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Res. 03787-2025 Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V · 22/04/2025
OutcomeResultado
The lawsuit is dismissed; the claim of administrative lapse is rejected and the revocation of the allocation is not annulled; the plaintiffs failed to refute the charges of abandonment, illegal sale, and damage to natural resources.Se declara sin lugar la demanda, se rechaza la caducidad y no se anula la revocatoria de adjudicación; los actores no lograron desvirtuar los cargos de abandono, venta ilegal y daño a recursos naturales.
SummaryResumen
The Administrative Appeals Court Section V denied the lawsuit filed by José Torres Cerdas and María Ester Alvarado Alvarado against INDER, which sought the expiration of the revocation procedure for the allocation of parcel No. 28 in the Altamira Settlement, Upala, as well as the annulment of related administrative and judicial acts and the transfer of ownership. The Court found that administrative lapse did not occur because the procedure was not paralyzed for more than six months due to the administration's fault; rather, upon discovering new facts—illegal sale of part of the parcel and repeated breaches of natural resource conservation rules—it was correctly restarted with expanded charges. It considered unjustified abandonment, unauthorized partial sale, and illegal logging within the Miravalles Protected Zone to be proven, so the revocation complied with Articles 67 and 68 of the Land and Colonization Law (Law 2825). Claims for damages were rejected, with plaintiffs' lack of right declared and costs imposed on them.El Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V resolvió sin lugar la demanda interpuesta por los señores José Torres Cerdas y María Ester Alvarado Alvarado contra el INDER, en la que solicitaban la caducidad del procedimiento de revocatoria de adjudicación de la parcela N° 28 del Asentamiento Altamira, Upala, así como la nulidad de los actos administrativos y judiciales relacionados y el traspaso de la propiedad. El Tribunal determinó que no operó la caducidad administrativa porque el procedimiento no estuvo paralizado por más de seis meses por causa imputable a la administración, sino que tras detectarse nuevos hechos —venta ilegal de parte de la parcela y faltas a la conservación de recursos naturales— se reinició correctamente con ampliación de cargos. Consideró probado el abandono injustificado, la venta parcial sin autorización y la tala ilegal de árboles dentro de la Zona Protectora Miravalles, por lo que la revocatoria fue conforme a los artículos 67 y 68 de la Ley de Tierras y Colonización (Ley 2825). Se rechazaron las pretensiones de daños y perjuicios, declarándose la falta de derecho de los actores y condenándolos al pago de ambas costas.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Thus, from the summarized analysis of what happened in the administrative procedure (which can be seen in its entirety in the facts deemed proven in this judgment), this Court finds no period equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was paralyzed attributable to the Administration, since, as has been determined, the IDA, now INDER, was quite diligent in its actions; therefore, given the lack of precision regarding the exact moment the plaintiff considers the violation occurred to apply Article 340 of the LGAP, and since, as indicated, it was necessary to restart the procedure due to the emergence of a subsequent and controversial fact attributable to the investigated party themselves, which warranted expanding the charges, this was done respecting the constitutional guarantee of due process under Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution and the reiterated case law beginning with Judgment No. 15-90 of the Constitutional Court. In this case, no omission or delay attributable to the administration is noted, much less the possibility of applying the administrative lapse doctrine, as it has not been conclusively determined that there was a period equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was halted. Nor is the plaintiff's argument acceptable, which seeks to count a single period from 2009 (start of the first procedure) until 2013, when the Administration resolved the situation of abandonment, misuse of natural resources, and illegal disposal of the allocated property by final act, for this thesis fails because the proceedings begun in 2009 had to be set aside due to the act occurring in 2010, which is attributable to the allocatees themselves, who did not prove in the administrative or judicial forum that the sale made of part of an unregistered property they claimed to possess was not part of the land given to them by the IDA.Así las cosas, del análisis resumido de lo acontecido en el procedimiento administrativo (pero que se puede ver en su totalidad en los hechos tenidos por probados en esta sentencia), no encuentra este Tribunal espacio igual o superior a seis meses durante el cual estuviera paralizado el procedimiento que se le pueda achacar a la Administración, ya que, como se ha podido determinar, el IDA, hoy INDER, fue bastante diligente en su actuaciones, por lo que, ante la falta de precisión del momento exacto en que considera la parte actora se dio la violación para aplicar el artículo 340 de la LGAP, y siendo que, como se indicó, fue necesario iniciar nuevamente el procedimiento, ante el advenimiento de un hecho posterior y controversial de la propia parte investigada, que ameritaba la ampliación de la imputación, así se hizo con el respeto a la garantía constitucional del debido proceso derivado del artículo 39 y 41 de la Carta Magna y de la jurisprudencia reiterada iniciada con la sentencia número 15-90 de la jurisdicción constitucional. En la especie no se denota omisión o atraso que puede imputársele a la administración, ni mucho menos la posibilidad de aplicar el instituto de la caducidad administrativa, pues no se ha podido determinar fehacientemente que haya existido un lapso de tiempo igual o superior a seis meses que durante el mismo estuviera detenido el procedimiento. Tampoco es de recibo el argumento de la parte actora, la cual quiere contar un tiempo único desde el año dos mil nueve (inicio del primer procedimiento) y hasta el año dos mil trece, cuando se resolvió por acto final de la Administración la situación surgida de abandono, mal uso de recursos naturales y disposición ilegal del bien adjudicado, pues esa tesis cae al haberse tenido que dejar sin efecto lo iniciado en el año dos mil nueve, por el acto acaecido en el año dos mil diez, que es imputable a los mismos adjudicados, quienes no probaron ni en sede administrativa, ni en al jurisdiccional, que la venta realizada de parte de una propiedad sin inscribir que indicaron poseían, no fuera parte del terreno dado a ellos por parte del IDA.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"Así las cosas, del análisis resumido de lo acontecido en el procedimiento administrativo [...] no encuentra este Tribunal espacio igual o superior a seis meses durante el cual estuviera paralizado el procedimiento que se le pueda achacar a la Administración [...]"
"Thus, from the summarized analysis of what happened in the administrative procedure [...] this Court finds no period equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was paralyzed attributable to the Administration [...]"
Considerando VI, inciso B-1
"Así las cosas, del análisis resumido de lo acontecido en el procedimiento administrativo [...] no encuentra este Tribunal espacio igual o superior a seis meses durante el cual estuviera paralizado el procedimiento que se le pueda achacar a la Administración [...]"
Considerando VI, inciso B-1
"Por otra parte, en el artículo 68 se establece: [...] "Por falta reiterada a las normas legales para la conservación de los recursos naturales. Con excepción del caso b) y antes de la revocatoria o extinción del derecho, debe proceder una amonestación que no haya sido atendida por el adjudicatario"."
"Furthermore, Article 68 establishes: [...] 'For repeated failure to comply with legal rules for the conservation of natural resources. Except in case b) and prior to revocation or extinction of the right, a warning that has not been heeded by the allocatee must be given.'"
Considerando VI, inciso B-3
"Por otra parte, en el artículo 68 se establece: [...] "Por falta reiterada a las normas legales para la conservación de los recursos naturales. Con excepción del caso b) y antes de la revocatoria o extinción del derecho, debe proceder una amonestación que no haya sido atendida por el adjudicatario"."
Considerando VI, inciso B-3
"En la especie no se denota omisión o atraso que puede imputársele a la administración, ni mucho menos la posibilidad de aplicar el instituto de la caducidad administrativa, pues no se ha podido determinar fehacientemente que haya existido un lapso de tiempo igual o superior a seis meses que durante el mismo estuviera detenido el procedimiento."
"In this case, no omission or delay attributable to the administration is noted, much less the possibility of applying the administrative lapse doctrine, as it has not been conclusively determined that there was a period equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was halted."
Considerando VI, inciso B-1
"En la especie no se denota omisión o atraso que puede imputársele a la administración, ni mucho menos la posibilidad de aplicar el instituto de la caducidad administrativa, pues no se ha podido determinar fehacientemente que haya existido un lapso de tiempo igual o superior a seis meses que durante el mismo estuviera detenido el procedimiento."
Considerando VI, inciso B-1
"Se acoge la Falta de Derecho aducida por la parte demandada. Se declara SIN LUGAR la demanda incoada por el señor José Torres Cerdas y la señora María Ester Alvarado Alvarado contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER)."
"The Lack of Right asserted by the defendant is upheld. The lawsuit brought by Mr. José Torres Cerdas and Mrs. María Ester Alvarado Alvarado against the Rural Development Institute (INDER) is DISMISSED."
Por tanto
"Se acoge la Falta de Derecho aducida por la parte demandada. Se declara SIN LUGAR la demanda incoada por el señor José Torres Cerdas y la señora María Ester Alvarado Alvarado contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER)."
Por tanto
Full documentDocumento completo
CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:
JOSE TORRES CERDAS DEMANDADO/A:
INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL No. 2025003787 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN QUINTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, at seventeen hours and twenty-one minutes on the twenty-second of April of two thousand twenty-five.- Proceso de conocimiento filed by JOSÉ TORRES CERDAS, of legal age, farmer, holder of residence card 270-118001-52586, and MARÍA ESTER ALVARADO ALVARADO, of legal age, homemaker, identity card number 5-0106-0678, both spouses and residents of Bijagua, Upala, Alajuela, Asentamiento Altamira II, represented by Rodrigo Johanning Quesada (see special judicial power of attorney at image 504 of the digital judicial file), AGAINST the INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO (INDER), represented by Diana Elena Alfaro Montenegro (special judicial power of attorney appearing at image 632 of the digital judicial file). Additionally, the State appears as an Interested Third Party, represented by Procuradora Mariamalia Murillo Kopper (appearing in the record at image 432), and the Sistema de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), represented by Gidgett Ramírez Hernández (power of attorney appearing at images 427 and 496).
RESULTANDO:
Judge Giusti Soto drafts the opinion with the affirmative vote of Judge Álvarez Molina and Judge Mena García;
CONSIDERANDO.
I.Proven facts. The following are of relevance for the purposes of this proceeding:
Summoning the parties to appear on September 22, 2011, making the applicable warnings, including the notice that a motion for reconsideration (recuso de revocatoria) could be filed against said act. At the foot of said documents appear the signatures of Messrs. Torres and Alvarado, acknowledging receipt of the respective notification on August 26, 2011 (Folios 84 and 86 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Proceeding conducted by INDER for the revocation of the award of parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement).
II.Facts not proven. Relevant to the purposes of this process are the following:
III.Object of the process. Upon analyzing the arguments and petitions of the parties involved in this conflict, it is determined as a mixed process, in which the declaration of Expiry (Caducidad) is requested, as well as several nullities within the administrative proceeding followed against the plaintiffs. Furthermore, it is requested to order INDER to transfer ownership of the disputed parcel to the name of the plaintiffs. And, a ruling for damages (daños y perjuicios).
IV.Arguments. The Plaintiff party alleges that they have been possessors for over 20 years of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira Peasant Settlement (Asentamiento Campesino), II stage, located in Bijagua, Upala, Alajuela. It measures 13 hectares, 6,109.75 meters. They state that the parcel was awarded to them by the IDA by agreement of its Board of Directors No. 15, article XV, session No. 002-00 of January 5, 2000. That on the property they have developed agriculture of beans, corn, and plantain, as well as dual-purpose cattle raising, for which they have planted pasture of the Breachiara, Brizantha, and Mombaza species. That on January 15, 2008, in official letter OSU-624-2008, the IDA office of the Huetar Norte region initiated a proceeding for the revocation of the award of the parcel they occupy. They indicate that they had already been given a warning on October 21, 2008. And on June 23, 2009, they were notified of the resolution transferring the charges (traslado de cargos) of the proceeding, given that between the warning and the transfer of charges, the administrative file was inactive for 8 months.
That on July 31, 2009, the evidence was received. And there was no final resolution until October 14, 2013. And, they argue, that while that proceeding was in process, on August 28, 2011, they were again notified of the transfer of charges to revoke the same parcel, resuming the same grounds of unjustified abandonment and repeated failure to comply with the legal norms for the conservation of natural resources, that evidence is again received on September 22, 2011; nonetheless, it is again scheduled to receive evidence on January 24, 2013, for evidence offered by the IDA that had not been provided on the previous occasion. That on August 16, 2013, by agreement of the Board of Directors, article 35, ordinary session 023-213 of June 24, 2013, the final resolution of 1:00 p.m. on August 16, 2013, was issued in administrative file No. 495-09, which was notified on October 14, 2013, via fax, that is, more than eight months after initiating the proceeding, so they consider that expiry operates.
On October 22, 2013, they filed an appeal by improper hierarchy against the final resolution, which the Agrarian Court of the second judicial circuit of San José, in Ruling No. 1211-F-2013 of December 20, 2013, rejected as untimely, which they consider was resolved contrary to law, since the calculation of the five-day period they had to file the appeal was performed incorrectly, since the final resolution was notified on October 14, 2013, via fax, so it was considered notified the following day, and the period began on Wednesday, October 16, therefore, they did file the appeal within the period, and the rejection left them defenseless. That in the final resolution of the IDA, errors were made: a) the proceeding began in violation of article 68, point 4, subparagraph b) of the Land and Colonization Law (ley de Tierras y Colonización). b) Among the facts taken as proven, the effective possession they have had of the parcel with their agricultural and livestock activity was accredited, even mentioning several inspections by MINAET, which indicated that the parcel had 90% forest land, which they consider a very biased assessment due to interests in the land. In addition, a supposed partial sale of the parcel was taken as proven, which is not true, since the sale was of another lot.
V.For its part, the Defendant INDER denies that the plaintiffs are possessors, since in an inspection carried out by the Upala office in February 2010, they determined that the planting of beans on approximately 2 hectares had been done by Marvin Jiménez Salazar. Later, during a site inspection by the head of the subregional office, an illegal sale was verified since they found a surveyor and two persons who indicated they had bought two hectares of parcel No. 28 from Mr. José Torres. That in their statements in the administrative venue, Mr. Torres indicated that he went to the parcel occasionally, coupled with the fact that in inspections it was determined that the crops belonged to third parties and that by September 11, 2014, no crops or pastures were observed, only cattle that belonged to a neighbor. That on December 16, two thousand eight, the proceeding for revocation of parcel 28 was initiated, which led to a warning and transfer of charges, that the file was inactive, a time that does not count, since the proceeding was rectified by annulling all previous resolutions to commence another proceeding, adding two more grounds: illegal sale and abandonment of natural resources, without any violation of due process having occurred.
They deny that expiry has operated, since the investigation began in 2008, but the file remained active with hearings, inspections, and investigations that have had to do with the seriousness of the case, such as the felling of trees in a protective zone that led Mr. Torres to criminal proceedings. They even indicate that the administrative proceeding was delayed because the plaintiffs requested evidence, were summoned, but then requested the postponement of the date. They allude that possession has not been effective, since the parcel has been worked and produced by other persons. Even when the first report was made, the total abandonment of the parcel was determined. That only a shed (galera) for a supposed tourism project that never materialized was built. That according to Minae, the land is located within the boundaries of the Miravalles protective zone (zona protectora Miravalles), decreed as such since 1991 according to decree 20172-MINAE, in which the parcel was classified as 90% native forest with species typical of the zone. It indicates that the land must be transferred to MINAE to consolidate the State Natural Heritage, as since September 2014 the lands have been safeguarded by that institution.
VI.On the merits. A) Initial clarification. Although the defendant party, and to a greater degree the interested institutions without their own claims, made emphatic mention of the issue that the property discussed here, being parcel No. 28 of the Altamira II Settlement, located in Bijagua de Upala, Alajuela province, relates to the topic of State Natural Heritage (PNE), since they insisted that since before being awarded to the plaintiffs here, said property was included within the Miravalles Protected Area (Decreto Ejecutivo No. 20172-MINAE) and that therefore, in application of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) it should have been transferred to the institution in charge of conserving natural resources, the truth is that, as indicated, none of the third parties that have participated in this litigation arranged any claim on behalf of their represented entities, nor did the object of the lawsuit determine a request in this regard, thus, with respect to this aspect, although argued, it will not be taken into account to resolve the issue before us, due to its disconnection from the course that must be followed in a claim for declaratory judgment in this contentious-administrative jurisdiction.
Later, a report was received derived from an inspection carried out on July eleventh, two thousand nine, issued by the person in charge of the Miravalles Protective Zone (Zona Protectora Miravalles) of the Ministry of Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía), in which an alarm was raised regarding possible incursions into the protective zone and tree felling on the parcel in question (Proven Fact Eight), which was confirmed by an official of the IDA itself in an official letter dated January twenty-eighth, two thousand ten, in addition to describing the state of the parcel at that time (Folio 34 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)); as well as the report of the occasions on which Mr.
Torres had been referred to the Prosecutor's Office for tree-felling offenses, even evidence was had in the administrative revocation file of the existence of an "Environmental Damage Appraisal" (Avalúo por daño ambiental) related to the land adjudicated to the plaintiffs herein (proven facts Ten and Eleven). Notwithstanding the normal course of the procedure up to that point, an event occurred that completely changed the landscape of the investigation, since it is recorded in the administrative records, public deed number One Hundred Eighty-Two, of Notary Mauricio Bolaños Delgado, dated February ninth, two thousand ten, in which appeared Messrs. José Torres Cerdas, María Ester Alvarado Alvarado, and José María Jiménez Valverde, the latter in his capacity as President of a company, at which time the former sold to the latter a lot located in the same locality of the Altamira Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira), of which the sellers claimed to be possessors without title (Folio 73 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)).
And it is that, as can be clearly denoted, that event changed the original conditions of the beginning of the procedure, since, as has been indicated, in it only the cause of abandonment of the adjudicated parcel was charged, according to the provisions of numeral 68 of the ITCO Law (Ley del ITCO), given that now, there was at stake, not only the aforementioned sale, but also the misuse of natural resources, aspects which, due to the reports mentioned above, made it necessary to subpoena regarding those new facts, for which the IDA at that time, made the decision to render void the admonishment previously applied and which had given rise to the commencement of the former procedure; and in its place, through official letter from the person in charge of the settlement and the Subregional Head of Upala of the IDA, No. OSU-175-2010 of May sixth, two thousand ten, addressed to Messrs. José Torres Cerdas and María Alvarado Alvarado, communicated to them that the previous admonishment was suppressed, that in that same act they were issuing another one now for the cause of article 87 of the same law Ley 2825, and reiterating that of article 68, subsection f), paragraph 4, see folio 57 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala).
With which, by August twenty-second, two thousand eleven, the Legal Department of the Huetar Norte Regional Office of the IDA, initiated an ordinary administrative revocation procedure for the adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira II Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira II), against Mr. José Torres Cerdas and María Ester Alvarado Alvarado, based on articles 67 and 68 paragraph 4, subsections b) and f) of Law No. 2825 (Folios 84 and 86 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)). That is to say, for this Tribunal, the situation supervened by the alleged sale of a part of the adjudicated land, that is, disposing of an asset that by law was not possible to do so, due to the legal limitations of these real estate properties that were adjudicated to peasant beneficiaries by the former IDA, precisely for an agricultural and livestock purpose, without, for a period of time (15 years), being able to dispose of the asset.
Coupled with reports that gave merit regarding the misuse of natural resources with the cutting of trees and encroachments on protection lands, aspects that, warranted the necessary extension of the imputation of charges, whether it is understood as a continuation of the procedure initiated in the year two thousand nine (thesis of the plaintiff), or a new one, the fact is that in the administrative procedural iter, nothing prevents, that, upon the emergence of new facts (See articles 221 and 306 of the LGAP), continuation is impeded, but with the necessary rectification; or the initiation of a new procedure, being, in the opinion of these adjudicators, based on what was carried out, that what occurred in the case was that latter situation, since, by rendering void the previous admonishment, and imposing another, based now on the new facts, gave rise to the emergence of another transfer of charges that occurred on August twenty-second, two thousand eleven (see proven fact 16), a procedural moment in which all the facts were subpoenaed, including the new one, the existing evidence in its entirety was mentioned, an opportunity for defense and access to the file was given.
Even, in this new procedure, contrary to what was alleged by the plaintiff, a hearing was held on September twenty-second, two thousand eleven, the evidence offered by the investigated parties was again received, given that on this occasion Mrs. Alvarado did declare, as well as Mr. Torres and other witnesses offered by the defense of the investigated parties, with the presence of their attorney at all times (Proven Fact 17). Subsequent to that, both the administration, and the defense itself of Mr. Torres and Mrs. Alvarado, requested more evidence (see proven facts 18 and 19), coupled with an inspection carried out by the directing body of the procedure in January of two thousand twelve (Folio 122 certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)).
Therefore, on October ninth, two thousand twelve, and February 7, 2013, respectively, the statements of the witness called ex officio, Mr. Wilberth Quesada Valverde, and the testimony of the declarant offered by the investigated party, Mr. Marvin Jiménez Salazar, were received (Proven Facts 21 and 22). Finally, the recommendation issued by the directing body was on May twenty-seventh, two thousand thirteen, and the final resolution of the procedure issued by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva), was on July twenty-fourth, two thousand thirteen. Thus, from the summarized analysis of what occurred in the administrative procedure (but which can be seen in its entirety in the facts taken as proven in this judgment), this Tribunal does not find any space equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was paralyzed that can be attributed to the Administration, since, as has been determined, the IDA, today INDER, was quite diligent in its actions, therefore, given the lack of precision of the exact moment in which the plaintiff considers the violation occurred to apply article 340 of the LGAP, and given that, as indicated, it was necessary to recommence the procedure, upon the advent of a subsequent and controversial event by the investigated party themselves, which warranted the extension of the imputation, it was done with respect to the constitutional guarantee of due process derived from articles 39 and 41 of the Magna Carta and from the reiterated jurisprudence initiated with judgment number 15-90 of the constitutional jurisdiction.
In the case at hand, no omission or delay that can be attributed to the administration is denoted, much less the possibility of applying the institute of administrative lapsing (caducidad administrativa), since it has not been reliably determined that there existed a time lapse equal to or greater than six months during which the procedure was halted. Neither is the argument of the plaintiff receivable, which seeks to count a single time from the year two thousand nine (start of the first procedure) until the year two thousand thirteen, when the situation arising from abandonment, misuse of natural resources, and illegal disposal of the adjudicated asset was resolved by a final act of the Administration, because that thesis falls apart since what was initiated in the year two thousand nine had to be rendered void, due to the act occurring in the year two thousand ten, which is attributable to the adjudicatees themselves, who did not prove either in the administrative venue, or in the jurisdictional one, that the sale made of part of an unregistered property they indicated they possessed, was not part of the land given to them by the IDA.
It must be noted that it is not about adding up all the time elapsed during the processing of a procedure, but rather that, in a rational manner, the reasons for the time taken to carry out the investigations must be analyzed (following the jurisprudence established by this jurisdiction that nullity for the sake of nullity does not exist). In this matter, it has not been possible to corroborate that there was any negligence, non-observance, or any delay on the part of the Administration, since, as has been noted, the last of the witnesses received was at the instance of the representation of the investigated parties, and this arose from the statements of previous witnesses, evidencing that the Administration was respectful of the right of defense in this case, denoting that after receiving that witness, the recommendation act of the directing body and the final resolution occurred, all in very reasonable times, linked to the complexity of the matter.
Furthermore, and of great importance, it must be indicated that the attorney for the plaintiff herein, bet in the second claim now under analysis, on alleging Lapsing (Caducidad), which, as has been indicated, does not apply in this case, without adducing Prescription of the Administration's possibility of restarting, rectifying, or commencing anew the procedure, so there can be no pronouncement in that regard. B-3: Third Petition. Based on what was said in the previous section, the plaintiff further claims that: "3- Consequently, the Absolute Nullity be declared of the agreement of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of the Institute of Rural Development (INDER), at 1:00 p.m. on August 16, 2013. Article No. 35, Ordinary Session 023-2013, held on June 24, 2013. And of every administrative act prior to it." This act is the final resolution issued by the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of INDER, in ordinary session 023-2013 of July twenty-fourth, two thousand thirteen, in its article 35, when it made the decision to revoke the adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira) due to the cause of sale without authorization from the IDA, unjustified abandonment, and the repeated failure to conserve natural resources (Folio 179 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)).
Against said act, the plaintiff in its lawsuit, specifically in Fact "Eighth", makes a series of challenges, citing some parts of that resolution especially proven facts, from which the plaintiffs' representation determines that rather their possession of the land and the development therein of agricultural and livestock activity was proven, that MINAE reports were mentioned though it was not a party to the matter, and that the sale of part of the parcel was found proven, however they indicated that: "My clients had possession of the same 10 years before the parcel was adjudicated to them, only that the possession they had and have encompassed more land than what was indicated as parcel 28. Therefore the IDA has tried to make it look like the lot in mention belongs to said parcel, when in reality it is not so." It is around said statement that the arguments contrary to what was indicated in the final resolution are centered.
However, and as an indispensable element, it must be started here from the fact that the plaintiff did not prove, either in the administrative venue, or in the jurisdictional one, reliably their claim, that is, that the capacity of the land adjudicated to them was greater than what was given to them by the IDA in the year two thousand. Neither has it been proven that of that "extra portion", they had some way of determining their possession (survey plan (plano catastrado), or initiation of possessory information), or that that part of the land did not even belong to the IDA, today INDER, since, they do not describe it, and from what has been argued in this process, all those lands are part of a single whole, all property of the IDA, and that therefore it proceeded to adjudicate as the ITCO Law allows it (see articles 49 and following of law 2528). And it is that, from the very statements of their witnesses in the administrative procedure, from which this Collegiate Body carried out an analysis that is reflected in the proven facts of this judgment, it can be concluded that although it is indicated that Mr.
Torres cultivated the land adjudicated to him, the frequency of it was not clear and on the contrary, in the different inspections carried out by representatives of the IDA, as well as of MINAE and of the directing body of the procedure (see proven facts 3, 4, 8, 9, 11 and 20), there is never mention of an extra strip of land possessed prior to the adjudication of the year two thousand, they only referred to parcel 28, even, regarding the maintenance and production on Parcel No. 28, it was very contradictory, since Mr. Torres Cerdas himself, accepted in his administrative statement, that he rented it to some people so they could have cattle on the property (see proven fact 17), while Mr. Marvin Jiménez indicated that the pasture had been planted on halves between Mr. Torres and his brother Raúl, without giving greater specifications in that regard. Furthermore, there was no common denominator regarding the state of the farm, the type of what was planted, but, the Administration did determine that the crops were scarce, and that they were abandoned (see proven facts 3, 4, 8, 9, 11 and 20).
On the other hand, Mr. Torres alleged that his intention was to carry out a tourism development, but that he was rendered unable to do so by the non-obtainment of title from the IDA (of which he also did not prove that he had carried out efforts in that regard), nor that for that reason he did not obtain loans (he does not prove that either), rather, his statement is linked there with the appearance of a supposed interested party on behalf of some "businessmen from Cartago", according to his own claim, with whom he supposedly conducted a business with a "little cart", a commercial activity about which he was not clear, nor did he present proof of its existence, given that, what does appear and was not disproven, is that Mr. Torres and his wife Mrs. Alvarado, in the year two thousand ten, before a notary public sold to the company Sweters House de Costa Rica S.A, a part of an unregistered land, without a plan, and without greater specifications, which they denied in their administrative statements, but in their lawsuit they argue that those sold assets were not from the parcel adjudicated to them, but they also do not prove, as indicated, the possession of another real estate.
All those contradictions were taken into account in the final resolution of the procedure, including the lack of proof of other aspects that led the administration to conclude, not only the proven abandonment of the land given to them, their misuse of natural resources by felling trees, but also, the partial sale of a lot of the same, sufficient aspects for the application of articles 67 and 68 paragraph 4, subsections b) and f) of Law No. 2825 which in their letter state: "Article 67.- The beneficiary may not transfer the ownership of his plot nor encumber it, lease it or subdivide it without authorization from the Institute, except that fifteen years have elapsed since the acquisition of the parcel and that all obligations with said organization are canceled. Neither may he, without that authorization and during the same term, encumber the crops, seeds, animals, belongings, tools or equipment necessary for the exploitation of the parcel, unless all his obligations with the Institute are canceled.
To authorize the encumbrance of the real estate, four conforming votes of the Board of Directors are required. Any contract concluded without complying with the preceding provisions shall be absolutely null. After the fifteen years have elapsed and the property right has been acquired, any transfer of the parcel that, in the judgment of the Institute, might produce the concentration or excessive subdivision of property, shall give it the right to acquire the parcel or parcels offered for sale at the price set by experts appointed by the parties, or by a third party, in case of disagreement. This third expert shall be appointed by the other two experts. The Public Registry shall take note of the limitations referred to in this article." An aspect that was demonstrated in the final resolution at hand, with the sale that the plaintiffs herein made in the year two thousand ten (Proven Fact 24), that is, the term of fifteen years determined by the norm had not yet been fulfilled and in the administrative venue, the investigated parties did not demonstrate that it was not Parcel No. 28 that had been subjected to a partial sale.
On the other hand, article 68 establishes: "Article 68.- In the contract made with the parcel holder and in the title delivered to him, the following stipulations shall be recorded: 4) That the Institute must, in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the Chapter on Land Tribunals, revoke or extinguish the adjudication for the following reasons:...b) For the unjustified abandonment of the parcel or of the family. In this latter case, the Institute shall adjudicate the parcel to the wife, to the person or persons who have permanently lived with the parcel holder and who demonstrate greater capacity, provided they meet the conditions stipulated in article 62;...f) For repeated failure to comply with the legal norms for the conservation of natural resources. With the exception of case b) and before the revocation or extinction of the right, there must be an admonishment that has not been heeded by the adjudicatee." And it is that, from the simple reading of the final resolution of the month of August of two thousand thirteen of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) of INDER, the abandonment and the improper use of natural resources were considered proven, without, the contrary being demonstrated by the investigated parties regarding them.
Thus, the arguments very focused in the lawsuit at hand, raised against the final act of INDER, do not lead to the requested nullity, especially due to the lack of proof in the administrative and judicial venues regarding what was charged and finally considered proven. B-4: Fourth Petition. In "4- That the Absolute Nullity be declared of Ruling No. 1211-F-2013 of the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario), Second Judicial Circuit of San José (Segundo Circuito Judicial de San José), at five thirty-nine p.m. on December twentieth, two thousand thirteen, which rejected the Improper Hierarchical Appeal (Recurso Jerárquico Impropio), as untimely, given that it was filed within the five business days. Likewise, the nullity of every administrative act subsequent to it." It must be recalled that the participation of the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario) in that matter, was as an improper two-phase hierarchical superior, that is, in this matter the agrarian jurisdiction does not act jurisdictionally, but as part of the administrative apparatus.
Thus, the claim made in the lawsuit under analysis, is that this non-hierarchical controller of legality incurred an error when taking into account the dates on which the final resolution was notified and the filing of the administrative appeal. However, this Collegiate Body shares in all its extremes the declaration of untimeliness of the administrative proceeding, since as indicated in Ruling No. 1211-F-2013 of the Agrarian Tribunal (Tribunal Agrario), the date that should have been taken as a starting point for the computation of the times for the further remedies, is Tuesday, October 15, two thousand thirteen, the day after the notification made to the fax number provided by the investigated party, so from that point, the fifth business day was Monday, October twenty-first, two thousand thirteen and not, as the appeal was filed on the twenty-second following. Furthermore, it must be indicated that the administratively investigated parties filed a revocation appeal (recurso de revocatoria) against that decision, which was rejected for the same reasons now reaffirmed (Folios 236, 243 and 250 of the certified administrative file of the Ordinary Procedure (Procedimiento Ordinario) followed by INDER for the revocation of adjudication of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala)).
B-5: Fifth Petition. In "5- That it be declared that the undersigned plaintiffs, have maintained the real and effective possession of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira), II Stage (A-144) Survey Plan No. A-328417-1996, ten years before the adjudication and up to the present day. That we never carried out and/or were actors of the causes of article 68, point 4 subsec. b) of the Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) and its Reforms, of unjustified abandonment of the Parcel, of repeated failures to comply with the legal norms for the conservation of natural resources, nor did we carry out a sale of a part of Parcel No. 28." This claim must be rejected, for the arguments given in the preceding sections, reiterating that the administrative investigation did not concern a case of non-possession, but of abandonment, distinct causes and the plaintiffs herein were never accused of not having possessed.
Furthermore, the failures regarding natural resources, it was proven in the records that, against Mr. Torres several criminal cases had been pursued parallel to the time in which the administrative one was being processed (proven fact 10), and while the outcomes of these are not known, the fact is that even Mr. Torres himself in his statement in the administrative venue, admitted to having been imprisoned for that (tree felling) occurring on the adjudicated parcel (see statement of September twenty-second, two thousand eleven visible on folio 88 of the certified administrative file.). B-6: Sixth Petition. It is adduced that: "6- That having been adjudicated Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira), II Stage (A-144) by the Institute of Agrarian Development IDA, today INDER by agreement of the Board of Directors (Junta Directiva) No. 15, Article XV, Session No. 002-00, held on January 5, 2000.
And given that the undersigned have maintained real and effective possession for more than 15 years, without interruption, the Institute of Rural Development be ordered, to transfer to the undersigned plaintiffs, through Public Deed, free of limitations the real estate in question, that is, the one described in Survey Plan No. A-328417-1996." However, the plaintiffs' claim that they managed the acquisition of the deed of the parcel from the IDA, now INDER, has not been proven; and that, under the circumstances of the investigation carried out since the year two thousand nine, where it was precisely for the purposes of determining the abandonment of the land, the having sold part of the parcel and the misuse of natural resources, it was not possible then nor now, to be able to request and obtain a property title, especially since, in the reports on the current state of the parcel issued by INDER officials from the years two thousand twenty-one and their update in the year two thousand twenty-five (see proven facts 27 and 28), the neighbors themselves indicated that Mr.
Torres and Mrs. Alvarado did not return to possess the land and that in their place was Mr. Raúl Jiménez who kept cattle on the property. B-7: Seventh Petition. Now, the plaintiff seeks that: "7- The Institute of Rural Development INDER be ordered to pay Damages and Losses (Daños y Perjuicios) in the following form: for subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo) in the sum of TEN MILLION COLONES, and material damage (daño material) for the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION COLONES. For loss of profits (perjuicios) in the sum of FIVE MILLION COLONES, same that refer to interest corresponding from January 5, 2000 to September 17, 2021, based on the legal interest rate of the National Bank." In the theory of Objective Liability, provided in the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública) (articles 190 and following) applicable to this case, for compensation like those requested (subjective moral damage (daño moral subjetivo), material damage (daño material)) to arise, one of the criteria of imputation that lead to the Causal Link (Nexo Causal) must always be present, an indispensable requirement so that the victim can be compensated.
But, as it has been determined in the preceding recitals of this judgment, none of the supposed damages derived from the "nullities" or adduced damages that could arise from the procedure followed against the plaintiffs herein have been accepted, which entails a disconnection with any possible payment for damage. Moreover, the interests suffer the same fate since if the principal (damages) does not arise, the accessories (interests) cannot appear. Thus, this request is also not receivable. B-8: Eighth Petition. Regarding costs, these will be analyzed in a later recital.
VII.Analysis of the defenses raised. The INDER representation formulated the defenses of: 1) Lack of Standing to Sue (Falta de Legitimación Ad Causam Activa y Pasiva), which must be rejected, given that as was evidenced in the case, the plaintiffs were the adjudicatees of Parcel No. 28 of the Altamira de Upala Settlement (Asentamiento Altamira de Upala) since the year two thousand, being precisely what the central axis of this lawsuit was about, therefore they had sufficient standing, and, on the other hand, the entity that adjudicated to them and subsequently initiated the procedure to obtain its revocation, was the IDA, which later changed its denomination to the Institute of Rural Development (INDER), therefore it would have passive legitimacy in the process. 2) The Generic Sine Actione Agit. Given that this is not properly one of the defenses established for the contentious-administrative jurisdiction in the applicable procedural law, it cannot be receivable. And, 3) Lack of Right. Which based on everything set forth in the substantive recital of this judgment must be admitted, and consequently the lawsuit must be declared without merit in all its extremes.
VIII.Costs. Pursuant to numeral 193 of the Contentious-Administrative Procedural Code (Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo), procedural and personal costs constitute a burden imposed on the losing party for the fact of being so. The exemption from this condemnation is only viable when there exists, in the judgment of the Tribunal, sufficient grounds for litigating or, when the judgment is issued by virtue of evidence whose existence was unknown to the opposing party. In the case, this Tribunal deems, none of the exemptions apply based on everything analyzed in the preceding recitals, therefore it is proper to order the plaintiffs to pay both costs of this process.
THEREFORE.
The defenses of Lack of Active and Passive Standing to Sue (Falta de Legitimación ad causam Activa y Pasiva), as well as the generic sine actione agit are rejected. The Lack of Right adduced by the defendant is admitted. The lawsuit filed by Mr. José Torres Cerdas and Mrs. María Ester Alvarado Alvarado against the Institute of Rural Development (INDER) is declared WITHOUT MERIT. Both costs of this action are the responsibility of the plaintiffs. Notify both the parties and the interested third parties.
Juan Luis Giusti Soto Marianella Álvarez Molina Sergio Mena García JUAN LUIS GIUSTI SOTO, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE MARIANELLA DEL CARMEN ALVAREZ MOLINA, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE SERGIO MENA GARCIA, DECISION-MAKING JUDGE Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 meters west of BNCR, across from Café Dorado. Telephones: 2545-0107 or 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 or 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 or 2545-0006. Email: [email protected] It is a faithful copy of the original - Taken from Nexus.PJ on: 03-26-2026 07:06:54.
Tribunal Contencioso Administrativo Sección V Sentencias del mismo expediente CONOCIMIENTO ACTOR/A:
JOSE TORRES CERDAS DEMANDADO/A:
INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO RURAL N° 2025003787 TRIBUNAL CONTENCIOSO ADMINISTRATIVO Y CIVIL DE HACIENDA, SECCIÓN QUINTA, SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL, SAN JOSÉ, GOICOECHEA, a las diecisiete horas con ventiuno minutos del ventidos de Abril del dos mil venticinco.- Proceso de conocimiento establecido por JOSÉ TORRES CERDAS, mayor, agricultor, portador de la cédula de residencia 270-118001-52586, y, MARÍA ESTER ALVARADO ALVARADO, mayor, de oficios del hogar, cédula de identidad número 5-0106-0678, ambos cónyuges y vecinos de Bijagua, Upala, Alajuela, Asentamiento Altamira II, representados por Rodrigo Johanning Quesada (ver poder especial judicial a imagen 504 del expediente judicial digital), CONTRA el INSTITUTO DE DESARROLLO AGRARIO (INDER), representado por Diana Elena Alfaro Montenegro (poder especial judicial que corre a imagen 632 del expediente judicial digital). Además, participan como Terceros Interesados el Estado representado por la Procuradora Mariamalia Murillo Kopper (Apersonada a los autos a imagen 432), y, el Sistema de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC), representado por Gidgett Ramírez Hernández (Poder que corre a imágenes 427 y 496).
RESULTANDO:
Redacta el juez Giusti Soto con el voto afirmativo de la juzgadora Álvarez Molina y del juzgador Mena García;
CONSIDERANDO.
I.Hechos probados. De relevancia para efectos del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes:
II.Hechos no probados. De relevancia para efectos del presente proceso se tienen los siguientes:
III.Objeto del proceso. Analizadas las alegaciones y peticiones de las partes involucradas en este conflicto, se determina como un proceso mixto, en el cual se solicita la declaración de Caducidad, y varias nulidades dentro del procedimiento administrativo seguido en contra de los actores. Además, se pide ordenar al INDER traspasar la propiedad de la parcela en disputa a nombre de los demandantes. Y, la condena en daños y perjuicios.
IV.Alegatos. La parte Actora aduce que son poseedores desde hace más de 20 años de la Parcela N° 28 del Asentamiento Campesino Altamira, II etapa, sito en Bijagua, Upala, Alajuela. Mide 13 hectáreas 6.109.75 metros. Manifiestan que la parcela les fue adjudicada por el IDA por acuerdo de su Junta Directiva N° 15, artículo XV, sesión N° 002-00 del 5 de enero de 2000. Que en el inmueble han desarrollado agricultura de frijoles, maíz y plátano, así como ganadería de doble propósito, para lo cual han sembrado pasto de la especie Breachiara, Brizantha y Mombaza. Que el 15 de enero de 2008, en oficio OSU-624-2008 la oficina del IDA de la región Huetar Norte, inició procedimiento de revocatoria de adjudicación de la parcela que ocupan. Indican que ya les habían realizado una amonestación del 21 de octubre de 2008. Y el 23 de junio de 2009 les notificaron la resolución de traslado de cargos del procedimiento, siendo que, entre la amonestación y el traslado de cargos el expediente administrativo estuvo inactivo por 8 meses.
Que el 31 de julio de 2009 se recibió la prueba. Y no hubo resolución final sino hasta el 14 de octubre de 2013. Y, aducen, que estando en trámite ese procedimiento, el 28 de agosto de 2011 les vuelven a notificar del traslado de cargos para revocar la misma parcela, retomando las mismas causales de abandono injustificado y la falta reiterada a las normas legales de conservación de los recursos naturales, que de nuevo se recibe prueba el 22 de setiembre de 2011, no obstante se vuelve a señalar para recibir prueba el 24 de enero de 2013 para prueba ofrecida por el IDA que no lo había realizado en el anterior ocasión. Que el 16 de agosto de 2013, en acuerdo de la Junta Directiva, artículo 35, sesión ordinaria 023-213 del 24 de junio de 2013, se dictó la resolución final de las 13 horas del 16 de agosto de 2013 en el expediente administrativo N° 495-09, la cual se notificó el 14 de octubre de 2013 vía fax, sea más de ocho meses después de iniciar el procedimiento, por lo que consideran opera la caducidad.
En fecha 22 de octubre de 2013, presentaron recurso de apelación en jerarquía impropia contra la resolución final, del cual el Tribunal Agrario del segundo circuito judicial de San José, en Voto N° 1211-F-2013 del 20 de diciembre de 2013 rechazó por extemporáneo, lo que consideran fue resuelto contrario a derecho, pues el computo del plazo de los cinco días que tenían para presentar el recurso fue mal realizado, pues la resolución final se notificó el 14 de octubre de 2013 vía fax, por lo que se tenía por notificado el día siguiente, y el miércoles 16 de octubre iniciaba el plazo, por lo que si presentaron la apelación en plazo, y con el rechazo los dejaron en indefensión. Que en la resolución final del IDA se cometieron yerros: a) el procedimiento inicio con violación al artículo 68 punto 4 inciso b) de la ley de Tierras y Colonización. b) Entre los hechos tenidos por probados se acredito la posesión efectiva que ellos han tenido de la parcela con su actividad agrícola y ganadera, mencionando inclusive varias inspecciones del MINAET, quien indicó que la parcela tenía un 90% de terreno de bosque, lo que consideran una apreciación muy parcializada por los intereses sobre el terreno. Además se tuvo por probado una supuesta venta parcial de la parcela, lo que no es cierto, pues la venta fue de otro lote.
V.Por su parte, la Demandada INDER rechaza que los actores sean poseedores, pues en inspección realizada por la oficina de Upala en febrero de 2010 determinaron que la siembra de frijoles de aproximadamente 2 hectáreas la había realizado Marvin Jiménez Salazar. Luego, en una vista de la jefa de la oficina subregional se comprobó una venta ilegal ya que encontraron a un topógrafo y dos personas que indicaron que habían comprado dos hectáreas de la parcela N° 28 al señor José Torres. Que en sus declaraciones en sede administrativa, el señor Torres indicó que iba esporádicamente a la parcela, aunado a que en inspecciones se determinó que los cultivos eran de terceras personas y que para el 11 de setiembre de 2014 no se observaron cultivos, ni pastos, únicamente ganado que le pertenecía a un vecino. Que el 16 de diciembre de dos mil ocho se inició el procedimiento de revocatoria de la parcela 28 lo que llevó a una amonestación y traslado de cargos, que el expediente estuvo inactivo, tiempo que no cuenta, pues el procedimiento se enderezó anulándose todas las resoluciones anteriores para dar inicio a otro procedimiento sumándose dos causas más la venta ilegal y el abandono de recurso naturales, sin que se haya dado violación al debido proceso.
Rechazan que haya operado caducidad, ya que la investigación inicio en el 2008, pero el expediente se mantuvo activo con audiencias, inspecciones e investigaciones que han tenido que ver con la gravedad del caso, como la tala de árboles en zona protectora que llevó al señor Torres a la vía penal. Incluso indican que el procedimiento administrativo se atrasó pues los actores pedían prueba, se les citaba, pero luego pedían el traslado de la fecha. Aluden que la posesión no ha sido efectiva, pues la parcela la han laborado y producido otras personas. Incluso al hacer el primer informe se determina el total abandono de la parcela. Que solo se construyó una galera de un supuesto proyecto turístico que no se realizó. Que según el Minae el terreno se encuentra dentro de los límites de la zona protectora Miravalles, decretado así desde 1991 según el decreto 20172-MINAE, en el cual la parcele se le calificó como bosque en 90% de bosque nativo con especies propias de la zona. Indica que el terreno se debe traspasar al MINAE para consolidar el Patrimonio Natural del Estado, siendo que desde setiembre de 2014 los terrenos están siendo resguardados por esa institución.
VI.Sobre el fondo. A) Aclaración inicial. Si bien, la parte demandada y, en mayor grado las instituciones interesadas, sin pretensiones propias, hicieron mención enfática al tema de que la propiedad que aquí se discute, sea la parcela N° 28 del Asentamiento Altamira II, ubicada en Bijagua de Upala provincia de Alajuela, en torno al tema del Patrimonio Natural del Estado (PNE), ya que insistieron que desde antes de ser adjudicada a los aquí actores, dicho fundo estaba comprendido dentro de la Área Protectora Miravalles (Decreto Ejecutivo N° 20172-MINAE) y que por ello, en aplicación de la Ley Forestal debía ser trasladada a la institución encargada de conservar los recursos naturales, lo cierto es que, como se indicó, ninguno de los terceros que han tomado parte en esta litis dispusieron a favor de sus representadas pretensión alguna, ni el objeto de la demanda determinó solicitud al respecto, por lo que, en lo tocante a este aspecto, si bien aludido argumentativamente, no será tomado en cuenta para resolver el asunto que nos ocupa, por su desvinculación con el norte que debe seguirse en una demanda de conocimiento en esta jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa.
VII.Análisis de las defensas opuestas. La representación del INDER formuló las defensas de: 1) Falta de Legitimación Ad Causam Activa y Pasiva, la cual debe rechazarse, toda vez que como quedó evidenciado en la especie, los actores fueron los adjudicatarios de la parcela N° 28 del Asentamiento Altamira de Upala desde el año dos mil, siendo precisamente sobre lo cual versó el eje central de esta demanda, por lo que tenían legitimación suficiente, y, por otra parte, el ente que les adjudicó y posteriormente inició el procedimiento para obtener la revocatoria de la misma, lo fue el IDA, que luego cambió su denominación a Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER), por lo que éste estaría legitimado pasivamente en el proceso. 2) La Genérica Sine Actione Agit. Siendo que ésta no es propiamente una de las defensas establecidas para la jurisdicción contenciosa administrativa en la ley procesal aplicable, no puede ser de recibo. Y, 3) Falta de Derecho. La cual con todo lo dispuesto en el considerando de fondo de esta sentencia debe admitirse, y en consecuencia debe declarase sin lugar la demanda en todos sus extremos.
VIII.Costas. De conformidad con el numeral 193 del Código Procesal Contencioso Administrativo, las costas procesales y personales constituyen una carga que se impone a la parte vencida por el hecho de serlo. La dispensa de esta condena solo es viable cuando hubiere, a juicio del Tribunal, motivo suficiente para litigar o bien, cuando la sentencia se dicte en virtud de pruebas cuya existencia desconociera la parte contraria. En la especie, estima este Tribunal, no aplica ninguna de las eximentes por todo lo analizado en los considerandos precedentes, por lo que cabe condenar a la parte actora al pago de ambas costas de este proceso.
POR TANTO.
Se rechazan las defensas de Falta de Legitimación ad causam Activa y Pasiva, así como la genérica de sine actione agit. Se acoge la Falta de Derecho aducida por la parte demandada. Se declara SIN LUGAR la demanda incoada por el señor José Torres Cerdas y la señora María Ester Alvarado Alvarado contra el Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (INDER). Son ambas costas de esta acción a cargo de los actores. Notifíquese tanto a las partes como a los terceros interesados.
Juan Luis Giusti Soto Marianella Álvarez Molina Sergio Mena García Goicoechea, Calle Blancos, 50 metros oeste del BNCR, frente a Café Dorado. Teléfonos: 2545-0107 ó 2545-0099. Ext. 01-2707 ó 01-2599. Fax: 2241-5664 ó 2545-0006. Correo electrónico: [email protected]
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