Unconstitutionality of dismissal for judicial employees due to insolvencyInconstitucionalidad del cese por insolvencia de judiciales

Res. No. 2020017611 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at nine hours twenty minutes on the sixteenth of September of two thousand twenty.

An unconstitutionality action filed by [Name 001], against articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch No. 7333 of May 5, 1993.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 7:34 a.m. on August 22, 2018, [Name 001] files an unconstitutionality action against articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, considering them contrary to numerals 28, 39, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. She indicates that she files the action in accordance with subsection a of article 73 and numeral 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in her personal capacity and her condition as a judicial servant. She accredits the foregoing with the permanent post of Unit Coordinator 2. She notes that as of March 1, 2017, she assumed the Coordination of the Administrative Management Unit of the Planning Directorate and as of February 21, 2018, she was promoted to Unit Coordinator 3 of the Evaluation Sub-process of the Planning Directorate. She clarifies that she serves this last post "in substitution". She states that the prior matter is a disciplinary sanctioning cause that is in the appellate exhaustion stage before the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch. She recounts that such cause is based on numeral 209 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and is being pursued against her by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal in case file no. [Value 001]. She alleges that the complaining party was the Human Resources Directorate of the Judicial Branch. She mentions that she attaches certification of the appeal in which the unconstitutionality was invoked. She explains that the investigating body of the procedure based the notice of charges on the fact that she lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch for "having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency", pursuant to the provisions of subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. She states that the notice of the administrative cause was based on the complaint filed by [Name 002] and [Name 003], respectively Unit Coordinator and head of Salary Administration of the Human Resources Department, who, through official letter no. [Value 016], communicated to the Judicial Inspection Tribunal the jurisdictional process handled in no. [Value 002] of the Civil Court of Cartago, in which she, as the petitioner, requested the declaration of civil insolvency proceedings. She argues that in that process, the first-instance judgment no. [Value 042] of 2:38 p.m. on August 8, 2017, was issued, by means of which she was declared in a state of insolvency for debts contracted with different banking and credit entities for the sum of ¢81,321,557.04 colones. She asserts that she was the petitioner of the judicial process and there was no creditors' meeting against her. She maintains that, given the legal possibility granted to her by the civil legal system, she filed the process to seek a solution to her economic and financial situation, in order to generate a judicially regulated compliance and satisfy all her debts. She indicates that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, through vote no. [Value 018] of October 4, 2018, ordered the revocation of her appointment, considering her state of insolvency as extremely serious conduct by virtue of what is contemplated in subsection 9 of article 26, in the following terms: "[...] it is imperative that all its officials and servants be upright persons with high levels of commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith, understood as those conducts executed transparently based on the trust deposited in them [...that] it is based on this value of probity, that this authorized power is presented and must be directed at assessing the conducts and actions displayed by the entire judicial population, even in its private sphere [...that] the employment relationship must be a relationship of trust where the servant is a person who can be trusted, to whom the care of assets can be entrusted, especially those of a public entity, so it is necessary to have a guarantee that the contracted person is honorable and responsible for their acts [...that] a public official can not only be sanctioned administratively for violations of express rules, but also for performing immoral acts that affect the public service or on the occasion of it, or that being in their private sphere are incompatible with the public function entrusted, [...arguing that] it is through subjection to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and related regulations, that all its servants are supervised through monitoring of their actions and their behavior both in the performance of their duties and in their private life. (See Art. 28 subsection 2. of the cited Law and numeral 49 of the Judicial Service Statute subsection c)". She points out that the specific normative scope challenged as unconstitutional is the ground for judicial declaration of insolvency contained in articles 12 and 26 subsection 9 of the aforementioned law. She argues that the foregoing, by action and omission, infringes constitutional norms and principles. She notes that such numerals provide: "Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be qualified, mentally and physically, to perform the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a firm order to open trial has been issued may not be appointed, nor those convicted of a crime with a prison sentence, those subjected to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency, those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious conduct disorders, in a way that could affect the continuity and efficiency of the service." (-the underlined and bold is not from the original, it is stated that way only for the purpose of highlighting the central and relevant content that is challenged through this unconstitutionality action) "Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those who serve judicial posts cease due to: [...] 9.- Having been convicted, in a firm judgment, for any crime that warrants a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions, and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency." (-the underlined and bold is not from the original, it is stated that way only for the purpose of highlighting the central and relevant content that is challenged through this unconstitutionality action). She affirms that it is contrary to the Law of the Constitution that in such articles the judicial declaration of insolvency is established as a reason for the cessation of her appointment without leaving a margin of discretion or assessment, even excusable, of what generated that condition and, above all, without assessing elements or the "principles of congruence, proportionality, causal reasonableness, legitimate purpose, good faith, family necessity, privacy, assessment of a loss of objective trust duly accredited in relation to the functions I perform, existence of real affectation to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of a serious fault, much less an extremely serious one, to the judicial public service, gender aspects, among others, all this in light of the existence or not of an affectation to the continuity and efficiency of the judicial service, as is indeed assessed and defined for other grounds in those same articles, as can be read literally in the transcription made of those articles". She highlights that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, in vote no. [Value 018], categorized her, due to the declaration of insolvency she petitioned, as an official lacking probity, without commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, or good faith and that, therefore, there is a relationship of distrust, considering that the Judicial Branch "needs to have a guarantee that the contracted person is honorable and responsible for their acts"; moreover, it considered this action incompatible with public function. She adds that in the cause pursued in case file no. [Value 001], by considering the peremptory ground, these aspects were not assessed, and the evidence she requested to incorporate was even rejected. She argues that the assessment made by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not determine the real existence of any serious affectation to the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, but rather punishes only an unfounded potential risk or mere convenience. She states that accepting the foregoing would mean her cessation from her permanent post as Professional 2 in Public Administration, assigned to the Institutional Projection Section of the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch, where she has performed impeccably for more than 23 years. She sets out the following background for the analysis of the unconstitutionality action: "With reason for what has already been stated, it is relevant to bring to the attention of this Honorable Constitutional Chamber the result of the investigation carried out on the ground for employment or service cessation by reason of a judicial declaration of insolvency. To this end, Bill No. 10.753 was analyzed, that is, what was the bill for the current Organic Law of the Judicial Branch Law No. 7333, which allows us to demonstrate the analysis, discussion, and opinions of legislative committees and mixed subcommittees composed of deputies and justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of the time, which reflects, as a highly relevant historical fact, the spirit of the legislator of the challenged norms. Likewise, it will be set out whether the ground challenged by this means exists or not in the regulations governing public service and labor relations, both in the public sector (-specifically in the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Civil Registry, National Banking System, Comptroller General of the Republic, Attorney General's Office-), as well as in the private sector. i.) Bill No. 10.753.- Through this Bill, the deputies of that legislative historical moment became aware of and discussed what was to be today known as Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. It must be indicated, as a relevant aspect, that this Bill, due to the scope and specificity of its content, as well as its national and institutional relevance for the Judicial Branch, generated that it was analyzed and discussed in its original text and regarding the approval and/or rejection of motions, -tending to form substitute texts-, by a mixed legislative subcommission appointed for this purpose and composed of various deputies with the support of justices of the Judicial Branch, such as Dr. Daniel González, Dr. Luis Paulino Mora, among others. From the analysis and investigation of the content of that Bill, the following aspects of importance for this unconstitutionality action were obtained: ü At folios [Value 019] (images [Value 020]), the original drafting content of article 12 is located, which refers to the ground of "the insolvent" as a general impediment to being appointed. ü At folios [Value 021] (images [Value 022]), the original drafting of article 26 subsection 9.1 is located, which simply established in its content the reference to incurring any of the grounds of article 12, as causes for cessation of appointment. ü At folios [Value 023] (images [Value 024]), a discussion is identified between the deputy acting as president of that mixed legislative subcommission and Justice Daniel González, regarding the issue of insolvency and bankruptcy as a ground, where it can be noted that the deputy refers to the ground due to the existence of 'a matter of public faith', pointing out that it involves a person who has not been able to manage their business and who later intends to try to enter the judicial service, so in their argumentation they turn that situation into an aspect of 'non-convenience', more so if there has been (-they refer-) "fraudulent bankruptcy, that is, a criminal offense has been committed". Justice González refers to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency that is not necessarily the conceptualization of the person who has done poorly in business, but of the one whose assets are judicially administered. ü At folio [Value 025] (image [Value 026]), the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the cited articles is recorded, highlighting that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, a discussion that of course involves the central theme of this unconstitutionality action, that is, the declaration of insolvency, in which reference is made that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear, which is applicable as long as these circumstances 'affect the public service'. ü At folios [Value 027], [Value 028], [Value 029] (images [Value 030], [Value 031], [Value 032]), motion No. [Value 035] filed by Deputy Ovidio Pacheco is evidenced, tending to modify the drafting of the referenced article 26 subsection 9.) and, for what is relevant, where it is provided, among others, to expressly include 'those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy and insolvency' as a ground for cessation of appointment, a drafting ultimately approved and currently in force; ü At folios [Value 033] (image [Value 034]), the mixed legislative committee becomes aware of the indicated motion No. [Value 035] and discusses its content. For these purposes, it is recorded in the legislative file that Deputy Ovidio Pacheco makes no reference whatsoever to the substantive reason, purpose, or cause that justifies expressly including the ground that is the object of this action, but rather his justification is merely a matter of form so that reference is not made to article 12, before which, that formal aspect was affirmatively assessed considering that "the motion tends to clarify at least what the true causes are for which a judicial official can be dismissed". It is insisted that, for the purposes of said motion, the suitable substantive reason, purpose, or cause that justified expressly including the ground for cessation that is the object of this action is not recorded. ü At folios [Value 036] (image [Value 037]), the legislative discussion related to disciplinary grounds is recorded, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship can conclude for that reason, highlighting the reference to the interest in the public service of judicial functions, before which the permanence of the official prevails, except when it results 'seriously inconvenient for the judicial service', as well as when, by reason thereof, 'doubts exist about their correctness'. ü At folio [Value 080] (image [Value 081]), the ground that is the object of this unconstitutionality action, provided in article 26 subsection 9.), is already added as substitute text. ü At folio [Value 082] (image [Value 065]), the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration must be highlighted, in which, expressly, they request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in the referenced article 26 subsection 9.) be eliminated. The justifying and explanatory element that the legislators manifest is the following: "Regarding the bankrupt and insolvent, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not be taken for anything as grounds to dismiss a judicial servant; if this is allowed, it would be sanctioning for a mere danger." (-the underlined and bold is not from the original, it is stated that way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action). ü At folio [Value 038] (image [Value 039]), legislative discussion on the scope of the disciplinary regime is recorded, highlighting the criterion of Deputy Allan Solano, in which, with reference to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for cessation of appointment, he criticizes that it constitutes a ground of 'sanction for mere convenience or risk' and regarding aspects of 'private life'. ü At folios [Value 040] (image [Value 041]), the discussion of Deputy Santana Esquivel and Justice Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Mixed Legislative Subcommission, appears, in which they analyze the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration regarding the ground of article 26 subsection 9.) of reiterated reference, for the purpose of deciding, definitively, whether to retain or modify said ground. For these purposes, it is of great interest to literally cite what was stated by them in this regard, as follows: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain confidence from the public because ultimately we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within the institutions of the State; that is why it has been considered that the person who is there declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets, and eventually he will have at his disposal the handling of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it is traditional to find norms of this nature. That is the only observation I could make to the effect of choosing to eliminate it or not maintain it; my recommendation is to maintain the existence that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL: We will continue then. We will maintain this article as it is [...]". (-the underlined is not from the original, it is stated that way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-) As can be observed with total clarity, it is the justification of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora that gives reason for legislatively deciding to maintain the ground for cessation indicated in the referenced article 26 subsection 9.), and consequently the one defined in article 12 of that same law, an argumentation that focuses on the following aspects: a.) By referring to 'resolution of discords', it only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch, and omits, and with that it is additionally not valued legislatively, the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, such as my judicial performance work as Unit Coordinator; b.) It points out the existence of 'a certain loss of confidence' by reason that the judicial official is declared in insolvency, that is, it would punish with cessation of appointment in the judicial service, for conduct whose appreciation does not effectively, objectively, causally, directly, substantiatedly, proportionally, or reasonably verify the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional service work, as well as before the citizenry, all of this accredited in light of the functions I perform, regardless of my state of insolvency. It is insisted, it must not only be assessed in jurisdictional work, but also in what concerns my person, that is, in the performance of administrative work. It also states that 'eventually he will have the disposition of economic resources', so again it reveals an empty argument without technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal foundation in light of the serious harm to the institutional service work, given that, in the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption. That is my case, because in the performance of my duties as Unit Coordinator of the Planning Directorate, I do not have assigned as a function, nor consequently do I perform by administering, nor guarding, nor controlling, nor disposing, under any title, economic resources of the Judicial Branch, nor evidently of the citizenry on the occasion of my function, so that it can be believed, and much less accredited by any means, thereby, that a serious harm to the judicial service exists. Additionally, I state before your Authority that I know my duties and responsibilities in the judicial service, which is accredited by my impeccable judicial service with more than 23 years of service; furthermore, there has not existed in the past, nor currently exists, any complaint or proceeding whatsoever against my person tending to demonstrate that I have incurred in a service fault due to an inadequate use of public funds and that this is causally due to the economic-financial situation that unfortunately happened to me and that generated the insolvency for the reasons that served as defense in the cause that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal is handling. I also accredit before your Authority that the criminal cause that is initiated ex officio by normative mandate, by reason of the declaration of insolvency, tending to investigate whether I incurred in the crime of fraudulent insolvency, was ordered to prosecutorial archiving for not existing any determination whatsoever of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions typified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Value 004] for complaint No. [Value 005] of the unique case file number [Value 006], confirming once again that my action was in accordance with civil legislation according to the possibility that this regulation provides to administratively confront the payment of my debts, and that I had to resort to that judicial process by my own act and due to the pressing economic situation I was facing. That the 'traditional' aspect argued to exist in other regulations, for the ground challenged in this venue to be contained, should not be the rule to equate its applicability as a reason for cessation from judicial service, even more so because it will be demonstrated later that the ground of insolvency is not conceived in other regulations in the way it is regulated by Law No. 7333, so this argumentation becomes at the same time a foundation lacking logic, truthfulness, and causal suitability in light of the serious harm to the institutional judicial service work, which has never existed on my part, and which the legislative technique did not consider, even more so in matters of disciplinary sanctions, whose sacrifice causes affectation to my person with the loss of work. From the investigation and documentary record that makes up the legislative file of Bill No. 10.753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the ground of insolvency as a reason for not being appointed and for declaring the cessation of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it is not in accordance with the complex regulatory framework of the disciplinary matter that regulates Law No. 7333 as a whole, tending to the demonstration, prior due process, of a serious affectation to the judicial service, as well as the existence of a serious fault, much less an extremely serious one, to the judicial public service, as a primary element for the sanctioning application of the challenged ground, which, as is visible, in my case would mean the greatest sacrifice of the loss of my job and the personal affectation and of those who depend economically on me, all this, but a mere expectation of a supposed risk, which in my case is non-existent, nor has it been valued by the judicial inspection, since they apply the ground as peremptory. As was demonstrated, and it was thus warned by various instances within the legislative processing of that bill, it was pointed out that allowing this ground, as it is stated, would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration in the face of necessity decisions that involve aspects of private life, which do not influence the judicial service, in my case not even mildly, much less seriously or extremely seriously. This aspect, I tried to demonstrate in the administrative procedure before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal; however, through an order of October 18, 2017, they rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I offered in that sense, considering that "[...] they bear no relation to what is accused in the delivery of charges; it should be noted that in this disciplinary sanctioning procedure, the causes that motivated the declared insolvency of the accused are not under discussion, that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. Nor is any breach in the exercise of her position being reproached to her, such that the offered testimonial evidence is rejected [...]". In that sense, it is noted, as already said, that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal considers the disciplinary procedure as one of pure law, without considering other relevant aspects in the service relationship, in strict application of the measure regulated in article 26 subsection 9.) of that Law, resulting in Vote No. [Value 018] that ordered the revocation of my appointment by considering the declared insolvency as an extremely serious fault without demonstrating in that disciplinary procedure, -as already said-, in a real manner that extremely serious fault with a proven reason of affectation to the service I provide to the Judicial Branch, as well as to the institutional image, or other similar, but rather by express provision of article 26 subsection 9.) of reiterated mention. Note, in the face of this, that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, through Vote No. [Value 018], in which it ordered the revocation of my appointment by express application of article 26 subsection 9.) of reiterated commentary, determines that I incurred in extremely serious conduct due to my state of insolvency. For that conclusive assessment of the existence of 'extremely serious conduct', it is further based on articles 28 subsection 2. of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and 49 subsection c.

of the Judicial Service Statute, which provide: "Article 28.- A public servant may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense: [...] 2.- Who, due to incorrections or failings in the exercise of their position or in their private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, has become deserving of such sanction." "Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, judicial servants shall have the following: […] c) Observe dignity in the performance of their duties and in their private life." As can be noted, these regulations refer directly to an affectation to the 'good service or the image of the Judicial Branch', as well as to observing 'dignity', aspects that were not demonstrated during the procedure leading to the adopted decision, despite the fact that, in a subjective, abusive, unfounded, and merely argumentative manner, they determine, in their understanding, that I am not a person of integrity, nor with high levels of commitment, nor of responsibility, nor of honesty, nor of loyalty, nor with decorum nor good faith, due to the loss of confidence generated by the state of insolvency, lacking the value of probity. Note that in the same Vote No. [Value 018], the Judicial Inspection Tribunal only determines as proven facts the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service to the Judicial Branch, and the absence of prior disciplinary sanctions, and not the affectation to the service or to the image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal shortcomings that affect dignity, an aspect that is very delicate to define due to the constitutional protection that exists in the matter, which privileges, above all, the honor of every person. Having reached this point, I wish to emphasize that voluntarily submitting myself to the insolvency process, as I have indicated, was the alternative provided to me by the legal system in civil matters to achieve a solution to my economic-financial situation, thereby generating a scheduled and judicially regulated compliance to satisfy the fulfillment of all my debts and the satisfaction of the interests of my creditors, all as an act of good faith, an aspect that was verified in criminal proceedings when it was determined that my insolvency was not fraudulent, a case that has a prosecutorial archival status, as will be mentioned later. ii.) Regulations related to the alleged unconstitutionality.- In this section, we will set out those highly relevant regulations that stipulate in their content the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. The high relevance of the regulations to be presented is due to them regulating the employment relationship in other Branches of the Republic, Entities of the National Banking System, Advisory and Technical Legal Bodies, as well as Control and Oversight of the Public Treasury, likewise, we will refer to general specific regulations of civil service and against corruption and illicit enrichment, as well as the private sector. a.) Regulations that make NO reference or mention whatsoever to the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, • nor is there any regulation in this matter in its Autonomous Statute; • Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, No. 6815, • Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, No. 7558; • Autonomous Regulations of the Legislative Assembly; • Regulations to the Civil Service Statute; • Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Office, No. 8422; • General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292. As can be noted, neither in the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, nor in the Comptroller General of the Republic, as Advisory and Technical Legal Bodies, and Control and Oversight of the Public Treasury, does regulation on the matter exist; likewise, there is no regulation for the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the Legislative Assembly, nor in general in specific regulations against corruption and illicit enrichment, nor in internal control, such that the declaration of insolvency is configured as a "traditional" ground nor necessary to avoid risks of administrative responsibility of a disciplinary nature. b.) Regulations that DO make reference to the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters, or for aspects of a prohibitive nature.- • Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Civil Registry, No. 3504. Its article 27, insofar as it is relevant, establishes: "[...] Those charged by a trial order, those serving a sentence of disqualification for public office and positions, those convicted of crimes meriting imprisonment as an ordinary penalty, the insolvent and bankrupt, as long as the insolvency or bankruptcy has not been qualified as excusable; those who habitually become intoxicated; those who have been dismissed from judicial and electoral positions; and, in general, all those who do not observe good conduct or have antecedents of dubious morality, cannot be appointed to hold positions in the Tribunal or in the Registry [...]". (.- the underlining and bold text is not from the original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-). As can be noted, in this Entity, categorized as a fourth Branch of the Republic, although the mentioned ground is stipulated for aspects of appointment, it only provides it under a parameter of 'excusable', which permits and obliges the operator of the norm to precisely assess the reasons for the insolvency declaration, the economic-financial condition of the person, and thereby the eventual affectation to the public service, and, why not, even its inappropriateness but faced with a proven, real, and effective risk or danger affecting the public service. This law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Organic Law of the National Banking System, No. 1644. Its article 22, insofar as it is relevant, establishes: "The following may not be designated as members of a board of directors: 1) Persons who during the year prior to their appointment have been sued in executive proceedings by any of the banks of the National Banking System, for collection of their own unsatisfied credits, or who have been declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency [...]” (.- the underlining and bold text is not from the original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-) Note that in this Law, the ground is also applicable for purposes of appointment, but not for any official, but exclusively for members of a board of directors, that is, for senior hierarchical officials of the banking organization, furthermore establishing a parameter of assessment and normative limitation with respect to the declaration of insolvency of 1 year prior to the appointment, meaning that, outside of that period, no matter how much the ground of insolvency exists, the prohibition of appointment to that senior position is not applicable. It is worth highlighting that this law does NOT establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment, even for a senior position, such as that of the board of directors of a banking entity. • Law of the Civil Service Statute, No. 1581. Article 8, subsection g.) of this Law, establishes, insofar as it is relevant, the following: "The Director General of Civil Service shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, following a competitive examination, shall report directly to the President, and must meet the following requirements: [...] g) Not be declared in insolvency or bankruptcy; and [...]". (-the underlining and bold text is not from the original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action). It must be highlighted in this case, that similarly to the previous ones, the normative regulation of the ground of declaration of insolvency is normatively determined for aspects of appointment, and not in general for public officials under the civil service regime, but specifically for the Director General of Civil Service. This law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Labor Code. In its article 85, subsection c.), insofar as it is relevant, it provides: "The following are causes that terminate the employment contract without liability for the worker and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or his/her beneficiaries to claim and obtain payment of the benefits and indemnities that may correspond to them by virtue of what is ordered by the Code or by special provisions: [...] c.) Force majeure or unforeseeable event, insolvency, creditor's proceeding (concurso), bankruptcy, or judicial or extrajudicial liquidation, the incapacity or death of the employer. This rule only applies when the facts to which it refers produce as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work, and when the legal preference held by the support creditors of the deceased, insolvent, or bankrupt has been satisfied [...]". (-the underlining and bold text is not from the original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action) As can be noted from the previous transcription, the Labor Code as a general norm regulating the labor relationship for the private sector establishes the ground in question, but rather as a ground in favor of the worker, in the understanding that if it is the employer who incurs in insolvency, it empowers the worker to terminate the employment contract, without liability for the worker, even establishing a conditional and evaluative ground for the application of that normative reason, which is that it only applies if the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work is produced as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence. This law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of the worker's appointment.” Explains insolvency as a legal mechanism in civil matters for the payment of creditors, in the following terms: “i.) On insolvency. The civil insolvency process is regulated as a legal possibility in articles 884 and following of the Civil Code, which, insofar as relevant, provide: "Article 884.- For the insolvency of a person to produce all the effects that the law attributes to it, it is necessary that it be judicially declared." "Article 886.- Whenever at the request of one or several creditors it is proven that the debtor's assets are insufficient to cover their debts, the declaration of the creditor's proceeding (concurso) is in order. The insufficiency of assets is presumed by the fact of the debtor not presenting, nor the Property Registry recording, sufficient assets to satisfy all of their obligations. The opening of the creditor's proceeding (concurso) will also be declared when the debtor himself/herself requests it, if the latter has two or more creditors." (- the bold highlighting is not from the original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-) In that same sense, and for aspects of its procedure, the judicial declaration of insolvency is regulated in articles 760 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, which, insofar as relevant, provide: "Article 760.- Causes. At the request of any creditor who proves that there are two or more pending executions against their debtor, originating from different titles and creditors, the enforceability of the credit with an executory title, and the insufficiency of the debtor's assets, the opening of the creditor's proceeding (concurso) shall be decreed, if the debtor, required for this purpose by the court, does not pay or does not present within the third day sufficient assets on which to levy execution. The resolution ordering the requirement shall be notified personally or by notice delivered to the debtor's residence. The requirement will be dispensed with in the urgent cases indicated in the following article. The proof that there are two or more executions will not be necessary if the opening is requested by two or more creditors. The same declaration shall be made at the debtor's request, who must present a detail of their assets and liabilities, or express the reasons that prevent them from doing so, and shall also present their books, if they keep them." (- the bold highlighting is not from the Original, it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-). In that understanding, doctrine has established that insolvency is "[...] The state of a debtor who lacks sufficient assets to satisfy their overdue obligations is called insolvency. It is not a matter of the person failing to pay one or more obligations, but rather what determines insolvency is the lack of sufficient assets to meet the debts [...]". (- Ickowez Faingezicht, Roxana. 1999 pp. 29) For its part, the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on this topic has indicated that: "When analyzing the economic situation of a debtor who has a plurality of creditors and insufficient assets, which justifies the collective execution, in application of article 982 of the Civil Code, one must consider, regarding the creditors, their existence as such, without attending to the nature of the credit -commercial or civil- or whether it originates from a personal debt or a joint surety bond, because it is precisely the existence with the possibility of pursuing the obligor's assets that makes the collective process necessary. (Second Chamber. Judgment: [Value 096] of ten hours ten minutes of May 31, nineteen ninety-one) In accordance with the foregoing, it is clear that the regulations in civil matters allow any citizen to submit to that type of procedure, as a mechanism to administratively cancel their debts, due to the lack of sufficient assets and income to meet them. The insolvency process should not be condemned nor qualified negatively and without assessment of the reasons that generated it, even more so if it is, as in my case, in which it was demonstrated that there were not even acts, amounts, nor transactions typified as fraudulent, as was defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Value 004] for complaint No. [Value 005] of the unique case file number [Value 006]”. States that the causes of her insolvency are as follows: “I filed, as petitioner, before the Civil Court of Cartago, an Insolvency Declaration process, protected by articles 884 and following of the Civil Code and 760 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, just as any Costa Rican citizen protected by civil regulations might be authorized to do, as a viable and legal mechanism to thus honor the debts that burdened my economy, both personal and family. The economic decline suffered by me, as I well explain in the Civil process, dates back to my last marital relationship, due to the inequality that always existed in the distribution of obligations that made me bear the greater percentage of housing expenses, services, food, education of my son, and the totality of his expenses from before birth, as well as all specialized medical treatments, exams, vaccines, and others he had to receive from approximately six months of age, for recurrent respiratory problems, lactose intolerance that caused gastric problems, optical and otorhinolaryngology treatments for nasal bleeding problems, and others, since his father never made disbursements for our son's health. On the other hand, that relationship was laden with psychological and economic violence, which is why I had to seek psychological help from the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, as among the effects caused by so many years of violence was the continuous fear and permanent dread I had of my ex-spouse, both for my physical integrity and that of my son, as well as a devaluation of my person and a strong feeling of sadness, frustration, and depression, among others. Within the situations experienced, it was common for my ex-husband, every time he got upset about something (which was frequent), in addition to his continuous insults, irony, humiliations, and explosions of violence, to stop providing his share of the family expenses, forcing me to cover the entirety of the household expenses, which was not possible solely with my salary, for which reason I had to resort to the use of credit cards or other sources of indebtedness to get by, since asking him for the expenses would anger him even more and cause him to explode and again become violent or insult and minimize me. It was also common that the expenses generated from our son's education, in school activities and later high school, were covered entirely by me, since he refused to cover those expenses; the same situation occurred with the person who took care of our son, whom in December he refused to pay the Christmas bonus, which I also had to assume. Added to the above, I supported my ex-husband in some personal expenses, because at that time, having a higher gross salary than him, he asked me to do so, since I reiterate, I did not have the strength to say no; all the foregoing affected, in some way, our family economy and even more so, my personal economy. With the marital breakup, my emotional and personal state reached such an extreme that I necessarily had to be attended again by Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, Professional of the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, who detected within a clinical study that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as economic, being a systematic type of abuse that generated that I found myself minimized as a woman and a person. My whole life, both personal and financial, suffered a severe imbalance, which led me to seek a legal type of solution, precisely because I have never thought to evade my responsibilities as a debtor; quite the contrary, the solution offered to me by the legal advisor was precisely to submit to a declaration of insolvency, especially since I did not have assets to answer for the credit operations, in addition to attending, as a mother and head of household, a series of priorities such as clothing, health, food, education, and housing for myself and my son [Name 012], as well as my elderly parents, my salary from the Judicial Branch being the only source of income, which, incidentally, was offered in said Declaration to the Civil Judge as the only means of payment to the creditors. As can be noted, the judicial alternative of insolvency was the mechanism, in civil law matters, to supply the need to honor my debts in the best possible way, as well as to access the enjoyment of the constitutional right that assists me to have a dignified life, which was being rendered nugatory by the financial burden borne by the undersigned. This aspect is recognized by the Civil Court of Cartago itself, in judgment No. [Value 042] that declared my insolvency, by affirming that: "Taking into consideration the gross salary received by the applicant, in relation to the other documented own obligations, in harmony with the cost of a dignified life presumed for any person subject to rights, it is evident that the imbalance of this debtor's finances is so severe that it makes it impossible for him/her to pay, in time and with complete installments, the debts he/she has contracted, in relation to his/her constitutional right to have a dignified life.” It is a Judge of the Republic, who, through the legal mechanisms contemplated by the Costa Rican civil regulations to solve a legal conflict brought to his knowledge, accepts and endorses that the payment mechanism to settle and thus be able to honor my debts with dignity is through the salary earned as the fruit of my work in the Judicial Branch, but distributed equitably among my creditors to thus maintain an orderly payment of debts. All of the foregoing situation, including the epicrisis of Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, Professional of the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, was submitted and proposed as evidence before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, under case file No. [Value 001] as a pending cause for this action, however, it was rejected outright, without further assessment, considering that it has no relation to the reason for the cause”. Develops her profile and her functions as a professional in the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch: “The purpose of this section is to record my professional profile and the functions I have performed from the date on which my insolvency was judicially declared by the Civil Judge, based on what has been stated. We will proceed to identify three moments in different positions, of an administrative, not judicial, nature, that I have held in the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch from that date onwards, due to my dedication to the service of the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. At the time of the declaration of insolvency, I held the permanent administrative position of Professional 2 in Public Administration, assigned to the Institutional Projection Section of the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch. The main administrative functions I was responsible for are the following: i. Design and conduct research, plans, work programs, projects, and complex analyses in diverse areas of the administrative field; ii. Compile, classify, tabulate, and analyze varied and complex information to propose the adoption of institutional policies; iii. Prepare procedures manuals; iv. Conduct interviews, whether structured, semi-structured, technical, specialized, among others, as part of the development of assigned activities; v. Participate in establishing indicators that allow follow-up on work plans, programs, and projects; vi. Prepare, analyze, and interpret charts, graphs, trends, and varied information; vii. Draft reports, procedures, and other documents that arise as a consequence of the activities carried out, presenting pertinent recommendations and observations, viii. Maintain various controls over the activities under my responsibility and ensure that they are fulfilled in accordance with established programs, dates, and deadlines; ix. Attend meetings, seminars, talks, and other similar activities, and x. Answer inquiries. As of March 1, 2017, I was permanently promoted to the administrative position of Unit Coordinator 2, assuming the Coordination of the Administrative Management Unit of the Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the technical and administrative tasks of the Unit, in accordance with the guidelines and policies established by the head; ii. Collaborate in the preparation and formulation of work programs and annual operational plans, iii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, charts, graphs, and diverse information; iv. Ensure that the records, files, controls, and statistics of the Unit under my charge are kept updated; v. Collaborate with the Heads of the Sub-processes or Sections in the coordination of professionals, acting as facilitators of the different projects or thematic axes under the charge of each sub-process; vi. Participate in the preparation of work programs related to internal control; and vii. Guide lower-level personnel in the execution of their tasks. Since February 21, 2018, I was again promoted -on a substitution basis- as Unit Coordinator 3, assuming the Evaluation Sub-process of the same Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the professional, technical, and administrative activities carried out in a Unit; ii. Collaborate with superiors in the development of project proposals, research, and technical studies aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of the activities specific to my area of competence; iii. Conduct research related to the unit's work program; iv. Compile, classify, and analyze varied information related to the competence of the Unit and formulate recommendations; v. Participate in the preparation of work programs, annual operational plan, internal control SEVRI, among others; vi. Attend meetings with superiors and colleagues in order to analyze problems arising from the unit's activities and propose changes, adjustments, and solutions; and vii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, charts, graphs, and diverse information. As can be noted, I do not perform senior management tasks, much less jurisdictional tasks, but rather administrative management whose work product is submitted -for ordinary aspects of internal control- to the approval and final decision of my superiors, and in light of which it is accredited that I do not administer, nor have custody of, nor control, nor dispose of, under any title, economic resources of the Judicial Branch or of third parties by reason of my position, just as I do not issue final administrative acts, nor serve the public, so much so that no type of bond (caución) is applicable to me due to the duty of my performance. More than the above, I am pleased to bring to your knowledge that, in all my years of service, which already exceed 23 years, I have never been sanctioned disciplinarily, having an unblemished record, which even led to receiving the Certificate of Judicial Merit in the year 2015”. Asserts that article 12 and subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) “Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to the Protection of the Family and to Legal Certainty, by an act managed in application of my autonomy of will. Labor discrimination based on economic situation in matters of employment is materialized”. Develops the content of the right to work. Mentions that the principle of progressivity establishes that every social right, once recognized, can only be improved. Partially cites vote no. [Value 108]. States that: “the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency is configured as a measure or parameter of suitability for appointment (article 12 of Law No. 7333-), likewise, as a ground for termination of appointment (article 26 subsection 9.

of Law No. 7333-), which affects that special protection of the right to work, since as was demonstrated from the analysis of the bill for that Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is found integrated into that block of legality without the causation of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency being mediated or foreseen, in relation to the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional order and of an administrative nature, nor a conditional or evaluative cause for the application of that normative ground, which in the case of the application of Article 26, subsection 9 of said law, generates by itself the termination of appointment as the most grievous disciplinary measure, even when there is no damage, harm, or effect on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, much less on society, nor the proven existence of a serious fault, much less a most serious one, to the judicial public service on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency. A demonstration of the foregoing is the sanctioning basis defined by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, in Ruling No. [Value 018] for my case in particular, in which it classifies—without greater proof or demonstration based on the procedure it followed—my person, on the grounds of the declaration of insolvency, as an official lacking probity, commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith, in which due to that situation a relationship of distrust exists, considering that the Judicial Branch 'needs to have a guarantee that the person hired is honorable and responsible for their actions,' considering such conduct as incompatible with public function; nevertheless, in the case followed under file No. [Value 001], these aspects are not assessed, so much so that the evidence I requested to introduce was rejected, considering the ground for application as being of full right (de pleno derecho), and having as the only proven facts the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service to the Judicial Branch, and the non-existence of prior disciplinary sanctions, and not the effect on the service or the image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal failings that affect dignity, which is the foundation of the regulation invoked. The assessment made by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not determine the real, causal, or objective existence of any serious effect on the judicial service, nor on the institutional image or the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, thus punishing only an unfounded eventual risk, or mere convenience through the normative application of full right. Additionally, with the proposed sanction, a fundamental principle of labor law is seriously violated, which is of supplementary application to the public employment relationship, such as the protective principle (principio protector), and consequently the application of the rule in dubio pro-operario, which will be associated later with the violation of the principle of innocence that assists me, before which, the revocation of the appointment applied to me for the indicated ground should have been constituted as the last resort (última ratio), seeking to choose the most favorable sanction for the worker, in application of the principles governing the law of the constitution and the same conventionality control, all of this in the face of a sanction evidently flagrant to the legal order. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of the evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship." She argues that her declaration of insolvency was due to her own decision, which she applied by autonomy of will, for which she used a legal possibility provided by the legal order to seek a solution to her economic-financial situation and thus generate a regulated fulfillment of her debts. She affirms that the institution of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent nature is declared. She partially transcribes, regarding the autonomy of will, ruling [Value 043]. She cites numeral 28 of the Political Constitution. She adds that the declaration of insolvency, managed by her herself, does not damage, affect, or injure morals or public order. She adds that in the very notification of charges (traslado de cargos) made by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the above is not particularized nor is it intended to be proven, nor is the effect on the public service due to the existence of a serious or most serious fault on the grounds of insolvency. She maintains that it was also not analyzed whether her condition harms third parties, since her creditors will see their credits reimbursed according to the bankruptcy rules through the withholding of a portion of her salary. She states that, due to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case to the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literalness as of full right. She argues that the assessment made is merely subjective. She relates that she faces a ground that seeks the termination of her appointment, without verification, assessment, or real or objective causation regarding the effect on the public service or the verification of a serious or most serious fault in the administrative (non-jurisdictional) judicial public service. She notes that this rule punishes with the most grievous measure an expectation or an eventual risk or danger, in her case unreal. She mentions that: “it becomes palpable that what was warned by the Legislative Commission of Government and Administration that reviewed Bill No. 10,753 becomes a reality, when it warned that a mere danger or eventual risk would be sanctioned, without even a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment that reflects a deterioration, effect, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point, what was mentioned from the record of Bill 10,753, specifically at folio [Value 025] (image [Value 026]) when in the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as those circumstances 'affect the public service'.” She asserts that she does not administer, control, or dispose of the Judicial Branch's economic resources, so no type of bond is applicable to her on the grounds of her performance, nor does she issue final administrative acts. She argues that in her case applies “what the Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora said at the time, in the legislative discussion on that ground, that is, that I am in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State (-which does not apply to me-), that on the grounds of insolvency there is a certain loss of trust (-it has not been demonstrated to me, even more so in my judicial career if I have demonstrated to date my merit and suitability for my professional performance-) and that eventually I will have disposition of economic assets of the citizenry (does not apply to me).” She adds that there is a serious and latent effect on the protection of the family and legal certainty, since due to her condition as a woman head of household, the measure would generate the termination of her appointment, condemning her possibility of satisfying her needs and those of her son and her parents; furthermore, her creditors would no longer see their credits reimbursed due to the non-existence of a salary to which the retention is proportionally applied, since she has no attachable assets. She cites, in relation to the right to family protection, judgment No. [Value 097]. She indicates that: “Just as Article 56 of our Political Constitution provides, as a guarantee limit of the State on the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, points out, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, the right to work, and protection against unemployment, all without any discrimination, among others, for reasons of economic situation or position, as is my case. In that same sense, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labor Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, relating to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent both in State bodies and in private companies, situations that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the patrimony of every individual. From all this arises Law No. 2694, of November 22, 1960, that is, the Convention of the International Labor Organization on the prohibition of labor discrimination, in force to date, which prohibits \"[...] any kind of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, founded on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, parentage or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunities or treatment in matters of employment or occupation\". In that sense, note that the prohibition of this conventional control has a single exception, which is that defined in Article 2 of that same Law No. 2694 which establishes \"From the previous prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions or preferences based on the qualifications necessary for the adequate fulfillment of the functions or tasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to the nature of these and the conditions of the worker.\" Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, the discrimination materializes due to the exhaustive ground that generates the termination of appointment for mere convenience, for mere danger, or for an eventual risk, without effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge on the grounds of my judicial declaration of insolvency.” She concludes that the effect on her fundamental rights to protection of work, family, and legal certainty is latent, which concretizes discrimination based on her economic situation. She adds that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal did not even assess a slight risk level in her case, since had it been so, it would have applied the labor suspension as a precautionary measure in accordance with the power established in Article 202 of the same Law No. 7333, as it is a ground for termination of appointment. ii) “Violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the non-existence of effect on the public service or third parties, as well as the lack of verification of a serious fault, much less a most serious one, to the judicial public service in application of the due process itself. An act of good faith is sanctioned with the superior sacrifice of termination of appointment before an eventual risk not proven nor evaluated, as well as before a mere or apparent unfounded and unjustified institutional convenience.” She argues that the regulation challenged in this action of unconstitutionality causes a flagrant violation of the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and the principles that integrate the Law of the Constitution, since it is intended to take the judicial declaration of insolvency as a ground to prevent appointment in the judicial service, as well as to cease an official, without making further assessment or accreditation of damage or harm—real, causal, and objective—to the institutional framework of the Judicial Branch. She adds that said ground is applied for aspects of mere unjustified convenience, for criteria of an eventual risk, without any demonstration that there exists at least a slight, moderate, or serious inconvenience for the service provided by the Judicial Branch nor specifically the Planning Directorate. She maintains that the disciplinary application of such a ground does not consider whether it involves jurisdictional or administrative labor, nor are criteria that demonstrate the existence of any effect on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch assessed or applied. She refers that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal applies the ground as of full right, so that, in her case, without further assessment, the technical and testimonial evidence she offered was denied, which sought to demonstrate her performance, the existence or not of an effect on the public service, among others. Despite the foregoing, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal classified her as an official lacking probity, commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith; moreover, that a relationship of distrust exists, considering that the Judicial Branch "needs to have a guarantee that the person hired is honorable and responsible for their actions" and, therefore, the conduct is incompatible with the public function. She mentions that in order to give a reason for the disciplinary measure it applies, the tribunal classified the insolvency as a most serious fault incompatible with public service and made unproven assessments in violation of my due process. She argues that "culpability" is generated for her by promoting in good faith the application of an institution contemplated in the legal order. She insists that insolvency—except if declared fraudulent—is not a crime that generates her disqualification from public positions, nor is it a sanction such that it results in the termination of her appointment. She points out that "culpability" is generated for her without assessing her “innocence” regarding the effect on the services, goals, or objectives of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of possible or eventual risks due to the management or disposition of public resources. She refers that she would be punitively disciplined with the termination of her appointment, violating her “fundamental right to innocence.” She argues that the challenged rules contravene the constitutional parameters and principles warned, as well as “that of congruence, which is required by the very parameter of legal certainty and due process.” She reiterates that only in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and in the Civil Registry is the declaration of insolvency contemplated in aspects of appointments; however, it is provided under a parameter of "excusable (excusable)", which allows the operator of the rule to assess precisely the reasons for the declaration of insolvency, the economic-financial condition of the person, and the existence or not of fraudulent insolvency, in order to thereby assess the eventual effect on the public service, or, the "existence of a serious or most serious fault in the judicial public service." She partially cites ruling No. [Value 098] of this Chamber, in relation to good faith as a principle of the Law of the Constitution. She mentions that she, through her twenty-three years of service path in the Judicial Branch, applies the highest ethical standards, as well as the values of the institution, which she intended to accredit through the testimonial evidence that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected on the basis that \"[...] they do not relate to what was alleged in the notification of charges, note that in this disciplinary sanctioning procedure, the causes that led to the accused's declaration of insolvency are not under discussion, that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. Neither is any non-compliance in the exercise of her position being reproached, such that the testimonial evidence offered is rejected [...]\". She denotes that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal considers the procedure as one of pure law (puro derecho), without considering other aspects in the service relationship. She affirms that she managed the declaration of insolvency on her own account, which underpins her good faith in the financial solution and the payment of creditors. She reiterates that in the notification of charges, no reference was made to the transgression of institutional ethical standards or values on the grounds of the judicial declaration of insolvency and the “effect on the judicial service, the institutional image or the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, nor of the existence of a serious or most serious fault in the judicial public service on that account, all because it is non-existent.” She presents three disciplinary cases of judicial officials. She states that the rules being challenged seem to punish the existence of a "loss of trust (pérdida de confianza)", on the grounds of the judicial declaration of insolvency; however, the objective loss of trust exists because good faith, performance, and fidelity that the employee owes to their employer are compared, in such a way that it is founded and demonstrated—congruently and proportionally—that, with the employee's conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, which makes it conclude that it is impossible to continue with the employment relationship. She cites judgments Nos. [Value 044], [Value 045], [Value 046] and [Value 047] of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in relation to the objective loss of trust. She argues that if the judicial declaration of insolvency is intended to sustain the “loss of trust (pérdida de confianza)” for the Judicial Branch with the consequence of the termination of appointment, being a disciplinary sanctioning matter, the legal norm must accredit in its content the constitutional parameter of serious, causal, reasonable, and objective culpability of the official vis-à-vis the service and public interest, in such a way that it accredits a real impossibility in the continuity of the employment, or, that it excuses the judicial employee for "lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of the public position." iii) “Violation of the Right to Privacy (Intimidad), Human Dignity and the Pro-Homine Principle. Non-existence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in the face of the superior sacrifice it involves, without there being an effect on the public service, nor on the institutional framework, nor on the image of the Judicial Branch, or, a demonstration of the existence of a serious fault, much less a most serious one, in the judicial public service on the grounds of insolvency.” She mentions that the right to privacy and human dignity in the face of discrimination has been developed by this Chamber and by international regulations and jurisprudence on human rights matters. She indicates that these rights are treated as a form of protection for the person. She cites excerpts from rulings Nos. [Value 048], [Value 049], [Value 050], [Value 051], [Value 052], [Value 053], [Value 054], [Value 055], and [Value 056]. She points out that it was through an act of good faith, with the exclusive aim of seeking a solution to her economic-financial situation, that she managed the declaration of insolvency. She reiterates the argument related to numeral 28 of the Political Constitution and the lack of harm to the Judicial Branch. She considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles that result in the termination of appointment does not have a legitimate purpose of the sanction, which affects the fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity, generating additionally a high level of discrimination due to the economic situation. She argues that the foregoing would have repercussions on the people who depend on her. She partially cites ruling No. [Value 057], in relation to the principle of legitimate purpose. She explains that with the present action of unconstitutionality she does not intend to ignore the power and faculties of direction, oversight, and sanction of the Judicial Branch regarding its administrative service relationship; however, there must be respect for her fundamental rights, since it is necessary that objective and reasonable sanctioning elements be accredited for its imposition, all of this in the face of the effective verification of a serious or most serious fault, the effect on the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or an eventual risk; that is, a ground without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes her years of service in the Judicial Branch, with consequences on her privacy and dignity, as she would be treated as if she had committed some criminal activity or a serious or most serious infraction. She mentions that “the spirit of the legislator permeated in the record of Bill 10,753, when in its legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as those circumstances 'affect the public service', a situation that is not my case.” She maintains that the challenged regulation, in the face of the rights to privacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle (principio pro homine), must be applied in the way that most favors the human being. She partially transcribes the rulings of this Chamber Nos. [Value 058], [Value 059] and [Value 060]. She explains that all restrictive and sanctioning measures, as well as those for termination of appointment, must cautiously respect human dignity, the protection of privacy, and the principle of proportionality, all under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual damage is assessed. She argues that, in her case, the insolvency situation was generated by a marital relationship that led to many credits in her name in order to mitigate poor economic management, which finally ended with the breakdown of the bond. She adds that, on the occasion of the foregoing, the psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a Professional of the Medical Service of Employees of the Judicial Branch, determined that she was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial, as it was a systematic type of abuse, causing her to feel minimized as a woman and a person. She argues that there is a binding gender aspect, as a real and excusable cause for the evaluation of what ultimately caused her to take the decision to manage the judicial declaration of insolvency, which she did for her own human dignity and that of those who depend on her. She refers that it would have been very easy for her to let judicial collection cases be generated for those credits, since she has no attachable assets nor could her salary withstand more limitations. She states that voluntarily resorting to the civil route to be judicially declared insolvent has generated in her person and family members, emotional and depressive repercussions and, even, the re-victimization of the psychological and emotional aggression experienced. She asserts that she mentions the foregoing because the Judicial Branch adopted the “Gender Equality Policy (Política de Igualdad de Género)” so that the gender perspective would be incorporated into all the work of that Branch of the Republic. She mentions that what was stated is supported “in the legal framework for the protection of human rights, both at the national and international level, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights of equality without discrimination of any kind, of protection of the law, of access to prompt and complete justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that make up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica.” She adds that such policy “recognized that \"Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when the circumstances are different, that is, when people are unequally situated\", likewise that \"The principle of equity impels judges, as well as all legal operators, to take into account with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider the personal, family and social conditions in each of the cases and their consequences\", a situation that is not being applied on the grounds of the unconstitutional content invoked through this action.” She notes that the policy aims to “guarantee equality of opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Judicial Branch.\" She explains that “that Gender Equality Policy was based on the 'Brasilia Rules on Access to Justice for Persons in Conditions of Vulnerability', under which rule 19 says that: \"Violence against women is considered any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, harm, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to the woman, both in the public and private spheres, through the use of physical or psychological violence\". It can be noted, therefore, that this situation of vulnerability caused by that psychological violence proven by the same medical authorities in the psychological field of the Judicial Branch, accredits a circumstance that requires an assessment for protection and gender equality, considering my personal, family and social condition and its consequences.” iv) “Violation of the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Non-existence of suitable connection and congruence between the conduct it regulates, the seriousness of the disciplinary sanction, and the superior sacrifice it involves. Existence of discrimination on the grounds of my economic situation.” She mentions that in the face of the violation of the fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Political Constitution and the Law of the Constitution that have been invoked as the basis for this action of unconstitutionality against Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9), specifically regarding the invocation of the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for not making the appointment of a judicial servant, as well as to provide for the disciplinary ground of termination of appointment, there also exists a violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness of the consequent termination of appointment. She notes that these rules lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements of assessment, congruence, balance, and connection with the essential content of the sanctioning law. She adds that in its application, the factual scenario, the personal conditions of the judicial servant are not analyzed in order to determine an excusable situation, the respective sacrifice that the measure involves, and the consequent ground for termination of appointment on the grounds of the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency, all of the above, in the face of the existence or not of an effect on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch, as well as on its institutional image or the prevailing public interest on the grounds of the performance of the position. She refers that a serious or most serious fault in the judicial public service is also not accredited to apply the ground. She cites rulings of this Chamber Nos. [Value 061] and [Value 062], in relation to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

He submits that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the challenged regulations in order to define and substantiate the existence of a violation of the fundamental rights invoked. He adds that the test contains the three sub-principles that function as rules to be taken into account, in the sense that they are maxims against which to question; that is, it must be verified whether the chosen means satisfies the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, in which case, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. He maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, in light of which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of States Parties to adopt the internal measures necessary to adapt their conduct and regulations to conventional parameters. He mentions the following: “Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and purpose of the challenged norms, we must ask ourselves a question: is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most severe disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of a Judicial Branch official who has been judicially declared insolvent in order to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, that they are charged with in the Judicial Branch? The performance of the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing, because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of regulations that tend to limit fundamental rights, or else, to generate the application of a punitive measure in disciplinary matters.” He sets forth the analysis as follows: “a.) As the first element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus its purpose,' that is, its adequacy, suitability, and efficacy. In that sense, the means employed by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed purpose, meaning, it establishes that the chosen means be the most suitable to the factual possibilities, taking into account the purpose to be achieved. There must be a judgment of congruence and practical connection between the means and the immediate purpose of the norm, given that, if that purpose is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case at hand, we are faced with Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of Law No. 7333, which establish, for what is relevant here, respectively, the prohibition on appointment to judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared insolvent; likewise, the ground for termination of appointment of those serving in judicial posts, for the same reason, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. As stated in this action, and because these legal norms do not expressly or implicitly state their purpose, the assessment of the legislative discussion put forward by the Joint Legislative Committee that reviewed and defined the final wording of Bill No. 10.753 for what is now Law No. 7333 must be considered for these purposes, (—which was already noted above—), as a defining element of that legislative intent regarding said ground. In that sense, the purpose provided for those legal norms challenged through this avenue is considered to be precautionary, based on an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, a member at the time of said Joint Legislative Committee, it was stated that “[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because at the end of the day we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent there, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his own economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal, the management of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]”, that being the foundation and/or criterion for leaving as final the text ultimately approved for those legal norms. The means used by said norms to obtain that purpose is, on the one hand (—Article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (—Article 26, subsection 9.—), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same ground, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. In this regard, it must be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, that ground is related in its wording, for the proportionality means explained, to other grounds linked to convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment and those who are subject to a penalty of debarment from holding public office or employment. In light of the foregoing, in my case, as is palpable and is accredited in the file of civil insolvency case No. [Value 002], the Civil Court of Cartago, in Judgment No. [Value 063] through which it declared my state of insolvency, only orders that I am legally separated and inhibited from the power to administer and dispose of the assets belonging to me that are legally seizable, and I am warned not to abandon my domicile or leave the country without judicial authorization, under warning of being prosecuted for disobedience to authority, but it never orders that, by reason of the insolvency, I be debarred from holding public office or employment. Additionally, and as I already mentioned above, the criminal case initiated ex officio by regulatory mandate, on occasion of the declaration of insolvency, aimed at investigating whether I incurred in the crime of fraudulent insolvency, was filed by the prosecutor's office, due to the non-existence of any determination of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions classified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Value 004] for complaint No. [Value 005] of unique case file number [Value 006]. With what has been indicated, it is evident that the means employed by those legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and incapable of achieving the proposed purpose, because the fact of considering that a person in a state of insolvency, judicially declared, is without merit for the judicial function, so much so that it generates, for those already working, the termination of their appointment, signifies the casuistic and banal application of an apparent and unjustified loss of trust, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege punitive application with the maximum sacrifice borne by the employee for an eventual, unproven, and merely risky situation, mere danger or convenience, without there being an effective, real, and objective assessment of the institutional purpose, of a general nature, which is the public service. I insist again, this aspect was also not assessed by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, furthermore, it rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I proposed for those purposes, in which I could demonstrate the causes that motivated my economic-financial situation, as well as my institutional performance of an administrative, non-jurisdictional nature. Added to the foregoing is that the spirit of the legislator foresaw that ground due to a possible use of resources by the judicial official in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of purely jurisdictional work, and not of an administrative order, which —as in my case— does not administer, safeguard, dispose of, control, nor guard any public funds, and moreover, does not serve the public, nor does any conflict resolution depend on that administrative management. Therefore, the first parameter of this test can be considered to result in the disproportionality of the norm, because there is no congruence between the means and the immediate purpose of the norm in adherence to the parameter mandated by constitutional law, since, although it can be thought that preventing an appointment and the termination of appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated purpose, the counterpart to it, i.e., the restriction without verification of its excusable and innocent nature, in the face of the superior sacrifice it generates, violating the stated parameters, causes the alleged disproportionality, even more so if one considers, as in the case that concerns me, that for the application of that disciplinary punitive measure, it is not assessed whether or not there is an affectation to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutional nature of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morality, or to third parties, nor whether or not there is a serious or very serious offense to the judicial public service, on account of the ground. b.) As the second element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation.' In that sense, it is assessed whether that means is needed to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the optimization mandate of the most benign means, through which it must be verified if the purpose cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For these purposes, different means must be compared, in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation. In light of the foregoing, excess in the measure is condemned because the urgent or imperative nature demands the sacrifice provided by the norm. With respect to the norms challenged through this unconstitutionality action, it was already stated in point a.) above of this test, that the means they employ to obtain that normative purpose is, on the one hand (—Article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (—Article 26, subsection 9.—), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same ground, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means in relation to the need to realize the regulation, verifying alternatives adhering to the parameters of constitutional law, by reason of the sacrifice generated or that may be generated precisely by that need for regulation. It goes without saying that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent necessity must assess the diversity of situations that may arise according to each specific case, as is precisely the case of whether the person works in a position with jurisdictional or administrative work. In my case, I have already indicated that I am a judicial official, whose profile and functions as Coordinator were detailed above, with service work exceeding 23 years, in which I have never been disciplinary sanctioned, and under which, I have had an impeccable record (sic), which even led to receiving with great honor the Certificate of Judicial Merit in the year 2015. Likewise, I reiterate that in the exercise of my functions of an administrative, non-jurisdictional nature, I do not administer, I do not safeguard, I do not control, I do not dispose of, nor guard any public funds, and moreover, I do not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict before third parties depend on my administrative management, nor do I issue final administrative acts nor serve the public; moreover, it is evident to my superiors, whom I offer as evidence before Your Authority because the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected that evidence from me, in the sense that I perform professional work in accordance with institutional requirements, and in adherence to the ethical and moral values expected and required of a judicial official. The situation of insolvency came upon my life, for the causes already set forth, and under which there even exists a medical-psychological criterion accrediting that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial aggression, as it involved systematic abuse, a gender-related aspect, as the real and excusable cause that ultimately caused me to have to make the decision to be judicially declared insolvent. In the administrative procedure conducted by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the existence of applying the termination of appointment by reason of a need for regulation, based on proven facts of loss of trust or any other circumstance, which would suppose that it is due to a supposed or apparent affectation, at least slight, to the prevailing public service and that it is, by principle of causality, on account of my judicial declaration of insolvency, is not assessed, analyzed, or defined; Rather, the procedure is opened, directly and expressly assuming the ground, stating that “[...] I lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch, as established in numeral 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [...]” as the central and sole element of the imputation of charges that was notified to me, without it ever being determined the verification of the existence of a serious or very serious offense to the judicial public service, on account of the insolvency. It would be punished as the only alternative, with the most serious sacrifice of the disciplinary power, that is, the termination of appointment for a mere risk or supposed danger, an eventual institutional convenience, which has no causal, objective, or real basis or foundation in relation to the public service, nor the image and institutional nature of the Judicial Branch, nor in relation to a third party, even more so when it generates a high level of discrimination based on my economic situation, being a regulatory provision, apparently neutral, but susceptible to implying a severe particular disadvantage without a reasonable and legitimate objective or justification in light of binding national and international human rights law, that is, it is not determined —under any circumstance or criterion— that the permanence of a person judicially declared insolvent is seriously inconvenient for the judicial service, such that the need for regulation only results in said termination of appointment. I highlight again that, at the level of labor courts, and as an example is case file [Value 011], the competent judge of the case granted early precautionary measures arguing that the Judicial Branch has indicated, through the Court, “the parameter for disciplining. If the magistrates have been treated with a soft hand, a more humble judicial official does not deserve a harsh hand [...] if the conduct of the high judges, known throughout the country, affecting the Judicial image, did not merit revocation of appointment, it is unjust to punish the petitioner more severely [...also indicating] A new paradigm has been created by the Chinchilla Sandí et al. case, from which a healthier, less repressive disciplinary regime is extracted, which allows for lesser sanctions and where the revocation of appointment is reserved for very serious cases [...]”. As a primary element for this proportionality test, we also highlight what was already mentioned above regarding the recent proceeding [Value 012], followed against [Name 013], at the time Assistant Prosecutor, for the cause of negligence in the service of his functions, in which the Judicial Inspection Tribunal sanctioned him WITH ONE MONTH WITHOUT ENJOYMENT OF SALARY, CLASSIFYING THE OFFENSE AS SERIOUS, for collaborating with the then Attorney General in the processing of judicial files against members of the supreme branches of government, an act that was publicly known and that caused the dismissal of the case for influence peddling against former deputies Víctor Morales and Otto Guevara Guth in favor of the Chinese cement importer, [Name 014]. As can be noted, for that cause, which had repercussions on the institutional nature and image of the Judicial Branch, as well as on third parties, and which was classified as serious for corresponding to the negligent exercise of functions, it was sanctioned with a disciplinary measure less than the termination of appointment. In the same sense, and for purposes of proportionality of punitive measures, is disciplinary cause number [Value 013] heard against [Name 015], Family Judge of the Courts of Goicoechea, commented on above, who was charged with negligence in the exercise of her position and non-compliance with functions, in which the Full Court considered that the administration of justice and its structure could be the cause of the delays attributed, even if it were demonstrated that in at least two cases there was negligence in her actions and consequently a direct affectation to the citizenry. The question then is: what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that should be applied in the case of a judicial declaration of insolvency where there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of a serious or very serious classification against the public service, nor against the image or institutional nature of the Judicial Branch? Is it proportionate to prevent the appointment of a person and, —on the other hand— the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared insolvent, in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of a serious or very serious classification against the public service, nor against the image or institutional nature of the Judicial Branch? We insist, legal norms, and especially punitive ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. In light of the foregoing, the application of the norms challenged as unconstitutional is clearly disproportionate. The punitive means is excessive in relation to the urgent or imperative character demanding the sacrifice provided by the norm, even more so, —as has already been stated and demonstrated— when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutional nature of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morality, or to third parties. In my case, I need the job, not only for the satisfaction of the immediate basic needs of those who depend on me, and my own personal needs, but also because the salary I receive is the only means by which the payment to my creditors will be generated, in accordance with the judicial regulation specific to the insolvency process, which was the very objective for which I initiated said judicial process. Therefore, it is apparent that the norms challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever performs the punitive function has suitable regulatory means for the various specific cases, in which there may exist, as in mine, exempting grounds of responsibility so as to justify the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment, and rather, to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring in punitive and regulatory excess of a disciplinary nature. I do not ignore, —nor do I intend to—, the control and oversight powers that my employer possesses, for which I am willing to have my professional performance as a servant of the Judicial Branch in Public Administration assigned to the Planning Directorate functionally audited, so that it can be accredited whether or not there is any affectation to the judicial service on account of, or causally due to, my judicial declaration of insolvency, or else, whether there is a real and objective risk or inconvenience that generates the application of the disciplinary punitive measure, due to the existence of a serious or very serious offense in the exercise of my functions on occasion of the ground under discussion. c.) As the third and final element of the proportionality test it is relevant to apply, we find the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit,' that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. Against that, the sacrifice, —as a cost—, is compared against the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit, and that alternative must be the least restrictive or least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to take into account three issues: the structure of the norm and its weighting, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close links are raised. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or affectation of one of the principles, the greater the importance of the satisfaction of the other must be. To do this, the legal interests or rights in conflict must be identified, in order to determine the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the higher hierarchy of the legal interest, to determine if a relationship or balance exists between them. In the case at hand, it was already mentioned in point a.) above of this test that the means employed by the norms challenged through this avenue to obtain that normative purpose is, on the one hand (—Article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent, and on the other (—Article 26, subsection 9—), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same ground, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. It must be understood, then, that the nature of the structure of the norm is mandatory and punitive in nature. In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means in relation to the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice implied by the punitive measure of termination of appointment, compared to the benefit or advantage obtained by the Judicial Branch with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all of this in relation to the purpose pursued by the norm. We have already stated previously that the purpose provided for those challenged legal norms is precautionary in nature, based on an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all of this based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the ground that involved the bill for what is now Law No. 7333, in which the Joint Legislative Committee that confirmed maintaining said grounds, relied on the criterion of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, who said that: “[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because at the end of the day we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent there, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his own economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal, the management of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]” (—folios [Value 040] (images [Value 064] of Bill No. 10.753—). It must be clarified again that this discussion arose because the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration issued an opinion on the scope of that ground of insolvency stating that “[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, are not to be taken as grounds to dismiss a judicial servant, if this is permitted, it would mean punishing for a mere danger [...]” [—folio [Value 082] [image [Value 065] of Bill No. 10.753—). It has also been stated that, in my case, there has been no procedure whatsoever on the part of the Judicial Branch that values, analyzes, and thereby defines the existence or non-existence of an affectation, even slight, to the prevailing judicial public service, to the image or institutional nature of the Judicial Branch, the existence of a serious or very serious offense to the judicial public service, and that this is, by the principle of causality, on account of my judicial declaration of insolvency; rather, the opening of the procedure conducted by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal was simply ordered, directly and expressly assuming the ground, stating that “[...] I lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch, as established in numeral 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [...]”, as the central and sole element of the imputation of charges notified to me, rejecting the testimonial and technical evidence that I proposed for those purposes with my material defense, that is, to apply, per se, the termination of appointment, without demonstrating a need for regulation, through proven facts of loss of trust or other circumstance, that demonstrates some affectation to the Institution, or else, due to the existence of a serious or very serious offense to the judicial public service, on occasion of the ground being challenged. Why do I insistently mention the foregoing? Because, given that there is no affectation, not even slight, to the judicial service due to my professional performance of an administrative nature, nor even an administrative procedure aimed at that demonstration or the existence of a serious or very serious offense on account of the same, but rather the direct mandatory application of the termination of appointment, for a mere danger, an eventual risk, or mere unfounded convenience, it would mean that the ground, in the public purpose it pursues, has no real or objective benefit or advantage for the Judicial Branch, much less is the sacrifice implied for my person by the termination of appointment equitable or proportionate, the judicial declaration of insolvency being an act promoted by me, as an act of good faith, not only to improve my economic-financial condition caused mainly by psychological and/or emotional aggression as well as patrimonial and gender-based aggression already explained, but also to responsibly pay, through the judicial control required by that process, my creditors. Without wishing to boast, it also means that, by not considering the least restrictive or least burdensome alternative, the sanction generates, in addition, the loss for the Judicial Branch of a human resource with experience in the judicial service of more than 23 years of service and who, as evidenced in the evidence requested by the same Judicial Inspection Tribunal from the Human Resources Directorate, has no disciplinary sanctions during my years of service. Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged norms, we have no objection, as it coincides with legal theory regarding their means of creation, i.e., by law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. However, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in Judgment of February 24, 2011, Gelman Case Vs. Uruguay: “[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect for International Law, including International Human Rights Law, which has been so considered even by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain facts or acts in a society is limited by the international norms and obligations for the protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so that the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by its formal as well as substantive characteristics, for which reason, particularly in cases of serious violations of the norms of International Human Rights Law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the majority rule, that is, to the sphere of what is 'susceptible to be decided' by the majorities in democratic instances, in which a 'conventionality control' must also prevail [...], which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judicial Branch [...]”.

In that same vein, regarding the legitimacy of internal regulations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Judgment of November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco vs. Mexico, ordered: "[...] For this Tribunal, it is not only the suppression or issuance of norms in domestic law that guarantees the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation comprised in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of State practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not in itself guarantee that its application is adequate. It is necessary that the application of norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of state public order, are adjusted to the same purpose pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]". Having reached this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for the purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of conventionality control, on the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights—as is the case of Costa Rica—its judges and public authorities in general are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of this binding international regulation is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object, and purpose. In this regard, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has indicated that authorities must not only exercise control of constitutionality but also "conventionality control" ex officio, whose function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the claimants in each specific case. (…) This Honorable Constitutional Chamber, in its jurisprudence and based on the principle of effectiveness, has recognized this conventionality control as a binding parameter for the resolution of specific cases in which a violation of fundamental human rights such as those alleged through this action may be evidenced. In this respect, it has stated: "[...] The principle of international law *effet utile* requires the State, in the interpretation and application of human rights treaties, and of those that are non-self-executing, to encourage all organs of the state apparatus to generate lasting effects in the domestic order in accordance with the international obligations acquired, so that the necessary measures must be taken as a whole, to ensure that the terms of an international agreement have effects in harmony with domestic law. This is followed by cooperation mechanisms between States and international organizations, and monitoring of the compatibility of domestic legislation with that of international conventions." ( -Voto No [Valor 099]) For the very application of this conventionality control, it is fitting to mention the cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, named as: Canese vs. Paraguay (31-8-2004), Kimel vs. Argentina (2-5-2008), Usón Rramirez (sic) vs. Venezuela (20-11-2009), and Fontevecchia y D´Amico vs. Argentina (29-11-2011). For the respective ruling in each case, that Inter-American Court applied the proportionality test alluded to, in which it has indicated for each of its elements: a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus its end," meaning its suitability and effectiveness, it has been indicated that the suitable or legitimate purpose, while present in all cases (whether a punishment or a civil indemnity), it is clarified that this does not imply that the mentioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportionate (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that a measure being suitable means that it serves to safeguard the legal interest that is intended to be protected, that is, that it is capable of contributing to the realization of said objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 53-). b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation," it has indicated with reference to the requirement of necessity, that it must serve an imperative public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least extent possible, as well as the condition that it must not limit more than what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48-, and Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 43-). c.) With respect to the third and last element of the proportionality test, that is, the “Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit,” meaning proportionality stricto sensu, both in Kimel -paras. 83 to 94- and in Usón Ramírez -paras. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the weighing structure when evaluating: on one hand, the degree of affectation of a right or principle—what we have understood as the means—, and on the other, the importance of the satisfaction of the other right or principle—what we have known as the cost-benefit—, against which, it analyzes the sacrifice involved. With this, the Court verifies whether the adopted measure—sanction—broadly guaranteed the right that was intended to be protected, without rendering nugatory the right that is limited and its consequent sacrifice. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the norms challenged through this action of unconstitutionality coincides with the parameters established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, determining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, or objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulation with its imperative exhaustiveness, making it disproportionate and consequently irrational, all of this in light of the sacrifice it involves. By reason of the foregoing, it can be conclusively concluded that the legal norms challenged by this means are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory based on my economic situation, thus violating my invoked fundamental rights. I request this Honorable Chamber to carefully analyze my situation against the challenged regulatory content, based on the factual and legal justification alleged in this action of unconstitutionality.” The petitioner establishes the following: “For the reasons indicated, and based on the doctrine, criteria, and jurisprudence invoked, which adequately substantiate and demonstrate the violation of fundamental rights in accordance with the content of our Political Constitution, in its Articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56, that is, the rights and principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction due to the nonexistence of a connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice it involves, Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle due to the nonexistence of a legitimate purpose for the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in light of the sacrifice it involves without there being an impact on the public service or proof of a serious or very serious fault, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the nonexistence of an impact on the public service, punishing a potential risk that was neither proven nor evaluated, as well as based on a mere unjustified convenience, and violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Certainty, for an act carried out in the exercise of my autonomy of will, I respectfully request this estimable Constitutional Chamber the following: i.) That this action of unconstitutionality be admitted for analysis and legal processing against Articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.1 of Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Power, of May 5, 1993, within the scope of their content as set forth. ii.) That this action be granted and Articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Power, of May 5, 1993, be declared unconstitutional, within the scope of their content as set forth, that is, regarding the specific reference to the cause for judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason to prevent appointment as a judicial officer and, especially, as a cause for termination of appointment in the judicial service, which is considered, by action and omission, to infringe upon the referenced constitutional and conventional norms and principles. iii.) That the corresponding Judicial Authorities be instructed to suspend as a precautionary measure—of an instrumental and provisional nature—any type of administrative act, as a final act, tending to define the application of the disciplinary sanctioning cause of termination of appointment as a judicial officer against my person as final procedural acts in their appellate stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies, until such time as Your Authority rules as appropriate under law. The foregoing, with high priority or urgent nature, and with a view to preserving my legal certainty with respect to my rights and legitimate interests, and thereby preventing the Superior Council of this Judicial Power as an administrative body from ruling definitively applying the norm invoked, thus causing potential injuries to my fundamental rights and causing difficult or impossible reparation, as well as to the direct efficacy of the very principle of constitutional supremacy. The foregoing is based on Article 41 of the Political Constitution, Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and the jurisprudence that Your Authority has issued on the matter of precautionary measures (such as Ruling No. [Valor 066] and concordant ones) which encompasses the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the judgment on the merits, as an essential function of precautionary protection. With the factual and legal scopes invoked in this action, the prerequisites for this request are met, namely the appearance of good law —fumus boni iuris— and the danger in delay —periculum in mora— and extreme urgency, based on its guiding criteria of adequacy, suitability of the measure, and necessity, all under the protection of the constitutional and conventional rights that have been invoked in this action. iv.) That the legally required hearing be granted to the Attorney General's Office. v.) That the legal edicts be published. vi.) That the State be ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses." 2.- By resolution of 3:36 p.m. on October 26, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber requested the President of the Superior Council of the Judicial Power for case file No. [Valor 001] corresponding to the disciplinary proceedings being processed against the petitioner.

3.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:21 p.m. on November 1, 2018, Fernando Cruz Castro, in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Power, appeared. In compliance with the resolution of 3:36 p.m. on August 26, 2018, he provided a certification of case file No. [Valor 001].

4.- By resolution of 10:12 a.m. on November 7, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber warned the petitioner to attach the stamp of the Costa Rican Bar Association.

5.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:02 p.m. on November 8, 2018, the petitioner indicated that she had provided the respective stamp on October 24, 2018; however, she provided it again at that time.

6.- By resolution of 2:17 p.m. on November 9, 2018, the action filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Articles 12 and 26 subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power was processed. On the occasion of the foregoing, a hearing was granted to the Attorney General of the Republic and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice. Likewise, it was ordered that the action was admitted for meeting the requirements contemplated in Articles 73 through 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and that the petitioner's standing derived from the first paragraph of Article 75 of that same regulatory body. Similarly, it was recorded that the underlying matter was disciplinary proceedings No. [Valor 001], which is in the stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in editions No. 234, 235, and 236 of the days December 17, 18, and 19, 2018, of the Judicial Bulletin.

8.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 5:05 p.m. on November 27, 2018, Carmen María Escoto Fernández, in her capacity as Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Power, appeared. She indicates that the petitioner requests that the following articles be declared unconstitutional: “Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements required by law, to enter the judicial service one must be mentally and physically qualified to perform the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a final order for the opening of trial has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by prison sentence; those subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, such that they may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (Thus reformed by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) ARTICLE 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial positions cease for: (…) 9. Having been convicted, in a final judgment, for a crime that deserves a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions, and for having been judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent." Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. She points out that the petitioner bases the action on disciplinary cause No. [Valor 001] which is in an appellate state before the Superior Council of the Judicial Power and that, additionally, she claims that Article 12 of the aforementioned law establishes not only the requirements that a person must meet to enter the judicial service but also defines a series of causes that prohibit appointment, among them, having been judicially declared insolvent. She argues that, as alleged by the petitioner, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, by vote No. [Valor 018] of 1:41 p.m. on October 4, 2018, imposed the sanction of revocation of appointment on her, according to Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. She adds that in the resolution initiating the proceedings, the following charges were imputed: “(…) Having been judicially declared insolvent, (Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power)”; also that "(...) upon having been declared insolvent, you [Name 001] lost a condition to be an official of the Judicial Power as established by Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power." She states that this is properly the direct application of Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power and not of Article 12 of that regulatory body. She adds that when Article 12 refers to the inability to appoint persons judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent, it must be understood as referring to the requirements for entering the judicial service, so it does not apply to persons who already hold an appointment in the institution and against whom disciplinary proceedings are being pursued for those reasons, because there is a specific norm for that—Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power—as the resolutions of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal were grounded. She asserts that admitting the action against an article that has no relation to the underlying matter raised in the action would mean distorting the system's own challenge regime. She mentions that since the prerequisite established in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is not met, the action filed by [Name 001] must be summarily dismissed as manifestly inadmissible (Article 9 of the cited legal body). She maintains that, should the action not be summarily dismissed regarding Article 12, the petitioner's allegations are rejected based on the following arguments: "As indicated in the first section of this report, the petitioner seeks to have Article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power annulled as unconstitutional, by virtue of the fact that in her view the cause of insolvency as a reason for being appointed or for declaring the termination of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it does not align with the comprehensive regulatory framework of the disciplinary matter governed by Law 7333, as a whole, which would demonstrate a serious impact on the judicial service. Furthermore, the petitioner considers that there is also no existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service as a fundamental element for the sanctioning application of the challenged cause. She insists that allowing this cause would mean punishing a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience. However, for the resolution of the action before us, it is important to take into account that the remission to that norm originates from a disciplinary power that the legislator conferred upon the Judicial Power, since the legislator's intention at all times was to ensure the proper functioning of the administration of justice and in safeguarding the public interest, which in the case of this institution contains some particularities in relation to other powers of the Republic, because users place their trust in judicial officers for the resolution of their conflicts. Thus, persons declared insolvent (sic) may have a conflict of interest in relation to the users of the judicial system, as expounded by former Supreme Court of Justice Magistrate Daniel González Álvarez, in the presentation to the 1993 edition (General reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Power introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993) where he pointed out that '(...) there is a matter of public faith there, a person who has not been capable of managing their affairs and later intends to opt to enter the Judicial Service regime is not convenient. Above all if there has been fraudulent bankruptcy, that is, a criminal offense has been incurred'; it is clear then that this article refers only to persons trying to enter employment with the Judicial Power, that it could also be considered under criteria of “suitability” broadly developed by the Constitutional Chamber itself, a person who has been declared bankrupt or insolvent lacks the conditions to perform their work efficiently since, as expressed by former Magistrate González, 'it is almost a civil death.' Don Daniel continues: 'A person in that state practically has no legal faculties even to contract obligations precisely because of the provisions of the Civil Code that do not allow them to acquire any type of obligations, or sign any contract, that is, civil death is from the legal point of view...' (Minutes No. 98 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission of Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the fourteenth day of November of nineteen ninety, Folios [Valor 100] and [Valor 101]); hence the basis of the norm is to prevent entry into the judicial function of persons who present that condition and that far from violating the rights protected in Articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as indicated by Ms. [Name 001], its purpose is to protect the interests of those who require the services of the Judicial Power, which justifies the challenged restriction, which is a requirement that must be met by those who seek to provide their services in this institution in accordance with Articles 191 and 192 of our constitutional norm, which highlights suitability as an indispensable requirement for a public officer to perform optimally in a public office or position." Thus, the Honorable Constitutional Chamber, in resolution number [Valor 102] of two thirty in the afternoon on July thirty-first, two thousand twelve, expressed: "ON THE PROVEN SUITABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, public officers shall be appointed based on proven suitability, which requires the objective verification of their qualities. This means that the public officer must meet certain characteristics and qualities which may be validly established and regulated by law, provided they are objective and reasonable. Suitability must be proven not only through purely academic aspects; rather, it requires the analysis and qualification of various elements, factors, or conditions of diverse nature, such as psychological aspects of stability, work and professional experience, and other credentials that, evaluated as a whole, determine that a person is the most suitable for the position. In this way, the public officer will demonstrate that they meet all the necessary conditions that empower them to perform optimally in the public office or position, that is; that they possess the merits that the function demands. The foregoing has the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency and proper functioning of the public function, besides maximizing and protecting public resources. In that sense, it is necessary to remember that the public officer is a servant of the administered in general, and therefore must look after the interests of the community and, hence, provide quality service to each administered individual as a representative of the community" (emphasis is not from the original). To further elaborate, Deputy Pacheco Salazar, in the discussion of motion number [Valor 103], of the Permanent Commission of Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly, stated that: "The appointment requirements must be broader, and of course, any employer, not just the Court, has that right to choose what suits them best. That is why in Article 12, in that second paragraph, it says that 'persons prosecuted with an order for trial elevation, trial summons may not be appointed. Those convicted of a crime punishable by prison sentence, those who were subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public office or positions...(continues reading).' That is, it establishes a series of entry requirements which, of course, the Court, at the time of choosing an official, can impose those and many more, because it is not going to appoint an insolvent person, a bankrupt, a disqualified person... (Emphasis is not from the original). (Minutes No. 7 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission of Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the twenty-first day of May of nineteen ninety-one, Folio [Valor 104]). Based on the foregoing, the questioned norm conforms to the guarantee of 'efficiency of the Administration' referred to in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, as a prerequisite for accessing public positions, translated into the need for the services provided by the State to be executed by those officers who can guarantee efficiency in the Administration." Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power. She indicates that the petitioner maintains that this norm violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality recognized in the Political Constitution, regarding the disciplinary sanction due to the lack of connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice it involves; in addition to the alleged violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle, due to the “nonexistence of a legitimate purpose for the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in light of the sacrifice it involves without there being an impact on the public service or proof of a serious or very serious fault, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the nonexistence of an impact on the public service, punishing an eventual risk that was neither proven nor evaluated, as well as based on a mere unjustified convenience, and violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Certainty for an act carried out in the exercise of the autonomy of will.” She adds that she considers that “it was warned within the legislative proceedings of the bill in which the cited norm was discussed, that allowing this cause would mean punishing a mere danger or a simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration against decisions of necessity that involve aspects of her private life.” She expounds, regarding what was alleged by the petitioner, that the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency imposes a series of conditions on the failed person, depending on each case, from interdiction of administering their assets or dispossession of assets, closure of current accounts, loss of legal faculties to contract obligations or sign contracts, among others; in each case, the declaration comes as a consequence of the debtor's cessation of payments and is synonymous with breach of a monetary obligation. She refers that the legislator upheld the importance of maintaining, as a cause for the application of the disciplinary regime in the Judicial Power, when a situation arises in which the judicial officer is judicially declared in that state—Article 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power—and as a reason to order the termination of functions of that person, after the disciplinary proceedings so determine it, respecting at all times the rights of the judicial officer and due process. She argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative bodies when the general reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Power was being analyzed, introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, former magistrate Luis Paulino Mora Mora (may he rest in peace) expressed that “judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because in the end we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within the State institutions, that is why it has been estimated that regarding the person who is there declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets…” (case file 10,753, folio [Valor 076]).” She refers that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary power that the Judicial Power has regarding its officers, necessary as an instrument of guarantee to the citizen that they will receive a quality, agile, effective, and efficient public service, equipped with an adequate organization and highly qualified judicial officers for the performance of their duties.

It explains that the plaintiff is incorrect when she argues that permitting this cause would mean penalizing a mere danger or a simple risk for reasons of mere judicial convenience, given that the rule is provided for when a declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is decreed in a judicial proceeding; that is, there is an entire judicial process in which issues related to the breaches of credit obligations assumed by the debtor are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions so that the person can resolve that situation. It adds that the legislator considered that the foregoing implies a situation of distrust and sought the probity of the judicial employee to have certainty that they are responsible with their obligations, both employment-related and in their private life. It asserts that the imposition of this type of sanctions has an absolute scope of the principle of legality because it involves engaging in conduct prohibited by a rule, which is not consistent with the plaintiff's allegations when she states that the rule allows penalizing a mere danger or a simple risk. It mentions that, as indicated by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal in vote no. 1923-18 of 1:41 p.m. on October 4, 2018, between judicial employees and the Judicial Branch there exists a relationship of "special subjection (sujeción especial)" that arises from activities that, by their nature, require a certain degree of regulation and oversight, which is carried out through monitoring of their behavior both in the performance of their duties and in their private life. It partially cites Article 28 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and numeral 49 of the Judicial Service Statute: "Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: ARTICLE 28.- The following employee may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with the prior opportunity for defense: (...) 2.- Who, due to improprieties or failings in the exercise of their position or in their private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, has become deserving of that sanction. (Emphasis not in original). Judicial Service Statute: Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, judicial employees shall have the following: c) Observe dignity in the performance of their position and in their private life; (Emphasis not in original)." It indicates that the special subjection relationship has been widely analyzed by this Constitutional Court and, in vote no. [Valor 105] at 8:30 a.m. on April 10, 2018, it stated that its observance is a guarantee both for the exercise of an effective defense and for the legality of the sanctioning conduct: "Said sanctioning power is exercised within the framework of a legal bond, a special subjection relationship between the public official, and the legal system applicable to this type of bond, within which we find a series of principles that serve as a kind of guide, insofar as they guide the meaning of the norms, and which, in sanctioning matters, constitute a dual guarantee, in that their observance guarantees the exercise of an effective defense, but also the legality of the sanctioning conduct." It argues that Article 153 of the Political Constitution grants the Judicial Branch one of the most important powers of the State, which is to administer justice, a task that this Branch of the Republic carries out through the activities performed by the people who work for the institution and collaborate to fulfill the entrusted task. It adds that peacefully and satisfactorily resolving the conflicts presented to them by society, in order to ensure the maintenance of social peace, depends largely on the credibility held by those who participate in the institutional resolution of such disputes. It considers that the plaintiff is incorrect when she mentions in her filing brief that her Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle have been injured, because subsection 9) of Article 26 of the Organic Law is complemented by Articles 28 and 49 of that regulation, which have constitutional and legal support regarding the duty to conduct both their judicial work and their private life correctly. It cites an excerpt from a ruling of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: "Public officials are repositories of the trust of the employer-State and of the users of the service, and therefore must have impeccable and honest behavior, as well as an unblemished conduct. For this reason, in the case of public employees, regardless of their nature, function, and category, the assessment of their faults must be done strictly and meticulously, since the public interest is at stake, before which the worker's interest must yield (regarding the greater rigor in the classification of faults of public employees, see among others votes number [Valor 106] at 10:30 a.m. on October 26, 2001, [Valor 107] at 9:30 a.m. on May 22, 2002, of this Chamber). A special duty of diligence is required of State employees in all matters related to the tasks they perform – after all, they are responsible for ensuring that the function they perform is executed according to criteria of objectivity, impartiality, efficiency, and professionalism, among others – so the trust placed in them reaches particular significance when analyzing the faults attributed to them, especially if they are related to the specific tasks assigned or may affect them (in this sense, see among others votes number [Valor 067] at 10:30 a.m. on November 30, [Valor 068] at 9:30 a.m. on December 5, both from 2001, of this Chamber). c) The foregoing is of vital importance in the present case, as we are in the presence of a public official who must possess the necessary personal conditions to work in the public service of Justice and be worthy of the trust placed in them – moral aptitude and suitability among other requirements established in numeral 18 of the Judicial Service Statute." It partially transcribes judgment no. [Valor 069] at 3:00 p.m. on November 3, 2004, of this Chamber, in which the duties of every public official were developed: "(…) dedicate oneself to the position with efficiency and loyalty, which implies the obligation of attendance and loyalty to the institution; observe the hierarchical order, which translates into a duty of obedience (comply with directives and orders from the superior under the terms of Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration); and dignity in conduct, this relating both to respect for the legal system and to propriety and morality in their conduct, both during the work day and in their private life, insofar as the condition of official is of fundamental importance since, as its definition indicates, they act in the name and on behalf of the Administration, and consequently, become its image. Hence the importance of the requirements of 'honorability' and 'respectability' demanded, as a direct derivative of the constitutional norm – Article 192 – of all public officials, insofar as it addresses the requirement of 'proven suitability,' as they are called upon to carry out the public purposes entrusted to the State. In this sense, the Chamber stated in judgments number [Valor 070] and [Valor 071], both of March 7, 1995. 'The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and from the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they are objective in nature.' (Emphasis not in original)." It states that, through the challenged rule, the legislator has delimited the sanctioning power of the Judicial Branch with respect to officials who "have been judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent," inasmuch as once they obtained a bond within the institution, they must respect the bond with the administration and comply with a series of obligations, including that of honoring their debts. It adds that the foregoing must prevent, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal well states in vote no. [Valor 018], the recovery of sums of money from being slower for creditors, "given that they receive a smaller sum of money than the installment agreed upon at the beginning of the credit relationship," in addition to the suspension of interest collection, among other consequences of that declaration. It argues that the disciplinary power aims to issue norms that regulate the activity with its officials, so that the duties entrusted to the Public Administration can be fulfilled, which is based on the constitutional pillars that impose the State's obligations to provide a correct public service, as specified in numeral 192 of the Political Constitution. It maintains that the legislator, in Article 26, subsection 9), established a reasonable ground for the termination of appointment of a judicial employee, which was extensively discussed and analyzed in the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly. It explains that: "There is no doubt then that the legislator, in the discussion of the reform of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, considered the existence of an entire normative and administrative apparatus that acts as a controlling filter in the work of judicial officials, within which the disciplinary power of the state can be materialized, a pillar that rests on the constitutionally recognized Principle of Hierarchy (judgments No. [Valor 072] at 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995, and [Valor 073], at 2:41 p.m. on March 16, 2005), and on the 'special subjection' relationship that is generated between judicial employees and the Judicial Branch, through the definition of strategies for an efficient provision of justice service and the application of the disciplinary regime when the provisions contained in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are breached; with total and absolute precision to this, Article 174 states: 'The disciplinary regime aims to ensure the efficiency, correctness, and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and to guarantee citizens a correct administration of justice.'" It states that to prevent such a postulate from being rendered nugatory, the legislator incorporated the provision in subsection 9) of Article 26 of the aforementioned law as one of the causes for the termination of appointment, and therefore it is not contrary to Articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56 of our Political Constitution, nor to the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness.

9.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 2:47 p.m. on November 29, 2018, Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic. He indicates, regarding the standing of the plaintiff, that it is based on the prior matter processed in case file no. [Valor 001] before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal. He points out that, upon reviewing that case file, it is confirmed that the proceeding followed against the plaintiff is in the exhaustion phase of the administrative channel; furthermore, in the underlying matter, she invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged articles (see the appeal filed), meaning there are no objections regarding her standing to file this unconstitutionality action. He states that, despite the foregoing, such standing is partial, because in the underlying matter, the provisions of numeral 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch were not applied to the plaintiff here, but only subsection 9) of Article 26 of that normative body. He argues that the plaintiff is an active official of the Judicial Branch, so only the provisions of Article 26.9 apply to her, insofar as it establishes judicial declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency as a cause for dismissal. He mentions that the provisions of numeral 12 are not applicable to her, because that article is aimed at people seeking to join the Judicial Branch as new judicial employees. He states that, therefore, the underlying matter in which the unconstitutionality of this numeral was alleged is not a reasonable means to protect the right deemed injured. He states that it is the Attorney General's Office's criterion that the plaintiff only has standing to challenge the provisions of subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the law in question, without prejudice to the Chamber deciding based on connection to analyze the provisions of Article 12. Analysis of the challenged norms from the perspective of the right to privacy and freedom. He indicates that the right to privacy, enshrined in constitutional numeral 24, operates as a limit against illegitimate intrusion by the State and other individuals; furthermore, it allows for the full development of the personality. He points out that this right not only excludes any activity by another that implies an imposition, intrusion, and interference in matters of the person's intimate life, but also entails the possibility of preventing the publication or disclosure of certain facts, which only acquire relevance for the subject. He notes that it has been recognized by this Chamber as "The sphere in which no one may interfere. The freedom of private life is the recognition of an area of activity that is proper to each individual, and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or of public authorities in the private life of the individual... " (Judgment [Valor 074] at 3:09 p.m. on August 3, 1995)." He maintains that the recognition of "private life" consequently consists of that part which is not dedicated to a public activity and which, for this same reason, is not intended to transcend and impact society directly, and where, in principle, third parties should not have any access whatsoever, since the activities developed within it are not their concern, nor do they affect them (constitutional Article 28). He mentions that in the case of public officials, it is necessary to analyze what boundary must be drawn between the protection of their private life sphere and their public sphere, in order to determine, definitively, whether such protection should be equated or not to that of any other individual. He argues that the Law Against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Service of Costa Rica defines an official as any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, in the name and on behalf of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and entirely independent of the imperative, representative, paid, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. He maintains that, consequently, a statutory relationship exists between the State and the official, regardless of the nature of the position held, so it is clear that the condition of public employees cannot be equated to that of other individuals, because the former are subject to a principle of transparency and accountability, which obliges them to answer to society for the acts they perform. He argues that the principle of transparency obliges public officials, due to their special responsibilities, to subject themselves to scrutiny and non-unlawful criticism from the administered in general. He asserts that the principle of accountability also constitutes a value accompanying public service, not only sporadically or periodically, but as a constant practice, through which officials are exposed to citizen control. He mentions that, therefore, the scope of protection for someone who has accepted to serve the Nation is narrower than for someone not in that situation, because they have freely chosen to place themselves in a position of visibility that allows broad public access. He states that whoever enters public life accepts a greater risk by the mere fact of doing so, although it will not always be easy to distinguish between the private acts and the public acts of an official, or between their personal acts without public transcendence or relevance and the personal acts that do have it. He indicates that, in the case of officials, the threshold of the right to privacy and their freedom exists, but it is different from that which protects the citizen who has not assumed the condition and the responsibility of someone holding a public office and who therefore has certain ethical and legal duties towards citizens. He points out that the private life of an official has an insurmountable core – as is the case for other individuals – but that of the former is narrower, because aspects of private life that normally would not be revealable for an ordinary citizen become lawful objects of public information insofar as there is a general interest at play that justifies it. He adds that society has the right to know about an act from that sphere of the official, even if it does not constitute a crime, when it may affect the public function with which they are entrusted. He maintains that the private life of public employees is consequently very limited, because society has the right to demand honesty from its representatives in what concerns their personal, family, and professional life, among others. He adds that the responsibility to project and maintain a certain image is detrimental to their sphere of privacy, and anyone not willing to admit this lacks a public vocation. He states that it is the Attorney General's Office's criterion that the legislator has a constitutional authorization to establish disqualifying norms that demand certain behaviors from the public official, even regarding areas related to their private life, provided these behaviors may affect the image of the institution they represent or the legitimate trust that must be held in the official. He explains that establishing a prohibition on entering public service or the loss of official status, based on a fact from private life such as the declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency, is not in itself unconstitutional, insofar as such acts may affect the image of the official and the institution. He argues that it must be considered that the existence of norms of this nature is also justified by the nature of certain positions that manage and administer resources and public funds, or that, due to their special condition, require impeccable behavior from the official in the handling of their personal debts. He mentions that this type of norm is not violative of the right to privacy or freedom and can be imposed on the public official, even when dealing with acts related to their private sphere. He states that the challenged norms will be analyzed based on the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Analysis of the challenged norms from the perspective of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. He cites the questioned articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: "Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is necessary to be mentally and physically capable of performing the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a final order to proceed to trial has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, such that they may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (As amended by Article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997). (Boldface not in original) (...) Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial positions cease due to: (...) 9. Having been convicted, by final judgment, for a crime meriting a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions and for having been judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent." (Boldface not in original)." He indicates that, as is clear from the challenged norms, they are not norms of a disciplinary nature in the strict sense, because there is no protected legal interest nor a consequence derived from a fault in the public service by the official. He points out that such norms are of a preventive nature, as they seek to establish a principle of "legitimate trust (confianza legítima)," by intending that those serving in any position within the Judicial Branch conduct themselves appropriately in their private sphere and do not have an economic insolvency that could potentially place them in a risky situation, which may later result in a detriment to the performance of their public functions. He notes that the norms intend that those working in the Judicial Branch have certain personal characteristics (economic solvency), which, if lost, will cause them to lose their appointment. He states that even though the norm applied to the plaintiff does not constitute a disciplinary sanction in the strict sense, it is true that the conduct provided for in the norm (insolvency or bankruptcy) has a burdensome consequence (termination of appointment) and, therefore, all the constitutional principles governing due process and, specifically, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality apply. He states that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any burdensome consequence in the individual's sphere must constitute a measure strictly necessary to achieve the objective sought. He argues that, therefore, the principle of proportionality requires the prior setting by the legislator of the limits within which the legal operator may move for the interpretation of the norm in light of the specific circumstances. He explains that the administrative authority, consequently, must have a margin of discretion previously granted by the legislator to guarantee that the burdensome consequence is only applied when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. He maintains that the application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality calls into question the constitutionality of the challenged norms. He comments that if the cited norms are analyzed, it is observed that the normative provision does not allow for any gradation or consideration of particular circumstances in concrete cases, because the only possible consequence upon a declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is the termination of the appointment or the impossibility of entering the Judicial Branch, regardless of which official is involved. He adds that the norm is of general scope for all positions within the Judicial Branch, without assessing the nature of the functions or the special work performed by some officials. He asserts that, considering the nature of certain positions that handle public funds or administer justice, the imposition of certain personal characteristics and behaviors may be justified, because these may affect the image or the independence of such employees in the performance of their duties. He states that from the analysis of the legislative file, it is clear that the intention of the challenged norm was always to declare a "loss of trust" of the judicial official "who has not been able to manage their personal assets and will eventually be in a position to manage the economic assets of the citizenry" (see statements by Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora on folios [Valor 075] and [Valor 076] of the legislative file)." He mentions that the intention was to direct the norm at officials who administered justice or who, due to the condition of their position, were required to have adequate management of their personal assets. He indicates that, despite this, the approved norm does not reflect that intention, but rather, on the contrary, was approved generally for all judicial officials, and by not allowing any distinction or assessment of concrete circumstances, it becomes unreasonable. He considers that the inflexible wording of the norm is violative of the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, because it does not allow any room for maneuver for the legal operator, who is forced to apply the legal consequence (termination of appointment) even for judicial positions that have no significance according to the purpose sought. He points out that although it might be thought that the described aspect is a matter of application of the norm and not of constitutionality, the truth is that the Judicial Inspection had no possibility other than to remove the plaintiff from her position, because the norm does not permit any other option. He insists that, in this specific case, there is no violation of a legal interest; therefore, the reasonableness of the norm (necessity) could only be justified by the special nature of certain positions within the Judicial Branch, which oblige the imposition of certain personal behaviors on those who occupy them, because eventually said behaviors may affect independence, objectivity, or the way certain matters are resolved. He notes that the imposed requirement should be a condition of the judicial employee based on a specific function, but it is disproportionate for it to be applied generally, as the norm is drafted, especially when it implies a serious impact on the right to work. He cites vote no. [Valor 077] of this Chamber: "Thus, the Chamber has recognized that an act that limits rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it precise to protect some good or set of goods of the community – or of a certain group – through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment as to whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The suitability of the measure would indicate that there may be other mechanisms that better solve the existing need, some of which could fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. Proportionally, in turn, refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed; so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community." It adds that rulings nos. [Valor 109] and [Valor 110] were issued in a similar vein. It explains that, in the opinion of that advisory body, the provision in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), as applied to the petitioner, is contrary to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality due to the inflexible manner in which it is drafted. It adds that the necessity of the rule for all judicial officials is not justified, nor is any margin of application granted to the legal operator. It considers that the rule should be annulled. It mentions judgment no. [Valor 078] of 11:57 a.m. on October 15, 1999, reproduced in resolution no. [Valor 079] of 2:47 p.m. on October 4, [Valor 027]. It states that, if the existence of the rule is considered in light of certain functions, an interpretation in conformity with Constitutional Law (Derecho de la Constitución) could be made, contemplating that the rule is justified and should be applied only to positions of officials who administer justice or public funds; however, in this case, it would be venturing into the legislator's domain. It explains that, taking into account the claims raised by the petitioner, it is not for the Chamber (Sala), through this action, to assess the alleged deficiencies in the processing of the case file carried out by the Judicial Inspection (Inspección Judicial), nor the manner in which that body has been applying sanctions in other cases. It notes that many of the petitioner's arguments are related to the application of the rule and not to its constitutionality, and therefore it refrains from addressing them. It concludes as follows: “In view of the foregoing considerations, this advisory body considers that the petitioner's standing (legitimación) is partial, only insofar as she challenges the provision in article 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as it is the rule applied in the underlying matter. As to the merits, this representation considers that the provision in said article is unconstitutional due to the rigidity of its wording, as it does not allow any margin of application to the legal operator and its necessity is not demonstrated in relation to the generality of Judicial Branch officials (principle of reasonableness and proportionality). Therefore, the annulment of the provision in the indicated article 26, subsection 9) is recommended, without prejudice to the Chamber deeming necessary an interpretation in conformity with Constitutional Law of said rule under the terms indicated. As for article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, said rule is not applicable to the petitioner, without prejudice to the Chamber deciding to assess it based on connectedness (conexidad).” 10.- By resolution of 3:35 p.m. on January 22, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber (Presidencia de la Sala) considered the hearings granted to have been answered and, in accordance with the corresponding assignment (turno), referred this action to the office of Magistrate (Magistrado) Paul Rueda Leal.

11.- On January 24, 2019, Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro filed a motion for recusal (inhibitoria), since, in his capacity as Presiding Judge (Presidente) of the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), he was called to report on the merits of the action. He clarifies that, even though he did not render the requested report, but rather the Vice-Presiding Judge (vicepresidenta) did, the situation remains, as it is improper for him to act as a judge in a matter in which he has been called as a party.

12.- By resolution of 11:47 a.m. on January 24, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber ordered Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro to be separated (tuvo por separado) from the knowledge of this matter and deemed the Alternate Magistrate (Magistrado Suplente) who replaces him in accordance with article 49 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch to be enabled.

13.- The hearing (vista) provided for in articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 ibidem, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in principles and rules, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court (Tribunal).

14.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been complied with.

Drafted by Magistrate Rueda Leal; and, Whereas (Considerando):

I.- Purpose of the action. Ms. [Nombre 001] files an action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad) against article 12 and subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, considering them contrary to articles 28, 39, and 56 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), as well as to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In general terms, she considers that the challenged rules violate the right to work, the protection of the family, and legal certainty (seguridad jurídica); furthermore, the principles of culpability and innocence by imposing the maximum sanction (revocation of appointment (revocatoria del nombramiento)) even though no harm to the public service or third parties has been demonstrated; and finally, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction, since they not only have a broad scope but also establish an objective criterion that prevents any assessment regarding the appropriateness of the sanction and the type of sanction to be applied.

II.- Regarding the challenged regulations. The challenged articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are the following:

“Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements established by law, to enter judicial service it is required to be capable, mentally and physically, to perform the function, according to its nature.

However, persons against whom a final order of committal for trial (auto firme de apertura a juicio) has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those who are subject to a penalty of disqualification (inhabilitación) from holding public office or positions; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy (quiebra) or insolvency (insolvencia); those who habitually drink alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in such a way that they may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service.

(Thus amended by article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)” “Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those who serve judicial positions cease for:

(…)

9.- Having been convicted, by final judgment (sentencia firme), of a crime punishable by disqualification from holding public office or positions, and for having been declared, judicially, in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency.” III.- Regarding the admissibility of the action. The action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied in order for the Chamber to validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the requirements for admissibility (presupuestos de admisibilidad) of the action of unconstitutionality. In the first place, a prior matter pending resolution is required, either in judicial or administrative proceedings (in the procedure to exhaust it), in which the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered to be harmed. In the second and third paragraphs, the law exceptionally contemplates cases in which the prior matter is not required, such as the nonexistence of individual and direct harm due to the nature of the matter, the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic (Contralor General de la República), the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic (Fiscal General de la República), and the Ombudsman (Defensor de los Habitantes). Now, regarding the need for a prior matter pending resolution in administrative proceedings, it is necessary that this concerns the procedure that exhausts the administrative channel, which, in accordance with article 126 of the General Law of Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), occurs from the moment ordinary appeals are filed before the superior hierarchical authority of the body that issued the final act, otherwise the action would be inadmissible. Likewise, there are other formalities that must be satisfied, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly grounded, with specific citation of the constitutional rules and principles considered infringed, the authentication by an attorney of the document in which the action is filed, the accreditation of standing conditions (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the document in which the unconstitutionality of the rules was invoked in the underlying matter, all requirements which, in the event of not being provided by the petitioner, may be subject to a compliance order (prevenidos para su cumplimiento) by the Presidency of the Chamber.

In the sub examine case, the petitioner states that case file no. [Valor 001] is the prior matter that supports this action of unconstitutionality against article 12 and subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In this regard, she points out that it is in the stage of exhaustion of the administrative channel (agotamiento de la vía administrativa) before the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) and was processed in the first instance by the Court of the Judicial Inspection (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial), which, through ruling (voto) no. [Valor 018] of October 4, 2018, ordered the revocation of her appointment for having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency.

In this regard, it is important to clarify that, indeed, the administrative procedure is in the stage of exhaustion of the channel; however, the resolution of the Court of the Judicial Inspection was solely based on subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Likewise, from a reading of the appeal (recurso de apelación) filed, it is clear that the petitioner only invoked and developed the unconstitutionality of this provision.

Consequently, the action is admitted regarding subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as the invocation of unconstitutionality in the prior matter constitutes a reasonable means to protect the rights considered harmed. On the other hand, the action is declared inadmissible with respect to article 12 of the same legal body, since it was not applied to the protected party (amparada) in the proceeding, nor was its unconstitutionality alleged in the administrative channel.

IV.- Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993.

a)- Regarding the petitioner's grounds related to her specific case. In this regard, it is important to indicate that the large number of arguments presented by the petitioner related to the merits of what was decided in the disciplinary case, as well as the deficiencies in its processing, the rejection of evidence, the situation that caused her insolvency, and the manner in which other proceedings have been resolved, are aspects that are not appropriate to be assessed through this action, since they refer to the application of the rule in her specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber will only address the arguments of constitutionality without delving into the specific circumstances presented, without prejudice to what is resolved in the ordinary jurisdiction on the occasion of the content of this judgment.

b)- Regarding the arguments of unconstitutionality formulated by the petitioner. In the sub examine case, the petitioner considers it contrary to Constitutional Law that a judicial declaration of insolvency is established as a ground for the cessation of duties without leaving a margin of discretion or assessment, even excusable, that generated that condition and, above all, without assessing elements or the "principles of congruence, proportionality, reasonableness of cause, legitimate purpose, good faith, family necessity, privacy, assessment of an objective loss of trust duly accredited in relation to the functions I perform, existence of real harm to the image or institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of a serious fault, let alone a very serious one, to the judicial public service, gender aspects, among others, all of this in light of the existence or not of an effect on the continuity and efficiency of the judicial service, as is indeed assessed and defined for other grounds in those same articles (…)”. She explains that from the analysis and investigation of the content of the legislative bill in question, the following were obtained as aspects of importance for this action of unconstitutionality: “(…) ü On pages [Valor 027], [Valor 028], [Valor 029] (images [Valor 030], [Valor 031], [Valor 032]), motion No. [Valor 035] proposed by Deputy Ovidio Pacheco is evidenced, aimed at modifying the wording of the referenced article 26 subsection 9.) and, for what is relevant, where it is provided, among others, to expressly include 'those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy and insolvency' as a ground for cessation of appointment, wording that was ultimately approved and is in force to date; ü On pages [Valor 033] (image [Valor 034]), the joint legislative committee (comisión mixta legislativa) considers the indicated motion No. [Valor 035] and discusses its content. For these purposes, it is recorded in the legislative file that Deputy Ovidio Pacheco makes no reference to the substantive reason, purpose, or cause justifying the express inclusion of the ground that is the object of this action, but rather his justification is purely a matter of form so that reference is not made to article 12, wherefore, that formal aspect was evaluated affirmatively considering that 'the motion tends to clarify at least what the true causes are for which a judicial official can be dismissed.' It is insisted, for the purposes of said motion, there is no record of a suitable substantive reason, purpose, or cause that would justify expressly including the ground for cessation that is the object of this action. ü On pages [Valor 036] (image [Valor 037]), the legislative discussion related to the disciplinary grounds is recorded, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship can be terminated for that reason, highlighting the reference to the interest in the public service of judicial functions, wherefore, the permanence of the official prevails, except when it is 'seriously inconvenient for the judicial service', as well as when, on the occasion thereof, 'there are doubts about his/her correctness'. ü On page [Valor 080] (image [Valor 081]), the ground that is the object of this action of unconstitutionality, provided in article 26 subsection 9.), already appears added as substitute text. ü On page [Valor 082] (image [Valor 065]), the expert opinion (dictamen) issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration (Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración) must be highlighted, in which, expressly, they request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in the referenced article 26 subsection 9.) be eliminated. The justifying and explanatory element that the legislators express is the following: 'Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they possess conditions that, if they do not influence the labor relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as grounds for dismissing a judicial servant; allowing this would be punishing for a mere danger.' (-the underlining and bold are not from the original, they are placed in that form only to highlight its content as an aspect of importance for the present action of unconstitutionality). ü On page [Valor 038] (image [Valor 039]), legislative discussion on the scope of the disciplinary regime is recorded, in which the criterion of Deputy Allan Solano is highlighted, in which, with reference to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for cessation of appointment, he criticizes that it becomes a ground for 'sanction by mere convenience or risk' and on aspects of 'private life'. ü On pages [Valor 040] (image [Valor 041]) appears the discussion of Deputy Santana Esquivel and Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee (Subcomisión Mixta Legislativa), in which they analyze the pertinence of the expert opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration regarding the ground of article 26 subsection 9.) of repeated reference, in order to decide, finally, whether to keep or modify that ground. For these purposes, it is of great interest to textually cite what was stated by them on the matter, as follows: 'MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions, that is why it has been considered that the person who is there declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposition the management of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it is traditional to find rules of this nature. That is the only observation I could make to the effect of choosing to eliminate or not maintain it, my recommendation is to maintain the existence that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL; We will continue then. This article we will keep as it is [...]'. (-the underlining is not from the original, it is placed in that form only to highlight its content as an aspect of importance for the present action of unconstitutionality-)”. She adds that the justification of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora was the reason that legislatively led to the decision to maintain the ground for cessation indicated in article 26 subsection 9), which focuses on the following aspects: “a.) When referring to 'resolution of discords', it only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch, and omits, and thereby it is not legislatively assessed, the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, such as my judicial work as Unit Coordinator; b.) It points out the existence of 'a certain loss of trust' on account of the judicial official being declared insolvent, that is, it would punish with cessation of appointment in the judicial service, for conduct whose appreciation does not effectively, objectively, causally, directly, substantively, proportionally, or reasonably prove the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional service work, as well as before the citizenry, all of this accredited in relation to the functions I perform, regardless of my state of insolvency. It is reiterated, it must be assessed not only in jurisdictional work, but also in what concerns my person, that is, in the performance of administrative work. It also states that 'eventually he will have disposition of economic resources', thereby again revealing an empty argument without technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal foundation in light of the serious harm to the institutional service work, given that, in the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption”. She explains that, according to the legislative file of bill No. 10.753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the ground of insolvency as a reason to declare the cessation of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so as it is not in accordance with the complex regulatory framework of the disciplinary matter that Law No. 7333 regulates as a whole, aimed at demonstrating, following due process (debido proceso), a 'serious harm to the judicial service, as well as the existence of a serious fault, let alone a very serious one, to the judicial public service, as a primary element for the punitive application of the challenged ground'. She adds that, as was warned during the legislative process, allowing that ground means punishing a mere danger or simple risk, for matters of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration in the face of decisions of necessity that involve aspects of private life that do not influence the judicial service. She argues that the wording of the rule implies an application of pure law (de puro derecho), without considering other relevant aspects in the service relationship. She asserts that insolvency is a legal mechanism established in civil matters for the payment of creditors. She mentions that the process of judicial declaration of a state of insolvency should not be qualified negatively without assessing the reasons that generated it and also considering if there were no actions classified as fraudulent. She asserts that subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) “Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Protection of the Family and to Legal Certainty, by an act managed in application of my autonomy of will. It materializes labor discrimination based on economic situation in matters of employment”. She explains that: “the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency, is configured (...) as a ground for cessation of appointment (article 26 subsection 9. of Law No. 7333-), which affects that special protection of the right to work, since as demonstrated from the analysis of the bill for that Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is integrated into that block of legality without there being, nor being foreseen, the causality of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency in relation to the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional order and in its administrative character, as well as no conditional ground nor one for assessment for the application of that normative reason, which in the case of the application of article 26 subsection 9. Of said law, generates by itself the cessation of appointment as the most serious disciplinary measure, even when there is no damage, harm, or impact on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, let alone on society, nor the proven existence of a serious fault, let alone a very serious one, to the judicial public service on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency. (...) Additionally, with the proposed sanction, an elementary principle of labor law that is applicable supplementarily for the public employment relationship is seriously violated, that is, the protective principle, and consequently the application of the rule in dubio pro-operario, which later will be associated with the violation of the principle of innocence that assists me, wherefore, the revocation of appointment that is applied to me for the indicated ground should have been the last resort (última ratio), seeking to choose the most favorable sanction for the worker, in application of the principles governing constitutional law and conventionality control (control de convencionalidad) itself, all of this against a sanction that is evidently flagrant to the legal system. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship”. She affirms that the institution of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent nature is declared. She states that, due to the wording of subsection 9) of article 26, the Court of the Judicial Inspection does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case, the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literalness as a matter of law (de pleno derecho). She notes that this rule punishes with the most serious measure an expectation or an eventual risk or danger, in her case unreal. She mentions that: “it is palpable that the warning of the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration that considered Bill No. 10.753 becomes a reality, when it warned that a mere danger or an eventual risk would be punished, without there even being a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment reflecting a deterioration, impact, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point, what was mentioned from the file of bill 10.753, specifically on page [Valor 025] (image [Valor 026]) when in the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as those circumstances 'affect the public service'". She indicates that: “Just as article 56 of our Political Constitution provides, as a guarantor limit of the State over the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, indicates, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, to the right to work, and to protection against unemployment, all without any discrimination, among others, for reasons of economic situation or position, as is my case. In the same vein, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labor Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, relating to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent both State organisms and private companies from experiencing situations that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the patrimony of every individual. From all this arises Law No. 2694, of November 22, 1960, that is, the International Labor Organization Convention on the prohibition of discrimination in employment, in force to date which prohibits '[...] all forms of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, parentage, or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunity or of treatment in matters of employment or occupation'. In this sense, note that the prohibition of this conventional control has a single exception, which is that defined in article 2 of that same Law No. 2694 which establishes 'From the foregoing prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences arising from the qualifications necessary for the full performance of the functions or tasks specific to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to the nature of these and the conditions of the worker.' Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, discrimination materializes due to the exhaustive ground (causal taxativa) that generates cessation of appointment by mere convenience, by mere danger, or by an eventual risk, without effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge on the occasion of my judicial declaration of insolvency”. She concludes that the impact on her fundamental rights to protection of work, the family, and legal certainty, which materializes discrimination based on her economic situation, is latent. ii) “Violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the nonexistence of harm to the public service or to third parties, as well as the non-verification of a serious fault, let alone a very serious one, to the judicial public service in the very application of due process.

An act of good faith is sanctioned with the supreme sacrifice of termination of appointment in the face of an unproven and unevaluated potential risk, as well as a mere or apparent unfounded and unjustified institutional convenience.” He argues that the challenged regulations in this acción de inconstitucionalidad cause a flagrant violation of the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and of the principles that make up the Derecho de la Constitución, since the intent is to take the judicial declaration of insolvency as a cause to prevent appointment in the judicial service, as well as to terminate an official, without carrying out a greater assessment or accreditation of damage or harm—real, causal, and objective—to the institutionality of the Poder Judicial. He adds that this cause is applied for reasons of mere unjustified convenience, based on criteria of a potential risk, without any demonstration that there is at least a slight, medium, or serious inconvenience for the service provided by the Poder Judicial, nor specifically for the Dirección de Planificación. He maintains that the disciplinary application of such a cause does not consider whether it involves jurisdictional or administrative work, nor are criteria applied that demonstrate the existence of any impact on the public service provided by the Poder Judicial. He insists that insolvency, unless declared fraudulent, is not a crime that generates disqualification from public office, nor is it a sanction such that it would result in the termination of appointments. He argues that the challenged norms contravene the noted constitutional parameters and principles, as well as “that of consistency (congruencia), which is required by the very parameter of legal certainty (seguridad jurídica) and due process (debido proceso)”. He states that the norms being challenged seem to punish the existence of a “loss of trust,” based on the judicial declaration of insolvency; nonetheless, the objective loss of trust exists because good faith, performance, and loyalty that the employee owes to their employer are compared, in such a way that it is substantiated and demonstrated—consistently and proportionally—that, with the employee's conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, which leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to continue the employment relationship. He alleges that if the judicial declaration of insolvency is intended to support the “loss of trust” for the Poder Judicial with the consequence of termination of appointment, as it is a sanctioning matter of a disciplinary nature, the legal norm must accredit in its content the constitutional parameter of serious culpability, causal, reasonable, and objective, on the part of the official with respect to the public service and interest, in such a way that it either accredits a real impossibility in the continuity of employment, or excuses the judicial employee for “lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of public office.” iii) “Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine Principle. Lack of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment compared to the supreme sacrifice involved by the disciplinary sanction without any impact on the public service, the institutionality, or the image of the Poder Judicial, or, alternatively, demonstration of the existence of a serious or especially serious (gravísima) fault to the judicial public service due to insolvency.” He mentions that the right to privacy (intimidad) and human dignity (dignidad humana) in the face of discrimination has been developed by this Sala and by international regulations and jurisprudence on human rights. He indicates that these rights are treated as a protective shield for the person. He reiterates the argument related to numeral 28 of the Constitución Política and the lack of harm to the Poder Judicial. He considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles, which results in the termination of appointment, has no legitimate purpose of sanction, which affects the fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity, also generating a high level of discrimination based on economic situation. He explains that with the present acción de inconstitucionalidad, he does not seek to disregard the power and authority of management, oversight, and sanction of the Poder Judicial with respect to its administrative service relationship; however, there must be respect for his fundamental rights, as it is necessary that objective and reasonable sanctioning elements be accredited for their imposition, all of this in the face of the effective verification of a serious or especially serious fault, the impact on the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or a potential risk; that is, a cause without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes his years of service in the Poder Judicial, with consequences for his privacy and dignity, as he would be treated as if he had committed some criminal activity or a serious or especially serious infraction. He mentions that “the spirit of the legislator permeating the legislative record of bill 10.753, when in its legislative discussion regarding the different causes of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is stated that the basic idea of the causes must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances 'affect the public service,' (...).” He maintains that the challenged regulations, in relation to the rights of privacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle, must be applied in the way that most favors the human being. He explains that all restrictive and sanctioning measures, as well as those of termination of appointment, must precautionarily respect human dignity, the protection of privacy, and the principle of proportionality (proporcionalidad), all under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual damage is assessed. He asserts that the Poder Judicial adopted the “Gender Equality Policy (Política de Igualdad de Género)” to incorporate the gender perspective into all the work of that Power of the Republic. He mentions that the foregoing is supported “within the legal framework for the protection of human rights, both at a national and international level, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights of equality without discrimination of any kind, protection of the law, access to prompt and complete justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that comprise the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Constitución Política of Costa Rica.” He adds that this policy “recognized that 'Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when circumstances are different, that is, when people are unequally situated,' likewise that 'The principle of equity drives judges, as well as all legal practitioners, to consider with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider personal, family, and social conditions in each case and their consequences,' a situation that is not being applied due to the unconstitutional content invoked through this action.” He notes that the policy's objective is “to guarantee equal opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Poder Judicial.” He explains that “that Gender Equality Policy was based on the 'Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People,' under which Rule 19 states that: 'Any action or conduct, based on gender, that causes death, injury, or physical, sexual, or psychological suffering to women, both in the public and private sphere, through the use of physical or psychological violence, is considered violence against women.' (...).” iv) “Violation of the Principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Lack of adequate connection (conexidad) and consistency (congruencia) between the conduct it regulates, the seriousness of the disciplinary sanction, and the supreme sacrifice involved. Existence of discrimination based on my economic situation.” He mentions that in addition to the violation of fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Constitución Política and the Derecho de la Constitución that have been invoked as the basis for this acción de inconstitucionalidad, referring specifically to the invocation of the cause of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason to not appoint a judicial servant, as well as to order the disciplinary cause of termination of appointment, there exists a further violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness (razonabilidad) of the consequent termination of appointment. He notes that these norms lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements of assessment, consistency (congruencia), balance, and connection (conexidad) with the essential content of sanctioning law. He adds that in its application, the factual framework and the personal conditions of the judicial servant are not analyzed to determine an excusable situation, nor is the respective sacrifice involved by the measure and the consequent cause of termination of appointment based on the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency, all of this in relation to the existence or not of an impact on the public service provided by the Poder Judicial, as well as its institutional image or the prevailing public interest due to the performance of the position. He states that neither is a serious or especially serious fault to the judicial public service accredited for the application of the cause. He explains that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the challenged regulations, in order to define and substantiate the existence of the invoked transgressions. He adds that the test contains the three subprinciples that function as rules to be considered, in the sense that they are maxims upon which to question; that is, it must be verified whether the chosen means meets the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, wherefore, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. He maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, wherefore the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of the States Parties to adopt necessary internal measures to adapt their conduct and regulations to conventional parameters. He mentions the following: “Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and ends of the challenged norms, we must ask ourselves a question: Is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most serious disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of an official of the Poder Judicial who has been judicially declared insolvent, to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, for which they are responsible in the Poder Judicial? The realization of the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of regulations that tend to limit fundamental rights, or else, to generate the application of a sanctioning measure in disciplinary matters.” He sets out the analysis as follows: “a.) As the first element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus its end,' that is, its adequacy, suitability, and effectiveness. In that term, the means employed by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed end, that is, it establishes that the chosen means is the most adequate to the factual possibilities, taking into account the end to be achieved. There must be a judgment of consistency (congruencia) and practical connection between the means and the immediate end of the norm, since, if that end is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case at hand, we find ourselves with Articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.) of Ley N° 7333, which establish, in what is relevant, respectively, the prohibition on appointment in the judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared insolvent; likewise, the cause for termination of appointment of those serving in judicial positions, for the same reason, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. As stated in this action, and because these legal norms do not expressly or implicitly state their end, the assessment of the legislative discussion raised by the Comisión Mixta Legislativa that considered and defined the final wording of Bill No. 10.753 for the current Ley N° 7333, (-which was already pointed out earlier-), must be considered for these purposes, as a defining element of that legislative spirit regarding said cause. In that sense, the end provided for those challenged legal norms via this route is considered to be precautionary, due to an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, a member at the time of said Comisión Mixta Legislativa, it was stated that '[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent there entails a certain loss of trust, given that they have not been able to manage their economic assets and will eventually have at their disposal the managing of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]', this being the basis and/or criterion for leaving as final the text ultimately approved for those legal norms. The means used by said norms to obtain that end is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (-Article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. In this regard, it must be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, this cause is related in its wording, for the means of proportionality explained, to other causes linked to convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment and to those who are subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public office or positions. (...) With what has been stated, it is evident that the means employed by these legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and incapable of achieving the proposed end, because the fact of considering that a person in a state of insolvency, judicially declared, lacks merit for judicial function, so much so that for those already working it generates the termination of their appointment, means the casuistic and banal application of an apparent unjustified loss of trust, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege the sanctioning application with the maximum sacrifice borne by the employee due to a possible, unproven situation of mere risk, mere danger, or convenience, without an effective, real, and objective assessment existing for the institutional end, of a general nature, which is the public service. (...) It is added to the foregoing, that the spirit of the legislator foresaw this cause due to a possible use of resources by the judicial official in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of a purely jurisdictional task, and not of an administrative nature, which—as in my case—does not administer, guard, dispose of, control, or safeguard any public funds, and moreover, does not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict depend on that administrative management. Therefore, it can be considered that the first parameter of this test yields, as a result, the disproportionality of the norm, because there is no consistency (congruencia) between the means and the immediate end of the norm in accordance with the parameter required by the derecho de la constitución, since, although it may be thought that preventing an appointment and the termination of appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated end, the counterpart to it, that is, the restriction without verification of its excusable and innocence nature, compared to the supreme sacrifice it generates, violating the stated parameters, causes the alleged disproportionality, even more so considering, as in the case at hand, that for the application of this measure of a disciplinary sanctioning nature, it is not assessed whether or not there is an impact on the prevailing public service, the image, and the institutionality of the Poder Judicial, on public order, on morals, or on third parties, thus, neither on the existence or not of a serious or especially serious fault to the judicial public service, due to the cause. b.) As the second element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation.' In that term, it is assessed whether that means is needed to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the mandate of optimization of the most benign means, through which it must be verified if the end cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For these purposes, different means must be compared, in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation. Faced with the foregoing, excess in the measure is condemned when, due to the urgent or imperative nature, the sacrifice mandated by the norm is demanded. With respect to the norms challenged through this acción de inconstitucionalidad, it was already said in point a.) above of this test, that the means they employ to obtain that normative end is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (-Article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. Faced with the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the need to concretize the regulation, verifying alternatives aligned with the parameters of the derecho de la constitución, due to the sacrifice generated or that may be generated precisely by that need for regulation. It goes without saying, that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent need must assess the diversity of situations that may arise according to each specific case, as is precisely the case of whether the person works in a jurisdictional or administrative position. (...) The question then is: what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that should be applied for the case of the judicial declaration of insolvency in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of a serious or especially serious classification affecting the public service, nor the image or institutionality of the Poder Judicial? Is it proportional to prevent the appointment of a person, and—on the other hand—to order the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared insolvent, in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of a serious or especially serious classification affecting the public service, nor the image or institutionality of the Poder Judicial? We insist, legal norms, and especially sanctioning ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. Faced with the foregoing, the application of the norms being challenged as unconstitutional are clearly disproportionate. The sanctioning means is excessive compared to the urgent or imperative nature, demanding the sacrifice mandated by the norm, even more so—as has already been stated and demonstrated—when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and to the institutionality of the Poder Judicial, to public order, to morals, or to third parties. (...) Due to the foregoing, it is latent that the norms challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory, that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever exercises the sanctioning function has suitable regulatory means for the various specific cases, in which, as in mine, exempting causes from responsibility may exist so as to accredit the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment, and so that, rather, the least burdensome alternative is determined, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring an excessive sanctioning and regulatory action of a disciplinary nature. (...) c.) As the third and last element of the proportionality test that is of interest to apply, we find the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit,' that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. Before that, the sacrifice—as a cost—is compared based on the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit and that alternative must be the least restrictive or the least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to consider three questions: the structure of the norm and its weighting, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close links arise. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or impairment of one of the principles, the greater the importance of the satisfaction of the other must be. For this, the legal interests or rights in conflict must be identified, in order to determine the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the higher hierarchy of the legal interest, in order to determine if there is a relationship or balance between them. In the case at hand, it was already mentioned in point a.) above of this test, that the means employed by the norms challenged via this route to obtain that normative end is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent, and on the other (-Article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. It must be understood thus, that the nature of the structure of the norm is mandatory (taxativa) and of a sanctioning nature. Faced with the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice implied by the sanctioning measure of termination of appointment, compared to the benefit or advantage obtained by the Poder Judicial with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all of this in relation to the end pursued by the norm. We already stated above, that the end provided for those challenged legal norms is of a precautionary nature, due to an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all of this based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the cause that involved the bill for the current Ley No. 7333, in which the Comisión Mixta Legislativa that confirmed maintaining such causes, based itself on the criterion of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, who said that: '[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent there entails a certain loss of trust, given that they have not been able to manage their economic assets and will eventually have at their disposal the managing of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]' (-folios [Valor 040] (images [Valor 064] of bill No. 10.753-). It must be clarified again, that this discussion was generated because the Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración ruled on the scope of this cause of insolvency stating that '[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they have conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as causes to terminate a judicial servant; if this were allowed, it would be sanctioning for a mere danger [...]' [-folio [Valor 082] [image [Valor 065] of bill No. 10.753-) (...) Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged norms, we have no objection, as it coincides with the legal theory regarding their means of creation, that is, via law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. However, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in the Judgment of February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman Vs. Uruguay: '[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect of International Law, including International Human Rights Law, which has been considered as such even by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain facts or acts in a society is limited by the norms and international obligations for the protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by its both formal and substantive characteristics, therefore, particularly in cases of serious violations of the norms of International Human Rights Law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the rule of majorities, that is, to the sphere of what is 'susceptible to being decided' by majorities in democratic instances, in which a 'conventionality control' must also prevail [...], which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judiciary [...]'. In that same sense, regarding the legitimacy of internal regulations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Judgment of November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco Vs. Mexico, stated: '[...] For this Tribunal, not only the suppression or issuance of norms in domestic law guarantee the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation contained in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of state practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not guarantee by itself that its application is adequate. It is necessary that the application of the norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of state public order, be adjusted to the same end pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]'.

At this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for the purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of the conventionality control, in the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights—as is the case of Costa Rica—its judges and public authorities in general are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of this binding international regulation is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, its object, and its purpose. In this sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has indicated that authorities must not only exercise a constitutionality control, but also a "conventionality" control ex officio, whose function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the plaintiffs in each specific case. (…)

a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, namely the "Means employed by the legal norm versus its end," that is, its suitability and efficacy, it has been pointed out that the suitable or legitimate purpose, while present in all cases (whether a punishment or a civil indemnification), it is clarified that this does not imply that the mentioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportionate (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that for a measure to be suitable means that it serves to safeguard the legal interest that is intended to be protected, that is, that it is capable of contributing to the realization of said objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 53-).

b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, namely the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation," it has indicated with reference to the requirement of necessity, that it must be based on a compelling public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least extent possible, and as a condition, that it must not limit more than what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48- and Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 43-).

c.) With respect to the third and final element of the proportionality test, namely the “Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit,” that is, proportionality stricto sensu, both in Kimel -paras. 83 to 94-, and in Usón Ramírez -paras. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the structure of balancing by evaluating: on one hand, the degree of affectation of a right or principle—what we have understood as the means—, and on the other, the importance of the satisfaction of the other right or principle—what we have known as the cost-benefit—, against which it analyzes the sacrifice it entails. With this, the Court verifies whether the measure adopted—sanction—broadly guaranteed the right it sought to protect, without rendering nugatory the right being limited and its consequent sacrifice. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the norms challenged through this unconstitutionality action coincides with the parameters set out by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, determining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, or objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulation with its imperative specificity, making it disproportionate and consequently irrational, all in light of the sacrifice it involves. By reason of the foregoing, it can be conclusively affirmed that the legal norms challenged through this means are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory by reason of my economic situation, thereby violating my invoked fundamental rights. I respectfully request that this Honorable Chamber carefully analyze my situation in relation to the challenged normative content, based on the factual and legal justification alleged in this unconstitutionality action.”

V.On the constitutionality analysis of subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In the sub examine, it is important to be clear about the scope of the questioned norm.

The article in question establishes the following grounds for cessation of functions of persons serving in judicial posts: death of the person (subsection 1), expiration of the appointment (subsection 2), revocation of the appointment (subsection 3), separation for the betterment of service (subsection 4), accepted resignation (subsection 5), material impediment for more than six months (subsection 6), an inferior judge being related to a superior judge in cases of kinship (subsection 7), having contracted a marriage that causes the person to incur any ground of prohibition (subsection 8), having been convicted of a crime subject to the penalty of disqualification from holding public office (subsection 9), and having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency (subsection 9). Note that this last subsection establishes two totally independent stages.

Regarding norms that refer to aspects of private life, like the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Chamber considers that, in principle, they are not in themselves unconstitutional, nor do they necessarily imply a violation of the rights to privacy and freedom of the employees, since they are subject to greater burdens, obligations, and duties. In this sense, this Tribunal shares what was expressed by the advisory body in that public officials do hold the rights to privacy and freedom, but their threshold is different from that which protects the citizen who has not assumed the condition and responsibility of holding a public office.

However, for the purposes of resolving this action, it is necessary to analyze whether the judicial declaration of insolvency as a ground for cessation of functions of any judicial employee is contrary to Constitutional Law.

The assumption under examination is expressly regulated in the following manner:

“Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial posts shall cease for:

(…)

9.- Having been convicted, in a final judgment, of a crime meriting the penalty of disqualification from holding public office or positions, and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency.” (Highlighting is not original).

According to a simple reading of the norm, any judicial employee, at the moment they are judicially declared in a state of insolvency, must be removed from their functions. That is to say, the law does not grant the legal operator any margin for evaluating the circumstances.

In this regard, as argued by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the conduct provided for in the norm (insolvency) has a burdensome consequence (cessation of the appointment), therefore the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality are applicable, regarding which this Tribunal has established the parameters that allow its analysis.

The Chamber, by means of judgment no. [Valor 084] of 12:06 hours on October 2, 1998, ordered:

“IX.- On the constitutional principle of reasonableness. The principle of reasonableness arises from the so-called 'substantive due process,' that is, that public acts must contain a substratum of intrinsic justice. When the restriction of certain rights is involved, this rule imposes the duty that such limitation be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction of the general principle of equality.

An act limiting rights is reasonable when it fulfills a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportionate. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is to say, that if such action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore, it cannot be constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment concerning whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or does not fulfill the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which might fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of an entity markedly superior to the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second is based on a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed." (Judgment number [Valor 085], of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight.”) () Subsequently, the Chamber, through judgment no. [Valor 111] of 16:31 hours on March 21, 2012 (A Calzada (VS), LP Mora (VS), G Armijo, F Cruz, F Castillo (VS), P Rueda and R Guerrero), specified the scope of the principle of reasonableness, in the following terms:

“V.- THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS. This so-called principle actually constitutes a “reasonableness test”, a protocol aimed at objectivizing, to a certain degree, the reflective process through which the judge concludes that a certain measure is unreasonable or disproportionate. “What is reasonable” is certainly a matter of appreciation that, nevertheless, can and must be argued so that it is at least plausible. The point is to propose a methodology for applying this principle, which is useful for exposing the arguments used to qualify something as reasonable or not. Said methodology contains the following elements: a) legitimacy, in the sense that the measure does not evidently violate any hierarchically superior legal mandate; b) suitability, insofar as the measure effectively serves to achieve the intended end; c) necessity implies that among several suitable measures, the least harmful one must be chosen; and d) so-called “proportionality in the strict sense”, which requires that under no circumstance is the essential content of a constitutional right affected in a process of normative balancing. It is clarified that for the majority doctrinal sector, the element of legitimacy is conceived rather as a presupposition. This protocol is applied in phases, so that if the examination of a first phase is unsatisfactory, it becomes unnecessary to continue with the study of the remaining aspects, although, in some cases, for greater forcefulness of the judgment, one may delve into them.” Thus, according to the Chamber's jurisprudence, an act limiting rights (such as the cessation of functions of a public employee for having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency) is reasonable when it fulfills a triple condition: necessary, suitable, and proportionate. Likewise, for such purposes, it must also satisfactorily overcome the elements of the reasonableness test: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense.

In this regard, it is necessary to point out that article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes quite dissimilar assumptions as grounds for the cessation of functions of persons serving in judicial posts, and therefore one cannot speak of any univocal purpose of that article. Now, specifically regarding subsection 9 of that article, it is observed that it incorporates both the conviction for a crime meriting the penalty of disqualification from holding public office, and the judicial declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency. There is no doubt that the first part responds to the penalty for a crime, thus configuring a material impossibility of exercising the office; however, the fact of having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency does not by itself, and generally, justify the cessation of functions of any employee of the Judicial Branch.

As for the purpose of this latter ground, the parties propose three positions in this action:

• 1)The plaintiff asserts that in the legislative record, on the occasion of the amendment that gave rise to the wording of subsection 9) of article 26 that was subsequently approved, no reference was made to the motive, purpose, or underlying cause that justified the express inclusion of the “cessation that is the object of this action.” Mentions that the discussion related to the disciplinary grounds for which the employment relationship may end revolved around the idea that permanence should prevail, except when “gravely inconvenient for the judicial service” or “doubts exist about their correctness.” Notes that the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration is recorded, in which, expressly, it was requested to eliminate the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in article 26 subsection 9.) of reference, in the following terms: "Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should never be taken as grounds to dismiss a judicial employee; allowing this would mean punishing for a mere danger." States that there is also a record of a legislative discussion on the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which Deputy Allan Solano, with reference to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a cause for cessation of appointment, criticizes that a “sanction for mere convenience or risk” and aspects of “private life” constitute a ground. Refers to a discussion between Deputy Santana Esquivel and then-Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Mixed Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyzed the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration on the ground of article 26 subsection 9.) of reiterated reference, for the purposes of deciding, definitively, whether that ground should be preserved or modified: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions, which is why it has been considered that a person declared insolvent suffers a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually will have at his disposal the management of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it is traditional to find norms of this nature. That is the only observation I could make to the effect of whether one opts to eliminate it or not keep it; my recommendation is to keep the provision that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL: Let us continue then. We will keep this article as it is [...]". Argues that the justification of former Magistrate Mora Mora was what provided the motive for keeping the ground for cessation related to insolvency, and that in it, reference was made to the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch without evaluating administrative functions, to the existence of “a certain loss of trust” with such a declaration, and to the fact that “eventually they will have economic resources at their disposal.” Argues that the foregoing reveals an empty and unfounded argument, since not all judicial employees fit into this assumption; and, furthermore, the existence of a motive that seriously harms the institutional work of service is not verified.
• 2)The Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative instances when the general reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch was being analyzed, former Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora Mora pointed out that “judicial employees must be protected by a certain trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions, which is why it has been considered that a person declared insolvent suffers a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets…”. Notes that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary power that the Judicial Branch has over its employees, which is necessary as an instrument of guarantee to the citizen that they will receive a quality, agile, effective, and efficient public service, endowed with an adequate organization and highly qualified judicial employees for the performance of their duties. Explains that it does not sanction a mere danger or simple risk based on aspects of mere judicial convenience, by virtue of the fact that the norm is provided for when a judicial declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is decreed, that is, there is a whole judicial process in which matters related to the non-compliance with credit obligations assumed by the debtor party are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions for the person to be able to resolve that situation. Adds that the legislator considered that the foregoing implies a situation of distrust and sought the probity of the judicial employee to have certainty that they are responsible with their obligations, both in their work and in their private life. Asserts that the imposition of this type of sanctions has an absolute scope under the principle of legality for incurring in conduct prohibited by a norm, which is not consistent with the plaintiff's allegations when she affirms that the norm allows sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk.
• 3)The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic states that from the analysis of the legislative record, it is evident that the intention of the challenged norm was always to declare a "loss of trust" of the judicial official “who has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually will have the disposition to manage the economic assets of the citizenry" (see statements by Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora at folios [Valor 075] and [Valor 076] of the legislative record).” Mentions that the intention was to direct the norm at officials who administered justice or who, due to the condition of their post, should be required to have adequate management of their personal assets.

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that a completely clear purpose is not demonstrated regarding the incorporation of the judicial declaration of insolvency as an automatic ground for cessation of functions of any judicial employee. While it would not be illegitimate to impose this ground on certain positions within the Judicial Branch due to the functions they perform, no objective justification is discerned to support the generic scope given to the subsection. Note that in the legislative discussions referred to by the plaintiff and partially taken up by the Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice, reference is made to a “there is a certain loss of trust towards him [referring to the judicial employee in charge of resolving discords], given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets”; however, there is no record of any express justification regarding the general scope of the ground and the lack of evaluation of specific circumstances. Additionally, the Chamber shares the position of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic insofar as it considers that the judicial declaration of insolvency, to constitute a valid ground for cessation of functions, must have some repercussion on the Judicial Branch or on the trust that was held in the official, which undoubtedly implies taking into consideration the nature of the positions and the possibility of evaluating any excusing or mitigating circumstances that may have concurred in the reason for the declaration.

On this last point, although the judicial declaration of insolvency is an aspect that can be of interest in a public employment relationship, it cannot be contemplated in absolute terms. For example, there is the possibility that, due to some situation unrelated to the judicial employee, such a declaration does not respond to a mismanagement of their assets, but rather is a consequence of debts incurred to attend to an illness or emergency, or is due to reasons of force majeure. Furthermore, there could be a case in which the functions of the judicial employee do not put the Judicial Branch at risk nor affect it.

Therefore, if the consequence of the ground is so serious (cessation of functions) and there is no justification extending its application to any employee of the Judicial Branch (without even granting the possibility of demonstrating the lack of danger or affectation, or the concurrence of excusing or mitigating circumstances), the transgression of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality becomes evident. In this sense, a priori, the necessity (that a factual basis exists making it essential to protect some good or set of goods through the adoption of a measure), suitability (that the restriction adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need), and proportionality (that the limitation is not of an entity markedly superior to the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community) of the act limiting rights are not proven. Thus, with the application of the reasonableness test, although no evident violation of legitimacy is perceived, the examination of suitability, necessity, and “proportionality in the strict sense” does not yield a satisfactory result, since respectively it was not verified: 1) that the measure serves to achieve the intended end (which, in any case, is not even entirely clear); 2) that among several measures, the least harmful one was chosen (only the absolute cessation is provided for, irrespective of the post or the circumstances); and 3) that the essential content of a constitutional right was not affected in the normative balancing (the generic provision of cessation of functions without any justification violates the essential content of the right to work of the employees, as it automatically suppresses it without the circumstances of each case being evaluated).

Additionally, the analysis made by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is shared, when it points out that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any burdensome consequence in the individual's sphere must constitute a strictly necessary measure to achieve the objective sought, and that the principle of proportionality requires the prior establishment by the legislator of the limits within which the legal operator may move for the interpretation of the norm in attention to the specific circumstances. Likewise, as argued by the advisory body, the administrative authority must have a margin of discretion granted by the legislator to guarantee that the burdensome consequence is only applied when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. Precisely, the current wording of the norm does not admit different types of interpretation; rather, its content necessarily prescribes that it be applied to any person who meets that assumption; that is to say, the problem does not derive from an incorrect application of the norm but from its application in the terms provided for by the legislator, which does not admit, as already stated, any margin for a hermeneutics that tempers its scope.

For the foregoing reasons, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase “or insolvency” contained in subsection 9) of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is appropriate, as it is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

Since there are sufficient reasons to declare the unconstitutionality of the reference to “insolvency” in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it becomes unnecessary to rule on the remaining claims, as has been the thesis of this Chamber from the beginning in a large number of cases (see judgments numbers [Valor 086], [Valor 087], [Valor 088], [Valor 089], [Valor 090], [Valor 091], among others).

Finally, it is worth recalling that the Judicial Branch has a normative body to address the unjustified non-fulfillment of financial obligations and commitments that compromise good public service due to the magnitude of the risk or the good image of the institution. Such cases can be channeled through disciplinary procedures with the consequences that the legal system establishes according to the circumstances, evidentiary elements, and legal assessment in the particular situation. In this regard, for example, article 192 subsection 9 and article 194 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch provide:

“Article 192.- The following are considered serious offenses:

(…) 9.- The unjustified non-payment of a credit obligation, which must be met as principal debtor and is being collected through judicial means.

Article 194.- Any other infraction or negligence in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position, not provided for in the preceding articles, shall be examined by the competent bodies for the purpose of determining whether they constitute a very serious, serious, or minor offense, with the aim of applying the disciplinary regime. For this purpose, the actions indicated in the preceding articles shall be taken as reference.” VI.- Documentation provided to the case file. The parties are advised that if they have provided any document in paper, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be removed from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, any material not removed within this period will be destroyed, according to the provisions of the "Regulation on the Electronic Case File before the Judicial Branch," approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, [Valor 027]12, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action is partially granted for violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, the phrase “or insolvency” contained in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is declared unconstitutional. The judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled law, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Regarding the alleged transgression of article 12 of the same normative body, the action is declared inadmissible.

Report this ruling in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish it in its entirety in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify this ruling to the petitioner, the Procurador General de la República, and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *HD43IVXXEHFK61* It is insisted, for the purposes of said motion, that no suitable underlying reason, purpose, or cause appears on the record justifying the express inclusion of the ground for termination that is the object of this action. At folio [Value 036] (image [Value 037]), the legislative discussion related to disciplinary grounds appears, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship may end for that reason, highlighting the reference to the interest in the public service of judicial functions, given which the permanence of the official prevails, except when it proves '*gravely inconvenient for the judicial service*', as well as when, on account of it, '*doubts exist about his/her correctness*'. At folio [Value 080] (image [Value 081]), the ground that is the object of this unconstitutionality action, set forth in Article 26, subsection 9, already appears added as substitute text. At folio [Value 082] (image [Value 065]), the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration must be highlighted, in which, expressly, they request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in the referenced Article 26, subsection 9.) be eliminated. The justificatory and explanatory element that the legislators express is the following: "*Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they possess conditions which, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as grounds to dismiss a judicial servant; allowing this would mean sanctioning for mere danger*". (-the underlining and bold are not in the original, they are set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action). At folio [Value 038] (image [Value 039]), legislative discussion appears on the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which the criterion of Deputy Allan Solano is highlighted, in which, referring to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for termination of appointment, he criticizes that it constitutes a ground of 'sanction for mere convenience or risk' and regarding aspects of 'private life'. At folios [Value 040] (image [Value 041]) the discussion of Deputy Santana Esquivel and Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora appears, as members of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyze the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration regarding the ground of Article 26, subsection 9.), repeatedly referenced, for purposes of definitively deciding whether to retain or modify said ground. For those purposes, it is of high interest to textually cite what they stated in this regard, as follows: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are those in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists among the citizenry and the State and within State institutions. That is why it has been considered that regarding a person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal the management of the citizenry's economic assets. That is why it is traditional to find norms of this nature. That is the only observation I could make regarding opting to eliminate or not to maintain it. My recommendation is to maintain the provision that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL; We will continue then. We will keep this article as it is [...]". (-the underlining is not in the original; it is set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-) As can be observed with total clarity, it is the justification of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora that provides the reason for legislatively deciding to maintain the ground for termination indicated in the referenced Article 26, subsection 9.), and consequently that defined in Article 12 of that same law, reasoning that centers on the following aspects: a.) By referring to 'resolution of discords', it only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch, and omits, and thereby legislatively no value is given to, the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, as is the work of my judicial performance as Unit Coordinator; b.) He points out the existence of 'a certain loss of trust' due to the judicial official being declared insolvent, that is, he would punish with termination the appointment in the judicial service, for a conduct whose assessment does not effectively, objectively, causally, directly, intrinsically, proportionally, nor reasonably verify the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional service work, as well as before the citizenry, all of this accredited in light of the functions I perform, independent of my state of insolvency. It is insisted, not only must the jurisdictional work be assessed, but also that which concerns my person, namely the performance of administrative work. He further states that 'he will eventually have the disposition of economic resources', for which reason he again reveals an empty argument lacking technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal basis regarding the serious harm to the institutional Service work, given that, in the judicial service relationship of an administrative nature, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption. That is my case, because in the performance of my duties as Unit Coordinator of the Planning Directorate, I have no assigned function, nor consequently do I perform my job administering, guarding, controlling, or disposing of, under any title, economic resources of the Judicial Branch, nor evidently of the citizenry on occasion of my function, such that it could be believed, much less accredited by any means, that there exists serious harm to the judicial service. Additionally, I state before Your Authority that I know my duties and responsibilities in the judicial service, which is accredited by my impeccable judicial service with more than 23 years of service. Furthermore, there has not existed in the past, nor does there currently exist, any complaint or procedure against me tending to demonstrate that I have incurred a breach of service due to improper use of public funds and that this is causally due to the economic-financial situation that unfortunately befell me and that generated the insolvency for the reasons that served as defense in the case processed by the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection. I further certify before Your Authority that the criminal case initiated ex officio by normative mandate, on account of the insolvency declaration, tending to investigate whether I incurred the crime of fraudulent insolvency, was ordered for prosecutorial file since there is no determination whatsoever of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions typified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Value 004] for complaint No. [Value 005] of file unique number [Value 006], confirming again that my conduct adhered to civil legislation according to the possibility that said regulations provide to face administratively the cancellation of my debts, and that I had to resort to that judicial process by my own act and due to the pressing economic situation I faced. That the 'traditional' aspect argued to exist in other regulations, for containing the ground challenged in this venue, should not be the rule to equate its applicability as ground for termination of judicial service, even more so because it will be demonstrated later that the ground of insolvency is not conceived in other regulations in the manner regulated by Law No. 7333, so this argument becomes at once a foundation lacking logic, truthfulness, and causal suitability regarding the serious harm to the institutional work of judicial service, which has never existed on my part, and which the legislative technique did not consider, even more so when dealing with sanctioning disciplinary matters, whose sacrifice causes prejudice to me by the loss of work. From the investigation and documentary evidence that comprises the legislative record of Bill No. 10.753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the ground of insolvency as a reason for not being appointed and for declaring the termination of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it is not in accordance with the regulatory complex of the disciplinary matters that Law No. 7333 regulates as a whole, tending to the demonstration, after due process, of a serious harm to the judicial service, nor the existence of a serious breach, much less a very serious one to the judicial public service, as a primary element for the sanctioning application of the challenged ground, which, as is visible, in my case would mean the greatest sacrifice of losing my job and personal harm and harm to those who depend economically on me, all of this, for a mere expectation of an alleged risk, which in my case is nonexistent, nor has it been assessed by the Judicial Inspection, since they apply the ground ipso jure. As was demonstrated, and thus warned by various instances within the legislative process of that bill, it was alleged that allowing that ground, as it is set forth, would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration in light of decisions of necessity involving aspects of private life, which do not influence the judicial service, in my case not even mildly, much less seriously or very seriously. This aspect, I tried to demonstrate in the administrative procedure before the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection. However, by means of a ruling dated October 18, 2017, they rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I offered in that sense, considering that "[...] they bear no relation to what is alleged in the statement of charges. Note that in this sanctioning disciplinary procedure, the causes that motivated the declaration of the accused's insolvency are not under discussion; that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. Nor is she being reproached for any breach in the exercise of her position, such that the offered testimonial evidence is rejected [...]". In that sense, note, as already stated, that the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection considers the disciplinary procedure as strictly legal (de puro derecho), without considering other relevant aspects in the service relationship, in strict application of the measure regulated in Article 26, subsection 9.) of that Law, resulting in Decision No. [Value 018] that ordered the revocation of my appointment, considering the declared insolvency as a very serious breach without demonstrating in that disciplinary procedure, -as already stated-, in a real manner that very serious breach with a verified reason of harm to the service I provide to the Judicial Branch, nor to the institutional image, or something similar, but rather by express provision of Article 26, subsection 9.), repeatedly mentioned. Note, in light of this, that the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, through Decision No. [Value 018], in which it ordered the revocation of my appointment by express application of Article 26, subsection 9.), repeatedly commented on, provides that I incurred very serious conduct due to my state of insolvency. For that conclusive assessment of the existence of 'very serious conduct' it is also based on Article 28, subsection 2. of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 49, subsection c. of the Judicial Service Statute, which provide: "Article 28.- The servant may be dismissed from his position, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense: [...] 2.-Who, due to incorrectness or faults in the exercise of his position or in his private life, which may affect the good service or image of the Judicial Branch, has become deserving of that sanction" “Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, judicial servants shall have the following: […] c) Observe dignity in the performance of their position and in their private life". As can be noted, that regulation refers directly to harm to the 'good service or image of the Judicial Branch', as well as observing 'dignity', aspects that were not demonstrated during the procedure for the adopted decision, even though in a subjective, abusive, unfounded, and merely argumentative manner they determine, in their understanding, that I am not a person of integrity (proba), nor with high levels of commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, or good faith, due to the loss of trust generated by the state of insolvency by lacking the value of probity. Note that in the same Decision No. [Value 018], the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection only determines as proven facts the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service to the Judicial Branch, and the nonexistence of prior disciplinary sanctions, and not the harm to the service or image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal failings affecting dignity, an aspect that is very delicate to define due to the constitutional protection that exists in the matter in which the honor of every person is privileged above all. Having reached this point, I wish to emphasize that voluntarily submitting myself to the insolvency process, as I have indicated, was the alternative that the legal system in civil matters provided me to reach a solution to my economic-financial situation, thereby generating a scheduled fulfillment regulated judicially to satisfy the fulfillment of all my debts and the satisfaction of my creditors' interests, all as an act of good faith, an aspect that was verified in criminal proceedings when it was determined that my insolvency was not fraudulent, a case that has a prosecutorial filing status, as will be mentioned later. ii.) Regulations related to the alleged unconstitutionality.- In this section, we shall set forth those highly relevant regulations that contain in their content the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. The high relevance of the regulations to be presented stems from their regulating the employment relationship in other Branches of the Republic, Entities of the National Banking System, Consultative and Technical Legal Bodies, as well as Control and Oversight Bodies of the Public Treasury. Likewise, we will refer to specific general regulations on civil service and against corruption and illicit enrichment, as well as the private sector. a.) Regulations that do NOT make any reference or mention whatsoever to the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for a disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, • nor is there any regulation in that matter in its Autonomous Statute; • Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, No. 6815, • Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, No. 7558; • Autonomous Regulations of the Legislative Assembly; • Regulations to the Civil Service Statute; • Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in Public Function, No. 8422; • General Law on Internal Control, No. 8292. As can be noted, neither in the Attorney General's Office of the Republic nor in the Comptroller General of the Republic, as Consultative and Technical Legal Bodies, and Control and Oversight Bodies of the Public Treasury, does any regulation exist in this regard. Likewise, there is no regulation for the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the Legislative Assembly, nor generally in specific regulations against corruption and illicit enrichment, nor in internal control, such that the declaration of insolvency is configured as a "traditional" ground, nor necessary to avoid risks of administrative liability of a disciplinary nature. b.) Regulations that DO make reference to the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for a disciplinary application in sanctioning matters, or for aspects of a prohibitive nature.- • Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Civil Registry, No. 3504. Its Article 27, in what is relevant, establishes: "[...] The following may not be appointed to hold positions in the Tribunal or in the Registry: those prosecuted with an order for prosecution, those serving a penalty of disqualification from public offices and posts, those convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment as an ordinary penalty, insolvents and bankrupts, as long as the insolvency or bankruptcy has not been qualified as excusable; those who habitually become intoxicated; those who have been dismissed from judicial and electoral positions; and, in general, all those who do not observe good conduct or have backgrounds of dubious morality [...]". (-the underlining and bold are not in the original; they are set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-). As can be noted, in this Entity, categorized as a fourth Branch of the Republic, although the ground in mention is set forth for appointment aspects, it only provides for it under a parameter of 'excusable', which allows and obliges the operator of the norm to assess precisely the reasons for the insolvency declaration, the economic-financial condition of the person, and with that the eventual harm to the public service, and why not, even its inconvenience, but in light of a verified, real, and effective risk or danger in harming the public service. That law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Organic Law of the National Banking System, No. 1644. Its Article 22, in what is relevant, establishes: "The following may not be designated as members of a board of directors: 1) Persons who during the year prior to their appointment have been sued in executive proceedings by any of the banks of the National Banking System, for collection of their own unsatisfied credits, or who have been declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency […]" (-the underlining and bold are not in the original; they are set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action-) Note that in this Law, the ground is also applicable for appointment purposes, but not for any official, rather exclusively for members of a board of directors, that is, for superior heads of the banking organization, also establishing a parameter of assessment and normative limitation with respect to the insolvency declaration of 1 year prior to appointment. That is, outside of that period, no matter how much the ground of insolvency exists, the prohibition of appointment for that superior position does not apply. It is worth highlighting that this law does NOT establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment, even when it is for a superior post, such as that of a board of directors of a banking entity. • Law of the Civil Service Statute, No. 1581. Article 8, subsection g.) of this Law establishes, in what is relevant, the following: "The Director General of Civil Service shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, after a competitive examination, shall report directly to him/her and must meet the following requirements: [...] g) Not be declared insolvent or bankrupt; and [...]". (-the underlining and bold are not in the original; they are set forth in this manner only for purposes of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for this unconstitutionality action). It must be highlighted in this case, that similarly to the foregoing, the normative regulation of the ground of insolvency declaration is determined normatively for appointment aspects, and not generally for public officials under the civil service regime, but specifically for the Director General of Civil Service. That law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Labor Code. In its Article 85, subsection c.), for what is relevant, it provides: "*They are causes that terminate the employment contract without liability for the worker* and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or of his/her successors to claim and obtain the payment of benefits and indemnities that may correspond to them by virtue of what is ordered by the Code or by special provisions: [...] c.) Force majeure or fortuitous event, insolvency, judicial or extrajudicial arrangement with creditors (concurso), bankruptcy or winding-up (liquidación), disability, or death of the employer. This rule only applies when the facts to which it refers produce as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work, and when the legal preference held by alimony creditors of the deceased, insolvent, or bankrupt has been satisfied [...]".

(-the underlined and bold text is not in the original, it is presented in that form only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present unconstitutionality action) As can be noted from the above transcription, the Labor Code, as the general rule that regulates the employment relationship for the private sector, establishes the ground for commentary, but rather as a ground in favor of the employee, in the understanding that if it is rather the employer who becomes insolvent, it empowers the employee to terminate the employment contract, without liability for the latter, even establishing a conditional and evaluative ground for the application of that normative reason, which is that it applies only if it results, as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence, in the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work. That law does not establish the ground of insolvency for purposes of terminating the employee's appointment.” The civil insolvency process is regulated as a legal possibility in Articles 884 and following of the Civil Code, which, for what is relevant, provide: “Article 884.- For the insolvency of a person to produce all the effects that the law attributes to it, it must be judicially declared.”. "Article 886.- Whenever, upon petition by one or several creditors, it is proven that the debtor's assets are insufficient to cover their debts, the declaration of bankruptcy (concurso) shall proceed. Asset insufficiency is presumed by the fact of the debtor not presenting, nor the Property Registry recording, sufficient assets to satisfy all their obligations. The opening of the bankruptcy (concurso) shall also be declared when requested by the debtor themselves, if they have two or more creditors." (- the text highlighted in bold is not from the original, it is presented in that form only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present unconstitutionality action-) In that same sense, and for aspects of its procedure, the judicial declaration of insolvency is regulated in Articles 760 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, which, for what is relevant, provide: "Article 760.- Causes. At the request of any creditor who proves that there are two or more pending executions against their debtor, originating from different titles and creditors, the enforceability of their credit with an executory title, and the insufficiency of the former's assets, the opening of the bankruptcy (concurso) shall be decreed, if the debtor, required to that effect by the court, does not pay or does not present within three days sufficient assets upon which to carry out the seizure. The resolution ordering the requirement shall be notified personally or by means of a notice at the debtor's home. The requirement shall be dispensed with in the urgent cases indicated in the following article. Proof that two or more executions exist shall not be necessary if the opening is requested by two or more creditors. The same declaration shall be made at the request of the debtor, who must present a detail of their assets and liabilities, or express the reasons that prevent them from doing so, and shall also present their books, if they keep them". (- the text highlighted in bold is not from the Original, it is presented in that form only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present unconstitutionality action-). Under that understanding, the doctrine has established that insolvency is "[...] The state of a debtor who lacks sufficient assets to satisfy their due obligations is called insolvency. It is not that the person fails to pay one or more obligations, but rather what determines insolvency is the lack of sufficient assets to face the debts [...]". (- Ickowez Faingezicht, Roxana. 1999 pp. 29) For its part, the jurisprudence of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, on this matter has indicated that: "When analyzing the economic situation of the debtor who has a plurality of creditors and insufficient assets, which justifies the collective execution, in application of Article 982 of the Civil Code, one must consider, regarding the creditors, their existence as such, without considering the nature of the credit -commercial or civil- or whether it originates from a personal debt or a joint surety bond, because it is precisely the existence with the possibility of pursuing the obligor's assets that makes the collective process necessary. (Second Chamber. Judgment: [Valor 096] at ten hours ten minutes on May 31, nineteen ninety-one) In accordance with the foregoing, it is clear that the regulations in civil matters allow any citizen to submit to that type of procedure, as a mechanism to orderly pay their debts, due to the lack of sufficient assets and income to face them. The insolvency process should not be condemned nor qualified negatively and without an assessment of the reasons that generated it, even more so if it is as in my case, in which it was demonstrated that there were not even acts, amounts, nor transactions classified as fraudulent, as was defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Valor 004] for complaint No. [Valor 005] of the unique case file number [Valor 006].” States the causes of her insolvency as follows: “I filed, as promoter, before the Civil Court of Cartago, a process for Declaration of Insolvency, protected by Articles 884 and following of the Civil Code and 760 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, just as any Costa Rican citizen might be empowered to do, protected (amarado) (sic) by the civil sphere regulations, as a viable and legal mechanism to thus be able to honor the debts that burdened my economy, both personal and family. The economic decline suffered by me, as I well explain in the Civil process, stems from my last marital relationship, due to the inequality that always existed in the distribution of obligations that made me bear the greater percentage of housing, services, food, education expenses for my son and the totality of his expenses from before he was born, as well as all the specialized medical treatments, exams, vaccines and others that he had to receive from approximately six months of age, due to recurrent respiratory problems, lactose intolerance that caused gastric problems, optical treatments, otorhinolaryngology for nosebleed problems and others, since his father never made expenditures for his son's health. Furthermore, that relationship was loaded with psychological and patrimonial violence, for which I had to resort to psychological help from the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, since among the effects caused by so many years of violence was the constant fear I had of my ex-spouse, both for my physical integrity and that of my son, as well as a devaluation of my person and a strong feeling of sadness, frustration and depression among others. Among the situations experienced, it was common that every time my ex-husband got angry about something (which was frequent), in addition to his continuous insults, irony, humiliations and forcing me to cover the totality of the household expenses, which was not possible solely with my salary, for which reason I had to resort to the use of credit cards or other sources of indebtedness to be able to get ahead, because asking him for the expenses would anger him even more, causing him to explode and become violent again or to insult and belittle me. It was also common that the expenses generated from our son's education, in school and later high school activities, were covered in their entirety by me, since he refused to make those expenses; the same situation occurred with the person who took care of our son, whom in December he refused to pay the Christmas bonus, which I also had to assume. Added to the above, I supported my ex-husband in some personal expenses, since at that time, as I had a better gross salary than him, he asked me to do so, because I reiterate, I did not have the courage to say no; all of the above affected in some way our family economy and even more so, my personal one. With the marital breakup, my emotional and personal state reached such an extreme that I necessarily had to be attended to again by Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a Professional from the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, who detected (sic) within a clinical study that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial, as it was a systematic type of abuse that caused me to feel minimized as a woman and person. My entire life, both personal and financial, suffered a severe disruption, which led me to seek a legal solution, precisely because I have never thought of evading my responsibilities as a debtor; quite the opposite, the solution offered to me by the legal advisor was precisely to submit to a declaration of insolvency, especially since I did not have assets to respond for the credit operations, in addition to addressing, as a mother and head of household, a series of priorities such as clothing, health, food, education, and housing for myself and my son [Nombre 012], in addition to my elderly parents, the only source of income being my salary from the Judicial Branch, which, by the way, was offered in said Declaration to the Civil Judge as the only means of payment to the creditors. As can be noted, the judicial alternative of insolvency was the mechanism, in civil law matters, to meet the need to honor my debts in the best possible way, as well as to access the enjoyment of the constitutional right that assists me to have a dignified life, which was being rendered nugatory by the financial burden borne by the undersigned. This aspect is recognized by the Civil Court of Cartago itself, in Judgment No. [Valor 042] that declared my insolvency, by stating that: "Taking into consideration the gross salary received by the (sic) patentee, in relation to the other documented obligations, in harmony with the cost of a dignified life presumed for any person subject to rights, it is evident that the imbalance of this debtor's (sic) finances is so severe that it makes it impossible for them to timely pay, with complete installments, the debts he (sic) incurred in relation to their constitutional right to have a dignified life." It is a Judge of the Republic who, through the legal mechanisms provided for by Costa Rican civil regulations to solve a legal conflict brought to their attention, accepts and endorses that the payment mechanism to settle and thus be able to dignifiedly honor my debts, is through the salary earned as fruit of my work in the Judicial Branch, but distributed equitably among my creditors to thus maintain orderly payment of the debts. All the above situation, including the epicrisis from Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a Professional from the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, was submitted and proposed as evidence before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, under case file No. [Valor 001] as a pending cause for this action; however, it was rejected outright, without further evaluation, considering that it is not related to the cause of the action.” Develops her profile and her functions as a professional in the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch: “The purpose of this section is to place on record my professional profile and the functions I have performed as of the date on which my insolvency was judicially declared by the Civil Judge, based on what has been stated. We will proceed to identify three moments in different positions, of an administrative nature, not judicial, that from that date I have held in the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch, due to my dedication to the service of the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. At the time of the declaration of insolvency, I was working in the administrative position of Professional 2 in Public Administration, with tenure, assigned to the Institutional Projection Section of the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch. The main administrative functions I was in charge of are the following: i. Design and conduct research, plans, work programs, projects, and complex analyses in various areas of the administrative field; ii. Compile, classify, tabulate, and analyze varied and complex information to propose the adoption of institutional policies; iii. Prepare procedure manuals; iv. Conduct interviews, whether structured, semi-structured, technical, specialized, among others, as part of the development of the assigned activities; v. Participate in the establishment of indicators that allow follow-up on work plans, programs, and projects; vi. Prepare, analyze, and interpret tables, graphs, trends, and varied information; vii. Draft reports, procedures, and other documents arising as a consequence of the activities performed, presenting the pertinent recommendations and observations; viii. Keep varied controls over the activities under her responsibility and ensure that they are fulfilled in accordance with the established programs, dates, and deadlines; ix. Attend meetings, seminars, talks, and other similar activities; and x. Answer inquiries. As of March 1, 2017, I was promoted with tenure to the administrative position of Unit Coordinator 2, assuming the Coordination of the Administrative Management Unit of the Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the technical and administrative tasks of the Unit, in accordance with the directives and policies established by the head; ii. Collaborate in the preparation and formulation of work programs and annual operating plans; iii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, tables, graphs, and diverse information; iv. Ensure that records, files, controls, and statistics of the Unit under her charge are kept updated; v. Collaborate with the Heads of the Sub-processes or Sections, in the coordination of professionals, acting as facilitators for the different projects or thematic axes in charge of each sub-process; vi.

Participate in the preparation of work programs related to internal control; and vii. Guide lower-level staff in the execution of their duties. As of February 21, 2018, she was again promoted—in a substitute capacity—as Unit Coordinator 3, assuming the Evaluation Subprocess of the same Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the professional, technical, and administrative activities carried out in a Unit; ii. Collaborate with superiors in developing project proposals, research, and technical studies aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of activities within her area of competence; iii. Conduct research related to the unit's work program; iv. Collect, classify, and analyze varied information related to the Unit's competence and formulate recommendations; v. Participate in the preparation of work programs, the annual operational plan, SEVRI internal control, among others; vi. Attend meetings with superiors and colleagues in order to analyze problems arising from the unit's activities and propose changes, adjustments, and solutions; and vii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, charts, graphs, and diverse information. As can be noted, I do not perform senior management duties, much less jurisdictional work, but rather administrative management whose work product is subject— for ordinary internal control aspects—to the final approval and decision of my superiors, and before which *it is certified that I do not administer, nor have custody of, nor control, nor do I have disposal over, under any title, economic resources of the Judicial Branch or third parties by reason of my position, just as I do not issue final administrative acts, nor serve the public, to such an extent that no type of bond is applicable to me by reason of my duty of performance.* More than the foregoing, I am pleased to inform you that, in all her years of service, which now exceed 23 years, I have never been subject to disciplinary sanctions, having an unblemished record (sic) , which even led to my receiving the Judicial Merit Certificate in the year 2015". She asserts that Article 12 and subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) are unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) "Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Certainty, due to an act managed in application of my personal autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad). Labor discrimination based on economic situation in employment matters is materialized." She develops the content of the right to work. She mentions that the principle of progressivity establishes that every social right, once recognized, can only be improved. She partially cites vote no. [Value 108]. She states that: "the cause for judicial declaration of insolvency, is configured as a measure or parameter of suitability for appointment (Article 12 of Law No. 7333), likewise, as a cause for termination of appointment (Article 26, subsection 9, of Law No. 7333), which affects that special protection of the right to work, since as demonstrated from the analysis of the bill for that Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is integrated into that block of legality without there being, nor is there foreseen, the causality of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency regarding the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional order, and of an administrative nature, nor, likewise, a conditional cause or one for assessment for the application of that normative reason, which in the case of the application of Article 26, subsection 9, of said law, generates by itself the termination of appointment as the most grievous disciplinary measure, even when there is no damage, harm, or impact on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, much less on society, nor the proven existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the public judicial service by reason of the declaration of insolvency. Demonstration of the foregoing is the sanctioning reasoning defined by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial), in Vote No. [Value 018] for my particular case, in which it classifies—without major proof or demonstration based on the procedure it followed—my person, by reason of the declaration of insolvency, as an official lacking in probity, commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith, in which due to this situation there exists a relationship of distrust, considering that the Judicial Branch 'needs to have a guarantee that the hired person is honest and responsible for their actions,' considering said action as incompatible with public function; however, in the case followed under file No. [Value 001], those aspects are not assessed, to such an extent that the evidence I requested to submit was rejected, considering the cause to be applicable by operation of law (de pleno derecho), and having as proven facts only the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service annuity to the Judicial Branch, and the non-existence of previous disciplinary sanctions, and not the impact on the service or the image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal shortcomings affecting dignity, which is the basis of the regulations invoked. The assessment made by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not determine the real, causal, or objective existence of any serious impact on the judicial service, nor the institutional image or the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, thus punishing only an unfounded potential risk, or mere convenience by normative application by operation of law. Additionally, with the proposed sanction, an elementary principle of labor law that is of supplementary application to the public employment relationship is seriously violated, such as the protective principle, and consequently the application of the in dubio pro-operario rule, which will be associated later with the violation of the principle of innocence that assists me, before which, the revocation of my appointment applied to me for the indicated cause should have constituted the last resort, seeking to choose the sanction most favorable to the worker, in application of the principles governing the law of the constitution and conventionality control itself, all of this in the face of a sanction evidently flagrant to the legal system. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of the evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship." She argues that her declaration of insolvency was due to her own decision applied through personal autonomy (autonomía de la voluntad), thus she used a legal possibility provided by the legal system to seek a solution to her economic-financial situation and thereby generate a regulated fulfillment of her debts. She affirms that the institution of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent nature is declared. She partially transcribes, regarding personal autonomy, vote [Value 043]. She cites numeral 28 of the Political Constitution. She adds that the declaration of insolvency, managed by herself, does not damage, affect, or harm public morality or public order. She adds that in the statement of charges (traslado de cargos) itself carried out by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the foregoing is neither particularized nor is it intended to prove it, nor the impact on the public service due to the existence of a serious or very serious fault by reason of the insolvency. She maintains that it was not analyzed whether her condition harms third parties, since her creditors will see their credits reimbursed according to bankruptcy rules through the withholding of a portion of her salary. She states that, due to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case, to the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literalness by operation of law. She contends that the assessment made is merely subjective. She relates that she finds herself facing a cause that seeks the termination of her appointment, without there being verification, assessment, or real or objective causality regarding the impact on the public service or the verification of a serious or very serious fault to the administrative (non-jurisdictional) public judicial service. She notes that this rule punishes with the most grievous measure an expectation or a potential risk or danger, in her case unreal. She mentions that: "it is palpable that what was warned by the Legislative Commission of Government and Administration that reviewed Bill No. 10,753 becomes a reality, when it warned that mere danger or a potential risk would be sanctioned, without there even being a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment reflecting a deterioration, impact, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point, what was mentioned in the file of bill 10,753, specifically at folio [Value 025] (image [Value 026]) when in the legislative discussion about the different causes of the invoked articles, it is emphasized that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the causes should be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances 'affect the public service'." She asserts that she does not administer, control, or dispose of economic resources of the Judicial Branch, thus no type of bond is applicable to her by reason of her performance, nor does she issue final administrative acts. She argues that in her case it applies "what was said at the time by Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, in the legislative discussion on that cause, that is, that I am in charge of resolving all kinds of disagreements that exist between citizens and the State (—which does not apply to me—), that by reason of the insolvency cause there is a certain loss of trust (—it has not been demonstrated to me, even more so in my judicial career if I have demonstrated to this day my merit and suitability for my professional performance—) and that eventually I will have disposition of economic assets of the citizenry (does not apply to me)." She adds that there is a serious and latent impact on the protection of the family and legal certainty, since due to her condition as a female head of household, the measure would generate the termination of her appointment, condemning her possibility of satisfying her needs and those of her son and her parents; furthermore, her creditors would no longer see their credits reimbursed due to the non-existence of a salary to which the proportional withholding can be applied, since she has no seizable assets. She cites, in relation to the right to family protection, judgment no. [Value 097]. She indicates that: "Just as Article 56 of our Political Constitution provides, as a guaranteeing limit of the State regarding the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, indicates, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, the right to work, and protection against unemployment, all without any discrimination, among others, for reasons of economic situation or position, as is my case. In that same sense, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labor Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, relating to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent both in State bodies and in private companies, situations from occurring that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the heritage of every individual. From all of this, Law No. 2694, of November 22, 1960, arises, that is, the International Labor Organization Convention on the prohibition of discrimination in employment, in force to date, which prohibits '[...] all kinds of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, marital status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, filiation or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunity or treatment in matters of employment or occupation.' In that sense, it is noted that the prohibition of that conventional control has a single exception, which is that defined in Article 2 of that same Law No. 2694, which establishes 'From the previous prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions or preferences arising according to the necessary qualifications for the thorough fulfillment of the functions or tasks proper to the type of position or job, exclusively according to their nature and the conditions of the worker.' Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, the discrimination is materialized due to the exhaustive cause that generates the termination of appointment for mere convenience, for mere danger, or for a potential risk, without effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge by reason of my judicial declaration of insolvency." She concludes that the impact on her fundamental rights of protection to work, family, and legal certainty, which materializes discrimination based on her economic situation, is latent. She adds that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal did not even assess a mild level of risk in her case, because had it been so, it would have applied the labor suspension as a precautionary measure according to the authority established in Article 202 of the same Law No. 7333, since it is a cause for termination of appointment. ii) "Violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the non-existence of impact on the public service or third parties, as well as no verification of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the public judicial service in application of due process itself. A (sic) act of good faith is sanctioned with the supreme sacrifice of termination of appointment before an unproven and unevaluated potential risk, as well as before a mere or apparent unfounded and unjustified institutional convenience." She argues that the regulations challenged in this unconstitutionality action cause a flagrant violation of the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and the principles that make up the Law of the Constitution, insofar as the judicial declaration of insolvency is intended to be taken as a cause to prevent appointment in judicial service, as well as to terminate an official, without carrying out a greater assessment or accreditation of damage or harm—real, causal, and objective—to the institutional framework of the Judicial Branch. She adds that this cause is applied for aspects of mere unjustified convenience, by criteria of a potential risk, without any demonstration that there exists at least a slight, medium, or serious drawback for the service provided by the Judicial Branch nor specifically the Planning Directorate. She maintains that the disciplinary application of such cause does not consider whether it involves jurisdictional work, or administrative, nor are criteria assessed or applied that demonstrate the existence of any impact on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch. She refers that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal applies the cause by operation of law (de pleno derecho), thus, in her case, without major assessment, the technical and testimonial evidence she offered was denied, which sought to demonstrate her performance, the existence or not of impact on the public service, among others. Despite the foregoing, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal classified her as an official lacking in probity, commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith; furthermore, that a relationship of distrust exists considering that the Judicial Branch "needs to have a guarantee that the hired person is honest and responsible for their actions" and, therefore, the action is incompatible with public function. She mentions that in order to give a reason for being to the disciplinary measure it applies, the tribunal classified the insolvency as a very serious fault incompatible with the public service and made unproven assessments in violation of my due process. She argues that "guilt" is generated against her for promoting in good faith the application of an institution provided for in the legal system. She insists that insolvency—unless declared fraudulent—is not a crime that generates her disqualification from public positions, nor is it a sanction such that it would have the consequence of terminating her appointment. She indicates that "guilt" is generated against her without assessing her "innocence" regarding the impact on the services, goals, or objectives of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of possible or potential risks due to the handling or disposition of public resources. She refers that she would be punished disciplinarily with the termination of her appointment, violating her "fundamental right to innocence." She argues that the challenged norms contravene the constitutional parameters and principles noted, as well as "that of congruence, which the very parameter of legal certainty and due process requires." She reiterates that only in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and the Civil Registry is the declaration of insolvency contemplated in aspects of appointments; however, it is provided under a parameter of "excusable," which allows the operator of the norm to precisely assess the reasons for the declaration of insolvency, the economic-financial condition of the person, and the existence or not of fraudulent insolvency, in order to assess thereby the potential impact on the public service, or, the "existence of a serious or very serious fault to the public judicial service." She partially cites vote no. [Value 098] of this Chamber, in relation to good faith as a principle of the Law of the Constitution. She mentions that she, through her twenty-three-year career of service in the Judicial Branch, applies the highest ethical standards, as well as the values of the institution, which she intended to prove through testimonial evidence that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected based on the fact that "[...] they do not relate to what is charged in the statement of charges, note that in this sanctioning disciplinary procedure the causes that led to the declaration of the accused's insolvency are not under discussion, that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. She is not being reproached for any breach in the exercise of her position in such a way that the testimonial evidence offered is rejected [...]." She denotes that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal considers the procedure as one of pure law, without considering other aspects in the service relationship. She affirms that she managed the declaration of insolvency on her own account, which underpins her good faith in the financial solution and the payment of creditors.

He reiterates that the statement of charges made no reference to the violation of institutional ethical norms or values due to the judicial declaration of insolvency and the “affectation of the judicial service, the institutional image, or the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, nor to the existence of a serious or very serious offense against the judicial public service by reason thereof, all because it is nonexistent.” He sets forth three disciplinary proceedings against judicial officials. He states that the challenged norms appear to punish the existence of a “loss of trust,” due to the judicial declaration of insolvency; however, the objective loss of trust exists because the good faith, performance, and fidelity that the employee owes to the employer are compared, in such a way that it is substantiated and demonstrated—congruently and proportionally—that, with the employee’s conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, which leads to the conclusion that continuing the employment relationship is impossible. He cites judgments nos. [Valor 044], [Valor 045], [Valor 046], and [Valor 047] of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice regarding the objective loss of trust. He argues that if the judicial declaration of insolvency is intended to support the “loss of trust” for the Judicial Branch with the consequence of termination of appointment, because it is a disciplinary sanctioning matter, the legal norm must substantiate in its content the constitutional parameter of serious, causal, reasonable, and objective culpability of the official regarding the service and public interest, in such a way that it proves a real impossibility in the continuity of employment, or else, excuses the judicial employee due to “lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of the public office.” iii) “Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine Principle. Nonexistence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in light of the superior sacrifice involved in the disciplinary sanction without there being an affectation of the public service, nor of the institutionality, nor of the image of the Judicial Branch, or, alternatively, a demonstration of the existence of a serious offense, much less a very serious one, against the judicial public service due to the insolvency.” He mentions that the right to privacy and human dignity in the face of discrimination have been developed by this Chamber and by international regulations and jurisprudence on human rights. He indicates that these rights are treated as sources of protection for the person. He cites excerpts from votes nos. [Valor 048], [Valor 049], [Valor 050], [Valor 051], [Valor 052], [Valor 053], [Valor 054], [Valor 055], and [Valor 056]. He points out that it was through an act of good faith, with the exclusive desire to find a solution to her financial economic situation, that she sought the declaration of insolvency. He reiterates the argument related to Article 28 of the Political Constitution and the lack of harm to the Judicial Branch. He considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles, which result in the termination of appointment, does not have a legitimate purpose for the sanction, which affects the fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity, also generating a high level of discrimination due to her economic situation. He argues that the foregoing would have repercussions on the people who depend on her. He partially cites vote no. [Valor 057], regarding the principle of legitimate purpose. He explains that with this action of unconstitutionality, she does not intend to disregard the power and authority of direction, oversight, and sanction of the Judicial Branch regarding its administrative service relationship; however, there must be respect for her fundamental rights, since it is necessary to prove objective and reasonable sanctioning elements for its imposition, all in the face of the effective verification of a serious or very serious offense, the affectation of the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or an eventual risk; that is, a ground without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes her years of service in the Judicial Branch, with consequences for her privacy and dignity, as she would be treated as if she had committed some criminal activity or a serious or very serious infraction. She mentions that “the spirit of the legislator permeated in the legislative file of bill 10.753, when in its legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances ‘affect the public service,’ a situation that is not my case.” She maintains that the challenged regulations, in the face of the rights to privacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle, must be applied in the manner that most favors the human being. She partially transcribes the votes of this Chamber nos. [Valor 058], [Valor 059], and [Valor 060]. She explains that all restrictive and sanctioning measures, as well as those of termination of appointment, must precautionarily respect human dignity, the protection of privacy, and the principle of proportionality, all under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual damage is assessed. She argues that, in her case, the insolvency situation was generated by a marital relationship that led to many credits in her name in order to alleviate poor financial management, which finally ended with the rupture of the bond. She adds that, on the occasion of the foregoing, the psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a Professional of the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, determined that she was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial aggression, as it was a systematic type of abuse, causing her to feel minimized as a woman and a person. She argues that there is a binding gender aspect, as a real and excusable cause for the assessment of what ultimately caused her to make the decision to seek the judicial declaration of insolvency, which she did for her own human dignity and that of those who depend on her. She refers that it would have been very easy for her to let judicial collection actions arise for those credits, since she has no seizable assets nor could her salary support more limitations. She states that voluntarily resorting to the civil jurisdiction to be judicially declared insolvent has generated emotional and depressive repercussions for her person and family members, and even the revictimization of the psychological and emotional aggression experienced. She asserts that she mentions the foregoing because the Judicial Branch adopted the “Gender Equality Policy” so that the gender perspective would be incorporated into all the work of that Branch of the Republic. She mentions that the foregoing is supported “in the legal framework for the protection of human rights, both at the national and international level, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights to equality without discrimination of any kind, to the protection of the law, to access to prompt and complete justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that make up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica.” She adds that such policy “recognized that ‘Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when the circumstances are different, that is, when people are unequally situated,’ likewise that ‘The principle of equity drives judges, as well as all legal operators, to take into account with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider the personal, family, and social conditions in each of the cases and their consequences,’ a situation that is not being applied due to the unconstitutional content invoked through this action.” She notes that the policy aims to “guarantee equality of opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Judicial Branch.” She explains that “that Gender Equality Policy was based on the ‘Brasilia Rules on Access to Justice for Persons in Vulnerable Conditions,’ under which, as Rule 19, it is stated that: ‘Violence against women is considered any action or conduct, based on her gender, that causes death, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to a woman, both in the public and private spheres, through the use of physical or psychological violence.’ It can be noted, therefore, that this situation of vulnerability caused by that psychological violence proven by the very medical authorities in the psychological field of the Judicial Branch, proves a circumstance that requires an assessment for protection and gender equality, considering my personal, family, and social condition and its consequences.” iv) “Violation of the Principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Nonexistence of adequate connection and congruence between the conduct it regulates, the severity of the disciplinary sanction, and the superior sacrifice it involves. Existence of discrimination based on my economic situation.” She mentions that in the face of the violation of fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Political Constitution and the Law of the Constitution that have been invoked as the basis for this action of unconstitutionality against Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9), specifically referring to the invocation of the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for not appointing a judicial servant, as well as for establishing the disciplinary ground for termination of appointment, there is also a violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness of the consequent termination of appointment. She notes that these norms lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements of assessment, congruence, balance, and connection with the essential content of sanctioning law. She adds that their application does not analyze the factual picture, the personal conditions of the judicial servant in order to determine an excusable situation, the respective sacrifice involved in the measure, and the consequent ground for termination of appointment due to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency, all of the foregoing, in light of the existence or not of an affectation to the public service provided by the Judicial Branch, as well as to its institutional image or the prevailing public interest due to the performance of the position. She refers that a serious or very serious offense against the judicial public service is also not proven to apply the ground. She cites the votes of this Chamber nos. [Valor 061] and [Valor 062], regarding the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. She explains that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the challenged regulations, in order to define and substantiate the existence of the violation of the invoked fundamental rights. She adds that the test contains the three sub-principles that function as rules to be taken into account, in the sense that they are maxims on which one must question; that is, it must be verified whether the chosen means meets the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, in response to which, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. She maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, in response to which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of the States Parties to adopt the necessary internal measures to adapt their conduct and regulations to conventional parameters. She mentions the following: “Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and purpose of the challenged norms, we must ask ourselves a question: is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most serious disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of an official of the Judicial Branch who has been judicially declared in a state of insolvency to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, that they have in their charge in the Judicial Branch? The realization of the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing, because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of the regulations that tend to limit fundamental rights, or else, to generate the application of a sanctioning measure in disciplinary matters.” She sets forth the analysis as follows: “a.) As a first element of the proportionality test, we have the ‘Means used by the legal norm versus its purpose,’ that is, its adequacy, suitability, and effectiveness. In that term, the means used by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed purpose, that is, it establishes that the chosen means is the most adequate to the factual possibilities, taking into account the purpose to be achieved. There must be a judgment of congruence and practical connection between the means and the immediate purpose of the norm, since, if that purpose is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case at hand, we have Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, which establish, as relevant here, respectively, the prohibition on appointment in the judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; likewise, the ground for termination of appointment of those who serve in judicial positions, for the same reason, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. As stated in this action, and because these legal norms do not expressly or implicitly indicate their purpose, the assessment of the legislative discussion raised by the Joint Legislative Commission that heard and defined the final wording of Bill No. 10.753 for what is now Law No. 7333, must be considered for these purposes, (-which was already indicated previously-), as a defining element of that legislative spirit regarding said ground. In that sense, the purpose provided for those legal norms challenged through this means is considered to be precautionary, for an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, a member at the time of said Joint Legislative Commission, it was said that ‘[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust on the part of the public because at the end of the day we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is there declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal, the management of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]’, that being the foundation and/or criterion for leaving as definitive the text finally approved for those legal norms. The means used by these norms to obtain that purpose is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; and on the other (-Article 26, subsection 9.-), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same ground, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In this regard, it should be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, that ground is related in its wording, for the proportionality means explained, to other grounds linked to convictions for a crime punishable by imprisonment and to those who are subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public office or professions.” Given the foregoing, in my case, as is palpable and accredited in the record of civil insolvency case No. [Valor 002], the Civil Court of Cartago, in Judgment No. [Valor 063] by which it declared my state of insolvency, only orders that I am legally separated and disqualified from the power to administer and dispose of my assets that are legally attachable, and I am warned not to abandon my domicile or leave the country without judicial authorization, under penalty of being tried for disobedience to authority, but it never orders that, by reason of the insolvency, I be disqualified from holding public offices or positions. In addition to the foregoing, and as I mentioned above, the criminal case initiated ex officio by legislative mandate, by reason of the declaration of insolvency, aimed at investigating whether I incurred in the crime of fraudulent insolvency, was filed by the prosecutor's office, as there was no determination whatsoever of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions classified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Valor 004] for complaint No. [Valor 005] of the single case file number [Valor 006]. With the foregoing, it is evident that the means employed by those legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and incapable of achieving the proposed end, because the fact of considering that a person in a court-declared state of insolvency is without merit for judicial office, so much so that it generates the termination of their appointment for those already working, signifies the casuistic and banal application of an apparent, unjustified loss of confidence, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege the punitive application with the maximum sacrifice borne by the employee for an eventual, unproven, and merely risk-based, purely dangerous or convenient situation, without an effective, real, and objective assessment for the general institutional end, which is the public service. I insist again, this aspect was also not assessed by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, furthermore, it rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I proposed for these effects, through which I could demonstrate the causes that led to my economic-financial situation, as well as my administrative, non-jurisdictional, institutional performance. It is added to the foregoing that the spirit of the legislator foresaw that cause for a potential use of resources by the judicial officer in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of a purely jurisdictional role, and not of an administrative nature, which -as in my case- does not administer, guard, control, manage, or safeguard any public funds, and moreover, does not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict depend on that administrative management. Therefore, it can be considered that the first parameter of this test yields the result of the norm's disproportionality, because there is no congruence between the means and the immediate end of the norm in accordance with the parameter required by constitutional law, since, although one might think that preventing the appointment and the termination of the appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated end, the counterpart to this, that is, the restriction without verification of its excusable and innocent nature, against the superior sacrifice it generates, violating the stated parameters, causes the accused disproportionality, even more so if one considers, as in the case at hand, that for the application of that measure of a disciplinary punitive nature, it is not assessed whether there is or is not an impact on the prevailing public service, on the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, on public order, on morals, or on third parties, nor on the existence or non-existence of a serious or very serious dereliction of judicial public service, by reason of the cause.

b.) As a second element of the test of proportionality, we have the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the necessity for regulation". In that regard, it is assessed whether that means is needed to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the mandate of optimization of the most benign means, whereby it must be verified whether the end cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For these purposes, different means must be compared in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation. Faced with the foregoing, excess in the measure is condemned because the urgent or imperative nature demands the sacrifice ordered by the norm. With respect to the norms challenged through this unconstitutionality action, it was already stated in point a.) above of this test, that the means they employ to obtain that normative end is, on one hand (-article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial employees if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; and on the other (-article 26, subsection 9-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In light of the foregoing, it is pertinent to analyze that described means against the need to concretize the regulation, verifying alternatives that adhere to the parameters of constitutional law, by reason of the sacrifice that this need for regulation generates or may generate. It is not superfluous to say that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent necessity must assess the diversity of situations that may arise according to each specific case, such as precisely the case of whether the person works in a jurisdictional or administrative role. In my case, I have already stated that I am a judicial officer, whose profile and functions as Coordinator were detailed above, with a service record exceeding 23 years, in which I have never been sanctioned disciplinarily, and under which I have had an unblemished record, which even led to receiving with great honor the Certificate of Judicial Merit in the year 2015. Likewise, I reiterate that in the exercise of my administrative, non-jurisdictional functions, I do not administer, guard, control, manage, or safeguard any public funds, and moreover, I do not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict before third parties depend on my administrative management, nor do I issue final administrative acts or serve the public; furthermore, it is known to my superiors, whom I offer as evidence before your Authority because the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected that evidence from me, that I perform professional work in accordance with institutional requirements, and adhering to the ethical and moral values expected and required of a judicial officer. The situation of insolvency came upon my life, due to the causes already set forth, and under which there is even a psychological medical opinion that certifies that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as financial aggression, for being a case of systematic abuse, a binding gender aspect, as the real and excusable cause that ultimately caused me to have to make the decision to be judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In the administrative procedure conducted by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, it is not assessed, analyzed, or defined whether to apply the termination of appointment by reason of a necessity for regulation, based on proven facts of loss of confidence or other circumstance, which presumes it is for a supposed or apparent impact, at least slight, on the prevailing public service and that this is, by the principle of causality, by reason of my judicial declaration of insolvency. Rather, the procedure is opened, assuming the cause directly and expressly, stating that "[...] I lost the condition to be an employee of the Judicial Branch, in accordance with the provisions of numeral 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [...]" as the central and sole element of the statement of charges that was notified to me, without it being determined from this the verification of the existence of a serious or very serious dereliction of judicial public service by reason of insolvency. It would be sanctioned as the only alternative, with the most serious sacrifice of the disciplinary power, that is, the termination of appointment for a mere risk or supposed danger, an eventual institutional convenience, which has no causal, objective, or real basis or foundation relative to the public service, nor the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, nor before third parties, even more so if it generates a high level of discrimination by reason of my economic situation, being a normative provision, apparently neutral, but susceptible of implying a severe particular disadvantage without a reasonable and legitimate objective or justification in light of binding national and international human rights law, that is, it is not determined -under any circumstance or criteria- that the permanence of a person judicially declared in a state of insolvency is seriously detrimental to the judicial service, in such a way that the necessity for the regulation only results in said termination of appointment. I highlight again that, at the level of labor courts, and as an example there is case file [Valor 011], the judge competent in the case granted preliminary injunctive relief arguing that the Judicial Branch has indicated, through the Court, "the parameter for disciplining. If the magistrates have been treated with a light hand, a more humble judicial employee does not deserve a heavy hand [...] if the conduct of the high judges, known throughout the country, affecting the Judicial image, did not merit revocation of appointment, it is unjust to punish the petitioner more severely [...also stating] A new paradigm has been created by the Chinchilla Sandí case and others, from which a healthier, less repressive disciplinary regime is extracted, which allows lesser sanctions and where the revocation of appointment is reserved for very serious cases [...]". As a primordial element for this test of proportionality, we likewise highlight what was already mentioned above in relation to the recent proceeding [Valor 012], filed against [Name 013], formerly an Assistant Prosecutor, for the cause of negligence in the service of his duties, in which the Judicial Inspection Tribunal sanctioned him WITH ONE MONTH WITHOUT PAY, QUALIFYING THE DERELICTION AS SERIOUS for collaborating with the then Attorney General in the processing of judicial files against members of the supreme powers, an act that was of public knowledge and which caused the dismissal of the case for influence peddling against former deputies Víctor Morales and Otto Guevara Guth in favor of the Chinese cement importer, [Name 014]. As can be noticed, for that case, which had repercussions on the institutionality and image of the Judicial Branch, as well as on third parties, and which was classified as serious for corresponding to negligent exercise of duties, it was sanctioned with a disciplinary measure lesser than the termination of appointment. In the same vein, and for proportionality purposes of the punitive measures, there is disciplinary case number [Valor 013] heard against [Name 015], a Family Court judge of the Goicoechea Courts, commented on above, who was accused of negligence in the exercise of her position and breach of duties, whom the Full Court considered that the administration of justice and its structure could be the cause of the attributed delays, even though it was demonstrated that at least in two cases there was negligence in her conduct and consequently a direct impact on the citizenry. The question then is, what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that should be applied for the case of the judicial declaration of insolvency in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of a serious or very serious classification regarding the public service, nor the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? Is it proportional to prevent the appointment of a person and, -on the other hand- the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared in insolvency, in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of a serious or very serious classification regarding the public service, nor the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? We insist, legal norms, and especially punitive ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. In light of the foregoing, the application of the norms challenged as unconstitutional is clearly disproportionate. The punitive means is excessive given the urgent or imperative nature, demanding the sacrifice ordered by the norm, even more so, -as has been said and demonstrated- when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morals, nor to third parties. In my case, I need the job, not only for the satisfaction of the immediate basic needs of those who depend on me, and my own personal needs, but also because the salary I receive is the only means by which the payment of my creditors will be generated, in accordance with the judicial regulation inherent to the insolvency process, which was the very objective for which I initiated said judicial process. Therefore, it is clear that the norms challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory, that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever exercises the sanctioning role has ideal regulatory means for various specific cases, in which there may exist, as in mine, exempting causes of liability such that the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment is accredited, and that, rather, the least burdensome alternative is determined, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring in punitive and regulatory excess of a disciplinary nature. I do not disregard, -nor do I intend to-, the control and oversight faculties that my employer possesses, therefore I am willing to undergo a functional audit of my professional practice as an employee of the Judicial Branch in Public Administration assigned to the Planning Directorate, so that it can be certified whether or not there is any impact on the judicial service by reason of, or causally linked to, my judicial declaration of insolvency, or, if there exists a real and objective risk or drawback that warrants the application of the disciplinary punitive measure, due to the existence of a serious or very serious dereliction in the exercise of my duties on the occasion of the cause under discussion.

c.) As the third and final element of the test of proportionality relevant to apply, we find the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. In this regard, the sacrifice, -as a cost-, is weighed against the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit and that alternative must be the least restrictive or least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to take into account three issues: the structure of the norm and its weighting, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close links are posited. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or impact of one of the principles, the greater the importance of satisfying the other must be. For this, the protected legal interests or rights in conflict must be identified, in order to determine the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the higher hierarchy of the protected legal interest, to determine if there is a relationship or balance between them. In the case at hand, it was already mentioned in point a.) above of this test, that the means employed by the norms challenged through this action to obtain that normative end is, on one hand (-article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial employees if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency, and on the other (-article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. It must thus be understood that the nature of the norm's structure is mandatory and of a punitive nature. In light of the foregoing, it is pertinent to analyze that described means against the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice involved in the punitive measure of termination of appointment, against the benefit or advantage that the Judicial Branch obtains with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all of this against the end pursued by the norm. We have already said previously that the end provided for those challenged legal norms is of a precautionary nature, due to an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all of this based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the cause that involved the draft law of what is now Law No. 7333, in which the Joint Legislative Commission that confirmed maintaining said causes, based its decision on the opinion of Magistrate.

Luis Paulino Mora, who stated: "[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of public trust because, ultimately, we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord [...] a person who has been declared insolvent suffers a certain loss of trust, given that they have been unable to manage their own economic assets and will eventually have at their disposal the management of the citizens' economic assets [...]" (-folios [Valor 040] (images [Valor 064] of legislative bill No. 10.753-) It must be clarified again that this discussion arose because the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration issued a ruling on the scope of this ground of insolvency, stating that "[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they possess conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not be taken as grounds for dismissing a judicial servant; to allow this would be to punish based on mere danger [...]" [-folio [Valor 082] [image [Valor 065] of legislative bill No. 10.753-) It was also stated that, in my case, there has been no procedure whatsoever on the part of the Judicial Branch that evaluates, analyzes, and thereby determines the existence or nonexistence of any, even slight, impact on the prevailing judicial public service, the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch, the existence of a serious or very serious misconduct against the judicial public service, and that this be, by the principle of causality, by reason of my judicial declaration of insolvency; rather, the opening of the procedure conducted by the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial was simply ordered, directly and expressly assuming the ground, stating that "[...] I lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch, as established in numeral 26, subsection 9 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [...]", as the central and sole element of the statement of charges that was notified to me, rejecting the testimonial and technical evidence that I proposed for these purposes with my material defense, that is, to apply, per se, the termination of appointment, without demonstrating a need for regulation, through proven facts of loss of trust or other circumstance that demonstrates any impact on the Institution, or, through the existence of a serious or very serious misconduct against the judicial public service, on the occasion of the ground being challenged. Why do I insistently mention the foregoing? Because, since there is no impact, not even slight, on the judicial service due to my professional performance of an administrative nature, nor even an administrative procedure aimed at that demonstration or the existence of a serious or very serious misconduct on that occasion, but directly the strict application of the termination of appointment, for a mere danger, a possible risk, or mere unfounded convenience, it would mean that the ground, in the public purpose it pursues, has no real or objective benefit or advantage for the Judicial Branch, nor is the sacrifice that the termination of appointment implies for me equitable or proportional, the judicial declaration of insolvency being an act promoted by me, as an act of good faith, not only to improve my economic-financial condition caused mainly by psychological and/or emotional aggression as well as patrimonial and gender-based aggression already explained, but also to responsibly pay my creditors through the judicial control that this process requires. Without wishing to boast, it also means that, by not considering the least restrictive or least burdensome alternative, the sanction additionally generates the loss for the Judicial Branch of a human resource with experience in judicial service of more than 23 years of service and who, as stated in the evidence requested by the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial itself from the Dirección de Gestión Humana, has no disciplinary sanctions during my years of service. Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged norms, we have no objection, as it coincides with legal theory regarding their means of creation, that is, via law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. However, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in its Judgment of February 24, 2011, Gelman Case Vs. Uruguay: "[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect for International Law, including International Human Rights Law, a fact which has been so considered even by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain facts or acts in a society is limited by the international norms and obligations for the protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so that the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by its formal as well as its substantive characteristics. Therefore, particularly in cases of serious violations of International Human Rights Law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the rule of majorities, that is, to the sphere of what is 'susceptible to being decided' by majorities in democratic instances, in which a 'conventionality control' must also prevail [...] which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judicial Branch [...]". In that same sense, regarding the legitimacy of domestic regulations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its Judgment of November 23, 2009, Radilla Pacheco Case Vs. Mexico, ordered: "[...] For this Tribunal, it is not only the suppression or enactment of norms in domestic law that guarantees the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation established in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of state practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not guarantee by itself that its application is adequate. It is necessary that the application of the norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of the state public order, be adjusted to the same end pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]". Having reached this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for the purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of conventionality control, on the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights—as is the case of Costa Rica—its judges and public authorities in general are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of this binding international regulation is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, its object, and its purpose. In that sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has indicated that authorities must not only exercise constitutional control but also "conventionality control" ex officio, a function that must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the claimants in each specific case. (…) This Honorable Constitutional Chamber, in its jurisprudence and based on the principle of effectiveness, has recognized this conventionality control as a binding parameter for the resolution of specific cases in which damage to fundamental human rights, such as those alleged through this action, can be evidenced. In this regard, it has stated: "[...] The international law principle of effet utile requires the State, in the interpretation and application of human rights Treaties, and of those that are non-self-executing, to stimulate all organs of the state apparatus to generate lasting effects in the domestic order in accordance with the international obligations acquired, so that the necessary measures must be taken as a whole to ensure that the terms of an international agreement have effects in harmony with domestic law. This is followed by cooperation mechanisms between States and international organizations, and monitoring of the compatibility of domestic legislation with that of international conventions." (-Vote No. [Valor 099]) For the very application of this conventionality control, it is appropriate to mention the cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, named as: Canese vs. Paraguay (31-8-2004), Kimel vs. Argentina (2-5-2008), Usón Ramirez (sic) vs. Venezuela (20-11-2009) and Fontevecchia y D´Amico vs. Argentina (29-11-2011). For the respective ruling in each case, that Inter-American Court applied the proportionality test alluded to, in which it has indicated for each of its elements: a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus its end," that is, its suitability and effectiveness, it has been pointed out that the suitable or legitimate purpose, although present in all cases (whether criminal punishment or civil compensation), it is clarified that this does not imply that the mentioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportionate (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that the measure being suitable means that it Serves to safeguard the legal right that one seeks to protect, that is, it is capable of contributing to the realization of said objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 53-). b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation," it has indicated with reference to the requirement of necessity, that it must obey an imperative public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least extent possible, as well as a condition that it must not limit beyond what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48- and Fontevecchia D´Amico -para. 43-). c.) With respect to the third and last element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit," that is, proportionality strictu sensu, both in Kimel -paras. 83 to 94-, and in Usón Ramírez -paras. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the structure of balancing when evaluating: on one hand, the degree of impact on a right or principle—what we have understood as the means—, and on the other, the importance of the satisfaction of the other right or principle—what we have known as the cost-benefit—, against which it analyzes the sacrifice involved. With this, the Court verifies if the measure adopted—sanction—broadly guaranteed the right that was intended to be protected, without rendering nugatory the right that is limited and its consequent sacrifice. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the norms challenged through this action of unconstitutionality coincides with the parameters established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, defining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, or objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulation with its imperative strictness, making it disproportionate and consequently irrational, all this against the sacrifice it involves. By reason of the foregoing, it can be reliably concluded that the legal norms challenged through this avenue are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory by reason of my economic situation, thus violating my invoked fundamental rights. I request this Honorable Chamber to carefully analyze my situation against the challenged normative content, by reason of the justification of fact and rights alleged in this action of unconstitutionality". Establishes the following petition: "For the reasons indicated, doctrine, criteria, and jurisprudence invoked, which ideally substantiate and demonstrate the violation of fundamental rights in accordance with the content of our Political Constitution, in its articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51 and 56, that is, the rights and principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction due to the nonexistence of a connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice it involves, Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity and the Pro-Homine principle due to the nonexistence of a legitimate purpose for the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment against the sacrifice it involves without there being an impact on the public service or verification of a serious or very serious misconduct, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the nonexistence of an impact on the public service, punishing a potential risk neither proven nor evaluated, as well as in the face of mere unjustified convenience and violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Certainty, for an act managed in application of my autonomy of will, I request this esteemed Constitutional Chamber the following: i.) That this action of unconstitutionality against articles 12 and 26, subsection 9.1 of Law No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, of May 5, 1993, be admitted for analysis and legal procedure, within the scope of its content that has been set forth. ii.) That this action be accepted and that articles 12 and 26, subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, of May 5, 1993, be declared unconstitutional within the scope of its content that has been set forth, that is, regarding the specific reference to the ground of a judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason to prevent appointment as a judicial servant and, especially, as a ground for termination of appointment in the judicial service, which is considered, by action and omission, to infringe the constitutional and conventional norms and principles referred to. iii.) That the corresponding Judicial Authorities be instructed to suspend as a precautionary measure—of an instrumental and provisional nature—, any type of administrative act, as a final act, aimed at defining the application of the punitive ground of a disciplinary nature of termination of appointment as a judicial servant against my person as final acts of a procedure in its exhaustion of administrative remedies phase on appeal, until such time as your Authority resolves what corresponds in law. The foregoing, given its high priority or urgent nature, and with a view to preserving my legal certainty in the face of my legitimate rights and interests, and thereby preventing the Consejo Superior of this Judicial Branch as an administrative body from definitively resolving by applying the invoked norm, thus causing eventual harm to my fundamental rights and causing difficult or impossible reparation, as well as to the direct effectiveness of the very principle of constitutional supremacy. The foregoing is supported by articles 41 of the Political Constitution, 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, and by the jurisprudence that your Authority has (sic) issued on the precautionary matter (such as Vote No. [Valor 066] and concordant ones) which encompasses the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the judgment on the merits, as an essential function of precautionary protection. With the factual and legal scopes invoked in this action, the prerequisites for this request are met, that is, the appearance of a good right -fumus boni iuris- and the danger in delay -periculum in mora- and the extreme urgency, based on its guiding criteria of adequacy, suitability of the measure, and necessity, all under the protection of the constitutional and conventional rights that have been invoked in the present action. iv.) That the legally required hearing be granted to the Procuraduría General de la República. v.) That the legal edicts be published. vi.) That the State be ordered to pay costs, damages, and losses.

2.- By resolution issued at 3:36 p.m. on October 26, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber requested the President of the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial for file no. [Valor 001] corresponding to the disciplinary procedure being processed against the claimant.

3.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:21 p.m. on November 1, 2018, Fernando Cruz Castro appeared, in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Branch. He provided, in compliance with the resolution issued at 3:36 p.m. on August 26, 2018, a certification of file no. [Valor 001].

4.- By resolution issued at 10:12 a.m. on November 7, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber cautioned the claimant to attach the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica.

5.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:02 p.m. on November 8, 2018, the claimant indicates that she provided the respective stamp on October 24, 2018; however, she provides it again in this act.

6.- By resolution issued at 2:17 p.m. on November 9, 2018, the action filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial was admitted for processing. On account of the foregoing, a hearing was granted to the Procurador General de la República and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice. Likewise, it was ordered that the action was admitted because it met the requirements contemplated in numerals 73 through 79 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional and that the claimant's legal standing derived from paragraph 1 of article 75 of that same normative body. Similarly, it was recorded that the prior matter was disciplinary procedure no. [Valor 001], which is in the stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional were published in editions nos. 234, 235, and 236 of the days December 17, 18, and 19, 2018, of the Boletín Judicial.

8.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 5:05 p.m. on November 27, 2018, Carmen María Escoto Fernández appeared, in her capacity as Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Branch. She indicates that the claimant requests that the following articles be declared unconstitutional: "Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be capable, mentally and physically, to perform the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a final order of trial commencement has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvencia; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in a way that may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (As amended by article 1 of the Ley de Reorganización Judicial No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) ARTICLE 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial posts shall cease due to: (...) 9. Having been convicted, by final judgment, for a crime that warrants a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvencia". On the alleged unconstitutionality of article 12 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. She points out that the claimant bases the action on disciplinary case no. [Valor 001] which is on appeal before the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial and that, furthermore, she affirms that article 12 of the mentioned law establishes not only the requirements that a person must possess to enter the judicial service, but also defines a series of grounds that prohibit appointment, among them, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvencia.

It argues that, as the claimant alleges, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, by means of vote no. [Value 018] of 13:41 hours on October 4, 2018, imposed the sanction of revocation of appointment, pursuant to Article 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. It adds that the resolution initiating the proceeding imputed the following charges: "(...) Having been judicially declared insolvent, (Article 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)"; furthermore, that "(...) by having been declared insolvent, you [Name 001] lost a condition required to be an employee of the Judicial Branch as established by section 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch". It states that this is properly the direct application of section 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and not of Article 12 of that normative body. It adds that when section 12 refers to the fact that persons judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent (quiebra o insolvencia) may not be appointed, it should be understood as referring to the requirements for entering judicial service, such that it does not apply to persons who already hold an appointment in the institution and against whom disciplinary proceedings are pursued for those reasons, because for that there is a specific rule—Article 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—as the resolutions of the Judicial Inspection Tribunal were grounded. It asserts that admitting the action against an article that is unrelated to the underlying matter raised in the action would mean distorting the impugnation regime inherent to the system. It mentions that since the prerequisite established in Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is not met, the action filed by [Name 001] must be rejected outright as manifestly improper (Article 9 of the cited legal body). It maintains that, should the action not be rejected outright regarding section 12, the claimant's allegations are rejected based on the following arguments: "As indicated in the first part of this report, the claimant seeks to have Article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch annulled as unconstitutional, by virtue of the fact that, in her opinion, the cause of insolvency as a reason for being appointed or for declaring the cessation of appointment in judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it is not consistent with the complex disciplinary regulatory framework set forth in Law 7333, as a whole, which would be the demonstration of a serious impact on judicial service. Furthermore, the claimant considers that there is also no existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service as a primary element for the sanctioning application of the impugned cause. She insists that allowing this cause would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience. However, for the resolution of the action at hand, it is important to take into account that the remission to that rule becomes a disciplinary power (potestad disciplinaria) conferred by the legislator upon the Judicial Branch, since the legislator’s intention at all times was to ensure the proper functioning of the administration of justice and to safeguard the public interest, which in the case of this institution contains some particularities in relation to other Powers of the Republic, because users place their trust in judicial servants for the resolution of their conflicts. Thus, persons declared insolvent (sic) may have a conflict of interest in relation to the users of the judicial system, as stated by former Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice Daniel González Álvarez, in the presentation for the 1993 edition (General reform of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993) where he pointed out that "(...) here there is a matter of public faith, a person who has not been able to manage their own affairs and later seeks to enter the Judicial Service regime is not suitable. Above all if there has been fraudulent bankruptcy (quiebra fraudulenta), that is, if a criminal offense has been incurred"; it is clear then that this article refers only to persons who seek to work for the Judicial Branch, which could also be considered under criteria of 'suitability' (idoneidad) widely developed by this Constitutional Chamber, a person who has been declared bankrupt or insolvent lacks the conditions to perform their work efficiently since, as former Justice González expressed, "it is almost a civil death". Mr. Daniel continues: "A person in that state has practically no legal capacity even to contract obligations, precisely because of the provisions of the Civil Code that do not allow them to acquire any type of obligations, or sign any contract, that is, it is civil death from a legal point of view..." (Act No. 98 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the fourteenth day of November, nineteen ninety, Folios [Value 100] and [Value 101]); hence the basis of the rule is to prevent access to the judicial function by persons who present that condition and that, far from violating the rights protected in Articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as indicated by Mrs. [Name 001], it aims to protect the interests of those who require the services of the Judicial Branch, which justifies the impugned restriction, which is a requirement that must be met by those who seek to provide their services in this institution in accordance with Articles 191 and 192 of our constitutional norm, which highlights suitability as an indispensable requirement for a public servant to perform optimally in a public position or post." Thus, the honorable Constitutional Chamber, in resolution number [Value 102] of fourteen hours thirty minutes on July thirty-first, two thousand twelve, expressed: "ON THE PROVEN SUITABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, public servants shall be appointed on the basis of proven suitability, which requires the objective verification of their qualifications. This means that the public servant must possess certain characteristics and qualities which can be validly established and regulated by law, provided they are objectively reasonable. Suitability must be proven not only through merely academic aspects; rather, it requires the analysis and qualification of various elements, factors, or conditions of diverse kinds, such as psychological aspects, stability, work and professional experience, and other credentials that, assessed jointly, determine that a person is the most suitable for the position. In this way, the public servant will demonstrate that they meet all the necessary conditions that empower them to perform optimally in the public post or position, that is, that they possess the merits that the function demands. The foregoing has the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency and proper functioning of the public function, in addition to maximizing and protecting public resources. In that sense, it is necessary to remember that the public servant is a servant of the administered public in general and must therefore look after the interests of the community and, consequently, provide quality service to each administered person as a representative of the community" (emphasis not in original). For greater abundance, Deputy Pacheco Salazar, in the discussion of motion number [Value 103], of the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly, stated that: "The appointment requirements must be broader and, of course, any employer, not only the Court, has that right to choose what suits them best. That is why in Article 12, in that second paragraph, it says that 'those prosecuted with an order of elevation to trial, of citation to trial, may not be appointed. Those convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment, those subjected to a penalty of disqualification for holding public office or positions...(continues reading)". That is, it establishes a series of entry requirements which, of course, the Court, when choosing an official, can expand upon those and many more, because it is not going to appoint an insolvent person, a bankrupt person, a disqualified person... (emphasis not in original). (Act No. 7 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the twenty-first day of May, nineteen ninety-one, Folio [Value 104]). For the reasons stated above, the questioned rule conforms to the guarantee of 'administrative efficiency' referred to in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, as a prerequisite for accessing public positions, translated into the need for the services provided by the State to be executed by those servants who can guarantee efficiency in the Administration." Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 26, subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. It indicates that the claimant maintains that this rule violates the principles of reasonableness and proportionality recognized in the Political Constitution, with respect to the disciplinary sanction due to a lack of connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice involved; furthermore, of the alleged violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle, due to "the nonexistence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of cessation of appointment in light of the sacrifice it involves, without there being an impact on the public service or proof of a serious or very serious fault, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the nonexistence of impact on the public service, sanctioning a potential risk neither proven nor evaluated, as well as a mere unjustified convenience and violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Certainty by an act managed in application of the autonomy of will". It adds that she considers that "it was warned during the legislative procedure of the bill in which the cited norm was discussed, that allowing this cause would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration in the face of necessity decisions that involve aspects of her private life". It states, regarding what the claimant alleged, that the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency imposes a series of conditions on the failed person (persona fallida), depending on each case, ranging from interdiction from administering their assets or dispossession of assets, closure of current accounts, loss of legal capacity to contract obligations or sign contracts, among others; in each case, the declaration comes as a consequence of the cessation of payments by the debtor and is synonymous with a breach of a monetary obligation. It refers that the legislator maintained the importance of keeping as a cause for the application of the disciplinary regime in the Judicial Branch, when a situation arises where a judicial servant is judicially declared in that state—Article 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch—and as a reason for ordering the cessation of that person's functions, after the disciplinary proceeding so determined, respecting at all times the rights of the judicial servant and due process. It argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative instances when the general reform of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, was analyzed, former Justice Luis Paulino Mora Mora (may he rest in peace) expressed that "judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are those in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within the institutions of the State, that is why it has been deemed that for the person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards them, given that they have not been able to manage their economic assets..." (file 10.753, folio [Value 076])". It refers that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary power held by the Judicial Branch over its servants, necessary as an instrument of guarantee to the citizen that they will receive a quality, agile, effective, and efficient public service, endowed with an adequate organization and highly qualified judicial servants for the performance of their duties. It explains that the claimant is not correct when she points out that allowing this cause would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience, this by virtue of the fact that the rule is provided for when the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is decreed in a judicial venue, that is, there is a whole judicial process in which matters related to the non-compliance with credit obligations assumed by the debtor are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions so that the person can resolve that situation. It adds that the legislator deemed that the foregoing implies a situation of distrust and sought the probity (probidad) of the judicial servant to have certainty that they are responsible with their obligations, both in their work and in their private life. It asserts that the imposition of this type of sanctions has an absolute scope of the principle of legality for incurring in conduct prohibited by a norm, which is not consistent with the claimant's allegations when she affirms that the norm allows sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk. It mentions that, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal pointed out in vote no. 1923-18 of 13:41 hours on October 4, 2018, between the judicial servants and the Judicial Branch there exists a relationship of "special subjection" (sujeción especial) that is generated from activities that by their nature require a certain degree of regulation and oversight, which is carried out through monitoring their behavior both in the performance of their duties and in their private life. It partially cites Article 28 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and section 49 of the Statute of Judicial Service: "Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: ARTICLE 28.- A servant may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense, who: (...) 2.- Due to improprieties or failings in the exercise of their position or in their private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, has become deserving of that sanction. (Emphasis not in original). Statute of Judicial Service: Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, judicial servants shall have the following: c) Observe dignity in the performance of their position and in their private life; (Emphasis not in original)". It indicates that the relationship of special subjection has been extensively analyzed by this Constitutional Tribunal and, in vote no. [Value 105] of 8:30 hours on April 10, 2018, it pointed out that its observance is a guarantee for both the exercise of an effective defense and the legality of the sanctioning conduct: "Said sanctioning power is exercised within the framework of a legal bond, of a relationship of special subjection between the public official and the legal order applicable to this type of bond, within which we find a series of principles that serve as a kind of guide, insofar as they guide the meaning of the norms, and which, in sanctioning matters, constitute a dual guarantee, insofar as their observance guarantees the exercise of an effective defense, but also the legality of the sanctioning conduct." It argues that Article 153 of the Political Constitution grants the Judicial Branch one of the most important attributions of the State, which is that of administering justice, a task that this Power of the Republic executes through the activities deployed by the persons who work for the institution and collaborate to fulfill the entrusted task. It adds that resolving the conflicts presented to them by society in a peaceful and satisfactory manner, in order to ensure the maintenance of social peace, depends largely on the credibility held by those who participate in the institutional resolution of such divergences. It considers that the claimant is not correct when she mentions in her filing brief that her Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle have been harmed, because subsection 9) of Article 26 of the Organic Law is complemented by Articles 28 and 49 of that regulation, which have constitutional and legal backing regarding the duty to conduct both their judicial performance and their private life correctly. It cites the excerpt from a judgment of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: "Public officials are depositaries of the trust of the State-employer and of the users of the service, and therefore they must have impeccable and probative behavior, as well as unimpeachable conduct.

Therefore, in the case of public servants, regardless of their nature, function, and category, the assessment of their faults must be done in a strict and meticulous manner, because the public interest is at stake, before which the interest of the worker must yield (regarding the greater rigor in the qualification of faults of public servants, see among others votes number [Valor 106] at 10:30 a.m. on October 26, 2001, and [Valor 107] at 9:30 a.m. on May 22, 2002, from this Chamber). State servants are required to have a special duty of diligence in all matters related to the work they perform - after all, they are responsible for ensuring that the function they carry out is executed in accordance with criteria of objectivity, impartiality, efficiency, and professionalism, among others - so the trust placed in them acquires a particular importance when analyzing the faults attributed to them, especially if these are related to the specific tasks assigned or may affect them (in this regard, see among others votes number [Valor 067] at 10:30 a.m. on November 30, and [Valor 068] at 9:30 a.m. on December 5, both of 2001, from this Chamber). c) The foregoing is of vital importance in the present case, as we are in the presence of a public official who must possess the personal conditions necessary to work in the public service of Justice" and be worthy of the trust placed in him - moral aptitude and suitability, among other requirements established in numeral 18 of the Judicial Service Statute-. It partially transcribes judgment no. [Valor 069] from 3:00 p.m. on November 3, 2004, from this Chamber, in which the duties of every public official were developed: "(...) dedicate themselves to the position with efficiency and loyalty, which implies the obligation of attendance and loyalty to the institution; observe the hierarchical order, which translates into an obligation of obedience (comply with directives and orders from the superior in the terms of Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration; and dignity in conduct, this being both regarding respect for the legal order and for decorum and morality in their conduct, both during the workday and in their private life, insofar as the condition of official holds a fundamental importance since, as its definition indicates, they act in the name and on behalf of the Administration, and consequently, become its image. Hence the importance of the requirements of "honorability" and "respectability" that are demanded as a direct derivative of the constitutional norm -Article 192-, of all public officials, as it addresses the requirement of "proven suitability", being called to carry out the public purposes entrusted to the State. In this sense, the Chamber ruled in judgments number [Valor 070] and [Valor 071], both from March 7, 1995. "The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they have an objective character." (The emphasis is not from the original). It states that, through the challenged norm, the legislator has delimited the sanctioning power of the Judicial Branch regarding officials who "have been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency", since once they obtained a link within the institution they must respect the link with the administration and the fulfillment of a series of obligations, among them, that of honoring their debts. It adds that the foregoing must prevent, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal well states in vote no. [Valor 018], that the recovery of sums of money be slower for creditors "given that they receive a lesser amount of money than the quota agreed upon at the beginning of the credit relationship", in addition to the suspension of interest collection, among other consequences of that declaration. It argues that the disciplinary power aims at issuing norms that regulate the activity with its officials, so that compliance with the duties entrusted to the Public Administration can be achieved, which is supported by the constitutional pillars that impose the State's obligations to provide a correct public service, as specified in numeral 192 of the Political Constitution. It maintains that the legislator, in Article 26, subsection 9), established a reasonable ground for the termination of appointment of a judicial servant, widely discussed and analyzed in the Permanent Commission of Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly. It explains that: "There is no doubt then that the legislator, in the discussion of the reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, considered that the existence of an entire normative and administrative apparatus that acts as a controlling filter in the work of judicial officials is necessary, in which the disciplinary power of the state can be materialized, whose pillar rests on the constitutionally recognized Principle of Hierarchy (judgments No. [Valor 072] at 3:36 p.m. on March 7, 1995, and [Valor 073] at 2:41 p.m. on March 16, 2005), and on the 'special subjection' relationship generated between judicial servants and the Judicial Branch, through the definition of strategies for an efficient provision of justice service and the application of the disciplinary regime when the provisions contained in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are breached, with total and absolute precision to the foregoing Article 174 states that: 'The disciplinary regime is intended to ensure the efficiency, correctness, and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and to guarantee citizens a correct administration of justice'." It states that so as not to render such postulate nugatory, the legislator incorporated what is indicated in subsection 9) of Article 26 of the aforementioned law as one of the grounds for termination of appointment, and therefore it is not contrary to articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56 of our Political Constitution, nor to the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness.

9.- By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 2:47 p.m. on November 29, 2018, Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Procurador General de la República. He indicates, regarding the plaintiff's standing, that it is based on the prior matter processed in file no. [Valor 001] before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal. He points out that, upon reviewing that file, it is confirmed that the procedure followed against the plaintiff is in the phase of exhausting administrative remedies; besides, she invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged articles in the base matter (see the filed appeal), so there are no objections regarding her standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality. He states that, despite the foregoing, such standing is partial, because in the base matter, the provisions of numeral 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch were not applied to the plaintiff here, but only subsection 9) of Article 26 of that normative body. He argues that the plaintiff is an active official of the Judicial Branch, so only the provisions of Article 26.9 apply to her, as it establishes the judicial declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency as a cause for dismissal. He mentions that the provisions of numeral 12 are not applicable to her, since said article is aimed at persons seeking to enter the Judicial Branch as new judicial servants. He states that, for this reason, the base matter in which the unconstitutionality of this numeral was alleged is not a reasonable means to protect the right considered injured. He states that it is the Procuraduría's opinion that the plaintiff only has standing to challenge the provisions of subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the law in question, without prejudice to the Chamber deciding to analyze, due to connection, the provisions of Article 12. Analysis of the challenged norms from the right to privacy and liberty. He indicates that the right to privacy, enshrined in constitutional numeral 24, operates as a limit against illegitimate intrusion by the State and other individuals; furthermore, it allows the integral development of the personality. He points out that this right not only excludes any activity by another that implies an imposition, intrusion, or interference in the matters of a person's private life, but also entails the possibility of preventing the publication or revelation of certain facts, which only acquire relevance for the subject. He notes that it has been recognized by this Chamber as "The sphere in which no one can interfere. The freedom of private life is the recognition of a zone of activity that is proper to each individual and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or public powers in the private life of the person..." (Judgment [Valor 074] at 3:09 p.m. on August 3, 1995). He maintains that the recognition of "private life", consequently, is composed of that part which is not devoted to a public activity and which therefore is not destined to transcend and impact society directly, and where, in principle, third parties should not have any access whatsoever since the activities developed in it are not of their concern, nor do they affect them (constitutional article 28). He mentions that, in the case of public officials, it is worth analyzing what the boundary should be between the protection of the sphere of their private life and their public sphere, to determine, ultimately, whether such protection should be equated or not to that of any other individual. He argues that the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function of Costa Rica defines an official as any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, in the name and on behalf of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and with complete independence of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent, or public nature of the respective activity. He maintains that, consequently, there is a statutory relationship between the State and the official, regardless of the nature of the position held, so it is clear that the condition of public servants cannot be equated to that of other individuals, because those are subject to a principle of transparency and accountability, which obliges them to answer to society for the acts they perform. He argues that the principle of transparency obliges public officials, due to their special responsibilities, to subject themselves to the scrutiny and non-unlawful criticism of the administered in general. He asserts that the principle of accountability also constitutes a value that accompanies the public function, not only in a sporadic or periodic manner, but it must be a constant practice, through which officials are exposed to citizen control. He mentions that, for this reason, the scope of protection of one who has accepted to serve the Nation is more reduced than that of one who is not in that situation, because they have freely wished to place themselves in a position of visibility that permits broad public access. He states that whoever enters public life accepts a greater risk by the mere fact of doing so, although it will not always be easy to distinguish between the private acts and the public acts of an official, or between their personal acts without public transcendence or relevance and the personal acts that do have it. He indicates that, in the case of officials, the threshold of the right to privacy and liberty exists, but it is different from that which protects the citizen who has not assumed the condition and responsibility of one who holds a public position and who, for that very reason, has certain ethical and legal duties toward the citizens. He points out that the private life of the official has an impenetrable core - as happens with the rest of people - but that of the former is more reduced, because aspects of private life that normally would not be revealable in the case of an ordinary citizen become lawful objects of public information as long as there is a general interest at stake that justifies it. He adds that society has the right to know about an act from that sphere of the official, even if it does not constitute a crime, when it may affect the public function they are entrusted with. He maintains that the private life of public servants is consequently very limited, because society has the right to demand honesty from its representatives in matters concerning their personal, family, and professional life, among others. He adds that the responsibility of projecting and maintaining a certain image is detrimental to their sphere of privacy, and whoever is not willing to admit this lacks public vocation. He states that it is the Procuraduría's opinion that the legislator has a constitutional authorization to establish disqualifying norms that demand certain behaviors from the public official, even concerning spheres related to their private life, provided that these behaviors may affect the image of the institution they represent or the legitimate trust that must be held in the official. He explains that establishing a prohibition on entering public function or the loss of the condition of official, based on a fact of private life such as the declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency, is not in itself unconstitutional, to the extent that such acts may affect the image of the official and the institution. He argues that it must be considered that the existence of norms of this nature is also justified, considering the nature of certain positions that handle and administer resources, public funds, or that, due to their special condition, require irreproachable behavior from the official in managing their personal debts. He mentions that this type of norm does not violate the right to privacy or liberty and can be imposed on the public official, even when dealing with acts related to their private sphere. He states that the challenged norms will be analyzed based on the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Analysis of the challenged norms from the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. He cites the questioned articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: "Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter judicial service it is required to be capable, mentally and physically, of performing the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a final order of opening of trial has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those subjected to a penalty of disqualification from holding public positions or offices; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency; those who habitually drink alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in such a way that they may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (Thus reformed by article 1 of the Law of Judicial Reorganization No. 7728 of December 15, 1997). (The boldface is not from the original) (...) Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those who serve judicial positions cease due to: (...) 9. Having been convicted, in a final judgment, for a crime that warrants a penalty of disqualification from holding public positions or offices and for having been declared, judicially, in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency." (The boldface is not from the original). He indicates that, as is clear from the challenged norms, these are not norms of a disciplinary nature in the strict sense, because there is no protected legal right nor a consequence derived from a fault in the public service by the official. He points out that such norms are preventive in nature, because they seek to establish a principle of "legitimate trust", aiming for those who work in any position within the Judicial Branch to conduct themselves adequately in their private sphere and not have an economic insolvency that could eventually place them in a risky situation, which could later translate into a detriment in the performance of their public functions. He notes that the norms aim for those who work in the Judicial Branch to have certain personal characteristics (economic solvency), which, if lost, will cause them to lose their appointment.

It refers to the fact that even when the rule applied to the plaintiff does not constitute a disciplinary sanction in the strict sense, the truth is that the conduct provided for in the rule (insolvency or bankruptcy) has a burdensome consequence (cessation of appointment) and, therefore, all the constitutional principles governing due process and, specifically, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality apply to it. It explains that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any burdensome consequence in the individual's sphere must constitute a strictly necessary measure to achieve the intended objective. It argues that, therefore, the principle of proportionality requires the prior establishment by the legislator of the limits within which the legal operator may move when interpreting the rule in light of the specific circumstances. It explains that the administrative authority, consequently, must have a margin of discretion previously granted by the legislator to guarantee that the burdensome consequence is only applied when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. It maintains that the application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality calls into question the constitutionality of the challenged rules. It comments that if the cited rules are analyzed, it is observed that the regulatory provision does not allow for any gradation or consideration of particular circumstances in specific cases, as the only possible consequence upon a declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is the cessation of the appointment or the impossibility of entering the Judicial Branch, regardless of which official it concerns. It adds that the rule is of general scope for all positions in the Judicial Branch, without assessing the nature of the functions or the special work performed by some officials. It asserts that, considering the nature of certain positions that handle public funds or administer justice, the imposition of certain personal characteristics and behaviors may be justified, as these can affect the image or independence of said servants in the performance of their duties. It states that from the analysis of the legislative record, it is clear that the intention of the challenged rule was always to declare a "loss of confidence" in the judicial official "who has not been able to manage his personal finances (haberes económicos) and will eventually be in a position to manage the economic assets of the citizenry" (see statements by Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora on pages [Valor 075] and [Valor 076] of the legislative record). It mentions that the intention was to direct the rule at officials who administered justice or who, due to the condition of their position, should be required to properly manage their personal finances. It indicates that, despite this, the approved rule does not reflect such an intention, but on the contrary, was approved in a general manner for all judicial officials and, by not allowing any distinction or assessment of specific circumstances, becomes unreasonable. It considers that the inflexible wording of the rule violates the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, as it does not allow any margin of maneuver for the legal operator, who is forced to apply the legal consequence (cessation of appointment) even to judicial positions that have no importance according to the intended purpose. It points out that while one might think the described aspect is a matter of applying the rule and not of constitutionality, the truth is that the Judicial Inspectorate had no other possibility but to cease the plaintiff from her position, because the rule does not permit any other option. It insists that, in this specific case, there is no violation of a legal interest, therefore the reasonableness of the rule (necessity) could only be justified by the special nature of certain positions within the Judicial Branch, which require imposing certain personal behaviors on those who occupy them, as eventually such behaviors can affect independence, objectivity, or the manner of resolving certain matters. It notes that the imposed requirement should be a condition of the judicial servant in relation to a specific function, but it is disproportionate that it is applied generally, as currently drafted, especially when it implies a serious impact on the right to work (derecho al trabajo). It cites vote no. [Valor 077] of this Chamber: "Thus, the Chamber has recognized that a rights-limiting act is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some good or set of goods of the community—or of a specific group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, if such action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity. The suitability of the measure would indicate that other mechanisms may exist that better resolve the existing necessity, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed; so that the limitation is not of an entity markedly superior to the benefit that it seeks to obtain for the benefit of the community." It adds that votes nos. [Valor 109] and [Valor 110] were rendered in a similar sense. It explains that, in the opinion of this advisory body, the provision in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), applied to the plaintiff, is contrary to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality due to the inflexible way in which it is drafted. It adds that the necessity of the rule for all judicial officials is not justified, nor is any margin of application granted to the legal operator. It considers that the rule should be annulled. It mentions judgment no. [Valor 078] of 11:57 a.m. on October 15, 1999, reproduced in resolution no. [Valor 079] of 2:47 p.m. on October 4, [Valor 027]. It affirms that, should the existence of the rule be considered in light of certain functions, an interpretation consistent with the Law of the Constitution (Derecho de la Constitución) could be made, contemplating that the rule is justified and should be applied only to positions of officials who administer justice or public funds; however, in this case, one would be venturing into the legislator's field. It states that, taking into account the claims raised by the plaintiff, it is not for the Chamber, in this proceeding, to assess the alleged deficiencies in the processing of the case conducted by the Judicial Inspectorate, nor the manner in which that body has been applying sanctions in other cases. It refers that many of the plaintiff's arguments are related to the application of the rule and not to its constitutionality, so it omits to refer to them. It concludes the following: "In view of the foregoing considerations, this advisory body considers the plaintiff's standing is partial, only insofar as she challenges the provision in article 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as it is the rule applied in the underlying matter. On the merits, this representation considers that the provision in said article is unconstitutional due to the rigidity of its wording, as it does not allow a margin of application for the legal operator and its necessity is not demonstrated in relation to the generality of officials of the Judicial Branch (principle of reasonableness and proportionality). Therefore, the annulment of the provision in the indicated article 26, subsection 9) is recommended, without prejudice to the Chamber considering it necessary to interpret said rule in accordance with the Law of the Constitution in the indicated terms. As for article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, this rule is not applicable to the plaintiff, without prejudice to the Chamber considering evaluating it by virtue of its connected nature." **10**.- By resolution of 3:35 p.m. on January 22, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber deemed the granted hearings to have been answered and, in accordance with the corresponding turn, referred this action to the office of Magistrate Paul Rueda Leal.

**11**.- On January 24, 2019, Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro filed a recusal, as, in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court of Justice, he was called to report on the merits of the action. He clarifies that, even though he did not render the requested report—rather, the Vice President did—the situation remains, as it is improper for him to act as judge in a matter in which he has been called as a party.

**12**.- By resolution of 11:47 a.m. on January 24, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber deemed Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro separated from hearing this matter and deemed empowered the Substitute Magistrate who replaces him in accordance with article 49 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

**13.-** The hearing provided for in articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

**14.-** The legal requirements have been met in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate **Rueda Leal**; and, **Considering:** **I.- Purpose of the action.** Mrs. [Nombre 001] files an action of unconstitutionality against article 12 and subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, deeming them contrary to articles 28, 39, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In general terms, she considers that the questioned norms harm the right to work (derecho al trabajo), the protection of the family, and legal certainty; also, the principles of culpability and innocence due to the imposition of the maximum sanction (revocation of appointment) despite the fact that no harm to the public service or third parties has been demonstrated; and finally, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction, as they not only have an extensive scope but also establish an objective criterion that prevents any assessment regarding the appropriateness of the sanction and the type of sanction to be applied.

**II.- Regarding the challenged regulations.** The questioned articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are the following:

“Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be mentally and physically capable of performing the function, according to its nature.

However, persons against whom a final order for trial opening has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime carrying a prison sentence; those subject to a sentence of disbarment from holding public office or employment; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in a way that may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service.

(Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)” “Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial positions cease due to:

(...)

9.- Having been convicted, by final judgment, of a crime punishable by a sentence of disbarment from holding public office or employment, and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency.” **III.- Regarding the admissibility of the action.** The action of unconstitutionality is a process with specific formalities, which must be satisfied so that the Chamber can validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality. First, a pending prior matter is required to be resolved, whether in judicial or administrative proceedings (in the procedure for exhausting it), where the unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. In the second and third paragraphs, the law exceptionally contemplates cases where the prior matter is not required, such as the inexistence of individual and direct harm due to the nature of the matter, defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is formulated directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Now, regarding the need for a pending prior matter to be resolved in the administrative venue, it is necessary that this concerns the procedure that exhausts the administrative channel, which, in accordance with article 126 of the General Law on Public Administration (Ley General de la Administración Pública), occurs from the moment the ordinary remedies are filed before the superior hierarch of the body that issued the final act, because otherwise the action would be inadmissible. Likewise, there are other formalities that must be satisfied, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, authentication by an attorney of the writ filing the action, accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the writ in which the unconstitutionality of the norms was invoked in the underlying matter, all requirements which, if not provided by the plaintiff, may be subject to a preventive order for their compliance by the Presidency of the Chamber.

In the case at hand (sub examine), the plaintiff states that case file no. [Valor 001] is the prior matter supporting this action of unconstitutionality against article 12 and subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In this regard, she indicates that she is in the process of exhausting the administrative channel before the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial) and it was processed in the first instance by the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspectorate (Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial), which, through vote no. [Valor 018] of October 4, 2018, ordered the revocation of her appointment for having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency.

On this matter, it is important to specify that, indeed, the administrative procedure is in the process of exhausting the administrative channel; however, the resolution of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspectorate was based solely on subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Likewise, from the reading of the appeal filed, it is clear that the plaintiff only invoked and developed the unconstitutionality of this article.

Consequently, the action is admitted regarding subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as the invocation of unconstitutionality in the prior matter constitutes a reasonable means to protect the rights considered harmed. On the other hand, the action is declared inadmissible regarding article 12 of the same body of law, as it was not applied to the protected party in the procedure, nor was its unconstitutionality alleged in the administrative venue.

**IV.- Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of subsection 9 of article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993**.

**a)- Regarding the plaintiff's grounds related to her specific case.** In this regard, it is important to indicate that the large number of arguments put forth by the plaintiff related to the merits of the decision in the disciplinary case, as well as to the deficiencies in its processing, the rejection of evidence, the situation that caused her insolvency, and the manner in which other procedures have been resolved, are aspects that are not suitable for assessment in this action, as they refer to the application of the rule in her specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, the Chamber will only address the constitutionality arguments without delving into the particularities set forth, without prejudice to what is resolved in the ordinary courts by reason of the content of this judgment.

b)-Regarding the arguments of unconstitutionality formulated by the plaintiff. In the sub examine, the plaintiff considers it contrary to the Law of the Constitution that a judicial declaration of insolvency be established as a ground for dismissal without leaving a margin of discretion or assessment, even excusable, regarding what generated that condition and, above all, without evaluating elements or the "principles of congruence, proportionality, reasonable causality, legitimate purpose, good faith, family necessity, privacy, assessment of an objectively accredited loss of trust in relation to the functions I perform, existence of real impact on the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch, as well as the non-existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the judicial public service, gender aspects, among others, all of this weighed against the existence or not of an impact on the continuity and efficiency of the judicial service, as is assessed and defined for other grounds in those same articles (…)". She states that from the analysis and investigation of the content of the bill in question, the following was obtained as important aspects for this action of unconstitutionality: "(…) ü At folios [Value 027], [Value 028], [Value 029] (images [Value 030], [Value 031], [Value 032]), Motion No. [Value 035] raised by Deputy Ovidio Pacheco is evident, aimed at modifying the wording of Article 26 subsection 9.) in reference and, for what matters, where it is provided, among others, to expressly include 'those judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent' as a ground for dismissal from appointment, a wording ultimately approved and currently in force; ü At folio [Value 033] (image [Value 034]), the joint legislative committee becomes aware of the indicated Motion No. [Value 035] and its content is discussed. For those purposes, it is recorded in the legislative file that Deputy Ovidio Pacheco makes no reference whatsoever to the substantive reason, purpose, or cause justifying the express inclusion of the ground that is the object of this action, but rather his justification is purely a matter of form so that no reference is made to Article 12, in light of which that aspect of form was favorably evaluated considering that 'the motion tends to clarify, at least, what the true causes are for which a judicial official may be dismissed.' It is emphasized that, for the purposes of said motion, the suitable substantive reason, purpose, or cause that would justify the express inclusion of the dismissal ground that is the object of this action is not recorded. ü At folio [Value 036] (image [Value 037]), the legislative discussion related to disciplinary grounds is recorded, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship can end for that reason, highlighting the reference to the interest in the public service of judicial functions, in light of which the permanence of the official prevails, except when it results 'seriously inconvenient for the judicial service', as well as when, for that reason, 'there are doubts about his correctness'. ü At folio [Value 080] (image [Value 081]), the ground that is the object of this action of unconstitutionality provided in Article 26 subsection 9.), already appears added as a substitute text. ü At folio [Value 082] (image [Value 065]), the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration must be highlighted, in which they expressly request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in Article 26 subsection 9.) in reference be eliminated. The justifying and explanatory element manifested by the legislators is the following: 'Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not at all be taken as grounds for dismissing a judicial servant. If this is permitted, it would be sanctioning for a mere danger'. (-the underlining and bold are not in the original, they are indicated in that manner only for the purpose of highlighting their content as an important aspect for this action of unconstitutionality). ü At folio [Value 038] (image [Value 039]), there is a legislative discussion about the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which the criterion of Deputy Allan Solano is highlighted, in which, referring to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for dismissal from appointment, he criticizes that it constitutes a ground for 'sanction for mere convenience or risk' and on aspects of 'private life'. ü At folios [Value 040] (image [Value 041]), the discussion appears between Deputy Santana Esquivel and Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyze the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration regarding the ground in Article 26 subsection 9.) repeatedly referred to, in order to decide, definitively, whether to retain or modify said ground. For these purposes, it is of great interest to quote textually what they manifest in this regard, as follows: 'MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are responsible for resolving all manner of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions. It is for this reason that it has been considered that a person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal the management of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it is traditional to find regulations of this nature. That is the only observation I could make to the effect of opting to eliminate or not maintain it. My recommendation is to maintain the existence so that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL; We will continue then. We will keep this article as it is [...]'. (-the underlining is not in the original, it is indicated in that manner only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for this action of unconstitutionality-)". She adds that the justification of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora was what gave reason for legislatively defining to maintain the dismissal ground indicated in Article 26 subsection 9), which centers on the following aspects: "a.) By referring to 'resolution of discords', it only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch and omits, and thereby it was not legislatively valued, the administrative judicial service relationship, such as my judicial performance as Unit Coordinator; b.) It points out the existence of 'a certain loss of trust' due to the judicial official being declared insolvent, that is, it would punish with dismissal from appointment to the judicial service for a conduct whose appreciation does not prove in an effective, objective, causal, direct, substantiated, proportional, or reasonable manner the existence of a reason that would seriously harm the institutional service work, as well as before the citizenry, all of this accredited against the functions I perform, regardless of my insolvency status. It is stressed that this must be assessed not only in the jurisdictional work but also in what concerns my person, that is, in the performance of administrative work. He further states that 'eventually he will have economic resources at his disposal', thus again revealing an empty argument without technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal foundation regarding serious harm to the institutional service work, given that, in the administrative judicial service relationship, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption." She states that, according to the legislative file for bill No. 10.753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the insolvency ground as a reason to declare dismissal from appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it is not consistent with the normative complex of the disciplinary matter regulated by Law No. 7333 as a whole, aimed at demonstrating, following due process, a "serious impact on the judicial service, as well as the non-existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the judicial public service, as a primary element for the sanctioning application of the challenged ground." She adds that, as was warned during the legislative process, allowing this ground means sanctioning a mere danger or simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration against decisions of necessity that involve aspects of private life that do not influence the judicial service. She argues that the wording of the rule implies an application of pure law, without considering other relevant aspects in the service relationship. She asserts that insolvency is a legal mechanism established in civil matters for the payment to creditors. She mentions that the process of a judicial declaration of insolvency should not be qualified negatively without assessing the reasons that generated it and also considering whether actions classified as fraudulent were not present. She asserts that subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) "Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Protection of the Family and Legal Certainty, by an act managed in application of my autonomy of will. A labor discrimination based on economic situation in matters of employment is materialized." She states that: "the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency is configured (…) as a ground for dismissal from appointment (Article 26 subsection 9. of Law No. 7333-), that affects that special protection to the right to work, given that as it was demonstrated from the analysis of the bill for that Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is integrated into that block of legality without mediating, nor providing for, the causality of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency concerning the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional and administrative nature, nor is there a conditional or valuation ground for the application of that normative reason, which in the case of the application of Article 26 subsection 9. of said law, generates in itself the dismissal from appointment as the most severe disciplinary measure, even when there is no damage, harm, or impact on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutionality of the Judicial Branch, much less on society, nor the proven existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the judicial public service by reason of the declaration of insolvency. (…) Additionally, with the proposed sanction, an elementary principle of labor law that is applicable supplementarily to the public employment relationship is seriously violated, namely the protective principle, and consequently the application of the in dubio pro-operario rule, which later will be associated with the violation of the principle of innocence that assists me, in light of which, the revocation of appointment applied to me on the indicated ground should have constituted the last ratio, seeking to choose the sanction most favorable to the worker, in application of the principles governing the law of the constitution and the same conventionality control, all of this against a sanction evidently flagrant against the legal system. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship." She affirms that the institution of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent character is declared. She states that, due to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literalness as a matter of law. She notes that with this rule an expectation or an eventual risk or danger, in her case unreal, is sanctioned with the most severe measure. She mentions that: "it is palpable that what was warned by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration that reviewed Bill No. 10.753 becomes a reality, when it warned that a mere danger or an eventual risk would be sanctioned, without even mediating a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment that reflects a deterioration, impact, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point, what is mentioned in the file of bill 10.753, specifically at folio [Value 025] (image [Value 026]) when in the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the articles invoked, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable to the extent that those circumstances 'affect the public service'." She indicates that: "Just as Article 56 of our Political Constitution provides, regarding the State's guarantees limit on the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, points out, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, to the right to work, and to protection against unemployment, all of this without any discrimination, among others, for reasons of economic situation or position, as is my case. In that same sense, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labour Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, relating to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent situations occurring in both State agencies and private companies that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the heritage of every individual. From all this Law No. 2694 is born, of November 22, 1960, that is, the Convention of the International Labour Organization on the prohibition of discrimination in employment, currently in force which prohibits '[...] any form of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, filiation or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunity or treatment in matters of employment or occupation.' In that sense, note that the prohibition of this conventional control has a single exception, which is the one defined in Article 2 of that same Law No. 2694 establishing 'From the previous prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions or preferences arising from the qualifications necessary for the complete fulfillment of the functions or tasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to their nature and the conditions of the worker.' Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, discrimination is materialized due to the exhaustive ground that generates dismissal from appointment for mere convenience, for mere danger, or for an eventual risk, without an effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge by reason of my judicial declaration of insolvency." She concludes that the impact on her fundamental rights to protection of work, family, and legal certainty is latent, which materializes discrimination based on her economic situation. ii) "Violation of the right of culpability and innocence due to non-existence of impact on the public service or third parties, as well as the non-verification of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the judicial public service in the very application of due process. An act of good faith (sic) is sanctioned with the supreme sacrifice of dismissal from appointment in the face of an eventual risk not proven nor evaluated, as well as in the face of a mere or apparent unfounded and unjustified institutional convenience." She argues that with the regulation challenged in this action of unconstitutionality, a flagrant violation is caused to the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and to the principles that integrate the Law of the Constitution, in that the judicial declaration of insolvency is sought to be taken as a ground to prevent appointment in the judicial service, as well as to dismiss an official, without carrying out any major assessment or accreditation of damage or harm, -real, causal and objective-, to the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. She adds that said ground is applied for aspects of mere unjustified convenience, by criteria of an eventual risk, without any demonstration that there exists at least a slight, medium, or serious inconvenience for the service provided by the Judicial Branch nor specifically for the Planning Directorate. She maintains that the disciplinary application of such ground does not consider whether it involves jurisdictional or administrative work, nor are criteria assessed or applied to demonstrate the existence of any impact on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch.

He insists that insolvency, unless declared fraudulent, is not a crime that generates disqualification from public office, nor is it a sanction such that it results in termination of appointments. He argues that the challenged norms contravene the identified constitutional parameters and principles, as well as "that of congruence, which is required by the very parameter of legal certainty and due process." He states that the norms being challenged seem to punish the existence of a "loss of confidence (pérdida de confianza)", due to a judicial declaration of insolvency; however, objective loss of confidence exists because good faith, performance, and the fidelity that the employee owes to the employer are compared, such that it is established and demonstrated—congruently and proportionally—that, with the employee's conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, which leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to continue the employment relationship. He argues that if the judicial declaration of insolvency intends to support the "loss of confidence (pérdida de confianza)" for the Judicial Branch with the consequence of termination of appointment, because it is a disciplinary sanctioning matter, the legal norm must demonstrate in its content the constitutional parameter of serious, causal, reasonable, and objective culpability of the official vis-à-vis the service and public interest, in such a way that it proves a real impossibility in the continuity of employment, or else, excuses the judicial employee due to "lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of the public office." iii) "Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine Principle. Non-existence of a legitimate purpose for the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in light of the superior sacrifice involved in the disciplinary sanction without there being any affectation on the public service, nor on the institutionality nor the image of the Judicial Branch, or demonstration of the existence of a serious, much less very serious, fault against the judicial public service due to insolvency." He mentions that the right to privacy and human dignity against discrimination has been developed by this Chamber and by international regulations and jurisprudence on human rights. He indicates that these rights are treated as a shield of protection for the person. He reiterates the argument related to Article 28 of the Political Constitution and the lack of harm to the Judicial Branch. He considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles, which results in termination of appointment, does not have a legitimate purpose for the sanction, which affects the fundamental rights to privacy and human dignity, also generating a high level of discrimination based on economic situation. He states that with this unconstitutionality action, he does not intend to disregard the authority and powers of direction, oversight, and sanction of the Judicial Branch regarding its administrative service relationship; however, there must be respect for his fundamental rights, as it is necessary to demonstrate objective and reasonable sanctioning elements for its imposition, all of this in light of the effective verification of a serious or very serious fault, affectation on the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or an eventual risk; that is, a cause without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes his years of service in the Judicial Branch, with consequences for his privacy and dignity, as he would be treated as if he had committed some criminal activity or a serious or very serious infraction. He mentions that "the spirit of the legislator permeated in the file of bill of law 10.753, when in its legislative discussion on the different causes of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the causes must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances 'affect the public service', (...)." He maintains that the challenged norm, in light of the rights to privacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle, must be applied in the manner that most favors the human being. He explains that all restrictive and sanctioning measures, as well as those of termination of appointment, must precautionarily respect human dignity, the protection of privacy, and the principle of proportionality, all under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual harm is assessed. He asserts that the Judicial Branch adopted the "Gender Equality Policy" so that the gender perspective would be incorporated into all the work of that Branch of the Republic. He mentions that the foregoing is based "on the legal framework for the protection of human rights, both at the national and international level, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights to equality without discrimination of any kind, to protection of the law, to access to prompt and complete justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that make up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica." He adds that this policy "recognized that 'Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when the circumstances are different, that is, when persons are unequally situated', likewise that 'The principle of equity impels judges, as well as all legal operators, to take into account, with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider the personal, family, and social conditions in each of the cases and their consequences', a situation that is not being applied due to the unconstitutional content invoked through this action." He notes that the policy aims to "guarantee equality of opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Judicial Branch." He states that "this Gender Equality Policy was based on the 'Brasilia Regulations on Access to Justice for Persons in Vulnerable Conditions', under which Rule 19 states that: 'Any action or conduct, based on gender, that causes death, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or private sphere, through the use of physical or psychological violence is considered violence against women.' (...)" iv) "Violation of the Principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Non-existence of suitable connection and congruence between the conduct it regulates, the severity of the disciplinary sanction, and the superior sacrifice involved. Existence of discrimination based on my economic situation." He mentions that in addition to the violation of the fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Political Constitution and the Law of the Constitution that have been invoked as the basis for this unconstitutionality action, specifically regarding the invocation of the cause of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for not issuing the appointment of a judicial server, as well as for imposing the disciplinary cause of termination of appointment, there is also a violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness of the consequent termination of appointment. He notes that these norms lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements of assessment, congruence, balance, and connection with the essential content of sanctioning law. He adds that their application does not analyze the factual picture, the personal conditions of the judicial server in order to determine an excusable situation, the respective sacrifice involved in the measure, and the consequent cause of termination of appointment due to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency, all of the foregoing, in relation to the existence or not of an affectation on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch, as well as on its institutional image or the prevailing public interest due to the performance of the position. He refers that the application of the cause also does not prove a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service. He states that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the challenged norm, in order to define and substantiate the existence of the transgressions invoked. He adds that the test contains the three sub-principles that function as rules to be considered, in the sense that they are maxims upon which one must inquire; that is, one must verify whether the chosen means complies with the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, whereby, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. He maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, before which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of the States parties to adopt the internal measures necessary to adapt their conduct and norms to conventional parameters. He mentions the following: "Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and end of the challenged norms, we must ask ourselves a question: Is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most serious disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of an official of the Judicial Branch who has been judicially declared in a state of insolvency to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, that they are in charge of in the Judicial Branch? The performance of the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing, because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of norms that tend to limit fundamental rights, or to generate the application of a sanctioning measure in disciplinary matters." He sets out the analysis as follows: "a.) As the first element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus its end', that is, its adequacy, suitability, and efficacy. In that term, the means employed by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed end, that is, it establishes that the chosen means is the most appropriate to the factual possibilities, taking into account the end to be achieved. There must be a judgment of congruence and practical connection between the means and the immediate end of the norm, since, if that end is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case at hand, we are dealing with Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of Law No. 7333, which establish, in what is relevant, respectively, the prohibition of appointment in the judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; likewise, the cause for termination of appointment of those serving in judicial positions, for the same reason, that is, having been declared, judicially, in a state of insolvency. As stated in this action, and because these legal norms expressly do not indicate their end, either expressly or implicitly, the assessment of the legislative discussion raised by the Joint Legislative Commission that heard and defined the final drafting of Bill of Law No. 10.753 for what is now Law No. 7333, (-which was already indicated previously-), must be considered for these purposes as a defining element of that legislative spirit regarding said cause. In that sense, the end provided for these legal norms challenged through this means is considered to be precautionary, due to an aspect of confidence, regarding the management of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, a member at the time of said Joint Legislative Commission, it was said that '[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain confidence from the public because, at the end of the day, we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is there declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of confidence in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal the management of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]', this being the basis and/or criterion for leaving as definitive the text finally approved for those legal norms. The means that these norms use to achieve that end is, on one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servers if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; and on the other hand (-Article 26, subsection 9-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In this regard, it must be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, this cause is related in its wording, for the means of proportionality explained, to other causes linked to convictions for a crime punishable by imprisonment and to those who are subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions. (...) With what has been indicated, it is evident that the means employed by these legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and not apt to achieve the proposed end, because the fact of considering that a person in a state of insolvency, judicially declared, is without merit for the judicial function, so much so that it generates the termination of appointment for those already working, signifies the casuistic and banal application of an apparent unjustified loss of confidence, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege the sanctioning application with the maximum sacrifice at the employee's expense for an eventual, unproven situation of mere risk, mere danger, or convenience, without there being an effective, real, and objective assessment of the institutional end, of a general nature, which is the public service. (...) It is added to the foregoing, that the spirit of the legislator foresaw this cause for an eventual use of resources by the judicial official in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of a purely jurisdictional task, and not of an administrative nature, which -as in my case- does not administer, custody, dispose, control, nor safeguard any public funds, and moreover, does not attend to the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict depend on that administrative management. Therefore, it can be considered that the first parameter of this test yields the result of disproportionality of the norm, because there is no congruence between the means and the immediate end of the norm in accordance with the parameter required by the law of the constitution, since, although it can be thought that preventing an appointment and the termination of appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated end, the counterpart to that, that is, the restriction without verification of its excusable nature and innocence, in light of the superior sacrifice it generates, violating the indicated parameters, causes the accused disproportionality, even more so if one considers, as in the case that concerns me, that for the application of this disciplinary sanctioning measure, it is not assessed whether or not there is an affectation on the prevailing public service, the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, public order, morals, or third parties, nor on the existence or not of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service, due to the cause. b.) As a second element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means employed by the legal norm versus the necessity of regulation'. In that term, it is assessed whether that means is needed to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the mandate of optimization of the most benign means, by which it must be verified whether the end cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For these purposes, different means must be compared, in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation.

In light of the above, the excess in the measure is condemned; by its urgent or imperative nature, the sacrifice ordered by the rule is required. With respect to the rules challenged through this action of unconstitutionality, it was already stated in point a.) above in this test, that the means they employ to obtain that regulatory purpose is, on the one hand (—article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency; and on the other (—article 26 subsection 9.—), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In light of the above, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the need to concretize the regulation, verifying alternatives adhering to the parameters of constitutional law, by reason of the sacrifice that this very need for regulation generates or may generate. It goes without saying that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent need must assess the diversity of situations that can arise according to each specific case, as is precisely the case of whether the person works in a jurisdictional or administrative position. (…) The question then is: what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that must be applied in the case of a judicial declaration of insolvency where there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of grave or very grave qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? Is it proportional to prevent the appointment of a person and—on the other hand—the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared insolvent, where there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of grave or very grave qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? We insist, legal rules, and especially sanctioning ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. In light of the above, the application of the rules challenged as unconstitutional are clearly disproportionate. The sanctioning means is excessive given that the urgent or imperative nature demands the sacrifice ordered by the rule, even more so—as has already been said and demonstrated—when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morality, nor to third parties. (…) For the foregoing reasons, it is patent that the rules challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory, that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever exercises the sanctioning function has suitable regulatory means for the various specific cases, in which there may exist, as in mine, exonerating causes of liability such that the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment is accredited, and that the least burdensome alternative is determined instead, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring a sanctioning and regulatory excess of a disciplinary nature. (…)

c.) As the third and last element of the proportionality test of interest to apply, we find the "Means employed by the legal rule versus cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. Given that, the sacrifice—as a cost—is weighed against the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit and that alternative must be the least restrictive or least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to take into account three issues: the structure of the rule and its weighing, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close links are established. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or affectation of one of the principles, the greater the importance of the satisfaction of the other must be. To that end, the legal interests or rights in conflict must be identified, for purposes of determining the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the higher hierarchy of the legal interest, in order to determine if there is a relationship or balance between them. In the case at hand, it was already mentioned in point a.) above in this test, that the means employed by the rules challenged through this avenue to obtain that regulatory purpose is, on the one hand (—article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency, and on the other (—article 26 subsection 9.—), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. It must thus be understood that the nature of the rule's structure is exhaustive of a sanctioning character. In light of the above, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice involved by the sanctioning measure of termination of appointment, against the benefit or advantage that the Judicial Branch obtains with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all of this against the purpose pursued by the rule. We previously stated that the purpose set for those challenged legal rules is of a precautionary nature, for an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all of this based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the cause that involved the bill of what is now Law No. 7333, in which the Joint Legislative Committee that confirmed maintaining said causes, relied on the opinion of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, who stated that: "[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because at the end of the day we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who has been declared insolvent there, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually will have at his disposal, the managing of the economic assets of the citizenry […]" (-folios [Valor 040] (images [Valor 064] of bill No. 10.753-) It must be clarified again, that this discussion arose because the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration issued an opinion on the scope of that cause of insolvency, stating that "[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not at all be taken as causes to terminate a judicial servant; if this were permitted, it would be sanctioning for mere danger […]" [-folio [Valor 082] [image [Valor 065] of bill No. 10.753-) (…) Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged rules, we have no objection, as it coincides with legal theory regarding their means of creation, that is, via law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. However, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in the Judgment of February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman Vs. Uruguay: "[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect of International Law, including International Human Rights Law, which has been so considered even by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain facts or acts in a society is limited by the norms and international obligations for the protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so that the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by its formal as well as substantial characteristics, whereby, particularly in cases of serious violations of the norms of International Human Rights Law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the rule of majorities, that is, to the sphere of what is "susceptible to be decided" by the majorities in democratic instances, in which a "conventionality control" must also prevail [...], which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judicial Branch [...]". In that same sense, regarding the legitimacy of domestic regulations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in the Judgment of November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco Vs. Mexico, stated: "[...] For this Tribunal, not only the suppression or issuance of norms in domestic law guarantee the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation comprised in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of state practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not by itself guarantee that its application is adequate. It is necessary that the application of the norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of the state public order, are adjusted to the same purpose pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]". Having reached this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of conventionality control, in the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights—as is the case of Costa Rica—, its judges and public authorities in general are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of this binding international regulation is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, its object, and purpose. In that sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has indicated that authorities must not only exercise a constitutionality control, but also a "conventionality" control ex officio, a function that must not remain limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the plaintiffs in each specific case. (…)

a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal rule versus its purpose", that is, its suitability and efficacy, it has been pointed out that the ideal or legitimate purpose, even if in all cases (whether a punishment or civil compensation), it is clarified that this does not imply that the mentioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportional (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that for the measure to be suitable means that it serves to safeguard the legal interest intended to be protected, that is, that it is capable of contributing to the realization of said objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 53-).

b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal rule versus the need for regulation", it has pointed out with reference to the requirement of necessity, that it must obey an imperative public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least possible extent, as well as the condition that it must not limit beyond what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48- and Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 43-).

c.) With respect to the third and last element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal rule versus cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense, in both Kimel -para. 83 to 94-, and in Usón Ramírez -para. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the structure of weighing by evaluating: on the one hand, the degree of affectation of one right or principle—what we have understood as means—, and on the other, the importance of the satisfaction of the other right or principle—what we have known as cost-benefit—, against which, it analyzes the sacrifice involved. With this, the Court verifies whether the adopted measure—sanction—broadly guaranteed the right that was intended to be protected, without rendering nugatory the right that is limited and its consequent sacrifice. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the rules challenged through this action of unconstitutionality coincides with the parameters set by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, defining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, or objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulations with their imperative exhaustiveness, making them disproportionate and consequently irrational, all of this against the sacrifice involved. By reason of the foregoing, it can be reliably concluded that the legal rules challenged through this avenue are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory by reason of my economic situation, thereby violating my invoked fundamental rights. I request this Honorable Chamber to carefully analyze my situation against the challenged regulatory content, by reason of the factual and legal justification alleged in this action of unconstitutionality".

V.On the analysis of constitutionality of subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In the sub examine, it is important to be clear about the scope of the questioned rule.

The article in question establishes the following causes for termination of functions of persons serving in judicial posts: death of the person (subsection 1), expiration of the appointment (subsection 2), revocation of the appointment (subsection 3), separation for the better service (subsection 4), accepted resignation (subsection 5), material impediment for more than six months (subsection 6), a lower judge being found with respect to a higher one in case of kinship (subsection 7), having contracted a marriage that causes the person to incur in some cause of prohibition (subsection 8), having been convicted of a crime with a penalty of disqualification from holding public office (subsection 9), and having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency (subsection 9). Note that this last subsection establishes two totally independent scenarios.

Regarding the rules that refer to aspects of private life, like the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Chamber considers that, in principle, they are not per se unconstitutional nor do they necessarily imply a violation of the rights to intimacy and freedom of the serving persons, since they are subject to greater burdens, obligations, and duties. In that sense, this Tribunal shares what was stated by the advisory body regarding the fact that public officials do hold the rights to intimacy and freedom, but that their threshold is different from that which protects a citizen who has not assumed the condition and responsibility of someone holding a public office.

However, for the purposes of resolving this action, it is necessary to analyze whether the judicial declaration in a state of insolvency as a cause for termination of functions of any judicial servant is or is not contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

The scenario under examination is expressly regulated as follows:

"Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving judicial posts shall cease due to:

(…)

9.- Having been convicted, by final judgment, of a crime warranting a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or posts, and for having been declared, judicially, in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency". (The emphasis is not original).

According to a simple reading of the rule, any judicial servant, at the moment they are judicially declared in a state of insolvency, must be terminated from their functions. That is, the operator of the law is not granted any margin of assessment of the circumstances.

In that sense, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic states, the conduct provided for in the rule (insolvency) has a burdensome consequence (termination of appointment), therefore the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality are applicable to it, upon which this Tribunal has established the parameters that allow its analysis.

The Chamber, through judgment no. [Valor 084] of 12:06 hours on October 2, 1998, held:

"IX.- On the constitutional principle of reasonableness. The principle of reasonableness arises from the so-called "substantive due process", that is, that public acts must contain a substratum of intrinsic justice. When it concerns the restriction of certain rights, this rule imposes the duty that said limitation be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction with the general principle of equality.

A rights-limiting act is reasonable when it fulfills a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure makes direct reference to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect some interest or set of interests of the community—or of a determined group—through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is, that if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment concerning whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms may exist that better solve the existing need, some of which could fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, such that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit sought to be obtained thereby for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, whereas the second stems from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed." (Judgment number [Valor 085], of sixteen hours and thirty-three minutes on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight)".

Subsequently, the Chamber, through judgment no. [Valor 111] of 4:31 p.m. on March 21, 2012 (A Calzada (VS), LP Mora (VS), G Armijo, F Cruz, F Castillo (VS), P Rueda and R Guerrero), clarified the scope of the principle of reasonableness, in the following terms:

"V.- THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS. This so-called principle actually constitutes a "reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad)", a protocol aimed at objectifying, to a certain degree, the reflective process through which the judge concludes that a certain measure is unreasonable or disproportionate. "What is reasonable" is certainly a matter of assessment that, nevertheless, can and must be argued so that it is at least plausible. The aim is to propose a methodology for applying this principle, which is useful for presenting the arguments used to classify something as reasonable or not. Said methodology contains the following elements: a) legitimacy (legitimidad), in the sense that the measure does not clearly violate any higher-ranking legal mandate; b) suitability (adecuabilidad), insofar as the measure actually serves to achieve the intended purpose; c) necessity (necesidad) implies that among several suitable measures, the least harmful one must be chosen; and d) the so-called "proportionality in the strict sense (proporcionalidad en sentido estricto)", which requires that under no circumstances be the essential content of a constitutional right affected in a process of normative balancing. It is clarified that for the majority doctrinal sector, the element of legitimacy is conceived rather as a prerequisite. This protocol is applied in phases, so that if the examination of a first phase is unsatisfactory, it becomes unnecessary to continue with the study of the remaining aspects, although, in some cases, for greater forcefulness of the judgment, this can be delved into." Thus, according to the Chamber's jurisprudence, an act limiting rights (such as the termination of a public servant's functions for having been judicially declared insolvent) is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: necessary, suitable, and proportional. Likewise, for these purposes, it must also satisfactorily overcome the elements of the reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad): legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense.

In this regard, it is necessary to point out that Article 26 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establishes quite dissimilar scenarios as grounds for the termination of the functions of persons serving in judicial posts, so one cannot speak of a univocal purpose for that ordinal. Now, regarding subsection 9 of that numeral, it is observed that it incorporates both conviction for a crime warranting the penalty of disqualification from holding public office, and the judicial declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency. There is no doubt that the first part responds to the penalty of a crime, thus configuring a material impossibility of holding the office; however, the fact of having been judicially declared insolvent does not, in and of itself and generally, justify the termination of functions of any Judicial Branch employee.

Regarding the purpose of this latter ground, the parties present three positions in this action:

1)The claimant maintains that in the legislative record, on the occasion of the amendment that gave rise to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26 that was subsequently approved, no reference was made to the reason, purpose, or substantive cause that justified the express inclusion of the "termination that is the object of this action". It mentions that the discussion related to the disciplinary grounds for which the service relationship may end revolved around the idea that permanence should prevail, except when it is "seriously inconvenient for the judicial service" or "there are doubts about his/her correctness". It notes that the record contains the opinion issued by the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration, in which, expressly, the elimination of the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in Article 26, subsection 9.) of reference was requested, in the following terms: "Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not at all be taken as grounds to terminate a judicial servant; allowing this would mean sanctioning for a mere danger." It states that there is also a legislative discussion about the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which Deputy Allan Solano, referring to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for termination of appointment, criticizes that a "sanction for mere convenience or risk" and aspects of "private life" constitute a ground. It refers to a discussion between Deputy Santana Esquivel and the then Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Mixed Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyzed the relevance of the opinion issued by the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration regarding the ground in Article 26, subsection 9.) of repeated reference, in order to decide, definitively, whether to keep or modify said ground: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions, that is why it has been considered that the person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal the management of the citizenry's economic assets and that is why it is traditional to find rules of this nature. That is the only observation I could make regarding the choice to eliminate or not maintain it, my recommendation is to maintain the existence that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL; Let us continue then. We are going to keep this article as it is [...]". It sets forth that the justification of former Magistrate Mora Mora was the reason to maintain the ground for termination related to insolvency, and that in it, reference was made to the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch without evaluating administrative functions, to the existence of "a certain loss of trust" with such declaration, and to the notion that "eventually he will have at his disposal the economic resources". It argues that the foregoing reveals empty and unfounded argumentation, since not all judicial servants fit that scenario; and, furthermore, the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional work of service is not proven.

2)The Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative instances when the general reform to the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial was being analyzed, former Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora Mora pointed out that "judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions, that is why it has been considered that the person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets…". It notes that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary power that the Judicial Branch has over its servants, which is necessary as an instrument of guarantee to the citizen that they will receive a quality, agile, effective, and efficient public service, equipped with an adequate organization and highly qualified judicial servants for the performance of their duties. It explains that a mere danger or simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience is not being sanctioned, by virtue of the fact that the rule is provided for when the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is decreed in a judicial venue, that is, there is an entire judicial process in which issues related to breaches of credit obligations assumed by the debtor are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions so that the person can resolve that situation. It adds that the legislator deemed that the foregoing implies a situation of distrust and sought the probity of the judicial servant to be certain that he/she is responsible with his/her obligations both at work and in his/her private life. It asserts that the imposition of this type of sanction has an absolute scope of the principle of legality for incurring in conduct prohibited by a rule, which is not consistent with the claimant's allegations when affirming that the rule allows sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk.

3)The Procuraduría General de la República states that from the analysis of the legislative record, it is evident that the intention of the challenged rule was always to declare a "loss of trust" of the judicial official "who has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually will have at his disposal the management of the citizenry's economic assets" (see statements of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora at folios [Valor 075] and [Valor 076] of the legislative record)". It mentions that the intention was to direct the rule at officials who administered justice or who, due to the condition of their post, should be required to adequately manage their personal assets.

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that a completely clear purpose is not proven regarding the incorporation of the judicial declaration of insolvency as an automatic ground for termination of functions of any judicial servant. Even though it would not be illegitimate to impose this ground on certain posts within the Judicial Branch due to the functions they perform, no objective justification is appreciated that supports the generic scope given to the subsection. Note that, in the legislative discussions to which the claimant refers and which are partially taken up by the Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice, reference is made to a "there is a certain loss of trust towards him [referring to the judicial employee responsible for resolving discords], given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets"; however, there is no record of any express justification regarding the general scope of the ground and the non-assessment of specific circumstances. In addition, the Chamber shares the position of the Procuraduría General de la República insofar as it considers that the judicial declaration of insolvency, in order to constitute a valid ground for termination of functions, should have some repercussion on the Judicial Branch or on the trust held in the official, which undoubtedly implies taking into consideration the nature of the posts and the possibility of assessing exemptions or mitigating circumstances that may have concurred in the reason for the declaration.

On this last point, although the judicial declaration of insolvency is an aspect that may be of interest in a public employment relationship, it cannot be contemplated in absolute terms. For example, there is the possibility that, due to some situation beyond the judicial servant's control, said declaration does not respond to poor management of his/her assets, but is rather a consequence of debts incurred to attend to an illness or emergency, or is due to reasons of force majeure. Furthermore, a case could arise in which the functions of the judicial servant neither endanger nor affect the Judicial Branch.

Then, if the consequence of the ground is so serious (termination of functions) and there is no justification that extends its application to any Judicial Branch official (without even granting the possibility of demonstrating the lack of danger or affectation, or the concurrence of exemptions or mitigating circumstances), the violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality becomes evident. In that sense, a priori, the necessity (that a factual basis exists making it necessary to protect some good or set of goods through the adoption of a measure), suitability (idoneidad) (that the adopted restriction fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected need), and proportionality (proporcionalidad) (that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit sought for the benefit of the community) of the rights-limiting act are not proven. Thus, with the application of the reasonableness test (test de razonabilidad), although no evident violation of legitimacy (legitimidad) is perceived, the examination of suitability (adecuabilidad), necessity (necesidad), and "proportionality in the strict sense (proporcionalidad en sentido escrito)" does not yield a satisfactory result, since respectively it was not verified: 1) that the measure serves to achieve the intended purpose (which, in any case, is not even entirely clear); 2) that among several measures, the least harmful was chosen (only absolute termination is ordered regardless of the post or circumstances); and 3) that the essential content of a constitutional right was not affected in the normative balancing (the generic provision of termination of functions without any justification violates the essential content of the servants' right to work, as it automatically suppresses it without evaluating the circumstances of each case).

In addition, the analysis made by the Procuraduría General de la República is shared, in pointing out that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any burdensome consequence in the sphere of the individual must constitute a strictly necessary measure to achieve the objective sought, and that the principle of proportionality requires the prior establishment by the legislator of the limits within which the legal operator may move for the interpretation of the rule in consideration of specific circumstances. Likewise, as stated by the advisory body, the administrative authority must have a margin of discretion granted by the legislator to guarantee that the burdensome consequence is only applied when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. Precisely, the current wording of the rule does not admit various types of interpretation, but rather its preceptive content necessarily dictates that it be applied to any person who meets that condition; that is, the problem does not derive from an incorrect application of the rule, but from its application in the terms provided by the legislator, which does not allow, as already stated, any margin for a hermeneutic that tempers its scope.

Based on the foregoing, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase "or insolvency" (o insolvencia) contained in subsection 9) of numeral 26 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial is appropriate, as it is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

As there are sufficient reasons to declare the unconstitutionality of the reference to "insolvency" (insolvencia) in subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, it becomes unnecessary to rule on the rest of the claims, as has been the thesis of this Chamber from the outset in a number of matters (see judgment numbers [Valor 086], [Valor 087], [Valor 088], [Valor 089], [Valor 090], [Valor 091], among others)." Finally, it is worth remembering that the Judicial Branch has a normative body to address the unjustified breach of financial obligations and commitments that compromise good public service due to the magnitude of the risk or the good image of the institution. Such cases can be channeled through disciplinary procedures with the consequences that the legal system establishes according to the circumstances, evidentiary elements, and legal assessment in the particular situation. In this sense, for example, ordinal 192, subsection 9 and numeral 194 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial provide:

"Article 192.- The following are considered serious offenses: (…)9.- The unjustified non-payment of a credit obligation, which must be attended to as the principal debtor and is being collected through judicial proceedings.

Article 194.- Any other infraction or negligence in the fulfillment of the duties proper to the post, not provided for in the preceding articles, shall be heard by the competent bodies, for the purpose of examining whether they constitute a very serious, serious, or minor offense, with the object of applying the disciplinary regime. For this purpose, the actions indicated in the preceding articles shall be taken as a reference." VI.- Documentation contributed to the case file.

The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 business days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, pursuant to the provisions of the "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial," approved by the Corte Plena in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Boletín Judicial number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, [Valor 027] 12, article LXXXI.

Por tanto:

The action for violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness is partially granted. Consequently, the phrase "o insolvencia" contained in subsection 9 of Article 26 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial is declared unconstitutional. The judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled law, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Regarding the alleged transgression of numeral 12 of the same normative body, the action is declared inadmissible. Let this pronouncement be summarized in the Diario Oficial La Gaceta and published in full in the Boletín Judicial. Let this pronouncement be notified to the petitioner, to the Procurador General de la República, and to the President of the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

D._{Fernando Castillo V.} President </td></tr><tr> </td> D._{Paul Rueda L.} </td> </td></tr></table> " coordinates.</font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 21.3mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:0mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">Each of the indices reported in the present document may be consulted at the office of the <b>National Registry (Registro Nacional)</b> of the MINAE, through the SIREA, or, where applicable, may be verified directly by means of a cadastral map consultation of the corresponding property at the <b>National Registry (Registro Nacional)</b>, with the respective cadastral map number.</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 21.3mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:0mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">The indices that make up the present document constitute a technical criterion, by which the MINAE corroborates the data of the environmental viability (viabilidad (licencia) ambiental), granted by SETENA, in strict adherence to the principle of legality and the technical criteria recommended by said institution.</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 21.3mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:0mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">The foregoing, for the purposes of the application of the provisions of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) and Executive Decree 25721, regarding the <b>Forest Cover Index (Índice de Cobertura Boscosa)</b> and the issuance of the technical criterion on the presence of forest cover on the properties indicated.</span></font></p></div><br clear="all" style="mso-special-character:line-break;page-break-before:always"/><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt"/><span style=" font-size:10pt"> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"/><table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;width:626.65pt;" width="836"><tr><td align="center" style="border:solid windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0mm 0mm 0mm 0mm;width:626.65pt;" valign="top" width="836"><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:center;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt;font-weight:bold">CERTIFICATION</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:center;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">We, Nancy Hernández L., in my capacity as Coordinator a.i. of the <b>Environmental Assessment and Management Unit (Unidad de Evaluación y Gestión Ambiental)</b> of the <b>Central Pacific Conservation Area (Área de Conservación Pacífico Central, ACOPAC)</b> of the <b>National System of Conservation Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, SINAC)</b> of the MINAE, and Luis Fernando Chavarría A., in my capacity as Head of the <b>Subregional Office of Garabito (Oficina Subregional de Garabito)</b> of the same Area,</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:center;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt;font-weight:bold">CERTIFY THAT:</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">The present <b>Forest Cover Index (Índice de Cobertura Boscosa)</b> was prepared based on the review and analysis of the digital cartography of forest cover available in this Area, generated through the interpretation of orthophotos and aerial photographs of different flight lines and years, by technical personnel of the <b>Geographic Information System (Sistema de Información Geográfica)</b> of the <b>ACOPAC</b>, as well as the verification in the SIREA system of the coordinates provided by the interested party. For the location and determination of the forest cover area, the coordinates indicated in the "Por tanto" of the respective environmental viability resolution (resolución de viabilidad (licencia) ambiental), issued by SETENA, were used.</span></font></p><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt">Given at the Subregional Office of Garabito of the <b>ACOPAC</b>, on the twenty-third (23rd) day of the month of August of the year two thousand and seventeen (2017).</span></font></p></td></tr></table><p style="margin:0mm 0mm 0mm 14.2mm;text-align:justify;text-indent:13.5mm;line-height:150%;"><font face="TIMES NEW ROMAN" color="#010101" size="2"><span style=" font-size:10pt"> <o:p></o:p></span></font></p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;" width="100%"><tr><td align="center" style="border:none;padding:0mm 0mm 0mm 0mm;width:227.0pt;" valign="top" width="303"><img 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Document Digitally Signed -- Verification code -- *HD43IVXXEHFK61* FILE No. 18-016591-0007-CO Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email address: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.South of the Perpetuo Socorro church). Reception of matters for vulnerable groups: Supreme Court of Justice Building, San José, Catedral District, González Lahmann neighborhood, streets 19 and 21, avenues 8 and 6 **CONSTITUTIONALITY CONTROL MATTERS** **017611-20. LABOR. DISMISSAL FOR BEING IN A STATE OF INSOLVENCY.** Unconstitutionality action against articles 12 and 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. No. 7333 of May 5, 1993.

“…Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that a fully clear purpose for incorporating the judicial declaration of insolvency as an automatic cause for termination of duties for any judicial servant is not demonstrated. While it would not be illegitimate to impose this cause for certain positions within the Judicial Branch due to the duties they perform, no objective justification is observed that supports the generic scope given to the subsection. Note that, in the legislative discussions referenced by the plaintiff and partially taken up by the Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice, reference is made to a ‘*there is a certain loss of trust in him* [referring to the judicial employee responsible for resolving disputes], *given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets*’; however, there is no record of any express justification for the general scope of the cause and the lack of assessment of specific circumstances…” “…Therefore, if the consequence of the cause is so serious (termination of duties) and there is no justification extending its application to any Judicial Branch official (without even granting the possibility to demonstrate the lack of danger or impact, or the concurrence of exonerating or mitigating circumstances), the violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality becomes evident…” “…The action is partially granted due to violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, the phrase ‘or insolvency’ contained in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is declared unconstitutional. The judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled law, without prejudice to good faith acquired rights. Regarding the alleged violation of numeral 12 of the same regulatory body, the action is declared inadmissible. Record this ruling in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and publish it in full in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify this ruling to the plaintiff, the Attorney General of the Republic, and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice…” **CO09/20** She asserts that it is contrary to the Law of the Constitution that in such articles the judicial declaration of insolvency is established as grounds for the termination of her appointment without leaving any margin for discretion or assessment, even excusable, which generated that condition and, above all, without assessing elements or the "principles of congruence, proportionality, causal reasonableness, legitimate purpose, good faith, family need, privacy, assessment of a loss of objective trust duly accredited in light of the functions I perform, the existence of real impact on the image or institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, as well as neither the existence of a serious fault nor much less a very serious fault to the judicial public service, gender aspects, among others, all this in light of the existence or not of an impact on the continuity and efficiency of the judicial service, as is indeed assessed and defined for other grounds in those same articles, as can be read literally in the transcription made of those articles". She emphasizes that the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, in vote no. [Valor 018], categorized her, due to the declaration of insolvency she initiated, as an official lacking probity, without commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, or good faith and that, therefore, there is a relationship of distrust, considering that the Judicial Branch "needs to have a guarantee that the hired person is honorable and responsible for their acts"; furthermore, it considered that action incompatible with public function. She adds that in the case followed in file no. [Valor 001], upon considering the full-right (pleno derecho) ground, such aspects were not assessed and even the evidence she requested to introduce was rejected. She argues that the assessment carried out by the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial does not determine the real existence of any serious impact on the judicial service, the institutional image, or the public interest, but rather punishes only a potential unfounded risk or mere convenience. She states that accepting the foregoing would mean her termination from her lifetime tenure (propiedad) position of Professional 2 in Public Administration, assigned to the Institutional Projection Section of the Planning Directorate of the Judicial Branch, in which she has performed impeccably for more than 23 years. She sets forth the following background for the analysis of the unconstitutionality action: "Given the foregoing, it is relevant to bring to the Knowledge of this Honorable Constitutional Chamber, the result of the investigation carried out on the ground for employment or service termination due to a judicial declaration of insolvency. For this purpose, Draft Law No. 10,753 was analyzed, that is, what was the draft law of the current Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Law No. 7333, which allows us to demonstrate the analysis, discussion, and opinions of legislative committees and mixed subcommittees composed of deputies and magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice of the time, which reflects, as a historical fact of high relevance, the spirit of the legislator of the challenged norms. Likewise, it will be set forth whether the ground challenged by this means exists or not in the regulations governing public service and labor relations, both in the public sector—specifically in the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Civil Registry, National Banking System, Contraloría General de la República, Procuraduría General de la República—as well as in the private sector. i.) Draft Law No. 10,753.- Through this Draft Law, the deputies of that historical legislative moment learned of and discussed what would become the law today known as Law No. 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. It must be indicated, as a relevant aspect, that this Draft Law, due to the scope and specificity of its content, as well as its national and institutional relevance for the Judicial Branch, meant that it was analyzed and discussed in its original text and regarding the approval and/or rejection of motions—tending to form substitute texts—by a mixed legislative subcommittee appointed for that purpose and composed of various deputies with the support of magistrates of the Judicial Branch, such as Dr. Daniel González, Dr. Luis Paulino Mora, among others. From the analysis and investigation of the content of that Draft Law, the following was obtained as aspects of importance for this unconstitutionality action: ü On folios [Valor 019] (images [Valor 020]), the original wording content of Article 12 is located, which refers to the ground of 'the insolvent' as a general impediment to being appointed. ü On folios [Valor 021] (images [Valor 022]), the original wording of Article 26, subsection 9.1 is located, which simply established in its content the reference to incurring any of the reasons of Article 12 as grounds for termination of appointment. ü On folios [Valor 023] (images [Valor 024]), a discussion is identified between the deputy acting as president of that mixed legislative subcommittee and magistrate Daniel González, regarding the issue of insolvency and bankruptcy as a ground, where it can be noticed that the deputy refers to the ground due to the existence of 'a matter of public faith', pointing out that it concerns a person who has not known how to administer their business and who later seeks to enter the judicial service, so in his argument he turns that situation into an aspect of 'non-convenience', even more so if there has been (-he refers-) 'fraudulent bankruptcy, that is, a criminal offense has been committed'. Magistrate González refers to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency that is not necessarily the conceptualization of the person who has failed in business, but rather that of someone whose assets are judicially administered. ü On folio [Valor 025] (image [Valor 026]) the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles is recorded, where it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, a discussion that of course involves the central issue of this unconstitutionality action, that is, the declaration of insolvency, in which reference is made to the fact that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as these circumstances 'affect the public service'. ü On folios [Valor 027], [Valor 028], [Valor 029] (images [Valor 030], [Valor 031], [Valor 032]), Motion No. [Valor 035] presented by Deputy Ovidio Pacheco is evidenced, aimed at modifying the wording of Article 26, subsection 9.) of reference and, for what is relevant, where it is provided, among others, to expressly include 'those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy and insolvency' as a ground for termination of appointment, wording ultimately approved and in force to date; ü On folios [Valor 033] (image [Valor 034]), the mixed legislative committee learns of the indicated Motion No. [Valor 035] and its content is discussed. For these purposes, it is recorded in the legislative file that Deputy Ovidio Pacheco makes no reference whatsoever to the underlying reason, purpose, or cause justifying the express inclusion of the ground that is the object of this action, but rather his justification is purely for a matter of form so that reference is not made to Article 12, in view of which, that aspect of form was assessed affirmatively considering that 'the motion tends to clarify at least what are the true causes for which a judicial official can be terminated'. It is insisted, for the purposes of said motion, the suitable underlying reason, purpose, or cause that would justify the express inclusion of the ground for termination that is the object of this action is not recorded. ü On folios [Valor 036] (image [Valor 037]), the legislative discussion related to the disciplinary grounds is recorded, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship may conclude for that reason, highlighting the reference to the interest in the public service of judicial functions, before which the permanence of the official prevails, except when they turn out to be 'seriously inconvenient for the judicial service', as well as when, because of it, 'doubts exist about their correctness'. ü On folio [Valor 080] (image [Valor 081]), the ground that is the object of this unconstitutionality action provided in Article 26, subsection 9.), is recorded as already added, as a substitute text. ü On folio [Valor 082] (image [Valor 065]), the opinion issued by the Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración must be highlighted, in which, expressly, they request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in the referenced Article 26, subsection 9.) be eliminated. The justificatory and explanatory element manifested by the legislators is the following: 'Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should not be taken at all as grounds to terminate a judicial servant; if this is permitted, one would be sanctioning due to a mere danger'. (-the underlined and bold text is not from the original; it is recorded in this form only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for the present unconstitutionality action). ü On folio [Valor 038] (image [Valor 039]), legislative discussion on the scope of the disciplinary regime is recorded, in which the criterion of Deputy Allan Solano is highlighted, in which, with reference to the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for termination of appointment, he criticizes that a ground be constituted by 'sanction for mere convenience or risk' and on aspects of 'private life'. ü On folios [Valor 040] (image [Valor 041]) the discussion of Deputy Santana Esquivel and Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora appears, as members of the Mixed Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyze the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración on the ground of the repeatedly referenced Article 26, subsection 9.), for the purpose of deciding, definitively, whether to keep or modify said ground. For these purposes, it is of high interest to textually cite what was stated by them in this regard, as follows: 'MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain confidence on the part of the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State and within the State institutions; it is for this reason that it has been considered that the person who has been declared insolvent there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually will have at his disposal the management of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it is traditional to find norms of this nature. That is the only observation I could make regarding whether to choose to eliminate it or not maintain it; my recommendation is to maintain the existence that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL: We will continue then. We are going to keep this article as it is [...]'. (-the underlined text is not from the original; it is recorded in this form only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an aspect of importance for the present unconstitutionality action-) As can be observed with total clarity, it is the justification of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora that provides the reason for legislatively deciding to maintain the ground for termination indicated in the referenced Article 26, subsection 9.), and consequently that defined in Article 12 of that same law, an argumentation that focuses on the following aspects: a.) By referring to 'resolution of discords', he only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch, and omits, and with it, moreover, is not legislatively valued, the judicial service relationship of an administrative order, such as the work of my judicial performance as Unit Coordinator; b.) He points out the existence of 'a certain loss of trust' due to the judicial official being declared insolvent, that is, he would punish with termination from appointment in the judicial service for conduct whose appreciation does not effectively, objectively, causally, directly, substantively, proportionally, or reasonably prove the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional work of service, as well as before the citizenry, all this accredited in light of the functions I perform, independently of my state of insolvency. It is insisted, it must not only be valued in the jurisdictional work, but also in what concerns my person, that is, in the performance of administrative work. He further states that 'eventually he will have the disposition of economic resources', thus again exposing an empty argument without technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal basis regarding the serious harm to the institutional Service work, since, in the judicial service relationship of an administrative order, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption. That is my case, because in the performance of my functions as Unit Coordinator of the Planning Directorate, I do not have the assigned function nor consequently do I perform by administering, nor safeguarding, nor controlling, nor disposing of, under any title, economic resources of the Judicial Branch nor evidently of the citizenry by reason of my function, so that it could be believed, much less accredited by any means, with this, that there is a serious harm to the judicial service. Additionally, I state before your Authority that I know my duties and responsibilities in the judicial service, which is accredited by my impeccable judicial service with more than 23 years of service; furthermore, there has not existed in the past, nor does there currently exist, any complaint or procedure against my person aimed at demonstrating that I have incurred in a breach of service due to an inadequate use of public funds and that this is causally due to the economic-financial situation that unfortunately happened to me and that generated the insolvency for the reasons that served as a defense in the case processed by the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial. I also accredit before your Authority that the criminal case that is initiated ex officio by regulatory mandate, on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency, aimed at investigating whether I incurred in the crime of fraudulent insolvency, was ordered to be filed by the prosecutor's office because there was no determination whatsoever of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions typified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Organismo de Investigación Judicial, according to report [Valor 004] for complaint No. [Valor 005] of the unique file number [Valor 006], confirming again that my conduct was in accordance with civil legislation according to the possibility that those regulations provide to administratively face the cancellation of my debts, as well as that I had to access that judicial process by my own act and due to the pressing economic situation I was facing. That the 'traditional' aspect that is argued to exist in other regulations, so that the ground challenged in this venue is contained, should not be the rule to equate its applicability as a reason for termination from the judicial service, even more so, since it will be demonstrated further on that the ground of insolvency is not conceived in other regulations in the way it is regulated by Law No. 7333, therefore this argumentation becomes at the same time a foundation lacking logic, veracity, and causal suitability regarding the serious harm to the institutional work of the judicial service, which has never existed on my part, and which the legislative technique did not consider, even more so in the case of punitive disciplinary matters, whose sacrifice causes harm to my person with the loss of employment. From the investigation and documentary evidence that makes up the legislative file of Draft Law No. 10,753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the ground of insolvency as a reason for not being appointed and for declaring the termination of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so since it is not consistent with the regulatory complex of the disciplinary matter regulated by Law No. 7333 as a whole, aimed at the demonstration, prior due process, of a serious impact on the judicial service, as well as neither the existence of a serious fault nor much less a very serious fault to the judicial public service, as a primary element for the punitive application of the challenged ground, which, as is visible, in my case would mean the greater sacrifice of the loss of my employment and personal harm and to those who depend economically on me, all this, but a mere expectation of a supposed risk, which in my case is non-existent, nor has it been assessed by the judicial inspection, since they apply the full-right (pleno derecho) ground. As was demonstrated, and so it was warned by various instances within the legislative process of that draft law, it was objected that allowing that ground, as it is recorded, would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration in the face of decisions of necessity that involve aspects of private life, which do not influence the judicial service, in my case not even lightly, much less seriously or very seriously. This aspect, I tried to demonstrate it in the administrative procedure before the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial; however, by means of a resolution dated October 18, 2017, they rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I offered in that sense, considering that '[...] they are not related to what is accused in the statement of charges; note that in this punitive disciplinary procedure, the causes that motivated the declaration of insolvency of the accused are not under discussion, as that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. Neither is any non-compliance in the exercise of her position being reproached in such a way that the testimonial evidence offered is rejected [...]'. In that sense, note, as already stated, that the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial considers the disciplinary procedure as one of strict law, without considering other relevant aspects in the service relationship, in the exhaustive application of the measure regulated in Article 26, subsection 9.) of that Law, resulting (sic) in Vote No. [Valor 018] that ordered the revocation of my appointment, considering the declared insolvency as a very serious fault without demonstrating in that disciplinary procedure—as already stated—in a real way that very serious fault due to a proven impact on the service I provide to the Judicial Branch, as well as nor to the institutional image, or other similar, but by express provision of Article 26, subsection 9.) of repeated mention.

It should be noted, in this regard, that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, through Ruling No. [Valor 018], in which it ordered the revocation of my appointment by express application of Article 26, subsection 9.) of the reiterated commentary, determines that I incurred in a very serious misconduct (conducta gravísima) due to my state of insolvency. For this conclusive valuation of the existence of 'very serious misconduct', it also relies on Article 28, subsection 2. of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and Article 49, subsection c. of the Judicial Service Statute, which provide: "Article 28.- The following may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense, the employee: [...] 2.- Who, due to improprieties or failures in the exercise of their duties or in their private life, which may affect the good service or the image of the Judicial Branch, has become deserving of such sanction" “Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, judicial employees shall have the following: […] c) Observe dignity in the performance of their duties and in their private life". As can be noted, these regulations refer directly to an impact on 'good service or the image of the Judicial Branch', as well as observing 'dignity', aspects that were not demonstrated during the procedure for the decision adopted, even though in a subjective, abusive, unfounded manner and through simple argumentation they determine, in their understanding, that I am not a person of probity, nor with high levels of commitment, nor responsibility, nor honesty, nor loyalty, nor with decorum or good faith, due to the loss of trust generated by the state of insolvency by lacking the value of probity. It should be noted that in the same Ruling No. [Valor 018] the Judicial Inspection Tribunal only determines as proven facts the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service to the Judicial Branch, and the non-existence of prior disciplinary sanctions, and not the impact on the service or the image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal deficiencies affecting dignity, an aspect that is very delicate to define due to the constitutional protection that exists in the matter in which personal honor is privileged above all else. At this point, I wish to highlight that voluntarily submitting to the insolvency process, as I have indicated, was the alternative provided to me by the legal system in civil matters to achieve a solution to my economic-financial situation, thus generating a scheduled and judicially regulated compliance to satisfy the fulfillment of all my debts and the interests of my creditors, all as an act of good faith, an aspect that was verified in the criminal jurisdiction when it was determined that my insolvency was not fraudulent, a cause that has a fiscal archive status, as will be mentioned later.

ii.) Regulations related to the alleged unconstitutionality.- In this section, we will set out those highly relevant regulations that contain, in their content, the cause of a judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. The high relevance of the regulations to be presented is due to their regulation of the employment relationship in other Branches of the Republic, Entities of the National Banking System, Advisory and Technical Legal Bodies, as well as Control and Oversight of the Public Treasury Bodies; likewise, we will refer to specific general regulations on civil service and against corruption and illicit enrichment, as well as the private sector.

a.) Regulations that make NO reference or mention to the cause of a judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters. Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, No. 7428, • nor is there any regulation on this matter in its Autonomous Statute; • Organic Law of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, No. 6815, • Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, No. 7558; • Autonomous Regulation of the Legislative Assembly; • Regulation to the Civil Service Statute; • Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function, No. 8422; • General Law of Internal Control, No. 8292. As can be noted, neither in the Attorney General's Office of the Republic, nor in the Comptroller General of the Republic, as Advisory and Technical Legal Bodies, as well as Control and Oversight of the Public Treasury Bodies, is there any regulation in this regard; likewise, there is no regulation for the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the Legislative Assembly, nor in general in specific regulations against corruption and illicit enrichment, nor in internal control, such that the declaration of insolvency constitutes a "traditional" cause, nor is it necessary to avoid risks of administrative responsibility of a disciplinary nature.

b.) Regulations that DO make reference to the cause of a judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason for disciplinary application in sanctioning matters, or for prohibitive order aspects.- • Organic Law of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and Civil Registry, No. 3504. Its Article 27, as relevant, establishes: "[...] The following cannot be appointed to hold positions in the Tribunal or in the Registry: those prosecuted with an order for trial, those who are serving a sentence of disqualification for public office and employment, those convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment as an ordinary penalty, insolvents and bankrupts, as long as the insolvency or bankruptcy has not been qualified as excusable; those who habitually become intoxicated; those who have been dismissed from judicial and electoral positions; and, in general, all those who do not observe good conduct or have records of dubious morality [...]". (.- the underlining and bold text is not original, it is set out in this way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present action of unconstitutionality-). As can be noted, in this Entity, categorized as a fourth Branch of the Republic, although the cause in question is set out for aspects of appointment, it only provides it under a parameter of 'excusable', which allows and obliges the operator of the norm to precisely assess the reasons for the declaration of insolvency, the economic-financial condition of the person, and with it the possible impact on the public service, and why not, even its inconvenience but against a proven, real, and effective risk or danger affecting the public service. That law does not establish the cause of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Organic Law of the National Banking System, No. 1644. Its Article 22, as relevant, establishes: "The following may not be designated as members of a board of directors: 1) Persons who, during the year prior to their appointment, have been sued in executive proceedings by any of the banks of the National Banking System for collection of their own unsatisfied credits, or who have been declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency […]" (.- the underlining and bold text is not original, it is set out in this way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present action of unconstitutionality-). Note that in this Law, the cause is also applicable for purposes of appointment, but not for any official, rather exclusively for members of the board of directors, that is, for senior hierarchs of the banking organization, also establishing an assessment parameter and normative limitation regarding the declaration of insolvency of 1 year prior to the appointment, that is, outside this period, even if the cause of insolvency exists, the prohibition of appointment to that senior position is not applicable. It is worth highlighting that this law does NOT establish the cause of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment, even for a senior position, such as that of a board of directors of a banking entity. • Law of the Civil Service Statute, No. 1581. Article 8, subsection g.) of this Law, establishes as relevant, the following: "The Director General of Civil Service shall be appointed by the President of the Republic, following a competitive examination, shall report directly to him/her, and must meet the following requirements: [...] g) Not be declared insolvent or bankrupt; and [...]". (-the underlining and bold text is not original, it is set out in this way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present action of unconstitutionality). It must be highlighted in this case, that similarly to the previous ones, the regulatory regulation of the cause of a declaration of insolvency is determined normatively for aspects of appointment, and not in general for public officials under the civil service regime, but specifically for the Director General of Civil Service. That law does not establish the cause of insolvency for purposes of termination of appointment. • Labor Code. In its Article 85, subsection c.), as relevant, provides: "The following are causes that terminate the employment contract without liability for the worker and without extinguishing the rights of the latter or their successors to claim and obtain payment of the benefits and indemnities that may correspond to them by virtue of what is ordered by the Code or by special provisions: [...] c.) Force majeure or fortuitous event, insolvency, composition with creditors (concurso), bankruptcy or judicial or extrajudicial liquidation, incapacity or death of the employer. This rule only applies when the events to which it refers produce, as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence, the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work, and when the legal preference held by the maintenance creditors of the deceased, insolvent, or bankrupt has been satisfied [...]". (-the underlining and bold text is not original, it is set out in this way only for the purpose of highlighting its content as an important aspect for the present action of unconstitutionality) As can be noted from the preceding transcription, the Labor Code as a general rule regulating the labor relationship for the private sector, establishes the cause in question, but rather as a cause in favor of the worker, in the understanding that if it is rather the employer who incurs in insolvency, it empowers the worker to terminate the employment contract, without liability for the latter, even establishing a conditional and assessment-based cause for the application of that normative reason, such as that it only applies if it produces, as a necessary, immediate, and direct consequence, the closure of the business or the definitive cessation of work. That law does not establish the cause of insolvency for purposes of termination of the worker's appointment".

</sub></i></span> <span style=" font-size:14pt"><sub>She explains the causes of her insolvency as follows: "I filed, as petitioner, before the Civil Court of Cartago, a Declaration of Insolvency process, protected by articles 884 and following of the Civil Code and 760 and following of the Civil Procedure Code, as any Costa Rican citizen might be empowered, protected by civil regulations, as a viable and legal mechanism to thus honor the debts that burdened my personal and family economy. The economic decline suffered by me, as I well explain in the Civil process, stems from my last marital relationship, due to the inequality that always existed in the distribution of obligations, which made me bear the greater percentage of housing, services, food expenses, my son's education, and the entirety of his expenses even before he was born, as well as all specialized medical treatments, examinations, vaccines, and others he had to receive from approximately six months of age, due to recurrent respiratory problems, lactose intolerance that caused gastric problems, optical treatments, otorhinolaryngology treatments for nasal bleeding problems and others, since his father never made disbursements for his son's health. On the other hand, that relationship was fraught with psychological and patrimonial violence, for which I had to resort to psychological help from the Medical Service for Judicial Branch Employees, since among the effects caused by so many years of violence was the continuous fear and permanent dread I had of my former spouse, both for my physical integrity and that of my son, as well as a devaluation of myself and a strong feeling of sadness, frustration, and depression, among others. Among the situations experienced, it was common that my ex-husband, whenever he got upset about something (which was frequent), in addition to his continuous insults, ironies, humiliations, and explosions of violence, would stop providing his share of the family expenses, forcing me to cover all household expenses, which was not possible with my salary alone, for which I had to resort to using credit cards or other sources of indebtedness to get ahead, because asking him for the expenses was to anger him even more and for him to explode and again become violent or insult and minimize me. It was also common that the expenses generated by our son's education, in school activities and later high school, were covered entirely by me, since he refused to make those expenses; the same situation occurred with the person who cared for our son, whom in December he refused to pay the Christmas bonus, which I also had to assume. Coupled with the above, I supported my ex-husband in some personal expenses, because at that time, having a better gross salary than he did, he asked me to do so, as I reiterate, I did not have the courage to say no; all of the above affected our family economy in some way and even more so, my personal one. With the marital breakdown, my emotional and personal state reached such an extreme that I necessarily had to be seen again by Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a professional from the Medical Service for Judicial Branch Employees, who detected (sic) within a clinical study that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial, as it was a systematic type of abuse that generated a situation where I found myself minimized as a woman and person. My entire personal and financial life suffered a severe disruption, which led me to seek a legal solution, precisely because I have never thought of evading my responsibilities as a debtor; quite the contrary, the solution offered to me by the legal advisor was precisely to submit myself to a declaration of insolvency, especially since I had no assets to answer for the credit operations, besides attending as a mother and head of household to a series of priorities such as clothing, health, food, education, and housing for myself and my son [Name 012], as well as my elderly parents, the only source of income being my Judicial Branch salary, which, by the way, was offered in said Declaration to the Civil Judge as the only means of payment to the creditors. As can be seen, the judicial alternative of insolvency was the mechanism, in civil law matters, to meet the need to honor my debts in the best possible way, as well as to access the enjoyment of the constitutional right that assists me to have a dignified life, which was being rendered nugatory given the financial burden borne by the undersigned. This aspect is recognized by the Civil Court of Cartago itself, in judgment No. [Value 042] that declared my insolvency, by stating that: "Taking into consideration the gross salary received by the (sic) patentee, in relation to the other documented own obligations, in harmony with the presumed cost of a dignified life for any person subject to rights, it is evident that the imbalance in this debtor's (sic) finances is so severe as to make it impossible to defray, in time and with complete payments, the debts contracted by him (sic) in relation to his constitutional right to have a dignified life." It is a Judge of the Republic, who through the legal mechanisms provided for in Costa Rican civil regulations to resolve a legal conflict brought before him, accepts and endorses that the payment mechanism to settle and thus be able to honor my debts with dignity is through the salary earned as a result of my work in the Judicial Branch, but distributed equitably among my creditors in order to maintain an orderly payment of the debts. All of the foregoing situation, including the epicrisis of Psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a professional from the Medical Service for Judicial Branch Employees, was submitted and proposed as evidence before the Judicial Inspectorate Tribunal, under file No. [Value 001] as a pending cause for this action; however, it was rejected outright, without further assessment, considering that it bears no relation to the reason for the cause." Develops her profile and her functions as a professional in the Judicial Branch Planning Directorate: "The purpose of this section is to place on record my professional profile and the functions I have performed since the date on which my insolvency was judicially declared by the Civil Judge, based on what has been set forth. I will proceed to identify three moments in different positions, of an administrative, non-judicial nature, that since that date I have held in the Judicial Branch Planning Directorate, due to my dedication to the service of the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. At the time of the declaration of insolvency, I held the administrative position of Professional 2 in Public Administration, permanently, assigned to the Institutional Projection Section of the Judicial Branch Planning Directorate. The main administrative functions that I was responsible for are the following: i. Design and conduct research, plans, work programs, projects, and complex analyses in diverse areas of the administrative field; ii. Collect, classify, tabulate, and analyze varied and complex information to propose the adoption of institutional policies; iii. Prepare procedure manuals; iv. Conduct interviews, whether structured, semi-structured, technical, specialized, among others, as part of the development of the assigned activities; v. Participate in the establishment of indicators to allow monitoring of work plans, programs, and projects; vi. Prepare, analyze, and interpret charts, graphs, trends, and varied information; vii. Draft reports, procedures, and other documents arising as a consequence of the activities performed, presenting pertinent recommendations and observations; viii. Maintain varied controls over the activities under my responsibility and ensure that they are carried out in accordance with established programs, dates, and deadlines; ix. Attend meetings, seminars, conferences, and other similar activities; and x. Attend to inquiries. As of March 1, 2017, I was permanently promoted to the administrative position of Unit Coordinator 2, assuming the Coordination of the Administrative Management Unit of the Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the technical and administrative tasks of the Unit, in accordance with the guidelines and policies established by the head; ii. Collaborate in the preparation and formulation of work programs and annual operational plans; iii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, charts, graphs, and diverse information; iv. Ensure that records, files, controls, and statistics of the Unit under my charge are kept updated; v. Collaborate with the Heads of the Subprocesses or Sections in the coordination of the professionals, acting as facilitators of the different projects or thematic axes in charge of each subprocess; vi. Participate in the preparation of work programs related to internal control; and vii. Guide lower-level personnel in the execution of their tasks. As of February 21, 2018, I was promoted again - as a substitute - as Unit Coordinator 3, assuming the Evaluation Subprocess of the same Planning Directorate, whose main functions are: i. Coordinate, execute, and supervise the professional, technical, and administrative activities carried out in a Unit; ii. Collaborate with superiors in the development of project proposals, research, and technical studies aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in the execution of the activities specific to my area of competence; iii. Carry out research related to the unit's work program; iv. Collect, classify, and analyze varied information related to the Unit's competence and formulate recommendations; v. Participate in the preparation of work programs, annual operational plan, SEVRI internal control, among others; vi. Attend meetings with superiors and colleagues in order to analyze problems derived from the unit's activities and propose changes, adjustments, and solutions; and vii. Prepare, analyze, and interpret statistics, charts, graphs, and diverse information. As can be seen, I do not perform senior management duties, much less jurisdictional work, but rather administrative management whose work product is subjected, -for ordinary aspects of internal control-, to the approval and final decision of my superiors, and before which it is accredited that I do not administer, nor do I have custody of, nor do I control, nor do I have disposal of, under any title, financial resources of the Judicial Branch or of third parties on the occasion of my position, just as I do not issue final administrative acts, nor attend to the public, so much so that no type of bond is applicable to me due to the duty of my performance. More than the above, I am pleased to bring to your knowledge that, in all my years of service, which already exceed 23 years, I have never been disciplinarily sanctioned, having an unblemished record (sic), which even led to having received the Certificate of Judicial Merit in the year 2015". Asserts that article 12 and subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Judicial Branch Organic Law are unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) "Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Family Protection and to Legal Certainty, by an act managed in application of my autonomy of will. Labor discrimination based on economic situation in employment matters is materialized". Develops the content of the right to work. Mentions that the principle of progressivity establishes that every social right, once recognized, can only be improved. Partially cites vote no. [Value 108]. States that: "the cause for a judicial declaration of insolvency is configured as a measure or parameter of suitability for appointment (article 12 of Law No. 7333-), likewise, as a cause for termination of appointment (article 26, subsection 9, of Law No. 7333-), which affects that special protection of the right to work, because as demonstrated from the analysis of the bill for that Judicial Branch Organic Law, it is integrated into that block of legality without there being mediated, nor foreseen, the causality of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency in relation to the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional order and of an administrative nature, as well as neither a conditional cause nor an assessment cause for the application of that normative reason, which in the case of the application of article 26, subsection 9, of said law, generates by itself the termination of appointment as a more serious disciplinary measure, even when there is no harm, detriment, nor impact on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutionality of the Judicial Branch, nor even less on society, as well as neither the proven existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one to the judicial public service on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency. A demonstration of the above is the sanctioning basis defined by the Judicial Inspectorate Tribunal, in Vote No. [Value 018] for my particular case, in which it categorizes - without further proof or demonstration based on the procedure it followed - my person on the grounds of the declaration of insolvency, as an official lacking probity, without commitment, nor responsibility, nor honesty, nor loyalty, nor decorum, nor good faith, in which due to that situation there is a relationship of distrust, considering that the Judicial Branch 'needs to have a guarantee that the person hired is honorable and responsible for their acts,' considering that action as incompatible with the public function; however, in the cause followed under file No. [Value 001], those aspects are not assessed, so much so that the evidence I requested to incorporate was rejected, considering the cause applicable by operation of law, and having only as proven facts the judicial resolution of my state of insolvency, my number of years of service to the Judicial Branch, and the absence of prior disciplinary sanctions, and not the impact on the service or on the image of the Judicial Branch, nor personal shortcomings affecting dignity, which is the basis of the normativity invoked. The assessment conducted by the Judicial Inspectorate Tribunal does not determine the real, causal, or objective existence of any serious impact on the judicial service, nor the institutional image or the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, thus punishing only an eventual unfounded risk, or mere convenience due to normative application by operation of law.

Additionally, with the proposed sanction, an elementary principle of labor law that is supplementary applicable to the public employment relationship is severely violated, namely the protective principle, and consequently the application of the in dubio pro-operario rule, which will later be associated with the violation of the principle of innocence that protects me, in view of which, the revocation of appointment applied to me for the stated cause should have constituted the last resort (última ratio), seeking to choose the sanction most favorable to the worker, in application of the principles governing constitutional law and conventionality control itself, all of this in the face of a sanction that is evidently flagrant to the legal system. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of the evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship.” She argues that her declaration of insolvency was due to her own decision, which she applied through autonomy of will, and therefore she used a legal possibility offered by the legal system to seek a solution to her economic and financial situation and thus generate a regulated fulfillment of her debts. She asserts that the institution of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent nature is declared. She partially transcribes, regarding autonomy of will, the ruling [Valor 043]. She cites numeral 28 of the Political Constitution. She adds that the declaration of insolvency, managed by herself, does not damage, affect, or injure morality or public order. She adds that in the statement of charges itself, made by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the foregoing is neither particularized nor is it attempted to be proven, nor is the impact on the public service due to the existence of a serious or very serious fault by reason of the insolvency. She maintains that it was also not analyzed whether her condition harms third parties, since her creditors will see their credits compensated according to the bankruptcy rules through the withholding of a portion of her salary. She states that, by the wording of subsection 9) of article 26, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case, the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literalness by operation of law (de pleno derecho). She argues that the assessment made is merely subjective. She relates that she faces a cause that seeks the termination of her appointment, without any verification, assessment, or real or objective causality regarding the impact on public service or the verification of a serious or very serious fault against the administrative (non-jurisdictional) judicial public service. She notes that this norm punishes with the most burdensome measure an expectation or an eventual risk or danger, which in her case is unreal. She mentions that:

“it is palpable that what was warned by the Legislative Commission of Government and Administration that reviewed Bill No. 10.753 becomes a reality, when it warned that a mere danger or an eventual risk would be sanctioned, without even a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment that reflects a deterioration, affectation, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point, what was mentioned in the record of bill 10.753, specifically at folio [Valor 025] (image [Valor 026]) when in the legislative discussion on the different causes of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the causes must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances 'affect the public service'.” She asserts that she does not administer, control, or dispose of economic resources of the Judicial Branch, so no type of bond is applicable to her due to her performance, nor does she issue final administrative acts. She argues that in her case, “what was said at the time by Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora in the legislative discussion on that cause applies, namely, that I am in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exists between the citizenry and the State (-which does not apply to me-), that due to the cause of insolvency there is a certain loss of trust (-it has not been demonstrated to me, even more so in my judicial career if I have demonstrated to this day my merit and suitability for my professional performance-) and that eventually I will have disposition of economic assets of the citizenry (does not apply to me).” She adds that there is a serious and latent affectation to the protection of the family and legal certainty, since due to her condition as a female head of household, the measure would generate the termination of her appointment, condemning her possibility of satisfying her needs and those of her son and parents; furthermore, her creditors would no longer see their credits compensated due to the non-existence of a salary to which the withholding can be proportionally applied, since she has no seizable assets. She cites, in relation to the right to family protection, judgment no. [Valor 097].

She indicates that:

“Just as provided by article 56 of our Political Constitution, as a guarantee limit of the State over the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, points out, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, the right to work, and protection against unemployment, all without any discrimination, among other reasons, for reasons of economic situation or position, as is my case. In that same sense, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labour Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, related to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent both in State organisms and in private companies, situations that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the heritage of every individual. From all of this arises Law No. 2694, of November 22, 1960, that is, the Convention of the International Labour Organization on the prohibition of discrimination in employment, in force to date, which prohibits '[...] any form of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national descent, social origin, parentage, or economic situation, that limit equality of opportunity or treatment in matters of employment or occupation'. In that sense, it should be noted that the prohibition of that conventional control has only one exception, which is that defined in article 2 of that same Law No. 2694 which establishes: 'From the foregoing prohibition are excepted those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences based on the qualifications necessary for the proper fulfillment of the functions or tasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively according to their nature and the worker's conditions.' Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, the discrimination is concretized due to the exhaustive cause that generates the termination of appointment for mere convenience, for mere danger, or for an eventual risk, without an effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge due to my judicial declaration of insolvency.” She concludes that the affectation to her fundamental rights to protection of work, family, and legal certainty, which concretizes a discrimination based on her economic situation, is latent. She adds that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal did not even assess a level of mild risk in her case, for if it had done so, it would have applied labor suspension as a precautionary measure in accordance with the power established in article 202 of the same law no. 7333, as it is a cause for termination of appointment.

**ii) “Violation of the right of culpability and innocence due to non-existence of affectation to the public service or to third parties, as well as non-verification of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service in application of due process itself. An act of good faith is sanctioned (sic) with the superior sacrifice of termination of appointment in the face of an eventual risk neither proven nor evaluated, as well as in the face of a mere or apparent unfounded and unjustified institutional convenience.”** She argues that the norm challenged in this unconstitutionality action causes a flagrant violation of the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and of the principles that integrate Constitutional Law, since it intends to take the judicial declaration of insolvency as a cause to prevent appointment in the judicial service, as well as to dismiss an official, without making any further assessment or accreditation of damage or harm, -real, causal, and objective-, to the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. She adds that this cause is applied for aspects of mere unjustified convenience, by criteria of an eventual risk, without any demonstration that there exists at least a mild, medium, or serious inconvenience for the service provided by the Judicial Branch or specifically the Planning Directorate (Dirección de Planificación). She maintains that the disciplinary application of such cause does not consider whether it is jurisdictional or administrative work, nor are criteria valued or applied that demonstrate the existence of any affectation to the public service provided by the Judicial Branch. She reports that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal applies the cause by operation of law (de pleno de derecho), so that, in her case, without further assessment, the technical and testimonial evidence she offered was denied, which sought to demonstrate her performance, the existence or not of affectation to the public service, among others. Despite the above, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal classified her as an official lacking probity, commitment, responsibility, honesty, loyalty, decorum, and good faith; furthermore, that a relationship of distrust exists when considering that the Judicial Branch “needs to have a guarantee that the hired person is honorable and responsible for their acts” and, therefore, the action is incompatible with public function. She mentions that in order to give a rationale to the disciplinary measure it applies, the tribunal classified the insolvency as a very serious fault incompatible with public service and made unproven assessments in violation of her due process. She argues that “culpability” is generated for her by promoting in good faith the application of an institution contemplated in the legal system. She insists that insolvency—unless declared fraudulent—is not a crime that generates her disqualification from public office, nor is it a sanction such that it results in the termination of her appointment. She points out that “culpability” is generated for her without assessing her “innocence” regarding the affectation to the services, goals, or objectives of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of possible or eventual risks due to the handling or disposition of public resources. She reports that she would be punished disciplinarily with the termination of her appointment, violating her “fundamental right to innocence.” She argues that the challenged norms contravene the constitutional parameters and principles warned about, as well as “the principle of congruence, which is required by the same parameter of legal certainty and due process.” She reiterates that only in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones) and in the Civil Registry (Registro Civil) is the declaration of insolvency contemplated in aspects of appointments; however, it is provided under an “excusable” parameter, which allows the operator of the norm to proceed to evaluate precisely the reasons for the declaration of insolvency, the economic-financial condition of the person, and the existence or not of fraudulent insolvency, in order to assess with that the eventual affectation to the public service, or rather, the “existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service.” She partially cites ruling no. [Valor 098] of this Chamber, in relation to good faith as a principle of Constitutional Law. She mentions that she, through her twenty-three-year career of service in the Judicial Branch, applies the highest ethical standards, as well as the values of the institution, which she sought to accredit through testimonial evidence that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected on the grounds that "[...] they are not related to what is accused in the statement of charges, note that in this sanctioning disciplinary procedure, the causes that motivated the accused's declaration of insolvency are not in dispute; that was analyzed in the respective judicial process. Neither is she being reproached for any non-compliance in the exercise of her position, such that the offered testimonial evidence is rejected [...]." She denotes that the Judicial Inspection Tribunal considers the procedure as one of pure law (de puro derecho), without considering other aspects in the service relationship. She affirms that she managed the declaration of insolvency on her own, which bases her good faith in the financial solution and the payment of creditors. She reiterates that in the statement of charges, no reference was made to the transgression of institutional ethical norms or values due to the judicial declaration of insolvency and the “affectation to the judicial service, to the institutional image, or to the prevailing public interest of the Judicial Branch, as well as nor to the existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service because of it, all because it is non-existent.” She sets forth three disciplinary cases of judicial officials. She states that the norms being challenged seem to punish the existence of a “loss of trust,” due to the judicial declaration of insolvency; however, the objective loss of trust exists because good faith, performance, and fidelity that the employee owes to their employer are compared, in such a way that it is substantiated and demonstrated—congruently and proportionally—that, with the employee's conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, which leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to continue the employment relationship. She cites judgments nos. [Valor 044], [Valor 045], [Valor 046], and [Valor 047] of the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in relation to the objective loss of trust. She argues that if the judicial declaration of insolvency seeks to support the “loss of trust” for the Judicial Branch with the consequence of the termination of appointment, as it is sanctioning matter of a disciplinary order, the legal norm must accredit in its content the constitutional parameter of serious, causal, reasonable, and objective culpability of the official vis-à-vis the service and public interest, in such a way that it accredits a real impossibility in the continuity of employment, or rather, excuses the judicial employee due to “lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of the public office.” **iii) “Violation of the Right to Intimacy, of Human Dignity, and the Pro-Homine Principle. Non-existence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment vis-à-vis the superior sacrifice involved in the disciplinary sanction without there being affectation to the public service, nor to the institutionality, nor to the image of the Judicial Branch, or demonstration of the existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service due to the insolvency.”** She mentions that the right to intimacy and human dignity against discrimination has been developed by this Chamber and by international regulations and jurisprudence on human rights. She indicates that these rights are treated as sources of protection for the person. She cites excerpts from rulings nos. [Valor 048], [Valor 049], [Valor 050], [Valor 051], [Valor 052], [Valor 053], [Valor 054], [Valor 055], and [Valor 056]. She points out that it was through an act of good faith, with the exclusive aim of seeking a solution to her economic-financial situation, that she managed the declaration of insolvency. She reiterates the argument related to numeral 28 of the Political Constitution and the lack of damage to the Judicial Branch. She considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles, which results in the termination of appointment, has no legitimate purpose of the sanction, which affects the fundamental rights to intimacy and human dignity, additionally generating a high level of discrimination due to economic situation. She argues that the foregoing would impact the people who depend on her. She partially cites ruling no. [Valor 057], in relation to the principle of legitimate purpose. She explains that with this unconstitutionality action, she does not intend to disregard the power and authorities of direction, oversight, and sanction of the Judicial Branch regarding its service relationship of an administrative nature; however, there must be respect for her fundamental rights, as it is necessary that objective and reasonable elements of a sanctioning nature be accredited for its imposition, all of this in the face of effective verification of a serious or very serious fault, the affectation to the judicial service, to the institutional image, or to the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or an eventual risk; that is, a cause without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes her years of service in the Judicial Branch, with consequences on her intimacy and dignity, as she would be treated as if she had committed some criminal activity or a serious or very serious infraction. She mentions that “the spirit of the legislator permeated in the record of bill 10.753, when in its legislative discussion on the different causes of the invoked articles, it is highlighted that they were interested in the service and administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the causes must be understood, so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable as long as those circumstances 'affect the public service', a situation which is not my case.” She maintains that the challenged norm, in view of the rights to intimacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle, must be applied in the manner most favorable to the human being. She partially transcribes rulings of this Chamber nos. [Valor 058], [Valor 059], and [Valor 060]. She explains that all measures of restriction and of a sanctioning nature, as well as those of termination of appointment, must respect, as a precaution, human dignity, the protection of intimacy, and the principle of proportionality, all of this under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual damage is evaluated.

She argues that, in her case, the insolvency situation was generated by a marital relationship that led to many credits in her name in order to palliate poor economic management, which ultimately ended with the breaking of the bond. She adds that, on the occasion of the foregoing, the psychologist Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, a Professional of the Medical Service for Employees of the Judicial Branch, determined that she was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial aggression, as it constituted a systematic type of abuse, causing her to feel minimized as a woman and as a person. She argues that there exists a binding gender aspect, as a real and excusable cause for the assessment of what ultimately caused her to make the decision to pursue the judicial declaration of insolvency (declaratoria judicial de insolvencia), which she did for her own human dignity and that of those who depend on her. She states that for her it would have been very easy to allow judicial collection causes to be generated for those credits, since she has no seizable assets nor could her salary withstand more limitations. She states that voluntarily resorting to the civil jurisdiction to be judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia) has generated in her person and family, emotional and depressive repercussions and, even, the re-victimization of the psychological and emotional aggression experienced. She asserts that she mentions the foregoing because the Judicial Branch adopted the "Gender Equality Policy (Política de Igualdad de Género)" so that the gender perspective would be incorporated into all the work of that Branch of the Republic. She mentions that the foregoing is supported "within the legal framework for the protection of human rights, both at the national and international level, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights to equality without discrimination of any kind, to protection of the law, to access to prompt and complete justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that make up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica". She adds that this policy "recognized that 'Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when the circumstances are different, that is, when persons are unequally situated,' likewise that 'The principle of equity drives judges, as well as all legal operators, to take into account, with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider the personal, family and social conditions in each of the cases and their consequences,' a situation that is not being applied due to the unconstitutional content invoked by means of this action." She notes that the policy's objective is to "guarantee equality of opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Judicial Branch." She explains that "this Gender Equality Policy (Política de Igualdad de Género) was based on the 'Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People', under which, as Rule 19, it is stated that: 'Violence against women is considered any action or conduct, based on gender, that causes death, harm or physical, sexual or psychological suffering to women, both in the public and private spheres, through the use of physical or psychic violence.' It can be noted, therefore, that this situation of vulnerability caused by that proven psychological violence by the same medical authorities in the psychological field of the Judicial Branch, accredits a circumstance that requires an assessment for gender protection and equality, considering my personal, family and social condition and its consequences." **iv) "Violation of the Principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Inexistence of suitable connection and congruence between the conduct regulated, the severity of the disciplinary sanction and the superior sacrifice involved. Existence of discrimination based on my economic situation."** She mentions that in addition to the violation of the fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Political Constitution and the Law of the Constitution that have been invoked as the basis for this action of unconstitutionality against Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9), specifically referring to the invocation of the cause of judicial declaration of insolvency (declaratoria judicial de insolvencia) as a reason for not generating the appointment of a judicial servant, as well as to provide for the disciplinary cause of termination of appointment, there is also a violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness of the consequent termination of appointment. She notes that these norms lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements for assessment, congruence, balance, and connection with the essential content of sanctioning law. She adds that their application does not analyze the factual picture, the personal conditions of the judicial servant in order to determine an excusable situation, the respective sacrifice involved in the measure and the consequent cause for termination of appointment due to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency (declaratoria judicial de insolvencia), all of the foregoing, in light of the existence or not of an affectation to the public service provided by the Judicial Branch, as well as to its institutional image or the prevailing public interest due to the performance of the position. She states that nor is a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service accredited to apply the cause. She cites Rulings nos. [Value 061] and [Value 062] of this Chamber, regarding the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. She explains that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the contested regulations, in order to define and substantiate the existence of the violation of the fundamental rights invoked. She adds that the test contains the three sub-principles that function as rules to be taken into account, in the sense that they are maxims to be questioned; that is, it must be verified whether the chosen means meets the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, in the face of which, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. She maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, before which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of the States Parties to adopt the necessary internal measures to adapt their conduct and regulations to conventional parameters. She mentions the following: "Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and end of the contested norms, we must ask ourselves a question: is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most serious disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of an official of the Judicial Branch who has been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia) to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, that he or she is responsible for in the Judicial Branch? Carrying out the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing, because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of regulations that tend to limit fundamental rights, or to generate the application of a sanctioning measure in disciplinary matters." She sets out the analysis as follows: **"a.) As the first element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means used by the legal norm versus its end', that is, its adequacy, suitability, and effectiveness.** In those terms, the means used by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed end; that is, it establishes that the chosen means be the most appropriate to the factual possibilities, taking into account the end to be achieved. There must be a judgment of congruence and practical connection between the means and the immediate end of the norm, since, if that end is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case before us, we are faced with Articles 12 and 26, subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, which establish, as relevant, respectively, the prohibition of appointment in the judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia); likewise, the cause for termination of appointment of those who serve in judicial positions, for the same reason, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia). As stated in this action, and because these legal norms do not expressly or implicitly indicate their end, the assessment of the legislative discussion raised by the Joint Legislative Committee that heard and defined the final wording of Bill No. 10,753 for what is now Law No. 7333, (-which was already pointed out previously-), must be considered for these purposes as a defining element of that legislative spirit regarding said cause. In that sense, the end provided for those legal norms contested through this means is considered to be precautionary, based on an aspect of trust, regarding the management of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, a member at that time of said Joint Legislative Committee, it was said that '[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent (insolvente) there, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and eventually he will have at his disposal, managing the economic assets of the citizenry [...]', that being the basis and/or criterion for leaving as final the text ultimately approved for those legal norms. The means used by said norms to obtain that end is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia); and on the other (-Article 26, subsection 9.-), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia). In this regard, it should be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, this cause is related in its wording, for the means of proportionality explained, to other causes linked to convictions for a crime carrying a prison sentence and to those who are subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions. In view of the foregoing, in my case, as is palpable and accredited in the file of civil insolvency (insolvencia) cause No. [Value 002], the Civil Court of Cartago, in Judgment No. [Value 063] by which it declared my insolvency (insolvencia), only provides that I am legally separated and inhibited from the power to administer and dispose of the assets that belong to me and are legally seizable, and I am warned not to abandon my domicile or leave the country without judicial authorization, under penalty of being tried for disobedience to authority, but it never provides that due to the insolvency (insolvencia) I am disqualified from holding public offices or positions. In addition to the foregoing, and as I already mentioned supra, the criminal cause that is initiated ex officio by regulatory mandate, on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency (insolvencia), aimed at investigating whether I incurred the crime of fraudulent insolvency (insolvencia fraudulenta), was indicated in a prosecutorial archiving, due to the lack of any determination of the existence of acts, amounts, or transactions classified as fraudulent, a situation thus defined by the Judicial Investigation Agency, according to report [Value 004] for complaint No. [Value 005] of the single case file number [Value 006]. With what has been pointed out, it is evident that the means used by those legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and inapt to achieve the proposed end, because the fact of considering that a person judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia) is without merit for the judicial function, so much so that it generates for those already working the termination of their appointment, signifies the casuistic and banal application of an apparent unjustified loss of trust, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege the sanctioning application with the maximum sacrifice on the part of the employee for an eventual, unproven, and merely risky situation, mere danger or convenience, without there being an effective, real, and objective assessment of the institutional end, of a general nature, which is the public service. I insist again, this aspect was not assessed by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal either, furthermore, it rejected the testimonial and technical evidence I proposed for those purposes, in which I could demonstrate the causes that motivated my economic-financial situation, as well as my institutional performance of an administrative, non-jurisdictional nature. In addition to the foregoing, the spirit of the legislator foresaw this cause for an eventual use of resources by the judicial official in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of a purely jurisdictional task, and not of an administrative order, which - as in my case - does not administer, safeguard, dispose of, control, or protect any public funds, and furthermore, does not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict depend on that administrative management. Therefore, it can be considered that the first parameter of this test yields as a result the disproportionality of the norm, because there is no congruence between the means and the immediate end of the norm in adherence to the parameter mandated by the law of the constitution, since although one might think that avoiding an appointment and terminating the appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated end, the counterpart to that, that is, the restriction without verification of its excusable and innocent nature, in the face of the superior sacrifice it generates, violating the parameters indicated, causes the alleged disproportionality, even more so if it is considered, as in the case before me, that for the application of this disciplinary sanctioning measure, no assessment is made as to whether or not there is an affectation to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morality, or to third parties, nor on the existence or not of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service, due to the cause. **b.) As the second element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means used by the legal norm versus the need for regulation'.** In those terms, it is assessed whether that means is necessary to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the mandate for optimization of the most benign means, through which it must be verified whether the end cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For those purposes, different means must be compared, in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation. In view of the foregoing, excess in the measure is condemned if the urgent or imperative nature requires the sacrifice mandated by the norm. With respect to the norms contested through this action of unconstitutionality, it was already stated in point a.) above of this test, that the means they use to obtain that normative end is, on the one hand (-Article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia); and on the other (-Article 26, subsection 9.), to provide for the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent (insolvencia). In view of the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the need to specify the regulation, verifying alternatives in accordance with the parameters of the law of the constitution, by reason of the sacrifice that precisely that need for regulation generates or may generate.

It goes without saying that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent necessity must assess the diversity of situations that may arise according to each specific case, as is precisely the case of whether the person works in a jurisdictional or administrative position. In my case, I have already indicated that I am a judicial official, whose profile and functions as Coordinator were detailed above, with service work exceeding 23 years, during which I have never been disciplined, and under which, I have had an unblemished record (sic), which even led to receiving with great honor the Certificate of Judicial Merit in 2015. Likewise, I emphasize that in the exercise of my functions of an administrative, non-jurisdictional nature, I do not administer, I do not have custody of, I do not control, I do not dispose of, nor do I safeguard any public funds, and furthermore, I do not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict before third parties depend on my administrative management, nor do I issue final administrative acts or serve the public; moreover, it is on record before my superiors, whom I offer as evidence before their Authority because the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rejected that evidence, that I perform professional work in accordance with institutional requirements, and in adherence to the ethical and moral values expected and demanded of a judicial official. The situation of insolvency befell my life, due to the causes already set forth, and under which there is even a psychological medical opinion that certifies that I was being subjected to psychological and/or emotional aggression, as well as patrimonial, as it was a systematic type of abuse, a binding gender-related aspect, as the real and excusable cause that ultimately led me to make the decision to have myself judicially declared in a state of insolvency. In the administrative proceeding conducted by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal, the existence of applying the termination of appointment (cese del nombramiento) based on a need for regulation, due to proven facts of loss of trust or other circumstance, is not assessed, analyzed, or defined; rather, the proceeding is opened, assuming the cause directly and expressly, stating that "[...] I lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch, as established in numeral 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [...]" as the central and sole element of the statement of charges that was notified to me, without thereby determining the verification of the existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service, on account of the insolvency. It would be sanctioned as the only alternative, with the most severe sacrifice of disciplinary authority, namely the termination of appointment for a mere risk or supposed danger, an eventual institutional convenience, which has no causal, objective, or real basis or foundation regarding the public service, nor the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, nor before third parties, even more so if it generates a high level of discrimination based on my economic situation by being a normative provision, apparently neutral, but susceptible to implying a severe particular disadvantage without a reasonable and legitimate objective or justification in light of the binding national and international human rights regulations, that is, it is not determined—under any circumstance or criterion—that the permanence of a person judicially declared in a state of insolvency is seriously inconvenient for the judicial service, such that the need for regulation only results in said termination of appointment. I highlight again that, at the level of labor courts, and as an example is case file [Valor 011], the competent judge of the case granted precautionary measures arguing that the Judicial Branch has indicated, through the Court, "the parameter for disciplining. If the magistrates have been treated with a soft hand, a more humble judicial officer does not deserve a hard hand [...] if the conduct of the high judges, known throughout the country, affecting the Judicial Image, did not merit revocation of appointment, it is unjust to punish the petitioner more severely [...further indicating] New paradigm, has created the Chinchilla Sandí and others case, from which a healthier, less repressive disciplinary regime is extracted, which allows lesser sanctions where the revocation of appointment is left for very serious cases [...]". As a primary element for this proportionality test, we likewise highlight what was already mentioned above in relation to the recent proceeding [Valor 012], followed against [Nombre 013], at the time Deputy Prosecutor, for the cause of negligence in the service of his functions, in which the Judicial Inspection Tribunal sanctioned him WITH ONE MONTH WITHOUT PAY, QUALIFYING THE FAULT AS SERIOUS for collaborating with the then Attorney General in the processing of judicial files against members of the supreme powers, an act that was of public knowledge and that caused the dismissal of the case for influence peddling against former deputies Víctor Morales and Otto Guevara Guth in favor of the Chinese cement importer, [Nombre 014]. As can be noted, for that cause which had repercussions on the institutionality and image of the Judicial Branch, as well as on third parties, and which was qualified as serious for corresponding to the negligent exercise of functions, it was sanctioned with a disciplinary measure less than termination of appointment. In the same sense, and for purposes of proportionality of the sanctioning measures is the disciplinary cause number [Valor 013] brought against [Nombre 015], Family Judge of the Goicoechea Courts, which was commented on above, who was charged with negligence in the exercise of her position and breach of duties, who by the Full Court, it was considered that the administration of justice and its structure could be the cause of the delays attributed, even if it were demonstrated that at least in two matters there was negligence in her actions and consequently a direct impact on the citizenry. The question then is what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that must be applied for the case of the judicial declaration of insolvency in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of a serious or very serious qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? Is it proportional to prevent the appointment of a person and, —on the other hand— the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared in insolvency, in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of a serious or very serious qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch? We insist, legal norms, and especially punitive ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. In light of the foregoing, the application of the norms challenged as unconstitutional are clearly disproportionate. The sanctioning means is excessive compared to the urgent or imperative nature demanding the sacrifice imposed by the norm, even more so, —as has already been said and demonstrated— when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutionality of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morality, nor to third parties. In my case, I need the job, not only for the satisfaction of the immediate basic needs of those who depend on me, and my own personal needs, but also because the salary I receive is the only means by which the payment to my creditors will be generated, in accordance with the judicial regulation proper to the insolvency process, which was the very objective for which I initiated said judicial process. Therefore, it is latent that the norms challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory, that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever carries out the sanctioning work has suitable regulatory means for the various specific cases, in which there may exist, as in my case, exempting causes of liability so as to prove that the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment is warranted, and that the less burdensome alternative is determined rather, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring in an excessive sanction and regulatory action of a disciplinary nature. I do not ignore, —nor do I intend to—, the control and oversight powers that my employer possesses, for which reason I am willing to have my professional exercise functionally audited as a servant of the Judicial Branch in Public Administration assigned to the Planning Directorate, in order to be able to prove whether or not there is any impact on the judicial service on account of, or causally related to, my judicial declaration of insolvency, or, if there exists a real and objective risk or inconvenience that generates the application of the disciplinary sanctioning measure, due to the existence of a serious or very serious fault in the exercise of my functions on the occasion of the cause under comment. c.) As the third and last element of the proportionality test we are interested in applying, we find the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. Faced with that, the sacrifice, —as a cost—, is juxtaposed against the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit and that alternative must be the least restrictive or the least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to take into account three questions: the structure of the norm and its weighting, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close links are raised. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or impact on one of the principles, the greater the importance of the satisfaction of the other must be. For this, the legal goods or rights in conflict must be identified, in order to determine the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the greater hierarchy of the legal good, to determine if there is a relationship or balance between them. In the case at hand, it was already mentioned in point a.) above of this test, that the means used by the norms challenged via this route to obtain that normative end, is on the one hand (—article 12—), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servers if they have been judicially declared in a state of insolvency, and on the other (—article 26 subsection 9.—), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. It must thus be understood, that the nature of the structure of the norm is exhaustive and of a punitive nature. In light of the foregoing, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice implied by the sanctioning measure of termination of appointment, against the benefit or advantage that the Judicial Branch obtains with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all of this against the aim pursued by the norm. We previously stated that the purpose provided for those challenged legal norms is of a precautionary nature, due to an aspect of trust, regarding the management of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the cause that involved the bill of what is now Law No. 7333, in which the Joint Legislative Commission that confirmed maintaining said causes, relied on the opinion of Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, who said that: "[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust on the part of the public because at the end of the day we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of disputes [...] the person who is declared insolvent there, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and he will eventually have at his disposal, the management of the economic assets of the citizens […]" (—folios [Valor 040] (images [Valor 064] of bill No. 10.753—) It must be clarified again, that this discussion arose, because the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration, opined on the scope of that cause of insolvency saying that "[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they hold conditions that, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as causes to dismiss a judicial server; if this is allowed, it would be sanctioning for a mere danger […]" [—folio [Valor 082] [image [Valor 065] of bill No. 10.753—) It was also said, that in my case, there has been no proceeding whatsoever on the part of the Judicial Branch that assesses, analyzes, and thereby defines the existence or non-existence of an impact, even slight, on the prevailing judicial public service, on the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch, the existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service, and that this is, by principle of causality, on account of my judicial declaration of insolvency; but rather simply the opening of the proceeding conducted by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal was ordered, assuming the cause directly and expressly, stating that "[...] I lost the condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch, as established in numeral 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch [...]", as the central and sole element of the statement of charges that was notified to me, rejecting the testimonial and technical evidence that I proposed for those purposes with my material defense, that is, to apply, per se, the termination of appointment, without demonstrating a need for regulation, through proven facts of loss of trust or other circumstance, that demonstrates some impact on the Institution, or, through the existence of a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service, on the occasion of the cause being challenged. Why do I insistently mention the foregoing? Well, because since there is no impact, not even slight, on the judicial service from my professional performance of an administrative nature, nor even so, an administrative proceeding aimed at that demonstration or at the existence of a serious or very serious fault on the occasion thereof, but rather directly the exhaustive application of the termination of appointment, for a mere danger, an eventual risk or mere unfounded convenience, would mean that the cause, in the public aim it pursues, has no real or objective benefit or advantage for the Judicial Branch, nor much less is the sacrifice that the termination of appointment implies for my person equitable or proportional, the judicial declaration of insolvency being an act promoted by me, as an act of good faith, not only to improve my economic-financial condition caused mainly by psychological and/or emotional aggression as well as patrimonial and gender-based as already explained, but also to responsibly pay, through the judicial control that this process demands, my creditors. Without wanting to boast, it also means that by not considering the least restrictive or the least burdensome alternative, the sanction also generates the loss for the Judicial Branch of a human resource with experience in judicial service of more than 23 years of service and who, as stated in the evidence requested by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal itself from the Human Resources Directorate, I have no disciplinary sanctions during my years of service. Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged norms, we have no objection, as it coincides with the legal theory regarding their means of creation, i.e., by law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. Nevertheless, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in Judgment of February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman Vs. Uruguay: "[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not guarantee, per se, the permanent respect for International Law, including the International Law of Human Rights, which has even been so considered by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain facts or acts in a society is limited by the international norms and obligations of protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so that the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by its formal as well as substantive characteristics, and therefore, particularly in cases of serious violations of international human rights law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the rule of majorities, that is, to the sphere of what is 'susceptible to being decided' by majorities in democratic instances, in which a 'conventionality control' must also prevail [...], which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judicial Branch [...]". In that same sense, regarding the legitimacy of domestic legislation, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Judgment of November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco Vs. Mexico, provided: "[...] For this Court, it is not only the suppression or issuance of norms in domestic law that guarantees the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation contained in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of state practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not in itself guarantee that its application will be adequate. It is necessary that the application of the norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of the state public order, be adjusted to the same aim pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]". Having reached this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of conventionality control, in the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights —as is the case of Costa Rica—, its judges and public authorities in general, are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of that binding international normative is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, its object and purpose. In that sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has indicated that authorities must not only exercise a constitutional control, but also a conventionality control ex officio, whose function must not be limited exclusively by the manifestations or acts of the petitioners in each specific case. (…) This Honorable Constitutional Chamber, in its jurisprudence and based on the principle of effectiveness, has recognized that conventionality control, as a binding parameter for the resolution of specific cases in which an injury can be evidenced to fundamental human rights such as those alleged through the present action. In this regard, it has stated: "[...] The international law principle of effet utile requires of the State, in the interpretation and application of Treaties on human rights, and of those that are non-self-executing, to stimulate all organs of the state apparatus so that lasting effects are generated in the internal order in accordance with the international obligations acquired, so that the necessary measures must be taken as a whole, to ensure that the terms of an international agreement have effects in harmony with domestic law. To this follow the cooperation mechanisms between States and international organizations, and of monitoring the compatibility of domestic legislation with that of international conventions". (—Vote No. [Valor 099]) For the very application of that conventionality control, it is worth mentioning the cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, named as: Canese vs. Paraguay (August 31, 2004), Kimel vs.

Argentina (2-5-2008), Usón Ramírez (sic) vs. Venezuela (20-11-2009) and Fontevecchia y D'Amico vs. Argentina (29-11-2011). For the respective judgment in each case, that Inter-American Court applied the aforementioned proportionality test, in which it has indicated for each of its elements: a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus its end", that is, its suitability and effectiveness, it was pointed out that the suitable or legitimate purpose, although present in all cases (whether a penalty or civil damages), it is clarified that this does not imply that the mentioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportionate (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that the measure being suitable means that it serves to safeguard the legal interest to be protected, that is, it is capable of contributing to the realization of that objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 53-). b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the necessity for regulation", it has indicated with reference to the necessity requirement that it must obey an imperative public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least extent possible, and as a condition, that it must not limit more than what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48-, and Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 43-). c.) With respect to the third and last element of the proportionality test, that is, the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense, in both Kimel -para. 83 to 94-, and Usón Ramírez -para. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the structure of balancing by evaluating: on one hand, the degree of affectation of a right or principle -what we have understood as the means-, and on the other, the importance of the satisfaction of the other right or principle -what we have known as cost-benefit-, against which, it analyzes the sacrifice it entails. With this, the Court verifies whether the measure adopted - sanction - broadly guaranteed the right that was intended to be protected, without rendering the right that is limited and its consequent sacrifice nugatory. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the norms challenged through this action of unconstitutionality coincides with the parameters established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, defining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, nor objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulation with its imperative strictness, making it disproportionate and consequently irrational, all this against the sacrifice it involves. In view of the foregoing, it can be conclusively concluded that the legal norms challenged through this means are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory based on my economic situation, thereby violating my invoked fundamental rights. I request this Honorable Chamber to carefully analyze my situation against the challenged normative content, based on the factual and legal justification alleged in this action of unconstitutionality." It establishes the following request: "For the reasons indicated, doctrine, criteria, and jurisprudence invoked, which adequately substantiate and demonstrate the violation of fundamental rights under the content of our Political Constitution, in its articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56, that is, the rights and principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction due to the non-existence of a connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice it involves, Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro-Homine principle due to the non-existence of a legitimate purpose for the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment against the sacrifice it involves without there being an affectation of the public service or proof of a serious or very serious fault, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the non-existence of affectation of the public service, penalizing an eventual risk not proven or evaluated, as well as against a mere unjustified convenience, and violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to Family Protection and Legal Security, by an act managed in application of my autonomy of will, I request this esteemed Constitutional Chamber the following: i.) That this action of unconstitutionality against articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.1 of Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993, be admitted for analysis and legal processing, within the scope of their content that was set forth. ii.) That this action be upheld and articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, of May 5, 1993, be declared unconstitutional, within the scope of their content that was set forth, that is, regarding the specific reference to the ground of judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason to prevent appointment as a judicial servant and, especially, as a ground for termination of appointment in the judicial service, which is considered, by action and omission, to infringe the referred constitutional and conventional norms and principles. iii.) That the corresponding Judicial Authorities be instructed to suspend as a precautionary measure -of an instrumental and provisional nature- any type of administrative act, or final act, tending to define the application of the sanctioning ground of a disciplinary nature of termination of appointment as a judicial servant against my person as final acts of the procedure in its appellate stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies, until such time as your Authority resolves what is appropriate under the law. The foregoing, as a matter of high priority or urgency, and with a view to preserving my legal certainty with respect to my rights and legitimate interests, and thereby preventing the Superior Council of this Judicial Branch as an administrative body from issuing a definitive resolution applying the norm invoked, thus causing eventual injuries to my fundamental rights and causing a difficult or impossible reparation, as well as to the direct effectiveness of the principle of constitutional supremacy itself. The foregoing is supported by articles 41 of the Political Constitution, 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, and the jurisprudence that in this regard has been issued by your Authority on precautionary matters (such as Vote No. [Valor 066] and concordant ones) which comprises the right to request and obtain from the jurisdictional body the necessary, suitable, and pertinent precautionary measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the final judgment on the merits, as an essential function of precautionary protection. With the factual and legal scope invoked in this action, the preconditions for this request are met, that is, the appearance of good law -fumus boni iuris- and the danger in delay -periculum in mora- and extreme urgency, based on its guiding criteria of adequacy, suitability of the measure, and necessity, all under the protection of the constitutional and conventional rights that have been invoked in this action. iv.) That the legal audience be granted to the Procuraduría General de la República. v.) That the legal edicts be published. vi.) That the State be condemned to pay costs, damages, and losses.

**2.-** By resolution at 3:36 p.m. on October 26, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber requested from the President of the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch the file no. [Valor 001] corresponding to the disciplinary proceeding being processed against the plaintiff.

**3.-** By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:21 p.m. on November 1st, 2018, Fernando Cruz Castro appeared, in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Branch. He provides, in compliance with the resolution at 3:36 p.m. on August 26, 2018, a certification of file no. [Valor 001].

**4.-** By resolution at 10:12 a.m. on November 7, 2018, the Presidency of the Chamber directed the plaintiff to affix the stamp of the Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica.

**5.-** By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:02 p.m. on November 8, 2018, the plaintiff indicates that she provided the respective stamp on October 24, 2018; nevertheless, she provides it again at that act.

**6.-** By resolution at 2:17 p.m. on November 9, 2018, the formulated action for the declaration of unconstitutionality of articles 12 and 26 subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch was given course. On the occasion of the foregoing, an audience was granted to the Procurador General de la República and the President of the Supreme Court of Justice. Likewise, it was ordered that the action was admitted for meeting the requirements contemplated in numerals 73 through 79 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction and that the plaintiff's standing derived from the first paragraph of article 75 of that same normative body. Similarly, it was recorded that the prior matter was the disciplinary proceeding no. [Valor 001], which is in the stage of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

**7.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in editions no. s 234, 235, and 236 of the days December 17, 18, and 19, 2018, of the Boletín Judicial.

**8.-** By a brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 5:05 p.m. on November 27, 2018, Carmen María Escoto Fernández appeared, in her capacity as Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice and of the Judicial Branch. She indicates that the plaintiff requests that the following articles be declared unconstitutional: "Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be mentally and physically capable of performing the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a final order of opening of trial has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime with a prison sentence; those subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency; those who habitually drink alcoholic beverages excessively, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in such a way that they could affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (Thus reformed by article 1 o of the Law of Judicial Reorganization No. 7728 of December 15, 1997) ARTICLE 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those serving in judicial positions cease for: (...) 9. Having been convicted, by a final judgment, for a crime that warrants a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency." **Regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.** She points out that the plaintiff bases the action on disciplinary case no. [Valor 001] which is in a stage of appeal before the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch and that, furthermore, she affirms that article 12 of the aforementioned law establishes not only the requirements a person must possess to enter the judicial service, but also defines a series of grounds that prohibit appointment, among them, having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency. She argues that, just as the plaintiff alleges, the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, by vote no. [Valor 018] at 1:41 p.m. on October 4, 2018, imposed on her the sanction of revocation of appointment, according to article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. She adds that in the resolution initiating the proceeding, the following charges were imputed: "(...) Having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency, (article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch)"; furthermore, that "(...) upon having been declared in a state of insolvency, you [Nombre 001] lost a condition to be an official of the Judicial Branch as established by numeral 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch". She states that this is properly the direct application of numeral 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch and not of article 12 of that normative body. She adds that when section 12 refers to the fact that persons judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency may not be appointed, it must be understood to refer to the requirements to enter the judicial service, such that it does not apply to persons who already have an appointment in the institution and against whom a disciplinary proceeding is being followed for those reasons, because for that there is the specific norm - article 26 subsection 9 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch - just as the resolutions of the Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial were grounded. She asserts that admitting the action against an article that has no relation to the underlying matter raised in the action would mean denaturing the challenge regime of the system. She mentions that since the precondition established in article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is not met, the action filed by [Nombre 001] must be rejected outright as manifestly inadmissible (article 9 of the cited legal body). She maintains that, in case the action is not rejected outright regarding section 12, the plaintiff's allegations are rejected based on the following arguments: "As indicated in the first part of this report, the plaintiff intends for article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch to be annulled as unconstitutional, by virtue of the fact that, in her judgment, the ground of insolvency as a reason to be appointed or to declare the termination of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so when it is not consistent with the complex of regulations on disciplinary matters that regulate Law 7333, as a whole, which would be a demonstration of a serious affectation of the judicial service. Furthermore, the plaintiff considers that there is also no existence of a serious or very serious fault to the judicial public service as a primary element for the sanctioning application of the challenged ground. She insists that allowing this ground would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience. However, for the resolution of the action before us, it is important to take into account that the referral to that norm becomes a disciplinary power that the legislator conferred on the Judicial Branch, because the legislator's intention at all times was to ensure the proper functioning of the administration of justice and to safeguard the public interest, which in the case of this institution contains some particularities in relation to other branches of the Republic, because the users deposit their trust in the judicial servants for the resolution of their conflicts. Therefore, persons declared insolvente (sic) may have a conflict of interest in relation to the users of the judicial system, as stated by former Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice Daniel González Álvarez, in the presentation to the 1993 edition (General reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993) where he pointed out that '(...) there is a matter of public trust there, a person who has not been able to administer their affairs and later intends to apply to enter the Judicial Service regime is not convenient. Above all if there has been fraudulent bankruptcy, that is, a criminal offense has been incurred'; it is clear then that this article refers only to persons trying to enter employment with the Judicial Branch, which could also be considered under criteria of 'suitability' widely developed by this Constitutional Chamber itself, a person who has been declared in bankruptcy or insolvent lacks the conditions to carry out their work efficiently since, as expressed by former Magistrate González, 'it is almost a civil death'." Continues don Daniel: "A person in that state practically has no legal capacity even to contract obligations, precisely because of the provisions of the Civil Code that do not allow them to acquire any type of obligation, or to sign any contract; that is, civil death from a legal standpoint..." (Minutes No. 98 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the fourteenth of November of nineteen ninety, Folios [Valor 100] and [Valor 101]); hence, the basis of the rule is to prevent the entry into the judicial function of persons who present that condition and which, far from violating the rights protected in Articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as indicated by doña [Nombre 001], has the purpose of protecting the interests of those who require the services of the Judiciary, which justifies the challenged restriction, which is a requirement that those who seek to provide their services in this institution must meet in accordance with Articles 191 and 192 of our constitutional norm, which highlights suitability as an indispensable requirement for a public servant to optimally perform in a public office or position." Thus, the honorable Constitutional Chamber in resolution number [Valor 102] at fourteen hours thirty minutes on the thirty-first of July of two thousand twelve, stated: "ON THE PROVEN SUITABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, public servants shall be appointed based on proven suitability, which requires the objective verification of their qualities. This means that the public servant must possess certain characteristics and qualities which may be validly established and regulated by law, provided that they are objective and reasonable. Suitability must be verified not only through purely academic aspects; it rather requires the analysis and qualification of several elements, factors, or conditions of diverse nature, such as, for example, psychological aspects of stability, work and professional experience, and other attestations that, valued as a whole, determine that a person is the most suitable to perform the position. In this way, the public servant will demonstrate that they meet all the necessary conditions that enable them to perform optimally in the public office or position; that is, that they meet the merits that the function demands. The foregoing has the purpose of guaranteeing the efficiency and proper functioning of the public function, in addition to maximizing and protecting public resources. In that sense, it is necessary to remember that the public servant is a servant of the administered in general, and therefore must look after the interests of the community and, thus, provide quality service to each administered as a representative of the community" (the highlighting is not from the original). For greater abundance, Deputy Pacheco Salazar in the discussion of motion number [Valor 103], of the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly, stated that: "The appointment requirements must be broader, and of course, any employer, not just the Court, has that right to choose what suits them best. That is why in Article 12, in that second paragraph, it says that 'those prosecuted with an order to proceed to trial, or summons to trial, may not be appointed. Those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment, those who were subjected to a penalty of disqualification from holding public office or positions... (continues reading).' That is, it establishes a series of entry requirements which, of course, the Court, when choosing an official, may add to those and many more, because it is not going to appoint an insolvent, a bankrupt, a disqualified..." (The highlighting is not from the original). (Minutes No. 7 of the ordinary session held by the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration, at FOURTEEN HOURS THIRTY-ONE MINUTES, on the twenty-first of May of nineteen ninety-one, Folio [Valor 104]). For the reasons set forth above, the questioned rule conforms to the guarantee of "efficiency of the Administration" referred to in Articles 191 and 192 of the Political Constitution, as a prerequisite for accessing public office, translated into the need that the services provided by the State be executed by those servants who can guarantee efficiency in the Administration." On the alleged unconstitutionality of Article 26, paragraph 9 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary. Indicates that the petitioner maintains that this rule breaches the principles of reasonableness and proportionality recognized in the Political Constitution, regarding the disciplinary sanction due to a lack of connection between the disciplinary sanction and the sacrifice it involves; in addition, to the alleged violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle, due to "non-existence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of cessation of appointment in light of the sacrifice it involves without there being an impact on the public service or proof of a serious or very serious fault, violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to non-existence of impact on the public service, sanctioning a potential risk not proven nor evaluated, as well as before a mere unjustified convenience and violation of the Right to Protection of the Family and Legal Certainty by an act managed in application of the autonomy of the will." Adds that she considers that "it was warned within the legislative process of the bill in which the cited rule was discussed, that allowing that cause would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration against decisions of necessity that involve aspects of her private life." States, regarding what is alleged by the petitioner, that the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency imposes a series of conditions on the failed person, depending on each case, from interdiction to administer their assets or seizure of assets, closure of checking accounts, loss of legal capacity to contract obligations or sign contracts, among others; in each case, the declaration comes as a consequence of the cessation of payments by the debtor and is synonymous with breach of a monetary obligation. Refers that the legislator maintained the importance of keeping, as a cause for the application of the disciplinary regime in the Judiciary, when a situation occurred in which the judicial servant was judicially declared in that state —Article 26, paragraph 9) of the Organic Law of the Judiciary— and as grounds to order the cessation of functions of that person, after the disciplinary procedure so determined, respecting at all times the rights of the judicial servant and due process. Argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative instances when the general reform to the Organic Law of the Judiciary, introduced by Law No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, was being analyzed, former magistrate Luis Paulino Mora Mora (RIP) expressed that "judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of public trust because, ultimately, we are the ones in charge of resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within the State institutions; that is why it has been considered that in a person declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards them, given that they have not been able to manage their economic assets…" (file 10.753, folio [Valor 076])." Refers that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary power that the Judiciary has regarding its servants, necessary as an instrument of guarantee to the citizen that they will receive a quality public service, agile, effective, and efficient, endowed with adequate organization and highly qualified judicial servants for the performance of their duties. Explains that the petitioner is incorrect when she points out that allowing that cause would mean sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk for aspects of mere judicial convenience, this by virtue of the fact that the rule is provided for when the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is judicially decreed, that is, there is an entire judicial process in which issues related to breaches of credit obligations assumed by the debtor party are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions so that the person can resolve that situation. Adds that the legislator considered that the foregoing implies a situation of distrust and sought the probity of the judicial servant to have certainty that they are responsible with their obligations, both work-related and in their private life. Asserts that the imposition of this type of sanctions has an absolute scope of the principle of legality for engaging in conduct prohibited by a norm, which is not consistent with the allegations of the petitioner when she affirms that the norm allows sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk. Mentions that, as indicated by the Judicial Inspection Tribunal in ruling No. 1923-18 at 13:41 hours on October 4, 2018, between judicial servants and the Judiciary there exists a relationship of "special subjection" (sujeción especial) that is generated from the activities that by their nature require a certain degree of regulation and oversight, which is carried out through the monitoring of their behavior both in the performance of their functions and in their private life. Partially cites Article 28 of the Organic Law of the Judiciary and numeral 49 of the Judicial Service Statute: "Organic Law of the Judiciary: ARTICLE 28.- A servant may be dismissed from their position, following the established procedure and with prior opportunity for defense: (…) 2.- Who, due to improprieties or failures in the exercise of their position or in their private life, that may affect the good service or the image of the Judiciary, has become deserving of that sanction. (The highlighting is not from the original). Judicial Service Statute: Article 49.- In addition to the specific duties established by the Organic Law of the Judiciary, judicial servants shall have the following: c) Maintain dignity in the performance of their position and in their private life; (The highlighting is not from the original)." Indicates that the relationship of special subjection has been widely analyzed by this Constitutional Tribunal and, in ruling No. [Valor 105] at 8:30 hours on April 10, 2018, it stated that its observance is a guarantee both for the exercise of effective defense and for the legality of the sanctioning conduct: "Said sanctioning power is exercised within the framework of a legal bond, of a relationship of special subjection between the public official and the legal system applicable to this type of bond, within which we find a series of principles that serve as a kind of guide, insofar as they orient the meaning of the norms, and which in sanctioning matters, constitute a guarantee in both directions, insofar as their observance guarantees the exercise of effective defense, but also the legality of the sanctioning conduct." Argues that Article 153 of the Political Constitution grants the Judiciary one of the most important attributions of the State, which is the administration of justice, a task that this Branch of the Republic executes through the activities deployed by the people who work for the institution and collaborate to fulfill the entrusted task. Adds that resolving the conflicts presented to them by society in a peaceful and satisfactory manner, in order to seek the maintenance of social peace, depends largely on the credibility held towards those who participate in the institutional resolution of such divergences. Considers that the petitioner is incorrect when she mentions in her filing brief that her Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro Homine principle have been harmed, because paragraph 9) of Article 26 of the Organic Law is complemented by Articles 28 and 49 of that regulation, which have constitutional and legal support regarding the duty to conduct both their judicial performance and their private life in a correct manner. Cites the excerpt of a judgment from the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice: "Public officials are depositaries of the trust of the State-employer and of the service users, and therefore they must have impeccable and honest behavior, as well as unblemished conduct. For this reason, in the case of public servants, regardless of their nature, function, and category, the assessment of their faults must be carried out in a strict and meticulous manner, as the public interest is at stake, to which the interest of the worker must yield (regarding the greater rigor in the classification of faults of public servants, see among others rulings number [Valor 106] at 10:30 hours on October 26, 2001, [Valor 107] at 9:30 hours on May 22, 2002, of this Chamber). A special duty of diligence is required of the servants of the State in all matters that are related to the tasks they perform - after all, they are responsible for ensuring that the function they carry out is executed according to criteria of objectivity, impartiality, efficiency, and professionalism, among others -, so the trust placed in them attains particular significance when analyzing the faults attributed to them, especially if they are related to the specific tasks assigned or may have an impact on them (in this sense, see among others rulings number [Valor 067] at 10:30 hours on November 30, [Valor 068] at 9:30 hours on December 5, both of 2001, of this Chamber). c) The foregoing is of vital importance in the present case, as we are in the presence of a public official who must have the necessary personal conditions to work in the public service of Justice" and be deserving of the trust placed in them - moral aptitude and suitability, among other requirements established in numeral 18 of the Judicial Service Statute-".

Partially transcribes judgment No. [Valor 069] at 15:00 hours on November 3, 2004, of this Chamber, in which the duties of every public official were developed: "(…) dedicate themselves to the position with efficiency and loyalty, which implies the obligation of assistance and loyalty to the institution; attend to the hierarchical order, which translates into an obligation of obedience (comply with directives and orders from the superior under the terms of Article 102 of the General Law of Public Administration); and dignity in conduct, this is both related to respect for the legal system and to civility and morality in their conduct, both during the workday and in their private life, insofar as the condition of official is of fundamental importance since, as its definition indicates, they act in the name and on behalf of the Administration, and consequently, they become its image. Hence the importance of the requirements of 'honorability' and 'respectability' that are demanded as a direct derivative of the constitutional norm —Article 192—, of all public officials, insofar as it addresses the requirement of 'proven suitability', as they are called to carry out the public purposes entrusted to the State. In this sense, the Chamber manifested itself in judgments number [Valor 070] and [Valor 071] both of March 7, 1995. 'The duties of officials derive, like their rights, from the law and the nature of the position or function they perform, that is, they are objective in nature.' (The highlighting is not from the original)." It states that, through the challenged provision, the legislature has delimited the sanctioning power of the Judicial Branch regarding officials who “have been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency,” since once they have obtained a position within the institution they must respect their bond with the administration and the fulfillment of a series of obligations, among them, that of honoring their debts. It adds that the foregoing must prevent, as the Judicial Inspection Tribunal rightly sets forth in vote No. [Value 018], the recovery of sums of money from being slower for creditors “given that they receive a smaller sum of money than the installment agreed upon at the beginning of the credit relationship,” in addition to the suspension of interest collection, among other consequences of that declaration. It submits that the disciplinary power has as its objective the issuance of rules that regulate the activity with its male and female officials, so that the duties entrusted to the Public Administration can be fulfilled, which is based on the constitutional pillars that impose the State's obligations to provide correct public service, as embodied in numeral 192 of the Political Constitution. It maintains that in article 26, subsection 9), the legislature established a reasonable cause for the cessation of a judicial servant’s appointment, which was widely discussed and analyzed in the Permanent Commission on Government and Administration of the Legislative Assembly. It explains that: “There is no doubt then that the legislature, in the discussion of the reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch considered that the existence of an entire normative and administrative apparatus is necessary to act as a controlling filter in the work of judicial officials, in which the state's disciplinary power can materialize, whose pillar rests on the Principle of Hierarchy constitutionally recognized (judgments No. [Value 072] of 15:36 hours on March 7, 1995 and [Value 073], of 14:41 hours on March 16, 2005), and on the 'special subjection' relationship, which is generated between judicial servants and the Judicial Branch, through the definition of strategies for providing an efficient justice service and the application of the disciplinary regime when the provisions contained in the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are breached, with total and absolute precision to the foregoing, article 174 states that: 'The disciplinary regime is intended to ensure the efficiency, correctness and decorum of the functions entrusted to the Judicial Branch and to guarantee citizens a correct administration of justice'." It declares that to avoid making such a postulate nugatory, the legislature incorporated what is indicated in subsection 9) of article 26 of the referred law as one of the grounds for cessation of appointment, and therefore it is not contrary to articles 24, 28, 33, 39, 51 and 56 of our Political Constitution, nor to the principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness.

9.- By a document received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at 14:47 hours on November 29, 2018, Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández appears, in his capacity as Attorney General of the Republic. It indicates, regarding the plaintiff's standing, that it is based on the prior matter processed in file No. [Value 001] before the Judicial Inspection Tribunal. It points out that, upon reviewing that file, it is verified that the procedure followed against the plaintiff is in the phase of exhausting the administrative channel; furthermore, in the underlying matter, she invoked the unconstitutionality of the challenged articles (see the appeal filed), therefore there are no objections regarding her standing to file this unconstitutionality action. It states that, despite the foregoing, such standing is partial, because in the underlying matter, the provision of numeral 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch was not applied to the plaintiff herein, but only subsection 9) of article 26 of that regulatory body. It submits that the plaintiff is an active official of the Judicial Branch, so that only the provisions of article 26.9 apply to her, insofar as it establishes the judicial declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency as a cause for dismissal. It mentions that the provision of numeral 12 is not applicable to her, because said article is directed at persons seeking to enter the Judicial Branch as new judicial servants. It notes that, for this reason, the underlying matter in which the unconstitutionality of this numeral was alleged is not a reasonable means to protect the right deemed injured. It states that it is the Attorney General's Office's criterion that the plaintiff only has standing to challenge what is established in subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the law in question, without prejudice to the Chamber deciding, on grounds of connection, to analyze what is established in article 12. Analysis of the challenged norms from the perspective of the right to privacy and freedom. It indicates that the right to privacy, enshrined in constitutional numeral 24, operates as a limit against illegitimate intrusion by the State and other private parties; moreover, it allows the full development of the personality. It points out that this right not only excludes any activity by another that implies an imposition, intrusion, or interference in the matters of a person's intimate life, but also entails the possibility of preventing the publication or disclosure of certain facts, which are only relevant to the subject. It notes that it has been recognized by this Chamber as "The sphere in which no one may interfere. The freedom of private life is the recognition of a zone of activity that is one's own and the right to privacy limits the intervention of other persons or public powers in the private life of the person... " (Judgment [Value 074] of 15:09 hours on August 3, 1995)". It maintains that the recognition of "private life" is consequently made up of that part which is not devoted to a public activity and which for that same reason is not destined to transcend and impact society directly, and where, in principle, third parties should have no access whatsoever since the activities carried out therein are not their concern, nor do they affect them (constitutional article 28). It mentions that in the case of public officials, it is pertinent to analyze what the boundary should be between the protection of the sphere of their private life and their public sphere, to determine, ultimately, whether such protection should be equated or not to that of any other private individual. It argues that the Law against Corruption and Illicit Enrichment in the Public Function of Costa Rica defines an official as any person who provides their services in the organs and entities of the Public Administration, state and non-state, on behalf and account of it and as part of its organization, by virtue of an act of investiture and entirely regardless of the imperative, representative, remunerated, permanent or public nature of the respective activity. It maintains that, consequently, there is a statutory relationship between the State and the official, regardless of the nature of the position held, so it is clear that the condition of public servants cannot be equated to that of other private individuals, since the former are subject to a principle of transparency and accountability, which obliges them to answer to society for the acts they perform. It argues that the principle of transparency obliges public officials, due to their special responsibilities, to subject themselves to the scrutiny and non-unlawful criticism of citizens in general. It asserts that the principle of accountability also constitutes a value that accompanies the public function, not only sporadically or periodically, but must be a constant practice, through which officials are exposed to citizen control. It mentions that, for the foregoing reason, the scope of protection of one who has accepted to serve the Nation is more reduced than that of one who is not in that situation, because they have freely chosen to place themselves in a position of visibility that allows broad public access. It states that one who enters public life accepts a greater risk by the mere fact of doing so, although it will not always be easy to distinguish between the private acts and the public acts of an official, or between their personal acts without public transcendence or relevance and the personal acts that do have it. It indicates that, in the case of officials, the threshold of the right to privacy and their freedom exists, but it is different from that which protects the citizen who has not assumed the condition and responsibility of one who holds public office and who for that very reason has certain ethical and legal duties towards citizens. It points out that the official's private life has an impenetrable core – as happens with the rest of individuals – but that of the former is more reduced, since aspects of private life that would normally not be disclosable in the case of an ordinary citizen become lawful objects of public information insofar as there is a general interest at stake that justifies it. It adds that society has the right to know of an act from that sphere of the official, even if it does not constitute a crime, when it may affect the public function entrusted to them. It maintains that the private life of public servants is consequently very limited, since society has the right to demand honesty from its representatives regarding their personal, family, and professional life, among others. It adds that the responsibility of projecting and maintaining a certain image is to the detriment of their scope of privacy and one who is not willing to admit this lacks a public vocation. It states that it is the Attorney General's Office's criterion that the legislature has constitutional authorization to establish disqualifying norms that demand certain behaviors from the public official, even concerning spheres related to their private life, provided and only if these behaviors may affect the image of the institution they represent or the legitimate trust that must be held in the official. It explains that establishing a prohibition on entering the public function or the loss of official status, based on a fact of private life such as the declaration of bankruptcy and insolvency, is not in itself unconstitutional, to the extent that such acts may affect the image of the official and the institution. It argues that it must be considered that the existence of norms of this nature is also justified, taking into account the nature of certain positions that handle and administer resources, public funds, or which, due to their special condition, require impeccable behavior from the official in the management of their personal debts. It mentions that this type of norm does not constitute a violation of the right to privacy or freedom and may be imposed on the public official, even when it concerns acts relating to their private sphere. It states that the challenged norms will be analyzed, based on the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Analysis of the challenged norms from the perspective of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. It quotes the questioned articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch: “Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements demanded by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be mentally and physically qualified to perform the function, according to its nature. However, persons against whom a firm order to open trial has been issued may not be appointed; nor those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those subject to a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions; nor those judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages in excess, consume unauthorized drugs or have serious conduct disorders, in a way that may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service. (Thus reformed by article 1 of the Judicial Reorganization Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997). (The bold is not from the original) (...) Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those who serve judicial positions cease due to: (...) 9. Having been convicted, by a firm sentence, for a crime warranting a penalty of disqualification from holding public offices or positions and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency" (The bold is not from the original)". It indicates that, as can be inferred from the challenged norms, they are not norms of a disciplinary nature in the strict sense, since there is neither a protected legal interest nor a consequence derived from a fault in the public service by the official. It points out that such norms are of a preventive nature, as they seek to establish a principle of "legitimate trust," by aiming to ensure that those who serve in any position within the Judicial Branch conduct themselves appropriately in their private sphere and do not have an economic insolvency that could eventually place them in a risky situation, which could later translate into a detriment in the performance of their public functions. It notes that the norms intend that those who work in the Judicial Branch have certain personal characteristics (economic solvency), which, if lost, will cause them to lose their appointment. It states that even though the norm applied to the plaintiff does not constitute a disciplinary sanction in the strict sense, the truth is that the conduct envisaged in the norm (insolvency or bankruptcy) has a burdensome consequence (cessation of appointment) and, therefore, all the constitutional principles governing due process and, specifically, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are applicable to it. It explains that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any burdensome consequence in the sphere of the individual must constitute a strictly necessary measure to achieve the objective sought. It argues that, for the foregoing reason, the principle of proportionality requires the prior setting by the legislature of the limits within which the legal operator may move for the interpretation of the norm in consideration of the specific circumstances. It explains that the administrative authority, consequently, must have a margin of discretion previously granted by the legislature to guarantee that the burdensome consequence is applied only when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. It maintains that the application of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality calls into question the constitutionality of the challenged norms. It comments that if the cited norms are analyzed, it is observed that the normative provision allows for no graduation whatsoever nor the consideration of particular circumstances in the face of specific cases, since the only possible consequence before the declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is the cessation of the appointment or the impossibility of entering the Judicial Branch, regardless of which official is involved. It adds that the norm is of general scope for all positions in the Judicial Branch, without assessing the nature of the functions nor the special work performed by some officials. It asserts that considering the nature of certain positions that handle public funds or administer justice, the imposition of certain personal characteristics and behaviors can be justified, since these may affect the image or the independence of said servants in the performance of their functions. It states that from the analysis of the legislative file, it can be deduced that the intention of the challenged norm was always to declare a "loss of trust" of the judicial official "who has not been able to manage their economic assets and will eventually have the disposition to manage the economic assets of the citizenry" (see statements of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora on folios [Value 075] and [Value 076] of the legislative file)". It mentions that the intention was to direct the norm at officials who administered justice or who, due to the condition of their position, should be required to have proper management of their personal assets. It indicates that, despite this, the approved norm does not reflect such intention, but rather, on the contrary, it was approved generally for all judicial officials and, by not allowing any distinction or assessment of specific circumstances, becomes unreasonable. It considers that the inflexible wording of the norm violates the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, since it does not allow any maneuvering room for the legal operator, who is forced to apply the legal consequence (cessation of appointment) even for judicial positions that have no transcendence according to the intended purpose. It points out that although it could be thought that the described aspect is a matter of application of the norm and not of constitutionality, the truth is that the Judicial Inspection had no other possibility than to cease the plaintiff from her position, because the norm does not permit her any other option. It insists that, in the specific case, there is no violation of a legal interest, therefore the reasonableness of the norm (necessity) could only be justified by the special nature of certain positions within the Judicial Branch, which oblige the imposition of certain personal behaviors on those who occupy them, since eventually these behaviors may affect independence, objectivity, or the manner of resolving certain matters. It notes that the imposed requirement should be a condition of the judicial servant in consideration of a specific function, but it is disproportionate that it is applied generally, as the norm is written, especially when it implies a serious impact on the right to work. It cites vote No. [Value 077] of this Chamber: "Thus, the Chamber has recognized that a restrictive act of rights is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportional. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it essential to protect some good or set of goods of the community -or of a certain group- through the adoption of a differentiating measure. That is to say, that if said action is not carried out, important public interests are going to be harmed. If the restriction is not necessary, it cannot be considered as reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, involves a judgment referring to whether the type of restriction that will be adopted does or does not fulfill the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity. The suitability of the measure would indicate to us that other mechanisms might exist which better solve the existing necessity, some of which may fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question.

For its part, proportionality refers us to a judgment of necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction that is imposed or intended to be imposed; so that the limitation is not markedly greater in magnitude than the benefit that is intended to be obtained with it for the benefit of the community.” He adds that, in a similar vein, rulings no. [Value 109] and [Value 110] were issued. He explains that, in the opinion of that advisory body, the provision in subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as applied to the petitioner, is contrary to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality due to the inflexible manner in which it is drafted. He adds that the necessity of the rule for all judicial officials is not justified, nor is any margin of application granted to the legal operator. He considers that the rule should be annulled. He mentions judgment no. [Value 078] of 11:57 a.m. on October 15, 1999, reproduced in resolution no. [Value 079] of 2:47 p.m. on October 4, [Value 027]. He affirms that, if the existence of the rule were to be considered with regard to certain functions, an interpretation in accordance with Constitutional Law could be made, contemplating that the rule is justified and should be applied only to positions of officials who administer justice or public funds; however, in this case, it would be venturing into the legislator's domain. He states that, taking into account the claims raised by the petitioner, it is not for this Chamber, through this action, to assess the alleged deficiencies in the processing of the file carried out by the Judicial Inspection, nor the manner in which that body has been applying sanctions in other cases. He notes that many of the petitioner's arguments are related to the application of the rule and not to its constitutionality, and therefore he omits to refer to them. He concludes the following: “In view of the foregoing considerations, this advisory body considers that the petitioner's standing is partial, only insofar as she challenges the provision in numeral 26, subsection 9) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as it is the rule applied in the underlying matter. As to the merits, this representation considers that the provision in said numeral is unconstitutional due to the rigidity of its drafting, as it does not allow any margin of application for the legal operator and its necessity in relation to the generality of Judicial Branch officials has not been demonstrated (principle of reasonableness and proportionality). Therefore, the annulment of the provision in the indicated numeral 26, subsection 9) is recommended, without prejudice to this Chamber considering necessary an interpretation of said rule in accordance with Constitutional Law, in the terms indicated. As for Article 12 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, said rule is not applicable to the petitioner, without prejudice to this Chamber considering assessing it by reason of connectedness.” **10**.- By resolution of 3:35 p.m. on January 22, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber deemed the granted hearings answered and referred, according to the corresponding turn, this action to the office of Magistrate Paul Rueda Leal.

**11**.- On January 24, 2019, Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro filed a recusal, since, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of Justice, he was called to report on the merits of the action. He clarifies that, even though he did not render the requested report, but rather the Vice-Presiding Judge did, the situation remains, as it is improper for him to act as a judge in a matter in which he has been called as a party.

**12**.- By resolution of 11:47 a.m. on January 24, 2019, the Presidency of the Chamber recused Magistrate Fernando Cruz Castro from hearing this matter and considered the Substitute Magistrate who replaces him enabled, in accordance with Article 49 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch.

**13.-** The hearing set forth in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

**14.-** The legal requirements have been met in these proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate **Rueda Leal**; and, **Considering:** **I.- Object of the action.** Mrs. [Name 001] files an action of unconstitutionality against Article 12 and subsection 9 of numeral 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993, considering them contrary to Articles 28, 39, and 56 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. In general terms, she considers that the challenged rules violate the right to work, the protection of the family, and legal certainty; furthermore, the principles of culpability and innocence due to the imposition of the maximum sanction (revocation of the appointment) despite the fact that no harm to the public service or to third parties has been demonstrated; and finally, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the sanction, since not only do they have an extensive scope but they also establish an objective criterion that prevents any assessment regarding the appropriateness of the sanction and the type of sanction to be applied.

**II.- Regarding the challenged regulations.** The questioned articles of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch are the following:

“Article 12.- Without prejudice to the other requirements required by law, to enter the judicial service it is required to be mentally and physically fit to perform the function, according to its nature.

However, persons against whom a final order of committal for trial has been issued may not be appointed; neither may those convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment; those subject to a penalty of disqualification (inhabilitación) from holding public office or employment; nor those judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent; those who habitually ingest alcoholic beverages in an excessive manner, consume unauthorized drugs, or have serious behavioral disorders, in such a way that they may affect the continuity and efficiency of the service.

(Thus amended by Article 1 of Law No. 7728 of December 15, 1997)” “Article 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those holding judicial positions cease due to: (…)

9.- Having been convicted, in a final judgment, of a crime that carries a penalty of disqualification (inhabilitación) from holding public office or employment, and for having been judicially declared bankrupt or insolvent.” **III.- On the admissibility of the action.** The action of unconstitutionality is a process with certain formalities, which must be satisfied so that this Chamber may validly hear the merits of the challenge. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the prerequisites for the admissibility of an action of unconstitutionality. First, a prior matter pending resolution is required, whether in judicial or administrative proceedings (in the procedure to exhaust it), in which unconstitutionality has been invoked as a reasonable means to protect the right or interest considered harmed. In the second and third paragraphs, the law exceptionally contemplates cases in which a prior matter is not required, such as the absence of individual and direct harm due to the nature of the matter, the defense of diffuse or collective interests, or when it is filed directly by the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, and the Ombudsman. Now, regarding the need for a prior matter pending resolution in administrative proceedings, it is necessary that this involves the procedure that exhausts the administrative path, which, in accordance with Article 126 of the General Law of Public Administration, occurs from the moment ordinary appeals are filed before the hierarchical superior of the body that issued the final act; otherwise, the action would be inadmissible. Likewise, there are other formalities that must be met, namely, the explicit determination of the challenged regulations, duly substantiated, with a specific citation of the constitutional norms and principles considered infringed, the authentication by an attorney of the brief in which the action is filed, the accreditation of the conditions of standing (powers and certifications), as well as the literal certification of the brief in which the unconstitutionality of the rules was invoked in the underlying matter; all of which are requirements that, in the event of not being provided by the petitioner, can be ordered to be fulfilled by the Presidency of the Chamber.

In the *sub examine*, the petitioner states that file no. [Value 001] is the prior matter that supports this action of unconstitutionality against Article 12 and subsection 9 of numeral 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In this regard, she indicates that it is at the stage of exhausting the administrative path before the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch and was processed in the first instance by the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection, which, by decision no. [Value 018] of October 4, 2018, ordered the revocation of her appointment for having been judicially declared insolvent.

On this particular point, it is important to specify that, indeed, the administrative procedure is at the stage of exhausting the path; however, the resolution of the Tribunal of the Judicial Inspection was based solely on subsection 9 of Article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. Likewise, from the reading of the appeal filed, it is clear that the petitioner only invoked and developed the unconstitutionality of this ordinal.

Consequently, the action is admitted with respect to subsection 9 of Article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, as the invocation of unconstitutionality in the prior matter constitutes a reasonable means to protect the rights considered harmed. On the other hand, the action is declared inadmissible regarding ordinal 12 of the same normative body, since it was not applied to the protected party in the proceeding, nor was its unconstitutionality even alleged in the administrative path.

**IV.- On the alleged unconstitutionality of subsection 9 of Article 26, both of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, No. 7333 of May 5, 1993**.

**a)- On the petitioner's grounds related to her specific case.** In this regard, it is important to indicate that the large number of allegations presented by the petitioner related to the merits of what was decided in the disciplinary case, as well as to the deficiencies in its processing, the rejection of evidence, the situation that caused her insolvency, and the manner in which other procedures have been resolved, are aspects that are not appropriate for assessment through this action, as they refer to the application of the rule in her specific case. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber will only hear the allegations of constitutionality without delving into the particularities presented, without prejudice to what is resolved in the ordinary courts on the occasion of the content of this judgment.

**b)- On the arguments of unconstitutionality formulated by the petitioner.** In the *sub examine*, the petitioner considers it contrary to Constitutional Law to establish a judicial declaration of insolvency as grounds for the cessation of functions without leaving a margin of discretion or assessment, even excusable, that generated that condition and, above all, without assessing elements or the “principles of congruence, proportionality, causal reasonableness, legitimate purpose, good faith, family necessity, privacy, assessment of a duly accredited objective loss of trust in light of the functions I perform, existence of real harm to the image or institutionality of the Judicial Branch, as well as the existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious one, to the judicial public service, gender aspects, among others, all this in light of the existence or not of an impact on the continuity and efficiency of the judicial service, as is indeed assessed and defined for other grounds in those same articles (…)”. She states that from the analysis and investigation of the content of the draft law in question, the following were obtained as important aspects for this action of unconstitutionality: “(…) ü On folios [Value 027], [Value 028], [Value 029] (images [Value 030], [Value 031], [Value 032]), Motion No. [Value 035] presented by Deputy Ovidio Pacheco is evident, aimed at modifying the wording of Article 26, subsection 9.) of reference and, for what is relevant, in which it is provided, among others, to expressly include 'those judicially declared bankrupt and insolvent' as grounds for cessation of appointment, a wording ultimately approved and currently in force; ü On folios [Value 033] (image [Value 034]), the joint legislative committee hears the indicated Motion No. [Value 035] and discusses its content. For these purposes, it is recorded in the legislative file that Deputy Ovidio Pacheco makes no reference whatsoever to the substantive reason, purpose, or cause that justifies expressly including the ground that is the object of this action; rather, his justification is merely a matter of form so that no reference is made to Article 12, before which, that formal aspect was affirmatively assessed considering that "the motion aims to clarify, at least, what the true causes are for which a judicial official may be removed." It is insisted, for the purposes of said motion, that there is no record of an adequate substantive reason, purpose, or cause that would justify expressly including the ground for cessation that is the object of this action. ü On folios [Value 036] (image [Value 037]), there is a record of the legislative discussion related to disciplinary grounds, and they expressly refer to those for which the service relationship may end for that reason, highlighting the reference to the public service interest of judicial functions, before which the permanence of the official prevails, except when it proves '**gravely inconvenient for the judicial service**', as well as when, on account of it, '**doubts exist about his/her correctness**'. ü On folio [Value 080] (image [Value 081]), the ground that is the object of this action of unconstitutionality, set forth in Article 26, subsection 9.), is already incorporated as substitute text. ü On folio [Value 082] (image [Value 065]), the report issued by **the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration** should be highlighted, in which, expressly, **they request that the ground of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in the referenced Article 26, subsection 9.) be eliminated**. The justificatory and explanatory element that the legislators express is the following: "**Regarding bankrupt and insolvent individuals, they possess conditions which, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as grounds to dismiss a judicial servant; if this is permitted, it would mean sanctioning for a mere danger**." (-the underlining and bold are not from the original; they are recorded in this way solely for the purpose of highlighting their content as an important aspect for this action of unconstitutionality).

At folio [Valor 038] (image [Valor 039]), there is a record of legislative discussion regarding the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which the opinion of Deputy Allan Solano is highlighted. In it, referring to the grounds of insolvency and bankruptcy as a reason for termination of appointment, he criticizes that a "sanction for mere convenience or risk" and matters of "private life" should constitute grounds. At folios [Valor 040] (image [Valor 041]) appears the discussion between Deputy Santana Esquivel and Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyze the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration regarding the repeatedly referenced grounds of Article 26, subsection 9), for the purpose of definitively deciding whether to retain or modify said grounds. For these purposes, it is highly relevant to quote verbatim what they stated on the matter, as follows: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of public trust because ultimately we are the ones responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within State institutions. That is why it has been considered that an individual who has been declared insolvent suffers a certain loss of trust, given that they have not been able to manage their own economic assets and may eventually have at their disposal the management of the economic assets of the citizenry, and that is why it has been traditional to find rules of this nature. That is the only observation I could make regarding the decision to eliminate it or not. My recommendation is to maintain the provision that those who are in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL: We shall continue then. We will maintain this article as it stands [...]". (—the underlining is not in the original; it is recorded in this manner solely for the purpose of highlighting its content as a matter of importance for this unconstitutionality action—)”. She adds that Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora's justification was what provided the reason for legislatively defining the retention of the grounds for termination indicated in Article 26, subsection 9), which focuses on the following aspects: “a.) By referring to the 'resolution of discords,' it only justifies the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch, and omits—and therefore is not legislatively valued—the administrative judicial service relationship, such as my judicial work as a Unit Coordinator; b.) It points to the existence of 'a certain loss of trust' due to the judicial official being declared insolvent, meaning it would punish with the termination of appointment in the judicial service for a conduct whose assessment does not prove in an effective, objective, causal, direct, substantiated, proportional, or reasonable manner the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional service work, nor before the citizenry, all accredited against the functions I perform, regardless of my state of insolvency. It is insisted that this must be valued not only in jurisdictional work but also in that which concerns my person, that is, in the performance of an administrative task. It further states that 'they will eventually have the disposition of economic resources,' thus again revealing an empty argument, lacking technical, real, truthful, suitable, or causal basis concerning serious harm to the institutional service work, given that, in the administrative judicial service relationship, not all judicial servants fit into that assumption”. She states that, according to the legislative record of Bill No. 10.753, it can be concluded with total certainty that the inclusion of the grounds of insolvency as a reason to declare the termination of appointment in the judicial service is unjustified and unfounded, even more so because it is not consistent with the complex set of disciplinary regulations governing Law No. 7333 as a whole, which tends toward the demonstration, after due process, of a “serious impact on the judicial service, nor the existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service, as a primary element for the punitive application of the challenged grounds”. She adds that, as was noted during the legislative process, allowing this ground means sanctioning a mere danger or simple risk, for aspects of mere judicial convenience, an aspect lacking demonstration regarding decisions of necessity that involve aspects of private life that do not influence the judicial service. She argues that the wording of the rule implies an application of pure law, without considering other relevant aspects of the service relationship. She asserts that insolvency is a legal mechanism established in civil matters for the payment of creditors. She mentions that the process of a judicial declaration of a state of insolvency should not be qualified negatively without evaluating the reasons that generated it and also considering whether actions classified as fraudulent did not occur. She asserts that subsection 9) of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is unconstitutional for the following reasons: i) “Violation of the Right to Work as a fundamental human right and consequently violation of the Right to the Protection of the Family and to Legal Certainty, for an act managed in application of my autonomy of will. Employment discrimination based on economic situation in matters of employment is being concretized”. She states that: “the grounds of a judicial declaration of insolvency is configured (...) as a ground for termination of appointment (Article 26, subsection 9. of Law No. 7333-), which affects that special protection of the right to work, because as demonstrated in the analysis of the bill for that Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it is found integrated into that block of legality without there being, nor is it foreseen, the causality of situations that may surround that judicial declaration of insolvency against the effective public service provided by the Judicial Branch, both in its jurisdictional and administrative character, nor a conditional or evaluative grounds for the application of that normative reason, which in the case of the application of Article 26, subsection 9. Of said law, generates by itself the termination of appointment as the most severe disciplinary measure, even when there is no damage, harm, or impact on the service, nor on the image, nor on the institutionality of the Judicial Branch, much less on society, nor the proven existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service on the occasion of the declaration of insolvency. (...) Additionally, with the proposed sanction, a fundamental principle of labor law that is of supplementary application for the public employment relationship is seriously violated, namely the protective principle, and consequently the application of the in dubio pro-operario rule, which will later be associated with the violation of the principle of innocence that assists me. Accordingly, the revocation of appointment applied to me on the stated grounds should have constituted the ultima ratio, seeking to choose the sanction most favorable to the worker, in application of the principles governing constitutional law and conventionality control itself, all in the face of a sanction that is evidently flagrant against the legal order. As is known, this rule is also applicable when interpreting the facts, or if preferred, when weighing the value of the evidence, seeking the most beneficial condition and the continuity of the service relationship”. She affirms that the institute of insolvency is not a sanction, fault, or crime, unless its fraudulent character is declared. She states that, due to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26, the Judicial Inspection Tribunal does not require any type of damage or harm to a third party (in this case, to the Judicial Branch as employer), but rather applies its literal meaning as a matter of law. She notes that this rule sanctions, with the most severe measure, an expectation or a potential risk or danger, which in her case is unreal. She mentions that: “it is palpable that what was warned by the Legislative Committee on Government and Administration that reviewed Bill No. 10.753 becomes a reality, when it warned that a mere danger or a potential risk would be sanctioned, without even a real, direct, objective, or causal assessment that reflects a decline, impact, or harm to the administrative service provided by the Judicial Branch. I highlight at this point what was mentioned in the record of Bill 10.753, specifically at folio [Valor 025] (image [Valor 026]), when in the legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is emphasized that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as these circumstances 'affect the public service'”. She indicates that: “Just as Article 56 of our Political Constitution provides, regarding the State's guaranteeing limit on the right to work, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, points out, among others, the right of every individual to a dignified life, the right to work, and protection against unemployment, all without any discrimination, among other reasons, for reasons of economic situation or position, as in my case. In that same sense, Convention III and Recommendation III adopted by the International Labor Organization, of which Costa Rica is a member, relating to discrimination in matters of employment and occupation, prevent situations occurring both in State bodies and in private companies that imply discrimination to the detriment of the sacred rights that, by nature and by humanity, constitute the heritage of every individual. From all this arises Law No. 2694, of November 22, 1960, that is, the Convention of the International Labor Organization on the prohibition of discrimination in employment, currently in force, which prohibits '[...] any form of discrimination, determined by distinctions, exclusions, or preferences, based on considerations of race, color, sex, age, religion, civil status, political opinion, national ancestry, social origin, origin, or economic situation, which limits equality of opportunity or treatment in matters of employment or occupation'. In that sense, note that the prohibition of that conventional control has a single exception, which is the one defined in Article 2 of that same Law No. 2694, which establishes: 'Excepted from the foregoing prohibition are those distinctions, exclusions, or preferences arising from the qualifications necessary for the proper fulfillment of the functions or tasks inherent to the type of position or employment, exclusively in accordance with their nature and the conditions of the worker.' Regarding the foregoing, it has been demonstrated that, in my case, discrimination is concretized due to the mandatory ground that generates the termination of appointment for mere convenience, for mere danger, or for a potential risk, without an effective, real, objective, or causal assessment of the administrative service under my charge on the occasion of my judicial declaration of insolvency”. She concludes that the impact on her fundamental rights to protection of work, family, and legal certainty that concretizes discrimination based on her economic situation is latent. ii) “Violation of the right to culpability and innocence due to the non-existence of an impact on the public service or on third parties, as well as the lack of proof of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service in the application of due process itself. An (sic) act of good faith is sanctioned with the supreme sacrifice of termination of appointment in the face of an unproven and unevaluated potential risk, as well as an unfounded and unjustified mere or apparent institutional convenience”. She argues that the regulations challenged in this unconstitutionality action cause a flagrant violation of the essential content of Article 39 of our Magna Carta and of the principles that integrate Constitutional Law, because the judicial declaration of insolvency is intended to be taken as grounds to prevent an appointment in the judicial service, as well as to terminate an official, without carrying out any major assessment or accreditation of damage or harm—real, causal, and objective—to the institutionality of the Judicial Branch. She adds that said grounds are applied for aspects of mere unjustified convenience, by criteria of a potential risk, without any demonstration that there exists at least a slight, medium, or serious inconvenience to the service provided by the Judicial Branch, nor specifically to the Planning Directorate. She maintains that the disciplinary application of such grounds does not consider whether it concerns jurisdictional work or, rather, administrative work, nor are criteria assessed or applied that demonstrate the existence of any impact on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch. She insists that insolvency, unless declared fraudulent, is not a crime that generates disqualification from public office, nor is it a sanction such that it would result in the termination of appointments. She argues that the challenged rules contravene the constitutional parameters and principles noted, as well as “that of congruence, which is required by the very parameter of legal certainty and due process”. She states that the rules being challenged seem to punish the existence of a “loss of trust,” on the occasion of the judicial declaration of insolvency; however, objective loss of trust exists because the good faith, performance, and fidelity that the employee owes to their employer are compared, in such a way that it is substantiated and demonstrated—congruently and proportionally—that, with the employee's conduct, there is a real and imminent harmful contrast, leading to the conclusion that it is impossible to continue the employment relationship. She argues that if the judicial declaration of insolvency intends to substantiate the “loss of trust” for the Judicial Branch with the consequence of termination of the appointment, being a disciplinary sanctioning matter, the legal norm must accredit in its content the constitutional parameter of serious, causal, reasonable, and objective culpability of the official regarding the service and public interest, in such a way that it demonstrates a real impossibility in the continuity of employment, or else excuses the judicial employee for “lack of demonstration of those aspects that inhibit them in the performance of their public office”. iii) “Violation of the Right to Privacy, Human Dignity, and the Pro-Homine Principle. Inexistence of a legitimate purpose of the disciplinary sanction of termination of appointment in relation to the supreme sacrifice involved in the disciplinary sanction without there being an impact on the public service, nor on the institutionality or the image of the Judicial Branch, or a demonstration of the existence of a serious fault, much less a very serious fault, against the judicial public service on the occasion of the insolvency”. She mentions that the right to privacy and human dignity in the face of discrimination has been developed by this Chamber and by international norms and jurisprudence in the field of human rights. She indicates that these rights are treated as sources of protection for the person. She reiterates the argument related to numeral 28 of the Political Constitution and the lack of harm to the Judicial Branch. She considers that the declaration of insolvency contemplated in the challenged articles, which results in the termination of appointment, does not have a legitimate purpose for the sanction, which affects the fundamental rights of privacy and human dignity, also generating a high level of discrimination based on economic situation. She states that with this unconstitutionality action, she does not intend to deny the authority and powers of direction, oversight, and sanction of the Judicial Branch regarding her administrative service relationship; however, there must be respect for her fundamental rights, as it is necessary that objective and reasonable sanctioning elements be accredited for its imposition, all in the face of the effective verification of a serious or very serious fault, the impact on the judicial service, on the institutional image, or on the public interest, and not a mere suspicion, a mere convenience, or a potential risk; that is, a ground without technical-legal content that illegitimately punishes her years of service in the Judicial Branch, with consequences for her privacy and dignity, as she would be treated as if she had committed some criminal activity or a serious or very serious infraction. She mentions that “the spirit of the legislator permeated in the record of Bill 10.753, when in its legislative discussion on the different grounds of the invoked articles, it is emphasized that they were interested in the service and the administration of justice, in which, with reference to insolvency, it is said that the basic idea of the grounds must be understood so that it is absolutely clear that it is applicable insofar as these circumstances 'affect the public service', (...)". She maintains that the challenged regulations, regarding the rights to privacy and human dignity, as well as the application of the pro homine principle, must be applied in the manner that most favors the human being. She explains that all restrictive and sanctioning measures, as well as those of termination of appointment, must precautionarily respect human dignity, the protection of privacy, and the principle of proportionality, all under the pro homine principle, so that the magnitude of the potential or eventual damage is assessed. She asserts that the Judicial Branch adopted the “Gender Equality Policy” so that the gender perspective would be incorporated into all the work of that Branch of the Republic. She mentions that what has been stated is based “on the legal framework for the protection of human rights, at both the national and international levels, which enshrines, among others, the protection of the rights to equality without discrimination of any kind, to equal protection of the law, and to access to prompt and effective justice, all of them enshrined in the principles that make up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights or Pact of San José.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Political Constitution of Costa Rica." It adds that this policy "recognized that 'Equality before the law means the possibility of differentiated treatment, when the circumstances are different, that is, when persons are unequally situated', likewise that 'The principle of equity impels judges, as well as all legal operators, to take into account, with equity criteria, the human background of conflicts, to consider the personal, family and social conditions in each of the cases and their consequences', a situation that is not being applied due to the unconstitutional content invoked through this action." It notes that the policy's objective is "to guarantee equal opportunities between women and men and non-discrimination based on gender in judicial decisions, in the public service of the administration of justice, and in the internal functioning of the Judicial Branch." It states that "this Gender Equality Policy was based on the 'Brasilia Regulations Regarding Access to Justice for Vulnerable People,' under which rule 19 states that: 'Any action or conduct, based on gender, that causes death, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to a woman, both in the public and private spheres, through the use of physical or psychological violence, is considered violence against women.'" (...)

**iv) "Violation of the Principles of Proportionality and Reasonableness of the disciplinary sanction. Nonexistence of connection and suitable congruence between the regulated conduct, the severity of the disciplinary sanction, and the superior sacrifice involved. Existence of discrimination based on my economic situation."** It mentions that, in addition to the violation of fundamental human rights and principles contained in our Political Constitution and the Constitution's Law invoked as grounds for this unconstitutionality action, specifically referring to the invocation of the cause for a judicial declaration of insolvency as a reason to not proceed with the appointment of a judicial servant, as well as to provide for the disciplinary cause of termination of appointment, there is also a violation, by action and omission, of the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness of the consequent termination of appointment. It notes that these rules lack real, suitable, necessary, causal, and objective elements of assessment, congruence, balance, and connection with the essential content of sanctioning law. It adds that, in their application, the factual framework, the personal conditions of the judicial servant are not analyzed in order to determine an excusable situation, the respective sacrifice involved in the measure, and the consequent cause for termination of appointment due to the existence of a judicial declaration of insolvency, all the foregoing, against the existence or not of an effect on the public service provided by the Judicial Branch, as well as on its institutional image or the prevailing public interest due to the performance of the position. It states that a serious or very serious fault against the judicial public service is not proven in order to apply the cause. It explains that it is necessary to apply a proportionality test to the challenged regulations, in order to define and substantiate the existence of the invoked transgressions. It adds that the test contains the three sub-principles that function as rules to be considered, in the sense that they are maxims on which one must question; that is, it must be verified if the chosen means meets the requirement of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense, before which, if the answer is unsatisfactory, the consequence would be the unconstitutionality of the norm. It maintains that what this test seeks is to define the legitimate purpose and suitability of the measure, as well as the necessity and proportionality of the norm, before which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that it is the obligation of the States Parties to adopt necessary internal measures to adapt their conduct and regulations to conventional parameters. It mentions the following: "Prior to the application of this proportionality test, considering the means and purpose of the challenged rules, we must ask ourselves a question: is it necessary to apply, as the sole and most severe disciplinary sanction, the termination of appointment of a Judicial Branch official who has been judicially declared insolvent to effectively guarantee the public service, of an administrative nature, that he is responsible for in the Judicial Branch? The performance of the proportionality test will give us that answer, the foregoing, because, in the specific case, proportionality seeks, as values, a balance and moderation in the application of regulations that tend to limit fundamental rights, or, to generate the application of a sanctioning measure in disciplinary matters." It sets out the analysis as follows:

"**a.) As the first element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means used by the legal norm versus its purpose,' that is, its adequacy, suitability, and effectiveness.** In that sense, the means used by the legal norm must be suitable, adequate, apt, and capable of achieving the proposed purpose, that is, it establishes that the chosen means is the most adequate to the factual possibilities, considering the purpose to be achieved. There must be a judgment of congruence and practical connection between the means and the immediate purpose of the norm, given that, if that purpose is not apt, even if the restriction is, it is disproportionate. In the case before us, we are dealing with articles 12 and 26 subsection 9.) of Law No. 7333, which establish, as relevant, respectively, the prohibition of appointment in the judicial service of those persons who have been judicially declared insolvent; likewise, the cause for termination of appointment of those serving in judicial positions, for the same reason, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. As stated in this action, and because these legal norms do not expressly or implicitly state their purpose, the assessment of the legislative discussion raised by the Joint Legislative Committee that heard and defined the final wording of Bill No. 10,753 for what is now Law No. 7333, (-which was already indicated above-), must be considered for these purposes, as a defining element of that legislative intent regarding said cause. In that sense, the purpose provided for those challenged legal norms is considered to be precautionary, based on an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, since, in that legislative discussion, in the express words of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, a member at that time of said Joint Legislative Committee, it was said that '[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain trust from the public because ultimately we are responsible for resolving all kinds of discord [...] the person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust towards him, given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets and will eventually have at his disposal, the management of the economic assets of the citizenry [...]', this being the basis and/or criterion to finalize the text finally approved for those legal norms. The means used by said norms to obtain that purpose is, on the one hand (-article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (-article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. In this regard, it must be highlighted as a highly relevant aspect that, for both cases, this cause is related in its wording, for the explained means of proportionality, with other causes linked to convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment and to those subjected to the penalty of disqualification from holding public office or professions. (...) With what has been indicated, it is evident that the means used by these legal norms is not only unsuitable, inadequate, and incapable of achieving the proposed purpose, since the fact of considering that a person in a state of insolvency, judicially declared, is without merit for the judicial function, so much so that it generates, for those already working, the termination of their appointment, means the casuistic and banal application based on an apparent unjustified loss of trust, which, as already stated, rather seems to privilege the sanctioning application with the maximum sacrifice borne by the employee for an eventual, unproven situation of mere risk, mere danger, or convenience, without an effective, real, and objective assessment existing in the way of the institutional purpose, of a general nature, which is the public service. (...) It is added to the above, that the legislator's intent foresaw this cause due to a potential use of resources by the judicial official in the resolution of conflicts, that is, in the exercise of a purely jurisdictional task, and not of an administrative nature, which -as in my case- does not involve administering, guarding, disposing of, controlling, or safeguarding any public funds, and even more so, does not serve the public, nor does the resolution of any conflict depend on that administrative management. Therefore, it can be considered that the first parameter of this test yields the disproportionality of the norm as a result, because there is no congruence between the means and the immediate purpose of the norm in adherence to the parameter mandated by constitutional law, since, while it can be thought that preventing an appointment and the termination of appointment of a person in that condition is the means to achieve the stated purpose, the counterpart to this, that is, the restriction without verification of its excusable and innocent nature, against the superior sacrifice it generates, violating the indicated parameters, causes the accused disproportionality, even more so if it is considered, as in the case concerning me, that for the application of this disciplinary sanctioning measure, it is not assessed whether or not there is an effect on the prevailing public service, on the image and institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, on public order, on morals, or on third parties, as well as, nor on the existence or not of a serious or very serious fault to the judicial public service, due to the cause.

**b.) As the second element of the proportionality test, we have the 'Means used by the legal norm versus the necessity of regulation'.** In that sense, what is assessed is whether that means is needed to achieve the expected regulation, that is, it is the mandate of optimization of the most benign means, through which it must be verified if the purpose cannot be achieved in another way that affects the individual less. For these purposes, different means must be compared, in order to determine the least burdensome alternative, achieving the expected legal regulation. In light of the above, excess in the measure is condemned because the urgent or imperative nature demands the sacrifice ordered by the norm. With respect to the rules challenged through this unconstitutionality action, it was already stated in point a.) above of this test, that the means they use to obtain that normative purpose is, on the one hand (-article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent; and on the other (-article 26 subsection 9.), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. In light of the above, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the need to specify the regulation, verifying alternatives aligned with the parameters of constitutional law, based on the sacrifice that this need for regulation generates or may generate. It goes without saying that the applicability of the regulatory measure and its consequent need must assess the diversity of situations that can arise according to each specific case, as is precisely the case of whether the person works in a position with jurisdictional or administrative work. (...) The question then is: what is the least burdensome disciplinary measure that should be applied in the case of a judicial declaration of insolvency in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of any type of damage, nor of a serious or very serious qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutional framework of the Judicial Branch? Is it proportional to prevent the appointment of a person and, -on the other hand- the termination of appointment of persons who have been judicially declared insolvent, in which there is no demonstration whatsoever of damage, nor of a serious or very serious qualification to the public service, nor to the image or institutional framework of the Judicial Branch? We insist, legal norms, and especially sanctioning ones, due to their more burdensome implications, must achieve an expected legal regulation, based on recognized constitutional and conventional principles. In light of the above, the application of the norms challenged as unconstitutional are clearly disproportionate. The sanctioning means is excessive against the urgent or imperative nature that demands the sacrifice ordered by the norm, even more so, -as has been said and demonstrated- when there is no damage whatsoever to the prevailing public service, to the image and institutional framework of the Judicial Branch, to public order, to morals, or to third parties. (...) Therefore, it is patent that the norms challenged through this action are so disproportionate and consequently irrational and discriminatory, that they do not provide elements so that, in an excusable manner, whoever exercises the sanctioning role has suitable regulatory means for the diverse specific cases, in which there may exist, as in mine, exempting causes from liability so as to justify the excessive sacrifice of termination of appointment, and so that the least burdensome alternative is determined instead, achieving the expected legal regulation, without incurring in sanctioning and regulatory excess of a disciplinary nature. (...)

**c.) As the third and final element of the proportionality test that is of interest to apply, we find the 'Means used by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit'**, that is, proportionality in the strict sense is considered. Before that, the sacrifice, -as cost-, is compared against the existence of some benefit or advantage, whether material or not. There must be a benefit and that alternative must be the least restrictive or the least burdensome, but at the same time, the most effective. It is necessary to consider three issues: the structure of the norm and its weighting, its rationality, and its legitimacy, among which close ties are raised. The greater the degree of non-satisfaction or affectation of one of the principles, the greater the importance of the satisfaction of the other must be. For this, the legal assets or rights in conflict must be identified, in order to determine the existing relationship between greater sacrifice versus the greater hierarchy of the legal asset, in order to determine if there is a relationship or balance between them. In the case before us, it was already mentioned in point a.) above of this test, that the means used by the norms challenged through this means to obtain that normative purpose is, on the one hand (-article 12-), to prohibit the appointment of persons as judicial servants if they have been judicially declared insolvent, and on the other (-article 26 subsection 9.-), to order the termination of appointment for that same cause, that is, having been judicially declared insolvent. It must be understood, therefore, that the nature of the structure of the norm is exhaustive and of a sanctioning nature. In light of the above, it is appropriate to analyze that described means against the cost-benefit, understanding that cost as the sacrifice involved in the sanctioning measure of termination of appointment, against the benefit or advantage obtained by the Judicial Branch with the application of the sacrifice, of course, all this against the purpose pursued by the norm. We previously stated that the purpose provided for those challenged legal norms is precautionary, based on an aspect of trust, regarding the handling of economic resources and the resolution of conflicts submitted at the jurisdictional level, all of this based on the understanding of the content of the legislative discussion of the cause that the bill for what is now Law No. 7333 involved, in which the Joint Legislative Committee that confirmed maintaining said causes, relied on the criterion of Magistrate.

Luis Paulino Mora, who stated that: "[...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of public trust because, ultimately, we are the ones responsible for resolving all kinds of discord [...] a person who is declared insolvent, there is a certain loss of trust in him, given that he has not been able to manage his own financial assets and eventually will have at his disposal the management of the financial assets of the citizenry [...]" (-folios [Valor 040] (images [Valor 064] of legislative bill No. 10,753-) It must be clarified again, that this discussion arose because the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration issued a report on the scope of that insolvency cause stating that "[...] Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they possess conditions which, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as causes to dismiss a judicial server; if this were permitted, it would be punishing based on a mere risk [...]" [-folio [Valor 082] [image [Valor 065] of legislative bill No. 10,753-) ] (...) Regarding the legitimacy of the challenged norms, we have no objection, as it coincides with legal theory regarding their means of creation, i.e., via law and, consequently, created by the ordinary legislator. However, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated, in its Judgment of February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman Vs. Uruguay: "[...] The mere existence of a democratic regime does not, per se, guarantee the permanent respect for International Law, including International Human Rights Law, which has been considered even by the Inter-American Democratic Charter itself. The democratic legitimacy of certain acts or acts in a society is limited by the norms and international obligations for the protection of human rights recognized in treaties such as the American Convention, so that the existence of a true democratic regime is determined by both its formal and substantive characteristics, and therefore, particularly in cases of serious violations of International Human Rights Law, the protection of human rights constitutes an insurmountable limit to the rule of majorities, that is, to the sphere of what is 'susceptible to being decided' by majorities in democratic instances, in which a 'conventionality control' must also prevail [...], which is a function and task of any public authority and not only of the Judicial Branch [...]". In the same vein, regarding the legitimacy of domestic regulations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its Judgment of November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco Vs. Mexico, held: "[...] For this Court, not only the suppression or enactment of norms in domestic law guarantees the rights contained in the American Convention, in accordance with the obligation provided in Article 2 of said instrument. The development of state practices conducive to the effective observance of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein is also required. Consequently, the existence of a norm does not by itself guarantee that its application is adequate. It is necessary that the application of the norms or their interpretation, as jurisdictional practices and a manifestation of state public order, are adjusted to the same end pursued by Article 2 of the Convention [...]". Having reached this point, we consider it necessary to mention, for the purposes of analysis and interpretation by this Honorable Chamber, the necessary application of conventionality control, in the understanding that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention on Human Rights -as is the case of Costa Rica-, its judges and public authorities in general are also subject to it, which obliges them to ensure that the useful effect of that binding international regulation is not nullified by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, its object, and its purpose. In that sense, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights itself has pointed out that authorities must not only exercise constitutional control but also "conventionality control" ex officio, a function that should not be limited exclusively to the manifestations or acts of the petitioners in each specific case. (...) a.) Regarding the first element of the proportionality test, namely the "Means employed by the legal norm versus its end", that is, its suitability and efficacy, it has been indicated that the suitable or legitimate purpose, while present in all cases (whether a punishment or civil damages), it is clarified that this does not imply that the aforementioned measure is suitable, necessary, or proportionate (Usón Ramírez -para. 66-). Likewise, it has indicated that for a measure to be suitable means that it serves to safeguard the legal right sought to be protected, that is, it is capable of contributing to the realization of said objective (Kimel -para. 71- and reiterated in Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 53-). b.) Regarding the second element of the proportionality test, namely the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the need for regulation", it has pointed out with reference to the requirement of necessity, that it must respond to an imperative public interest, that the restriction must interfere to the least degree possible, and as a condition, that it must not limit more than what is strictly necessary (Canese -para. 96-, Kimel -para. 76-, Usón Ramírez -para. 48- and Fontevecchia D'Amico -para. 43-). c.) With respect to the third and final element of the proportionality test, namely the "Means employed by the legal norm versus the cost-benefit", that is, proportionality in the strict sense, both in Kimel -paras. 83 to 94-, and in Usón Ramírez -paras. 80 to 88-, the Court refers to the structure of balancing when evaluating: on the one hand, the degree of interference with a right or principle -which we have understood as the means-, and on the other, the importance of satisfying the other right or principle -which we have known as cost-benefit-, in light of which, it analyzes the sacrifice involved. With this, the Court verifies whether the measure adopted -sanction- broadly guaranteed the right it was intended to protect, without rendering null the right being limited and its consequent sacrifice. As can be noted, the proportionality test applied to the norms challenged through this unconstitutionality action coincides with the parameters established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, determining that there is no congruence, legitimate purpose, suitability, or objective necessity for the existence of the challenged regulation with its imperative strictness, making it disproportionate and consequently irrational, all of this in light of the sacrifice involved. By reason of the foregoing, it can be conclusively concluded that the legal norms challenged through this means are disproportionate, and consequently irrational and discriminatory by reason of my economic situation, thus violating my invoked fundamental rights. I request this Honorable Chamber to carefully analyze my situation in light of the challenged normative content, by reason of the factual and legal justification alleged in this unconstitutionality action".

V.Regarding the constitutionality analysis of subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch. In the sub examine, it is important to be clear about the scope of the challenged norm.

The article in question establishes the following causes for the termination of functions of persons serving in judicial posts: death of the person (subsection 1), expiration of the appointment (subsection 2), revocation of the appointment (subsection 3), separation for the betterment of the service (subsection 4), accepted resignation (subsection 5), material impediment for more than six months (subsection 6), a lower judge being found to be related to a higher judge (subsection 7), having contracted a marriage that causes the person to incur a cause for prohibition (subsection 8), having been convicted of a crime with a penalty of disqualification for holding public office (subsection 9) and having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency (subsection 9). Note that this last subsection establishes two entirely independent scenarios.

Regarding norms that refer to aspects of private life, like the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Chamber considers that, in principle, they are not inherently unconstitutional nor do they necessarily imply a violation of the rights to privacy and freedom of the serving persons, since they are subject to greater burdens, obligations, and duties. In that sense, this Tribunal shares what was stated by the advisory body in regard to the fact that public officials do hold the rights to privacy and freedom, but that their threshold is different from that which protects the citizen who has not assumed the condition and responsibility of one who holds public office.

However, for the purposes of resolving this action, it is necessary to analyze whether a judicial declaration of insolvency as a cause for termination of functions of any judicial server is contrary to the Law of the Constitution.

The scenario under examination is expressly regulated as follows:

"Artículo 26.- In compliance with the conditions and procedures established by this Law, the functions of those who serve in judicial posts cease by:

(...)

9.- Having been convicted, in a final judgment, of a crime that merits the penalty of disqualification for holding public offices or positions, and for having been judicially declared in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency". (The highlighting is not original).

According to a plain reading of the norm, any judicial server, at the moment they are judicially declared in a state of insolvency, must have their functions terminated. That is to say, the legal operator is not granted any margin to assess the circumstances.

In that sense, as the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic states, the conduct provided for in the norm (insolvency) has a burdensome consequence (termination of appointment), therefore the constitutional principles of reasonableness and proportionality are applicable to it, upon which this Tribunal has established the parameters that allow for their analysis.

The Chamber, through judgment no. [Valor 084] of 12:06 p.m. on October 2, 1998, held:

"IX.- Regarding the constitutional principle of reasonableness. The principle of reasonableness arises from the so-called "substantive due process", that is, public acts must contain a substratum of intrinsic justice. When it comes to the restriction of certain rights, this rule imposes the duty that said limitation must be justified by a sufficiently weighty reason to legitimize its contradiction with the general principle of equality.

A rights-limiting act is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: it must be necessary, suitable, and proportionate. The necessity of a measure directly refers to the existence of a factual basis that makes it necessary to protect a particular right or set of rights of the community—or a specific group—by adopting a differentiating measure. That is to say, that if said action is not carried out, important public interests will be harmed. If the limitation is not necessary, it cannot be considered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally valid. Suitability, for its part, entails a judgment regarding whether the type of restriction to be adopted fulfills or not the purpose of satisfying the detected need. The unsuitability of the measure would indicate to us that there may be other mechanisms that better solve the existing need, some of which might fulfill the proposed purpose without restricting the enjoyment of the right in question. In turn, proportionality sends us to a necessary comparison between the purpose pursued by the act and the type of restriction imposed or intended to be imposed, so that the limitation is not of a markedly greater magnitude than the benefit sought to be obtained for the benefit of the community. Of the last two elements, it could be said that the first is based on a qualitative judgment, while the second starts from a quantitative comparison of the two objects analyzed." (Sentence number [Valor 085], of four thirty-three in the afternoon on December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-eight)".

Subsequently, the Chamber, through judgment no. [Valor 111] of 4:31 p.m. on March 21, 2012 (A Calzada (VS), LP Mora (VS), G Armijo, F Cruz, F Castillo (VS), P Rueda and R Guerrero), specified the scope of the principle of reasonableness, in the following terms:

"V.- THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS. This so-called principle in reality constitutes a "reasonableness test", a protocol aimed at objectivizing, to a certain degree, the reflective process by which the judge concludes that a certain measure is unreasonable or disproportionate. "What is reasonable" is certainly a matter of appreciation that, nevertheless, can and must be argued so that it is at least plausible. The point is to propose a methodology for the application of such a principle, which is useful for presenting the arguments used to qualify something as reasonable or not. Said methodology contains the following elements: a) legitimacy, in the sense that the measure does not evidently violate any legally hierarchical superior mandate; b) suitability, in that the measure effectively serves to achieve the intended purpose; c) necessity implies that among several suitable measures, the one least harmful must be chosen; and d) the so-called "proportionality in the strict sense", which requires that under no circumstances should the essential content of a constitutional right be affected in a normative balancing process. It is clarified that for the majority doctrinal sector, the element of legitimacy is conceived rather as a prerequisite. This protocol is applied in phases, so that if the examination of a first phase is unsatisfactory, it becomes unnecessary to continue with the study of the rest of the aspects, although, in some cases, for greater forcefulness of the decision, it is possible to delve into it." Thus, according to the jurisprudence of the Chamber, a rights-limiting act (such as the termination of functions of a public server for having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency) is reasonable when it meets a triple condition: necessary, suitable, and proportionate. Likewise, for such purposes, it must also satisfactorily overcome the elements of the reasonableness test: legitimacy, suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the strict sense.

In this regard, it is necessary to point out that Article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes quite dissimilar scenarios among themselves as causes for the termination of functions of persons serving in judicial posts, so one cannot speak of any single purpose of that article. Now, specifically from subsection 9 of that numeral, it is observed that it incorporates both a conviction for a crime that merits the penalty of disqualification for holding public office and a judicial declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency. There is no doubt that the first part responds to the penalty for a crime, thus configuring a material impossibility to exercise the office; however, the fact of having been judicially declared in a state of insolvency does not, by itself and in a general manner, justify the termination of functions of any official of the Judicial Branch.

Regarding the purpose of this last cause, the parties raise three positions in this action:

• 1)The plaintiff maintains that in the legislative record, on the occasion of the amendment that gave rise to the wording of subsection 9) of Article 26 that was subsequently approved, no reference whatsoever was made to the motive, end, or underlying reason that would have justified the express inclusion of the "termination that is the subject of this action". He mentions that the discussion related to the disciplinary causes for which the service relationship can be concluded revolved around the fact that permanence should prevail, except when "gravely inconvenient for the judicial service" or "doubts exist as to his/her correctness". He notes that the record contains the opinion issued by the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration, in which, expressly, the elimination of the cause of insolvency and bankruptcy contained in Article 26, subsection 9.) in reference was requested, in the following terms: "Regarding bankrupts and insolvents, they possess conditions which, if they do not influence the employment relationship with the institution, should in no way be taken as causes to dismiss a judicial server; if this were permitted, it would be punishing based on a mere risk".

He states that there is also a legislative discussion on the scope of the disciplinary regime, in which Deputy Allan Solano, with reference to the cause of insolvency and bankruptcy as a ground for termination of appointment, criticizes that a "sanction for mere convenience or risk" constitutes a cause and on aspects of "private life." He refers to a discussion between Deputy Santana Esquivel and the then Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora, as members of the Joint Legislative Subcommittee, in which they analyzed the pertinence of the opinion issued by the Legislative Commission on Government and Administration regarding the cause in Article 26, subsection 9) of repeated reference, in order to decide, definitively, whether to keep or modify said cause: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are the ones responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within the State's institutions. That is why it has been deemed that a person who is declared insolvent there represents a certain loss of confidence, given that they have been unable to manage their economic assets and may eventually have at their disposal the management of the citizenry's economic assets. That is the only observation I could make regarding whether to choose to eliminate it or not maintain it; my recommendation is to maintain the provision that those in a state of bankruptcy or insolvency cannot serve as judicial officials. DEPUTY SANTANA ESQUIVEL: Let us continue then. We will keep this article as it is [...]." He argues that the justification of former Magistrate Mora Mora was the reason given for maintaining the cause for termination related to insolvency, and that in it, reference was made to the jurisdictional work of the Judicial Branch without assessing the administrative functions, to the existence of "a certain loss of confidence" with such a declaration, and that they "may eventually have at their disposal economic resources." He contends that the foregoing exposes an empty and unfounded argument, since not all judicial staff fit that assumption; and, furthermore, the existence of a reason that seriously harms the institutional service work is not proven.

• 2)The Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice argues that, according to the discussion that took place in legislative instances when the general reform to the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial) was being analyzed, former Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora Mora noted that "judicial employees must be protected with a certain degree of trust from the public because, at the end of the day, we are the ones responsible for resolving all kinds of discord that exist between the citizenry and the State and within the State's institutions. That is why it has been deemed that a person who is declared insolvent there represents a certain loss of confidence, given that they have been unable to manage their economic assets…". She notes that the foregoing falls within the disciplinary authority that the Judicial Branch has with respect to its staff, which is necessary as an instrument guaranteeing the citizen that they will receive quality, agile, effective, and efficient public service, equipped with an adequate organization and highly qualified judicial staff for the performance of their duties. She explains that a mere danger or simple risk is not sanctioned for aspects of mere judicial convenience, by virtue of the fact that the rule is provided for when a declaration of bankruptcy or insolvency is decreed in court, that is, there is an entire judicial process in which issues related to non-compliance with credit obligations assumed by the debtor party are discussed and conclude in that declaration; in addition to the imposition of a series of measures or restrictions so that the person can resolve that situation. She adds that the legislator deemed that the foregoing implies a situation of mistrust and sought the probity of the judicial staff member to be certain that they are responsible with their obligations, both labor-related and in their private life. She asserts that the imposition of this type of sanctions has an absolute scope of the principle of legality for incurring conduct prohibited by a rule, which is not consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff when she affirms that the rule allows sanctioning a mere danger or a simple risk.
• 3)The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República) states that from the analysis of the legislative file, it is evident that the intention of the challenged rule was always to declare a "loss of confidence" of the judicial official "who has been unable to manage their economic assets and may eventually have at their disposal the management of the citizenry's economic assets" (see statements of Magistrate Luis Paulino Mora at folios [Valor 075] and [Valor 076] of the legislative file). It mentions that the intention was to direct the rule at officials who administered justice or who, by the nature of their position, should be required to have adequate management of their personal assets.

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that a completely clear purpose is not accredited regarding the incorporation of the judicial declaration of insolvency as an automatic cause for termination of duties of any judicial staff member. While it would not be illegitimate to impose this cause on certain positions within the Judicial Branch due to the functions they perform, no objective justification is apparent that supports the generic scope given to the subsection. Note that, in the legislative discussions to which the plaintiff refers and which are partially taken up by the Vice President of the Supreme Court of Justice, reference is made to "a certain loss of confidence in him [referring to the judicial employee in charge of resolving discords], given that he has not been able to manage his economic assets"; however, no express justification for the general scope of the cause and no assessment of concrete circumstances is documented. In addition, the Chamber shares the position of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in considering that the judicial declaration of insolvency, to constitute a valid cause for termination of duties, must have some repercussion on the Judicial Branch or on the trust held in the official, which undoubtedly implies taking into consideration the nature of the positions and the possibility of assessing exemptions or mitigating factors that may have concurred in the reason for the declaration.

On this last point, while the judicial declaration of insolvency is an aspect that can be a matter of interest in a public employment relationship, it cannot be contemplated in absolute terms. For example, it is possible that, due to a situation beyond the judicial staff member's control, such a declaration does not correspond to poor management of their assets but rather is a consequence of debts incurred to attend to an illness or emergency, or is due to force majeure. Furthermore, there could be a case in which the duties of the judicial staff member neither put the Judicial Branch at risk nor affect it.

Therefore, if the consequence of the cause is so severe (termination of duties) and there is no justification extending its application to any official of the Judicial Branch (without even granting the possibility of demonstrating the lack of danger or impact, or the concurrence of exemptions or mitigating factors), the violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality becomes evident. In that sense, a priori, the necessity (that there exists a factual basis making it precise to protect some good or set of goods through the adoption of a measure), suitability (that the adopted restriction fulfills the purpose of satisfying the detected necessity), and proportionality (that the limitation is not of a markedly higher degree than the benefit intended to be obtained for the benefit of the community) of the act limiting rights is not accredited. Thus, with the application of the reasonableness test, although a clear violation of legitimacy is not appreciated, the examination of suitability, necessity, and "proportionality in the strict sense" does not yield a satisfactory result, since, respectively, it was not verified that: 1) the measure serves to achieve the intended purpose (which, in any case, is not even entirely clear); 2) that among several measures, the least harmful was chosen (only absolute termination is provided, regardless of the position or the circumstances); and 3) that the essential content of a constitutional right has not been affected in the normative weighting (the generic provision of termination of duties without any justification violates the essential content of the right to work of the staff members, as it automatically suppresses it without assessing the circumstances of each case).

In addition, the analysis made by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic is shared, in pointing out that, based on the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, any grievous consequence in the sphere of the individual must constitute a measure strictly necessary to achieve the sought objective, and that the principle of proportionality requires the prior establishment by the legislator of the limits within which the legal operator may move to interpret the rule in consideration of the concrete circumstances. Likewise, as the advisory body states, the administrative authority must have a margin of discretion granted by the legislator to guarantee that the grievous consequence is only applied when it is reasonable and proportional to the originating cause. Precisely, the current wording of the rule does not admit various types of interpretation, but rather its content necessarily mandates that it be applied to any person who meets that assumption; that is, the problem does not arise from an incorrect application of the rule but from its application in the terms provided by the legislator, which does not admit, as already stated, any margin for a hermeneutics that tempers its scope.

Based on the foregoing, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the phrase "or insolvency" ("o insolvencia") contained in subsection 9) of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is appropriate, as it is contrary to the principles of proportionality and reasonableness.

As there are sufficient reasons to declare the unconstitutionality of the reference to "insolvency" ("insolvencia") in subsection 9 of numeral 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, it becomes unnecessary to rule on the rest of the claims, just as has been the thesis of this Chamber in numerous matters from the outset (see judgments numbers [Valor 086], [Valor 087], [Valor 088], [Valor 089], [Valor 090], [Valor 091], among others).

Finally, it is worth remembering that the Judicial Branch has a normative body to address the unjustified non-compliance with financial obligations and commitments that compromise good public service due to the magnitude of the risk or the good image of the institution. Such cases can be channeled through disciplinary procedures with the consequences that the legal system establishes according to the circumstances, evidentiary elements, and legal assessment in the particular situation. In this sense, for example, ordinal 192, subsection 9, and numeral 194 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch provide:

"Article 192.- The following are considered serious offenses: (...) 9.- The unjustified non-payment of a credit obligation, which must be attended to as the principal debtor and is being collected through judicial means.

Article 194.- Any other infraction or negligence in the fulfillment of the duties inherent to the position, not provided for in the preceding articles, shall be heard by the competent bodies, in order to examine whether they constitute a very serious, serious, or minor offense, for the purpose of applying the disciplinary regime. For this, the actions indicated in the preceding articles shall be taken as a reference." VI.- Documentation provided to the case file. The parties are warned that if they have provided any paper document, as well as objects or evidence contained in any additional electronic, computer, magnetic, optical, telematic device or one produced by new technologies, these must be withdrawn from the office within a maximum period of 30 working days counted from the notification of this judgment. Otherwise, all material not withdrawn within this period will be destroyed, as provided in the "Regulation on Electronic Case Files before the Judicial Branch" ("Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial"), approved by the Full Court in session No. 27-11 of August 22, 2011, article XXVI and published in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial) number 19 of January 26, 2012, as well as in the agreement approved by the Superior Council of the Judicial Branch (Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial), in session No. 43-12 held on May 3, [Valor 027] 12, article LXXXI.

Therefore:

The action is partially granted for violation of the principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Consequently, the phrase "or insolvency" ("o insolvencia") contained in subsection 9 of article 26 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch is declared unconstitutional. The judgment has declaratory and retroactive effects to the effective date of the annulled law, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith. Regarding the alleged transgression of numeral 12 of the same normative body, the action is declared inadmissible. This ruling shall be summarized in the Official Gazette La Gaceta and published in full in the Judicial Bulletin. This ruling shall be notified to the plaintiff, to the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la República), and to the President of the Supreme Court of Justice.

D._{Fernando Castillo V.} President </td></tr><tr> </td> D._{Paul Rueda L.} </td> </td></tr></table> I don't see any Spanish legal text in your message to translate. The content appears to be base64-encoded image data and HTML table formatting.

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Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Digitally Signed Document -- Verification code -- *HD43IVXXEHFK61* Telephones: 2549-1500 / 800-SALA-4TA (800-7252-482). Fax: 2295-3712 / 2549-1633. Email: www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional. Address: (Sabana Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Reception of matters from vulnerable groups: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6

*180165910007CO* Res. Nº 2020017611 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las nueve horas veinte minutos del dieciseis de setiembre de dos mil veinte .

Acción de inconstitucionalidad interpuesta por [Nombre 001], contra los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial n.o 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 7:34 horas de 22 de agosto de 2018, [Nombre 001] interpone acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial n.o 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, por estimarlos contrarios a los numerales 28, 39 y 56 de la Constitución Política, así como a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Indica que plantea la acción conforme al inciso a del artículo 73 y al numeral 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su carácter personal y su condición de servidora judicial. Acrecito lo anterior con el puesto en propiedad de Coordinadora de Unidad 2. Acota que desde el 1o de marzo de 2017 asumió la Coordinación de la Unidad de Gestión Administrativa de la Dirección de Plantificación y desde el 21 de febrero de 2018 fue ascendida como Coordinadora de Unidad 3 del Subproceso de Evaluación de la Dirección de Planificación. Aclara que este último puesto lo funge “ en sustitución”. Expone que el asunto previo es una causa sancionatoria disciplinaria que se encuentre en estado recursivo de agotamiento de la vía ante el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial. Refiere que tal causa se sustenta en el numeral 209 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y es seguida en su contra por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial en el Judicial. Menciona que remite certificación del recurso de apelación en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad. Explica que el órgano instructor del procedimiento sustentó la intimación de cargos en que perdió la condición para ser funcionaria del Poder Judicial por “ haber sido declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia”, conforme lo dispuesto en el inciso 9 del artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Manifiesta que la intimación de la causa administrativa se fundamentó en la denuncia incoada por [Nombre 002] y [Nombre 003], por su orden coordinadora de Unidad y jefa de Administración Salarial del Departamento de Gestión Humana, quienes, mediante oficio n.o [Valor 016], comunicaron al Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial el proceso jurisdiccional tramitado en el n.[Valor 002] del Juzgado Civil de Cartago, en el que ella, como promovente, solicitó la declaratoria del concurso civil de insolvencia. Arguye que en ese proceso se dictó la sentencia de primera instancia n.° [Valor 042] de las 14:38 horas de 8 de agosto de 2017, por medio de la cual se le declaró en estado de insolvencia por deudas contraídas con diferentes entidades bancarias y crediticias por la suma de ¢81.321.557,04 colones. Asevera que ella fue la promovente del proceso judicial y no hubo concurso de acreedores en su contra. Sostiene que, ante la posibilidad jurídica que le otorga el ordenamiento jurídico civil, planteó el proceso para buscar una solución a su situación económica y financiera, para así generar un cumplimiento regulado judicialmente y satisfacer todas sus deudas. Indica que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, mediante voto n.o [Valor 018] de 4 de octubre de 2018, dispuso la revocatoria de su nombramiento, al considerar su estado de insolvencia como una conducta gravísima en virtud de lo contemplado en el inciso 9 del artículo 26, en los siguientes términos: "[...] resulta imperioso que todos sus funcionarios y servidores sean personas probas y con altos niveles de compromiso, responsabilidad, honestidad, lealtad, decoro y buena fe, entendidas como aquellas conductas ejecutadas de forma transparente a partir de la confianza que se les deposita [...que] es con sustento en ese valor de probidad, que se presenta esa potestad autorizada y debe encaminarse a valorar las conductas y acciones desplegadas por toda la población judicial, incluso en su ámbito privado [...que] la relación laboral debe ser una relación de confianza donde el servidor sea una persona en la que se pueda confiar, en la que se pueda depositar el cuidado de los bienes, máxime los de un ente público, por lo que se necesita tener garantía de que la persona contratada es honrada y responsable de sus actos [...que] un funcionario público no sólo puede ser sancionado administrativamente por faltas a normas expresas, sino por la realización de actos inmorales que afectan el servicio público o con ocasión de este, o que siendo en su ámbito privado resultan incompatibles con la función pública encomendada, [...argumentando que] es mediante la sujeción a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y normas conexas, que todos sus servidores son fiscalizados mediante la vigilancia de su accionar y su comportamiento tanto en el desarrollo de sus funciones, como en su vida privada. (Ver Art. 28 inciso 2. de la Ley citada y numeral 49 del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial inciso c)". Señala que el alcance normativo específico que se impugna como inconstitucional es la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia contenida en los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9 de la ley supra mencionada. Arguye que lo anterior, por acción y omisión, infringen normas y principios constitucionales. Acota que tales numerales disponen: “Artículo 12.- Sin perjuicio de los otros requisitos exigidos por la ley, para ingresar al servicio judicial se requiere estar capacitado, mental y físicamente, para desempeñar la función, según su naturaleza. Sin embargo, no podrán ser nombradas las personas contra quienes haya recaído auto firme de apertura a juicio, tampoco los condenados por delito a pena de prisión, los que estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos; ni los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia, los que habitualmente ingieran bebidas alcohólicas en forma excesiva, consuman drogas no autorizadas o tengan trastornos graves de conducta, de modo que puedan afectar la continuidad y la eficiencia del servicio." (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar el contenido central y relevante que se impugna mediante la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad) "Artículo 26.- En cumplimiento de las condiciones y procedimientos que establece esta Ley, las funciones de los que sirven puestos judiciales cesan por: [...] 9.- Haber sido condenado, en sentencia firme, por algún delito que merezca pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos, y por haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de quiebra o insolvencia." (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar el contenido central y relevante que se impugna mediante la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad)”. Afirma que resulta contrario al Derecho de la Constitución que en tales artículos se establezca la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para que el cese de su nombramiento sin dejar un margen de discrecionalidad o valoración, hasta excusable, que generó esa condición y, ante todo, sin valorar elementos ni los “principios de congruencia, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad causal, finalidad legítima, buena fe, necesidad familiar, intimidad, valoración de una pérdida de confianza objetiva debidamente acreditada frente a las funciones que desempeño, existencia de afectación real a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, así como tampoco la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial, aspectos de género, entre otros, todo ello frente a la existencia o no de una afectación a la continuidad y la eficiencia del servicio judicial, como sí se valora y define para otras causales en esos mismos artículos, conforme puede leerse literalmente en la trascripción realizada de esos artículos ”. Destaca que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, en el voto n.o [Valor 018] , la catalogó por la declaratoria de insolvencia que promovió, como una funcionaria carente de probidad, sin compromiso, responsabilidad, honestidad, lealtad, decoro ni buena fe y que, por ello, hay una relación de desconfianza, al considerar que el Poder Judicial “necesita tener garantía de que la persona contratada es honrada y responsable de sus actos ”; además, consideró esa actuación como incompatible con la función pública. Añade que en la causa seguida en el expediente n.o [Valor 001], al considerar la causal de pleno derecho, no se entraron a valorar tales aspectos e incluso se le rechazó la prueba que solicitó incorporar. Aduce que la valoración que efectúa el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial no determina la existencia real de alguna afectación grave al servicio judicial, la imagen institucional o el interés público, sino que castiga únicamente un eventual riesgo infundado o la mera conveniencia. Refiere que aceptar lo anterior significaría su cese de su puesto en propiedad de Profesional 2 en Administración Pública, asignada a la Sección de Proyección Institucional de la Dirección de Planificación del Poder Judicial, en el que se ha desempeñado de forma intachable por más de 23 años. Expone los siguientes antecedentes para el análisis de la acción de inconstitucionalidad: “ Con motivo de lo ya expuesto, resulta relevante poner en Conocimiento de esta Honorable Sala Constitucional, el resultado de la investigación realizada sobre la causal de cese laboral o de servicio con motivo de una declaratoria judicial de insolvencia. Para ello, se analizó el Proyecto de Ley N° 10.753, sea lo que fue el proyecto de ley de la actual Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Ley N" 7333, que nos permite demostrar el análisis, discusión y dictámenes de comisiones legislativas y subcomisiones mixtas integradas por diputados y magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia del momento, lo cual refleja, como hecho histórico de alta relevancia, el espíritu del legislador de las normas impugnadas. Así mismo, se expondrá sí la causal que se impugna por este medio existe o no en la normativa que regula las relaciones de servicio público y laboral, tanto en el sector público, (-en específico en el Poder Ejecutivo, Poder Legislativo, Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y Registro Civil, Sistema Bancario Nacional, Contraloría General de la República, Procuraduría General de la República-1, así como en el privado. i.) Proyecto de Ley No 10.753.-Mediante este Proyecto de Ley, los señores diputados de ese momento histórico legislativo, conocieron y discutieron lo que iba a ser la hoy conocida Ley No 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Debe indicarse, como aspecto relevante, que ese Proyecto de Ley, debido a la envergadura y especificidad de su contenido, así como a su relevancia nacional e institucional para el Poder Judicial, generó que fuera analizado y discutido en su texto original y lo relativo a la aprobación y/o rechazo de mociones, -tendente a conformar textos sustitutivos-, por una subcomisión mixta legislativa nombrada al efecto y compuesta por diversos diputados con el apoyo de magistrados del Poder Judicial, como fueron el Dr. Daniel González, el Dr. Luis Paulino Mora, entre otros. Del análisis e investigación del contenido de ese Proyecto de Ley se obtuvo como aspectos de importancia para esta acción de inconstitucionalidad lo siguiente: ü A folios [Valor 019] (imágenes [Valor 020] ), se ubica el contenido de redacción original del artículo 12 que refiere a la causal de "los insolventes" como impedimento general para ser nombrado. ü A folios [Valor 021] (imágenes [Valor 022] ), se ubica la redacción original del artículo 26 inciso 9.1, que simplemente establecía en su contenido la referencia de incurrir en cualquiera de los motivos del artículo 12, como causales de cese de nombramiento. üA folios [Valor 023] (imágenes [Valor 024], se identifica una discusión entre el diputado en calidad de presidente de esa subcomisión mixta legislativa y el magistrado Daniel González, con relación al tema de insolvencia y quiebra como causal, en donde puede notarse que el diputado refiere a la causal por la existencia de 'un asunto de fe pública', señalando que se trata de una persona que no ha sabido administrar sus negocios y que después pretende optar por ingresar al servicio judicial, por lo que en su argumentación convierte esa situación en un aspecto de 'no conveniencia', más si ha habido (-refiere-) "quiebra fraudulenta, o sea, se ha incurrido en un delito penal". El Magistrado González, refiere a la existencia de una declaratoria judicial de insolvencia que no necesariamente es la conceptualización de la persona que le haya ido mal en los negocios, sino de aquella a quien se le administran sus bienes judicialmente.ü A folio [Valor 025] (imagen [Valor 026] ) consta la discusión legislativa sobre las diferentes causales de los artículos invocados, en donde se resalta que les interesaba el servicio y la administración de justicia, discusión que por supuesto involucra el tema central de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, sea la declaratoria de insolvencia, en el que se hace referencia a que debe entenderse la idea básica de las causales, para que quede absolutamente claro, que es aplicable en el tanto esas circunstancias 'afecten el servicio público'.ü A folios [Valor 027], [Valor 028] , [Valor 029] (imágenes [Valor 030] , [Valor 031], [Valor 032]), se evidencia la moción No [Valor 035] planteada por el diputado Ovidio Pacheco, tendente a modificar la redacción del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia y, para lo que interesa, en donde se dispone, entre otros, incluir expresamente a 'los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra e insolvencia' como causal de cese de nombramiento, redacción a la postre aprobada y vigente a la fecha;ü A folios [Valor 033] (imagen [Valor 034] ), conoce la comisión mixta legislativa la indicada moción N° [Valor 035] y se discute su contenido. Para esos efectos, consta en el expediente legislativo que el diputado Ovidio Pacheco, no hace referencia alguna al motivo, fin o causa de fondo que justifique incluir expresamente la causal que es objeto de esta acción, sino que su justificación es meramente por un asunto de forma para que no se haga referencia al artículo 12, ante lo cual, ese aspecto de forma fue valorado afirmativamente considerando que "la moción tiende a aclarar por lo menos, cuáles son las verdaderas causas por las que se puede cesar a un funcionario judicial". Se insiste, para los efectos de dicha moción, no consta el motivo, fin o causa de fondo idónea que justificara el incluir expresamente la causal de cese que es objeto de esta acción. ü A folios [Valor 036] (imagen [Valor 037]), consta la discusión legislativa relacionada con las causales disciplinarias, y expresamente refieren a aquellas por las cuales puede concluir la relación de servicio por ese motivo, destacando la referencia al interés en el servicio público de las funciones judiciales, ante lo cual priva la permanencia del funcionario, salvo cuando resulte 'gravemente inconveniente para el servicio judicial', así como cuando, con motivo de ello, 'existan dudas sobre su corrección' .ü A folio [Valor 080] (imagen [Valor 081]), consta ya agregada, como texto sustitutivo, la causal que es objeto de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad dispuesta en el artículo 26 inciso 9.). ü A folio [Valor 082] (imagen [Valor 065] ), debe destacarse el dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración , en el cual, de forma solicitan que se elimine la causal de insolvencia y quiebra contenido en el artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia . El elemento justificativo y explicativo que manifiestan los legisladores es el siguiente: "Respecto a los quebradas e insolventes, ostentan condiciones que de no influir en la relación laboral con la institución para nada tienen que tomarse como causales para cesar a un servidor judicial, de permitirse esto se estaría sancionando por un mero peligro". (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad). ü A folio [Valor 038] (imagen [Valor 039] ), consta discusión legislativa sobre los alcances del régimen disciplinario, en la cual se resalta el criterio del diputado Allan Solano, en el que, con referencia a la causal de insolvencia y quiebra como motivo de cese de nombramiento, critica que se constituya en una causal la 'sanción por mera conveniencia o riesgo' y sobre aspectos de 'la vida privada'. ü A folios [Valor 040] (imagen [Valor 041] ) aparece la discusión de diputado Santana Esquivel y del Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora, como miembros de la Subcomisión Mixta Legislativa, en la que analizan la pertinencia del dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración sobre la causal del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de reiterada referencia, a efectos de decidir, en definitiva, si conservan o modifican dicha causal. Para esos efectos, es de alto interés citar textualmente lo manifestado por ellos al respecto, de la siguiente forma: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado y dentro de las instituciones del Estado, es por eso que se ha estimado que la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía y es por eso que resulta tradicional encontrar normas de esta índole. Esa es la única observación que yo podría hacer al efecto de que se opte por eliminar o no mantenerla, mi recomendación es mantener la existencia de que los que están en el estado de quiebra o insolvencia no puedan desempeñarse como funcionarios judiciales. DIPUTADO SANTANA ESQUIVEL; Vamos a continuar entonces. Este artículo lo vamos a mantener tal y como está [...]". (-lo subrayado no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-) Como puede observarse con total claridad, es la justificación del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora la que da motivo para que legislativamente se defina mantener la causal de cese indicada en el artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia, y consecuentemente la definida en el artículo 12 de esa misma ley, argumentación que se centra en los siguientes aspectos: a.) Al referir a 'resolución de discordias', solo justifica la labor jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, y omite, y con ello demás no se valora legislativamente, la relación de servicio judicial de orden administrativo, a como es la labor de mi desempeño judicial como Coordinadora de Unidad; b.) Señala la existencia de 'una cierta pérdida de confianza' con motivo de que el funcionario judicial sea declarado en insolvencia, es decir, castigaría con el cese al nombramiento en el servicio judicial, por una conducta cuya apreciación no comprueba de forma efectiva, objetiva, causal, directa, consustanciada, proporcional ni razonable, la existencia de un motivo que perjudique gravemente la labor institucional de servicio, así como ante la ciudadanía, todo ello acreditado frente a las funciones que desempeño, con independencia de mi estado de insolvencia. Se insiste, no solo debe valorarse en la labor jurisdiccional, sino además en lo que incumbe a mi persona, sea en el desempeño de una labor administrativa. Expresa además que 'eventualmente va a tener la disposición de recursos económicos', por lo que nuevamente deja al descubierto una argumentación vacía y sin fundamento técnico, real, veraz, idóneo ni causal frente al perjuicio grave de la labor institucional de Servicio, toda vez que, en la relación de servicio judicial de orden administrativo, no todos los servidores judiciales encasillamos en ese supuesto. Ese es mi caso, debido a que en el desempeño de mis funciones como Coordinadora de Unidad de la Dirección de Planificación, no tengo como función asignada ni consecuentemente me desempeño administrando, ni custodiando, ni controlando, ni disponiendo, bajo ningún título, recursos económicos del Poder Judicial ni evidentemente de la ciudadanía con ocasión de mi función, como para que se crea, ni mucho menos acredite por ningún medio, con ello, que existe un perjuicio grave al servicio judicial. Adicionalmente, manifiesto ante su Autoridad conocer mis deberes y responsabilidades en el servicio judicial, lo cual se acredita con mi servicio judicial intachable con más de 23 años de servicio, además, no ha existido en el pasado, ni existe de forma actual, denuncia ni procedimiento alguno contra mi persona tendente a demostrar que haya incurrido en una falta de servicio por un uso inadecuado de fondos públicos y que ello se deba, causalmente, a la situación económica-financiera que lamentablemente me ocurrió y que generó la insolvencia por los motivos que sirvieron de defensa en la causa que tramita el Tribunal de la inspección Judicial. Acredito además ante su Autoridad, que la causa penal que de oficio se inicia por mandato normativo, con motivo de la declaratoria de insolvencia, tendente a que se investigara si incurrí en el delito de insolvencia fraudulenta, fue señalado en archivo fiscal por no existir determinación alguna de la existencia de actos, montos ni transacciones tipificadas como fraudulentas, situación así definida por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, según informe [Valor 004] para la denuncia No [Valor 005] del número único de expediente [Valor 006], confirmándose nuevamente que mi actuación estuvo apegada a la legislación civil según la posibilidad que esa normativa brinda para enfrentar administradamente la cancelación de mis deudas, así como, que tuve que acceder a ese proceso judicial por acto propio y con motivo de la situación económica apremiante que enfrentaba. Que el aspecto 'tradicional' que se argumenta existir en otra normativa, para que se contenga la causal impugnada en esta sede, no debe ser la regla para equiparar su aplicabilidad como motivo de cese al servicio judicial, más aún, por cuanto, va a quedar demostrado más adelante, que la causal de insolvencia no es concebida en otra normativa de la forma en que lo regula la Ley N° 7333, por lo que esta argumentación se convierte a la vez en un fundamento carente de lógica, veracidad e idoneidad causal frente al perjuicio grave de la labor institucional de servicio judicial, que nunca ha existido de mi parte, y que la técnica legislativa no consideró, más aun tratándose de materia disciplinaria sancionatoria, cuyo sacrificio causa la afectación a mi persona con la pérdida del trabajo. De la investigación y constancia documental que integra el expediente legislativo del Proyecto de Ley No 10.753, puede concluirse con total certeza que la inclusión de la causal de insolvencia como motivo para no ser nombrado y el de declarar el cese del nombramiento en el servicio judicial se encuentra injustificada e infundada, más aún por cuanto no resulta acorde con el complejo normativo de la materia disciplinaria que regula la Ley No 7333 en su conjunto, tendente a la demostración, previo debido proceso, de una afectación grave al servicio judicial, así como tampoco la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial, como elemento primordial para la aplicación sancionatoria de la causal impugnada, que, como es visible, en mi caso significaría el sacrificio mayor de la pérdida de mi trabajo y la afectación personal y de quienes dependen económicamente de mí, todo ello, pero una mera expectativa de un supuesto riesgo, que en mi caso es inexistente, ni ha sido valorado por la inspección judicial, va que aplican la causal de pleno derecho. Como quedó demostrado, y así fue advertido por varias instancias dentro del trámite legislativo de ese proyecto de ley, se acusó que permitir esa causal, conforme se consigna, significaría sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo, por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial, aspecto carente de demostración frente a decisiones de necesidad que involucra aspectos de la vida privada, que no influyen en el servicio judicial, en mi caso ni de forma leve, ni mucho menos grave ni gravísimo. Este aspecto, traté de demostrarlo en el procedimiento administrativo ante el Tribunal de la inspección Judicial, no obstante, mediante auto del 18 de octubre del 2017 me rechazaron la prueba testimonial y técnica que ofrecí en ese sentido al considerar que "[...] no guardan relación con lo acusado en el traslado de cargos, obsérvese que en este procedimiento disciplinario sancionatorio no están en discusión las causas que motivaron que se declarara la insolvencia de la acusada, ello fue analizado en el proceso judicial respectivo. Tampoco se le está reprochando incumplimiento alguno en el ejercicio de su cargo de forma tal que se rechaza la prueba testimonial ofrecida [...]". En ese sentido, nótese, como ya se dijo, que el Tribunal de la Inspección judicial considera el procedimiento disciplinario como de puro derecho, sin considerar otros aspectos relevantes en la relación de servicio, en aplicación taxativa de la medida regulada en el artículo 26 inciso 9.) de esa Ley, dando a la porte (sic) como resultado el Voto No [Valor 018] que dispuso la revocatoria de mi nombramiento al considerar la insolvencia declarada como falta gravísima sin demostrar en ese procedimiento disciplinario, -como ya se dijo-, de forma real esa falta gravísima con motivo comprobado de afectación al servicio que brindo al Poder Judicial, así como tampoco a la imagen institucional, u otro similar, sino por disposición expresa del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de reiterada mención. Nótese, frente a ello, que Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, mediante en el Voto N° [Valor 018], en el que dispuso la revocatoria de mi nombramiento por aplicación expresa del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de reiterado comentario, dispone que incurrí en una conducta gravísima por mi estado de insolvencia. Para esa valoración conclusiva de la existencia de 'conducta gravísima' se sustenta además en los artículos 28 inciso 2. de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el 49 inciso c. del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial, que disponen: "Articulo 28.- Podrá ser destituido de su cargo, siguiendo el procedimiento establecido y con la previa oportunidad de defensa, el servidor: [...] 2.-Que, por incorrecciones o fallas en el ejercicio de su cargo o en su vida privada, que pueden afectar el buen servicio o la imagen del Poder Judicial, se haya hecho acreedor a esa sanción" “Artículo 49.- Además de los deberes específicos que establece la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, los servidores judiciales tendrán los siguientes: […] c) Observar dignidad en el desempeño de su cargo y en su vida privada". Como puede notarse, esa normativa refiere de forma directa a una afectación al 'buen servicio o a la imagen del Poder Judicial', así como a observar 'dignidad', aspectos que no fueron demostrados durante el procedimiento para la decisión adoptada, no obstante que de una forma subjetiva, abusiva, infundada y de simple argumentación determinan, en su entender, que no soy una persona proba, ni con altos niveles de compromiso, ni de responsabilidad, ni de honestidad, ni de lealtad, ni con decoro ni buena fe, por la pérdida de confianza que genera el estado de insolvencia al carecer del valor de probidad. Nótese que en el mismo Voto No [Valor 018] el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, solo determina como hechos probados la resolución judicial de mi estado de insolvencia, mi cantidad de anualidades al servicio del Poder Judicial v la inexistencia de sanciones disciplinarias anteriores, y no la afectación al servicio o a la imagen del Poder Judicial, ni falencias personales que afecten la dignidad, aspecto que es muy delicado definir por la protección constitucional que existe en la material en el que se privilegia, ante todo, el honor de toda persona. Llegado este punto, deseo resaltar que someterme voluntariamente al proceso de insolvencia, como lo he indicado, fue la alternativa que me brindó el ordenamiento jurídico en materia civil para alcanzar una solución a mi situación económico-financiera, generando de tal forma un cumplimiento programado y regulado judicialmente para satisfacer el cumplimiento de todas mis deudas y la satisfacción de los intereses de mis acreedores, todo ello como acto de buena fe, aspecto que fue comprobado en sede penal al determinarse que mi insolvencia no fue fraudulenta, causa que tiene estado de archivo fiscal, como más adelante se mencionará. ii.) Normativa relacionada a la inconstitucionalidad que se alega.- En este apartado, consignaremos aquella normativa de alta relevancia que dispone en su contenido la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para una aplicación disciplinaria en materia sancionatoria. La alta relevancia de la normativa que se expondrá, obedece por regular la relación de empleo en otros Poderes de la República, Entes del Sistema Bancario Nacional, Órganos Consultivo y Técnico Jurídico, así como de Control y Fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, así mismo, referiremos a normativa general específica de servicio civil y contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito, así como de sector privado. a.) Normativa que NO hace referencia ni mención alguna a la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para una aplicación disciplinaria en materia sancionatoria. Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República, N° 7428, • así como tampoco existe regulación alguna en esa materia en su Estatuto Autónomo; • Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General de la República, N" 6815, • Ley Orgánica del Banco Central de Costa Rica, N" 7558; • Reglamento Autónomo de la Asamblea Legislativa; •Reglamento al Estatuto de Servicio Civil; • Ley contra la Corrupción y el Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública, N° 8422; • Ley General de Control Interno, N° 8292. Como puede notarse, ni en la Procuraduría General de la República, ni en la Contraloría General de la República, como Órganos Consultivo y Técnico Jurídico, así como de Control y Fiscalización de la Hacienda Pública, existe regulación al respecto, así mismo, tampoco existe regulación para el Banco Central de Costa Rica, la Asamblea Legislativa, ni en general en normativa específica contra la corrupción y el enriquecimiento ilícito, ni en control interno, de tal forma que se configure la declaratoria de insolvencia como causal "tradicional" ni necesaria para evitar riesgos de responsabilidad administrativa de orden disciplinario. b.) Normativa que SÍ hace referencia a la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para una aplicación disciplinaria en materia sancionatoria, o bien, por aspectos de orden prohibitivo.- • Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y Registro Civil, N° 3504. Su artículo 27, en lo que interesa, establece: "[...] No pueden ser nombrados para desempeñar cargos en el Tribunal o en el Registro los procesados con auto de enjuiciamiento, los que estuvieren sufriendo pena de inhabilitación para cargos y oficios públicos, los condenados por delitos que merezcan prisión como pena ordinaria, los insolventes y quebrados, mientras no esté calificada de excusable la insolvencia o quiebra; los que acostumbren embriagarse; los que hubieren sido destituidos de cargos judiciales y electorales; y, en general, todos los que no observen buena conducta o tengan antecedentes de dudosa moralidad [...]". (.- lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-). Como puede notarse, en este Ente, catalogado como un cuarto Poder de la República, si bien se consigna para aspectos de nombramiento la causal en mención, solo la dispone bajo un parámetro de 'excusable', lo que permite y obliga al operador de la norma, a valorar precisamente los motivos de la declaratoria de insolvencia, la condición económico-financiera de la persona, y con ello la eventual afectación al servicio público, y por qué no, hasta su inconveniencia pero frente a un riesgo o peligro comprobado, real y efectivo en afectación al servicio público. No establece esa ley, la causal de insolvencia para efectos de cese de nombramiento. • Ley Orgánica del Sistema Bancario Nacional, No 1644. Su artículo 22, en lo que interesa, establece: "No podrán ser designados como miembros de una junta directiva: 1) Las personas que durante el año anterior a su nombramiento hayan sido demandadas en la vida ejecutiva por cualquiera de los bancos del Sistema Bancario Nacional, en cobro de créditos propios no satisfechos, o que hayan sido declaradas en estado de quiebra o insolvencia […]” (.- lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-) Nótese que en esta Ley, la causal es aplicable también para efectos de nombramiento, pero no de cualquier funcionario, sino exclusivamente para miembros de junta directiva, es decir para superiores jerarcas de la organización bancaria, estableciendo además un parámetro de valoración y limitación normativa con respecto a la declaratoria de insolvencia de 1 año anterior al nombramiento, es decir, fuera de ese plazo, por más que la causal de insolvencia exista, no resulta aplicable la prohibición de nombramiento para ese cargo superior. Es dable resaltar, que NO establece esa ley, la causal de insolvencia para efectos de cese de nombramiento, aún y cuando sea para un puesto superior, como lo es el de junta directiva de una entidad bancaria. • Ley del Estatuto del Servicio Civil, N° 1581. El artículo 8, inciso g.) de esta Ley, establece en lo que interesa, lo siguiente: "El Director General de Servicio Civil será de nombramiento del Presidente de la República, previo concurso de oposición, dependerá directamente de él y deberá reunir los siguientes requisitos: [...] g) No estar declarado en insolvencia o quiebra; y [...]". (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad). Debe resaltarse en este caso, que de igual forma a las anteriores, la regulación normativa de la causal de declaratoria de insolvencia se determina normativamente para aspectos de nombramiento, y no en general para funcionarios públicos bajo el régimen de servicio civil, sino en específico para el Director General de Servicio Civil. No establece esa ley, la causal de insolvencia para efectos de cese de nombramiento. • Código de Trabajo. En su artículo 85 inciso c.), para lo que interesa, dispone: "Son causas que terminan con el contrato de trabajo sin responsabilidad para el trabajador y sin que extingan los derechos de éste o de sus causahabientes para reclamar y obtener el pago de las prestaciones e indemnizaciones que pudieran corresponderles en virtud de lo ordenado por el Código o por disposiciones especiales: [...] c.) La fuerza mayor o el caso fortuito, la insolvencia, concurso, quiebra o liquidación judicial o extrajudicial, la incapacidad o la muerte del patrono. Esta regla sólo rige cuando los hechos a que ella se refiere produzcan como consecuencia necesaria, inmediata y directa, el cierre del negocio o la cesación definitiva de los trabajos, y cuando se haya satisfecho la preferencia legal que tienen los acreedores alimentarios del occiso, insolvente o fallido [...]". (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad) Como puede notarse de la anterior transcripción, el Código de Trabajo como norma general que regula la relación laboral para el sector privado, establece la causal de comentario, pero más bien como una causal a favor del trabajador, en el entendido de que si más bien es el patrono quien incurre en insolvencia, le faculta al trabajador a dar por terminado el contrato de trabajo, sin responsabilidad para éste, estableciendo hasta una causal condicional y de valoración para la aplicación de ese motivo normativo, como es que rige solo si se produce como consecuencia necesaria inmediata y directa, el cierre del negocio o la cesación definitiva de los trabajos. No establece esa ley, la causal de insolvencia para efectos de cese de nombramiento del trabajador”. materia civil para el pago de acreedores, en los siguientes términos: “i.) Sobre la insolvencia. El proceso civil de insolvencia, se encuentra regulado como posibilidad jurídica en los artículos 884 y siguientes del Código Civil, que para lo que interesa disponen: "Artículo 884.- Para que la insolvencia de una persona produzca todos los efectos que la ley le atribuye, es necesario que esté declarada judicialmente". "Artículo 886.- Siempre que por gestión de uno o varios acreedores se compruebe que los bienes del deudor son insuficientes para cubrir sus deudas, procede la declaratoria del concurso. La insuficiencia patrimonial se presume por el hecho de no presentar el deudor ni acusar el Registro de la Propiedad bienes bastantes para satisfacer todas sus obligaciones. También se declarará la apertura del concurso cuando lo solicite el propio deudor, si éste tuviere dos o más acreedores. " (- lo resaltado en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-) En ese mismo sentido, y para aspectos de su procedimiento, la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, se encuentra regulado en los artículos 760 y siguientes del Código Procesal Civil, que para lo que interesa disponen: "Artículo 760.- Causas. A solicitud de cualquier acreedor que compruebe que existen dos o más ejecuciones pendientes contra su deudor, originadas en títulos y acreedores diferentes, la exigibilidad de su crédito con título ejecutivo y la insuficiencia de los bienes de aquél, se decretará la apertura del concurso, si el deudor, requerido al efecto por el juzgado, no pagara o no presentara dentro de tercero día bienes suficientes en qué practicar el embargo. La resolución en la que se ordene el requerimiento será notificada personalmente o por medio de cédula en la casa de habitación del deudor. Se prescindirá del requerimiento en los casos urgentes señalados en el artículo siguiente. La comprobación de que existen dos o más ejecuciones no será necesaria si la apertura la piden dos o más acreedores. Igual declaratoria se hará a solicitud del deudor, quien deberá presentar un detalle de su activo y pasivo, o expresar las razones que le impidan hacerlo, y presentará también sus libros, Si los llevare". (- lo resaltado en negrita no es del Original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-). En ese entendido, la doctrina ha establecido que la insolvencia es "[...] El estado del deudor que carece de bienes suficientes para satisfacer sus obligaciones vencidas, se llama insolvencia. No se trata de que la persona falte al pago de una o más obligaciones, sino que lo que determina la insolvencia es la falta de bienes suficientes para afrontar las deudas [...]". (- Ickowez Faingezicht, Roxana. 1999 pp. 29) Por su parte la jurisprudencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, sobre este tema ha señalado que: "Al analizar la situación económica del deudor que tiene una pluralidad de acreedores y un patrimonio insuficiente, lo que justifica la ejecución colectiva, en aplicación del artículo 982 del Código Civil, debe estarse, en cuanto a los acreedores, a su existencia como tales, sin atender a la naturaleza del crédito -mercantil o civil- o a si se origina en una deuda personal o en una fianza solidaria, porque es precisamente la existencia con posibilidad de perseguir el patrimonio del obligado, lo que hace necesario el proceso colectivo. (Sala Segunda. Sentencia: [Valor 096] de las diez horas diez minutos del 31 de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno) Conforme a lo anterior, resulta claro que la normativa en materia civil, permite a cualquier ciudadano a someterse a ese tipo de procedimiento, como mecanismo para cancelar administradamente sus deudas, con motivo de la falta de bienes e ingresos suficientes para afrontarlas. El proceso de insolvencia no debe condenarse ni calificarse de forma negativa y sin valoración de los motivos que lo generaron, más aún si es como en mi caso, en el que quedó demostrado que no existieron ni siquiera actos, montos ni transacciones tipificadas como fraudulentas, como fue definido por el Organismo de Investigación Judicial, según informe [Valor 004] para la denuncia N° [Valor 005] del número único de expediente [Valor 006]”. Interpuse, como promovente, ante el Juzgado Civil de Cartago, un proceso de Declaratoria de Insolvencia, amparada en los artículos 884 y siguientes del Código Civil y 760 y siguientes del Código Procesal Civil, tal y como pudiere estar facultado cualquier ciudadano costarricense amarado (sic) en la normativa de ámbito civil, como un mecanismo viable y legal para poder honrar de esta forma las deudas que agobiaban mi economía, tanto personal como familiar. El decaimiento económico sufrido por mi persona, como bien lo explico en el proceso Civil, deviene desde mi última relación matrimonial, debido a la desigualdad que existió siempre en la distribución de las obligaciones que me hacían soportar el mayor porcentaje de gastos de vivienda, servicios, alimentación, educación de mi hijo y la totalidad de gastos de éste desde antes de nacer, así como todos los tratamientos médicos especializados, exámenes, vacunas y otros que tuvo que recibir desde los seis meses de edad aproximadamente, por problemas respiratorios recurrentes, intolerancia a la lactosa que le provocaron problemas gástricos, tratamientos ópticos, de otorrinolaringología por problemas de sangrado nasal y otros, pues su padre nunca realizó erogaciones para la salud de su hijo. Por otra parte, esa relación estuvo cargada de violencia psicológica y patrimonial, por lo que tuve que recurrir a ayuda psicológica del Servicio Médico de Empleados de Poder Judicial, pues entre los efectos provocados por tantos años de violencia estaba el continuo temor y miedo permanente que tenía a mi ex cónyuge, tanto por mi integridad física como por la de mi hijo, así como una desvalorización de mi persona y un fuerte sentimiento de tristeza, frustración y depresión entre otros. Dentro de las situaciones vividas era común que mi ex esposo cada vez que se molestaba por algo (lo cual era frecuente), además de sus continuos insultos, ironías, humillaciones y obligándome a cubrir la totalidad de los gastos del hogar, lo cual no era posible únicamente con mi salario, por lo cual debía recurrir al uso de tarjetas de crédito u otras fuentes de endeudamiento para poder salir adelante, pues pedirle los gastos era enojarlo aún más y que explotara y nuevamente se pusiera violento o a insultarme y minimizarme. Era común además, que los gastos que se generaban producto de la educación de nuestro hijo, en actividades de la escuela y luego del colegio, fueran cubiertas en su totalidad por mí, pues él se negaba a realizar esos gastos, igual situación ocurría con la persona que cuidaba de nuestro hijo a quien en diciembre se negaba a pagarle el aguinaldo, lo que también yo debía asumir. Unido a lo anterior, apoyé a mi ex esposo en algunos gastos personales, pues en aquel momento al tener yo mejor salario bruto que él, me pidió que lo hiciera, pues reitero, no tenía el valor de decir que no, todo lo anterior, afectaba de alguna manera nuestra economía familiar y más aún, la personal. Con la ruptura matrimonial, mi estado anímico y personal llegó a tal extremo que tuve necesariamente que ser atendida nuevamente por la Psicóloga Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, Profesional del Servicio Médico de Empleados del Poder Judicial, quien detecto (sic) dentro de estudio clínico, que estaba siendo objeto de agresión psicológica y/o emocional, así como patrimonial, por tratarse de un abuso de tipo sistemático que generaba que me encontrara minimizada como mujer y persona. Toda mi vida tanto personal como financiera sufrió un severo desajuste, lo cual me llevó a buscar una solución de tipo legal, precisamente debido a que nunca he pensado en evadir mis responsabilidades como deudora, todo lo contrario la solución que se me ofreció por parte del asesor legal fue precisamente en someterme a una declaratoria de insolvencia, máxime que no contaba con bienes para responder por las operaciones crediticias, además de atender como madre y jefa de hogar una serie de prioridades como vestido, salud, comida, educación y habitación propios y de mi hijo [Nombre 012], además de mi padres adultos mayores, siendo la única fuente de ingreso mi salario del Poder Judicial, el cual dicho sea de paso fue ofrecido en dicha Declaratoria al Juez Civil como el único medio de pago a los acreedores. Como puede notarse, la alternativa judicial de insolvencia fue el mecanismo, en materia de derecho civil, para suplir la necesidad de honrar mis deudas de la mejor manera posible, así como para acceder al goce del derecho constitucional que me asiste a tener una vida digna, el cual estaba siendo nugatorio ante la carga financiera soportada por la suscrita. Dicho aspecto lo reconoce el mismo Juzgado Civil de Cartago, en la sentencia N° [Valor 042] que declaro mi insolvencia, al afirmar que: "Tomando en consideración el salario bruto que recibe el (sic) patente, en relación con las demás obligaciones propias documentadas, en armonía con el costo de una vida digna presunto para cualquier persona sujeto de derechos, es evidente que el desbalance de las finanzas de este deudor (sic) es tan severo que se le imposibilita sufragar en tiempo y con abonos completos, las deudas por él (sic) contraídas en relación con su derecho constitucional consistente en tener una vida digna.” Es un Juez de la República, quien mediante los mecanismos legales que prevé la normativa civil costarricense para solucionar un conflicto jurídico puesto en su conocimiento, acepta y avala que el mecanismo de pago para solventar y así poder honrar dignamente mis deudas, sea por medio del salario devengado como fruto de mi trabajo en el Poder Judicial, pero distribuido de manera equitativa entre mis acreedores para así mantener un pago ordenado de las deudas. Toda la situación anterior, incluida la epicrisis la Psicóloga Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, Profesional del Servicio Médico de Empleados del Poder Judicial, fue sometida y propuesta como prueba ante la Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, bajo el expediente N° [Valor 001] como causa pendiente para esta acción, no obstante, fue rechazada de plano, sin mayor valoración, al considerar que no tiene relación con el motivo de la causa”. Desarrolla su perfil y sus funciones como profesional en la Dirección de Planificación del Poder Judicial: “El propósito de este apartado, es dejar constancia de mi perfil profesional y de las funciones que he ejercido a partir de la fecha en que fue declarada judicialmente mi insolvencia por parte del Juez Civil, con base en lo va judicial, que a partir de esa fecha he desempeñado en la Dirección de Planificación del Poder Judicial, por mi dedicación al servicio dela institucionalidad del Poder Judicial. Al momento de la declaratoria de insolvencia, me desempeñaba en el puesto administrativo de Profesional 2 en Administración Pública, en propiedad, asignada a la Sección de Proyección Institucional de la Dirección de Planificación del Poder Judicial. Las principales funciones administrativas que tuve a cargo son las siguientes: i. Diseñar y realizar investigaciones, planes, programas de trabajo, proyectos y análisis complejos en áreas diversas del campo administrativo; ii. Recopilar, clasificar, tabular y analizar información variada v compleja para proponer la adopción de políticas institucionales; iii. Confeccionar manuales de procedimientos; iv. Efectuar entrevistas ya sea estructuradas, semiestructuradas, técnicas, especializadas, entre otros, como parte del desarrollo de las actividades encomendadas; v. Participar en el establecimiento de indicadores que permitan dar seguimiento a planes de trabajo, programas y proyectos; vi. Preparar, analizar e interpretar cuadros, gráficos, tendencias e información variada; vii. Redactar informes, procedimientos y otros documentos que surgen como consecuencia de las actividades que realiza, presentando las recomendaciones y observaciones pertinentes, viii. Llevar controles variados sobre las actividades bajo su responsabilidad y velar porque éstos se cumplan de acuerdo con los programas, fechas y plazos establecidos; ix. Asistir a reuniones, seminarios, charlas y otras actividades similares, y x. Atender consultas. A partir de 1 de marzo de2017, fue ascendida en propiedad al puesto administrativo de Coordinadora de Unidad 2. asumiendo la Coordinación de la Unidad de Gestión Administrativa de la Dirección de Planificación, cuyas funciones principales son: i. Coordinar, ejecutar y supervisar las labores técnicas y administrativas de la Unidad, de conformidad con las directrices y políticas establecidas por la jefatura; ii. Colaborar en la elaboración v formulación de programas de trabajo y planes anuales operativos, iii. Preparar, analizar e interpretar estadísticas, cuadros, gráficos e información diversa; iv. Velar porque se lleven actualizados registros, archivos, controles y estadísticas de la Unidad a su cargo; v. Colaborar con las Jefaturas de los Subprocesos o Secciones, en la coordinación de los profesionales, fungiendo como los facilitadores de los diferentes proyectos o ejes temáticos a cargo de cada subproceso; vi. Participar en la elaboración de programas de trabajo relacionadas con control interno; y vii. Orientar al personal de menor nivel en la ejecución de sus labores. Desde el 21 de febrero de 2018. fue nuevamente ascendida -en sustitución- como Coordinadora de Unidad 3, asumiendo el Subproceso de Evaluación de la misma Dirección de Planificación, cuyas funciones principales son: i. Coordinar, ejecutar y supervisar las actividades profesionales, técnicas, y administrativas que se realizan en una Unidad; ii. Colaborar con sus superiores en el desarrollo de propuestas de proyectos, investigaciones y estudios técnicos tendentes a mejorar la eficiencia y eficacia en la ejecución de ¡as actividades propias de su área de competencia; iii. Efectuar investigaciones referidas al programa de trabajo de la unidad; iv. Recopilar, clasificar y analizar información variada relacionado con la competencia de la Unidad y formular recomendaciones; v. Participar en la elaboración de programas de trabajo, plan anual operativo, control interno SEVRI. entre otros; vi. Asistir a reuniones con superiores y compañeros con el fin analizar problemas derivados de las actividades de la unidad v proponer cambios, ajustes y soluciones; y vii. Preparar, analizar e interpretar estadísticas, cuadros, gráficos e información diversa. Como puede notarse, no ejerzo labores de dirección superior, ni mucho menos labor jurisdiccional, sino más bien gestión administrativa cuyo producto de trabajo se encuentra sometido, -por aspectos ordinarios de control interno-, a la aprobación y decisión final de mis superiores, y ante lo cual se acredita que no administro, ni custodio, ni controlo, ni tampoco dispongo, bajo ningún título, recursos económicos del Poder Judicial ni de terceros con ocasión de mi puesto, así como que no emito acto administrativo final, ni atiendo público, tanto así que no me es aplicable ningún tipo de caución con motivo del deber de mi desempeño. Más que lo anterior, me es grato poner en su conocimiento que, en todos sus años de servicio, los cuales ya sobrepasan los 23 años, nunca he sido sancionada disciplinariamente teniendo un record (sic) intachable, lo que generó incluso haber recibido el Certificado al Mérito Judicial en el año 2015”. Asevera que el artículo 12 y el inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial son inconstitucionales por los siguientes motivos: i) “Violación al Derecho al Trabajo como derecho humano fundamental y consecuentemente violación al Derecho a la Protección a la Familia y a la Seguridad Jurídica, por un acto gestionado en aplicación de mi autonomía de la voluntad. Se concreta una discriminación laboral por situación económica en materia de empleo”. Desarrolla el contenido del derecho al trabajo. Menciona que el principio de progresividad establece que todo derecho social, una vez reconocido, solo puede ser mejorado. Cita parcialmente el voto n.o [Valor 108]. Expone que: “ la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, se configura como una medida o parámetro de idoneidad para el nombramiento (artículo 12 de la Ley N° 7333-), así mismo, como una causal de cese de nombramiento (artículo 26 inciso 9. de la Ley N° 7333-), que afecta esa protección especial al derecho al trabajo, por cuanto como se demostró del análisis del proyecto de ley a esa Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, se encuentra integrada a ese bloque de legalidad sin que medie, ni se prevea, la causalidad de situaciones que pueden rodear esa declaratoria judicial de insolvencia frente al servicio público efectivo que brinda el Poder Judicial, tanto en su orden jurisdiccional, como de carácter administrativo, así como tampoco, una causal condicional ni de valoración para la aplicación de ese motivo normativo, que en el caso de la aplicación del artículo 26 inciso 9. De dicha ley, genera por sí mismo el cese de nombramiento como medida disciplinaria más gravosa, aún y cuando no exista daño, perjuicio ni afectación al servicio, ni a la imagen, ni a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, ni menos aún a la sociedad, así como tampoco la existencia comprobada de una falta grave, ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial con ocasión de la declaratoria de insolvencia. Demostración de lo anterior, es la fundamentación sancionatoria definida por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, en el Voto No [Valor 018] para mi caso en particular, en el que cataloga -sin mayor prueba ni demostración basada en el procedimiento que siguió- a mi persona con motivo de la declaratoria de insolvencia, como una funcionaria carente de probidad, sin compromiso, ni responsabilidad, ni honestidad, ni lealtad, ni decoro, ni de buena fe, en el que por esa situación existe una relación de desconfianza, al considerar que el Poder Judicial 'necesita tener garantía de que la persona contratada es honrada y responsable de sus actos' considerando esa actuación como incompatible con la función pública; no obstante, en la causa seguida bajo el expediente N° [Valor 001], no se entra a valorar esos aspectos, tanto así que me fue rechazada la prueba que solicité incorporar, al considerar la causal de aplicación de pleno derecho, y teniendo solo como hechos probados la resolución judicial de mi estado de insolvencia, mi cantidad de anualidades al servicio del Poder Judicial y la inexistencia de sanciones disciplinarias anteriores, y no la afectación al servicio o a la imagen del Poder Judicial, ni falencias personales que afecten la dignidad, que es el fundamento de la normativa que invoca. La valoración que realiza el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial no determina la existencia real, causal ni objetiva de afectación grave alguna al servicio judicial, ni la imagen institucional o al interés público imperante del Poder Judicial, castigando así únicamente un eventual riesgo infundado, o la mera conveniencia por aplicación normativa de pleno derecho. Adicionalmente, con la sanción propuesta, se violenta gravemente un principio elemental del derecho laboral que resulta de aplicación supletoria para la relación de empleo público, como lo es el del principio protector, y consecuentemente la aplicación de la regla in dubio pro-operario, de lo cual más adelante se asociará con la violación al principio de inocencia que me asiste, ante lo cual, la revocatoria de nombramiento que se me aplica por la causal señalada, debió haberse constituido en la última ratio, buscando escoger la sanción más favorable al trabajador, en aplicación de los principios que rigen el derecho de la constitución y el mismo control de convencionalidad, todo ello frente a una sanción evidentemente flagrante al ordenamiento jurídico. Como es sabido, ésta regla es también aplicable a la hora de interpretar los hechos, o si se prefiere, al ponderar el valor de la prueba, buscando la condición más beneficiosa y la continuidad de la relación de servicio”. Arguye que su declaratoria de insolvencia obedeció a una decisión propia que por autonomía de la voluntad aplicó, por lo que utilizó una posibilidad jurídica que le brinda el ordenamiento jurídico para buscar una solución a su situación económica financiera y así generar un cumplimiento regulado de sus deudas. Afirma que el instituto de la insolvencia no es una sanción, falta o delito, salvo que se declare su carácter fraudulento. Transcribe parcialmente, en cuanto a la autonomía de la voluntad, el voto [Valor 043] . Cita el numeral 28 de la Constitución Política. Añade que la declaratoria de insolvencia, gestionada por ella misma, no daña, afecta ni lesiona la moral ni el orden público. Agrega que en el propio traslado de cargos efectuado por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial no se particulariza ni se pretende probar lo anterior ni tampoco la afectación al servicio público por la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima con motivo de la insolvencia. Sostiene que tampoco se analizó si su condición perjudica a terceros, toda vez que sus acreedores verán resarcidos sus créditos según las reglas concursales por medio de la retención de una porción de su salario. Manifiesta que, por la redacción del inciso 9) del artículo 26, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial no exige ningún tipo de daño ni perjuicio a tercero (en este caso al Poder Judicial como patrono), sino que aplica de pleno derecho su literalidad. Aduce que la valoración que se efectúa es meramente subjetiva. Relata que se encuentra ante una causal que pretende el cese de su nombramiento, sin que medio comprobación, valoración ni causalidad real u objetiva sobre la afectación al servicio público o la comprobación de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial administrativo (no jurisdiccional). Acota que con esa norma se sanciona con la medida más gravosa una una realidad lo advertido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno v Administración que conoció el Proyecto de Ley No 10.753, cuando advirtió que se sancionaría un mero peligro o un eventual riesgo, sin que medie ni siquiera una valoración real, directa, objetiva ni causal que refleje una desmejora, afectación o perjuicio al servicio administrativo que brinda el Poder Judicial. Rescato en este punto, lo mencionado del expediente del proyecto de ley 10.753, en específico a folio [Valor 025] (imagen [Valor 026]) cuando en la discusión legislativa sobre las diferentes causales de los artículos invocados, se resalta que les interesaba el servicio y la administración de justicia, en el que, con referencia a la insolvencia, se dice que debe entenderse la idea básica de las causales, para quede absolutamente claro que es aplicable en el tanto esas circunstancias 'afecten el servicio público'”. Asevera que ella no administra, controla o dispone recursos económicos del Poder Judicial, por lo que no le es aplicable ningún tipo de caución con motivo de su desempeño ni tampoco emite labores actos administrativos finales. Aduce que en su caso se aplica “aquello que dijo en su momento el Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora, en la discusión legislativa sobre esa causal, sea que soy encargada de resolver toda clase de discordias que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado (-lo cual no me aplica-), que con motivo de la causal de insolvencia hay una cierta pérdida de confianza (-no me ha sido demostrada, más aún en mi trayectoria judicial si he demostrado al día de hoy mi mérito e idoneidad para mi desempeño profesional-) y que eventualmente voy a tener disposición de haberes económicos de la ciudadanía (no me aplica)”. Adiciona que se da una afectación grave y latente a la protección a la familia y seguridad jurídica, toda vez que por su condición de mujer jefa de hogar, la medida generaría el cese de su nombramiento, condenando su posibilidad de satisfacer sus necesidades las de su hijo y sus padres; además, sus acreedores ya no verían resarcidos sus créditos por la inexistencia de salario al cual se le aplique de forma proporcional la retención, ya que no tiene bienes embargables. Cita, en relación con el derecho de protección a la familia, la sentencia n.o [Valor 097]. Indica que: “Al igual que lo dispone el artículo 56 de nuestra Constitución Política, en cuanto a límite garantista del Estado sobre el derecho del trabajo, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, proclamada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, señala, entre otros, el derecho de todo individuo a la vida digna, al derecho al trabajo y a la protección contra el desempleo, todo ello sin discriminación alguna, entre otros, por razones de situación o posición económica, como es mi caso. En ese mismo sentido, el Convenio III y la Recomendación III adoptados por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, de la cual Costa Rica es miembro, relativos a la discriminación en materia de empleo y ocupación, impiden tanto en los organismos del Estado como en las empresas privadas, que ocurran situaciones que impliquen discriminación en perjuicio de los sagrados derechos que, por naturaleza y por humanidad, constituyen patrimonio de todo individuo. De todo ello nace la Ley No 2694, del 22 de noviembre de 1960, sea la Convención de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo sobre la prohibición de discriminación del trabajo, vigente a la fecha que prohíbe "[...] toda suerte de discriminación, determinada por distinciones, exclusiones o preferencias, fundadas en consideraciones sobre raza, color, sexo, edad, religión, estado civil, opinión política, ascendencia nacional, origen social, filiación o situación económica, que limite la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en materia de empleo u ocupación". En ese sentido, nótese que la prohibición de ese control convencional tiene una única excepción, cual es la definida en el artículo 2 de esa misma Ley N' 2694 que establece "De la prohibición anterior se exceptúan aquellas distinciones, exclusiones o preferencias procedentes según las calificaciones necesarias para el cabal cumplimiento de las funciones o tareas propias del género de cargo o empleo, exclusivamente conforme a la naturaleza de éstas y a las condiciones del trabajador." Respecto a lo anterior, ha quedado demostrado que, en mi caso, la discriminación se concreta debido a la causal taxativa que genera el cese de nombramiento por mera conveniencia, por mero peligro o por un eventual riesgo, sin valoración efectiva, real, objetiva ni causal, del servicio de carácter administrativo a mi cargo con motivo de mi declaratoria judicial de insolvencia”. Concluye que resulta latente la afectación la afectación a sus derechos fundamentales de protección al trabajo, a la familia y a la seguridad jurídica que concreta una discriminación en razón de su situación económica . Añade que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial ni siquiera valoró un nivel de riesgo leve en su caso, pues de haber sido así hubiera aplicado como medida cautelar la suspensión laboral de acuerdo con la facultad establecida en el artículo 202 de la misma ley n.o 7333, por ser una causal de cese de nombramiento. ii) “Violación al derecho de culpabilidad e inocencia por inexistencia de afectación al servicio público o a terceros, así como tampoco comprobación de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial en aplicación misma del debido proceso. Se sanciona una (sic) acto de buena fe con el sacrificio superior de cese de nombramiento ante un eventual riesgo no probado ni evaluado, así como ante una mera o aparente conveniencia institucional infundada e injustificada”. Arguye que con la normativa impugnada en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad se causa una flagrante violación al contenido esencial del artículo 39 de nuestra Carta Magna y a los principios que integran el Derecho de la Constitución, por cuanto se pretende tomar la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como una causal para impedir el nombramiento en el servicio judicial, así como para cesar a un funcionario, sin efectuar mayor valoración ni acreditación de daño o perjuicio, -real, causal y objetivo-, a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial. Añade que se aplica dicha causal por aspectos de mera conveniencia injustificada, por criterios de un eventual riesgo, sin demostración alguna de que exista al menos un leve, medio o grave inconveniente para el servicio que brinda el Poder Judicial ni en específico la Dirección de Planificación. Sostiene que la aplicación disciplinaria de tal causal no considera si se trata de labor jurisdiccional, o bien, administrativa, ni tampoco se valoran ni aplican criterios que demuestren la existencia de alguna afectación al servicio público que brinda el Poder Judicial. Refiere que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial aplica la causal de pleno de derecho, por lo que, en su caso, sin mayor valoración, se le denegó la prueba técnica y testimonial que ofreció, la cual pretendía demostrar su desempeño, la existencia o no de afectación al servicio público, entre otros. A pesar de lo anterior, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial la catalogó como una funcionaria carente de probidad, compromiso, responsabilidad, honestidad, lealtad, decoro y buena fe; además, que existe una relación de desconfianza al considerar que el Poder Judicial “necesita tener garantía de que la persona contratada es honrada y responsable de sus actos” y, por ello, la actuación es incompatible con la función pública. Menciona que para poder dar una razón de ser a la medida disciplinaria que aplica, el tribunal catalogó la insolvencia como una falta gravísima e incompatible con el servicio público y efectuó valoraciones no probadas en violación a mi debido proceso. Arguye que se le genera “culpabilidad ” por promover de buena fe la aplicación de un instituto contemplado en el ordenamiento jurídico. Insiste en que la insolvencia-salvo que se declare fraudulenta-, no es un delito que genere mi inhabilitación a cargos públicos, ni tampoco es una sanción como para que tenga como consecuencia el cese de su nombramiento. Señala que se le genera “culpabilidad” sin valorar su “inocencia ” frente a la afectación al servicios, metas u objetivos del Poder Judicial, así como la existencia de posibles o eventuales riesgos por manejo o disposición de recursos públicos. Refiere que se le castigaría disciplinariamente con el cese de su nombramiento, violentando su “derecho fundamental a la inocencia ”. Arguye que las normas impugnadas contravienen los parámetros y principios constitucionales advertidos, así como “ el de congruencia, que lo exige el parámetro mismo de seguridad jurídica y el debido proceso”. Reitera que solo en el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones y en el Registro Civil se encuentra contemplada la declaratoria de insolvencia en aspectos de nombramientos; no obstante, se dispone bajo un parámetro de “excusable ”, lo cual permite al operador de la norma, entrar a valorar precisamente los motivos de la declaratoria de insolvencia, la condición económica financiera de la persona y la existencia o no de insolvencia fraudulenta, para valorar con ello la eventual afectación al servicio público, o bien, la “existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial”. Cita parcialmente el voto n.o [Valor 098] de esta Sala, en relación con la buena fe como principio del Derecho de la Constitución. Menciona que ella, por su trayecto de veintitrés años de servicio en el Poder Judicial, aplicar las más altas normas éticas, así como lo valores de la institución, lo cual pretendió acreditar por medio de la prueba testimonial que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial le rechazó con sustento en que "[...] no guardan relación con lo acusado en el traslado de cargos, obsérvese que en este procedimiento disciplinario sancionatorio no están en discusión las causas que motivaron que se declarara la insolvencia de la acusada, ello fue analizado en el proceso judicial respectivo. Tampoco se le está reprochando incumplimiento alguno en el ejercicio de su cargo de forma tal que se rechaza la prueba testimonial ofrecida [...]". Denota que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial considera el procedimiento como de puro derecho, sin considerar otros aspectos en la relación de servicio. Afirma que la declaratoria de insolvencia la gestionó por cuenta propia, lo que fundamenta su buena fe en la solución financiera y el pago de acreedores. Reitera que en el traslado de cargos no se hizo referencia a la transgresión a las normas o valores éticos institucionales con motivo de la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia y la “afectación al servicio judicial, a la imagen institucional o al interés público imperante del Poder Judicial, así como tampoco de la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial con motivo de ello, todo ello porque es inexistente”. Expone tres causas disciplinarias de personas funcionarias judiciales. Manifiesta que las normas que se impugnan parecen castigar la existencia de una “pérdida de confianza”, con motivo de la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia; no obstante, la pérdida objetiva de confianza existe porque se compara la buena fe, el desempeño y la fidelidad que el empleado debe a su patrono, de tal forma que se fundamente y demuestre -congruente y proporcionalmente- que, con la conducta del empleado, existe un contraste perjudicial real e inminente, que hace concluir que es imposible seguir con la relación laboral. Cita las sentencias n.os [Valor 044] , [Valor 045] , [Valor 046] y [Valor 047] de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia en relación con la pérdida objetiva de confianza. Aduce que si la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia pretende sustentar la “pérdida de confianza ” para el Poder Judicial con la consecuencia del cese del nombramiento, por ser materia sancionatoria de orden disciplinario, la norma legal debe acreditar en su contenido el parámetro constitucional de culpabilidad grave, causal, razonable y objetiva del funcionario frente al servicio e interés público, de forma tal, que acredite una imposibilidad real en la continuidad del empleo, o bien, que excuse al empleado judicial por “falta de demostración de esos aspectos que le inhiben en el desempeño del cargo público”. iii) “Violación al Derecho de Intimidad, de la Dignidad Humana y el principio Pro- Homine. Inexistencia de una finalidad legítima de la sanción disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento frente al sacrificio superior que involucra de la sanción disciplinaria sin que exista afectación al servicio público, ni a la institucionalidad ni a la imagen del Poder Judicial, o bien, demostración sobre la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial con motivo de la insolvencia”. Menciona que el derecho a la intimidad y dignidad humana frente a la discriminación ha sido desarrollado por esta Sala y por normativa y jurisprudencia internacional en materia de derechos humanos. Indica que se trata a estos derechos como fueron de protección para la persona. Cita extractos de los votos n.os [Valor 048] , [Valor 049] , [Valor 050], [Valor 051], [Valor 052], [Valor 053], [Valor 054], [Valor 055] y [Valor 056]. Señala que fue por un acto de buena fe, con el afán exclusivo de buscar una solución a su situación económica financiera, que gestionó la declaratoria de insolvencia. Reitera el argumento relacionado con el numeral 28 de la Constitución Política y la falta de daño al Poder Judicial. Considera que la declaratoria de insolvencia contemplada en los artículos impugnados que tienen como consecuencia el cese del nombramiento, no tiene una finalidad legítima de la sanción, lo cual afecta los derechos fundamentales de intimidad y dignidad humana, generándose además un nivel alto de discriminación por la situación económica. Aduce que lo anterior repercutiría en las personas que dependen de ella. Cita parcialmente el voto n.o [Valor 057], en relación con el principio de finalidad legítima. Expone que con la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad no pretende desconocer la potestad y poderes de dirección, fiscalización y sanción del Poder Judicial para con su relación de servicio de carácter administrativo; sin embargo, debe existir un respeto a sus derechos fundamentales, pues es necesario que se acrediten elementos de carácter sancionatorio objetivos y razonables para su imposición, todo ello frente a la efectiva comprobación de una falta grave o gravísima, la afectación al servicio judicial, a la imagen institucional o al interés público, y no una mera sospecha, una mera conveniencia o un eventual riesgo; es decir, una causal sin contenido técnico-jurídico que de forma ilegítima castiga sus años de servicio en el Poder Judicial, con consecuencias en su intimidad y dignidad, pues se le estaría tratando como si hubiera cometido alguna actividad delictiva o una infracción grave o gravísima. Menciona que “ el espíritu del legislador permeado en el expediente del proyecto de ley 10.753, cuando en su discusión legislativa sobre las diferentes causales de los artículos invocados, se resalta que les interesaba el servicio y la administración de justicia, en el que, con referencia a la insolvencia, se dice que debe entenderse la idea básica de las causales, para quede absolutamente claro que es aplicable en el tanto esas circunstancias 'afecten el servicio público', situación que no es mi caso”. Sostiene que la normativa impugnada, frente a los derechos de intimidad y dignidad humana, así como a la aplicación del principio pro homine, debe ser aplicada de la manera que más favorezca al ser humano. Transcribe parcialmente los votos de esta Sala n.os [Valor 058], [Valor 059] y [Valor 060]. Explica que todas las medidas de restricción y de carácter sancionatorio, así como las de cese de nombramiento, deben respetar precautoriamente la dignidad humana, la protección a la intimidad y el principio de proporcionalidad, todo ello bajo el principio pro homine, de modo que se valore la magnitud del daño potencial o eventual. Aduce que, en su caso, la situación de insolvencia fue generada por una relación matrimonial que propició muchos créditos a su nombre a fin de palear malos manejos económicos, lo cual finalmente terminó con la ruptura del vínculo. Añade que, con ocasión de lo anterior, la psicóloga Yesennia Paniagua Gómez, Profesional del Servicio Médico de Empleados del Poder Judicial, determinó que estaba siendo objeto de agresión psicológica y/o emocional, así como patrimonial, por tratarse de un abuso de tipo sistemático, causando que se sintiera minimizada como mujer y persona. Arguye que existe un aspecto vinculante de género, como causa real y excusable para la valoración de lo que a la postre provocó que tomara le decisión de gestionar la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, lo cual hizo por su propia dignidad humana y la de quienes dependen de ella. Refiere que para ella hubiera sido muy fácil dejar que se generaran causas judiciales de cobro por esos créditos, pues no tiene bienes embargables ni su salario podía soportar más limitaciones. Manifiesta que acudir voluntariamente a la vía civil para que se le declarara judicialmente en insolvencia le ha generado en mi persona y familiares, repercusiones anímicas y depresivas e, incluso, la revictimización de la agresión psicológica y emocional vivida. Asevera que lo anterior lo menciona porque el Poder Judicial adoptó la “Política de Igualdad de Género ” para que se incorporara la perspectiva de género en todo el quehacer de ese Poder de la República. Menciona que lo expuesto se sustenta “ en el marco jurídico de protección de los derechos humanos, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional, que consagra, entre otros, la tutela de los derechos de igualdad sin discriminación de ninguna índole, de protección de la ley, de acceso a una justicia pronta y cumplida, todos ellos consagrados en los principios que integran la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José. Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Civiles y Políticos, Convención para la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer y la Constitución Política de Costa Rica”. Añade que tal política “ reconoció que "La igualdad ante la ley significa la posibilidad de un trato diferenciado, cuando las circunstancias sean diferentes, es decir cuando las personas estén desigualmente situadas", así mismo que "El principio de equidad impulsa a los y las juezas, así como a todos y todas las operadoras jurídicas a tomar en cuenta con criterios de equidad, el trasfondo humano de los conflictos, a considerar las condiciones personales, familiares y sociales en cada uno de los casos y sus consecuencias", situación que no está siendo aplicado con motivo del contenido inconstitucional que se invoca por medio de esta acción”. Acota que la política tiene como objetivo “garantizar la igualdad de oportunidades entre mujeres y hombres y la no discriminación por género en las decisiones judiciales, en el servicio público de la administración de justicia, y en el funcionamiento interno del Poder Judicial". Expone que “esa Política de igualdad de Género se fundamentó en las 'Reglas de Brasilia sobre el Acceso a la Justicia de las Personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad', bajo las cuales como regla 19 se dice que: "Se considera violencia contra la mujer cualquier acción o conducta, basada en su género, que cause muerte, daño o sufrimiento físico, sexual o psicológico a la mujer, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado, mediante el empleo de la violencia física o psíquica". Puede notarse, por tanto, que esa situación de vulnerabilidad causada por esa violencia psicológica probada por mismas autoridades médicas en el ámbito psicológico del Poder Judicial, acreditan una circunstancia que requiere una valoración por protección e igualdad de género, considerando mi condición personal, familiar y social y sus consecuencias” . iv) “Violación a los principios de Proporcionalidad y Razonabilidad de la sanción disciplinaria. Inexistencia de conexidad y congruencia idónea entre la conducta que regula, la gravedad de la sanción disciplinaria y sacrificio superior que involucra. Existencia de discriminación en razón de mi situación económica”. Menciona que frente a la violación de los derechos humanos fundamentales y principios contenidos en nuestra Constitución Política y el Derecho de la Constitución que han sido invocados como fundamento de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9), referente en específico sobre la invocación a la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para no generar el nombramiento de un servidor judicial, así como para disponer la causal disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento, existe además una violación, por acción y omisión, de los principios constitucionales de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad del consecuente cese de nombramiento. Acota que esas normas carecen de elementos reales, idóneos, necesarios, causales y objetivos de valoración, congruencia, equilibrio y conexidad con el contenido esencial del derecho sancionatorio. Agrega que en su aplicación no se analiza el cuadro fáctico, las condiciones personales del servidor judicial a fin de determinar una situación excusable, el respectivo sacrificio que involucra la medida y la consecuente causal de cese de nombramiento con motivo de la existencia de una declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, todo lo anterior, frente a la existencia o no de una afectación al servicio público que brinda el Poder Judicial, así como a su imagen institucional o al interés público imperante con motivo del desempeño del puesto. Refiere que tampoco se acredita para aplicar la causal una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial. Cita los votos de esta Sala n.os [Valor 061] y [Valor 062], en relación con los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. Expone que es necesario aplicar un test de proporcionalidad a la normativa impugnada, a efectos de definir y fundamentar la existencia de la violación a los derechos fundamentales invocados. Añade que el test contiene los tres subprincipios que funcionan como reglas a tener cuenta, en el sentido que son máximas sobre las que se debe cuestionar; es decir, se debe constatar si el medio elegido cumple con la exigencia de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ante lo cual, si la respuesta es insatisfactoria, la consecuencia sería la inconstitucionalidad de la norma. Sostiene que lo que busca este test, es definir la finalidad legítima e idoneidad de la medida, así como la necesidad y la proporcionalidad de la norma, ante lo cual la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha establecido que es obligación de los Estados parte adoptar medidas internas necesarias para adecuar sus conductas y normativa a los parámetros convencionales. Menciona lo siguiente: “Previo a la aplicación de este test de proporcionalidad, considerando el medio y fin de las normas impugnadas, debemos hacernos una pregunta: ¿es necesario aplicar, como única y más grave sanción disciplinaria, el cese de nombramiento de un funcionario del Poder Judicial que ha sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia para garantizar de forma efectiva el servicio público, de carácter administrativo, que tiene a cargo en el Poder Judicial? La realización del test de proporcionalidad nos va a dar esa respuesta, lo anterior, debido a que, en el caso concreto, la proporcionalidad busca, como valores, un equilibrio y una moderación en la aplicación de la normativa que tiende a limitar derechos fundamentales, o bien, a generar la aplicación de una medida sancionatoria en materia disciplinaria”. Expone el análisis de siguiente manera: “ a.) Como primer elemento del test de proporcionalidad, tenemos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus su fin", es decir, su adecuación, idoneidad y eficacia. En ese término, el medio que emplea la norma jurídica debe ser idóneo, adecuado, apto y capaz de alcanzar el fin propuesto, es decir, establece que el medio elegido sea el más adecuado a las posibilidades fácticas, teniendo en cuenta el fin a alcanzar. Debe existir un juicio de congruencia y conexión práctica entre el medio y el fin inmediato de la norma, toda vez que, si ese fin no es apto, aunque la restricción lo sea, es desproporcional. En el caso que nos ocupa, nos encontramos con los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9.) de la Ley N° 7333, que establecen, en lo que interesa, respectivamente, la prohibición de nombramiento en el servicio judicial de aquellas personas que han sido declarados judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; así mismo, la causal de cese de nombramiento de quienes sirven en puestos judiciales, por el mismo motivo, sea el haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de insolvencia. Conforme lo manifestado en esta acción, y debido a que de forma expresa esas normas legales no señalan expresa ni implícitamente su fin, debe considerarse para esos efectos, la valoración de la discusión legislativa planteada por la Comisión Mixta Legislativa que conoció y definió la redacción final del Proyecto de Ley No 10.753 para la hoy Ley N° 7333, (-que fue ya señalado con anterioridad-), como elemento definitorio de ese espíritu legislador sobre dicha causal. En ese sentido, el fin dispuesto para esas normas legales impugnadas por esta vía se considera que es precautorio, por un aspecto de confianza, en cuanto al manejo de recursos económicos y la resolución de conflictos sometidos a nivel jurisdiccional, ya que, en esa discusión legislativa, en palabras expresas del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, miembro en su momento de dicha Comisión Mixta Legislativa, se dijo que "[...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia [...] la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía [...]", siendo ese el fundamento y/o criterio para dejar como definitivo el texto finalmente aprobado para esas normas legales. El medio que utiliza dichas normas para obtener ese fin es, por un lado (-artículo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.-), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Al respecto debe resaltarse como aspecto de alta relevancia que, para ambos casos, esa causal se relaciona en su redacción, para el medio de proporcionalidad explicado, con otras causales vinculadas a condenas por delito a pena de prisión y de quienes estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos. Ante lo anterior, en mi caso, como es palpable y se acredita en el expediente de la causa civil de insolvencia No [Valor 002], el Juzgado Civil de Cartago, en la Sentencia N° [Valor 063] mediante la cual declaró mi estado de insolvencia, solo dispone que quedo de derecho separada e inhibida de la facultad de administrar y disponer de los bienes que me pertenecen y sean legalmente embargables, y se me previene a no abandonar mi domicilio ni salir del país sin autorización judicial, bajo el apercibimiento de ser juzgada por desobediencia a la autoridad, pero nunca dispone que con motivo de la insolvencia se me inhabilite para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos. Adicionalmente a lo anterior, y como ya lo mencioné supra, la causa penal que de oficio se inicia por mandato normativo, con motivo de la declaratoria de insolvencia, tendente a que se investigara si incurrí en el delito de insolvencia fraudulenta, fue señalado en archivo fiscal, por no existir determinación alguna de la existencia de actos, montos ni transacciones tipificadas como fraudulentas, situación así definida por el Organismo de investigación Judicial, según informe [Valor 004] para la denuncia N° [Valor 005] del número único de expediente [Valor 006] . Con lo señalado, resulta evidente que el medio que emplea esas normas legales no solo resulta inidóneo, inadecuado y no apto de alcanzar el fin propuesto, por cuanto el hecho de considerar que una persona en estado de insolvencia, declarada judicialmente, resulta sin mérito para la función judicial, tanto así que le genera para quienes ya se encuentran laborando el cese de su nombramiento, significa la aplicación casuística y banal sobre una aparente pérdida de confianza injustificada, que como ya se dijo, más bien parece que privilegia la aplicación sancionatoria con el sacrificio máximo a cargo del empleado por una situación eventual, no probada y de mero riesgo, mero peligro o conveniencia, sin que exista de por medio una valoración efectiva, real y objetiva al fin institucional, de carácter general, cual es el servicio público. Insisto nuevamente, este aspecto tampoco fue valorado por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, más aún me rechazó la prueba testimonial y técnica que plantee para esos efectos, en el que podía demostrar las causa que motivaron mi situación económico-financiera, así como mi desempeño institucional de carácter administrativo, no jurisdiccional. Se añade a lo anterior, que el espíritu del legislador previó esa causal por un eventual uso de recursos por parte del funcionario judicial en la resolución de conflictos, sea en el ejercicio de una labor puramente jurisdiccional, y no de orden administrativo, que -como en mi caso- no se administra, custodia, dispone, controla, ni resguarda fondo público alguno, y más aún, no se atiende público, ni depende de esa gestión administrativa la resolución de conflicto alguno. Por lo anterior, puede considerarse que el primer parámetro de este test arroja como resultado la desproporcionalidad de la norma, debido a que no existe una congruencia entre el medio y el fin inmediato de la norma en apego al parámetro que obliga el derecho de la constitución, ya que si bien, se puede pensar que el evitar un nombramiento y el cese de nombramiento de una persona en esa condición, es el medio para alcanzar el fin señalado, la contraparte a ello, sea la restricción sin verificación de su carácter excusable y de inocencia, frente al sacrificio superior que genera, violentando los parámetros señalados, causa la desproporcional acusada, más aún si se considera, como en el caso que me ocupa, que para la aplicación de esa medida de carácter sancionatorio disciplinario, no se valora si existe o no la afectación al servicio público imperante, a la imagen y a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, al orden público, a la moral, ni a terceros, así como, tampoco sobre la existencia o no de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial, con motivo de la causal. b.) Como segundo elemento del test de proporcionalidad, tenemos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus la necesidad de regulación". En ese término, se valora si se necesita ese medio para alcanzar la regulación esperada, es decir, es el mandato de optimización del medio más benigno, mediante el cual debe verificarse si el fin no puede alcanzarse de otra manera que afecte menos al individuo. Para esos efectos, debe de compararse diferentes medios, a efectos de determinar la alternativa menos gravosa, alcanzando la regulación jurídica esperada. Frente a lo anterior, se condena el exceso en la medida por el carácter urgente o imperioso se exige el sacrificio dispuesto por la norma. Con respecto a las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, ya se dijo en el punto a.) anterior de este test, que el medio que emplean para obtener ese fin normativo, es por un lado (-articulo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Frente a lo anterior, corresponde analizar ese medio descrito frente a la necesidad de concretar la regulación, verificando alternativas apegadas a los parámetros del derecho de la constitución, en razón del sacrificio que genera o pueda generar precisamente esa necesidad de regulación. No sobra decir, que la aplicabilidad de la medida regulatoria y su consecuente necesidad debe valorar la diversidad de situaciones que pueden presentarse conforme a cada caso en concreto, como es precisamente el caso de si la persona labora en un puesto con labor jurisdiccional o administrativo. En mi caso, ya he señalado que soy funcionaria judicial, cuyo perfil y funciones de Coordinadora fueron detallados supra, con labor de servicio que sobrepasan los 23 años, en los cuales nunca he sido sancionada disciplinariamente, y bajo lo cual, he tenido un record (sic) intachable, que hasta generó recibir con gran honor el Certificado al Mérito Judicial en el año 2015. Así mismo, recalco, que en el ejercicio de mis funciones de carácter administrativo, no jurisdiccional, no administro, no custodio, no controlo, no dispongo, ni resguardo fondo público alguno, y más aún, no atiendo público, ni depende de mi gestión administrativa la resolución de conflicto alguno ante terceros, ni emito acto administrativo final ni atiendo público; más aún, consta ante mis superiores, a quienes ofrezco como prueba ante su Autoridad debido a que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial me rechazó esa prueba, en el sentido de que ejerzo una labor profesional acorde a los requerimientos institucionales, y en apego a los valores éticos y morales que se espera y exige de un funcionario judicial. La situación de insolvencia sobrevino a mi vida, por las causales ya expuestas, y que bajo las cuales hasta existe criterio médico psicológico que acredita que estaba siendo objeto de agresión psicológica y/o emocional, así como patrimonial, por tratarse de un abuso de tipo sistemático, aspecto vinculante de género, como causa real y excusable que a la postre causó que tuviera que tomar le decisión de que se me declarara judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. En el procedimiento administrativo que instruye el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, no se valora, no analiza ni define la existencia de aplicar el cese del nombramiento con motivo de una necesidad de regulación, por hechos probados de pérdida de confianza u otra circunstancia, lo cual supone que es por una supuesta o aparente afectación, al menos leve, al servicio público imperante y que ello sea, por principio de causalidad, con motivo de mi declaratoria judicial de insolvencia; Sino que se abre el procedimiento, asumiendo de forma directa y expresa la causal, manifestándose que "[...] perdí la condición para ser funcionaria del Poder Judicial, conforme lo establece el numeral 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [...]" como elemento central y único de la imputación de cargos que me fue notificada, sin que de ello se llegue a determinar la comprobación sobre la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial, con motivo de la insolvencia. Se sancionaría como única alternativa, con el sacrificio más grave de la potestad disciplinaria, sea el cese de nombramiento por un mero riesgo o supuesto peligro, una eventual conveniencia institucional, que no tiene base ni fundamento causal, objetivo ni real frente al servicio público, ni la imagen e institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, ni frente a tercero, más aún si genera un nivel alto de discriminación en razón de mi situación económica al ser una disposición normativa, aparentemente neutra, pero susceptible de implicar una severa desventaja particular sin un objetivo o justificación razonable y legítimo a la luz de la normativa vinculante nacional e internacional de los derechos humanos, es decir, no se determina -bajo ninguna circunstancia ni criterio- que la permanencia de una persona declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia resulta gravemente inconveniente para el servicio judicial, de tal forma que la necesidad de la regulación solo cause como resultado dicho cese de nombramiento. Resalto nuevamente que, a nivel de tribunales laborales, y como ejemplo está el argumentando que el Poder Judicial ha señalado, por medio de la Corte, "el parámetro para disciplinar. Si a los magistrados se les ha hecho con mano suave, un judicial más humilde no merece mano dura [...] si la conducta de los altos jueces, conocida por todo el país, afectando la Imagen judicial, no mereció revocatoria del nombramiento, es injusto penar más severo al promovente [...señalando además] Nuevo paradigma, ha creado el caso Chinchilla Sandí y otros, del cual se extrae un régimen disciplinario más sano, menos represivo, que permite sanciones menores v donde la revocatoria de nombramiento queda para casos gravísimos [...]". Como elemento primordial para este test de proporcionalidad, resaltamos de igual forma lo ya mencionado supra con relación al reciente proceso [Valor 012] , seguido contra [Nombre 013], en su momento Fiscal Adjunto, por la causa de negligencia en el servicio de sus funciones, en el que el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial lo sancionó CON UN MES SIN GOCE DE SALARIO CALIFICANDO LA FALTA COMO GRAVE al colaborar con el entonces Fiscal General en el trámite de los expedientes judiciales contra miembros de los supremos poderes, acto que fue de conocimiento público y que causó la desestimación de la causa por tráfico de influencias contra los exdiputados Víctor Morales y Otto Guevara Guth a favor del importador de cemento chino, [Nombre 014]. Como puede notarse, para esa causa la cual tuvo repercusión a la institucionalidad e imagen del Poder Judicial, así como a terceros, y que fue calificada como grave por corresponder al ejercicio negligente de funciones se sancionó con una medida disciplinaria inferior al cese de nombramiento. En igual sentido, y para efectos de proporcionalidad de las medidas sancionatoria es la causa disciplinaria número [Valor 013] ventilada contra [Nombre 015], jueza de Familia de los Tribunales de Goicoechea, que se comentó supra, a quien se le intimó negligencia en el ejercicio de su cargo e incumplimiento de funciones, a quien Corte Plena, consideró que la administración de justicia y su estructura podrían ser causa de los atrasos que se achacan, aún y cuando si quedara demostrado que al menos en dos causas existió negligencia en su actuar y consecuentemente una afectación directa a la ciudadanía. La pregunta entonces es ¿cuál es la medida disciplinaria menos gravosa que debe aplicarse para el caso de la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia en la que no existe demostración alguna de ningún tipo de daño, ni de calificación grave ni gravísima al servicio público, ni a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial? ¿Resulta proporcional evitar el nombramiento de una persona y, -por otro lado- el cese de nombramiento de personas que han sido declaradas judicialmente en insolvencia, en la que no existe demostración alguna de daño, ni de calificación grave ni gravísima al servicio público, ni a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial? insistimos, las normas jurídicas, y en especial las sancionatorias, por sus implicaciones más gravosas, deben alcanzar una regulación jurídica esperada, con base en principios constitucionales y convencionales reconocidos. Frente a lo anterior, la aplicación de las normas que se impugnan como inconstitucionales son a todas luces desproporcionadas. El medio sancionatorio resulta excesivo frente al carácter urgente o imperioso se exige el sacrificio dispuesto por la norma, más aún, -como ya se ha dicho y demostrado- cuando no existe daño alguno al servicio público imperante, a la imagen v a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, al orden público, a la moral, ni a terceros. En mi caso necesito el trabajo, no solo para la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas inmediatas de quienes dependen de mí, y las mías propias y personales, sino porque además el salario que recibo es el único medio por el cual se generará el pago de mis acreedores, conforme a la regulación judicial propia del proceso de insolvencia, que fue el objetivo mismo por el cual genere dicho proceso judicial. Por lo anterior, es latente que las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción resultan tan desproporcionadas y consecuentemente irracionales y discriminatorias, que no brindan elementos para que, de forma excusable, quien ejerza la labor sancionatoria cuente con medios regulatorios idóneos a los diversos casos concretos, en los que puedan existir, como en el mío causas eximentes de responsabilidad como para que se acredite el sacrificio excesivo de cese de nombramiento, y que se determine, más bien, la alternativa menos gravosa, alcanzando la regulación jurídica esperada, sin que se incurra en exceso sancionatorio y regulatorio de orden disciplinario. No desconozco, -ni pretendo hacerlo-, las facultades de control y fiscalización que posee mi patrono, por lo que me encuentro anuente a que se audite funcionalmente mi ejercicio profesional como servidora del Poder Judicial en Administración Pública asignada a la Dirección de Planificación, a efectos de que se pueda acreditar si existe o no afectación alguna al servicio judicial con motivo, o de forma causal, a mi declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, o bien, si existe riesgo o inconveniente real y objetivo que genere la aplicación de la medida sancionatoria disciplinaria, por existir falta grave o gravísima en el ejercicio de mis funciones con ocasión de la causal en comentario. c.) Como tercer y último elemento del test de proporcionalidad que interesa aplicar, encontramos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus el costo-beneficio", es decir, se considera la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Ante eso, se antepone el sacrificio, -como costo-, en razón de la existencia de algún beneficio o ventaja, sea material o no. Debe existir un beneficio y que esa alternativa sea la menos restrictiva o la menos gravosa, pero a la vez, la más eficaz. Es necesario tener en cuenta tres cuestiones: la estructura de la norma y su ponderación, su racionalidad y su legitimidad, entre las cuales se plantean vínculos estrechos. Cuanto mayor es el grado de la no satisfacción o de afectación de uno de los principios, tanto mayor debe ser la importancia de la satisfacción del otro. Debe, para ello, identificarse los bienes jurídicos o derechos en conflicto, a efectos de determinar la relación existente entre mayor sacrificio versus la mayor jerarquía del bien jurídico, a efectos de determinar si existe relación o balance entre ellos. En el caso que nos ocupa, ya se mencionó en el punto a.) anterior de este test, que el medio que emplean las normas impugnadas por esta vía para obtener ese fin normativo, es por un lado (-articulo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia, y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.-), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Debe entenderse así, que la naturaleza de la estructura de la norma es taxativa de carácter sancionatorio. Frente a lo anterior corresponde analizar ese medio descrito frente al costo-beneficio, entendido ese costo como el sacrificio que implica la medida sancionatoria de cese de nombramiento, frente al beneficio o ventaja que obtiene el Poder Judicial con la aplicación del sacrificio, claro está, todo ello frente al fin que persigue de la norma. Ya dijimos anteriormente, que el fin dispuesto para esas normas legales impugnadas es de carácter precautorio, por un aspecto de confianza, en cuanto al manejo de recursos económicos y la resolución de conflictos sometidos a nivel jurisdiccional, todo ello fundamentado del entendimiento del contenido de la discusión legislativa de la causal que involucró el proyecto de ley de la hoy Ley N" 7333, en el cual la Comisión Mixta Legislativa que confirmó mantener dichas causales, se basó en el criterio del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, quien dijo que: "[...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia [...] la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía […]" (-folios [Valor 040] (imágenes [Valor 064] del proyecto de ley No 10.753-) Debe aclararse nuevamente, que esa discusión se generó, debido a que la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración, dictaminó los alcances de esa causal de insolvencia diciendo que "[...] Respecto a los quebrados e insolventes, ostentan condiciones que de no influir en la relación laboral con la institución para nada tienen que tomarse como causales para cesar a un servidor judicial, de permitirse esto se estaría sancionando por un mero peligro […]" [-folio [Valor 082] [imagen [Valor 065] del proyecto de ley N° 10.753-) También se dijo, que en mi caso, no ha existido procedimiento alguno de parte del Poder Judicial que valore, analice y con ello defina sobre la existencia o inexistencia de afectación al menos leve al servicio público judicial imperante, a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial, y que ello sea, por principio de causalidad, con motivo de mi declaratoria judicial de insolvencia; sino que simplemente se dispuso la apertura del procedimiento que instruye el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, asumiendo de forma directa v expresa la causal, manifestándose que "[...] perdí la condición para ser funcionaria del Poder Judicial, conforme lo establece el numeral 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [...]", como elemento central y único de la imputación de cargos que me fue notificada, rechazándome la prueba testimonial y técnica que propuse para esos efectos con mi defensa material, es decir, para aplicar, per se, el cese del nombramiento, sin demostrarse una necesidad de regulación, por hechos probados de pérdida de confianza u otra circunstancia, que demuestre alguna afectación a la Institución, o bien, por la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial, con ocasión de la causal que se impugna. ¿Por qué menciono insistentemente lo anterior? Pues debido a que al no existir afectación, ni siquiera leve, al servicio judicial por mi desempeño profesional de carácter administrativo, ni aun así, procedimiento administrativo tendente a esa demostración o a la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima con ocasión del mismo, sino directamente la aplicación taxativa del cese de nombramiento, por un mero peligro, un eventual riesgo o mera conveniencia infundada, significaría que la causal, en el fin público que persigue, no tiene un beneficio o ventaja real ni objetiva para el Poder Judicial, ni mucho menos resulta equitativo ni proporcional el sacrificio que implica para mi persona el cese de nombramiento, siendo la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, un acto promovido por mí, como acto de buena fe, para no solo mejorar mi condición económico-financiera provocado principalmente por agresión psicológica y/o emocional así como patrimonial y de género ya explicado, sino además para responsablemente cancelar, mediante el control judicial que exige ese proceso, a mis acreedores. Sin querer vanagloriarme, significa además que al no considerarse la alternativa menos restrictiva o la menos gravosa, la sanción genera además la pérdida para el Poder Judicial de un recurso humano con solicitada por el mismo Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial a la Dirección de Gestión Humana no poseo sanciones disciplinarias durante mis años de servicio. Sobre la legitimación de las normas impugnadas, no tenemos objeción, pues coincide con la teoría jurídica respecto de su medio de creación, sea vía ley y, consecuentemente, creada por el legislador ordinario. Nos obstante, conforme lo ha dicho la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 2011, Caso Gelman Vs. Uruguay: "[...] La sola existencia de un régimen democrático no garantiza, per se, el permanente respeto del Derecho Internacional, incluyendo al Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, lo cual ha sido así considerado incluso por la propia Carta Democrática Interamericana. La legitimación democrática de determinados hechos o actos en una sociedad está limitada por las normas y obligaciones internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos reconocidos en tratados como la Convención Americana, de modo que la existencia de un verdadero régimen democrático está determinada por sus características tanto formales como sustanciales, por lo que, particularmente en casos de graves violaciones a las normas del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos, la protección de los derechos humanos constituye un límite infranqueable a la regla de mayorías, es decir, a la esfera de lo "susceptible de ser decidido" por parte de las mayorías en instancias democráticas, en las cuales también debe primar un "control de convencionalidad" [...], que es función y tarea de cualquier autoridad pública y no sólo del Poder Judicial [...]". En ese mismo sentido, sobre la legitimación de la normativa interna, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en Sentencia de 23 de noviembre de 2009 Caso Radilla Pacheco Vs. México, dispuso: "[...] Para este Tribunal, no sólo la supresión o expedición de las normas en el derecho interno garantizan los derechos contenidos en la Convención Americana, de conformidad a la obligación comprendida en el artículo 2 de dicho instrumento. También se requiere el desarrollo de prácticas estatales conducentes a la observancia efectiva de los derechos y libertades consagrados en la misma. En consecuencia, la existencia de una norma no garantiza por si misma que su aplicación sea adecuada. Es necesario que la aplicación de las normas o su interpretación, en tanto prácticas jurisdiccionales y manifestación del orden público estatal, se encuentren ajustadas al mismo fin que persigue el artículo 2 de la Convención [...]". Llegado este punto, consideramos necesario mencionar, para efectos de análisis e interpretación de esa Honorable Sala, la necesaria aplicación del control de convencionalidad, en el entendido de que cuando un Estado que ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos -como es el caso de Costa Rica-, sus jueces y autoridades públicas en general, también están sometidos a ella, lo que les obliga a velar porque el efecto útil de esa normativa vinculante de carácter internacional no se vea anulada por la aplicación de leyes contrarias a sus disposiciones, a su objeto y fin. En ese sentido, la misma Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que las autoridades no deben únicamente ejercer sólo un control de constitucionalidad, sino también "de convencionalidad" ex officio, cuya función no debe quedar limitada exclusivamente por las manifestaciones o actos de los accionantes en cada caso concreto. (…) Esa honorable Sala Constitucional, en su jurisprudencia y con base en el principio de efectividad, ha reconocido ese control de convencionalidad, como parámetro vinculante para la resolución de casos concretos en los que se puede evidenciar lesión a derechos humanos fundamentales como los alegados mediante la presente acción. Al respecto ha dicho: "[...] El principio de derecho internacional effet utile exige del Estado, en la interpretación y aplicación de los Tratados sobre derechos humanos, y de aquellos no autoaplicables (non-self executing), la de estimular a todos los órganos del aparato estatal para que se generen efectos duraderos en el orden interno de acuerdo con las obligaciones internacionales adquiridas, de modo que se deben tornar las medidas necesarias en todo su conjunto, para asegurar que los términos de un acuerdo internacional tengan efectos en armonía con el derecho interno. A esto siguen los mecanismos de cooperación entre los Estados y organizaciones internacionales, y de seguimiento sobre la compatibilidad de la legislación interna con la de los convenios internacionales". (-Voto No [Valor 099]) Para la aplicación misma de ese control de convencionalidad, conviene mencionar los casos fallados por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, denominados como: Canese vs. Paraguay (31-8-2004), Kimel vs. Argentina (2-5-2008), Usón Rramirez (sic) vs. Venezuela (20-11-2009) y Fontevecchia y D´Amico vs. Argentina (29-11-2011). Para el respectivo fallo de cada caso, esa Corte Interamericana aplicó el test de proporcionalidad aludido, en los que ha señalado para cada uno de sus elementos: a.) En cuanto al primer elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus su fin" , es decir, su adecuación y eficacia, se señalado que la finalidad idónea o legítima, a si bien en todos los casos, (ya sea una punición o una indemnización civil), se aclara que ello no implica que la mencionada medida sea idónea, necesaria ni proporcionada (Usón Ramírez -párr 66-). Así mismo, ha señalado que la medida sea idónea significa que Sirve para salvaguardar el bien jurídico que se quiere proteger, es decir, que está en capacidad de contribuir a la realización de dicho objetivo (Kimel -párr 71- y es reiterado en Fontevecchia D´Amico -párr. 53-). b.) En cuanto al segundo elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus la necesidad de regulación", ha señalado con referencia al requisito de necesidad, que debe obedecer a un interés público imperativo, que la restricción debe interferir en la menor medida posible, así como condición, que no se debe limitar más allá de lo estrictamente necesario (Canese -párr. 96-, Kimel -párr. 76-, Usón Ramírez -párr. 48- y Fontevecchia D´Amico -párr. 43-). c.) Con respecto al tercer y último elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el “Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus el costo-beneficio" , es decir la proporcionalidad en estricto sensu, tanto en Kimel -párr. 83 a 94-, como en Usón Ramírez -párr. 80 a 88-, la Corte refiere a la estructura de la ponderación al evaluar: por un lado el grado de afectación de un derecho o principio -lo que hemos entendido como medio-, y por otro, la importancia de la satisfacción del otro derecho o principio -lo que hemos conocido como costo-beneficio-, frente a lo cual, analiza el sacrificio que implica. Con ello la Corte constata, si la medida adoptada -sanción - garantizó ampliamente el derecho que se intentaba proteger, sin hacer nugatorio el derecho que se limita y su consecuente sacrificio. Como puede notarse, el test de proporcionalidad aplicado a las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, coincide con los parámetros dispuestos por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, definiendo que no existe congruencia, finalidad legítima, idoneidad, ni necesidad objetiva, para la existencia de la normativa impugnada con su taxatividad imperativa, convirtiéndola en desproporcional y consecuentemente en irracional, todo ello frente al sacrificio que involucra. En razón de lo expuesto, se puede concluir fehacientemente que, las normas jurídicas impugnadas por esta vía resultan desproporcionadas, y consecuentemente irracionales y discriminatorias en razón de mi situación económica. violentándose así mis derechos fundamentales invocados. Solicito a esa Honorable Sala, analizar con atención mi situación frente al contenido normativo impugnado, en razón de la justificación de hecho y de derechos alegados en eta acción de inconstitucionalidad”. Establece la siguiente petitoria: “Por las razones indicadas, doctrina, criterios y jurisprudencia invocada, que fundamentan y demuestran idóneamente la violación de derechos fundamentales conforme al contenido de nuestra Constitución Política, en sus artículos 24, 28, 33, 39, 51 y 56, sea a los derechos y principios de Proporcionalidad y Razonabilidad de la sanción disciplinaria por inexistencia de conexidad entre la sanción disciplinaria y sacrificio que involucra, Violación al Derecho de Intimidad, de la Dignidad Humana y el principio Pro- Homine por inexistencia de una finalidad legítima de la sanción disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento frente al sacrificio que involucra sin que exista afectación al servicio público o comprobación de falta grave o gravísima, violación al derecho de culpabilidad e inocencia por inexistencia de afectación al servicio público, sancionando un eventual riesgo no probado ni evaluado, así como ante una mera conveniencia injustificada y violación al Derecho al Trabajo como derecho humano fundamental y consecuentemente violación al Derecho a la Protección a la Familia y a la Seguridad Jurídica, por un acto gestionado en aplicación de mi autonomía de la voluntad, solicito a esa estimable Sala Constitucional lo siguiente: i.) Se admita para análisis y trámite de ley la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad contra los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9.1 de la Ley N° 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, del 05 de mayo de 1993, en los alcances de su contenido que fueron expuestos. ii.) Se acoja la presente acción y se declaren inconstitucionales los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9.) de la Ley No 7333, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, del 05 de mayo de 1993, en los alcances de su contenido que fueron motivo para impedir el nombramiento como servidor judicial y, en especial, como causal de cese de nombramiento en el servicio judicial, lo cual se considera, que por acción y omisión infringe las normas y principios constitucionales y convencionales referidos. iii.) Se instruya a las Autoridades Judiciales que correspondan, a suspender como medida precautoria, -de carácter instrumental y provisional-, cualquier tipo de acto administrativo, como acto final, tendente a definir la aplicación de la causal sancionatoria de naturaleza disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento como servidora judicial contra mi persona como actos finales de procedimiento en su estado recursivo de agotamiento de vía administrativa, ello hasta tanto su Autoridad resuelva lo que en derecho corresponda. Lo anterior, en su carácter de alta prioridad o urgente, y con miras a preservar mi seguridad jurídica frente a mis derechos e intereses legítimos, y con ello evitar que el Consejo Superior de este Poder Judicial como órgano administrativo resuelva en definitiva aplicando la norma invocada, causando así eventuales lesiones a mis derechos fundamentales y se cause una difícil o imposible reparación, así corno a la eficacia directa del principio mismo de la supremacía constitucional. Lo anterior tiene sustento en los artículos 41 de la Constitución Política, 81 de la Ley de la jurisdicción Constitucional y en la jurisprudencia que al respecto a (sic) emitido su Autoridad sobre la materia precautoria (como es el Voto N° [Valor 066] y concordantes) que comprende el derecho de pedir y obtener del órgano jurisdiccional las medidas cautelares necesarias, idóneas y pertinentes para garantizar la eficacia de la sentencia de mérito, como función esencial de la tutela cautelar. Con los alcances de hecho y de derecho invocados en esta acción se cumplen los presupuestos para esta solicitud, se la apariencia de buen derecho -fumus boni iuris- y el peligro en la mora -periculum in mora- y la extrema urgencia, basada en sus criterios rectores de adecuación, idoneidad de la medida y necesidad, todo ello al amparo de los derechos constitucionales y convencionales que se han invocado en la presente acción. iv.) Se le brinde la audiencia de ley a la Procuraduría General de la República. v.) Se publiquen los edictos de ley. vi.) Se condene al Estado al pago de costas, daños y perjuicios.

2.- Mediante resolución de las 15:36 horas de 26 de octubre de 2018, la Presidencia de la Sala pidió al Presidente del Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial el expediente n.o [Valor 001] correspondiente al procedimiento disciplinario que se tramita contra la accionante.

3.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:21 horas del 1o de noviembre de 2018, se apersona Fernando Cruz Castro, en su condición de Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y del Poder Judicial. Aporta, en cumplimiento de la resolución de las 15:36 horas de 26 de agosto de 2018, certificación del expediente n.o [Valor 001].

4.- Mediante resolución de las 10:12 horas de 7 de noviembre de 2018, la Presidencia de la Sala previno a la accionante, agregar el timbre del Colegio de Abogados y Abogadas de Costa Rica.

5.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 15:02 horas de 8 de noviembre de 2018, la accionante indica que aportó el timbre respectivo el 24 de octubre de 2018; sin embargo, lo vuelve a aportar en ese acto.

6.- Mediante resolución de las 14:17 horas de 9 de noviembre de 2018, se dio curso a la acción formulada para la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Con ocasión de lo anterior, se confirió audiencia al Procurador General de la República y al Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Asimismo, se dispuso que la acción se admitía por reunir los requisitos contemplados en los numerales del 73 al 79 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y que la legitimación de la accionante provenía del párrafo 1o del artículo 75 de ese mismo cuerpo normativo. De igual forma, se consignó que el asunto previo era el procedimiento disciplinario n.o [Valor 001], que se encuentra en etapa de agotamiento de la vía administrativa 7.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en las ediciones n.ºs 234, 235 y 236 de los días 17, 18 y 19 de diciembre de 2018 del Boletín Judicial.

8.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 17:05 horas de 27 de noviembre de 2018, se apersona Carmen María Escoto Fernández, en su condición de Vicepresidenta de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y del Poder Judicial. Indica que la accionante pide que se declaren inconstitucionales los siguientes artículos: “Artículo 12.- Sin perjuicio de los otros requisitos exigidos por la ley, para ingresar al servicio judicial se requiere estar capacitado, mental y físicamente, para desempeñar la función, según su naturaleza. Sin embargo no podrán ser nombradas las personas contra quienes haya recaído auto firme de apertura a juicio; tampoco los condenados por delito a pena de prisión; los que estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos; ni los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia; los que habitualmente ingieran bebidas alcohólicas en forma excesiva, consuman drogas no autorizadas o tengan trastornos graves de conducta, de modo que puedan afectar la continuidad y la eficiencia del servido. (Así reformado por el articulo 1 o de la Ley de Reorganización Judicial No. 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997) ARTICULO 26.- En cumplimiento de las condiciones y procedimientos que establece esta Ley, las funciones de los que sirven puestos judiciales cesan por: (…) 9. Haber sido condenado, en sentencia firme, por algún delito que merezca pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos y por haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de quiebra o insolvencia". Sobre la presunta inconstitucionalidad del artículo 12 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Señala que la accionante funda la acción en la causa disciplinaria n.o [Valor 001] que se encuentra en estado recursivo ante el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial y que, además, afirma que el artículo 12 de la ley mencionada establece no solo los requisitos que debe poseer una persona para ingresar al servicio judicial, sino que define además una serie de causales que prohíben el nombramiento, entre ellas, haber sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Arguye que, tal y como lo alega la accionante, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, mediante voto n.o [Valor 018] de las 13:41 horas de 4 de octubre de 2018, le impuso la sanción de revocatoria de nombramiento, según el artículo 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Añade que en la resolución de inicio del procedimiento se le imputaron los siguientes cargos: “(…) Haber sido declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia, (artículo 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial)”; además que " (...) al haber sido declarada en estado de insolvencia, usted [Nombre 001] perdió una condición para ser funcionaria del Poder Judicial conforme lo establece el numeral 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial ". Expone que se trata propiamente de la aplicación directa del numeral 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y no del artículo 12 de ese cuerpo normativo. Añade que el ordinal 12 cuando hace referencia a que no podrán ser nombradas las personas declaradas judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia, se debe entender que se refiere a los requisitos para ingresar al servicio judicial, de manera que no aplica para las personas que ya cuentan con un nombramiento en la institución y a las que se le sigue un procedimiento disciplinario por esos motivos, porque para ello se cuenta con la norma específica -artículo 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial- tal y como fueron fundamentadas las resoluciones del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial. Asevera que admitir la acción contra un artículo que no tiene relación con el asunto base planteado en la acción significaría desnaturalizar el régimen de impugnación propio del sistema. Menciona que como no se cumple con el presupuesto establecido en el artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la acción planteada por [Nombre 001] deber ser rechazada de plano al resultar manifiestamente improcedente (artículo 9 del citado cuerpo legal). Sostiene que, en caso de que no se rechace de plano la acción en cuanto al ordinal 12, se rechazan los alegatos de la accionante con base en los siguientes argumentos: “Como se indica en el aparte primero de este informe, la accionante pretende que se anule por inconstitucional el artículo 12 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en virtud de que a su criterio la causal de insolvencia como motivo para ser nombrada o para declarar el cese del nombramiento en el servicio judicial se encuentra injustificada e infundada, más aún por cuanto no resulta acorde con el complejo normativo de la materia disciplinaria que regula la Ley 7333, en su conjunto, lo cual serían la demostración de una afectación grave en el servicio judicial. Además, considera la accionante que tampoco se da la existencia de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial como elemento primordial para la aplicación sancionatoria de la causal impugnada. insiste, en que permitir esa causal significaría sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo, por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial. Sin embargo, para la resolución de la acción que nos ocupa, es importante tomar en cuenta que la remisión a esa norma deviene en una potestad disciplinaria que le confirió el legislador al Poder Judicial, pues la intención del legislador en todo momento fue velar por el adecuado funcionamiento de la administración de justicia y en resguardo del interés público, que en el caso de esta institución contiene algunas particularidades en relación con otros poderes de la República, porque las personas usuarias depositan su confianza en las personas servidoras judiciales para la resolución de sus conflictos. De manera que, las personas declaradas insolvente (sic) pueden tener un conflicto de intereses en relación con las personas usuarias del sistema judicial, así lo expuso el ex Magistrado de la Corte Suprema de Justicia Daniel González Álvarez, en la presentación a la edición de 1993 (Reforma general a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial introducida por Ley N° 7333 del 5 de mayo de 1993) donde señaló que "(...) ahí hay un asunto de fe pública, una persona que no ha sido capaz de administrar sus negocios que después pretenda optar para ingresar al régimen del Servicio Judicial no es conveniente. Sobre todo si ha habido quiebra fraudulenta, o sea, se ha incurrido en un delito penal”; queda claro entonces que este artículo refiere únicamente a las personas que tratan de ingresar a laborar para el Poder Judicial, que además podría considerarse bajo criterios de “idoneidad” ampliamente desarrollados por la misma Sala Constitucional, una persona que haya sido declarada en quiebra o insolvente carece de condiciones para realizar su labor de manera eficiente ya que tal y como lo expresó el ex Magistrado González "es casi una muerte civil". Continúa don Daniel "Una persona en ese estado, prácticamente no tiene facultades legales ni siquiera, para contraer obligaciones precisamente por las disposiciones del Código Civil que no le permite adquirir ningún tipo de obligaciones, o suscribir ningún contrato, es decir, la muerte civil es desde el punto de vista jurídico...” (Acta N° 98 de la sesión ordinaria celebrada por la Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración, a las CATORCE HORAS TREINTA Y UN MINUTOS, del día catorce de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa, Folios [Valor 100] y [Valor 101] ); de ahí que el fundamento de la norma es impedir el ingreso a la función judicial de personas que presenten esa condición y que lejos de vulnerar los derechos protegidos en los artículos 24, 28, 33, 39, 51 y 56 de la Constitución Política, como lo indica doña [Nombre 001] , tiene como fin tutelar los intereses de quienes requieren los servicios del Poder Judicial, lo cual justifica la restricción impugnada, que es un requisito que deben cumplir quienes pretendan prestar sus servicios en esta institución de conformidad con los artículos 191 y 192 de nuestra norma constitucional, que destaca la idoneidad como un requisito indispensable para que un servidor público pueda desempeñarse de manera óptima en un cargo o puesto público”. Así, la honorable Sala Constitucional en resolución número [Valor 102] de las catorce horas treinta minutos del treinta y uno de julio del dos mil doce, expresó: "SOBRE LA IDONEIDAD COMPROBADA DE Los SERVIDORES PUBLICOS. De acuerdo con lo dispuesto en los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, los servidores públicos serán nombrados con base de idoneidad comprobada, lo que exige la verificación objetiva de sus cualidades. Esto quiere decir que el servidor público debe reunir determinadas características y cualidades las cuales pueden ser válidamente establecidas y reguladas por ley, siempre que resulten objetivas razonables. La idoneidad debe comprobarse no solo a través de aspectos meramente académicos se requiere más bien del análisis y calificación de varios elementos, factores o condiciones de diversa índole, como por ejemplo aspectos psicológicos de estabilidad experiencia laboral y profesional y demás atestados que valorados en conjunto determinen que una persona es la más idónea para desempeñar el puesto. De esta forma, el servidor público, demostrará que reúne todas las condiciones necesarias que lo faculta para desempeñarse óptimamente en el puesto o cargo público, es decir; que reúne los méritos que la función demande. Lo anterior; tiene como finalidad garantizar la eficiencia y el buen funcionamiento de la función pública, además, de maximizar y proteger los recursos públicos. En ese sentido, es necesario recordar que el servidor público, es un servidor de los administrados en general por lo que debe velar por los intereses de la colectividad y por ende, brindar un servicio de calidad a cada administrado como representante de la colectividad” (el destacado no es del original). A mayor abundamiento, el diputado Pacheco Salazar en la discusión de la moción número [Valor 103] , de la Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración de la Asamblea Legislativa, manifestó que: " Los requisitos de nombramiento deben ser más amplios y desde luego, cualquier patrono, no solo la Corte, tiene ese derecho a escoger lo que más le convenga. Por eso en el artículo 12, en ese párrafo segundo, dice que “no podrán ser nombrados los procesados con auto de elevación a juicio, de citación a juicio. Los condenados por delito de pena de prisión, los que estuvieran sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño del cargo u oficios públicos...(continúa leyendo)". O sea, establece una serie de requisitos de ingreso que desde luego, la Corte a la hora de escoger un funcionario pueden ponerle a esos y mucho más, porque no va a nombrar a un insolvente, a un quebrado, a un inhabilitado... (El destacado no es del original). (Acta N° 7 de la sesión ordinaria celebrada por la Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración, a las CATORCE HORAS TREINTA Y UN MINUTOS, del día veintiuno de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y uno, Folio [Valor 104]). Por lo anteriormente expuesto, la norma cuestionada se ajusta a la garantía de "eficiencia de la Administración" que refieren los artículos 191 y 192 de la Constitución Política, como presupuesto para acceder a cargos públicos, traducido en la necesidad de que los servicios que brinda el Estado sean ejecutados por aquellas personas servidoras que puedan garantizar la eficiencia en la Administración”. Sobre la presunta inconstitucionalidad del artículo 26 inciso 9 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Indica que la accionante sostiene que esta norma quebranta los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad reconocidos en la Constitución Política, respecto a la sanción disciplinaria por no haber conexidad entre la sanción disciplinaria y el sacrificio que involucra; además, de la presunta violación al Derecho a la Intimidad, la Dignidad Humana y al principio Pro Homine, por “inexistencia de una finalidad legítima de la sanción disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento frente al sacrificio que involucra sin que exista afectación al servicio público o comprobación de falta grave o gravísima, violación al derecho de culpabilidad e inocencia por inexistencia de afectación al servicio público, sancionando un eventual riesgo no probado ni evaluado, así como ante una mera conveniencia injustificada y violación al Derecho a la Protección a la Familia y a la Seguridad Jurídica por un acto gestionado en aplicación a la autonomía de la voluntad”. Añade que ella considera que “fue advertido dentro del trámite legislativo del proyecto de ley en el que se discutió la norma citada, que de permitir esa causal significaría sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial, aspecto carente de demostración frente a decisiones de necesidad que involucran aspectos de su vida privada ”. serie de condiciones a la persona fallida, según cada caso, desde interdicción de administrar sus bienes o desapoderamiento de bienes, cierre de cuentas corrientes, perdida de facultades legales para contraer obligaciones o suscribir contratos, entre otros, en cada caso le declaratoria viene como consecuencia de la cesación de pagos del deudor y es sinónimo de incumplimiento de una obligación dineraria. Refiere que el legislador sostuvo la importancia de mantener como causal de la aplicación del régimen disciplinario en el Poder Judicial, cuando se diera una situación en que la persona servidora judicial fuera declarada judicialmente en ese estado -artículo 26, inciso 9) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial- y como motivo para ordenar el cese de funciones de esa persona, luego de que el procedimiento disciplinario así lo determinara, respetando en todo momento los derechos del servidor o la servidora judicial y el debido proceso. Aduce que, según la discusión que se dio en instancias legislativas cuando se analizaba la reforma general a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, introducida por ley n.o 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, el exmagistrado Luis Paulino Mora Mora (qdDg) expresó que “los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado y dentro de las instituciones del Estado, es por eso que se ha estimado que la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos…” (expediente 10.753, folio [Valor 076])”. Refiere que lo anterior se encuentra dentro de la potestad disciplinaria que tiene el Poder Judicial respecto a sus servidores y servidoras, necesaria como un instrumento de garantía al ciudadano de que recibirá un servicio público de calidad, ágil, efectivo y eficaz, dotado de una organización adecuada y de personas servidoras judiciales altamente calificadas para el desempeño de sus labores. Explica que no lleva razón la accionante cuando señala que permitir esa causal significaría sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial, eso en virtud de que la norma está prevista para cuando en sede judicial se decrete la declaratoria de quiebra o insolvencia, o sea hay todo un proceso judicial en el que se discuten cuestiones relacionadas con los incumplimientos de las obligaciones crediticias asumidas por la parte deudora y concluyen en esa declaratoria; además de la imposición de una serie de medidas o restricciones para que la persona pueda solucionar esa situación. Agrega que el legislador estimó que lo tener certeza de que es responsable con sus obligaciones tanto laborales como en su vida privada. Asevera que la imposición de este tipo de sanciones tiene un alcance absoluto del principio de legalidad por incurrir en conductas prohibidas por una norma, lo que no es consecuente con los alegatos de la accionante cuando afirma que la norma permite sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo. Menciona que, tal y como lo señaló el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial en el voto n.o 1923-18 de las 13:41 horas de 4 de octubre de 2018, entre las personas servidoras judiciales y el Poder Judicial existe una relación de “ sujeción especial” que se genera a partir de las actividades que por su naturaleza requieren de cierto grado de regulación y fiscalización, la cual se efectúa mediante la vigilancia de su comportamiento tanto en el desarrollo de sus funciones, como en la vida privada. Cita parcialmente el artículo 28 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y el numeral 49 del Estatuto del Servicio Judicial: “Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial: ARTÍCULO 28.- Podrá ser destituido de su cargo, siguiendo el procedimiento establecido y con la previa oportunidad de defensa, el servidor: (…) 2.- Que, por incorrecciones o fallas en el ejercicio de su cargo o en su vida privada, que pueden afectar el buen servicio o la imagen del Poder Judicial, se haya hecho acreedor a esa sanción. (El destacado no es del original). Estatuto de Servicio Judicial: Artículo 49.- Además de los deberes específicos que establece la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, los servidores judiciales tendrán los siguientes: c) Observar dignidad en el desempeño de su cargo y en su vida privada; (El destacado no es del original)”. Indica que la relación de sujeción especial ha sido ampliamente analizada por este Tribunal Constitucional y, en el voto n.o [Valor 105] de las 8:30 horas de 10 de abril de 2018, señaló que su observancia es una garantía tanto para el ejercicio de una defensa efectiva como para la legalidad de la conducta sancionatoria: "Dicha potestad sancionatoria se ejerce en el marco de un vínculo jurídico, de una relación de sujeción especial entre el funcionario público, y el ordenamiento jurídico aplicable a este tipo de vínculo, dentro del cual encontramos una serie de principios que sirven como una especie de guía, en cuanto orientan el sentido de las normas, y que en materia sancionatoria, se constituyen en una garantía en doble vía, en cuanto su observancia garantiza el ejercicio de una defensa efectiva, pero además la legalidad de la conducta sancionatoria". Arguye que el artículo 153 de la Constitución Política le otorga al Poder Judicial una de las atribuciones más importantes del Estado, que es la de administrar justicia, tarea que este Poder de la República ejecuta a través de las actividades desplegadas por las personas que trabajan para la institución y colaboran para cumplir la labor encomendada. Añade que resolver de manera pacífica y satisfactoria los conflictos que se les presentan por parte de la sociedad, a fin de procurar el mantenimiento de la paz social, depende de gran parte de la credibilidad que se le tenga a quienes participan en la resolución institucional de tales divergencias. Estima que no lleva razón la accionante cuando menciona en su escrito de interposición que se le ha lesionado su Derecho de Intimidad, Dignidad Humana y el principio Pro Homine, debido a que el inciso 9) del artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica se complementa con los artículos 28 y 49 de esa normativa, que cuentan con respaldo constitucional y legal en cuanto al deber de dirigir tanto su desempeño judicial como su vida privada de manera correcta. Cita el extracto de una sentencia de la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia: “ Los funcionarios públicos son depositarios de la confianza del Estado-patrono y de los usuarios del servicio, por lo que deben tener un comportamiento impecable y probo, así como una conducta intachable. Por eso, en tratándose de servidores públicos independientemente de su naturaleza, función y categoría, la valoración de sus faltas debe hacerse en forma estricta y meticulosa, por estar de por medio el interés público ante el cual debe ceder el del trabajador (en cuanto a la mayor rigurosidad de la calificación de las faltas de los servidores públicos véase entre otros los votos número [Valor 106] de las 10:30 horas del 26 de octubre de 2001, [Valor 107] de las 9:30 horas del 22 de mayo de 2002 de esta Sala). A los servidores y servidoras del Estado se les exige un especial deber de diligencia en todos aquellos asuntos que guarden relación con las labores que desempeñan - después de todo son responsables de que la función que realizan sea ejecutada conforme a criterios de objetividad imparcialidad eficiencia y profesionalidad entre otros-, por lo que la confianza en ellos depositada, alcanza una trascendencia particular al momento de analizar las faltas que se les atribuyen, especialmente si las mismas están relacionadas con las tareas específicas asignadas o pueden incidir en ellas (en este sentido, ver entre otros los votos número [Valor 067] de las 10:30 horas del 30 de noviembre, [Valor 068] de las 9:30 horas del 5 de diciembre ambos del 2001, de esta Sala). c ) Lo vital importancia en el presente caso, al encontrarnos en presencia de un funcionario público que debe contar con las condiciones personales necesarias para laborar en el servicio público de la Justicia" y ser merecedor de la confianza en él depositada -aptitud moral e idoneidad entre otros requerimientos establecidos en el numeral 18 del Estatuto de Servicio Judicial-". Transcribe parcialmente la sentencia n.o [Valor 069] de las 15:00 horas de 3 de noviembre de 2004 de esta Sala, en la que se desarrollaron los deberes de toda persona funcionaria pública: “ (…) dedicarse al cargo con eficiencia y lealtad lo cual implica la obligación de asistencia y lealtad con la institución; atender el orden jerárquico, lo cual se traduce en una obligación de obediencia (acatar directrices y órdenes del superior en los términos del artículo 102 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública; y la dignidad en la conducta, esta es tanto relativas al respeto del ordenamiento jurídico como de urbanismo y moralidad en su conducta, tanto en la jornada laboral como en su vida privada, en tanto la condición de funcionario reviste una importancia fundamental toda vez que, como su definición lo indica actúa en nombre y a cuenta de la Administración, y en consecuencia, se convierte en su imagen. De ahí la importancia de los requisitos de "honorabilidad" y "respetabilidad" que se hace exigida como un derivado directo de la norma constitucional -artículo 192-, a todos los funcionarios públicos, en tanto atiende a la exigencia de la "idoneidad comprobada” , al estar llamados a realizar los fines públicos encomendadas al Estado. En este sentido se manifestó la Sala en sentencias número [Valor 070] y [Valor 071] ambos del siete de marzo de 1995. “ Los deberes de los funcionarios derivan, como sus derechos de la ley y de la naturaleza del cargo o función que desempeñan, es decir, tienen carácter objetivo". (El destacado no es del original)”. Refiere que, mediante la norma impugnada, el legislador ha delimitado la potestad sancionatoria del Poder Judicial respecto de las personas funcionarias que “han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia ”, por cuanto una vez que obtuvieron un vínculo dentro de la institución deben respetar el vínculo con la administración y el cumplimiento de una serie de obligaciones, entre ellas, la de honrar sus deudas. Agrega que lo anterior debe evitar, como bien lo expone el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial en el voto n.o [Valor 018], que la recuperación de las sumas de dinero resulte más lenta para los acreedores “ siendo que reciben una suma menor de dinero que la cuota que se acordó al inicio de la relación crediticia ”, además de la suspensión del cobro de intereses, entre otras consecuencias de esa declaratoria. Aduce que el poder disciplinario tiene por objetivo, el dictado de normas que regulen la actividad con sus funcionarios y funcionarias, para que se pueda dar el cumplimiento a los deberes encomendados a la Administración Pública, lo que se sustenta en los pilares constitucionales que imponen las obligaciones del Estado, de brindar un correcto servicio público que se concreta en el numeral 192 de la Constitución Política. Sostiene que el legislador en el artículo 26 inciso 9), estableció un motivo razonable para el cese de nombramiento de una persona servidora judicial, ampliamente discutido y analizado en la Comisión Permanente de Gobierno y Administración de la Asamblea Legislativa. Explica que: “No hay duda entonces que el legislador en la discusión de la reforma a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial consideró que resulta necesaria la existencia de todo un aparato normativo y administrativo que se desempeñe como filtro contralor en el quehacer de las personas funcionarias judiciales, en el que se pueda materializar la potestad disciplinaria del estado, cuyo pilar descansa sobre el Principio de Jerarquía constitucionalmente reconocido (sentencias No. [Valor 072] de las 15:36 horas del 7 de marzo de 1995 y [Valor 073], de las 14:41 horas del 16 de marzo de 2005), y en la relación de 'sujeción especial', que se genera entre las personas servidoras judiciales y el Poder Judicial, mediante la definición de estrategias para una prestación del servicio de justicia eficiente y la aplicación del régimen disciplinario cuando se incumplan las disposiciones contenidas en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, con total y absoluta precisión a lo anterior el artículo 174 señala que: "El régimen disciplinario tiene por objeto asegurar la eficiencia, corrección y decoro de las funciones encomendadas al Poder Judicial y garantizar a los ciudadanos una correcta administración de justicia". Manifiesta que para no hacer nugatorio tal postulado, es que el legislador incorporó como una de las causales para el cese del nombramiento lo señalado en el inciso 9) del artículo 26 de la referida ley, y por ende no resulta contrario a los artículos 24, 28, 33, 39, 51 y 56 de nuestra Constitución Política, ni tampoco a los principios de Proporcionalidad y Razonabilidad.

9.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las 14:47 horas de 29 de noviembre de 2018, se apersona Julio Alberto Jurado Fernández, en su condición de Procurador General de la República. Indica, en cuanto a la legitimación de la parte accionante, que se fundamenta en el asunto previo tramitado en el constata que el procedimiento seguido contra la accionante se encuentra en fase de agotamiento de la vía administrativa; además, ella invocó en el asunto base, la inconstitucionalidad de los artículos impugnados (ver recurso de apelación presentado), con lo cual no existen reparos en cuanto a su legitimación para interponer la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad. Expone que, pese a lo anterior, tal legitimación es parcial, pues en el asunto base no se aplicó a la aquí accionante, lo dispuesto en el numeral 12 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, sino únicamente el inciso 9) del artículo 26 de ese cuerpo normativo. Aduce que la accionante es funcionaria activa del Poder Judicial, con lo cual únicamente le resulta de aplicación lo dispuesto en el artículo 26.9, en cuanto establece como causal de despido la declaratoria judicial de quiebra e insolvencia. Menciona que no le resulta aplicable lo dispuesto en el numeral 12, pues dicho artículo está dirigido a personas que pretenden ingresar como servidoras judiciales nuevas al Poder Judicial. Refiere que, por lo anterior, el asunto base en el que se alegó la inconstitucionalidad de este numeral no es un medio razonable para amparar el derecho que se estima lesionado. Manifiesta que es criterio de la Procuraduría que la accionante solo tiene legitimación para impugnar lo dispuesto en el inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la ley de marras, sin perjuicio de que la Sala decida por conexidad analizar lo dispuesto en el artículo 12. Análisis de las normas impugnadas desde el derecho a la intimidad y la libertad. Indica que el derecho a la intimidad, consagrado en el numeral 24 constitucional, opera como límite frente a la intromisión ilegítima del Estado y de otros particulares; además, permite el desarrollo íntegro de la personalidad. Señala que ese derecho no solo excluye cualquier actividad de otro que implique una imposición, intromisión e injerencia en los asuntos de la vida íntima de la persona, sino que entraña la posibilidad de impedir la publicación o revelación de determinados hechos, que únicamente adquieren relevancia para el sujeto. Acota que ha sido reconocido por esta Sala como "La esfera en la cual nadie puede inmiscuirse. La libertad de la vida privada es el reconocimiento de una zona de actividad que es propia de cada uno y el derecho a la intimidad limita la intervención de otras personas o de los poderes públicos en la vida privada de la persona... " (Sentencia [Valor 074] de las 15:09 horas del 3 de agosto de 1995)”. Sostiene que el reconocimiento la " vida privada" en consecuencia, se conforma por aquella parte que no está consagrada a una actividad pública y que por lo mismo no está destinada a trascender e impactar a la sociedad de manera directa, y en donde en principio, los terceros no deben tener acceso alguno toda vez que las actividades que en ella se desarrollan no son de su incumbencia, ni les afectan (artículo 28 constitucional). Menciona que en el caso de los funcionarios públicos cabe analizar cuál es el deslinde que debe realizarse entre la protección al ámbito de su vida privada y su esfera pública, para determinar, en definitiva, si tal protección debe equipararse o no a la de cualquier otro particular. Arguye que la Ley contra la Corrupción y Enriquecimiento Ilícito en la Función Pública de Costa Rica, define al funcionario como toda persona que presta sus servicios en los órganos y en los entes de la Administración Pública, estatal y no estatal, a nombre y por cuenta de esta y como parte de su organización, en virtud de un acto de investidura y con entera independencia del carácter imperativo, representativo, remunerado, permanente o público de la actividad respectiva. Sostiene que, en consecuencia, existe una relación estatutaria entre el Estado y el funcionario, independientemente de la naturaleza del cargo que se ocupe, por lo que es claro que no puede equipararse la condición de los servidores públicos a los demás particulares, pues aquellos están sometidos a un principio de transparencia y rendición de cuentas, que los obliga a responder frente a la sociedad por los actos que realizan. Arguye que el principio de transparencia obliga a los funcionarios públicos, por sus especiales responsabilidades, a sujetarse al escrutinio y la crítica no antijurídica de los administrados en general. Asevera que el principio de rendición de cuentas también constituye un valor que acompaña a la función pública, no solo de manera esporádica o periódica, sino que debe ser una práctica constante, a través de la cual los funcionarios quedan expuestos al control ciudadano. Menciona que, por lo anterior, el ámbito de protección de quien ha aceptado servir a la Nación, es más reducido que el de quien no se encuentra en esa situación, por cuanto libremente ha querido colocarse en una posición de visibilidad que permite un amplio acceso público. Manifiesta que quien ingresa a la vida pública acepta un riesgo mayor por el solo hecho de hacerlo, aunque no siempre será fácil distinguir entre los actos privados y los actos públicos de un funcionario, o entre sus actos personales sin trascendencia o relevancia pública y los actos personales que sí la tienen. Indica que, tratándose de los funcionarios, el umbral del derecho a la intimidad y su libertad existe, pero es diferente del que ampara al ciudadano que no ha asumido la condición y la responsabilidad de quien tiene un cargo público y que por eso mismo tiene determinados deberes éticos y jurídicos frente a los ciudadanos. Señala que la vida privada del funcionario tiene un núcleo infranqueable -como sucede con el resto de las personas- pero el de aquel es más reducido, pues aspectos de la vida privada que normalmente no serían revelables tratándose de un ciudadano común pasan a ser objetos lícitos de información pública en tanto exista, un interés general en juego que lo justifique. Añade que la sociedad tiene el derecho de conocer un acto de ese ámbito del funcionario, aunque no constituya delito, cuando pueda incidir en la función pública que tiene encargada. Sostiene que la vida privada de los servidores públicos es en consecuencia muy limitada, pues la sociedad tiene derecho a exigir honestidad a sus representantes en lo que concierne a su vida personal, familiar, profesional, entre otras. Agrega que la responsabilidad de proyectar y mantener una imagen determinada va en detrimento de su ámbito de intimidad y quien no esté dispuesto a admitirlo carece de vocación pública. Expone que es criterio de la Procuraduría que el legislador tiene una autorización constitucional para establecer normas inhabilitantes, que exijan determinados comportamientos al funcionario público, aun tratándose de ámbitos relacionados con su vida privada, siempre y cuando estos comportamientos puedan incidir en la imagen de la institución que representa o en la confianza legitima que debe tenerse sobre el funcionario. Explica que establecer una prohibición de ingreso a la función pública o la pérdida de la condición de funcionario, fundamentado en un hecho de la vida privada como es la declaratoria de quiebra e insolvencia, no es por sí mismo inconstitucional, en la medida que tales actos puedan incidir en la imagen del funcionario y de la institución. Arguye que debe considerarse que la existencia de normas de esta naturaleza se justifica también, atendiendo a la naturaleza de ciertos puestos que manejan y administran recursos, fondos públicos, o que por su especial condición requieren de un comportamiento intachable del funcionario con el manejo de sus deudas personales. Menciona que este tipo de normas no resulta violatorio del derecho a la intimidad ni a la libertad y pueden ser impuestas al funcionario público, aun cuando se trate de actos relativos a su esfera privada. Manifiesta que se analizarán las normas impugnadas, a partir de los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Análisis de las normas impugnadas desde los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Cita los artículos cuestionados de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial: “Artículo 12.- Sin perjuicio de los otros requisitos exigidos por la ley, para ingresar al servicio judicial se requiere estar capacitado, mental y físicamente, para desempeñar la función, según su naturaleza. Sin embargo no podrán ser nombradas las personas contra quienes haya recaído auto firme de apertura a juicio; tampoco los condenados por delito a pena de prisión; los que estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos; ni los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia; los que habitualmente ingieran bebidas alcohólicas en forma excesiva, consuman drogas no autorizadas o tengan trastornos graves de conducta, de modo que puedan afectar la continuidad y la eficiencia del servido. (Así reformado por el articulo 1 o de la Ley de Reorganización Judicial No. 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997). (La negrita no es del original) (…) Artículo 26.- En cumplimiento de las condiciones y procedimientos que establece esta Ley, las funciones de los que sirven puestos judiciales cesan por: (…) 9. Haber sido condenado, en sentencia firme, por algún delito que merezca pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos y por haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de quiebra o insolvencia" (La negrita no es del original)”. Indica que, tal como se desprende de las normas impugnadas, no se trata de normas de carácter disciplinario en sentido estricto, pues no existe un bien jurídico tutelado ni una consecuencia derivada de la falta en el servicio público por parte del funcionario. Señala que tales normas son de carácter preventivo, pues buscan establecer un principio de "confianza legítima ", al pretender que quienes se desempeñen en cualquier puesto dentro del Poder Judicial, se conduzcan adecuadamente en su esfera privada y no tengan una insolvencia económica que los podría colocar eventualmente en una situación riesgosa, que pueda traducirse posteriormente en un detrimento en el desempeño de sus funciones públicas. Acota que las normas pretenden que quienes trabajen en el Poder Judicial tengan ciertas características personales (solvencia económica), que, en caso de perderlas, los hará perder su nombramiento. Refiere que aun cuando la norma aplicada a la accionante no constituye una sanción disciplinaria en sentido estricto, es lo cierto que la conducta prevista en la norma (insolvencia o quiebra) tiene una consecuencia gravosa (cese del nombramiento) y, por tanto, le resulta de aplicación todos los principios constitucionales que rigen el debido proceso y, específicamente los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Expone que, a partir del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, cualquier consecuencia gravosa en la esfera del individuo, debe constituir una medida estrictamente necesaria para alcanzar el objetivo buscado. Arguye que, por lo anterior, el principio de proporcionalidad requiere la previa fijación por parte del legislador de los límites dentro de los cuales el operador jurídico se podrá mover para la interpretación de la norma en atención a las circunstancias concretas. Explica que la autoridad administrativa, en consecuencia, debe contar con un margen de discrecionalidad otorgado previamente por el legislador para garantizar que la consecuencia gravosa únicamente se aplique cuando esta sea razonable y proporcional a la causa de origen. Sostiene que la aplicación de los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad hace cuestionar la constitucionalidad de las normas impugnadas. Comenta que si se analizan las normas citadas, se observa que la disposición normativa no permite graduación alguna ni la atención de circunstancias particulares frente a los casos concretos, pues la única consecuencia posible ante la declaratoria de quiebra o insolvencia, es el cese del nombramiento o la imposibilidad de ingreso al Poder Judicial, sin importar de cuál funcionario se trate. Añade que la norma resulta de alcance general para todos los puestos del Poder Judicial, sin valorar la naturaleza de las funciones ni la especial labor que realizan algunos funcionarios. Asevera que atendiendo a la naturaleza de ciertos puestos que manejan fondos públicos o que administran justicia, puede justificarse la imposición de ciertas características y comportamientos personales, pues estos pueden incidir en la imagen o en la independencia de dichos servidores en el desempeño de sus funciones. Manifiesta que del análisis del expediente legislativo, se desprende que la intención de la norma impugnada siempre fue declarar una "pérdida de confianza" del funcionario judicial “que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener disposición de manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía" (ver manifestaciones del Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora a folios [Valor 075] y [Valor 076] del administraban justicia o que, por la condición de su puesto, debía exigírseles un adecuado manejo de sus haberes personales. Indica que, pese a ello, la norma aprobada no refleja tal intención, sino que, por el contrario, se aprobó de manera general para todos los funcionarios judiciales y al no permitir distinción alguna ni valoración de circunstancias concretas, se convierte en irrazonable. Estima que la redacción inflexible de la norma, resulta violatoria del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, pues no permite ningún margen de maniobra para el operador jurídico, que se ve obligado a aplicar la consecuencia jurídica (cese del nombramiento) aun para puestos judiciales que no tienen trascendencia según el fin buscado. Señala que si bien podría pensarse que el aspecto descrito es un tema de aplicación de la norma y no de constitucionalidad, lo cierto que la Inspección Judicial no tenía otra posibilidad diferente a cesar de su puesto a la accionante, pues la norma no le permite ninguna otra opción. Insiste que, en el caso concreto, no existe la violación a un bien jurídico, por tanto la razonabilidad de la norma (necesidad) únicamente podría justificarse en la especial naturaleza que tienen ciertos puestos del Poder Judicial, que obligan a imponer determinados comportamientos personales a quienes los ocupan, pues eventualmente dichos comportamientos pueden incidir en la independencia, objetividad, o la forma de resolver determinados asuntos. Acota que el requisito impuesto debería ser una condición del servidor judicial en atención a una función determinada, pero resulta desproporcionado que se aplique de manera general, tal como está redactada la norma, sobre todo cuando la misma implica una seria afectación al derecho al trabajo. Cita el voto de esta Sala n.o [Valor 077]: “Así, ha reconocido la Sala que un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad -o de un determinado grupo- mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción que será adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La idoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión . Por su parte la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer; de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad”. Agrega que en similar sentido se dictaron los votos n.os [Valor 109] y [Valor 110]. que, en criterio de ese órgano asesor, lo dispuesto en el inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, aplicado a la accionante, resulta contrario a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad por la forma inflexible en que está redactado. Añade que no se justifica la necesidad de la norma para todos los funcionarios judiciales ni se otorga margen de aplicación al operador jurídico. Considera que la norma debería anularse. Menciona la sentencia n.o [Valor 078] de las 11:57 horas de 15 de octubre de 1999 reproducida en la resolución n.o [Valor 079] de las 14:47 horas de 4 de octubre de [Valor 027] . Afirma que, en caso de considerarse la existencia de la norma en atención a ciertas funciones, podría realizarse una interpretación conforme al Derecho de la Constitución, que contemple que la norma se justifica y debe aplicarse únicamente a los puestos de funcionarios que administren justicia o fondos públicos; sin embargo, en este caso se estaría incursionando en el campo del legislador. Expone que, tomando en cuenta los reclamos planteados por la accionante, no corresponde a la Sala, en la vía de la acción, valorar las supuestas deficiencias en la tramitación del expediente llevada a cabo por la Inspección Judicial, ni tampoco la forma en la que tal órgano ha venido aplicando las sanciones en otros casos. Refiere que muchos de los argumentos de la accionante están relacionados con la aplicación de la norma y no con la constitucionalidad de esta, por lo que omiten referirse al respecto. Concluye lo siguiente: “En vista de las anteriores consideraciones, este órgano asesor estima que la legitimación de la accionante es parcial, únicamente en cuanto impugna lo dispuesto en el numeral 26 inciso 9) de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, al ser la norma aplicada en el asunto base. En cuanto al fondo, esta representación considera que lo dispuesto en dicho numeral, resulta inconstitucional por la rigidez de su redacción, al no permitir margen de aplicación al operador jurídico y no demostrarse su necesidad con relación a la generalidad de los funcionarios del Poder Judicial (principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad). Por lo anterior, se recomienda la anulación de lo dispuesto en el numeral 26 inciso 9) indicado, sin perjuicio de que la Sala estime necesaria la interpretación conforme al Derecho de la Constitución de dicha norma en los términos indicados. En cuanto al artículo 12 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, dicha norma no resulta de aplicación a la accionante, sin perjuicio de que la Sala estime entrar a valorar la misma por conexidad”.

10.- Mediante resolución de las 15:35 horas de 22 de enero de 2019, la Presidencia de la Sala tuvo por contestadas las audiencias conferidas y remitió, de acuerdo con el turno correspondiente, esta acción a la oficina del Magistrado Paul Rueda Leal.

11.- El 24 de enero de 2019, el Magistrado Fernando Cruz Castro planteó inhibitoria, por cuanto, en su condición de Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, fue llamado a informar sobre el fondo de la acción. Aclara que, aun cuando no rindió el informe solicitado, sino que lo hizo la vicepresidenta, la situación se mantiene, ya que es improcedente que actúe como juez en un asunto en el que ha sido llamado como parte.

12.- Mediante resolución de las 11:47 horas de 24 de enero de 2019, la Presidencia de la Sala tuvo por separado al Magistrado Fernando Cruz Castro del conocimiento de este asunto y tuvo por habilitado al Magistrado Suplente que lo sustituya de conformidad con el artículo 49 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.

13.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibidem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

14.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Rueda Leal; y,

Considerando:

I.- Objeto de la acción. La señora [Nombre 001] plantea acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra del artículo 12 y del inciso 9 del numeral 26, ambos de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, n.o 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993, por estimarlos contrarios a los artículos 28, 39 y 56 de la Constitución Política, así como a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En términos generales, estima que las normas cuestionadas lesionan el derecho al trabajo, a la protección de la familia y a la seguridad jurídica; además, los principios de culpabilidad e inocencia por la imposición de la máxima sanción (revocatoria del nombramiento) pese a que no se ha demostrado afectación al servicio público o terceros; y finalmente, los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de la sanción, pues no solo tienen un alcance extenso sino que establecen un criterio objetivo que impide cualquier valoración en relación con la oportunidad de la sanción y el tipo de sanción a aplicar.

II.- Sobre la normativa impugnada. Los artículos cuestionados de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial son los siguientes:

“Artículo 12.- Sin perjuicio de los otros requisitos exigidos por la ley, para ingresar al servicio judicial se requiere estar capacitado, mental y físicamente, para desempeñar la función, según su naturaleza.

Sin embargo, no podrán ser nombradas las personas contra quienes haya recaído auto firme de apertura a juicio; tampoco los condenados por delito a pena de prisión; los que estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos; ni los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia; los que habitualmente ingieran bebidas alcohólicas en forma excesiva, consuman drogas no autorizadas o tengan trastornos graves de conducta, de modo que puedan afectar la continuidad y la eficiencia del servicio.

(Así reformado por el artículo 1° de la Ley N° 7728 de 15 de diciembre de 1997)” “Artículo 26.- En cumplimiento de las condiciones y procedimientos que establece esta Ley, las funciones de los que sirven puestos judiciales cesan por:

(…)

9.- Haber sido condenado, en sentencia firme, por algún delito que merezca pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos, y por haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de quiebra o insolvencia”.

III.- Sobre la admisibilidad de la acción. La acción de inconstitucionalidad es un proceso con determinadas formalidades, que deben ser satisfechas a efectos de que la Sala pueda válidamente conocer el fondo de la impugnación. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece los presupuestos de admisibilidad de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. En primer término, se exige un asunto previo pendiente de resolver, sea en vía judicial o administrativa (en el procedimiento para agotarla), en que se haya invocado la inconstitucionalidad como medio razonable para amparar el derecho o interés que se considera lesionado. En el párrafo segundo y tercero, de manera excepcional contempla la ley supuestos en los que no se exige el asunto previo, tales como inexistencia de lesión individual y directa por la naturaleza del asunto, defensa de intereses difusos o colectivos, o bien, cuando sea formulada directamente por el Contralor General de la República, el Procurador General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República y el Defensor de los Habitantes. Ahora, en cuanto a la necesidad de un asunto previo pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa, es necesario que este trate del procedimiento que agota la vía administrativa, el cual, de conformidad con el artículo 126 de la Ley General de la Administración Pública, se da a partir del momento en que se interponen los recursos ordinarios ante el superior jerarca del órgano que dictó el acto final, pues de lo contrario la acción resultaría inadmisible. Asimismo, existen otras formalidades que deben ser satisfechas, a saber, la determinación explícita de la normativa impugnada, debidamente fundamentada, con cita concreta de las normas y principios constitucionales que se consideren infringidos, la autenticación por abogado del escrito en el que se plantea la acción, la acreditación de las condiciones de legitimación (poderes y certificaciones), así como la certificación literal del escrito en el que se invocó la inconstitucionalidad de las normas en el asunto base, requisitos todos que, en caso de no ser aportados por la parte accionante, pueden ser prevenidos para su cumplimiento por la Presidencia de la Sala.

En el sub examine, la accionante refiere que el expediente n.o [Valor 001] es el asunto previo que sustenta la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad en contra del artículo 12 y del inciso 9 del numeral 26, ambos de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Al respecto, señala que se encuentra en etapa de agotamiento de la vía administrativa ante el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial y fue tramitado en primera instancia por el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial, quien, mediante voto n.o [Valor 018] de 4 de octubre de 2018, dispuso la revocatoria de su nombramiento por haber sido declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia.

Sobre el particular, es importante precisar que, en efecto, el procedimiento administrativo se encuentra en etapa de agotamiento de la vía; sin embargo, la resolución del Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial únicamente se sustentó en el inciso 9 del artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. Asimismo, de la lectura del recurso de apelación incoado, se desprende que la accionante solo invocó y desarrolló la inconstitucionalidad de este ordinal.

En consecuencia, se admite la acción en cuanto al inciso 9 del artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, por constituir la invocación de la inconstitucionalidad en el asunto previo, medio razonable para amparar los derechos que se consideran lesionados. Por otra parte, se declara inadmisible la acción en lo que corresponde al ordinal 12 del mismo cuerpo normativo, toda vez que no se le aplicó a la amparada en el procedimiento ni mucho menos se alegó su inconstitucionalidad en la vía administrativa.

IV.- Sobre la alegada inconstitucionalidad del inciso 9 del artículo 26, ambos de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, n.o 7333 de 5 de mayo de 1993.

a)- Sobre los motivos de la accionante relacionados con su caso concreto. Al respecto, es importante indicar que la gran cantidad de alegatos expuestos por la accionante relacionados con el fondo de lo decidido en la causa disciplinaria, así como con las deficiencias en su tramitación, el rechazo de la prueba, la situación que provocó su insolvencia y la forma en la que se han resuelto otros procedimientos, son aspectos que no son propios de ser valorados en la vía de la acción, ya que están referidos a la aplicación de la norma en su caso concreto. En virtud de lo anterior, la Sala solo entrará a conocer los alegatos de constitucionalidad sin ahondar en las particularidades expuestas, sin perjuicio de lo que se resuelva en la vía común con ocasión del contenido de esta sentencia.

b)-Sobre los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad formulados por la accionante. En el sub examine, la accionante considera contrario al Derecho de la Constitución que se establezca la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para que el cese de funciones sin dejar un margen de discrecionalidad o valoración, hasta excusable, que generó esa condición y, ante todo, sin valorar elementos ni los “ principios de congruencia, proporcionalidad, razonabilidad causal, finalidad legítima, buena fe, necesidad familiar, intimidad, valoración de una pérdida de confianza objetiva debidamente acreditada frente a las funciones que desempeño, existencia de afectación real a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, así como tampoco la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial, aspectos de género, entre otros, todo ello frente a la existencia o no de una afectación a la continuidad y la eficiencia del servicio judicial, como sí se valora y define para otras causales en esos mismos artículos (…)”. Expone que del análisis e investigación del contenido del proyecto de la ley de marras se obtuvo como aspectos de importancia para esta acción de inconstitucionalidad lo siguiente : “(…) ü A folios [Valor 027] , [Valor 028] , [Valor 029] (imágenes [Valor 030], [Valor 031], [Valor 032] ), se evidencia la moción No [Valor 035] planteada por el diputado Ovidio Pacheco, tendente a modificar la redacción del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia y, para lo que interesa, en donde se dispone, entre otros, incluir expresamente a 'los declarados judicialmente en estado de quiebra e insolvencia' como causal de cese de nombramiento, redacción a la postre aprobada y vigente a la fecha;ü A folios [Valor 033] (imagen [Valor 034] ), conoce la comisión mixta legislativa la indicada moción N° [Valor 035] y se discute su contenido. Para esos efectos, consta en el expediente legislativo que el diputado Ovidio Pacheco, no hace referencia alguna al motivo, fin o causa de fondo que justifique incluir expresamente la causal que es objeto de esta acción, sino que su justificación es meramente por un asunto de forma para que no se haga referencia al artículo 12, ante lo cual, ese aspecto de forma fue valorado afirmativamente considerando que "la moción tiende a aclarar por lo menos, cuáles son las verdaderas causas por las que se puede cesar a un funcionario judicial". Se insiste, para los efectos de dicha moción, no consta el motivo, fin o causa de fondo idónea que justificara el incluir expresamente la causal de cese que es objeto de esta acción. ü A folios [Valor 036] (imagen [Valor 037]), consta la discusión legislativa relacionada con las causales disciplinarias, y expresamente refieren a aquellas por las cuales puede concluir la relación de servicio por ese motivo, destacando la referencia al interés en el servicio público de las funciones judiciales, ante lo cual priva la permanencia del funcionario, salvo cuando resulte 'gravemente inconveniente para el servicio judicial', así como cuando, con motivo de ello, 'existan dudas sobre su corrección' .ü A folio [Valor 080] (imagen [Valor 081]), consta ya agregada, como texto sustitutivo, la causal que es objeto de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad dispuesta en el artículo 26 inciso 9.). ü A folio [Valor 082] (imagen [Valor 065] ), debe destacarse el dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración , en el cual, de forma solicitan que se elimine la causal de insolvencia y quiebra contenido en el artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia . El elemento justificativo y explicativo que manifiestan los legisladores es el siguiente: "Respecto a los quebradas e insolventes, ostentan condiciones que de no influir en la relación laboral con la institución para nada tienen que tomarse como causales para cesar a un servidor judicial, de permitirse esto se estaría sancionando por un mero peligro". (-lo subrayado y en negrita no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad). ü A folio [Valor 038] (imagen [Valor 039] ), consta discusión legislativa sobre los alcances del régimen disciplinario, en la cual se resalta el criterio del diputado Allan Solano, en el que, con referencia a la causal de insolvencia y quiebra como motivo de cese de nombramiento, critica que se constituya en una causal la 'sanción por mera conveniencia o riesgo' y sobre aspectos de 'la vida privada'. ü A folios [Valor 040] (imagen [Valor 041] ) aparece la discusión de diputado Santana Esquivel y del Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora, como miembros de la Subcomisión Mixta Legislativa, en la que analizan la pertinencia del dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración sobre la causal del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de reiterada referencia, a efectos de decidir, en definitiva, si conservan o modifican dicha causal. Para esos efectos, es de alto interés citar textualmente lo manifestado por ellos al respecto, de la siguiente forma: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado y dentro de las instituciones del Estado, es por eso que se ha estimado que la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía y es por eso que resulta tradicional encontrar normas de esta índole. Esa es la única observación que yo podría hacer al efecto de que se opte por eliminar o no mantenerla, mi recomendación es mantener la existencia de que los que están en el estado de quiebra o insolvencia no puedan desempeñarse como funcionarios judiciales. DIPUTADO SANTANA ESQUIVEL; Vamos a continuar entonces. Este artículo lo vamos a mantener tal y como está [...]". (-lo subrayado no es del original, se consigna de esa forma solo para efectos de resaltar su contenido como aspecto de importancia para la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad-)”. Añade que la justificación del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora fue la que dio motivo para que legislativamente se haya definido mantener la causal de cese indicada en el artículo 26 inciso 9), la cual se centra en los siguientes aspectos : “a.) Al referir a 'resolución de discordias', solo justifica la labor jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial, y omite, y con ello demás no se valora legislativamente, la relación de servicio judicial de orden administrativo, a como es la labor de mi desempeño judicial como Coordinadora de Unidad; b.) Señala la existencia de 'una cierta pérdida de confianza' con motivo de que el funcionario judicial sea declarado en insolvencia, es decir, castigaría con el cese al nombramiento en el servicio judicial, por una conducta cuya apreciación no comprueba de forma efectiva, objetiva, causal, directa, consustanciada, proporcional ni razonable, la existencia de un motivo que perjudique gravemente la labor institucional de servicio, así como ante la ciudadanía, todo ello acreditado frente a las funciones que desempeño, con independencia de mi estado de insolvencia. Se insiste, no solo debe valorarse en la labor jurisdiccional, sino además en lo que incumbe a mi persona, sea en el desempeño de una labor administrativa. Expresa además que 'eventualmente va a tener la disposición de recursos económicos', por lo que nuevamente deja al descubierto una argumentación vacía y sin fundamento técnico, real, veraz, idóneo ni causal frente al perjuicio grave de la labor institucional de Servicio, toda vez que, en la relación de servicio judicial de orden administrativo, no todos los servidores judiciales encasillamos en ese supuesto”. Expone que, de acuerdo con el expediente legislativo del proyecto de ley n.o 10.753, puede concluirse con total certeza que la inclusión de la causal de insolvencia como motivo para declarar el cese del nombramiento en el servicio judicial se encuentra injustificada e infundada, más aún por cuanto no resulta acorde con el complejo normativo de la materia disciplinaria que regula la ley n.o 7333 en su conjunto, tendente a la demostración, previo debido proceso, de una “afectación grave al servicio judicial, así como tampoco la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial, como elemento primordial para la aplicación sancionatoria de la causal impugnada”. Añade que, tal y como se advirtió durante el trámite legislativo, permitir esa causal significa sancionar un mero peligro o simple riesgo, por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial, aspecto carente de demostración frente a decisiones de necesidad que involucran aspectos de la vida privada que no influyen en el servicio judicial. Aduce que la redacción de la norma implica una aplicación de puro derecho, sin considerar otros aspectos relevantes en la relación de servicio . Asevera que la insolvencia es un mecanismo jurídico establecido en materia civil para el pago de acreedores. Menciona que el proceso de declaratoria judicial de estado de insolvencia no debe calificarse de forma negativa sin valorar los motivos que lo generaron y también considerando si no se dieron actuaciones tipificadas como fraudulentas. Asevera que el inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial es inconstitucional por los siguientes motivos: i) “Violación al Derecho al Trabajo como derecho humano fundamental y consecuentemente violación al Derecho a la Protección a la Familia y a la Seguridad Jurídica, por un acto gestionado en aplicación de mi autonomía de la voluntad. Se concreta una discriminación laboral por situación económica en materia de empleo”. declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, se configura (…) como una causal de cese de nombramiento (artículo 26 inciso 9. de la Ley N° 7333-), que afecta esa protección especial al derecho al trabajo, por cuanto como se demostró del análisis del proyecto de ley a esa Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, se encuentra integrada a ese bloque de legalidad sin que medie, ni se prevea, la causalidad de situaciones que pueden rodear esa declaratoria judicial de insolvencia frente al servicio público efectivo que brinda el Poder Judicial, tanto en su orden jurisdiccional, como de carácter administrativo, así como tampoco, una causal condicional ni de valoración para la aplicación de ese motivo normativo, que en el caso de la aplicación del artículo 26 inciso 9. De dicha ley, genera por sí mismo el cese de nombramiento como medida disciplinaria más gravosa, aún y cuando no exista daño, perjuicio ni afectación al servicio, ni a la imagen, ni a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, ni menos aún a la sociedad, así como tampoco la existencia comprobada de una falta grave, ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial con ocasión de la declaratoria de insolvencia. (…) Adicionalmente, con la sanción propuesta, se violenta gravemente un principio elemental del derecho laboral que resulta de aplicación supletoria para la relación de empleo público, como lo es el del principio protector, y consecuentemente la aplicación de la regla in dubio pro-operario, de lo cual más adelante se asociará con la violación al principio de inocencia que me asiste, ante lo cual, la revocatoria de nombramiento que se me aplica por la causal señalada, debió haberse constituido en la última ratio, buscando escoger la sanción más favorable al trabajador, en aplicación de los principios que rigen el derecho de la constitución y el mismo control de convencionalidad, todo ello frente a una sanción evidentemente flagrante al ordenamiento jurídico. Como es sabido, ésta regla es también aplicable a la hora de interpretar los hechos, o si se prefiere, al ponderar el valor de la prueba, buscando la condición más beneficiosa y la continuidad de la relación de servicio”. Afirma que el instituto de la insolvencia no es una sanción, falta o delito, salvo que se declare su carácter fraudulento. Manifiesta que, por la redacción del inciso 9) del artículo 26, el Tribunal de la Inspección Judicial no exige ningún tipo de daño ni perjuicio a tercero (en este caso al Poder Judicial como patrono), sino que aplica de pleno derecho su literalidad. Acota que con esa norma se sanciona con la medida más gravosa una expectativa o un eventual riesgo o peligro, en su caso irreal. Menciona que: “resulta palpable que se hace una realidad lo advertido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno v Administración que conoció el Proyecto de Ley No 10.753, cuando advirtió que se sancionaría un mero peligro o un eventual riesgo, sin que medie ni siquiera una valoración real, directa, objetiva ni causal que refleje una desmejora, afectación o perjuicio al servicio administrativo que brinda el Poder Judicial. Rescato en este punto, lo mencionado del expediente del proyecto de ley 10.753, en específico a folio [Valor 025] (imagen [Valor 026]) cuando en la discusión legislativa sobre las diferentes causales de los artículos invocados, se resalta que les interesaba el servicio y la administración de justicia, en el que, con referencia a la insolvencia, se dice que debe entenderse la idea básica de las causales, para quede absolutamente claro que es aplicable en el tanto esas circunstancias 'afecten el servicio público'”. Indica que: “Al igual que lo dispone el artículo 56 de nuestra Constitución Política, en cuanto a límite garantista del Estado sobre el derecho del trabajo, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, proclamada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, señala, entre otros, el derecho de todo individuo a la vida digna, al derecho al trabajo y a la protección contra el desempleo, todo ello sin discriminación alguna, entre otros, por razones de situación o posición económica, como es mi caso. En ese mismo sentido, el Convenio III y la Recomendación III adoptados por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, de la cual Costa Rica es miembro, relativos a la discriminación en materia de empleo y ocupación, impiden tanto en los organismos del Estado como en las empresas privadas, que ocurran situaciones que impliquen discriminación en perjuicio de los sagrados derechos que, por naturaleza y por humanidad, constituyen patrimonio de todo individuo. De todo ello nace la Ley No 2694, del 22 de noviembre de 1960, sea la Convención de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo sobre la prohibición de discriminación del trabajo, vigente a la fecha que prohíbe "[...] toda suerte de discriminación, determinada por distinciones, exclusiones o preferencias, fundadas en consideraciones sobre raza, color, sexo, edad, religión, estado civil, opinión política, ascendencia nacional, origen social, filiación o situación económica, que limite la igualdad de oportunidades o de trato en materia de empleo u ocupación". En ese sentido, nótese que la prohibición de ese control convencional tiene una única excepción, cual es la definida en el artículo 2 de esa misma Ley No 2694 que establece "De la prohibición anterior se exceptúan aquellas distinciones, exclusiones o preferencias procedentes según las calificaciones necesarias para el cabal cumplimiento de las funciones o tareas propias del género de cargo o empleo, exclusivamente conforme a la naturaleza de éstas y a las condiciones del trabajador." Respecto a lo anterior, ha quedado demostrado que, en mi caso, la discriminación se concreta debido a la causal taxativa que genera el cese de nombramiento por mera conveniencia, por mero peligro o por un eventual riesgo, sin valoración efectiva, real, objetiva ni causal, del servicio de carácter administrativo a mi cargo con motivo de mi declaratoria judicial de insolvencia”. Concluye que resulta latente la afectación la afectación a sus derechos fundamentales de protección al trabajo, a la familia y a la seguridad jurídica que concreta una discriminación en razón de su situación económica . ii) “Violación al derecho de culpabilidad e inocencia por inexistencia de afectación al servicio público o a terceros, así como tampoco comprobación de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial en aplicación misma del debido proceso. Se sanciona una (sic) acto de buena fe con el sacrificio superior de cese de nombramiento ante un eventual riesgo no probado ni evaluado, así como ante una mera o aparente conveniencia institucional infundada e injustificada”. Arguye que con la normativa impugnada en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad se causa una flagrante violación al contenido esencial del artículo 39 de nuestra Carta Magna y a los principios que integran el Derecho de la Constitución, por cuanto se pretende tomar la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como una causal para impedir el nombramiento en el servicio judicial, así como para cesar a un funcionario, sin efectuar mayor valoración ni acreditación de daño o perjuicio, -real, causal y objetivo-, a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial. Añade que se aplica dicha causal por aspectos de mera conveniencia injustificada, por criterios de un eventual riesgo, sin demostración alguna de que exista al menos un leve, medio o grave inconveniente para el servicio que brinda el Poder Judicial ni en específico la Dirección de Planificación. Sostiene que la aplicación disciplinaria de tal causal no considera si se trata de labor jurisdiccional, o bien, administrativa, ni tampoco se valoran ni aplican criterios que demuestren la existencia de alguna afectación al servicio público que brinda el Poder Judicial. Insiste en que la insolvencia, salvo que se declare fraudulenta, no es un delito que genere inhabilitación de cargos públicos, ni tampoco es una sanción como para que tenga como consecuencia el cese de nombramientos. Arguye que las normas impugnadas contravienen los parámetros y principios constitucionales advertidos, así como “el de congruencia, que lo exige el parámetro mismo de seguridad jurídica y el debido proceso”. Manifiesta que las normas que se impugnan parecen castigar la existencia de una “pérdida de confianza ”, con motivo de la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia; no obstante, la pérdida objetiva de confianza existe porque se compara la buena fe, el desempeño y la fidelidad que el empleado debe a su patrono, de tal forma que se fundamente y demuestre -congruente y proporcionalmente- que, con la conducta del empleado, existe un contraste perjudicial real e inminente, que hace concluir que es imposible seguir con la relación laboral. Aduce que si la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia pretende sustentar la “pérdida de confianza ” para el Poder Judicial con la consecuencia del cese del nombramiento, por ser materia sancionatoria de orden disciplinario, la norma legal debe acreditar en su contenido el parámetro constitucional de culpabilidad grave, causal, razonable y objetiva del funcionario frente al servicio e interés público, de forma tal, que acredite una imposibilidad real en la continuidad del empleo, o bien, que excuse al empleado judicial por “falta de demostración de esos aspectos que le inhiben en el desempeño del cargo público”. iii) “ Violación al Derecho de Intimidad, de la Dignidad Humana y el principio Pro- Homine. Inexistencia de una finalidad legítima de la sanción disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento frente al sacrificio superior que involucra de la sanción disciplinaria sin que exista afectación al servicio público, ni a la institucionalidad ni a la imagen del Poder Judicial, o bien, demostración sobre la existencia de una falta grave ni mucho menos gravísima al servicio público judicial con motivo de la insolvencia”. Menciona que el derecho a la intimidad y dignidad humana frente a la discriminación ha sido desarrollado por esta Sala y por normativa y jurisprudencia internacional en materia de derechos humanos. Indica que se trata a estos derechos como fueron de protección para la persona. Reitera el argumento relacionado con el numeral 28 de la Constitución Política y la falta de daño al Poder Judicial. Considera que la declaratoria de insolvencia contemplada en los artículos impugnados que tienen como consecuencia el cese del nombramiento, no tiene una finalidad legítima de la sanción, lo cual afecta los derechos fundamentales de intimidad y dignidad humana, generándose además un nivel alto de discriminación por la situación económica. Expone que con la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad no pretende desconocer la potestad y poderes de dirección, fiscalización y sanción del Poder Judicial para con su relación de servicio de carácter administrativo; sin embargo, debe existir un respeto a sus derechos fundamentales, pues es necesario que se acrediten elementos de carácter sancionatorio objetivos y razonables para su imposición, todo ello frente a la efectiva comprobación de una falta grave o gravísima, la afectación al servicio judicial, a la imagen institucional o al interés público, y no una mera sospecha, una mera conveniencia o un eventual riesgo; es decir, una causal sin contenido técnico-jurídico que de forma ilegítima castiga sus años de servicio en el Poder Judicial, con consecuencias en su intimidad y dignidad, pues se le estaría tratando como si hubiera cometido alguna actividad delictiva o una infracción grave o gravísima. Menciona que “ el espíritu del legislador permeado en el expediente del proyecto de ley 10.753, cuando en su discusión legislativa sobre las diferentes causales de los artículos invocados, se resalta que les interesaba el servicio y la administración de justicia, en el que, con referencia a la insolvencia, se dice que debe entenderse la idea básica de las causales, para quede absolutamente claro que es aplicable en el tanto esas circunstancias 'afecten el servicio público', (…) ”. Sostiene que la normativa impugnada, frente a los derechos de intimidad y dignidad humana, así como a la aplicación del principio pro homine, debe ser aplicada de la manera que más favorezca al ser humano. Explica que todas las medidas de restricción y de carácter sancionatorio, así como las de cese de nombramiento, deben respetar precautoriamente la dignidad humana, la protección a la intimidad y el principio de proporcionalidad, todo ello bajo el principio pro homine, de modo que se valore la magnitud del daño potencial o eventual. Asevera que el Poder Judicial adoptó la “ Política de Igualdad de Género” para que se incorporara la perspectiva de género en todo el quehacer de ese Poder de la República. Menciona que lo expuesto se sustenta “en el marco jurídico de protección de los derechos humanos, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional, que consagra, entre otros, la tutela de los derechos de igualdad sin discriminación de ninguna índole, de protección de la ley, de acceso a una justicia pronta y cumplida, todos ellos consagrados en los principios que integran la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos o Pacto de San José. Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Civiles y Políticos, Convención para la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer y la Constitución Política de Costa Rica”. Añade que tal política “ reconoció que "La igualdad ante la ley significa la posibilidad de un trato diferenciado, cuando las circunstancias sean diferentes, es decir cuando las personas estén desigualmente situadas", así mismo que "El principio de equidad impulsa a los y las juezas, así como a todos y todas las operadoras jurídicas a tomar en cuenta con criterios de equidad, el trasfondo humano de los conflictos, a considerar las condiciones personales, familiares y sociales en cada uno de los casos y sus consecuencias", situación que no está siendo aplicado con motivo del contenido inconstitucional que se invoca por medio de esta acción”. Acota que la política tiene como objetivo “garantizar la igualdad de oportunidades entre mujeres y hombres y la no discriminación por género en las decisiones judiciales, en el servicio público de la administración de justicia, y en el funcionamiento interno del Poder Judicial". Expone que “esa Política de igualdad de Género se fundamentó en las 'Reglas de Brasilia sobre el Acceso a la Justicia de las Personas en Condición de Vulnerabilidad', bajo las cuales como regla 19 se dice que: "Se considera violencia contra la mujer cualquier acción o conducta, basada en su género, que cause muerte, daño o sufrimiento físico, sexual o psicológico a la mujer, tanto en el ámbito público como en el privado, mediante el empleo de la violencia física o psíquica". (…) ”. iv) “Violación a los principios de Proporcionalidad y Razonabilidad de la sanción disciplinaria. Inexistencia de conexidad y congruencia idónea entre la conducta que regula, la gravedad de la sanción disciplinaria y sacrificio superior que involucra. Existencia de discriminación en razón de mi situación económica”. Menciona que frente a la violación de los derechos humanos fundamentales y principios contenidos en nuestra Constitución Política y el Derecho de la Constitución que han sido invocados como fundamento de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, referente en específico sobre la invocación a la causal de declaratoria judicial de insolvencia como motivo para no generar el nombramiento de un servidor judicial, así como para disponer la causal disciplinaria de cese de nombramiento, existe además una violación, por acción y omisión, de los principios constitucionales de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad del consecuente cese de nombramiento. Acota que esas normas carecen de elementos reales, idóneos, necesarios, causales y objetivos de valoración, congruencia, equilibrio y conexidad con el contenido esencial del derecho sancionatorio. Agrega que en su aplicación no se analiza el cuadro fáctico, las condiciones personales del servidor judicial a fin de determinar una situación excusable, el respectivo sacrificio que involucra la medida y la consecuente causal de cese de nombramiento con motivo de la existencia de una declaratoria judicial de insolvencia, todo lo anterior, frente a la existencia o no de una afectación al servicio público que brinda el Poder Judicial, así como a su imagen institucional o al interés público imperante con motivo del desempeño del puesto. Refiere que tampoco se acredita para aplicar la causal una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial. Expone que es necesario aplicar un test de proporcionalidad a la normativa impugnada, a efectos de definir y fundamentar la existencia de las transgresiones invocadas. Añade que el test contiene los tres subprincipios que funcionan como reglas a tener cuenta, en el sentido que son máximas sobre las que se debe cuestionar; es decir, se debe constatar si el medio elegido cumple con la exigencia de idoneidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto, ante lo cual, si la respuesta es insatisfactoria, la consecuencia sería la inconstitucionalidad de la norma. Sostiene que lo que busca este test, es definir la finalidad legítima e idoneidad de la medida, así como la necesidad y la proporcionalidad de la norma, ante lo cual la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha establecido que es obligación de los Estados parte adoptar medidas internas necesarias para adecuar sus conductas y normativa a los parámetros convencionales. Menciona lo siguiente: “ Previo a la aplicación de este test de proporcionalidad, considerando el medio y fin de las normas impugnadas, debemos hacernos una pregunta: ¿es necesario aplicar, como única y más grave sanción disciplinaria, el cese de nombramiento de un funcionario del Poder Judicial que ha sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia para garantizar de forma efectiva el servicio público, de carácter administrativo, que tiene a cargo en el Poder Judicial? La realización del test de proporcionalidad nos va a dar esa respuesta, lo anterior, debido a que, en el caso concreto, la proporcionalidad busca, como valores, un equilibrio y una moderación en la aplicación de la normativa que tiende a limitar derechos fundamentales, o bien, a generar la aplicación de una medida sancionatoria en materia disciplinaria”. Expone el análisis de siguiente manera: “a.) Como primer elemento del test de proporcionalidad, tenemos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus su fin", es decir, su adecuación, idoneidad y eficacia. En ese término, el medio que emplea la norma jurídica debe ser idóneo, adecuado, apto y capaz de alcanzar el fin propuesto, es decir, establece que el medio elegido sea el más adecuado a las posibilidades fácticas, teniendo en cuenta el fin a alcanzar. Debe existir un juicio de congruencia y conexión práctica entre el medio y el fin inmediato de la norma, toda vez que, si ese fin no es apto, aunque la restricción lo sea, es desproporcional. En el caso que nos ocupa, nos encontramos con los artículos 12 y 26 inciso 9.) de la Ley N° 7333, que establecen, en lo que interesa, respectivamente, la prohibición de nombramiento en el servicio judicial de aquellas personas que han sido declarados judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; así mismo, la causal de cese de nombramiento de quienes sirven en puestos judiciales, por el mismo motivo, sea el haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de insolvencia. Conforme lo manifestado en esta acción, y debido a que de forma expresa esas normas legales no señalan expresa ni implícitamente su fin, debe considerarse para esos efectos, la valoración de la discusión legislativa planteada por la Comisión Mixta Legislativa que conoció y definió la redacción final del Proyecto de Ley No 10.753 para la hoy Ley N° 7333, (-que fue ya señalado con anterioridad-), como elemento definitorio de ese espíritu legislador sobre dicha causal. En ese sentido, el fin dispuesto para esas normas legales impugnadas por esta vía se considera que es precautorio, por un aspecto de confianza, en cuanto al manejo de recursos económicos y la resolución de conflictos sometidos a nivel jurisdiccional, ya que, en esa discusión legislativa, en palabras expresas del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, miembro en su momento de dicha Comisión Mixta Legislativa, se dijo que "[...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia [...] la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía [...]", siendo ese el fundamento y/o criterio para dejar como definitivo el texto finalmente aprobado para esas normas legales. El medio que utiliza dichas normas para obtener ese fin es, por un lado (-artículo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.-), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Al respecto debe resaltarse como aspecto de alta relevancia que, para ambos casos, esa causal se relaciona en su redacción, para el medio de proporcionalidad explicado, con otras causales vinculadas a condenas por delito a pena de prisión y de quienes estén sometidos a pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos. (…) Con lo señalado, resulta evidente que el medio que emplea esas normas legales no solo resulta inidóneo, inadecuado y no apto de alcanzar el fin propuesto, por cuanto el hecho de considerar que una persona en estado de insolvencia, declarada judicialmente, resulta sin mérito para la función judicial, tanto así que le genera para quienes ya se encuentran laborando el cese de su nombramiento, significa la aplicación casuística y banal sobre una aparente pérdida de confianza injustificada, que como ya se dijo, más bien parece que privilegia la aplicación sancionatoria con el sacrificio máximo a cargo del empleado por una situación eventual, no probada y de mero riesgo, mero peligro o conveniencia, sin que exista de por medio una valoración efectiva, real y objetiva al fin institucional, de carácter general, cual es el servicio público. (…) Se añade a lo anterior, que el espíritu del legislador previó esa causal por un eventual uso de recursos por parte del funcionario judicial en la resolución de conflictos, sea en el ejercicio de una labor puramente jurisdiccional, y no de orden administrativo, que -como en mi caso- no se administra, custodia, dispone, controla, ni resguarda fondo público alguno, y más aún, no se atiende público, ni depende de esa gestión administrativa la resolución de conflicto alguno. Por lo anterior, puede considerarse que el primer parámetro de este test arroja como resultado la desproporcionalidad de la norma, debido a que no existe una congruencia entre el medio y el fin inmediato de la norma en apego al parámetro que obliga el derecho de la constitución, ya que si bien, se puede pensar que el evitar un nombramiento y el cese de nombramiento de una persona en esa condición, es el medio para alcanzar el fin señalado, la contraparte a ello, sea la restricción sin verificación de su carácter excusable y de inocencia, frente al sacrificio superior que genera, violentando los parámetros señalados, causa la desproporcional acusada, más aún si se considera, como en el caso que me ocupa, que para la aplicación de esa medida de carácter sancionatorio disciplinario, no se valora si existe o no la afectación al servicio público imperante, a la imagen y a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, al orden público, a la moral, ni a terceros, así como, tampoco sobre la existencia o no de una falta grave o gravísima al servicio público judicial, con motivo de la causal. b.) Como segundo elemento del test de proporcionalidad, tenemos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus la necesidad de regulación". En ese término, se valora si se necesita ese medio para alcanzar la regulación esperada, es decir, es el mandato de optimización del medio más benigno, mediante el cual debe verificarse si el fin no puede alcanzarse de otra manera que afecte menos al individuo. Para esos efectos, debe de compararse diferentes medios, a efectos de determinar la alternativa menos gravosa, alcanzando la regulación jurídica esperada. Frente a lo anterior, se condena el exceso en la medida por el carácter urgente o imperioso se exige el sacrificio dispuesto por la norma. Con respecto a las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, ya se dijo en el punto a.) anterior de este test, que el medio que emplean para obtener ese fin normativo, es por un lado (-articulo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia; y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Frente a lo anterior, corresponde analizar ese medio descrito frente a la necesidad de concretar la regulación, verificando alternativas apegadas a los parámetros del derecho de la constitución, en razón del sacrificio que genera o pueda generar precisamente esa necesidad de regulación. No sobra decir, que la aplicabilidad de la medida regulatoria y su consecuente necesidad debe valorar la diversidad de situaciones que pueden presentarse conforme a cada caso en concreto, como es precisamente el caso de si la persona labora en un puesto con labor jurisdiccional o administrativo. (…) La pregunta entonces es ¿cuál es la medida disciplinaria menos gravosa que debe aplicarse para el caso de la declaratoria judicial de insolvencia en la que no existe demostración alguna de ningún tipo de daño, ni de calificación grave ni gravísima al servicio público, ni a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial? ¿Resulta proporcional evitar el nombramiento de una persona y, -por otro lado- el cese de nombramiento de personas que han sido declaradas judicialmente en insolvencia, en la que no existe demostración alguna de daño, ni de calificación grave ni gravísima al servicio público, ni a la imagen o institucionalidad del Poder Judicial? insistimos, las normas jurídicas, y en especial las sancionatorias, por sus implicaciones más gravosas, deben alcanzar una regulación jurídica esperada, con base en principios constitucionales y convencionales reconocidos. Frente a lo anterior, la aplicación de las normas que se impugnan como inconstitucionales son a todas luces desproporcionadas. El medio sancionatorio resulta excesivo frente al carácter urgente o imperioso se exige el sacrificio dispuesto por la norma, más aún, -como ya se ha dicho y demostrado- cuando no existe daño alguno al servicio público imperante, a la imagen v a la institucionalidad del Poder Judicial, al orden público, a la moral, ni a terceros. (…) Por lo anterior, es latente que las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción resultan tan desproporcionadas y consecuentemente irracionales y discriminatorias, que no brindan elementos para que, de forma excusable, quien ejerza la labor sancionatoria cuente con medios regulatorios idóneos a los diversos casos concretos, en los que puedan existir, como en el mío causas eximentes de responsabilidad como para que se acredite el sacrificio excesivo de cese de nombramiento, y que se determine, más bien, la alternativa menos gravosa, alcanzando la regulación jurídica esperada, sin que se incurra en exceso sancionatorio y regulatorio de orden disciplinario. (…) c.) Como tercer y último elemento del test de proporcionalidad que interesa aplicar, encontramos el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus el costo-beneficio" , es decir, se considera la proporcionalidad en sentido estricto. Ante eso, se antepone el sacrificio, -como costo-, en razón de la existencia de algún beneficio o ventaja, sea material o no. Debe existir un beneficio y que esa alternativa sea la menos restrictiva o la menos gravosa, pero a la vez, la más eficaz. Es necesario tener en cuenta tres cuestiones: la estructura de la norma y su ponderación, su racionalidad y su legitimidad, entre las cuales se plantean vínculos estrechos. Cuanto mayor es el grado de la no satisfacción o de afectación de uno de los principios, tanto mayor debe ser la importancia de la satisfacción del otro. Debe, para ello, identificarse los bienes jurídicos o derechos en conflicto, a efectos de determinar la relación existente entre mayor sacrificio versus la mayor jerarquía del bien jurídico, a efectos de determinar si existe relación o balance entre ellos. En el caso que nos ocupa, ya se mencionó en el punto a.) anterior de este test, que el medio que emplean las normas impugnadas por esta vía para obtener ese fin normativo, es por un lado (-articulo 12-), prohibir el nombramiento de personas como servidores judiciales si han sido declaradas judicialmente en estado de insolvencia, y por otro (-artículo 26 inciso 9.-), disponer el cese de nombramiento por esa misma causal, sea el haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia. Debe entenderse así, que la naturaleza de la estructura de la norma es taxativa de carácter sancionatorio. Frente a lo anterior corresponde analizar ese medio descrito frente al costo-beneficio, entendido ese costo como el sacrificio que implica la medida sancionatoria de cese de nombramiento, frente al beneficio o ventaja que obtiene el Poder Judicial con la aplicación del sacrificio, claro está, todo ello frente al fin que persigue de la norma. Ya dijimos anteriormente, que el fin dispuesto para esas normas legales impugnadas es de carácter precautorio, por un aspecto de confianza, en cuanto al manejo de recursos económicos y la resolución de conflictos sometidos a nivel jurisdiccional, todo ello fundamentado del entendimiento del contenido de la discusión legislativa de la causal que involucró el proyecto de ley de la hoy Ley No 7333, en el cual la Comisión Mixta Legislativa que confirmó mantener dichas causales, se basó en el criterio del Mag. Luis Paulino Mora, quien dijo que: "[...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia [...] la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía […]" (-folios [Valor 040] (imágenes [Valor 064] del proyecto de ley No 10.753-) Debe aclararse nuevamente, que esa discusión se generó, debido a que la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración, dictaminó los alcances de esa causal de insolvencia diciendo que "[...] Respecto a los quebrados e insolventes, ostentan condiciones que de no influir en la relación laboral con la institución para nada tienen que tomarse como causales para cesar a un servidor judicial, de permitirse esto se estaría sancionando por un mero peligro […]" [-folio [Valor 082] [imagen [Valor 065] del proyecto de ley N° 10.753-) (…) Sobre la legitimación de las normas impugnadas, no tenemos objeción, pues coincide con la teoría jurídica respecto de su medio de creación, sea vía ley y, consecuentemente, creada por el legislador ordinario. Nos obstante, conforme lo ha dicho la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 2011, Caso Gelman Vs. Uruguay: "[...] La sola existencia de un régimen democrático no garantiza, per se, el permanente respeto del Derecho Internacional, incluyendo al Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, lo cual ha sido así considerado incluso por la propia Carta Democrática Interamericana. La legitimación democrática de determinados hechos o actos en una sociedad está limitada por las normas y obligaciones internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos reconocidos en tratados como la Convención Americana, de modo que la existencia de un verdadero régimen democrático está determinada por sus características tanto formales como sustanciales, por lo que, particularmente en casos de graves violaciones a las normas del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos, la protección de los derechos humanos constituye un límite infranqueable a la regla de mayorías, es decir, a la esfera de lo "susceptible de ser decidido" por parte de las mayorías en instancias democráticas, en las cuales también debe primar un "control de convencionalidad" [...], que es función y tarea de cualquier autoridad pública y no sólo del Poder Judicial [...]". En ese mismo sentido, sobre la legitimación de la normativa interna, la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en Sentencia de 23 de noviembre de 2009 Caso Radilla Pacheco Vs. México, dispuso: "[...] Para este Tribunal, no sólo la supresión o expedición de las normas en el derecho interno garantizan los derechos contenidos en la Convención Americana, de conformidad a la obligación comprendida en el artículo 2 de dicho instrumento. También se requiere el desarrollo de prácticas estatales conducentes a la observancia efectiva de los derechos y libertades consagrados en la misma. En consecuencia, la existencia de una norma no garantiza por si misma que su aplicación sea adecuada. Es necesario que la aplicación de las normas o su interpretación, en tanto prácticas jurisdiccionales y manifestación del orden público estatal, se encuentren ajustadas al mismo fin que persigue el artículo 2 de la Convención [...]". Llegado este punto, consideramos necesario mencionar, para efectos de análisis e interpretación de esa Honorable Sala, la necesaria aplicación del control de convencionalidad, en el entendido de que cuando un Estado que ha ratificado un tratado internacional como la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos -como es el caso de Costa Rica-, sus jueces y autoridades públicas en general, también están sometidos a ella, lo que les obliga a velar porque el efecto útil de esa normativa vinculante de carácter internacional no se vea anulada por la aplicación de leyes contrarias a sus disposiciones, a su objeto y fin. En ese sentido, la misma Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que las autoridades no deben únicamente ejercer sólo un control de constitucionalidad, sino también "de convencionalidad" ex officio, cuya función no debe quedar limitada exclusivamente por las manifestaciones o actos de los accionantes en cada caso concreto. (…) a.) En cuanto al primer elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus su fin", es decir, su adecuación y eficacia, se señalado que la finalidad idónea o legítima, a si bien en todos los casos, (ya sea una punición o una indemnización civil), se aclara que ello no implica que la mencionada medida sea idónea, necesaria ni proporcionada (Usón Ramírez -párr 66-). Así mismo, ha señalado que la medida sea idónea significa que Sirve para salvaguardar el bien jurídico que se quiere proteger, es decir, que está en capacidad de contribuir a la realización de dicho objetivo (Kimel -párr 71- y es reiterado en Fontevecchia D´Amico -párr. 53-). b.) En cuanto al segundo elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el "Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus la necesidad de regulación", ha señalado con referencia al requisito de necesidad, que debe obedecer a un interés público imperativo, que la restricción debe interferir en la menor medida posible, así como condición, que no se debe limitar más allá de lo estrictamente necesario (Canese -párr. 96-, Kimel -párr. 76-, Usón Ramírez -párr. 48- y Fontevecchia D´Amico -párr. 43-). c.) Con respecto al tercer y último elemento del test de proporcionalidad, sea el “Medio que emplea la norma jurídica versus el costo-beneficio", es decir la proporcionalidad en estricto sensu, tanto en Kimel -párr. 83 a 94-, como en Usón Ramírez -párr. 80 a 88-, la Corte refiere a la estructura de la ponderación al evaluar: por un lado el grado de afectación de un derecho o principio -lo que hemos entendido como medio-, y por otro, la importancia de la satisfacción del otro derecho o principio -lo que hemos conocido como costo-beneficio-, frente a lo cual, analiza el sacrificio que implica. Con ello la Corte constata, si la medida adoptada -sanción - garantizó ampliamente el derecho que se intentaba proteger, sin hacer nugatorio el derecho que se limita y su consecuente sacrificio. Como puede notarse, el test de proporcionalidad aplicado a las normas impugnadas mediante esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, coincide con los parámetros dispuestos por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, definiendo que no existe congruencia, finalidad legítima, idoneidad, ni necesidad objetiva, para la existencia de la normativa impugnada con su taxatividad imperativa, convirtiéndola en desproporcional y consecuentemente en irracional, todo ello frente al sacrificio que involucra. En razón de lo expuesto, se puede concluir fehacientemente que, las normas jurídicas impugnadas por esta vía resultan desproporcionadas, y consecuentemente irracionales y discriminatorias en razón de mi situación económica. violentándose así mis derechos fundamentales invocados. Solicito a esa Honorable Sala, analizar con atención mi situación frente al contenido normativo impugnado, en razón de la justificación de hecho y de derechos alegados en eta acción de inconstitucionalidad”.

V.Sobre el análisis de constitucionalidad del inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. En el sub examine, es importante tener claridad sobre los alcances de la norma cuestionada.

El artículo de marras establece las siguientes causales de cese de las funciones de las personas que sirven en puestos judiciales: muerte de la persona (inciso 1), término del nombramiento (inciso 2), revocatoria del nombramiento (inciso 3), separación para el mejor servicio (inciso 4), renuncia aceptada (inciso 5), impedimento material por más de seis meses (inciso 6), encontrarse un juez inferior respecto de uno superior en caso de parentesco (inciso 7), haber contraído matrimonio que haga incurrir a la persona en alguna causal de prohibición (inciso 8), haber sido condenado por algún delito con pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos públicos (inciso 9) y haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de quiebra o insolvencia (inciso 9). Nótese que este último inciso, establece dos estadios totalmente independientes.

En cuanto a las normas que refieren a aspectos de la vida privada, al igual que la Procuraduría General de la República, la Sala estima que, en principio, no son por sí mismas inconstitucionales ni tampoco implican necesariamente una violación a los derechos de intimidad y libertad de las personas servidoras, ya que ellas están sujetas a mayores cargas, obligaciones y deberes. En ese sentido, este Tribunal comparte lo manifestado por el órgano asesor en lo que refiere a que las personas funcionarias sí ostentan los derechos a la intimidad y la libertad, pero que su umbral es diferente del que ampara al ciudadano que no ha asumido la condición y la responsabilidad de quien tiene un cargo público.

No obstante, a los efectos de resolver esta acción, es preciso analizar si la declaratoria judicial en estado de insolvencia como causal de cese de funciones de cualquier persona servidora judicial, resulta o no contraria al Derecho de la Constitución.

El supuesto bajo examen está regulado expresamente de la siguiente manera:

“Artículo 26.- En cumplimiento de las condiciones y procedimientos que establece esta Ley, las funciones de los que sirven puestos judiciales cesan por:

(…)

9.- Haber sido condenado, en sentencia firme, por algún delito que merezca pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos u oficios públicos, y por haber sido declarado, judicialmente, en estado de quiebra o insolvencia”. (El destacado no es original).

De acuerdo con la simple lectura de la norma, cualquier persona servidora judicial, en el momento en que es declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia, tiene que ser cesada de sus funciones. Es decir, no se otorga al operador del derecho tenga algún margen de valoración de las circunstancias.

En ese sentido, tal y como lo expone la Procuraduría General de la República, la conducta prevista en la norma (insolvencia) tiene una consecuencia gravosa (cese del nombramiento), por tanto le resultan aplicables los principios constitucionales de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, sobre los cuales este Tribunal ha establecido los parámetros que permiten su análisis.

La Sala, mediante sentencia n.o [Valor 084] de las 12:06 horas de 2 de octubre de 1998, dispuso:

“IX.- Sobre el principio constitucional de razonabilidad. El principio de razonabilidad, surge del llamado "debido proceso substantivo", es decir, que los actos públicos deben contener un substrato de justicia intrínseca. Cuando de restricción a determinados derechos se trata, esta regla impone el deber de que dicha limitación se encuentre justificada, por una razón de peso suficiente para legitimar su contradicción con el principio general de igualdad.

Un acto limitativo de derechos es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: debe ser necesario, idóneo y proporcional. La necesidad de una medida hace directa referencia a la existencia de una base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes de la colectividad - o de un determinado grupo - mediante la adopción de una medida de diferenciación. Es decir, que si dicha actuación no es realizada, importantes intereses públicos van a ser lesionados. Si la limitación no es necesaria, tampoco podrá ser considerada como razonable, y por ende constitucionalmente válida. La idoneidad, por su parte, importa un juicio referente a si el tipo de restricción a ser adoptado cumple o no con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada. La inidoneidad de la medida nos indicaría que pueden existir otros mecanismos que en mejor manera solucionen la necesidad existente, pudiendo algunos de ellos cumplir con la finalidad propuesta sin restringir el disfrute del derecho en cuestión. Por su parte, la proporcionalidad nos remite a un juicio de necesaria comparación entre la finalidad perseguida por el acto y el tipo de restricción que se impone o pretende imponer, de manera que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que con ella se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad. De los dos últimos elementos, podría decirse que el primero se basa en un juicio cualitativo, en cuanto que el segundo parte de una comparación cuantitativa de los dos objetos analizados." (Sentencia número [Valor 085], de a las dieciséis horas con treinta y tres minutos del quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y ocho)”. () Posteriormente, la Sala, mediante la sentencia n.o [Valor 111] de las 16:31 horas de 21 de marzo de 2012 (A Calzada (VS), LP Mora (VS), G Armijo, F Cruz, F Castillo (VS), P Rueda y R Guerrero), precisó los alcances del principio de razonabilidad, en los siguientes términos:

“V.- LA APLICACIÓN DEL PRINCIPIO DE RAZONABILIDAD. Este denominado principio en realidad constituye un “test de razonabilidad”, un protocolo tendente a objetivizar, en cierto grado, el proceso reflexivo mediante el cual el juzgador llega a concluir que determinada medida es irrazonable o desproporcionada. “Qué es razonable” es ciertamente un asunto de apreciación que, sin embargo, se puede y debe argumentar para que resulte al menos plausible. De lo que se trata es de plantear una metodología de aplicación de tal principio, que resulte útil para exponer los argumentos utilizados para calificar algo como razonable o no . Dicha metodología contiene los siguientes elementos: a) la legitimidad , en el sentido de que la medida no violente de manera evidente algún mandato legal jerárquicamente superior; b) la adecuabilidad, en tanto la medida sirva efectivamente para alcanzar el fin pretendido; c) la necesidad implica que entre varias medidas adecuadas, se debe escoger la menos lesiva; y d) la denominada “proporcionalidad en sentido estricto” , que obliga a que desde ninguna circunstancia se vea afectado el contenido esencial de un derecho constitucional en un proceso de ponderación normativa. Se aclara que para el sector doctrinario mayoritario, el elemento legitimidad es concebido más bien como un presupuesto. Este protocolo se aplica por fases, de manera que si el examen de una primera fase es insatisfactorio, resulta innecesario proseguir con el estudio del resto de aspectos, aunque, en algunos casos, para mayor contundencia del fallo se puede ahondar en ello”.

Así, de acuerdo con la jurisprudencia de la Sala, un acto limitativo de derechos (como lo sería el cese de funciones de una persona servidora pública por haber sido declarada judicialmente en estado de insolvencia) es razonable cuando cumple con una triple condición: necesario, idóneo y proporcional. Asimismo, para tales efectos, también debe superar satisfactoriamente los elementos del test de razonabilidad: legitimidad, adecuabilidad, necesidad y proporcionalidad en sentido estricto.

Al respecto, es necesario señalar que el artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial establece supuestos bastante disímiles entre sí como causales para el cese de las funciones de las personas que sirven en puestos judiciales, por lo que no se puede hablar de alguna finalidad unívoca de ese ordinal. Ahora, propiamente del inciso 9 de ese numeral, se observa que en él se incorpora tanto la condenatoria por un delito que merezca la pena de inhabilitación para el desempeño de cargos públicos, como la declaratoria judicial en estado de quiebra o insolvencia. No quedan dudas de que la primera parte responde a la pena de un delito por lo que se configura una imposibilidad material de ejercer el cargo; sin embargo, el hecho de haber sido declarado judicialmente en estado de insolvencia, no justifica por sí mismo y de manera general, el cese de funciones de cualquier persona funcionaria del Poder Judicial.

En cuanto a la finalidad de esta última causal, las partes plantean tres posiciones en esta acción:

1)La parte accionante sostiene que en el expediente legislativo, con ocasión de la modificación que dio origen a la redacción del inciso 9) del artículo 26 que se aprobó posteriormente, no se hizo referencia alguna al motivo, fin o causa de fondo que haya justificado la inclusión expresa del “cese que es objeto de esta acción”. Menciona que la discusión relacionada con las causales disciplinarias por las cuales pueden concluir la relación de servicio versó sobre que debía privar la permanencia, salvo cuando “gravemente inconveniente para el servicio judicial” o “existan dudas sobre su corrección”. Acota que consta el dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración, en el cual, de forma expresa, se solicitó la eliminación de la causal de insolvencia y quiebra contenido en el artículo 26 inciso 9.) de referencia, en los siguientes términos: "Respecto a los quebradas e insolventes, ostentan condiciones que de no influir en la relación laboral con la institución para nada tienen que tomarse como causales para cesar a un servidor judicial, de permitirse esto se estaría sancionando por un mero peligro". Manifiesta que también consta una discusión legislativa sobre los alcances del régimen disciplinario, en la cual el diputado Allan Solano, con referencia a la causal de insolvencia y quiebra como motivo de cese de nombramiento, critica que se constituya en una causal la “sanción por mera conveniencia o riesgo” y sobre aspectos de “ la vida privada”. Hace referencia a una discusión entre el diputado Santana Esquivel y el en aquel entonces Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora, como miembros de la Subcomisión Mixta Legislativa, en la que analizaron la pertinencia del dictamen emitido por la Comisión Legislativa de Gobierno y Administración sobre la causal del artículo 26 inciso 9.) de reiterada referencia, a efectos de decidir, en definitiva, si se conservaba o modificaba dicha causal: "MAG. LUIS PAULINO MORA: [...] Los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado y dentro de las instituciones del Estado, es por eso que se ha estimado que la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener a disposición de él, el manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía y es por eso que resulta tradicional encontrar normas de esta índole. Esa es la única observación que yo podría hacer al efecto de que se opte por eliminar o no mantenerla, mi recomendación es mantener la existencia de que los que están en el estado de quiebra o insolvencia no puedan desempeñarse como funcionarios judiciales. DIPUTADO SANTANA ESQUIVEL; Vamos a continuar entonces. Este artículo lo vamos a mantener tal y como está [...]". Expone que la justificación del ex Magistrado Mora Mora fue la que dio motivo para mantener la causal de cese relacionada con la insolvencia, y que en ella, se hizo referencia a la labor jurisdiccional del Poder Judicial sin valorar las funciones administrativas, a la existencia de “una cierta pérdida de confianza” con tal declaratoria y a que “eventualmente va a tener la disposición de recursos económicos”. Arguye que lo anterior deja al descubierto una argumentación vacía y sin fundamento, pues no todos los servidores judiciales encajan en ese supuesto; y, además, no se comprueba la existencia de un motivo que perjudique gravemente la labor institucional de servicio.

2)La Vicepresidenta de la Corte Suprema de Justicia aduce que, según la discusión que se dio en instancias legislativas cuando se analizaba la reforma general a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, el ex Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora Mora señaló que “los empleados judiciales deben ser protegidos con cierta confianza de parte del público porque al final de cuentas somos los encargados de resolver toda clase de discordia que existe entre la ciudadanía y el Estado y dentro de las instituciones del Estado, es por eso que se ha estimado que la persona que está ahí declarada insolvente, hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él, dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos…”. Acota que lo anterior se encuentra dentro de la potestad disciplinaria que tiene el Poder Judicial respecto a sus servidores y servidoras, la cual es necesaria como un instrumento de garantía al ciudadano de que recibirá un servicio público de calidad, ágil, efectivo y eficaz, dotado de una organización adecuada y de personas servidoras judiciales altamente calificadas para el desempeño de sus labores. Explica que no se sanciona un mero peligro o simple riesgo por aspectos de mera conveniencia judicial, en virtud de que la norma está prevista para cuando en sede judicial se decrete la declaratoria de quiebra o insolvencia, o sea hay todo un proceso judicial en el que se discuten cuestiones relacionadas con los incumplimientos de las obligaciones crediticias asumidas por la parte deudora y concluyen en esa declaratoria; además de la imposición de una serie de medidas o restricciones para que la persona pueda solucionar esa situación. Agrega que el legislador estimó que lo expuesto implica una situación de desconfianza y buscó la probidad de la persona servidora judicial para tener certeza de que es responsable con sus obligaciones tanto laborales como en su vida privada. Asevera que la imposición de este tipo de sanciones tiene un alcance absoluto del principio de legalidad por incurrir en conductas prohibidas por una norma, lo que no es consecuente con los alegatos de la accionante cuando afirma que la norma permite sancionar un mero peligro o un simple riesgo.

3)La Procuraduría General de la República manifiesta que del análisis del expediente legislativo, se desprende que la intención de la norma impugnada siempre fue declarar una "pérdida de confianza" del funcionario judicial “que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos y eventualmente va a tener disposición de manejar los haberes económicos de la ciudadanía" (ver manifestaciones del Magistrado Luis Paulino Mora a folios [Valor 075] y [Valor 076] del expediente legislativo)”. Menciona que la intención era dirigir la norma a los funcionarios que administraban justicia o que, por la condición de su puesto, debía exigírseles un adecuado manejo de sus haberes personales.

Con base en lo anterior, se puede concluir que no se acredita una finalidad del todo clara sobre la incorporación de la declaratoria judicial en estado de insolvencia como causal automática de cese de funciones de cualquier persona servidora judicial. Si bien no resultaría ilegítimo imponer esta causal a determinados puestos del Poder Judicial debido a las funciones que realizan, no se aprecia alguna justificación objetiva que sustente el alcance genérico que se da al inciso. Nótese que, en las discusiones legislativas a las que hace referencia la accionante y que son retomadas parcialmente por la Vicepresidenta de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, se hace referencia a una “hay una cierta pérdida de confianza para con él [refiriéndose al empleado judicial encargado de resolver discordias] , dado que no ha podido manejar sus haberes económicos”; sin embargo, no consta alguna justificación expresa sobre alcance general de la causal y no valoración de circunstancias concretas. En adición, la Sala comparte la posición de la Procuraduría General de la República en tanto considera que la declaratoria judicial en estado de insolvencia, para constituir una causal válida de cese de funciones, debería tener alguna repercusión en el Poder Judicial o en la confianza que se tenía sobre la persona funcionaria, lo que implica sin lugar a dudas tomar en consideración la naturaleza de los puestos y la posibilidad de valorar eximentes o atenuantes que hayan concurrido en el motivo de la declaratoria.

Sobre este último punto, si bien la declaratoria judicial en estado de insolvencia es un aspecto que puede ser objeto de interés en una relación de empleo público, esta no puede contemplarse en términos absolutos. Por ejemplo, existe la posibilidad de que, por alguna situación ajena a la persona servidora judicial, tal declaratoria no responda a un mal manejo de su patrimonio, sino ser consecuencia de deudas contraídas para atender alguna enfermedad o emergencia, o bien se deban a razones de fuerza mayor. Además, podría darse el caso en el que las funciones de la persona servidora judicial no pongan en riesgo ni afecten al Poder Judicial.

Entonces, si la consecuencia de la causal es tan grave (cese de funciones) y no existe alguna justificación que extienda su aplicación a cualquier funcionario del Poder Judicial (sin siquiera otorgar posibilidad de demostrar la falta de peligro o afectación, o bien, la concurrencia de eximentes o atenuantes), se hace evidente la transgresión a los principios de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En ese sentido, a priori no se acredita la necesidad (que exista base fáctica que haga preciso proteger algún bien o conjunto de bienes mediante la adopción de una medida), idoneidad (que la restricción adoptada cumpla con la finalidad de satisfacer la necesidad detectada) y proporcionalidad (que la limitación no sea de entidad marcadamente superior al beneficio que se pretende obtener en beneficio de la colectividad) del acto limitativo de derechos. Así, con la aplicación del test de razonabilidad, si bien no aprecia una violación evidente a la legitimidad, el examen sobre la adecuabilidad, necesidad y “proporcionalidad en sentido escrito” no arroja un resultado satisfactorio, ya que respectivamente no se constató: 1) que la medida sirva para alcanzar el fin pretendido (el cual en todo caso ni siquiera resulta del todo claro); 2) que entre varias medidas se haya escogido la menos lesiva (únicamente se dispone el cese absoluto sin importar el puesto ni las circunstancias); y 3) que no se haya afectado el contenido esencial de un derecho constitucional en la ponderación normativa (la disposición genérica de cese de funciones sin justificación alguna, violenta el contenido esencial del derecho al trabajo de las personas servidoras, pues lo suprime automáticamente sin que se valoren las circunstancias de cada caso).

En adición, se comparte el análisis que hace la Procuraduría General de la República, al señalar que, a partir del principio de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, cualquier consecuencia gravosa en la esfera del individuo, debe constituir una medida estrictamente necesaria para alcanzar el objetivo buscado y que el principio de proporcionalidad requiere la previa fijación por parte del legislador de los límites dentro de los cuales el operador jurídico se podrá mover para la interpretación de la norma en atención a las circunstancias concretas. Asimismo, tal y como lo expone el órgano asesor, la autoridad administrativa debe contar con un margen de discrecionalidad otorgado por el legislador para garantizar que la consecuencia gravosa únicamente se aplique cuando esta sea razonable y proporcional a la causa de origen. Precisamente, la redacción actual de la norma no admite diversos tipos de interpretación, sino que su contenido preceptúa necesariamente que se le aplique a cualquier persona que cumpla en ese supuesto; es decir, el problema no se deriva de una aplicación incorrecta de la norma sino en su aplicación en los términos previstos por el legislador, lo cual no admite, como ya se dijo, margen alguno a una hermenéutica que atempere su alcance.

Por lo expuesto, procede la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad de frase “ o insolvencia” contemplada en el inciso 9) del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, por resultar contraria a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad.

Al existir suficientes razones para declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la referencia a “ insolvencia” del inciso 9 del numeral 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, deviene innecesario pronunciarse sobre el resto de reclamos, tal como desde un inicio ha sido la tesis de esta Sala en cantidad de asuntos (ver sentencias números [Valor 086], [Valor 087], [Valor 088], [Valor 089] , [Valor 090] , [Valor 091], entre otras). ” Finalmente, no está de más recordar que el Poder Judicial cuenta con un acervo normativo para abordar el incumplimiento injustificado de las obligaciones y compromisos financieros que comprometan el buen servicio público por la magnitud del riesgo o la buena imagen de la institución. Tales casos se pueden encausar a través de procedimientos disciplinarios con las consecuencias que el ordenamiento establezca según las circunstancias, elementos probatorios y valoración jurídica en la situación particular. En tal sentido, por ejemplo, el ordinal 192 inciso 9 y el numeral 194 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial disponen:

“Artículo 192.- Se consideran faltas graves:

(…)9.- El no pago injustificado de una obligación de crédito, que deba atender como deudor principal y se esté cobrando en la vía judicial.

Artículo 194.- Cualquier otra infracción o negligencia en el cumplimiento de los deberes propios del cargo, no prevista en los artículos anteriores, será conocida por los órganos competentes, a efecto de examinar si constituyen falta gravísima, grave o leve, con el objeto de aplicar el régimen disciplinario. Para ello, se tomarán como referencia las acciones señaladas en los artículos anteriores”.

VI.- Documentación aportada al expediente . Se previene a las partes que de haber aportado algún documento en papel, así como objetos o pruebas contenidas en algún dispositivo adicional de carácter electrónico, informático, magnético, óptico, telemático o producido por nuevas tecnologías, estos deberán ser retirados del despacho en un plazo máximo de 30 días hábiles contados a partir de la notificación de esta sentencia. De lo contrario, será destruido todo aquel material que no sea retirado dentro de este plazo, según lo dispuesto en el "Reglamento sobre Expediente Electrónico ante el Poder Judicial", aprobado por la Corte Plena en sesión N° 27-11 del 22 de agosto del 2011, artículo XXVI y publicado en el Boletín Judicial número 19 del 26 de enero del 2012, así como en el acuerdo aprobado por el Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial, en la sesión N° 43-12 celebrada el 3 de mayo del [Valor 027] 12, artículo LXXXI.

Por tanto:

Se declara parcialmente con lugar la acción por violación a los principios de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad. En consecuencia, se declara inconstitucional la frase “o insolvencia” contenida en el inciso 9 del artículo 26 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. La sentencia tiene efectos declarativos y retroactivos a la fecha de vigencia de la ley anulada, sin perjuicio de derechos adquiridos de buena fe. En cuanto a la acusada transgresión del numeral 12 del mismo cuerpo normativo se declara inadmisible la acción. Reséñese este pronunciamiento en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta y publíquese íntegramente en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese este pronunciamiento a la parte accionante, al Procurador General de la República y al Presidente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia.

Fernando Castillo V.

Paul Rueda L.

Nancy Hernández L.

Luis Fdo. Salazar A.

Jorge Araya G.

Anamari Garro V.

Ronald Salazar Murillo Documento Firmado Digitalmente -- Código verificador -- *HD43IVXXEHFK61* Sur, Calle Morenos, 100 mts.Sur de la iglesia del Perpetuo Socorro). Recepción de asuntos de grupos vulnerables: Edificio Corte Suprema de Justicia, San José, Distrito Catedral, Barrio González Lahmann, calles 19 y 21, avenidas 8 y 6