Statute of limitations in agricultural adjudication revocation proceedingsCaducidad en procedimiento de revocatoria de adjudicación agrícola

2 Case File No. 11-004109-1027-CA No. 210-2012-VI SIXTH SECTION OF THE CONTENTIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. Second Judicial Circuit of San José, Anexo A, Dirección01, at fourteen hours twenty minutes on October fourth, two thousand twelve.

A proceeding of a purely legal nature, filed by Nombre142925, with identity card number CED112246, resident of Siquirres, without indication of other qualities, against the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO (IDA), currently Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), most recently represented by its general judicial attorney, Alex Benjamín Gen Palma, with identity card number CED28222, without indication of other qualities. Appearing as special judicial attorney for the plaintiff is Nombre71606, married, attorney, identity card number CED52761, resident of Tibás, and for the assistance of the preliminary hearing, Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, identity card number CED30415, resident of Heredia. The last two appearing parties are of legal age, married, and attorneys (folios 6 and 114 and 115).

WHEREAS:

1.- The plaintiff's claims, which were adjusted during the preliminary hearing held at thirteen hours thirty minutes on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, are for the judgment to declare the following: "1. the lawsuit is granted in all its aspects. / 2. That the procedure being processed in file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Directorate of the Huetar Atlántica Region of the defendant Institute is lapsed in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as the six-month period has been amply exceeded without it having been moved toward its continuation as provided by law. / 3. That this lapsing has occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute. / 4. That the criterion issued by the Board of Directors resolving that in procedures referring to revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply and that consequently the institute of lapsing does not apply is unfounded and illegal. / 5. That as a consequence of the lapsing, the archiving of the file be ordered. / 6. That as a consequence of the archiving of the file, the lifting of any precautionary measure ordered by the Institute against the registered rights of my represented party be ordered. / 7. That the Institute be ordered to pay both costs of this action.” (Filing of the lawsuit at folios 1 to 5 of the judicial file and supporting digital recording of the preliminary hearing on CD and in minutes, at folios 77 front and back.)

2.- The representative of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario filed a negative response to the lawsuit, and to that effect raised the defense of lack of right. (Response to the lawsuit at folios 41 to 56 of the judicial file.)

3.- Having been summoned to a conciliation hearing, the representative of the defendant institute stated its refusal to participate, so the processing of the proceeding continued. (Folios 57 to 59 of the judicial file).

4.- The preliminary hearing established in section 90 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo was commenced at thirteen hours thirty minutes on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, with the presence of attorney Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, license number 6590, acting in substitution of Nombre71606, special judicial attorney for the plaintiff, and attorneys Shirley Campos García, license 17627, and Óscar Rolando Chaves Castro, license 13302, representing the defendant institution. At said hearing, the plaintiff's legal representative made adjustments to the claim, as outlined in the first Whereas of this judgment, and the Processing Judge - Lourdes Vargas Castillo -, through resolution number 2108-2011, at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, rejected the preliminary defense of necessary passive joinder of parties, raised by the IDA's representation. Advertised of the filing of the respective appeal against this decision, the hearing was suspended. The Appeals Court confirmed it, through ruling number 201-2012, at fourteen hours fifty-five minutes on April ninth, two thousand twelve. At nine hours on May thirtieth, two thousand twelve, the preliminary hearing continued, with the presence of attorney Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, acting in substitution of Nombre71606, special judicial attorney for the plaintiff, and attorneys Alex Gen Palma, license 6484, and Óscar Rolando Chaves Castro, license number 13302, who act representing the IDA. The disputed facts were defined and the documentary evidence offered by the parties was admitted, the judicial inspection offered by the defendant being rejected. By reason of the foregoing, since there was no testimonial or expert evidence to be taken, the Processing Judge declared this matter to be purely of law, pursuant to the provisions of article 98.2 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, with the representations of the intervening parties immediately rendering their closing arguments. (Supporting digital recording of the preliminary hearing on CD and in minutes, viewable at folios 77 front and back, 96 to 98, and 103 to 106.)

4.- This matter was received for study in the Sixth Section on September seventh, two thousand twelve, according to the referral stamp viewable at folio 106 back.

5.- That by means of an order issued at fourteen hours twenty-five minutes on September twenty-seventh, two thousand twelve, this Court directed the plaintiff to rectify the power of attorney of the lawyer who intervened in his defense at the preliminary hearings; which was fully complied with on October first, two thousand twelve (order at folios 107 to 108; response at folios 114 to 115).

6.- In the proceedings before this Court, no nullities have been observed that must be corrected or that cause defenselessness; therefore, this judgment is rendered, after deliberation, within the fifteen-day period established in the second paragraph of article 98 of the cited Código Procesal in relation to section 82 subsection 4) of the Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio of this Jurisdiction.

Judge Fernández Brenes writes, with the affirmative vote of Judges Garita Navarro and Hess Araya; and,

WHEREAS:

I.- OF THE PROVEN FACTS.- Of importance for the decision on this matter, the following is deemed duly accredited: 1.) That by agreement of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, in session 29-92, on April twenty-seventh, nineteen ninety-two, article XXIX, parcel number 23 of the Asentamiento Trujicafé, located at Dirección17341, was allocated to Nombre142925 (an uncontroverted fact, by reference in official communication ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five, from the Siquirres Subregional Office of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, at folio 22 of the administrative file); 2.) That said allocation gave rise to the property with real folio registration number Placa28125, annotation of contract in the Registry, on November twenty-second, nineteen ninety-five, in which Nombre142925 appears as its titleholder, and over which the limitation of article 67 of the Ley del IDA, number 2825, from September thirtieth, nineteen ninety-four to September thirtieth, two thousand nine, weighs (copy of the registry information, folio 48 of the administrative file); 3.) That on March eighth, nineteen ninety-five, Nombre142925 signed a private land sale and purchase agreement for the lot that had been allocated to him by the IDA to Nombre100352, Nombre142926, and Nombre142927, free of mortgage liens and for the exact sum of two million eight hundred thousand colones, indicating that "the final deed of sale will be executed when the IDA registers the property in question before the Public Property Registry," and that possession of the land would be exercised by the purchasers from the date of that transaction. This contract was protocolized by notary public Edgardo Campos Espinoza in deed number 138-21, of his twenty-first protocol, on June twenty-sixth, two thousand two (folios 3 front and back, 10 and 11 of the administrative file; maps at folios 12, 13, and 14 of the administrative file); 4.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario conducted studies of the legal situation and field studies of the property allocated to Mr. Nombre142925, where it recorded that he does not exercise possession over the property, nor has residence at the site, and that it is divided into three parts, being exploited by third parties (official communications ORS-1214-2002, of December second, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eighth, two thousand three; Technical Report; ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteenth, two thousand eight; Identificacion237, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight; at folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all from the administrative file); 5.) That at eight hours on July fifteenth, two thousand three, Mr. Nombre142925 was notified of the formal notice ORS-610-2003, of July eighth, two thousand three, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, to correct the situation of the allocated property, as he had it divided into parcels (folio 6 of the administrative file); 6.) That at "2:35 p.m." on October twenty-seventh, two thousand four, Nombre142928 (who "takes care of the parcel"), was notified of official communication ORS 910-04, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which is a reprimand directed at Nombre142925, for non-compliance with Ley Placa19660, and granting him five days to correct the situation regarding the sale of his parcel (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative file); 7.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario attempted to locate Nombre142925 in order to notify him of the commencement of the procedure for the revocation of allocation and annulment of the title of ownership, this being unsuccessful, as his relatives indicated they did not know his domicile, for which a record is made in minutes at fifteen hours thirty minutes on July twenty-third, two thousand nine (folio 65 of the administrative file); 8.) That through resolution at fourteen hours ten minutes on August sixth, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the procedure - Licenciado Rolando Castro Arce - issued the act commencing the administrative procedure for revocation of allocation and annulment of the title of ownership that had been allocated to Nombre142925, which is property with real folio registration number Placa28125, of the Province of Limón, summoning him for the holding of the oral hearing to be conducted at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, and ordered that this administrative procedure be annotated in the Public Property Registry, as a precautionary measure, and advises that the decision will be notified by edict, as the domicile of the administered party is unknown. This file was processed under number 240-m (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative file); 9.) That through resolution at fifteen hours on August twelfth, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure sent a request to the Public Property Registry, in order to make the registry annotation on the property with registration number inscribed in the Partido de Limón with real folio registration number Placa28125, in the name of Nombre142925, of the administrative procedure being conducted against its titleholder, and to keep in force the limitations inscribed under citations 416-17150-01-0108-001. This filing was presented at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeenth, two thousand nine, and bears citations 2009-213876-001 (resolution at folios 82 to 83; registry information at folios 85 and 86, both references, from the administrative file); 10.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario published by edicts in numbers 178 and 179 of La Gaceta, on the eleventh and fourteenth of September, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative file); 11.) That by decision at thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-first, two thousand nine, Nombre142926, Nombre100352, and Nombre142927 were included as parties to administrative file 240-m. They were informed that the hearing would be held at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine. That same day, they are personally notified (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative file); 18.) That on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre142925 appeared in the procedure and provided an address for receiving notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative file); 19.) That on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, Nombre71606, argued the lack of competence of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to initiate that procedure, due to its lapsing; and because it concerns the affectation of the right of ownership, its origin being the Fodesaf program, under the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the fifteen years provided in Ley 2825 for the affectation of ownership having expired; pursuant to which statements, he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year. The document was accompanied by a special administrative power of attorney granted by Nombre142925, Nombre142926, and Nombre100352 to Nombre71606 (brief at folios 95 to 99 of the administrative file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney at folio 100 of the administrative file); 20.) That on October twentieth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed nullity of the actions and resolutions, alleging that the normative framework sought to be applied does not exist and that the respective reprimands have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative file and 7 to 9 of the judicial file); 21.) That on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, responded to the granted hearing and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file); 22.) That on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-holding of the convened hearing, due to the non-appearance of the parties, which it recorded with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative file); 23.) That on April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the lapsing of the procedure in application of section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file); 24.) That by agreement of article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, held on May eleventh, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Directorate Huetar Atlántica Region to issue a recommendatory resolution on the filed request (folio 20 of the judicial file); 25.) That in ordinary session number 020-2010, of July fifth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario heard and approved official communication DAJ-423-2010, of June second, two thousand ten, from Licenciado Carlos Enrique García Anchía, recommending the non-applicability of the alleged lapsing. The previous decision was notified via fax on the following July sixteenth to attorney Nombre71606 by official communication JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial file; official communication DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial file); 26.) That against the previous agreement, on July twentieth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal for review before the Tribunal Agrario (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial file); 27.) That by agreement adopted in article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal to the Legal Affairs Directorate, to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was brought to the interested party's knowledge via fax, by official communication JD-0678-2010, of the following August twelfth (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial file).

II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.- Also of importance for this matter, the following is deemed unaccredited: 1.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the commencement of the procedure for revocation of allocation and nullity of the title of ownership against Nombre142925 through resolution at fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; 2.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the commencement of the procedure for revocation of allocation and nullity of the title of ownership against Nombre142925 through resolution at nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; 3.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the commencement of the procedure for revocation of allocation and nullity of the title of ownership against Nombre142925 through resolution at nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine; 4.) That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario communicated to Nombre142925 the resolutions of May tenth, two thousand four at fourteen hours; of June first, two thousand nine at nine hours five minutes; and June fourth, two thousand nine at nine hours five minutes, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure. 5.) That the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario resolved the appeal filed by attorney Nombre71606, through the agreement of article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten, and that this was notified to the interested parties. There is no evidence in this regard.

III.- OF THE OBJECT OF THE LAWSUIT.- The claim of the lawsuit is specific. The declaration of lapsing of the administrative procedure for the revocation of allocation and revocation of the title of ownership that was allocated to the plaintiff - Nombre142925 -, because the period established in section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública has expired, amply so - more than seven years -. It is alleged that since the year two thousand four, when the procedure was commenced against Mr. Nombre142925, actions have been dictated "to prevent it from lapsing," "which do not serve to give mobility to the file but rather to 'pretend' to interrupt the lapsing period, which is not legally permissible." He accuses that the process has been inactive with a serious violation of due process, the principles of equality, prompt and complete justice, and legal certainty, thereby affecting the right to ownership. He asks for the application of the criterion already expressed by this Court in judgment number 90-2012-VI, although he is aware that this judgment is not final, as the respective cassation appeal is pending resolution. Consequently, he requests the lifting of any precautionary measure ordered on the property and the condemnation of the losing party to pay costs. It should be considered that the adjustment made by the plaintiff's attorney at the preliminary hearing, held on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, was not substantial, as it only consisted of adding the phrase "in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública," between the words "lapsed" and "for" in point 2 of the claim, transcribed at folio 3 of the lawsuit. Already in the legal foundation, the argument for declaring the lapsing had been made based on section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Therefore, in substance, such adjustment came to represent nothing new or substantial. (Lawsuit at folios 1 to 5, and statements in response to defenses 64 to 65 and at the preliminary hearing, according to digital recording on CD and minutes, at folios 77 front and back, 96 to 98, and 103 to 106.)

IV.- OF THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.- To the plaintiff's arguments, the representative of the defendant Institute responds with the following considerations: a.) That the procedure opened against Nombre142925 was due to the verification of non-compliance with his obligation as allottee of the parcel, by not working the land, but rather dividing it into three parts through a private agreement recorded in a document, since the year nineteen ninety-five; which is verified through several site inspections; b.) That the institute of lapsing of proceedings provided in section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is inapplicable to this type of procedure - for the revocation of allocation and nullity of the right of ownership - as it is governed by special law and right; having been expressly exempted from the application of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to the provision of sections 229 and 367.1 and Decreto Ejecutivo number 9469-P, which taxatively excludes the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. The foregoing has been expressly recognized by the Sala Constitucional (judgment number 1282-97), the Tribunal Agrario (judgment number 574-98), and the Contencioso Administrativo Court itself (Judgment number 2658-2009, of the Fourth Section). He cautions that the precedent of this Court (Contencioso Administrativo) that the plaintiff attempts to apply is not final, as the cassation appeal filed against it is pending resolution. Regarding the case under study, he alleges that there has been no inactivity in the procedure, the delay being more attributable to attending to the plaintiff's motions, having to respond to them. In this sense, he points out that by agreement of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten, the appeal filed against the denial of lapsing was rejected, a decision that was duly notified to the interested party. He requests that the lawsuit be dismissed and that the judgment declare the following: "2. That agrarian law and agricultural administrative procedure are regulated by special norms, so the application of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is not appropriate. 3. That the institute of lapsing does not apply to procedures for the revocation of allocation with the subsequent nullity of the title, as recognized by the Tribunal Agrario. 4. That the Institute has the power to annotate the property through a request during the entire period in which the limitations imposed by Ley 2825 are in force. 5. That my represented party has acted in accordance with the law and following due process in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiffs. 6. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding." (Response to the lawsuit at folios 299 to 326; digital recording of the preliminary hearing and in minutes, at folios 385 to 387.)

V.- ON THE LAPSING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE IDA AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE.- Once the foregoing has been established, it is appropriate to analyze the arguments made. On this point, there are two aspects that must be elucidated: first: whether the institute of lapsing is applicable, in the terms provided in section 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the administrative procedures carried out by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the exercise of its legally assigned powers, and second: if this institute were determined to be applicable, whether or not lapsing occurred within the procedure for the revocation of allocation and nullity of title, followed by the defendant against the plaintiff, and processed in file number 240-m. Regarding the first, as the plaintiff rightly points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of lapsing to administrative procedures for the revocation of parcel allocation by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Thus, in judgments number 57-2011-VI, at eleven hours five minutes on March eighth, two thousand eleven, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, at seven hours fifty minutes on March ninth, number 57-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-ninth, 90-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-third, number 112-2012-VI, at ten hours on June fourteenth, and more recently, number 159-2012-VI, at fourteen hours on August thirteenth, the last four of the current year (two thousand twelve). In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the institute of lapsing, in the terms provided in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the procedures followed by the defendant institution is concluded. In any event, from such precedents and from national doctrine and jurisprudence, the same conclusion is reached, for the following reasons:

a.) One must start from the basis that respect for due process and the elements comprising it applies not only in jurisdictional processes but also in administrative procedures, without exception or distinction regarding the administrative body responsible for its instruction or the subject matter concerned. Indeed, as repeatedly considered in the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional (in this sense, among others, judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96, and 2003-13140 may be consulted), respect for the elements that comprise due process - derived from the guarantees established in articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Constitución Política - is required in administrative procedures, especially when they are punitive - as in this case -, precisely because an obligation may be imposed, a subjective right or legitimate interest may be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction may be imposed (suspension, dismissal, financial penalty, etc.), which have a punitive nature. In this regard, it must be noted that “[...] all these legal norms, derived from the Constitución Política as an ideological model, pursue nothing more and nothing less than the realization of the fundamental purpose of justice, which is the greatest of the principles that protect a Rule-of-Law State, including rules – general principles – that have full force and applicability to the administrative procedures of any Administration body, it is reiterated, because the principles extracted from it must be strictly observed by the authorities in charge of authorizing any administrative procedure whose object is or produces a punitive result.” (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Sala Constitucional).

(The highlighting is not from the original.)

Thus, the guarantee of due process (debido proceso) manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which evidences its instrumental character, insofar as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution thereof, in the terms provided in Article 215.1 of the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administración Pública):

"The administrative procedure shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the purposes of the Administration, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party, in accordance with the legal system." The constitutional jurisprudence itself has recognized the following essential and indispensable requirements for every procedure, which must necessarily be met in order to guarantee the intervening parties the effective exercise of the right of defense, the absence of which constitutes a serious impairment of these rights (due process and right of defense): a) notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure, better known as the right to proper intimation and imputation, which requires not only the instruction of the charges, but also the possible imputation of the facts, meaning the indication of the possible sanction to be applied; b) the right to a hearing (derecho de audiencia), which comprises the right to intervene in the process, to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce evidence it deems pertinent; c) as a consequence of the foregoing, the presumption of innocence, which implies that the Administration (or the complainant) is obligated to demonstrate the guilt of the offender or investigated party; d) the opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; e) the right of the administered party to technical defense, which includes its right to be represented and advised by attorneys, technicians, and other qualified persons, such as experts; f) adequate notification of the decision rendered by the Administration and the grounds upon which it is based; g) the interested party's right to appeal the decision rendered, which entails the principle of congruence of the judgment; which, in the case of administrative procedures, includes not only the right to appeal the final act, but also those procedural acts that have their own effect and may affect the right of defense—the order initiating the procedure, the denial of holding the oral and private hearing, the denial of the admission of evidence, the application of precautionary measures, the denial of access to the case file, the reduction of procedural time limits, and the ruling deciding the recusal; h) the pro-judgment principle, whereby procedural rules must be applied and interpreted in a manner that facilitates the administration of justice, both judicial and administrative; and lastly, and no less important, i) the formal and material efficacy of the judgment or ruling. Also forming part of this right are access to justice under equal conditions and without discrimination; the gratuity and informalism of justice; prompt and complete justice, that is, without unjustified delay; the principle of minimum intervention in the sphere of citizens' rights; the principle of legal reserve for the regulation of fundamental rights (Article 28 of the Political Constitution), for the regulation of procedural matters (pursuant to Articles 11 and 28 of the Political Constitution, 5 and 7, 19.1, 59.1, and 367 subsection h) of the General Public Administration Law), as well as for the establishment of administrative sanctions (Article 39 of the Fundamental Charter and Article 124 of the General Public Administration Law); the principle of the regular judge (Article 35 of the Political Constitution), the principle of non-retroactivity of the law (Article 34 of the Political Constitution), the prohibition of degrading or confiscatory sanctions (Article 40 of the Constitution), and the prohibition of double jeopardy for the same facts (Article 42 of the Fundamental Charter). The binding nature of this guarantee has such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that its non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) indicated in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.

b.) In accordance with the foregoing, it bears remembering that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide procedural activity, as the Constitutional Chamber also indicated in judgment number 2004-13140, of fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on November twelve, two thousand three. In this case, the principle of celerity and ex officio action (celeridad y oficiosidad) is applicable (linked with other principles of administrative procedures, such as the search for material truth and anti-formalism or informalism), which entails a power-duty of the directing and decision-making bodies to compel the processing of the procedure toward its resolution on the merits, which, pursuant to Articles 222.1 and 225 of the General Public Administration Law, constitutes an obligation for the Administration to instigate or drive the procedure ex officio, that is, without requiring action from the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, meaning it is processed without undue delays for the parties. This ex officio nature also manifests itself in the manner in which the procedure may be initiated, not only at the instance of a party, but also ex officio, for the purpose of verifying a possible infringement of the legal system (in this case, of duties pertaining to the correct exercise of a professional activity). This concerns the due resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is consistent with the principles of procedural economy and efficacy, in addition to the principle of constitutional reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with the expiration of proceedings (caducidad), in the terms provided in Article 340 of the General Public Administration Law, a provision that was amended by canon 200 subsection 10) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) in the following terms:

"1) When the procedure is halted for more than six months by virtue of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, the expiration of proceedings shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it involves the case provided in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code.

• 2)The expiration of proceedings initiated at the instance of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to take action because positive or negative silence has operated, or when the case file is ready for the final act to be issued.
• 3)The expiration of the administrative proceeding does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are deemed not pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations." (Amendment effective as of January first, two thousand eight.)

Now, it is noted that for the sake of promoting an expeditious process, this cannot call into question or impair the guarantees that comprise due process, such as failing to duly state the grounds for the resolution due to the lack of conducting expert reports, appearances, or any important evidence; or failing to respect the time limits established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. As for the institution of expiration of proceedings provided in the transcribed legal provision, it is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica), as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act, and likewise, it is innocuous when that final act has already been issued. For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned provision, the expiration of proceedings requires the following conditions: first: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; second, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the instance of a party, or to the Administration, if it was instituted ex officio; and third, that said state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a period that constitutes the minimum temporary limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the case file and not from the opening of the procedure. This implies that in sanctioning procedures or those of possible impairment of rights instructed ex officio, the expiration of proceedings is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber (Sala Primera) of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated in its core regarding the institution under discussion:

"Firstly, it can be observed that the provision recently transcribed is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a faculty; on the contrary, once the factual conditions contained therein are met, the consequence becomes obligatory for the body in charge of processing. This implies that its effects are produced by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive ones. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence—which is, by definition, non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 LGAP—, but solely as the impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred." However, the procedural effects of the expiration of proceedings require that action has been taken within the procedure to bring it to an end. From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the General Public Administration Law, public competencies are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the expiry of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, competencies are not extinguished by the passage of the time limit set for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states with complete force that an act issued outside the time limit is valid for all legal purposes, except express provision of law, which does not occur here. It is clear that the expiration of proceedings is an early way of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself denominates as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, within the administrative procedure; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.

c.) This is based on the "principle-based" character and "complementarity" of the General Public Administration Law, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, insofar as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, insofar as, despite the existence of matters and procedures that by legal mandate—Article 367 of the same reference Law—and determined by Executive Decree—8979-P and 9469-P—have specific and particular regulation, it is true that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the General reference Law, the application to all of them of the jurisprudence, principles, and values inherent to Administrative Law cannot be obviated. It is undeniable that the institution of the expiration of proceedings is inherent and integral to Administrative Law. Moreover, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obliges the applier of the Law—both in the administrative sphere and the Judge—to interpret the rules, principles, and values "in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, within respect for the rights and interests of the individual" (Article 10.1 of the General Public Administration Law), which in this case requires respect for the forms and elements comprising due process; which is proper in a Social and Democratic State of Law.

d.) The respondent's proposal that, because the institution of the expiration of administrative proceedings followed by the IDA is not expressly regulated in the Regulation for the Selection and Allocation of Land Applicants (Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras), this figure is not applicable, is not acceptable. Bearing in mind that the determination of administrative procedures is a matter reserved to law—theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of liberty, which derives from Article 28 of the Fundamental Charter, according to jurisprudential development by the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, judgments number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on November twenty-four, nineteen ninety-two; number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July six, nineteen ninety-three; 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on May ten, nineteen ninety-six, may be consulted)—; obviously legal regulation prevails over the regulatory provision. In any case, as previously indicated, in the face of a gap or normative vacuum, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first in the Public Law branch (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider—as already indicated in the precedents cited supra—that the regulation of the Agrarian Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) itself for this type of situation, and in force at the time of the facts under analysis, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; thus, the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provisions of numeral 364 of the General Public Administration Law cannot be obviated, which fully provides for the "prevalence" of its principles and norms, "over those of any other provisions of equal or lower rank," which it establishes as "criteria for the interpretation of the entire administrative legal system of the country." e.) Finally, it should be noted that despite the fact that the cited precedents of this Court are being subject to the respective Cassation appeals before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice—according to a query made to the case management system of this Jurisdiction—this does not detract from the decision now adopted, insofar as, to date, it has not been refuted by that High Court, and objective elements exist to reaffirm the criterion of applying the institution of the expiration of proceedings as an abnormal mechanism for terminating the procedure, due to inactivity that is verified in each particular case, for a period exceeding six months, as provided in ordinal 340 of the General Public Administration Law.

VI.- Having determined the application of the institution of the expiration of proceedings to the administrative proceeding followed against Nombre142925, we proceed to analyze the second point brought to this process, that is, whether or not the six-month inactivity provided for by the figure occurred. Having reviewed the case file records, it must be clarified that the plaintiff errs in considering that the procedure has been inactive for more than seven years. Indeed, it is not possible to consider that it was initiated in two thousand four, as affirmed. It is true that the administrative case file contains several resolutions with a determined time and date and the content of the act opening the procedure for the revocation of the allocation and nullity of the title of the plaintiff here, namely the resolutions of fourteen hours on May ten, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; and of nine hours five minutes on June four, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure; however, none of them were notified to the interested party, which is why they lack efficacy. Moreover, it is evident that the Administration, prior to opening the procedure, conducted several field studies and studies of the legal situation of the allocated property (official letters ORS-1214-2002, of December two, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eight, two thousand three; Technical report; ORS-003-2005, of January four, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteen, two thousand eight; Identificacion237, of August twenty-five, two thousand eight; on folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all of the administrative case file), in which they recorded the reasons that gave rise to the opening of the procedure (that the allocatee—Mr. Nombre142925—does not exercise possession over the property, nor does he reside on the site, the same being divided into three parts, and that it is being exploited by third parties). Two warnings given to him are also recorded: the one made by ORS-610-2003, of July eight, two thousand three, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Agrarian Development Institute, notified at eight hours on July fifteen, two thousand three to the plaintiff (folio 6 of the administrative case file); and the one contained in official letter ORS 910-04, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Agrarian Development Institute, notified at "2:35 p.m." on October twenty-seven, two thousand four, to Nombre142928 (who "looks after the plot") (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative case file). It was not until August six, two thousand nine, that the resolution of fourteen hours ten minutes (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative case file) was issued, which is the act opening this administrative procedure, ordered to be notified by edict, given the lack of knowledge of the administered party's domicile (record at folio 65 of the administrative case file). From that moment, the activity of the procedure began, in which the following actions were verified. The edicts ordered to notify the plaintiff of the opening of the procedure followed against him (given the lack of knowledge of his domicile) were published in La Gaceta, in numbers 178 and 179 of September eleven and fourteen, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative case file). Likewise, prior to this, by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelve previously (two thousand nine), the Directing Body of the procedure sent the order (mandamiento) to the Public Property Registry for the corresponding annotation and maintenance of the limitations of Law 2825 (folios 82 to 83 of the administrative case file); the request was filed with the Registry at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeen following, with citations 2009-213876-001 (registry information on folios 85 and 86 of the administrative case file). The possessors of the allocated plot—according to a private purchase-sale agreement—namely, Nombre142926, Nombre100352, and Nombre142927, were made parties to that procedure by resolution of thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-one, two thousand nine, and were summoned to the hearing at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seven following; a decision that was notified to them personally that same day (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative case file). Furthermore, on September eighteen, two thousand nine, the plaintiff here appeared in the procedure, at which time he indicated a place to receive notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative case file). Subsequent to that, on October thirteen, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October nine, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606 appeared in the procedure, acting on behalf of Nombre142925, Nombre142926, and Nombre100352, for which he provided a special administrative power of attorney, alleging the lack of competence of the Agrarian Development Institute to initiate that procedure, due to its expiration of proceedings for having been initiated since two thousand four, and because it involves the impairment of property rights, and that the origin of that allocation was the Fodesaf program, under the Mixed Institute of Social Aid (Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social), and that the fifteen-year period provided in Law 2825 for the property encumbrance has expired; statements pursuant to which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year (brief on folios 95 to 99 of the administrative case file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney on folio 100 of the administrative case file). On October twenty, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed a nullity action against the actions and resolutions, alleging that the regulation they are attempting to apply does not exist and that the respective warnings have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative case file and 7 to 9 of the judicial case file); and again, on October twenty-six, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, answered the granted hearing and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative case file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file). On October twenty-seven, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded that the scheduled hearing was not held due to the non-attendance of the parties, which it recorded with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative case file). Again, on April twenty-eight, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration of proceedings in application of numeral 340 of the General Public Administration Law (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative case file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file). The actions of the investigated parties were partially addressed, until May eleven, two thousand ten, when, by agreement of Article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, the Board of Directors of the Agrarian Development Institute referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate to issue a recommendatory resolution on the action filed (folio 20 of the judicial case file); an action that was finally rejected, until July five following (two thousand ten), by agreement adopted in Article 78 of ordinary session number 020-2010; a decision that was notified by fax until July sixteen following to attorney Nombre71606 by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement on folios 21 to 22 of the judicial case file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, on folios 109 to 112; notification on folio 23 of the judicial case file). Against the previous decision, on July twenty, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal before the Agrarian Court (Tribunal Agrario) (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial case file); upon which, by agreement adopted in Article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July twenty-six, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Agrarian Development Institute referred the appeal to the Legal Affairs Directorate, to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was made known to the interested party by fax, by official letter JD-0678-2010, of August twelve following (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial case file). It bears repeating that there is no record that said appeal has been resolved. From what has been outlined, it is evident to this Court that there is inactivity in the procedure for the revocation of the allocation and nullity of the property title that was followed in administrative case file 240-m before the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate of the Agrarian Development Institute, due to exclusive fault attributable to the respondent. Having clarified that the procedure began with the resolution of fourteen hours ten minutes on August seven, two thousand nine, an inertia is indeed observed, occurring from October twenty-seven, two thousand nine (when the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-holding of the oral and private hearing due to the non-attendance of the investigated parties), to July five, two thousand ten, when the Board of Directors rejected the alleged expiration of proceedings; a decision that, in any case, takes effect upon its notification, which occurred until the sixteenth of that month and year; all of this, over a period of eight months and eighteen days. It must be considered that the referral of the expiration of proceedings claim to the Legal Advisory Office of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate does not have the virtue of compelling the effective continuation of the procedure, in a double sense: first, because as of April twenty-eight, two thousand ten, the fatal six-month time limit provided in the transcribed numeral 340 of the General Public Administration Law was completed, which makes any future action null, given that the expiration of the proceeding has operated; and also, because it is evident that, in itself, it does not drive the procedure toward its effective conclusion. It is necessary to also note that in this case, there are actions filed by the investigated parties, pending resolution, in which the suspension of holding the oral and public hearing scheduled for October twenty-seven, two thousand nine was even sought, and that to date, as the plaintiff alleges, there is no record that the appeal filed against the rejection of the alleged expiration of proceedings has been resolved; which means that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act. Pursuant to which, it being evident that the applicability of the referenced mechanism for terminating the procedure derives from the fact that the proceedings have been halted for a cause exclusively attributable—in this case—to the Administration that initiated it, for more than six months, this is fully met in this case, as has been explained. The paralysis of the proceedings is exclusively attributable to the Administration, without it being possible to claim that the appeals and defenses opposed are extensive and/or excessive, since they are exercised in accordance with the provisions of the legal system, there being rather an obligation on the part of the Administration to duly resolve them. Rather, a total abandonment of processing and studying this matter in due form is evident, which, through inertia—there being no explanation whatsoever to justify this situation—was left inactive. It is evident that, as of April twenty-eight, two thousand ten, when the request for the declaration of expiration of proceedings was reiterated, it was admissible, because the fatal six-month time limit provided in numeral 340 of the General Public Administration Law expired that day. Any subsequent action is issued outside the time limit, which is why everything done after that date is null, insofar as it does not have the virtue of modifying the situation derived from the occurrence of the expiration period in this case, even more so if it is taken into consideration that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act (subsection 2 of Article 340 of the General Public Administration Law), since several prior issues remain pending, challenges that made holding the preliminary hearing impossible, as they implied challenging the act opening the procedure. Thus, this Court agrees with the plaintiff in that the claim filed must be upheld, declaring the procedure processed before the Dirección17342, in case file 240-m, followed against Nombre142925, Nombre142926, Nombre100352, and Nombre142927, expired, which must be archived. And since the consequence of this means of abnormal termination is that the proceedings are deemed not pursued (Article 340.3 of the cited LGAP), this also inescapably imposes the necessity to lift the order (mandamiento or “exhorto”) for annotation on the property with real folio registration number Placa28125, of the District of Limón, which the Directing Body of the procedure sent by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelve, two thousand nine, to the Public Property Registry, and which was sent at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeen following, corresponding to citations number 2009-213876-001, which is ordered by means of a court order to be issued as soon as this judgment becomes final.

VIII.- CONCLUSION.- Thus, the filed complaint must be upheld, in the terms indicated below, following the order of the established claims: 1.) It must be declared that the procedure being processed in case file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate of the respondent Institute is expired in accordance with the General Public Administration Law, because the six-month period has more than elapsed without its continuation having been instigated as provided by law.

As a consequence of the foregoing, the court orders the lifting or cancellation of the Exhorto de anotación de proceso (Process Annotation Request) sent by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in a resolution issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on August twelfth, two thousand nine, addressed to the Director of the Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble and recorded under the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, corresponding to filing references 2009-213876-001, at eleven thirty-four in the morning on August seventeenth, two thousand nine. Once the judgment becomes final, a judicial order must be issued to the Registry ordering the lifting of said annotation; 2.) It must be declared that this expiration of the proceeding (caducidad) occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute; and, 3.) It must be declared that the criterion issued by the Junta Directiva (Board of Directors) is unfounded and illegal insofar as it resolves that in proceedings regarding the revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries, the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply and that, consequently, the legal concept of expiration of proceedings (caducidad) does not apply. Likewise, it is noted that in its response to the lawsuit, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario requests a series of pronouncements, without this in any way constituting a counterclaim; but which, in any case, by their content are observed to be the antithesis of the plaintiffs' claims, and therefore, they must obviously be understood as resolved in the opposite sense of what was declared.

IX.- ON THE SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITES OF THE LAWSUIT AND THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF RIGHT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.- The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario opposed the lawsuit in its response, and to that effect, requested that it be declared without merit in all its aspects, for which it formulated only the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the truth is that both procedural doctrine and jurisprudence (in this sense, consult the cassation judgment 34-1961, at ten twenty in the morning on March twenty-second, nineteen sixty-one) recognize as substantial prerequisites for the issuance of any judgment those relating to the legal standing (legitimación) of the intervening parties, the interest in the resolution of the conflict, and the right; which are reviewable even ex officio by the judge. In the case under study, it is true that there is legal standing, both active and passive, insofar as the declaration of expiration of proceedings (caducidad) of the administrative procedure for the revocation of the parcel adjudication and the consequent nullity of the property title, opened by the defendant institution against the plaintiff herein, is sought. Likewise, it is also evident that the subject under discussion holds current interest for the plaintiff entity, insofar as said administrative procedure is ongoing. And finally, it is based on the considerations given in this decision that the merits of the filed lawsuit are determined, as the plaintiff has a right in his action, which compels the rejection of the defense of lack of right.

X.- ON COSTS.- In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when, in the Tribunal's judgment, there was sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered based on evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the present case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and break the principle of condemnation on the losing party. Therefore, the condemnation of costs to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario is imposed.

POR TANTO:

The defense of lack of right raised by the defendant is rejected. Consequently, the lawsuit filed by Nombre142925 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario is declared with merit, for which the following pronouncements are made:

1.) It is declared that the procedure being processed in file 240-M of the Asesoría Jurídica of the Dirección Jurídica of the Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica of the defendant Institute has expired (caduco) in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública, given that the six-month period has amply elapsed without its continuation having been urged as provided by law. As a consequence of the foregoing, the court orders the lifting or cancellation of the Exhorto de anotación de proceso sent by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in a resolution issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on August twelfth, two thousand nine, addressed to the Director of the Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble and recorded under the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, corresponding to filing references 2009-213876-001, at eleven thirty-four in the morning on August seventeenth, two thousand nine. Once the judgment becomes final, a judicial order must be issued to the Registry ordering the lifting of said annotation; 2.) It is declared that this expiration of the proceeding (caducidad) occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute; 3.) It is declared that the criterion issued by the Junta Directiva is unfounded and illegal insofar as it resolves that in proceedings regarding the revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries, the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply and that, consequently, the legal concept of expiration of proceedings (caducidad) does not apply; 4.) Both costs are to be borne by the defendant entity.

Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Roberto Garita Navarro Christian Hess Araya Proceso Contencioso Administrativo declared of pure law Nombre142925 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario That same day, they are notified personally (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative file); **18.)** That on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre142925 appeared in the proceeding and designated a place to receive notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative file); **19.)** That on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, Nombre71606 alleged the lack of competence of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to initiate that proceeding, due to its expiration (caducidad); and because it concerns the encumbrance of the property right, given that its origin was the Fodesaf program, under the responsibility of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the fifteen years established in Law 2825 for the encumbrance of the property having expired; statements pursuant to which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that same month and year. The document was accompanied by a special administrative power of attorney granted by Nombre142925, Nombre142926, and Nombre100352 to Nombre71606 (memorial at folios 95 to 99 of the administrative file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney at folio 100 of the administrative file); **20.)** That on October twentieth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed a nullity action against the proceedings and resolutions, alleging that the regulation intended to be applied does not exist and that the respective admonitions have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative file and 7 to 9 of the judicial file); **21.)** That on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, replied to the granted hearing and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file); **22.)** That on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-realization of the convened hearing due to the non-attendance of the parties, which it recorded with the signatures of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative file); **23.**) That on April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding in application of numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file); **24.)** That by agreement of article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, held on May eleventh, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate to issue a recommendatory resolution on the formulated request (folio 20 of the judicial file); **25.)** That in ordinary session number 020-2010, of July fifth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario heard and approved official letter DAJ-423-2010, of June second, two thousand ten, from Licenciado Carlos Enrique García Anchía, in which he recommends the inapplicability of the alleged expiration (caducidad). The previous decision was notified via fax on the sixteenth of the following July to attorney Nombre71606 by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial file); **26.)** That against the previous agreement, on July twentieth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal Agrario (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial file); **27.)** That by agreement adopted in article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal (recurso de apelación) to the Legal Affairs Directorate to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was communicated to the interested party via fax, by official letter JD-0678-2010, of August twelfth of the following year (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial file).

**II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Of importance to this matter, the following is also considered unproven: **1.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution of two o'clock in the afternoon on May tenth, two thousand four; **2.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; **3.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine; **4.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario communicated to Nombre142925 the resolutions of two o'clock in the afternoon on May tenth, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; and of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure. **5.)** That the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario resolved the appeal (apelación) filed by attorney Nombre71606, by agreement of article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten, and that this was notified to the interested parties. There is no evidence in this regard.

**III.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE LAWSUIT.-** The claim of the lawsuit is specific. The declaration of expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and revocation (revocatoria) of the property title that was granted to the plaintiff - Nombre142925 -, because the deadline established in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública has been exceeded, and amply so -more than seven years-. It is alleged that since the year two thousand four, when the proceeding was opened against Mr. Nombre142925, actions have been dictated "to prevent it from expiring", "which do not give mobility to the file but rather 'attempt' to interrupt the expiration (caducidad) period, which is not legally permissible". He claims that the process is inactive, in grave violation of due process (debido proceso), the principles of equality, prompt and complete justice, and legal certainty, thereby affecting the right of property. He requests applying the criterion already expressed by this Court in judgment number 90-2012-VI, although he is aware that it is not final, as the respective cassation appeal (recurso de casación) is pending resolution. Consequently, he requests the lifting of any precautionary measure ordered on the property and the condemnation of the losing party to pay costs (costas). It is worth considering that the adjustment made by the plaintiff's attorney at the preliminary hearing, held on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, was not substantial, as it only consisted of adding the phrase "in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública," between the words "expires" and "by" in point 2 of the claim, transcribed at folio 3 of the lawsuit. Already in the legal grounds, the allegation of a declaration of expiration (caducidad) had been made based on numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública. Therefore, in substance, such an adjustment represented nothing new or substantial. (Lawsuit at folios 1 to 5, and statements in reply to exceptions 64 to 65 and at the preliminary hearing, according to digital backup on CD and in minutes, at folios 77 front and back, 96 to 98, and 103 to 106.)

**IV.- ON THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.-** The representative of the defendant Institute responds to the plaintiff's arguments with the following considerations: **a.)** That the procedure opened against Nombre142925 was due to the verification of the breach of his obligation as the grantee of the parcel, by not working the land, but rather dividing it into three parts through a private agreement recorded in a document, dating from the year nineteen ninety-five; which is verified by several on-site inspections; **b.)** That the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) of the proceeding established in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is inapplicable to that type of procedure - for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and nullity of the property right - because it is governed by special right and law; having been expressly exempted from the application of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, according to the provision of numerals 229 and 367.1 and Decreto Ejecutivo number 9469-P, which categorically excludes the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. The foregoing was expressly recognized by the Sala Constitucional (judgment number 1282-97), Tribunal Agrario (judgment number 574-98), and the Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo itself (Judgment number 2658-2009, of the Fourth Section). He warns that the precedent of this Court (Contencioso Administrativo) that the plaintiff attempts to apply is not final, as the cassation appeal (recurso de casación) filed against it is pending resolution. Regarding the case under study, he alleges that there has been no inactivity in the proceeding, the delay having been rather to attend to the plaintiff's requests, having to respond to them. In this sense, he points out that by agreement of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the denial of expiration (caducidad) was rejected, a decision that was duly notified to the interested party. He requests that the lawsuit be dismissed and that the judgment declare the following: "2. That agrarian matters and the agrarian administrative procedure are regulated by special norms, therefore the application of the Ley General de la Administración Pública is not appropriate. 3. That the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) does not apply to procedures for the revocation (revocatoria) of land grants with the subsequent nullity of the title, as recognized by the Tribunal Agrario. 4. That the Institute has the power to annotate the property by means of a rogatory letter throughout the period during which the limitations imposed by Law 2825 are in force. 5. That my represented party has acted in accordance with the law and following due process (debido proceso) in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiffs. 6. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the costs (costas) of this process." (Reply to the lawsuit at folios 299 to 326; digital backup of the preliminary hearing and in minutes, at folios 385 to 387.)

**V.- ON THE EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE IDA AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE.-** Once the foregoing is established, it is appropriate to analyze the allegations made. On this point, there are two aspects that must be elucidated: **first**: whether the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) is applicable, in the terms provided in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the administrative procedures carried out by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it and, **second**: in the event that this legal concept is applicable, whether or not the expiration (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant and nullity of the title, followed by the defendant against the plaintiff, and processed in file number 240-m. Regarding the **first**, as the plaintiff correctly points out, this Court has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the legal concept of expiration (caducidad) to administrative procedures for the revocation (revocatoria) of the land grant of parcels from the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Thus, in judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes on March eighth, two thousand eleven, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes on March ninth, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-ninth, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-third, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours on June fourteenth, and more recently, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours on August thirteenth, the last four of the current year (two thousand twelve). In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the legal concept of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the procedures followed by the defendant institution is concluded. In any case, from these precedents and from national doctrine and jurisprudence, the same conclusion is reached, for the following reasons:

**a.)** It must be assumed that respect for due process (debido proceso) and the elements that comprise it are applicable, not only in jurisdictional processes, but also in administrative procedures, without exception or distinction of the administrative body responsible for its instruction or the subject matter. Indeed, as the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional has repeatedly considered (in this sense, among others, judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96, and 2003-13140 can be consulted), **respect for the elements that comprise due process (debido proceso) - which derive from the guarantees established in articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Constitución Política - is required in administrative procedures, especially when they are sanctioning**- as in this case -, precisely because in them an obligation can be imposed, a subjective right or legitimate interest can be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction (of suspension, dismissal, economic, etc.), which have a punitive nature. In this regard, it should be noted that "[...] *all these legal norms, derived from the Constitución Política as an ideological model, pursue nothing more and nothing less than the realization of the fundamental end of justice, which is the greatest of the principles protected by a State of Law, in which rules –general principles– are included that have full validity and applicability to the administrative procedures of all Administration bodies, it is reiterated, therefore,* ***the principles extracted from it must be strictly observed by the authorities in charge of authorizing any administrative procedure whose purpose or result is sanctioning***." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Sala Constitucional. The emphasis is not from the original.)

Thus, the guarantee of due process (debido proceso) manifests itself in the effective exercise of the defense, which demonstrates **its instrumental nature**, as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution of the same, in the terms provided in article 215.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública:

"*The administrative procedure* ***shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party***, *in accordance with the legal system.*" The same constitutional jurisprudence has recognized as essential and indispensable to any procedure the following requirements, which must necessarily be met in order to guarantee the parties involved the effective exercise of the right of defense, the absence of which constitutes a serious infringement of these rights (due process (debido proceso) and right of defense): **a)** notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure, better known as the right to proper intimation and imputation, from which it is necessary not only the instruction of charges but also the possible imputation of the facts, which means indicating the possible sanction to be applied; **b)** the right to a hearing, which includes the right to intervene in the process, to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence deemed pertinent; **c)** a consequence of the above, the presumption of innocence, which implies that the Administration (or the complainant) is obliged to prove the guilt of the offender or investigated party; **d)** the opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and administrative records linked to the matter in question; **e)** the right of the administered party to a technical defense, which includes their right to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons, such as experts; **f)** adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and of the reasons on which it is based; **g)** the right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued, which entails the principle of congruence of the judgment; which in the case of administrative procedures, includes not only the right to appeal the final act, but also those procedural acts that have their own effect and may affect the right of defense - the order to open the procedure, the denial of holding the oral and private hearing, the denial of receipt of evidence, the application of precautionary measures, the denial of access to the file, the reduction of procedural deadlines, and the resolution deciding a challenge (recusación) -; **h)** the pro-judgment principle, whereby procedural norms must be applied and interpreted in a way that facilitates the administration of justice, both jurisdictional and administrative; and finally, and no less importantly, **i)** the formal and material efficacy of the judgment or ruling. This right also includes **access to justice under equal conditions and without discrimination**; ***free and informal justice***; **prompt and complete justice**, that is, without unjustified delay; the **principle of minimum intervention in the sphere of citizens' rights**; the **principle of legal reservation** for the regulation of fundamental rights (article 28 of the Constitución Política), for the regulation of procedural matters (pursuant to articles 11 and 28 of the Constitución Política, 5 and 7, 19.1, 59.1, and 367 subsection h) of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), as well as for the establishment of administrative sanctions (articles 39 of the Carta Fundamental and 124 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública); the **principle of the regular judge** (article 35 of the Constitución Política), the **principle of non-retroactivity of the law** (article 34 of the Constitución Política), the **prohibition of degrading or confiscatory sanctions** (article 40 of the Constitution), and the **prohibition of double jeopardy for the same facts** (article 42 of the Carta Fundamental). The binding nature of this guarantee has such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that its non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the decision-making body, as indicated by the Sala Constitucional in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.

**b.)** In accordance with the foregoing, it is worth remembering that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide procedural activity, as also indicated by the Sala Constitucional in judgment number 2004-13140, of fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on November twelfth, two thousand three. In this case, the principle of **speed and official impetus (celeridad y oficiosidad)** is applicable (linked with other principles of administrative procedures, such as the *pursuit of material truth* and *anti-formalism* or *informalism*), which entails a power-duty of the directing and decision-making bodies to compel the processing of the procedure toward its resolution on the merits, which according to the provisions of articles 222.1 and 225 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, constitutes an obligation for the Administration **to instigate or drive the procedure ex officio, that is, without requiring action from the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, meaning it is processed without undue delay for the parties. This official impetus (oficiosidad) also manifests itself in the way the procedure can be initiated, not only at the request of a party, but also ex officio**, in order to verify a possible infringement of the legal system (in this case, of duties pertaining to the correct exercise of a professional activity).

This concerns the proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is consistent with the principles of procedural economy and efficiency, in addition to the principle of constitutional reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad), under the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, a rule that was amended by Canon 200, subsection 10) of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo in the following terms:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">1) When the proceeding is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it is the case provided for in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">2) The expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) of a procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to act because positive or negative silence has occurred, or when the case file is ready for the final act to be issued. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">3) The expiration of the administrative proceeding (caducidad del procedimiento administrativo) does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are considered not to have been pursued, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (Reform effective as of January 1, 2008.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Now, it is noted that in the interest of promoting a speedy process, this cannot call into question or undermine the guarantees that constitute due process, such as failing to properly state the reasons for the resolution due to the lack of expert reports, appearances, or some important evidence; or not respecting the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the institution of expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) provided for in the transcribed legal rule, it is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of proceedings, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It becomes unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act and, likewise, it is innocuous when that final act has already been issued. For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned rule, expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) requires the following conditions: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">first</span><span style="font-family:Arial">: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">second</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when initiated at the request of a party, or to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio; and</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">third</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that this state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a period that constitutes the minimum temporal limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the case file and not from the opening of the proceeding. This implies that in sanctioning proceedings or proceedings that may affect rights, initiated ex officio, expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated in its core reasoning regarding the institution under discussion, it considered: </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">Firstly, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">it can be observed that the recently transcribed rule is drafted in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual conditions contained therein are met, the consequence becomes mandatory for the body in charge of processing</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">. This implies that its effects occur by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory effects, not constitutive ones. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of jurisdiction –which is, by definition, inalienable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 of the LGAP–, but rather, solely, as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific proceeding in which the inertia occurred</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">However, the procedural effects of the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) require that actions have been taken within the proceeding to put an end to it. From the doctrine of Canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, public powers are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the termination of that power due to temporal factors, is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, powers are not extinguished</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> by the passage of the</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> deadline set to exercise them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same article when it indicates that there will be a limitation of power by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states with all force that the act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal purposes, unless expressly provided otherwise by law, which is not the case here. It is clear that the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) is an early way to terminate the proceeding; which the reference Law itself calls an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">within the administrative proceeding</span><span style="font-family:Arial">; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">c.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> We start from the "principle-based" (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">principista</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) and "complementarity" (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">complementariedad</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) nature of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, insofar as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, insofar as despite there being matters and procedures that by legal mandate - Article 367 of the same reference Law - and determined by Decreto Ejecutivo - 8979-P and 9469-P - have specific and particular regulation, the truth is that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the reference General Law, the application of jurisprudence, principles, and values of Administrative Law to all of them cannot be ignored. It is undeniable that the institution of the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) is inherent and integral to Administrative Law. Furthermore, it is true that a correct weighting of the situation obliges the applier of the Law - both in the administrative venue and the Judge - to interpret the norms, principles, and values "in the way that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">within respect for the rights and interests of the individual</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (Article 10.1 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), which in this case, obliges respect for the forms and integral elements of due process; which is inherent in a Social and Democratic State of Law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">d.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The respondent's proposal that, because the institution of expiration of the administrative proceedings (caducidad) followed by the IDA is not expressly regulated in the Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, this figure is not applicable, is not acceptable. Being clear that the determination of administrative proceedings is a matter reserved to the law - theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of freedom, which derives from Article 28 of the Carta Fundamental, according to jurisprudential development by the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, rulings number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on November twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two, number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July sixth, nineteen ninety-three, 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on May tenth, nineteen ninety-six can be consulted) -; obviously, legal regulation prevails over regulatory norms. In any case, as previously indicated, in the face of a regulatory gap or vacuum, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first in the branch of Public Law (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider - as already indicated in the supra-cited precedents - that the regulation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario itself for this type of situation, and in force at the time of the analyzed facts, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; hence the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provision in numeral 364 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública cannot be ignored, which fully provides for the "prevalence" (</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">prevalencia</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) of its principles and norms, "over those of</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> any other provisions of equal or lower rank</span><span style="font-family:Arial">", which it establishes as "interpretative criteria for the entire administrative legal system of the country.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">e.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt"> Finally, it should be noted that although the cited precedents of this Court are the subject of respective Cassation appeals before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice - according to a query made to the case management system of this Jurisdiction – this does not diminish the decision now adopted, since, to date, it has not been refuted by that High Court, there being objective elements to reaffirm the criterion of applying the institution of expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) as an abnormal mechanism for termination of the proceeding, due to inactivity verified in each specific case, in a period exceeding six months, as provided by Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VI.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Having determined the application of the institution of expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative proceeding followed against Nombre142925</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, it is appropriate to analyze the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">second</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> point brought to this process, that is, whether or not that inactivity of six months provided for by the figure occurred. Reviewed the case records, it must be clarified that the plaintiff is mistaken in considering that the proceeding has been inactive for more than seven years. Indeed, it is not possible to consider that it began in the year two thousand four, as stated. The truth is that in the administrative case file, several resolutions with a specific time and date and the content of the act initiating the proceeding for the revocation of the adjudication and the nullity of the title of the plaintiff here, namely the resolutions of fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; and of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative proceeding; however, none of them was notified to the interested party, for which reason they lack efficacy. It is also evident that the Administration, prior to the opening of the proceeding, carried out numerous field studies and studies of the legal situation of the adjudicated property (official letters ORS-1214-2002, of December second, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eighth, two thousand three; Technical report; ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteenth, two thousand eight; Identificacion237, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight; at folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all from the administrative case file), in which it recorded the reasons that gave rise to the opening of the proceeding (that the awardee - Mr. Nombre142925 ) does not exercise possession over the property, nor has residence on the site, the same being divided into three parts, and that it is being exploited by third parties). There are also two warnings that were made to him: the one carried out through ORS-610-2003, of July eighth, two thousand three, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notified at eight hours on July fifteenth, two thousand three to the plaintiff (folio 6 of the administrative case file); and the one contained in official letter ORS 910-04, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notified</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> at "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">2:35 p.m.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" on October twenty-seventh, two thousand four, was notified to Nombre142928</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">(who "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">takes care of the parcel</span><span style="font-family:Arial">") (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative case file). It is not until August sixth, two thousand nine, that a resolution at fourteen hours ten minutes was issued (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative case file), which is the act opening this administrative proceeding, which was ordered to be notified by edict, given the unknown domicile of the administered party (certification at folio 65 of the administrative case file). From that moment on, the activity of the proceeding began, in which the following actions were verified. The edicts ordered to notify the plaintiff of the opening of the proceeding against him (given the unknown domicile) were published in La Gaceta, in numbers 178 and 179 of September eleventh and fourteenth, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative case file). Likewise, prior to this, by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelfth of the previous year (two thousand nine), the Directing Body of the proceeding sent the order to the Public Property Registry for the corresponding annotation and maintenance of the limitations of Ley 2825 (folios 82 to 83 of the administrative case file); the filing was submitted to the Registry at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on the following August seventeenth, with entry numbers 2009-213876-001 (registral information at folios 85 and 86 of the administrative case file). The possessors of the adjudicated parcel - according to a private purchase-sale agreement - namely, Nombre142926</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre100352</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre142927</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, were considered as part of that proceeding, by resolution of thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-first, two thousand nine, who were summoned to the hearing at eight hours thirty minutes on the following October twenty-seventh; a decision that was personally notified to them on that same day (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative case file). Likewise, on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, the plaintiff here appeared in the proceeding, at which time he indicated a place for receiving notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative case file). Subsequent to that, on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, the lawyer Nombre71606</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">appeared in the proceeding, acting as representative of Nombre142925</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre142926</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre100352</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, for which he provided a special administrative power of attorney, alleging the lack of competence of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to initiate that proceeding, due to the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) thereof because it had begun in two thousand four, and because it involves the affectation of property rights, and that the origin of that adjudication was the Fodesaf program, under the responsibility of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, and that the fifteen-year deadline established in Ley 2825 affecting the property has expired; statements to the effect of which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year (brief at folios 95 to 99 of the administrative case file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney at folio 100 of the administrative case file). On October twentieth, two thousand nine, the lawyer Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed a nullity plea against the proceedings and resolutions, alleging that the regulations intended to be applied do not exist and that the respective warnings have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative case file and 7 to 9 of the judicial case file); and again, on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, the lawyer Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, responded to the granted hearing and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative case file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file). On October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Proceeding, recorded a certification of the non-realization of the summoned hearing, due to the non-attendance of the parties, which it certified with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative case file). Again, on April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, the lawyer Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) in application of numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative case file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file). The actions of the investigated parties were partially addressed, until May eleventh, two thousand ten, when, by agreement in Article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica to issue a recommendatory resolution on the formulated action (folio 20 of the judicial case file); an action that was finally rejected, until the following July fifth (two thousand ten), by agreement adopted in Article 78 of ordinary session number 020-2010; a decision that was notified by fax until the following July sixteenth to the lawyer Nombre71606</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial case file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial case file). Against the previous decision, on July twentieth, two thousand ten, the lawyer Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal for consideration by the Agrarian Tribunal (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial case file); in response to which, by agreement adopted in Article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal to the Legal Affairs Directorate, to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was communicated to the interested party by fax, through official letter JD-0678-2010, of the following August twelfth (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial case file). It bears repeating, that there is no evidence that said appeal has been resolved. From what has been outlined, it is evident to this Tribunal that there is inactivity in the proceeding for the revocation of the adjudication and nullity of the property title followed in administrative case file 240-m before the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, due to the exclusive fault pertaining to the respondent. Having clarified that the proceeding began with the resolution of fourteen hours ten minutes on August seventh, two thousand nine, inertia is indeed observed, occurring from October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine (when the Directing Body of the Proceeding recorded the certification of the non-realization of the oral and private hearing due to the non-attendance of the investigated parties), to July fifth, two thousand ten, when the Board of Directors rejected the alleged expiration of the proceedings (caducidad); a decision that in any case, takes effect upon its notification, which occurred until the sixteenth of that month and year; all of this, over a period of eight months and eighteen days. It should be considered that the referral of the expiration request to the Legal Advisory Office of the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica does not have the virtue of compelling the effective continuation of the proceeding, in a double sense, first, because from April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, the fatal six-month deadline provided in the transcribed numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública expired, which makes any future action null and void, because the expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) has occurred, and furthermore, because it is evident that, in itself, it does not drive the proceeding towards its effective conclusion. It is also necessary to note that in this case, there are actions formulated by the investigated parties, pending resolution, which even sought the suspension of the oral and public hearing scheduled for October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, and to date, as the plaintiff alleges, there is no evidence that the appeal filed against the rejection of the alleged expiration of the proceedings (caducidad) has been resolved; which causes the proceeding not to be ready for the issuance of the final act. In accordance with which, it being evident that the applicability of the referred mechanism for terminating the proceeding </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">derives from the fact that the proceedings were paralyzed for a cause exclusively attributable – in this case – to the Administration that initiated it, for more than six months, this is fully met in this case, as has been explained. </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The paralysis of the proceedings is exclusively attributable to the Administration, and it is not possible to argue that the appeals and defenses presented are extensive and/or excessive, since they are exercised in accordance with the provisions of the legal system, and there is rather an obligation on the part of the Administration to properly resolve them. Rather, a total abandonment of processing and studying this matter in due form is evidenced, which due to inertia - since there is no explanation whatsoever to justify this situation - was left inactive. It is evident that, from </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, </span><span style="font-family:Arial">when the request for the declaration of expiration was insisted upon, it was appropriate, as the fatal six-month deadline provided in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública expired on that day. Any subsequent action is issued out of time, for which reason, everything done as of that date is null and void, as </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">it does not have the virtue of modifying the situation derived from the occurrence of the expiration deadline in this case, even more so considering that the proceeding is not ready for the issuance of the final act</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> (subsection 2 of Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública)</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">,</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> given that several prior matters and challenges are pending, which made it impossible to hold the preliminary hearing, as they implied a challenge to the act initiating the proceeding. Thus, this Tribunal concurs with the plaintiff in that the filed claim must be upheld, declaring the expiration of the proceeding (caducidad) processed before the</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> Dirección17342</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, in case file 240-m, followed against Nombre142925</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre142926</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre100352</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre142927</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, which must be archived. And since the consequence of this means of abnormal termination is that the proceedings are considered not to have been pursued (Article 340.3 of the cited LGAP), this inevitably imposes the need to lift the order (“</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">exhorto</span><span style="font-family:Arial">”) for annotation on the property with real folio registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, which the Directing Body of the proceeding sent by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelfth, two thousand nine, to the Public Property Registry, which was sent at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on the following August seventeenth, corresponding to entry numbers 2009-213876-001, which is ordered to be done by means of a court order that will be issued as soon as this judgment becomes final.</span></p> **VIII.- CONCLUSION.-** In light of the foregoing, the filed claim must be granted, in the terms indicated below, following the order of the established claims: **1.)** It must be declared that the procedure being processed in case file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Directorate of the Huetar Atlántica Region of the respondent Institute is lapsed (caduco) in accordance with the General Public Administration Law (Ley General de la Administrativa Pública), because the six-month period has elapsed in excess without its continuation having been sought as provided by law. Consequently, it is ordered to lift or cancel the Exhorto (Exhorto) of procedural annotation sent by the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) in a resolution issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on August twelfth, two thousand nine, addressed to the Director of the Public Registry of Real Property (Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble) and annotated against the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido of Limón, corresponding to presentation entries 2009-213876-001, at eleven thirty-four in the morning on August seventeenth, two thousand nine. Once the judgment is final, a writ must be issued to the Registry ordering the lifting of said annotation; **2.)** It must be declared that this lapse (caducidad) was caused by fault attributable to the Institute; and, **3.)** It must be declared that the criterion issued by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) is unfounded and illegal in that it resolves that the General Public Administration Law does not apply to procedures concerning the revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries and that, consequently, the doctrine of lapse (instituto de la caducidad) does not apply. It is also noted that in its response to the claim, the Institute of Agrarian Development requested a series of pronouncements, without this in any way constituting a counterclaim; but that in any case, by their content it is observed that they are the antithesis of the plaintiffs' claims, for which reason it must obviously be understood that they are resolved in a manner contrary to what has been declared.

**IX.- THE SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS OF THE CLAIM AND THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF RIGHT RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT INSTITUTION.-** The representation of the Institute of Agrarian Development opposed the claim in its response, and to that end, requested that it be dismissed in its entirety, for which it formulated only the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). Notwithstanding the above, the truth is that both procedural doctrine and case law (in this regard, consult cassation judgment 34-1961, issued at ten twenty in the morning on March twenty-second, nineteen sixty-one) recognize as substantial grounds for the issuance of any judgment those relating to the legal standing (legitimación) of the intervening parties, the interest in the resolution of the conflict, and the right; which are reviewable even sua sponte by the judge. In the case under study, it is true that there is legal standing, both active and passive, insofar as a declaration of lapse of the administrative procedure for the revocation of the parcel award and consequent nullity of the property title, initiated by the respondent institution against the plaintiff herein, is sought. Likewise, it is also evident that the issue under discussion holds current interest for the plaintiff corporation, insofar as said administrative procedure is ongoing. And lastly, it is based on the considerations given in this decision that the merits of the filed claim are determined, as the plaintiff has a legal right supporting his action, which necessitates the rejection of the defense of lack of right.

**X.- COSTS.-** In accordance with article 193 of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs (costas) constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by the fact of being so. Exemption from this award is only viable when, in the opinion of the Court, there was sufficient reason to litigate or, when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the present case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulations and to break the principle of awarding costs against the losing party. Therefore, the award of costs is imposed on the Institute of Agrarian Development.

**POR TANTO:** The defense of lack of right raised by the defendant is rejected. Consequently, the claim filed by Nombre142925 against the Institute of Agrarian Development is granted, and the following pronouncements are made:

**1.)** It is declared that the procedure being processed in case file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Directorate of the Huetar Atlántica Region of the respondent Institute is lapsed in accordance with the General Public Administration Law, because the six-month period has elapsed in excess without its continuation having been sought as provided by law. Consequently, it is ordered to lift or cancel the Exhorto of procedural annotation sent by the Institute of Agrarian Development in a resolution issued at three o'clock in the afternoon on August twelfth, two thousand nine, addressed to the Director of the Public Registry of Real Property and annotated against the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido of Limón, corresponding to presentation entries 2009-213876-001, at eleven thirty-four in the morning on August seventeenth, two thousand nine. Once the judgment is final, a writ must be issued to the Registry ordering the lifting of said annotation; **2.)** It is declared that this lapse was caused by fault attributable to the Institute; **3.)** It is declared that the criterion issued by the Board of Directors is unfounded and illegal in that it resolves that the General Public Administration Law does not apply to procedures concerning the revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries and that, consequently, the doctrine of lapse does not apply; **4.)** Both costs are the responsibility of the respondent entity.

**Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes** **Roberto Garita Navarro** **Christian Hess Araya** Administrative Contentious Proceeding declared purely of law Nombre142925 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario V.- OF THE LAPSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FOLLOWED BY THE IDA AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE.- Having established the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze the arguments submitted. On this point, there are two aspects that must be elucidated: first: whether the institute of lapse (caducidad), under the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, is applicable to the administrative proceedings conducted by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it, and second: should this institute be applicable, whether or not the lapse occurred within the proceeding for revocation of the award (adjudicación) and nullity of title, followed by the defendant against the plaintiff, and processed in case file number 240-m. Regarding the first, as the plaintiff rightly points out, this Tribunal has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of lapse to the administrative proceedings for revocation of the award of parcels of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Thus, in judgments number 57-2011-VI, of eleven hours five minutes on March eighth, two thousand eleven, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, of seven hours fifty minutes on March ninth, number 57-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-ninth, 90-2012-VI, of fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-third, number 112-2012-VI, of ten hours on June fourteenth, and most recently, number 159-2012-VI, of fourteen hours on August thirteenth, the last four of the current year (two thousand twelve). In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the institute of lapse, under the terms provided in Article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública, to the proceedings followed by the defendant institution is concluded. In any case, from such precedents and from national doctrine and jurisprudence, the same conclusion is reached, for the following reasons:

a.) One must start from the premise that respect for due process and the elements that comprise it applies not only in jurisdictional processes, but also in administrative proceedings, without exception or distinction as to the administrative body responsible for its instruction or the subject matter involved. Indeed, as has been repeatedly considered by the jurisprudence of the Sala Constitucional (in that regard, among others, judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96, and 2003-13140 may be consulted), it is required that the elements that comprise due process—which derive from the guarantees established in Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Constitución Política—be respected in administrative proceedings, especially when they are punitive—as in this case—precisely because in them an obligation may be imposed, or a subjective right or legitimate interest may be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction (of suspension, dismissal, economic, etc.) may be imposed, which are of a punitive nature.

In this regard, it must be noted that "[...] *all those legal norms, derived from the Political Constitution as an ideological model, pursue nothing less than the realization of the fundamental end of justice, which is the greatest of the principles safeguarded by a State of Law, in which are included rules –general principles– that have full force and applicability to the administrative procedures of every organ of the Administration, it is reiterated, then,* ***the principles extracted from it are of strict observance by the authorities responsible for authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a punitive result***." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Constitutional Chamber. The highlighting is not from the original.)

Thus, the guarantee of due process is manifested in the effective exercise of the defense, which evidences **its instrumental nature**, insofar as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution of the same, in the terms provided in Article 215.1 of the General Law on Public Administration:

"*The administrative procedure* ***shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party***, *in accordance with the legal system.*" The same constitutional jurisprudence has recognized the following requirements as essential and indispensable to every procedure, which must necessarily be fulfilled, in order to guarantee the intervening parties the effective exercise of the right of defense, the absence of which constitutes a serious affectation of these rights (due process and right of defense): **a)** notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure, better known as the right to proper intimation and imputation, from which it is necessary not only the instruction of the charges, but also the possible imputation of the facts, which means the indication of the possible sanction to be applied; **b)** the right to a hearing, which comprises the right to intervene in the process, to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present the arguments and produce the evidence it deems pertinent; **c)** as a consequence of the foregoing, the presumption of innocence, which implies that the Administration (or the complainant) is obligated to demonstrate the guilt of the offender or investigated party; **d)** the opportunity for the administered party to prepare its allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and to the administrative records, linked to the matter in question; **e)** the right of the administered party to a technical defense, which includes its right to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons, such as experts; **f)** adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and of the reasons on which it is based; **g)** the right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued, which entails the principle of the congruence of the judgment; which, in the case of administrative procedures, comprises not only the right to appeal the final act, but also those acts of the procedure that have their own effect and may affect the right of defense—the order initiating the procedure, the refusal to hold the oral and private hearing, the refusal to receive evidence, the application of precautionary measures, the denial of access to the case file, the reduction of procedural deadlines, and the resolution deciding the recusal—; **h)** the pro-judgment principle, from which procedural norms must be applied and interpreted in a sense that facilitates the administration of justice, both jurisdictional and administrative; and lastly, and no less important, **i)** the formal and material efficacy of the judgment or ruling. Also comprising this right are **access to justice under equal conditions and without discrimination**; the ***gratuity and informalism of justice***; **prompt and complete justice**, that is, without unjustified delay; the **principle of minimum intervention in the sphere of citizens' rights**; the **principle of legal reserve** for the regulation of fundamental rights (Article 28 of the Political Constitution), for the regulation of procedural matter (pursuant to Articles 11 and 28 of the Political Constitution, 5 and 7, 19.1, 59.1, and 367(h) of the General Law on Public Administration), as well as for the establishment of administrative sanctions (Article 39 of the Fundamental Charter and 124 of the General Law on Public Administration); the **principle of the regular judge** (Article 35 of the Political Constitution), the **principle of non-retroactivity of the law** (Article 34 of the Political Constitution), the **prohibition of degrading or confiscatory sanctions** (Article 40 of the Constitution), and the **prohibition of double jeopardy for the same facts** (Article 42 of the Fundamental Charter). The binding nature of this guarantee has such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that its non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the deciding body, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96.

**b.)** In accordance with the foregoing, it should be recalled that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide procedural activity, as also indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2004-13140, at fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on November twelfth, two thousand three. In this case, the principle of **speed and officiousness** is applicable (linked with other principles of administrative procedures, such as the *search for the real truth* and *anti-formalism* or *informalism*), which entails a power-duty of the directing and deciding bodies to compel the processing of the procedure to its resolution on the merits, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 222.1 and 225 of the General Law on Public Administration, constitutes an obligation for the Administration **to instigate or drive the procedure ex officio (oficiosa), that is, without requiring a motion from the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, that is, processed without undue delays for the parties. This officiousness is also manifested in the manner in which the procedure may be initiated, not only at the request of a party, but also ex officio**, in order to verify a possible violation of the legal system (in this case, of duties pertaining to the correct practice of a professional activity). This is about due resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is in accordance with the principles of procedural economy and efficacy, in addition to the principle of constitutional reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in Article 340 of the General Law on Public Administration, a rule that was reformed by canon 200, section 10) of the Contentious Administrative Procedure Code in the following terms:

"*1) When the procedure is suspended for more than six months by virtue of a cause, exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio (de oficio) or by complaint, expiration (caducidad) shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it concerns the case provided for in the final paragraph of Article 339 of this Code.* *2) The expiration (caducidad) of the procedure initiated at the motion of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to take action due to the operation of affirmative or negative silence, or when the case file is ready for the issuance of the final act.* *3) The expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the procedures are deemed not to have been followed, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.*" (Reform in force as of January first, two thousand eight.)

Now, it is noted that in the interest of promoting an expeditious process, this cannot call into question or undermine the guarantees that comprise due process, such as failing to properly state the reasons for the resolution due to the lack of carrying out expert reports, appearances, or some important evidence; or failing to respect the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the institution of expiration (caducidad) provided for in the transcribed legal rule, it is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act, and likewise, it is moot when that final act has already been issued. For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned rule, expiration (caducidad) requires the following presuppositions: *first*: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; *second*, that such stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when initiated at the motion of a party, or to the Administration, if it was initiated ex officio (de oficio); and *third*, that this state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a period that constitutes a minimum temporal limit of inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the case file and not from the opening of the procedure. This means that in sanctioning procedures or those possibly affecting rights initiated ex officio (de oficio), expiration (caducidad) is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this figure, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated on the merits regarding the institution under comment:

"*In the first place,* ***it can be observed that the recently transcribed rule is written in an imperative form, that is, it does not regulate a faculty; on the contrary, once the factual presuppositions contained therein are fulfilled, the consequence becomes obligatory for the body in charge of the processing***. *This implies that its effects are produced by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declaratory, not constitutive, effects. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence—which is, by definition, non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 LGAP—, but solely as the* ***impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred***." However, the procedural effects of expiration (caducidad) require that action has been taken within the procedure to put an end to it. From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the General Law on Public Administration, public competences are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for the termination of that competence due to temporal factors is the public body unable to act. As a general rule, competences are not extinguished by the lapse of the period indicated for exercising them. The exception to this rule is contemplated by the same ordinal when it indicates that there will be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem states with all forcefulness that the act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal effects, save express provision of law, which is not the case here. It is clear that expiration (caducidad) is an early form of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself denominates as an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that closing effect, **within the administrative procedure**; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.

**c.)** We start from the "principle-based" and "complementarity" nature of the General Law on Public Administration, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, insofar as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, in that despite the existence of matters and procedures that by legal mandate—Article 367 of the same reference Law—and determined by Executive Decree—8979-P and 9469-P—have a specific and particular regulation, the truth is that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the General Law of reference, the application to all of them of the jurisprudence, principles, and values proper to Administrative Law cannot be obviated. It is undeniable that the institution of the expiration (caducidad) of procedures is proper to and an integral part of Administrative Law. Moreover, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obligates the applier of Law—both in the administrative venue and as a Judge—to interpret the norms, principles, and values "*in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed,* ***within the respect for the rights and interests of the individual***" (Article 10.1 of the General Law on Public Administration), which in this case, obligates respect for the forms and integral elements of due process; which is proper in a Social and Democratic State of Law.

**d.)** The respondent's proposal that, because the institution of the expiration (caducidad) of administrative procedures followed by the IDA is not expressly regulated in the Regulations for the Selection and Allocation of Land Applicants, this figure is not applicable, is not acceptable. Being clear that the determination of administrative procedures is a matter reserved to the law—theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of liberty, which derives from Article 28 of the Fundamental Charter, according to jurisprudential development by the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, judgments number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on November twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two; number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July sixth, nineteen ninety-three; 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on May tenth, nineteen ninety-six can be consulted)—; obviously, legal regulation prevails over the regulatory norm. In any case, as indicated above, in the face of a legal gap or regulatory vacuum, an integrative interpretation of Law must be made, in this case, first in the branch of Public Law (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider—as already indicated in the precedents cited supra—that the Institute of Agrarian Development's own regulations for this type of situation, and in force at the time of the facts analyzed, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; from which the exception of this figure is not possible. Finally, the provisions of numeral 364 of the General Law on Public Administration cannot be obviated, which, precisely, provides for the "*prevalence*" of its principles and norms, "*over those of any other provisions of equal or lesser rank*", which it establishes as "*criteria of interpretation for the entire administrative legal system of the country.*" **e.)** Finally, it should be noted that despite the fact that the cited precedents of this Tribunal are being the subject of the respective Cassation appeals before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice—according to a query made to the case management system of this Jurisdiction—this does not detract from the decision now adopted, insofar as, to date, it has not been overturned by that High Tribunal, there being objective elements to reaffirm the criterion of application of the institution of expiration (caducidad) as an abnormal mechanism for terminating the procedure, due to inactivity verified in each particular case, in a period exceeding six months, just as provided by ordinal 340 of the General Law on Public Administration.

**VI.-** Having determined the application of the institution of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative procedure followed against Didier Alberto Pizarro Espinoza, it is appropriate to analyze the **second** point brought to this process, that is, whether or not that six-month inactivity provided for by the figure occurred. Having reviewed the case record, it must be clarified that the plaintiff incurs in an error, by considering that the procedure has been inactive for more than seven years. In effect, it is not possible to consider that it was initiated in the year two thousand four, as affirmed. It is true that in the administrative case file, several resolutions bearing a specific hour and date and the content of the act initiating the procedure for the revocation of the allocation and nullity of the title of the plaintiff here reside, namely the resolutions of fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; and of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure; however, none of them was notified to the interested party, for which reason, they lack efficacy. Furthermore, it is evident that the Administration, prior to the opening of the procedure, conducted respective field studies and studies of the legal situation of the allocated property (official letters ORS-1214-2002, of December second, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eighth, two thousand three; Technical report; ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteenth, two thousand eight; ORS-009696-2008, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight; at folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all from the administrative case file), in which it recorded the reasons that gave rise to the opening of the procedure (that the allottee—Mr. Pizarro Espinoza) does not exercise possession over the property, nor has residence on the site, the property being divided into three parts, and that it is being exploited by third persons). There are also two admonishments made to him: the one made by ORS-610-2003, of July eighth, two thousand three, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Institute of Agrarian Development, notified at eight hours on July fifteenth, two thousand three to the plaintiff (folio 6 of the administrative case file); and the one contained in official letter ORS 910-04, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Institute of Agrarian Development, notified at "*2:35 p.m.*" on October twenty-seventh, two thousand four, to Randy Torres (who "*takes care of the parcel*") (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative case file). It was not until August sixth, two thousand nine, that a resolution was issued at fourteen hours ten minutes (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative case file), which is the act initiating this administrative procedure, which was ordered to be notified by edict, given the unknown domicile of the administered party (certification at folio 65 of the administrative case file). From that moment on, the activity of the procedure began, in which the following actions were verified. The edicts ordered to notify the plaintiff of the opening of the procedure against him (given the unknown nature of his domicile) were published in La Gaceta, in numbers 178 and 179 of September eleventh and fourteenth, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative case file). Likewise, prior to that, by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelfth of the previous year (two thousand nine), the Directing Body of the procedure sent the writ to the Public Registry of Property for the corresponding annotation and maintenance of the limitations of Law 2825 (folios 82 to 83 of the administrative case file); the petition being presented to the Registry at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeenth following, with citations 2009-213876-001 (registry information at folios 85 and 86 of the administrative case file). The possessors of the allocated parcel—according to a private purchase-sale agreement—namely, Flora María Cortés Ugalde, Rosa María Cortes Ugalde, and Nelson Soto Villalobos, were taken as part of that procedure by resolution of thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-first, two thousand nine, and were summoned for the hearing of eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh following; a decision that was personally notified to them that same day (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative case file). Likewise, on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, the plaintiff here appeared in the procedure, at which time he indicated a place to receive notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative case file). Subsequently, on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, attorney Geovanny Retana Madriz appeared in the procedure, acting on behalf of Didier Pizarro Espinoza, Flora María and Rosa María Cortés Ugalde, for which he provided a special administrative power of attorney, alleging the lack of competence of the Institute of Agrarian Development to initiate that procedure, due to the expiration (caducidad) of the same for having begun in the year two thousand four, and because it concerns the affectation of property rights, and that the origin of that allocation was the Fodesaf program, in charge of the Joint Institute of Social Aid, and that the period of fifteen years provided in Law 2825 for the affectation of the property has expired; statements pursuant to which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year (brief at folios 95 to 99 of the administrative case file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney at folio 100 of the administrative case file). On October twentieth, two thousand nine, attorney Retana Madriz, in the indicated capacity, filed a motion for nullity of the actions and resolutions, alleging that the regulation they were attempting to apply to him does not exist and that the respective admonishments have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative case file and 7 to 9 of the judicial file); and again, on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, attorney Retana Madriz, in the indicated capacity, responded to the granted hearing and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative case file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file). On October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-occurrence of the summoned hearing, due to the non-attendance of the parties, which it certified with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative case file). Again, on April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, attorney Retana Madriz, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure in application of numeral 340 of the General Law on Public Administration (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative case file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file). The motions of the investigated parties were partially addressed, until May eleventh, two thousand ten, when, by agreement of Article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, the Board of Directors of the Institute of Agrarian Development, referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate so that it could issue a recommendatory resolution on the motion filed (folio 20 of the judicial file); a motion that was finally dismissed, until July fifth of the following year (two thousand ten), by agreement adopted in Article 78 of ordinary session number 020-2010; a decision that was notified by fax until July sixteenth following to attorney Retana Madriz by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial file.

Against the previous decision, on the twentieth of July two thousand ten, attorney Retana Madriz, in the capacity indicated, filed an appeal before the Agrarian Tribunal (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial file); in response to which, by agreement adopted in article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of the twenty-sixth of July two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal to the Directorate of Legal Affairs, to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was made known to the interested party via fax, by official letter JD-0678-2010, of the twelfth of August following (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial file). It is repeated that there is no record that said appeal has been resolved. From what has been recounted, it is evident to this Tribunal that there is inactivity in the procedure for the revocation of the award (adjudicación) and nullity of the property title that was followed in administrative file 240-m before the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, due to the exclusive fault attributable to the defendant. Having clarified that the procedure began with the resolution of fourteen hours ten minutes of the seventh of August two thousand nine, an inertia is indeed observed that occurred from the twenty-seventh of October two thousand nine (when the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-occurrence of the oral and private hearing due to the non-appearance of the investigated parties), to the fifth of July two thousand ten, when the Board of Directors rejected the alleged expiration (caducidad); a decision which, in any case, takes effect upon its notification, which occurred until the sixteenth of that month and year; all of this, over a period of eight months and eighteen days. It is worth considering that the referral of the expiration (caducidad) motion to the Legal Advisory Office of the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica does not have the virtue of compelling the effective continuation of the procedure, in a double sense: first, because as of the twenty-eighth of April two thousand ten, the fatal six-month deadline established in the transcribed numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública had expired, which means that any future action is null, as the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure has occurred; and furthermore, because it is evident that, in itself, it does not drive the procedure towards its effective conclusion. It is necessary to also warn that, in this case, there are motions filed by the investigated parties, pending resolution, in which the suspension of the oral and public hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of October two thousand nine was even sought, and to date, as the plaintiff alleges, there is no record that the appeal filed against the rejection of the alleged expiration (caducidad) has been resolved; which means that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act. In light of which, it being evident that the applicability of the aforementioned mechanism for the termination of the procedure <b>derives from the fact that the proceedings have been paralyzed for a cause exclusively attributable –in this case– to the Administration that initiated it, for more than six months, this is fully met in this case, as has been explained.</b> The paralysis of the proceedings is exclusively attributable to the Administration, and it is not possible to argue that the appeals and defenses filed are extensive and/or excessive, given that these are exercised in accordance with the provisions of the legal system, and there is rather an obligation on the part of the Administration to duly resolve them. Rather, a total abandonment of processing and properly studying this matter is evidenced, which by inertia –as there is no explanation whatsoever that justifies this situation– was left inactive. It is evident that, as of the <b>twenty-eighth of April two thousand ten,</b> when the request for the declaration of expiration (caducidad) was insisted upon, it was appropriate, because on that day the fatal six-month deadline established in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública expired. Any subsequent action is taken out of time, for which reason everything performed after that date is null, insofar as <b>it does not have the virtue of modifying the situation arising from the occurrence of the expiration (caducidad) deadline in this case, even more so if one considers that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act</b> (subsection 2 of article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), given that several preliminary issues are pending, challenges that made it impossible to hold the preliminary hearing, as they implied the challenge to the act initiating the procedure. This being so, this Tribunal concurs with the plaintiff in that the claim filed must be upheld, declaring the procedure processed before the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica, in file 240-m, followed against Didier Alberto Pizarro Espinoza, Flora María Cortes Ugalde, Rosa María Cortés Ugalde and Nelson Soto Villalobos, expired, and it must be archived. And since the consequence of this means of abnormal termination is that the procedures are to be considered as not having taken place (article 340.3 of the cited LGAP), this also inevitably imposes the need to lift the order ("exhorto") for annotation on the property with real folio registration number 057802-000, of the Partido de Limón, which the Directing Body of the procedure sent by resolution of fifteen hours on the twelfth of August two thousand nine to the Registro Público de la Propiedad, which was sent at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on the seventeenth of August following, corresponding to presentation entries number 2009-213876-001, which is ordered to be carried out by an order that will be issued as soon as this judgment becomes final.

**VIII.- CONCLUSION.-** Thus, the filed lawsuit must be upheld, in the terms indicated below, following the order of the established claims: **1.)** It must be declared that the procedure being processed in file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica of the defendant Institute is expired in accordance with the Ley General de la Administración Pública, as more than the six-month deadline has elapsed without its continuation having been sought as provided by law. As a consequence of the above, it is ordered to lift or cancel the Order (Exhorto) for annotation of proceedings that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario sent in a resolution of fifteen hours on the twelfth of August two thousand nine, addressed to the Director of the Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble and annotated under the property with real folio registration number 057802-000, of the Partido de Limón, corresponding to presentation entries 2009-213876-001, at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on the seventeenth of August two thousand nine. Once the judgment is final, an order must be issued to the Registry ordering the lifting of said annotation; **2.)** It must be declared that this expiration (caducidad) has occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute; and, **3.)** It must be declared that the criterion issued by the Board of Directors is unfounded and illegal insofar as it resolves that the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply to procedures related to the revocation or extinction of rights as beneficiaries, and that consequently, the institute of expiration (caducidad) does not apply. Likewise, it is noted that in the response to the lawsuit, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario requests a series of pronouncements, without in any way constituting a counterclaim; but which, in any case, due to their content, are observed to be the antithesis of the plaintiffs' claims, and therefore, must obviously be understood as resolved in the opposite sense of what has been declared.

This contract was formalized by notary public Edgardo Campos Espinoza in deed number 138-21, of his twenty-first protocol, on June twenty-sixth, two thousand two (folios 3 front and back, 10 and 11 of the administrative file; plans at folios 12, 13 and 14 of the administrative file); **4.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario conducted studies of the legal situation and field studies of the farm awarded to Mr. Nombre142925, where it certifies that he does not exercise possession over the property, nor does he have residence at the site, the same being divided into three parts, being exploited by third parties (official letters ORS-1214-2002, of December second, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eighth, two thousand three; Technical Report; ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteenth, two thousand eight; Identificacion237, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight; at folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all from the administrative file); **5.)** That at eight o'clock on July fifteenth, two thousand three, Mr. Nombre142925 was notified of the prevention ORS-610-2003, of July eighth, two thousand three, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, so that he would correct the situation of the awarded farm, having it divided into parcels (folio 6 of the administrative file); **6.)** That at "2:35 p.m." on October twenty-seventh, two thousand four, Nombre142928 (who "takes care of the parcel") was notified of official letter ORS 910-04, from the Siquirres Sub-Regional Office of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, which is a reprimand directed at Nombre142925, for non-compliance with Law Placa19660, and he is given five days to correct the situation, due to the sale of his parcel (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative file); **7.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario attempted to locate Nombre142925 in order to notify him of the opening of the procedure for revocation of award and annulment of the property title, which was unsuccessful, as his relatives indicated they did not know his address, which is recorded in a record at fifteen hours thirty minutes on July twenty-third, two thousand nine (folio 65 of the administrative file); **8.)** That by resolution at fourteen hours ten minutes on August sixth, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the procedure -Attorney Rolando Castro Arce- issued the act opening the administrative procedure for revocation of award and annulment of the property title that had been awarded to Nombre142925, which is property with real folio registration number Placa28125, of the Province of Limón, summoning him to the holding of the oral hearing to be held at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, and ordered the annotation of that administrative procedure in the Public Property Registry, as a precautionary measure, and warns that the decision will be notified by edict, as the address of the administered party is unknown. This file was processed under number 240-m (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative file); **9.)** That by resolution at fifteen hours on August twelfth, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the procedure sent a letter rogatory to the Public Property Registry, so that the registration annotation is made on the farm with registration registered in the Canton of Limón with real folio registration number Placa28125, in the name of Nombre142925, of the administrative procedure being conducted against its owner, and to keep current the limitations registered in entries 416-17150-01-0108-001. This proceeding was filed at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeenth, two thousand nine and has entries 2009-213876-001 (resolution at folios 82 to 83; registration information at folios 85 and 86, both references, of the administrative file); **10.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario made the publication by edicts in numbers 178 and 179 of La Gaceta, of the days September eleventh and fourteenth, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative file); **11.)** That by decision at thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-first, two thousand nine, Nombre142926, Nombre100352, and Nombre142927 were included as parties to administrative file 240-m. They were informed that the hearing will be held at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine. That same day, they are notified personally (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative file); **18.)** That on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, Mr. Nombre142925 appeared in the proceeding and indicated a place to receive notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative file); **19.)** That on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, Nombre71606 alleged the lack of competence of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to initiate this procedure, due to its expiration (caducidad); and because it involves the affectation of the property right, its origin being the Fodesaf program, under the responsibility of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, the fifteen years of property affectation established in Law 2825 having expired; statements pursuant to which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year. The document was accompanied by a special administrative power of attorney granted by Nombre142925, Nombre142926, and Nombre100352 to Nombre71606 (memorial at folios 95 to 99 of the administrative file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney at folio 100 of the administrative file); **20.)** That on October twentieth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, raised nullity of the actions and resolutions, alleging that the regulations intended to be applied do not exist and that the respective reprimands were not made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative file and 7 to 9 of the judicial file); **21.)** That on October twenty-sixth, two thousand nine, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, responded to the hearing granted and formulated conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file); **22.)** That on October twenty-seventh, two thousand nine, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-holding of the convened hearing, due to the non-attendance of the parties, which it recorded with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative file); **23.)** That on April twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure in application of numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file); **24.)** That by agreement of article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, held on May eleventh, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Huetar Atlántica Regional Directorate so that it may issue a recommendatory resolution on the formulated petition (folio 20 of the judicial file); **25.)** That in ordinary session number 020-2010, of July fifth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario heard and approved official letter DAJ-423-2010, of June second, two thousand ten, from Attorney Carlos Enrique García Anchía, in which he recommends the non-applicability of the alleged expiration (caducidad). The foregoing decision was notified via fax on the following July sixteenth to attorney Nombre71606 by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial file); **26.)** That against the foregoing agreement, on July twentieth, two thousand ten, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial file); **27.)** That by agreement adopted in article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July twenty-sixth, two thousand ten, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal (recurso de apelación) to the Legal Affairs Directorate, so that it may provide a recommendation for resolution; which was communicated to the interested party via fax, by official letter JD-0678-2010, of the following August twelfth (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial file).

**II.- UNPROVEN FACTS.-** Also of importance for this matter, the following is considered not accredited: **1.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the award and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution at fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; **2.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the award and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution at nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; **3.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario ordered the opening of the procedure for revocation of the award and nullity of the property title against Nombre142925 by resolution at nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine; **4.)** That the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario communicated to Nombre142925 the resolutions of fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine, and of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure. **5.)** That the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario resolved the appeal (apelación) filed by attorney Nombre71606, by agreement of article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten and that this was notified to the interested parties. There is no proof in this regard.

**III.- ON THE OBJECT OF THE LAWSUIT.-** The claim of the lawsuit is punctual. The declaration of expiration (caducidad) of the administrative procedure for revocation of the award and revocation of the property title that was awarded to the plaintiff -Nombre142925-, for having elapsed, in an ample manner -more than seven years-, the term established in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). It is alleged that since the year two thousand four, when the procedure was opened against Mr. Nombre142925, actions were dictated "so as not to let it expire (caducar)", "which do not give mobility to the file but rather 'pretend' to interrupt the term of expiration (caducidad), which is not procedurally correct legally speaking". It accuses that the process is inactive with serious violation of due process, the principles of equality, prompt and complete justice, and legal certainty, thereby affecting the right of property. It asks to apply the criterion already expressed by this Tribunal in judgment number 90-2012-VI, although it is aware that the same is not final, as the respective appeal for cassation is pending resolution. Consequently, it requests the lifting of any precautionary measure ordered on the property and the condemnation to pay the costs of the losing party. It should be considered that the adjustment made by the plaintiff's attorney in the preliminary hearing, held on December thirteenth, two thousand eleven, was not substantial, as it only consisted of adding the phrase "in accordance with the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública)", between the words "expires (caduca)" and "by" in point 2 of the claim, transcribed at folio 3 of the lawsuit. Already in the legal foundation, the allegation of declaration of expiration (caducidad) had been made based on numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública). So, in essence, this adjustment did not represent anything new or substantial. (Lawsuit at folios 1 to 5, and statements in response to exceptions 64 to 65 and in preliminary hearing, according to digital backup on CD and in minutes, at folios 77 front and back, 96 to 98 and 103 to 106.)

**IV.- ON THE POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.-** To the arguments of the plaintiff, the legal representative of the defendant Institute responds with the following considerations: **a.)** That the procedure opened against Nombre142925 was due to the verification of the breach of his obligation as awardee of the parcel, by not working the land, but rather dividing it into three parts through a private agreement set forth in a document, since the year nineteen ninety-five; which is verified with several inspections of the site; **b.)** That the institute of expiration (caducidad) of the procedure provided for in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is inapplicable for this type of procedure -for revocation of the award and nullity of the property right-, as it is governed by special law and right; having been expressly exempted from the application of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), according to the provision of numerals 229 and 367.1 and Executive Decree number 9469-P, which expressly excludes the Ley de Tierras y Colonización. The foregoing was expressly recognized by the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) (judgment number 1282-97, Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) (judgment number 574-98) and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo) itself (Judgment number 2658-2009, of the Fourth Section). It warns that the precedent of this Tribunal (Contentious-Administrative) that the plaintiff attempts to apply is not final, as the appeal for cassation filed against it is pending resolution. Regarding the case under study, it alleges that there has been no inactivity in the procedure, the delay having rather been to address the petitions of the plaintiff, needing to attend to them. In this sense, it points out that by agreement of the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in article 48 of ordinary session number 032-2010, of October fourth, two thousand ten, the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed against the denial of expiration (caducidad) was rejected, a decision that was duly notified to the interested party. It requests that the lawsuit be dismissed and that the judgment declare the following: "2. That agrarian matters and the agrarian administrative procedure are regulated by special norms, therefore the application of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) is not proper. 3. That the institute of expiration (caducidad) is not applied to procedures for revocation of award with the subsequent nullity of the title, as has been recognized by the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario). 4. That the Institute has the power to annotate the property via a letter rogatory during the entire term in which the limitations imposed by Law 2825 are in force. 5. That my principal has acted in accordance with the law and following due process in the administrative procedure initiated against the plaintiffs. 6. That the plaintiffs be ordered to pay the costs of this proceedings." (Response to the lawsuit at folios 299 to 326; digital backup of the preliminary hearing and in minutes, at folios 385 to 387.)

**V.- ON THE EXPIRATION (CADUCIDAD) OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY THE IDA AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE.-** Once the foregoing is established, it is proper to analyze the claims made. On this point, there are two aspects that must be elucidated: **first**: whether the institute of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in numeral 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), is applicable to the administrative procedures carried out by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in the exercise of the powers legally assigned to it and, **second**: if this institute were applicable, whether or not the expiration (caducidad) occurred within the procedure for revocation of the award and nullity of the title, conducted by the defendant against the plaintiff, and processed in file number 240-m. Regarding the **first**, as the plaintiff rightly points out, this Tribunal has already had the opportunity to analyze the applicability of the institute of expiration (caducidad) to the administrative procedures for revocation of the award of parcels of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Thus, in judgments number 57-2011-VI, at eleven hours five minutes on March eighth, two thousand eleven, whose criterion is reiterated in numbers 47-2012-VI, at seven hours fifty minutes on March ninth, number 57-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on March twenty-ninth, 90-2012-VI, at fifteen hours twenty minutes on May twenty-third, number 112-2012-VI, at ten hours on June fourteenth, and more recently, number 159-2012-VI, at fourteen hours on August thirteenth, the last four of the current year (two thousand twelve). In all these pronouncements, the applicability of the institute of expiration (caducidad), in the terms provided in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), to the procedures conducted by the defendant institution is concluded. In any case, from these precedents and from national doctrine and jurisprudence, the same conclusion is reached, for the following reasons:

**a.)** One must start from the premise that respect for due process and the elements that comprise it are applicable, not only in jurisdictional processes, but also in administrative procedures, without exception or distinction of the administrative body responsible for its instruction or the matter in question. Indeed, as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) has repeatedly considered (in this sense, among others, judgments numbers 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96 and 2003-13140 can be consulted) **respect for the elements that comprise due process -which derive from the guarantees established in articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Political Constitution- is required in administrative procedures, especially when they are sanctioning** -as in this case-, precisely because an obligation may be imposed in them, a subjective right or legitimate interest may be suppressed or denied, or an administrative sanction (suspension, dismissal, economic, etc.), which hold a punitive nature. In this regard, it must be noted that "[...] *all these legal norms, derived from the Political Constitution as an ideological model, pursue nothing more and nothing less than the realization of the fundamental end of justice, which is the greatest of the principles that protect a Rule of Law, in which are included rules –general principles- that have full validity and applicability to the administrative procedures of any body of the Administration, it is reiterated, therefore,* **the principles extracted from it are strictly to be complied with by the authorities in charge of authorizing any administrative procedure that has as its object or produces a sanctioning result**." (Judgment number 1484-96 of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional).

(The highlighting is not from the original.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">It is thus that the guarantee of due process (debido proceso) is manifested in the effective exercise of the defense, which demonstrates **its instrumental character**, as it is designed to guarantee the best resolution thereof, in the terms provided in article 215.1 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública):</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; text-indent:36.85pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">The administrative procedure </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">shall serve to ensure the best possible fulfillment of the Administration's purposes, with respect for the subjective rights and legitimate interests of the administered party</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">, in accordance with the legal system.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">The same constitutional jurisprudence has recognized the following requirements as essential and indispensable to every procedure, which must necessarily be fulfilled in order to guarantee the intervening parties the effective exercise of the right of defense, the absence of which constitutes a serious violation of these rights (due process and right of defense): </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">a)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> notification to the interested party of the nature and purposes of the procedure, better known as the right to proper intimation and imputation, where it is necessary not only to specify the charges, but also the possible imputation of the facts, which means indicating the possible sanction to be applied; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">b)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the right to a hearing, which comprises the right to intervene in the process, to be heard, and the opportunity for the interested party to present arguments and produce the evidence deemed pertinent; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">c)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> as a consequence of the foregoing, the presumption of innocence, which implies that the Administration (or the complainant) is obliged to demonstrate the guilt of the offender or investigated party; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">d)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the opportunity for the administered party to prepare their allegation, which necessarily includes access to information and the administrative records, linked to the matter in question; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">e) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">the right of the administered party to technical defense, which comprises their right to be represented and advised by lawyers, technicians, and other qualified persons, such as experts; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">f)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> adequate notification of the decision issued by the Administration and the grounds on which it is based; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">g)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the right of the interested party to appeal the decision issued, which entails the principle of congruence of the judgment; which, in the case of administrative procedures, comprises not only the right to appeal the final act, but also those procedural acts that have their own effect and may affect the right of defense - the order initiating the procedure, the denial of holding the oral and private hearing, the denial of admission of evidence, the application of precautionary measures, the denial of access to the case file, the reduction of procedural deadlines, and the resolution deciding the motion to recuse -; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">h)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the pro-judgment principle, whereby procedural rules must be applied and interpreted in a manner that facilitates the administration of justice, both jurisdictional and administrative; and lastly, and no less importantly, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">i)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> the formal and material efficacy of the judgment or ruling. This right also comprises **access to justice under equal conditions and without discrimination**; the ***cost-free nature and informalism of justice***; **swift and complete justice**, that is, without unjustified delay; the **principle of minimum intervention in the sphere of citizens' rights**; the **principle of legal reserve** for the regulation of fundamental rights (article 28 of the Political Constitution), for the regulation of procedural matters (pursuant to articles 11 and 28 of the Political Constitution, 5 and 7, 19.1, 59.1 and 367 subsection h) of the General Law of Public Administration), as well as for the establishment of administrative sanctions (articles 39 of the Fundamental Charter and 124 of the General Law of Public Administration); the **principle of the regular judge** (article 35 of the Political Constitution), the **principle of non-retroactivity of the law** (article 34 of the Political Constitution), that of **prohibition of degrading or confiscatory sanctions** (article 40 of the Constitution) and the **prohibition of double jeopardy for the same facts** (article 42 of the Fundamental Charter). The binding nature of this guarantee has such relevance in the administrative sanctioning sphere that its non-observance produces the nullity of all procedural actions and decisions adopted, both by the directing body and the deciding body, as indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in its judgments 3433-93 and 5516-96. </span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">b.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">In accordance with the foregoing, it should be remembered that the administrative procedure has its own principles that guide procedural activity, as also indicated by the Constitutional Chamber in judgment number 2004-13140, of fourteen hours thirty-seven minutes on November twelfth, two thousand three. In this case, the principle of </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">celerity and ex officio action </span><span style="font-family:Arial">(linked with other principles of administrative procedures, such as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">search for the material truth</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> and </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">anti-formalism</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> or </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">informalism</span><span style="font-family:Arial">) is applicable, which entails a power-duty of the directing and deciding bodies to compel the processing of the procedure to its resolution on the merits, which, in accordance with the provisions of articles 222.1 and 225 of the General Law of Public Administration, constitutes an obligation for the Administration </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">to instigate or drive the procedure ex officio, that is, without requiring action from the parties, so that the procedure is as expeditious and effective as possible, meaning it is processed without undue delays for the parties. This ex officio action is also manifested in the way the procedure can be initiated, not only at the request of a party, but also ex officio</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, in order to verify a possible infraction of the legal system (in this case, of duties pertaining to the correct exercise of a professional activity). This concerns proper resolution, with respect for the legal system and the subjective rights and interests of the administered party; which is in accordance with the principles of procedural economy and efficacy, in addition to the constitutional principle of reasonableness, which leads to sanctioning procedural inactivity with the lapsing of proceedings (caducidad), in the terms provided for in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration, a norm that was reformed by canon 200 subsection 10) of the Code of Contentious-Administrative Procedure (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo) in the following terms:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">1) When the procedure is paralyzed for more than six months by virtue of a cause exclusively attributable to the interested party who promoted it or to the Administration that initiated it, ex officio or by complaint, the lapsing of proceedings shall occur and its archiving shall be ordered, unless it is the case provided for in the final paragraph of article 339 of this Code. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">2) The lapsing of the procedure initiated at the request of a party shall not proceed when the interested party has ceased to take action because positive or negative administrative silence has operated, or when the file is ready for the final act to be issued. </span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">3) The lapsing of the administrative procedure does not extinguish the right of the parties; but the proceedings are considered as not followed, for the purposes of interrupting the statute of limitations.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (Reform effective as of January first, two thousand eight.)</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">Now then, it is noted that in the interest of promoting an expeditious process, this cannot undermine or impair the guarantees that constitute due process, such as not properly grounding the resolution due to the lack of conducting expert examinations, appearances, or some important piece of evidence; or not respecting the deadlines established for filing appeals; or the omission of holding the oral and private hearing. Regarding the institution of the lapsing of proceedings provided for in the transcribed legal norm, it is justified as a means of avoiding the excessive prolongation of procedures, in the interest of legal certainty, as well as the need to guarantee the continuity and efficiency of administrative activity. It is unfeasible when the matter is ready for the issuance of the final act, and likewise, it is innocuous when that final act has already been issued. For it to operate, as established by the aforementioned norm, the lapsing of proceedings requires the following conditions: </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">first</span><span style="font-family:Arial">: that the matter has entered a state of procedural abandonment, that is, inactivity; </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">second</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that said stagnation is the product of causes attributable to the administered party, when it was initiated at the request of a party, or to the Administration, if it was instituted ex officio; and</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold"> </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline">third</span><span style="font-family:Arial">, that this state has been maintained for a period of more than six months, a term that constitutes the minimum time limit for inertia, ergo, it must be computed from the last action within the file and not from the initiation of the procedure. This implies that in sanctioning procedures or those with possible effects on rights conducted ex officio, the lapsing of proceedings is feasible when the indicated elements concur. Regarding this concept, recently, the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in ruling 34-F-S1-2011, stated in essence regarding the institution under commentary:</span></p><p style="margin:0pt 28.35pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">In the first place, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">it can be observed that the norm just transcribed is drafted in an imperative manner, that is, it does not regulate a power; on the contrary, once the factual assumptions contained therein are fulfilled, the consequence becomes obligatory for the body in charge of the processing</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">. This implies that its effects are produced by operation of law, and therefore its recognition has merely declarative, not constitutive, effects. It is worth clarifying that the foregoing should not be interpreted as a loss of competence – which is, by definition, non-waivable, non-transferable, and imprescriptible according to numeral 66 of the General Law of Public Administration -, but rather, solely, as the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">impossibility of continuing with the processing of the specific procedure in which the inertia occurred</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial">However, the procedural effects of the lapsing of proceedings require that action has been taken within the procedure to bring it to an end. From the doctrine of canon 59 in relation to 66, both of the General Law of Public Administration, public competences are granted to be exercised. Only in cases where the legislator expressly provides for an expiration of that competence due to temporal factors, is the public body prevented from acting. As a general rule, competences are not extinguished</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> by the lapse of the</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> deadline set to exercise them. The exception to this rule is contemplated in the same article when it indicates that there shall be a limitation of competence by reason of time when the legislator expressly provides that</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> its existence or exercise is subject to conditions or terms of extinction. In this sense, precept 329 ibidem indicates with full force that the act issued outside the deadline is valid for all legal purposes, unless there is an express provision of law, which does not occur here. It is clear that the lapsing of proceedings is an early way of terminating the procedure; which the reference Law itself denominates an abnormal mechanism and which, as such, must be decreed to generate that effect of closure, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">within the administrative procedure</span><span style="font-family:Arial">; therefore, as long as it is not ordered, or at least, has not been requested, it does not produce that procedural consequence.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">c.)</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> It starts from the "principle-based" ("</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">principista</span><span style="font-family:Arial">") and "complementarity" ("</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">complementariedad</span><span style="font-family:Arial">") character of the General Law of Public Administration, inspired by the highest values of Constitutional Law and Administrative Law, favorable to the administered party, as it makes effective the full exercise of Administrative Justice and the principle of legal certainty, since although there are matters and procedures that by legal mandate -article 367 of the same reference Law- and determined by Executive Decree -8979-P and 9469-P- have a specific and particular regulation, the truth is that in application of the legal mandate of numeral 9 of the General Law of reference, the application to all of them of the jurisprudence, principles, and values inherent to Administrative Law cannot be overlooked. It is undeniable that the institution of the lapsing of proceedings is inherent to and an integral part of Administrative Law. Furthermore, it is true that a correct weighing of the situation obliges the applicator of the Law -both in administrative venue and the Judge- to interpret the norms, principles, and values "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">in the manner that best guarantees the realization of the public purpose to which it is directed, </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic">within the respect for the rights and interests of the individual</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" (article 10.1 of the General Law of Public Administration), which in this case, obliges respect for the forms and elements comprising due process; which is characteristic and proper in a Social and Democratic State of Law.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">d.) </span><span style="font-family:Arial">The respondent's proposal that, because the institution of the lapsing of proceedings in administrative procedures followed by the IDA is not expressly regulated in the Regulation for the Selection and Allocation of Land Applicants (Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras), this concept is not applicable, is not acceptable. Being clear that the determination of administrative procedures is a matter reserved to the law -theory of the regulation of fundamental rights, as a necessary corollary of the principle of freedom, which derives from article 28 of the Fundamental Charter, according to jurisprudential development of the Constitutional Chamber itself (among others, judgments number 3550-92, of sixteen hours on November twenty-fourth, nineteen ninety-two; number 03173-93, of fourteen hours fifty-seven minutes on July sixth, nineteen ninety-three; 2175-96, of nine hours six minutes on May tenth, nineteen ninety-six may be consulted)-; obviously, the legal regulation prevails over the regulatory norm. In any case, as indicated previously, in the face of a gap or normative void, an integrative interpretation of the Law must be made, in this case, first within the branch of Public Law (Constitutional-Administrative). But it is also important to consider -as already indicated in the precedents cited above- that the regulation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario itself for this type of situation and in force at the time of the facts under analysis, does refer to the principles of Administrative Law, in numerals 3 and 101; therefore the exception of this concept is not possible. Finally, what is provided in numeral 364 of the General Law of Public Administration cannot be ignored, which fully provides for the "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">prevalence</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" of its principles and norms, "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">over those of</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic"> any other provisions of equal or lesser rank</span><span style="font-family:Arial">", which it establishes as "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">criteria for interpretation of the country's entire administrative legal system.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">"</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:150%"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">e.)</span><span style="line-height:150%; font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt"> Finally, it should be noted that despite the fact that the cited precedents of this Court are being subject to the respective Appeals in Cassation before the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice -according to a consultation made to the case file management system of this Jurisdiction– this does not detract from the decision now adopted, as, to date, it has not been overturned by that High Court, and objective elements exist to reaffirm the criterion of applying the institution of the lapsing of proceedings as an abnormal mechanism for terminating the procedure, due to inactivity that is verified in each particular case, for a period exceeding six months, as provided in article 340 of the General Law of Public Administration.</span></p><p style="margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:28.35pt; line-height:150%; font-size:11pt"><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold">VI.- </span><span style="font-family:Arial">Having determined the application of the institution of the lapsing of proceedings (caducidad) to the administrative procedure conducted against Nombre142925</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, it is appropriate to analyze the </span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline">second</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> point brought to this process, that is, whether or not the inactivity of six months provided for by the concept occurred. Upon reviewing the case file, it must be clarified that the plaintiff is mistaken in considering that the procedure has been inactive for more than seven years. Indeed, it is not possible to consider that the same began in the year two thousand four, as asserted. The truth is that the administrative file contains several resolutions with a specific date and time and with the content of an act initiating the procedure for the revocation of the award and nullity of the title of the plaintiff here, namely the resolutions of fourteen hours on May tenth, two thousand four; of nine hours five minutes on June first, two thousand nine; and of nine hours five minutes on June fourth, two thousand nine, all from the directing body of the administrative procedure; however, none of them were notified to the interested party, for which reason they lack efficacy. Furthermore, it is evident that the Administration, prior to the initiation of the procedure, conducted respective field studies and studies of the legal situation of the awarded property (official communications ORS-1214-2002, of December second, two thousand two; ORS-007-03, of January eighth, two thousand three; Technical Report; ORS-003-2005, of January fourth, two thousand five; Memorandum DRHA-0925-2008, of July eighteenth, two thousand eight; Identificacion237, of August twenty-fifth, two thousand eight; on folios 1 to 2, 4 to 5, 9, 22 to 27, 28, 30 to 31, respectively, all of the administrative file), in which it recorded the reasons that gave rise to the initiation of the procedure (that the awardee -Mr. Nombre142925 ) does not exercise possession over the property, nor has residence on the site, the property being divided into three parts, and that it is being exploited by third parties). There are also two admonishments made to him: the one made by ORS-610-2003, of July eighth, two thousand three, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notified at eight hours on July fifteenth, two thousand three to the plaintiff (folio 6 of the administrative file); and the one contained in official communication ORS 910-04, from the Sub-Regional Office of Siquirres of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notified</span><span style="font-family:Arial">&#xa0;</span><span style="font-family:Arial"> at "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">2:35 p.m.</span><span style="font-family:Arial">" on October twenty-seventh, two thousand four, to Nombre142928</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">(who "</span><span style="font-family:Arial; font-style:italic">takes care of the plot</span><span style="font-family:Arial">") (folios 17 and 18 of the administrative file). It is not until August sixth, two thousand nine, that a resolution was issued at fourteen hours ten minutes (folios 76 and 77 of the administrative file), which is the act initiating this administrative procedure, which was ordered to be notified by edict, given the lack of knowledge of the domicile of the administered party (certification on folio 65 of the administrative file). From that moment on, the activity of the procedure began, in which the following actions were verified. The edicts ordered to notify the plaintiff of the initiation of the procedure conducted against him (given the lack of knowledge of his domicile) were published in La Gaceta, in numbers 178 and 179 of September eleventh and fourteenth, two thousand nine (folios 69 and 70 of the administrative file). Likewise, prior to that, by resolution of fifteen hours on August twelfth of the previous year (two thousand nine), the Directing Body of the procedure sent the order to the Public Registry of Property for the corresponding annotation and maintenance of the limitations of Law 2825 (folios 82 to 83 of the administrative file); the action was filed with the Registry at eleven hours thirty-four minutes on August seventeenth following, with citations 2009-213876-001 (registry information on folios 85 and 86 of the administrative file). The possessors of the awarded plot -according to a private purchase-sale agreement- namely, Nombre142926</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre100352</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre142927</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, were admitted as parties to that procedure, by resolution of thirteen hours eight minutes on September twenty-first, two thousand nine, and were summoned for the hearing at eight hours thirty minutes on October twenty-seventh following; a decision that was notified to them in person that same day (folios 71 and 74 of the administrative file). Likewise, on September eighteenth, two thousand nine, the plaintiff here appeared before the procedure, at which time he indicated a place to receive notifications (folios 73 and 74 of the administrative file). Subsequent to that, on October thirteenth, two thousand nine, in a brief dated October ninth, two thousand ten, lawyer Nombre71606</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">appeared before the procedure, acting on behalf of Nombre142925</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, Nombre142926</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">and Nombre100352</span><span style="font-family:Arial; -aw-import:spaces">&#xa0;&#xa0; </span><span style="font-family:Arial">, for which purpose he provided a special administrative power of attorney, alleging the lack of competence of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario to initiate that procedure, due to the lapsing of proceedings because it had been initiated in two thousand four, and because it involved the affectation of property rights, and that the origin of that award was the Fodesaf program, under the responsibility of the Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, and that the fifteen-year period provided in Law 2825 for the affectation of property has expired; statements in accordance with which he requested the suspension of the hearing scheduled for the twenty-seventh of that month and year (memorial on folios 95 to 99 of the administrative file and 10 to 14 of the judicial file; power of attorney on folio 100 of the administrative file).</span></p> On October 20, 2009, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed for annulment of the proceedings and resolutions, alleging that the regulation intended to be applied does not exist and that the respective warnings have not been made (folios 87 to 89 of the administrative file and 7 to 9 of the judicial file); and again, on October 26, 2009, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, responded to the hearing granted and presented conclusions (folios 91 to 93 of the administrative file and 15 to 17 of the judicial file). On October 27, 2009, the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-occurrence of the convened hearing due to the non-attendance of the parties, which was attested with the signature of other municipal officials (folio 75 of the administrative file). Again, on April 28, 2010, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, requested the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure in application of numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 to 109 of the administrative file and 18 to 19 of the judicial file). The motions of the investigated parties were partially addressed, until May 11, 2010, when, by agreement of article 17, of ordinary session number 017-2010, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the matter to the Legal Advisory Office of the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica to issue a recommendatory resolution on the motion filed (folio 20 of the judicial file); a motion that was finally rejected, by July 5 of that year (two thousand ten), by agreement adopted in article 78 of ordinary session number 020-2010; a decision that was notified via fax on July 16 of that year to attorney Nombre71606 by official letter JD-0605-2010 (agreement at folios 21 to 22 of the judicial file; official letter DAJ-423-2010, at folios 109 to 112; notification at folio 23 of the judicial file). Against the preceding decision, on July 20, 2010, attorney Nombre71606, in the indicated capacity, filed an appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Tribunal Agrario (folios 24 to 33 of the judicial file); in response to which, by agreement adopted in article 14, of ordinary session number 023-2010, of July 26, 2010, the Board of Directors of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario referred the appeal to the Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos to provide a recommendation for resolution; which was made known to the interested party via fax, by official letter JD-0678-2010, of August 12 of that year (folios 34 and 35 of the judicial file). It bears repeating that there is no record that said appeal has been resolved.

From what has been outlined, it is evident to this Court that there is inactivity in the procedure for the revocation of the award and annulment of the property title that was followed in administrative file 240-m before the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, due exclusively to the fault of the defendant. Having clarified that the procedure began with the resolution of two ten in the afternoon of August 7, 2009, an inertia is indeed observed, occurring from October 27, 2009 (when the Directing Body of the Procedure recorded the non-occurrence of the oral and private hearing due to the non-attendance of the investigated parties), until July 5, 2010, when the Board of Directors rejected the alleged expiration; a decision that, in any case, takes effect upon its notification, which occurred on the sixteenth of that month and year; all of this, over a period of eight months and eighteen days. It must be considered that the referral of the expiration motion to the Legal Advisory Office of the Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica does not have the virtue of compelling the effective continuation of the procedure, in a double sense: first, because as of April 28, 2010, the fatal six-month term established in the transcribed numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública expired, which means that any future action is null, as the expiration of the procedure has occurred; and furthermore, because it is evident that, in itself, it does not drive the procedure toward its effective conclusion. It is also necessary to warn that, in this case, there are motions filed by the investigated parties pending resolution, in which even the suspension of the oral and public hearing scheduled for October 27, 2009, was sought, and as of this date, as the plaintiff alleges, there is no record that the appeal filed against the rejection of the alleged expiration has been resolved; which means that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act.

Accordingly, it being evident that the applicability of the referred mechanism for termination of the procedure **derives from the fact that the proceedings have been paralyzed for a cause exclusively attributable –in this case– to the Administration that initiated it, for more than six months, this is fully met in this case, as has been explained.** The paralysis of the proceedings is exclusively attributable to the Administration, without it being possible to argue that the appeals and defenses presented are extensive and/or excessive, given that they are exercised in accordance with the provisions of the legal system, with the Administration rather having the obligation to duly resolve them. Instead, a total abandonment of processing and duly studying this matter is evident, which was left inactive by inertia—as there is no explanation whatsoever to justify this situation. It is evident that, since **April 28, 2010,** when the request for the declaration of expiration was reiterated, it was appropriate, as the fatal six-month term established in numeral 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública expired on that day. Any subsequent action is issued out of time, for which reason everything done after that date is null, insofar as **it does not have the virtue of modifying the situation derived from the occurrence of the expiration period in this case, even more so considering that the procedure is not ready for the issuance of the final act** (subsection 2 of article 340 of the Ley General de la Administración Pública), given that several preliminary issues are pending, challenges that made it impossible to hold the preliminary hearing, as they implied questioning the act of opening the procedure. Thus, this Court agrees with the plaintiff in that the claim filed must be upheld, declaring the expiration (caducidad) of the procedure processed before Dirección17342, in file 240-m, against Nombre142925, Nombre142926, Nombre100352, and Nombre142927, which must be archived. And since the consequence of this abnormal means of termination is that the procedures are considered as not having been pursued (article 340.3 of the cited LGAP), this inevitably also imposes the need to lift the order ("exhorto") of annotation on the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, which the Directing Body of the procedure sent by resolution of three in the afternoon of August 12, 2009, to the Registro Público de la Propiedad, which was sent at eleven thirty-four in the morning of August 17 of that year, corresponding to filing numbers 2009-213876-001, which is ordered by means of an order that will be issued as soon as this judgment becomes final.

**VIII.- CONCLUSION.-** Thus, the complaint filed must be upheld, in the terms indicated below, following the order of the claims established: **1.)** It must be declared that the procedure processed in file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica of the defendant Institute has expired (caduco) in accordance with the Ley General de la Administrativa Pública, because the six-month period has amply elapsed without its continuation having been urged as provided by law. Consequently, the order to lift or cancel the Exhorto of process annotation that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario sent in a resolution of three in the afternoon of August 12, 2009, addressed to the Director of the Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble and annotated under the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, corresponding to filing numbers 2009-213876-001, of eleven thirty-four in the morning of August 17, 2009, is ordered. Once the judgment is final, an order must be issued to the Registry to lift the cited annotation; **2.)** It must be declared that this expiration has occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute; and, **3.)** It must be declared that the criterion issued by the Board of Directors, to the effect that the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply to procedures related to the revocation or termination of rights as beneficiaries and that therefore the institute of expiration does not apply, is unfounded and illegal. Likewise, it is noted that in the response to the complaint, the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario requests a series of pronouncements, without it in any way constituting a counterclaim; but which, in any case, due to their content, are observed to be the antithesis of the plaintiffs' claims, and therefore, must obviously be understood as resolved in the opposite sense of what was declared.

**IX.- SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF RIGHT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT INSTITUTION.-** The representation of the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario opposed the complaint in its response, and to that effect, requested that it be declared without merit in all its aspects, for which it raised only the defense of lack of right (falta de derecho). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the truth is that both procedural doctrine and jurisprudence (in this sense, the cassation judgment 34-1961, of ten twenty in the morning of March 22, 1961, can be consulted) recognize as substantial requirements for the issuance of any judgment, those related to the standing (legitimación) of the intervening parties, the interest in the resolution of the conflict, and the right; which are reviewable even ex officio by the judge. In the case under study, the truth is that there is standing, both active and passive, insofar as the declaration of expiration of the administrative procedure for the revocation of the parcel award and consequent annulment of the property title, opened by the defendant institution against the plaintiff here, is sought. Likewise, it is also evident that the issue under discussion holds current interest for the plaintiff party, insofar as said administrative procedure is pending. And finally, it is based on the considerations given in this decision that the merit of the complaint filed is determined, as the plaintiff has the right in his action, which compels the rejection of the defense of lack of right.

**X.- COSTS.-** In accordance with numeral 193 of the Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party by virtue of being so. The waiver of this award is only viable when there has been, in the Court's judgment, sufficient reason to litigate or when the judgment is rendered by virtue of evidence whose existence the opposing party was unaware of. In the present case, this collegiate body finds no reason to apply the exceptions established by the applicable regulation and break the principle of awarding costs against the loser. Therefore, the award of costs against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario is imposed.

**POR TANTO:** The defense of lack of right raised by the defendant is rejected. Consequently, the complaint filed by Nombre142925 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario is declared with merit, and the following pronouncements are made:

**1.)** It is declared that the procedure processed in file 240-M of the Legal Advisory Office of the Legal Directorate of the Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica of the defendant Institute has expired in accordance with the Ley General de la Administrativa Pública, because the six-month period has amply elapsed without its continuation having been urged as provided by law. Consequently, the order to lift or cancel the Exhorto of process annotation that the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario sent by the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario in a resolution of three in the afternoon of August 12, 2009, addressed to the Director of the Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble and annotated under the property with folio real registration number Placa28125, of the Partido de Limón, corresponding to filing numbers 2009-213876-001, of eleven thirty-four in the morning of August 17, 2009, is ordered. Once the judgment is final, an order must be issued to the Registry to lift the cited annotation; **2.)** It is declared that this expiration has occurred due to fault attributable to the Institute; **3.)** It is declared that the criterion issued by the Board of Directors, to the effect that the Ley General de la Administración Pública does not apply to procedures related to the revocation or termination of rights as beneficiaries and that therefore the institute of expiration does not apply, is unfounded and illegal; **4.)** Both costs are to be borne by the defendant entity.

**Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes** **Roberto Garita Navarro** **Christian Hess Araya** Proceso Contencioso Administrativo declared purely of law Nombre142925 against the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario

2 No. 210-2012-VI SECCIÓN SEXTA DEL TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO. Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José, Anexo A, Dirección01 , a las catorce horas veinte minutos del cuatro de octubre del dos mil doce.

Proceso de conocimiento declarado de puro derecho, interpuesto por Nombre142925 , con cédula de identidad número CED112246, vecino de Siquirres, sin indicación de otras calidades, contra el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO (IDA), actualmente Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), últimamente representado por su apoderado general judicial, Alex Benjamín Gen Palma, con cédula de identidad número CED28222, sin indicación de otras calidades. Figura como apoderado especial judicial del actor Nombre71606 , casado, abogado, cédula número CED52761, vecino de Tibás, y para la asistencia de la audiencia preliminar, Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, cédula número CED30415, vecino de Heredia. Los dos últimos comparecientes son mayores, casados y abogados (folios 6 y 114 y 115).

RESULTANDO:

1.- Las pretensiones del actor, que se ajustaron durante la audiencia preliminar celebrada a las trece horas treinta minutos del trece de diciembre del dos mil once, es para que en sentencia se declare lo siguiente: "1. con lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos. / 2. Que el procedimiento que se tramita en expediente 240-M de la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica del Instituto demandado, está caduco de conformidad con la Ley General de la Administración Pública, por haber transcurrido de sobra el plazo de seis meses sin que se hubiere instado a su prosecución conforme lo dispone la ley. / 3. Que esa caducidad se ha producido por culpa imputable al Instituto . / 4. Que es infundado e ilegal el criterio emitido por la Junta Directiva en cuanto resuelve que en los procedimientos referidos a revocación o extinción de derechos como beneficiarios no se aplica la Ley General de la Administración Pública y que por consiguiente no se aplica el instituto de la caducidad. / 5. Que como consecuencia de la caducidad se decrete el archivo del expediente. / 6. Que como consecuencia del archivo del expediente, se decrete el levantamiento de cualquier medida cautelar dispuesta por el Instituto contra los derechos inscritos de mi representado. / 7. Que se condene al Instituto al pago de ambas costas de esta acción.” (Interposición de la demanda a folios 1 a 5 del expediente judicial y respaldo de la audiencia preliminar digital en CD y en minuta, a folios 77 frente y vuelto.)

2.- El representante del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario contestó negativamente la demanda, y a tal efecto opuso la excepción de falta de derecho. (Contestación de la demanda a folios 41 a 56 del expediente judicial.)

3.- Que habiéndose citado a audiencia para celebración de conciliación, el representante del instituto accionado manifestó su negativa a la misma, por lo que se continuó con la tramitación del proceso. (Folios 57 a 59 del expediente judicial).

4.- Que la audiencia preliminar establecida en el ordinal 90 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo fue iniciada a las trece horas treinta minutos del trece de diciembre del dos mil once, con la presencia del abogado Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, carné número 6590 actuando en sustitución de Nombre71606 , apoderado especial judicial del actor y los abogados Shirley Campos García, carné 17627 y Óscar Rolando Chaves Castro, carné 13302, en representación de la institución demandada. En dicha audiencia, el personero del actor hizo ajustes en la pretensión, según se reseñó en el Resultando primero de esta sentencia y la Jueza Tramitadora -Lourdes Vargas Castillo-, mediante resolución número 2108-2011, de las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del trece de diciembre del dos mil once, rechaza la defensa previa de litis consorcio pasivo necesario, opuesta por la representación del IDA. Advertida de la interposición del respectivo recurso de apelación contra esta decisión, se suspendió la audiencia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones la confirmó, mediante fallo número 201-2012, de las catorce horas cincuenta y cinco minutos del nueve de abril del dos mil doce. A las nueve horas del treinta de mayo del dos mil doce, se continuó con la celebración de la audiencia preliminar, con la presencia de del abogado Carlos Enrique López Baltodano, actuando en sustitución Nombre71606 , apoderado especial judicial del actor y los abogados Alex Gen Palma, carné 6484 y Óscar Rolando Chaves Castro, carné número 13302, quienes actúan en representación del IDA. Se definieron los hechos controvertidos y se admitió la prueba documental ofrecida por las partes, rechazándose el reconocimiento ofrecido por la demandada. En razón de lo anterior, al no existir prueba testimonial ni pericial que evacuar, la Jueza Tramitadora declaró este asunto de puro derecho, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 98.2 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, rindiendo de inmediato las representaciones de las partes intervinientes, su alegato de conclusiones. (Respaldo de la audiencia preliminar digital en CD y en minutas, visibles a folios 77 frente y vuelto, 96 a 98 y 103 a 106.)

4.- Este asunto se recibió para estudio en la Sección Sexta el siete de setiembre del dos mil doce, conforme al sello de pase visible a folio 106 vuelto.

5.- Que mediante auto de las catorce horas veinticinco minutos del veintisiete de setiembre del dos mil doce, este Despacho previno a la parte actora la subsanación del poder del abogado que intervino en su defensa en las audiencias preliminares; a lo cual, se dio cabal cumplimiento el primero de octubre del dos mil doce (auto a folios 107 a 108; contestación a folios 114 a 115).

6.- En los procedimientos ante este Tribunal no se han observado nulidades que deban ser subsanadas o que generen indefensión; de manera que, se dicta esta sentencia, previa deliberación, dentro del plazo de quince días establecido en el párrafo segundo del artículo 98 del citado Código Procesal en relación numeral 82 inciso 4) del Reglamento Autónomo de Organización y Servicio de esta Jurisdicción.

Redacta la juez Fernández Brenes, con el voto afirmativo de los jueces Garita Navarro y Hess Araya; y,

CONSIDERANDO:

I.- DE LOS HECHOS PROBADOS.- De importancia para la decisión de este asunto, se tiene como debidamente acreditado lo siguiente: 1.) Que por acuerdo de Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, en la sesión 29-92, del veintisiete de abril de mil novecientos noventa y dos, artículo XXIX, se adjudicó la parcela número 23 del Asentamiento Trujicafé, ubicado en el Dirección17341 , , a Nombre142925 (hecho no controvertido, por referencia en oficio ORS-003-2005, del cuatro de enero del dos mil cinco, de la Oficina Subregional de Siquirres del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, a folio 22 del expediente administrativo); 2.) Que dicha adjudicación dio lugar a la finca con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, anotación de contrato en el Registro, el veintidós de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, en la que figura como su titular Nombre142925 , y sobre la que pesa la limitación del artículo 67 de la Ley del IDA, número 2825, del treinta de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro al treinta de setiembre del año dos mil nueve (copia de la información registral, folio 48 del expediente administrativo); 3.) Que el ocho de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y cinco, Nombre142925 suscribe convenio privado de compraventa de terreno, del lote que le fuera adjudicado por el IDA a Nombre100352 , Nombre142926 y Nombre142927 , libre de gravámenes hipotecarios y por la suma de dos millones ochocientos mil colones exactos, indicándose que "la escritura final de venta se hará cuando el IDA inscriba el inmueble que nos ocupa ante el Registro Público de la Propiedad", y que la posesión del terreno la ejercerán los compradores desde la fecha de ese negocio. Este contrato es protocolizado por el notario público Edgardo Campos Espinoza en escritura número 138-21, de su protocolo vigésimo primero, el veintiséis de junio del dos mil dos (folios 3 frente y vuelto, 10 y 11 del expediente administrativo; planos a folios 12, 13 y 14 del expediente administrativo); 4.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario realizó estudios de la situación jurídica y estudios de campo de la finca adjudicada al señor Nombre142925 , donde hace constar que no ejerce la posesión sobre el bien, ni tiene residencia en el sitio, estando divida la misma en tres partes, siendo explotada por terceras personas (oficios ORS-1214-2002, del dos de diciembre del dos mil dos; ORS-007-03, del ocho de enero del dos mil tres; Informe técnico; ORS-003-2005, del cuatro de enero del dos mil cinco; Memorándum DRHA-0925-2008, del dieciocho de julio del dos mil ocho; Identificacion237, del veinticinco de agosto del dos mil ocho; a folios 1 a 2, 4 a 5, 9, 22 a 27, 28, 30 a 31, respectivamente, todos del expediente administrativo); 5.) Que a las ocho horas del quince de julio del dos mil tres, se notificó al señor Nombre142925 de la prevención ORS-610-2003, del ocho de julio del dos mil tres, de la Oficina Sub-Regional de Siquirres del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, para que corrigiera la situación de la finca adjudicada, al tenerla divida en parcelas (folio 6 del expediente administrativo); 6.) Que a las "2:35 p.m." del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil cuatro, se notificó a Nombre142928 (quien "cuida la parcela"), el oficio ORS 910-04, de la Oficina Sub-Regional de Siquirres del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, que es amonestación dirigida a Nombre142925 , del incumplimiento de la Ley Placa19660, y se le confiere cinco días para que corrija la situación, por la venta de su parcela (folios 17 y 18 del expediente administrativo); 7.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario intentó localizar a Nombre142925 a fin de notificarle la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de adjudicación y anulación del título de propiedad, siendo que ello fue infructuoso, por indicar sus familiares desconocer su domicilio, de lo que se deja constancia en acta de las quince horas treinta minutos del veintitrés de julio del dos mil nueve (folio 65 del expediente administrativo); 8.) Que mediante resolución de las catorce horas con diez minutos del seis de agosto del dos mil nueve, el Órgano Director del procedimiento -Licenciado Rolando Castro Arce- dictó acto de apertura del procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria de adjudicación y anulación del título de propiedad que le fuera adjudicado a Nombre142925 , que es propiedad con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, de la Provincia de Limón, citándolo para la celebración de la audiencia oral a realizarse a las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve, y dispuso hacer la anotación de ese procedimiento administrativo en el Registro Público de la Propiedad, en carácter de medida cautelar, y advierte que se notificará la decisión por edicto, al desconocer el domicilio del administrado. Este expediente se tramitó con el número 240-m (folios 76 y 77 del expediente administrativo); 9.) Que por resolución de las quince horas del doce de agosto del dos mil nueve, el Órgano Director del procedimiento envió exhorto al Registro Público de la Propiedad, a fin de que se haga la anotación registral en la finca con matrícula inscrita en el Partido de Limón con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, a nombre de Nombre142925 , del procedimiento administración que se le sigue a su titular, y mantener vigentes las limitaciones inscritas en las citas 416-17150-01-0108-001. Esta gestión fue presentada a las once horas treinta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de agosto del dos mil nueve y tiene las citas 2009-213876-001(resolución a folios 82 a 83; información registral a folios 85 y 86, ambas referencias, del expediente administrativo); 10.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario hizo la publicación por edictos en los número 178 y 179 de La Gaceta, de los días once y catorce de setiembre del dos mil nueve (folios 69 y 70 del expediente administrativo); 11.) Que por decisión de las trece horas ocho minutos del veintiuno de setiembre del dos mil nueve, se tuvo como parte del expediente administrativo 240-m a Nombre142926 , Nombre100352 y a Nombre142927 . Se les indicó que la audiencia se realizará a las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve. Ese mismo día, son notificados en lo personal (folios 71 y 74 del expediente administrativo); 18.) Que el dieciocho de setiembre del dos mil nueve, se apersonó al procedimiento el señor Nombre142925 y señaló lugar para recibir notificaciones (folios 73 y 74 del expediente administrativo); 19.) Que el trece de octubre del dos mil nueve, en escrito con fecha del nueve de octubre del dos mil diez, Nombre71606 , alegó la falta de la competencia del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario para iniciar ese procedimiento, por caducidad del mismo; y por tratarse de la afectación del derecho de propiedad, siendo que su origen fue el programa de Fodesaf, a cargo del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, habiéndose vencido los quince años dispuestos en la ley 2825 de afectación de la propiedad; manifestaciones al tenor de las cuales pidió la suspensión de la audiencia prevista para el veintisiete de ese mes y año. El documento se acompañó con poder especial administrativo otorgado por Nombre142925 , Nombre142926 y Nombre100352 a Nombre71606 (memorial a folios 95 a 99 del expediente administrativo y 10 a 14 del judicial; poder a folio 100 del expediente administrativo); 20.) Que el veinte de octubre del dos mil nueve, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, formuló nulidad de las actuaciones y resoluciones, alegando que no existe la normativa que se le intenta aplicar y que no se han hecho las respectivas amonestaciones (folios 87 a 89 del expediente administrativo y 7 a 9 del expediente judicial); 21.) Que el veintiséis de octubre del dos mil nueve, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, contestó la audiencia concedida y formuló conclusiones (folios 91 a 93 del expediente administrativo y 15 a 17 del judicial); 22.) Que el veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve, el Órgano Director del Procedimiento, dejó constancia de la no realización de la audiencia convocada, por inasistencia de las partes, lo que hizo constar con firma de otros funcionarios municipales (folio 75 del expediente administrativo); 23.) Que el veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, solicitó la caducidad del procedimiento en aplicación del numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 a 109 del expediente administrativo y 18 a 19 del judicial); 24.) Que por acuerdo del artículo 17, de la sesión ordinaria número 017-2010, celebrada el once de mayo del dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, remitió el asunto a la Asesoría Legal de la Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica para que emita resolución recomendativa sobre la gestión formulada (folio 20 del expediente judicial; 25.) Que en sesión ordinaria número 020-2010, del cinco de julio del dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario conoció y aprobó el oficio DAJ-423-2010, del dos de junio del dos mil diez, del Licenciado Carlos Enrique García Anchía, en el que recomienda la inaplicabilidad de la caducidad aducida. La anterior decisión le fue notificada mediante fax el dieciséis de julio siguiente al abogado Nombre71606 por oficio JD-0605-2010 (acuerdo a folios 21 a 22 del expediente judicial; oficio DAJ-423-2010, a folios 109 a 112; notificación a folio 23 del expediente judicial); 26.) Que contra el acuerdo anterior, el veinte de julio del dos mil diez, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, formuló recurso de apelación para ante el Tribunal Agrario (folios 24 a 33 del expediente judicial); 27.) Que por acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 14, de la sesión ordinaria número 023-2010, del veintiséis de julio del dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario remitió a la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos el recurso de apelación, para que brinde recomendación de resolución; lo que se puso en conocimiento del interesado mediante fax, por oficio JD-0678-2010, del doce de agosto siguiente (folios 34 y 35 del expediente judicial).

II.- HECHOS NO PROBADOS.- También de importancia para este asunto se tiene por no acreditado lo siguiente: 1.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario haya ordenado la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título de propiedad contra Nombre142925 mediante resolución de las catorce horas del diez de mayo del dos mil cuatro; 2.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario haya ordenado la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título de propiedad contra Nombre142925 mediante resolución de las nueve horas cinco minutos del primero de junio del dos mil nueve; 3.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario haya ordenado la apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título de propiedad contra Nombre142925 mediante resolución de las nueve horas cinco minutos del cuatro de junio del dos mil nueve; 4.) Que el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario haya comunicado a Nombre142925 las resoluciones de las catorce horas del diez de mayo del dos mil cuatro; de las nueve horas cinco minutos del primero de junio del dos mil nueve, y de las de las nueve horas cinco minutos del cuatro de junio del dos mil nueve, todas, del órgano director del procedimiento administrativo. 5.) Que la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario haya resuelto la apelación formulada por el abogado Nombre71606 , mediante acuerdo del artículo 48 de la sesión ordinaria número 032-2010, del cuatro de octubre del dos mil diez y que éste se le haya notificado a los interesados. No existe prueba al respecto.

III.- DEL OBJETO DE LA DEMANDA.- La pretensión de la demanda es puntual. La declaratoria de caducidad del procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria de la adjudicación y revocatoria del título de la propiedad que le fue adjudicada al actor -Nombre142925 -, por haber transcurrido, de manera sobrada -más de siete años-, el plazo establecido en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Se alega que desde el año dos mil cuatro, en que se abrió el procedimiento en contra del señor Nombre142925 -, dictándose actuaciones "para no dejarlo caducar", "que no vienen a darle movilidad al expediente sino a 'pretender' interrumpir el plazo de la caducidad, lo cual no es procedente legalmente hablando". Acusa que el proceso está inactivo con grave infracción del debido proceso, los principios de igualdad, justicia pronta y cumplida y de seguridad jurídica, y afectándose con ello, el derecho de propiedad. Pide aplicar el criterio ya externado por este Tribunal en sentencia número 90-2012-VI, aunque tiene conocimiento que la misma no está firme, al estar pendiente de resolverse el recurso de casación respectivo. Consecuentemente, pide el levantamiento de cualquier medida cautelar ordenada sobre el inmueble y la condenatoria en costas del vencido. Cabe considerar que, el ajuste que hiciera el abogado del actor en la audiencia preliminar, realizada el trece de diciembre del dos mil once, no fue sustancial, en tanto únicamente consistió en agregar la frase "de conformidad con la Ley General de la Administración Pública", entre las palabras "caduca" y "por" en el punto 2 de la pretensión, transcrita a folio 3 de la demanda. Ya en la fundamentación jurídica, el alegato de declaratoria de caducidad se había hecho con fundamento en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. De manera que, en el fondo, nada nuevo ni sustancial vino a representar tal ajuste. (Demanda a folios 1 a 5, y manifestaciones en contestación de excepciones 64 a 65 y en audiencia preliminar, según respaldo digital en CD y en minuta, a folios 77 frente y vuelto, 96 a 98 y 103 a 106.)

IV.- DE LA POSICIÓN DE LA INSTITUCIÓN DEMANDADA.- A los argumentos de del actor, responde el personero del Instituto demandado, con las siguientes consideraciones: a.) Que el procedimiento que se le abrió a Nombre142925 se debió a la constatación del incumplimiento de su obligación como adjudicatario de la parcele, al no trabajar la tierra, sino más bien dividirla en tres partes mediante convenio privado que se consigna en un documento, desde el año de mil novecientos noventa y cinco; lo cual constata con varias inspecciones al sitio; b.) Que el instituto de la caducidad del procedimiento dispuesto en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública es inaplicable para ese tipo de procedimientos -de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del derecho de propiedad-, por regirse por derecho y ley especial; habiendo sido excepcionado de manera expresa de la aplicación de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, según previsión de los numerales 229 y 367.1 y Decreto Ejecutivo número 9469-P, que excluye de manera taxativa a la Ley de Tierras y Colonización. Lo anterior fue del reconocimiento expreso por la Sala Constitucional (sentencia número 1282-97, Tribunal Agrario (sentencia número 574-98) y el propio Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo (Sentencia número 2658-2009, de la Sección Cuarta). Advierte que el precedente de este Tribunal (Contencioso Administrativo) que el actor intenta aplicar, no está firme, al estar pendiente de resolución el recurso de casación planteado contra éste. En cuanto al caso en estudio, alega que no ha habido inactividad en el procedimiento, siendo que la dilación ha sido más bien para atender a las gestiones del actor, debiendo atender a las mismas. En este sentido, señala que por acuerdo de la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en el artículo 48 de la sesión ordinaria número 032-2010, del cuatro de octubre del dos mil diez, se rechazó el recurso de apelación formulado contra la denegatoria de caducidad, decisión que le fue debidamente notificada al interesado. Solicita que se desestime la demanda y que en sentencia se declare lo siguiente: "2. Que la materia agraria y el procedimiento administrativo agrario es regulado por normas especiales, por lo que no procede la aplicación de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. 3. Que el instituto de la caducidad no se aplica a los procedimientos de revocatoria de adjudicación con la subsecuente nulidad del título, conforme lo ha reconocido el Tribunal Agrario. 4. Que el Instituto tiene la potestad de anotar la propiedad mediante exhorto durante todo el plazo en que se encuentre vigente las limitaciones impuestas por la Ley 2825. 5. Que mi representado ha actuado conforme a derecho y siguiendo el debido proceso en el procedimiento administrativo iniciado contra los actores. 6. Que se condenen a los actores al pago de las cotas del presente proceso." (Contestación de la demanda a folios 299 a 326; respaldo digital de la audiencia preliminar y en minuta, a folios 385 a 387.)

V.- DE LA CADUCIDAD DEL PROCEDIMIENTO ADMINISTRATIVO SEGUIDO POR EL IDA CONTRA LOS ACTORES. ANÁLISIS DEL CASO.- Una vez establecido lo anterior, procede hacer el análisis de los alegatos formulados. Sobre este punto, son dos los aspectos que deben dilucidarse: primero: si resulta aplicable el instituto de la caducidad, en los términos previstos en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a los procedimientos administrativos que realiza el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en ejercicio de las competencias que le son legalmente asignadas y, segundo: en caso de que resultare aplicable este instituto, si se produjo o no la caducidad dentro del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título, seguido por la demandada contra el actor, y tramitado en expediente número 240-m. En cuanto al primero, como bien lo señala la parte actora, este Tribunal ha tenido ya la oportunidad de analizar la aplicabilidad del instituto de la caducidad a los procedimientos administrativos de revocatoria de la adjudicación de parcelas del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario. Así, en las sentencias número 57-2011-VI, de las once horas cinco minutos del ocho de marzo del dos mil once, cuyo criterio es reiterado en las número 47-2012-VI, de las siete horas cincuenta minutos del nueve de marzo, número 57-2012-VI, de las quince horas veinte minutos del veintinueve de marzo, 90-2012-VI, de las quince horas veinte minutos del veintitrés de mayo, número 112-2012-VI, de las diez horas del catorce de junio, y más recientemente, la número 159-2012-VI, de las catorce horas del trece de agosto, las cuatro últimas del año en curso (dos mil doce). En todos estos pronunciamientos, se concluye la aplicabilidad del instituto de la caducidad, en los términos previstos en el artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, a los procedimientos que sigue la institución demandada. En todo caso, de tales precedentes y de la doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional se llega a la misma conclusión, por los siguientes motivos:

a.) Se debe partir de que el respeto del debido proceso y elementos que lo conforman son de aplicación, no sólo en los procesos jurisdiccionales, sino también en los procedimientos administrativos, sin excepción ni distingo del órgano administrativo que le corresponde su instrucción o la materia de que se trate. En efecto, tal y como lo ha considerado en forma reiterada la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional (en tal sentido, entre otras, se pueden consultar las sentencias números 15-90, 3433-93, 3929-95, 1484-96, 5516-96 y 2003-13140) resulta exigido el respeto de los elementos que conforman el debido proceso -que derivan de las garantías establecidas en los artículos 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 y 42 de la Constitución Política- en los procedimientos administrativos, máxime cuando sean sancionatorios -como en este caso-, precisamente en atención a que en ellos puede imponerse una obligación, suprimirse o denegarse un derecho subjetivo o interés legítimo, o una sanción administrativa (de suspensión, destitución, económica, etc.), las cuales ostentan naturaleza punitiva. Al respecto, debe atenderse que “[...] todas esas normas jurídicas, derivadas de la Constitución Política como modelo ideológico, persiguen ni más ni menos que la realización del fin fundamental de justicia que es el mayor de los principios que tutelan un Estado de Derecho, en la que se incluyen reglas –principios generales- que tienen plena vigencia y aplicabilidad a los procedimientos administrativos de todo órgano de la Administración, se reitera, pues, los principios que de ella se extraen son de estricto acatamiento por las autoridades encargadas de autorizar cualquier procedimiento administrativo que tenga por objeto o produzca un resultado sancionador." (Sentencia número 1484-96 de la Sala Constitucional. El resaltado no es del original.)

Es así como la garantía del debido proceso se manifiesta en el ejercicio efectivo de la defensa, lo que evidencia su carácter instrumental, en tanto está dispuesto para garantizar la mejor resolución del mismo, en los términos previstos en el artículo 215.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública:

"El procedimiento administrativo servirá para asegurar el mejor cumplimiento posible de los fines de la Administración, con respeto para los derechos subjetivos e intereses legítimos del administrado, de acuerdo con el ordenamiento jurídico." La misma jurisprudencia constitucional ha reconocido esenciales e indispensables a todo procedimiento los siguientes requisitos, que necesariamente deben cumplirse, a fin de garantizarle a las partes que intervienen, el efectivo ejercicio del derecho de defensa, cuya ausencia constituye una grave afectación a estos derechos (debido proceso y derecho de defensa): a) la notificación al interesado del carácter y fines del procedimiento, más conocido como el derecho a la debida intimación e imputación, de donde se hace necesario no sólo la instrucción de los cargos, sino también la posible imputación de los hechos, lo que significa la indicación de la posible sanción a aplicar; b) el derecho de audiencia, que comprende el derecho de intervenir en el proceso, a ser oído y oportunidad del interesado para presentar los argumentos y producir las pruebas que entienda pertinentes; c) consecuencia del anterior, la presunción de inocencia, que implica que la Administración (o el denunciante) está obligada a demostrar la culpabilidad del infractor o investigado; d) la oportunidad para el administrado de preparar su alegación, lo que incluye necesariamente el acceso a la información y a los antecedentes administrativos, vinculados con la cuestión de que se trate; e) el derecho del administrado a una defensa técnica, que comprende su derecho a hacerse representar y asesorar por abogados, técnicos y otras personas calificadas, como peritos; f) la notificación adecuada de la decisión que dicta la Administración y de los motivos en que ella se funde; g) el derecho del interesado de recurrir la decisión dictada, que conlleva el principio de la congruencia de la sentencia; que en el caso de los procedimientos administrativos, comprende no sólo el derecho de recurrir el acto final, sino también aquellos actos del procedimiento que tengan efecto propio y puedan incidir en el derecho de defensa -el auto de apertura del procedimiento, la denegatoria de la celebración de la audiencia oral y privada, la denegatoria de recepción de prueba, la aplicación de medidas cautelares, la denegación del acceso al expediente, la reducción de los plazos del procedimiento, y la resolución que resuelva la recusación-; h) el principio pro-sentencia, de donde, las normas procesales deben aplicarse e interpretarse en el sentido de facilitar la administración de justicia, tanto jurisdiccional como administrativa; y por último, y no menos importante, i) la eficacia formal y material de la sentencia o fallo. También integran este derecho el acceso a la justicia en igualdad de condiciones y sin discriminación; la gratuidad e informalismo de la justicia; la justicia pronta y cumplida, es decir, sin retardo injustificado; el principio de la intervención mínima en la esfera de los derechos de los ciudadanos; el principio de reserva legal para la regulación de los derechos fundamentales (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política), para la regulación de la materia procesal (al tenor de los artículos 11 y 28 de la Constitución Política, 5 y 7, 19.1, 59.1 y 367 inciso h) de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), así como para el establecimiento de sanciones administrativas (artículos 39 de la Carta Fundamental y 124 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública); el principio del juez regular (artículo 35 de la Constitución Política), el principio de irretroactividad de la ley (artículo 34 de la Constitución Política), el de prohibición de sanciones degradantes o confiscatorias (artículo 40 constitucional) y la prohibición de un doble juzgamiento por los mismos hechos (artículo 42 de la Carta Fundamental). La vinculación de esta garantía tiene tal relevancia en el ámbito sancionador administrativo que su inobservancia produce la nulidad de todas las actuaciones procesales y decisiones adoptadas, tanto por el órgano director como el decisorio, como lo señaló la Sala Constitucional en sus sentencias 3433-93 y 5516-96.

b.) En concordancia con lo anterior, cabe recordar que el procedimiento administrativo tiene principios propios que orientan la actividad procesal, como lo señaló también la Sala Constitucional en la sentencia número 2004-13140, de las catorce horas treinta y siete minutos del doce de noviembre del dos mil tres. Para el caso, resulta de aplicación el principio de la celeridad y oficiosidad (vinculado con otros principios de los procedimientos administrativos, tales como la búsqueda de la verdad real y antiformalismo o informalismo), que comporta un poder-deber de los órganos director y decisorio para compulsar la tramitación del procedimiento a su resolución por el fondo, que conforme a lo dispuesto en los artículo 222.1 y 225 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se constituye en obligación para la Administración el instar o impulsar el procedimiento en forma oficiosa, es decir, sin requerir gestión de las partes, a fin de que el procedimiento sea lo más expedito y eficaz posible, es decir, que se tramite sin dilaciones indebidas para las partes. Esta oficiosidad también se manifiesta en la forma en que puede iniciarse el procedimiento, no sólo a instancia de parte, sino también de oficio, a efecto de que se verifique sobre la posible infracción del ordenamiento (en este caso, de deberes atinentes al correcto ejercicio de una actividad profesional). Se trata de la debida resolución, con el respeto del ordenamiento y de los derechos subjetivos e intereses del administrado; lo cual resulta acorde con los principios de economía y eficacia procesal, además del principio de razonabilidad constitucional, lo que lleva a sancionar una inactividad procesal con la caducidad, en los términos en que está previsto los artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, norma que fue reformada por el canon 200 inciso 10) del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo en los siguientes términos:

"1) Cuando el procedimiento se paralice por más de seis meses en virtud de causa, imputable exclusivamente al interesado que lo haya promovido o a la Administración que lo haya iniciado, de oficio o por denuncia, se producirá la caducidad y se ordenará su archivo, a menos que se trate del caso previsto en el párrafo final del artículo 339 de este Código.

• 2)No procederá la caducidad del procedimiento iniciado a gestión de parte, cuando el interesado haya dejado de gestionar por haberse operado el silencio positivo o negativo, o cuando el expediente se encuentre listo para dictar el acto final.
• 3)La caducidad del procedimiento administrativo no extingue el derecho de las partes; pero los procedimientos se tienen por no seguidos, para los efectos de interrumpir la prescripción." (Reforma vigente a partir del primero de enero del año dos mil ocho.)

Ahora bien, se advierte que en aras de promover un proceso célere, ello no puede poner en entredicho o menoscabar las garantías que conforman el debido proceso, como sería, el no motivar debidamente la resolución por la falta de la realización de pericias, comparecencias, o alguna probanza de importancia; o el no respetar los plazos establecidos para la formulación de recursos; o la omisión de la celebración de la audiencia oral y privada. En cuanto al instituto de la caducidad previsto en la norma legal transcrita, se justifica como un medio de evitar la prolongación excesiva de los procedimientos, en aras de la seguridad jurídica, así como en la necesidad de garantizar la continuidad y eficiencia de la actividad administrativa. Resulta inviable cuando el asunto se encuentre listo para el dictado del acto final y de igual suerte, resulta inocuo cuando ya se dictó ese acto final. Para que opere, según lo establece la norma aludida, la caducidad requiere de los siguientes presupuestos: primero: que el asunto haya ingresado en un estado de abandono procesal, esto es, una inactividad; segundo, que dicho estancamiento sea producto de causas imputables al administrado, cuando haya iniciado a gestión de parte, o bien de la Administración, si fue instaurado de oficio; y tercero, que ese estado se haya mantenido por un espacio de más de seis meses, plazo que se constituye en límite temporal mínimo de inercia, ergo, debe computarse desde la última acción dentro del expediente y no desde la apertura del procedimiento. Ello supone que en los procedimientos sancionatorios o de posible afectación de derechos instruidos de oficio, la caducidad es factible cuando concurran los indicados elementos. Sobre esta figura, recientemente, la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, en el fallo 34-F-S1-2011 señaló en lo medular sobre el instituto de comentario consideró:

"En primer término, se puede observar que la norma recién transcrita se encuentra redactada en forma imperativa, es decir, no regula una facultad; por el contrario, una vez cumplidos los presupuestos de hecho en ella contenidos, la consecuencia deviene en obligatoria para el órgano encargado de la tramitación. Esto implica que sus efectos se producen de pleno derecho, y por ende su reconocimiento tiene efectos meramente declarativos, no constitutivos. Vale aclarar que lo anterior no debe ser interpretado como una pérdida de competencia –la cual es, por definición, irrenunciable, intransmisible e imprescriptible según el numeral 66 LGAP-, sino, únicamente, como la imposibilidad de continuar con la tramitación del procedimiento específico en el que se produjo la inercia." Empero, los efectos procedimentales de la caducidad requieren que se haya gestionado dentro del procedimiento para ponerle fin. De la doctrina del canon 59 en relación al 66, ambos de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, las competencias públicas se otorgan para ser ejercitadas. Solo en los supuestos en que el legislador de manera expresa disponga un fenecimiento de esa competencia por factores temporales, el órgano público se encuentra imposibilitado de actuar. Por regla general, las competencias no se extinguen por el transcurso del plazo señalado para ejercerlas. La excepción a esta regla la contempla el mismo ordinal cuando indica que habrá una limitación de la competencia por razón del tiempo cuando expresamente el legislador disponga que su existencia o ejercicio esté sujeto a condiciones o términos de extinción. En este sentido, el precepto 329 ibídem señala con toda contundencia que el acto dictado fuera de plazo es válido para todo efecto legal, salvo disposición expresa de ley, lo que aquí no ocurre. Resulta claro que la caducidad es una forma anticipada de terminar el procedimiento; que la propia Ley de referencia denomina como mecanismo anormal y que como tal, debe decretarse para generar ese efecto de cierre, dentro del procedimiento administrativo; por ende, mientras no se disponga o al menos, no se haya solicitado, no produce esa consecuencia procedimental.

c.) Se parte del carácter "principista" y "complementariedad" de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, inspirado en los más altos valores del Derecho de la Constitución y del Derecho Administrativo, favorable al administrado, en tanto hace efectivo el ejercicio pleno de la Justicia Administrativa y el principio de la seguridad jurídica, en tanto no obstante existir materias y procedimientos que por mandato legal -artículo 367 de la misma Ley de referencia- y determinados por Decreto Ejecutivo -8979-P y 9469-P- tienen una regulación específica y particular, es lo cierto que en aplicación del mandato legal del numeral 9 de la Ley General de referencia, no puede obviarse la aplicación a todos ellos, de la jurisprudencia, los principios y valores propios del Derecho Administrativo. Es innegable que el instituto de la caducidad de los procedimientos es propio e integrante del Derecho Administrativo. Además, es lo cierto que una correcta ponderación de la situación obliga al aplicador del Derecho -tanto en sede administrativa como al Juez- a interpretar las normas, principios y valores "en la forma que mejor garantice la realización del fin público a que se dirige, dentro del respeto a los derechos e intereses del particular" (artículo 10.1 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), lo que en este caso, obliga al respeto de las formas e elementos integrantes del debido proceso; que es lo propio en un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho.

d.) No es aceptable la propuesta de la accionada de que, por no regularse de manera expresa el instituto de la caducidad de los procedimientos administrativos seguidos por el IDA en el Reglamento para la Selección y Asignación de Solicitantes de Tierras, no resulte aplicable esta figura. Teniendo claro que la determinación de los procedimientos administrativos es materia reservada a la ley -teoría de la regulación de los derechos fundamentales, como corolario necesario del principio de la libertad, que deriva del artículo 28 de la Carta Fundamental, según desarrollo jurisprudencial de la propia Sala Constitucional (entre otras, se pueden consultar las sentencias número 3550-92, de las dieciséis horas del veinticuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa y dos, número 03173-93, de las catorce horas cincuenta y siete minutos del seis de julio de mil, 2175-96, de las nueve horas seis minutos del diez de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y seis novecientos noventa y tres)-; obviamente prevalece la regulación legal frente a la norma reglamentaria. En todo caso, como se indicó anteriormente, ante laguna o vacío normativo, se debe hacer una interpretación integrativa del Derecho, en este caso, primero en la rama del Público (Constitucional-Administrativo). Pero además es importante considerar -como ya se indicó en los precedentes supra citados- que el propio reglamento del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario para este tipo de situaciones y vigente al momento de los hechos que se analiza, sí remite a los principios del Derecho Administrativo, en los numerales 3 y 101; de donde no resulta posible la excepción de esta figura. Finalmente, no puede obviarse lo dispuesto en el numeral 364 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, que, cabalmente dispone de la "prevalencia" de sus principios y normas, "sobre los de cualesquiera otras disposiciones de rango igual o menor", los cuales establece como "criterios de interpretación de todo el ordenamiento jurídico administrativo del país." e.) Finalmente, cabe señalar que no obstante que los precedentes citados de este Tribunal estén siendo objeto de los respectivos recursos de Casación ante la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia -según consulta efectuada al sistema de gestión de expedientes de esta Jurisdicción– ello no desmerita la decisión que ahora se adopta, en tanto, a la fecha no ha sido desvirtuado por ese Alto Tribunal, existiendo elementos objetivos para reafirmar el criterio de aplicación del instituto de la caducidad como mecanismo anormal de terminal del procedimiento, por inactividad que se constate en cada caso en particular, en un lapso superior a los seis meses, tal y como lo dispone el ordinal 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública.

VI.- Determinado como quedó la aplicación del instituto de la caducidad al procedimiento administrativo seguido contra Nombre142925 , procede analizarse el segundo punto traído a este proceso, esto es, si se produjo o no esa inactividad de los seis meses que prevé la figura. Revisados los autos, se debe aclarar que incurre en un error el actor, al considerar que el procedimiento tiene más de siete años inactivo. En efecto, no resulta posible considerar que se haya iniciado el mismo desde el año dos mil cuatro, como se afirma. Es lo cierto que en el expediente administrativo rolan varias resoluciones con hora y fecha determinada y contenido de acto de apertura del procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título del aquí actor, a saber las resoluciones de las catorce horas del diez de mayo del dos mil cuatro; de las nueve horas cinco minutos del primero de junio del dos mil nueve, y de las de las nueve horas cinco minutos del cuatro de junio del dos mil nueve, todas, del órgano director del procedimiento administrativo; sin embargo, ninguna de ellas le fue notificada al interesado, motivo por el cual, carecen de eficacia. Además es evidente que la Administración, previo a la apertura del procedimiento, realizó sendos estudios de campo y de la situación jurídica de la propiedad adjudicada (oficios ORS-1214-2002, del dos de diciembre del dos mil dos; ORS-007-03, del ocho de enero del dos mil tres; Informe técnico; ORS-003-2005, del cuatro de enero del dos mil cinco; Memorándum DRHA-0925-2008, del dieciocho de julio del dos mil ocho; Identificacion237, del veinticinco de agosto del dos mil ocho; a folios 1 a 2, 4 a 5, 9, 22 a 27, 28, 30 a 31, respectivamente, todos del expediente administrativo), en los que consignó los motivos que dieron lugar a la apertura del procedimiento (que el adjudicado -señor Nombre142925 ) no ejerce la posesión sobre el bien, ni tiene residencia en el sitio, estando divida la misma en tres partes, que la misma está siendo explotada por terceras personas). Constan además dos amonestaciones que se le hizo a éste: la realizada por ORS-610-2003, del ocho de julio del dos mil tres, de la Oficina Sub-Regional de Siquirres del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notificada a las ocho horas del quince de julio del dos mil tres al actor (folio 6 del expediente administrativo); y la contenida en el oficio ORS 910-04, de la Oficina Sub-Regional de Siquirres del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, notificada a las "2:35 p.m." del veintisiete de octubre del dos mil cuatro, se notificó a Nombre142928 (quien "cuida la parcela") (folios 17 y 18 del expediente administrativo). Es hasta el seis de agosto del dos mil nueve, en que se dictó resolución de las catorce horas diez minutos (folios 76 y 77 del expediente administrativo), que es el acto de apertura de este procedimiento administrativo, el cual se ordenó notificar por edicto, ante el desconocimiento del domicilio del administrado (constancia a folio 65 del expediente administrativo). A partir de ese momento se inició la actividad del procedimiento, en el cual se verificaron las siguientes actuaciones. Los edictos ordenados para notificarle al actor de la apertura del procedimiento seguido en su contra (ante el desconocimiento de su domicilio) se publicaron en La Gaceta, en los números 178 y 179 del once y catorce de setiembre del dos mil nueve (folios 69 y 70 del expediente administrativo). Asimismo, previo a ello, por resolución de las quince horas del doce de agosto anterior (dos mil nueve), el Órgano Director del procedimiento envió el mandamiento al Registro Público de la Propiedad para la correspondiente anotación y mantenimiento de las limitaciones de la Ley 2825 (folios 82 a 83 del expediente administrativo); presentandose la gestión ante el Registro a las once horas treinta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de agosto siguiente, con las citas 2009-213876-001 (información registral a folios 85 y 86 del expediente administrativo). Se tuvo como parte de ese procedimiento a los poseedores de la parcela adjudicada -según convenio de compraventa privado- a saber, Nombre142926 , Nombre100352 y a Nombre142927 , mediante resolución de las trece horas ocho minutos del veintiuno de setiembre del dos mil nueve, a los que se les convocó para la audiencia de las ocho horas treinta minutos del veintisiete de octubre siguiente; decisión que les fue notificada en lo personal ese mismo día (folios 71 y 74 del expediente administrativo). Asimismo, el dieciocho de setiembre del dos mil nueve, se apersonó al procedimiento el aquí accionante, oportunidad en la que señaló lugar para recibir notificaciones (folios 73 y 74 del expediente administrativo). Posterior a ello, el trece de octubre del dos mil nueve, en escrito con fecha del nueve de octubre del dos mil diez, se apersonó al procedimiento el abogado Nombre71606 , actuando en representación de Nombre142925 , Nombre142926 y Nombre100352 , para lo cual aportó un poder especial administrativo, alegando la falta de la competencia del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario para iniciar ese procedimiento, por caducidad del mismo por haber iniciado desde el año dos mil cuatro, y por tratarse de la afectación de derecho de propiedad, y que el origen de esa adjudicación lo fue el programa de Fodesaf, a cargo del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social, y que se encuentra vencido el plazo de los quince años dispuestos en la ley 2825 de afectación de la propiedad; manifestaciones al tenor de lo cual pidió la suspensión de la audiencia prevista para el veintisiete de ese mes y año (memorial a folios 95 a 99 del expediente administrativo y 10 a 14 del judicial; poder a folio 100 del expediente administrativo). El veinte de octubre del dos mil nueve, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, formuló nulidad de las actuaciones y resoluciones, alegando que no existe la normativa que se le intenta aplicar y que no se han hecho las respectivas amonestaciones (folios 87 a 89 del expediente administrativo y 7 a 9 del expediente judicial); y nuevamente, el veintiséis de octubre del dos mil nueve, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, contestó la audiencia concedida y formula conclusiones (folios 91 a 93 del expediente administrativo y 15 a 17 del judicial). El veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve, el Órgano Director del Procedimiento, puso constancia de la no realización de la audiencia convocada, por inasistencia de las partes, lo que hizo constar con firma de otros funcionarios municipales (folio 75 del expediente administrativo). Nuevamente, el veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, solicitó la caducidad del procedimiento en aplicación del numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública (folios 107 a 109 del expediente administrativo y 18 a 19 del judicial. Las gestiones de los investigados fueron parcialmente atendidas, hasta el once de mayo del dos mil diez, en que, por acuerdo del artículo 17, de la sesión ordinaria número 017-2010, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, remitió el asunto a la Asesoría Legal de la Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica para que emitiera resolución recomendativa sobre la gestión formulada (folio 20 del expediente judicial); gestión que fue rechazada finalmente, hasta el cinco de julio siguiente (dos mil diez), por acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 78 de la sesión ordinaria número 020-2010; decisión que fue notificada mediante fax hasta el dieciséis de julio siguiente al abogado Nombre71606 por oficio JD-0605-2010 (acuerdo a folios 21 a 22 del expediente judicial; oficio DAJ-423-2010, a folios 109 a 112; notificación a folio 23 del expediente judicial. Contra la decisión anterior, el veinte de julio del dos mil diez, el abogado Nombre71606 , en la condición indicada, formuló recurso de apelación para ante el Tribunal Agrario (folios 24 a 33 del expediente judicial); ante lo cual, por acuerdo adoptado en el artículo 14, de la sesión ordinaria número 023-2010, del veintiséis de julio del dos mil diez, la Junta Directiva del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario remitió a la Dirección de Asuntos Jurídicos el recurso de apelación, para que brindara recomendación de resolución; lo que se puso en conocimiento del interesado mediante fax, por oficio JD-0678-2010, del doce de agosto siguiente (folios 34 y 35 del expediente judicial). Se repite, que no existe constancia de que dicha apelación haya sido resuelta. De lo reseñado, resulta evidente para este Tribunal que existe inactividad en el procedimiento de revocatoria de la adjudicación y nulidad del título de propiedad que se siguiera en expediente administrativo 240-m ante la Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, por culpa exclusiva atinente a la accionada. Aclarado que el procedimiento se inició con la resolución de las catorce horas diez minutos del siete de agosto del dos mil nueve, sí se observa una inercia ocurrida, desde el veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve (en que el Órgano Director del Procedimiento puso la constancia de la no realización de la audiencia oral y privada ante la inasistencia de los investigados), al cinco de julio del dos mil diez, en que la Junta Directiva rechazó de la caducidad aducida; decisión que en todo caso, surte efectos hasta su notificación, lo que ocurrió hasta el dieciséis de ese mes y año; todo ello, en un lapso de ocho meses dieciocho días. Cabe considerar que, la remisión de la gestión de caducidad a la Asesoría Legal de la Dirección Región Huetar Atlántica, no tiene la virtud de compeler a la prosecución efectiva del procedimiento, en un doble sentido, primero, porque desde el veintiocho de abril del año dos mil diez, se cumplió el plazo fatal de los seis meses dispuesto en el transcrito numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, lo que hace, que cualquier actuación futura sea nula, por haber operado la caducidad del procedimiento, y además, porque es evidente que, en sí misma, no impulsa el procedimiento hacia su efectiva conclusión. Resulta necesario advertir además, que en este caso, existen gestiones formuladas por los investigados, pendientes de resolver, en la que incluso se pretendía la suspensión de la realización de la audiencia oral y publica, prevista para el veintisiete de octubre del dos mil nueve, siendo que a la fecha, tal y como lo alega el actor, no existe constancia de que se haya resuelto la apelación formulada contra el rechazo de la caducidad aducida; lo que provoca que el procedimiento no esté listo para el dictado del acto final. Al tenor de lo cual, siendo evidente que la aplicabilidad del referido mecanismo de terminación del procedimiento deriva del hecho de que los trámites hayan estado paralizados por causa exclusivamente imputable –en este caso– a la Administración que lo inició, durante más de seis meses, ello se cumple a cabalidad en este caso, según se ha explicado. La parálisis de los trámites resulta exclusivamente atribuible a la Administración, sin que sea posible esgrimir que los recursos y defensas opuestas son extensos y/o excesivos, toda vez que los mismos son ejercidos conforme a las previsiones del ordenamiento jurídico, existiendo más bien obligación de parte de la Administración de su debida resolución. Más bien se evidencia un total abandono de tramitar y estudiar de la debida forma este asunto, que por inercia -por no existir explicación alguna que justifique esta situación-, se dejó inactivo. Es evidente que, desde el veintiocho de abril del dos mil diez, cuando se insiste en la solicitud de la declaratoria de caducidad, ésta resultaba procedente, por vencer ese día, el plazo fatal de los seis meses dispuesto en el numeral 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública. Cualquier actuación posterior, es dictada fuera de término, razón por la cual, todo lo actuado a partir de esa fecha es nulo, en tanto no tiene la virtud de modificar la situación derivada del acaecimiento del plazo de caducidad en este caso, más aún si se toma en consideración que el procedimiento no se encuentra listo para el dictado del acto final (inciso 2 del artículo 340 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública), toda vez que existen pendientes varias cuestiones previas, impugnaciones que imposibilitaban la realización de la audiencia preliminar, al implicar el cuestionamiento del acto de apertura del procedimiento. Así las cosas, este Tribunal concurre con la parte actora en el sentido de que debe acogerse la pretensión formulada, declarando caduco el procedimiento tramitado ante la Dirección17342 , en expediente 240-m, seguido contra Nombre142925 , Nombre142926 , Nombre100352 y Nombre142927 , el cual deberá ser archivado. Y puesto que la consecuencia de este medio de terminación anormal es que los procedimientos se tengan por no seguidos (artículo 340.3 de la citada LGAP), esto impone indefectiblemente también la necesidad de levantar el mandamiento ("exhorto”) de anotación en la finca con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, del Partido de Limón, que remitió el Órgano Director del procedimiento mediante resolución de las quince horas del doce de agosto del dos mil nueve al Registro Público de la Propiedad, que fuera enviado a las once horas treinta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de agosto siguiente, correspondiendo a las citas número 2009-213876-001, lo cual se dispone ordenar mediante mandamiento que se expedirá tan pronto quede firme esta sentencia.

VIII.- CONCLUSIÓN.- Así las cosas, debe acogerse la demanda interpuesta, en los términos que de seguido se indica, siguiendo el orden de las pretensiones fijadas: 1.) Se debe declarar que el procedimiento que se tramita en expediente 240-M de la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Jurídica de la Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica del Instituto demandado, está caduco de conformidad con la Ley General de la Administrativa Pública, por haber transcurrido de sobra el plazo de seis meses sin que se hubiere instado su prosecución conforme lo dispone la ley. En consecuencia de lo anterior, se ordena levantar o cancelar el Exhorto de anotación de proceso que remitió el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en resolución de las quince horas del doce de agosto del dos mil nueve, dirigido al Director del Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble y anotado bajo la finca con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, del Partido de Limón, correspondiendo a las citas de presentación 2009-213876-001, de las once horas treinta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de agosto del dos mil nueve. Una vez firme la sentencia, debe expedirse mandamiento al Registro ordenando levantar la citada anotación; 2.) Se debe declarar que esa caducidad se ha producido por culpa imputable al Instituto; y, 3.) Se debe declarar que es infundado e ilegal el criterio emitido por la Junta Directiva en cuanto resuelve que en los procedimientos referidos a revocación o extinción de derechos como beneficiarios no se aplica la Ley General de la Administración Pública y que por consiguiente no se aplica el instituto de la caducidad. Asimismo, se advierte que en la contestación de la demanda, el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario solicita una serie de pronunciamientos, sin que en modo alguno se constituya en contrademanda; pero que en todo caso, por su contenido se observa que son la antítesis de las pretensiones de los actores, por lo que, obviamente se debe entender resueltas en sentido contrario de lo declarado.

IX.- DE LOS PRESUPUESTOS DE FONDO DE LA DEMANDA Y LA EXCEPCIÓN DE FALTA DE DERECHO OPUESTA POR LA INSTITUCIÓN ACCIONADA.- La representación del Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario se opuso a la demanda en su contestación, y a tal efecto, solicitó que se declarase sin lugar en todos sus extremos, para lo cual formuló únicamente la excepción de falta de derecho. No obstante lo anterior, es lo cierto que tanto la doctrina procesal como la jurisprudencia (en este sentido, puede consultarse la sentencia de casación 34-1961, de las diez horas veinte minutos del veintidós de marzo de mil novecientos sesenta y uno) reconocen como presupuestos sustanciales para el dictado de toda sentencia, los relativos a la legitimación de las partes intervinientes, el interés en la resolución del conflicto y el derecho; los cuales son revisables aún de oficio por el juzgador. En el caso en estudio, es lo cierto que hay legitimación, tanto activa como pasiva, en tanto se pretende la declaratoria de caducidad del procedimiento administrativo de revocatoria de la adjudicación de parcela y consecuente nulidad del título de propiedad, abierto por la institución demandada contra el aquí actor. Asimismo, también es evidente que el tema en discusión reviste interés actual para la sociedad actora, en tanto está en trámite dicho procedimiento administrativo. Y por último, es con fundamento en las consideraciones dadas en esta decisión, que se determina la procedencia de la demanda interpuesta, al asistirle derecho al actor en su acción, lo que obliga al rechazo de la excepción de falta de derecho.

X.- DE LAS COSTAS.- De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, no encuentra este órgano colegiado motivo para aplicar las excepciones que fija la normativa aplicable y quebrar el postulado de condena al vencido. Por ende, se impone la condenatoria en costas al Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario.

POR TANTO:

Se rechaza la excepción de falta de derecho opuesta por el demandado. En consecuencia, se declara con lugar la demanda interpuesta por Nombre142925 contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario, por lo que se hacen los siguientes pronunciamientos:

1.) Se declara que el procedimiento que se tramita en expediente 240-M de la Asesoría Jurídica de la Dirección Jurídica de la Dirección de la Región Huetar Atlántica del Instituto demandado, está caduco de conformidad con la Ley General de la Administrativa Pública, por haber transcurrido de sobra el plazo de seis meses sin que se hubiere instado su prosecución conforme lo dispone la ley. En consecuencia de lo anterior, se ordena levantar o cancelar el Exhorto de anotación de proceso que remitió el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario que remitió el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario en resolución de las quince horas del doce de agosto del dos mil nueve, dirigido al Director del Registro Público de la Propiedad Inmueble y anotado bajo la finca con matrícula de folio real número Placa28125, del Partido de Limón, correspondiendo a las citas de presentación 2009-213876-001, de las once horas treinta y cuatro minutos del diecisiete de agosto del dos mil nueve. Una vez firme la sentencia, debe expedirse mandamiento al Registro ordenando levantar la citada anotación; 2.) Se declara que esa caducidad se ha producido por culpa imputable al Instituto; 3.) Se declara que es infundado e ilegal el criterio emitido por la Junta Directiva en cuanto resuelve que en los procedimientos referidos a revocación o extinción de derechos como beneficiarios no se aplica la Ley General de la Administración Pública y que por consiguiente no se aplica el instituto de la caducidad; 4.) Son ambas costas a cargo del ente demandado.

Silvia Consuelo Fernández Brenes Roberto Garita Navarro Christian Hess Araya Proceso Contencioso Administrativo declarado de puro derecho Nombre142925 contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario