Denial of compensation for lack of containment barriersImprocedencia de indemnización por ausencia de barreras de contención

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A CIVIL DE HACIENDA ACTORES:

Nombre111148 Y OTROS EL ESTADO Y EL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD No. 058-2019-IV.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección01 , Edificio Anexo A, at fifteen hours and thirty-five minutes on the nineteenth of July, two thousand nineteen.

Civil treasury proceeding (Proceso civil de hacienda) processed under case file No. 14-010363-1027-CA filed by the plaintiffs Nombre111148 , ID No. CED87806, Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, ID No. CED87807, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, ID No. CED87808, [Nombre 001] and [Nombre62 002], both minors. Accumulated to said proceeding is proceeding No. 14-10362-1027-CA of Alfredo Brizuela González ID No. CED87809, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, ID No. CED87810, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, ID No. CED87811. Proceeding 14-010364-1027-CA of Edith María Villalobos Campos ID No. CED87812, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, ID No. CED87813, Nombre111149 , ID No. CED87814, all of these persons represented by Licenciado Alejandro Martínez Sandoval bar ID CED87815 and Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero. Proceeding No. 15-000550-1027-CA of Alice Fuentes Ospina, of legal age, holder of ID CED87816, represented by Licenciado Humberto Gerardo Méndez Barrantes bar ID CED87817. Proceeding No. 15-7855-1027-CA of Joyce Allen Brooks, of legal age, holder of ID No. CED87818, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, holder of ID No. CED87819, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras, ID No. CED87820 and the minor [Nombre62 003], represented by Licenciada Susan Naranjo López bar ID CED25604 against the ESTADO, represented by Licenciada Georgina Chaves Olarte bar ID CED17385 and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad hereinafter CONAVI represented by Licenciada Carolina Elena Alvarado Gutiérrez bar ID CED87821, by Licenciado Oscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, bar ID CED87822 and Licenciada Nombre111150 .

RESULTANDO:

I.- The plaintiffs in the proceedings processed under No. 14-010363-1027-CA, 14-010364-1027-CA and 14-010362-1027-CA filed a civil treasury proceeding requesting that the judgment condemn the Estado and CONAVI to the following remedies: A) 14-10363-1027-CA: 1. That this claim be granted in all its terms. 2. That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz made along Dirección13198 represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. 3. That it be declared that the omission in the oversight (fiscalización) function by CONAVI and the Estado in the correct execution of the works carried out and the absence of guardrails (barreras de contención) along the Florencio del Castillo highway by CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit in the best safety conditions, which they are obligated by law to guarantee, but also prevented, by not building safety barriers, the invasion of the opposite lane. 4. That it be declared that they are jointly and severally liable for the damages (daños y perjuicios) caused as a consequence of their unlawful (ilícita), abnormal, and inefficient conduct, and that CONAVI and the Estado must therefore be held financially liable for their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on Dirección13198 . CONAVI and the Estado for their omission in their oversight function regarding the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not executing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a period of six months on the entire highway. Specified in the provisional estimate of this claim. Consisting of: For Damages (Perjuicios): one hundred twelve million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages (Daño Moral proporcional Subjetivo): ¢70,000,000. Seventy million colones. For a total of material damage (daño material): ¢42,000,000 (forty-two million colones). Resulting in the amount of this proceeding being the sum of one hundred twelve million colones. 5. That CONAVI and the Estado be ordered to fulfill an obligation to perform (obligación de hacer), consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio de Castillo Highway and guardrails to prevent lane invasion. 6. That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) of this matter. B) 14-10362-1027-CA: 1. That this claim be granted in all its terms. 2. That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz made along Dirección13198 represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. 3. That it be declared that the omission in the oversight function by CONAVI and the Estado in the correct execution of the works carried out and the absence of guardrails along the Florencio del Castillo highway by CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit in the best safety conditions, which they are obligated by law to guarantee. 4. That it be declared that they are jointly and severally liable for the damages caused as a consequence of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, and that CONAVI and the Estado must therefore be held financially liable for their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on Dirección13198 . CONAVI and the Estado for their omission in their oversight function regarding the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not executing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a period of six months on the entire highway. Specified in the provisional estimate of this claim. Consisting of: For Damages: Ninety-five million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages: ¢50,000,000. Fifty million colones. For a total of material damage: ¢45,000,000 (forty-five million colones). Resulting in the amount of this proceeding being the sum of ninety-five million colones. 5. That CONAVI and the Estado be ordered to fulfill an obligation to perform, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio de Castillo Highway and guardrails to prevent lane invasion. 6. That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. C) 14-10364-1027-CA: 1. That this claim be granted in all its terms. 2. That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz made along Dirección13198 represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. 3. That it be declared that the omission in the oversight function by CONAVI and the Estado in the correct execution of the works carried out and the absence of guardrails along the Florencio del Castillo highway by CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit in the best safety conditions, which they are obligated by law to guarantee. 4. That it be declared that they are jointly and severally liable for the damages caused as a consequence of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, and that CONAVI and the Estado must therefore be held financially liable for their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on Dirección13198 . CONAVI and the Estado for their omission in their oversight function regarding the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not executing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a period of six months on the entire highway. Specified in the provisional estimate of this claim. Consisting of: For Damages: eighty-two million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages: ¢40,000,000. Forty million colones. For a total of material damage: ¢42,000,000 (forty-two million colones). Resulting in the amount of this proceeding being the sum of eighty-two million colones. 5. That CONAVI and the Estado be ordered to fulfill an obligation to perform, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio de Castillo Highway and guardrails to prevent lane invasion. 6. That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. The plaintiff in the proceeding processed under No. 15-000550-1027-CA, filed a civil treasury proceeding requesting that the judgment condemn the Estado and CONAVI to the following remedies: That this action be granted and the responsibility of the administration be determined, and the Estado and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad be condemned to pay the objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo) and damages caused, as well as subjective moral damages (moral subjetivo) produced, and the costs of this proceeding. Liquidation of the objective moral damages and damages caused: While it is true that the direct responsibility for the collision is attributed to the figure of the driver of the vehicle in which her brother was traveling, because he lost control of the motor vehicle; the truth is that if a dividing fence (malla divisoria), specifically a guardrail (barrera de contención), had existed, as the defendants were obligated to build it, the motor vehicle would not have veered off its course, nor would it have collided with the base of the public lighting poles existing in the median (jardinera) that divides the directions of Route Two, and much less would it have invaded the opposite lane and ended his life incinerated as indeed occurred. For all of the above, she estimated the objective moral damages and the damages caused from the expenses incurred in the sum of twenty million colones. The plaintiffs in the proceeding processed under No. 15-007855-1027-CA, filed a civil treasury proceeding so that the judgment declares: That this claim be granted in all its terms. The objective liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the defendants for omissions regarding signage works and lack of barriers. That the defendants be condemned to pay moral damages (daño moral) in the sum of ¢75,000,000.00 (seventy-five million colones). That the defendants be condemned to pay material damages (daño material) in the sum of ¢40,000,000 (forty million colones). That CONAVI be ordered to install a protection and prevention system for collisions on the bases of the lighting poles, on Dirección3536 . That the defendants be condemned to pay the costs generated from this proceeding. (See preliminary hearing minutes and audio in the custody of this Tribunal and judicial digital file).

II.- By order at 10:15 hours on December 19, 2014, the claim processed under case file No. 14-010363-1027-CA was served; by order at 14:21 hours on February 03, 2015, the claim processed under case file No. 14-010362-1027-CA was served; by order at 08:35 hours on January 07, 2015, the claim processed under case file No. 14-010364-1027-CA was served; by order at 09:32 hours on February 25, 2015, the claim processed under case file No. 15-000550-1027-CA was served; by order at 10:58 hours on October 05, 2015, the claim processed under case file No. 15-007855-1027-CA was served. (See judicial digital file).

III.- The State's representation, through briefs received on March 07, 12, and 13, February 23, and December 03, 2015, answered the claims negatively and in its defense raised the substantive exception (excepción de fondo) of lack of right (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva). For its part, the CONAVI representation, through briefs received on February 25, March 02 and 24, April 28, and December 03, 2015, rejected the facts of the claim and raised in its defense the exception of lack of right. (See judicial digital file).

IV.- The preliminary hearing (audiencia preliminar) provided for in Article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was held on May 13, 2016, with the presence of the parties, in which the claims were analyzed, the contested facts were determined, and documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence was admitted. (See preliminary hearing record and backup in digital format).

V.- On June 20, 21, and 28, 2019, the complementary oral and public trial hearing (audiencia complementaria de juicio oral y público) was held, in which opening arguments were made, the party statement (declaración de parte) of the plaintiffs Edith Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Guzmán Villalobos, Ivannia Calderón Sanabria, Luis Fernando Calderón Sanabria, Alfredo Brizuela González, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks, and Imelda Mora Porras, and of the expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, an official of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Forensic Engineering Section, was received, and the corresponding conclusions were rendered.

VI.- The proceedings have followed the prescriptions of law, and no defects capable of invalidating the actions taken are observed. This judgment is issued by majority, within the fifteen-business-day period established in Article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for complex matters, following due deliberation and by unanimity.

Judge Salas Leitón writes.

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- ON THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER): During the trial hearing, Licenciada Susan Naranjo López, special judicial attorney-in-fact for the plaintiffs in the case processed under exp15-007855-1027-CA, requested the admission as evidence for better provision (prueba para mejor proveer) of the “Proyección Provisional de Fecha de Consolidación de Derecho a Pensión” issued by the Dirección de Pensiones of the CCSS in the name of Nombre111151 . For its part, the representation of CONAVI requested admission under the same condition of: 1) Copy of pages 15 and 26 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, where Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 “Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198 , sections: Ruta Nacional No. 252 and Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersection of Ruta Nacional No. 252 with Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersection Ruta Nacional No. 2 with Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)” was published. Awarding record of said tender dated July 03, 2014, to the company Puente PREFA Ltda. 2) Copy of official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, in which Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 was declared unsuccessful. 3) Copy of official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, which is the final acceptance record for Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 “Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Florencio del Castillo Highway, sections: Ruta Nacional No. 252 and Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersection of Ruta Nacional No. 252 with Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersection Ruta Nacional No. 2 with Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)”. Because it is pertinent and significant to the object of the proceeding, the evidence offered by the CONAVI representation is admitted, but not that offered under this condition by Licenciada Naranjo López.

II.- PROVEN FACTS: The following are considered as such for the purpose of rendering this judgment: 1) That around 9:00 p.m. on September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 was driving vehicle license plate Placa19605, make Honda, registered in the name of Mr. Nombre111152 , heading from east to west on the Florencio del Castillo highway, accompanied by Mr. Nombre111153 , Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . (Uncontested fact). 2) That while driving on said highway at the height of the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, the driver lost control of it, the vehicle moving from the outside lane to the inside lane, crossing the central median (jardinera central) that divides both roadways, colliding in its path with the base of a public lighting pole and continuing to the outside lane of the roadway heading from west to east and colliding with the heavy vehicle make International, license plate Placa19606, driven by Mr. Nombre111155 . (Uncontested fact). 3) That as a result of the accident, its 5 occupants died. (Uncontested fact). 4) That according to the statement of Mr. Nombre111156 , ID CED87823, given before the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, on the day of the accident “...he could observe a white vehicle, automobile type, entering the highway through the exit to the Tres Ríos center or the Bomba Tinoco towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it since there was little traffic at that time...” (See folios 31, 32, and 69 of the criminalistic analysis file). 5) That according to Criminalistic Analysis Report No. 2014-03805-TOX, in the blood of Mr. Nombre111149 , the driver of the vehicle, the presence of Carboxy Delta THC was detected, which is indicative of the intake or consumption of Cannabis products, and he did not have a driver's license. (See folio 85 of the criminalistic analysis file and the State's evidence bundle). 6) That the conditions of the place and the roadway on the day of the accident were: Roadway Type: Asphalt. Roadway Condition: Good. Lighting: Artificial light. Characteristics: Urban. Vertical Alignment: Level. Road Signage: None. Existence of: Shoulder. Direction: Two-way. State: Good. Weather Condition: Clear. Intersection Type Y: None. Horizontal Alignment: Level. Risk Factor: Running off the road. (See folios 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the criminalistic analysis file). 7) That under case file No. 14-000714-0569-PE, a criminal proceeding for negligent homicide was initiated against Nombre111149 to the detriment of Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . A proceeding in which, by means of the resolution at 11:15 hours on January 30, 2015, a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) was issued due to the death of Mr. Nombre111149 . (See folios 97 and 98 of the criminalistic analysis file). 8) That according to the Accident Report prepared by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, the driver of vehicle license plate Placa19605 lost control of it and left the roadway, moving into the oncoming lane, which caused it to collide head-on with the truck license plate Placa19606. (See evidence file provided by the Estado). 9) According to the certification from the Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, no type of license appears in its records in the name of Mr. Nombre111149 , ID CED87824. (See evidence file provided by the Estado). 10) That the foundation (cimiento) used for the lighting poles on Dirección5948 is a common global engineering practice, which houses an anchor system based on steel bolts, nuts, and a support plate attached to the column (metal pole). (See evidence file provided by the Estado). 11) That by resolution number 346-2011 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, CONAVI was ordered to build and install, within a period of six months, a guardrail (barrera de contención) in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents. A judgment that became final by Voto of Sala Primera No. 1039-F-S1-2013 of eight hours thirty-five minutes on August 14, 2013. (See judicial digital file). 12) That in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 “Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198 , sections: Ruta Nacional No. 252 and Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersection of Ruta Nacional No. 252 with Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersection Ruta Nacional No. 2 with Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)” was published, but due to the lack of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it was declared unsuccessful, having to be tendered again through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the acceptance of the work was given. (See administrative contracting file Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 and evidence for better provision admitted by this Tribunal).

III.- UNPROVEN FACTS: 1) That as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 had the knowledge, capacity, or skill to drive a motor vehicle or had authorization to do so. (There is no evidence to this effect, in conjunction with the certification of the Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015). 2) That the existence of guardrails (guarda vías) at the accident site would have prevented the outcome of the accident in terms of the deaths of Mr. Nombre111149 , Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . (There is no evidence to this effect). 3) That the design of the base of pole No. 83 struck by vehicle license plate Placa19605 would have influenced in any way the outcome of the accident. (There is no evidence to this effect).

IV.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING AND THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS: This is a civil treasury proceeding in which the plaintiffs of the accumulated proceedings claim payment for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) and material damage (daño material) for the tragic loss of their relatives. The representation for the cases processed under case files No. 14-010363-1027-CA; (to which case No. 14-010362-1027-CA and No. 14-010364-1027-CA were accumulated), stated regarding the facts, in summary: That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the young persons Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, Nombre111149 , Nombre111153 , and Nombre111151 were traveling aboard vehicle license plate Placa19607, make Honda, Sedan type, driven by Mr. Nombre111149 , heading from Cartago towards Dirección13199 , in the direction (Cartago-San José) along the Florencio del Castillo highway, route number 2. That in front of the vicinity of the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, the driver of the vehicle, due to circumstances that are not very clear (as there are contradictory versions), lost control of the vehicle, left the road, and ended up colliding against the support base of one of the poles installed on the road by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, before moving into the opposite lane and colliding against another heavy cargo vehicle, truck type, license plate Placa19606, which was traveling in the opposite direction, from San José towards Cartago, both vehicles colliding and the heavy vehicle dragging the light one, until both vehicles came to a stop, and the explosion of vehicle license plate Placa19607 occurred. The accident had a fatal outcome, as all its occupants died at the site, by virtue of the impact, and there was a total loss of the vehicle due to the impact and the fire. This representation asserted that the displacement of vehicle license plate Placa19607, driven by Nombre111149 from its lane into the opposite lane, occurred by virtue of the absence of guardrails (vallas de protección) that would separate both roadways or contain vehicles within the same lane in which the vehicle was traveling. It indicated that this situation was evidenced in the official report of the Policía de Tránsito, number 2014-245700194, prepared by Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, Code No. 2457, who, in relation to the accident and the conditions found at the accident site, recorded: Special structure: none, direction: two-way, roadway surface condition: Good, roadway type: Asphalt, roadway condition: Good, vertical alignment: level, lighting: Artificial Light, Existence of shoulder, sidewalk, type of accident: Collision between vehicles, indicating in the report that it left the roadway, obstacles on the roadway: no skid mark exists, weather condition: clear, driver condition: no alcohol, no drugs, no medication, no fatigue or fainting, no illness, no physical disability, appreciation of sinking: Totally destroyed, driver maneuver: dodge. Risk factor, running off the road. That according to this report, at the site on Dirección13198 where the accident occurred, there are no guardrails, given that they collided by virtue of vehicle license plate Placa19607 being able to reach the other oncoming lane without any type of safety barrier or guardrail to prevent it. That the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, within the proceeding processed under case file No. 09-002867-1027-CA, issued judgment 346-2011, which was confirmed by the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, via voto 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and in which it was ordered to place a dividing barrier on said highway within 6 months; however, as of the date the event occurred (September 3, 2014), what was ordered had not been complied with. That the death of their clients was produced as a direct and immediate consequence of the illegal (ilegal), abnormal, and inefficient conduct of CONAVI; that they openly departed from the recommendations given by SIECA for the placement of public service poles in the document called Manual de Diseños Geográficos de las Carreteras Regionales of the Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, and disregarded the recommendations of the Road Safety Technical Audits of LANAMME, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the road: things that they evidently did not do. Coupled with the fact that they disobeyed the order of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install dividers and safety barriers on Dirección3536 , thereby causing the death of more people. At the trial hearing, the special judicial attorney-in-fact directing these cases reiterated his arguments, pointing out that Costa Rica signed the SIECA, in which it committed to establishing dividing guardrails (vallas divisorias) and breakaway poles (postes abatibles) on highways. That in 2009 there was an accident at that same location, and by judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the Sala Primera, the defendants were condemned to establish dividing guardrails and to pay compensation. That in this case, in 2014, an accident occurs again in which 5 people die, without the dividing guardrails and breakaway poles having been installed by that date. That the victims did not perish due to speed, but because there was no dividing guardrail at the location and the base of the pole did not meet safety conditions. That if there had been dividing guardrails, the death outcome possibly would not have occurred. So the determining factor in the outcome was the absence of the guardrail (valla guarda vía). That Article 254 of the Ley de Tránsito sanctions high speed, and here the expert report established that the vehicle was traveling at no less than 61 kilometers per hour, but it is not stated at what speed it was actually traveling. That in the case of cannabis, it turns out to be a blank criminal statute and there is no measurement in this regard, and therefore it cannot be said that the driving was reckless. That it was demonstrated that there was moral damage (daño moral) and economic damage (daño económico). That the liability of the defendants is for omission by not having placed the dividing guardrails or guardrails (guarda vías). For her part, co-representative Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero indicated that the vehicle presented no mechanical problem and that the damage was foreseeable.

That the risk factor was leaving the roadway, and the lack of a guardrail or dividing barrier was what failed to help, but had one existed at the accident site, the outcome could have been avoided. That there was unforeseeability on the part of the defendants, and this led to a failure in the safety of persons. That there was no planning or maintenance of the highways, despite this being the public service provided by CONAVI. That the regulations indicate what the obligations of CONAVI are, and everything was foreseeable, yet CONAVI did not do it. That vehicle owners are obligated to take them for RTV to certify that the vehicle is in condition to circulate and to avoid accidents, this as a primary measure, but that there are other secondary measures under the responsibility of the defendants to minimize the results of an accident; however, in this case, they did not do them. That there are exemptions from liability such as fault of the victim or act of a third party, but the facts must be analyzed globally. That just as there was no foreseeability and avoidability, neither can there be fault of the victim or act of a third party, because the occupants of the vehicle did not know that the driver did not have a driver's license. That in the case where the defendants were condemned, even though high speed was demonstrated, they were still condemned.

For its part, the representation for the case processed under case file No. 15-000550-1027-CA stated in summary: That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Mr. Nombre111153 was traveling in a Honda Civic vehicle, license plate Placa19605, and at the location of Dirección3257, the driver of the vehicle, for reasons unknown to this date, lost control of the vehicle, which entered the median strip dividing Dirección13200, colliding with the concrete base of one of the public lighting posts located in the center of the median strip; it impacted the right-side rear fender, from which a piece of the fender was detached and remained at that location, the rear bumper also detached and ended up on the other side of the opposing lanes, the vehicle spins or skids clockwise on the green area, exits on the opposing lane, which is a double lane in a west-east direction, where the heavy truck was traveling that impacted the automobile on the left side, from the driver's door rearward, and carries it trapped, dragging it along the pavement from the lower front part of the heavy vehicle until it comes to a complete stop in the right-hand lane, still in the west-east direction, San José-Cartago, and subsequently the vehicle caught fire and was completely burned, with the occupants dying at the accident site. That according to the evidence provided by the Fiscalía de la Unión, the accident occurred on the segment between Terramall and Pasoca, and that the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda, Fourth Section, by judgment number 346-2011, rendered on September 13, 2011, had ordered CONAVI: "...The Consejo Nacional de Vialidad is condemned to construct and install, within a period of six months from the finality of this judgment, a containment barrier on Dirección13198, specifically on the segment between Terramall and Pasoca, both in the Cartago-San José direction and in the San José-Cartago direction...". That if the provision ordered by the Tribunal had been complied with, perhaps the outcome would have been different. An argument that was reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing.

At the trial hearing, it reiterated that, on the day of the events, the driver of the vehicle, for inexplicable reasons, lost control of the vehicle, collided with the base of a concrete-covered post, which diverted it into the opposing roadway where it collided with a truck. That at that date, there was a judgment ordering the defendants to install a guardrail or containment barrier in the accident zone; however, they did not do so, thus a negligent action by the State and CONAVI is claimed. That beyond the fact that the driver did not have a driver's license, that does not mean it was the cause of the accident. Nor was the amount of cannabis residue in the driver's body proven. That such circumstances do not constitute an exemption from liability, since if the dividing barriers had existed on the highway, the fatal outcome would not have occurred. That it was also not proven that the vehicle was traveling at high speed, only that it was going no less than 62 kilometers per hour, in a place where a speed of 90 kilometers per hour is permitted. That there is liability on the part of the defendants, because they had already been ordered by judgment to install containment barriers or guardrails within a period of 6 months and they did not do so, and that with them, the death of the vehicle's occupants would have been avoided. That in the case of its represented party, he was a young man of just 16 years who financially helped his family. That having proven the obligation of the defendants to install barriers or guardrails, as they were ordered in a prior judgment, and not having done so at the time of the accident, the liability of the defendants in the present case is clear.

Finally, the representation for the case processed under case file No. 15-007855-1027-CA stated: That on September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111151, in the company of Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, went out for a ride near his house in a Honda Civic vehicle, model year 1993, license plate Placa19607, and coming from Cartago toward Dulce Nombre62 de la Dirección13201, at kilometer 9 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the Cartago-San José direction, the vehicle was impacted by an International truck, model year 1998, license plates Placa19606, in front of the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, in the opposing lane, since there are no protective barriers between the lanes going in different directions. That as a result of said collision, the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was traveling burst into flames, and all the passengers died at the site. That on the segment where the accident occurred, Lanamme had warned the defendants about the dangers due to signaling and infrastructure errors, which were not corrected in time, and precisely at the location where the fatal accident occurred, identified in the Lanamme report as sections 4 and 5, this zone has a high risk of accidents, and they occur very frequently. That according to the official report of the Transit Police 2014-245700194, it indicates that the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was being transported left the roadway; there were no obstacles to prevent it from moving into the lane in the opposite direction, and furthermore, it does not record that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, ill, or with any physical or mental disability; which confirms that the collision occurred due to the lack of dividing barriers between the lanes going in different directions. That despite the fact that by resolution number 346-2011 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, CONAVI was condemned to construct and install within a period of six months a containment barrier, specifically on the segment between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents. A judgment that was confirmed by the Sala Primera by Voto No. 1039-F-S1-2013, at eight hours thirty-five minutes on August 14, 2013; however, as of the day of the accident, CONAVI had still not carried out any of the ordered works, despite the fact that the court order had become final more than a year earlier. Arguments reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing.

At the trial hearing, it reaffirmed what was stated in its complaint. It reiterated that the lack of the guardrail barrier led to the death of 5 young people, among them, the young man Nombre111151, who was the breadwinner for his family. That the negligence of the State and CONAVI resulted in the corresponding guardrails not being in place at the time of the accident, despite the fact that since 2003, and reiterated in 2011, this problem on the highway had been noted. And that this Tribunal, for a similar case, had already condemned the defendants to install guardrail barriers in the zone. That the vehicle did not present mechanical problems and that the skid mark indicated a speed of 62 kilometers per hour. That therefore, there is liability on the part of the State and CONAVI. That CONAVI installed the guardrail barriers 3 years after being ordered to do so, which constitutes a very clear omission. That CONAVI accepted that the highway presented safety problems but claimed it lacked a budget. And Lanamme, since 2012, had stated that the highway presented fractures and deteriorated slabs. Regarding speed, it reiterated that the expert opinion states the vehicle was traveling at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, but in a place where the permitted speed is 90 kilometers, so the speed was not a determining factor for the accident to occur. That guardrails are not for preventing accidents, but for minimizing their results, so that, had they existed, it is probable that the fatal outcome would not have occurred. That there is strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for the omissive and illegitimate conduct of the State and CONAVI, which leads to an unlawful injury that their represented parties were not obligated to bear. Finally, it noted that subjective non-material damage was proven by the party's statement, and that the fault of the victim was alleged due to traces of cannabis found in the driver; however, with or without it, the result would have been the same. That in an analogous case, the Sala Primera condemned solely for the lack of a bridge; here it is for the lack of a guardrail barrier.

The representation of CONAVI stated generally for the consolidated cases: That in the present proceedings, a petition is made for the judgment to declare the joint and several liability of the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad for lack of oversight in the implementation of public lighting posts along Dirección13198, requesting payment for material and non-material damages, basing such claims on the lack of containment walls on Dirección3536 and having permitted the installation of electricity posts, which in its opinion allowed the vehicle driven by the late Nombre111149 Villalobos to invade the opposite lane, causing the death of the occupants of the vehicle he was driving. That thus, it is appropriate, first, to point out that this Council has carried out the necessary steps to provide said highway with such a containment system.

That the invasion of the opposite lane by Mr. Nombre111149 stems from his reckless driving, and illegally so, as he lacked the necessary license for such purpose, which is why he loses control of the vehicle, as described in the accident report, which states: "...it leaves the roadway, crossing into the oncoming lane, which causes it to collide head-on with vehicle number 1, which drags it for a distance of about thirty-seven meters...", which coincides with what is recorded in report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, made by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, at folio 81 verso, which states "...the invasion by the light vehicle into the central median strip and then into the opposite lane occurred...", which stems from his lack of suitability and experience to drive and the excess speed at which he was doing so.

That in this regard, it is necessary to note that even if the installation of the mentioned barriers had been completed, these should not become a factor that allows drivers to drive at high speeds, violating traffic signals and basic rules of responsible driving.

That regarding the liability claimed in this case, it must be remembered that for an obligation to compensate to arise, the requirements of Articles 190 et seq. of the Ley General de la Administración Pública must be present, i.e., there must be an action or omission derived from the conduct of a Public Administration (cause), that results in an injury to the patrimonial or non-patrimonial sphere of an Administered party (effect), and a causal link between the administrative conduct and the injury to the Administered party.

That in a civil treasury proceeding, such as this one, since the only thing sought is the payment of damages, in accordance with Article 2, subsection b), of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to Article 58 of the same legal body; the plaintiff must prove the existence of the damage produced by the conduct of a Public Administration, this in accordance with Article 220 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, in relation to Article 317 of the Código Procesal Civil. (Judgment 224, at 4:15 a.m. on February 12, 2009, of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Section VI).

That in this consolidated proceeding, the plaintiffs accuse CONAVI of lack of oversight; however, not only was compliance with the contracting verified, but also, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out the corresponding technical study that supports the placement of the posts in the location they hold.

That from the above, the inadmissibility of what is requested is derived, since the formal and material elements for the imputation of liability to its represented party are not configured, and even less is there sufficient proof of the damages that occurred, which are clearly inadmissible.

That in any case, should the honorable Tribunal consider that state liability existed in the death of the vehicle's occupants, it is worth highlighting that, in accordance with the aforementioned ordinal 190, this liability is extinguished totally or partially when any of the exemptions established by the legal system are present - Fault of the victim, act of a third party, and force majeure.

That in this matter, in the opinion of this representation, we are before the exemption called fault of the victim and act of a third party.

That according to doctrine, this is conceived when the damage is produced by the victim themself and by the action or omission of a subject totally unrelated to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party, to the extent that it is the passive subject of the damage themself who produces – through inexcusable negligence or recklessness – the injury, jurisprudential line of the Sala Primera de la Corte, at 2:00 p.m. on March 27, 2014.

That in that line of thought, its jurisprudence has indicated: Exemptions. Full and partial exemption: (...) The current regulations, Article 190 of the aforementioned Ley General, contemplates three scenarios of total or partial exemption from liability, namely:... act of a third party, insofar as it is produced by the action or omission of a subject totally unrelated to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party (...) All of them cause the breaking of the causal link. (...) Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, vote 584-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005.

That the above cited applies to the situation of the young people who were traveling in the vehicle with license plates Placa19605, while it was being driven by Nombre111149, acting with inexcusable negligence, taking the wheel of said motor vehicle despite not possessing the respective license and therefore the necessary aptitude to drive, losing control of the motor vehicle and producing the mishap, dying at the site along with the other occupants of the vehicle.

Based on the foregoing, we find that, in this case, the exemption from liability is configured, thus breaking the causal link, so it becomes inadmissible to condemn CONAVI for the lamentable death.

Arguments that were reiterated at the trial hearing, stating that CONAVI did not place the deceased young people in a risky situation. That there is no causal link between the loss of control of the vehicle and the final result, due to the absence at that moment of a guardrail barrier. That the driver Nombre111149 was not forced to drive under the effects of cannabis consumed hours before the accident and also did not have a license, so he was driving recklessly. That at the time of the events, Mr. Nombre111149 was of legal age and knew the consequences. That the issue of the barrier not existing at that time does not have an impact because the cause for which he lost control of the vehicle was never determined, so the fault of the victim operated due to excess speed and cannabis consumption.

Regarding what was ordered by this Tribunal with respect to the installation of guardrail barriers or safety barriers, that representation indicated that a bid notice was published, but due to a lack of bidders, the contracting had to be declared unsuccessful. That circumstantially, the accident occurred in the same place but for different causes. That in 2014, Lanamme said the barriers were to reduce risk by 40%. That the official report says the condition of the highway was optimal and that at that site there were 4 accidents and only this one was fatal, but that this was because the driver was driving without a license and under the influence of narcotics. That the Ley de Tránsito establishes possessing a license as a requirement for driving. That none of the plaintiffs were alimony creditors. That the fault of the victim and the act of a third party operated as exemptions from liability.

That notwithstanding the above, if the Tribunal considers that the fault of the victim is not configured absolutely, it is true that it at least attenuates the liability of CONAVI, since, inevitably, the lack of skill of the now deceased demonstrates beyond any doubt that his conduct was inexcusably reckless and that it effectively contributed greatly to the occurrence of the accident that one tries to attribute to CONAVI.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that in this matter, the elements required by the legal system for the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of CONAVI to be declared for the death of Mr. Nombre111149 are not configured.

The State's representation stated: "…As is generally known, the Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) establishes a system of strict and general liability by providing in its Article 190 that the Administration is liable for all damages. That is, it measures the Administration's liability based on the criterion of damage, according to which, if the causal link is established between that damage and the conduct of the Administration, it must compensate, except for the existence of exemptions from liability that break the causal link. The rule in question, in what is of interest, stipulates: 'The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party.' (Underlining is not from the original). In accordance with the transcribed rule, in the face of an exemption from liability, liability cannot be demanded from the Administration, as it breaks the causal link between the damage and the conduct attributable to the Administration. In the case at hand, it is true that as a result of a lamentable traffic accident, several young people died, among them Nombre111154, son and brother of the plaintiffs, who affirm that his death caused them a series of damages which they request be compensated by CONAVI and the State, entities they blame for the accident for deviating from the recommendations given by SIEGA for the placement of public service posts and disregarding the recommendations of the Auditoría Técnica de Seguridad Vial of LANAMME regarding the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for eventual collisions with the bases of the lighting posts on the roadway where the accident occurred. However, this representation of the State considers that the plaintiffs are not correct, as it is true that at least two exemptions from liability exist which break the causal link between the damage produced and the Administration's action. We refer to the exemptions known as 'fault of the victim and act of a third party.' As the plaintiff party itself acknowledges in the FIFTH fact of the complaint, the accident occurred late at night. On this matter, the mother of the deceased and plaintiff in the present proceeding told a media outlet that she had begged her son Nombre111154 not to go out; however, she affirms she could not stop him. In a statement given to Diario Extra on September 5, 2014, Mrs. Sanabria stated: 'A friend arrived and told him to go for a ride in the car, I begged my son not to go out because I had a bad feeling, but even so, he asked for my blessing and left forever.' Equally, it is recorded that there was a sixth friend, by the name of Nombre111157, who, knowing that none of the young people in the vehicle had a driver's license, perceived the danger and decided to get out of the motor vehicle and reject the invitation to go out and try the car his friend, who was the driver of the vehicle, namely Nombre111149, had recently purchased: 'Nombre111149 had bought the car two days ago and we were all excited. It was very nice, I was going with them, but I got scared, we don't have licenses, so I decided to get out and stay with the others [...].' See news from the newspaper La Teja, Friday, September 5, 2014, front page and pages 6 and 7. It is evident that, in the case at hand, the exemption from liability called fault of the victim is configured, since the deceased, including the son of the plaintiffs, knowing that the driver of the vehicle nor any of its occupants had a driver's license, at their own account and risk decided to accompany them 'for a ride.' Regarding the exemption from liability in question, it is interesting what was said by the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia in judgment No. 584-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005: '[...] Exemptions, Full and partial exemption The current regulations, Article 190 of the aforementioned Ley General, contemplates three scenarios of total or partial exemption from liability, namely: fault of the victim, to the extent that it is the passive subject of the damage themself who produces – through inexcusable negligence or recklessness – the injury or places themselves in a position conducive to it; for the jurisprudential concept of Fault of the victim, one can see the judgment of this Chamber No. 33 at 9:30 a.m. on April 9, 1953. All of them cause the breaking of the causal link...' (Highlighting does not belong to the original). Without a doubt, in this case, the son and brother of the plaintiffs placed himself in a position propitious for suffering the damage, I repeat, by agreeing to accompany his friends to 'go for a ride in the car,' knowing that none of them had a driver's license. On the other hand, the fact that the driver of the vehicle was driving at high speed and without a driver's license demonstrates, without any further explanation, the existence of the exemption from liability called 'act of a third party.' Evidently, the direct cause of the accident was the lack of skill and precaution of the driver, who, despite not having a driver's license, was driving at high speed and without the necessary duty of care. Regarding the speed at which driver Nombre111149, also deceased in the accident, was driving, various media outlets recorded that 'the adrenaline of youth' led the young people to their death: 'Nombre111149, who was the owner of the car, was driving along Dirección13202 and 1 kilometer after the toll booth lost control, supposedly because of how fast he was going, he hit a post of those dividing the street, crossed into the other lane, and upon being in the direction of Dirección3797, collided very hard with a truck, which dragged the friends' white Honda Civic 40 meters.' See Periódico La Teja, September 5, 2014, page 6. According to witnesses, the automobile in which the deceased were traveling was moving at excess speed, and the driver allegedly lost control, left the highway, collided with a post, advanced along the grass lane divider, and upon entering the opposite lane was impacted by a truck. In this regard, one can see the news published by Diario Extra, of Dirección13203, page 16. And the relatives of the deceased boys themselves affirmed to the media that they were going at high speed and without a driver's license: 'Relatives of the deceased confirmed to this newspaper that none had a driver's license. 'Soldado was driving, but he switched with "El Negro." None had a license, they were all young and were going at high speed,' said Nombre111158, cousin of the deceased.' Diario La Extra, September 5, 2014, page 8. For his part, Diego Herrera, Chief of the Transit Police in San José, commented to the newspaper La Nación that 'there was possible excess speed by the automobile, which was a 1993 Honda, which caused the driver to lose control of the car and the invasion of the lane to occur.' La Nación, September 5, 2014, page 12A. As can be appreciated, the statements of different people recorded in the different media outlets are in agreement that the person driving was doing so at high speed and without the duty of care. And this is logical because, I insist, none of the deceased occupants had a driver's license. Regarding the conditions of the roadway and weather, in the official traffic report, it is recorded that the roadway where the accident occurred was in good condition, properly illuminated, and the weather conditions were normal. It is also indicated that no skid marks are recorded. Hence, I repeat, the main cause of the accident was, without a doubt, the lack of skill and recklessness of the driver, also deceased. Consequently, neither the young man's death nor the damages that the plaintiffs may have suffered should be imputable to the State or CONAVI, as it is clear that two exemptions from liability are configured that break the causal link between the damages and the Administration's conduct. Now then, the plaintiff party insists on imputing the responsibility for the accident in which their son and brother died to the State and CONAVI, for lack of oversight in the correct execution of the work developed with the installation of lighting posts on the roadway, as well as for the absence of containment barriers along the Dirección3536 roadway, which would contain vehicles within the same lane in which they were traveling, which led to the fatal outcome. However, as we have pointed out, the invasion of the opposite lane by the vehicle in which the plaintiffs' family member was traveling was due to the lack of skill and recklessness of its driver, who lost control of the vehicle. Report No. 840-51-2014, of October 1, 2014, made by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial describes it as follows: '[...] 500 meters before or to the east of where the invasion of the light vehicle into the central median strip and then into the opposite lane occurred, this indicates the maximum speed permitted is 90KPH. [...] Apparently, the light vehicle with license plates Placa19605, in which the deceased were traveling, was moving in an East-West direction; for some reason it leaves its lane, entering the central median strip in the direction already described, continued heading west and impacted the concrete base of one of the public lighting posts located in the center of the median strip [...].' Contrary to what the plaintiff party stated, it is clear that the cause of the accident is the lack of skill on the part of the driver of the vehicle who, as we have indicated, did not even have a driver's license. Any person who takes the road safety course – necessary to obtain a driver's license – is aware of the danger involved in driving at excess speed and especially at nighttime hours…" Arguments that were reiterated in the consolidated cases. At the trial hearing, this representation stated that there is no causal link between the conduct and the damage being claimed. That there was excess speed, driving without a license and under the influence of narcotics, which caused the loss of control of the vehicle by its driver. That the exemptions from liability, fault of the victim and act of a third party, operated. That the probable cause of the accident was speed and human error, and that even though the vehicle struck the base of the post, this was not sufficient to stop it, but rather it continued into the opposite lane and collided with a truck.

V.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: As indicated supra, in the present proceeding, strict patrimonial liability (responsabilidad patrimonial objetiva) of the Administration is claimed for an alleged omission. In this regard, it is appropriate to point out that the Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa finds its basis in Article 49 of the Constitución Política, as part of the fundamental rights that, in a State of Law, all inhabitants of the Republic enjoy. The purpose of this Jurisdiction is "...to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity." Abuse of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the governed." With respect to the scope and objectives of this Jurisdiction, the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional), in its vote 5686-95 of 15:30 hours on October 18, 1995, referring to vote 3905-94 of 15:57 hours on August 3, 1994, stated: "(...) it is appropriate to analyze whether the jurisdiction assigned by Article 49 of the Constitution to the Contentious-Administrative courts may be delegated by law to other courts of different material jurisdiction, (...) This provision forms part of a concept—in its modern meaning—introduced into Costa Rican political law by the 1949 Constitution, which is that of judicial oversight of public acts. (...) The concept was reinforced by the reform introduced through Law #3124 of June 25, 1963, which also permitted the challenging of discretionary acts of the administration, not contemplated within the original wording of Article 49, which limited the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to overseeing the 'use of regulated powers.' The purpose of the constituent legislator was to place in Costa Rican constitutional law a new and true subjective right in favor of citizens, guaranteeing their defense in the event of overreach by the governors." As a development of the aforementioned constitutional norm, Articles 1 and 2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) establish that this venue has the purpose of protecting the legal situations of all persons, guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to administrative law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the legal-administrative relationship, given that the grounds for illegality comprise any infringement, by action or omission, of the legal system, including abuse of power. It is also responsible for hearing matters of contractual or non-contractual patrimonial liability of the Public Administration and its officials. It follows, then, that the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to hearing about the conformity of administrative conduct, also hears about its patrimonial liability, based on what is indicated in Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, insofar as they respectively provide that "The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternating, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers." (The highlighting is not from the original), as well as that "By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. (...)." To fulfill this purpose, Article 190.1) of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) obligates the Administration to respond for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, establishing as the only exemptions from this liability the intervention of force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. The Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. 5207-2004 of 14 hours and 55 minutes on May 18, 2004, indicated: "Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the governed. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of various constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (…) responsible (…),' thereby taking for granted the liability of the major public entity or State and its various organs (...) Ordinal 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(…) criminal liability (…)' of public officials, and the second paragraph refers us to the '(…) personal liability for officials in the performance of their duties (…).' Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects 'acquired patrimonial rights' and 'consolidated legal situations,' which can only be effectively and truly protected by a system of broad-spectrum administrative liability with no immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public activity or performance. Numeral 41 ibidem, establishes that 'By resorting to the laws, all must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…),' this precept imposes the duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the governed as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of public entities, thereby converting it into the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a system of objective and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for intent (dolo) or fault (culpa), but solely and exclusively for having inflicted or received, effectively, '(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…),' that is, an unlawful injury they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. (...) it is recognized (...) by the fundamental text that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the governed individual has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they derive from a lawful activity (...) must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in judicial courts when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear basis for administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned ordinal 49 provides that 'The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the governed,' and one of the principal forms of guaranteeing these is an objective, direct, broad, and complete regime of administrative liability. (...). The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the governed a singular or special burden or sacrifice they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which, if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several governed individuals and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the Political Constitution includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the governed to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of the numerals, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the Fundamental Law, insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the 'proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,' 'good running of the Government,' and 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act, in the exercise of their powers and the provision of public services, in an efficient and effective manner and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it becomes evident that the original constituent implicitly embraced the principle of the liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial and non-patrimonial sphere of the governed by its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct." (The emphases do not belong to the original). Note also that the regime of administrative liability devised by the legislator and developed in the General Law of Public Administration from Article 190 onwards is of an objective nature, insofar as it imposes that the State, as well as its institutions—Decentralized Administration—must answer for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party, which implies that the Public Administration must assume the damages it causes, unless a duly proven exonerating cause intervenes. Consequently, for its recognition of liability, three essential requirements are necessary: 1) an action or omission derived from the function or conduct of the Public Administration, whether formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful, 2) an injury or the existence of unlawful damage (daño antijurídico), insofar as it infringes the legal system. An injury which, in turn, must be certain, effective, real, evaluable, and individualizable, and not merely hypothetical, pursuant to numeral 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 3) a causal nexus (nexo causal) constituting a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact imputed and the damage produced, as an indispensable condition for the duty to compensate the damage to be attributable to the Administration, without grounds for exclusion of the causal nexus. As mentioned, among the causes that break the causal nexus and therefore exclude administrative liability is force majeure, understood as an event of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and inevitable, or, though foreseeable, irresistible. Also operative is the fault of the victim, which occurs when, by their own action or through excusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, they cause the injury, placing themselves in a position conducive to it, assuming the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The last of the grounds contemplates the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected person, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia): number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001). For its part, in the case of a public servant, their liability to third parties is governed by the stipulations in numerals 199 to 202 of the General Law of Public Administration, which provide that the public official shall answer personally when they have incurred intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof, this being in reality a subjective liability. In turn, it is established that, without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall be jointly and severally liable to the affected persons for fault in choosing (culpa in eligendo) or fault in supervising (culpa in vigilando). By virtue of this, for a servant to be subjectively and personally liable to the affected parties, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their powers and functions and that the subjective unlawfulness of their conduct involved intent or gross negligence. Liability, then, consists of the obligation to repair another's damage, borne by the one who caused it, or by another subject related to the causer, who can legally be obliged to repair that damage. In such a way that the matter is necessarily concatenated with the causing of damage, so it is pertinent to cite what was said by the First Chamber (Sala Primera) regarding damages that may be subject to compensation in the contentious-administrative venue, in vote No. 112 of 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, which, among other things, indicated: "IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of non-contractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if an unlawful harmful act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or non-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (aggrieved party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, with respect to which its preservation was objectively expectable had the harmful event not occurred. Under this framework, there is no civil liability without damage, just as there is no damage without an aggrieved party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven (reality or existence) is compensable damage, this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the injurious gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the situation subsequent to it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' (daños) and 'losses' (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss incurred by the aggrieved party (damnum emergens), while loss consists of the frustrated or forgone gain or profit (lucro cessans), which was reasonably and probably expectable had the unlawful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For such effect, the following characteristics must basically converge to constitute 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, indeterminate, or difficult to appreciate or prove; nor should certainty be confused with current existence, as compensation for certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, one should not confuse future damage with loss of profit or loss (lucro cesante), as the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected at the time the proceeding is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes an aspect of subjective concern solely of the aggrieved party, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest deserving of protection. Thus, there can be a direct aggrieved party and an indirect one: the former is the victim of the harmful act, and the latter will be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsistent, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsistent. D) There must be a relationship of causality between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damage, there is, in the first place, material damage (daño material) and bodily harm (daño corporal), the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific categories of bodily harm and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The latter seems to be the most appropriate expression, since bodily harm often affects the patrimonial interests of the aggrieved party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medicines, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, as a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly to things (damnum) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated proves to be economically assessable...". In accordance with the foregoing, it is not sufficient to invoke damage; rather, its existence and the causal nexus linking it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated. Now, in the case of the liability of municipalities as part of the decentralized organization of the State, these, as local entities, enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, based on territorial decentralization, as inferred from numeral one hundred sixty-eight of the Political Constitution. This level of independence is granted by precept one hundred sixty-nine of the Magna Carta, within the framework of their territorial jurisdiction, comprised of the physical space assigned to the canton they represent, insofar as it provides that each municipal government is responsible for the: "...administration of local interests and services…"; thus, the fundamental charter confers a series of functions or attributions upon those governments by reason of "the local," that is, to administer the services and interests of the sphere to which they are circumscribed, i.e., the canton; however, regarding the liability regime, they are obligated before the governed or third parties in the same terms as the State. In this way, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities, on the understanding that jurisdiction is not exclusive, especially when there are local interests that are simultaneously regional or even national, so that interests from the local to the national level converge, without prejudice to the fact that in some cases, their affectation is limited to the smallest level; however, none escape the liability imposed on them by the legal system regarding damages they may cause in the exercise or omission of their activities. The territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original jurisdiction of the municipal governments and can only be displaced from them by a law of nationalization, provided that such legislative manifestation does not entail a breach of the referred autonomy or imply emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. In this manner, the liability of the State is separate from that of the Municipality, for although the Municipality forms part of the State, each of those organizations responds separately. For its part, Article four of the Municipal Code (Código Municipal), Law No. 7794 of April thirty, one thousand nine hundred ninety-eight, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy (see Constitutional Chamber, votes 5204-2004 and 8928-2004). The Constitutional Chamber, in resolution no. 5445-99, in addition to developing the bases of municipal autonomy, established the interaction of interests and determined the obligatory coordination of the local, regional, and national to satisfy the different interacting public interests. Municipal autonomy, imposed by the Magna Carta, confers upon the local corporations a special jurisdiction for the administration of the interests and services within their territorial jurisdiction (Articles 169 and 170), a jurisdiction prevalent over that of other institutions in the context of the locality, and a separate liability regime. Regarding the liability regime of municipal corporations specifically, it is opportune to bring up what this Section of the Tribunal indicated in judgment No. 28-2014-IV of 13:30 hours on March 31, 2014: "... The regime of non-contractual civil liability is developed in two spheres: the subjective, established in Article 1045 of the Civil Code, and the objective, regulated in numeral 9 of the Political Constitution, Article 1048 of the Civil Code, and numeral 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, providing that the State and its entities shall answer for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this manner, the causer of the harm shall compensate it, unless they demonstrate some exonerating cause. Thus, we have that the Public Administration is liable for its lawful and normal conduct, when it issues a formal administrative act substantially in conformity with the legal system or omits to issue it, or through a permitted and normal material action or fact. For its part, liability is of an unlawful, abnormal, and formal nature when the administrative act is contrary to the legal system, and non-formal when we are dealing with a non-permitted or abnormal material action. So then, the no-fault liability regime requires abnormal damage or a special sacrifice that violates the principle of equality, and, for its part, the regime based on abnormal operation requires a lack of service. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are needed: 1) Action or omission derived from the function or Conduct of the Public Administration, whether omissive or active, formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful. 2) Injury or existence of unlawful damage, a conduct by action or omission that infringes the legal system. Such injury affects the aggrieved party in their patrimonial or non-patrimonial sphere, producing an unlawful and compensable injury they have no duty to bear (objective unlawfulness), such conduct, whether by action or omission, infringing the objective law. Thus, such injury must be certain, effective, real, evaluable, individualizable, and not hypothetical, according to the tenor of ordinal 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 3) The Causal Nexus, that is, the existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact imputed and the damage produced, legitimizing the claim for the harm caused, without grounds for exclusion of the causal nexus, such as an exonerating situation like force majeure, the fault of the victim, and the act of a third party. As for the causes that exclude the causal nexus, they include force majeure, understood as an event of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and inevitable; also, the fault of the victim is operative, which occurs when, by their own action, or through excusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, they cause the injury, and the governed individual places themselves in a position conducive to it and assumes the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency; and the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected person, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001.)...".

VI.- ON THE MERITS: As indicated supra, the plaintiffs filed a civil public treasury proceeding (proceso civil de hacienda), under the allegation that this Tribunal, by judgment No. 346-2011 of 14:50 hours on September 13, 2011, ordered COSEVI to build and install, within a period of six months from its finality, a containment barrier on Dirección13198, specifically in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both the Cartago-San José direction and the San José-Cartago direction. A judgment that became final with the ruling of Chamber I (Sala I) No. 1039-FS1-2013 on August 14, 2013, but that as of September 3, 2014, the guardrails (vallas guardavías) had not been installed, an accident occurring on that date in which their family members died. They affirmed that the defendants incurred an abnormal activity by omission by not complying with what was ordered in the cited judgments. The representations of the plaintiffs affirmed that, had the guardrails or protective barriers been installed at the accident site, the result of the accident would have been different, avoiding the death of their family members. Based on this, they requested payment for subjective moral damages (daño moral subjetivo) for the pain experienced upon the loss of their family members, and patrimonial damages (daño patrimonial) due to the economic contribution the deceased made to their homes. It is therefore necessary to analyze whether liability of the State and CONAVI arises from the omission attributed to them in the death of the young people Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111151, Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, for not having placed the guardrails by the date the accident occurred. Opinion of the Tribunal: For the plaintiffs, the dynamics of the accident were that, although the driver lost control of the vehicle, it was the absence of the guardrails—despite the fact that the defendants had been ordered to install them—that caused the death of all its occupants, since had they been placed in a timely manner, the result would have been different, ultimately and in part, they have also linked such result in nexus to the characteristics of the lighting post with which the vehicle driven by the person identified in life with the Nombre62 of Nombre111149 had collided. In the opinion of this Tribunal, such affirmation constitutes a mere presumption of the plaintiffs, if not speculation of the plaintiffs, as there is no evidence establishing that the existence of such a mechanism would have avoided the result, noting that at no level is this presumption based on a report or technical study about the possible mechanics of the accident and the result had the guardrail existed. Thus, the evidence in the case file does not allow us to conclude that the plaintiffs are correct, in that the installation of guardrails would have avoided the death of the vehicle's occupants. The affirmation made in this regard by the plaintiffs, lacking evidentiary support, constitutes a presumption, and as a presumption, it would only constitute evidence if it were a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Then, as part of the investigative procedures by the O.I.J., Report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, was prepared, made by Investigator Jorge Rojas Chacón, with the approval of Mr. Luis Arguedas Rojas, Coordinator of the OIJ of La Unión, and Mr. Edwin Obando Granados, Chief of the OIJ of La Unión, in which he noted that the vehicle, for some reason, left its lane, crossing the central median and impacting a truck traveling in the opposite lane (west-east). He also indicated in said report that as part of the procedures, a statement was taken from Mr. Nombre111156, identification number CED87823, who stated that on the day of the accident, he could observe a white vehicle, automobile type, entering the highway, via the exit from the Tres Ríos center or from Dirección13204 towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it as there was little traffic at that moment. The testimony of the Judicial Expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, identification number CED87825, Topographic Engineer, specialist in Road Accidentology (Accidentología Vial), was also received, who, at the request of this Tribunal, prepared "Expert Opinion No. DCF-2016-01200-ING" of September 16, 2016, and its amplification No. DCF-2017-00439-ING of April 24, 2017. Regarding the dynamics of the accident, he indicated that the vehicle, due to human error as the highest probability, left the roadway. That the roadway has an adequate design and was in good condition. That the vehicle did not manage to crash against the post, but against the base or anchorage, which is normal. He indicated that the existence of the barrier is to minimize the magnitude of the damage, but not to prevent accidents, and that it was very probable that, had barriers existed in the place, the damage could have been lesser, but it is still a mere presumption that does not lead us to certainty that the result would have been different. To a question from this Tribunal regarding the efficient cause of the accident, he stated that, in his opinion, such situation was due to the speed at which the vehicle was traveling and the loss of control over it by its driver. In the opinion of this Chamber, it is also important to take into consideration that, according to "Official Report" (Parte Oficial) No. 2014-245700194, made by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal No. 2457, on the day of the accident, the roadway conditions were good, illuminated, without obstacles, and the weather was clear, and he expressly indicated that the risk factor was leaving the roadway.

Thus, the cause of the accident for this Court was the loss of control over the vehicle, without it being possible to reach the certainty that the existence of guardrails would have avoided the fatal outcome, for although these minimize the potential results of an accident, it does not equate to concluding that their mere existence could have the virtue of avoiding the result of death. And it is that, as indicated supra, the result of the accident and the injuries to its passengers is a matter that would only have been accredited through technical evidence; nevertheless, the only thing that was accredited is that the vehicle was traveling on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, without them managing to prove the exact speed and the dynamics of the accident that would allow us to conclude that the existence of the barrier would have avoided the known outcome. It should be noted that the expert indicates that this type of barrier is to minimize the risk in an accident, and that its existence at the site could have altered the fatal outcome; however, the expert does not conclude that its mere existence would have avoided the outcome that occurred in the present case, since that will depend on the dynamics of the accident, for which no technical evidence was provided.

In turn, this Chamber also bears in mind that Mr. Nombre111156, identification number CED87823, ---who was interviewed within the investigative proceedings carried out by the Delegation of the O.I.J. of La Unión---, stated that moments before the accident he spotted the vehicle which "was going fast". In this way, it is an incontrovertible fact that the driver lost control of the vehicle he was driving, and the plaintiffs did not provide evidence proving that the mere existence of the guardrail barriers or fences would have avoided the death of its driver and companions. It is reiterated that under the shadow of the provisions of Article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, it is the obligation of the party to prove their claim. From the relationship of both articles derives what is known as the onus probandi (or burden of proof), a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts.

Neither was it proven that the absence of guardrails or railings on the roadway was the efficient cause of the death of the driver of the crashed vehicle and its 4 occupants, but rather that the loss of control of the same was the cause of it leaving the outer lane of the roadway, moving into the inner lane, crossing the median strip (jardinera) that divides both roadways, and reaching the inner lane, colliding with the truck that was heading from west to east. The foundation of the onus probandi lies in an old legal aphorism that expresses that "what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal is proven". Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality must prove it ("affirmanti incumbit probatio": to the one who affirms, the proof falls). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or the work of proving a statement must fall on the one who breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject).

Thus, since the dynamics of the accident indicated by the plaintiffs were not accredited, it is not possible to impute to the defendants the responsibility that the plaintiffs attribute to them. Given the foregoing, and since a direct causal relationship is not constituted (that the absence of the guardrails was the efficient cause), in relation to the effect (the death of the driver and his companions and, consequently, the subjective and patrimonial moral damages claimed); the causal link is broken, since for the Administration's duty to compensate the damage to be attributable, that causal link had to be accredited. Given the foregoing, and since the causal link between the accused situation and the damage claimed by the plaintiffs was not accredited, the claim is rejected in all its aspects.

In addition to the foregoing, and even admitting that the existence of the guardrail fences would have avoided the fatality of the accident; in the Court's opinion, even if that had been the case, the causal link is also broken starting from the driver's own acts. Thus, it was also accredited that as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 did not have a Driver's License and that, according to the toxicological examination, residues of carboxy Delta 9 THC were detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products.

Regarding the need to have a License to drive a motor vehicle, the "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres" No. 9078, ---which regulates the circulation, on public land roads, of vehicles and of persons who intervene in the transit system---, states in its Article 2.61) that the "Driver's License (Licencia de conducir)" is the permit granted by the State through which a person is authorized to drive a vehicle during a determined period, and although any person can obtain the license for driving vehicles on public land roads, the interested party must previously comply with a series of requirements established in the Law and its Regulation, all with the purpose of accrediting their suitability to drive. Among these requirements we have: a) The completion of a practical exam, which must be done in a vehicle that presents the characteristics proper to the type of license to which the driver aspires. b) Be over eighteen years of age, except in the case provided for by Article 85 for type A-1 licenses. In the case of type B2, B3, and B4 licenses, regulated by Article 86 of this law, the minimum age indicated therein must be met. c) Know how to read and write. If the person presents some type of learning, cognitive, or similar limitation, the applicant may substitute this requirement with the special courses established by the Dirección General de Educación Vial. Persons with disabilities must be guaranteed the necessary accommodations and support services during the course instruction. d) Present a general medical opinion carried out by a professional in medical sciences, authorized by the Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos. e) Pass the basic road safety education course, the requirements of which will be established by regulation. f) Pass the practical exam for the type of license aspired to, in accordance with the provisions that the competent authorities establish for that purpose. g) Not have committed any of the offenses typified in Article 261 bis.

Now, driving a vehicle without possessing a Driver's License means that whoever does so turns out to be an inexperienced driver, who exposes themselves to the imposition of an administrative sanction consisting of a fine and the detention of the vehicle. Attention must be drawn to the fact that Mr. Nombre111149 not having had a driver's license before or at the time of the accident, turned, on the legal plane and dealing with the norms regulating the circulation of motor vehicles, not only into the assumption of the exercise of an illegal activity, but also and on the technical plane, the certainty that he would not have proven suitability for driving motor vehicles before any authority, which is equivalent to or holds identity with saying that, just as he would not have done so in his time of being interested in driving this type of vehicle on public roads, nor was it proven by the current plaintiffs in this judicial venue, that at least as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 also had the knowledge, capacity, and/or skills to operate a motor vehicle on public land roads, which is inferred from the certification of the Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, taking into account that there has been a total absence of any element of conviction that allows stating the contrary.

In this sense, it could not be affirmed that the burden of proof regarding the lack of suitability was not accredited because it corresponded to the defendant parties to prove such a circumstance without having successfully done so, when rather, in addition to having proven the corresponding from the scope of the aforementioned certification which by itself allows affirming that there was no suitability in Nombre111149 for not having fulfilled any requirement to access the required license, in the face of such proven absence of suitability, any attempt aimed at affirming that despite everything, Mr. Nombre111149 did have the knowledge and skill or capacity to operate a motor vehicle corresponds, in order to the burden of proof, to whoever so affirms, a matter that did not occur in the present case.

Furthermore, knowing that he did not have a Driver's License, he chose to take a vehicle and drive it on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, and that, in the opinion of Mr. Nombre111156, he was doing so quickly. Mr. Nombre111149, moreover, never accredited before the Traffic authorities having the necessary capacity and skill to operate a motor vehicle, and yet he decided to take one and drive it, without being authorized for the purposes, assuming under his responsibility the consequences that this could produce for him. Added to the fact that he was a driver lacking a Driver's License, this Chamber takes into consideration that according to the "Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico" No. 2014-03805-TOX, of December 1, 2014, the presence of CANNABINOIDS POSITIVE for "Carboxy-Delta-9THC" was detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. That is to say that, besides not being authorized by the State to drive, he was doing so under the influence of a non-permitted substance.

And it is that whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects, ---independently of the amount they have consumed---, incurs a crime, denominated "Reckless Driving (Conducción Temeraria)". In this sense, Article 261 bis of the Penal Code sanctions this crime in the following manner: "...A prison sentence of one to three years shall be imposed, in the following cases: ...c)...The same penalty shall be applied to whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects..." Thus, driving under the influence of a drug like cannabis is typified in our legal system as a crime, ---without this Court in any way declaring its commission from the sphere of criminal law---. The norm does not require, for the configuration of the crime, any verification for the case of drugs other than alcohol, of the degree to which they exist in the driver's organism, so the simple presence of the same subsumes the conduct into the type.

Thus, the damage claimed would stem from the illegitimate, because illegal, driving of a vehicle by a subject who does not possess a driver's license and consequently lacks the technical suitability for it, and in reinforcement of the foregoing, while committing an illicit act (reckless driving), so that aspiring to compensation for damage generated from facts that would have occurred on the occasion of the commission of a qualifiedly illicit, negligent, and careless conduct of the kind would without doubt imply an abusive use of right, since in the production of the damage claimed there concurred as an element that without a doubt had an impact with a high degree of probability on the production of the accident. In this way, the harmful result was produced with an efficient cause in an illicit conduct displayed by the victim themselves (contributory negligence / culpa de la víctima), which also as a cause for exoneration or non-attribution of responsibility breaks the causal link necessary to make prosper a reproach of responsibility as that claimed in this case from the State and CONAVI. (Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code).

Then, in this same line of thought, it is evident that the damage suffered by Mrs. Nombre111151, Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153 was produced by a third party, namely, by Nombre111149, so that with respect to them, the act of a third party (hecho de un tercero) defense operates. All the foregoing allows affirming that the indemnity claims set forth in their entirety by all the plaintiff parties are unfounded.

Regarding the accused abnormal conduct by omission of the Administration (State and CONAVI) by reason of what this Court ordered in judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the First Chamber in its judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013; this Chamber differs from such an allegation. And it is that it has been accredited that in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, the Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Road safety implementation works on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras))" was published, but due to the inexistence of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it had to be declared infructuous. It was also accredited that the work was again put out to tender through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally, by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the reception of the work was given.

Thus, the judgment issued by this Court became final until the issuance of the judgment of the First Chamber No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and after the corresponding studies and preparation of the bidding documents, the Administration put out to tender the Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Road safety implementation works on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras))", published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10 and June 12, 2014, but because no company bid, it had to declare the tender infructuous. It should be noted that between the finality of the judgment and the publication of the tender, around 8 months elapsed, a period that is neither unreasonable nor excessive, since this type of works must by legal imperative be put out to tender and this necessarily entails a period, for in administrative matters, procurement must be done following the norms of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa).

Notwithstanding what was managed, an unforeseeable event occurred for the Administration, and that was that there were no bidders, which is why the tender had to be declared infructuous as that is the correct manner of proceeding in the face of a lack of interested parties in tendering or submitting their sealed bids or offers. Then, the Administration again put out to tender the Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the definitive reception of the work was given. In this way, in the Court's opinion, no abnormal conduct by omission could be attributed to the Administration with respect to what this Court and the First Chamber ordered in the indicated judgments. A corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the claim in all its aspects.

VII.- DEFENSES (EXCEPCIONES): The representation of the State opposed the substantive defenses of lack of right (falta de derecho) and lack of passive procedural standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), and the representation of CONAVI opposed the defense of lack of right. The defense of lack of passive standing must be rejected since the passive standing of the State in the present cause derives from Article 12 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (legal impleading). Regarding the defense of lack of right, retaking what was said by our First Chamber, it is necessary to refer to the demonstration of the facts, as a fundamental part thereof, because from what is determined in that section, it can be inferred whether or not the legal bases exist for what is claimed. The current legislation establishes that one of the defenses opposable in judicial processes is Lack of Right and, the protectable right in favor of the plaintiffs not having been accredited, the defense must be upheld and consequently, the claim declared without merit.

VIII.- COSTS: Article 193 of the CPCA establishes that the procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the sole fact of being so, a pronouncement that must even be made ex officio, in accordance with the provisions of that same norm, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibidem. The waiver of this sentence is only viable: a) when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence that the opposing party was unaware of; or, c) when an instance of plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the claim are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or an expert’s opinion (ordinal 194 ibidem). In the present case, this Chamber does not observe that we are before any of the exceptions indicated supra, which allow breaking the postulate of sentencing the losing party to pay costs. To that extent, the appropriate course is to sentence the plaintiffs to pay both costs plus their interests until their effective payment, which will be liquidated in the sentence execution phase at the request of the defendants.

THEREFORE (POR TANTO):

The evidence for better resolution offered by the representation of CONAVI is admitted, but not that offered by Attorney Susan Naranjo López. The defense of lack of passive procedural standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) opposed by the State representation is rejected. The defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) interposed by both defendant parties is upheld, and therefore, the claim filed by Mrs. Nombre111148, Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, [Nombre 001 002], Alfredo Brizuela González, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Edith María Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, Nombre111149, Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras, and [Nombre 003] against the State and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiffs, which will be liquidated in the sentence execution phase at the request of the representation of CONAVI and the State, plus the interests on these only with respect to the State. NOTIFY. José Iván Salas Leitón, Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Elías Baltodano Gómez. Judges.

**3.** That it be declared that the omission in the oversight duty by CONAVI and the State in the correct execution of the works developed and the absence of containment barriers along the Florencio del Castillo highway by CONAVI, allowed not only electricity poles to be installed to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit in the best safety conditions, which they are obligated to guarantee by law. **4.** That it be declared that CONAVI and the State are jointly and severally liable for the damages and losses caused as a consequence of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient action and for which they must be held financially responsible for their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for locating poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on the Dirección13198 . CONAVI and the State for omission in their duty to oversee the correct execution of the works developed for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not executing the judgment of the Administrative Appeals Court where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers, within a period of six months on the entire highway. Specified in the provisional estimate of this claim. Consisting of: For Losses: Ninety-five million colones. For Subjective Proportional Moral Damages: ₡50,000,000. Fifty million colones. For a total of material damage: ₡45,000,000 (forty-five million colones). The amount in controversy in this proceeding thus being the sum of ninety-five million colones. **5.** That CONAVI and the State be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio de Castillo Highway and protection barriers that prevent the invasion of lanes. **6.** That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. **C)** **14-10364-1027-CA: 1.** That this claim be granted in all its aspects. **2.** That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out along the Dirección13198 , represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. **3.** That it be declared that the omission in the oversight duty by CONAVI and the State in the correct execution of the works developed and the absence of containment barriers along the Florencio del Castillo highway by CONAVI, allowed not only electricity poles to be installed to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit in the best safety conditions, which they are obligated to guarantee by law. **4.** That it be declared that CONAVI and the State are jointly and severally liable for the damages and losses caused as a consequence of their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient action and for which they must be held financially responsible for their unlawful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for locating poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on the Dirección13198 . CONAVI and the State for omission in their duty to oversee the correct execution of the works developed for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not executing the judgment of the Administrative Appeals Court where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers, within a period of six months on the entire highway. Specified in the provisional estimate of this claim. Consisting of: For Losses: eighty-two million colones. For Subjective Proportional Moral Damages: ₡40,000,000. Forty million colones. For a total of material damage: ₡42,000,000 (forty-two million colones). The amount in controversy in this proceeding thus being the sum of eighty-two million colones. **5.** That CONAVI and the State be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Florencio de Castillo Highway and protection barriers that prevent the invasion of lanes. **6.** That the defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. The plaintiff in the proceeding processed under No. **15-000550-1027-CA**, filed a civil treasury claim requesting that the judgment condemn the State and CONAVI to the following: Grant this action and determine the administration's liability and order the State and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad to pay the objective moral damages and losses caused, as well as subjective moral damages produced, and the costs of this proceeding. Liquidation of objective moral damages and losses caused: That while it is true that direct responsibility for the collision is attributed to the figure of the driver of the vehicle in which his brother was traveling, because he lost control of the motor vehicle; the fact is that had there been a median barrier, specifically a containment barrier as the defendants were obligated to build, the motor vehicle would not have deviated from its course, nor would it have collided with the base of the public lighting poles existing in the median strip dividing the directions of Route 2, much less would it have invaded the opposite lane and ended his life burned alive as indeed occurred. For all this, he estimated the objective moral damages and the losses caused as a result of the expenses incurred in the sum of twenty million colones. The plaintiffs in the proceeding processed under No. **15-007855-1027-CA**, filed a civil treasury claim so that the judgment declares: This claim granted in all its aspects. The objective liability of the defendants for omissive conduct regarding signaling works and lack of barriers. That the defendants be ordered to pay moral damages in the sum of ₡75,000,000.00 (seventy-five million colones). That the defendants be ordered to pay material damages in the sum of ₡40,000,000 (forty million colones). That CONAVI be ordered to install a protection and prevention system for collisions, on the bases of the lighting poles, on the Dirección3536 . That the defendants be ordered to pay the costs generated as a result of this proceeding. **(See preliminary hearing record and audio in the custody of this Court and digital court file)**.

**II.-** By order at 10:15 a.m. on December 19, 2014, the claim processed under file No. 14-010363-1027-CA was served for answer; by order at 2:21 p.m. on February 3, 2015, the claim processed under file No. 14-010362-1027-CA was served for answer; by order at 8:35 a.m. on January 7, 2015, the claim processed under file No. 14-010364-1027-CA was served for answer; by order at 9:32 a.m. on February 25, 2015, the claim processed under file No. 15-000550-1027-CA was served for answer; by order at 10:58 a.m. on October 5, 2015, the claim processed under file No. 15-007855-1027-CA was served for answer. **(See digital court file).** **III.-** The State's representation, through briefs received on March 7, 12, and 13, February 23, and December 3, 2015, negatively answered the claims and in its defense raised the substantive defenses of lack of right and lack of passive legal standing (*legitimación ad causam pasiva*). For its part, the representation of CONAVI through briefs received on February 25, March 2 and 24, April 28, and December 3, 2015, rejected the facts of the claim and raised in its defense the defense of lack of right. **(See digital court file).** **IV.-** The preliminary hearing provided for in Article 90 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure was held on May 13, 2016, with the presence of the parties and in which the claims were analyzed, the disputed facts were determined, and documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence was admitted. **(See preliminary hearing record and support in digital format)**.

**V.-** On June 20, 21, and 28, 2019, the complementary oral and public trial hearing was held, in which opening arguments were made, the party declarations of Ms. Edith Villalobos Campos, Mr. Alejandro Guzmán Villalobos, Ms. Ivannia Calderón Sanabria, Mr. Luis Fernando Calderón Sanabria, Mr. Alfredo Brizuela González, Mr. Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Ms. Alice Fuentes Ospina, Ms. Joyce Allen Brooks, and Ms. Imelda Mora Porras and the expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, official of the Judicial Investigation Agency, Forensic Engineering Section, were received, and the corresponding conclusions were rendered.

**VI.-** In the proceeding, the prescriptions of law have been followed and no defects capable of invalidating the actions taken are observed. This judgment is rendered by majority, within the fifteen-business-day period established in Article 111 of the Code of Administrative Contentious Procedure for complex matters, after rigorous deliberation and by unanimous vote.

Drafted by Judge Salas Leitón.

**CONSIDERING:** **I.- REGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER PROVISION:** During the trial hearing, Ms. Susan Naranjo López, special judicial representative of the plaintiffs in the case processed under exp15-007855-1027-CA, requested that the "***Provisional Projection of Pension Right Consolidation Date***" issued by the Pension Directorate of the CCSS in Nombre62 of Nombre111151 be admitted as evidence for better provision. For its part, the representation of CONAVI requested that the following be admitted under that same condition: **1)** Copy of page 15 and 26 of the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, where Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "***Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198 , sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)***". Award decision of said tender dated July 3, 2014, to the company Puente PREFA Ltda. **2)** Copy of official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, in which Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 was declared unsuccessful. **3)** Copy of official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, which is the final acceptance record for Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 "***Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Florencio del Castillo Highway, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)***". As it is pertinent and significant to the object of the proceeding, the evidence offered by the CONAVI representation is admitted, but not that offered in this condition by Licensed Attorney Naranjo López.

**II.- PROVEN FACTS:** Those of importance for the issuance of this judgment are considered as follows: **1)** That around 9:00 p.m. on September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 was driving vehicle license plate Placa19605, brand Honda, registered in Nombre62 of Mr. Nombre111152 , heading from east to west on the Florencio del Castillo highway, accompanied by Messrs. Nombre111153 , Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . **(Uncontested fact).** **2)** That while the vehicle was traveling on said highway along the section near the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, the driver lost control of it, the vehicle passing from the outer lane to the inner lane, crossing the central median strip that divides both roadways, colliding in its path with the base of a public lighting pole and continuing to the outer lane of the west-to-east roadway and colliding with the heavy vehicle brand International, license plate Placa19606, driven by Mr. Nombre111155 . **(Uncontested fact).** **3)** That as a result of the accident, its 5 occupants died. **(Uncontested fact).** **4)** That according to the declaration of Mr. Nombre111156 , ID CED87823 given before the Judicial Investigation Agency, on the day of the accident "...he could observe a white, automobile-type vehicle enter the highway, via the exit from the Tres Ríos center or from Bomba Tinoco towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it as there was little traffic at that moment..." **(See folios 31, 32, and 69 of the criminal analysis file).** **5)** That according to the Criminal Analysis Opinion No. 2014-03805-TOX, the presence of Carboxy Delta THC was detected in the blood of Mr. Nombre111149 , the vehicle's driver, which is indicative of the ingestion or consumption of Cannabis products, and he did not have a driver's license. **(See folio 85 of the criminal analysis file and the State's evidence appendix).** **6)** That the conditions of the location and the road on the day of the accident were: Roadway class: Asphalt. Roadway condition: Good. Lighting: Artificial light. Characteristics: Urban. Vertical alignment: Level. Road signage: None. Existence of: Shoulder. Direction: Two-way. State: Good. Weather condition: Clear. Intersection Y Type: None. Horizontal alignment: Level. Risk factor: Running off the road. **(See folios 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the criminal analysis file).** **7)** That under file No. 14-000714-0569-PE, a criminal proceeding for manslaughter was initiated against Nombre111149 to the detriment of Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . A proceeding in which, by means of the resolution at 11:15 a.m. on January 30, 2015, a definitive dismissal was issued due to the death of Mr. Nombre111149 . **(See folios 97 and 98 of the criminal analysis file).** **8)** That according to the Accident Report prepared by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, the driver of vehicle license plate Placa19605 lost control of it and ran off the road, passing into the opposite-direction lane, which caused him to meet head-on with the truck license plate Placa19606. **(See evidence file provided by the State).** **9)** According to the certification from the Road Safety Council No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, no type of license appears in its records in Nombre62 of Mr. Nombre111149 , ID CED87824. **(See evidence file provided by the State).** **10)** That the foundation used for the lighting poles of the Dirección5948 is a common engineering practice worldwide, which houses an anchoring system based on steel bolts, nuts, and a support plate attached to the column (metal pole). **(See evidence file provided by the State).** **11)** That by resolution number 346-2011 of the Administrative Appeals Court, CONAVI was ordered to build and install, within a period of six months, a containment barrier on the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents. A judgment that became final by Ruling of the First Chamber No. 1039-F-S1-2013 at eight thirty-five on August 14, 2013. **(See digital court file).** **12)** That in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of **April 10, 2014** and **June 12, 2014**, Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "***Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198 , sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)***" was published, but due to the lack of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it was declared unsuccessful, requiring a new tender through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the acceptance of the work was given. **(See administrative contracting file for Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 and evidence for better provision admitted by this Court).** **III.- UNPROVEN FACTS:** **1)** That as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 had the knowledge, capacity, or skill to drive a motor vehicle or had authorization to do so. **(There is no evidence to that effect, in conjunction with the certification from the Road Safety Council No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015).** **2)** That the existence of guardrails at the accident site would have prevented the outcome of the accident in terms of the deaths of Messrs. Nombre111149 , Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111151 . **(There is no evidence to that effect).** **3)** That the design of the base of pole No. 83 struck by vehicle license plate Placa19605 would have influenced in any way the outcome of the accident. **(There is no evidence to that effect).** **IV.- OBJECT OF THE PROCEEDING AND ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:** This is a civil treasury proceeding in which the plaintiffs in the consolidated proceedings claim payment for subjective moral damages and material damages for the tragic loss of their relatives. **The representation for the cases processed under files No. 14-010363-1027-CA; (to which case No. 14-010362-1027-CA and No. 14-010364-1027-CA were consolidated), stated regarding the facts, in summary form:** That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the young men Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, Nombre111149 , Nombre111153 , and Nombre111151 were traveling aboard vehicle license plate Placa19607, brand Honda, Sedan type, driven by Mr. Nombre111149, heading from Cartago toward Dirección13199 in the direction (Cartago-San José) on the Florencio del Castillo highway, route number 2. That in front of the premises of the Ujarrás jam factory, the vehicle's driver, due to circumstances that are not very clear (since there are contradictory versions), lost control of the vehicle, ran off the road, and ended up colliding against the support base of one of the poles installed on the road by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, then going into the opposite lane and colliding with another heavy cargo vehicle, box-truck type, license plate Placa19606, which was traveling in the opposite direction, from San José toward Cartago, both vehicles colliding and the heavy vehicle dragging the light one, until both vehicles came to a stop, and the explosion of vehicle license plate Placa19607 occurred. The accident had a fatal outcome, as all its occupants died at the site, due to the impact, and the vehicle was a total loss due to the impact and the fire. That representation assured that the displacement of vehicle license plate Placa19607, driven by Nombre111149 , from its lane to the opposite lane, occurred due to the absence of protective traffic barriers that would separate both roadways or that would contain the vehicles within the same lane in which the vehicle was traveling. **It indicated that this situation was evidenced in** the official Traffic Police report, number 2014-245700194, prepared by inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, Code No. 2457, who, regarding the accident and the conditions found at the accident site, recorded: Special structure: none, direction: two-way, roadway state: Good, roadway class: Asphalt, roadway condition: Good, vertical alignment: level, lighting: Artificial Light, Existence of shoulder, sidewalk, type of accident: Collision between vehicles, it being indicated in the report that it ran off the road, obstacles on the road: no skid marks exist, weather condition: clear, driver condition: no alcohol, no drugs, no medication, no fatigue or fainting, no illness, no physical disability, appraisal of sinking: Totally destroyed, driver maneuver: dodge. **Risk factor, running off the road**. That according to this report, at the site of the Dirección13198 where the accident occurred, there are no containment barriers, given that they collided because vehicle license plate Placa19607 was able to reach the other opposite lane, without any type of safety or containment barrier to prevent it. That the Administrative Appeals Court, within the proceeding processed under file No. 09-002867-1027-CA, issued judgment 346-2011, which was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through ruling 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and in which it was ordered to place a median barrier on said highway within a period of 6 months, however, as of the date the event occurred (September 3, 2014), what was ordered was not complied with. That the death of their clients occurred as a direct and immediate consequence of the illegal, abnormal, and inefficient action of CONAVI; that they openly departed from the recommendations given by SIECA for the placement of public service poles in the document called the Manual of Geographic Designs for Regional Highways of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration, and disregarded the recommendations of the Technical Road Safety Audits of LANAMME, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system for eventual collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting poles: things they evidently did not do. In addition to disobeying the order of the Administrative Appeals Court where they were ordered to install dividers and safety barriers on the Dirección3536 , thereby causing the death of more people.

At the trial hearing, the special judicial attorney-in-fact director of these cases reiterated his arguments, stating that Costa Rica signed the SIECA, in which it committed to establishing dividing barriers and frangible posts on highways. That in 2009 there was an accident in that same place and by judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the First Chamber, in which the defendants were ordered to establish dividing barriers and to pay compensation. That in this case, in 2014 an accident happened again in which 5 people died, without the dividing barriers and frangible posts having been installed by that date. That the victims did not perish because of speed, but because there was no dividing barrier at the site and the base of the post did not meet safety conditions. That if there had been dividing barriers, the death outcome possibly would not have occurred. So what was decisive in the outcome was the lack of a guardrail. That Article 254 of the Traffic Law penalizes high speed, and here the expert report established that the vehicle was traveling at no less than 61 kilometers per hour, but it does not say at what speed it was actually traveling. That in the case of cannabis, it turns out to be a blank criminal type and there is no measurement in that regard and therefore it cannot be said that the driving was reckless. That it was demonstrated that there was moral and economic damage. That the liability of the defendants is by omission for not having installed the dividing barriers or guardrails. For her part, co-representative Attorney Adriana Rojas Rivero indicated that the vehicle did not present any mechanical problem and that the damage was foreseeable. That the risk factor was leaving the roadway, and due to the lack of a guardrail or dividing barrier, that was what did not help, but that if it had existed at the accident site, the outcome could have been avoided. That there was an unforeseeability on the part of the defendants and this led to a failure in the safety of the people. That there was no planning or maintenance of the roads, despite that being the public service provided by CONAVI. That the regulations indicate what the obligations of CONAVI are, and everything was foreseeable, however CONAVI did not do it. That vehicle owners are obliged to take them to RTV to certify that it is in condition to circulate and avoid accidents, this as a primary measure, but that there are other secondary measures under the responsibility of the defendants to minimize the results of an accident, however in this case, they did not do so. That there are exemptions from liability such as fault of the victim or act of a third party, but the facts must be analyzed globally. That just as there was no foreseeability and avoidability, there can also be no fault of the victim or act of a third party, because the occupants of the vehicle did not know that the driver did not have a driver's license. That in the case in which the defendants were condemned, despite the fact that high speed was demonstrated, they were still condemned.

For its part, the representation of the case processed under file No. 15-000550-1027-CA stated in summary: That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Mr. Nombre111153 was traveling in a Honda brand vehicle, Civic style, license plate Placa19605, and at the height of Dirección3257, the driver of the vehicle, without knowing the causes to date, lost control of the vehicle, which went into the median strip that divides Dirección13200, colliding with the concrete base of one of the public lighting posts located in the center of the median strip, impacts the rear right-side fender, from which a piece of fender detaches and remains in that place, the rear bumper also detaches and ends up on the other side of the opposing lanes, the vehicle takes a turn or skids clockwise on the green area, exits the opposing lane which is double and in the west-east direction where the heavy truck was traveling that impacts the automobile on the left side, from the driver's door to the rear, and carries it pinned, dragging it along the pavement from the lower front part of the heavy vehicle until it manages to stop completely in the right-hand lane, still in the west-east direction, San José-Cartago, and subsequently the vehicle caught fire and burned completely, with the occupants dying at the accident site. That according to the evidence provided by the Unidad Fiscal, the accident occurred in the section between Terramall and Pasoca and that the Administrative and Civil Finance Court, Fourth Section, by judgment number 346-2011, of the minutes of September 13, 2011, had ordered CONAVI: "...The National Road Council is condemned to build and install, within a period of six months from the finality of this judgment, a containment barrier on Dirección13198, specifically in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, both in the Cartago-San José direction and in the San José-Cartago direction...". That had what was ordered by the Court been complied with, perhaps the result would have been different. Arguments that were reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing. He reiterated at the trial hearing that, on the day of the events, the driver of the vehicle for inexplicable reasons lost control of the vehicle, collided with the base of a concrete-covered post, which deflects it into the opposite roadway and collides with a truck. That on that date there was a judgment in which the defendants were ordered to install a guardrail or containment barrier in the accident zone, however they did not do so, which is why a negligent act by the State and CONAVI is claimed. That regardless of whether the driver did not have a driver's license, this does not mean that it is the cause of the accident. The amount of cannabis residues in the driver's body was also not proven. That such circumstances do not constitute an exemption from liability, since if the dividing barriers had existed on the highway, the death outcome would not have occurred. That it was also not proven that the vehicle was traveling at high speed, only that it was going no less than 62 kilometers per hour, in a place where a speed of 90 kilometers per hour is permitted. That there is liability on the part of the defendants, because they had already been ordered by judgment to install containment barriers or guardrails within a period of 6 months and they did not do so, and that with them the death of the vehicle's occupants would have been avoided. That in the case of his represented party, he was a young man of just 16 years old who financially supported his family. That having proven the obligation of the defendants to install barriers or guardrails, since they were ordered to do so in a previous judgment and not having done so at the time of the accident, the liability of the defendants in the present case is clear.

Finally, the representation of the case processed under file No. 15-007855-1027-CA stated: That on September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111151, in the company of Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, went out for a ride near his house in a Honda Civic brand vehicle, model year 1993, license plate Placa19607, and that coming from Cartago towards Dulce Nombre62 de la Dirección13201, at kilometer 9 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the Cartago-San José direction, the vehicle was impacted by an International brand truck, model year 1998, license plate Placa19606 in front of the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, in the opposing lane, since there are no guardrails between the lanes going in different directions. That as a result of said collision, the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was traveling burst into flames, and all the passengers died at the site. That in the section where the accident occurred, Lanamme had warned the defendants about the dangers due to signaling and infrastructure errors, which were not corrected in time, and precisely in the place where the fatal accident occurred, identified in the Lanamme report as section 4 and 5, that this area has a high risk of accidents, and they occur very frequently. That according to the official Traffic Police report 2014-245700194, it indicates that the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was being transported left the roadway, there were no obstacles to prevent it from moving into the lane in the opposite direction, and also it is not recorded that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, ill, or had any physical or mental disability; which confirms that the collision occurred by virtue of the lack of dividing barriers between the lanes going in different directions. That despite the fact that by resolution number 346-2011 of the Administrative Court, CONAVI was condemned to build and install within a period of six months a containment barrier, specifically in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents. A judgment that was confirmed by the First Chamber by Vote No. 1039-F-S1-2013 at eight thirty-five a.m. on August 14, 2013, however on the day of the accident, CONAVI had still not carried out any of the ordered works, even though the judicial order had become final more than a year before. Arguments reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing. At the trial hearing, he reaffirmed what was indicated in his claim. He reiterated that the lack of the guardrail barrier led to the death of 5 young people, among them, the young man Nombre111151 who was the support of his family. That the negligence of the State and CONAVI resulted in the corresponding guardrails not being in place at the time of the accident, despite the fact that since 2003 and then reiterated in 2011, it was known that the highway presented this problem. And that this Court, for a similar case, had already condemned the defendants to install guardrail barriers in the area. That the vehicle did not present mechanical problems and that the skid mark indicated a speed of 62 kilometers per hour. That for this reason there is liability of the State and CONAVI. That CONAVI installed the guardrails 3 years after it was ordered, resulting in a very clear omission. That CONAVI accepted that the highway presented safety problems but argued that it had no budget. And Lanamme since 2012 said that the highway presented fractures and deteriorated slabs. Regarding speed, he reiterated that the expert opinion says that the vehicle was traveling at a speed no less than 62 kilometers per hour, but in a place where the permitted speed is 90 kilometers, so speed was not a determining factor for the accident to occur. That guardrails are not for preventing accidents, but for minimizing their results, so if they had existed, it is probable that the death outcome would not have occurred. That there is strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for the State's and CONAVI's omissive and illegitimate conduct, which entails an unlawful injury that his represented parties were not obliged to bear. Finally, he pointed out that the subjective moral damage was proven by the party's statement and that a fault of the victim was alleged, for traces of cannabis having been found in the driver, however with it or without it the result would have been the same. That in an analogous case, the First Chamber condemned solely for the lack of a bridge; here it is for the lack of a guardrail barrier.

The representation of CONAVI stated generally for the consolidated cases: That in the present process, a request is made that the judgment declares the joint and several liability of the National Road Council, for lack of supervision in the implementation of public lighting posts along Dirección13198, requesting payment of material and moral damages, supporting such claims on the lack of containment walls on Dirección3536 and having allowed the installation of electricity posts, which in their view allowed the vehicle driven by the late Nombre111149 Villalobos to invade the opposite lane, generating the death of the occupants of the vehicle he was driving. That thus, it is appropriate, first of all, to point out that this Council has taken the necessary steps to equip said highway with such a containment system. That Mr. Nombre111149's invasion of the opposite lane derives from his reckless driving, and illegally since he lacked the necessary license for such purpose, a reason why he loses control of the vehicle, as described in the accident report, which states: "...leaves the roadway, crossing into the lane of the opposite direction, which causes it to collide head-on with vehicle number 1, which drags it for a distance of about thirty-seven meters...", which coincides with what is recorded in report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, carried out by the Judicial Investigation Agency, on folio 81 verso which states "...the invasion of the light vehicle into the central median and then into the opposite lane occurred..." which derives from his lack of fitness and experience to drive and the excess speed at which he was doing so. That in this regard, it is necessary to note that even if the installation of the mentioned barriers had been completed, these should not be a factor that makes it permissible for drivers to drive at high speeds, violating traffic signs and basic rules of responsible driving. That regarding the liability claimed in this case, it must be remembered that for a compensation obligation to arise, the requirements of Articles 190 and following of the General Public Administration Law must be present, that is, there must be an act or omission deriving from the action of a Public Administration (cause), resulting in an injury to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere of an Administered Person (effect), and a causal link between the administrative conduct and the injury to the Administered Person. That in a civil treasury process, such as this one, since the only thing sought is the payment of damages and losses, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph b), of the Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to 58 of that same legal body; the plaintiff must prove the existence of the damage produced by the conduct of a Public Administration, this in accordance with Article 220 of the Administrative Procedure Code in relation to Article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Judgment 224 at 4:15 a.m. on February 12, 2009, of the Administrative Court, Section VI). That in this consolidated process, the plaintiffs accuse CONAVI of a lack of supervision, however, not only was compliance with the contract verified, but also the National Power and Light Company carried out the corresponding technical study that supports the placement of the posts in the location they hold. That from the foregoing, the inadmissibility of what is requested is derived since the formal and material elements for imputing liability to their represented party are not configured, and even less so is there sufficient proof of the damages that occurred, which are clearly inadmissible. That in any case, should the honorable Court consider that there was state liability in the death of the vehicle's occupants, it is worth highlighting that, in accordance with Article 190 already cited, this is extinguished totally or partially when any of the exemptions established by the legal system are present - Fault of the victim, act of a third party, and force majeure. That in this matter, in the opinion of this representation, we are facing the exemption called fault of the victim and act of a third party. That according to doctrine, this is conceived when the damage is produced by the victim themselves and by the action or omission of a subject totally alien to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party, to the extent that it is the passive subject of the damage themselves, who produces - through inexcusable negligence or imprudence - the injury, a jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of the Court, at 2:00 p.m. on March 27, 2014. That in this thinking, its jurisprudence has indicated: Exemptions. Full and partial exemption: (...) The current regulations, Article 190 of the aforementioned General Law, contemplates three assumptions of total or partial exemption from liability, namely:... act of a third party, insofar as it is produced by the action or omission of a subject totally alien to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party (...) All of them cause the rupture of the causal link. (...) First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, vote 584-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005. That the aforementioned applies to the situation of the young people who were traveling in the vehicle with license plate Placa19605, while it was driven by Nombre111149, acting with inexcusable negligence, taking the wheel of said automobile, despite not possessing the respective license and therefore the necessary aptitude to drive, losing control of the automobile causing the mishap, dying at the site together with the other occupants of the vehicle. From the foregoing, we have that, in this case, the exemption from liability is configured, thus breaking the causal link, for which reason condemning CONAVI for the lamentable death becomes inadmissible. Arguments that were reiterated at the trial hearing, stating that CONAVI did not place the deceased young people in a situation of risk. That there is no causal link between the loss of control of the vehicle and the final result by virtue of the absence at that moment of a guardrail barrier. That the driver Nombre111149 was not forced to drive under the effects of cannabis consumed hours before the accident and also did not have a license, so he was driving recklessly. That at the time of the events, Mr. Nombre111149 was of legal age and knew the consequences. That the fact that the barrier did not exist at that moment does not have an impact because the cause for which he lost control of the vehicle was never determined, meaning a fault of the victim operated due to excess speed and cannabis consumption. Regarding what was ordered by this Court with respect to the installation of guardrail barriers or safety barriers, that representation indicated that a tender notice was published, but due to a lack of bidders, the procurement had to be declared unsuccessful. That circumstantially the accident happened in the same place but for different causes. That in 2014 Lanamme said that the barriers were to reduce the risk by 40%. That the official report says that the condition of the highway was optimal and that in that site there were 4 accidents and only this one was fatal, but that this was because the driver was driving without a license and under the influence of intoxicants. That the Traffic Law establishes possessing a license as a requirement for driving. That none of the plaintiffs were a maintenance creditor. That a fault of the victim and act of a third party operated as exemptions from liability. That without prejudice to what has been said, should the Court consider that the fault of the victim is not absolutely configured, the truth is that, at the very least, it attenuates CONAVI's liability, since, inevitably, the inexperience that the now deceased had, demonstrates beyond any doubt that his conduct was inexcusably imprudent and that, indeed, greatly contributed to the accident occurring that is attempted to be attributed to CONAVI. From all the foregoing, it is clear that in this matter the elements required by the legal system to declare the strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of CONAVI for the death of Mr. Nombre111149 are not configured.

The State representation stated: “...As is generally known, the General Public Administration Law (LGAP) establishes a system of strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) and general by providing in its Article 190 that the Administration is liable for all damages. That is, it measures the Administration's liability based on the damage criterion, according to which if the causal link between that damage and the Administration's conduct is established, compensation must be paid, except for the existence of exemptions from liability that break the causal link. The rule in question, as relevant, provides: 'The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party.' (Underlining is not original). In accordance with the transcribed rule, in the presence of an exemption from liability, liability cannot be demanded from the Administration because it breaks the causal link between the damage and the conduct attributable to the Administration. In the case at hand, the truth is that as a result of a lamentable traffic accident, several young people died, among them Nombre111154, son and brother of the plaintiffs, who affirm that their death caused them a series of damages and losses which they request be compensated for by CONAVI and the State, entities they blame for the accident for deviating from the recommendations given by SIECA, for the placement of public service posts, and ignoring the recommendations of the Lanamme Road Safety Technical Audit, regarding the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for eventual collisions with the bases of the lighting posts on the road where the accident occurred. However, this State representation considers that the plaintiffs are not right, because the truth is that there are at least two exemptions from liability that break the causal link between the damage produced and the Administration's actions. We refer to the exemptions known as 'fault of the victim and act of a third party.' As the plaintiff party itself well acknowledges in the FIFTH fact of the claim, the accident occurred late at night. Regarding this, the deceased's mother and plaintiff in this process, stated to a media outlet that she had begged her son Nombre111154 not to go out, however, she affirms, she could not stop him. In a statement given to Diario Extra, on September 5, 2014, Mrs. Sanabria stated: 'A friend arrived and told him to go for a ride in the car, I begged my son not to go out because I had a bad feeling, but even so he asked for my blessing and left forever.' Likewise, it is recorded that there was a sixth friend, named Nombre62 Nombre111157, who upon knowing that none of the young people in the vehicle had a driver's license, perceived the danger and decided to get out of the automobile and reject the invitation to go out and test the car that his friend, who was the driver of the vehicle, had just bought, namely, Nombre111149: 'Nombre111149 had bought the car two days before and we were all excited. It was very nice, I was going with them, but I kinda got scared, we don't have a license, so I better got out and stayed with the others [...].' See news from La Teja newspaper, Friday, September 5, 2014, front page and pages 6 and 7. It is evident that, in the case at hand, the exemption from liability called fault of the victim is configured, since the deceased, including the plaintiffs' son, knowing that the driver of the vehicle nor any of its occupants had a driver's license, at their own risk decided to accompany them 'to go for a ride.' Regarding the exemption from liability under comment, what was said by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment No. 584-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, is interesting: '[...] Exemptions, Full and partial exemption The current regulations, Article 190 of the aforementioned General Law, contemplates three assumptions of total or partial exemption from liability, namely: fault of the victim, to the extent that the passive subject of the damage themselves produces –through inexcusable negligence or imprudence– the injury or places themselves in a propitious position for it, for the jurisprudential concept of Fault of the victim, see the judgment of this Chamber No. 33 at 9:30 a.m. on April 9, 1953. All of them cause the rupture of the causal link...' (Highlighting does not belong to the original) Without a doubt, in this case, the plaintiffs' son and brother placed himself in a suitable position to suffer the damage, I repeat, by accepting to accompany his friends 'to go for a ride in the car,' knowing that none of them had a driver's license. On the other hand, the fact that the vehicle driver was driving at high speed and without a driver's license demonstrates, without further explanation, the existence of the exemption from liability called 'act of a third party.' Evidently, the direct cause of the accident was the driver's lack of skill and caution, who, despite not having a driver's license, was driving at high speed and without the necessary duty of care. Regarding the speed at which the driver Nombre111149, also deceased in the accident, was driving, various media outlets reported that it was the 'adrenaline of youth' that led the young people to their death: 'Nombre111149, who was the owner of the car, was driving on Dirección13202 and 1 kilometer after the toll booth lost control, supposedly because of how fast he was going, hit a post of those dividing the road, crossed over the lane, and upon ending up in the direction Dirección3797, hit a truck very hard, which dragged the friends' white Honda Civic 40 meters.' See La Teja Newspaper, September 5, 2014, page 6. According to witnesses, the automobile in which the deceased were traveling was moving at excess speed, the driver having lost control, left the highway, collided with a post, advanced through the grass lane division, and upon entering the opposite lane was impacted by a truck. In this regard, see the news published by Diario Extra, from Dirección13203, page 16. And the relatives of the deceased young men themselves told the media that they were going at high speed and without a driver's license: 'Relatives of the deceased confirmed to this newspaper that none of them had a driver's license.' "The soldier was driving, but he switched with 'El Negro'. None of them had a license; they were all young and were going at high speed," said Nombre111158, a cousin of the deceased." Diario La Extra, September 5, 2014, page 8. For his part, Diego Herrera, Chief of the Traffic Police in San José, told the newspaper La Nación that "there was a possible excess of speed by the automobile, which was a 1993 Honda, which caused the driver to lose control of the car and the lane invasion to occur." La Nación, September 5, 2014, page 12A. As can be seen, the statements from various individuals appearing in different media outlets are consistent in that the person driving was doing so at high speed and without due care. And this is logical since, I insist, none of the deceased occupants had a driver's license. Regarding the road and weather conditions, the official traffic report states that the roadway where the accident occurred was in good condition, properly illuminated, and the weather conditions were normal. It also indicates that no skid marks were found. Hence, I repeat, the main cause of the accident was, without a doubt, the lack of skill and recklessness of the driver, also deceased. Consequently, neither the young man's death nor the damages and losses that the plaintiffs may have suffered should be attributable to the State or to CONAVI, as it is clear that two exemptions from liability are configured, breaking the causal link between the damages and the Administration's conduct.

Now then, the plaintiff party insists on attributing liability for the accident in which their son and brother died to the State and CONAVI, for a lack of oversight in the correct execution of the works carried out with the installation of lighting poles on the roadway, as well as for the absence of containment barriers along the Dirección3536 roadway that would have kept vehicles within the same lane in which they were traveling, which led to the fatal outcome. However, as we have pointed out, the invasion of the opposite lane by the vehicle in which the plaintiffs' family member was traveling was due to the lack of skill and recklessness of its driver, who lost control of the vehicle. This is described in report No. 840-51-2014, of October 1, 2014, prepared by the Judicial Investigation Organization: "[...] 500 meters before or to the east of where the invasion of the central median and then the opposite lane by the light vehicle occurred, the maximum permitted speed is indicated as 90KPH. [...] It appears that the light vehicle with license plate Placa19605, in which the deceased were traveling, was moving in an East-West direction, for some reason left its lane, entering the central median in the direction already described, continued heading west and impacted the concrete base of one of the public lighting poles located in the center of the median [...]." Contrary to what the plaintiff party asserts, it is clear that the cause of the accident is the lack of skill on the part of the vehicle's driver, who, as we have indicated, did not even have a driver's license. Any person who takes the road safety course — necessary to obtain a driver's license — is aware of the danger involved in speeding, especially at night…" Arguments that were reiterated in the consolidated cases. At the trial hearing, this representation pointed out that there is no causal link between the conduct and the damage claimed. That there was excessive speed, driving without a license and under the influence of intoxicating substances, which caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle. That the exemptions from liability of fault of the victim and act of a third party applied. That the probable cause of the accident was speed and human error, and that even though the vehicle struck the base of the pole, this was not enough to stop it; rather, it continued into the opposite lane and collided with a truck.

**V.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION** : As indicated supra, in the present proceeding, objective patrimonial liability of the Administration is claimed for an alleged omission. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction finds its basis in Article 49 of the Political Constitution, as part of the fundamental rights that, in a State of Law, all inhabitants of the Republic enjoy. The purpose of this Jurisdiction is *"...to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State, its institutions, and any other public law entity. Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenging administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered."* Regarding the scope and objectives of this Jurisdiction, the Constitutional Chamber, in its vote **5686-95** of 3:30 p.m. on October 18, 1995, referring to vote **3905-94** of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, stated: *"(...) it is appropriate to analyze whether the competence assigned by Article 49 of the Constitution to the Contentious-Administrative courts may be delegated by law to other courts of different material competence, (...) This norm forms part of a concept — in its modern meaning — introduced into Costa Rican political law by the 1949 Constitution, which is the judicial oversight of public acts. (...) The concept was reinforced by the reform introduced through Law #3124 of June 25, 1963, which allowed challenging discretionary acts of the administration as well, not contemplated in the original wording of Article 49, which limited the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to overseeing the 'use of regulated powers.' The purpose of the constituent legislator was to place in Costa Rican constitutional law a new and true subjective right in favor of citizens, guaranteeing their defense in case of overreach by the governors."* As a development of the aforementioned constitutional norm, Articles 1 and 2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establish that this venue has the purpose of protecting the legal situations of all persons, guaranteeing or restoring the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to administrative law, as well as hearing and resolving the various aspects of the administrative legal relationship, it being understood that the grounds for illegality comprise any infraction, by action or omission, of the legal system, including deviation of power. It is also responsible for hearing matters of contractual or extracontractual patrimonial liability of the Public Administration and its officials. Therefore, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to hearing about the conformity of administrative conduct, also hears about its patrimonial liability, based on what is set forth in Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they respectively provide that *"The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and **responsible**. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers."* (The emphasis is not from the original*),* as well as that *"By resorting to the laws, all must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. (...)".* To fulfill this purpose, Article 190.1) of the General Law of Public Administration obliges the Administration to be liable for all damages caused by its **legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning**, establishing as the only exemptions from that liability the occurrence of force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. The Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. **5207-2004** of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004, indicated: *“Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (...) **responsible** (...)', thereby assuming the liability of the major public entity or State and its various organs (...) Ordinal 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(...) criminal responsibility (...)' of public officials, and the second paragraph refers to the '(...) personal responsibility for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (...)'. Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects 'acquired patrimonial rights' and 'consolidated legal situations,' which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum administrative liability system without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their activities or public performance. Numeral 41 ibidem states that 'By resorting to the laws, all must find redress for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (...)'; this precept imposes on the author and person responsible for the damage the duty to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through **positive conducts by action or negative ones by omission** by public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a **system of objective and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for intent or fault,** but **solely and exclusively for having inflicted or received, effectively,** '(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)', that is, an unlawful injury they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. (...) **it is recognized (...) by the fundamental text that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered person does not have the duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from a lawful activity (...), must be compensated.** Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in court when they breach their obligations, constitutes a clear basis for administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned Ordinal 49 provides that 'The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered,' and one of the main forms of guaranteeing these is an objective, direct, broad, and comprehensive administrative liability regime. (...). The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which **prevents the imposition on the administered of a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they do not have the duty to bear**, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or more administered persons and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that **the Political Constitution contains an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered to the proper functioning of public services**, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental law, as they respectively contain the deontological parameters of the administrative function, such as the 'proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,' 'good operation of the Government,' and 'efficiency of the administration.' This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. In this way, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is **the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury that its normal or abnormal functioning, or its lawful or unlawful conduct, causes to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered.**”* (The emphasis does not belong to the original). Note also that the administrative liability regime devised by the legislator, developed in the General Law of Public Administration starting from Article 190 and following, is of an objective nature, insofar as it imposes that the State and its institutions — Decentralized Administration — must be liable for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or the act of a third party, which implies that the Public Administration must assume the damages it causes, unless a duly accredited exonerating cause exists. Consequently, for the recognition of liability, three essential requirements are needed: **1) an action or omission derived from the function or conduct of the Public Administration**, whether formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful, **2) an injury or the existence of an unlawful damage**, insofar as it infringes the legal system. An injury that, in turn, must be certain, effective, real, evaluable, and individualizable, and not merely hypothetical, pursuant to the provisions of Numeral 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, and **3)** a **causal link** that constitutes a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act alleged and the damage produced, as an indispensable condition for the duty to compensate the damage to be attributed to the Administration, without grounds for exclusion of the causal link. As mentioned, among the causes that break the causal link and therefore exclude administrative liability are force majeure, understood as an act of nature, extraneous, external, unforeseeable, and unavoidable, or though foreseeable, irresistible. The fault of the victim also applies, which occurs when by their own actions or through their carelessness, inexcusable negligence, and recklessness, they cause the injury, placing themselves in a position conducive to it, assuming the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The last of the grounds contemplates the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person extraneous to the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected party, without whose participation the harmful act would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: number 025-F-99 of 2:15 p.m. on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001). For its part, in the case of a public servant, their liability to third parties is governed by the provisions of Numerals 199 to 202 of the General Law of Public Administration, which state that the public official shall be personally liable when they have incurred intent or gross negligence in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof, this being actually a subjective liability. In turn, it is established that, without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall be jointly liable to those affected for fault in choosing or in supervising (culpa in eligendo or in vigilando). By virtue of this, for the servant to be subjectively and personally liable to the affected parties, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their competencies and functions and that there was subjective unlawfulness in their conduct by having incurred intent or gross negligence. Liability, then, consists of the obligation to repair damage to another, borne by the person who caused it, or by another subject related to the causer, who can be legally obligated to repair that damage. Therefore, the matter is necessarily linked to the causing of damage, making it pertinent to cite what the First Chamber stated regarding the damages that may be subject to compensation in the contentious-administrative venue, in vote No. 112 of 2:15 p.m. on July 15, 1992, among other things, indicating: *“IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites for extracontractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful illicit act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, susceptible to being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, the conservation of which was objectively expected had the harmful act not occurred. Under this framework, there is no civil liability if no damage occurs, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. On the other hand, **compensable damage is only that which is proven** (reality or existence), this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In sum, damage constitutes the prejudicial gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illicit act with the one after it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' and 'losses' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss incurred by the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or unrealized gain or profit (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the illicit act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge for it to be 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely possible or hypothetical; it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with currentness, since the repair of future but certain damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with lost profit or loss, since the first refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating act of the damage, that is, its repercussions do not project at the time the proceeding is initiated. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of exclusive subjective concern to the injured party; however, the law cannot address claims based on insignificant damages derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. **Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful act, and the second will be the victim's successors. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the liable party or a third party (insurer), it becomes insubsistent. D) There must be a relationship of causality between the illicit act and the damage.** VII.- Within the classes of damages, we find in the first place material damage and bodily damage, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up a person's estate, while the second impacts bodily and physical integrity. In legal doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in a strict sense, are usually included. The second appears to be the more appropriate term, since bodily damage usually affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated the person from performing their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, where a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnum) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is economically assessable...”* In accordance with the above, **it is not enough to invoke damage, but its existence and the causal link connecting it with the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated**. Now then, in the case of the liability of municipalities as part of the decentralized organization of the State, these, as local entities, enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, based on territorial decentralization, as inferred from Numeral one hundred sixty-eight of the Political Constitution. This level of independence is granted by Precept one hundred sixty-nine of the Magna Carta, within the framework of their territorial competence, comprised of the physical space designated for the canton they represent, insofar as it indicates that each municipal council is responsible for: *"...the administration of local interests and services…"*; thus, the fundamental charter confers a series of functions or attributions upon those governments by reason of *"the local"*, that is, to administer the services and interests of the area to which it is circumscribed, namely, the canton; however, as far as the liability regime is concerned, they are obligated before the administered or third parties in the same terms as the State. In this way, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, there coexist others whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities, on the understanding that competence is not exclusive, especially when there are local interests that are simultaneously regional or even national, so that interests from the local to the national level converge, without prejudice that in some cases their impact is limited to the smallest level; however, none escapes the liability imposed on them by the legal system for damages they may cause in the exercise or omission of their activities. The territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the municipal councils and can only be removed from them by means of a nationalization law, provided that this legislative expression does not constitute a breach of the referenced autonomy or imply emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. In this way, the liability of the State is separate from that of the Municipality, for although the Municipality forms part of the State, each of these organizations responds separately. For its part, Article four of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of April 30, 1998, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy (see Constitutional Chamber, votes 5204-2004 and 8928-2004). The Constitutional Chamber, in resolution No. 5445-99, in addition to developing the bases of municipal autonomy, established the interaction of interests and determined the obligatory coordination of the local, regional, and national levels to satisfy the different interacting public interests. Municipal autonomy, imposed by the Magna Carta, confers upon local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests and services within their territorial competence (Articles 169 and 170), a competence that prevails over that of other institutions in the local context, and a separate liability regime. Regarding the specific liability regime of municipal corporations, it is pertinent to bring up what this Section of the Tribunal indicated in judgment No. 28-2014-IV of 1:30 p.m. on March 31, 2014: "...

The regime of non-contractual civil liability is developed in two spheres: subjective liability, established in article 1045 of the Civil Code, and objective liability, regulated by numeral 9 of the Political Constitution, article 1048 of the Civil Code, and numeral 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, providing that the State and its entities shall be responsible for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this way, the party causing the harm shall compensate for it, unless they demonstrate an exonerating cause. Thus, we have that the Public Administration is responsible for its lawful and normal conduct, when it issues a formal administrative act substantially in conformity with the legal system or omits issuing it, or through a material action or permitted and normal fact. For its part, the liability is of an unlawful, abnormal and formal nature when the administrative act is contrary to the legal system, and non-formal when we are faced with a material action not permitted or abnormal. So, the no-fault liability regime requires an abnormal damage or a special sacrifice that violates the principle of equality, and for its part, the abnormal functioning regime requires a lack of service. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are necessary: 1) Action or omission derived from the function or Conduct of the Public Administration, whether omissive or active, formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful. 2) Injury or existence of an unlawful damage, conduct by action or omission that infringes the legal system. Such injury affects the injured party in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere, producing an unlawful and compensable injury that they have no duty to bear (objective unlawfulness), said conduct by action or omission infringing objective law. So, such injury must be certain, effective, real, assessable, individualizable, and not hypothetical, in accordance with ordinal 196 of the General Law of Public Administration, and 3) The Causal Link, that is, that there exists a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the fact alleged and the damage produced that legitimizes the claim for the harm caused, without causes for exclusion of the causal link, upon the occurrence of an exonerating situation such as force majeure, fault of the victim, and act of a third party. As for the causes that exclude the causal link, these are force majeure, understood as a fact of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and inevitable; fault of the victim also operates, which occurs when by their own action, or by their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, the injury is caused, and the administered party places themselves in a position conducive to it and assumes the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency; and the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected party, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001.)...".

**VI.- ON THE MERITS:** As indicated supra, the plaintiffs filed a civil treasury proceeding, under the allegation that this Court, by judgment No. 346-2011 of 14:50 hours on September 13, 2011, ordered COSEVI to build and install, within a period of six months from its finality, a containment barrier at Dirección13198, specifically on the stretch between Terramall and Pasoca, in both the Cartago-San José direction and the San José-Cartago direction. A judgment that became final with the ruling of Chamber I No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, but as of September 3, 2014, the guardrails had not been installed, and on that date an accident occurred where their relatives died. They affirmed that the defendants incurred in abnormal activity by omission by not complying with what was ordered in the cited judgments. The plaintiffs' representatives asserted that had guardrails or protective barriers been installed at the accident site, the result of the accident would have been different, avoiding the death of their relatives. Based on this, they requested payment for subjective moral damage for the pain experienced due to the loss of their relatives and patrimonial damage due to the economic contribution the deceased made to their homes. It is then appropriate to analyze whether the State and CONAVI bear responsibility for the omission attributed to them in the death of the young people Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111151, Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, for not having placed the guardrails by the date the accident occurred. **Court's Criterion**: For the plaintiffs, the dynamics of the accident were that, although the driver lost control of the vehicle, it was the absence of the guardrails ---despite the defendants having been ordered to install them--- that caused the death of all its occupants, since, had they been placed in a timely manner, the result would have been different, upon perishing and, in part, they have also related such result in connection with the characteristics of the lighting pole with which the vehicle driven by the person identified in life with the Nombre62 of Nombre111149 had collided. In this Court's criterion, such an assertion constitutes a mere presumption of the plaintiffs, rather speculation by the plaintiffs, since there is no proof establishing that the existence of such a mechanism would have avoided the result, it being necessary to note that at no level is said presumption based on a report or technical study on the possible mechanics of the accident and the result had the guardrail existed. Thus, the evidence in the record does not allow us to conclude that the plaintiffs are correct, in that the placement of guardrails would have avoided the death of the vehicle's occupants. The assertion made in this sense by the plaintiffs, lacking evidentiary support, constitutes a presumption, and as a presumption, it would only constitute proof if it were a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Subsequently, within the investigative proceedings by the O.I.J., Report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, was prepared, made by Investigator Jorge Rojas Chacón, with the approval of Mr. Luis Arguedas Rojas, Coordinator of the OIJ of La Unión, and Mr. Edwin Obando Granados, Chief of the OIJ of La Unión, which indicated that the vehicle, for some reason, left its lane, crossing the central median and impacting a truck traveling in the opposite lane (west-east). It also indicated in said report that as part of the proceedings, a statement was taken from Mr. Nombre111156, ID CED87823, who stated that on the day of the accident he was able to observe a white vehicle, automobile type, entering the highway, from the Tres Ríos center exit or from Dirección13204 towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it since there was little traffic at that moment. The testimony of Judicial Expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, ID CED87825, Surveying Engineer, specialist in Road Accidentology, was also received, who at the request of this Court prepared "Expert Opinion No. DCF-2016-01200-ING" of September 16, 2016, and its amplification No. DCF-2017-00439-ING of April 24, 2017. Regarding the dynamics of the accident, he indicated that the vehicle, due to human error as the highest probability, left the roadway. That the roadway has adequate design and was in good condition. That the vehicle did not manage to hit the pole itself, but rather the base or anchor, which is normal. He pointed out that the existence of the barrier is to minimize the magnitude of the damage, but not to avoid accidents, and that it was very probable that had barriers existed at the site, the damage could have been less, but it is equally a mere presumption that does not lead us to certainty that the result would have been different. To a question from this Court regarding the efficient cause of the accident, he stated that in his criterion, such situation was due to the speed at which the vehicle was traveling and the loss of control over it by its driver. In this Chamber's criterion, it is also important to consider that according to "Official Report" No. 2014-245700194 prepared by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal No. 2457, on the day of the accident, the roadway conditions were good, illuminated, without obstacles, and the weather condition was clear, and he expressly indicated that the risk factor was leaving the road. So, the cause of the accident for this Court was the loss of control over the vehicle, without it being possible to arrive at certainty that the existence of guardrails would have avoided the fatal result, since although these minimize the eventual results of an accident, it does not equate to concluding that their mere existence could have the virtue of avoiding the result of death. And it is that, as indicated supra, the result of the accident and the injuries to its passengers is a matter that would only have been accredited through technical proof; however, the only thing accredited was that the vehicle was traveling on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, without it being possible to demonstrate the exact speed and the dynamics of the accident that would allow us to conclude that the existence of the barrier would have avoided the known result. Note that the expert indicates that this type of rail is to minimize the risk in an accident, and that its existence at the site could have varied the fatal result; however, the expert does not conclude that its mere existence would have avoided the result that occurred in the present case, as this depends on the dynamics of the accident, for which no technical proof was provided. Furthermore, this Chamber also has in mind that Mr. Nombre111156, ID CED87823, ---who was interviewed within the investigation proceedings carried out by the O.I.J. Delegation of La Unión---; stated that moments before the accident he spotted the vehicle which "was going fast." Thus, it is an uncontroverted fact that the driver lost control of the vehicle he was driving, and the plaintiffs did not provide proof accrediting that the mere existence of barriers or guardrails would have avoided the death of its driver and companions. It is reiterated that under what is regulated by article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, it is the obligation of the party to prove their claim. From the relationship of both articles derives what is known as the *onus probandi* (or burden of proof), a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a specific fact before the courts. Nor was it demonstrated that the absence of guardrails or railings on the roadway was the efficient cause of the death of the driver of the crashed vehicle and its 4 occupants, but rather that the loss of control over it was the cause of it leaving the outer lane of the roadway, moving into the inner lane, crossing the median that divides both roadways, and reaching the inner lane, hitting the truck that was heading from west to east. The foundation of the *onus probandi* lies in an old legal aphorism that expresses that *"what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal is proven"*. Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality must prove it ("*affirmanti incumbit probatio*": he who affirms bears the proof). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or work of proving a statement must fall on the one who breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a *new* truth on a subject). So, as the dynamics of the accident alleged by the plaintiffs were not accredited, it is not possible to attribute to the defendants the liability that the plaintiffs impute to them. Given the foregoing, and since a direct cause-and-effect relationship is not constituted (that the absence of guardrails was the efficient cause), in relation to the effect (the death of the driver and his companions and, consequently, the claimed subjective moral and patrimonial damage); the causal link is broken, since in order for the Administration's duty to compensate for the damage to be attributable, that causal link should have been accredited. Given the foregoing, and since the causal link between the accused situation and the damage claimed by the plaintiffs was not accredited; the lawsuit is rejected in all respects. In addition to the above, and even admitting that the existence of the guardrails would have avoided the fatality of the accident; in the Court's criterion, even if that were so, the causal link is also broken based on the own acts incurred by the driver of the vehicle. Thus, it was also accredited that as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 did not have a Driver's License and that, according to the toxicological examination, residues of carboxy Delta 9 THC were detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. Regarding the need to have a License to drive a motor vehicle, the "**Transit on Public Land Routes Law**" No. 9078, ---which regulates the circulation, on public land routes, of vehicles and of persons who intervene in the transit system---, indicates in its article 2.61) that the "**Driver's License**" is the permit granted by the State through which a person is authorized to drive a vehicle for a specific period, and although any person can obtain a license to drive vehicles on public land routes, the interested party must previously comply with a series of requirements established in the Law and its Regulations, all with the aim of accrediting their suitability to drive. Among these requirements we have: **a)** The completion of a practical exam, which must be done in a vehicle that presents the characteristics specific to the type of license to which the driver aspires. **b)** Be over eighteen years of age, except in the case of what is provided in article 85 for the A-1 type license. In the case of B2, B3, and B4 type licenses, regulated by article 86 of this law, the minimum age indicated therein must be met. **c)** Know how to read and write. If the person presents some type of learning, cognitive, or similar limitation, the applicant may substitute this requirement with the special courses established by the General Directorate of Road Education. Persons with disabilities must be guaranteed the necessary accommodations and support services during the course instruction. **d)** Present a general medical opinion performed by a professional in medical sciences, authorized by the College of Physicians and Surgeons. **e)** Pass the basic road education course, the requirements of which shall be established by regulation. **f)** Pass the practical exam for the type of license aspired to, in accordance with the provisions established for that effect by the competent authorities. **g)** Not have committed any of the crimes typified in article 261 bis. Now, driving a vehicle without possessing a Driver's License means that whoever does so is an inexperienced driver, who exposes themselves to the imposition of an administrative sanction consisting of a fine and the detention of the vehicle. It must be noted that Mr. Nombre111149 not having had a driver's license before or at the time of the accident, resulted in the legal sphere, and regarding the rules that regulate the circulation of motor vehicles, not only to suppose the exercise of an illegal activity, but also, on the technical plane, the certainty that he would not have demonstrated before any authority suitability for driving motor vehicles, which is equivalent to or has identity with saying that, just as he would not have done so at the time when he had an interest in driving this type of vehicle on public roads, nor was it demonstrated by the now plaintiffs in this judicial venue, that at least on September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 also had the knowledge, capacity, and/or skills to operate a motor vehicle on public land routes, which is inferred from the certification of the Road Safety Council No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, taking into account that there has been a total absence of any element of conviction that allows stating the contrary. In this sense, it could not be affirmed that the burden of proof regarding the lack of suitability was not accredited because it fell to the defendant parties to prove such circumstance without having done so successfully, when rather, in addition to proving what was relevant based on the scope of the mentioned certification, which by itself allows affirming that there was no suitability in Nombre111149 for not having complied with any requirement to access the required license, in the face of such proven absence of suitability, any attempt aimed at affirming that nonetheless, Mr. Nombre111149 did have the knowledge and skill or capacity to operate a motor vehicle corresponds, in terms of the burden of proof, to whoever so affirms, a thing that did not occur in the present case. furthermore, knowing that he did not have a Driver's License, he chose to take a vehicle and drive it on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour and that, in Mr. Nombre111156's opinion, he was doing so rapidly. Mr. Nombre111149, moreover, never accredited before the Traffic authorities having the necessary capacity and skill to operate a motor vehicle and yet decided to take one and drive it, without being authorized for such effects, assuming under his responsibility the consequences that this could produce for him. In addition to the fact that he was a driver lacking a Driver's License, this Chamber takes into consideration that according to "**Criminalistic Analysis Opinion**" No. 2014-03805-TOX, of December 1, 2014, the presence of CANNABINOIDS POSITIVE for "Carboxy-Delta-9THC" was detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. That is to say, in addition to not being authorized by the State to drive, he was doing so under the influence of an unpermitted substance. And it is that whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects, ---regardless of the amount consumed---, commits a crime, called "**Reckless Driving**". In this sense, article 261 bis of the Penal Code sanctions this crime as follows: "*...A prison sentence of one to three years shall be imposed, in the following cases: ...c)...The same penalty shall apply to whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects...*" Thus, driving under the effects of a drug like cannabis is typified in our legal system as a crime, ---without this Court in any way declaring its commission from the field of criminal law---. The rule does not require, for the configuration of the crime, any verification for the case of drugs other than alcohol, of the degree to which they exist in the driver's organism, so the mere presence of the same subsumes the conduct in the type. So, the damage claimed would arise from the illegitimate, because unlawful, driving of a vehicle by a subject who does not possess a driver's license and consequently technical suitability for it, and in reinforcement of the above, while committing an unlawful act (reckless driving), so that attempting to aspire to compensation for damage generated from events that would have occurred on the occasion of the commission of a highly qualified unlawful, negligent, and careless conduct of the kind, would undoubtedly imply an abusive use of right, since in the production of the damage claimed, an element concurred that undoubtedly influenced with a high degree of probability in the production of the accident. Thus, the harmful result occurred with the efficient cause being an unlawful conduct displayed by the victim themselves (fault of the victim), which also, as a cause for exculpation or exclusion of liability, breaks the causal link necessary to make a reproach of liability such as that claimed in this case against the State and CONAVI prosper. (Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code). Subsequently, in this same line of thought, it is evident that the damage suffered by Messrs. Nombre111151, Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, was produced by a third party, namely, by Nombre111149, so that with respect to them, the exonerating circumstance of act of a third party operates. All of the foregoing allows affirming that the claims of an indemnifying nature in their entirety, outlined by all the plaintiff parties, are unfounded. Regarding the accused abnormal conduct by omission of the Administration (State and CONAVI) due to what this Court ordered in judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by Chamber I in its judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013; this Chamber differs from such allegation. And it is that it has been accredited that in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "*Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)*" was published, but due to the lack of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it had to be declared unsuccessful. It was also accredited that the work was again tendered through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the reception of the work occurred. So, the judgment issued by this Court became final upon the issuance of Chamber I's judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and after the corresponding studies and preparation of the bidding documents, the Administration put out to tender Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "*Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)*", published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10 and June 12, 2014, but because no company submitted an offer, it had to declare the tender unsuccessful.

Note that between the finality of the judgment and the publication of the tender, approximately 8 months elapsed, a period that is not unreasonable or excessive, since this type of work must, by legal imperative, be put out to tender and this necessarily entails a period of time, because in administrative matters, contracting must be done following the rules of the Administrative Contracting Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Despite the efforts made, an unforeseeable event occurred for the Administration, which was that there were no bidders, meaning the tender had to be declared unsuccessful, as that is the correct way to proceed in the absence of interested parties to bid or submit their sealed proposals or offers. Subsequently, the Administration again put out to tender Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and by official communication GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the final acceptance of the work was given. Thus, in the opinion of the Court, an abnormal conduct by omission on the part of the Administration could not be attributed regarding what was ordered by this Court and the First Chamber in the indicated judgments. The corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the lawsuit in all its aspects.

**VII.- EXCEPTIONS:** The State's representation raised the substantive exceptions of lack of right and lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), and CONAVI's representation raised the exception of lack of right. The exception of lack of passive legal standing must be rejected, as the State's passive legal standing in this case derives from Article 12 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) (legal integration). Regarding the exception of lack of right, returning to what was said by our First Chamber, it is necessary to refer to the demonstration of the facts, as a fundamental part thereof, because from what is determined in that section, it will be possible to deduce whether or not the legal bases for what is sought exist. Current legislation establishes that one of the exceptions that can be raised in judicial proceedings is Lack of Right, and since no protectable right in favor of the plaintiffs has been proven, the exception must be upheld and therefore the lawsuit declared without merit.

**VIII.- COSTS:** Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (CPCA) establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party by the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, pursuant to the provisions of that same norm, in accordance with numeral 119.2 ibid. The dispensation of this condemnation is only viable: a) when, in the Court's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence unknown to the opposing party; or c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between the amount claimed and the amount definitively obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the lawsuit are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibid). In this case, this Chamber does not observe that we are facing any of the exceptions indicated above, which allow breaking the postulate of condemnation of costs to the losing party. To that extent, it is appropriate to condemn the plaintiffs to pay both costs plus their interest until their effective payment, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase at the request of the defendants.

**THEREFORE:** The evidence for better resolution offered by CONAVI's representation is admitted, but not that offered by Licenciada Susan Naranjo López. The exception of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the State's representation is rejected. The exception of lack of right raised by both defendant parties is upheld, and therefore the lawsuit filed by **Nombre111148** , **Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, [Nombre 001 002], Alfredo Brizuela González, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Edith María Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, Nombre111149** , **Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras and [Nombre 003]** against the **State** and the **Consejo Nacional de Vialidad** is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are to be borne by the plaintiffs, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase at the request of the representation of CONAVI and the State, plus interest on these only with respect to the State. **NOTIFY. José Iván Salas Leitón, Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Elías Baltodano Gómez.** **Judges.**

It is also its responsibility to hear matters of contractual or non-contractual patrimonial liability of the Public Administration and its officials. Thus, the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to hearing about the conformity of administrative conduct, also hears about the patrimonial liability thereof, based on the provisions of Articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, insofar as they respectively provide that "The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and responsible. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and independent Powers." (Highlighting not in the original), as well as that "By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests. (...)". To fulfill this purpose, Article 190.1) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública obligates the Administration to answer for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, establishing as the only exemptions from that liability the intervention of force majeure, the fault of the victim, or the act of a third party. The Sala Constitucional, in its judgment No. 5207-2004 of 14 hours and 55 minutes on May 18, 2004, indicated: "Our Constitución Política does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered parties. However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Carta Política provides that 'The Government of the Republic is (...) responsible (...)', which takes for granted the liability of the larger public entity or State and its various organs (...) Article 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the '(...) criminal liability (...)' of public officials, and the second paragraph refers to the '(...) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (...)'. Article 34 of the Constitución Política protects 'acquired patrimonial rights' and 'consolidated legal situations', which can only be effectively and truly protected with a broad-spectrum system of administrative liability without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public activity or performance. Article 41 ibidem establishes that 'By resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received to their person, property, or moral interests (...)', this precept imposes on the author and party responsible for the damage the duty to compensate for the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through positive conduct by action or negative conduct by omission of the public entities, thereby becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of an objective and direct liability system in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for willful misconduct or negligence, but solely and exclusively on having actually inflicted or received '(...) injuries or damages (...) to their person, property, or moral interests (...)', that is, an unlawful injury that they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. (...) the fundamental text recognizes (...) that special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered party has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from a lawful activity (...), must be compensated. Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Constitución Política, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in judicial courts when they fail to comply with their obligations, constitutes a clear basis for administrative liability. For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned article 49 provides that 'The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered parties', one of the main forms of guaranteeing these being an objective, direct, broad, and complete administrative liability regime. (...). The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (Articles 18 and 33), which prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they have no duty to bear, and the principle of social solidarity (Article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the latter that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered parties and unjustly borne by them. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the Constitución Política includes an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of Articles, interpreted a contrario sensu, 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law insofar as they include, respectively, the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the 'proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies', 'proper progress of the Government', and 'efficiency of the administration'. This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competencies and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when this constitutional guarantee is violated. Thus, it is evident that the original constituent implicitly included the principle of liability of public administrations, which, as such, must serve all public powers and operators of the Law as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties by its normal or abnormal operation or its lawful or unlawful conduct." (The emphases are not from the original). Note also that the administrative liability regime devised by the legislator and developed in the Ley General de la Administración Pública starting from Article 190 and following is objective in nature, insofar as it requires that the State and its institutions -Decentralized Administration- must answer for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party, which implies that the Public Administration must assume the damages it causes, unless a duly proven exonerating cause intervenes. Consequently, for its liability to be recognized, three essential requirements are needed: 1) an action or omission derived from the function or conduct of the Public Administration, whether formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful, 2) an injury or existence of an unlawful damage, insofar as it infringes the legal system. An injury that, in turn, must be certain, effective, real, assessable, and individualizable, and not merely hypothetical, in accordance with the provisions of Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, and 3) a causal link that constitutes a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act alleged and the damage produced, as an indispensable condition for the duty to compensate the damage to be attributable to the Administration, without causes for exclusion of the causal link. As mentioned, among the causes that break the causal link and therefore exclude administrative liability are force majeure, understood as an act of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and unavoidable, or even if foreseeable, irresistible. Also operative is the fault of the victim, which occurs when by their own actions or due to their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, they provoke the injury, placing themselves in a position conducive to it, assuming the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The last of the causes contemplates the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected party, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001). For its part, in the case of a public servant, their liability to third parties is governed by the provisions of Articles 199 to 202 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which provide that the public official shall be personally liable when they have incurred in willful misconduct or gross negligence in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof, this actually being a subjective liability. In turn, it is established that without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall be jointly and severally liable to the affected parties for fault in eligendo or in vigilando. By virtue of this, for the servant to be subjectively and personally liable to the affected parties, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their competencies and functions and that the subjective unlawfulness of their conduct stems from having incurred in willful misconduct or gross negligence. Liability, then, consists of the obligation to repair another's damage, borne by the one who caused it, or by another subject related to the causer, who can legally be obligated to repair that damage. In such a way that the issue is necessarily linked to the causing of damage, so it is pertinent to cite what was stated by the Sala Primera regarding the damages that may be subject to compensation in the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, in ruling No. 112 of 14 hours 15 minutes on July 15, 1992, which, among other things, indicated: "IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites of non-contractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate is only configured if a harmful unlawful act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in the legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (the injured party), which causes the deprivation of a legal good, whose preservation was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred. Under this perspective, there is no civil liability if no damage occurs, just as there is no damage if there is no injured party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven is compensable (reality or existence), this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent judgment of the adjudicator. In short, damage constitutes the detrimental gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the unlawful act with the one after it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions 'damages' and 'losses' are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to clarify and distinguish both concepts. Damage constitutes the loss inflicted on the injured party (damnum emergens), while loss is made up of the frustrated or unearned gain or profit (lucrum cessans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the unlawful act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must basically converge to be a 'compensable damage': A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on assumed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; nor should certainty be confused with presentness, as the reparation of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with loss of profit or loss, as the first refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating act of the damage, that is, its repercussions are not projected upon filing the process. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern to the injured party, however, the law cannot deal with claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct injured party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful act, and the second shall be the successors of the victim. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it becomes non-subsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the unlawful act and the damage. VII.- Among the classes of damages, there is firstly material damage and bodily damage, the first being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person's patrimony, while the second affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific ones of bodily damage and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The second seems to be the most accurate expression, as bodily damage usually affects the patrimonial interests of the injured party (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medicines, etc.), frustrated earnings if the damage has incapacitated them from carrying out their usual occupations (losses), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, as a distinction was made between damage inflicted on things directly (damnum) and that which injured the physical person of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the generated impairment is economically assessable...". In accordance with the foregoing, it is not enough to invoke damage, but its existence and the causal link connecting it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be convincingly demonstrated. Now then, in the case of the liability of the municipalidades as part of the decentralized organization of the State, these as local entities enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, based on territorial decentralization, as inferred from Article one hundred sixty-eight of the Constitución Política. This level of independence is granted by Article one hundred sixty-nine of the Magna Carta, within the framework of their territorial competence, made up of the physical space designated for the canton they represent, as it states that it corresponds to each local government (ayuntamiento) to: "...administration of local interests and services..."; thus the fundamental charter confers a series of functions or attributions in favor of those governments by reason of "the local", that is, to administer the services and interests of the area to which it is circumscribed, i.e., the canton; however, as far as the liability regime is concerned, they are obligated before the administered parties or third parties in the same terms as the State. Thus, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalidades and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities, on the understanding that competence is not exclusive, especially when there are local interests that are simultaneously regional or even national, such that interests from the local to the national plane converge, without prejudice that in some cases their affectation is limited to the smallest plane, however, none escapes the liability imposed by the legal system regarding the damages they may cause in the exercise or omission of their activities. The territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the local governments (ayuntamientos) and can only be displaced from them by means of a nationalization law, provided that such legislative manifestation does not imply a breach of the aforementioned autonomy or entail emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. In this way, the liability of the State is separate from that of the Municipalidad, for although the Municipalidad forms part of the State, each of those organizations answers separately. For its part, Article four of the Código Municipal, Law No. 7794 of April 30, nineteen ninety-eight, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator considered these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy (see Sala Constitucional, rulings 5204-2004 and 8928-2004). The Sala Constitucional in resolution no. 5445-99, in addition to developing the bases of municipal autonomy, established the interaction of interests and determined the obligatory coordination of the local, regional, and national, to satisfy the different public interests that interact. Municipal autonomy, imposed by the Magna Carta, confers on local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests and services of their territorial competence (Articles 169 and 170), a competence that prevails over that of other institutions in the local context, and a separate liability regime. Regarding the liability regime of municipal corporations specifically, it is appropriate to bring up what this Section of the Tribunal indicated in judgment No. 28-2014-IV of 13:30 hours on March 31, 2014: "... The non-contractual civil liability regime is developed in two areas, the subjective established in Article 1045 of the Código Civil and the objective, regulated in Article 9 of the Constitución Política, Article 1048 of the Código Civil, and Article 190 and following of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, providing that the State and its entities shall answer for all damages caused by their legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal operation, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. Thus, the causer of the harm shall compensate it, unless they demonstrate some exonerating cause. So, we have that the Public Administration answers for its lawful and normal conduct when it issues a formal administrative act substantially in accordance with the legal system or omits issuing it, or through a material action or permitted and normal act. On the other hand, liability is unlawful, abnormal, and formal when the administrative act is contrary to the legal system, and non-formal when we are dealing with a non-permitted or abnormal material action. Consequently, the no-fault liability regime requires abnormal damage or a special sacrifice that violates the principle of equality, and for its part, the regime for abnormal operation requires a lack of service. Therefore, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are needed: 1) An action or omission derived from the function or Conduct of the Public Administration, whether omissive or active, formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful. 2) Injury or existence of an unlawful damage, conduct by action or omission that infringes the legal system. Such injury affects the injured party in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere, producing an unlawful and compensable injury that they have no duty to bear (objective unlawfulness), said conduct by action or omission infringing the objective law. So, said injury must be certain, effective, real, assessable, individualizable, and not hypothetical, according to Article 196 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública and 3) The Causal link, that is, that a direct cause-and-effect relationship exists between the act alleged and the damage produced, which legitimizes the claim for the harm produced, without causes for exclusion of the causal link, upon the occurrence of an exonerating situation such as force majeure, the fault of the victim, and the act of a third party. As for the causes that exclude the causal link, there is force majeure, which is understood as an act of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and unavoidable; also operative is the fault of the victim, which occurs when by their own actions, or due to their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, the injury is provoked, and the administered party places themselves in a position conducive to it and assumes the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency; and the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected party, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: number 025-F-99 of 14:15 hours on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 hours on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 hours on March 28, 2001.)...".

VI.- ON THE MERITS: As indicated supra, the plaintiffs filed a civil treasury process, under the allegation that this Tribunal, by judgment No. 346-2011 of 14:50 hours on September 13, 2011, ordered COSEVI to construct and install, within a period of six months from its finality, a containment barrier on the Florencio del Castillo highway, specifically on the stretch between Terramall and Pasoca, both in the Cartago-San José direction and in the San José-Cartago direction. A judgment that became final with the ruling of the Sala I No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, but that by September 3, 2014, it had not installed the guardrail barriers, an accident occurring on that date where their relatives died. They affirmed that the defendants incurred in an abnormal activity by omission by not complying with what was ordered in the cited judgments. The representatives of the plaintiffs asserted that had the guardrails or protective barriers been installed at the accident site, the outcome of the accident would have been different, avoiding the death of their relatives. Based on this, they requested the payment of subjective moral damages for the pain experienced due to the loss of their relatives and patrimonial damages due to the economic contribution the deceased made to their homes.

It is therefore appropriate to analyze whether the State and CONAVI bear liability for the omission attributed to them in the deaths of the young men Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos (Driver), Joseph Alfonso Chaves Allen, Diego Armando Calderón Sanabria, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Gabriel Fuentes Ospina, for not having installed guardrails (vallas guardavías) by the date on which the accident occurred. **Court's Opinion**: For the plaintiffs, the dynamics of the accident were such that, although the driver lost control of the vehicle, it was the absence of guardrails (vallas guardavías)—despite the defendants having been ordered to install them—that caused the death of all its occupants, since if they had been installed in a timely manner, the outcome would have been different; they have also, in part, linked this outcome to the characteristics of the lighting pole with which the vehicle driven by the person identified in life as Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos had collided. In this Court's opinion, such an assertion constitutes a mere presumption or speculation by the plaintiffs, as there is no evidence establishing that the existence of such a mechanism would have prevented the outcome, bearing in mind that at no level is this presumption based on a report or technical study regarding the possible mechanics of the accident and the outcome had the guardrail (valla guardavías) existed. Thus, the evidence in the record does not allow us to conclude that the plaintiffs are correct in asserting that the installation of guardrails would have prevented the death of the vehicle's occupants. The statement made in this regard by the plaintiffs, lacking evidentiary support, constitutes a presumption, and as a presumption, it would only constitute evidence if it were a direct, precise, and logically deduced consequence of a proven fact. Subsequently, within the investigative proceedings conducted by the O.I.J., Report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, was prepared by Investigator Jorge Rojas Chacón, with the approval of Mr. Luis Arguedas Rojas, Coordinator of the OIJ of La Unión, and Mr. Edwin Obando Granados, Chief of the OIJ of La Unión, in which it was noted that for some reason the vehicle left its lane, crossing the central median and impacting a truck traveling in the opposite lane (west-east). It was also indicated in said report that, as part of the proceedings, a statement was taken from Mr. Johnny Murillo Acuña, ID number 1-699-753, who stated that on the day of the accident he observed a white vehicle, a sedan type, entering the highway from the exit of the Tres Ríos center or from the Bomba Tinoco towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it as there was little traffic at that time. The testimony was also received from the Judicial Expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, ID number 1-01031-0329, a Topographic Engineer specializing in Road Accidentology, who, at the request of this Court, prepared the “Expert Report No. DCF-2016-01200-ING” of September 16, 2016, and its addendum No. DCF-2017-00439-ING of April 24, 2017. Regarding the dynamics of the accident, he indicated that the vehicle left the roadway, most likely due to human error. That the roadway has an adequate design and was in good condition. That the vehicle did not manage to collide with the pole itself, but with its base or anchor, which is normal. He pointed out that the existence of the barrier is to minimize the magnitude of the damage, but not to prevent accidents, and that it was very probable that if barriers had existed at the site, the damage could have been less, but this is still a mere presumption that does not give us the certainty that the outcome would have been different. To a question from this Court regarding the efficient cause of the accident, he stated that in his opinion it was due to the speed at which the vehicle was traveling and the driver's loss of control over it. In the opinion of this Chamber, it is also important to consider that according to the “Official Report” No. 2014-245700194 prepared by Transit Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, badge No. 2457, on the day of the accident the roadway conditions were good, illuminated, without obstacles, and the weather was clear, and he expressly noted that the risk factor was leaving the road. Therefore, the cause of the accident for this Court was the loss of control over the vehicle, without it being possible to conclude with certainty that the existence of guardrails (guardavías) would have prevented the fatal outcome, for although these minimize the potential results of an accident, it is not equivalent to concluding that their mere existence would have the virtue of preventing the outcome of death. And it is that, as indicated supra, the result of the accident and the injuries to its passengers is a matter that would only have been accredited through technical evidence; nevertheless, the only thing accredited is that the vehicle was traveling on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, without the exact speed and the dynamics of the accident being demonstrated, which would allow us to conclude that the existence of the barrier would have prevented the known outcome. Note that the expert states that this type of barrier is to minimize the risk in an accident, and that its existence at the site could have varied the fatal outcome; however, the expert does not conclude that its mere existence would have prevented the outcome that occurred in this case, as that will depend on the dynamics of the accident, for which no technical evidence was provided. Furthermore, this Chamber also bears in mind that Mr. Johnny Murillo Acuña, ID number 1-699-753—who was interviewed within the investigative proceedings conducted by the La Unión Delegation of the O.I.J.—stated that moments before the accident he spotted the vehicle which "was going fast." Thus, it is an undisputed fact that the driver lost control of the vehicle he was driving, and the plaintiffs did not provide evidence proving that the mere existence of the barriers or guardrails (vallas guardavías) would have prevented the death of its driver and passengers. It is reiterated that under what is established by Article 41.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Código Procesal Civil) in relation to Article 220 of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), it is the obligation of the party to prove its claim. From the relationship of both articles derives what is known as the onus probandi (burden of proof), a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts. Nor was it proven that the absence of guardrails or railings (barandas) on the roadway was the efficient cause of the death of the driver of the crashed vehicle and its 4 occupants; rather, the loss of control of the vehicle was the cause of it leaving the outer lane of the roadway, passing to the inner lane, crossing the median (jardinera) that divides both roadways, and reaching the inner lane, hitting the truck traveling from west to east. The foundation of the onus probandi lies in an old legal aphorism that states "what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal is proven." Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality must prove it ("affirmanti incumbit probatio": the burden of proof lies with him who affirms). Basically, what is meant by this aphorism is that the burden or task of proving a statement must fall on the one who breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject). Therefore, as the dynamics of the accident alleged by the plaintiffs were not accredited, it is not possible to impute to the defendants the liability that the plaintiffs attribute to them. Given the foregoing, and as a direct cause-and-effect relationship is not established (that the absence of guardrails (guardavías) was the efficient cause) in relation to the effect (the death of the driver and his companions and, consequently, the subjective moral and pecuniary damages claimed), the causal link is broken, since for the Administration to be attributed a duty to compensate for the damage, this causal link should have been accredited. Given the foregoing, and as the causal link between the accused situation and the damage claimed by the plaintiffs is not accredited, the claim is rejected in all respects. Moreover, and even admitting that the existence of the guardrails (vallas guardavías) would have prevented the fatality of the accident, in the Court's opinion, even if that had been so, the causal link is also broken based on the driver of the vehicle's own actions. It was also accredited that as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Mauricio Calderón Villalobos did not have a Driver's License and that, according to the toxicological examination, residues of carboxy Delta 9 THC were detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. Regarding the need to have a License to drive a motor vehicle, the "Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres" No. 9078—which regulates the circulation, on public land roads, of vehicles and persons involved in the transit system—states in its Article 2.61) that the "Licencia de conducir" is the permit granted by the State by which a person is authorized to drive a vehicle for a determined period, and although any person may obtain a license to drive vehicles on public land roads, the interested party must previously comply with a series of requirements established in the Law and its Regulation, all aimed at accrediting their fitness to drive. Among these requirements we have: **a)** Passing a practical examination, which must be taken in a vehicle presenting the characteristics of the type of license to which the driver aspires. **b)** Being over eighteen years of age, except in the case of the provisions of Article 85 for the A-1 type license. In the case of the B2, B3, and B4 type licenses, regulated by Article 86 of this law, the minimum age indicated therein must be met. **c)** Knowing how to read and write. If the person has any type of learning, cognitive, or similar limitation, the applicant may substitute this requirement with the special courses established by the Dirección General de Educación Vial. Persons with disabilities must be guaranteed the necessary accommodations and support services during the course instruction. **d)** Submitting a general medical opinion conducted by a professional in medical sciences, authorized by the Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos. **e)** Passing the basic road safety education course, the requirements of which shall be established by regulation. **f)** Passing the practical examination for the type of license aspired to, in accordance with the provisions established for that purpose by the competent authorities. **g)** Not having committed any of the offenses categorized in Article 261 bis. Now, driving a vehicle without possessing a Driver's License means that whoever does so is an inexperienced driver, who is exposed to the imposition of an administrative sanction consisting of a fine and the detention of the vehicle. Attention must be drawn to the fact that Mr. Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos not having had a driver's license before or at the time of the accident meant, in the legal realm, and as regards the rules regulating the circulation of motor vehicles, not only the assumption of engaging in an illegal activity, but also, in the technical realm, the certainty that he would not have demonstrated fitness to drive motor vehicles before any authority, which is equivalent to or synonymous with saying that, just as he would not have done so at the time he had an interest in driving this type of vehicle on public roads, it was also not demonstrated by the now-plaintiffs in this judicial venue that, at least as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Calderón Villalobos also possessed the knowledge, capacity, and/or skills to operate a motor vehicle on public land roads, as follows from the certification of the Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, taking into account the total absence of any convincing evidence allowing the contrary to be affirmed. In this sense, it could not be claimed that the burden of proof regarding the lack of fitness was not met because it was for the defendant parties to prove such a circumstance without having successfully done so; quite the contrary, in addition to the fact that the relevant matter was proven based on the scope of the aforementioned certification, which by itself allows affirming that Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos lacked fitness for not having met any requirement to obtain the required license, in the face of such proven lack of fitness, any attempt to affirm that, despite all that, Mr. Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos did have the knowledge and skill or capacity to operate a motor vehicle corresponds, in terms of the burden of proof, to whomever so claims, which did not occur in this case. Furthermore, knowing he did not have a Driver's License, he chose to take a vehicle and drive it on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, and in Mr. Johnny Murillo Acuña's opinion, he was doing so quickly. Mr. Calderón Villalobos also never accredited before the Transit authorities that he possessed the necessary capacity and skill to operate a motor vehicle, and yet he decided to take one and drive it, without being authorized to do so, assuming under his own responsibility the consequences this could produce for him. Coupled with the fact that he was a driver lacking a Driver's License, this Chamber takes into consideration that according to the “Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico” No. 2014-03805-TOX, of December 1, 2014, the presence of POSITIVE CANNABINOIDS, specifically "Carboxy-Delta-9THC", was detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. That is to say, in addition to not being authorized by the State to drive, he was doing so under the influence of an illicit substance. And it is that whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects—regardless of the amount consumed—commits a crime, called “Conducción Temeraria” (Reckless Driving). In this sense, Article 261 bis of the Penal Code punishes this crime in the following manner: "...A prison sentence of one to three years shall be imposed in the following cases: ...c)...The same penalty shall apply to anyone who drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and analogous enervating or depressive effects..." Thus, driving under the influence of a drug like cannabis is categorized in our legal system as a crime—without this Court in any way declaring its commission from a criminal law standpoint. The rule does not require, for the configuration of the crime in the case of drugs other than alcohol, any verification of the degree to which they exist in the driver's organism; therefore, their mere presence subsumes the conduct into the offense. Thus, the damage claimed would arise from the illegitimate, illicit driving of a vehicle by a person who does not possess a driver's license and, consequently, lacks the technical fitness for it, and in reinforcement of the above, during the commission of an unlawful act (reckless driving), so that seeking compensation for damage generated from acts that would have occurred on the occasion of the commission of such a manifestly illicit, negligent, and careless conduct would undoubtedly imply an abusive exercise of rights, since the production of the damage claimed involved an element that undoubtedly contributed with a high degree of probability to the production of the accident. In this way, the damaging result was produced with an efficient cause being the illicit conduct displayed by the victim himself (contributory negligence of the victim), which, also as a cause for exculpation or exemption from liability, breaks the causal link necessary to sustain a claim of liability like the one claimed in this case against the State and CONAVI. (Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code). Then, in this same line of thought, it is evident that the damage suffered by Messrs. Joseph Alfonso Chaves Allen, Diego Armando Calderón Sanabria, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Gabriel Fuentes Ospina was produced by a third party, namely, by Mauricio Alonso Calderón Villalobos, so that with respect to them, the exemption from liability for the act of a third party applies. All of the foregoing allows affirming that the compensatory claims made in their entirety by all the plaintiff parties are inadmissible. Regarding the alleged abnormal conduct by omission of the Administration (the State and CONAVI) due to what this Court ordered in judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the Sala I in its judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013; this Chamber differs from such allegation. It has been accredited that in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, the Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Carretera Florencio del Castillo, secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)" was published, but due to the lack of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it had to be declared unsuccessful. It was also accredited that the work was put out to tender again through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally, by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the reception of the work took place. Thus, the judgment issued by this Court became final upon the issuance of the judgment of the Sala I No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and after the corresponding studies and preparation of the tender documents, the Administration put out to competition the Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Carretera Florencio del Castillo, secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)", published in the official gazette La Gaceta of April 10 and June 12, 2014, but because no company bid, it had to declare the tender unsuccessful. Note that between the finality of the judgment and the publication of the tender, approximately 8 months elapsed, a period that is not unreasonable or excessive, since by legal mandate this type of work must be put out to tender, and this necessarily entails a period, for in administrative matters, procurement must be done following the rules of the Law on Administrative Procurement (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Despite what was undertaken, an unforeseeable event occurred for the Administration, which was that there were no bidders; therefore, the tender had to be declared unsuccessful, as that is the correct way to proceed in the absence of interested parties to compete or submit their bids or offers. Then, the Administration again put out to tender the Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the final reception of the work took place. Thus, in the Court's opinion, an abnormal conduct due to omission could not be attributed to the Administration regarding what this Court and the Sala I ordered in the indicated judgments. The corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the claim in all respects." Email ...01</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; line-height:115%; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Annex A</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:10pt; text-align:center; line-height:115%; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span></p><table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="width:432.75pt; border-collapse:collapse"><tr style="height:13.5pt"><td style="width:118.5pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">EXPEDIENTE:</span></p></td><td style="width:311.25pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">14-010363-1027-CA</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:15.75pt"><td style="width:118.5pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">PROCESO:</span></p></td><td style="width:311.25pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">CIVIL DE HACIENDA</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:16.5pt"><td style="width:118.5pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">ACTORES:</span></p></td><td style="width:311.25pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">Nombre111148</span><span style="font-weight:bold; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-weight:bold">AND OTHERS</span></p></td></tr><tr style="height:13.5pt"><td style="width:118.5pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">DEMANDADO:</span></p></td><td style="width:311.25pt; padding:0.75pt 1pt; vertical-align:top"><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">THE STATE AND THE CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD</span></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">No. 058-2019-IV. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección01 ,</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">Edificio Anexo A, at fifteen hours and thirty-five minutes on the nineteenth of July of two thousand nineteen.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span>&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span>Civil de Hacienda proceeding processed under expediente No. 14-010363-1027-CA filed by the individuals Nombre111148</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>, ID No. CED87806, Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, ID No. CED87807, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, ID No. CED87808, [Nombre 001] and [Nombre62 002], both minors. Consolidated with the aforementioned proceeding is proceeding No. 14-10362-1027-CA of Alfredo Brizuela González ID No. CED87809, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, ID No. CED87810, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, ID No. CED87811. Proceeding 14-010364-1027-CA of Edith María Villalobos Campos ID No. CED87812, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, ID No. CED87813, Nombre111149</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, ID No. CED87814, all these persons represented by the Attorney Alejandro Martínez Sandoval license number CED87815 and Attorney Adriana Rojas Rivero. Proceeding No. 15-000550-1027-CA of Alice Fuentes Ospina, of legal age, bearer of ID No. CED87816, represented by Attorney Humberto Gerardo Méndez Barrantes license number CED87817. Proceeding No. 15-7855-1027-CA of Joyce Allen Brooks, of legal age, bearer of ID No. CED87818, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, bearer of ID No. CED87819, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras, ID No. CED87820 and the minor [Nombre62 003], represented by Attorney Susan Naranjo López license number CED25604 against the </span><span style="font-weight:bold">STATE</span><span>, represented by Attorney Georgina Chaves Olarte license number CED17385 and the </span><span style="font-weight:bold">Consejo Nacional de Vialidad</span><span> hereinafter </span><span style="font-weight:bold">CONAVI</span><span> represented by Attorney Carolina Elena Alvarado Gutiérrez license number CED87821, by Attorney Oscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, license number CED87822 and Attorney Nombre111150</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">WHEREAS:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">I.- </span><span>The plaintiffs in the proceedings processed under No. 14-010363-1027-CA, 14-010364-1027-CA and 14-010362-1027-CA filed a civil de hacienda proceeding requesting that the judgment condemn the State and CONAVI to the following findings: </span><span style="font-weight:bold">A) 14-10363-1027-CA: 1.</span><span> That this lawsuit be declared with merit in all its findings. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">2.</span><span> That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out along the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">3.</span><span> That it be declared that the omission in the oversight function by CONAVI and the State regarding the correct execution of the works carried out, and the absence of containment barriers along the Florencio del Castillo highway on the part of CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit under the best safety conditions, which they are obligated to guarantee by law, but also prevented, through the construction of safety barriers, the invasion of the opposite lane. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">4.</span><span> That they be declared jointly and severally liable (solidariamente responsables) for the damages caused as a consequence of their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient action, and for which CONAVI and the State must be held patrimonially liable for their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. CONAVI and the State for the omission in their function of overseeing the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not enforcing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a term of six months along the entire highway. As specified in the provisional estimation of this lawsuit. Consisting of: Damages (Perjuicios): one hundred twelve million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages (Daño Moral proporcional Subjetivo): ¢70,000,000. Seventy million colones. For a total of material damage (daño material): ¢42,000,000 (forty-two million colones). The amount in controversy (cuantía) of this proceeding thus totaling one hundred twelve million colones.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> 5. </span><span>That CONAVI and the State be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do (obligación de hacer), consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Carretera Florencio de Castillo and protection barriers that prevent lane invasion. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">6. </span><span>That the defendants be jointly and severally condemned to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">B)</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">14-10362-1027-CA: 1.</span><span> That this lawsuit be declared with merit in all its findings. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">2.</span><span> That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out along the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">3.</span><span> That it be declared that the omission in the oversight function by CONAVI and the State regarding the correct execution of the works carried out, and the absence of containment barriers along the Florencio del Castillo highway on the part of CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit under the best safety conditions, which they are obligated to guarantee by law.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> 4.</span><span> That they be declared jointly and severally liable for the damages caused as a consequence of their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient action, and for which CONAVI and the State must be held patrimonially liable for their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. CONAVI and the State for the omission in their function of overseeing the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not enforcing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a term of six months along the entire highway. As specified in the provisional estimation of this lawsuit. Consisting of: Damages: Ninety-five million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages: ¢50,000,000. Fifty million colones. For a total of material damage: ¢45,000,000 (forty-five million colones). The amount in controversy of this proceeding thus totaling ninety-five million colones. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">5. </span><span>That CONAVI and the State be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Carretera Florencio de Castillo and protection barriers that prevent lane invasion. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">6.</span><span> That the defendants be jointly and severally condemned to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> C)</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">14-10364-1027-CA: 1.</span><span> That this lawsuit be declared with merit in all its findings. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">2. </span><span>That it be declared that the installation of poles that the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out along the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, represents a serious danger in the event of a collision, given their rigid condition and absence of protection and signage, thereby unacceptably increasing the risk of suffering an accident with fatal consequences.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> 3.</span><span> That it be declared that the omission in the oversight function by CONAVI and the State regarding the correct execution of the works carried out, and the absence of containment barriers along the Florencio del Castillo highway on the part of CONAVI, allowed not only the installation of electricity poles to the detriment of the right to mobility and freedom of transit under the best safety conditions, which they are obligated to guarantee by law. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">4.</span><span> That they be declared jointly and severally liable for the damages caused as a consequence of their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient action, and for which CONAVI and the State must be held patrimonially liable for their wrongful, abnormal, and inefficient conduct, the former for placing poles with rigid bases and without any protection or signage on the Dirección13198</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. CONAVI and the State for the omission in their function of overseeing the correct execution of the works carried out for the lighting of the Florencio del Castillo and for not enforcing the judgment of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo where they were ordered to install safety or protection barriers within a term of six months along the entire highway. As specified in the provisional estimation of this lawsuit. Consisting of: Damages: eighty-two million colones. For Proportional Subjective Moral Damages: ¢40,000,000. Forty million colones. For a total of material damage: ¢42,000,000 (forty-two million colones). The amount in controversy of this proceeding thus totaling eighty-two million colones.</span><span style="font-weight:bold"> 5. </span><span>That CONAVI and the State be ordered to fulfill an obligation to do, consisting of the design and installation of a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Carretera Florencio de Castillo and protection barriers that prevent lane invasion. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">6. </span><span>That the defendants be jointly and severally condemned to pay the procedural and personal costs of this matter. The plaintiff of the proceeding processed under No. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">15-000550-1027-CA</span><span>, filed a civil de hacienda proceeding requesting that the judgment condemn the State and CONAVI to the following findings: To grant this action and determine the responsibility of the administration and condemn the State and the Consejo Nacional de Vialidad to pay the objective moral damages (daño moral objetivo) and damages caused, as well as the subjective moral damages (moral subjetivo) produced, and the costs of this proceeding. Liquidation of objective moral damages and damages caused: That while it is true that the direct responsibility for the collision is attributed to the figure of the driver of the vehicle in which her brother was traveling, because he lost control of the motor vehicle; the truth is that had a dividing mesh existed, specifically a containment barrier just as the defendants were obligated to build, the motor vehicle would not have deviated from its course, nor would it have collided with the base of the public lighting poles existing in the median strip that divides the directions of Route Two, much less would it have invaded the opposite lane and ended its life burned as indeed occurred. For all of this, she estimated the objective moral damages and the damages caused resulting from the expenses incurred in the sum of twenty million colones. The plaintiffs of the proceeding processed under No. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">15-007855-1027-CA</span><span>, filed a civil de hacienda proceeding so that the judgment declares: To grant this lawsuit in all its findings. The strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) of the defendants for acts of omission regarding signage works and lack of barriers. That the defendants be condemned to pay a moral damages (daño moral) in the sum of ¢75,000,000.00 (seventy-five million colones). That the defendants be condemned to pay material damage (daño material) in the sum of ¢40,000,000 (forty million colones). That CONAVI be ordered to install a protection and prevention system for collisions with the bases of the lighting poles on the Dirección3536</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. That the defendants be condemned to pay the costs generated as a result of this proceeding. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See preliminary hearing minutes and audio in the custody of this Tribunal and the digital judicial file)</span><span>.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">II.-</span><span> By order of 10:15 hours on December 19, 2014, the lawsuit processed under expediente No. 14-010363-1027-CA was served for response (traslado); by order of 14:21 hours on February 03, 2015, the lawsuit processed under expediente No. 14-010362-1027-CA was served for response; by order of 08:35 hours on January 07, 2015, the lawsuit processed under expediente No. 14-010364-1027-CA was served for response; by order of 09:32 hours on February 25, 2015, the lawsuit processed under expediente No. 15-000550-1027-CA was served for response; by order of 10:58 hours on October 05, 2015, the lawsuit processed under expediente No. 15-007855-1027-CA was served for response. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See digital judicial file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">III.- </span><span>The State's representation, by writings received on March 07, 12, and 13, February 23, and December 03, 2015, responded negatively to the lawsuits and in its defense raised the substantive defenses (excepción de fondo) of lack of right (falta de derecho) and lack of passive standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva). For its part, CONAVI's representation, by writings received on February 25, March 02 and 24, April 28, and December 03, 2015, rejected the facts of the lawsuit and raised in its defense the defense of lack of right. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See digital judicial file).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">IV.- </span><span>The preliminary hearing provided for in article 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was held on May 13, 2016, with the presence of the parties, during which the claims were analyzed, the disputed facts were determined, and documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence was admitted. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See preliminary hearing record and digital backup)</span><span>.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">V.- </span><span>On June 20, 21, and 28, 2019, the supplementary oral and public trial hearing (audiencia complementaria de juicio oral y público) was held, during which opening arguments were made, the party statements (declaración de parte) of the individuals Edith Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Guzmán Villalobos, Ivannia Calderón Sanabria, Luis Fernando Calderón Sanabria, Alfredo Brizuela González, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks and Imelda Mora Porras and of the expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, an official of the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Forensic Engineering Section, were received, and the corresponding conclusions were presented. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">VI.-</span><span> The procedure has followed the prescriptions of law and no defects capable of invalidating the proceedings are observed. This judgment is issued by majority within the term of fifteen business days established in article 111 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo for complex matters, after rigorous deliberation and by unanimity.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">&#xa0;</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">Drafted by Judge Salas Leitón</span><span> .</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">CONSIDERING: </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">I.- OF THE EVIDENCE FOR BETTER DECISION (PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER): </span><span style="font-size:10pt">During the trial hearing, Attorney Susan Naranjo López, special judicial representative of the plaintiffs in the case processed under exp15-007855-1027-CA, requested that a “</span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">Proyección Provisional de Fecha de Consolidación de Derecho a Pensión</span><span style="font-size:10pt">” (Provisional Projection of the Pension Right Consolidation Date) issued by the Dirección de Pensiones of the CCSS in the name of Nombre111151</span><span style="font-size:10pt; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-size:10pt">be admitted as evidence for better decision (prueba para mejor proveer). Additionally, CONAVI's representation requested that the following be admitted under the same condition: </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">1)</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> Copy of page 15 and 26</span><span style="font-size:10pt">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> of the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, where Public Tender (Licitación Pública) No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "</span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198</span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)</span><span style="font-size:10pt">" was published. Awarding act of said tender of July 03, 2014, to the company Puente PREFA Ltda. </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">2)</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> Copy of official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, in which the public tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 was declared unsuccessful. </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">3)</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> Copy of official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, which is the final delivery record for Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 "</span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Carretera Florencio del Castillo, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)</span><span style="font-size:10pt">". As it is pertinent and significant to the object of the proceeding, the evidence offered by CONAVI's representation is admitted, but not that offered under that condition by Attorney Naranjo López. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">II.- PROVEN FACTS (HECHOS PROBADOS): </span><span>Of importance for the issuance of this judgment, the following are considered as such: </span><span style="font-weight:bold">1)</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> That around 21:00 hours on September 03, 2014, the individual Nombre111149</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>was driving vehicle with license plates Placa19605, make Honda, registered in the name of Nombre111152</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, traveling east to west on the Florencio del Castillo highway, accompanied by the individuals Nombre111153</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>, Nombre111154</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar and Nombre111151</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(Undisputed fact).</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">2) </span><span>That while the vehicle was traveling on said highway near the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, the driver lost control of it, the vehicle moving from the outer lane to the inner lane, crossed the central median strip that divides both roadways, colliding in its path with the base of a public lighting pole and continued to the outer lane of the west-to-east roadway and collided with the heavy vehicle make International, license plates Placa19606, driven by the individual Nombre111155</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(Undisputed fact).</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">3) </span><span>That as a result of the accident, its 5 occupants died. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(Undisputed fact).</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">4) </span><span>That according to the statement of the individual Nombre111156</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>, ID CED87823, given before the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, on the day of the accident "...he could observe a white vehicle, automobile type, entering the highway via the exit from the Tres Ríos center or from the Bomba Tinoco towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it since there was little traffic at that time..." </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See folios 31, 32 and 69 of the criminal analysis file). 5) </span><span>That according to the Criminal Analysis Report (Dictamen de Análisis Criminalística) No. 2014-03805-TOX, the presence of Carboxy Delta THC was detected in the blood of the individual Nombre111149</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, the driver of the vehicle, which is indicative of the ingestion or consumption of Cannabis products, and he did not have a driver's license. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See folio 85 of the criminal analysis file and the State's evidence bundle).</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">6) </span><span>That the conditions of the location and roadway on the day of the accident were: Roadway class: Asphalt. Roadway condition: Good. Illumination: Artificial light. Characteristics: Urban. Vertical alignment: Level. Road signage: None. Existence of: Shoulder. Direction: Two directions. State: Good. Weather condition: Clear. Type of Intersection Y: None. Horizontal alignment: Level. Risk factor: Running off the road. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See folios 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the criminal analysis file). 7) </span><span>That under expediente No. 14-000714-0569-PE, criminal proceedings for negligent homicide were initiated against Nombre111149</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>to the detriment of Nombre111154</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, Nombre111153</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar and Nombre111151</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span>. Proceedings in which, by means of the resolution of 11:15 hours on January 30, 2015, a definitive dismissal (sobreseimiento definitivo) was issued due to the death of the individual Nombre111149 .</span><span>&#xa0;</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See folios 97 and 98 of the criminal analysis file). 8) </span><span>That according to the Accident Report prepared by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, the driver of vehicle with license plates Placa19605 lost control of it and left the road, moving into the oncoming lane, which caused it to collide head-on with the truck with license plates Placa19606. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See evidence file provided by the State). 9)</span><span> According to the certification of the Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015, no type of license appears in its records in the name of the individual Nombre111149</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, ID CED87824. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See evidence file provided by the State). 10) </span><span>That the foundation used for the lighting poles of the Dirección5948</span><span style="-aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span>, is a common global engineering practice, which houses an anchoring system based on steel bolts, nuts, and a support plate attached to the column (metallic pole). </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See evidence file provided by the State). 11) </span><span>That by resolution number 346-2011 of the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, CONAVI was ordered to build and install, within a term of six months, a containment barrier in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents.</span></p> Judgment that became final by Decision of the First Chamber No. 1039-F-S1-2013 of eight hours thirty-five minutes on August 14, 2013. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See digital judicial file)</span><span>. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">12)</span><span> That in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of </span><span style="font-weight:bold">April 10, 2014 </span><span>and </span><span style="font-weight:bold">June 12, 2014</span><span>, Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Works for the implementation of road safety on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras)" was published, but due to the lack of bidders, by official letter No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it was declared unsuccessful, requiring a new tender through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally, by official letter GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the acceptance of the work was given. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">(See the administrative contracting file for Public Tender No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 and evidence for better provision admitted by this Court).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt"><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">III.- FACTS NOT PROVEN:</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">1) </span><span style="font-size:10pt">That as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149</span><span style="font-size:10pt"> had the knowledge, capacity, or skill to drive a motor vehicle or had authorization to do so.</span><span> </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">(There is no evidence in that regard, in conjunction with certification from the Road Safety Council No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of January 27, 2015). 2) </span><span style="font-size:10pt">That the existence of guardrails (guarda vías) at the accident site would have prevented the outcome of the accident in terms of the deaths of Messrs. Nombre111149, Nombre111154, Nombre111153, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar and Nombre111151. </span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold">(There is no evidence in that regard). 3) </span><span style="font-size:10pt">That the design of the base of post No. 83 struck by vehicle license plate Placa19605 had in any way influenced the outcome of the accident.</span><span style="font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold"> (There is no evidence in that regard).</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">IV.- SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING AND PARTIES' ARGUMENTS: </span><span>This is a civil public-law (civil de hacienda) proceeding in which the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases claim payment for subjective moral damages and material damages for the tragic loss of their relatives. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">The representation for the cases processed under files No. 14-010363-1027-CA; (to which case No. 14-010362-1027-CA and No. 14-010364-1027-CA were consolidated), stated regarding the facts, in summary</span><span>: That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the young men Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, Nombre111149, Nombre111153, and Nombre111151 were traveling aboard vehicle license plate Placa19607, make Honda, type Sedan, driven by Mr. Nombre111149, heading from Cartago towards Dirección13199, in the direction (Cartago-San José) on the Florencio del Castillo highway, route number 2. That opposite the Ujarrás jelly factory, the driver of the vehicle, due to circumstances that are not very clear (since there are contradictory versions), lost control of the vehicle, left the road, and ended up colliding against the support base of one of the posts installed on the road by the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, then went into the opposite lane and collided with another heavy cargo vehicle, box-truck type, license plate Placa19606, which was traveling in the opposite direction, from San José towards Cartago, both vehicles colliding and the heavy vehicle dragging the light vehicle until both vehicles stopped, and the vehicle license plate Placa19607 exploded. The accident had a fatal outcome, as all its occupants died at the site, by virtue of the impact, and the vehicle was a total loss due to the impact and the fire. That representation asserted that the displacement of vehicle license plate Placa19607, driven by Nombre111149, from its lane into the opposite lane, occurred by virtue of the absence of protective barriers (vallas de protección) separating both roadways or containing vehicles within the same lane in which the vehicle was traveling. It indicated that such a situation was evidenced in the official Traffic Police report, number 2014-245700194, prepared by inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, Code No. 2457, who in relation to the accident and the conditions found at the accident site recorded: Special structure: none, direction: two directions, roadway condition: Good, roadway class: Asphalt, roadway condition: Good, vertical alignment: level lighting: Artificial Light, Existence of shoulder (espaldón), sidewalk, type of accident: Collision between vehicles, the report indicating that it left the road, obstacles on the road: no skid marks (huella de frenado) exist, weather condition: clear, driver condition: no alcohol, no drugs, no medication, no fatigue or fainting, no illness, no physical disability, appraisal of sinking: Totally destroyed, driver maneuver: dodge. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">Risk factor, leaving the road</span><span>. That according to this report, at the site of Dirección13198 where the accident happened there are no containment barriers (barreras de contención), since they collided by virtue of the fact that vehicle license plate Placa19607 was able to reach the other opposite lane, without any type of safety or containment barrier to prevent it. That the Administrative Appeals Court (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) within the proceeding processed under file No. 09-002867-1027-CA issued judgment 346-2011, which was confirmed by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, through decision 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and in which it was ordered</span><span> </span><span> to place a dividing barrier (barrera divisoria) on said highway within a period of 6 months; however, on the date the event occurred (September 3, 2014), the order had not been complied with. That the death of its clients occurs as a direct and immediate consequence of the illegal, abnormal, and inefficient action of CONAVI; that they openly deviated from the recommendations given by SIECA for the placement of public utility posts in the document called Manual of Geometric Designs for Regional Highways of the Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration, and they disregard the recommendations of Road Safety Technical Audits of LANAMME, which recommended designing and installing a protection and prevention system for eventual collisions with the bases of the roadway lighting posts: things that they evidently did not do. Coupled with the fact that they disobey the order of the Administrative Appeals Court in which they were ordered to put divisions and safety barriers on Dirección3536, thereby causing the death of more</span><span> </span><span> people. At the trial hearing, the special judicial representative directing these cases reiterated his arguments, noting that Costa Rica signed the SIECA, in which it undertook to establish dividing barriers (vallas divisorias) and breakaway posts (postes abatibles) on highways. That in 2009 there was an accident in that same place and by judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the First Chamber, in which the defendants were ordered to establish dividing barriers and pay compensation. That in this case, in 2014 an accident occurs again in which 5 people die, without the dividing barriers and breakaway posts having been placed by that date. That the victims did not perish due to speed, but because there was no dividing barrier at the site and the base of the post did not meet the safety conditions. That if there had been dividing barriers, the result of death possibly would not have occurred. So the determining factor in the result was the non-existence of the guardrail barrier (valla guarda vía). That article 254 of the Traffic Law penalizes high speed, and here the expert report established that the vehicle was traveling at no less than 61 kilometers per hour, but it does not say at what speed it was actually traveling. That in the case of cannabis, it turns out to be a blank criminal type, and there is no measurement in that regard, and therefore it cannot be said that the driving was reckless. That it was demonstrated that there was moral and economic damage. That the responsibility of the defendants is by omission for not having placed the dividing barriers or guardrails. For her part, co-representative Attorney Adriana Rojas Rivero indicated that the vehicle did not present any mechanical problem and that the damage was foreseeable. That the risk factor was leaving the road, and due to the lack of a guardrail or dividing barrier, this was what did not help, but that had one existed at the accident site, the result could have been avoided. That there was an unforeseeability on the part of the defendants and this led to a failure in the safety of people. That there was no planning or maintenance of the roads, even though that is the public service provided by CONAVI. That the regulations indicate what the obligations of CONAVI are, and everything was foreseeable, however CONAVI did not do it. That vehicle owners are required to bring them to RTV to certify that it is in condition to circulate and avoid accidents, this as a primary measure, but that there are other secondary measures under the responsibility of the defendants to minimize the results of an accident, however in this case, they did not do them. That there are exemptions from liability such as fault of the victim or act of a third party, but the facts must be analyzed globally. That just as there was no foreseeability and avoidability, there also cannot be fault of the victim or act of a third party, because the occupants of the vehicle did not know that the driver did not have a driver's license. That in the case in which the defendants were condemned, even though high speed was demonstrated, they were still condemned. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">For its part, the representation of the case processed under file No. 15-000550-1027-CA</span><span> stated in summarized form: That on September 3, 2014, at approximately 9 p.m., Mr. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">Nombre111153</span><span> was traveling in the vehicle make Honda, Style Civic, license plates Placa19605, and at the height of Dirección3257, the driver of the vehicle, for unknown reasons to date, lost control of the vehicle, which went into the median strip (jardinera) that divides Dirección13200, colliding with the concrete base of one of the public lighting posts located in the center of the median strip, impacts the rear fender on the right side, from which a piece of fender detaches and remains in that place, the rear bumper also detaches and remains on the other side of the opposite lanes, the vehicle turns or skids in a clockwise direction on the green zone, leaves the opposite lane which is double and in a west-east direction where a heavy truck that impacts the automobile on the left side, from the driver's door to the rear, was traveling, and carries it pressed against it, dragging it along the pavement from the lower front part of the heavy vehicle until it manages to stop completely in the right-side lane, still in the west-east direction, San José-Cartago, and subsequently the vehicle caught fire and burned completely, all occupants dying at the accident site. That according to the evidence provided by the Unión Prosecutor's Office, the accident occurred in the stretch between Terramall and Pasoca, and that the Fourth Section Administrative Appeals and Civil Public-Law Court, through judgment number 346-2011, of the minutes of September 13, 2011, had ordered CONAVI: "...The National Road Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad) is ordered to build and install, within six months from the finality of this judgment, a containment barrier on Dirección13198, specifically in the stretch between Terramall and Pasoca, both in the Cartago-San José direction and in the San José-Cartago direction... ". That had what was ordered by the Court been complied with, perhaps the result would have been another. Argument that was reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing. Reiterated at the trial hearing that, on the day of the events, the driver of the vehicle for inexplicable reasons lost control of the vehicle, collided against the base of a post covered in concrete, which deflects it to the opposite roadway and collides with a truck. That on that date there was a judgment ordering the defendants to place a guardrail (guarda vías) or containment barrier in the accident zone, however they did not do it, so a negligent act by the State and CONAVI is claimed. That beyond the fact that the driver did not have a driver's license, that does not mean it is the cause of the accident. Nor was the amount of cannabis residue in the driver's body proven. That such circumstances do not constitute an exemption from liability, since if the dividing barriers had existed on the highway, the result of death would not have occurred. That it was also not proven that the vehicle was traveling at high speed, only that it was not going at less than 62 kilometers per hour, in a place where a speed of 90 kilometers per hour is permitted. That there is liability on the part of the defendants, because they had already been ordered by judgment to place containment barriers or guardrails within a period of 6 months and they did not do it, and that with them the death of the vehicle's occupants would have been avoided. That in the case of its client, he was a young man of just 16 years who helped his family financially. That having proven the obligation of the defendants to place barriers or guardrails (guardavías), since they were so ordered in a previous judgment and not having done so at the time of the accident, the liability of the defendants in the present case is clear. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">Finally, the representation of the case processed under file No. 15-007855-1027-CA</span><span> stated: That on September 3, 2014, Mr. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">Nombre111151</span><span>, in the company of Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar and Nombre111153, went out for a drive near their house in the vehicle make Honda Civic, model 1993, license plate Placa19607 and that coming from Cartago towards Dulce Nombre62 of Dirección13201, at kilometer 9 of the Florencio del Castillo highway, in the Cartago-San José direction, the vehicle was impacted by a truck make International, model 1998, license plates Placa19606 in front of the Jaleas Ujarrás factory, in the opposite lane, since there are no protective barriers (vallas de protección) between the lanes going in different directions. That as a result of said collision, the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was traveling burst into flames, and all the passengers died at the site. That in the stretch where the accident occurred, Lanamme had warned the defendants about the dangers due to signaling and infrastructure errors, which were not corrected in time, and precisely in the place where the fatal accident occurred, identified in the Lanamme report as section 4 and 5, that this area has a high risk of accidents, and they occur very frequently. That according to the official Traffic Police report 2014-245700194, it is indicated that the vehicle in which Mr. Nombre111151 was transported left the road, there were no obstacles to prevent it from moving into the lane in the opposite direction, and also it is not recorded that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, ill, with some physical or mental disability; which confirms that the collision occurred by virtue of the non-existence of dividing barriers (vallas divisorias) between the lanes going in different directions. That even though by resolution number 346-2011 of the Administrative Appeals Court, CONAVI was ordered to build and install within six months a containment barrier, specifically in the stretch between Terramall and Pasoca, in both directions, in order to reduce accidents. Judgment that was confirmed by the First Chamber by Decision No. 1039-F-S1-2013 of eight hours thirty-five minutes on August 14, 2013, however on the day of the accident, CONAVI had still not carried out any of the ordered works, even though the court order had become final more than a year ago. Arguments reiterated at the oral and public trial hearing. At the trial hearing, it reaffirmed what was indicated in its complaint. Reiterated that the non-existence of the guardrail barrier led to the death of 5 young people, among them, the young man Nombre111151 who was the breadwinner for his family. That the negligence of the State and CONAVI resulted in the fact that at the time of the accident the corresponding guardrails (guardavías) did not exist at the site, even though since 2003 and then reiterated in 2011 it was known that the highway presented this problem. And that this Court, for a similar case, had already ordered the defendants to place the guardrail barriers in the area. That the vehicle did not present mechanical problems and that the skid mark indicated a speed of 62 kilometers per hour. That therefore there is liability on the part of the State and CONAVI. That CONAVI placed the guardrail barriers (vallas guardavías) 3 years after it was ordered, resulting in a very clear omission. That CONAVI accepted that the road presented safety problems, but alleged it had no budget. And Lanamme since 2012 said that the road presented fractures and deteriorated slabs. Regarding speed, reiterated that the expert report says the vehicle was traveling at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, but in a place where the permitted speed is 90 kilometers, so speed was not decisive for the accident to happen. That guardrails are not to prevent accidents, but to minimize their results, so had they existed it is likely that the death result would not have occurred. That there is strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) for an omissive and illegitimate conduct by the State and CONAVI, which leads to an anti-juridical injury, which its clients were not obligated to bear. Finally, it stated that the subjective moral damage was proven with the party statement and that a fault of the victim was alleged, for having found traces of cannabis in the driver, however with it or without it the result would have been the same. That in an analogous case, the First Chamber condemned due to the mere non-existence of a bridge; here it is for the non-existence of the guardrail barrier. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">The representation of CONAVI stated generally for the consolidated cases</span><span> : </span><span style="color:#010101">That in the present proceeding, it is petitioned that the judgment declare the joint and several liability of the National Road Council, for lack of oversight in the implementation of public lighting posts along Dirección13198, requesting payment of material and moral damages, supporting such claims on the lack of retaining walls (muros de contención) on Dirección3536 and having allowed the installation of electricity posts, which in its opinion allowed the vehicle driven by the late Nombre111149 Villalobos to invade the opposite lane, causing the death of the occupants of the vehicle he was driving. That this being so, it is appropriate, first, to point out that this Council has carried out the necessary steps to provide said road with such a containment system. That the invasion by Mr. Nombre111149 of the opposite lane derives from his reckless driving, and illegally so as he lacked the necessary license for such purpose, which is why he loses control of the vehicle, as described in the accident report, which states: "...he leaves the road crossing into the opposite direction lane, causing him to collide head-on with vehicle number 1, which drags him for a distance of about thirty-seven meters...", which coincides with what was recorded in report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014, made by the Judicial Investigation Organization, on folio 81 verso which states "...the invasion by the light vehicle into the central median strip (jardinera central) and then towards the opposite lane occurred..." which derives from his lack of suitability and experience to drive and the excess speed at which he was doing so. That in this sense, it is necessary to note that even if the installation of the mentioned barriers had been completed, these should not become a factor that makes it permissible for drivers to do so at high speeds, violating traffic signals and basic norms of responsible driving. That regarding the liability claimed in the case, it must be remembered that for a compensatory obligation to arise, the prerequisites of articles 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration must be present, that is, there must be an action or omission derived from the act of a Public Administration (cause), resulting in an injury to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere of a Party (effect), and a causal link between the administrative conduct and the injury to the Party. That in a civil public-law proceeding, such as this one, since only the payment of damages is sought, in accordance with article 2, subsection b), of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, in relation to article 58 of that same legal body; the plaintiff must prove the existence of the damage produced by the conduct of a Public Administration, this in accordance with article 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code in relation to article 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Judgment 224 of 4:15 hours on February 12, 2009, of the Administrative Appeals Court, Section VI). That in this consolidated proceeding, the plaintiffs accuse lack of oversight by CONAVI, however, not only was compliance with the contract verified, but, in addition, the Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz carried out the corresponding technical study that supports the placement of the posts in the location they hold. That from the foregoing derives the impropriety of what is requested since the formal and material elements for the imputation of liability of its client are not configured, and even less is there sufficient proof of the damages occurred, which are clearly improper. That in any case, should the honorable Court consider that there was state liability in the death of the vehicle's occupants, it is worth noting that, in accordance with article 190 already cited, this is extinguished totally or partially when any of the exemptions established by the legal system are present - Fault of the victim, act of a third party, and force majeure -. That in this matter, in the opinion of that representation, it is facing the exemption called fault of the victim and act of a third party. That according to doctrine, this is conceived when the damage is produced by the victim themselves and by the action or omission of a subject totally alien to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party, to the extent that it is the passive subject of the damage itself, who produces - by inexcusable negligence or recklessness - the injury, jurisprudential line of the First Chamber of the Court, of 14:00 hours on March 27, 2014. That in that thought, its jurisprudence has indicated: Exemptions. Full and partial exemption: (...) The current regulations, article 190 of the mentioned General Law, contemplates three assumptions of total or partial exemption from liability, namely:... act of a third party, insofar as it is produced by the action or omission of a subject totally alien to the triangular relationship between Administration-official-affected party (...) All of them originate the breaking of the causal link. (...) First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, decision 584-2005, of 10:40 minutes on August 11, 2005. That the aforementioned applies to the situation of the young people who were traveling in vehicle license plates Placa19605, while it was driven by Nombre111149, acting with inexcusable negligence, taking the wheel of said motor vehicle, despite not possessing the respective license and therefore the necessary aptitude to drive, losing control of the motor vehicle producing the mishap, dying at the site in the company of the other occupants of the vehicle. From what has been stated, we have that, in the case, the exemption from liability is configured, thus breaking the causal link, therefore, it becomes improper to condemn CONAVI for the lamentable demise. Arguments that were reiterated at the trial hearing, stating that CONAVI did not place the deceased young people in a situation of risk. That there is no causal link between the loss of control of the vehicle and the final result by virtue of the absence at that time of a guardrail barrier (valla guardavías). That the driver Nombre111149 was not forced to drive under the effects of the cannabis consumed hours before the accident, and he also did not have a license, so he was driving recklessly. That at the time of the events, Mr. Nombre111149 was of legal age and knew the consequences.

The fact that there was no guardrail at that time is irrelevant because the cause for which he lost control of the vehicle was never determined, such that the victim's own fault operated due to excessive speed and cannabis consumption. Regarding what this Court ordered with respect to the placement of guardrails or safety barriers, that representation indicated that a tender notice was published, but due to a lack of bidders, the procurement had to be declared unsuccessful. That circumstantially the accident occurred in the same place but due to different causes. That in 2014 Lanamme stated that the barriers were meant to reduce risk by 40%. That the official report states that the road condition was optimal and that there were 4 accidents at that site and only this one was fatal, but that this was because the driver was driving without a license and under the influence of intoxicating substances. That the Traffic Law (Ley de Tránsito) establishes possessing a license as a requirement to drive. That none of the plaintiffs were alimony creditors. That the victim's own fault and the act of a third party operated as exemptions from liability. That without prejudice to the foregoing, should the Court consider that the victim's own fault is not configured absolutely, the truth is that it at least attenuates CONAVI's liability, since, unavoidably, the lack of skill of the now deceased demonstrates beyond any doubt that his conduct was inexcusably reckless and that it indeed greatly contributed to the accident that is sought to be attributed to CONAVI. From all the foregoing, it is clear that in this matter, the elements required by the legal system for CONAVI's strict liability (responsabilidad objetiva) to be declared for the death of Mr. Nombre111149 are not configured. </span><span style="font-weight:bold; color:#010101">The State's representation stated</span><span style="color:#010101">: “…</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">As is generally known, the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública, LGAP) establishes a system of strict and general liability (responsabilidad objetiva y general) by providing in its article 190 that the Administration is liable for all damages. That is, it measures the Administration's liability based on the damage criterion, according to which, if the causal link between that damage and the Administration's conduct is established, compensation must be paid, save for the existence of exemptions from liability that break the causal link. The rule in question, as relevant, provides: “The Administration shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, save for force majeure, the victim's own fault, or the act of a third party.” (The underlining is not from the original). In accordance with the transcribed rule, given the existence of an exemption from liability, liability cannot be demanded from the Administration as it breaks the causal link between the damage and the conduct attributable to the Administration. In the case before us, the truth is that as a result of a regrettable traffic accident, several young people died, among them Nombre111154</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">, son and brother of the plaintiffs, who affirm that their death caused them a series of damages and losses which they request be compensated by CONAVI and the State, entities they blame for the accident for deviating from the recommendations given by SIEGA for the placement of public service posts, and for disregarding the recommendations of the LANAMME Road Safety Technical Audit regarding the design and installation of a protection and prevention system against eventual collisions with the bases of the lighting posts on the road where the accident occurred. However, this representation of the State considers that the plaintiffs are not correct, as the truth is that there are at least two exemptions from liability that break the causal link between the damage produced and the Administration's actions. We refer to the exemptions known as “the victim's own fault and the act of a third party.” As the plaintiff party itself acknowledges in the FIFTH fact of the complaint, the accident occurred in the late hours of the night. On this matter, the mother of the deceased and plaintiff in this proceeding stated to a media outlet that she had begged her son Nombre111154</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">not to go out, however, she affirms, she could not stop him. In a statement given to Diario Extra on September 5, 2014, Mrs. Sanabria stated: “A friend arrived and told him they were going for a ride in the car, I begged my son not to go out because I had a bad feeling, but even so he asked for my blessing and left forever.” Likewise, it is recorded that there was a sixth friend, Nombre62 Nombre111157, who, knowing that none of the young people in the vehicle had a driver's license, perceived the danger and decided to get out of the vehicle and reject the invitation to go out and test the car that his friend, the driver of the vehicle, namely Nombre111149, had recently acquired: “Nombre111149 had bought the car two days ago and we were all excited. It was very nice, I was going with them, but I kind of got scared, we don't have licenses, so I better got out and stayed with the others [...]. ” See news story from the newspaper La Teja, Friday, September 5, 2014, front page and pages 6 and 7. It is evident that, in the case before us, the exemption from liability called the victim's own fault is configured, since the deceased, including the plaintiffs' son, knowingly that the driver of the vehicle and none of its occupants had a driver's license, at their own account and risk decided to accompany them “for a ride.” Regarding the exemption from liability under discussion, what was stated by the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in judgment No. 584-2005, at 10:40 a.m. on August 11, 2005, is interesting: “[...] Exemptions, Full and partial exoneration. The regulations in force, article 190 of the aforementioned General Law, provides for three grounds for total or partial exemption from liability, namely: the victim's own fault, to the extent that it is the harmed party themselves who produces – through inexcusable negligence or recklessness – the injury or places themselves in a position conducive to it; for the jurisprudential concept of the Victim's own fault, see the judgment of this Chamber No. 33 at 9:30 a.m. on April 9, 1953. All of these cause the break in the causal link...” (The highlight does not belong to the original) Without a doubt, in this case, the plaintiffs' son and brother placed himself in a position apt for suffering the damage, I repeat, by accepting to accompany his friends “for a ride in the car,” knowing that none of them had a driver's license. On the other hand, the fact that the driver of the vehicle was driving at high speed and without a driver's license demonstrates, without further explanation, the existence of the exemption from liability called the “act of a third party.” Evidently, the direct cause of the accident was the lack of skill and caution of the driver, who, despite not having a driver's license, was driving at high speed and without the necessary duty of care. Regarding the speed at which driver Nombre111149, also deceased in the accident, was driving, various media outlets reported that it was “[the] adrenaline of youth” that led the young people to their deaths: “Nombre111149, who was the owner of the car, was driving along Dirección13202</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">and 1 kilometer after the toll booth lost control, supposedly because of how fast he was going, hit a post of those dividing the road, crossed lanes, and upon ending up in the direction of Dirección3797, struck a truck very hard, which dragged the friends' white Honda Civic 40 meters.” See La Teja Newspaper, September 5, 2014, page 6. According to witnesses, the automobile in which the deceased were traveling was moving at excessive speed, and the driver supposedly lost control, went off the road, collided with a post, advanced through the grass median strip, and upon entering the opposite lane was impacted by a truck. In this regard, see the news published by Diario Extra, on Dirección13203</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">, page 16. And the relatives of the deceased young men themselves told the media outlets that they were going at high speed and without a driver's license: “Relatives of the deceased confirmed to this newspaper that none had a driver's license. ‘Soldier was driving, but [he] switched with “El Negro”’ None had a license, they were all young men and were going at high speed’ said Nombre111158</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">, cousin of the deceased.” Diario La Extra, September 5, 2014, page 8. For his part, Diego Herrera, Chief of the Traffic Police in San José, commented to the newspaper La Nación, that “there was possible excessive speed on the part of the automobile, which was a 1993 Honda model, which caused the driver to lose control of the car and the lane invasion to occur.” La Nación, September 5, 2014, page 12A. As can be seen, the statements from different people recorded in the various media outlets are unanimous that the person driving was doing so at high speed and without a duty of care. And that is logical since, I insist, none of the deceased occupants had a driver's license. Regarding the road and weather conditions, the official traffic report records that the road where the accident occurred was in good condition, properly illuminated, and the weather conditions were normal. It also indicates that no skid marks are recorded. Hence, I repeat, the main cause of the accident was, without a doubt, the lack of skill and recklessness of the driver, also deceased. Consequently, neither the young man's death nor the damages and losses that the plaintiffs may have suffered should be attributable to the State or CONAVI, as it is clear that two exemptions from liability are configured that break the causal link between the damages and the Administration's conduct. Now then, the plaintiff party insists on attributing liability for the accident in which their son and brother died to the State and CONAVI, for a lack of oversight in the correct execution of the works carried out with the installation of lighting posts on the road, as well as for the absence of containment barriers along the Dirección3536</span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-style:italic; color:#010101">roadway, to contain vehicles within the same lane in which they were traveling, which led to the fatal outcome. However, as we have pointed out, the invasion of the opposite lane by the vehicle in which the plaintiffs' relative was traveling was due to the lack of skill and recklessness of its driver, who lost control of the vehicle. This is how Report No. 840-51-2014, dated October 1, 2014, prepared by the Judicial Investigation Agency (Organismo de Investigación Judicial), describes it: “[...] 500 meters before or to the east of where the light vehicle invaded the central median and then the opposite lane, this indicates a maximum permitted speed of 90KPH. [...] Apparently, the light vehicle with plates Placa19605, in which the deceased were traveling, was moving in an East-West direction, for some reason it left its lane, entering the central median in the direction already described, continued heading west and impacted the concrete base of one of the public lighting posts located in the center of the median [...].” Contrary to what the plaintiff party stated, it is clear that the cause of the accident is the lack of skill on the part of the driver of the vehicle, who, as we have indicated, did not even have a driver's license. Every person who takes the road safety course – necessary to obtain a driver's license – is aware of the danger involved in driving at excessive speed, especially at nighttime hours</span><span style="color:#010101">…” Arguments that were reiterated in the consolidated cases. At the trial hearing, this representation stated that there is no causal link</span><span style="color:#010101"> </span><span style="color:#010101"> between the conduct and the damage being claimed. That there was excessive speed, driving without a license and under the influence of intoxicating substances, which caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle. That the exemptions from liability of the victim's own fault and the act of a third party operated. That the probable cause of the accident was speed and human error, and that even though the vehicle hit the base of the post, this was not enough to stop it, but rather it continued into the opposite lane and collided with a truck.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt"><span style="font-weight:bold">V.- ON THE LIABILITY OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</span><span> : As indicated supra, strict patrimonial liability of the Administration is claimed in this proceeding for an alleged omission. In this regard, it is timely to point out that the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction finds its basis in article 49 of the Political Constitution, as part of the fundamental rights that all inhabitants of the Republic enjoy in a State of Law. The object of this Jurisdiction is </span><span style="font-style:italic">"...to guarantee the legality of the administrative function of the State, of its institutions, and of every other public law entity. Deviation of power shall be grounds for challenge of administrative acts. The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered parties." </span><span>With respect to the scope and objectives of this Jurisdiction, the Constitutional Chamber, in its vote </span><span style="font-weight:bold">5686-95</span><span> of 3:30 p.m. on October 18, 1995,</span><span> </span><span> referring to vote </span><span style="font-weight:bold">3905-94</span><span> of 3:57 p.m. on August 3, 1994, stated: </span><span style="font-style:italic">"(...) it is appropriate to analyze whether the competence assigned by article 49 of the Constitution to the Contentious-Administrative courts can be delegated by law to other courts of different material competence, (...) This rule is part of a concept - in its modern meaning - introduced to Costa Rican political law by the 1949 Constitution, which is that of judicial oversight of public acts. (...) The concept was reinforced by the reform introduced through law #3124 of June 25, 1963, which also allowed challenging discretionary acts of the administration, not contemplated within the original wording of article 49 which limited the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to overseeing the 'use of regulated powers.' The purpose of the constituent legislator was to establish in Costa Rican constitutional law a new and true subjective right in favor of citizens, guaranteeing their defense in case of overreach by the governors." </span><span>As a development of the aforementioned constitutional norm, articles 1 and 2 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code establish that this venue aims to protect the legal situations of all persons, guarantee or restore the legality of any conduct of the Public Administration subject to administrative law, as well as to hear and resolve the various aspects of the administrative legal relationship, and that the grounds for illegality include any infraction, by action or omission, of the legal system, including deviation of power. It is also responsible for hearing matters of contractual or extracontractual patrimonial liability of the Public Administration and its officials. Thus,</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span> the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction, in addition to</span><span> </span><span> hearing about the conformity of administrative conduct, also hears about the patrimonial liability thereof, based on what is stated in articles 9 and 41 of our Magna Carta, as they respectively provide that </span><span style="font-style:italic">"The Government of the Republic is popular, representative, participatory, alternative, and </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">responsible</span><span style="font-style:italic">. It is exercised by the people and three distinct and mutually independent Powers." </span><span>(The emphasis is not from the original</span><span style="font-style:italic">), </span><span>as well as that </span><span style="font-style:italic">"Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests. (...)." </span><span>To fulfill this purpose, article 190.1) of the General Public Administration Law obliges the Administration to answer for all damages caused by its </span><span style="font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning</span><span>, establishing as the only exemptions from that liability the intervention of force majeure, the victim's own fault, or the act of a third party. The Constitutional Chamber, in its judgment No. </span><span style="font-weight:bold">5207-2004</span><span> of 2:55 p.m. on May 18, 2004, indicated: </span><span style="font-style:italic">“Our Political Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the principle of patrimonial liability of public administrations for the unlawful injuries that, in the exercise of the administrative function, they cause to the administered parties.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> However, this principle is implicitly contained in the Law of the Constitution, and it can be inferred from a systematic and contextual interpretation of several constitutional precepts, principles, and values. Indeed, article 9, paragraph 1, of the Political Charter provides that “The Government of the Republic is (…) </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">responsible </span><span style="font-style:italic">(…)”, thus taking for granted the liability of the major public entity or State and its various organs (...) Number 11, for its part, establishes in its first paragraph the “(…) criminal liability (…)” of public officials, and the second paragraph refers to the “(…) personal liability for officials in the fulfillment of their duties (…)”.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> Article 34 of the Political Constitution protects “acquired patrimonial rights” and “consolidated legal situations,” which can only be effectively and really protected with a broad-spectrum administrative liability system without immune or exempt zones when they are violated by public administrations in the deployment of their public activity or performance.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> Number 41 ibidem establishes that “Resorting to the laws, everyone must find reparation for the injuries or damages they have received in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, this precept imposes the duty on the author and party responsible for the damage to compensate the unlawful injuries effectively suffered by the administered parties as a consequence of the exercise of the administrative function through </span><span style="font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">positive conducts by action or negative by omission </span><span style="font-style:italic">by the public entities, thus becoming the constitutional cornerstone for the legislative development of a </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">system of strict and direct liability in which compensation does not depend on the moral and subjective reproach of the public official's conduct for intent or fault</span><span style="font-style:italic">,</span><span> </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">but, solely and exclusively, on having inflicted or received, effectively,</span><span style="font-style:italic"> “(…) injuries or damages (…) in their person, property, or moral interests (…)”, that is, an unlawful injury that they have no duty to bear and, consequently, must be compensated. (...) </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">It is recognized (...) by the fundamental text that the special sacrifices or singular burdens that the administered party has no duty to bear or tolerate, even if they arise from lawful activity (...) must be compensated.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Political Constitution, insofar as it implicitly recognizes legal personality and, consequently, the possibility of suing public entities in judicial courts when they fail to fulfill their obligations, constitutes a clear basis for administrative liability.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> For its part, the final paragraph of the aforementioned ordinal 49 provides that “The law shall protect, at least, the subjective rights and the legitimate interests of the administered parties,” and one of the main forms of guaranteeing these is an objective, direct, broad, and complete administrative liability regime. (...). The principle of administrative liability of public entities and their officials is complemented by the constitutional enshrinement of the principle of equality in bearing public burdens (articles 18 and 33) which </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">prevents imposing on the administered parties a singular or special burden or sacrifice that they have no duty to bear</span><span style="font-style:italic"> and the principle of social solidarity (article 74), according to which if the administrative function is exercised and deployed for the benefit of the community, it is the community that must bear the unlawful injuries caused to one or several administered parties and unjustly borne by them.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> Finally, it is necessary to consider that t</span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">he Political Constitution encompasses an unnamed or atypical fundamental right, which is that of the administered parties to the proper functioning of public services</span><span style="font-style:italic">, which is clearly inferred from the relationship of numerals 140, subsection 8, 139, subsection 4, and 191 of the fundamental Law, interpreted a contrario sensu, insofar as they respectively encompass the deontological parameters of the administrative function such as the “proper functioning of administrative services and dependencies,” “good governance,” and “efficiency of the administration.”</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> This fundamental right to the proper functioning of public services imposes on public entities the duty to act in the exercise of their competences and the provision of public services efficiently and effectively and, of course, the correlative obligation to repair the damages and losses caused when that constitutional guarantee is violated.</span><span style="font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-style:italic"> Thus, it is evident that the original constituent legislator implicitly incorporated the principle of public administration liability, which, as such, must serve all public powers and legal operators as a parameter for interpreting, applying, integrating, and delimiting the entire legal system. Under this understanding, a fundamental corollary of the constitutional principle of administrative liability is </span><span style="font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the impossibility for the ordinary legislator to exempt or exonerate any public entity from liability for any unlawful injury caused to the patrimonial and extra-patrimonial sphere of the administered parties by its normal or abnormal functioning or its lawful or unlawful conduct.</span><span style="font-style:italic">”</span><span> (The emphases do not belong to the original) </span><span style="font-style:italic">. </span><span>Note also that the administrative liability regime devised by the legislator and developed in the General Public Administration Law starting from article 190 onwards is of a strict nature (objetiva), as it imposes that the State, like its institutions - Decentralized Administration - must answer for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, save for force majeure, the victim's own fault, or the act of a third party, which implies that the Public Administration must assume the damages it causes, unless a duly accredited exonerating cause mediates. Consequently, for its liability to be recognized, three essential requirements are needed: </span><span style="font-weight:bold">1) an action or omission derived from the function or conduct of the Public Administration</span><span>, whether formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or unlawful, </span><span style="font-weight:bold">2) an injury or the existence of an unlawful damage</span><span>, insofar as it violates the legal system. An injury that, in turn, must be certain, effective, real, evaluable, and individualizable, and not merely hypothetical, as provided by numeral 196 of the General Public Administration Law, and </span><span style="font-weight:bold">3) </span><span>a </span><span style="font-weight:bold">causal link </span><span>that constitutes a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act attributed and the damage produced, as an indispensable condition for the Administration to be attributed the duty to compensate the</span><span> </span><span> damage, without grounds for exclusion of the causal link. As mentioned, among the causes that break the causal link and therefore exclude administrative liability is force majeure, understood as an event of nature, extraneous, external, unforeseeable, and unavoidable, or, although foreseeable, irresistible. The victim's own fault also operates, which occurs when, by their own actions or through their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, and recklessness, they cause the injury, placing themselves in a position conducive to it, assuming the risk and its harmful effects foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency. The last of the grounds contemplates the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship among Administration-official and affected party, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: number 025-F-99 of 2:15 p.m. on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 2:20 p.m. on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 4:15 p.m. on March 28, 2001). For its part, in the case of a public servant, their liability to third parties is governed by the provisions of numerals 199 to 202 of the General Public Administration Law, which provide that the public official shall be personally liable when they have incurred intent (dolo) or gross negligence (culpa grave) in the exercise of their duties and functions or on the occasion thereof, it being in reality a subjective liability. In turn, it is established that without prejudice to the classification of the servant's conduct, the Administration shall be jointly and severally liable to the affected parties for culpa in eligendo or in vigilando. By virtue of this, for the servant to be subjectively and personally liable before the affected parties, it is required that they acted in the exercise of their competences and functions and that the subjective unlawfulness of their conduct exists by having incurred intent or gross negligence. Liability, then, consists of the obligation to repair another's damage, at the charge of the one who caused it, or of another subject related to the causer, and who can legally be obliged to repair that damage.

Thus, the issue is necessarily linked to the causing of damage, so it is pertinent to cite what the First Chamber stated regarding the damages that may be subject to compensation in contentious-administrative proceedings, in vote No. 112 of 14:15 on July 15, 1992, among other things, it indicated: “IV. Damage constitutes one of the prerequisites for extracontractual civil liability, since the duty to compensate only arises if a harmful illicit act has occurred that injures a legally relevant interest, capable of being protected by the legal system. Damage, in a legal sense, constitutes any impairment, loss, or detriment to the patrimonial or extra-patrimonial legal sphere of the person (damnificado), which causes the deprivation of a legal right, the preservation of which was objectively expected had the harmful event not occurred. Under this framework, there is no civil liability without damage, just as there is no damage without a damaged party. On the other hand, only damage that is proven is compensable (reality or existence), this being a question of fact reserved to the prudent discretion of the judge. In summary, damage constitutes the harmful gap for the victim, resulting from comparing the situation prior to the illicit act with the situation following it. V.- On many occasions, the expressions “damages” (daños) and “loss of profits” (perjuicios) are used indiscriminately. It is necessary to specify and distinguish both concepts. Damage (daño) constitutes the loss inflicted on the damaged party (damnum emergens), while loss of profits (perjuicio) consists of the frustrated or forgone gain or profit (lucro cesans), which was reasonably and probably expected had the illicit act not occurred. VI.- Not any damage gives rise to the obligation to compensate. For this purpose, the following characteristics must essentially converge to be a “compensable damage”: A) It must be certain; real and effective, and not merely eventual or hypothetical, it cannot be based on supposed or conjectural realizations. Damage does not lose this characteristic if its quantification is uncertain, undetermined, or difficult to assess or prove; certainty should not be confused with actuality, as the repair of certain but future damage is admissible; likewise, future damage should not be confused with loss of profits (lucro cesante) or loss of profits (perjuicio), as the former refers to that which arises as a necessary consequence derived from the causal or generating event of the damage, i.e., its repercussions are not projected upon filing the process. Regarding the magnitude or amount (seriousness) of the damage, this constitutes a matter of sole subjective concern for the damaged party, yet the law cannot address claims based on insignificant damages, derived from excessive susceptibility. B) There must be an injury to a legally relevant interest worthy of protection. Thus, there can be a direct damaged party and an indirect one: the first is the victim of the harmful event, and the second will be the victim’s successors. C) It must be caused by a third party, and subsisting, that is, if it has been repaired by the responsible party or a third party (insurer), it is not subsisting. D) There must be a causal relationship between the illicit act and the damage. VII.- Within the classes of damages, there is first material damage (daño material) and bodily injury (daño corporal), the former being that which affects the things or material goods that make up the person’s patrimony, while the latter affects bodily and physical integrity. In doctrine, under the generic denomination of material or patrimonial damage, the specific categories of bodily injury and material damage, in the strict sense, are usually included. The second seems to be the most appropriate expression, since bodily injury often affects the damaged party’s patrimonial interests (payment of medical treatment, hospitalization expenses, medications, etc.), frustrated earnings if the injury has incapacitated them from performing their usual occupations (loss of profits, perjuicios), etc. This distinction originated in Roman Law, as a distinction was made between damage inflicted directly on things (damnun) and that which injured the physical personality of the individual (injuria). In patrimonial damage, the impairment generated is economically assessable...”. According to the foregoing, it is not sufficient to invoke damage, but its existence and the causal link connecting it to the conduct or omission of the responsible entity must be conclusively demonstrated. Now, in the case of the responsibility of municipalities as part of the decentralized organization of the State, these, as local entities, enjoy relative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, based on territorial decentralization, as inferred from Article one hundred sixty-eight of the Political Constitution. This level of independence is granted by precept one hundred sixty-nine of the Magna Carta, within the framework of their territorial competence, comprised of the physical space designated for the canton they represent, as it states that it corresponds to each municipality the: “... administration of local interests and services…”; thus the fundamental charter confers a series of functions or attributions on behalf of these governments by reason of “that which is local”, that is, to administer the services and interests of the area to which it is circumscribed, i.e., the canton; however, regarding the liability regime, they are obligated to administrators or third parties under the same terms as the State. Thus, it is clear that there are interests whose safeguarding corresponds to the Municipalities, and alongside them, others coexist whose constitutional or legal protection is attributed to other public entities, on the understanding that competence is not exclusive, especially when there are local interests that are simultaneously regional or even national, such that interests from the local to the national level converge, without prejudice that in some cases their affectation is limited to the smallest level, however, none escapes the liability imposed by the legal system regarding damages they may cause in the exercise or omission of their activities. The territorial sphere of the municipality constitutes an original competence of the municipalities and can only be displaced from them by a law of nationalization, provided that such legislative expression does not imply a breach of the referred autonomy or entail emptying the constitutional content of the municipal regime. In this way, the responsibility of the State is separate from that of the Municipality, because although the Municipality forms part of the State, each of these organizations responds separately. For its part, article four of the Municipal Code, Law No. 7794 of the thirtieth of April, nineteen ninety-eight, develops the types of autonomy that the ordinary legislator deemed these corporations held, indicating that they possess political, administrative, and financial autonomy (see Constitutional Chamber, votes 5204-2004 and 8928-2004). The Constitutional Chamber in resolution no. 5445-99, in addition to developing the bases of municipal autonomy, established the interaction of interests and determined the mandatory coordination of the local, regional, and national, to satisfy the different interacting public interests. Municipal autonomy, imposed by the Magna Carta, confers on local corporations a special competence for the administration of the interests and services within their territorial competence (articles 169 and 170), a competence prevalent over that of other institutions in the context of the locality and a separate liability regime. Regarding the liability regime of municipal corporations specifically, it is pertinent to bring up what this Section of the Court indicated in judgment No. 28-2014-IV of 13:30 on March 31, 2014: “... The extracontractual civil liability regime is developed in two areas, the subjective one established in article 1045 of the Civil Code and the objective one, regulated in article 9 of the Political Constitution, article 1048 of the Civil Code and article 190 and following of the General Law of Public Administration, providing that the State and its entities shall be liable for all damages caused by its legitimate or illegitimate, normal or abnormal functioning, except for force majeure, fault of the victim, or act of a third party. In this way, the party causing the harm shall compensate for it, unless they demonstrate an exonerating cause. Thus, we have that the Public Administration is liable for its lawful and normal conduct, when it issues a formal administrative act substantially in accordance with the legal system or omits issuing it, or through a permitted and normal material action or fact. For its part, liability is of an illicit, abnormal, and formal nature when the administrative act is contrary to the legal system, and non-formal when we are dealing with an unpermitted or abnormal material action. So, the liability regime without fault requires an abnormal damage or a special sacrifice that violates the principle of equality, and for its part, in the regime for abnormal functioning, a lack of service is required. Consequently, for its occurrence, three essential requirements are needed: 1) Action or omission derived from the function or Conduct of the Public Administration, whether by omission or active, formal or material, normal or abnormal, lawful or illicit. 2) Injury or existence of unlawful damage (daño antijurídico), conduct by action or omission that infringes upon the legal system. Such injury affects the damaged party in their patrimonial or extra-patrimonial sphere, producing an unlawful and compensable injury that they do not have a duty to bear (objective unlawfulness, antijuridicidad objetiva), this conduct being that which by action or omission infringes upon objective law. So, said injury must be certain, effective, real, assessable, individualizable, and not hypothetical, in accordance with article 196 of the General Law of Public Administration and 3) The Causal Link, that is, that there exists a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the act attributed and the damage produced that legitimizes the claim for the harm caused, without causes for exclusion of the causal link, through the occurrence of an exonerating situation such as force majeure, the fault of the victim, and the act of a third party. As for the causes that exclude the causal link, there is force majeure, which is understood as an event of nature, strange, external, unforeseeable, and inevitable; the fault of the victim also operates, which occurs when through their own actions, or through their inexcusable carelessness, negligence, and imprudence, the injury is caused, and the administered party places themselves in a position conducive to it and assumes the risk and its harmful effects, foreseeing the eventuality or possibility of the contingency; and the act of a third party, which is the action or omission of a person outside the triangular relationship between the Administration-official and the affected party, without whose participation the harmful event would not have occurred (First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: number 025-F-99 of 14:15 on January 22, 1999, number 589-F-99 of 14:20 on October 1, 1999, and number 252-F-01 of 16:15 on March 28, 2001 )...”.

**VI.- ON THE MERITS:** As indicated supra, the plaintiffs filed a civil treasury process, under the allegation that this Court, by judgment No. 346-2011 of 14:50 on September 13, 2011, ordered COSEVI to build and install, within a term of six months from its finality, a containment barrier at Dirección13198, specifically in the section between Terramall and Pasoca, in both the Cartago-San José direction and the San José-Cartago direction. Judgment that became final with the ruling of the First Chamber No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, but that by September 3, 2014, the guardrails had not been installed, and on that date an accident occurred where their relatives died. They affirmed that the defendants incurred abnormal activity by omission by failing to comply with what was ordered in the cited judgments. The plaintiffs’ representatives asserted that had guardrails or protective barriers been installed at the accident site, the result of the accident would have been different, preventing the death of their relatives. Based on this, they requested payment for subjective moral damage for the pain experienced due to the loss of their relatives and patrimonial damage due to the economic contribution the deceased made to their homes. It is therefore necessary to analyze whether liability falls upon the State and CONAVI for the omission attributed to them in the death of the youths Nombre111149 (Driver), Nombre111151, Nombre111154, Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Nombre111153, for not having placed the guardrails by the date the accident occurred. **Court’s Criterion**: For the plaintiffs, the dynamics of the accident were that, although the driver lost control of the vehicle, it was the non-existence of the guardrails, ---despite the defendants having been ordered to place them---, that caused the death of all its occupants, since had they been placed in a timely manner, the result would have been different; in passing and in part, they have also related such result in connection with the characteristics of the lighting pole with which the vehicle driven by the person identified in life with ID Nombre62 of Nombre111149 had collided. In the opinion of this Court, such assertion constitutes a mere presumption by the plaintiffs, indeed speculation by the plaintiffs, as there is no evidence establishing that the existence of such a mechanism would have prevented the result, it being necessary to note that at no level is said presumption based on a report or technical study on the possible mechanics of the accident and the result had the guardrail existed. Thus, the evidence in the record does not allow us to conclude that the plaintiffs are correct, in that the placement of guardrails would have prevented the death of the vehicle’s occupants. The statement made in this sense by the plaintiffs, lacking evidentiary support, constitutes a presumption and as a presumption, it would only constitute evidence if it were a direct consequence, precise and logically deduced from a proven fact. Then, within the investigative proceedings by the OIJ, Report 840-SI-2014 of October 1, 2014 was prepared, made by Investigator Jorge Rojas Chacón, with the approval of Mr. Luis Arguedas Rojas, Coordinator of the OIJ of La Unión and Mr. Edwin Obando Granados, Chief of the OIJ of La Unión, in which it was noted that the vehicle for some reason left its lane, crossing the central median strip and hitting a truck traveling in the opposite lane (west-east). It also indicated in said report that as part of the proceedings, a statement was taken from Mr. Nombre111156, ID CED87823, who stated that on the day of the accident he could observe a white vehicle, automobile type, entering the highway, via the exit from the center of Tres Ríos or from Dirección13204 towards the highway, that it was going fast and he never lost sight of it since there was little traffic at that time. The testimony of the Judicial Expert Andrés Miranda Benavides, ID CED87825, Surveying Engineer, specialist in Road Accidentology, was also received, who at the request of this Court prepared the “Expert Opinion No. DCF-2016-01200-ING” of September 16, 2016, and its amplification No. DCF-2017-00439-ING of April 24, 2017. Regarding the dynamics of the accident, he indicated that the vehicle, due to human error as the highest probability, left the roadway. That the roadway has an adequate design and was in good condition. That the vehicle did not manage to hit the pole, but rather the base or anchorage, which is normal. He noted that the existence of the barrier is to minimize the magnitude of the damage, but not to prevent accidents and that it was very likely that had barriers existed at the site, the damage could have been less, but it is still a mere presumption, which does not lead us to certainty that the result would have been different. To a question from this Court regarding the efficient cause of the accident, he stated that in his opinion such situation was due to the speed at which the vehicle was traveling and the loss of control over it by its driver. In the opinion of this Chamber, it is also important to consider that according to “Official Report” No. 2014-245700194 prepared by Traffic Inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal No. 2457, on the day of the accident the road conditions were good, lit, without obstacles, and the weather condition was clear, and he expressly noted that the risk factor was leaving the road. So, the cause of the accident for this Court was the loss of control over the vehicle, without it being possible to reach certainty that the existence of the guardrails would have prevented the fatal result, because although these minimize the eventual results of an accident, it is not equivalent to concluding that their mere existence could have the virtue of preventing the result of death. And it is that as indicated supra, the result of the accident and the injuries to its passengers is a matter that would only have been proven through technical evidence; nevertheless, the only thing proven is that the vehicle was traveling on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour, without them being able to prove the exact speed and the dynamics of the accident that would allow us to conclude that the existence of the barrier would have prevented the known result. Note that the expert points out that this type of guardrail is to minimize the risk in an accident, and that its existence at the site could have varied the fatal result; however, the expert does not conclude that its mere existence would have prevented the result that occurred in the present case, as that depends on the dynamics of the accident, for which no technical evidence was provided. Then, this Chamber also bears in mind that Mr. Nombre111156, ID CED87823, ---who was interviewed within the investigative proceedings carried out by the Delegation of the OIJ of La Unión---; stated that moments before the accident he spotted the vehicle which “was going fast”. Thus, it is an undisputed fact that the driver lost control of the vehicle he was driving, and the plaintiffs did not provide evidence proving that the mere existence of the barriers or guardrails would have prevented the death of its driver and companions. It is reiterated that in the shadow of what is regulated by article 41.1 of the Civil Procedure Code in relation to 220 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code, it is the party’s obligation to prove their claim. From the relationship of both articles derives what is known as the onus probandi (or burden of proof) a Latin expression of the legal principle that indicates who is obliged to prove a certain fact before the courts. Nor was it proven that the absence of guardrails or railings on the roadway was the efficient cause of the death of the driver of the crashed vehicle and its 4 occupants, but rather that the loss of control over it was the cause for it leaving the outer lane of the roadway, going into the inner lane, crossing the median strip dividing both roadways, and reaching the inner lane where it hit the truck traveling from west to east. The basis of the onus probandi lies in an old legal aphorism that states “what is normal is presumed, what is abnormal is proven”. Therefore, whoever invokes something that breaks the state of normality must prove it (“affirmanti incumbit probatio”: proof lies upon him who affirms). Basically, what this aphorism means is that the burden or work of proving a statement must fall on the one who breaks the state of normality (the one who claims to possess a new truth on a subject). So, given that the dynamics of the accident alleged by the plaintiffs were not proven, it is not possible to attribute to the defendants the liability the plaintiffs assign to them. Given the foregoing, and since a direct relationship of cause (that the absence of the guardrails was the efficient cause) is not constituted, in relation to the effect (the death of the driver and his companions and consequently, the subjective moral and patrimonial damage claimed); the causal link is broken, since in order for the duty of the Administration to compensate the damage to be attributed, that causal link had to be proven. Given the foregoing, and since the causal link between the alleged situation and the damage claimed by the plaintiffs was not proven; the lawsuit is rejected in all respects. In addition to the foregoing and even admitting that the existence of the guardrails would have prevented the fatality of the accident, in the Court’s opinion, even if that had been the case, the causal link is also broken based on the vehicle driver’s own acts. Thus, it was also proven that as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 did not have a Driver’s License and that according to the toxicological exam, residues of carboxy Delta 9 THC were detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. Regarding the need to have a license to drive a motor vehicle, the “Land Transit on Public Roads Law” No. 9078, ---which regulates the circulation, on public land roads, of vehicles and persons involved in the transit system---, states in its article 2.61) that the “Driver’s License” is the permit granted by the State by which a person is authorized to drive a vehicle for a determined period, and although any person can obtain the license to drive vehicles on public land roads, the interested party must first comply with a series of requirements established in the Law and its Regulations, all for the purpose of proving their suitability to drive. Among these requirements, we have: a) The completion of a practical exam, which must be done in a vehicle that presents the characteristics proper to the type of license to which the driver aspires. b) Be over eighteen years old, except in the case provided for in article 85 for the type A-1 license. In the case of type B2, B3, and B4 licenses, regulated by article 86 of this law, the minimum age indicated therein must be met. c) Know how to read and write. If the person presents some type of learning, cognitive, or similar limitation, the applicant may substitute this requirement with the special courses established by the General Directorate of Road Safety Education. Persons with disabilities must be guaranteed the necessary adaptations and support services during the course instruction. d) Present a general medical opinion performed by a professional in medical sciences, authorized by the College of Physicians and Surgeons. e) Pass the basic road safety education course, whose requirements shall be established by regulation. f) Pass the practical exam for the type of license sought, in accordance with the provisions established for that effect by the competent authorities. g) Not having committed any of the crimes typified in article 261 bis. Now, driving a vehicle without possessing the Driver’s License means that the person who does so is an inexperienced driver, who exposes themselves to the imposition of an administrative sanction consisting of a fine and the detention of the vehicle.

Attention must be drawn to the fact that Mr. Nombre111149 not having a driver's license before or at the time of the accident meant, in the legal sphere and insofar as the rules governing the circulation of motor vehicles are concerned, not only the exercise of an illegal activity, but also, and in the technical sphere, the certainty that he would not have demonstrated to any authority his fitness (idoneidad) to drive motor vehicles. This is equivalent to, or identical with, stating that just as he would not have done so at the time had he been interested in driving this type of vehicle on public roads, neither was it demonstrated by the current plaintiffs in this judicial venue that, at least as of September 3, 2014, Mr. Nombre111149 also possessed the knowledge, capacity, and/or skills to operate a motor vehicle on public land roads. This follows from certification No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT of the Roadway Safety Council (Consejo de Seguridad Vial) dated January 27, 2015, taking into account the total absence of any element of conviction that would allow the contrary to be affirmed. In this sense, it cannot be affirmed that the burden of proof regarding the lack of fitness (idoneidad) was not accredited because such a circumstance corresponded to the defendant parties to prove without them having successfully done so, when instead, aside from having proven what was relevant based on the scope of the aforementioned certification—which by itself allows the affirmation that Nombre111149 lacked fitness (idoneidad) for not having fulfilled any requirement to obtain the required license—in the face of such proven lack of fitness (idoneidad), any attempt aimed at affirming that, despite everything, Mr. Nombre111149 did have the knowledge, skill, or capacity to operate a motor vehicle corresponds, as a matter of the burden of proof, to whoever so affirms, a situation that did not occur in the present case. Furthermore, knowing that he did not have a Driver's License, he chose to take a vehicle and drive it on a highway at a speed of no less than 62 kilometers per hour and which, in the opinion of Mr. Nombre111156, he was driving fast. Moreover, Mr. Nombre111149 never accredited before the Traffic authorities that he had the necessary capacity and skill to operate a motor vehicle, yet he still decided to take one and drive it, without being authorized for such purposes, assuming under his own responsibility the consequences that this could produce for him. In addition to the fact that he was a driver lacking a Driver's License, this Chamber takes into consideration that according to the “Criminalistic Analysis Opinion (Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico)” No. 2014-03805-TOX, dated December 1, 2014, the presence of CANNABINOIDS POSITIVE for "Carboxy-Delta-9THC" was detected in his blood, which is indicative of consumption of Cannabis products. That is to say, in addition to not being authorized by the State to drive, he was doing so under the influence of a prohibited substance. And it is that whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and similar enervating or depressive effects—regardless of the amount consumed—incurs a crime, called “Reckless Driving (Conducción Temeraria).” In this sense, Article 261 bis of the Penal Code sanctions this crime in the following manner: "... A prison sentence of one to three years shall be imposed, in the following cases: ...c)... The same penalty shall be applied to whoever drives under the influence of toxic drugs, narcotics, psychotropic substances, or other substances that produce states of alteration and similar enervating or depressive effects..." Thus, driving under the influence of a drug such as cannabis is typified in our legal system as a crime—without this Court in any way declaring its commission from the field of criminal law. The rule does not require, for the configuration of the crime, any verification, in the case of drugs other than alcohol, of the degree to which they exist in the driver's organism; therefore, the simple presence of the same subsumes the conduct into the type. Thus, the damage claimed would arise from the illegitimate, because illegal, driving of a vehicle by a subject who does not possess a driver's license and consequently lacks the technical fitness (idoneidad) for it, and in reinforcement of the above, while committing an illicit act (reckless driving (conducción temeraria)). So, to seek compensation for damage generated from events that would have occurred on the occasion of the commission of a qualifiedly illicit, negligent, and careless conduct of the kind, would undoubtedly imply an abusive use of the right, since in the production of the damage claimed, an element concurred that undoubtedly influenced the production of the accident with a high degree of probability. In this way, the harmful result was produced with an efficient cause in an illicit conduct deployed by the victim himself (victim's fault), which, also as a cause for exculpation or liability, breaks the causal link necessary to make a reproach of liability prosper, such as that claimed in this case against the State and CONAVI. (Articles 21 and 22 of the Civil Code). Later, along this same line of thought, it is evident that the damage suffered by Mr. Nombre111151, Ms. Nombre111154, Mr. Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, and Ms. Nombre111153 was produced by a third party, namely, by Nombre111149, so that with respect to them, the exoneration from liability for the act of a third party applies. All of the foregoing allows the affirmation that the indemnification claims in their entirety, outlined by all the plaintiff parties, are improper. Regarding the alleged abnormal conduct by omission of the Administration (State and CONAVI) by reason of what this Court ordered in judgment No. 346-2011, confirmed by the First Chamber (Sala I) in its judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013; this Chamber disagrees with such an allegation. It has been proven that in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10, 2014, and June 12, 2014, Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Road safety implementation works on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras))" was published, but due to the non-existence of bidders, by official communication No. ACA-01-14-0590 of July 17, 2014, it had to be declared unsuccessful. It was also proven that the work was put out to tender again through Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and finally, by official communication GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the reception of the work was given. Thus, the judgment issued by this Court became final until the issuance of the First Chamber's judgment No. 1039-FS1-2013 of August 14, 2013, and after the corresponding studies and preparation of the tender documents, the Administration put out to tender Public Tender No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Road safety implementation works on National Routes No. 252 and 2, Dirección13198, sections: National Route No. 252 and National Route No. 2 (Intersection of National Route No. 252 with National Route No. 2-Intersection of National Route No. 2 with National Route No. 219 (Taras))," published in the Official Gazette La Gaceta of April 10 and June 12, 2014, but because no company submitted a bid, it had to declare the tender unsuccessful. Note that between the finality of the judgment and the publication of the tender, approximately 8 months elapsed, a period that is neither unreasonable nor excessive, since this type of work, by legal imperative, must be put out to tender and this necessarily entails a timeframe, as in administrative matters, procurement must follow the rules of the Administrative Procurement Law (Ley de Contratación Administrativa). Notwithstanding the efforts made, an unforeseeable event occurred for the Administration, which was that there were no bidders; therefore, the tender had to be declared unsuccessful, as that is the correct way to proceed in the absence of interested parties in bidding or submitting their sealed bids or offers. Subsequently, the Administration again put out to tender Public Tender 21014-LN-000015-0D100, and by official communication GCSV-09-2018-4787 of August 16, 2018, the definitive reception of the work was given. In this way, in the Court's opinion, an abnormal conduct by omission cannot be attributed to the Administration with respect to what this Court and the First Chamber ordered in the indicated judgments. A corollary of the foregoing is the rejection of the lawsuit in all its aspects.

**VII.- DEFENSES:** The representation of the State raised the substantive defenses of lack of right and lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva), and the representation of CONAVI raised the defense of lack of right. The defense of lack of passive standing must be rejected, as the State's passive standing in the present case derives from Article 12 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code (legal integration). Regarding the defense of lack of right, retaking what was stated by our First Chamber, it is necessary to refer to the demonstration of the facts, as a fundamental part thereof, because from what is determined in that section, it can be deduced whether or not there are legal bases for what is sought. The current legislation establishes that one of the defenses that can be raised in judicial processes is Lack of Right, and since no protectable right in favor of the plaintiffs has been accredited, the defense must be upheld, and therefore, the lawsuit declared without merit.

**VIII.- COSTS:** Article 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedure Code establishes that procedural and personal costs are imposed on the losing party for the mere fact of being so, a pronouncement that must be made even ex officio, in accordance with the provisions of that same rule, in concordance with numeral 119.2 ibid. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable: a) when there was, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate; b) when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence that was unknown to the opposing party; or else, c) when plus petitio is incurred, that is, when the difference between what was claimed and what was ultimately obtained is fifteen percent (15%) or more, unless the bases of the lawsuit are expressly considered provisional or their determination depends on judicial discretion or expert opinion (ordinal 194 ibid). In the case at hand, this Chamber does not observe that we are before any of the supra-indicated exceptions that allow the postulate of condemnation in costs to the losing party to be broken. To that extent, the appropriate course is to condemn the plaintiffs to the payment of both costs plus their interest until their effective payment, which will be liquidated in the sentence execution phase upon request of the defendants.

**THEREFORE:** The evidence for a better decision offered by the representation of CONAVI is admitted, but not that offered by Licenciada Susan Naranjo López. The defense of lack of passive legal standing (falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva) raised by the state representation is rejected. The defense of lack of right raised by both defendant parties is upheld, and therefore, the lawsuit filed by Mr. **Nombre111148**, Ms. **Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo**, Ms. **Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria**, **[Nombre 001 002]**, Mr. **Alfredo Brizuela González**, Ms. **Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez**, Mr. **Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar**, Ms. **Edith María Villalobos Campos**, Mr. **Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos**, Mr. **Nombre111149**, Ms. **Alice Fuentes Ospina**, Ms. **Joyce Allen Brooks**, Mr. **Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira**, Ms. **Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras**, and **[Nombre 003]** against the **State** and the **National Roadway Council (Consejo Nacional de Vialidad)** is declared without merit in all its aspects. Both costs are borne by the plaintiffs, which will be liquidated in the sentence execution phase upon request of the representation of CONAVI and the State, plus interest on these solely with respect to the State. **NOTIFY. José Iván Salas Leitón, Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Elías Baltodano Gómez.** **Judges.**

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA Central 2545-0003. Fax 2545-0033. Correo Electrónico ...01 Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A CIVIL DE HACIENDA ACTORES:

Nombre111148 Y OTROS EL ESTADO Y EL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD No. 058-2019-IV.

TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SECCIÓN CUARTA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Dirección01 , Edificio Anexo A, a las quince horas con treinta y cinco minutos del diecinueve de julio de dos mil diecinueve.

Proceso civil de hacienda tramitado bajo expediente No. 14-010363-1027-CA interpuesto por los señores Nombre111148 , cédula No. CED87806, Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, cédula No. CED87807, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, cédula No. CED87808, [Nombre 001] y [Nombre62 002], ambas menores de edad. Se encuentra acumulado al proceso dicho, el proceso No. 14-10362-1027-CA de Alfredo Brizuela González cédula No. CED87809, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, cédula No. CED87810, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, cédula No. CED87811. El proceso 14-010364-1027-CA de Edith María Villalobos Campos cédula No. CED87812, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, cédula No. CED87813, Nombre111149 , cédula No. CED87814, todas estas personas representadas por el Licenciado Alejandro Martínez Sandoval carné CED87815 y la Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero. El proceso No. 15-000550-1027-CA de Alice Fuentes Ospina, mayor, portadora de la cédula CED87816, representada por el Licenciado Humberto Gerardo Méndez Barrantes carné CED87817. El proceso No. 15-7855-1027-CA de Joyce Allen Brooks, mayor, portadora de la cédula No. CED87818, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, portador de la cédula No. CED87819, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras, cédula No. CED87820 y el menor [Nombre62 003], representados por la Licenciada Susan Naranjo López carné CED25604 contra el ESTADO, representado por la Licenciada Georgina Chaves Olarte carné CED17385 y el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad en adelante CONAVI representado por la Licenciada Carolina Elena Alvarado Gutiérrez carné CED87821, por el Licenciado Oscar Eduardo Romero Aguilar, carné CED87822 y la Licenciada Nombre111150 .

RESULTANDO:

I.- Los actores de los procesos tramitados bajo No. 14-010363-1027-CA, 14-010364-1027-CA y 14-010362-1027-CA presentaron proceso civil de hacienda solicitando que en sentencia de condene al Estado y al CONAVI a los siguientes extremos: A) 14-10363-1027-CA: l. Que se declare con lugar en todos sus extremos la presente demanda. 2. Que se declare que la instalación de postes que la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz hizo a lo largo de la Dirección13198 , representa un grave peligro en caso colisión, dada su condición de rigidez y ausencia de protección y señalamiento, por lo que aumentan de manera inaceptable el riesgo de sufrir un accidente de fatales consecuencias. 3. Que se declare que la omisión en la labor de fiscalización por parte del CONAVI y del Estado en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados y la ausencia de barreras de contención a lo largo de la vía de la autopista Florencio del Castillo por parte del CONAVI, permitió que se instalaran no solo postes de electricidad en detrimento del derecho a la movilidad y libertad de tránsito en las mejores condiciones de seguridad, que están obligados a garantizar por ley, sino que se impida con la construcción de barreras de seguridad, invadir el carril contrario. 4. Que se declare que son responsables solidariamente por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia de su actuación ilícita, anormal e ineficiente y por lo que deben responder patrimonialmente el CONAVI y el Estado por su conducta ilícita, anormal e ineficiente, la primera por ubicar postes con bases rígidas y sin ninguna protección ni señalamientos en la Dirección13198 . El CONAVI y el Estado por omisión en su labor de fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados para la iluminación de la Florencio del Castillo y no ejecutar la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo donde se le ordenaba la instalación de barreras de seguridad o protección, en el plazo de seis meses en toda la autopista. Especificados en la estimación provisional de esta demanda. Consistente en: Por Perjuicios: ciento doce millones de colones. Por Daño Moral proporcional Subjetivo: ¢70.000.000. Setenta millones de colones. Para un total de daño material: ¢42.000.000 (cuarenta y dos millones de colones). Resultando la cuantía de este proceso en la suma de ciento doce millones de colones. 5. Que se le ordene al CONAVI y al Estado a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en el diseño e instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la Carretera Florencio de Castillo y barreras de protección que impidan la invasión de carriles. 6. Que se condene a los demandados solidariamente, al pago de las costas procesales y personales del presente asunto. B) 14-10362-1027-CA: 1. Que se declare con lugar en todos sus extremos la presente demanda. 2. Que se declare que la instalación de postes que la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz hizo a lo largo de la Dirección13198 , representa un grave peligro en caso de colisión, dada su condición de rigidez y ausencia de protección y señalamiento, por lo que aumentan de manera inaceptable el riesgo de sufrir un accidente de fatales consecuencias. 3. Que se declare que la omisión en la labor de fiscalización por parte del CONAVI y del Estado en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados y la ausencia de barreras de contención a lo largo de la vía de la autopista Florencio del Castillo por parte del CONAVI, permitió que se instalaran no solo postes de electricidad en detrimento del derecho a la movilidad y libertad de tránsito en las mejores condiciones de seguridad, que están obligados a garantizar por ley. 4. Que se declare que son responsables solidariamente por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia de su actuación ilícita, anormal e ineficiente y por lo que deben responder patrimonialmente el CONAVI y el Estado por su conducta ilícita, anormal e ineficiente, la primera por ubicar postes con bases rígidas y sin ninguna protección ni señalamientos en la Dirección13198 . El CONAVI y el Estado por omisión en su labor de fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados para la iluminación de la Florencio del Castillo y no ejecutar la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo donde se le ordenaba la instalación de barreras de seguridad o protección, en el plazo de seis meses en toda la autopista. Especificados en la estimación provisional de esta demanda. Consistente en: Por Perjuicios: Noventa y cinco millones de colones. Por Daño Moral proporcional Subjetivo: ¢50.000.000. Cincuenta millones de colones. Para un total de daño material: ¢45.000.000 (cuarenta y cinco millones de colones). Resultando la cuantía de este proceso en la suma de noventa y cinco millones de colones. 5. Que se le ordene al CONAVI y al Estado a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en el diseño e instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la Carretera Florencio de Castillo y barreras de protección que impidan la invasión de carriles. 6. Que se condene a los demandados solidariamente, al pago de las costas procesales y personales del presente asunto. C) 14-10364-1027-CA: 1. Que se declare con lugar en todos sus extremos la presente demanda. 2. Que se declare que la instalación de postes que la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz hizo a lo largo de la Dirección13198 , representa un grave peligro en caso colisión, dada su condición de rigidez y ausencia de protección y señalamiento, por lo que aumentan de manera inaceptable el riesgo de sufrir un accidente de fatales consecuencias. 3. Que se declare que la omisión en la labor de fiscalización por parte del CONAVI y del Estado en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados y la ausencia de barreras de contención a lo largo de la vía de la autopista Florencio del Castillo por parte del CONAVI, permitió que se instalaran no solo postes de electricidad en detrimento del derecho a la movilidad y libertad de tránsito en las mejores condiciones de seguridad, que están obligados a garantizar por ley. 4. Que se declare que son responsables solidariamente por los daños y perjuicios ocasionados como consecuencia de su actuación ilícita, anormal e ineficiente y por lo que deben responder patrimonialmente el CONAVI y el Estado por su conducta ilícita, anormal e ineficiente, la primera por ubicar postes con bases rígidas y sin ninguna protección ni señalamientos en la Dirección13198 . El CONAVI y el Estado por omisión en su labor de fiscalizar la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados para la iluminación de la Florencio del Castillo y no ejecutar la sentencia del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo donde se le ordenaba la instalación de barreras de seguridad o protección, en el plazo de seis meses en toda la autopista. Especificados en la estimación provisional de esta demanda. Consistente en: Por Perjuicios: ochenta y dos millones de colones. Por Daño Moral proporcional Subjetivo: ¢40.000.000. Cuarenta millones de colones. Para un total de daño material: ¢42.000.000 (cuarenta y dos millones de colones). Resultando la cuantía de este proceso en la suma de ochenta y dos millones de colones. 5. Que se le ordene al CONAVI y al Estado a cumplir con una obligación de hacer, consistente en el diseño e instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención, ante colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la Carretera Florencio de Castillo y barreras de protección que impidan la invasión de carriles. 6. Que se condene a los demandados solidariamente, al pago de las costas procesales y personales del presente asunto. La actora del proceso tramitado bajo No. 15-000550-1027-CA, presentó proceso civil de hacienda solicitando que en sentencia de condene al Estado y al CONAVI a los siguientes extremos: Con lugar la presente acción y determinar la responsabilidad de la administración y condenar al Estado y al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad a cancelar el daño moral objetivo y perjuicios ocasionados, así como moral subjetivo producido, y las costas del presente proceso. Liquidación del daño moral objetivo y perjuicios ocasionados: Que si bien es cierto, la responsabilidad directa de la colisión le es atribuida a la figura del conductor del vehículo donde circulaba su hermano, porque perdió el control del automotor; lo cierto es que de haber existido una malla divisoria, concretamente una barrera de contención tal y como fue obligado a los demandados a construirla, el automotor no se hubiera desviado de su rumbo, como tampoco hubiera colisionado con la base de los postes de alumbrado público existentes en la jardinera que divide los sentidos de la ruta dos y mucho menos hubiera invadido el carril contrario y haber finalizado su vida calcinado como en efecto ocurrió. Por todo ello estimó el daño moral objetivo y los perjuicios ocasionados producto de los gastos en los que incurrido en la suma de veinte millones de colones. Los actores del proceso tramitado bajo No. 15-007855-1027-CA, presentaron proceso civil de hacienda para que en sentencia se declare: Con lugar la presente demanda en todos sus extremos. La responsabilidad objetiva de los demandados por conductas omisivas en cuanto obras de señalización y falta de barreras. Que se condene a los demandados al pago de un daño moral por la suma de ¢75, 000,000.00 (setenta y cinco millones de colones). Que se condene a los demandados al pago del daño material por la suma de ¢40, 000,000 (cuarenta millones de colones. Que se ordene al CONAVI a la instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención para colisiones, en las bases de los postes del alumbrado, en la Dirección3536 . Que se condene a las demandadas al pago de las costas generadas producto del presente proceso. (Ver minuta de audiencia preliminar y audio en custodia de este Tribunal y expediente judicial digital).

II.- Por auto de las 10:15 horas del 19 de diciembre de 2014, se dio traslado de la demanda tramitada bajo expediente No. 14-010363-1027-CA; por auto de las 14:21 horas del 03 de febrero de 2015 se dio traslado de la demanda tramitada bajo expediente No. 14-010362-1027-CA; por auto de las 08:35 horas del 07 de enero de 2015, se dio traslado de la demanda tramitada bajo expediente No. 14-010364-1027-CA; por auto de las 09:32 horas del 25 de febrero de 2015, se dio traslado de la demanda tramitada bajo expediente No. 15-000550-1027-CA; por auto de las 10:58 horas del 05 de octubre de 2015, se dio traslado de la demanda tramitada bajo expediente No. 15-007855-1027-CA. (Ver expediente judicial digital).

III.- La representación estatal por escritos recibidos durante los días 07, 12 y 13 de marzo, 23 de febrero y 03 de diciembre de 2015, contestó negativamente las demandas y en su defensa opuso la excepción de fondo de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva. Por su parte la representación del CONVI por escritos recibidos los días 25 de febrero, 02 y 24 de marzo, 28 de abril y 03 de diciembre de 2015, rechazando los hechos de la demanda y oponiendo en su defensa la excepción de falta de derecho. (Ver expediente judicial digital).

IV.- La audiencia preliminar prevista en el artículo 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativa se llevó a cabo el día 13 de mayo de 2016, contando con la presencia de las partes y en la que se analizaron las pretensiones, se determinaron los hechos controvertidos y se admitió la prueba documental, testimonial y pericial. (Ver acta de audiencia preliminar y respaldo en formato digital).

V.- Durante los días 20, 21 y 28 de junio de 2019, se realizó la audiencia complementaria de juicio oral y público, en la que se hicieron los alegatos de apertura, se recibió la declaración de parte de los señores (as) Edith Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Guzmán Villalobos, Ivannia Calderón Sanabria, Luis Fernando Calderón Sanabria, Alfredo Brizuela González, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks e Imelda Mora Porras y del perito Andrés Miranda Benavides, funcionario del Organismo de Investigación Judicial, Sección Ingeniería Forense y se rindieron las conclusiones correspondientes.

VI.- En el procedimiento se han seguido las prescripciones de ley y no se observan vicios capaces de invalidar lo actuado. Se dicta esta sentencia por mayoría, dentro del plazo de quince días hábiles establecido en el artículo 111 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo para los asuntos complejos, previa deliberación de rigor y por unanimidad.

Redacta el Juez Salas Leitón .

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- DE LA PRUEBA PARA MEJOR RESOLVER: Durante la audiencia de juicio la Licenciada Susan Naranjo López, apoderada especial judicial de los accionantes en la causa tramitada bajo exp15-007855-1027-CA solicitó se le admitiera como prueba para mejor proveer “ Proyección Provisional de Fecha de Consolidación de Derecho a Pensión” emitido por la Dirección de Pensiones de la CCSS a Nombre62 de Nombre111151 . Por su parte la representación del CONAVI solicitó se le admitiera en esa misma condición: 1) Copia de la página 15 y 26 del Diario Oficial La Gaceta del 10 de abril de 2014 y del 12 de junio de 2014, donde se publicó la Licitación Pública No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 " Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Dirección13198 , secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)". Acta de adjudicación de dicha licitación del 03 de julio de 2014 a la empresa Puente PREFA Ltda. 2) Copia del oficio No. ACA-01-14-0590 del 17 de julio de 2014 en la que se declaró infructuosa la licitación pública No. 2014LN-000006-0D100. 3) Copia del oficio GCSV-09-2018-4787 del 16 de agosto de 2018 que es acta de recepción final de la Licitación Pública No. No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 "Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Carretera Florencio del Castillo, secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)". Por resultar pertinente y trascendente con el objeto del proceso, se admite la prueba ofrecida por la representación del CONAVI, no así la ofrecida en esa condición por la Licenciada Naranjo López.

II.- HECHOS PROBADOS: De importancia para el dictado de esta sentencia, se tienen como tales los siguientes: 1) Que alrededor de las 21 horas del día 03 de setiembre de 2014, el señor Nombre111149 conducía el vehículo placas Placa19605 marca Honda, registrado a Nombre62 del señor Nombre111152 , dirigiéndose de este a oeste sobre la autopista Florencio del Castillo, siendo acompañado por los señores Nombre111153 , Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111151 . (Hecho no controvertido). 2) Que al circular el vehículo sobre dicha autopista a la altura de la fábrica Jaleas Ujarrás, el conductor perdió el control del mismo, pasando el vehículo del carril externo al interno, traspasó la jardinera central que divide ambas calzadas, colisionando en su trayecto con la base de un poste de alumbrado público y continuó hasta el carril externo de la calzada con vía de oeste a este y colisionó al vehículo pesado marca Internacional placas Placa19606, conducido por el señor Nombre111155 . (Hecho no controvertido). 3) Que producto del accidente fallecieron sus 5 ocupantes. (Hecho no controvertido). 4) Que según la declaración del señor Nombre111156 , cédula CED87823 rendida ante el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, el día del accidente "...pudo observar un vehículo color blanco, tipo automóvil ingresar a la autopista, por la salida del centro de Tres Ríos o de la Bomba Tinoco hacia la autopista, que iba rápido y nunca lo perdió de vista ya que había poco tránsito en ese momento..." (Ver folios 31, 32 y 69 del expediente de análisis criminalística). 5) Que de acuerdo con el Dictamen de Análisis Criminalística No. 2014-03805-TOX, en la sangre del señor Nombre111149 , conductor del vehículo se detectó la presencia de Carboxy Delta THC, lo que es indicativo de ingreso o consumo de productos del Cannabis y no contaba con licencia de conducir. (Ver folio 85 del expediente de análisis criminalístico y legajo de prueba del Estado). 6) Que las condiciones del lugar y de la calzada el día del accidente eran: Clase de calzada: Asfalto. Condición de calzada: Buena. Iluminación: Luz artificial. Características: Urbano. Alineación vertical: Nivel. Señalamiento vial: Ninguno. Existencia de: Espaldón. Sentido: Dos sentidos. Estado: Buena. Estado del tiempo: Despejado. Tipo de Intersección Y: Ninguna. Alineación horizontal: Nivel. Factor de riesgo: Salirse de la carretera. (Ver folios 6, 7, 8, 9 y 10 del expediente de análisis criminalístico). 7) Que bajo expediente No. 14-000714-0569-PE se inició proceso penal por homicidio culposo contra Nombre111149 en perjuicio de Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111151 . Proceso en el que por medio de la resolución de las 11:15 horas del 30 de enero de 2015, se dictó un sobreseimiento definitivo por deceso del señor Nombre111149 . (Ver folios 97 y 98 del expediente de análisis criminalístico). 8) Que conforme al Informe de Accidentes confeccionado por el Inspector de Tránsito Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, el conductor del vehículo placas Placa19605, perdió el control del mismo y se salió de la vía pasando al carril de sentido contrario lo cual provocó que se topara de frente con el camión placas Placa19606. (Ver expediente de prueba aportada por el Estado). 9) Conforme a la certificación del Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT del 27 de enero de 2015, en sus registros no aparece ningún tipo de licencia a Nombre62 del señor Nombre111149 , cédula CED87824. (Ver expediente de prueba aportada por el Estado). 10) Que el cimiento utilizado para los postes de iluminación de la Dirección5948 , es una práctica común de ingeniería mundial, el cual aloja un sistema de anclaje, basados en pernos de acero, tuercas y una placa soporte adosada a la columna (poste metálico). (Ver expediente de prueba aportada por el Estado). 11) Que por resolución número 346-2011 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, se ordenó al CONAVI construir e instalar en el plazo de seis meses una barrera de contención, en el tramo comprendido entre Terramall y Pasoca, en ambos sentidos, con el fin de disminuir accidentes. Sentencia que quedó en firme por Voto de la Sala Primera No.1039-F-S1-2013 de las ocho horas treinta y cinco minutos del 14 de agosto de 2013. (Ver expediente digital judicial). 12) Que en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta del 10 de abril de 2014 y del 12 de junio de 2014, se publicó la Licitación Pública No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Dirección13198 , secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)" pero debido a la inexistencia de oferentes por oficio No. ACA-01-14-0590 del 17 de julio de 2014 se declaró infructuosa, debiéndose licitar nuevamente por Licitación Pública 21014-LN-000015-0D100, y finalmente por oficio GCSV-09-2018-4787 del 16 de agosto de 2018 se dio la recepción de la obra. (Ver expediente de la contratación administrativa Licitación Pública No. 2014LN-000015-0D100 y prueba para mejor proveer admitida por este Tribunal).

III.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS: 1) Que al día 03 de setiembre de 2014, el señor Nombre111149 contase con el conocimiento, capacidad, habilidad para conducir un vehículo automotor o contara con autorización para ello. (No hay prueba en tal sentido, en asocio con la certificación del Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT del 27 de enero de 2015). 2) Que la existencia de guarda vías en el lugar del accidente hubiese evitado el resultado del accidente en términos de la muerte de los señores Nombre111149 , Nombre111154 , Nombre111153 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111151 . (No hay prueba en tal sentido). 3) Que el diseño de la base del poste No. 83 golpeado por el vehículo placas Placa19605 hubiese influido de alguna forma en el resultado del accidente. (No hay prueba en tal sentido).

IV.- OBJETO DEL PROCESO Y ALEGATO DE LAS PARTES: Se trata de un proceso civil de hacienda en el que los actores de los procesos acumulados reclaman el pago por daño moral subjetivo y daño material por la pérdida de manera trágica de sus parientes. La representación de las causas tramitadas bajo expedientes No. 14-010363-1027-CA; (a la que se acumuló la causa No. 14-010362-1027-CA y la No. 14-010364-1027-CA), manifestó sobre los hechos a manera de síntesis: Que el día 03 de setiembre del año 2014, al ser aproximadamente las 21:00 horas, los jóvenes Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar, Nombre111149 , Nombre111153 y Nombre111151 viajaban a bordo del vehículo placas Placa19607, marca Honda, tipo Sedan, conducido por el señor Nombre111149 , dirigiéndose de Cartago hacia Dirección13199 , , en sentido (Cartago-San José) por la carretera autopista Florencio del Castillo, ruta número 2. Que frente a las inmediaciones de la fábrica de jaleas Ujarrás, el conductor del vehículo, por circunstancias que no son muy claras (toda vez que existen versiones contradictorias), perdió el control del vehículo, se salió de la carretera y terminó colisionando contra la base de soporte a uno de los postes instalados en la carretera por la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, para luego irse hasta el carril contrario y colisionar contra otro vehículo de carga pesada, tipo furgón, placa Placa19606, que circulaba en sentido contrario, con sentido desde San José hacia Cartago, colisionando ambos vehículos y arrastrando el vehículo pesado al liviano, hasta el detenimiento de ambos vehículos, y produciéndose la explosión del vehículo placa Placa19607. El accidente tuvo un fatal desenlace, ya que todos sus ocupantes fallecieron en el sitio, en virtud del impacto y se dio pérdida total del vehículo por el impacto y el fuego. Aseguró esa representación que, el desplazamiento del vehículo placa Placa19607, que conducía Nombre111149 desde su carril hasta el carril contrario, se dio en virtud de la ausencia de vallas de protección que separaran ambas vías o que contuvieran los vehículos dentro del mismo carril en que circulaba el vehículo. Indicó que tal situación quedó evidenciada en el parte oficial de la Policía de Tránsito, número 2014-245700194, confeccionado por el inspector Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal, Código No. 2457 quien en relación con el accidente y las condiciones encontradas en el sitio del accidente consignó: Estructura especial: ninguna, sentido: dos sentidos, estado de la calzada: Buena, clase de calzada: Asfalto, condición de la calzada: Buena, alineamiento vertical: nivel iluminación: Luz Artificial, Existencia de espaldón, acera, tipo de accidente: Colisión entre vehículos, indicándose en el parte que se salió de la vía, obstáculos en la vía: no existe huella de frenado, estado del tiempo: despejado, condición del conductor: no alcohol, no drogas, no medicamento, no fatiga o desmayo, no enfermo, no discapacidad física, apreciación de hundimiento: Totalmente destrozado, maniobra del conductor: esquivar. Factor de riesgo, salirse de la carretera. Que según este parte en el sitio de la Dirección13198 donde sucedió el accidente no hay barreras de contención, toda vez que, colisionaron en virtud de que el vehículo placa Placa19607 pudo llegar hasta el otro carril contrario, sin ningún tipo de barrera de seguridad o contención que se lo impidiera. Que el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo dentro del procedimiento tramitado bajo expediente No. 09-002867-1027-CA emitió la sentencia 346-2011, la cual fue confirmada por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, mediante voto 1039-FS1-2013 del día 14 de agosto de 2013, y en la que se ordenó colocar en dicha autopista una barrera divisoria en un plazo de 6 meses, sin embargo a la fecha en que sucedió el evento (03 de setiembre de 2014), no se acató lo ordenado. Que la muerte de sus patrocinados se produce como consecuencia directa e inmediata, de la actuación ilegal, anormal e ineficiente del CONAVI; que se apartaron abiertamente de las recomendaciones dadas por el SIECA para la colocación de los postes de servicio público en el documento denominado Manual de Diseños Geográficos de las Carreteras Regionales de la Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, y desatienden las recomendaciones de Auditorías Técnicas de Seguridad Vial del LANAMME, el cual recomendó diseñar e instalar un sistema de protección y prevención ante eventuales colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la vía: cosas que evidentemente no hicieron. Aunado a que desobedecen la orden del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en donde se les ordenó poner divisiones y barreras de seguridad en la Dirección3536 , provocando con ello la muerte de más personas. En la audiencia de juicio el apoderado especial judicial director de estas causas, reiteró sus alegatos, señalando que Costa Rica firmó el SIECA, en el que se comprometió a establecer en las autopistas vallas divisorias y postes abatibles. Que en el año 2009 hubo un accidente en ese mismo lugar y por sentencia No. 346-2011, confirmada por la Sala Primera, en la que se condenó a los accionados a establecer vallas divisorias y a pagar una indemnización. Que en este caso, en el 2014 vuelve a suceder un accidente en el que mueren 5 personas, sin que a esa fecha se hubiesen colocado las vallas divisorias y los postes abatibles. Que las víctimas no perecieron por la velocidad, sino porque no había valla divisoria en el lugar y la base del poste no cumplía con las condiciones de seguridad. Que si hubiese habido vallas divisorias, posiblemente no se hubiese dado el resultado muerte. De manera que lo determinante en el resultado fue la inexistencia de la valla guarda vía. Que el artículo 254 de la Ley de Tránsito sanciona la alta velocidad, y acá el peritaje estableció que el vehículo circulaba a no menos de 61 kilómetros por hora, pero no se dice a qué velocidad transitaba realmente. Que en el caso del cannabis, resulta ser un tipo penal en blanco y no hay medición al respecto y por ende no se puede decir que la conducción fuese temeraria. Que quedó demostrado que hubo un daño moral y económico. Que la responsabilidad de las accionadas es por omisión al no haber colocado las vallas divisorias o guarda vías. Por su parte la co-representante Licenciada Adriana Rojas Rivero, indicó que el vehículo no presentó ningún problema mecánico y que el daño era previsible. Que el factor de riesgo fue salirse de la vía, y por falta del guarda vía o valla divisoria, fue lo que no colaboró pero que de haber existido en el sitio del accidente el resultado podría haberse evitado. Que hubo una imprevisibilidad de las accionadas y ello conllevó a un fallo en la seguridad de las personas. Que no hubo planificación ni mantenimiento de las carreteras, a pesar que ello es el servicio público que presta el CONVI. Que la normativa señala cuales son las obligaciones del CONAVI, y todo era previsible, sin embargo el CONAVI no lo hizo. Que los propietarios de vehículos están obligados a llevarlos a RTV para acreditar que se encuentra en condiciones de circular y evitar accidentes, esto como medida primaria, pero que hay otras medidas secundarias a cargo de las accionadas para minimizar los resultados ante un accidente, sin embargo en este caso, no lo hicieron. Que hay eximentes de responsabilidad como culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero, pero los hechos deben analizarse globalmente. Que así como no hubo previsibilidad y evitabilidad, tampoco puede haber culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero, porque los ocupantes del vehículo no sabían que el conductor no contaba con licencia de conducir. Que en el caso en que se condenó a las accionadas, a pesar que se demostró la alta velocidad, siempre fueron condenadas. Por su parte la representación de la causa tramitada bajo expediente No. 15-000550-1027-CA señaló de manera resumida: Que el día 03 de setiembre de 2014, al ser aproximadamente las 21 horas el señor Nombre111153 se desplazaba en el vehículo marca honda, Estilo Civic, placas Placa19605 y a la altura de Dirección3257, el conductor del vehículo, sin saber las causas hasta la fecha, perdió el control del vehículo, el cual se introdujo dentro de la jardinera que divide la Dirección13200 , colisionando con la base de concreto de uno de los postes de alumbrado público ubicados en el centro de la jardinera, impacta en el guardabarros posterior del costado derecho, al que se le desprende un trozo de guardabarros y queda en ese lugar, el bumper trasero también se desprende y queda al otro lado de los carriles contrarios, el vehículo toma un giro o derrapa en sentido (de las manecillas del reloj) sobre la zona verde, se sale del carril contrario el cual es doble y en sentido oeste-este donde transitaba el camión pesado que impacta al automóvil en el costado izquierdo, desde la puerta del conductor y hasta atrás, y se lo lleva prensado arrastrándolo por el pavimento de la parte delantera inferior del vehículo pesado hasta que logra detenerse por completo en el carril del lado derecho, siempre en sentido oeste-este, San José-Cartago, y posteriormente se incendió y se quemó en su totalidad el vehículo, falleciendo en el sitio del accidente. Que conforme a la prueba aportada de la Fiscalía de la Unión el accidente ocurrió en el tramo comprendido entre el Terramall y Pasoca y que el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda Sección Cuarta, mediante sentencia número 346-2011, de las minutos del día 13 de setiembre del año 2011, había ordenado al CONAVI: "...Se condena al Consejo Nacional de Vialidad a construir e instalar, en el plazo de seis meses contados a partir de la firmeza de la presente sentencia, una barrera de contención en la Dirección13198 , específicamente en el tramo comprendido entre Terramall y Pasoca, tanto en sentido Cartago-San José como en el sentido San José-Cartago... ". Que de haberse cumplido con lo dispuesto por el Tribunal quizá el resultado hubiese sido otro. Alegato que fue reiterado en la audiencia de juicio oral y público. Reiteró en la audiencia de juicio que, el día de los hechos, el conductor del vehículo por causas inexplicables perdió el control del vehículo, colisionó contra la base de un poste cubierto de concreto, el cual lo desvía a la calzada contraria y choca con un camión. Que a esa fecha existía una sentencia en que se ordenó a las accionadas a colocar en la zona del accidente un guarda vías o barrera de contención, sin embargo no lo hicieron, por lo que se reclama un actuar negligente del Estado y del CONAVI. Que más allá que el conductor no tuviese licencia de conducir, ello no significa que sea la causa del accidente. Tampoco se acreditó la cantidad de residuos de cannabis en el cuerpo del conductor. Que tales circunstancias no constituyen un eximente de responsabilidad, ya que de haber existido las barreras divisorias en la autopista, el resultado muerte no se hubiere dado. Que tampoco se acreditó que el vehículo circulara a gran velocidad, y solo que no iba a menos de 62 kilómetros por hora, en un lugar que se permite una velocidad de 90 kilómetros por hora. Que hay una responsabilidad de las accionadas, porque ya se le había ordenado por sentencia que en un lapso de 6 meses colocara barreras de contención o guarda vías y no lo hicieron y que con ellas se hubiera evitado la muerte de los ocupantes del vehículo. Que en el caso de su representado, se trataba de un joven de apenas 16 años que ayudaba económicamente a su familia. Que al haberse acreditado la obligación de las accionadas de colocar vallas o guardavías, pues así se les ordenó en una sentencia anterior y al no haberlo hecho al momento del accidente, es clara la responsabilidad de las accionadas en el presente caso. Finalmente la representación de la causa tramitada bajo expediente No. 15-007855-1027-CA señaló: Que el día de 03 de setiembre de 2014, el señor Nombre111151 , en compañía de Nombre111149 (Conductor), Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111153 , salieron a dar una vuelta cerca de su casa en el vehículo marca Honda Civic, modelo 1993, placa Placa19607 y que viniendo de Cartago hacia Dulce Nombre62 de la Dirección13201 , a la altura del kilómetro 9 de la autopista Florencio del Castillo, en el sentido Cartago-San José, el vehículo fue impactado por un camión marca International, modelo 1998, placas Placa19606 al frente de la fábrica de Jaleas Ujarrás, en el carril contrario, ya que no existen vallas de protección entre los carriles que van en diferentes sentidos. Que producto de dicha colisión, el vehículo en que viajaba el señor Nombre111151 ardió en llamas, y murieron todos los pasajeros en el sitio. Que en el tramo donde sucedió el accidente, el Lanamme había advertido a las demandadas sobre los peligros por yerros de señalización e infraestructura, que no fueron corregidos a tiempo, y precisamente en el lugar donde ocurrió el fatal accidente, identificado en el informe del Lanamme como la sección 4 y 5, que esta zona tiene un alto riesgo de accidentes, y se presentan de manera muy frecuente. Que de acuerdo con el parte oficial de la Policía de Tránsito 2014-245700194, se indica que el vehículo en el que se transportaba el señor Nombre111151 se salió de la vía, no había obstáculos que impidieran que no se trasladara al carril en sentido opuesto, y además no se consigna que el conductor estuviera bajo efectos del licor, enfermo, con alguna discapacidad física o mental; lo que ratifica que la colisión se dio en virtud de la inexistencia de vallas divisorias entre los carriles que van en diferente sentido. Que a pesar de que por resolución número 346-2011 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, se condenó al CONAVI a construir e instalar en el plazo de seis meses una barrera de contención, específicamente en el tramo comprendido entre Terramall y Pasoca, en ambos sentidos, con el fin de disminuir accidentes. Sentencia que fue confirmada por la Sala Primera por Voto No.1039-F-S1-2013 de las ocho horas treinta y cinco minutos del 14 de agosto de 2013, sin embargo al día del accidente, el CONAVI aún no había realizado ninguna de las obras ordenadas, a pesar que desde hacía más de un año había adquirido firmeza la orden judicial. Alegatos reiterados en audiencia de juicio oral y público. En la audiencia de juicio reafirmó lo indicado en su demanda. Reiteró que la inexistencia de la barrera guardavías llevó a la muerte de 5 jóvenes, entre ellos, el joven Nombre111151 quien era el sustento de su familia. Que la negligencia del Estado y del CONAVI generó que al momento del accidente no existieran en el lugar las guardavías correspondientes, a pesar que ya desde el año 2003 y luego se reiteró en el 2011 que la autopista presentaba este problema. Y que este Tribunal por un caso similar, ya había condenado a las accionadas a colocar las barreras guardavías en la zona. Que el vehículo no presentó problemas mecánicos y que la huella de frenado lo era sobre una velocidad de 62 kilómetros por hora. Que por ello hay responsabilidad del Estado y del CONAVI. Que el CONAVI colocó las vallas guardavías 3 años después de que se le ordenó, con lo que se dio una omisión clarísima. Que el CONAVI aceptó que la carretera presentaba problemas de seguridad, pero adujo que no tenía presupuesto. Y el Lanamme desde el año 2012 dijo que la carretera presentaba fracturas y lozas deterioradas. En cuanto a la velocidad, reiteró que el dictamen pericial dice que el vehículo circulaba a una velocidad no menor a los 62 kilómetros por hora, pero en un lugar en el que la velocidad permitida es de 90 kilómetros, de forma que la velocidad no fue determinante como para que sucediera el accidente. Que los guardavías no son para evitar accidentes, sino para minimizar sus resultados, de forma que de haber existido es probable que el resultado muerte no se hubiese dado. Que hay una responsabilidad objetiva por conducta omisiva e ilegítima del Estado y del CONAVI, lo que conlleva a una lesión antijurídica, que no estaban obligados a soportar sus representados. Finalmente señaló que el daño moral subjetivo quedó acreditado con la declaración de parte y que se alegó una culpa de la víctima, por haberse encontrado rastros de cannabis en el conductor, sin embargo con ella o sin ella el resultado hubiese sido el mismo. Que en un caso análogo la Sala Primera condenó por la sola inexistencia de un puente, acá es por la inexistencia de la barrera guardavías. La representación del CONAVI manifestó en general para las causas acumuladas : Que en el presente proceso, se peticiona que en sentencia se declare la responsabilidad solidaria del Consejo Nacional de Vialidad, por falta de fiscalización en la implementación de postes de alumbrado público a lo largo de la Dirección13198 , solicitando el pago de daño material y moral sustentando tales pretensiones, en la carencia de muros de contención, en la Dirección3536 y el haber permitido la instalación de postes de electricidad, lo que en su criterio permitió que el vehículo que conducía quien en vida fuera Nombre111149 Villalobos invadiera el carril contrario, generando la muerte de los ocupantes del vehículo que conducía. Que así las cosas, conviene, en primer término, señalar que ese Consejo ha efectuado las diligencias necesarias para dotar dicha carretera de tal sistema de contención. Que la invasión del señor Nombre111149 al carril contrario, deriva de su conducir temerario, y de forma ilegal al carecer de la licencia necesaria para tal efecto, motivo por el cual, pierde el control del vehículo, tal como lo describe el informe de accidente, que señala: "...se sale de la vía pasando el carril de sentido contrario, lo cual provoca que se tope de frente con el vehículo número 1, el cual lo arrastra por una distancia de unos treinta y siete metros...", lo cual coincide con lo consignado en el informe 840-SI-2014 del 01 de octubre del 2014, realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, a folio 81 vuelto que señala "...se dio la invasión del vehículo liviano a la jardinera central y luego hacia el carril contrario..." lo cual deriva de su falta de idoneidad y experiencia para conducir y al exceso de velocidad en que lo hacía. Que en tal sentido, es menester acotar que aun cuando hubiese sido concretada la instalación de las mencionadas vallas, estas no deben constituirse en un factor que haga permisible a los conductores, hacerlo a altas velocidades, quebrantando las señales de tránsito y normas básicas de conducción responsable. Que respecto a la responsabilidad reclamada en la especie, se debe recordar que para el surgimiento de una obligación resarcitoria se deben presentar los presupuestos de los artículos 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, es decir, debe existir una actuación u omisión derivada del actuar de una Administración Pública (causa), que tenga como resultado una lesión a la esfera patrimonial o extrapatrimonial de un Administrado (efecto), y un nexo causal entre la conducta administrativa y la lesión al Administrado. Que en un proceso civil de hacienda, como lo es éste, ya que lo único que se pretende es el pago de daños y perjuicios, de conformidad con el artículo 2, inciso b), del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, en relación al 58 de ese mismo cuerpo legal; la parte actora debe probar la existencia del daño producido por la conducta de una Administración Pública, esto de conformidad con el artículo 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en relación al artículo 317 del Código Procesal Civil. (Sentencia 224 de las 4:15 horas del 12 de febrero del 2009 del Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo, Sección VI). Que en este proceso acumulado, los accionantes acusan falta de fiscalización por parte del CONAVI, empero, no solo, se verificó el cumplimiento de la contratación, sino que, además, la Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, realizó el estudio técnico correspondiente que respalda la colocación de los postes en la ubicación que detentan. Que de lo anterior se deriva, la improcedencia de lo solicitado toda vez que no se configuran los elementos formales, ni materiales para la imputación de responsabilidad de su representado, y menos aún existe prueba suficiente de los daños ocurridos, los cuales a todas luces son improcedentes. Que en todo caso, de considerar el honorable Tribunal que existió responsabilidad estatal en el fallecimiento de los ocupantes del vehículo, conviene destacar que, de conformidad con el ordinal 190 ya citado, esta se extingue total o parcialmente cuando se presentan cualquiera de las eximentes que establece el ordenamiento jurídico -Culpa de la víctima, hecho de un tercero y fuerza mayor-. Que en este asunto, a criterio de esa representación, se está ante el eximente denominado culpa de la víctima y hecho de un tercero. Que según la doctrina, esta se concibe cuando el daño es producido por la misma víctima y por la acción u omisión de un sujeto totalmente ajeno a la relación triangular entre Administración-funcionario-afectado, en la medida en que es el propio sujeto pasivo del daño, quien produce -por negligencia o imprudencia inexcusable- la lesión, línea jurisprudencial de la Sala Primera de la Corte, de las 14:00 horas del 27 de marzo del 2014. Que en ese pensamiento, su jurisprudencia ha indicado: Eximentes. Exención plena y parcial: (...) La normativa vigente artículo 190 de la mencionada Ley General contempla tres supuestos de exención total o parcial de responsabilidad, a saber:... hecho de un tercero, en tanto es producido por la acción u omisión de un sujeto totalmente ajeno a la relación triangular entre Administración-funcionario-afectado (...) Todas ellas originan la ruptura del nexo causal. (...) Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, voto 584-2005, de las 10:40 minutos del 11 de Agosto del 2005. Que lo anteriormente citado se aplica a la situación de los jóvenes quienes viajaban en el vehículo placas Placa19605, mientras era conducido por Nombre111149 , actuando con inexcusable negligencia, tomando el volante de dicho automotor, pese a no poseer la licencia respectiva y por ende la aptitud necesaria para manejar, perdiendo el control del automotor produciendo el percance, falleciendo en el sitio en compañía de los demás ocupantes del vehículo. A partir de lo expuesto, tenemos que, en la especie, se configura la eximente de responsabilidad, quebrándose así, el nexo de causalidad, por lo que, deviene improcedente condenar al CONAVI por el lamentable deceso. Alegatos que fueron reiterados en la audiencia de juicio, manifestando que el CONAVI no colocó a los jóvenes fallecidos en una situación de riesgo. Que no existe nexo causal entre la pérdida de control del vehículo y el resultado final en virtud de la ausencia en ese momento de una valla guardavías. Que el conductor Nombre111149 no fue forzado a conducir bajo los efectos de la cannabis consumida horas antes del accidente y tampoco contaba con licencia, de manera que conducía de manera temeraria. Que al momento de los hechos en señor Nombre111149 era mayor de edad y sabía de las consecuencias. Que el tema de que no existiera a ese momento la valla no incide porque nunca se determinó la causa por la que perdió el control del vehículo, de forma que operó una culpa de la víctima por exceso de velocidad y consumo de cannabis. En cuanto a lo ordenado por este Tribunal con respecto a la colación de vallas guardavías o barreras de seguridad, indicó esa representación que se publicó un cartel licitatorio, pero por falta de oferentes se debió declarar infructuosa la contratación. Que circunstancialmente el accidente sucedió en el mismo lugar pero por causas diferentes. Que en el año 2014 el Lanamme dijo que las barreras eran para disminuir el riesgo en un 40%. Que el parte oficial dice que el estado de la carretera era optima y que en ese sitio hubo 4 accidentes y solo este resultó fatal, pero que ello se debió a que el conductor manejaba sin licencia y bajo efectos enervantes. Que la Ley de Tránsito establece como requisito para conducir, el poseer licencia. Que ninguno de los actores era acreedor alimentario. Que operó una culpa de la víctima y hecho de un tercero como eximentes de responsabilidad. Que sin perjuicio de lo dicho, de considerar el Tribunal que la culpa de víctima no se configura de forma absoluta, es lo cierto que, cuando menos atenúa la responsabilidad del CONAVI, ya que, ineludiblemente, la impericia que tenía el hoy fallecido, demuestra más allá de toda duda, que su actuar fue inexcusablemente imprudente y que, efectivamente, coadyuvó en gran forma a que se produjera el accidente que intenta endilgársele al CONAVI. De todo lo expuesto, se desprende que en este asunto no se configuran los elementos exigidos por el ordenamiento jurídico para que se declare la responsabilidad objetiva del CONAVI por el deceso del señor Nombre111149 . La representación estatal señaló : “…Como es de conocimiento general, la Ley General de la Administración Pública (LGAP) establece un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y general al disponer en su artículo 190 que la Administración responde por todos los daños. Es decir, mide la responsabilidad de la Administración con base en el criterio del daño, conforme al cual si se establece el nexo de causalidad entre ese daño y la conducta de la Administración, se debe indemnizar, salvo la existencia de eximentes de responsabilidad que rompan el nexo causal. La norma en cuestión, en lo que interesa, dispone: “La Administración responderá por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero." (Lo subrayado no es del original). Conforme con la norma transcrita, ante la existencia de una eximente de responsabilidad, no cabe exigir responsabilidad a la Administración pues rompe el nexo de causalidad entre el daño y la conducta imputable a la Administración. En el caso que nos ocupa, es lo cierto que como producto de un lamentable accidente de tránsito fallecieron varios jóvenes, entre ellos Nombre111154 , hijo y hermano de los actores, quienes afirman que su muerte les ocasionó una serie de daños y perjuicios los cuales solicitan que le sean indemnizados por el CONAVI y al Estado, entidades a los que culpan del accidente por apartarse de las recomendaciones dadas por el SIEGA, para la colocación de los postes de servicio público, y desatender las recomendaciones de la Auditoria Técnica de Seguridad Vial del LANAMME, en cuanto al diseño e instalación de un sistema de protección y prevención ante eventuales colisiones en las bases de los postes del alumbrado de la vía donde ocurrió el accidente. Sin embargo, considera esta representación del Estado que no llevan razón los actores, pues es lo cierto que existen al menos dos eximentes de responsabilidad, que rompen el nexo causal entre el daño producido y el accionar de la Administración. Nos referimos, a las eximentes conocidas como "culpa de la víctima y hecho de un tercero.” Como bien lo reconoce la misma parte actora en el hecho QUINTO de la demanda el accidente ocurrió en altas horas de la noche. Sobre el particular, la madre del fallecido y actora en el presente proceso, manifestó a un medio de comunicación, que le había rogado a su hijo Nombre111154 que no saliera, sin embargo, afirma, no pudo frenarlo. En declaración brindada al Diario Extra, del 5 de setiembre del 2014, la señora Sanabria manifestó: "Un amigo llegó y le dijo que fueran a darse una vuelta en carro, le rogué a mi hijo que no saliera porque tenía un mal presentimiento, pero aun así me pidió la bendición y se fue para siempre." De igual forma, consta que hubo un sexto amigo, de Nombre62 Nombre111157 , quien al saber que ninguno de los jóvenes que iban en el vehículo tenía licencia para conducir, percibió el peligro y decidió bajarse del automotor y rechazar la invitación de salir a probar el carro que recién había adquirido su amigo, quien era el conductor del vehículo, a saber, Nombre111149 : "Nombre111149 tenía dos días de haber comprado el carro y todos estábamos emocionados. Era muy bonito, yo iba con ellos, pero como que me dio miedo, no tenemos licencia, entonces mejor me bajé y me quedé con los demás [...]. "Ver noticia del periódico La Teja, del viernes 5 de setiembre del 2014, portada y página 6 y 7. Resulta evidente que, en el caso que nos ocupa, se configura la eximente de responsabilidad denominada culpa de la víctima, pues los fallecidos, incluyendo el hijo de los actores, a sabiendas de que el conductor del vehículo ni ninguno de sus ocupantes contaba con licencia de conducir, bajo su cuenta y riesgo decidió acompañarlos "a dar una vuelta". Sobre la eximente de responsabilidad en comentario, resulta interesante lo dicho por la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en sentencia No. 584-2005, de las 10:40 horas del 11 de agosto del 2005: "[...] Eximentes, Exención plena y parcial La normativa vigente artículo 190 de la mencionada Ley General contempla tres supuestos de exención total o parcial de responsabilidad, a saber: culpa de la víctima, en la medida que es el propio sujeto pasivo del daño quien produce –por negligencia o imprudencia inexcusable- la lesión o se coloca en posición propicia para ello, para el concepto jurisprudencial de Culpa de la víctima, puede verse la sentencia de esta Sala. N° 33 de las 9 horas 30 minutos del 9 de abril de 1953. Todos ellas originan la ruptura del nexo causal..." (Lo resaltado no pertenece al original) Sin duda alguna, en este caso el hijo y hermano de los actores, se colocó en una posición propia para sufrir el daño, repito, al aceptar acompañar a sus amigos a "dar una vuelta en carro", a sabiendas de que ninguno contaba con licencia de conducir. Por otra parte, el hecho de que el conductor del vehículo manejara a alta velocidad y sin licencia de conducir, demuestra, sin mayor explicación, la existencia de la eximente de responsabilidad denominada "hecho de un tercero." Evidentemente, la causa directa del accidente lo fue la falta de pericia y precaución del conductor, quien a pesar de que no contaba con licencia de conducir, lo hacía a alta velocidad y sin el deber de cuidado necesario. Respecto de la velocidad a la que conducía el conductor Nombre111149 , también fallecido en el accidente, los distintos medios de comunicación consignaron que fue la adrenalina de la juventud" la que llevó a los jóvenes a la muerte: "Nombre111149, quien era el dueño del carro, manejaba por el Dirección13202 y 1 kilómetro después del peaje perdió el control, se supone que por lo rápido que iba pegó contra un poste de los que dividen la calle, se pasó de carril y al quedar en dirección Dirección3797 , le dio durísimo a un camión, el cual arrastró 40 metros al Honda Civic blanco de los amigos." Ver Periódico La Teja, del 5 de setiembre del 2014, página 6. Según testigos, el automóvil en el que viajaban los fallecidos, se desplazaba a exceso de velocidad, siendo que el conductor habría perdido el control, se salió de la carretera, colisionó contra un poste, avanzó por la división de carriles de zacate y al ingresar al carril contrario fue impactado por un camión. Al respecto puede verse la noticia publicada por el Diario Extra, del Dirección13203 , página 16. Y los mismos familiares de los muchachos fallecidos afirmaron a los medios de comunicación, que iban a alta velocidad y sin licencia de conducir: "Familiares de los fallecidos confirmaron a este diario que ninguno tenía licencia de conducir. "Soldado iba manejando, pero cambio con "El Negro” Ninguno tenía licencia, todos eran jóvenes e iban a alta velocidad" dijo Nombre111158 , prima del fallecido." Diario La Extra, del 5 de setiembre del 2014, página 8. Por su parte Diego Herrera, Jefe de la Policía de Tránsito en San José, comentó al periódico La Nación, que "hubo un posible exceso de velocidad por parte del automóvil, que era un Honda modelo 1993, lo cual causó al chofer la pérdida de control del carro y que se generara la invasión del carril" La Nación, 5 de setiembre del 2014, página 12A. Conforme se puede apreciar, las declaraciones de distintas personas que constan en los diferentes medios de comunicación, son contestes en que la persona que conducía lo hacía a gran velocidad y sin el deber de cuidado. Y ello es lógico pues, insisto, ninguno de los ocupantes fallecidos contaba con licencia conducir. En cuando a las condiciones de la calzada y climáticas, en el parte oficial de tránsito, se hace constar que la calzada donde se produjo el accidente se encontraba en buen estado, debidamente iluminada y las condiciones climáticas eran normales. Se indica, además, que no consta huella de frenado. De ahí que, repito, la causa principal del accidente lo fue, sin duda, la impericia e imprudencia del conductor, también fallecido. Por consiguiente, ni la muerte del joven, ni los daños y perjuicios que pudieran haber sufrido los actores, debe ser imputable al Estado ni al CONAVI pues es claro que se configuran dos eximentes de responsabilidad que rompen el nexo de causalidad entre los daños y la conducta de la Administración. Ahora bien, la parte actora insiste en imputar la responsabilidad del accidente en el que falleció su hijo y hermano al Estado y el CONAVI, por falta de fiscalización en la ejecución correcta de los trabajos desarrollados con la instalación de postes de alumbrado de la vía, así como por la ausencia de barreras de contención a lo largo de la vía de la Dirección3536 , que contuvieran los vehículos dentro del mismo carril en que circulaba, lo cual generó el fatal desenlace. No obstante, como hemos apuntado, la invasión del carril contrario del vehículo en el que viajaba el familiar de los actores, obedeció a la impericia e imprudencia de su conductor, quien perdió el control del vehículo. Así lo describe el informe No. 840-51-2014, del 1 de octubre del 2014, realizado por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial: "[...] a 500 metros antes o al este de donde se dio la invasión del vehículo liviano a la jardinera central y luego hacia el carril contrario, esta indica como máximo de velocidad permitida 90KPH. [...] En apariencia, el vehículo liviano placas Placa19605, donde viajaban los occisos, transitaba en sentido Este-Oeste, por algún motivo se sale de su carril, ingresando a la jardinera central en la dirección ya descrita, continuó con rumbo al oeste e impactó la base de concreto de uno de los postes del alumbrado público ubicados en el centro de la jardinera [...]." Contrario a lo afirmado por la parte actora, es claro que la causa del accidente lo es la falta de pericia por parte del conductor del vehículo quien, como hemos indicado, ni siquiera contaba con licencia de conducir. Toda persona que realice el curso de seguridad vial -necesario para poder obtener la licencia de conducir-, es consciente del peligro que involucra el conducir a exceso de velocidad y sobre todo en horas de la noche…” Alegatos que fueron reiterados en las causas acumuladas. En la audiencia de juicio esta representación señaló que no hay vínculo causal entre la conducta y el daño que se reclama. Que hubo exceso de velocidad, conduciendo sin licencia y bajo efectos enervantes, lo cual generó la pérdida de control del vehículo por parte de su conductor. Que operaron las eximentes de responsabilidad culpa de la víctima y hecho de un tercero. Que la causa probable del accidente fue la velocidad y el error humano y que aun cuando el vehículo golpeó la base del poste, esto no fue suficiente para detenerlo, sino que continuó hasta el carril contrario y chocó con un camión.

V.- SOBRE LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA : Tal y como se indicó supra, en el presente proceso se reclama responsabilidad patrimonial objetiva de la Administración, por una acusada omisión. Al respecto resulta oportuno señalar, que la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa encuentra su basamento en el artículo 49 de la Constitución Política, como parte de los derechos fundamentales que en un Estado de Derecho, gozan todos los habitantes de la República. El objeto de esta Jurisdicción es "...garantizar la legalidad de la función administrativa del Estado, de sus instituciones y de toda otra entidad de derecho público. La desviación de poder será motivo de impugnación de los actos administrativos. La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados". Con respecto a los alcances y objetivos de esta Jurisdicción, la Sala Constitucional, en su voto 5686-95 de 15:30 horas de 18 de octubre de 1995, haciendo referencia al voto 3905-94 de 15:57 horas de 3 de agosto de 1994 señaló: "(...) es procedente analizar si la competencia asignada por el artículo 49 de la Constitución a los tribunales de lo Contencioso Administrativo, puede ser delegada por ley en otros tribunales de competencia material distinta, (...) Esta norma, forma parte de un concepto -en su acepción moderna- introducido al derecho político costarricense por la Constitución de 1949, cual es el de la fiscalización judicial de los actos públicos. (...) El concepto fue reforzado por la reforma introducida mediante ley #3124 de 25 de junio de 1963 que permitió impugnar también los actos discrecionales de la administración, no contemplados dentro de la redacción original del artículo 49 que limitó la jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa a fiscalizar el "uso de facultades regladas". El propósito del legislador constituyente fue situar en el derecho constitucional costarricense, un nuevo y verdadero derecho subjetivo en favor de los ciudadanos, que garantizara su defensa en caso de extralimitaciones de los gobernantes". Como desarrollo de la mencionada norma constitucional, los artículos 1° y 2°del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo establecen que esta sede tiene por objeto tutelar las situaciones jurídicas de toda personas, garantizar o restablecer la legalidad de cualquier conducta de la Administración Pública sujeta al derecho administrativo, así como conocer y resolver los diversos aspectos de la relación jurídico administrativa, siendo que los motivos de ilegalidad comprenden cualquier infracción, por acción u omisión al ordenamiento jurídico, incluso la desviación de poder. Le corresponde además, conocer las cuestiones de responsabilidad patrimonial contractual o extracontractual de la Administración Pública y sus funcionarios. Se tiene entonces, que la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa además de conocer sobre la conformidad de la conducta administrativa, conoce también sobre la responsabilidad patrimonial de ésta, con base en lo señalado en los artículos 9 y 41 de nuestra Carta Magna, en tanto disponen respectivamente que "El Gobierno de la República es popular, representativo, participativo, alternativo y responsable. Lo ejercen el pueblo y tres Poderes distintos e independientes entre sí". (El destacado no es del original ), así como que "Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales. (...)". Para cumplir con dicho fin, el artículo 190.1) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, obliga a la Administración responder por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal , estableciendo como únicas eximentes de esa responsabilidad el que medie una fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima o el hecho de un tercero. La Sala Constitucional en su sentencia N° 5207-2004 de las 14 horas y 55 minutos del 18 de mayo del 2004, indicó: “Nuestra Constitución Política no consagra explícitamente el principio de la responsabilidad patrimonial de las administraciones públicas por las lesiones antijurídicas que, en el ejercicio de la función administrativa, le causen a los administrados. Empero, este principio se encuentra implícitamente contenido en el Derecho de la Constitución, siendo que puede ser inferido a partir de una interpretación sistemática y contextual de varios preceptos, principios y valores constitucionales. En efecto, el artículo 9°, párrafo 1°, de la Carta Política dispone que “El Gobierno de la República es (…) responsable (…)”, con lo cual se da por sentada la responsabilidad del ente público mayor o Estado y sus diversos órganos (...) El ordinal 11°, de su parte, establece en su párrafo primero la “(…) responsabilidad penal (…)” de los funcionarios públicos y el segundo párrafo nos refiere la “(…) responsabilidad personal para los funcionarios en el cumplimiento de sus deberes (…)”. El artículo 34 de la Constitución Política ampara los “derechos patrimoniales adquiridos” y las “situaciones jurídicas consolidadas”, los cuales solo pueden ser, efectiva y realmente, amparados con un sistema de responsabilidad administrativa de amplio espectro sin zonas inmunes o exentas cuando sean vulnerados por las administraciones públicas en el despliegue de su giro o desempeño público. El numeral 41 ibídem, estatuye que “Ocurriendo a las leyes, todos han de encontrar reparación para las injurias o daños que hayan recibido en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, este precepto impone el deber al autor y responsable del daño de resarcir las lesiones antijurídicas efectivamente sufridas por los administrados como consecuencia del ejercicio de la función administrativa a través de conductas positivas por acción o negativas por omisión de los entes públicos, con lo cual se convierte en la piedra angular a nivel constitucional para el desarrollo legislativo de un sistema de responsabilidad objetiva y directa en el cual el resarcimiento no depende del reproche moral y subjetivo a la conducta del funcionario público por dolo o culpa, sino, única y exclusivamente, por habérsele infligido o recibido, efectivamente, “(…) injurias o daños (…) en su persona, propiedad o intereses morales (…)”, esto es, una lesión antijurídica que no tiene el deber de soportar y, por consiguiente, debe serle resarcida. (...) se reconoce (...) por el texto fundamental que los sacrificios especiales o las cargas singulares que el administrado no tiene el deber de soportar o tolerar, aunque devengan de una actividad lícita (...) deben resarcirse. El artículo 49, párrafo 1°, de la Constitución Política en cuanto, de forma implícita, reconoce la personalidad jurídica y, por consiguiente, la posibilidad de demandar en estrados judiciales a los entes públicos, cuando incumplan con sus obligaciones constituye un claro basamento de la responsabilidad administrativa. De su parte el párrafo in fine del ordinal 49 ya citado dispone que “La ley protegerá, al menos, los derechos subjetivos y los intereses legítimos de los administrados”, siendo que una de las principales formas de garantía de éstos lo constituye un régimen de responsabilidad administrativa objetivo, directo, amplio y acabado. (...). El principio de responsabilidad administrativa de los entes públicos y de sus funcionarios resulta complementado con la consagración constitucional del principio de igualdad en el sostenimiento de las cargas públicas (artículos 18 y 33) que impide imponerle a los administrados una carga o sacrificio singular o especial que no tienen el deber de soportar y el principio de la solidaridad social (artículo 74), de acuerdo con el cual si la función administrativa es ejercida y desplegada en beneficio de la colectividad, es ésta la que debe soportar las lesiones antijurídicas causadas a uno o varios administrados e injustamente soportadas por éstos. Finalmente, es menester tomar en consideración que la Constitución Política recoge un derecho fundamental innominado o atípico que es el de los administrados al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos, el que se infiere claramente de la relación de los numerales, interpretados, a contrario sensu, 140, inciso 8°, 139, inciso 4° y 191 de la Ley fundamental en cuanto recogen, respectivamente, los parámetros deontológicos de la función administrativa tales como el “buen funcionamiento de los servicios y dependencias administrativas”, “buena marcha del Gobierno” y “eficiencia de la administración”. Este derecho fundamental al buen funcionamiento de los servicios públicos le impone a los entes públicos actuar en el ejercicio de sus competencias y la prestación de los servicios públicos de forma eficiente y eficaz y, desde luego, la obligación correlativa de reparar los daños y perjuicios causados cuando se vulnere esa garantía constitucional. De esta forma, queda en evidencia que el constituyente originario recogió de forma implícita el principio de la responsabilidad de las administraciones públicas, el que, como tal, debe servir a todos los poderes públicos y operadores del Derecho como parámetro para interpretar, aplicar, integrar y delimitar el entero ordenamiento jurídico. Bajo esta inteligencia, un corolario fundamental del principio constitucional de la responsabilidad administrativa lo constituye la imposibilidad para el legislador ordinario de eximir o exonerar de responsabilidad a algún ente público por alguna lesión antijurídica que le cause su funcionamiento normal o anormal o su conducta lícita o ilícita a la esfera patrimonial y extra patrimonial de los administrados.” (Los énfasis no pertenecen al original) . Adviértase además que el régimen de responsabilidad administrativa ideado por el legislador desarrollado en la Ley General de la Administración Pública a partir del artículo 190 y siguientes es de carácter objetiva, en tanto impone que el Estado como sus instituciones -Administración Descentralizada- deben responden por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero, lo que implica que la Administración Pública debe asumir los daños que cause, salvo que medie una causal exonerativa debidamente acreditada. En consecuencia, para su reconocimiento de responsabilidad, se requiere de tres requisitos esenciales: 1) una actuación u omisión derivada de la función o conducta de la Administración Pública, sea formal o material, normal o anormal, lícita o ilícita, 2) una lesión o existencia de un daño antijurídico, en tanto infringe el ordenamiento jurídico. Lesión que a su vez, debe ser cierta, efectiva, real, evaluable e individualizable, y no meramente hipotética, conforme lo dispuesto por el numeral 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y 3) un nexo causal que constituye una relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido, como condición indispensable para que pueda atribuirse a la Administración el deber de resarcir el daño, sin causales de exclusión del nexo de causalidad. Como se mencionó entre las causas que rompen el nexo de causalidad y que por ende excluyen la responsabilidad administrativa, están la fuerza mayor, que se entiende como un hecho de la naturaleza, extraño, exterior, imprevisible e inevitable, o aunque previsible resulte irresistible. También opera la culpa de la víctima, que acontece cuando por su propio accionar o por su descuido, negligencia e imprudencia inexcusable, se provoca la lesión, colocándose en una posición propicia para ello, asumiendo el riesgo y sus efectos nocivos previendo la eventualidad o posibilidad de la contingencia. La última de las causales contempla el hecho de un tercero, que es la acción u omisión de una persona ajena a la relación triangular entre la Administración-funcionario y afectado, sin cuya participación no se hubiera producido el hecho lesivo (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: número 025-F-99 de las 14:15 horas del 22 de enero de 1999, número 589-F-99 de las 14:20 horas del 1 de octubre de 1999, y la número 252-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 28 de marzo del 2001). Por su parte, tratándose de un servidor público, su responsabilidad ante terceros se rige por lo estipulado en los numerales 199 a 202 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, en los cuales se dispone que el funcionario público responderá en forma personal cuando haya incurrido en dolo o culpa grave en el ejercicio de sus deberes y funciones o con ocasión del mismo, tratándose en realidad de una responsabilidad subjetiva. A su vez, se establece que sin perjuicio de la calificación de la conducta del servidor, la Administración responderá en forma solidaria para con los afectados por culpa in eligendo o in vigilando. En mérito de ello, para que responda en forma subjetiva y personal ante los afectados el servidor, se requiere que haya actuado en el ejercicio de sus competencias y funciones y la antijuridicidad subjetiva de su conducta al haber incurrido en dolo o culpa grave. La responsabilidad entonces, consiste en la obligación de reparar un daño ajeno, a cargo de quien lo causó, o de otro sujeto que se relaciona con el causante, y que jurídicamente puede ser obligado a reparar ese daño. De manera tal, que el tema necesariamente está concatenado con la provocación de un daño, por lo que resulta pertinente traer a cita lo dicho por la Sala Primera en relación con los daños que pueden ser objeto de resarcimiento en sede contencioso-administrativa, en el voto N° 112 de las 14 horas 15 minutos del 15 de julio de 1992, entre otras cosas, indicó: “IV. El daño constituye uno de los presupuestos de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, por cuanto el deber de resarcir solamente se configura si ha mediado un hecho ilícito dañoso que lesione un interés jurídicamente relevante, susceptible de ser tutelado por el ordenamiento jurídico. El daño, en sentido jurídico, constituye todo menoscabo, pérdida o detrimento de la esfera jurídica patrimonial o extra patrimonial de la persona (damnificado), el cual provoca la privación de un bien jurídico, respecto del cual era objetivamente esperable su conservación de no haber acaecido el hecho dañoso. Bajo esta tesitura, no hay responsabilidad civil si no media daño, así como no existe daño si no hay damnificado. Por otra parte, sólo es daño indemnizable el que se llega a probar (realidad o existencia), siendo ello una cuestión de hecho reservada al prudente arbitrio del juzgador. En suma, el daño constituye la brecha perjudicial para la víctima, resultante de confrontar la situación anterior al hecho ilícito con la posterior al mismo. V.- En muchas ocasiones se utilizan indiscriminadamente las expresiones "daños" y "perjuicios". Es menester precisar y distinguir ambos conceptos. El daño constituye la pérdida irrogada al damnificado (damnum emergens), en tanto el perjuicio está conformado por la ganancia o utilidad frustrada o dejada de percibir (lucro cesans), la cual era razonable y probablemente esperable si no se hubiese producido el hecho ilícito. VI.- No cualquier daño da pie a la obligación de resarcir. Para tal efecto, han de confluir, básicamente las siguientes características para ser un "daño resarcible": A) Debe ser cierto; real y efectivo, y no meramente eventual o hipotético, no puede estar fundado en realizaciones supuestas o conjeturales. El daño no pierde esta característica si su cuantificación resulta incierta, indeterminada o de difícil apreciación o prueba; tampoco debe confundirse la certeza con la actualidad, pues es admisible la reparación del daño cierto pero futuro; asimismo, no cabe confundir el daño futuro con el lucro cesante o perjuicio, pues el primero está referido a aquél que surge como una consecuencia necesaria derivada del hecho causal o generador del daño, es decir, sus repercusiones no se proyectan al incoarse el proceso. En lo relativo a la magnitud o monto (seriedad) del daño, ello constituye un extremo de incumbencia subjetiva única del damnificado, empero el derecho no puede ocuparse de pretensiones fundadas en daños insignificantes, derivadas de una excesiva susceptibilidad. B) Debe mediar lesión a un interés jurídicamente relevante y merecedor de amparo. Así puede haber un damnificado directo y otro indirecto: el primero es la víctima del hecho dañoso, y el segundo serán los sucesores de la víctima. C) Deberá ser causado por un tercero, y subsistente, esto es, si ha sido reparado por el responsable o un tercero (asegurador) resulta insubsistente. D) Debe mediar una relación de causalidad entre el hecho ilícito y el daño. VII.- Dentro de las clases de daños, se encuentra en primer término el daño material y el corporal, siendo el primero el que incide sobre las cosas o bienes materiales que conforman el patrimonio de la persona, en tanto el segundo repercute sobre la integridad corporal y física. En doctrina, bajo la denominación genérica de daño material o patrimonial, suelen comprenderse las específicas de daño corporal y de daño material, en sentido estricto. La segunda parece ser la expresión más feliz, pues el daño corporal suele afectar intereses patrimoniales del damnificado (pago de tratamiento médico, gastos de hospitalización, medicamentos, etc.), ganancias frustradas si el daño lo ha incapacitado para realizar sus ocupaciones habituales (perjuicios), etc. Esta distinción nació en el Derecho Romano, pues se distinguía entre el daño inferido a las cosas directamente (damnun) y el que lesionaba la personalidad física del individuo (injuria). En el daño patrimonial el menoscabo generado resulta ser valorable económicamente...”. De acuerdo con lo anterior, no es suficiente invocar un daño, sino que se debe demostrar fehacientemente su existencia y el nexo de causalidad que le une con la conducta u omisión del ente responsable. Ahora bien, en el caso de la responsabilidad de las municipalidades como parte de la organización descentralizada del Estado, éstas como entidades locales, gozan de autonomía relativa en el ejercicio de sus funciones, a partir de una descentralización territorial, según se colige del numeral ciento sesenta y ocho de la Constitución Política. Este nivel de independencia lo otorga el precepto ciento sesenta y nueve de la Carta Magna, en el marco de su competencia territorial, integrada por el espacio físico dispuesto para el cantón al cual representa, en tanto señala que corresponde a cada ayuntamiento la: "...administración de los intereses y servicios locales…"; así la carta fundamental le confiere una serie de funciones o atribuciones en favor de esos gobiernos en razón de "lo local", esto es, para administrar los servicios e intereses del ámbito a la que está circunscrita, sea, el cantón; sin embargo en cuanto al régimen de responsabilidad se refiere, se encuentran obligadas frente a los administrados o terceros, en los mismos términos que el Estado. De este modo, es claro que existen intereses cuya salvaguardia corresponde a las Municipalidades y junto a ellos, coexisten otros cuya protección constitucional o legal es atribuida a otros entes públicos, en el entendido que la competencia no es excluyente, máxime cuando existen intereses locales que a la vez son regionales o incluso nacionales, de suerte que los intereses desde el plano local al nacional confluyen, sin perjuicio que en algunos de los casos su afectación se limite al plano más pequeño, sin embargo ninguna escapa a la responsabilidad que les impone el ordenamiento jurídico en cuanto a los daños que puedan causar en el ejercicio u omisión de sus actividades. La esfera territorial del municipio constituye una competencia originaria de los ayuntamientos y solo mediante ley de nacionalización puede serles desplazada, siempre que esa manifestación legislativa no suponga un quebranto a la autonomía referida o implique vaciar el contenido constitucional del régimen municipal. De esta forma la responsabilidad del Estado está separada a la de la Municipalidad, pues aunque la Municipalidad forma parte del Estado, su cada una de esas organizaciones responde por separado. Por su parte, el artículo cuatro del Código Municipal, Ley No. 7794 del treinta de abril de mil novecientos noventa y ocho, desarrolla los tipos de autonomía que el legislador ordinario estimó ostentaban estas corporaciones, indicando que poseen la política, administrativa y financiera (ver Sala Constitucional, votos 5204-2004 y 8928-2004). La Sala Constitucional en la resolución no. 5445-99 además de desarrollar las bases de la autonomía municipal, fijó la interacción de los intereses y determinó la obligatoria coordinación de lo local, regional y nacional, para satisfacer los diferentes intereses públicos que interactúan. La autonomía municipal, impuesta por la Carta Magna, confiere a las corporaciones locales una competencia especial para la administración de los intereses y servicios de su competencia territorial (artículos 169 y 170), competencia prevalente sobre la de otras instituciones, en el contexto de la localidad y un régimen de responsabilidad separado. En cuanto al régimen de responsabilidad de las corporaciones municipales en específico, resulta oportuno traer a colación, lo que esta Sección del Tribunal indicó en la sentencia No. 28-2014-IV de las 13:30 horas del 31 de marzo de 2014: "... El régimen de responsabilidad civil extracontractual, se desarrolla en dos ámbitos, la subjetiva establecida en el artículo 1045 del Código Civil y la objetiva, normada en el numeral 9 de la Constitución Política, el artículo 1048 del Código Civil y el numeral 190 y siguientes de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, disponiendo que el Estado y sus entidades responderán por todos los daños que cause su funcionamiento legítimo o ilegítimo, normal o anormal, salvo fuerza mayor, culpa de la víctima o hecho de un tercero. De esta forma, el causante del perjuicio lo resarcirá, salvo que demuestre alguna causal eximente. Así las cosas, tenemos que la Administración Pública responde por su conducta lícita y normal, cuando dicta un acto administrativo formal sustancialmente conforme con el ordenamiento jurídico u omite dictarlo, o bien mediante una actuación material o hecho permitido y normal. Por su parte, la responsabilidad es de carácter ilícito, anormal y formal cuando el acto administrativo es contrario al ordenamiento jurídico, y no formal cuando estamos ante una actuación material no permitida o anormal. De modo que, el régimen de responsabilidad sin falta requiere un daño anormal o un sacrificio especial que violente el principio de igualdad y por su parte en el régimen por funcionamiento anormal se exige la falta de servicio. En consecuencia para su acaecimiento se requiere de tres requisitos esenciales: 1) Actuación u omisión derivada de la función o Conducta de la Administración Pública omisiva o activa, formal o material, normal o anormal, lícita o ilícita. 2) Lesión o existencia de un daño antijurídico, una conducta por acción u omisión que infringe el ordenamiento jurídico. Tal lesión afecta al damnificado en su esfera patrimonial o extra patrimonial, produciéndose una lesión antijurídica y resarcible que no tiene el deber de soportar (antijuridicidad objetiva), siendo dicha conducta que por acción u omisión infringe el derecho objetivo. De modo que, dicha lesión debe ser cierta, efectiva, real, evaluable, individualizable, y no hipotética, al tenor del ordinal 196 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y 3) El Nexo causal, es decir que exista relación directa de causa a efecto entre el hecho que se imputa y el daño producido que legitimen el reclamo por el perjuicio producido, sin causales de exclusión del nexo de causalidad, al acontecer una situación eximente como la fuerza mayor, la culpa de la víctima y el hecho de un tercero. En cuanto a las causas que excluyen el nexo causal, están la fuerza mayor, la cual se entiende como un hecho de la naturaleza, extraño, exterior, imprevisible e inevitable, también opera la culpa de la víctima, que acontece cuando por su propio accionar, o por su descuido, negligencia e imprudencia inexcusable, se provoca la lesión, y el administrado se coloca en una posición propicia para ello y asume el riesgo y sus efectos nocivos previendo la eventualidad o posibilidad de la contingencia y el hecho de un tercero, que es la acción u omisión de una persona ajena a la relación triangular entre la Administración-funcionario y afectado, sin cuya participación no se hubiera producido el hecho lesivo (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: número 025-F-99 de las 14:15 horas del 22 de enero de 1999, número 589-F-99 de las 14:20 horas del 1 de octubre de 1999, y la número 252-F-01 de las 16:15 horas del 28 de marzo del 2001.)...".

VI.- SOBRE EL FONDO: Tal y como se indicó supra, los actores plantearon un proceso civil de hacienda, bajo el alegato de que este Tribunal por sentencia No. 346-2011 de la 14:50 horas del 13 de setiembre de 2011, ordenó al COSEVI a construir e instalar, en el plazo de seis meses contados a partir de su firmeza, una barrera de contención en la Dirección13198 , específicamente en el tramo comprendido entre Terramall y Pasoca, tanto en el sentido Cartago-San José como en el sentido San José-Cartago. Sentencia que adquirió firmeza con el fallo de la Sala I No.1039-FS1-2013 del día 14 de agosto de 2013, pero que al 03 de setiembre de 2014 no había instalado las vallas guardavías, sucediendo en esa fecha un accidente donde fallecieron sus familiares. Afirmaron que las accionadas incurrieron en una actividad anormal por omisión al no acatar lo ordenado en las citadas sentencias. Aseguraron las representaciones de los actores que de haberse instalado en el sitio del accidente, los guardavías o barreras protectoras, el resultado del accidente hubiese sido distinto, evitándose la muerte de sus familiares. Con base en ello solicitaron el pago del daño moral subjetivo por el dolor vivido ante la pérdida de sus familiares y patrimonial en razón del aporte económico que hacían los fallecidos a sus hogares. Corresponde entonces analizar si cabe responsabilidad del Estado y del CONAVI por la omisión que se le achaca en el deceso de los jóvenes Nombre111149 (Conductor), Nombre111151 , Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111153 , al no haber colocado a la fecha en que sucedió el accidente las vallas guardavías. Criterio del Tribunal: Para los actores, la dinámica del accidente fue que, si bien el conductor perdió el control de vehículo, fue la inexistencia de las vallas guardavías, ---a pesar de que se había ordenado a las accionadas su colocación---, lo que generó la muerte de todos sus ocupantes, ya que de haber sido colocadas oportunamente, el resultado hubiere sido otro, al perecer y en parte, también han relacionado tal resultado en nexo con las características del poste de alumbrado con el que había colisionado el vehículo conducido por quien en vida se identificó con el Nombre62 de Nombre111149 . En criterio de este Tribunal tal afirmación consiste en una mera presunción de los actores, sino especulación de los actores, pues no hay prueba que establezca que la existencia de tal mecanismo hubiese evitado el resultado, debiéndose tomar nota de que en ningún nivel, dicha presunción está basada en un informe o estudio técnico sobre la posible mecánica del accidente y el resultado de haber existido la valla guardavías. De esta forma, la prueba que consta en autos, no nos permite concluir que los actores lleven razón, en cuanto a que la colocación de guardavías hubiese evitado la muerte de los ocupantes del vehículo. La afirmación hecha en este sentido por los actores, al no contar con sustento probatorio, constituye una presunción y como presunción que es, sólo constituiría prueba, si fuese consecuencia directa, precisa y lógicamente deducida de un hecho probado. Luego, dentro de las diligencias investigativas por parte del O.I.J. se levantó el Informe 840-SI-2014 del 01 de octubre de 2014, confeccionado por el Investigador Jorge Rojas Chacón, con el visto bueno del señor Luis Arguedas Rojas, Coordinador del OIJ de La Unión y del señor Edwin Obando Granados, Jefe del OIJ de La Unión, en el que señaló que el vehículo por alguna razón se salió de su carril, atravesando la jardinera central e impactado un camión que circulaba en el carril contrario (oeste-este). También indicó en dicho informe que como parte de las diligencias se le tomó declaración al señor Nombre111156 , cédula CED87823 quien manifestó que el día del accidente pudo observar un vehículo color blanco, tipo automóvil ingresar a la autopista, por la salida del centro de Tres Ríos o de la Dirección13204 hacia la autopista, que iba rápido y nunca lo perdió de vista ya que había poco tránsito en ese momento. También se recibió el testimonio del Perito Judicial Andrés Miranda Benavides, cédula CED87825, Ingeniero Topógrafo, especialista en Accidentología Vial, quien a solicitud de este Tribunal confeccionó el “Dictamen Pericial No. DCF-2016-01200-ING” del 16 de setiembre de 2016 y su ampliación No. DCF-2017-00439-ING del 24 de abril de 2017. Sobre la dinámica del accidente indicó que el vehículo, debido a un error humano como mayor probabilidad se salió de la calzada. Que la calzada cuenta con un adecuado diseño y se encontraba en buen estado. Que el vehículo no alcanzó chocar contra el poste, sino contra la base o anclaje, la cual es normal. Señaló que la existencia de la barrera es para minimizar la magnitud del daño, pero no para evitar accidentes y que era muy probable que de haber existido barreras en el lugar, el daño podría haber sido menor, pero igual es una mera presunción, que no nos lleva a la certeza de que el resultado hubiese sido distinto. A una pregunta de este Tribunal con respecto a la causa eficiente del accidente, manifestó que en su criterio tal situación se debió a la velocidad en que circulaba el vehículo y la pérdida de control sobre el mismo por parte de su chofer. En criterio de esta Cámara, también es importante tomar en consideración que según el “Parte Oficial” No. 2014-245700194 confeccionado por el Inspector de Tránsito Edwin Gutiérrez Carvajal No. 2457, el día de accidente las condiciones de la calzada eran buenas, iluminada, sin obstáculos y el estado del tiempo era despejado y señaló expresamente que el factor de riesgo, fue salirse de la carretera. De manera que la causa del accidente para este Tribunal, fue la pérdida de control sobre el vehículo, sin que se pueda llegar a la certeza de que la existencia de las guardavías hubiesen evitado el fatal resultado, pues si bien estas minimizan los eventuales resultados de un accidente, no equivale a concluir que su sola existencia podrían tener la virtud de evitar el resultado muerte. Y es que tal y como se indicó supra el resultado del accidente y las lesiones en sus pasajeros, es una asunto que solamente se hubiese acreditado, mediante prueba técnica, no obstante lo único que se acreditó es que el vehículo circulaba en una autopista a una velocidad no menor de 62 kilómetros por hora, sin que lograran demostrar la velocidad exacta y la dinámica del accidente que nos permitiera concluir que la existencia de la barrera hubiese evitado el resultado conocido. Nótese que el perito señala que este tipo de valla es para minimizar el riesgo ante un accidente, y que su existencia en el sitio podría haber variado el resultado fatal, sin embargo, el perito no concluye que su sola existencia se hubiese evitado el resultado que se dio en el presente caso, pues ello va a depender de la dinámica del accidente, de lo cual no se aportó prueba técnica. Luego, también tiene presente esta Cámara que, el señor Nombre111156 , cédula CED87823, ---quien fue entrevistado dentro de las diligencias de investigación realizadas por la Delegación del O.I.J. de La Unión---; manifestó que momentos antes del accidente divisó el vehículo el cual "iba rápido". De esta forma, es un hecho incontrovertido, que el conductor perdió el control del vehículo que conducía, y los actores no aportaron prueba que acreditara que la sola existencia de las barreras o vallas guardavías hubiese evitado la muerte de su conductor y acompañantes. Se reitera que a la sombra de lo normado por el artículo 41.1 del Código Procesal Civil con relación al 220 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, es obligación de la parte probar su dicho. De la relación de ambos artículos se deriva lo que se conoce como el onus probandi (o carga de la prueba) expresión latina del principio jurídico que señala quién está obligado a probar un determinado hecho ante los tribunales. Tampoco se demostró que fuese la ausencia de guardavías o barandas en la calzada la causa eficiente de la muerte del chofer del vehículo accidentado y sus 4 ocupantes, sino que la pérdida de control del mismo, fue la causa de que este abandonara el carril externo de la calzada, pasara al carril interno, atravesara la jardinera que divide ambas calzadas y llegara hasta el carril interno chocando el camión que se dirigía de oeste a este. El fundamento del onus probandi radica en un viejo aforismo de derecho que expresa que "lo normal se presume, lo anormal se prueba". Por tanto, quien invoca algo que rompe el estado de normalidad, debe probarlo ("affirmanti incumbit probatio": a quien afirma, incumbe la prueba). Básicamente, lo que se quiere decir con este aforismo es que la carga o el trabajo de probar un enunciado debe recaer en aquel que rompe el estado de normalidad (el que afirma poseer una nueva verdad sobre un tema). De manera que al no haberse acreditado la dinámica del accidente señalada por los actores, no es posible imputar a las accionadas la responsabilidad que le endilgan los actores. Dado lo anterior, y al no constituirse una relación directa de causa (que fuese la ausencia de los guardavías, la causa eficiente), en relación con el efecto (la muerte del conductor y sus acompañantes y en consecuencia, el daño moral subjetivo y patrimonial reclamado); el nexo causal se rompe, ya que para que se le pudiera atribuir el deber de la Administración a resarcir el daño, debió acreditarse ese nexo de causalidad. Dado lo anterior, y al no acreditarse el nexo de causalidad entre la situación acusada y el daño reclamado por los actores; se rechaza la demanda en todos extremos. Además de lo anterior y aún admitiendo que la existencia de las vallas guardavías hubiese evitado la fatalidad del accidente; en criterio del Tribunal, aun y si ello hubiese sido así, el nexo causal se rompe también a partir de hechos propios en que incurrió el conductor del vehículo. Así también quedó acreditado que al 03 de setiembre de 2014, el señor Nombre111149 no contaba con Licencia de Conducir y que conforme al examen toxicológico, en su sangre se detectaron residuos de carboxy Delta 9 THC en sangre, que es indicativo de consumo de productos de la Cannabis. En cuanto a la necesidad de contar con Licencia para conducir un vehículo automotor, la " Ley de Tránsito por Vías Públicas Terrestres" No. 9078, ---la cual regula la circulación, por las vías públicas terrestres, de los vehículos y de las personas que intervengan en el sistema de tránsito---, señala en su artículo 2.61) que la "Licencia de conducir" es el permiso otorgado por el Estado mediante el que se faculta a una persona a conducir un vehículo durante un período determinado y si bien toda persona puede obtener la licencia para la conducción de vehículos por vías públicas terrestres, el interesado debe cumplir previamente con una serie de requisitos establecidos en la Ley y su Reglamento, todo con el fin de acreditar su idoneidad para conducir. Entre estos requisitos tenemos: a) La realización de un examen práctico, el cual debe hacerse en un vehículo que presente las características propias del tipo de licencia a la que el conductor aspira. b) Ser mayor de dieciocho años, salvo en el caso de lo dispuesto por el artículo 85 para la licencia tipo A-1. En el caso de las licencias tipo B2, B3 y B4, reguladas por el artículo 86 de esta ley, deberá cumplirse la edad mínima allí indicada. c) Saber leer y escribir. Si la persona presenta algún tipo de limitación de aprendizaje, cognitiva o similar, el solicitante podrá sustituir este requisito con los cursos especiales que establezca la Dirección General de Educación Vial. A las personas con discapacidad se les deberán garantizar las adecuaciones y los servicios de apoyo necesarios durante la instrucción del curso. d) Presentar un dictamen médico general realizado por un profesional en ciencias médicas, autorizado por el Colegio de Médicos y Cirujanos. e) Aprobar el curso básico de educación vial, cuyos requisitos se establecerán mediante reglamento. f) Aprobar el examen práctico para el tipo de licencia a la que se aspira, de conformidad con las disposiciones que para ese efecto establezcan las autoridades competentes. g) No haber cometido ninguno de los delitos tipificados en el artículo 261 bis. Ahora, el conducir un vehículo sin poseer la Licencia de Conducir significa que quien lo hace así, resulta ser un conductor inexperto, el cual se expone a la imposición de una sanción administrativa que consistente en una multa y la detención del vehículo. Debe llamarse la atención, en que el no haber contado el señor Nombre111149 antes ni al momento del accidente con licencia de conducir, tornó en el plano jurídico y si de las normas que regulan la circulación de vehículos automotores se trata, no sólo suponer el ejercicio de una actividad ilegal, sino que además y en el plano técnico, la certeza de que no habría demostrado frente a autoridad alguna idoneidad para la conducción de vehículos automotores, lo que equivale o guarda identidad con decir, que tal y como no lo habría hecho en su momento de tener interés en conducir este tipo de vehículos por las vías públicas, como tampoco fue demostrado por los ahora accionantes en esta sede judicial, que al menos al día 03 de setiembre de 2014, el señor Nombre111149 contase además, con el conocimiento, capacidad y/o habilidades para operar un vehículo automotor por las vías públicas terrestres, lo que se desprende de la certificación del Consejo de Seguridad Vial No. DAC-6651-2015-CERT del 27 de enero de 2015, tomando en cuenta que ha mediado total ausencia de elemento de convicción alguno que permita afirmar lo contrario. En este sentido, no podría afirmarse que la carga de la prueba sobre la falta de idoneidad no se acreditó por corresponder probar tal circunstancia a las partes demandadas sin que lo hayan logrado con éxito, cuando antes bien, además de que se probó lo correspondiente a partir de los alcances de la mencionada certificación que por sí sola permite afirmar que no medió idoneidad en Nombre111149 por no haber cumplido con requisito alguno para acceder a la licencia requerida, frente a tal ausencia de idoneidad comprobada, cualquier intento dirigido a afirmar que con todo y ello, el señor Nombre111149 sí tenía el conocimiento y habilidad o capacidad para operar un vehículo automotor corresponde en orden a la carga de la prueba, a quien así lo afirmase, casa que no ocurrió en el presente caso. además, a sabiendas que no contaba con Licencia de Conducir, optó por tomar un vehículo y conducirlo por una autopista a una velocidad no inferior de 62 kilómetros por hora y que en criterio del señor Nombre111156 lo hacía de manera rápida. El señor Nombre111149 además, no acreditó nunca ante las autoridades de Tránsito contar con la capacidad y habilidad necesaria para operar un vehículo automotor y aún así decidió tomar uno y conducirlo, sin estar facultado para los efectos, asumiendo bajo su responsabilidad las consecuencias que ello le pudiera producir. Aunado a que se trataba de un conductor carente de la Licencia de Conducir, esta Cámara toma en consideración que de acuerdo al "Dictamen de Análisis Criminalístico” No. 2014-03805-TOX, del 01 de diciembre de 2014, en su sangre se detectó la presencia CANNABINOIDES POSITIVO de "Carboxy-Delta-9THC", lo que es indicativo de consumo de productos de la Cannabis. Es decir que, además de no estar autorizado por el Estado para conducir, lo hacía bajo los efectos de una sustancia no permitida. Y es que quien conduce bajo la influencia de drogas tóxicas, estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas u otras sustancias que produzcan estados de alteración y efectos enervantes o depresivos análogos, ---independientemente de la cantidad que haya consumido---, incurre en un delito, denominado “Conducción Temeraria ”. En este sentido el artículo 261 bis del Código Penal sanciona este delito de la siguiente manera: "...Se impondrá pena de prisión de uno a tres años, en los siguientes casos: ...c)...Igual pena se aplicará a quien conduzca bajo la influencia de drogas tóxicas, estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas u otras sustancias que produzcan estados de alteración y efectos enervantes o depresivos análogos..." Así, el conducir bajo los efectos de una droga como la cannabis, se encuentra tipificada en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, como delito, ---sin que este Tribunal en forma alguna se encuentre declarando su comisión desde el ámbito del derecho penal---. La norma no exige para la configuración del delito comprobación alguna para el caso de drogas distintas al alcohol, del grado en que existen en el organismo del conductor, por lo que la simple presencia de las mismas subsume la conducta en el tipo. De manera que el daño reclamado lo sería a partir de la conducción ilegítima por ilícita de un vehículo por un sujeto que no posee licencia de conducir y en consecuencia idoneidad técnica para ello y en refuerzo de lo anterior, en comisión de un ilícito (conducción temeraria), de modo que pretender aspirar a una indemnización por un daño generado a partir hechos que se habrían dado con ocasión de la comisión de una conducta calificadamente ilícita, negligente y descuidada de la especie, sin duda implicaría un uso abusivo del derecho, ya que en la producción del daño que se reclama concurrió como elemento que sin duda incidió con alto grado de probabilidad en la producción del accidente. De este modo, el resultado dañoso se produjo con causa eficiente en una conducta ilícita desplegada por la propia víctima (culpa de la víctima), lo que también como causa de exculpación o de responsabilidad, rompe con el nexo causal necesario para hacer prosperar un reproche de responsabilidad como el reclamado en este caso al Estado y al CONAVI. (Artículos 21 y 22 del Código Civil). Luego, en esta misma línea de pensamiento, resulta evidente, que el daño sufrido por los señores Nombre111151 , Nombre111154 , Steven Jesús Brizuela Alcázar y Nombre111153 , fue producido por un tercero, a saber, por Nombre111149 , de manera que con respecto a ellos opera la eximente de responsabilidad hecho de un tercero. Todo lo anterior permite afirmar que resultan improcedentes las pretensiones de corte indemnizatorio en su integridad, esbozadas por todas las partes demandadas. En cuanto a la acusada actuación anormal por omisión de la Administración (Estado y CONAVI) en razón de lo que dispuso este Tribunal en la sentencia No. 346-2011, confirmada por la Sala I en su sentencia No.1039-FS1-2013 del día 14 de agosto de 2013; esta Cámara difiere de tal alegato. Y es que ha quedado acreditado que en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta del 10 de abril de 2014 y del 12 de junio de 2014, se publicó la Licitación Pública No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 "Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Dirección13198 , secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)" pero debido a la inexistencia de oferentes, por oficio No. ACA-01-14-0590 del 17 de julio de 2014, se tuvo que declarar infructuosa. También quedó acreditado que nuevamente se concursó la obra por Licitación Pública 21014-LN-000015-0D100, y finalmente por oficio GCSV-09-2018-4787 del 16 de agosto de 2018 se dio la recepción de la obra. De forma que la sentencia dictada por este Tribunal quedó en firme hasta el dictado de la sentencia de la Sala I No.1039-FS1-2013 del día 14 de agosto de 2013, y luego de los estudios correspondientes y preparación del cartel, la Administración sacó a concurso la Licitación Pública No. 2014LN-000006-0D100 " Obras de implementación de seguridad vial en las Rutas Nacionales No. 252 y 2, Dirección13198 , secciones: Ruta Nacional No. 252 y Ruta Nacional No. 2 (Intersección de la Ruta Nacional No. 252 con Ruta Nacional No. 2-Intersección Ruta Nacional No. 2 con Ruta Nacional No. 219 (Taras)", publicada en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta del 10 de abril y 12 de junio de 2014, pero debido a que ninguna empresa ofertó debió declarar el concurso infructuoso. Nótese que entre la firmeza de la sentencia y la publicación del concurso, transcurrió alrededor de 8 meses, plazo que no resulta irrazonable, ni excesivo, ya que este tipo de obras por imperativo legal deben sacarse a concurso y ello conlleva necesariamente un plazo, pues en materia administrativa la contratación debe hacerse siguiendo las normas de la Ley de Contratación Administrativa. No obstante lo gestionado, se dio un hecho imprevisible para la Administración y fue que no hubo oferentes, por lo que debió declararse infructuosa la licitación pues esa es la forma correcta de proceder ante la carencia de interesados en concursar o presentar sus plicas u ofertas. Luego, la Administración nuevamente sacó a concurso la Licitación Pública 21014-LN-000015-0D100, y por oficio GCSV-09-2018-4787 del 16 de agosto de 2018 se dio la recepción definitiva de la obra. De esta forma en criterio del Tribunal, no podría achacarse una conducta anormal por omisión de la Administración con respecto a lo que le ordenó este Tribunal y la Sala I en las sentencias indicadas. Corolario de lo anterior es el rechazo de la demanda en todos sus extremos.

VII.- EXCEPCIONES: La representación del Estado opuso las excepciones de fondo de falta de derecho y falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva y la representación de CONAVI opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. La excepción de falta de legitimación pasiva se debe rechazar ya que la legitimación pasiva del Estado en la presente causa deviene del artículo 12 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo (integración legal). En cuanto a la excepción de falta de derecho, retomando lo dicho por nuestra Sala Primera, es menester remitirse a la demostración de los hechos, como parte fundamental de ello, porque de lo que en ese acápite se determina, se podrá desprender si existen o no las bases legales para lo pretendido. Establece la legislación vigente que una de las excepciones oponibles en los procesos judiciales es la Falta de Derecho y no habiéndose acreditado derecho amparable a favor de los actores, se debe acoger la excepción y por ende declarar sin lugar la demanda.

VIII.- COSTAS: El artículo 193 del CPCA establece que las costas procesales y personales son impuestas al vencido por el solo hecho de serlo, pronunciamiento que debe hacerse incluso de oficio, al tenor de lo dispuesto en esa misma norma, en concordancia con el numeral 119.2 ibídem. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable: a) cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar; b) cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas que desconociera la parte contraria; o bien, c) cuando se incurra en plus petitio, esto es, cuando la diferencia entre lo reclamado y lo obtenido en definitiva sea de un quince por ciento (15%) o más, a no ser que las bases de la demanda sean expresamente consideradas provisionales o su determinación dependa del arbitrio judicial o dictamen de peritos (ordinal 194 ibídem). En la especie, no observa esta Cámara que estemos ante alguna de las excepciones supra señaladas, que permiten quebrar el postulado de condenatoria en costas a la parte vencida. En ese tanto, lo procedente es condenar a los actores al pago de ambas costas más sus intereses hasta su efectivo pago, las cuales se liquidarán en fase de ejecución de sentencia a pedido de las accionadas.

POR TANTO:

Se admite la prueba para mejor resolver ofrecida por la representación del CONAVI, no así la ofrecida por la Licenciada Susan Naranjo López. Se rechaza la excepción de falta de legitimación ad causam pasiva opuesta por la representación estatal. Se acoge la excepción de falta de derecho interpuesta por ambas partes demandadas y por ende se declara sin lugar en todos sus extremos la demanda incoada por los señores Nombre111148 , Mirania del Pilar Sanabria Elizondo, Ivannia Patricia Calderón Sanabria, [Nombre 001 002], Alfredo Brizuela González, Ana Marlene de los Ángeles Alcázar Ramírez, Luis Alfredo Brizuela Alcázar, Edith María Villalobos Campos, Alejandro Humberto Guzmán Villalobos, Nombre111149 , Alice Fuentes Ospina, Joyce Allen Brooks, Jorge Rodolfo Chaves Moreira, Imelda Tatiana Mora Porras y [Nombre 003] contra el Estado y el Consejo Nacional de Vialidad. Son ambas costas a cargo de los actores las cuales se liquidarán en fase de ejecución de sentencia a pedido de la representación del CONAVI y del Estado, más los intereses sobre estas únicamente con respecto al Estado. NOTIFÍQUESE. José Iván Salas Leitón, Felipe Córdoba Ramírez, Elías Baltodano Gómez. Jueces.