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Res. 00149-2016 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección VI · 14/10/2016
OutcomeResultado
The claim is dismissed in its entirety, the defense of lack of right is upheld, and the plaintiffs are ordered to pay costs.Se declara sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos, se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho y se condena a los actores al pago de costas.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Appeals Court rejects the claim of the agrarian plot awardees who alleged statute of limitations and procedural expiration regarding the administrative process that ended with the revocation of the award and the reversal of the property to INDER. The ruling analyzes the special legal nature of agrarian property arising from land assignment contracts, determines that the 15-year limitation period runs from the execution of the deed and not from the award decision, and concludes that there was no procedural inactivity exceeding six months attributable to the administration. It also declares the plaintiffs lack standing to claim re-registration of the property because they sold it illegally while the restrictions were in effect, characterizing their conduct as an attempted fraud on the law.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo rechaza la demanda de los adjudicatarios de una parcela agraria que alegaron prescripción y caducidad del procedimiento administrativo que culminó con la revocatoria de la adjudicación y la reversión del inmueble al INDER. La sentencia analiza la naturaleza especial de la propiedad agraria surgida de contratos de asignación de tierras, determina que el plazo de 15 años de limitaciones se computa desde la suscripción de la escritura y no desde el acuerdo de adjudicación, y concluye que no hubo inactividad procesal mayor a seis meses imputable a la administración. Además, declara la falta de legitimación activa de los actores para reclamar la reinscripción del bien por haberlo vendido ilegalmente durante la vigencia de las restricciones, calificando su conducta como un intento de fraude de ley.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Having assessed the situation, this Court considers that neither date applies. Indeed, note that neither the award by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution nor the registration in the Registry confer ownership rights, because this is a right acquired with the passage of time and satisfactory fulfillment of the imposed obligations, under the terms of Article 65 of the Land and Colonization Law No. 2825 (and its amendments). Therefore, the alleged statute of limitations (of the exercise of the oversight power of the Rural Development Institute) does not occur in this case, because the notification of the decision of 2:00 p.m. on September 25, 2008, which ordered the opening of the revocation of award and nullity of title proceedings, was notified to the plaintiffs here on September 29, 2008, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations. From the foregoing account it is evident that there were no delays contrary to the legal framework, since it is not even true that there was an inactivity exceeding six months attributable to the Administration, under the terms established in Article 340 of the General Public Administration Law.Valorada la situación, este Tribunal considera que no aplica ni una fecha ni otra. En efecto, nótese que ni la adjudicación por acuerdo de la Junta Directiva de la institución competente, ni tampoco la inscripción en el Registro, confieren el derecho de propiedad, en razón de que se trata de un derecho que se adquiere, con el transcurso del tiempo y el cumplimiento a satisfacción de las obligaciones impuestas, en los términos del numeral 65 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 (y sus reformas). En razón de lo anterior, no se produce en este caso la alegada prescripción (del ejercicio de la potestad fiscalizadora a cargo del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), por cuanto la notificación de la resolución de las catorce horas del veinticinco de setiembre del año dos mil ocho, que ordenó la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título, les fue notificada a los aquí actores el veintinueve de setiembre del dos mil ocho, esto es, antes del vencimiento de las limitaciones de ley. Del recuento anterior se advierte que no hubo dilaciones contrarias al bloque de legalidad, en tanto incluso, ni siquiera es cierto que haya habido una inactividad de más de seis meses, por culpa atinente a la Administración, en los términos establecidos en el artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"ni la adjudicación por acuerdo de la Junta Directiva de la institución competente, ni tampoco la inscripción en el Registro, confieren el derecho de propiedad, en razón de que se trata de un derecho que se adquiere, con el transcurso del tiempo y el cumplimiento a satisfacción de las obligaciones impuestas"
"neither the award by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution nor the registration in the Registry confer ownership rights, because this is a right acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the imposed obligations"
Considerando IX
"ni la adjudicación por acuerdo de la Junta Directiva de la institución competente, ni tampoco la inscripción en el Registro, confieren el derecho de propiedad, en razón de que se trata de un derecho que se adquiere, con el transcurso del tiempo y el cumplimiento a satisfacción de las obligaciones impuestas"
Considerando IX
"la sujeción de aquellas limitaciones legales es por el plazo de quince años, contados a partir de la aceptación de quien se obliga a ellas, y no antes, como proponen los actores, por cuanto no ha mediado aceptación de su parte"
"the subjection to those legal limitations is for a period of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance of the person bound by them, and not before, as the plaintiffs propose, since there has been no acceptance on their part"
Considerando IX
"la sujeción de aquellas limitaciones legales es por el plazo de quince años, contados a partir de la aceptación de quien se obliga a ellas, y no antes, como proponen los actores, por cuanto no ha mediado aceptación de su parte"
Considerando IX
"no puede obviarse lo dispuesto en el numeral 364 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que, cabalmente dispone de la ‘prevalencia’ de sus principios y normas, ‘sobre los de cualesquiera otras disposiciones de rango igual o menor’"
"the provisions of Article 364 of the General Public Administration Law cannot be ignored, which precisely provides for the ‘prevalence’ of its principles and norms ‘over those of any other provisions of equal or lower rank’"
Considerando X
"no puede obviarse lo dispuesto en el numeral 364 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que, cabalmente dispone de la ‘prevalencia’ de sus principios y normas, ‘sobre los de cualesquiera otras disposiciones de rango igual o menor’"
Considerando X
"los actores han actuado con evidente temeridad, a tal punto, que puede tenérsele como un intento de fraude de ley, en los términos regulados en el numeral 20 del Código Civil"
"the plaintiffs have acted with evident recklessness, to such an extent that it can be considered an attempted fraud on the law, under the terms regulated in Article 20 of the Civil Code"
Considerando XII
"los actores han actuado con evidente temeridad, a tal punto, que puede tenérsele como un intento de fraude de ley, en los términos regulados en el numeral 20 del Código Civil"
Considerando XII
Full documentDocumento completo
2 of 25 2 of 25 Judgment 149-2016-VI Case File 13-006424-1027-CA No. 149-2016-VI SIXTH SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL FINANCE TRIBUNAL. SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF SAN JOSÉ. Annex A, Address01, at fourteen hours thirty minutes on October fourteenth, two thousand sixteen.
This Tribunal hears the ordinary contentious administrative proceeding, declared to be processed as a pure matter of law, brought by Nombre140255, farmer, identity card number CED110420, and Nombre140256, homemaker, identity card number CED110421, both married (spouses) and residents of Dirección16888, against the INSTITUTE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT (INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL), represented latterly by its general agent Nombre140257, married, Master in Business Administration, identity card CED89756, resident of Sabanilla de Montes de Oca (certification of standing (personería) registered in the National Registry, incorporated into the electronic case file). Participating in the proceeding as interested third parties are Mr. Nombre140258, widowed once, farmer, identity card number CED110422, resident of Dirección16877, and the ESTATE OF Nombre140259, represented by her provisional executor Nombre140260 Nombre140261, single, student, identity card number CED110423, resident of Dirección16878 (designation according to resolution at seven hours on April fourteenth, two thousand sixteen, of the Civil Court of Puntarenas, certified and contributed to the virtual case file).
Acting as special judicial attorneys for the participants are the following lawyers: for the plaintiffs: Gerardo Moya Paniagua, married, identity card number CED110424, resident of Orotina (power of attorney granted on September twenty-eighth, two thousand thirteen, on folio 103 of the judicial case file, scanned in the virtual case file); for the defendant institution: Guillermo Goyenaga Calvo, married, identity card number CED110425, without indication of domicile (power of attorney dated January fourth, two thousand sixteen, in the virtual case file); and for the third party Arguedas Cortés: Jorge Fabricio Fernández Mayorga, divorced, identity card number CED110426, resident of Palmares de Alajuela (power of attorney granted on February fifteenth, two thousand sixteen, in the virtual case file). Appearing as directing attorney for the executor of the estate of Nombre140259 is lawyer Jorge Fabricio Fernández Mayorga. All participants are of legal age and Costa Rican.
WHEREAS:
Judge Rapporteur Fernández Brenes writes.
WHEREAS:
Of importance for the resolution of this matter, the following is deemed duly demonstrated:
The foregoing action was communicated to the interested parties at the fax number indicated (folios 76 bis and 76 of the administrative file);
III.OBJECT OF THE LAWSUIT.- The plaintiffs bring a contentious-administrative proceeding against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in which they make the following declaratory claims; the first and principal one — upon which the subsequent ones depend —, aimed at having prescription (prescripción) and/or expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure processed by the defendant institution under file 161-08-NUL declared. The basis for the foregoing declarations is as follows: a.) Regarding the alleged prescription (prescripción): that the limitations on property imposed under Article 67 of Law 2825, of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, begin to run from the award of the parcel, as interpreted by the Procuraduría General de la República (does not indicate any specific ruling) and the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the latter in judgment number 275-S1-F-2011; hence, it cannot be interpreted that the period runs from the registration of the right in the Registro Público de la Propiedad.
Thus, in this case, given that the award of parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement was ordered by agreement Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of the Junta Directiva of the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the fifteen-year period expired on September 27, 2008; therefore, they reason, that at the time they were notified of the initiation of the proceeding for revocation of the award and nullity of the title — which they claim occurred on September 30, 2008 —, the legal limitations and the competence of the defendant institution to act against them had already expired. The same fate befalls the order (exhorto) that was sent to the Registro to annotate the existence of that administrative proceeding, dated October 1st of the following year, they say, five days after the legal limitations expired; and b.) Regarding the alleged expiration (caducidad) of the procedure: they state that the administrative proceeding brought against them, processed under file 161-08-NUL, was inactive, due to fault exclusively attributable to the defendant institution, from December 3, 2008, to September 25, 2009, that is, for eight months and twenty-two days, such that the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure occurred, under the terms regulated in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to the text amended in 2006, effective as of January 1, 2008; which is applicable according to what was resolved by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo in judgment number 57-2011-VI, and as understood and assimilated by the active administration.
In addition to the foregoing claim, they also formulated the declaratory claim, dependent on the acceptance of the foregoing request, for nullity of the following administrative actions: the resolution of the Junta Directiva of three p.m. on July 19, 2010, which revoked the award that said body made to them by agreement in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of the Dirección16886 (Garabito) and the nullity of the title of ownership that was registered in the Registro de la Propiedad for the property with Folio Real number Placa26912); resolution number 1163-2012, of seven thirty-two a.m. on September 20, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Agrario (in its capacity as improper hierarchical superior), and which confirmed that decision; and the order (exhorto) that the defendant institution sent to the Registro Público de la Propiedad with presentation citations 2012-00333943-01; in which it ordered reversion of the ownership of that land to the defendant institution.
As a consequence of the foregoing, it requested the annulment of the registration of the aforementioned property in favor of the defendant institute. As a corollary of the acceptance of the nullities they requested to be declared — and also of an accessory nature to the principal declaratory claim —, they formulated a claim for injunctive relief, consisting of an order that the referenced property be registered under their ownership (that of the plaintiffs) in equal parts. Finally, they requested that this matter be declared without special award of costs. (Complaint document at folios 99 to 103 of the judicial file scanned and incorporated into the virtual file and statements during the Preliminary Hearing, according to the recording on the accompanying compact disc.)
IV.POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit filed against it, formulating the substantive defenses of lack of interest and lack of right; based on which it requested its dismissal regarding all its aspects and the awarding of costs against the plaintiffs. The grounds for its opposition are as follows: a.) That the proceeding brought against the plaintiffs for the revocation of the award of the Dirección16886 is governed by special regulations, both of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, and of the Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, text as published in La Gaceta number 13 of January 20, 2004 — in force at the time the challenged proceeding began —; in which full guarantee of respect for due process and the right of defense is provided, but to which the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) of proceedings is not applicable, with the regulated periods even being different from those of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; b.) That said proceeding was conducted in the exercise of the oversight powers that this institution has over its properties, to verify compliance with the purpose for which they were awarded; and in this case, the plaintiffs' breach of the limitations imposed by legal mandate — illegal sale of the property — was verified, giving rise to the loss of their right, in the manner typified in Articles 66 and 68 of Law number 2825, and as was declared in the administrative venue; c.) That the fifteen-year period of the limitations on the property of the parcels that are awarded does not run from the moment of the award, as this is a prior act to the granting of the deed; therefore, it runs from its corresponding registration in the Registro, under the terms of Article 67 of the cited Law number Placa19660.
It also points out the error in the interpretation of the ruling of the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, since it refers to the fact that new limitations cannot be imposed on the property after they have expired; at which time the cassation appeal filed was even dismissed; d.) That when the plaintiffs were notified of the initiation of the proceeding for revocation of the award and nullity of the title, the legal limitations were in force, since the registration of the right of ownership in favor of the plaintiffs occurred on July 9, 1994, so that the limitations did not expire until July 9, 2009; e.) Regarding the alleged expiration (caducidad) of the procedure, it indicated that it is a form of "abnormal" termination of the procedure, and in this case, it is evident that the procedure in question is already terminated and even the ownership of the asset has been reverted; that it must be considered that the legal concept of expiration of the procedure (caducidad del procedimiento) came into force upon the enactment of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, effective as of January 1, 2008; hence, under Transitory Provision IV of said procedural code, administrative procedures initiated prior to the entry into force of said procedural regulation, whatever their procedural stage, must continue to be processed under the regulations that previously governed them; and that in any case, the processing of administrative procedure 161-08-NUL was continuous and the alleged inactivity is not proven; f.) That regarding the issues of prescription (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) alleged in this process, the improper hierarchical superior — Tribunal Agrario — found no defect whatsoever; g.) It added that the matter should be reviewed with a comprehensive view of the situation, and in this regard, called attention to the situation of the interested third parties appearing in this proceeding, since as of 2005, they are the ones exercising possession over the land that is the object of this proceeding; based on which it alleges lack of interest in this matter.
Finally, it requested that both the preliminary and substantive defenses alleged be upheld. (Answer to the complaint at folios 107 to 123 and statements by the representative during the closing arguments phase, according to digital backup on accompanying compact disc.)
V.POSITION OF THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES.- Mr. Nombre140258 and the late Ms. Nombre140259 — now represented by her son, who acts as her executor — requested that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects, for the following reasons: a.) that on the occasion of the purchase option (opción de venta) granted to them by the plaintiffs herein over the property with Folio Real number — at that time — Placa26912 of the Province of Puntarenas, and which was subject to the limitations of Law number 2825, they accepted it according to the legal transaction entered into on December 9, 2005, at which time they paid forty-five million colones, on the condition that the title of ownership be delivered to them, upon authorization by the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario or when the legal limitations expired; b.) That as of the date of that legal transaction — December 9, 2005 — they have exercised possession over the indicated land, with all the attributes of the right of ownership; c.) That said sale was real and concrete, according to a deed executed before the same professional (attorney/notary) who now acts as the legal representative of the plaintiffs herein; without warning them of the illegality of the transaction, insofar as the sale of the property that is the object of this proceeding by the plaintiffs was carried out during the validity of the limitations of the referenced law; and subsequently, they even concealed from them the proceeding for revocation and nullity against the plaintiffs herein; d.) That the foregoing situation obliged them to file an ordinary agrarian lawsuit against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in order to find remedy for their situation, first to have said parcel granted to them in ownership, and failing that, to have the improvements (mejoras) introduced paid to them, as corresponds by right, having worked it since the date they took possession; e.) They reject that the prescription (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) alleged occurred in the administrative proceeding brought against the plaintiffs herein; since the limitations of Law 2825 expired after the date on which they were notified of the administrative proceeding against them, and there was no paralysis of the procedure under the terms of Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; g.) Finally, they warned of the bad faith of the plaintiffs in this litigation, who in their lawsuit and allegations have concealed the sale they made to them of the property object of the litigation, showing that they intend to profit from their own fraudulent act, a circumstance that even shows the lack of active legal standing (of the plaintiffs), by claiming a right they do not have, given that they are not the legitimate owners — due to the sale of the property — nor possessors of the asset.
(Brief of appearance in the process at folios 201 recto to 206 recto of the judicial file scanned and incorporated into the virtual file and statements by the representative and lead attorney, according to digital backup on the accompanying compact disc.)
VI.PRIOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WILL BE RESOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING.- Having seen the allegations underlying this lawsuit and those of the defendant institute and interested third parties, it is deemed necessary to specify that this proceeding will not address the situation of the latter regarding their right or expectations over the property with Folio Real number Placa26915 of the Province of Puntarenas, derived from their possession since December 9, 2005, on the occasion of their acceptance of the purchase option (opción de venta) granted to them by the plaintiffs herein and payment for that property — proven facts 4.) and 5.) —. The foregoing, because it has been clear that those claims (or pretensions) are being resolved in the agrarian proceeding being processed under file number 12-1601000-0642-AG-2, in the Juzgado Agrario of Puntarenas — proven fact 33.) —, hence it exceeds the scope of competence of this Authority and the object of this proceeding to address such a situation.
Consequently, the reference made to that situation is only insofar as it affects the claims that the plaintiffs formulate in this contentious-administrative proceeding. Furthermore, it is clarified that the only matter to be examined in this ruling is the legality of the actions taken by the defendant Administration — Instituto de Desarrollo Rural —, in the manner in which it was raised in the lawsuit, so we will focus on whether or not there was prescription (prescripción) and/or expiration (caducidad) of the procedure processed in file 161-08-NUL in the administrative venue.
As previously noted, the other pronouncements requested are accessory to the prescription and expiration (caducidad) that is sought to be declared.
VII.OF THE DEFENSE OF EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE ACTION REITERATED IN THE CONCLUSIONS PHASE.- It had already been indicated that, at the Preliminary Hearing held on May thirteenth of this year, the Processing Judge in charge of the matter rejected the privileged preliminary defense of expiration (caducidad) of the action formulated up to that point by the representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural. However, in the conclusions phase, without adding any additional consideration, its proponent reiterated this exception. Regarding this aspect, we must recall that, pursuant to the provisions of article 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, for the filing of contentious proceedings concerning the review of the legality of administrative conduct, the legislator established the mechanism of expiration (caducidad) of the action —with the exception of what is expressly regulated in article 41 of the same procedural code, cases in which the rule of prescription of the right applies—.
This period was set at one year, which, as applicable to the sub judice, runs from "the day following notification," when the challenged act must be notified, as stated in subsection a) of the aforementioned numeral 39. In the case under study, even though the record does not contain the date on which the Tribunal Agrario notified Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 of resolution 1163, of seven thirty-two hours on September twenty, two thousand twelve, which is a decision of an improper hierarchical superior and, by virtue thereof, exhausted the administrative process –pursuant to canon 126 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública–; it is possible to conclude that this process was filed on time, that is, within the one-year expiration (caducidad) period established in the applicable regulations. This is so because the date of that decision was September twenty, two thousand twelve, and the filing of this action was on September nineteen, two thousand thirteen –proven fact 34.)–, meaning it did not even exceed that period. Consequently, the rejection of the privileged preliminary defense raised is appropriate. We proceed then with the analysis of the merits of the matter raised.
VIII.OF THE AGRARIAN PROPERTY ORIGINATING IN CONTRACTS WITH THE INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL.- Insofar as the object of the lawsuit refers to the analysis of the actions taken by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural in an administrative procedure for the revocation of an award of an (agrarian) parcel and annulment of the (property right) title, it is deemed pertinent, before hearing the claims in that procedural path, to understand the special legal nature of agrarian property originating in the land allocation contracts signed with the sued institute; its mode of acquisition and the conditions that bind it; the foregoing, to understand the basis of the oversight functions and instruments under the responsibility of the institution sued in this process, the author and responsible party for the challenged conduct. For this reason, it is deemed necessary to make some brief clarifications regarding agrarian property. In this sense, it is useful to refer to what was indicated by the Sala Constitucional in judgment number 2006-1806, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on February fifteen, two thousand six, in relation to these, in which it clarified the moment from which the beneficiary acquires the property right, with all the attributes it comprises –pursuant to the regulation of numeral 45 of the Carta Fundamental and 264 of the Código Civil–:
"First, it must be clear that ownership is not acquired with the delivery of the title, nor even at the moment the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario transfers the parcel to the beneficiary, but rather upon the fulfillment of the conditions set forth in that numeral, namely, the passage of that period –the fifteen years set forth in the challenged norm–, the effective and real payment for the property, and compliance with the requirements stipulated for the proper use of that parcel. Second, it is characteristic of this type of contracts –of an agrarian nature– to stipulate a duration period, as a condition precedent, so that it is only when the beneficiary fulfills the requirements set forth both in the referenced law and in the award contract that they definitively acquire that property. Pursuant to the foregoing, the issue of the period established by law –and which is the subject of challenge in this action– is a matter of legislative discretion; the alleged unconstitutionality rests on its purported unreasonableness, an issue that will be addressed later.
Third, it must be taken into account that the land award contract can be revoked by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario –pursuant to the provisions of article 66 of the same referenced law– before the expiration of that period, if the beneficiary does not meet the conditions stipulated in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización and in the award contract, insofar as the parcel is delivered with a specific purpose, that is, to promote agrarian production, in accordance with the agricultural vocation recognized in these parcels. ..." (The highlighting is from the original.)
Furthermore, already prior to this ruling, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia had expressed its opinion on the special legal nature of land award contracts, typical of Agrarian Law, which find their legal support in subsections 5) and 6) of article 1, 4, 5, 55, 63 subsection 1) and 64 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, and its amendments, in the following terms:
"VIII.- The allocation contract is a duration contract through which the agrarian entity awards an agrarian parcel to a beneficiary of the land grant programs, previously qualified according to the parameters established by its own regulations, committing to transfer it, for an eventual price or free of charge, if the beneficiary demonstrates the technical capacity to develop the agrarian enterprise and fulfills the imposed obligations during a trial period; the transfer of ownership is verified subject to a multiplicity of obligations on the part of the beneficiary, the breach of which allows the entity to revoke the award, during a period of 15 years or until there are no outstanding debts, without being able to dispose of it in any way without prior express authorization from the Institute, since by provision of the Law the allocating entity may recover the asset to award it to another beneficiary, and must always exercise direct control over the activity carried out by the awardee, even after the 15-year period has elapsed or the debts have been paid off, when the beneficiary has full and exclusive ownership.
IX.From a causal point of view, it cannot be maintained that the cause of the allocation transaction consists, as in a sale, of the exchange of a thing for a price, because that is not the social economic function, or social policy, in relation to the goal of allocating lands to those who have none or have them insufficiently; on the contrary, it seeks to contribute to a better distribution of wealth with a sense of social justice and to the increase of the country's production or productivity. From this point of view, when the Law refers to a sale, or the administrative practice of the entity leads to carrying out a sale-purchase legal transaction to register it in the Registro Público de la Propiedad, it does not allow us to ignore that the allocation will be carried out through the execution of an agreement of the administrative entity whose existence exceeds the agreement of the parties.
But that administrative agreement also entails very important elements to differentiate the land allocation contract from the sale, or from the simple administrative contract, in that the clauses contained in the contract originate from the Law, and its exercise does not arise from the power of imperium or the interest of the parties, but from the State's own purposes that bind it to achieving a better distribution of land and raising the economic and social conditions of farmers, agricultural entrepreneurs, and land workers, especially if they do not have the means within their reach to lead a dignified life. It is for this reason that the land allocation has been classified as a typical contract of Agrarian Law.
X.A very important characteristic of this contract established in the Law, and interpreted by doctrine, is that it is a duration contract. Its perfection does not take effect with the transfer of ownership of the parcel; on the contrary, this crystallizes as the beneficiary fulfills their obligations, during the time established by the Law, and carries out the activity for which it was granted. Ownership is fully acquired only after the period has elapsed. In our case, this can reach up to 30 years as a 5-year grace period is granted, prior to the granting of the deed, and another of up to 25 years for the payment of the price; but it can have two types of variations: increasing it, when due to insufficient production not attributable to the parcel holder, the Institute must readjust the payment method, and another, decreasing it, by allowing early payment, upon completing 15 years from the transfer of ownership. In this sense, if the contract is for a specific price, or free of charge, from the granting of the deed there will be 15 years during which the Institute may revoke, rescind, or annul the contract in the event of the beneficiary's breach. (Articles 59, 67 and 68 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización)." (Judgment number 229-90, of fifteen hours on July twenty, nineteen ninety, of the Sala Primera. The underlining is not from the original.)
Furthermore, in the referenced constitutional judgment 2006-1806, the special purpose of this type of contract is concluded, precisely in light of the conceptualization that governs us as a Costa Rican Social and Democratic Rule of Law, according to the design established in our Constitución Política, based on the following considerations:
"... the limitations on free disposition and the prohibition of land-use change (cambio de uso) have their origin in the social function recognized in this property, whose primary objective is its award –precisely– so that its owner may have a dignified way of life, through an activity previously determined by the law and the contract through which it was acquired. Thus, the conditions imposed in the law and in the land award contract are fully justified in light of Constitutional Law, insofar as their sole purpose is to ensure that the land award procedures fulfill the purpose for which this program was created; which should never be understood as a simple program for granting property titles to solve urgent squatting problems, but as a true instrument to achieve an adequate and just distribution of the land resource, the creation of self-sufficient family agrarian enterprises, and the effective increase in national production, which allows the peasant to raise their living standard, by making them a participant in the development of the Nation.
(In the same sense, judgments number 5363-95, of nine hours twenty-seven minutes on September twenty-nine, nineteen ninety-five, and 2004-9099, of eleven hours thirteen minutes on August twenty, two thousand four, of this Chamber.) Allowing the contrary would imply the perversion of the land parceling (parcelación) and colonization system for the lands awarded by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario." (The highlighting is from the original.)
Based on the foregoing guidelines, the analysis of what is debated in this matter proceeds, circumscribed to whether or not there was prescription of the oversight power by the Public Administration, to revoke the award of the agrarian parcel in favor of the plaintiffs herein, and whether or not expiration (caducidad) occurred in the subsequent administrative procedure.
IX.OF THE ALLEGED PRESCRIPTION OF THE REVOCATION AND TITLE ANNULMENT PROCEDURE.- In relation to this point, and taking into consideration the special legal nature of the agrarian parcel award contracts, the point regarding the prescription of the Administration's power to revoke the award and annul the granted title must be elucidated. As indicated supra, the plaintiffs allege that it is from the date of the Board of Directors' agreement in which the award was ordered, and for its part, the sued institution alleges that it is from the registration in the Registry of that transfer. Having assessed the situation, this Tribunal considers that neither date applies. Indeed, note that neither the award by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution, nor the registration in the Registry, confer the property right, because it is a right acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the imposed obligations, in the terms of numeral 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 (and its amendments).
Thus, with the act of "award" (adjudicación) of a parcel, ownership is not transferred, and it is a unilateral act of the Administration, in which the beneficiary(ies) do not participate, by which the sale of the parcel in their favor is simply authorized; and by virtue thereof, it is merely the pre-condition to subsequently configure the respective contract, which is the individualized (individual) deed in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries, in which, now indeed, the conditions of that grant are established, and in which are exactly comprised the limitations established in ordinals 66, 67 and 68 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825, as well as the effective transfer of the awarded parcel, precisely from the date of its execution. In this sense, that deed acquires the condition of a contract transferring ownership, which, in light of what is established in article 1007 of the Código Civil, insofar as it establishes obligations for the buyer –beneficiaries– is formal, bilateral, consensual, and in relation to the legal limitations on this property, requires the consent or acceptance of the obligor, so that compliance may be compelled, in this case, by the selling institution; the failure to comply, in the terms established precisely in numeral 66 of the reference Law (number 2825 and its amendments) and generically in 692 of the Código Civil, gives rise to revocation of the award and annulment of the title.
Note that the acquisition of the parcel in the hands of the beneficiary(ies) occurs with and from the execution of this deed, not before, and by virtue thereof, numeral 67 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización refers as a parameter for calculating the fifteen-year validity of the limitations of that law, the date of acquisition of the parcel, which in no way occurs with the (it is repeated, unilateral) act of the Administration, but with and from the signing of the corresponding deed. Finally, it must be remembered to this effect, that pursuant to mandate 1022 of the Código Civil, the contract is law between the parties, and what is agreed binds its signatories, "... both to what is expressed in them, and to the consequences that equity, custom, and the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature," states subsection 1) of numeral 1023 of the cited Código Civil. Thus, the subjection of those legal limitations is for the period of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance of the person who binds themselves to them, and not before, as proposed by the plaintiffs, since no acceptance on their part has been mediated, nor legitimate occupation of that property.
With the situation thus presented, the period cannot be computed from the award of parcel 57 of the Asentamiento de Lagunillas to Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256, which occurred by agreement of Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-six, nineteen ninety-three –proven fact 1.)–, nor from the registration of those rights in the Registro Público de la Propiedad, after the execution of the corresponding deed, which occurred on July ninth of the year nineteen ninety-four –proven fact 3.)–, as argued by the sued institution, but rather from the date of execution of the corresponding deed transferring the real property, an occasion on which the limitations of the law were also imposed, with the acceptance of the beneficiaries, which occurred on October first of the year nineteen ninety-three –proven fact 2.)–. In this sense, it is noteworthy that with the registration of those rights, the effective date of these limitations was annotated, i.e., from October first, nineteen ninety-three, to October first, two thousand eight, as stated in the corresponding property certification that the Folio Real registration number Placa26912 held at that time – proven fact 3.)–; consequently, those who bring this action can neither claim ignorance nor attempt its modification.
By reason of the foregoing, the alleged prescription (of the exercise of the oversight power under the responsibility of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural) does not occur in this case, since the notification of the resolution of fourteen hours on September twenty-five, two thousand eight, which ordered the opening of the procedure for the revocation of the award and annulment of the title, was notified to the plaintiffs herein on September twenty-nine, two thousand eight – proven fact 11.)–, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations. Likewise, the official letter sent to the Registro Público to communicate the opening of this proceeding was ordered in the resolution of sixteen hours on September twenty-five, two thousand eight –proven fact 12.)–, without affecting its validity, the fact that it was made known to the Registry until the following October first, due to the fact that by that date, the plaintiffs herein had already been personally notified of the opening of the administrative proceeding against them, thereby interrupting the prescription.
Finally, on this aspect, it must be indicated that the criterion put forth in this pronouncement on this point is not subject to the reasons or considerations of other rulings, such as the one alleged in the lawsuit, under the consideration that in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, judges are only subject to the Constitution and the laws (block of legality), in the terms of numeral 154 of the Constitución Política, so a sphere of independence of the judges is recognized, who are not even subject to or bound by precedents or jurisprudence, the latter understood as the reiterated criterion (of at least three rulings) emanating from the Courts of Cassation, in relation to a specific legal point (in the terms of numeral 9 of the Código Civil). For the reasons stated, the lawsuit must be dismissed regarding this point.
X.OF EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR THE REVOCATION OF AWARDS AND ANNULMENT OF AGRARIAN PROPERTY TITLES.- In relation to the second point to be analyzed, the first thing that must be clarified is whether the mechanism of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, applies to the administrative procedures carried out by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the exercise of its legally assigned powers, and second: if this mechanism is applicable, whether or not the alleged expiration (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for the revocation of the award and annulment of the title, conducted by the defendant against the plaintiffs herein –Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256, and processed in case file number 161-08-NUL. Regarding the first, as the plaintiff correctly points out, this Tribunal has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the mechanism of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative procedures for the revocation of parcel awards by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.
Thus, among others, judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes on March eight, two thousand eleven, can be consulted, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes on March nine, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-nine, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-three, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours on June fourteen, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours on August thirteen, the last four of two thousand twelve, and number 210-2012-VI, of fourteen hours twenty minutes on October four, two thousand twelve. In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the mechanism of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the procedures conducted by the sued institution, was concluded; a criterion shared on the basis of the following considerations:
In this regard, it must be considered that "[...] all these legal norms, derived from the Constitución Política as an ideological model, pursue nothing more and nothing less than the realization of the fundamental goal of justice, which is the greatest of the principles that protect a State of Law, which includes rules –general principles– that have full validity and applicability to the administrative procedures of any Administration body, it is reiterated, therefore, the principles extracted from it must be strictly observed by the authorities in charge of authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a sanctioning result." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Sala Constitucional. The highlighting is not from the original.)
It is thus how the guarantee of due process manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which demonstrates its instrumental character, since it is designed to guarantee the best resolution thereof, in the terms provided in article 215.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública:
"The administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system." (The highlighting is not from the original.)
The binding nature of the guarantees that make up due process has such relevance in the administrative sanctioning field that its non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as stated by the Sala Constitucional in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.
It is about the proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is in accordance with the principles of procedural economy and efficiency, as well as the principle of constitutional reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a rule that was amended by canon 200, subsection 10) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in the following terms:
"1) When the procedure is suspended for more than six months by reason of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who initiated it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code.
Now then, it is noted that in the interest of promoting a speedy process, this cannot call into question or undermine the guarantees that make up due process, such as not duly justifying the resolution due to the lack of carrying out expert reports, summonses, or some important evidence; or not respecting the deadlines established for the filing of appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the mechanism of expiration (caducidad) provided in the transcribed legal rule, it is justified as a means to avoid the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act –when the matter was initiated at the request of a party– and likewise, it is moot when that final act has already been issued.
For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned rule, expiration (caducidad) requires the following conditions: first, that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; second, that such stagnation is the result of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio; and third, that this state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a period that constitutes the minimum time limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure. This implies that in sanctioning procedures or those possibly affecting rights initiated ex officio, expiration (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated, in essence, on the mechanism under commentary, it considered:
"In the first place, it can be observed that the recently transcribed norm is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual conditions contained therein are met, the consequence becomes obligatory for the body in charge of processing. This implies that its effects occur ipso jure, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive ones." It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence—which is, by definition, non-waivable, non-transferable, and not subject to a statute of limitations according to numeral 66 LGAP—but rather, solely, as the impossibility of continuing to process the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred." (The highlighting is not from the original.)
From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the General Law on Public Administration, public competences are granted in order to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the expiration of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, competences are not extinguished by the passage of the time limit set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states with full force that the act issued outside the time limit is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided otherwise by law, which is not the case here. It is clear that expiration (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself denominates as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect within the administrative procedure; therefore, as long as it is not ordered or, at least, requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.
Furthermore, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obligates the official and the Judge to interpret the norms, principles, and values "in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within respect for the rights and interests of the individual" (article 10.1 of the General Law on Public Administration), which in this case requires respect for the forms and constituent elements of due process; which is proper in a Social and Democratic State of Law.
In any case, as indicated previously, in the face of a normative gap or vacuum, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first in the Public branch (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider—as already indicated in the precedents cited above—that the regulation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario itself for this type of situation, in force at the time of the facts under analysis, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; from which the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provision in numeral 364 of the General Law on Public Administration cannot be ignored, which fully provides for the "prevalence" of its principles and norms, "over those of any other provisions of equal or lower rank," which it establishes as "criteria for interpretation of the entire administrative legal order of the country."
XI.ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE PURSUED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.- Having determined the applicability of the institute of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative procedure pursued against the plaintiffs here—Messrs. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256—we proceed to the analysis of the situation in that indicated matter. After a meticulous review of what occurred in said matter, it can be verified that the alleged inactivity of the procedure in question does not occur. Indeed, it is noted that the processing has been continuous, with multiple participations of the plaintiffs here, in the full exercise of the defense of their interests, and also of those who participate in this matter as interested third parties. Thus, after the notification of the opening of the procedure to the plaintiffs here, which occurred on September twenty-ninth, two thousand eight—proven fact 11.)—they responded by brief on October eighth, two thousand eight, at which time they accepted the accused non-compliance (illegal sale of the parcel while the limitations were in force)—proven fact 13.)—.
Later, on the following December second, the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate changed the date for conducting the site inspection to fourteen hours thirty minutes on the following December third, two thousand eight, and rescheduled the hearing for the following December fourth, starting at fourteen hours—proven fact 14.)—. That same day (December second, two thousand eight), Messrs. Nombre140258 and Nombre140259 appeared in the procedure, requesting to be considered as interested third parties in the matter and that those proceedings be archived—proven fact 15.)—. The plaintiffs here submitted a note on December third, two thousand eight, in which they recorded that at the indicated time and day, the officials of the defendant Institute had not appeared to carry out the site inspection—proven fact 16.)—; which inspection was carried out starting at fourteen hours thirty minutes on that same day (December third, two thousand eight), with the presence of Licentiate Lewis Mac Laren, technician Jonathán Rodríguez, and engineer Francisco Molina Salas, and at which Mrs.
Nombre140259 and her son were present, which was recorded in the respective minutes—proven fact 17.)—. By reason of the foregoing, on December twelfth, two thousand eight, the plaintiffs here—Messrs. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256—filed an incident of nullity of the actions and resolutions, starting from the one issued at eight hours forty minutes on the preceding December second—proven fact 18.)—. Now, the next action that occurred in this procedural iter was the submission, at sixteen hours on June third, two thousand nine, of the report DRCP-FCO 001-08 (which is dated December third, two thousand eight), which is the report that engineer Francisco Molina Salas sent to the Central Pacific Regional Directorate of the then Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario containing the findings and conclusions of the inspection carried out at Dirección16883—proven fact 19.)—. Later, on July seventh, two thousand nine, Messrs.
Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 filed a motion for expiration (caducidad) of the procedure processed under case file 161-08-NUL; a motion they reiterated on the thirteenth of that same month and year—proven fact 20.)—By official letter JD-0457-2009, of August third, two thousand nine, the Secretary General of the Board of Directors referred the matter to the knowledge of the Regional Directorate of the Central Pacific Regional Directorate of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, so that it could rule on the alleged expiration (caducidad); and this unit, in turn, by official letter DRPC-581-2009, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand nine, referred it to the Regional Legal Advisory Office—proven fact 21.)—. It is thus that, by resolution at nine hours forty minutes on October twenty-second, two thousand nine, the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate considered the previous briefs as submitted; granted a hearing on the inspection report, and referred the recusal to the Regional Director—proven fact 22.)—.
On November thirteenth, two thousand nine, the plaintiffs here filed a new incident of nullity of everything acted upon, starting from December third, two thousand eight—proven fact 23.)—and the pending motions were resolved in the resolution at eight hours on December fourteenth, two thousand nine, of the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate, which rejected the alleged nullity, considering the inspection carried out on December third, two thousand eight as legitimate; rejected the motion for expiration (caducidad)—considering that this matter is governed by special regulations, to which the General Law on Public Administration is not applicable—; and the motion to consider Messrs. Nombre140258 and Nombre140259 as third parties; and finally summoned the investigated parties for a hearing to be held starting at nine hours thirty minutes on January twenty-seventh, two thousand ten—proven fact 24.)—.
Against the previous decision, on January sixth, two thousand ten, the plaintiffs here filed an appeal with concomitant nullity; which was dismissed by official letter DRPC-024-2009, of the following January twenty-fifth, issued by the Regional Director of the Central Pacific—proven fact 25.)—. It is thus that on the day and at the indicated time (nine hours thirty minutes on January twenty-seventh, two thousand ten), the hearing in the procedure for the extinction of adjudication and annulment of the title of parcel 57 of Asentamiento Lagunillas was held, without the presence of Messrs. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256, nor their judicial representative (Rigoberto Jiménez Vega), which was recorded, along with the fact that there was no justification in that regard; a proceeding in which the testimony of the witness engineers Nombre140264 and Nombre140265 was received—proven fact 26.)—. Finally, on June third, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the then-denominated Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario received the final report of the procedure for the extinction of adjudication and annulment of the title of parcel 57 of Asentamiento Lagunillas, given by Official Letter AJORO-17-10, of the previous June second, prepared by the Legal Advisory Office for Legal Affairs of the Central Pacific Region, in which it considered proven the non-compliance with the limitations of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización by Messrs.
Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 ("unjustified abandonment of the parcel by physically and permanently absenting themselves from the property for several years and not being in possession thereof, in which third persons unrelated to them and their family are living, working, and exploiting it, and illegal sale, for having sold the parcel to these third-party occupants, grounds classified in articles 67 and 68, subsection 4) paragraph b) ibidem, ..."), in light of which it recommended declaring the extinction of rights with the revocation of the adjudication made by agreement adopted by the Board of Directors of the institution in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-three, with the subsequent annulment of the property title of the estate registered in the Real Estate Registry under Real Folio registration number Placa26912, of the Province of Puntarenas, free of annotations, cancelling document 577-49-01, which is the official communication of annotation of that procedure, and requiring the cancellation of the encumbrances under citations 407-06703-0178, as they correspond to the limitations of the Law, and citations 527-13,250-003, which is a mortgage, whose debt obligation has been satisfied and its registral cancellation requested by the creditor—according to a document annotated under citations 577-88,344—; and that the Registry be notified by official communication, so that it reverts the property to the name of the institution (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario); finally, it warned that an appraisal of the improvements to the property should be carried out, in order to determine by whom they were made—proven fact 27.)—.
In light of this report, by Agreement adopted unanimously in Article 72 of ordinary session 022-2010, held on July nineteenth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the then-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, and resolution at fifteen hours on the indicated date, issued the final act in this administrative procedure, at which time it ordered: a.) the extinction of rights with the revocation of the adjudication made by agreement adopted by the Board of Directors of the institution in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-three, with the subsequent annulment of the property title of the estate registered in the Real Estate Registry, under Real Folio registration number Placa26912, of the Province of Puntarenas, free of annotations and encumbrances; b.) the issuance of the official communication in due form to notify the Registry of the reversion of the property to the name of the institution; c.) to carry out the appraisal of improvements to the property and determine by whom they were made for their corresponding payment; d.) for the Orotina Subregional Office to proceed with the prompt eviction process from the property, by means of the corresponding demands to the illegal occupants, so that they vacate it voluntarily, and to any other person who is illegally on the property; and in case of refusal, proceed with eviction by means of the Civil Guard, and that in case of doubt regarding the claim for improvements by the occupants (buyers), the corresponding amount be deposited in the account of the Agrarian Court under the case file for anticipated evidence proceedings of judicial recognition and expert evidence, under case file 09-160133-0642-AG-2.
Finally, it advised the plaintiffs here of the availability of the appeal against that decision (for appeal before the improper hierarchical superior, the Agrarian Tribunal)—proven fact 29.)—. It is thus that the appeal that was filed against the previous decision on November sixteenth, two thousand ten, was finally resolved by resolution 1163, at seven hours thirty-two minutes on September twentieth, two thousand twelve, of the Agrarian Tribunal—proven fact 31.)—. From the foregoing recount, it is noted that there were no delays contrary to the legality framework, in that it is not even true that there was an inactivity of more than six months, due to fault attributable to the Administration, in the terms established in article 340 of the General Law on Public Administration, and of reference for this matter. On the contrary, even if we were to count from the carrying out of the inspection of the parcel, which was done on December third, two thousand eight—proven fact 17.)—, which seems improper, given that the interested parties here filed a motion for nullity of the actions on December twelfth, two thousand eight—proven fact 18.)—, the truth is that on June third, two thousand nine, the corresponding report of that proceeding was submitted to the case file—proven fact 19.)—, which is of transcendence for the resolution of this matter, to the point that it was brought to the knowledge of the interested parties by resolution on October twenty-second, two thousand nine, of the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate—proven fact 21.)—.
This being the case, the motion for expiration (caducidad) filed by Messrs. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 did not "interrupt" the accused inactivity of the procedure, given that previously, an important action by the Administration for the progression of this procedure had occurred. This being the case, the alleged inactivity does not occur, and the action is also dismissed in relation to this point.
XII.PRONOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE CLAIMS FORMULATED.- In light of the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to review the claims that were formulated in this proceeding, which includes various pronouncements, as follows:
By virtue of this, this Chamber considers that in relation to this point, the plaintiffs lack active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) to request the inscription of that property in their name. Indeed, what was already said regarding the special connotation of this type of property is recalled, upon which rests an important social function, which manifests itself in the obligation of the beneficiary to directly work and exploit the ceded parcel, as clearly and simply required by article 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, when it provides: "If the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and fulfilled to the satisfaction of it all other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted a property title, ..." and is reinforced by the second paragraph of numeral 67 of the same legal body, by establishing: "After fifteen years have elapsed and the property right has been acquired, ..." Thus, in this case, it is evident that the plaintiffs did not acquire ownership of the property they claim, due to the non-compliance with the limitations that by law were imposed on the cession in their favor, an adjudication that was revoked according to the procedure followed for that purpose, in time, that is, prior to the expiration of those limitations.
An interpretation different from what was said would imply distorting the raison d'être of these adjudications. With the situation framed thusly, this Authority considers that in the case, the plaintiffs have acted with evident recklessness, to such a point that it can be considered an attempt at fraud of law (fraude de ley), in the terms regulated in numeral 20 of the Civil Code, which literally provides: "Acts carried out under the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal order, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded."
XIII.ON THE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES OF THE LAWSUIT.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit in its answer, and to that effect, requested that it be declared without merit in all its points, for which it formulated the defenses of lack of interest and lack of right, and the interested third parties raised the defense of lack of standing (legitimación activa). In this sense, we must attend to the fact that standing (legitimación), current interest in the resolution of the matter, and right are substantive prerequisites of every jurisdictional process, which must be reviewed by every Judge, even ex officio, and in that rigorous order. In this regard, the following should be noted:
"This Chamber has expressed that standing is: '...a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the lawsuit and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible a judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantial interest being discussed in the proceeding. Standing in the cause refers to the substantial relationship that is intended to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person who by law is required to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows that the substantial legal relationship being the object of the lawsuit be declared; and the plaintiff, the person who according to the law can formulate the claims of the lawsuit, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. ...' (Ruling 000976-F-2006, at seven hours forty minutes on December nineteenth, two thousand six).
And more recently, the cited High Court, in ruling number 1042-F-SI-2013, at eight hours fifty minutes on August fourteenth, two thousand thirteen, held:
'(...) In accordance with procedural doctrine, the so-called "legitimatio ad causam" active or passive, or, as it is also termed, standing in the cause or standing to act, alludes to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and of being obligated to the provision (the defendant). That is, those who have standing in the cause are the persons who legally and directly will be affected in their rights by the judgment. In this line of thought, this Chamber has indicated that standing is: "(...) a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the lawsuit and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make possible a judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantial interest being discussed in the proceeding.
Standing in the cause refers to the substantial relationship that is intended to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person who by law is required to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows that the substantial legal relationship being the object of the lawsuit be declared; and the plaintiff, the person who according to the law can formulate the claims of the lawsuit, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. ... According to the subject having standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing, the former corresponding to the plaintiff and the persons who later intervene to defend their cause, the latter belonging to the defendant and those who intervene to discuss and oppose the plaintiff's claim.
The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment, if the adjudicator notices the lack thereof, they must declare it ex officio and issue a judgment of dismissal, which is no obstacle for it to be timely alleged as a preliminary exception. (...) Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a concrete proceeding, it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for such purpose concerning the procedural claim. Thus, the active legitimatio ad causam, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position in which the subject finds themselves, regarding the procedural claim promoted. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they claim in court. ...' (Ruling number 976 at 7 hours 40 minutes on December 19, 2006. In the same sense, consult, among others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 89 at 14 hours 50 minutes on June 19, 1991, 83 at 15 hours 15 minutes on September 24, 1997, 604 at 10 hours on August 17, 2007, and 1023-A-S1-2009 at 14 hours 50 minutes on October 1, 2009)'.
In light of the foregoing, it can be concluded that in essence, active standing in the cause (legitimación ad causam activa) determines that the person who appears as plaintiff in a proceeding is the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims of the lawsuit, and by virtue thereof, is the holder of the right or legitimate interest that is requested to be recognized in their favor, and regarding whom it is possible to issue a ruling favorable to their claims; and for its part, passive standing in the cause (legitimación ad causam pasiva) determines that the person who is sued is the person who by law is required to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows that the substantial legal relationship being the object of the lawsuit be declared. The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantial impediment to granting the lawsuit, and if the adjudicator notices the lack thereof, they must declare it ex officio and issue a judgment accordingly, although it is no obstacle for it to be timely alleged as a preliminary exception.
Ergo, standing in the cause is outlined as an elementary substantive prerequisite for the issuance of a favorable judgment, since if its absence is not noticed, the judge could incur the error of granting a right to someone to whom it does not correspond or imposing an obligation on someone who is not the obligor, insofar as this would mean that the ruling as such becomes unenforceable.
In light of the foregoing, it is considered that the plaintiffs—Nombre140255 and Nombre140256—in their capacity as allottees of an agricultural parcel, pursuant to an agreement to that effect issued by the competent body—at that time, the so-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario—have active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) to seek review of the legality of the administrative conduct they challenged in this venue, all of which derives from the administrative proceeding for the revocation of that allotment and annulment of the title. And in that regard, passive standing to be sued (legitimación ad causam pasiva) also exists with respect to the institution sued in this proceeding. In relation to these portions of the complaint (declaratory claims), it had already been declared—by resolution number 107-2015, at fifteen hours and two minutes on March fifth, two thousand fifteen, of Section I of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda—that Mr.
Nombre140258 and now the Estate of the late Nombre140259 have an interest in the matter, in the capacity or position of interested third parties (terceros interesados). However, as was alleged by the interested third parties, the defense of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) is appropriately upheld, but only with respect to the claim for injunctive relief made in this proceeding, aimed at ordering that the property with Folio Real registration number Placa26915 be re-registered in the name of the plaintiffs, given that since December ninth, two thousand five, and as of the date of adopting this jurisdictional decision, the plaintiffs do not exercise possession over the property whose title they claim, having sold (illegally) that parcel to those who appear as interested third parties (terceros interesados) in this proceeding; in accordance with which, granting their request would constitute an evident abuse of right (abuso de derecho), in light of the special nature of agricultural property (purposes and mode of acquisition), as has been explained supra.
XIV.COSTS.- In accordance with article 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. Dispensation from this assessment is only viable when, in the Court’s judgment, there exists sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of assessment against the losing party. Therefore, the plaintiffs are assessed the payment of procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this ruling becomes final. Regarding the interested third parties (terceros interesados), Nombre140258 and the estate of the late Nombre140259, they did not formulate their own claim; with respect to them, no special assessment of costs is declared.
POR TANTO:
The preliminary defense of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) reiterated in the conclusions phase by the representation of the sued institution is rejected. The defense of lack of active standing to sue (falta de legitimación ad causam activa) raised by the interested third parties (terceros interesados) is partially upheld, that is, in relation to the last claim, for injunctive relief, aimed at ordering the registration of the property with Folio Real registration number Placa26915, again in favor of the plaintiffs, and in equal shares; and it is rejected with respect to the other claims. As for the rest, the substantive defense of lack of interest raised by the sued institution is rejected, and the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho) raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the interested third parties (terceros interesados) is upheld. Consequently, the complaint filed by Nombre140255 AND Nombre140256 against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL AND THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES (TERCEROS INTERESADOS), Nombre140258 AND THE ESTATE OF THE LATE Nombre140259, is declared WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS PARTS.
The plaintiffs are assessed the payment of procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) in favor of the sued institution, which shall be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this ruling becomes final. No special assessment of costs is declared with respect to the interested third parties (terceros interesados).
Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre136022 Daniel Aguilar Méndez Proceso de conocimiento con trámite de puro derecho (art. 98.2 del CPCA) Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 against the INDER.
Interested third parties (Terceros interesados): Nombre140258 and Sucesión de Nombre140259 For the areas it takes for the stated purposes, the State shall pay the original purchase price and the value of the necessary and useful improvements; D) That the purchasers may not transfer ownership of the property, nor encumber, lease, or subdivide (subdividir) it without the prior authorization of the selling Institute, except after fifteen years from this date, with the exception of transactions with the Nationalized Banking, the National Production Council, or any other State credit institutions. After said fifteen years, any sale of the parcel or parcels that, in the judgment of the selling Institute, could produce excessive concentration or subdivision of the property shall give the latter the right to acquire the parcel or parcels offered for sale at the price set by appraisers named by the parties or by a third party appointed by the two other experts in case of disagreement; and that the parcels, crops, seeds, animals, equipment, tools, and equipment necessary for the operation of the parcels, MAY NOT be subject to preventive or executory judicial measures by third-party creditors before the parcel holders have canceled their obligations with the Institute, unless such creditors are such for having provided credit duly authorized by this Institute; F) That the breach by the purchasers or by the persons to whom they have transferred the parcels acquired herein of any of the obligations set forth in the Land and Colonization Law, number two thousand eight hundred twenty-five of October fourteenth, nineteen hundred sixty-one and its amendments, shall give the selling Institute the right to administratively revoke the land grant (adjudicación) and to petition the Registry to register the parcel or parcels sold here again in favor of said Institute, who shall pay whoever appears as owner in the Registry at the time of revocation the original purchase price and the value of the improvements that may have been introduced to the property according to the appraisal to be carried out for that purpose by an appraiser of the selling Institution.
We, the undersigned Notaries, attest that the Representative of the selling Institute was duly authorized by its Board of Directors through an agreement taken in article number five of Session seventy-three held on November twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred ninety-three ..." (deed at folios 11 front to 10 back and cadastral plan at folio 9 of the administrative file);
The testimony of the expert witnesses engineers Nombre140264 and Nombre140265 was received (record at folios 182 to 181 of the administrative file); 27.) That on June 3, 2010, the Board of Directors of the then-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario received the final report of the proceeding for extinction of the award and nullity of the title for parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement, given by Official Letter AJORO-17-10, of June 2 of the previous year, prepared by the Legal Advisory Office for Legal Affairs of the Central Pacific Region, in which it was deemed accredited that the limitations of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización had been breached by the individuals Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 ("*unjustified abandonment of the parcel by being physically and permanently absent from the property for several years and not being in possession of it, where third parties unrelated to them and their family are living, working, and exploiting it, and illegal sale, as the parcel was sold to these third-party occupants, grounds typified in articles 67 and 68, subsection 4) paragraph b) ibidem*, ..."), and in light of which it recommended declaring the extinction of rights with the revocation of the award made by agreement adopted by the institution's Board of Directors in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, with the subsequent nullity of the property title of the farm registered in the Real Property Registry under registration number Placa26912, of the Province of Puntarenas, free of annotations, cancelling document 577-49-01, which is a request for annotation of that proceeding, and the encumbrances under citations 407-06703-0178, as they correspond to the limitations of the Law, and citations 527-13.250-003, which is a mortgage that has been satisfied regarding its debt obligation and whose registry cancellation was requested by the creditor -according to the document annotated under citations 577-88.344-; must be cancelled, and that the Registry must be notified by means of a request so that the property reverts to the name of the institution (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario).
Finally, it warned that an appraisal of the improvements on the property had to be made, in order to determine by whom they were made (folios 290 to 275 of the administrative file, the highlighting is from the original);
III.OBJECT OF THE LAWSUIT.- The plaintiffs bring a contentious-administrative proceeding against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in which they make the following declaratory claims; the first and main one -and upon which the subsequent ones depend-, aimed at having the prescription and/or lapse of the administrative proceeding processed by the defendant institution under case file 161-08-NUL declared. The basis for the preceding declarations is as follows: a.) Regarding the alleged prescription: that the limitations on property imposed under the terms of Law 2825, of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, begin to run from the awarding of the parcel, as interpreted by the Procuraduría General de la República (it does not indicate any) and the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, the latter in judgment number 275-S1-F-2011; hence it cannot be interpreted that the period runs from the registration of the right in the Public Property Registry.
Thus, in this case, given that the awarding of parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement was ordered by the Fifth agreement of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of the Board of Directors of the then-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the fifteen-year period expired on September 27, 2008; therefore, they reason that at the time they were notified of the initiation of the proceeding for the revocation of the award and nullity of the title -which they claim occurred on September 30, 2008-, the limitations of the law and the jurisdiction of the defendant institution to act against them had expired. The same fate befalls the request sent to the Registry to annotate the existence of that administrative proceeding, dated October 1 of the same year, they say, five days after the limitations of the law had expired; and b.) Regarding the alleged lapse of the proceeding: they point out that the administrative proceeding brought against them, processed under case file 161-08-NUL, was inactive for a reason exclusively attributable to the defendant institution, from December 3, 2008, to September 25, 2009, that is, for eight months and twenty-two days, therefore the lapse of the proceeding occurred, under the terms regulated in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to the text given by the amendment in 2006, effective as of January 1, 2008; which is applicable according to what was resolved by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo in judgment number 57-2011-VI, and as understood and assimilated by the active administration.
In addition to the previous claim, they made the claim, also declaratory and dependent on the granting of the previous request, for the nullity of the following administrative actions: the resolution of the Board of Directors at 3:00 p.m. on July 19, 2010, which revoked the award that body made to them by agreement in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of the property (finca) (Garabito) and the nullity of the property title that was registered in the Property Registry for the farm with Real Folio registration number Placa26912); resolution number 1163-2012, at 7:32 a.m. on September 20, 2012, issued by the Tribunal Agrario (in its capacity as improper hierarchical superior), and which confirmed that decision; and the request that the defendant institution sent to the Public Property Registry with filing citations 2012-00333943-01; in which it ordered the reversal of the ownership of that land to the defendant institution).
As a consequence of the foregoing, it requested the annulment of the registration of the mentioned farm in favor of the defendant institute. As a corollary to the granting of the nullities that they requested be declared -and also accessory to the main declaratory claim-, they made the claim for a condemnatory judgment, consisting of an order to register the referenced farm under their ownership (that of the plaintiffs) in equal shares. Finally, they requested that this matter be declared without a special award of costs (Lawsuit brief at folios 99 to 103 of the judicial file scanned and incorporated into the virtual file and statements during the Preliminary Hearing, according to the recording on the attached compact disc.)
IV.POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit filed against it, raising the substantive defenses of lack of interest and lack of right; in light of which it requested its dismissal regarding all its aspects and an award of costs against the plaintiffs. The basis for its opposition is as follows: a.) That the proceeding brought against the plaintiffs for the revocation of the award of the property (finca) is governed by a special regulation, both the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, and the Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, text according to publication in La Gaceta number 13 of January 20, 2004 -in force at the time the questioned proceeding was initiated-; in which full guarantee of respect for due process and the right of defense is given, but in which the legal concept of lapse of proceedings is not applicable, the regulated deadlines even being different from those of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; b.) That said proceeding was carried out in the exercise of the oversight powers that that institution has over its properties, to verify compliance with the purpose for which they were awarded; and in this case, the plaintiffs' breach of the limitations imposed by legal mandate -illegal sale of the property- was verified, which gave rise to the loss of their right, in the manner typified in articles 66 and 68 of Law number 2825, and as was declared in the administrative venue; c.) That the fifteen-year period of limitations on the property rights of parcels that are awarded does not run from the moment of the award, as this is an act prior to the granting of the deed; thus, it runs from its corresponding registration in the Registry, under the terms of article 67 of the cited Law number Placa19660.
It also points out the error in the interpretation of the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as it refers to the fact that new limitations cannot be re-imposed on the property after they have expired; a time at which the cassation appeal filed was even dismissed; d.) That when the plaintiffs were notified of the initiation of the proceeding for revocation of the award and nullity of the title, the limitations of the law were in force, because the registration of the property right in favor of the plaintiffs occurred on July 9, 1994, so the limitations did not expire until July 9, 2009; e.) Regarding the alleged lapse of the proceeding, it indicated that it is a form of "*abnormal*" termination of the proceeding, and in this case, it is evident that the proceeding in question is already terminated and even the ownership of the asset has reverted; that it must be considered that the legal concept of lapse of proceedings came into effect with the enactment of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, effective as of January 1, 2008; hence, under the terms of Transitory IV of the cited procedural code, administrative proceedings initiated prior to the entry into force of said procedural regulation, whatever their procedural stage, must continue to be substantiated with the regulations that previously governed them; and that in any case, the processing of administrative proceeding 161-08-NUL was continuous and the alleged inactivity is not accredited; f.) That in relation to the claims of prescription and lapse argued in this process, the improper hierarchical superior -Tribunal Agrario- found no defect whatsoever; g.) It added that the matter should be reviewed with a comprehensive view of the situation, and in this sense, it drew attention to the situation of the interested third parties appearing in this process, since as of 2005, they are the ones exercising possession over the land object of this process; in light of which, it alleges lack of interest in this matter. It finally requested that both the preliminary and substantive defenses raised be granted.
(Reply to the complaint on folios 107 to 123 and statements of the representative during the closing arguments phase, according to the digital backup on the attached compact disc.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">V.- THE POSITION OF THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Mr. Nombre140258</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">and the late Nombre140259</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">—now represented by his son, who acts as his executor— requested that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, for the following reasons: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">a.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> that on the occasion of the sale option given to them by the plaintiffs here for the property with real property registration number (matrícula de Folio Real) —at that time— number Placa26912</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">of the Province of Puntarenas, which was subject to the limitations of Law number 2825, they accepted it pursuant to a transaction signed on December 9, 2005, at which time they paid forty-five million colones, on condition that the title of ownership be delivered to them, upon authorization by the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario or when the</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">legal limitations expired; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">b.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> That as of the date of that legal transaction —December 9, 2005— they have exercised possession (posesión) over the indicated property, with all the attributes of the right of ownership; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">c.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> That that sale was real and concrete, according to the deed granted before the same professional (lawyer/notary) who now acts as the legal representative of the plaintiffs here; without warning them of the illegality of the transaction, insofar as the sale of the farm that is the object of this proceeding was made by the plaintiffs during the validity of the limitations of the referenced law; and subsequently, they even concealed from them the revocation and nullity procedure against the plaintiffs here; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">d.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">That the foregoing situation forced them to file an ordinary agrarian complaint against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in order to find redress for their situation, first so that the plot be granted to them in ownership, and failing that, so that they be paid for the improvements made, as legally corresponds, for having worked it since the date they have exercised possession; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">e.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> They reject that, in the administrative procedure against the plaintiffs here, the alleged statute of limitations (prescripción) and lapse (caducidad) occurred; because the limitations of Law 2825 expired after the date on which they were notified of the administrative procedure against them, and there was no paralysis of the procedure in the terms of Article 340 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública); </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">g.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> Finally, they warned of the bad faith of the plaintiffs in this litigation, who in their complaint and allegations have concealed the sale they made to them of the property that is the object of the litigation, denoting that they want to take advantage of their own fraud (dolo), a circumstance that even demonstrates the lack of standing (legitimación activa) (of the plaintiffs), by claiming a right they do not have, given that they are not the legitimate owners —on the occasion of the sale of the property— nor possessors of the asset.
(Brief of appearance in the proceedings on folios 201 front to 206 front of the scanned judicial case file and incorporated into the virtual case file, and </span><span style="font-family:Arial">statements of the representative and lead attorney, according to the digital backup on the attached compact disc.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VI.- PRIOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WILL BE RESOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Having seen the allegations supporting this complaint and those of the defendant institute and interested third parties, it is deemed necessary to specify that this proceeding will not address the situation of the latter regarding their right or expectations over the farm with real property registration number (matrícula de Folio Real) number Placa26915 of the Province of Puntarenas, derived from their possession since December 9, 2005, on the occasion of the acceptance of the sale option made to them by the plaintiffs here and the payment for that property —</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">proven facts 4.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">5.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">—.
The foregoing, because it has become clear that those claims (or pretensions) are being resolved in the agrarian proceeding processed under case file </span><span style="font-family:Arial">number 12-1601000-0642-AG-2, at the Agrarian Court of Puntarenas —</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 33.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">—, whereby it exceeds the scope of competence of this Authority and the object of this proceeding to hear that situation. Consequently, the reference to that situation is solely insofar as it affects the pretensions that the plaintiffs formulate in this contentious administrative proceeding. Furthermore, it is clarified that the only thing to be analyzed in this ruling is the legality of the actions of the defendant Administration —Instituto de Desarrollo Rural—, in the manner in which it was raised in the complaint, so we will focus on whether or not there was a statute of limitations (prescripción) and/or lapse (caducidad) of the procedure processed under administrative case file 161-08-NUL.
As previously warned, the other rulings that were requested are accessory to the statute of limitations (prescripción) and lapse (caducidad) that are requested to be declared. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VII.- THE DEFENSE OF LAPSE OF THE ACTION (CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN) REITERATED IN THE CLOSING ARGUMENTS PHASE.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">It had already been indicated that, in the Preliminary Hearing held on May 13th last, the Procedural Judge in charge of the matter rejected the privileged preliminary defense (defensa previa privilegiada) that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural had formulated up to that point, regarding the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción).
However, in the closing arguments phase, without adding any additional consideration, its proponent reiterated this exception. Regarding this aspect, we must remember that, under the provisions of Article 39 of the Code of Contentious Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), for the formulation of contentious proceedings concerning the review of the legality of administrative conduct, the legislator established the institution of the lapse of the action (caducidad de la acción) —with the exception of what is expressly regulated in Article 41 of the same procedural code, cases in which the rule of the statute of limitations of the right (prescripción del derecho) applies—. This term was set at one year, regarding its application to the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">sub judice</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> matter, starting from "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">the day following notification</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">", when the contested act must be notified, as stated in subsection a) of the cited Article 39.
In the case under study, even though the record does not contain the</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> date on which the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) notified Mr. Nombre140255</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Mr. Nombre140256</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">of resolution 1163, of seven hours thirty-two minutes on September 20, 2012, which is a decision of the improper hierarch (jerarca impropio) and, by virtue thereof, exhausted the administrative channel —in accordance with canon 126 of the General Public Administration Act (Ley General de la Administración Pública)—; it is possible to conclude that this proceeding was filed in time, that is, within the annual lapse (caducidad) term established in the regulations governing the matter. And this is so because the date of that decision was September 20, 2012, and the filing of this action was September 19, 2013 —</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 34.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">—, that is, it did not even exceed that term.
Consequently, the rejection of the privileged preliminary defense (defensa previa privilegiada) raised is appropriate. We therefore proceed with the analysis on the merits of the matter raised.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VIII.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101"> AGRARIAN PROPERTY ORIGINATING IN CONTRACTS WITH THE INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Since the object of the complaint refers to the analysis of the actions of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural in an administrative revocation (revocatoria) procedure of an award (adjudicación) of an (agrarian) plot and the nullity (nulidad) of the title (of ownership right), it is deemed pertinent, before hearing the claims in that procedural path, to understand the special legal nature of agrarian property originating in the land assignment contracts signed with the defendant institute; its mode of acquisition and the conditions that subject it; the foregoing, to understand the basis of the supervisory functions and instruments in charge of the institution that is sued in this proceeding, author and responsible for the contested conduct.
Therefore, it is deemed necessary to make some brief clarifications regarding agrarian property. In this sense, it is useful to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in ruling number 2006-1806, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on February 15, 2006, regarding these, in which it clarified the moment from which the beneficiary acquires the right of ownership, with all the attributes it comprises —in accordance with the regulation of Article 45 of the Constitution (Carta Fundamental) and Article 264 of the Civil Code (Código Civil)—:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">In the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">first place</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, it must be clear that </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">ownership is not acquired with the delivery of the title, nor even at the moment when the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario transfers the plot to the beneficiary, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">but rather with the fulfillment of the conditions established in that article</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, namely, the passage of that period –the fifteen years established in the contested regulation–, the effective and real payment for the property, and the submission to the requirements stipulated for the proper use of that property.
In the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">second place</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> it is typical of this type of contracts –of an agrarian nature– to stipulate a duration term, as a condition precedent (condición suspensiva)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">, so that it is only at the moment when the beneficiary fulfills the requirements established both in the referenced law and in the award contract, that he definitively acquires that property. In light of the foregoing, the issue of the term established by law –and which is the object of challenge in this action– is a matter of the legislator's discretion; the alleged unconstitutionality resides in its alleged unreasonableness, an issue that will be addressed later.
In the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">third place, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">it must be taken into account that the land award contract (contrato de adjudicación de tierras) can be revoked by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario –in accordance with the provisions of Article 66 of the same referenced law–, before the expiration of that period, if the beneficiary does not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) and in the award contract, because the property is delivered for a specific purpose, that is, to promote agrarian production, in accordance with the agricultural vocation recognized in these properties. ...</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (The highlighting is from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Furthermore, prior to this ruling, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia) had already pronounced on the special legal nature of land award contracts, typical of Agrarian Law, which find their legal basis in subsections 5) and 6) of Article 1, Articles 4, 5, 55, 63 subsection 1), and 64 of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización), number 2825, of October 14, 1961, and its amendments, in the following terms: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">VIII.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">The assignment contract is a duration contract (contrato de duración)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">by which the agrarian entity awards to a beneficiary of the land provision programs, previously qualified according to the parameters established by its own regulations, an agrarian property, committing to transfer it, for an eventual price or free of charge, if the beneficiary demonstrates the technical capacity to develop the agrarian enterprise and fulfills the obligations imposed during a trial period; the transfer in ownership is verified subject to a multiplicity of obligations on the part of the beneficiary, whose breach allows the entity to revoke the award, during a term of 15 years or until there are no outstanding debts, and it cannot in any way be sold if prior express authorization from the Institute is not obtained, since by provision of the Law the assigning entity may recover the asset to award it to another beneficiary, always having to exercise direct control over the activity carried out by the awardee, even after the 15-year period has passed or the debts have been paid off, when the beneficiary has full and exclusive ownership. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">IX.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">From a causal point of view </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">it cannot be maintained that the cause (causa) of the assignment transaction consists, as in a purchase-sale, of the exchange of a thing for a price, because that is not its social economic function, or social policy, in relation to the purpose of assigning land to those who have none or have it insufficiently; on the contrary, it seeks to contribute to a better distribution of wealth with a sense of social justice and to the increase of the country's production or productivity</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">From this point of view, when the Law refers to a sale, or the administrative practice of the entity leads to carrying out a purchase-sale legal transaction to register it in the Public Registry of Property, it does not allow ignoring that the assignment will be carried out through the execution of an agreement of the administrative entity whose existence goes beyond the agreement of the parties.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">But that administrative agreement also entails very important elements to differentiate the land assignment contract from the purchase-sale, or from the simple administrative contract, insofar as the clauses contained in the contract come from the Law, and their exercise does not derive from the power of authority (poder de imperio) or the interest of the parties, but from the State's own purposes that bind it to achieve a better distribution of land and raise the economic and social conditions of farmers, agricultural entrepreneurs, and land workers, especially if they do not have the means at their disposal to lead a dignified life.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> This is why land assignment has been classified as a typical contract of Agrarian Law. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">X.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">A very important characteristic of this contract established in the Law, and interpreted by doctrine, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101">is that it is a duration contract (contrato de duración).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101"> Its perfection does not operate with the transfer of ownership of the property; on the contrary, it crystallizes as the beneficiary fulfills his obligations, during the time established by Law, and carries out the activity for which it was granted.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#010101"> Ownership is fully acquired only after the term has elapsed</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> In our case, this can be up to 30 years, as a grace period of 5 years is granted, prior to the issuance of the deed, and another period of up to 25 years for the payment of the price; but it can have two types of variations:</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">increasing it, when by virtue of insufficient production not attributable to the plot holder, the Institute must readjust the form of payment; and another, decreasing it, by allowing early payment, once 15 years from the transfer of ownership have elapsed.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> In this sense, if the contract is for a determined price, or else free of charge, from the issuance of the deed there will be 15 years during which the Institute can revoke, rescind, or annul the contract in the event of the beneficiary's breach.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> (Articles 59, 67 and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law).</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (Ruling number 229-90, of fifteen hours on July 20, 1990, of the First Chamber.
The underlining is not from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Furthermore, in the aforementioned constitutional ruling 2006-1806, it concludes the special purpose of this type of contracts, precisely in consideration of the conceptualization that governs our Costa Rican Social and Democratic Rule of Law State (Estado Social y Democrático), according to the design established in our Constitution (Constitución Política), based on the following considerations:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">... the limitations on free disposal and the prohibition on land-use change (cambio de uso) originate in the social function recognized in this property, whose primary objective is its award —precisely—</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101"> so that its holder may have a dignified way of life, through an activity previously determined by law and the contract through which it was acquired</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">.
Thus, the conditions imposed in the law and in the land award contract are fully justified in light of the Law of the Constitution, as their sole purpose is to ensure that the procedures for awarding land fulfill the purpose for which this program was created; which must never be understood as a simple program for delivering property titles to solve urgent squatting problems, but as a </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; color:#010101">true instrument through which an adequate and just distribution of the land resource, the creation of self-sufficient family agrarian enterprises, and an effective increase in national production are achieved, allowing the farmer to raise his standard of living by making him a participant in the Nation's development</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">.
(In the same sense, rulings number 5363-95, of nine hours twenty-seven minutes on September 29, 1995, and 2004-9099, of eleven hours thirteen minutes on August 20, 2004, of this Chamber.) Allowing the contrary would imply the perversion of the parceling and colonization system for lands awarded by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" (The highlighting is from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">Based on the foregoing guidelines, the analysis of what is debated in this matter proceeds, circumscribed to whether or not there was a statute of limitations (prescripción) of the supervisory power on the part of the Public Administration, in order to revoke the award of the agrarian plot in favor of the plaintiffs here, and whether or not there was a lapse (caducidad) in the administrative procedure followed to that effect.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#010101">IX.- THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PRESCRIPCIÓN) OF THE REVOCATION AND NULLITY OF TITLE PROCEDURE.-</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">In relation to this point, and taking into consideration the special legal nature of agrarian plot award contracts, the point concerning the statute of limitations (prescripción) of the Administration's power to revoke the award and annul the conferred title must be elucidated.
As indicated above, the plaintiffs claim that it is from the date of the Board of Directors' agreement in which the award was ordered, and for its part, the defendant institution claims that it is from the registration of that transfer in the Registry. Having assessed the situation, this Tribunal considers that neither date applies. Indeed, note that neither the award by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution, nor the registration in the Registry, confer the right of ownership, due to the fact that it is a right that is acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the obligations imposed, in the terms of Article 65 of the </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 (and its amendments). Thus, with the act of "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; color:#010101">award (adjudicación)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101">" of a plot, ownership is not transferred, and it is a unilateral act of the Administration, in which the beneficiary or beneficiaries do not participate, by which,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; color:#010101"> it simply authorizes the sale of the property in their favor; and by virtue thereof, it is just the precondition to subsequently configure the respective contract, which is the individualized (particularized) deed in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries, in which, now, the conditions of that land provision are established, and in which the limitations established in articles 66, 67, and 68 of the </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, are fully comprised, as well as the effective transfer of the awarded plot, precisely from the date of its subscription.
In this sense, that deed acquires the condition of a translative domain contract (contrato traslativo de dominio), which, in light of the provisions of Article 1007 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), insofar as it establishes obligations for the buyer -beneficiaries- is solemn, bilateral, consensual, and in relation to the legal limitations on this property, requires the consent or acceptance of the obligor, so that compliance can be compelled, in this case, in charge of the selling institution; whose breach, in the terms established precisely in Article 66 of the referenced Law (number 2825 and its amendments) and generically in Article 692 of the Civil Code, gives rise to the revocation (revocatoria) of the award and nullity (nulidad) of the title.</span></p> Note that the acquisition of the parcel by the beneficiary or beneficiaries occurs with and as of the signing of this deed, not before, and by virtue of this, numeral 67 of the Land and Colonization Law refers to the date of acquisition of the parcel as the parameter for computing the fifteen-year term for the limitations of that law, which in no way occurs with the (we repeat, unilateral) act of the Administration, but rather with and as of the signing of the corresponding deed.
Finally, it must be remembered for this purpose that, pursuant to mandate 1022 of the Civil Code, the contract is law between the parties, and what is agreed binds its signatories, "... </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">both as to what is expressed in them, and as to the consequences that equity, usage, and the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature</span><span style="font-family:Arial">", states subsection 1) of numeral 1023 of the cited Civil Code. Thus, the subjection to those legal limitations is for a period of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance of the party who is bound by them, and not before, as the plaintiffs propose, since there has been no acceptance on their part, nor legitimate occupation of that property. Given this situation, the term cannot be computed from the adjudication of parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement to Mr.
Nombre140255</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre140256</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, which occurred by agreement of Article Five of Session 73-93, on the twenty-sixth of September, nineteen ninety-three -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 1.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, nor from the registration of those rights in the Public Property Registry, after the signing of the corresponding deed, which occurred on the ninth of July of the year nineteen ninety-four -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 3.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, as the defendant institution alleged, but rather from the date of signing the corresponding deed of transfer of the real estate, the occasion on which the limitations of the law were also imposed, with the acceptance of the beneficiaries, which occurred on the first of October of the year nineteen ninety-three -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 2.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-.
In this sense, it is noteworthy that with the registration of those rights, the effective date of these limitations was noted, that is, from the first of October, nineteen ninety-three, to the first of October of the year two thousand eight, as recorded in the corresponding property certification that was held at that time under the Real Folio registration number Placa26912</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">- </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 3.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-; from which those who bring this action can neither claim ignorance nor attempt its modification. Due to the foregoing, the alleged statute of limitations (on the exercise of the supervisory power held by the Rural Development Institute) does not occur in this case, because the notification of the resolution of fourteen hundred hours on the twenty-fifth of September of the year two thousand eight, which ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and annulment of the title, was notified to the plaintiffs herein on the twenty-ninth of September, two thousand eight - </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations.
Likewise, the official communication sent to the Public Registry to notify the opening of this ruling was ordered in the resolution of sixteen hundred hours on the twenty-fifth of September, two thousand eight -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 12.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, without affecting its validity, the fact that it was brought to the attention of the Registry until the first of the following October, given that on that date, the plaintiffs herein had already been personally notified of the opening of the administrative proceeding against them, thereby interrupting the statute of limitations. Finally, on this aspect it must be indicated that the criterion set forth in this ruling on this point is not subject to the reasons or considerations of other judgments, such as the one alleged in the complaint, under the consideration that in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, judges are only subject to the Constitution and the laws (block of legality), under the terms of numeral 154 of the Political Constitution, such that a sphere of independence for judges is recognized, who are not even subject to or bound by precedents or jurisprudence, the latter understood as the reiterated criterion (at least three rulings) emanating from the Courts of Cassation, regarding a specific legal point (under the terms of numeral 9 of the Civil Code).
By reason of the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed in what refers to this point.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">X.- OF THE LAPSE OF PROCEEDINGS (CADUCIDAD) IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR REVOCATION OF ADJUDICATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE AGRARIAN PROPERTY TITLE.-</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Regarding the second point to be analyzed, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">the first thing</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> that must be elucidated is whether the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms provided in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, is applicable to the administrative procedures carried out by the Agrarian Development Institute in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it, and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">the second</span><span style="font-family:Arial">: should this institute be applicable, whether or not the alleged lapse of proceedings (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and annulment of the title, pursued by the defendant against the plaintiffs herein -Mr.
Nombre140255</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre140256</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, and processed under file number 161-08-NUL. As for the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">first</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, as the plaintiff correctly points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative procedures for the revocation of the adjudication of parcels by the Agrarian Development Institute. Thus, among others, one may consult judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes on the eighth of March, two thousand eleven, a criterion reiterated in number 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes on the ninth of March, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on the twenty-ninth of March, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on the twenty-third of May, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours on the fourteenth of June, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours on the thirteenth of August, the last four from two thousand twelve, and number 210-2012-VI, of fourteen hours twenty minutes on the fourth of October, two thousand twelve.
In all these rulings, it was concluded that the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms provided in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, is applicable to the procedures pursued by the defendant institution; a criterion that is shared based on the following considerations:</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">a.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">It must be assumed that respect for due process and the elements that comprise it are applicable, not only in jurisdictional processes, but also in administrative procedures, without exception or distinction regarding the administrative body responsible for conducting it or the subject matter involved. Indeed, as has been repeatedly considered by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (in this sense, among others, one may consult judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96, and 2003-13140), respect for the elements that make up due process -which derive from the guarantees established in articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Political Constitution- is required in administrative procedures, especially when they are punitive or have ablatio effects -as in this case-, precisely because in them an obligation may be imposed, a subjective right or legitimate interest may be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction may be imposed (suspension, dismissal, economic, etc.), which have a punitive nature.
In this regard, it must be noted that </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"[...] </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">all those legal norms, derived from the Political Constitution as an ideological model, pursue nothing more nor less than the realization of the fundamental end of justice, which is the greatest of the principles protected by a State of Law, in which are included rules –general principles– that have full force and applicability to the administrative procedures of any body of the Administration, it is reiterated, therefore, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">the principles extracted from it are of strict observance by the authorities responsible for authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a sanctioning result</span><span style="font-family:Arial">." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Constitutional Chamber.
The highlighting is not from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">It is thus that the guarantee of due process manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which demonstrates </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">its instrumental character</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, insofar as it is arranged to guarantee the best resolution thereof, under the terms provided in article 215.1 of the General Law of Public Administration:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The administrative procedure </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, in accordance with the legal system.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (The highlighting is not from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">The binding nature of the guarantees that make up due process holds such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that their non-observance produces the annulment of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">b.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">In accordance with the foregoing, it is worth recalling that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide the procedural activity, as also indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2004-13140, of fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on the twelfth of November, two thousand three.
In this case, the principles of </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">celerity and official impetus (oficiosidad) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">(linked to other principles of administrative procedures, such as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">search for material truth (verdad real)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">anti-formalism</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> or </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">informalism</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) are applicable, which entail a power-duty of the directing and decision-making bodies to compel the processing of the procedure until its resolution on the merits, which, pursuant to the provisions of articles 222.1 and 225 of the General Law of Public Administration, constitutes an obligation for the Administration to initiate or promote the procedure sua sponte, that is, without requiring action by the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, meaning it is processed without undue delays for the parties.
This refers to the proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and for the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is in accordance with the principles of economy and procedural efficiency, in addition to the constitutional principle of reasonableness, leading to the sanctioning of procedural inactivity with the lapse of proceedings (caducidad), under the terms set forth in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, a norm that was amended by canon 200, subsection 10) of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code in the following terms:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">1) When the procedure is halted for more than six months due to a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, sua sponte or by complaint, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">2) The lapse of proceedings (caducidad) of a procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to act due to the operation of positive or negative silence, or when the file is ready for the issuance of the final act. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">3) The lapse of proceedings (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are considered not to have been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (Amendment effective as of the first of January of the year two thousand eight.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Now, it is noted that in the interest of promoting an expeditious process, this cannot call into question or impair the guarantees that constitute due process, such as, failing to duly state the reasons for the resolution due to the lack of conducting expert examinations, appearances, or some piece of evidence of importance; or not respecting the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing.
Regarding the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) provided for in the transcribed legal norm, it is justified as a means to avoid the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as in the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act -when the matter was initiated at the request of a party- and likewise, it becomes moot once that final act has been issued. For it to operate, according to the provisions of the aforementioned norm, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) requires the following prerequisites: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">first</span><span style="font-family:Arial">: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">second</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or else to the Administration, if it was instituted sua sponte; and</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">third</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that said state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a term that constitutes the minimum time limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure.
This implies that in punitive procedures or those with possible effects on rights that are conducted sua sponte, the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, notably stated on the institute under discussion, considering: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">In the first place, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">it can be observed that the recently transcribed norm is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual prerequisites contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body responsible for processing</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">.
This implies that its effects occur as a matter of law (de pleno derecho), and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory, not constitutive, effects. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence –competence being, by definition,</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 of the General Law of Public Administration (LGAP)-, but rather, solely, as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (The highlighting is not from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to canon 66, both of the General Law of Public Administration, public powers (competencias) are granted to be exercised.
Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the extinguishment of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, public powers (competencias) are not extinguished</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> by the passage of the</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> term set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same ordinal when it indicates that there will be a limitation of the competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial"> its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states emphatically that an act issued outside the time limit is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided otherwise by law, which does not occur here.
It is clear that the lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself describes as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">within the administrative procedure</span><span style="font-family:Arial">; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">c.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> We start from the "principle-based" (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">principista</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) and "complementarity" character of the General Law of Public Administration, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, insofar as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, since, although there are matters and procedures that by legal mandate -article 367 of the same reference Law- and determined by Executive Decree -number 8979-P and number 9469-P- have a specific and particular regulation, it is true that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the reference General Law, the application of the jurisprudence, principles, and values inherent to Administrative Law cannot be ignored.
It is undeniable that the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) is inherent to and part of Administrative Law. Moreover, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obliges the official</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and the Judge to interpret the norms, principles, and values "</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">in the way that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">within the respect for the rights and interests of the individual</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (article 10.1 of the General Law of Public Administration), which in this case, requires respect for the forms and constituent elements of due process; which is characteristic of a Social and Democratic State of Law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">d.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Due to the foregoing, the defendant's proposal to exclude the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) from the administrative procedures pursued by that entity is not acceptable, for lacking a specific regulation in the norms of the subject matter governing the procedures for revocation of adjudications and annulment of titles, that is, in the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 and its amendments, and in the Regulation for the Selection and Assignment of Land Applicants.
On the contrary, bearing in mind that the determination of administrative procedures is a matter reserved to law -theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of liberty, which derives from article 28 of the Fundamental Charter, according to the jurisprudential development of the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, one may consult judgments number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on the twenty-fourth of November, nineteen ninety-two, number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on the sixth of July, nineteen, 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on the tenth of May, nineteen ninety-six, nineteen ninety-three)-; legal regulation obviously prevails over regulatory norms. In any case, as previously indicated, in the face of a regulatory gap or vacuum, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first within the Public Law branch (Constitutional-Administrative).
But it is also important to consider -as already indicated in the supra-cited precedents- that the Agrarian Development Institute's own regulation for this type of situation, in force at the time of the facts under analysis, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; from which the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provisions of numeral 364 of the General Law of Public Administration cannot be ignored, which fully provides for the "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">prevalence</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" of its principles and norms, "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">over those of</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> any other provisions of equal or lesser rank</span><span style="font-family:Arial">", which it establishes as "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">criteria for the interpretation of the entire administrative legal order of the country.</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:7.5pt"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:8pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">XI.- ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION REGARDING THE ALLEGED LAPSE OF PROCEEDINGS (CADUCIDAD) IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING PURSUED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Having determined the applicability of the institute of lapse of proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative proceeding pursued against the plaintiffs herein -Mr.
Nombre140255</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre140256</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, we proceed with the analysis of the situation in the indicated matter. After a meticulous review of what occurred in said matter, it is possible to verify that the alleged inactivity of the procedure in question does not occur. Indeed, it is noted that the processing has been continuous, with multiple participation by the plaintiffs herein, in full exercise of the defense of their interests, and also by those participating in this matter as interested third parties. Thus, after the notification of the opening of the proceeding to the plaintiffs herein, which occurred on the twenty-ninth of September, two thousand eight -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 11.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-, they responded by brief on the eighth of October, two thousand eight, an opportunity in which they accepted the alleged non-compliance (illegal sale of the parcel while the limitations were in force) -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 13.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-.
Subsequently, on the following second of December, the Legal Advisory Office of the Central Pacific Region Directorate changed the date for conducting the site inspection to fourteen hundred thirty hours on the following third of December, two thousand eight, and postponed the appearance hearing to the fourth of December, starting at fourteen hundred hours - </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 14.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">-. That same day (the second of December, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre140258</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre140259</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial">appeared in the proceeding, requesting to be considered interested third parties in the matter and that those proceedings be archived -</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">proven fact 15.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial">.
The plaintiffs here filed a note on December 3, 2008, in which they stated that at the appointed time and day, the officials of the respondent Institute had not appeared to carry out the on-site inspection — proven fact
XII.RULING REGARDING THE CLAIMS FILED.- In consideration of the foregoing, it is appropriate to review the claims that were filed in this proceeding, which include various pronouncements, in the following manner:
By virtue of this, this Chamber considers that in relation to this point, the plaintiffs lack standing ad causam activa to request the registration of that property in their name. Indeed, what has already been said regarding the special connotation of this type of property is recalled, over which an important social function weighs, which manifests in the obligation of the beneficiary to directly work and exploit the ceded parcel, as clearly and simply required by article 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, when it provides: "*If the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and fulfilled all other obligations to its satisfaction, they shall have the right to be granted a property title*, ..." and paragraph two of numeral 67 of the same legal body reinforces this, by establishing: "*Once fifteen years have elapsed and the right of property has been acquired*, ..." Thus, in this case, it is evident that the plaintiffs did not acquire ownership of the farm they claim, due to the breach of the limitations that were legally imposed on the cession in their favor, an adjudication that was revoked in accordance with the procedure followed for that purpose, in time, that is, prior to the expiration of those limitations.
An interpretation different from what has been stated would imply distorting the raison d'être of these adjudications. The situation thus presented, this Authority considers that in this case, the plaintiffs have acted with evident recklessness, to such an extent that it can be regarded as an attempt at fraud of law (fraude de ley), under the terms regulated in numeral 20 of the Civil Code, which literally provides: "*Acts performed under the shelter of the text of a norm, which pursue a result prohibited by the legal system, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the due application of the norm that was intended to be evaded.*"
XIII.OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES OF THE LAWSUIT.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit in its answer, and to that effect, requested that it be dismissed in all its parts, for which it raised the defenses of lack of interest and lack of right, and the interested third parties raised the defense of lack of standing. In this regard, we must note that standing, the current interest in the resolution of the matter, and the right are substantive prerequisites of every jurisdictional proceeding, which must be reviewed by every Judge, even ex officio and in that strict order. In this respect, the following should be indicated:
"*This Chamber has stated that standing is: ‘…a prerequisite of the claim set forth in the lawsuit and of the opposition raised by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantive interest at issue in the proceeding. Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the subject of the lawsuit to be declared; and the plaintiff must be the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims in the lawsuit, even if the substantive right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. …*" (Judgment 000976-F-2006, of 7:40 a.m. on December 19, 2006).
And more recently, the cited High Court, in judgment number 1042-F-SI-2013, of 8:50 a.m. on August 14, 2013, held:
"*(…) In accordance with procedural doctrine, the so-called 'legitimatio ad causam' active or passive, or, as it is also called, standing in the cause or standing to act, refers to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and of being obligated to the performance (the defendant). That is, those persons who will be legally and directly affected in their rights by the judgment have standing in the cause. In this line of thought, this Chamber has stated that standing is: '(…) a prerequisite of the claim set forth in the lawsuit and of the opposition raised by the defendant, to make possible the judgment on the merits that resolves them; consequently, standing in the cause does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantive relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and the substantive interest at issue in the proceeding.
Standing in the cause refers to the substantive relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the proceeding and the substantive interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person whom the law requires to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law allows the substantive legal relationship that is the subject of the lawsuit to be declared; and the plaintiff must be the person who, according to the law, can formulate the claims in the lawsuit, even if the substantive right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. … According to the subject with standing or their position in the procedural relationship, a distinction can be made between active and passive standing; the first corresponds to the plaintiff and to persons who later intervene to defend their cause, and the second belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim.
The absence of standing in the cause constitutes a substantive impediment; if the judge notices the lack thereof, they must declare it ex officio and issue an inhibitory judgment, which is not an obstacle to its being opportunely alleged as a preliminary exception. (…) Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific proceeding; it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for such effect with respect to the procedural claim. Thus, legitimación ad causam activa, which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position the subject holds regarding the procedural claim brought. In sum, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they seek in court. …' (Judgment number 976 of 7:40 a.m. on December 19, 2006).*" In the same vein, reference may be made, among others, to the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 89 of 14 hours 50 minutes of June 19, 1991, 83 of 15 hours 15 minutes of September 24, 1997, 604 of 10 hours of August 17, 2007, and 1023-A-S1-2009 of 14 hours 50 minutes of October 1, 2009)\".
By virtue of the foregoing, it can be concluded that in essence, active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) determines that the person appearing as plaintiff in a proceeding is the person who, under the law, may formulate the claims of the complaint, and by virtue thereof, be the holder of the right or legitimate interest sought to be recognized in their favor, and with respect to whom a ruling favorable to their claims may be issued; and for its part, passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) determines that the person who is sued is the person who, by law, is required to oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits that the substantial legal relationship that is the subject of the complaint be declared. The absence of standing constitutes a substantial impediment to granting the complaint, and if the adjudicator becomes aware of the lack thereof, they must so declare sua sponte and issue a judgment accordingly, although it is no bar to it being raised timely as a preliminary exception.
Therefore, standing is outlined as an elementary substantive prerequisite for issuing an estimatory judgment, since, should its absence go unnoticed, the judge could commit the error of granting a right to someone not entitled to it or imposing a obligation on someone not obligated, insofar as that would mean the judgment as such becomes unenforceable. In light of what has been said, it is deemed that the plaintiffs —Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 —, in their capacity as allottees of an agrarian parcel, according to an agreement to that effect issued by the competent body —at that time, the so-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario—, have active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) to request judicial review (control de legalidad) of the administrative conduct they challenged in this venue, all derived from the administrative procedure for the revocation of that allocation and annulment of the title.
And accordingly, there is also passive standing (legitimación ad causam pasiva) with respect to the institution sued in this proceeding. In relation to these aspects of the complaint (declaratory claims), it had already been declared —by resolution number 107-2015, of fifteen hours two minutes of March five, two thousand fifteen, of Section I of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda— that the gentlemen Nombre140258 and now the Estate of the late Nombre140259 , have an interest in the matter, in the character or position of interested third parties. However, as was alleged by the interested third parties, the defense of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) is properly granted, but only insofar as it refers to the claim for condemnation made in this proceeding, aimed at ordering the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915 to be registered again in the name of the plaintiffs, considering that since December nine, two thousand five, and as of the date of adopting this jurisdictional decision, the plaintiffs do not exercise possession over the property whose title they claim, having sold (illegally) that parcel to those who appear as interested third parties in this proceeding; accordingly, granting their request would constitute an evident abuse of rights (abuso de derecho), in light of the special nature of agrarian property (purposes and mode of acquisition), as explained supra.
XIV.OF COSTS.- Pursuant to numeral 193 of the Contencioso Administrativo Procedural Code, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the very fact of being so. Dispensation from this award is only viable when there was, in the Tribunal’s judgment, sufficient grounds to litigate, or when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and overturn the principle of awarding costs against the losing party. Therefore, the award against the plaintiffs for the payment of procedural and personal costs in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is imposed, which will be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. With regard to the interested third parties, Nombre140258 and the estate of the late Nombre140259 , they did not formulate their own claim; as to them, no special award of costs is declared.
POR TANTO:
The preliminary defense of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción), reiterated in the conclusions phase by the representation of the sued institution, is rejected. The defense of lack of active standing (legitimación ad causam activa) raised by the interested third parties is partially granted, that is, in relation to the final claim, for condemnation, aimed at ordering the registration of the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915, once again in favor of the plaintiffs, and in equal parts; and it is rejected with regard to the remaining claims. As to the rest, the substantive defense of lack of interest raised by the sued institution is rejected, and the defense of lack of right raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the interested third parties is granted. Consequently, the complaint filed by Nombre140255 AND Nombre140256 against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL AND THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES, Nombre140258 AND THE ESTATE OF THE LATE Nombre140259 is declared WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. The award against the plaintiffs for the payment of procedural and personal costs in favor of the sued institution is imposed, which will be liquidated in the judgment execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. No special award of costs is declared with respect to the interested third parties.
Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre136022 Daniel Aguilar Méndez Proceso de conocimiento con trámite de puro derecho (art.
98.2 of the CPCA)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:9pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Nombre140255</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">   </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre140256</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">   </span><span style="font-family:Arial">against INDER.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:9pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Interested third parties: Nombre140258</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">    </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and the Succession of Nombre140259</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">    </span></p></div></body></html> "VIII.- AGRARIAN PROPERTY ORIGINATED IN CONTRACTS WITH THE INSTITUTE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT.- Inasmuch as the object of the lawsuit refers to the analysis of actions taken by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER) in an administrative proceeding to revoke an adjudication of a (agrarian) parcel and nullify the (property right) title, it is deemed pertinent, before examining the claims within that procedural path, to understand the special legal nature of agrarian property originated in the land assignment contracts signed with the defendant institute; its mode of acquisition and the conditions to which it is subject; the foregoing, in order to understand the basis of the oversight functions and instruments incumbent upon the institution that is the defendant in this proceeding, the author of and party responsible for the conduct being challenged." For this reason, it is deemed necessary to make a few brief clarifications regarding agrarian property.
In this sense, it is helpful to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in judgment number 2006-1806, of fourteen hours fifty-five minutes of February fifteen, two thousand six, in relation to these, in which it clarified the moment from which the beneficiary acquires the right of property, with all the attributes it comprises—pursuant to the regulation of numeral 45 of the Fundamental Charter (Carta Fundamental) and 264 of the Civil Code:
"*First*, it must be clear that property is not acquired upon delivery of the title, nor even at the moment the Agrarian Development Institute transfers the parcel to the beneficiary, <u>but rather upon fulfillment of the conditions set forth in that numeral</u>, namely, the passage of that term—the fifteen years set forth in the challenged norm—, the effective and actual payment for the property, and submission to the requirements stipulated for the adequate use of that land. Second, it is characteristic of this type of contract—of an agrarian nature—to stipulate a duration term, as a condition precedent (condición suspensiva), such that it is only at the moment the beneficiary fulfills the requirements set forth both in the reference law and in the allocation contract, that they definitively acquire that property. In light of the foregoing, the issue of the term set by the law—and which is the subject of challenge in this action—is a matter of legislative discretion; the alleged unconstitutionality resides in its alleged unreasonableness, an issue that will be addressed later.
Third, it must be considered that the land allocation contract may be revoked by the Agrarian Development Institute—in accordance with the provisions of Article 66 of the same reference law—before the expiration of that term, if the beneficiary does not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) and in the allocation contract, since the land is delivered for a specific purpose, namely, to promote agricultural production, in consideration of the agricultural vocation recognized in these lands. ...*" (The highlighting is from the original.)
Furthermore, even prior to this ruling, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice had already commented on the special legal nature of land allocation contracts, typical of Agrarian Law, which find their legal basis in subsections 5) and 6) of Article 1°, 4, 5, 55, 63 subsection 1), and 64 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, of October fourteen, nineteen sixty-one, and its amendments, in the following terms:
"VIII.- <u>*The allocation contract is a duration contract*</u> *by which the agrarian entity allocates an agrarian land to a beneficiary of the land endowment programs, previously qualified according to the parameters established by its own regulations, committing to transfer it, for an eventual price or free of charge, if the beneficiary demonstrates the technical capacity to develop the agrarian enterprise and fulfills the imposed obligations during a trial period; the transfer of ownership is verified subject to a multiplicity of obligations on the part of the beneficiary, the breach of which allows the entity to revoke the allocation, during a period of 15 years or until the moment there are no outstanding debts, without being able to alienate it in any way without the prior express authorization of the Institute, since by provision of the Law (Ley) the allocating entity may recover the property to allocate it to another beneficiary, and must always exercise direct control over the activity carried out by the allottee, even after the 15-year period has elapsed or the debts have been settled, when the beneficiary has full and exclusive ownership.* IX.- *From a causal point of view, <u>it cannot be maintained that the cause of the allocation transaction consists, as in a sale, in the exchange of a thing for a price, since that is not the social economic function, or social policy, related to the purpose of allocating lands to those who do not have them or have them insufficiently</u>; on the contrary, it seeks to contribute to a better distribution of wealth with a sense of social justice and to the increase of the country's production or productivity*. *From this point of view, when the Law refers to a sale, or the administrative practice of the entity leads to executing a legal transaction of sale to register it in the Public Registry of Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad), this does not allow us to ignore that the allocation will be carried out through the execution of an agreement of the administrative entity whose existence goes beyond the agreement of the parties.
But that administrative agreement also entails very important elements to differentiate the land allocation contract from a sale, or from a simple administrative contract, insofar as the clauses contained in the contract originate from the Law, and their exercise does not arise from the power of authority nor from the interest of the parties, but from the State's own purposes that bind it to achieving a better distribution of land and raising the economic and social conditions of farmers, agricultural entrepreneurs, and land workers, especially if they do not have the means at their disposal to lead a dignified life. It is for this reason that the land allocation contract has been classified as a typical contract of Agrarian Law.* X.- *A very important characteristic of this contract established in the Law, and interpreted by doctrine, <u>is that it is a duration contract. Its perfection does not occur with the transfer of ownership of the land; on the contrary, this crystallizes as the beneficiary fulfills their obligations, during the time established by the Law, and carries out the activity for which it was granted.
Full ownership is acquired only once the term has elapsed</u>. In our case, this can reach up to 30 years because a grace period of 5 years is granted, prior to the issuance of the deed, and another of up to 25 annual payments for payment of the price; but this can have two types of variations: increasing it, when due to insufficient production not attributable to the parcel holder, the Institute must readjust the form of payment, and another, decreasing it, by allowing early payment, upon completion of 15 years from the transfer of ownership. In this sense, if the contract is for a determined price, or free of charge, from the issuance of the deed there will be 15 years during which the Institute may revoke, rescind, or annul the contract due to the beneficiary's non-compliance. (Articles 59, 67, and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law).*" (Judgment number 229-90, of fifteen hours of July twenty, nineteen ninety, of the First Chamber. The underlining is not from the original.)
In addition, in the aforementioned constitutional judgment 2006-1806, the special purpose of this type of contract is concluded, precisely in consideration of the conceptualization that governs us of a Costa Rican Social and Democratic State of Law, according to the design established in our Political Constitution, based on the following considerations:
"*... the limitations on free disposition and the prohibition on land-use change (cambio de uso del suelo) have their origin in the social function recognized in this property, whose primary objective is precisely its allocation—so that its holder may have a dignified way of life, through an activity previously determined by the law and the contract through which it was acquired. Thus, the conditions imposed in the law and in the land allocation contract are fully justified in light of the Constitution's Law (Derecho de la Constitución), since their sole purpose is to ensure that the procedures for land allocation fulfill the purpose for which this program was created; which must never be understood as a simple program for the delivery of property titles to solve problems of urgent squatting (precarismo), but as a true instrument through which an adequate and just distribution of the land resource, the creation of self-sufficient family agrarian enterprises, and an effective increase in national production are achieved, which allows the peasant to elevate their living conditions, by making them a participant in the development of the Nation (Nación) ... To permit the contrary would entail the perversion of the system of subdivision and colonization of the lands allocated by the Agrarian Development Institute.*" (The highlighting is from the original.)
Based on the foregoing guidelines, the analysis of what is debated in this matter proceeds, circumscribed to whether or not the supervisory power of the Public Administration (Administración Pública) to revoke the allocation of an agrarian parcel in favor of the plaintiffs herein had prescribed, and whether or not the administrative procedure followed to this effect had lapsed.
IX.THE ALLEGED PRESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION AND NULLITY OF THE TITLE.- Regarding this point, and taking into consideration the special legal nature of agrarian parcel allocation contracts, the point concerning the prescription of the Administration's (Administración) power to revoke the allocation and annul the conferred title must be elucidated. As indicated supra, the plaintiffs allege that it is from the date of the Board of Directors' agreement in which the allocation was ordered, while the defendant institution alleges that it is from the registration of that transfer in the Registry. Having assessed the situation, this Court considers that neither date is applicable. Indeed, note that neither the allocation by agreement of the Board of Directors of the competent institution, nor the registration in the Registry, confer the right of property, because it is a right that is acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the imposed obligations, under the terms of numeral 65 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825 (and its amendments).
Thus, with the act of "*allocation*" of a parcel, ownership is not transferred; it is a unilateral act of the Administration, in which the beneficiary or beneficiaries do not participate, by which the sale of the land in their favor is simply authorized; and by virtue thereof, it is merely the prior condition for subsequently forming the respective contract, which is the individualized (particular) deed in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries, in which, now, the conditions of that endowment are established, and in which the limitations established in sections 66, 67, and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law, number 2825, are fully included, as well as the effective transfer of the allocated parcel, precisely from the date of its signing. In this sense, that deed acquires the condition of a translative contract of ownership, which, in light of the provisions of Article 1007 of the Civil Code, insofar as it establishes obligations for the buyer—beneficiaries—is solemn, bilateral, and consensual, and in relation to the legal limitations on this property, requires the consent or acceptance of the obligor, so that its fulfillment may be compelled, in this case, at the charge of the selling institution; whose non-compliance, under the terms precisely established in numeral 66 of the reference Law (number 2825 and its amendments) and generically in 692 of the Civil Code, gives rise to revocation of the allocation and nullity of the title.
Note that the acquisition of the parcel in the hands of the beneficiary or beneficiaries occurs with and from the signing of this deed, not before, and by virtue of this, numeral 67 of the Land and Colonization Law refers as the parameter for the computation of the fifteen-year validity of the limitations of that law, to the date of acquisition of the parcel, which in no way occurs with the act (it is repeated, unilateral) of the Administration, but rather with and from the signing of the corresponding deed. Finally, it must be remembered in this regard, that according to mandate 1022 of the Civil Code, the contract has the force of law between the parties, and what is agreed upon binds its signatories, "*... both to what is expressed in them, and to the consequences that equity, usage, and law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature*," states subsection 1) of numeral 1023 of the aforementioned Civil Code.
Thus, the subjection to those legal limitations is for a period of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance by the one who obligates themselves to them, and not before, as the plaintiffs propose, since there has been no acceptance on their part, nor legitimate occupation of that property. With the situation thus posed, the period cannot be computed from the allocation of parcel 57 of the Lagunillas Settlement (Asentamiento de Lagunillas) to Mr. Miguel Brenes Mejía and Mrs. Ramona Maroto Rojas, which occurred by agreement of Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-six, nineteen ninety-three—proven fact 1.)—, nor from the registration of those rights in the Public Registry of Property, after the signing of the corresponding deed, which occurred on July ninth of the year nineteen ninety-four—proven fact 3.)—, as the defendant institution alleged, but rather from the date of signing the corresponding deed of transfer of the real estate, an occasion on which the limitations of the law were also imposed, with the acceptance of the beneficiaries, which occurred on October first of the year nineteen ninety-three—proven fact 2.)—.
In this sense, it is noteworthy that with the registration of those rights, the effective date of these limitations was noted, that is, from October first, nineteen ninety-three to October first of the year two thousand eight, as recorded in the corresponding certificate of ownership that the Registered Folio number 84.634-001 and 002—proven fact 3.)—carried at that moment; hence, those promoting this action cannot allege ignorance nor attempt its modification. By reason of the foregoing, the alleged prescription (of the exercise of the supervisory power by the Rural Development Institute) does not occur in this case, because the notification of the resolution of fourteen hours of September twenty-five of the year two thousand eight, which ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the allocation and nullity of the title, was notified to the plaintiffs herein on September twenty-nine, two thousand eight—proven fact 11.)—, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations.
Likewise, the official communication sent to the Public Registry to notify the opening of this proceeding was ordered in the resolution of sixteen hours of September twenty-five, two thousand eight—proven fact 12.)—, without the fact that the Registry was not informed until the first of October following affecting its validity, because on that date, the plaintiffs herein had already been personally notified of the opening of the administrative procedure against them, thereby interrupting the prescription. Finally, regarding this aspect, it must be indicated that the criterion put forth in this ruling on this point is not subject to the reasons or considerations of other judgments, such as the one alleged in the complaint, under the consideration that in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, judges are only subject to the Constitution (Constitución) and the laws (block of legality), under the terms of numeral 154 of the Political Constitution, such that an area of independence of the judges is recognized, who are not even subject to or bound by precedents or jurisprudence, the latter understood as the reiterated criterion (at least three rulings) emanating from the Courts of Cassation, in relation to a specific legal point (under the terms of numeral 9 of the Civil Code). By reason of what has been said, the complaint must be dismissed with respect to this point.
X.THE LAPSE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION AND NULLITY OF THE AGRARIAN PROPERTY TITLE.- In relation to the second point to be analyzed, the first thing to be elucidated is whether the institute of lapse is applicable, under the terms provided for in numeral 340 of the General Law of the Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), to the administrative procedures carried out by the Agrarian Development Institute in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it, and the second: if this institute were applicable, whether or not the alleged lapse occurred within the procedure for revocation of the allocation and nullity of the title, followed by the defendant against the plaintiffs herein—Mr. Miguel Brenes Mejía and Mrs. Ramona Maroto Rojas—and processed in case file number 161-08-NUL. As for the first, as the plaintiff party well points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of lapse to administrative procedures for the revocation of parcel allocations by the Agrarian Development Institute.
Thus, among others, judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes of March eight, two thousand eleven, may be consulted, which criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes of March nine, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes of March twenty-nine, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes of May twenty-three, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours of June fourteen, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours of August thirteen, the last four of two thousand twelve, and number 210-2012-VI, of fourteen hours twenty minutes of October four, two thousand twelve. In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the institute of lapse was concluded, under the terms provided for in Article 340 of the General Law of the Public Administration, to the procedures followed by the defendant institution; a criterion that is shared based on the following considerations:
In this regard, it must be noted that "[...] *all these legal norms, derived from the Political Constitution as an ideological model, pursue nothing more and nothing less than the realization of the fundamental goal of justice, which is the greatest of the principles that protect a State of Law, which includes rules – general principles – that are fully valid and applicable to the administrative procedures of any body of the Administration, it is reiterated, because* *the principles extracted from it must be strictly observed by the authorities responsible for authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a sanctioning result*." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Constitutional Chamber. The highlighting is not from the original.)
It is thus that the guarantee of due process manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which evidences its instrumental character, insofar as it is designed to guarantee its best resolution, under the terms provided for in Article 215.1 of the General Law of the Public Administration:
"*The administrative procedure* *shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the purposes of the Administration, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party*, *in accordance with the legal system.*" (The highlighting is not from the original.)
The binding nature of the guarantees that constitute due process is of such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that their non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural acts and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as the Constitutional Chamber indicated in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.
This concerns the proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is consistent with the principles of procedural economy and efficiency, as well as the constitutional principle of reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, a rule that was reformed by canon 200, subsection 10) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code, in the following terms:
"*1) When the procedure is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause imputable exclusively to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, the expiration (caducidad) will occur and its archiving will be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code.* *2) The expiration (caducidad) of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to take action due to the operation of positive or negative silence, or when the file is ready for the final act to be issued.* *3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are considered as not having been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.*" (Reform effective as of January first, two thousand eight.)
Now then, it is noted that in the interest of promoting a speedy process, this cannot call into question or undermine the guarantees that constitute due process, such as, failing to properly state the grounds for the resolution due to the lack of performance of expert reports, appearances, or some important piece of evidence; or failing to respect the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the institution of expiration (caducidad) provided in the transcribed legal norm, it is justified as a means to avoid the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act – when the matter was initiated at the request of a party – and likewise, it is moot when that final act has already been issued.
For it to operate, according to what the aforementioned norm establishes, the expiration (caducidad) requires the following conditions: *first*: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, an inactivity; *second*, that said standstill is the result of causes imputable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or to the Administration, if it was established ex officio; and *third*, that this state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a period that constitutes the minimum time limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure. This implies that in sanctioning procedures or those of possible affectation of rights instructed ex officio, the expiration (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated at its core regarding the institution under comment:
"*First of all, it can be observed that the recently transcribed norm is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a faculty; on the contrary, once the factual conditions contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body in charge of the processing. This implies that its effects are produced by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declarative effects, not constitutive ones. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence – which is, by definition, inalienable, non-transferable and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 LGAP-, but only as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred.*" (The highlighting is not from the original.)
From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the General Law of Public Administration, public competences are granted to be exercised. Only in the cases where the legislator expressly provides for an expiry of that competence due to temporal factors, is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, competences are not extinguished by the lapse of the period indicated for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states emphatically that the act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal effects, except express provision of law, which is not the case here. It is clear that the expiration (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself calls an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, within the administrative procedure; therefore, while it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.
Furthermore, it is true that a correct weighting of the situation obliges the official and the Judge to interpret the norms, principles and values "*in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within the respect for the rights and interests of the individual*" (article 10.1 of the General Law of Public Administration), which in this case, requires respect for the forms and integral elements of due process; which is characteristic in a Social and Democratic State of Law.
III.SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LAWSUIT.- The plaintiffs filed a contentious-administrative proceeding against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in which they make the following declaratory claims; the first and principal one—upon which the subsequent ones depend—aimed at having the prescription (prescripción) and/or expiration of proceedings (caducidad) declared regarding the administrative proceeding processed by the defendant institution in file 161-08-NUL. The basis for the foregoing declarations is as follows: a.) Regarding the alleged prescription (prescripción): that the limitations on the property imposed according to 67 Law No. 2825, of October 14, 1961, and its reforms, begin to run from the adjudication of the parcel, as interpreted by the Procuraduría General de la República (it does not indicate any) and the Sala Primera of the Corte Suprema de Justicia, the latter in judgment number 275-S1-F-2011; from which it cannot be interpreted that the term runs from the registration of the right in the Registro Público de la Propiedad.
Thus, in this case, given that the adjudication of parcel 57 of the Asentamiento de Lagunillas was ordered by agreement Five of Session 73-93, of September 27, 1993, of the Junta Directiva of the then-named Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, the fifteen-year term expired on September 27, 2008; therefore, they reason, that at the time they were notified of the initiation of the proceeding for revocation of adjudication and nullity of title—which they say occurred on September 30, 2008—the law's limitations and the defendant institution's jurisdiction to act against them had expired. The same fate befalls the judicial request (exhorto) sent to the Registry to annotate the existence of that administrative proceeding, which dates to October 1 of the following year, they say, five days after the law's limitations expired; and b.) Regarding the alleged expiration of the proceeding (caducidad): they indicate that the administrative proceeding brought against them, processed in file 161-08-NUL, was inactive, due to fault attributable exclusively to the defendant institution, from December 3, 2008, to September 25, 2009, that is, for eight months and twenty-two days, meaning that the expiration of the proceeding (caducidad) occurred, under the terms regulated in section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to the text given by the reform in 2006, effective as of January 1, 2008; which is applicable in accordance with what was resolved by the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo in judgment number 57-2011-VI, and as the active administration has understood and assimilated.
In addition to the foregoing claim, they also formulated the claim, likewise declaratory and dependent upon the acceptance of the prior request, for the nullity of the following administrative actions: the resolution of the Board of Directors at three o'clock in the afternoon on July nineteenth, two thousand ten, which revoked the award that body had made to them by agreement in Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-three, of Dirección16886 (Garabito) and the nullity of the title of ownership that was registered in the Property Registry for the property with Real Folio registration number Placa26912 ); resolution number 1163-2012, at seven thirty-two in the morning on September twentieth, two thousand twelve, issued by the Agrarian Tribunal (acting as improper superior), which confirmed that decision; and the official request that the sued institution sent to the Public Property Registry with filing references 2012-00333943-01, in which it was ordered to revert the ownership of that property back to the sued institution.
As a consequence of the foregoing, they requested the annulment of the registration of the aforementioned property in favor of the sued institute. As a corollary to the acceptance of the nullities they requested be declared—and also accessory in nature to the main declaratory claim—they formulated the claim for condemnation, consisting of an order to register the referenced property under their (the plaintiffs’) ownership, in equal shares. Finally, they requested that this matter be declared without a special award of costs. (Complaint brief at folios 99 to 103 of the scanned judicial file incorporated into the virtual file and statements made during the Preliminary Hearing, per the recording on the attached compact disc.)
IV.REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE SUED INSTITUTION.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the lawsuit filed against it, raising the substantive defenses of lack of interest and lack of right; under which it requested its dismissal in relation to all its aspects and the awarding of costs against the plaintiffs. The grounds for its opposition are as follows: a.) That the procedure followed against the plaintiffs for the revocation of the award of Dirección16886 is governed by special regulations, both from the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one and its amendments, and from the Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, text per publication in La Gaceta number 13 of January twentieth, two thousand four—in force at the time the challenged procedure began—; in which full guarantee of respect for due process and the right to defense is provided, but in which the legal doctrine of the expiration of proceedings (caducidad del procedimiento) does not apply, with the regulated deadlines even being different from those of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; b.) That said procedure was carried out in exercise of the oversight powers that institution holds over its properties, to verify compliance with the purpose for which they were awarded; and in the case, the non-compliance of the plaintiffs with the limitations imposed by legal mandate—illegal sale of the property—was verified, which gave rise to the loss of their right, in the manner typified in articles 66 and 68 of Law number 2825, and as was declared at the administrative venue; c.) That the fifteen-year term of the limitations on the ownership of the parcels that are awarded does not run from the moment of the award, as this is an act prior to the granting of the deed; therefore, it runs from its corresponding registration in the Registry, under the terms of numeral 67 of the cited Law number Placa19660.
It also notes the error in the interpretation of the pronouncement of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, insofar as it refers to the fact that new limitations on ownership cannot be imposed again after they have expired; an occasion on which the filed cassation appeal was even dismissed; d.) That when the plaintiffs were notified of the initiation of the procedure for the revocation of the award and nullity of the title, the limitations of the law were in force, since the registration of the ownership right in favor of the plaintiffs occurred on July ninth, nineteen ninety-four, meaning the limitations expired on July ninth, two thousand nine; e.) Regarding the alleged expiration of proceedings (caducidad del procedimiento), it indicated that this is an "*abnormal*" form of termination of the proceeding, and in the case, it is evident that the proceeding in question is already terminated and the ownership of the asset has even been reverted; that it must be considered that the legal doctrine of expiration of proceedings (caducidad del procedimiento) came into force upon the enactment of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, effective as of January first, two thousand eight; therefore, under Transitory Provision IV of said procedural code, administrative proceedings initiated prior to the entry into force of said procedural regulation, regardless of their procedural stage, must continue to be processed under the regulations that governed them previously; and that in any case, the processing of administrative proceeding 161-08-NUL was continuous and the alleged inactivity is not proven; f.) That in relation to the aspects of statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) alleged in this proceeding, the improper superior hierarchical authority—Agrarian Tribunal—found no defect whatsoever; g.) It added that the matter should be reviewed with a comprehensive view of the situation, and in this sense, drew attention to the situation of the interested third parties appearing in this proceeding, since as of the year two thousand five, they are the ones exercising possession of the property that is the subject of this process; accordingly, it alleges a lack of interest in this matter.
It finally requested that both the preliminary and substantive defenses alleged be accepted. (Answer to the complaint at folios 107 to 123 and statements by the representative during the conclusions phase, per the digital backup on the attached compact disc.)
V.REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES.- The parties, Mr. Nombre140258 and the late Nombre140259 —now represented by her son, who acts as her executor— requested that the lawsuit be dismissed in all its aspects, for the following reasons: a.) that on the occasion of a purchase option granted to them by the plaintiffs herein for the property with Real Folio registration number—at that time—Placa26912 of the Province of Puntarenas, over which the limitations of Law number 2825 weighed, they accepted it pursuant to a transaction signed on December ninth, two thousand five, at which time they paid forty-five million colones, and on the condition that the title of ownership be delivered to them, either by authorization of the then-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario or when the legal limitations expired; b.) That as of the date of that legal transaction—December ninth, two thousand five— they exercise possession of the indicated property, with all the attributes of the right of ownership; c.) That said sale was real and concrete, pursuant to a deed granted before the same professional (lawyer/notary) who now acts as the legal representative of the plaintiffs herein; without warning them of the illegality of the transaction, insofar as the sale of the property that is the subject of this process, made to them by the plaintiffs, was carried out while the limitations of the referenced law were in force; and subsequent to that, they even concealed from them the revocation and nullity proceeding against the plaintiffs herein; d.) That the foregoing situation forced them to file an ordinary agrarian lawsuit against the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, in order to find redress for their situation, first so that said parcel be granted to them in ownership, and failing that, so that they be paid for the improvements introduced, as legally corresponds, for having worked it since the date on which they exercise possession; e.) They reject that the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) alleged in the administrative proceeding followed against the plaintiffs herein occurred; because the limitations of Law 2825 expired after the date on which they were notified of the administrative proceeding against them, and there was no paralysis of the proceeding under the terms of article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública; g.) Finally, they noted the bad faith of the plaintiffs in this litigation, who in their complaint and allegations have concealed the sale they made to them of the property subject to the litis, indicating they want to benefit from their own fraud, a circumstance that even demonstrates the lack of standing (of the plaintiffs), by claiming a right they do not have, given that they are neither the legitimate owners—due to the sale of the property—nor the possessors of the asset.
(Written submission entering the proceeding at folios 201 recto to 206 recto of the scanned judicial file incorporated into the virtual file and statements by the representative and lead attorney, per the digital backup on the attached compact disc.)
VI.PRIOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WILL BE RESOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING.- In view of the allegations supporting this lawsuit and those of the sued institute and interested third parties, it is deemed necessary to specify that in this proceeding, the situation of the latter will not be addressed regarding their right or expectations over the property with Real Folio registration number Placa26915 of the Province of Puntarenas, derived from their possession since December ninth, two thousand five, on the occasion of their acceptance of the purchase option given to them by the plaintiffs herein and payment for that property—proven facts 4.) and 5.)—. This is because it has become clear that those claims (or pretensions) are being resolved in the agrarian proceeding being processed in file number 12-1601000-0642-AG-2, at the Agrarian Court of Puntarenas—proven fact 33.)—, thus hearing such a situation exceeds the jurisdictional scope of this Authority and the object of this proceeding.
Consequently, the reference made to that situation is only insofar as it affects the claims made by the plaintiffs in this contentious-administrative proceeding. Furthermore, it is clarified that the only matter to be analyzed in this ruling is the legality of the actions taken by the sued Administration—Instituto de Desarrollo Rural—in the manner that was set forth in the complaint, so we will focus on whether or not there was a statute of limitations (prescripción) and/or expiration of proceedings (caducidad del procedimiento) in the matter processed under file 161-08-NUL at the administrative venue. As was noted previously, the other pronouncements requested are accessory to the statute of limitations (prescripción) and expiration (caducidad) sought to be declared.
VII.REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF EXPIRATION OF THE ACTION REITERATED IN THE CONCLUSIONS PHASE.- It had already been indicated that, at the Preliminary Hearing held on May thirteenth last, the Procedural Judge in charge of the matter rejected the privileged preliminary defense of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción) that the representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural formulated at that time. However, in the conclusions phase, without adding any additional consideration, its proponent reiterated this exception. On this aspect, we must remember that, under the terms of article 39 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, for the filing of contentious proceedings that refer to the control of the legality of administrative conduct, the legislator established the legal doctrine of expiration of the action (caducidad de la acción)—with the exception of what is expressly regulated in article 41 of the same procedural code, cases in which the rule of statute of limitations of the right (prescripción del derecho) applies—.
This time limit was set at one year, in what applies to the *sub judice* case, starting from "the day following notification," when the challenged act must be notified, as stated in subsection a) of the cited numeral 39. In the case under study, even though the date on which the Agrarian Tribunal notified the parties, Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256 , of resolution 1163, at seven thirty-two in the morning on September twentieth, two thousand twelve—which is the decision of the improper superior and as such, exhausted the administrative channel—pursuant to canon 126 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública—does not appear in the case file; it is possible to conclude that this proceeding was filed on time, that is, within the one-year expiration (caducidad) period established in the regulations governing the matter. And this is so, because the date of that decision was September twentieth, two thousand twelve, and the filing of this action was on September nineteenth, two thousand thirteen—proven fact 34.) —, meaning it did not even exceed that period. Consequently, the rejection of the raised privileged preliminary defense is appropriate. We thus proceed with the substantive analysis of the matter raised.
VIII.REGARDING AGRARIAN PROPERTY ORIGINATING IN CONTRACTS WITH THE INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL.- Insofar as the object of the lawsuit refers to the analysis of the actions of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural in an administrative proceeding for the revocation of an award of an (agrarian) parcel and the nullity of the (ownership right) title, it is deemed pertinent, before hearing the claims regarding that procedural journey, to understand the special legal nature of agrarian property originating in the land allocation contracts signed with the sued institute; its mode of acquisition and the conditions that bind it; the foregoing, in order to understand the basis of the oversight functions and instruments under the charge of the institution that is sued in this proceeding, author and responsible for the challenged conduct. For this reason, it is deemed necessary to make a few brief clarifications regarding agrarian property.
In this sense, it is worthwhile to refer to what was indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2006-1806, at fourteen fifty-five on February fifteenth, two thousand six, regarding these, in which it clarified the moment from which the beneficiary acquires the right of ownership, with all the attributes it entails—pursuant to the regulation of numeral 45 of the Constitution and 264 of the Civil Code—: "*In the first place, it must be clearly understood that ownership is not acquired upon delivery of the title, nor even at the moment the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario transfers the parcel to the beneficiary, *but rather upon fulfillment of the conditions set forth in that numeral*, namely, the passage of that period—the fifteen years provided in the challenged norm—, the effective and real payment for the property, and compliance with the stipulated requirements for the appropriate use of that property.
In the second place, it is characteristic of this type of contracts—of an agrarian nature—to stipulate a duration period, by way of a condition precedent, so that it is only at the moment the beneficiary complies with the requirements set forth both in the referenced law and in the award contract, that they definitively acquire that property. In light of the foregoing, the matter of the period established by law—and which is the object of challenge in this action—is a matter of legislative discretion, and the alleged unconstitutionality rests on its supposed unreasonableness, a topic to be addressed later. In the third place, it must be considered that the land award contract can be revoked by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario—under the terms of article 66 of the same referenced law—, before the expiration of that period, if the beneficiary does not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the Ley de Tierras y Colonización and in the award contract, since the property is delivered for a specific purpose, namely, to promote agrarian production, in accordance with the agricultural vocation recognized in these properties. ...*" (Emphasis is from the original.) Furthermore, even prior to this ruling, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had pronounced on the special legal nature of land award contracts, characteristic of Agrarian Law, which find their legal basis in subsections 5) and 6) of article 1, 4, 5, 55, 63 subsection 1) and 64 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825, of October fourteenth, nineteen sixty-one, and its amendments, in the following terms: "VIII.- *The allocation contract is a contract of duration* *by which the agrarian entity awards to a beneficiary of the land provision programs, previously qualified according to the parameters established by its own regulations, an agrarian property, committing to transfer it, for an eventual price or free of charge, if the beneficiary demonstrates they have the technical capacity to develop the agrarian enterprise and fulfills the imposed obligations during a trial period; the transfer of ownership is verified subject to a multiplicity of obligations on the part of the beneficiary, the breach of which allows the entity to revoke the award, during a period of 15 years or until the moment there are no outstanding debts, without being able to alienate it in any way without first obtaining express authorization from the Institute, since by provision of Law the allocating entity can recover the asset to award it to another beneficiary, always having to exercise direct control over the activity carried out by the awardee, even after the 15-year period has passed or the debts have been settled, when the beneficiary holds ownership fully and exclusively.* IX.- *From a causal point of view* *it cannot be maintained that the cause of the allocation transaction consists, as in a sale, of the exchange of a thing for a price, because that is not the economic-social function, or social policy, in relation to the purpose of allocating land to those who do not have it or have it insufficiently on the contrary, it seeks to contribute to a better distribution of wealth with a sense of social justice and to an increase in the country's production or productivity* . *From this point of view, when the Law refers to a sale, or the administrative practice of the entity leads to carrying out a sale transaction to register it in the Public Property Registry, it does not allow one to disregard that the allocation is to be carried out through the execution of a decision of the administrative entity, the existence of which exceeds the agreement of the parties.* *But that administrative decision also entails very important elements to differentiate the land allocation contract from a sale, or from a simple administrative contract, since the clauses contained in the contract originate from the Law, and their exercise does not derive from the power of the state nor from the interest of the parties, but from the State's own purposes that bind it to achieving a better distribution of land and raising the economic and social conditions of farmers, agricultural entrepreneurs, and land workers, especially if they lack the means at their disposal to have a dignified life.* *This is why the land allocation contract has been characterized as a typical contract of Agrarian Law.*
X.A very important characteristic of this contract established in the Law, and interpreted by doctrine, is that it is a durational contract. Its perfection does not occur with the transfer of ownership of the land; on the contrary, it crystallizes as the beneficiary fulfills his obligations, during the time established by the Law, and carries out the activity for which it was granted. Ownership is fully acquired only once the term has elapsed. In our case, this can be up to 30 years, as a 5-year grace period is granted prior to the issuance of the deed, and another period of up to 25 annual installments for the payment of the price; but this can have two types of variations: increasing it, when, by virtue of insufficient production not attributable to the parcel holder (parcelero), the Institute must readjust the form of payment, and another, decreasing it, by allowing early payment, upon completing 15 years from the transfer of ownership.
In this sense, if the contract is for a determined price, or is free of charge, from the granting of the deed there will be 15 years in which the Institute can revoke, rescind, or annul the contract in the event of the beneficiary’s non-compliance. (Articles 59, 67, and 68 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización)." (Judgment number 229-90, at three o'clock in the afternoon on July twentieth, nineteen ninety, of the First Chamber. The underlining is not from the original.)
Furthermore, in the aforementioned constitutional judgment 2006-1806, it is concluded from the special purpose of this type of contracts, precisely in consideration of the conceptualization that governs us of a Costa Rican Social and Democratic State of Law, according to the design established in our Constitución Política, based on the following considerations:
"... the limitations on free disposal and the prohibition on land-use change (cambio de uso) have their origin in the social function recognized in this property, whose primary objective is its adjudication –precisely– so that its titleholder may have a dignified way of life, through an activity previously determined by law and the contract through which it was acquired. Thus, the conditions imposed in the law and in the land adjudication contract are fully justified in light of Constitutional Law, as their sole purpose is to ensure that the procedures for land adjudication fulfill the purpose for which this program was created; which must never be understood as a simple program of delivery of property titles to solve problems of urgent squatting (precarismo), but as a true instrument through which an adequate and just distribution of land resources is achieved, the creation of self-sufficient family agricultural enterprises, and an effective increase in national production, which allows the farmer to elevate his living conditions, by making him a participant in the Nation's development.
(In the same sense, judgments number 5363-95, at nine hours twenty-seven minutes on September twenty-ninth, nineteen ninety-five, and 2004-9099, at eleven hours thirteen minutes on August twentieth, two thousand four, of this Chamber.) Allowing the contrary would imply the perversion of the subdivision (parcelación) and colonization system of the lands adjudicated by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario." (The highlighting is from the original.)
Based on the foregoing guidelines, the analysis of what was debated in this matter proceeds, circumscribed to whether or not there was a statute of limitations on the supervisory power of the Public Administration, in order to revoke the adjudication of an agricultural parcel in favor of the plaintiffs herein, and whether or not there was expiration (caducidad) in the administrative procedure followed for that purpose.
IX.REGARDING THE ALLEGED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE REVOCATION AND NULLITY PROCEDURE OF THE TITLE.- In relation to this point, and taking into consideration the special legal nature of the agricultural parcel adjudication contracts, the point relative to the statute of limitations on the Administration's power to revoke the adjudication and annul the conferred title must be elucidated. As indicated supra, the plaintiffs allege that it is from the date of the Board of Directors' agreement in which the adjudication was ordered, and for its part, the defendant institution alleges that it is from the registration of that transfer in the Registry. Having assessed the situation, this Court considers that neither one date nor the other applies. Indeed, it should be noted that neither the adjudication by agreement of the competent institution's Board of Directors, nor the registration in the Registry, confer the right of ownership, for the reason that it is a right that is acquired with the passage of time and the satisfactory fulfillment of the imposed obligations, in the terms of Article 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825 (and its amendments).
Thus, with the act of "adjudication" of a parcel, ownership is not transferred, and it is a unilateral act of the Administration, in which the beneficiary or beneficiaries do not participate, by which it simply authorizes the sale of the land in their favor; and by virtue of this, it is merely the precondition for subsequently configuring the respective contract, which is the individualized (individual) deed in favor of the corresponding beneficiaries, in which, now indeed, the conditions of that grant are established, and in which are fully comprised the limitations established in articles 66, 67, and 68 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, number 2825, as well as the effective transfer of the adjudicated parcel, precisely from the date of its subscription. In this sense, that deed acquires the condition of a contract transferring ownership, which, in light of the provisions of article 1007 of the Código Civil, insofar as it establishes obligations for the buyer -beneficiaries- is solemn, bilateral, consensual, and in relation to the legal limitations on this property, requires the consent or acceptance of the obligor, so that compliance can be compelled, in this case, at the charge of the selling institution; whose non-compliance, in the terms precisely established in Article 66 of the reference Law (number 2825 and its amendments) and generically in Article 692 of the Código Civil, gives rise to revocation of the adjudication and nullity of the title.
It should be noted that the acquisition of the parcel in the hands of the beneficiary or beneficiaries occurs with and from the subscription of this deed, not before, and by virtue of this, Article 67 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización refers, as a parameter for the computation of the fifteen years of validity of the limitations of that law, to the date of acquisition of the parcel, which in no way occurs with the act (it is repeated, unilateral) of the Administration, but with and from the signing of the corresponding deed. Finally, it must be remembered for this purpose, that according to the mandate of Article 1022 of the Código Civil, the contract is law between the parties, and what is agreed binds its signatories, "... both to what is expressed in them, and to the consequences that equity, custom, and the law give rise to from the obligation, according to its nature", states subsection 1) of Article 1023 of the cited Código Civil.
Thus, the subjection to those legal limitations is for a term of fifteen years, counted from the acceptance of he who obliges himself to them, and not before, as the plaintiffs propose, since there has been no acceptance on their part, nor legitimate occupation of that property. Thus, with the situation so presented, the term cannot be computed from the adjudication of parcel 57 of the Asentamiento de Lagunillas to Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256, which occurred through the agreement of Article Five of Session 73-93, of September twenty-sixth, nineteen ninety-three -proven fact 1.)-, nor from the registration of those rights in the Public Property Registry, after the subscription of the corresponding deed, which occurred on July ninth, nineteen ninety-four -proven fact 3.)-, as the defendant institution alleged, but rather from the date of subscription of the corresponding transfer deed of the real property, an occasion on which the limitations of the law were also imposed, with the acceptance of the beneficiaries, which occurred on October first, nineteen ninety-three -proven fact 2.)-.
In this sense, it is striking that with the registration of those rights, the effective date of these limitations was noted, that is, from October first, nineteen ninety-three to October first, two thousand eight, as recorded in the corresponding certification of the property that the registration entry of Folio Real number Placa26912 carried at that moment - proven fact 3.)-; hence, those who promote this action can neither claim ignorance nor attempt its modification. By reason of the foregoing, the alleged statute of limitations (on the exercise of the supervisory power in charge of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural) does not occur in this case, because the notification of the resolution of fourteen hours on September twenty-fifth, two thousand eight, which ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and nullity of the title, was notified to the plaintiffs herein on September twenty-ninth, two thousand eight - proven fact 11.)-, that is, before the expiration of the legal limitations.
Likewise, the official letter sent to the Public Registry to communicate the opening of this ruling was ordered in the resolution of sixteen hours on September twenty-fifth, two thousand eight -proven fact 12.)-, without affecting its validity, the fact that it was not brought to the attention of the Registry until October first of the following year, by reason that on that date, the plaintiffs herein had already been personally notified of the opening of the administrative procedure against them, thereby interrupting the statute of limitations. Finally, regarding this aspect, it must be indicated that the criterion put forward in this ruling on this point is not subject to the reasons or considerations of other judgments, such as the one alleged in the lawsuit, under the consideration that in the exercise of the jurisdictional function, judges are only subject to the Constitución and the law (block of legality), in the terms of Article 154 of the Constitución Política, thus recognizing a sphere of independence for the judges, who are not even subject to or bound by precedents or jurisprudence, understood as the latter the reiterated criterion (at least three judgments) emanating from the Courts of Cassation, in relation to a specific legal point (in the terms of Article 9 of the Código Civil). By reason of what has been said, it is appropriate to dismiss the lawsuit regarding this point.
X.REGARDING THE EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR REVOCATION OF ADJUDICATION AND NULLITY OF THE AGRARIAN PROPERTY TITLE.- In relation to the second point to be analyzed, the first thing that must be elucidated is whether the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) is applicable, in the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the administrative procedures carried out by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in exercise of the competences legally assigned to it, and the second: in the event that this legal concept is applicable, whether or not the alleged expiration (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for revocation of the adjudication and nullity of the title, pursued by the defendant against the plaintiffs herein -Mr. Nombre140255 and Mr. Nombre140256, and processed in file number 161-08-NUL. Regarding the first, as the plaintiff party rightly points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative procedures for revocation of the adjudication of parcels by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.
Thus, among others, one can consult judgments number 57-2011-VI, at eleven hours five minutes on March eighth, two thousand eleven, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, at seven hours fifty minutes on March ninth, number 57-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-ninth, 90-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-third, number 112-2012-VI, at ten hours on June fourteenth, number 159-2012-VI, at fourteen hours on August thirteenth, the last four of two thousand twelve, and number 210-2012-VI, at fourteen hours twenty minutes on October fourth, two thousand twelve. In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the legal concept of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the procedures followed by the defendant institution was concluded; a criterion that is shared based on the following considerations:
"[...] all those legal norms, derived from the Constitución Política as an ideological model, pursue no more and no less than the realization of the fundamental purpose of justice, which is the greatest of the principles that safeguard a State of Law, in which are included rules –general principles– that have full validity and applicability to the administrative procedures of any Administration body, it is repeated, because the principles extracted from it are of strict observance by the authorities in charge of authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a punitive result." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Sala Constitucional. The highlighting is not from the original.)
Thus, the guarantee of due process manifests itself in the effective exercise of defense, which evidences its instrumental nature, insofar as it is arranged to guarantee the best resolution thereof, in the terms provided in Article 215.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública:
"The administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system." (The highlighting is not from the original.)
The binding nature of the guarantees that constitute due process has such relevance in the administrative punitive sphere that their non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as the Sala Constitucional indicated in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.
This concerns the due resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is consistent with the principles of procedural economy and efficiency, as well as the principle of constitutional reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning a procedural inactivity with expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a norm that was amended by provision 200, subsection 10) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in the following terms:
"1) When the procedure is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause, attributable exclusively to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, officially (de oficio) or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code. 2) The expiration (caducidad) of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to take action because the positive or negative silence has been operated, or when the file is ready for the final act to be issued. 3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are considered as not having been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations." (Reform effective as of January first, two thousand eight.)
Now, it is noted that in the interest of promoting a speedy process, this cannot call into question or impair the guarantees that make up due process, such as not properly motivating the resolution due to the lack of carrying out expert reports, appearances, or any important evidence; or not respecting the established deadlines for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) provided for in the transcribed legal norm, it is justified as a means to avoid the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act –when the matter was initiated at the request of a party– and similarly, it is innocuous when that final act has already been issued.
For it to operate, according to the provisions of the aforementioned norm, expiration (caducidad) requires the following prerequisites: first: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; second, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or else to the Administration, if it was instituted officially (de oficio); and third, that this state has been maintained for a space of more than six months, a term that constitutes the minimum temporal limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the opening of the procedure. This supposes that in punitive procedures or those possibly affecting rights instructed officially (de oficio), expiration (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated in its core regarding the legal concept under discussion, considered:
"In the first place, it can be observed that the recently transcribed norm is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a faculty; on the contrary, once the factual prerequisites contained in it are fulfilled, the consequence becomes obligatory for the body in charge of the processing. This implies that its effects occur by operation of law (de pleno derecho), and therefore its recognition has merely declarative effects, not constitutive ones." It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence – which is, by definition, irrevocable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible (irrenunciable, intransmisible e imprescriptible) according to numeral 66 LGAP – but rather, solely, as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred. (Emphasis not in original.)
From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, public competences are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for an expiration of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, competences are not extinguished by the passage of the term established to exercise them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states with complete force that an act issued outside of term is valid for all legal purposes, save express provision of law, which does not occur here. It is clear that expiration (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the referenced Law itself designates as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, within the administrative proceeding; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.
Furthermore, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obliges the official and the Judge to interpret the norms, principles, and values "in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, while respecting the rights and interests of the individual" (article 10.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which in this case, obliges respect for the forms and constituent elements of due process; which is proper in a Social and Democratic State of Law.
In any case, as previously indicated, before a normative lacuna or gap, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first in the branch of Public Law (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider – as already indicated in the precedents cited supra – that the own regulation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario for this type of situation and in force at the time of the facts being analyzed, does remit to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; from which the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, one cannot disregard the provision in numeral 364 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, which fully provides for the "prevalence" ("prevalencia") of its principles and norms, "over those of any other provisions of equal or lesser rank," which it establishes as "criteria for the interpretation of the entire administrative legal order of the country."
XI.ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RELATION TO THE ALLEGED EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FOLLOWED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.- Having determined as such the application of the institute of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative proceeding followed against the plaintiffs herein – Messrs. Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 –, we proceed with the analysis of the situation in the indicated matter. After a meticulous review of what occurred in said matter, it is possible to verify that the alleged inactivity of the proceeding in question did not occur. Indeed, it is noted that the proceeding has been continuous, with multiple participation by the plaintiffs herein, in full exercise of the defense of their interests, and also by those participating in this matter as interested third parties. Thus, after the notification of the opening of the proceeding to the plaintiffs herein, which occurred on the twenty-ninth of September two thousand eight – proven fact 11.) –, they responded by written submission on the eighth of October two thousand eight, an opportunity in which they accepted the accused non-compliance (illegal sale of the parcel while the limitations were in force) – proven fact 13.) –.
Then, on the second of the following December, the Legal Advisory Office (Asesoría Jurídica) of the Dirección Región Pacífico Central changed the date for carrying out the site inspection to fourteen hours thirty minutes on the following third of December two thousand eight, and moved the hearing to the following fourth of December, starting from fourteen hours – proven fact 14.) –. That same day (second of December two thousand eight, Messrs. Nombre140258 and Nombre140259 appeared in the proceeding, requesting to be considered as interested third parties in the matter and that those proceedings be archived – proven fact 15.). The plaintiffs herein presented a note on the third of December two thousand eight in which they recorded that at the indicated time and day, the officials of the defendant Institute had not appeared to carry out the site inspection – proven fact
XII.RULING REGARDING THE CLAIMS FORMULATED.- In light of the foregoing considerations, it is appropriate to review the claims that were formulated in this process, which comprises various pronouncements, in the following manner:
In this virtue, this Chamber considers that in relation to this point, the plaintiffs lack active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) to require the registration of that property in their name. Indeed, we recall what has already been said regarding the special connotation of this type of property, which carries an important social function, manifested in the obligation of the beneficiary to directly work and exploit the allocated parcel, as clearly and simply required by Article 65 of the Ley de Tierras y Colonización, when it provides: "If the occupant has cultivated the minimum indicated by the Institute and fulfilled to its satisfaction all other obligations, they shall have the right to be granted a title of ownership, ..." and reinforced by the second paragraph of numeral 67 of the same legal body, when it establishes: "After fifteen years have elapsed and the right of ownership has been acquired, ..." Thus, in this case, it is evident that the plaintiffs did not acquire ownership of the land they claim, due to non-compliance with the limitations imposed by law on the cession in their favor, an adjudication that was revoked according to the procedure followed for that purpose, in time, that is, prior to the expiration of those limitations.
A different interpretation from what has been stated would imply distorting the raison d'être of these adjudications. With the situation thus posed, this Authority considers that in this case, the plaintiffs have acted with evident recklessness, to such an extent that it may be regarded as an attempt of fraud of law (fraude de ley), in the terms regulated in numeral 20 of the Civil Code (Código Civil), which literally provides: "Acts carried out under the text of a norm, that pursue a result prohibited by the legal order, or contrary to it, shall be considered executed in fraud of law and shall not prevent the proper application of the norm that was sought to be evaded."
XIII.OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES OF THE CLAIM.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural opposed the claim in its response, and for that purpose, requested that it be declared without merit in all its aspects, for which it formulated the defenses of lack of interest and lack of right, and the interested third parties raised the defense of lack of active standing. In this regard, we must attend to the fact that the substantive prerequisites of every jurisdictional process are standing, the current interest in resolving the matter, and the right, which must be reviewed by every Judge, even sua sponte and in that strict order. In this respect, it is pertinent to indicate the following:
"This Chamber has expressed that standing is: '…a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make a judgment on the merits that resolves them possible; consequently standing to sue does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest discussed in the process. Standing to sue refers to the substantial relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person who, by law, must oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits the substantial legal relationship object of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff the person who, under the law, can formulate the claims of the complaint, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. …' " (Judgment 000976-F-2006, of seven hours forty minutes on the nineteenth of December two thousand six).
And more recently, the cited High Court, in judgment number 1042-F-SI-2013l, of eight hours fifty minutes on the fourteenth of August two thousand thirteen, provided:
"(...) In accordance with procedural doctrine, the so-called 'legitimatio ad causam' active or passive or, as it is also called, standing to sue or standing to act, alludes to the condition of being the holder of the right (the plaintiff) and of being obliged to the performance (the defendant). That is, the persons who will legally and directly be affected in their rights by the judgment have standing to sue. In this line of thought, this Chamber has indicated that standing is: '(…) a prerequisite of the claim formulated in the complaint and of the opposition made by the defendant, to make a judgment on the merits that resolves them possible; consequently standing to sue does not constitute a procedural prerequisite, insofar as it does not refer to the procedure or the valid exercise of the action, but rather refers to the substantial relationship that must exist between plaintiff and defendant and to the substantial interest discussed in the process. Standing to sue refers to the substantial relationship claimed to exist between the parties to the process and the substantial interest in litigation. The defendant must be the person who, by law, must oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits the substantial legal relationship object of the complaint to be declared; and the plaintiff the person who, under the law, can formulate the claims of the complaint, even if the substantial right claimed does not exist or belongs to another. … According to the legitimized subject or their position in the procedural relationship, one can distinguish between active and passive standing; the former corresponds to the plaintiff and to the persons who subsequently intervene to defend their cause, the latter belongs to the defendant and to those who intervene to dispute and oppose the plaintiff's claim. The absence of standing to sue constitutes a substantial impediment, if the judge becomes aware of its lack, they must declare it sua sponte and issue an inhibitory ruling, which is no obstacle for it to be alleged timely as a preliminary exception. (…) Consequently, standing is the aptitude to be a party in a specific process, it can be active or passive, which will depend on the conditions that the law establishes for that purpose regarding the procedural claim. Thus, active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa), which is of interest in the case under study, is the capacity to sue, a character that arises from the position in which the subject finds themselves, with respect to the promoted procedural claim. In short, it is the necessary identity that must exist between the plaintiff and the right they claim in court. …' (Judgment number 976 of 7 hours 40 minutes on December 19, 2006. In the same sense, one may consult, among others, the resolutions of this Chamber numbers 89 of 14 hours 50 minutes on June 19, 1991, 83 of 15 hours 15 minutes on September 24, 1997, 604 of 10 hours on August 17, 2007 and 1023-A-S1-2009 of 14 hours 50 minutes on October 1, 2009)".
Under the tenor of the foregoing, it can be concluded that in essence active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) determines that the person who appears as a plaintiff in a process is the person who, under the law, can formulate the claims of the complaint, and in such virtue, be the holder of the right or legitimate interest that is sought to be recognized in their favor, and regarding whom it is possible to issue a favorable ruling on their claims; and for its part, passive standing to sue (legitimación ad causam pasiva) determines that the person who is sued is the person who, by law, must oppose the plaintiff's claim or against whom the law permits the substantial legal relationship object of the complaint to be declared. The absence of standing to sue constitutes a substantial impediment to granting the claim, and if the judge becomes aware of its lack, they must declare it sua sponte and issue a ruling to that effect, although it is no obstacle for it to be alleged timely as a preliminary exception.
Ergo, standing to sue emerges as an elementary substantive prerequisite for the issuance of a favorable judgment, because if its absence is not noticed, the judge could incur the error of granting a right to someone who does not correspond or imposing a performance on someone who is not the obligor, insofar as that would mean the judgment as such becomes unenforceable. In attention to what has been said, it is considered that the plaintiffs -Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 -, in their condition as adjudicatees of an agrarian parcel, according to an agreement for that purpose emanating from the competent body -at that time, the so-called Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario-, are possessed of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) to require the review of legality of the administrative conduct they challenged in this venue, all derived from the administrative procedure to revoke that adjudication and nullify the title.
And in this sense, passive standing to sue (legitimación ad causam pasiva) also exists regarding the institution sued in this process. In relation to these aspects of the claim (declaratory claims), it had already been declared -through resolution number 107-2015, of fifteen hours two minutes on the fifth of March two thousand fifteen, from Section I of the Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda- that the gentlemen Nombre140258 and now the Succession (Sucesión) of he who in life was Nombre140259 , have an interest in the matter, in the character or position of interested third parties. However, as was alleged by the interested third parties, it is appropriate to grant the defense of lack of active standing to sue, but only in what refers to the claim for condemnation made in this process, tending to order the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915 to be re-registered in the name of the plaintiffs, in attention to the fact that from the ninth of December two thousand five and as of the date of adopting this jurisdictional decision, the plaintiffs do not exercise possession over the property whose ownership they claim, for having sold (illegally) that parcel to those who appear as interested third parties in this process; under the tenor of which, granting their request would constitute an evident abuse of right, in attention to the special nature of agrarian property (purposes and mode of acquisition), as has been explained supra.
XIV.OF THE COSTS (COSTAS).- In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs (costas procesales y personales) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. The waiver of this condemnation is only viable when there is, in the Tribunal's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is handed down by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In this case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions set forth in the applicable regulations and to break the postulate of condemning the losing party. Therefore, the condemnation of the plaintiffs to pay the procedural and personal costs in favor of the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural is imposed, which shall be liquidated in the sentence execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. In attention to the interested third parties, Nombre140258 and the succession of he who in life was Nombre140259 , they did not formulate their own claim; regarding them, no special condemnation in costs is declared.
POR TANTO:
The preliminary defense of expiration of the action (caducidad) reiterated in the conclusions phase by the representation of the sued institution is rejected. The defense of lack of active standing to sue (legitimación ad causam activa) raised by the interested third parties is partially granted, that is, in relation to the last claim, for condemnation, tending to have the registration of the property with Real Folio Registry number Placa26915 ordered, again in favor of the plaintiffs, and in equal shares; and it is rejected regarding the other claims. In all else, the substantive defense of lack of interest raised by the sued institution is rejected, and the defense of lack of right raised by the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural and the interested third parties is granted. Consequently, the claim filed by Nombre140255 AND Nombre140256 against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL AND THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES, Nombre140258 AND THE SUCCESSION OF HE WHO IN LIFE WAS Nombre140259 , is declared WITHOUT MERIT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. The condemnation of the plaintiffs to pay the procedural and personal costs in favor of the sued institution is imposed, which shall be liquidated in the sentence execution phase, once this pronouncement is final. No special condemnation in costs is declared regarding the interested third parties.
Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre136022 Daniel Aguilar Méndez Proceso de conocimiento con trámite de puro derecho (art. 98.2 del CPCA) Nombre140255 and Nombre140256 against the INDER. Interested third parties: Nombre140258 and Sucesión of Nombre140259
2 de 25 2 de 25 Sentencia 149-2016-VI No. 149-2016-VI SECCIÓN SEXTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA. SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ. Anexo A, Dirección01 , a las catorce horas treinta minutos del catorce de octubre del dos mil dieciséis.
Conoce este Tribunal del proceso ordinario contencioso administrativo, declarado con trámite de puro derecho, establecido por Nombre140255 , agricultor, con cédula de identidad número CED110420 y Nombre140256 , ama de casa, cédula número CED110421, ambos casados (esposos) y vecinos de Dirección16888 contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL, representado últimamente por su apoderada generalísima Nombre140257 , casada, Máster en Administración de Empresas, cédula de identidad CED89756, vecina de Sabanilla de Montes de Oca (certificación de personería inscrita en el Registro Nacional, incorporada al expediente electrónico). Participan en el proceso como terceros interesados el señor Nombre140258 , viudo una vez, agricultor, cédula de identidad número CED110422, vecino de Dirección16877 , , y la SUCESIÓN DE QUIEN EN VIDA FUE Nombre140259 , representada por su albacea provisional Nombre140260 Nombre140261 , soltero, estudiante, cédula número CED110423, vecino de Dirección16878 , , (designación según resolución de las siete horas del catorce de abril del dos mil dieciséis, del Juzgado Civil de Puntarenas, certificada e aportado al expediente virtual).
Actúan como apoderados especiales judiciales de los intervinientes, los siguientes abogados: de los actores: Gerardo Moya Paniagua, casado, cédula número CED110424, vecino de Orotina (poder otorgado el veintiocho de setiembre del dos mil trece, a folio 103 del expediente judicial, escaneado en expediente virtual); de la institución accionada : Guillermo Goyenaga Calvo, casado, cédula número CED110425, sin indicación de domicilio (poder de fecha del cuatro de enero del dos mil dieciséis, en expediente virtual) y del tercero Arguedas Cortés: Jorge Fabricio Fernández Mayorga, divorciado. cédula de identidad número CED110426, vecino de Palmares de Alajuela (poder otorgado el quince de febrero del dos mil dieciséis, en expediente virtual). Figura como abogado director del albacea de la sucesión de Nombre140259 , el abogado Jorge Fabricio Fernández Mayorga. Todos los intervinientes son mayores y costarricenses.
RESULTANDO:
Redacta la jueza ponente Fernández Brenes
CONSIDERANDO:
I.DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- De importancia para la resolución de este asunto, se tiene por debidamente demostrado lo siguiente:
III.DEL OBJETO DE LA DEMANDA.- Los accionantes formulan proceso contencioso contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, en la que hacen las siguientes pretensiones declarativas; la primera y principal -y de la cual penden las subsiguientes-, tendente a que se declare la prescripción y/o caducidad del procedimiento administrativo tramitado por la institución accionada en expediente 161-08-NUL. El fundamento de las anteriores declaraciones es el siguiente: a.) En relación a la prescripción alegada: que las limitaciones a la propiedad impuestas al tenor de la 67 Ley 2825, del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno y sus reformas, empiezan a correr desde la adjudicación de la parcela, como lo ha interpretado la Procuraduría General de la República (no indica ninguno)y la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, ésta última en sentencia número 275-S1-F-2011; de donde no puede interpretarse que el plazo corra a partir de la inscripción del derecho en el Registro Público de la Propiedad.
Así en el caso, siendo que la adjudicación de la parcela 57 del Asentamiento de Lagunillas se dispusiera por acuerdo Quinto de la Sesión 73-93, del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres de la Junta Directiva del entonces denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, el plazo de los quince años venció el veintisiete de setiembre del dos mil ocho; por lo que razonan, que al momento de notificárseles el inicio del procedimiento de revocatoria de adjudicación y nulidad del título -lo que dicen ocurrió el treinta de setiembre del dos mil ocho-, habían fenecido las limitaciones de la ley y la competencia de la institución accionada para actuar en su contra. Igual suerte corre el exhorto que se envió al Registro, para anotar la existencia de aquel procedimiento administrativo, que data del primero de octubre siguiente, dicen, cinco días después de vencidas las limitaciones de la ley; y b.) En relación a la caducidad del procedimiento aducida: señalan que el procedimiento administrativo seguido en su contra, tramitado en expediente 161-08-NUL estuvo inactivo, por culpa atinente en exclusiva a la institución accionada, desde el tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho al veinticinco de setiembre del año dos mil nueve, esto es, por ocho meses veintidós días, por lo que se produjo la caducidad del procedimiento, en los términos regulados en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, conforme a texto dado por reforma en el año dos mil seis, vigente a partir del primero de enero del dos mil ocho; que resulta de aplicación conforme a lo resuelto por el Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo en sentencia número 57-2011-VI, y lo ha entendido y asimilado la administración activa.
En adición a la anterior pretensión, formularon la pretensión también declarativa y dependiente del acogimiento del anterior requerimiento, de nulidad de las siguientes actuaciones administrativas: la resolución de la Junta Directiva de las quince horas del diecinueve de julio del dos mil diez, que revocó la adjudicación que ese órgano les hiciera mediante acuerdo en el Artículo Quinto de la Sesión 73-93, del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, de la Dirección16886 (Garabito) y la nulidad del titulo de propiedad que fuera inscrito en el Registro de la Propiedad en la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26912 ); la resolución número 1163-2012, de las siete horas treinta y dos minutos del veinte de setiembre del dos mil doce, dictada por el Tribunal Agrario (en condición de jerarca impropio), y que confirmó aquella decisión; y el exhorto que la institución accionada envió al Registro Público de la Propiedad con citas de presentación 2012-00333943-01; en el que se ordenó revertir la titularidad de ese fundo a la institución demandada).
Consecuencia de lo anterior, pidió la anulación de la inscripción de la finca mencionada a favor del instituto demandado. Corolario del acogimiento de las nulidades que pidieron declarar -y también de naturaleza accesoria a la pretensión declarativa principal-, formuló la pretensión de condena, consistente en que se ordene inscribir la finca de referencia bajo su titularidad (la de los actores) y por partes iguales. Finalmente, pidió que este asunto se declarase sin especial condena en costas. (Escrito de demanda a folios 99 a 103 del expediente judicial escaneado e incorporado en expediente virtual y manifestaciones durante la celebración de la Audiencia Preliminar, según grabación en disco compacto adjunto.)
IV.DE LA POSICIÓN DE LA INSTITUCIÓN DEMANDADA.- La representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural se opuso a la demanda interpuesta en su contra, con la formulación de las defensas de fondo de falta de interés y falta de derecho; al tenor de la cual pidió su desestimación en relación a todos sus extremos y la condenatoria en costas a los actores. El sustento de su oposición es el siguiente: a.) Que el procedimiento seguido en contra de los actores para la revocatoria de la adjudicación de la Dirección16886 se rige por una normativa especial, tanto de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno y sus reformas, como del Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, texto según publicación en La Gaceta número 13 del veinte de enero del dos mil cuatro -vigente al momento de iniciarse el procedimiento cuestionado-; en los que se da plena garantía del respeto del debido proceso y derecho de defensa, pero en los que no tiene aplicación el instituto de la caducidad del procedimientos, siendo incluso los plazos regulados diferentes a los de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; b.) Que dicho procedimiento se realizó en ejercicio de las potestades fiscalizadoras que esa institución tiene sobre sus predios, para verificar el cumplimiento del fin para el cual fueron adjudicados; y en el caso, se verificó el incumplimiento de los actores a las limitaciones impuestas por mandato legal -venta ilegal del predio- que dio lugar a la pérdida de su derecho, en la forma tipificada en los artículos 66 y 68 de la Ley número 2825, y como fuera declarado en sede administrativa; c.) Que el plazo de los quince años de las limitaciones a la propiedad de las parcelas que se adjudican, no corre desde el momento de la adjudicación, por ser un acto previo al otorgamiento de la escritura; de manera que, el mismo corre a partir de su correspondiente inscripción en el Registro, en los términos del numeral 67 de la citada Ley número Placa19660.
Asimismo advierte del error en la interpretación del pronunciamiento de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en tanto refiere a que no pueden volver a imponerse nuevas limitaciones a la propiedad, después de vencidas; oportunidad en la que incluso se desestimó el recurso de casación formulado; d.) Que al notificársele a los actores del inicio del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título, las limitaciones de la ley estaban vigentes, por cuanto la inscripción del derecho de propiedad a favor de los actores ocurrió el nueve de julio de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro, de manera que las limitaciones vencían hasta el nueve de julio del año dos mil nueve; e.) En relación a la alegada caducidad del procedimiento, indicó que es una forma de terminación "anormal" del procedimiento, y en el caso es evidente que el procedimiento en cuestión ya está terminado e incluso revertida la titularidad del bien; que debe considerarse que el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento entró a regir con ocasión de la promulgación del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, vigente a partir del primero de enero del año dos mil ocho; de donde, al tenor del Transitorio IV del citado código procesal, los procedimientos administrativos iniciados con anterioridad a la entrada en vigencia de dicha regulación procesal, cualquiera que sea su estado procesal, deben continuar substanciándose con la normativa que les regía con anterioridad; y que en todo caso, el trámite del procedimiento administrativo 161-08-NUL fue continuo y no se acredita la inactividad que se acusa; f.) Que en relación a los extremos de prescripción y caducidad aducidos en este proceso, el superior jerárquico impropio -Tribunal Agrario- no encontró vicio alguno g.) Agregó que el asunto debía de revisarse con una visión integral de la situación, y en este sentido llamó la atención en relación a la situación de los terceros interesados que figuran en este proceso, ya que desde el año dos mil cinco, son los que ejercen posesión sobre el fundo objeto de este proceso; al tenor de lo cual, alega la falta de interés en este asunto.
Pidió finalmente acoger tanto las defensas previas como de fondo alegadas. (Contestación de la demanda a folios 107 a 123 y manifestaciones del representante durante la fase de conclusiones, conforme a respaldo digital en disco compacto adjunto.)
V.DE LA POSICIÓN DE LOS TERCEROS INTERESADOS.- Solicitaron los señores Nombre140258 y quien en vida fue Nombre140259 -ahora representada por su hijo, quien figura como su albacea- que la demanda se declare sin lugar en todos los extremos, por lo siguiente: a.) que con ocasión de opción de venta que les hicieran los aquí actores de la propiedad con matrícula de Folio Real -en ese momento- número Placa26912 de la Provincia de Puntarenas, y sobre la que pesaban las limitaciones de la Ley número 2825, ellos la aceptaron conforme a negocio suscrito el nueve de diciembre del año dos mil cinco, momento en el que les pagaron cuarenta y cinco millones de colones, y a condición de que les entregaran el título de propiedad, por autorización del entonces denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario o cuando vencieran las limitaciones de ley; b.) Que a partir de la fecha de aquel negocio jurídico -nueve de diciembre del dos mil cinco- ejercen la posesión sobre el indicado fundo, con todos los atributos del derecho de propiedad; c.) Que aquella venta fue real y concreta, conforme a escritura otorgada ante el mismo profesional (abogado/notario) que ahora figura como representante legal de los aquí actores; sin advertirles de la ilegalidad del negocio, en tanto la venta que les hicieran los actores de la finca objeto de este proceso, fue realizada en la vigencia de las limitaciones de la ley de referencia; y posterior a ello, incluso les ocultaron el procedimiento de revocatoria y nulidad en contra de los aquí actores; d.) Que la situación anterior les obligó a formular demanda agraria ordinaria contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, a efecto de encontrar reparación a su situación, primero para que se les otorgue en propiedad aquella parcela, y en su defecto, para que se les paguen las mejoras introducidas, conforme a derecho corresponde, por haberla trabajado desde que la fecha en que ejercen posesión; e.) Rechazan que en el procedimiento administrativo seguido contra los aquí actores, se haya dado la prescripción y caducidad aducidas; por cuanto las limitaciones de la Ley 2825 vencían con posterioridad a la fecha en que fueron notificados del procedimiento administrativo en su contra, y no hubo paralización del procedimiento en los términos del 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; g.) Finalmente, advirtieron de la mala fe de los actores en este litigio, que en su demanda y alegaciones han ocultado la venta que les hicieran de la propiedad objeto de la litis, denotando que quieren sacar provecho de su propio dolo, circunstancia que incluso evidencia la falta de legitimación activa (de los actores), al pretender un derecho que no tienen, dado que no son los legítimos propietarios -con ocasión de la venta del inmueble- y tampoco poseedores del bien.
(Escrito de apersonamiento al proceso a folios 201 frente a 206 frente del expediente judicial escaneado e incorporado el expediente virtual y manifestaciones del personero y abogado director, conforme a respaldo digital en disco compacto adjunto.)
VI.ACLARACIÓN PREVIA DE LO QUE SE RESOLVERÁ EN ESTE PROCESO.- Vistas las alegaciones que sustentan esta demanda y las del instituto accionado y terceros interesados, se estima necesario precisar que en este proceso no se atenderá la situación de estos últimos en lo que refiere a su derecho o expectativas sobre la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26915 de la Provincia de Puntarenas, derivadas de su posesión desde el nueve de diciembre del año dos mil cinco, con ocasión de la aceptación de la opción de venta que les hicieran los aquí actores y pago de aquella propiedad -hechos probados 4.) y 5.)-. Lo anterior, por cuanto ha quedado claro que aquellos reclamos (o pretensiones) están siendo dilucidadas en el proceso agrario que se tramita en expediente número 12-1601000-0642-AG-2, en el Juzgado Agrario de Puntarenas -hecho probado 33.)-, de donde excede al ámbito competencial de esta Autoridad y el objeto de este proceso, el conocer tal situación.
Consecuentemente, la referencia que se tiene de aquella situación, únicamente es en cuanto incide en las pretensiones que los actores formulan en este proceso contencioso. Además se aclara que lo único que se analizará en este pronunciamiento, es sobre la legalidad de lo actuado por la Administración accionada -Instituto de Desarrollo Rural-, en la forma en que fuera planteado en la demanda, de manera que nos centraremos en si hubo o no prescripción y/o caducidad del procedimiento en el tramitado en expediente 161-08-NUL en sede administrativa. Como se advirtió previamente, los otros pronunciamientos que se pidieron hacer, son accesorios a la prescripción y caducidad que se pide declarar.
VII.DE LA DEFENSA DE CADUCIDAD DE LA ACCIÓN REITERADA EN LA FASE DE CONCLUSIONES.- Ya se había indicado, que en la Audiencia Preliminar celebrada el trece de mayo último, la Jueza Tramitadora a cargo del asunto rechazó la defensa previa privilegiada que hasta ese momento formuló la representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, de caducidad de la acción. No obstante en la fase de conclusiones, sin agregar ninguna consideración adicional, su proponente reiteró esta excepción. Sobre este aspecto, debemos de recordar que, al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 39 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, la formulación de procesos contenciosos que refieran al control de la legalidad de la conducta administrativa, el legislador estableció el instituto de la caducidad de la acción -a excepción de lo expresamente regulado en el artículo 41 del mismo código procesal, supuestos en los que rige la regla de la prescripción del derecho-.
Este plazo fue fijado en un año, en lo que tiene aplicación al subjudice, a partir "día siguiente de la notificación", cuando el acto impugnado deba ser notificado, según reza el inciso a) del citado numeral 39. En el caso en estudio, aún y cuando no consta en autos la fecha en que el Tribunal Agrario notificó a los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 la resolución 1163, de las siete horas treinta y dos minutos del veinte de setiembre del dos mil doce, que es decisión del jerarca impropio y en tal virtud, agotó la vía administrativa -conforme al canon 126 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública-; es posible concluir que este proceso fue interpuesto en tiempo, esto es, dentro del plazo anual de caducidad establecido en la normativa que rige la materia. Y ello es así, por cuanto, la data de aquella decisión lo fue el veinte de setiembre del dos mil doce, y la interposición de esta acción lo fue el diecinueve de setiembre del dos mil trece -hecho probado 34.) -, es decir, ni siquiera sobrepasó aquel plazo. Consecuentemente, procede el rechazo de la defensa previa privilegiada opuesta. Se procede entonces con el análisis de fondo del asunto planteado.
VIII.DE LA PROPIEDAD AGRARIA ORIGINADA EN LOS CONTRATOS CON EL INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL.- En tanto el objeto de la demanda refiere al análisis de lo actuado por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural en un procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria de una adjudicación de una parcela (agraria) y nulidad del título (de derecho de propiedad), se estima pertinente, previo a conocer los reclamos en aquel íter procedimental, comprender la especial naturaleza jurídica de la propiedad agraria originada en los contratos de asignación de tierras suscritos con el instituto accionado; su modo de adquisición y condiciones que la sujetan; lo anterior, para entender el fundamento de las funciones e instrumentos de fiscalización a cargo de la institución que es demandada en este proceso, autora y responsable de la conducta impugnada. Por ello, se estima necesario hacer unas breves precisiones respecto de la propiedad agraria. En tal sentido, resulta provechoso remitirnos a lo indicado por la Sala Constitucional en sentencia número 2006-1806, de las catorce horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del quince de febrero del dos mil seis, en relación a éstos, en que aclaró el momento a partir del cual, el beneficiario adquiere el derecho de propiedad, con todos los atributos que éste comprende -conforme a la regulación del numeral 45 de la Carta Fundamental y 264 del Código Civil-:
"En primer lugar, debe tenerse en claro que la propiedad no se adquiere con la entrega del título, ni tan siquiera al momento en que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario le traspasa la parcela al beneficiario, sino más bien con el cumplimiento de las condiciones dispuestas en ese numeral, a saber, el transcurso de ese plazo –los quince años dispuestos en la norma impugnada–, el pago efectivo y real del inmueble, y el sometimiento a las exigencias estipuladas para el adecuado uso de ese fundo. En segundo lugar, es propio de este tipo de contratos –de orden agrario– de estipular un plazo de duración, a modo de condición suspensiva, de manera que es hasta el momento en que el beneficiario cumple con las exigencias dispuestas tanto en la ley de referencia como en el contrato de adjudicación, que adquiere, de manera definitiva, esa propiedad. Al tenor de lo anterior, el tema del plazo que fija la ley –y que es objeto de impugnación en esta acción– es un asunto de discrecionalidad del legislador, de la supuesta inconstitucionalidad queda residenciado en su supuesta irrazonabilidad, tema que se abordará posteriormente.
En tercer lugar, debe tenerse en cuenta que el contrato de adjudicación de tierras puede ser revocado por el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario –al tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 66 de la misma ley de referencia–, antes del vencimiento de ese plazo, si el beneficiado no cumple las condiciones estipuladas en la Ley de Tierras y Colonización y en el contrato de adjudicación, por cuanto el fundo se entrega con una finalidad determinada, esta es, la de promover la producción agraria, en atención a la vocación agrícola que se reconoce en estos fundo. ..." (El resaltado es del original.)
Además, ya con anterioridad a este fallo, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se había manifestado a la especial naturaleza jurídica de los contratos de adjudicación de tierras, típicos del Derecho Agrario, que encuentran su sustento jurídico en los incisos 5) y 6) del artículo 1°, 4, 5, 55, 63 inciso 1) y 64 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825, del catorce de octubre de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, y sus reformas, en los siguientes términos:
"VIII.- El de asignación es un contrato de duración por el cual el ente agrario adjudica a un beneficiario de los programas de dotación de tierras, previamente calificados conforme a los parámetros establecidos por propia normativa, un fundo agrario, comprometiéndose a traspasarlo, por un eventual precio o a título gratuito, si el beneficiario demuestra tener capacidad técnica para desarrollar la empresa agraria y cumple con las obligaciones impuestas durante un período de prueba; el traspaso en propiedad se verifica sujeto a una multiplicidad de obligaciones de parte del beneficiario, cuyo incumplimiento permiten al ente revocar la adjudicación, durante un plazo de 15 años o hasta el momento de no existir deudas pendientes, sin que pueda en ninguna forma enajenarlo si no media previamente una autorización expresa del Instituto, pues por disposición de la Ley el ente asignante puede recuperar el bien para adjudicarlo a otro beneficiario, debiendo siempre ejercer un control directo sobre la actividad realizada por el adjudicatario, incluso después de superado el plazo de 15 años o que las deudas hubieren sido canceladas, cuando el beneficiario tenga la propiedad en forma plena y exclusiva.
IX.Desde un punto de vista causal no puede sostenerse que la causa del negocio de asignación consista, como en la compraventa, en el intercambio de una cosa por un precio, pues esa no es la función económica social, o política social, en relación al fin de asignar tierras a quienes no las tengan o las tengan en forma insuficiente por el contrario se busca colaborar a una mejor distribución de la riqueza con sentido de justicia social y al aumento de la producción o productividad del país . Desde este punto de vista cuando la Ley hace referencia a venta, o la práctica administrativa del ente lleva a realizar un negocio jurídico de compraventa para inscribirla en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, no permite obviar que la asignación se va a realizar mediante la ejecución de un acuerdo del ente administrativo cuya existencia extralimita el acuerdo de las partes. Pero ese acuerdo administrativo conlleva también elementos muy importantes para diferencias el contrato de asignación de tierras de la compraventa, o del simple contrato administrativo, en cuanto las cláusulas contenidas en el contrato provienen de la Ley, y su ejercicio no deviene del poder de imperio ni del interés de las partes, sino de fines propios del Estado que le vinculan con lograr una mejor distribución de la tierra y elevar las condiciones económicas y sociales de los agricultores, los empresarios agrícolas, los trabajadores de la tierra, sobre todo si ellos no tienen los medios a su alcance para tener una vida digna. Es por esto que se ha calificado al de asignación de tierras como un contrato típico del Derecho Agrario.
X.Una característica muy importante de este contrato establecida en la Ley, e interpretada por la doctrina, es la de ser un contrato de duración. Su perfeccionamiento no opera con el traspaso en propiedad del fundo, por el contrario éste se cristaliza en cuanto al beneficiario cumple sus obligaciones, durante el tiempo establecido por la Ley, y realiza la actividad para la cual le fue otorgado. La propiedad se adquiere plenamente hasta que el plazo haya transcurrido. En nuestro caso éste puede llegar hasta 30 años pues se concede uno de 5 años de gracia, previo al otorgamiento de la escritura, y otro de hasta 25 anualidades para el pago del precio; pero el mismo puede tener dos tipos de variaciones: aumentándolo, cuando en virtud de producciones insuficientes no imputables al parcelero el Instituto deba readecuar la forma de pago, y otra, disminuyéndolo, al permitir el pago anticipado, al cumplirse 15 años del traspaso en propiedad.
En este sentido si el contrato es por un precio determinado, o bien a título gratuito, desde el otorgamiento de la escritura van a existir 15 años en que el Instituto puede revocar, rescindir o anular el contrato frente el incumplimiento del beneficiario. (Artículos 59, 67 y 68 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización)." (Sentencia número 229-90, de las quince horas del veinte de julio de mil novecientos noventa de la Sala Primera. El subrayado no es del original.)
Además, en la referida sentencia constitucional 2006-1806, se concluye de la especial finalidad de este tipo de contratos, precisamente en atención a la conceptualización que nos rige de un Estado Social y Democrático costarricense, conforme al diseño establecido en nuestra Constitución Política, con base en las siguientes consideraciones:
"... las limitaciones a la libre disposición y la prohibición al cambio de uso tienen su origen en la función social que se reconoce en esta propiedad, que tiene como objetivo primario su adjudicación –precisamente– para que su titular tenga un modo de vida digna, a través de una actividad previamente determinada por la ley y el contrato a través del cual se adquirió . Así, las condiciones que se imponen en la ley y en el contrato de adjudicación de tierras resultan plenamente justificadas a la luz del Derecho de la Constitución, en tanto tienen como único propósito el asegurar que los trámites para la adjudicación de tierras cumplan la finalidad por que la fue creado este programa; el cual, nunca debe ser entendido como un simple programa de entrega de títulos de propiedad para solucionar problemas de urgente precarismo, sino como un verdadero instrumento por el que se alcance una adecuada y justa distribución del recurso tierra, la creación de empresas agrarias familiares autosuficientes y el aumento efectivo en la producción nacional, lo cual permita al campesino elevar su condición de vida, al hacérsele partícipe del desarrollo de la Nación .
(En igual sentido, las sentencias número 5363-95, de las nueve horas veintisiete minutos del veintinueve de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco y 2004-9099, de las once horas trece minutos del veinte de agosto del dos mil cuatro de esta Sala.) Permitir lo contrario implicaría la perversión del sistema de parcelación y colonización de las tierras que adjudica el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario." (El resaltado es del original.)
Con base en los anteriores lineamientos, procede el análisis de lo debatido en este asunto, circunscrito a si hubo o no prescripción de la potestad fiscalizadora de parte de la Administración Pública, a fin de revocar la adjudicación de parcela agraria a favor de los aquí actores y si hubo o no caducidad en el procedimiento administrativo seguido al efecto.
IX.DE LA ALEGADA PRESCRIPCIÓN DEL PROCEDIMIENTO DE REVOCATORIA Y NULIDAD DEL TÍTULO.- En relación a este punto, y teniendo en consideración la especial naturaleza jurídica de los contratos de adjudicación de parcela agraria, es que debe de dilucidarse el punto relativo a la prescripción de la potestad de la Administración para revocar la adjudicación y anular el título conferido. Como se indicó supra, los actores alegan que es a partir de la fecha del acuerdo de Junta Directiva en que se dispuso la adjudicación, y por su parte la institución demandada alega que es a partir de la inscripción en el Registro de aquel traspaso. Valorada la situación, este Tribunal considera que no aplica ni una fecha ni otra. En efecto, nótese que ni la adjudicación por acuerdo de la Junta Directiva de la institución competente, ni tampoco la inscripción en el Registro, confieren el derecho de propiedad, en razón de que se trata de un derecho que se adquiere, con el transcurso del tiempo y el cumplimiento a satisfacción de las obligaciones impuestas, en los términos del numeral 65 de la Ley Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825 (y sus reformas).
Así con el acto de "adjudicación " de una parcela, no se traslada la propiedad, y es un acto unilateral de la Administración, en el cual no participa el o los beneficiarios, por el cual, simplemente se autoriza la venta del fundo a favor de aquellos; y en tal virtud es apenas la condición previa para configurar posteriormente el contrato respectivo, que es la escritura particularizada (individual) a favor de los correspondientes beneficiarios, en la que, ahora sí, se establecen las condiciones de aquella dotación, y en las que cabalmente están comprendidas las limitaciones establecidas en los ordinales 66, 67 y 68 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, número 2825, así como el traspaso efectivo de de la parcela adjudicada, precisamente a partir de la fecha de su suscripción. En este sentido, esa escritura adquiere la condición de contrato traslativo de dominio, que, a la luz de lo establecido en el artículo 1007 del Código Civil, en tanto establece obligaciones para el comprador -beneficiarios- es solemne, bilateral, consensuado, y en relación con las limitaciones legales a esta propiedad, requiere del consentimiento o aceptación del obligado, a efecto de que pueda compelirse a su cumplimiento, en este caso, a cargo de la institución vendedora; cuyo incumplimiento, en los términos establecidos de manera precisa en el numeral 66 de la Ley de referencia (número 2825 y sus reformas) y de manera genérica en el 692 del Código Civil, da lugar a revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título.
Nótese que la adquisición de la parcela en manos del o los beneficiarios se da con y a partir de la suscripción de esta escritura, no antes, y en tal virtud, el numeral 67 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización refiere como parámetro para el cómputo de los quince años de vigencia de las limitaciones de esa ley, la fecha de la adquisición de la parcela, que en modo alguno se produce con el acto (se repite, unilateral) de la Administración, sino con y a partir de la rúbrica de la correspondiente escritura. Finalmente, debe de recordarse a este efecto, que al tenor del mandato 1022 del Código Civil, el contrato es ley entre las partes, y lo pactado obliga a sus suscribientes, "... tanto a lo que se expresa en ellos, como a las consecuencias que la equidad, el uso y la ley hacen nacer de la obligación, según la naturaleza de ésta", reza el inciso 1) del numeral 1023 del citado Código Civil. Así, la sujeción de aquellas limitaciones legales es por el plazo de quince años, contados a partir de la aceptación de quien se obliga a ellas, y no antes, como proponen los actores, por cuanto no ha mediado aceptación de su parte, así como tampoco de ocupación legítima sobre el aquel inmueble.
Así planteada la situación, no puede computarse el plazo a partir de la adjudicación de la parcela 57 del Asentamiento de Lagunillas a los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 , lo que se dio mediante acuerdo del Artículo Quinto de la Sesión 73-93, del veintiséis de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres -hecho probado 1.)-, como tampoco a partir de la inscripción de aquellos derechos en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, luego de la suscripción de la correspondiente escritura, lo que ocurrió el nueve de julio del año de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro -hecho probado 3.)-, como alegó la institución demandada, sino a partir de la fecha de suscripción de la correspondiente escritura de traspaso del bien inmueble, ocasión en la que también se impusieron las limitaciones de la ley, con la aceptación de los beneficiarios, lo que ocurrió el primero de octubre del año de mil novecientos noventa y tres -hecho probado 2.)-.
En este sentido, llama la atención que con la inscripción de aquellos derechos, se anotó la fecha de vigencia de estas limitaciones, sea, a partir del primero de octubre de mil novecientos noventa y tres al primero de octubre del año dos mil ocho, como consta en la correspondiente certificación de la propiedad que llevaba en ese momento, la matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26912 - hecho probado 3.)-; de donde no puede alegar ni desconocimiento ni tampoco intentar su modificación quienes promueven esta acción. En razón de lo anterior, no se produce en este caso la alegada prescripción (del ejercicio de la potestad fiscalizadora a cargo del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural), por cuanto la notificación de la resolución de las catorce horas del veinticinco de setiembre del año dos mil ocho, que ordenó la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título, les fue notificada a los aquí actores el veintinueve de setiembre del dos mil ocho - hecho probado 11.)-, esto es, antes del vencimiento de las limitaciones de ley.
Igualmente, el exhorto que se envió al Registro Público para comunicar la apertura de este pronunciamiento se ordenó en la resolución de las dieciséis horas del veinticinco de setiembre del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 12.)-, sin que afecte su validez, el hecho de que se pusiera en conocimiento al Registro hasta el primero de octubre siguiente, en razón de que a esa data, ya se había notificado personalmente a los aquí actores de la apertura del procedimiento administrativo en su contra, interrumpiéndose con ello, la prescripción. Finalmente, sobre este aspecto debe de indicarse que, el criterio esgrimido en este pronunciamiento sobre este extremo no está sujeto a las razones o consideraciones de otros fallos, como el que se alega en la demanda, bajo la consideración de que en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, los jueces únicamente estamos sujetos a la Constitución y a las leyes (bloque de legalidad), en los términos del numeral 154 de la Constitución Política, de manera que se reconoce un ámbito de independencia de los juzgadores, quienes ni siquiera estamos sujetos o vinculados por precedentes o jurisprudencia, entendida esta última como el criterio reiterado (al menos de tres fallos) emanado de los Tribunales de Casación, en relación a un punto jurídico en específico (en los términos del numeral 9 del Código Civil). En razón de lo dicho, procede desestimarse la demanda en lo que refiere a este extremo.
X.DE LA CADUCIDAD EN LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS DE REVOCATORIA DE ADJUDICACIÓN Y NULIDAD DEL TÍTULO DE PROPIEDAD AGRARIA.- En relación al segundo extremo a analizar, lo primero que debe dilucidarse es si resulta aplicable el instituto de la caducidad, en los términos previstos en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a los procedimientos administrativos que realiza el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en ejercicio de las competencias que le son legalmente asignadas y, lo segundo: en caso de que resultare aplicable este instituto, si se produjo o no la alegada caducidad dentro del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título, seguido por la demandada contra los aquí actores -señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 , y tramitado en expediente número 161-08-NUL. En cuanto al primero , como bien lo señala la parte actora, este Tribunal ha tenido ya la oportunidad de analizar la aplicabilidad del instituto de la caducidad a los procedimientos administrativos de revocatoria de la adjudicación de parcelas del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.
Así, entre otras, se pueden consultar las sentencias número 57-2011-VI, de las once horas cinco minutos del ocho de marzo del dos mil once, cuyo criterio es reiterado en las número 47-2012-VI, de las siete horas cincuenta minutos del nueve de marzo, número 57-2012-VI, de las quince horas veinte minutos del veintinueve de marzo, 90-2012-VI, de las quince horas veinte minutos del veintitrés de mayo, número 112-2012-VI, de las diez horas del catorce de junio, la número 159-2012-VI, de las catorce horas del trece de agosto, las cuatro últimas del dos mil doce y la número 210-2012-VI, de las catorce horas veinte minutos del cuatro de octubre del dos mil doce. En todos estos pronunciamientos, se concluyó de la aplicabilidad del instituto de la caducidad, en los términos previstos en el artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a los procedimientos que sigue la institución demandada; criterio que se comparte sobre la base de las siguientes consideraciones:
Al respecto, debe atenderse que "[...] todas esas normas jurídicas, derivadas de la Constitución Política como modelo ideológico, persiguen ni más ni menos que la realización del fin fundamental de justicia que es el mayor de los principios que tutelan un Estado de Derecho, en la que se incluyen reglas –principios generales- que tienen plena vigencia y aplicabilidad a los procedimientos administrativos de todo órgano de la Administración, se reitera, pues, los principios que de ella se extraen son de estricto acatamiento por las autoridades encargadas de autorizar cualquier procedimiento administrativo que tenga por objeto o produzca un resultado sancionador." (Sentencia número 1484-96 de la Sala Constitucional. El resaltado no es del original.)
Es así como la garantía del debido proceso se manifiesta en el ejercicio efectivo de la defensa, lo que evidencia su carácter instrumental, en tanto está dispuesto para garantizar la mejor resolución del mismo, en los términos previstos en el artículo 215.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública:
"El procedimiento administrativo servirá para asegurar el mejor cumplimiento posible de los fines de la Administración, con respeto para los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos del administrado, de acuerdo con el ordenamiento jurídico." (El resaltado no es del original.)
La vinculación de las garantías que conforman el debido proceso tiene tal relevancia en el ámbito sancionador administrativo, que su inobservancia produce la nulidad de todas las actuaciones procesales y decisiones adoptadas, tanto por el órgano director como el decisorio, como lo señaló la Sala Constitucional en sus sentencias 3433-93 y 5516-96.
Se trata de la debida resolución, con el respeto del ordenamiento y de los derechos subjetivos e intereses del administrado; lo cual resulta acorde con los principios de economía y eficacia procesal, además del principio de razonabilidad constitucional, lo que lleva a sancionar una inactividad procesal con la caducidad, en los términos en que está previsto los artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, norma que fue reformada por el canon 200 inciso 10) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en los siguientes términos:
"1) Cuando el procedimiento se paralice por más de seis meses en virtud de causa, imputable exclusivamente al interesado que lo haya promovido o a la Administración que lo haya iniciado, de oficio o por denuncia, se producirá la caducidad y se ordenará su archivo, a menos que se trate del caso previsto en el párrafo final del artículo 339 de este Código.
Ahora bien, se advierte que en aras de promover un proceso célere, ello no puede poner en entredicho o menoscabar las garantías que conforman el debido proceso, como sería, el no motivar debidamente la resolución por la falta de la realización de pericias, comparecencias, o alguna probanza de importancia; o el no respetar los plazos establecidos para la formulación de recursos; o la omisión de la celebración de la audiencia oral y privada. En cuanto al instituto de la caducidad previsto en la norma legal transcrita, se justifica como un medio para evitar la prolongación excesiva de los procedimientos, en aras de la seguridad jurídica, así como en la necesidad de garantizar la continuidad y eficiencia de la actividad administrativa. Resulta inviable cuando el asunto se encuentre listo para el dictado del acto final -cuando el asunto se inició a instancia de parte- y de igual suerte, resulta inocuo cuando ya se dictó ese acto final.
Para que opere, según lo establece la norma aludida, la caducidad requiere de los siguientes presupuestos: primero: que el asunto haya ingresado en un estado de abandono procesal, esto es, una inactividad; segundo, que dicho estancamiento sea producto de causas imputables al administrado, cuando haya iniciado a gestión de parte, o bien de la Administración, si fue instaurado de oficio; y tercero, que ese estado se haya mantenido por un espacio de más seis meses, plazo que se constituye en límite temporal mínimo de inercia, ergo, debe computarse desde la última acción dentro del expediente y no desde la apertura del procedimiento. Ello supone que en los procedimientos sancionatorios o de posible afectación de derechos instruidos de oficio, la caducidad es factible cuando concurran los indicados elementos. Sobre esta figura, recientemente, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el fallo 34-F-S1-2011 señaló en lo medular sobre el instituto de comentario consideró:
"En primer término, se puede observar que la norma recién transcrita se encuentra redactada en forma imperativa, es decir, no regula una facultad; por el contrario, una vez cumplidos los presupuestos de hecho en ella contenidos, la consecuencia deviene en obligatoria para el órgano encargado de la tramitación. Esto implica que sus efectos se producen de pleno derecho, y por ende su reconocimiento tiene efectos meramente declarativos, no constitutivos. Vale aclarar que lo anterior no debe ser interpretado como una pérdida de competencia –la cual es, por definición, irrenunciable, intransmisible e imprescriptible según el numeral 66 LGAP-, sino, únicamente, como la imposibilidad de continuar con la tramitación del procedimiento específico en el que se produjo la inercia ." (El resaltado no es del original.)
De la doctrina del canon 59 en relación al 66, ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, las competencias públicas se otorgan para ser ejercitadas. Solo en los supuestos en que el legislador de manera expresa disponga un fenecimiento de esa competencia por factores temporales, el órgano público se encuentra imposibilitado de actuar. Por regla general, las competencias no se extinguen por el transcurso del plazo señalado para ejercerlas. La excepción a esta regla la contempla el mismo ordinal cuando indica que habrá una limitación de la competencia por razón del tiempo cuando expresamente el legislador disponga que su existencia o ejercicio esté sujeto a condiciones o términos de extinción. En este sentido, el precepto 329 ibídem señala con toda contundencia que el acto dictado fuera de plazo es válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición expresa de ley, lo que aquí no ocurre. Resulta claro que la caducidad es una forma anticipada de terminar el procedimiento; que la propia Ley de referencia denomina como mecanismo anormal y que como tal, debe decretarse para generar ese efecto de cierre, dentro del procedimiento administrativo; por ende, mientras no se disponga o al menos, no se haya solicitado, no produce esa consecuencia procedimental.
Además, es lo cierto que una correcta ponderación de la situación obliga al funcionario y al Juez a interpretar las normas, principios y valores " en la forma que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige, dentro del respeto a los derechos e intereses del particular" (artículo 10.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), lo que en este caso, obliga al respeto de las formas y elementos integrantes del debido proceso; que es lo propio en un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho.
En todo caso, como se indicó anteriormente, ante laguna o vacío normativo, se debe hacer una interpretación integrativa del Derecho, en este caso, primero en la rama del Público (Constitucional-Administrativo). Pero además es importante considerar -como ya se indicó en los precedentes supra citados- que el propio reglamento del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario para este tipo de situaciones y vigente al momento de los hechos que se analiza, sí remite a los principios del Derecho Administrativo, en los numerales 3 y 101; de donde no resulta posible la excepción de esta figura. Finalmente, no puede obviarse lo dispuesto en el numeral 364 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que, cabalmente dispone de la "prevalencia" de sus principios y normas, "sobre los de cualesquiera otras disposiciones de rango igual o menor", los cuales establece como "criterios de interpretación de todo el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo del país. "
XI.ANÁLISIS DE LA SITUACIÓN EN RELACIÓN A LA ALEGADA CADUCIDAD DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO SEGUIDO CONTRA LOS ACTORES.- Determinado como quedó la aplicación del instituto de la caducidad al procedimiento administrativo seguido contra los aquí actores -señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 -, se procede al análisis de la situación en el indicado asunto. Luego de una minuciosa revisión de lo acontecido en dicho asunto, se logra constatar que no se produce la alegada inactividad del procedimiento en cuestión. En efecto, se advierte que el trámite ha sido continuo, con múltiples participación de los aquí actores, en pleno ejercicio de la defensa de sus intereses, y también de quienes participan en este asunto como terceros interesados. Así, luego de la notificación de la apertura del procedimiento a los aquí actores, ocurrida el veintinueve de setiembre del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 11.)-, éstos contestaron mediante escrito el ocho de octubre del dos mil ocho, oportunidad en la que aceptaron el incumplimiento acusado (venta ilegal de la parcela estando vigentes las limitaciones) -hecho probado 13.)-.
Luego, el dos de diciembre siguiente, la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Región Pacífico Central cambió la fecha de realización de la inspección del sitio para las catorce horas treinta minutos del siguiente tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho, y trasladó la comparecencia para el cuatro de diciembre siguiente, a partir de las catorce horas - hecho probado 14.)-. Ese mismo día (dos de diciembre del dos mil nueve, se apersonaron al procedimiento los señores Nombre140258 y Nombre140259 , requiriendo ser tenidos como terceros interesados en el asunto y que se archivasen aquellas diligencias -hecho probado 15.). Los aquí actores presentaron nota el tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho en la que hicieron constar que a la hora y día señalado, no se habían hecho presentes los funcionarios del Instituto accionado, a efecto de realizar la inspección en el sitio -hecho probado 16.) -; la cual se llevó a cabo a partir de las catorce horas treinta minutos de ese mismo día (tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho), con la presencia del Licenciado Lewis Mac Laren, técnico Jonathán Rodríguez y el ingeniero Francisco Molina Salas y en la que estuvo presente la señora Nombre140259 y su hijo, de lo cual se dejó constancia del acta respectiva - hecho probado 17.)-.
En razón de lo anterior, el doce de diciembre del dos mil ocho, los aquí actores -señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 - formularon incidente de nulidad de las actuaciones y resoluciones, a partir de la dictada a las ocho horas cuarenta minutos del dos de diciembre anterior -hecho probado 18.)-. Ahora bien, la siguiente actuación que se dio en este íter procedimiental es la presentación, a las dieciséis horas del tres de junio del año dos mil nueve, del informe DRCP-FCO 001-08 (que está fechado del tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho), que es el reporte que hizo el ingeniero Francisco Molina Salas remitió a la Dirección Regional Pacífico Central del entonces Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario de los hallazgos y conclusiones de la inspección realizada en el Dirección16883 - hecho probado 19.)-. Luego, el siete de julio del año dos mil nueve, los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 formularon gestión de caducidad del procedimiento tramitado en expediente 161-08-NUL; gestión que reiteraron el trece de ese mismo mes y año - hecho probado 20.)- Mediante oficio JD-0457-2009, del tres de agosto del dos mil nueve, el Secretario General de la Junta Directiva, remitió el asunto a conocimiento de la Dirección Regional de la Dirección Regional Pacífico Central del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, a fin de que se pronunciase sobre la alegada caducidad; y esta dependencia a su vez, mediante oficio DRPC-581-2009, del veinticinco de agosto del dos mil nueve, lo remitió a la Asesoría Jurídica Regional -hecho probado 21.)-.
Es así como, mediante resolución de las nueve horas cuarenta minutos del veintidós de octubre del dos mil nueve, la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Región Pacífico Central tuvo por presentados los escritos anteriores; confirió audiencia sobre el informe de la inspección y trasladó la recusación al Director Regional - hecho probado 22.)-. El trece de noviembre del dos mil nueve, los aquí actores formularon nuevo incidente de nulidad de todo lo actuado, a partir del tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 23.)- y las gestiones pendientes fueron resueltas en la resolución de las ocho horas del catorce de diciembre del dos mil nueve, de la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Región Pacífico Central, en que rechazó la nulidad alegada, teniendo por legítima la inspección realizada el tres de diciembre del dos mil nueve; la gestión de caducidad -por estimar que ese asunto se rige por normativa especial, al que no le es aplicable la Ley General de la Administración Pública-; y la gestión para tener como terceros a los señores Nombre140258 y Nombre140259 ; y finalmente citó a los investigados para la comparencia a realizarse a partir de las nueve horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de enero del dos mil diez -hecho probado 24.)-.
Contra la decisión anterior, el seis de enero del dos mil diez, los aquí accionantes formularon recurso de apelación con nulidad concomitante; la cual fue desestimada mediante oficio DRPC-024-2009, del veinticinco de enero siguiente, dictada por el Director Regional del Pacífico Central -hecho probado 25.)-. Es así como el día y a la hora señalada (nueve horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de enero del dos mil diez), se llevó a cabo la comparecencia en el procedimiento de extinción de adjudicación y nulidad del título de parcela 57 del Asentamiento Lagunillas, sin la presencia de los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 , ni de su representante judicial (Rigoberto Jiménez Vega), de lo cual se dejó constancia así como de que no hubo justificación alguna al respecto; diligencia en la que se recibió el testimonio de los testigos ingenieros Nombre140264 y Nombre140265 -hecho probado 26.)-. Finalmente, el tres de junio del dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del entonces denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario recibió el informe final del procedimiento de extinción de adjudicación y nulidad del título de parcela 57 del Asentamiento Lagunillas, dado por Oficio AJORO-17-10, del dos de junio anterior, preparado por la Asesoría Jurídica de Asuntos Jurídicos de la Región Pacífico Central, en la que tuvo por acreditado los incumplimientos de las limitaciones de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización de parte de los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 ("abandono injustificado de la parcela al ausentarse física y permanentemente del predio desde hace varios años y sin estar en posesión del mismo, en el cual se encuentran viviendo, trabajando y explotando terceras personas ajenas a ellos y su familia, y venta ilegal, por haber sido vendida la parcela a estos terceros ocupantes, causales tipificadas en artículos 67 y 68 en su inciso 4) párrafo b) ibídem, ..."), al tenor de lo cual recomendó declarar la extinción de derechos con la revocatoria de la adjudicación hecha mediante acuerdo tomado por la Junta Directiva de la institución en el artículo Quinto de la Sesión 73-93, del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, con la subsecuente nulidad del título de propiedad de la finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26912 , de la Provincia de Puntarenas, libre de anotaciones, cancelándose el documento 577-49-01, que es exhorto de anotación de ese procedimiento, y debiéndose cancelar los gravámenes bajo citas 407-06703-0178, al corresponder a las limitaciones de la Ley y las citas 527-13.250-003, que es hipoteca, la cual se encuentra satisfecha en su compromiso deudor y fuera solicitada su cancelación registral de parte de la acreedora -según documento anotado bajo las citas 577-88.344; y que se comunicase al Registro por medio de exhorto, para que revierta el inmueble a nombre de la institución (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario); finalmente advirtió que debía hacerse avalúo de las mejores del inmueble, a fin de determinar por quién fueron hechas - hecho probado 27.)-.
Al tenor de este informe, por Acuerdo adoptado por unanimidad en el Artículo 72 de la sesión ordinaria 022-2010, celebrada el diecinueve de julio del año dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del entonces llamado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario y resolución de las quince horas de la indicada fecha, dictó el acto final en este procedimiento administrativo, ocasión en la que ordenó: a.) la extinción de derechos con la revocatoria de la adjudicación hecha mediante acuerdo tomado por la Junta Directiva de la institución en el artículo Quinto de la Sesión 73-93, del veintisiete de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, con la subsecuente nulidad del título de propiedad de la finca inscrita en el Registro Inmobiliario, con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26912 , de la Provincia de Puntarenas, libre de anotaciones y gravámenes; b.) la expedición del exhorto de estilo para comunicar al Registro la reversión del inmueble a nombre de la institución; c.) realizar el avalúo de mejoras del inmueble y determinar por quién fueron hechas para su correspondiente pago; d.) a la Oficina Subregional de Orotina proceder con la pronta gestión de desalojo del inmueble, por medio de las intimaciones correspondientes a los ocupantes ilegales, para que lo abandonen de manera voluntaria y de cualquier otra persona que se encuentre de manera ilegal en el fundo; y en caso de negativa, proceder con el desalojo por medio de la Guardia Civil, y que en caso de duda sobre el reclamo de las mejoras de parte de los ocupantes (compradores), se hiciera depósito del monto correspondiente en la cuenta del Juzgado Agrario bajo expediente de diligencias de prueba anticipada de reconocimiento judicial y prueba pericial, bajo expediente 09-160133-0642-AG-2.
Finalmente advirtió a los aquí actores, de la procedencia del recurso oponible contra esa decisión (de apelación ante el jerarca impropio, Tribunal Agrario) -hecho probado 29.)-. Es así que, la apelación que fuera interpuesta contra la anterior decisión el dieciséis de noviembre del dos mil diez, fue finalmente resuelta mediante resolución 1163, de las siete horas treinta y dos minutos del veinte de setiembre del dos mil doce, del Tribunal Agrario -hecho probado 31.)-. Del recuento anterior se advierte que no hubo dilaciones contrarias al bloque de legalidad, en tanto incluso, ni siquiera es cierto que haya habido una inactividad de más de seis meses, por culpa atinente a la Administración, en los términos establecidos en el artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, y de referencia para este asunto. Al contrario, aún y cuando si hiciéramos el conteo a partir de la realización de la inspección de la parcela, la que se hizo el tres de diciembre del dos mil ocho -hecho probado 17.)-, lo cual pareciera que no es propio, al haber formulado los aquí interesados gestión de nulidad de lo actuado en fecha doce de diciembre del dos mil -hecho probado 18.)-, es lo cierto que el tres de junio del dos mil nueve, se presentó a los autos, el informe correspondiente de aquella diligencia - hecho probado 19.)-, de trascendencia para la resolución de este asunto, a tal punto que se puso en conocimiento de los interesados mediante resolución de las veintidós de octubre del dos mil nueve, la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Región Pacífico Central -hecho probado 21.)-.
Así las cosas, la gestión de caducidad que formularan los señores Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 , no "interrumpió" la acusada inactividad del procedimiento, dado que con anterioridad, se había producido una actuación de la Administración importante para la consecución de este procedimiento. Así las cosas, no se produce la inactividad alegada, y también se desestima la acción en relación a este extremo.
XII.PRONUNCIAMIENTO RESPECTO DE LAS PRETENSIONES FORMULADAS.- En atención a las anteriores consideraciones, procede revisar las pretensiones que se formularon en este proceso, que comprende diversos pronunciamientos, de la siguiente manera:
En tal virtud, esta Cámara considera que en relación a este extremo, los actores carecen de legitimación ad causam activa para requerir la inscripción de aquel inmueble a su nombre. En efecto, se recuerda lo ya dicho en torno a la especial connotación de este tipo de propiedad, sobre la que pesa una importante función social, que se manifiesta en la obligación del beneficiario, de trabajar y explotar de manera directa la parcela cedida, como lo exige de manera clara y sencilla el artículo 65 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización, cuando dispone: "Si el ocupante ha cultivado el mínimo señalado por el Instituto y cumplido a satisfacción de éste todas las demás obligaciones, tendrá derecho a que se le otorgue título de propiedad, ..." y refuerza el párrafo segundo del numeral 67 del mismo cuerpo legal, al establecer: " Transcurridos los quince años y adquirido el derecho de propiedad, ..." Así, en el caso, es evidente que los actores no adquirieron la propiedad del fundo que reclaman, ello debido al incumplimiento de las limitaciones que por ley le fueran impuestas a la cesión a su favor, adjudicación que fue revocada conforme a procedimiento seguido al efecto, en tiempo, es decir, con antelación al vencimiento de aquellas limitaciones.
Una interpretación diversa a lo dicho implicaría desnaturalizar la razón de ser de estas adjudicaciones. Así planteada la situación, estima esta Autoridad que en el caso, los actores han actuado con evidente temeridad, a tal punto, que puede tenérsele como un intento de fraude de ley, en los términos regulados en el numeral 20 del Código Civil, que en su literalidad dispone: "Los actos realizados al amparo del texto de una norma, que persigan un resultado prohibido por el ordenamiento jurídico, o contrario a él, se considerarán ejecutados en fraude de ley y no impedirán la debida la debida aplicación de la norma que se hubiere tratado de eludir. "
XIII.DE LOS PRESUPUESTOS DE FONDO DE LA DEMANDA.- La representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural se opuso a la demanda en su contestación, y a tal efecto, solicitó que se declarase sin lugar en todos sus extremos, para lo cual formuló las defensas de falta de interés y falta de derecho y los terceros interesados la de falta de legitimación activa. En este sentido, debemos atender a que son presupuestos de fondo de todo proceso jurisdiccional, la legitimación, el interés actual en la resolución del asunto y el derecho, que deben ser revisados por todo Juzgador, incluso de oficio y en ese orden riguroso. Al respecto cabe indicar lo siguiente:
"Esta Sala ha expresado que la legitimación es: “…un presupuesto de la pretensión formulada en la demanda y de la oposición hecha por el demandado, para hacer posible la sentencia de fondo que las resuelve; consecuentemente la legitimación en la causa no constituye un presupuesto procesal, en tanto no se refiere al procedimiento o al válido ejercicio de la acción, antes bien se refiere a la relación sustancial que debe existir entre actor y demandado y al interés sustancial que se discute en el proceso. La legitimación en la causa se refiere a la relación sustancial que se pretende existente entre las partes del proceso y el interés sustancial en litigio. El demandado debe ser la persona a quien le corresponde por la ley oponerse a la pretensión del actor o frente a la cual la ley permite que se declare la relación jurídica sustancial objeto de la demanda; y el actor la persona que a tenor de la ley puede formular las pretensiones de la demanda, aunque el derecho sustancial pretendido no exista o le corresponda a otro. …" (Sentencia 000976-F-2006, de las siete horas cuarenta minutos del diecinueve de diciembre del dos mil seis).
Y más recientemente, el citado Alto Tribunal, en sentencia número 1042-F-SI-2013l, de las ocho horas cincuenta minutos del catorce de agosto del dos mil trece dispuso:
"(...) De conformidad con la doctrina procesalista, la denominada “ legitimatio ad causam ” activa o pasiva o, como también se le denomina, legitimación en la causa o legitimación para obrar, alude a la condición de titular del derecho (el actor) y de obligado a la prestación (el demandado). Es decir, están legitimados en la causa las personas que jurídica y directamente van a ser afectadas en sus derechos por la sentencia. En esta línea de pensamiento, esta Sala ha señalado que la legitimación es: “(…) un presupuesto de la pretensión formulada en la demanda y de la oposición hecha por el demandado, para hacer posible la sentencia de fondo que las resuelve; consecuentemente la legitimación en la causa no constituye un presupuesto procesal, en tanto no se refiere al procedimiento o al válido ejercicio de la acción, antes bien se refiere a la relación sustancial que debe existir entre actor y demandado y al interés sustancial que se discute en el proceso. La legitimación en la causa se refiere a la relación sustancial que se pretende existente entre las partes del proceso y el interés sustancial en litigio. El demandado debe ser la persona a quien le corresponde por la ley oponerse a la pretensión del actor o frente a la cual la ley permite que se declare la relación jurídica sustancial objeto de la demanda; y el actor la persona que a tenor de la ley puede formular las pretensiones de la demanda, aunque el derecho sustancial pretendido no exista o le corresponda a otro. … De acuerdo al sujeto legitimado o a su posición en la relación procesal se puede distinguir entre legitimación activa y pasiva, la primera le corresponde al actor y a las personas que con posterioridad intervengan para defender su causa, la segunda le pertenece al demandado y a quienes intervengan para discutir y oponerse a la pretensión del actor. La ausencia de legitimación en la causa constituye un impedimento sustancial, si el juzgador se percata de la falta de la misma, así debe declararlo de oficio y dictar una sentencia inhibitoria, lo que no es óbice para que sea alegada oportunamente como excepción previa. (…) En consecuencia, la legitimación es la aptitud para ser parte en un proceso concreto, puede ser activa o pasiva, lo cual dependerá de las condiciones que para tal efecto establezca la ley en cuanto la pretensión procesal. Así, la legitimación ad causam activa, que interesa en el caso en estudio, es la capacidad para demandar, carácter que nace de la posición en que se halle el sujeto, respecto a la pretensión procesal promovida. En suma, es la identidad necesaria que debe darse entre el actor y el derecho que pretenda en juicio. …” ( Sentencia número 976 de las 7 horas 40 minutos del 19 de diciembre de 2006. En igual sentido, pueden consultarse, entre otras, las resoluciones de esta Sala números 89 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 19 de junio de 1991, 83 de las 15 horas 15 minutos del 24 de septiembre de 1997, 604 de las 10 horas del 17 de agosto de 2007 y 1023-A-S1-2009 de las 14 horas 50 minutos del 1 de octubre de 2009)".
Al tenor de lo anterior, puede concluirse que en esencia la legitimación ad causam activa determina que quien figura como actor en un proceso, es la persona, que a tenor de la ley, puede formular las pretensiones de la demanda, y en tal virtud, ser el titular del derecho o interés legítimo que pide ser reconocido a su favor, y respecto de quien es posible dictar un fallo favorable a sus pretensiones; y por su parte, la legitimación ad causam pasiva determina que quien es accionado es la persona a quien le corresponde por la ley oponerse a la pretensión del actor o frente a la cual la ley permite que se declare la relación jurídica sustancial objeto de la demanda. La ausencia de legitimación en la causa constituye un impedimento sustancial para acoger la demanda, y si el juzgador se percata de la falta de la misma, así debe declararlo de oficio y dictar una sentencia en tal sentido, aunque no es óbice para que sea alegada oportunamente como excepción previa.
Ergo, la legitimación ad causam se perfila como un presupuesto sustantivo elemental para el dictado de una sentencia estimatoria, pues de no advertir su ausencia, el juez podría incurrir en el yerro de conceder un derecho a quien no le corresponde o imponerle una prestación a quien no es el obligado, en tanto ello significaría que el fallo como tal se torna inejecutable. En atención a lo dicho, se estima que a los actores -Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 -, en su condición de adjudicatarios de una parcela agraria, conforme a acuerdo al efecto emanado del órgano competente -en aquel entonces, el denominado Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario-, les asiste legitimación ad causam activa para requerir el control de legalidad de la conducta administrativa que impugnaron en esta sede, derivada toda ella, del procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria de aquella adjudicación y nulidad del título. Y en tal sentido, también se da la legitimación ad causam pasiva respecto de la institución accionada en este proceso.
En relación con estos extremos de la demanda (pretensiones declarativas), ya se había declarado -mediante resolución número 107-2015, de las quince horas dos minutos del cinco de marzo del dos mil quince, de Sección I del Tribunal de Apelaciones de lo Contencioso Administrativo y Civil de Hacienda-, que a los señores Nombre140258 y ahora la Sucesión de quien en vida fue Nombre140259 , les asiste un interés en el asunto, en carácter o posición de terceros interesados. Sin embargo, tal y como fuera alegado por los terceros interesados, sí procede acoger la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam activa, pero en lo que refiere únicamente a la pretensión de condena que se hace en este proceso, tendente a que se ordene inscribir nuevamente la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26915 a nombre de los actores, en atención a que desde el nueve de diciembre del dos mil cinco y a la fecha de adoptarse esta decisión jurisdiccional, los actores no ejercen posesión sobre el bien cuya titularidad reclaman, por haber vendido (de manera ilegal) aquella parcela a quienes figuran como terceros interesados en este proceso; al tenor de lo cual, acoger su requerimiento, se constituiría en un evidente abuso de derecho, en atención a la especial naturaleza de la propiedad agraria (fines y modo de adquisición), según se ha explicado supra.
XIV.DE LAS COSTAS.- De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, no encuentra este órgano colegiado motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido. Por ende, se impone la condenatoria a los actores del pago de las costas procesales y personales a favor del Instituto de Desarrollo Rural, que se liquidarán en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, firme este pronunciamiento. En atención a los terceros interesados, Nombre140258 y la sucesión de quien en vida fue Nombre140259 , no formularon pretensión propia, respecto de ellos, se declara sin especial condenatoria en costas.
POR TANTO:
Se rechaza la defensa previa de caducidad de la acción reiterada en fase de conclusiones por la representación de la institución accionada. Se acoge parcialmente la defensa de falta de legitimación ad causam activa opuesta por los terceros interesados, esto es, en relación a la última pretensión, de condena, tendente a que se ordenase la inscripción de la finca con matrícula de Folio Real número Placa26915, nuevamente a favor de los actores, y por partes iguales; y se rechaza en lo que refiere a las demás pretensiones. En lo demás, se rechaza la falta defensa de fondo de falta de interés opuesta por la institución accionada y se acoge la defensa de falta de derecho opuesta por el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural y los terceros interesados. En consecuencia, se declara SIN LUGAR EN TODOS LOS EXTREMOS la demanda interpuesta por Nombre140255 Y Nombre140256 contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL Y LOS TERCEROS INTERESADOS, Nombre140258 Y LA SUCESIÓN DE QUIEN EN VIDA FUE Nombre140259 . Se impone la condenatoria a los actores del pago de las costas procesales y personales a favor de la institución accionada, que se liquidarán en la fase de ejecución de sentencia, firme este pronunciamiento. Se declara sin especial condenatoria en costas respecto de los terceros interesados.
Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Nombre136022 Daniel Aguilar Méndez Proceso de conocimiento con trámite de puro derecho (art. 98.2 del CPCA) Nombre140255 y Nombre140256 contra el INDER.
Terceros interesados: Nombre140258 y Sucesión de Nombre140259
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