Nacional de Salud Animal (SENASA), tratándose de la solicitud de un permiso de operación para el muelle ubicado en playa Portete de la provincia de Limón. Así las cosas, según el orden cronológico que se acreditó en la sentencia, lleva razón la actora cuando alega que, en febrero de 2015, al recomendar a los integrantes de la comisión antes indicada, el señor Bell Fernández no era cliente suyo, por lo que el fundamento del despido señalado por el Tribunal, es incompatible con la cronología de los hechos probados y es distinto a los fundamentos establecidos en el acto administrativo de despido, por lo que se configura la falta de motivación de la sentencia, al apartarse de las pruebas que constan en autos y de los hechos que se acreditaron en la vía administrativa. Por otra parte, también se observan falencias y contradicciones en el análisis de la competencia subjetiva del órgano director del procedimiento administrativo y del órgano que emitió la resolución final de despido. En el fragmento de la sentencia que se transcribió en el Considerando anterior, se observa que, inicialmente, la sentencia invocó el artículo 16 de la Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA como la norma que establece que el procedimiento sancionatorio debe realizarlo la Junta Administrativa del INCOPESCA, sin embargo, luego descartó la aplicación de dicha ley y acreditó que la causa del despido fue el quebranto al deber de probidad en la función pública, según los artículos 3 y 4 de la LCCEI, por lo que indicó que la competencia subjetiva, para este caso concreto, se determinaba según los artículos 2.1, 33 y 61.3 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (en lo sucesivo LGAP), según los cuales subyace un poder – deber en cabeza del Consejo de Gobierno, quien podía delegar la instrucción de los procedimientos en su Secretaría. Sin embargo, contradictoriamente, la sentencia llegó a la conclusión de que la competencia era correcta, por cuanto está atribuida al “…Consejo Superior, según lo preceptuado en el numeral 16 de la Ley del INCOPESCA…”. Puede observarse que después de haber indicado la inaplicación de dicho artículo, al final se contradice y vuelve a invocarlo para establecer la competencia subjetiva del órgano que denomina como “Consejo Superior”. Ante tales contradicciones, en la sentencia se visualiza una gran confusión entre tres cuerpos normativos (la Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA, la Ley Contra la Corrupción e Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública y la Ley General de la Administración Pública), sin que haya un hilo conductor en su razonamiento, lo cual también trasgrede las reglas de la sana crítica racional, al entrar en contradicciones que van contra la lógica. Al final de cuentas, la sentencia impugnada no logró motivar, de manera diáfana, los hechos endilgados a la actora conforme a las pruebas aportadas a los autos, ni la aplicación de las normas concretas que establecen las causales de sanción, tampoco las normas que determinan el órgano competente para instruir el procedimiento sancionatorio. Tampoco explicó el por qué dejó de aplicar la norma especial de INCOPESCA, para luego citar, de manera confusa, las normas generales de la LGAP y, luego, aplicar nuevamente el artículo 16 de la Ley de Creación del INCOPESCA, sin brindar un razonamiento lógico, por lo que tales confusiones y contradicciones en la motivación se constituyen en causales de nulidad del fallo recurrido. Incluso, la sentencia omite desarrollar el tipo de relación de la actora con la Administración Pública, también el régimen aplicable para el cargo que desempeñaba, tampoco define el órgano que legalmente nombró a la señora Mc Donald Rodríguez, ni realizó el análisis, según el principio de paralelismo de las formas, para determinar quién tenía la competencia para removerla de sus funciones como Directora de la Junta Directiva del INCOPESCA, aspectos que eran fundamentales para resolver el presente litigio y que se echan de menos en la sentencia impugnada. Ante tales vicios en la motivación de la sentencia, esta Cámara se ve imposibilitada a revisar por el fondo el presente asunto, por lo que se deberá acoger el agravio procesal antes mencionado y se ordenará el reenvío del proceso al Tribunal de Juicio, para que dicte una nueva sentencia conforme a derecho. Por la forma en que se resuelve, carece de interés analizar los demás agravios de índole sustantivo planteados por la casacionista.

VII.- En mérito de lo expuesto, se acogerá el recurso de casación planteado por la parte actora. En consecuencia, se casará el fallo impugnado. Por así disponerlo el artículo 150 inciso 1) del CPCA y al no ser posible fallar sobre los alegatos de las partes en única instancia, se ordenará el reenvío del proceso al Despacho de origen con la finalidad de que el Tribunal de Instancia dicte nueva sentencia conforme a derecho corresponde. Por la forma en que se resuelve, se omitirá pronunciamiento respecto de los demás agravios de la casacionista.

POR TANTO

Se declara con lugar el recurso planteado. Se casa el fallo impugnado. Se ordena el reenvío del proceso al Despacho de origen con la finalidad de que el Tribunal de Instancia dicte nueva sentencia conforme a derecho corresponde.

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