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Res. 17375-2016 Sala Constitucional · Sala Constitucional · 23/11/2016
OutcomeResultado
The unconstitutionality claim against Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE is dismissed.Se declara sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE.
SummaryResumen
The Constitutional Chamber rejects a claim of unconstitutionality against Executive Decree 39136-S-MINAE, which regulates operating conditions and emission controls for co-incineration of ordinary solid waste. The plaintiffs argued the decree violated the right to a healthy environment (Art. 50 Constitution), environmental principles and international obligations, by authorizing a risky activity and discouraging integrated waste management. The Chamber analyzed the claims in two groups: violations arising from the mere promulgation (damage to the waste management design, disregard of international obligations, violation of the principles of objectivation and non-regression, lack of trained professionals) and violations from specific provisions (lack of regulation of hazardous waste, final products, safety distances, permit deadlines). It concluded the decree does not contradict the Integrated Waste Management Law (8839), respects the hierarchy (reduce, reuse, recycle, and only subsidiarily permits co-incineration), is compatible with international treaties, and does not breach environmental principles. The action was dismissed, as the decree established sufficient regulations and the arguments lacked technical substantiation to prove unconstitutionality. One judge added a note stating the regulation is at the limit of what is admissible and future application could raise new questions.La Sala Constitucional rechaza una acción de inconstitucionalidad contra el Decreto Ejecutivo 39136-S-MINAE, que regula las condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones de coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios. Los accionantes alegaban que el decreto violaba el derecho a un ambiente sano (Art. 50 Constitución), principios ambientales y obligaciones internacionales, al autorizar una actividad riesgosa y desincentivar el manejo integral de residuos. La Sala analizó los reclamos en dos grupos: infracciones por la mera promulgación (lesión al diseño de manejo de residuos, irrespeto de obligaciones internacionales, violación de principios de objetivación y no regresión, falta de profesionales capacitados) e infracciones por disposiciones específicas (falta de regulación de residuos peligrosos, productos finales, distancias de protección, plazos para permisos). Concluyó que el decreto no contradice la Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos (8839), respeta la jerarquización (reduce, reutiliza, recicla, y solo subsidiariamente permite coincineración), es compatible con los convenios internacionales y no quebranta los principios ambientales. Declaró sin lugar la acción, considerando que el decreto establece regulaciones suficientes y los argumentos carecían de fundamentación técnica para acreditar la inconstitucionalidad. Un magistrado añadió nota señalando que la normativa está en el límite admisible y que la aplicación futura podría suscitar nuevos análisis.
Key excerptExtracto clave
Contrary to what the plaintiffs indicated, this Court finds that Decree 39136 does not contradict the law either expressly or implicitly; rather, —in express terms— it leaves intact the preferential attention and priority stimulation of activities such as reduction, reuse and recycling. The option outlined by the authorities in the Decree under discussion meshes with the law insofar as it does not seek to incentivize or stimulate co-incineration, but only to produce a regulatory framework for that activity in case there are subjects interested in carrying it out; that exercise is not, per se, contrary to the constitutional right to the environment or its principles if we adhere to its content, since such regulation includes, as can be seen, a specific regime of operating and control conditions that are added to, and do not replace, all the other general requirements demanded by the various environmental protection laws, with the purpose of protecting the natural environment in different ways. The Court does not find that Decree 39136 contains an authorization for co-incineration conceived as an independent, open alternative, without limits or controls, and even less is it observed that an incentive or stimulation of that activity has been established above the activities ranked higher in the order of priorities set by the law.Contrario a lo indicado por los accionantes- este Tribunal encuentra que el Decreto 39136 no contradice la ley ni expresa ni implícitamente; más bien, –a texto expreso- deja intacta la atención preferente y el estímulo prioritario de actividades como la reducción, la reutilización y el reciclaje. La opción plasmada por las autoridades, en el Decreto discutido se engarza con la ley en el tanto no busca incentivar ni estimular la coincineración, sino solamente producir un marco de regulación para esa actividad en caso de que existan sujetos interesados en su realización; ese ejercicio no es, per se, contrario al derecho constitucional al ambiental ni a sus principios si nos atenemos a su contenido, pues tal regulación incluye, según se aprecia, un régimen específico de condiciones de operación y control que se suman, y no sustituyen, a todos los demás requisitos generales exigidos por las distintas leyes protectoras del ambiente, con la finalidad de proteger de distintas formas el entorno natural. No encuentra el Tribunal que exista en el Decreto 39136, una autorización para la coincineración concebida como una alternativa independiente, abierta, sin límites ni controles, y menos aún se observa que se haya establecido un incentivo o un estímulo de tal actividad por encima de las actividades ubicadas por encima en el orden de prioridades fijado por la ley.
Pull quotesCitas destacadas
"el Decreto 39136 no contradice la ley ni expresa ni implícitamente; más bien, –a texto expreso- deja intacta la atención preferente y el estímulo prioritario de actividades como la reducción, la reutilización y el reciclaje."
"Decree 39136 does not contradict the law either expressly or implicitly; rather, —in express terms— it leaves intact the preferential attention and priority stimulation of activities such as reduction, reuse and recycling."
Considerando V
"el Decreto 39136 no contradice la ley ni expresa ni implícitamente; más bien, –a texto expreso- deja intacta la atención preferente y el estímulo prioritario de actividades como la reducción, la reutilización y el reciclaje."
Considerando V
"la coincineración será ventajosa si se le compara con la opción de disponer de los residuos en los vertederos a cielo abierto que, lamentablemente, aún subsisten en nuestro país"
"co-incineration will be advantageous if compared with the option of disposing of waste in open-air landfills that, unfortunately, still exist in our country"
Considerando V
"la coincineración será ventajosa si se le compara con la opción de disponer de los residuos en los vertederos a cielo abierto que, lamentablemente, aún subsisten en nuestro país"
Considerando V
"los plazos en materia ambiental -tal como resulta ser este caso- no pueden ni deben considerarse perentorios sino meramente ordenatorios, al igual que se ha afirmado además con claridad que en esta materia ambiental tampoco opera la figura del silencio positivo"
"deadlines in environmental matters —as is the case here— cannot and must not be considered peremptory but merely directory, just as it has also been clearly stated that in this environmental area the figure of positive silence does not apply"
Considerando XIV
"los plazos en materia ambiental -tal como resulta ser este caso- no pueden ni deben considerarse perentorios sino meramente ordenatorios, al igual que se ha afirmado además con claridad que en esta materia ambiental tampoco opera la figura del silencio positivo"
Considerando XIV
"no cabe afirmar regresión alguna respecto de lo dispuesto por el Decreto de Moratoria si lo que allí se expresó fue la suspensión de la actividad hasta que las autoridades confirmaran la existencia de las condiciones exigidas"
"it is not possible to claim any regression with respect to what was provided by the Moratorium Decree if what was expressed there was the suspension of the activity until the authorities confirmed the existence of the required conditions"
Considerando VII
"no cabe afirmar regresión alguna respecto de lo dispuesto por el Decreto de Moratoria si lo que allí se expresó fue la suspensión de la actividad hasta que las autoridades confirmaran la existencia de las condiciones exigidas"
Considerando VII
Full documentDocumento completo
*160022900007CO* Res. No. 2016-017375 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours forty minutes on the twenty-third of November of two thousand sixteen.
Constitutional Action (Acción de inconstitucionalidad) brought by ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ and ALLAN ASTORGA GATGENS, holders of identity card numbers 2-0365-0227 and 3-0252-0451, respectively, against Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE (Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for installations for co-incineration of ordinary solid waste), published in Digital Supplement No. 069 to La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2015. Participating in this matter are Ana Lorena Brenes in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic; Fernando Llorca Castro, as Minister of Health; Ms. Irene Cañas Díaz, in her capacity as Acting Minister of Environment and Energy (hereinafter MINAE). Also participating as active coadjuvants are the following persons: Fabián de Jesús Pacheco Rodríguez, Edgardo Araya Sibaja, Melissa Flores Núñez, representing the Asociación de Desarrollo de Residencial Ciudad Cariari, Andrés Camacho L. and others, Yorleny Rodríguez Conejo and others, Amanda Araya Rivas and others, Ernesto Monge and others, Minor Picado Camareno and others, Fernando Araya Anderson, Yerling Ruiz Vásquez and others, Héctor González Pacheco. Participating as passive coadjuvants are the Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesiones Afines, and the Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de Guanacaste R.L. (CoopeGuanacaste R.L.).
Resultando:
1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at fifteen hours on February eighteenth, two thousand sixteen, the claimants request that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for installations for co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, be declared, considering it contrary to articles 7, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the environmental principles of objectification (objetivación), progressivity (progresividad), non-regression (no regresión), sustainable development (desarrollo sustentable), scientific guidance (tutela científica), precautionary (precautorio), shared responsibilities (responsabilidades compartidas), internalization of costs (internalización de costos), and prevention at the source (prevención en la fuente). They allege that said regulation establishes the operating requirements and maximum emission limits for installations for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, which implies authorizing or permitting the incineration of those wastes generated in homes or from other sources whose wastes are similar to those from homes. They consider that by authorizing or enabling the operation of co-incineration installations, the comprehensive management of ordinary solid waste is being disincentivized and, instead, priority is being given in practice to the incineration of such wastes over implementing other more environmentally friendly options, as required by the Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos Sólidos; all of the foregoing violates the logic of protection, education, sustainable development, and environmental awareness emanating from article 50 of the Political Constitution. They add that Executive Decree No. 38500-S-MINAE of June 11, 2014, established a moratorium on the waste incineration industry to reduce air pollution; however, it was repealed by Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE in its article 36, without having conducted the studies to verify that the primary hierarchization (jerarquización) processes provided for in article 4 of the Ley General de Residuos had been fulfilled; they consider that this repeal violates the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. They state that, under the current Regulation, by allowing the operation of incinerators, the Costa Rican State's international obligations to protect human health and the environment against the adverse effects resulting or that may result from human activities such as incineration, which generate the emission of gases that can modify the ozone layer, are breached. These obligations are provided for in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Ley No. 7228) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, instruments that form part of the Costa Rican legal system pursuant to article 7 of the Political Constitution. They state that opening up to the incineration industry violates the international objective set forth in those norms of avoiding the generation of greenhouse gases, meaning the challenged Decree is regressive and violates the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources. They add that Costa Rica has ratified other conventions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which guide the avoidance of gases that cause the depletion of the ozone layer and constitute express limitations to avoid greenhouse gases; however, article 3 of the challenged Decree states that there will be emissions of gases such as total organic carbon, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, where dioxins and furans are toxic to human life. They point out that from the annexes of the Regulation it is evident that allowing the incineration activity is a latent risk to human life, in violation of constitutional article 21, and represents a clash with sustainable development. They allege that there are no trained professionals to verify that incineration processes are carried out properly, as derived from the second transitory provision of the challenged regulation. They add that for establishments and installations that incinerate hazardous wastes, the emission limits of the challenged regulation apply, until the State establishes specific regulations for the incineration of hazardous waste, which implies that a percentage of the wastes that would be taken to incineration would be hazardous wastes, increasing the polluting potential of the dioxins and slag produced as a final product of the process, apart from the emissions that may be produced. They affirm that the challenged regulation is regressive and violates the principle of scientific guidance, since it comes to light to be applied without specific norms existing. They allege that the incineration of ordinary solid waste constitutes a high environmental risk activity and that it can cause very serious environmental damage to biodiversity and to the health of the general population. They argue that the final product of incineration is gases, extremely polluting, and hazardous wastes that require a very strict environmental control mechanism which, if not implemented, can cause serious and severe damage to the environment and health. They consider that the precautionary principle is violated, insofar as an activity is authorized without establishing express measures regarding what will be done with the final wastes. They explain that article 7 of the challenged Decree establishes the need for a quantitative risk assessment (evaluación de riesgos cuantitativos), which contemplates the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the co-incineration installation and the measures for mitigating and controlling such risks. They allege that article 7 of the challenged decree excludes universities and residences from the 1000-meter protection radius regarding co-incinerators, which they consider violates constitutional article 21 in relation to articles 33 and 50 of the Political Constitution. They question the 1000-meter protection distance established in the decree, without taking particular atmospheric factors into consideration. Likewise, they state that the 20-day limit the Ministry of Health has to issue an opinion regarding the location permit application is not justified; they consider that this undermines the right to life, health, and a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by establishing rigid terms for the issuance of permits by the Ministry of Health. They allege that the challenged regulation violates the constitutional principles of shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, since from these it is inferred that incineration processes should not be viable and instead establish a tacit prohibition on incinerating waste. They point out that article 33, table 5 of the challenged Decree, establishes a protocol to follow due process in case of non-compliance with emission limits, without suspending the incineration processes while the corrections are being made, which causes the industry to continue contaminating the population with emissions of dioxins or furans.
2.- To substantiate the standing they hold to bring this constitutional action, they indicate that they are vested with diffuse interests, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
3.- By resolution at thirteen hours forty minutes on February twenty-fourth, two thousand sixteen, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).
4.- The Attorney General's Office submitted its report. It points out that this constitutional action challenges Decree 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for installations for co-incineration of ordinary solid waste (Supplement 69 to La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2015), insofar as it authorizes the incineration of ordinary solid waste generated in homes or similar sources. It argues that the challenged Decree establishes operating requirements and maximum emission limits for installations for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, as a subordinate option to the other prior processes in the hierarchy of comprehensive waste management provided for in article 4 of Ley 8839 (Decree 39136, articles 1, 2, 4, and 15 subsection a). It points out that the Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos, No. 8839 of June 24, 2010, contemplates energy recovery as one of the alternatives for waste recovery (valorización) (articles 4, 6, and 42), subordinated to the hierarchy for comprehensive management that prioritizes material recovery over energy recovery, according to technical criteria. Thus, it indicates that the challenged Decree regulates energy recovery (valorización energética) in its article 3 through the co-incineration process, and, for its part, article 5, subsection 3 of the same norm expressly prohibits "the use of thermal treatment systems for ordinary solid waste that are not for electricity generation, energy recovery, or material recovery." For its part, article 4 in fine of Decree 39136 reiterates that "wastes for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, must not be subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration." Likewise, among the requirements that the Environmental Impact Study and the location permit application before the Ministry of Health must include are the installations for separation, classification, and recovery of recoverable wastes that should not be incinerated (articles 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j), 10 subsections k) and l). Furthermore, it adds that article 15 ibidem requires having a storage area for waste in accordance with the Reglamento de Centros de Recuperación de Residuos Valorizables, Decree 35906-S of January 27, 2010; the studies on the generation and composition of ordinary wastes must observe Decree 37745-S, Officialization of the Methodology for Studies on Generation and Composition of Ordinary Solid Waste; and, ordinary wastes must be managed and stored complying with the Reglamento sobre el Manejo de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios, Decree 36093-S of July 15, 2010. It considers that the challenged Decree respects the priority established by Ley 8839 for comprehensive waste management, which includes energy recovery. Regarding the obligations derived from international conventions, it affirms that the analyzed Decree is consistent with the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Ley 7228 of May 6, 1991), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Ley 7223 of April 8, 1991), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Ley 7414 of June 13, 1994), and the Kyoto Protocol (Ley 8219 of March 8, 2002), incorporated into our legal system, according to Constitutional article 7; these instruments establish international commitments and controls for the reduction of substances affecting the ozone layer. It considers that the analyzed Decree is consistent with the principles of non-regressivity and sustainable development, and provides progressivity to internal regulations, insofar as it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, through separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of persistent organic pollutants. Likewise, one of the sectors or source categories cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration, is regulated and subjected to technical limits. The Regulation also sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Ley 8839. The foregoing is compatible with the obligations contained in Constitutional article 50 and the principle of progressivity, as measures tending to the protection of the environment and health are adopted, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set in accordance with the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and the rules of science and technique. Regarding the emissions of gases that can be toxic to human health resulting from incineration activity, it is noted that the challenged Decree considers that the co-incineration of waste with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, through separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Considering 5, articles 4 in fine, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). In addition, it prohibits the activities of recovering waste previously disposed of in sanitary landfills (rellenos sanitarios) or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosives, including mineral acids, containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals or contaminated with them, of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from health care services, their teaching establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons intended for destruction, Persistent Organic Compounds, and Polyvinyl Chloride Waste (article 5). For its part, article 21 of the challenged Regulation indicates the technical parameters for establishing the maximum emission limits for general pollutants. The normal reference conditions (273.15 K and 101.325 kPa on a dry basis, referenced to 11% oxygen) and the maximum emission limits established in the cited article 21 of Decree 39136 coincide with those of Annex VIII, Part 2, of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of November 24, 2010, on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control). Regarding the criticism against the repeal of the moratorium provided for in Decree 38500 of June 11, 2014, it clarifies that this measure was conceived as a transitory provision to adopt the necessary technical measures to comply with Ley 8839. It is not considered that Decree 39136 violates the principle of non-regression, since the norm does not reduce the degree of environmental protection, but rather, in line with the Law, regulates the energy recovery of solid waste. Decree 39136 provides the necessary technical measures for the adequate control of co-incineration as one of the alternatives for solid waste recovery contained in Ley 8839, and the repeal of Decree 38500 also does not disregard the principles of objectification, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. It affirms that regarding the claim of the absence of trained professionals, Transitory II of Decree 36136 is congruent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, pursuant to which commitments are established to promote and support education and training programs that foster the creation of national human and institutional capacity. For its part, the challenged Decree considers the function of the Consejo Técnico de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión in the analysis and assessment of regulatory compliance. Regarding the incineration of hazardous waste, it considers that the challenged norm is preventive and temporary, because the emission limits provided for therein apply to the incineration of hazardous waste, which is in accordance with the State's duty of prevention and the principles recognized by constitutional jurisprudence. It concludes that insofar as the application of the limits imposed by Transitory VI of the challenged Decree improves the current protection against emissions from authorized hazardous waste incineration processes, this would be in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the principles of progressivity and non-regression in environmental matters. Regarding the claim of the incorporation of hazardous waste into co-incineration processes, it is considered that Decree 39136 establishes that the co-incineration of waste with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, through separation and control operations, in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants. In relation to the operation of the incineration system, it considers that the challenged regulation requires immediate shutdown under abnormal conditions, provides for compliance verification, as well as establishing the corrective and sanctioning regime. Regarding the gases and waste products from co-incineration and potential damage to the environment and health, it is affirmed that the challenged Decree provides for the separate storage of solid waste products from incineration. It considers that as Ley 8839 establishes sanitary landfills as the last option in the hierarchy for waste management, Decree 39136 demands compliance with the Reglamento sobre Rellenos Sanitarios. Regarding the lack of a decree for the incineration of hazardous waste, it considers that the principles of objectification, progressivity, and non-regression are not violated since the management and disposal of hazardous waste is regulated in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, in the Ley General de Salud, and various regulations. Regarding the safety distances and the alleged violation of the principles of equality, healthy environment, and objectification, it considers that contrasting the challenged norm with the content of the principle of equality shows no breach, because it is reasonable and in accordance with the preventive principle to admit the setback distance with respect to populations considered vulnerable, which include all types of educational and hospital centers, and risk installations due to their handling of combustible or flammable products in quantities greater than 1000 m³, agricultural activities, and food processing industries. It argues that the regulation requires the approval of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) that considers atmospheric dispersion studies and a quantitative risk assessment, and the location of co-incineration installations must be in accordance with the approved Land-Use Planning (Ordenamiento Territorial) or a land-use permit (uso de suelo) issued by the Municipality, as well as the distance to be proven in the permit before the Ministry of Health. Regarding the deadline for installation permits, it alludes that the 10-business-day deadlines provided for in articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, given the rigor and technical complexity in analyzing applications for this type of project, with an impact on the environment and public health, are insufficient and contrary to the principle of legal reasonableness (constitutional rulings 7294-1998 and 2410-2007), and therefore the one-month period of article 331 of Ley 6227 must be respected. It considers that if the Chamber considers that these deadlines are not contrary to the Law of the Constitution, it could be interpreted that positive silence (silencio positivo) does not operate upon their expiration, pursuant to article 4 of Ley 7575. The same can be said regarding the 30-day period granted to the Ministry of Health to issue, if appropriate, the authorization for the activity and the detail of materials authorized for co-incineration (article 24). Regarding the principles of shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, it analyzes that the general principles that underpin comprehensive waste management are not violated since they are recognized in the Law and are addressed by Decree 39136 in several of its articles. Regarding the protocols in case of non-compliance with emission limits, it is added that Decree 39136, in its article 17, establishes the immediate shutdown of the process under abnormal conditions, which coincides with what is stipulated in European Directive 2010/75/EU. Regarding the non-compliance with national goals by allowing incineration processes, it is appreciated that Decree 39136 is consistent with international conventions and the principle of progressivity in internal regulations, because it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, through separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or source categories cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration, and sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Ley 8839. The implementation of clean development mechanisms in public policies has been considered in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2011-2014 and 2015-2018. It concludes that Decree 39136 is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, with the exception of the 10-business-day deadlines provided for in articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, which harm the principle of legal reasonableness, unless it is considered that positive silence does not operate upon their expiration, and the 30-day period of article 24 ibidem must also be interpreted in that order. It considers that Transitory VI of Decree 39136 is constitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the limits provided therein will be applicable when, in accordance with the principle of progressivity, they improve the current protection against emissions from hazardous waste incineration processes that are already authorized.
5.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his capacity as Minister of Health, responds to the granted hearing, stating the criteria set forth by the Director and Acting Head of the Unidad de Normalización de Servicios de Salud en Ambiente Humano, of the Dirección de Protección al Ambiente Humano, of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that Decree 39136 does not conflict with the Kyoto Protocol since Annex A, in relation to article 3 of the Protocol, only indicates which processes must be taken into consideration for the country to comply with the requirements established in that international instrument. He considers that the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources and greenhouse gases is not violated, since the Decree seeks to reverse the emissions of gases that cause global warming. Nor does this violate the international objective provided for in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. He considers, with respect to the regulation of gas emissions emitted by solid waste co-incineration activities, that establishing maximum limits for pollutants in solid waste in atmospheric emissions, as well as establishing maximum permissible limits in wastewater for solids, heavy metals, as well as for dioxins and furans, allows compliance with the precept of constitutional article 50. Regarding the protection distances and surrounding areas, he considers that article 7 of the Decree seeks to establish a balance between the protection of public health and that of vulnerable groups, emphasizing the protection of sensitive populations. He affirms that article 4 of the Decree establishes the obligation to comply with Ley 8839, and the claimants do not analyze the variety of actions and regulations that the Ministry of Health has issued to ensure the proper management of waste, in adherence to the hierarchy in comprehensive waste management. He considers that priority is given to recycling over thermal treatment; he clarifies that co-incineration is not the last stage in the hierarchical waste management. He states that the law establishes an order of priority, and if one of these cannot be fulfilled, one continues seeking alternatives at the lower level, which does not imply that the first ones must be fulfilled in their entirety prior to using the subsequent ones; therefore, the repeal of the moratorium does not violate the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. He affirms that the Municipalities and the general population have the obligation to achieve the separate collection of waste, and, for their part, co-incinerators must have spaces for their separation, to ensure they are not processed; likewise, the regulation clearly establishes prohibitions for specific materials that should not be co-incinerated. He points out that the challenged Decree does contain limits for the management of co-incineration by-products, which guarantees that environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle, are not violated, and compliance with constitutional article 50 is ensured. He clarifies that co-processing and co-incineration are methods that allow energy recovery, permitted by the Law, so it should not be interpreted that there is any tacit prohibition on incineration. He affirms that regarding the training of the responsible professionals, the Decree establishes the duty for every company and responsible professional to create the required capacity within a reasonable period. He clarifies that emissions of dioxins and furans produced by the industry, at concentration levels below the maximum permissible level, are subject to prevention before closure, in respect of due process. He notes that the regulation establishes the obligation to present and implement a Corrective Action Plan. He confirms that the Environmental Impact Assessment, provided for in the Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554 of 1995, is the predictive control mechanism to regulate productive activities in terms of environmental protection. He expands on the foregoing by pointing out that the Secretaría Técnica Ambiental (SETENA) is the national technical body responsible for determining whether productive activities are dangerous for the environment, and if environmental damage is determined, it does not authorize environmental viability.
Based on the rendered report, it is considered that it is the obligation of the State and principally of MINAE and the Ministry of Health, in that order, to take the necessary measures to prevent damage to the environment, guaranteeing, defending, and preserving the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, protecting the health of persons, the environment, and life in general. It concludes that Decree 39136 is in accordance with the environmental and sanitary parameters required by the Costa Rican population.
6.- Ms. Irene Cañas Díaz, in her capacity as Acting Minister of Environment and Energy (hereinafter MINAE), responded to the granted hearing, presenting the opinion issued by the Director of the Environmental Quality Management Directorate of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in which she states that Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE came to regulate the activity of waste incineration in a safer manner, thus fulfilling the principle of progressivity. She clarifies that Executive Decree DE-38500-S-MINAE was a temporary measure while the technical regulation allowing thermal waste treatment processes in a safer manner was being developed. She points out that the challenged Regulation establishes, as a prerequisite to the thermal treatment of waste, that the hierarchy processes provided for in the law (reduction, reuse, and recycling) must be complied with, and prior separation of recoverable waste must be carried out. She adds that waste hierarchy does not require technical studies, but rather compliance with the separation of recoverable waste. She warns that in environmental feasibility studies, compliance with the provisions of the challenged Decree must be verified; thus, a specific assessment must be performed in each case. Regarding compliance with international obligations provided for in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, she indicates that the questioned Decree establishes a series of technical measures to guarantee that dioxins and furans will not be produced in waste co-processing processes, such as waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, real-time temperature control, monitoring of atmospheric emissions, among others. She points out that the Regulation provides, first, for the hierarchy in waste management and, as a last option, thermal treatment, with co-incineration understood as when the energy produced during thermal treatment is harnessed. She expands that this matter is protected at the international level by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to which Costa Rica is a party through Law No. 8538 and Executive Decree No. 33438. She refers that the challenged Decree does not permit open-air waste incineration, as this would produce high greenhouse gas emissions, as well as emissions of dioxins and furans, hence the ozone layer is not affected, nor would greenhouse gas emissions be produced beyond those already emitted in current waste management processes. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, and the Montreal Protocol are not breached. In relation to the gas emanations produced in the thermal treatment processes of organic waste, she affirms that the Decree points them out in order to propose actions for their reduction, as well as to follow up on compliance with the maximum emission limits for pollutants permitted in the current national regulations. Regarding the training of professionals and technicians in the field of incineration processes, she emphasizes that every new technology requires preparing the people who will develop projects and verify the application of the regulations; she clarifies that the Ministry of Health, with support from the Emission and Immission Standards Council, has programs scheduled in response to the identified need. As for the incineration of hazardous waste, she indicates that Executive Decree 31837-S currently regulates the operating conditions for the treatment of hazardous waste and is based on Technical Guidelines on national environmental co-processing of hazardous waste in cement kilns; even so, the questioned Decree expands the co-incineration limits for this type of waste, as they are more updated and regulated more strictly compared to what Decree No. 31837-S provides. For its part, regarding the observation related to the content of hazardous waste found in ordinary waste, she warns that the Decree establishes the materials and substances that cannot be treated in incineration processes; the obligation to separate hazardous waste is mandated. It is established that the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) must include the facilities for separation, classification, and recovery of recoverable waste that should not be incinerated. She refers that article 16 of the challenged Regulation indicates that the ashes resulting from thermal treatment are considered hazardous solid waste and must therefore be disposed of appropriately, following what is established in the General Regulation for the classification and management of hazardous waste. She emphasizes that the Decree establishes the regulations that must be considered for the management of this type of waste; likewise, article 5 of Decree 39136-S-MINAE expressly indicates the substances and materials prohibited from being incinerated. For her part, she indicates that the Decree establishes the maximum permitted atmospheric emission limits for the different pollutants that could be produced, limits that are consistent with national and international regulations. The working regime of a thermal waste treatment facility is also regulated to minimize the possibility of producing pollutants. She states that the protection measures and safety distances are ensured from the environmental feasibility studies presented before SETENA; she argues that 1000 meters is the minimum distance an incineration facility could be located from towns, which may be greater according to the results of the environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental) before SETENA. She affirms that the 20-day period for the Ministry of Health to issue an opinion on applications to carry out incineration activities is found to be reasonable; she indicates that this period was considered by the Ministry of Health during the discussion and drafting process of the Regulation. Finally, in relation to the protocol for cases of non-compliance with the emission limits established in article 33, table 5 of the challenged Decree, she clarifies that said regulation defines the action ranges based on the results of laboratory measurements and evaluations, which take into account the maximum limits defined in international literature regarding health effects; likewise, two mechanisms aimed at preventing the potential production of dioxins and furans are contemplated. She does not share the claimants' statement about the non-existence of a technical criterion to regulate the activity; she affirms that a commission was formed with participants from the public, private, academic sectors, etc., to work on the matter.
7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 69, 70, and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin, on April 12, 13, and 14, 2016.
8.- By resolution at 10:20 a.m. on May 5, 2016, the Presidency of the Chamber admitted the coadjuvancies in favor of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree presented by FABIÁN DE JESÚS PACHECO RODRÍGUEZ, identity card number 110170021; EDGARDO ARAYA SIBAJA, identity card number 204830663; MELISSA FLORES NÚÑEZ, identity card number 701260268, representing the ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO DE RESIDENCIAL CIUDAD CARIARI, legal entity identification number 3-002-361677; ANDRÉS CAMACHO L., identity card number 113680148, and others; YORLENY RODRÍGUEZ CONEJO, identity card number 111220107, and others; AMANDA ARAYA RIVAS, identity card number 111320483; ERNESTO MONGE, identity document number 1304295982) and others; MINOR PICADO CAMARENO (identity card number 502580179) and others; on April 1, 2016, by FERNANDO ARAYA ANDERSON, identity card number 0108230617; YERLING RUIZ VÁSQUEZ, identity card number 603040331, and others; HÉCTOR GONZÁLEZ PACHECO, identity card number 0105990966. In all of them, the arguments raised by the claimants are reiterated and explained, and the need for the Decree to be invalidated is affirmed for presenting a threat both to their respective interests and in general to their right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.
9.- In the same resolution, the coadjuvancies in favor of the validity of the regulation were also accepted, presented by ALBERTO ANTILLÓN ARROYO, identity card number 108310616, in his capacity as PRESIDENT OF THE COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS QUÍMICOS Y PROFESIONALES AFINES, legal entity identification number 3-007-383731; MIGUEL GÓMEZ COREA (identity card number 502230027), in his capacity as GENERAL MANAGER OF COOPERATIVA DE ELECTRIFICACIÓN RURAL DE GUANACASTE R.L. (COOPEGUANACASTE R.L.). In both cases, respective writings were submitted providing a specific analysis of the infra-legal provisions discussed and giving the reasons why they are deemed to adequately comply with the rules and principles related to the right to a healthy environment.- 10.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 69, 70, and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin, on April 12, 13, and 14, 2016.
11.- The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by article 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.
12.- The prescriptions of the law have been complied with in the proceedings.
Magistrate Hernández López writes; and,
Considering:
I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, and requires a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked. This requirement is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when due to the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In the case at hand, the action is an exercise in defense of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment enshrined in article 50 of the Political Constitution. On this point, since before its establishment through the constitutional reform of 1994, such right as well as broad standing for its defense had been established by this Court.- Added to this jurisprudential line is that currently the Political Constitution itself expressly provides for procedural standing, vested in any person, for the defense of the environment according to the current text of article 50 of the Political Constitution.
II.- Standing in the specific case. The petition of this unconstitutionality action seeks the annulment of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, “Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for facilities for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste,” because it authorizes the activity of incinerating ordinary and hazardous solid waste, which, in their opinion, is contrary to the principles of progressivity, objectivization of environmental law, and non-regression of human rights. Thus, the case falls squarely within the defense of the right enshrined in article 50 of the Constitution, so the action is admissible under its express text.- III.- Grouping of claims for analysis purposes. The unconstitutionality action requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, named “Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for facilities for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste,” and hereinafter referred to only as “Decree 39136.” As its name indicates, this regulatory set establishes several specific requirements, but not the only ones to be met, if one intends to obtain state authorization to carry out the activity of co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, and it imposes the operating conditions and control mechanisms for such activity. The claims against this regulatory body can be separated into two clear strands: the first groups several infringements that have arisen from the fact of the promulgation of Decree 39136, as a legal action of the State. It is maintained that said promulgation injures the constitutional right to the environment and several of the principles that have been derived from it, and also a group of international obligations acquired by the country. The second strand includes claims against specific provisions of Decree 39136 whose content injures – by action or omission – several constitutional principles in environmental matters as well as the principle of equality. Thus, the Chamber will address both sectors of claims separately.
IV.It is also worth noting that the review of some of the points raised allows the conclusion that they lack sufficient elements of judgment to serve the purpose of properly substantiating the infringements alleged, as required by the Law regulating Constitutional Jurisdiction. Such defect will be specified in each case where it appears, the foregoing in application of a clear jurisprudential line on the point, as seen, for example, from the following citations:
“The unconstitutionality action is filed with the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures and infringes the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments signed with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the claimants, what the Attorney General's Office indicates is confirmed, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional, but rather it is limited to establishing discrepancies in a generic and abstract manner against the entirety of the Regulation, even more so against all activity carried out by Sugar Mills and Haciendas, as they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of neighboring inhabitants, without specifying which constitutionality arguments should be considered against each of the provisions or groups of rules of the challenged Regulation. […] The first paragraph of article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the obligation to authenticate the writs for filing unconstitutionality actions, since it is deemed necessary that there be arguments put forward by a legal professional, which this Tribunal does not rule out respond to a serious study of the technical and scientific background of a given matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike protective processes, that is, habeas corpus and amparo remedies, which can be directly filed by any interested party before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that injure their particular sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the unconstitutionality action), the legislator entrusted the certifying attorney with a task whose demand is even greater, more elaborate and exhaustive if you will, which must be set forth in the filing brief by reason of their professional duty, to demonstrate to the Tribunal the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal elaboration of the Law, as well as of other secondary provisions, involves a process that is extremely costly for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways for or against, and whose formation, approval, and promulgation procedures should not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is limited room for this Tribunal to remedy the manifest shortcomings of legal professionals who authenticate writs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without compromising the impartiality and analysis owed to each unconstitutionality action.” (Judgment number 005285-2012 of 3:15 p.m. on April 25, 2012).
And subsequently in judgment number 2014-004239, it reaffirmed:
“IV.- On the lack of concreteness of the unconstitutionality arguments. The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in its article 3, provides that ‘The Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the comparison of the text of the questioned norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with the constitutional norms and principles.’ However, for this Tribunal to deem the infringement established and declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever promotes an unconstitutionality action has the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the constitutional norm or principle and, additionally, must indicate why the claim should be considered. This is termed by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, “a norm that facially contradicts the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that in reality there is no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs if action is taken against a norm that upon first examination does not seem contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the claimant who must advance with arguments that convince about the unconstitutionality” (see judgment number 0184-95 of 4:30 p.m. on January 10, 1995).”
Point A. Injury to the waste management design set in Domestic Law norms with higher rank than Decree 39136.- The claimants point out that the issuance of Decree 39136 injures the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment in general, and particularly the precautionary principle; the principle of non-regression; the principle of objectivization; and the right to sustainable development. They believe that the activity of solid waste co-incineration that the decree authorizes and regulates is harmful to the environment, given the current situation of waste management in our country. A contradiction is alleged with the waste management design contained in the Law for Integrated Waste Management number 8839 (hereinafter Law 8839), because with the issuance of the challenged Decree 39136, co-incineration is highlighted and facilitated to the detriment of other activities and practices more environmentally friendly, which goes against the hierarchy in integrated waste management provided for in Law 8839 and, therefore, also contravenes the principles mentioned above. They estimate that in practice, priority will be given to co-incineration over other options, such as reuse and recycling, contained in the Solid Waste Plan of 2008 (PRESOL). It is also maintained that the Decree “incentivizes,” or rather that it “stimulates” co-incineration, which entails an environmental risk, therefore it violates the Right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Along these specific lines, the claimants allude to the violation of the principles of the Integrated Waste Treatment System: shared responsibility, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, in addition to environmental education. Regarding all these grievances, the Tribunal considers that the key to the decision on this specific point lies in properly understanding the purpose sought by the challenged regulation and the way in which that purpose has been embodied in the regulatory design. First, it must be clear that the activity regulated by Decree 39136 is an activity intended to fit into the system of environmental protection measures.- Co-incineration of waste cannot be compared with purely extractive activities, for example, because prohibiting the latter brings only advantages for the environment; in contrast, this Chamber's intervention in the case of the Decree on waste co-incineration must take into account that carrying out the activity may have an impact on the environment, but preventing it may also have impacts. The Chamber understands that on this point the perspective of the claimants is correct in that the potential damages of the co-incineration activity must be assessed, but it is also partial because it does not give full weight to the harmful consequences for the environment that may result from preventing it from being carried out.- It is from this latter perspective that a more complete and comprehensive understanding of Decree 39136 is gained, which includes among its considerations and rationale, the need to regulate the activity of co-incineration of ordinary waste in order to eliminate negative impacts on public health and the environment. Likewise, it establishes that the co-incineration of waste with recycling or reuse potential must be avoided, for which there must be a process for separating this type of waste at the co-incineration plant.- Furthermore, the incineration of hazardous waste is not permitted, which are listed in the decree, or those with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, for which a specific separation and control operation must exist to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. The challenged Decree also contemplates among its grounds the fact that the protection of the health of persons and the environment requires individuals and legal entities wishing to engage in the activity to establish and maintain rigorous operating conditions and technical requirements in the co-incineration activity. Among the main regulations found in Decree 39136, operating requirements and maximum emission limits are established for ordinary solid waste co-incineration facilities, always as a subordinate option to the other prior processes in the hierarchy of integrated waste management provided for in article 4 of Law 8839. When delimiting the scope of the activity regulated by the Regulation, article 3 differentiates between co-incineration and incineration; energy recovery through the co-incineration process is regulated, understood as “thermal treatment of waste with recovery of the heat produced by combustion, including incineration by oxidation of waste, as well as pyrolysis, gasification, or other thermal treatment processes, for example the plasma process, to the extent that the substances resulting from the treatment are subsequently incinerated.” The energy recovery sought to be made viable with the challenged Decree is contained in the Solid Waste Plan (Decree 34647 of May 28, 2008, “Approval and Declaration of Public and National Interest of the Solid Waste Plan–Costa Rica (PRESOL)), which remains as a guidance framework, in accordance with article 1 of Executive Decree 37567 of November 2, 2012, General Regulation to the Law for Integrated Waste Management. On the other hand, regarding the limits of the thermal treatment process by co-incineration, article 4 in fine of Decree 39136 reiterates that “waste for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, must not be subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration.” (highlighting is not from the original). It is clear from all the foregoing that Decree 39136 has been constructed in a manner consistent with the very perspective held by the claimants, in the sense that co-incineration should not be the priority mechanism for waste disposal and that efforts should be directed towards adherence to Law 8839 and its hierarchy. Indeed, Decree 39136 accepts this concept and repeats the need to respect the hierarchy in integrated waste management. Its article 1 indicates that “co-incineration must be the last option, once the hierarchy in integrated waste management, established in article 4 of Law No. 8839 of June 24, 2010, ‘Law for Integrated Waste Management,’ published in La Gaceta No. 135 of July 13, 2010, has been complied with.” Therefore, if – as the claimants intend – we accept that Law 8839 is a valid development and an acceptable and valid framework within the principles of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, then we must understand that the Decree – insofar as it replicates what is provided in said law and does not deviate from it – also complies with and adheres to constitutional requirements.- Contrary to what the claimants indicated – this Tribunal finds that Decree 39136 does not contradict the law, either expressly or implicitly; rather, – expressly – it leaves intact the preferential attention and priority stimulation of activities such as reduction, reuse, and recycling. The option set forth by the authorities in the discussed Decree links with the law insofar as it does not seek to incentivize or stimulate co-incineration, but only to produce a regulatory framework for that activity in case there are individuals interested in carrying it out; that exercise is not, per se, contrary to the constitutional right to the environment or its principles if we adhere to its content, since such regulation includes, as observed, a specific regime of operating and control conditions that are added to, and do not replace, all other general requirements demanded by the various environmental protection laws, with the purpose of protecting the natural surroundings in different ways. The Tribunal does not find that there exists in Decree 39136 an authorization for co-incineration conceived as an independent, open alternative, without limits or controls, and even less is it observed that an incentive or stimulus has been established for this activity above the activities placed higher in the order of priorities set by law.- In this order of considerations, it is clear that one cannot lose sight of the fact that the activity of waste co-incineration, poorly conceived or scarcely regulated, would raise serious doubts of constitutionality, as it is a potentially more polluting activity compared to waste reduction, reuse, or recycling, which leave a smaller footprint on the environment. But that is not the case when co-incineration is conceived as a secondary or subsidiary option, just as it is presented in the challenged Decree. Unlike the claimants and the position held by some coadjuvants, the Chamber understands that the State does no wrong in producing a regulation for the activity of waste co-incineration because it is a lawful activity, since formally there is no prohibition against its execution and rather – from the perspective of the constitutional right to the environment and its principles – it may well have its place within waste management, provided its possibility of use is regulated and provided for normatively in cases where it is less polluting than other available means for waste disposal.- As stated, its utility and environmental value will depend on which activities we compare it with; if we contrast it with waste reduction, reuse, or recycling, its disadvantage would be clear, and therefore Decree 39136 does well when it emphasizes the prohibition of co-incinerating waste susceptible to those treatments; but conversely, co-incineration will be advantageous if compared with the option of disposing of waste in open-air dumps that, unfortunately, still exist in our country, and on which the claimants omit any comparison or assessment.
Beyond this, no substantial evidentiary elements are provided as to how the regulatory framework, which clearly governs a subordinate operation, would have the effect of actually producing an effective inducement toward the co-incineration activity, to the detriment of the other waste disposal activities that rank above it in the legally established hierarchy for waste disposal. Even less so, convincing reasons are given for the Court to deem certain, or at least highly probable, the future conduct of the various actors in this matter. Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Decree 39136 is not contrary to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment or to any of its principles that have been embraced by the Chamber as an integral part of Constitutional Law.
VI.- Point B: Disregard of international obligations with the promulgation of Decree 39136. The petitioners challenge that the thermal treatment of solid waste in the presence of air generates harmful gases that are released into the atmosphere, which injures part of the provisions of various international instruments to which Costa Rica is a party. It is mentioned, on the one hand, that the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer establish obligations to protect health and the environment against the adverse effects of activities that may affect the ozone layer. It is considered that the objective established in Articles 1 and 4 of Decree 39136 violates the principle of progressiveness in eliminating polluting sources. It is added that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, whose Annex A mentions waste incineration as one of the expressly limiting activities to achieve the reduction of greenhouse gases. The petitioners argue noncompliance with international instruments, indicating that by permitting the incineration industry, the international objective set forth in the cited instruments of preventing the generation of greenhouse gases and minimizing the effect on the ozone layer is transgressed, all of which endangers human health. On this point, this Court does not find that the petitioners prove in this proceeding how the challenged Decree and its provisions fail to comply with what is specifically set forth in the cited international instruments, since the Chamber is merely warned about the risky effects of incineration activity on human life. It is set forth that Article 3 of Decree 39136 establishes the different gas emissions produced by incineration activity, but no specification is made as to which provisions of the cited international Conventions and Protocol are not complied with or contain prohibitive rules that have been transgressed. To reinforce this conclusion of the Court, it is therefore considered necessary to review what the international instruments on the subject matter addressed by Decree 39136 provide. Regarding what the international instruments provide, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Law 7228 of May 6, 1991, allows the control, limitation, reduction, or prevention of activities that may have adverse effects on the ozone layer. In what is relevant, its Article 2, paragraph 2 provides that the Parties shall, to the extent of their capabilities, adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures to control, limit, reduce, or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or control in the event that it is found that these activities have or may have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the ozone layer. For its part, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Law 7223 of April 8, 1991), aims to adopt preventive measures to equitably control the total global emissions of specific substances, namely: chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, halons, and methyl bromides, for their elimination based on scientific advances, technical and economic aspects, and the needs of developing countries. Under this Protocol, Costa Rica has taken specific actions, such as the prohibition of the use of chlorofluorocarbons and halons since 2010, and in the case of hydrochlorofluorocarbons, their import is restricted through substance quotas, among others. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Law 7414 of June 13, 1994, also empowers anticipating, preventing, or minimizing the causes of climate change, and among the commitments the Parties undertake is to promote and support technologies, practices, and processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol, Law 8219 of March 8, 2002, and the cited Convention on Climate Change, coincide in committing their Parties to achieve individual and legally binding objectives to limit or reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases, namely: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol aims to fulfill the quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments by applying policies and measures according to national circumstances. Although the Kyoto Protocol includes waste incineration on the list of activities that harm the environment, it is true that it is not prohibited; it is on this basis that the Parties acquire commitments to prevent or control the activity to safeguard the environment and public health. Based on the foregoing, this Court agrees with the position stated by the State advisory body, concluding that Decree 39136 is consistent with those international conventions, and with the principles of non-regression and sustainable development, and of progressiveness, since it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, through separation operations and control of waste to be incinerated, in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or source categories cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration. It also sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Law 8839. Among the measures the Decree requires are waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, temperature control, and the monitoring of atmospheric emissions (Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Decree). Conceived in this way, the Chamber understands that the operation is compatible with the obligations contained in Article 50 of the Constitution, and with international commitments and the principle of progressiveness, since measures are adopted that do not degrade the level of protection but rather synchronize with the protection of the environment and health, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set according to parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and the rules of science and technique. Similarly, this Chamber accepts as true the assertion of the State advisory body that the regulation contained in the challenged Decree converges with the purposes considered for the adoption of European Directive 2010/75/EU. In accordance with all of the above, it is concluded that the issuance of the discussed Decree does not contradict the goals and legal commitments acquired by Costa Rica through the signing of international treaties on these issues, and therefore, on this point, the action must be dismissed.
VII.- Point C: Claim of injury to the principles of objectivization and non-regression in environmental matters, with the promulgation of Decree 39136. Also, with this unconstitutionality action, it is alleged that Decree 39136 renders ineffective Executive Decree 38500-S-MINAE, “National Moratorium on Thermal Transformation Activities of Ordinary Solid Waste,” a situation the petitioners consider violates the principles of objectivization and non-regression recognized by constitutional environmental doctrine, given that there are no studies verifying that the primary processes of the hierarchy have already been completed. They also believe that the principle of non-regression is transgressed insofar as Decree 39136 authorizes an environmentally risky activity, even with the controls established in said regulatory body; this represents a regression from the prior legal situation, since Decree 38500-S-MINAE better ensured environmental protection. In relation to this allegation, the authorities issued their report and insist that the nature of Executive Decree 38500-S-MINAE, “National Moratorium on Thermal Transformation Activities of Ordinary Solid Waste” (hereinafter referred to as the Moratorium Decree), cannot be overlooked. Such measure, it is indicated, was adopted as a temporary provision to achieve the necessary period of time to formulate the necessary technical measures to faithfully comply with Law 8839, articles 4, 6, and 42. With regard to this point, the text of the cited Moratorium Decree literally states:
“Article 1-A national moratorium is established on thermal transformation activities of ordinary solid waste, until such time as the Environmental and Health Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts on health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839, entitled the Comprehensive Waste Management Law.
Article 2-It shall be effective upon publication.” This provision was submitted to constitutionality analysis regarding its validity vis-à-vis the proper protection of the Right to the environment, and in ruling 2014-16162, the Constitutional Chamber stated the following on this point:
“III.- In this case, the grounds for the challenged Decree are clear in indicating that within the principles contained in the Comprehensive Waste Management Law “is the Precautionary Principle, according to which, when there is danger of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective measures based on costs to prevent the degradation of the environment or health.” Likewise, that “in the country, technologies are being promoted that seek the production of electrical energy through thermal transformation (combustion, gasification, pyrolysis, plasma, among others) of ordinary solid waste, which could contravene the spirit of the Comprehensive Waste Management Law No. 8839, as well as pose a risk to the health of people and the environment because thermal transformation processes are sensitive to the composition of the raw material and the technique used for its transformation regarding the results of its emissions into the atmosphere.” Finally, that “the proposals for technologies known to date represent very dissimilar electrical generation yields, which makes evident the need to analyze such technologies based on their energy recovery capacity, in order to ensure the national interest in the matter.” The State, in application of the precautionary principle and in the interest of protecting the environment and the health of people, seeks to suspend the thermal transformation activity of ordinary solid waste until the corresponding technical studies are carried out. For their part, the petitioners consider that said moratorium, far from protecting the environment, causes damage since said thermal transformation, besides producing new energies, expeditiously resolves the disposal of solid waste. This Court appreciates that, at heart, there is no collision between the challenged rule and Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but rather a discrepancy between what is provided in the challenged Decree and the arguments of the petitioner regarding the best way to protect the environment and people's health. It is not for the Chamber to decide on the merit of one form or another of disposing of solid waste. The Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Ministry of Health, in the challenged decree, in compliance with what is provided not only in Article 50 of the Political Constitution but also in the Comprehensive Waste Management Law, have taken the initiative to review the possible consequences that the thermal transformation of solid waste may have on health and the environment, to take appropriate measures, without it being appropriate for the Chamber to interfere in such matters, of an eminently technical nature, which are clearly outside its competence. Consequently, the action must be dismissed regarding this aspect.” (Emphasis not in original) Both the wording of said Decree itself and the way it was understood and interpreted by this Chamber in the recently cited ruling allow for the conclusion that the moratorium was not intended to become a permanent regulation within the legal framework related to environmental protection. On the contrary, it is evident from the transcribed texts that it was a decision made under the precautionary principle, and that it established a temporary state of affairs while the State, through its authorities, managed to produce the studies and instruments to ensure respect for the right to health of people and the right to enjoy an ecologically healthy and balanced environment. Thus, with Decree 39136 and its provisions, the State considers itself satisfied with the existence of those technical conditions and their suitability to achieve the intended purpose, insofar as – in its opinion – the co-incineration activity, carried out under the strict terms of the Decree, ensures full protection of health and the environment. The petitioners generally find this design insufficient, and therefore they assert that the Decree fails to ensure health and the environment, as there is no sufficient scientific basis, particularly in relation to the issue of hazardous waste, the emission of toxic gases recognized in Article 3 of Decree 39136, and the safety distances of incineration plants, thereby causing injury to the principle of objectivization, due to the lack of proper technical backing for its operation. In response to this reproach, in the reports of the Health and Environment authorities, the Chamber is warned that Decree 39136 regulates incineration activity more safely, as the regulations set forth the necessary technical measures for the adequate control of co-incineration as one of the recovery (valorización) alternatives for solid waste contained in Law 8839, such that the repeal of the Moratorium Decree does not disregard the principles of objectivization, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. Indeed, Decree 39136 promotes the prior separation of recoverable (valorizables) waste, a prerequisite for the thermal treatment of waste. With respect to the violation of the principle of objectivization, it is noted that in environmental feasibility studies (estudios de viabilidad ambiental), it is for the Ministry of Health and SETENA to verify compliance with the provisions of Decree 39136 and all other applicable regulations prior to authorizing the activity and, of course, throughout its operation. No special studies are required, as in each case a specific assessment must be conducted that will determine whether or not the operation of the co-incineration activity intended to be carried out is environmentally admissible. Finally, it is not superfluous to point out that a correct analysis of the Moratorium Decree also allows for discarding any impact on the principle of non-regression, because, aside from the temporary nature of that legal act, the prohibition of the activity established at the time was conditional until “the Environmental and Health Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts on health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839, entitled the Comprehensive Waste Management Law.” What the authorities maintain in this regard is that with the design for the operation and control of co-incineration activities set out in Decree 39136, added to the application of the other applicable control norms, sufficient technical and scientific certainty is achieved – in their opinion – regarding the protection of health and the environment and also compliance with the provisions of Law 8839. From this perspective, the Chamber understands that no regression can be claimed with respect to the provisions of the Moratorium Decree, if what was expressed therein was the suspension of the activity until the authorities confirmed the existence of the required conditions; it could therefore be said that the competent bodies have adhered to such provisions when issuing Decree 39136. For the Court, and regarding claims related to constitutional rights, Decree 39136 does not nullify the efforts achieved in the regulations governing the subject; the Executive Branch took actions to control and regulate the thermal processing of waste and thereby organize the exercise of this activity provided for in Law 8839; the co-incineration activity of solid waste has been regulated, and the conditions and limits to minimize any impact on the environment and health from the co-incineration activity have been established. The Court thus concludes that on this point, the violation of the principles of objectivization and non-regression in environmental matters is not substantiated.
VIII.- Point D: Claim regarding the lack of trained professionals for the co-incineration activity authorized in Decree 39136. The petitioners allege the absence of trained professionals to verify that the co-incineration activity of waste does not become a threat or injury to health or the environment, as the discussed Decree itself indicates in Transitory Provision II the need for training professionals for the activities of startup and initial commissioning, stewardship (regencia), materials studies, mechanical strength, operation, and environmental control of the installations. This situation is considered to contravene the spirit of Article 50 of the Constitution due to the risk from the effects of contamination and eventual environmental damage. On this point, the court observes that the petitioners argue that the absence of trained professionals will result in a co-incineration activity that causes environmental damage and harm to people's health. This is an obvious issue, but one precisely addressed by Decree 39136 in its Transitory Provision II, and what can be appreciated is that the conclusions the petitioners draw from the text of that provision do not conform to a systematic reading of the challenged Decree. The cited second transitory provision states:
SECOND TRANSITORY PROVISION: Within a period of six (6) months, the Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos, the Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines, and the Colegio de Químicos de Costa Rica must train their professionals to perform the activities of startup and initial commissioning, stewardship (regencia), materials studies, mechanical strength, operation, and environmental control of the regulated installations, to guarantee, during the useful life of the installation, compliance with the provisions of this regulation at the time of state operating authorization and its renewals. Within that same period, the cited Professional Associations must implement an electronic endorsement system for the documentation that, under the law governing them, must be submitted to public institutions.
Meanwhile, Transitory Provision IV complements the idea by providing:
“FOURTH TRANSITORY PROVISION: SETENA will not hear the EIA processes for co-incineration installations during the first nine (9) months counted from the publication of this regulation in the official gazette La Gaceta.” As can be seen, if the Decree is fully complied with, by the time the authorization processes begin, the problem pointed out by the petitioners will not exist because the training ordered by the Decree to the various authorities and specifically to the Professional Associations that are specifically mentioned will have been completed. Therefore, there is no injury in the design of Decree 39136 to the rights to the environment or to people's health, in the specific terms raised at this point by the petitioners. However, it is not superfluous to additionally indicate that the competent authorities clarify that all new technology requires training the professionals and technicians who will develop projects and verify the application of regulations, and that in this case, there are programs in the Ministry of Health, with support from the Emission and Immission Standards Council created by Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, and international commitments for training. Regarding this aspect, no violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution is therefore observed.
IX.- Second group of claims: Infractions arising from the provisions of Decree 39136 or from omissions in the cited regulation.
X.- Lack of specific regulation for the incineration of hazardous waste. The lack of specific regulation for the incineration of hazardous waste is alleged, due to its level of risk and airborne toxicity. It is reproached that between 3% and 10% of ordinary solid waste corresponds to hazardous waste, which would be taken to incineration, increasing the contaminating potential. On this matter, the Chamber notes that the challenged Decree establishes that co-incineration with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, through separation and control operations in order to prevent the formation of organic pollutants such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Considering 5, Articles 4 in fine, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). The rejection of hazardous waste in co-incineration processes is also provided for in Decree 39136. Furthermore, it prohibits the recovery activities of waste previously disposed of in sanitary landfills or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosive materials including mineral acids, materials containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals, or contaminated with these, materials of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from healthcare services, their educational establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons intended for destruction, Persistent Organic Compounds, and Polyvinyl Chloride waste (Article 5). For their part, Articles 22 and 23 of Decree 39136 set the emission limits and maximums for dioxins, furans, polychlorinated biphenyls, and heavy metals. According to the reports submitted by the authorities of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the co-incineration limits are more up-to-date and stricter than those provided in Decree 31837-S, which regulates the operating conditions for the treatment of hazardous waste and is based on Technical Guidelines on the environmental co-processing of hazardous waste. In this aspect, the violation of the right to a healthy environment is alleged; however, the argument is based on the possible effects that may arise from a lack of compliance with the regulation at the time of its implementation, so the impact that the regulation itself may contain and that would make it deserving of annulment is not specified.
XI.Regarding the claim of risk and lack of regulatory measures on the final products of incineration. The petitioners consider that the right to a healthy environment and the health of the population, as well as the precautionary principle, are seriously threatened by the omission to regulate the issue of the final disposal of the final products of incineration. In order to safeguard the environment and health, Decree 39136 contains extensive regulatory provisions, especially in Articles 6, 10, 13, 14, and 16, which set the rules for all types of final products of co-incineration, including both gases and ashes, and also sludge from wastewater treatment, except chemical analysis indicating otherwise (Article 16). Based on these rules, their separate storage is required; the approval of a Comprehensive Hazardous Solid Waste Management Program; testing to establish the physical and chemical characteristics, their contaminating potential, and hazardousness pursuant to the Regulation on the procedure to carry out the extraction test to determine constituents that make a waste hazardous due to its toxicity to the environment, Decree 27002-MINAE of April 29, 1998 (La Gaceta No. 101 of May 27, 1998); in addition to monthly analyses and a daily log pursuant to Decree 37788. Therefore, this specific point must be dismissed, as the specific provisions set forth in Decree 39136, added to the rest of the established monitoring and control regulations, are understood to constitute a sufficiently protective framework for the environment and health, all without prejudice to the possibility that specific activities or state omissions that may endanger such rights in specific cases can be reviewed by the competent authorities, and, in cases of serious and direct impacts, by the Chamber itself.
XII.- Constitutional injuries originating in Article 7 of Decree 39136, regarding protected distances and populations. The petitioners question that Decree 39136 contains a list of institutions and populations that must be protected from the proximity of co-incineration plants, but without technical justification, universities and residences are left without such protection. This injures the principle of objectivization in environmental matters and the right to life and equality. They consider that all people should have special protection so that co-incinerators are not within a radius of 1000 meters set by the Decree. They also challenge that protective radius distance, considering that particular atmospheric factors are not taken into account. On this question, the Court observes that the articles covering the issue are Articles 7 and 9 of Decree 39136; these provisions state, where relevant:
"Article 7. (…)
vii.- Quantitative risk assessment (evaluación de riesgos cuantitativa) that contemplates the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the installation, and the mitigation and control measures for such risks. Studies must be included on blast waves and safety distances to installations of official centers of the Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI, and comprehensive care centers, public, private and mixed, for individuals up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas, and chemical industries that store combustible or flammable products on the surface in quantities greater than 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries, within a radius of 1000 m., as well as their consequences for health and the environment.” “Article 9.- Of the application for a Location Permit before the Ministry of Health.
Co-incineration installations must maintain a location distance of one thousand (1000) m. from installations of official centers of the Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI, and comprehensive care centers, public, private and mixed, for individuals up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas, and chemical industries that store combustible or flammable products on the surface in quantities greater than 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries.” That is, it concerns the inclusion, on the one hand, of special impact studies and safety measures, and on the other, the setting of location restrictions regarding certain types of institutions, which are objectively deserving of greater protection, due to the concentration of people who may be presumed to have lesser abilities to follow instructions and, in general, to act on their own in complying with instructions.
Therein lies for the Chamber the key to the distinction and its justification, which from that perspective is reasonable and appropriate. However, in addition to the foregoing, the advisory body of the Chamber is correct in pointing out that this list cannot be read as a decree of lack of protection for the rest of the population, and that is clear when atmospheric dispersion studies and a general quantitative risk assessment are required. Added to the above is that the location and approval of proposed sites for co-incineration installations must be in accordance with the approved Land-Use Planning (Ordenamiento Territorial), or a compliant land-use certificate (uso de suelo conforme) issued by the respective Municipality, as well as the application for a location permit before the Ministry of Health that allows reporting the distance to various installations and evaluating studies on wind and the population to be served, among others (articles 8 and 9 of Decree 39136). Thus, it follows that the regulations have indeed considered the analysis of technical aspects that must be assessed by the competent environmental and health authorities, and regarding such matters, this Court goes only so far as to determine that the system contains the bodies and processes responsible for ensuring the technical correctness of the proposals, and that their decisions are framed by provisions that allow for the protection of the environment and, of course, people's health. As indicated above, the Chamber understands that the Decree, on this issue of protecting the health and safety of the population, sets rules that add to and do not replace all other existing protection measures regarding the environment and the population's health. It is clear, therefore, that there is no violation of the principle of equality regarding the protection owed to the general population, and there is no reason to annul articles 7 and 9 if their purpose is to add to the regulatory framework that must be complied with in environmental matters to operate a waste co-incineration plant.
XIII.Omission of the State to produce a decree on hazardous waste incineration. The plaintiffs note that instead of a decree like 39136, which regulates the incineration of ordinary waste, what should have been issued, due to its obvious need, is a regulation that orders and establishes strict standards for a treatment system for hazardous solid waste (residuos sólidos peligrosos), including as part of it the waste from the incineration process, and that this absence violates by omission the principles of objectification (objetivación), progressivity (progresividad), and non-regression (no regresión). They add that this absence is more marked due to the lack of an appropriate failure control mechanism and the existence of Transitional Provision VI of Decree 39136, which imposes the limits of said Decree on the incineration of hazardous waste (residuos peligrosos), thereby implicitly recognizing the absence of specific regulations. The Court understands that, on the first point, the interested parties merely express what must be considered their particular opinion on the appropriateness and need to issue a Decree on hazardous waste management instead of the challenged Decree, so there is no constitutional claim to support that complaint. Secondly, the challenged Decree contains (article 17 of the discussed Decree) a system with rules and parameters that serve to order the shutdown of the incineration process. Finally, regarding the third aspect, it should be noted that Transitional Provision VI is an additional safety measure that, in principle, does not apply to the activity being authorized by the Decree, which only permits the incineration of ordinary waste (residuos ordinarios) and expressly excludes the incineration of hazardous waste (residuos peligrosos). This is how this Court sees it, understanding that said rule is absolutely not authorizing the incineration of hazardous waste (residuos peligrosos), which would require a regulatory framework quite different from the content of Decree 39136. However, it is not superfluous to point out, as the State's advisory body does, that the management and disposal of hazardous waste (residuos peligrosos) is indeed normatively regulated in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Law 7438 of October 6, 1994; the General Health Law (Ley General de Salud), No. 5395 of October 30, 1973; the Regulation for the Management of Industrial Hazardous Waste (Reglamento para el Manejo de los Desechos Peligrosos Industriales), Decree 27001 of April 29, 1998; and in the General Regulation for the Classification and Management of Hazardous Waste (Reglamento General para la Clasificación y Manejo de Residuos Peligrosos), Decree 37788 of February 15, 2013. It is stated that there is also specific regulation, such as, for example, the Regulation on the management of infectious-contagious waste generated in establishments providing health care and related services (Reglamento sobre la gestión de los desechos infecto-contagiosos que se generan en establecimientos que prestan atención a la salud y afines), Decree 30965 of December 17, 2002; the Regulation of requirements, conditions, and controls for the use of alternative fuels in cement kilns (Reglamento de requisitos, condiciones y controles para la utilización de combustibles alternos en los hornos cementeros), Decree 31837 of April 1, 2004; the Regulation for the Declaration of Special Management Waste (Reglamento para la Declaratoria de Residuos de Manejo Especial), Decree 38272 of January 7, 2014; and the Regulation on air emission limits for glass melting furnaces (Reglamento sobre límites de emisiones al aire para hornos de fundición de vidrio), Decree 38237 of February 3, 2014. From all the above, it must be concluded that the challenged Decree 39136 does not violate the Political Constitution on this point.
XIV.On the deadlines for granting permits by the authorities. The plaintiffs consider that the deadlines granted to the Ministry of Health authorities in the final paragraph of article 9, to authorize the location of incineration plants and grant the operating permit, are excessively short and therefore affect the right to a healthy environment and, with it, people's health. The respective paragraph of the cited article states:
"Article 9. (...) The Ministry of Health must issue the resolution regarding the location permit application within ten (10) business days following receipt of the application with the complete information. In justified cases, the deadline may be extended upon prior notification to the interested party, but said extension may not exceed ten (10) business days. If the permit is granted, its validity shall be one year from the date of issuance of the resolution granting it. (...)" The plaintiffs consider that the 10 days established to carry out the prior verification of technical and legal conditions are insufficient, thereby increasing the contaminating risk of the waste incineration activity. On this aspect, the Office of the Attorney General agrees with the plaintiffs regarding the shortness of the ten-day deadline for the Ministry of Health to be able to appropriately analyze and assess a decision of such relevance. The Chamber understands the concern reflected in the cited arguments and shares that haste is not the appropriate attitude when authorizing activities that necessarily entail the possibility of eventualities and contingencies that could put people's health or the environment at risk. However, on this point, and as the Office of the Attorney General also indicates, when resolving the issue this Chamber must take into account the settled jurisprudence of this Court, which has held that deadlines in environmental matters —as this case turns out to be— cannot and must not be considered peremptory but merely directory, just as it has also been clearly stated that in this environmental matter the figure of tacit consent (silencio positivo) does not apply either; therefore, the rule is not deemed to present a constitutional problem in that sense, since the lack of response within the indicated period could not be taken as a tacit or implicit authorization to carry out the co-incineration activity regulated by the discussed Decree.
XV.Conclusions. The plaintiffs allege that Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE, violates articles 7 and 50 of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional principles of sustainable development, environmental education, precautionary principle (precautorio), objectification (objetivación), and progressivity (progresividad). From the analysis of the different arguments presented in the action, it is concluded that, in general, the challenged Decree contains the regulations pertaining to the limits, control, and operation of the solid waste co-incineration activity, both ordinary and hazardous, such that we are not in the presence of uncontrolled authorizations of the thermal waste treatment process as a threat to the environment. It is not evident in this process that the regulation of the solid waste co-incineration process breaches international commitments acquired for the protection of the ozone layer, the reduction of greenhouse gases, and the safeguarding of air and the environment ratified by Costa Rica. It is also concluded that a part of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs in the filing brief lack the required foundation to request the annulment of the regulatory rule for unconstitutionality, and in several cases, it is an exposition of how —in the opinion of the interested parties— the matter should be ordered. It follows from the filing brief that the plaintiffs make considerations about the scope of the regulation and point out possible effects of the regulation when put into practice; however, no evidence is provided that the problems they anticipate originate specifically and concretely from the strict application of the provisions of Decree 39136; in this way, the claim about possible effects that the activity regulated in the challenged Decree may bring, but without having technically accredited its existence and its direct link to the disputed rule, prevents carrying out the constitutionality review of the rule to potentially eliminate it from the legal system. It is clear that the foregoing does not mean that authorities and interested parties cannot return to the Chamber to challenge, at the appropriate time and through the corresponding procedural avenue, the harms that may be occurring due to the defective implementation of the regulation at that corresponding time. For all the foregoing, the action must therefore be declared without merit.
Por tanto:
The filed action is declared without merit. Judge Cruz Castro files a separate note.
Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C. Fernando Castillo V. Paul Rueda L. Nancy Hernández L. José P. Hernández G. Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
SEPARATE NOTE OF JUDGE CRUZ CASTRO: The arguments presented by the plaintiffs raise transcendental questions and assessments; however, the challenged regulations are promulgated within acceptable parameters for the protection of the environment, as set forth in the opinion I subscribe to. I consider that the rules challenged in the action are at the limit of what is admissible in the constitutional protection of the environment. The objections raised by the appellants become an important reference point when assessing the problems and threats that may arise in the application of Decree 39136. The co-incineration of solid waste, both ordinary and hazardous, is a very sensitive and vulnerable activity in the effective protection of the environment, especially due to the validity of such important principles as the preventive principle and the "in dubio pro natura" principle.
I consider that what we have resolved in this judgment does not completely close the questions that the plaintiffs have very aptly raised; the effective execution of the challenged Decree will give rise to new perspectives on the matter, and it is quite possible that in the future there will be better elements of judgment, derived from practice, in which the objections raised in the action deserve reconsideration and a thorough analysis.
Fernando Cruz C.
(CoopeGuanacaste R.L.).
**Whereas:** 1.- By brief received at the Secretariat of the Chamber at three o'clock in the afternoon on February eighteenth, two thousand sixteen, the petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulations on Operating Conditions and Emission Control for Installations for the Co-incineration of Ordinary Solid Waste, be declared, considering it contrary to Articles 7, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the environmental principles of objectification (objetivación), progressivity (progresividad), non-regression (no regresión), sustainable development (desarrollo sustentable), scientific guardianship (tutela científica), precautionary (precautorio), shared responsibilities (responsabilidades compartidas), cost internalization (internalización de costos), and prevention at source (prevención en la fuente). They allege that said regulation establishes operating requirements and maximum emission limits for co-incineration (coincineración) facilities for ordinary solid waste, which implies authorizing or permitting the incineration of waste generated in dwellings or from other sources whose waste is similar to that of dwellings. They consider that by authorizing or enabling the operation of co-incineration facilities, the integrated management of ordinary solid waste is being discouraged and instead, priority is being given in practice to the incineration of such waste before implementing other more environmentally friendly options, as required by the Integrated Solid Waste Management Law; all of the foregoing violates the logic of protection, education, sustainable development, and environmental awareness emanating from Article 50 of the Political Constitution. They add that Executive Decree No. 38500-S-MINAE of June 11, 2014, established a moratorium on the waste incineration industry to reduce air pollution; however, it was repealed by Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE in its Article 36, without having conducted studies verifying that the primary processes of the hierarchy provided for in Article 4 of the General Waste Law had been fulfilled; they consider that this repeal transgresses the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. They state that, with the current Regulation, by permitting the operation of incinerators, the international obligations of the Costa Rican State to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or that may result from human activities such as incineration, which generate the emission of gases that can modify the ozone layer, are breached. Said obligations are provided for in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Law No. 7228) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, instruments that form part of the Costa Rican legal system according to Article 7 of the Political Constitution. They state that opening up to the incineration industry transgresses the international objective set forth in said norms of avoiding the generation of greenhouse gases, for which reason the challenged Decree is regressive and violates the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources. They add that Costa Rica has ratified other conventions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which guide toward avoiding gases that cause the ozone layer depletion effect and constitute express limitations to avoid greenhouse gases; however, Article 3 of the challenged Decree states that there will be emanations of gases such as total organic carbon, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, where dioxins and furans are toxic to human life. They point out that from the annexes of the Regulation, it is seen that permitting incineration activity is a latent risk to human life, in violation of constitutional Article 21 and results in a clash against sustainable development. They allege that there are no trained professionals to verify that incineration processes are carried out properly, as derived from Transitory Provision II of the challenged regulation. They add that for establishments and facilities that incinerate hazardous waste, the emission limits of the challenged regulation are applied, until such time as the State establishes specific regulations for the incineration of hazardous waste, which implies that a percentage of the waste taken to incineration would be hazardous waste, increasing the contaminating potential of the dioxins and slag produced as the final product of the process, apart from the emissions that may be produced. They affirm that the challenged regulation is regressive and transgresses the principle of scientific guardianship, since it comes to public light to be applied without specific norms existing. They allege that the incineration of ordinary solid waste involves an activity of high environmental risk and that it can cause very serious environmental damage to biodiversity and the health of the general population. They argue that the final product of incineration is gases, highly contaminating, and hazardous waste that requires a very strict environmental control mechanism which, if not provided, can produce grave and serious damage to the environment and health. They consider that the precautionary principle is violated, insofar as an activity is authorized without establishing express measures on what will be done with the final waste. They explain that Article 7 of the challenged Decree establishes the need for a quantitative risk assessment (evaluación de riesgos cuantitativos) that contemplates the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the co-incineration facility and the mitigation and control measures for said risks. They allege that Article 7 of the challenged decree excludes universities and residences from the 1000-meter protection radius regarding co-incinerators, which they consider violates Article 21 in relation to Articles 33 and 50, all of the Political Constitution. They question the 1000-meter protection distance established in the decree without taking into consideration particular atmospheric factors. Likewise, they state that the 20-day limit for the Ministry of Health to issue an opinion regarding the location permit application is unjustified; they consider that this attacks the right to life, to health, and to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by establishing rigid terms for the granting of permits by the Ministry of Health. They allege that the challenged regulation breaks the constitutional principles of shared responsibilities, cost internalization, and prevention at source, since it is inferred from these that incineration processes should not be viable and instead they establish a tacit prohibition on incinerating waste. They point out that Article 33, Table 5, of the challenged Decree establishes a protocol to follow due process in case of non-compliance with emission limits, without suspending the incineration processes while corrections are made, which causes the industry to continue contaminating the population with emissions of dioxins or furans.
2.- In order to substantiate the standing they hold to bring this action of unconstitutionality, they point out that diffuse interests (intereses difusos) assist them, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction.
3.- By resolution issued at one forty in the afternoon on February twenty-fourth, two thousand sixteen, the action was admitted for processing, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).
4.- The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report. It points out that this action of unconstitutionality challenges Executive Decree 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulations on Operating Conditions and Emission Control for Installations for the Co-incineration of Ordinary Solid Waste, (Supplement 69 to La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1st, 2015), insofar as it authorizes the incineration of ordinary solid waste generated in dwellings or similar sources. It argues that the challenged Decree establishes operating requirements and maximum emission limits for co-incineration facilities of ordinary solid waste, as a subordinated option to the other prior processes in the hierarchy for integrated waste management provided for in Article 4 of Law 8839 (Decree 39136, Articles 1, 2, 4, and 15 subsection a). It points out that the Law for Integrated Waste Management, No. 8839 of June 24, 2010, contemplates energy recovery (aprovechamiento energético) as one of the alternatives for waste valorization (Article 4, 6, and 42), subject to the hierarchy for integrated management that gives priority to the recovery of materials over energy recovery, according to technical criteria. Thus, it indicates that the challenged Decree regulates in its Article 3 energy valorization through the co-incineration process and, for its part, Article 5 subsection 3 of the same norm expressly prohibits "the use of thermal treatment systems for ordinary solid waste that are not for electricity generation, energy recovery, or material recovery." For its part, Article 4 in fine of Decree 39136 reiterates that "waste for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, must not be subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration." Likewise, among the requirements that the Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) and the location permit application before the Ministry of Health must include, are facilities for the separation, classification, and recovery of valorizable waste that must not be incinerated (Articles 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j), 10 subsections k) and l). Furthermore, it adds that Article 15 ibidem requires having a storage area for waste in accordance with the Regulations for Recovery Centers for Valorizable Waste, Executive Decree 35906-S of January 27, 2010; the generation and composition studies for ordinary waste must observe Decree 37745-S, Officialization of the Methodology for Studies on Generation and Composition of Ordinary Solid Waste; and, ordinary waste must be managed and stored complying with the Regulations on the Management of Ordinary Solid Waste, Executive Decree 36093-S of July 15, 2010. It considers that the challenged Decree respects the priority established by Law 8839 for the integrated management of waste, among which energy valorization is found. Regarding the obligations deriving from international conventions, it affirms that the analyzed Decree is consistent with the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Law 7228 of May 6, 1991), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Law 7223 of April 8, 1991), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Law 7414 of June 13, 1994), and the Kyoto Protocol (Law 8219 of March 8, 2002), incorporated into our legal system, according to Constitutional Article 7; said instruments establish international commitments and controls for the reduction of substances affecting the ozone layer. It considers that the analyzed Decree is consistent with the principles of non-regressivity and sustainable development, and gives progressivity to domestic regulations, insofar as it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, under separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of persistent organic pollutants. Likewise, one of the sectors or categories of sources cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration, is regulated and subjected to technical limits. The Regulation also sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Law 8839. The foregoing is compatible with the obligations contained in Constitutional Article 50 and the principle of progressivity, since measures tending toward the protection of the environment and health are adopted, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set according to the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and to the rules of science and technology. Regarding the emanations of gases that may be toxic to human health as a product of incineration activity, it is noted that the challenged Decree considers that the co-incineration of waste with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine should be avoided, under separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of organic contaminants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Considering 5, Articles 4 in fine, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). Furthermore, it prohibits recovery activities for waste previously disposed of in sanitary landfills (rellenos sanitarios) or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosives, including mineral acids, containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals or contaminated with these, of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from health care services, their teaching establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons destined for destruction, Persistent Organic Compounds, and Polyvinyl Chloride Residues (Article 5). For its part, Article 21 of the challenged Regulation indicates the technical parameters for establishing the maximum emission limits for general pollutants. The normal reference conditions (273.15 K and 101.325 kPa on a dry basis, referred to 11% oxygen) and the maximum emission limits set forth in the cited Article 21 of Decree 39136, coincide with those of Annex VIII, Part 2, of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of November 24, 2010, on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control). Regarding the reproach against the repeal of the moratorium provided for in Decree 38500 of June 11, 2014, it clarifies that said measure was conceived as a transitory provision to adopt the technical measures necessary to comply with Law 8839. It is not considered that Decree 39136 breaks the principle of non-regression, since the norm does not diminish the degree of environmental protection, but rather, in harmony with the Law, regulates the energy recovery of solid waste. With Decree 39136, the necessary technical measures for the adequate control of co-incineration as one of the alternatives for the valorization of solid waste contained in Law 8839 are laid out, and the repeal of Decree 38500 neither disregards the principles of objectification, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. It affirms that regarding the allegation about the absence of trained professionals, Transitory Provision II of Decree 36136 is congruent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, according to which commitments are established to promote and support education and training programs that foster the creation of national human and institutional capacity. For its part, the challenged Decree considers the function of the Technical Council for Emission and Immission Standards in the analysis and assessment of compliance with the regulations. Regarding the activity of incinerating hazardous waste, it considers that the challenged norm is preventive and temporary, because the emission limits provided for therein are applied to the incineration of hazardous waste; the foregoing is consistent with the State's duty of prevention and the principles recognized by constitutional jurisprudence. It concludes that insofar as the application of the limits imposed by Transitory Provision VI of the challenged Decree improve the current protection against emissions from authorized hazardous waste incineration processes, this would be in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the principles of progressivity and non-regression in environmental matters. Regarding the allegation of the incorporation of hazardous waste into the co-incineration processes, it is considered that Decree 39136 establishes that the co-incineration of waste with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine should be avoided, under separation and control operations, in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants. In relation to the operation of the incineration system, it considers that the challenged regulation requires immediate shutdown under anomalous conditions, provides for compliance verification, as well as establishes the corrective and sanctioning regime. Regarding the gases and waste product of co-incineration and potential damage to the environment and health, it is affirmed that the challenged Decree provides for the separate storage of solid waste product of incineration. It considers that since Law 8839 places sanitary landfills as the last option in the waste management hierarchy, Decree 39136 requires compliance with the Regulations on Sanitary Landfills. Regarding the lack of a decree for the incineration of hazardous waste, it considers that the principles of objectification, progressivity, and non-regression are not violated, since the management and disposal of hazardous waste is regulated in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, in the General Health Law, and various regulations.
Regarding safety distances and the alleged violation of the principles of equality, a healthy environment, and objectification, it considers that comparing the challenged rule with the content of the principle of equality, there is no breach, because it is reasonable and consistent with the preventive principle to admit the setback distance with respect to populations considered vulnerable, which include all types of educational and hospital centers, and risk installations due to their handling of combustible or flammable products in quantities greater than 1000 m³, agricultural activities, and food processing industries. It argues that the regulation requires the approval of an environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) that considers atmospheric dispersion studies and a quantitative risk assessment and, the location of co-incineration (coincineración) installations must be in accordance with the approved Territorial Zoning (Ordenamiento Territorial) or a conforming land use (uso de suelo conforme) issued by the Municipality, as well as the distance to be accredited in the permit before the Ministry of Health. Regarding the deadline for installation permits, it alludes that the 10 business days timeframes provided in Articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, given the rigor and technical complexity in the analysis of applications for this type of projects, with an impact on the environment and public health, are insufficient and contrary to the principle of legal reasonableness (constitutional judgments 7294-1998 and 2410-2007), and therefore the one-month period of Article 331 of Law 6227 must be respected. It considers that if the Chamber considers that these timeframes are not contrary to Constitutional Law, it would be appropriate to interpret that upon their expiration, positive silence does not operate pursuant to Article 4 of Law 7575. The same can be said regarding the 30-day period granted to the Ministry of Health to issue, if applicable, the authorization for the activity and the detail of authorized materials to co-incinerate (Article 24). Regarding the principles of shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, it analyzes that general principles underlying comprehensive waste management are not violated because they are recognized in the Law and are addressed by Decree 39136 in several of its articles. As for protocols in case of non-compliance with emission limits, it is added that Decree 39136, in its Article 17, establishes the immediate stoppage of the process under abnormal conditions, which coincides with what is stipulated in European Directive 2010/75/EU. Regarding the non-compliance with national goals by allowing incineration (incineración) processes, it is observed that Decree 39136 is consistent with international agreements and the principle of progressiveness of domestic regulations, because it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, under separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or categories of sources cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration, and sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Law 8839. The implementation of clean development mechanisms in public policies has been considered in the National Development Plan 2011-2014 and 2015-2018. It concludes that Decree 39136 is consistent with Constitutional Law, with the exception of the 10 business days timeframes provided in Articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, which violate the principle of legal reasonableness, unless it is considered that upon their expiration, positive silence does not operate, and the 30-day period of numeral 24 ibídem must also be interpreted in that order. It considers that Transitorio VI of Decree 39136 is constitutional as long as it is interpreted that the limits set forth therein will be applicable when, pursuant to the principle of progressiveness, they improve the current protection against emissions from hazardous waste incineration processes that are already authorized.
5.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his capacity as Minister of Health, responds to the hearing granted, stating the criteria expressed by the Director and Acting Head of the Normalization Unit of Health Services in the Human Environment, of the Directorate of Protection of the Human Environment, of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that Decree 39136 does not contravene the Kyoto Protocol since Annex A, in relation to Article 3 of the Protocol, only indicates which processes must be taken into consideration for the country to comply with the requirements established in said international instrument. It considers that the principle of progressiveness in the elimination of polluting sources and greenhouse gases is not violated, since the Decree seeks to reverse the emissions of gases that generate global warming. Nor does this transgress the international objective established in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. It considers, regarding the regulation of gas emissions emitted by solid waste co-incineration activities, that the establishment of maximum limits of pollutants in solid waste in atmospheric emissions, as well as the establishment of maximum permissible limits in wastewater for solids, heavy metals, as well as for dioxins and furans, allows compliance with the precept of Article 50 of the Constitution. Regarding protection distances and surrounding areas, it estimates that Article 7 of the Decree seeks to establish a balance between the protection of public health and that of vulnerable groups, emphasizing the protection of sensitive populations. It affirms that Article 4 of the Decree establishes the obligation to comply with Law 8839 and the appellants do not analyze the variety of actions and regulations that the Ministry of Health has issued to ensure the proper management of waste, in accordance with the hierarchy in comprehensive waste management (gestión integral de residuos). It considers that priority is given to recycling over thermal treatment; it clarifies that co-incineration is not the last stage in the hierarchical management of waste. It refers that the law establishes a priority order, and if one of these cannot be met, alternatives at the lower level continue to be sought, which does not imply that the first ones must be fully met prior to using the subsequent ones; therefore, the repeal of the moratorium does not transgress the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. It affirms that the Municipalities and the general population have the obligation to achieve the separate collection of waste and, for their part, co-incinerators must have spaces for its separation, in order to ensure that it is not processed; likewise, the regulation clearly establishes prohibitions for specific materials that must not be co-incinerated. It indicates that the challenged Decree does contain limits for the management of co-incineration by-products, which guarantees that environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), are not violated and compliance with Article 50 of the Constitution is guaranteed. It clarifies that co-processing (coprocesamiento) and co-incineration are methods that allow energy recovery, permitted by the Law, so it should not be interpreted that there is any tacit prohibition on incineration. It affirms that regarding the training of responsible professionals, the Decree establishes the duty for every company and responsible professional to create the required capacity within a reasonable timeframe. It clarifies that for dioxin and furan emissions produced by the industry, at concentration levels below the maximum permissible level, a warning is given before closure, in attention to due process. It notes that the regulation establishes the obligation to submit and implement a Corrective Action Plan. It confirms that the Environmental Impact Assessment, provided for in the Organic Environmental Law, No. 7554 of 1995, is the predictive control mechanism to regulate productive activities based on environmental protection. It expands on the above by pointing out that the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) is the national technical body responsible for determining whether productive activities are dangerous for the environment and, if environmental damage is determined, it does not authorize environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). Based on the report rendered, it is considered that it is the obligation of the State and mainly of MINAE and the Ministry of Health, in that order, to take the necessary measures to avoid damage to the environment, guaranteeing, defending, and preserving the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, protecting the health of people, the environment, and life in general. It concludes that Decree 39136 complies with the environmental and health parameters required by the Costa Rican population.
6.- Ms. Irene Cañas Díaz, in her capacity as Acting Minister of Environment and Energy (hereinafter MINAE), responds to the hearing granted, stating the criteria expressed by the Director of the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management, of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in which she states that Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE came to regulate waste incineration activities in a safer manner, thus fulfilling the principle of progressiveness. She clarifies that Executive Decree DE-38500-S-MINAE was a temporary measure while the technical regulation allowing thermal waste treatment processes in a safer manner was being developed. She points out that the challenged Regulation establishes as a prerequisite to the thermal treatment of waste, that the hierarchy processes provided for in the law (reduction, reuse, and recycling) are complied with, and the prior separation of recoverable waste is carried out. She adds that the waste hierarchy does not require technical studies, but rather compliance with the separation of recoverable waste. She warns that in environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) studies, compliance with the provisions of the challenged Decree must be verified; thus, a specific assessment must be carried out in each case. In relation to compliance with international obligations under the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, she points out that the questioned Decree establishes a series of technical measures to guarantee that dioxins and furans will not be produced in waste co-processing processes, such as waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, real-time temperature control, monitoring of atmospheric emissions, among others. She points out that the Regulation provides firstly for the hierarchy in waste management and, as a last option, thermal treatment, understood as co-incineration when the energy produced during thermal treatment is recovered. She expands that this matter is regulated at the international level by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, of which Costa Rica is a party through Law No. 8538 and Executive Decree No. 33438. She refers that the challenged Decree does not permit open-air waste incineration, as this would produce high emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as emissions of dioxins and furans, hence the ozone layer is not affected, nor would greenhouse gas emissions be produced beyond those already emitted in current waste management processes. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, nor the Montreal Protocol are breached. In relation to the gas emanations produced in the thermal treatment processes of organic waste, she affirms that the Decree points them out in order to propose actions for their reduction, as well as to follow up on compliance with the maximum emission limits for pollutants permitted in current national regulations. Regarding the training of professionals and technicians in incineration processes, she highlights that any new technology requires preparing the people who will develop projects and verify the application of the regulations; she clarifies that the Ministry of Health, with support from the Emission and Immission Standards Council, are scheduled in response to the identified need. Regarding the incineration of hazardous waste, she points out that currently Executive Decree 31837-S regulates the operating conditions for the treatment of hazardous waste and is based on Technical Guidelines on national environmental co-processing of hazardous waste in cement kilns; even so, the questioned Decree expands the co-incineration limits for this type of waste, as they are more updated and are regulated more strictly compared to what Decree No. 31837-S provides. For its part, regarding the observation related to the content of hazardous waste found in ordinary waste, she warns that the Decree establishes the materials and substances that cannot be treated in incineration processes; the obligation to separate hazardous waste is provided for. It is established that the environmental impact assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) must include installations for the separation, classification, and recovery of recoverable waste that should not be incinerated. She refers that Article 16 of the challenged Regulation indicates that the ashes resulting from thermal treatment are considered hazardous solid waste and must therefore be disposed of appropriately, following the provisions of the General Regulation for the Classification and Management of Hazardous Waste. She highlights that the Decree establishes the regulations that must be considered for the management of this type of waste; likewise, Article 5 of Decree 39136-S-MINAE expressly indicates the substances and materials prohibited from being incinerated. For its part, she indicates that the Decree establishes the maximum permissible atmospheric emission limits for the various pollutants that could be produced, limits that are consistent with national and international regulations. It also regulates the working regime of a thermal waste treatment facility to minimize the possibility of producing pollutants. She states that protection measures and safety distances are ensured from the environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental) studies submitted to SETENA; she argues that 1000 meters is the minimum distance at which an incineration facility can be located with respect to towns, which may be greater according to the results of the environmental impact assessments before SETENA. She affirms that the 20-day period for the Ministry of Health to issue its opinion on applications to carry out incineration activities is reasonable; she indicates that said period was considered by the Ministry of Health during the discussion and drafting process of the Regulation. Finally, in relation to the protocol for cases of non-compliance with emission limits established in Article 33, Table 5 of the challenged Decree, she clarifies that said regulation defines the action ranges based on the results of laboratory measurements and evaluations, which take into account the maximum limits for health effects defined in international literature; likewise, two mechanisms aimed at preventing the eventual production of dioxins and furans are contemplated. She does not share the appellants' affirmation about the non-existence of a technical criterion to regulate the activity; she affirms that a commission was formed with participants from the public, private, academic, etc. sectors to work on the issue.
7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 69, 70, and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin, of the 12th, 13th, and 14th of April, 2016.
8.- By resolution at 10:20 a.m. on May 5, 2016, the Presidency of the Chamber admitted the joinders in favor of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree filed by FABIÁN DE JESÚS PACHECO RODRÍGUEZ, identity card number 110170021; EDGARDO ARAYA SIBAJA, identity card number 204830663; MELISSA FLORES NÚÑEZ, identity card number 701260268, representing the ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO DE RESIDENCIAL CIUDAD CARIARI, legal entity number 3-002-361677; ANDRÉS CAMACHO L., identity card number 113680148 and others; YORLENY RODRÍGUEZ CONEJO, identity card number 111220107 and others; AMANDA ARAYA RIVAS, identity card number 111320483; ERNESTO MONGE, identity document number 1304295982 and others; MINOR PICADO CAMARENO, identity card number 502580179 and others; on April 1, 2016, by FERNANDO ARAYA ANDERSON, identity card number 0108230617; YERLING RUIZ VÁSQUEZ, identity card number 603040331 and others; HÉCTOR GONZÁLEZ PACHECO, identity card number 0105990966. In all of them, the arguments raised by the plaintiffs are reiterated and made explicit, and the need for the Decree to be invalidated is affirmed as it presents a threat both to their respective interests and, in general, to their right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.
9.- In the same resolution, the joinders in favor of the validity of the rule were also accepted, filed by ALBERTO ANTILLÓN ARROYO, identity card number 108310616, in his capacity as PRESIDENT OF THE COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS QUÍMICOS Y PROFESIONALES AFINES, legal entity number 3-007-383731; MIGUEL GÓMEZ COREA (identity card number 502230027), in his capacity as GENERAL MANAGER OF THE COOPERATIVA DE ELECTRIFICACIÓN RURAL DE GUANACASTE R.L. (COOPEGUANACASTE R.L.).
In both cases, respective briefs were submitted providing a specific analysis of the sub-legal provisions under discussion and giving the reasons why they are deemed to adequately comply with the norms and principles related to the right to a healthy environment.
10.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law were published in numbers 69, 70, and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin, dated April 12, 13, and 14, 2016.
11.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 of the same law, upon deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.
12.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been fulfilled.
Drafted by Magistrate Hernández López; and,
Considering:
I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, and requires a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked. This requirement is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In this case, the action is an exercise in defense of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. On this point, even before its establishment through the 1994 constitutional reform, such right as well as broad standing for its defense had been established by this Court. To this jurisprudential line must be added that currently the Political Constitution itself expressly grants procedural standing, vested in any person, for the defense of the environment as provided by the current text of Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
II.- Standing in the specific case. The petition of this unconstitutionality action seeks to annul Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, “Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for ordinary solid waste co-incineration facilities”, because it authorizes the activity of incinerating ordinary and hazardous solid waste, which, in their opinion, is contrary to the principles of progressiveness, objectivization of environmental law, and non-regression of human rights. Thus, the case is fully situated as a defense of the right enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution, so the action is admissible according to its express text.
III.- Grouping of the claims for purposes of analysis. The unconstitutionality action requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, named “Regulation on operating conditions and emission control for ordinary solid waste co-incineration facilities” and hereinafter simply referred to as “Decreto 39136”. As its name indicates, this set of norms establishes several specific requirements, but not the only ones to be met, if one seeks to obtain state authorization to carry out the activity of co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, and imposes the operating conditions and control mechanisms for such activity. The claims against this regulatory body can be separated into two clear streams: the first groups several violations that have arisen from the fact of the promulgation of Decreto 39136, as a legal action of the State. It is argued that with said promulgation, the constitutional right to the environment and several of the principles derived from it, as well as a group of international obligations acquired by the country, are injured. The second stream includes claims against specific provisions of Decreto 39136 whose content injures – by action or omission – various constitutional principles in environmental matters as well as the principle of equality. In this way, the Chamber will address both sectors of claims separately.
IV.It should also be noted that the review of some of the points raised allows concluding that they lack sufficient elements of judgment to serve the purpose of duly substantiating the violations reported, as required by the Law regulating Constitutional jurisdiction. Such defect will be specified in each case where it arises, the foregoing in application of a clear jurisprudential line on the point, as seen, for example, from the following citations:
"The unconstitutionality action is filed on the argument that the challenged Executive Decree is harmful, injures and infringes the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments subscribed to with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the plaintiffs, it is confirmed what the Procuraduría General de la República indicates, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Executive Decree that are considered unconstitutional, but rather it merely establishes discrepancies in a generic and abstract manner against the entirety of the Regulation, even more so against all activity carried out by the Sugar Mills and Haciendas, as they maintain that they cause inconveniences in the quality of life and health of the neighboring inhabitants, without specifying what constitutional arguments must be taken into account against each of the provisions or groups of norms of the challenged Regulation. [...] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law establishes the obligation to authenticate the briefs filing unconstitutionality actions, since it is deemed necessary that there exist arguments put forth by a legal professional, which this Court does not rule out responds to a serious study of the technical and scientific merits of a given matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike guarantee processes, that is, habeas corpus and amparo appeals, which can be filed directly by any interested party before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that harm them in their private sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the unconstitutionality action), the legislator entrusted the authenticating attorney with an even greater task, a more elaborate and exhaustive one if you will, which must be reflected in the filing brief by reason of their professional office, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal drafting of the Law, as well as of the other secondary provisions, involves an extremely costly process for the State, in which in many ways organized civil society has participated in favor or against its drafting, and whose formation, approval, and promulgation procedures must not be analyzed lightly. In this sense, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest shortcomings of the legal professionals who authenticate briefs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without exposing the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the unconstitutionality actions." (Judgment number 005285-2012 of 15.03 hours of April 25, 2012).
And later in judgment number 2014-004239, it reaffirmed:
"IV.- On the lack of concreteness of the unconstitutionality arguments. The Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, in its Article 3, provides that “The Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the confrontation of the text of the questioned norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with the constitutional norms and principles.” However, for this Court to deem the violation established and declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever promotes an unconstitutionality action has the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the constitutional norm or principle and, additionally, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is referred to by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, 'a norm that is facially contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that in reality there is no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite happens if action is taken against a norm that upon first examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the plaintiff who must advance arguments that convince about the unconstitutionality' (see judgment number 0184-95 of 16:30 hours of January 10, 1995).”
V.First group of claims: Violations originating from the act of promulgation of Decreto 39136. Point A. Injury to the waste management design established in norms of domestic Law with a rank higher than Decreto 39136. The plaintiffs point out that the issuance of Decreto 39136 injures the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment in general and particularly the precautionary principle; the non-regression principle; the objectivization principle; and the right to sustainable development. They understand that the co-incineration of solid waste activity that the decree authorizes and regulates is harmful to the environment, given the current waste management situation in our country. A contradiction is claimed with the waste management design contained in the Comprehensive Waste Management Law number 8839 (hereinafter Ley 8839), since with the issuance of the challenged Decreto 39136, co-incineration is highlighted and facilitated to the detriment of other activities and practices that are more environmentally friendly, which goes against the hierarchy in comprehensive waste management provided for in Ley 8839 and, therefore, also contravenes the principles indicated above. They estimate that in practice, priority will be given to co-incineration over other options, such as reuse and recycling, contained in the 2008 Solid Waste Plan (PRESOL). It is also maintained that the Decree “incentivizes”, or rather “stimulates”, co-incineration, which entails environmental risk, and therefore attempts against the Right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Along this specific line, the plaintiffs allude to the breach of the principles of the Comprehensive Waste Treatment System: shared responsibility, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, in addition to environmental education. Regarding all these grievances, this Court considers that the key to the decision on this specific point lies in properly understanding the purpose sought by the challenged regulation and the way in which that purpose has been embodied in the regulatory design. In the first place, it must be clear that the activity regulated by Decreto 39136 is an activity that seeks to integrate into the system of environmental protection measures. Co-incineration of waste cannot be compared with purely extractive activities, for example, because the prohibition of the latter brings only advantages for the environment; in contrast, the intervention of this Chamber in the case of the co-incineration Decree must take into account that carrying out the activity may have an impact on the environment, but preventing it may also have impacts. The Chamber understands that on this point the plaintiffs' perspective is correct regarding the need to assess the possible damages of the co-incineration activity, but it is also partial because it does not give the full weight to the harmful consequences for the environment that may result from preventing it from being carried out. It is from this latter perspective that a more complete and thorough understanding of Decreto 39136 is acquired, which includes among its recitals and motivation the need to regulate the activity of co-incineration of ordinary waste in order to eliminate the negative impacts on public health and the environment.
Likewise, it establishes that the co-incineration of waste with recycling or reuse potential must be avoided, for which purpose a separation process for this type of waste must exist at the co-incineration plant. Furthermore, the incineration of hazardous waste, as listed in the decree, or waste with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, is not permitted; therefore, a specific separation and control operation must exist to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. The challenged Decree also includes among its foundations the fact that protecting people's health and the environment requires from natural and legal persons wishing to engage in the activity the establishment and maintenance of rigorous operating conditions and technical requirements for the co-incineration activity. Among the main regulations found in Decree 39136, operating requirements and maximum emission limits are established for ordinary solid waste co-incineration facilities, always as a subordinate option to the other prior processes in the hierarchy of integrated waste management provided for in article 4 of Law 8839. In delimiting the scope of the activity regulated by the Regulation, article 3 differentiates between co-incineration and incineration; it regulates energy recovery (valorización energética) through the co-incineration process, understood as the "thermal treatment of waste with recovery of the heat produced by combustion, including incineration by oxidation of waste, as well as pyrolysis, gasification or other thermal treatment processes, for example the plasma process, insofar as the substances resulting from the treatment are subsequently incinerated." The energy recovery sought to be made viable by the challenged Decree is contained in the Solid Waste Plan (Decreto 34647 of May 28, 2008, "Approval and Declaration of Public and National Interest of the Solid Waste Plan–Costa Rica (PRESOL)"), which remains as a guiding framework, in accordance with article 1 of Executive Decree 37567 of November 2, 2012, General Regulation to the Law for Integrated Waste Management. On the other hand, regarding the limits of the thermal treatment process by co-incineration, article 4 in fine of Decree 39136 reiterates that "waste for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, must not be subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration." (emphasis not in the original). It follows from all the foregoing that Decree 39136 has been constructed in a manner consistent with the very perspective held by the plaintiffs, in the sense that co-incineration should not be the priority mechanism for waste disposal and that efforts should be directed towards adherence to Law 8839 and its hierarchy. Indeed, Decree 39136 embraces this concept and repeats the need to respect the hierarchy in integrated waste management. Its article 1 states that "co-incineration must be the last option, once the hierarchy in integrated waste management, established in article 4 of Law No. 8839 of June 24, 2010 'Law for Integrated Waste Management', published in La Gaceta No. 135 of July 13, 2010, has been fulfilled." Thus, if—as the plaintiffs intend—we accept that Law 8839 is a valid development and an acceptable and valid framework within the principles of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, then we must understand that the Decree—insofar as it replicates what is provided in said law and does not depart from it—also complies with and adheres to constitutional requirements. Contrary to what was indicated by the plaintiffs, this Court finds that Decree 39136 does not contradict the law, either expressly or implicitly; rather, by express text, it leaves intact the preferential attention and priority stimulus for activities such as reduction, reuse, and recycling. The option embodied by the authorities in the discussed Decree is linked to the law insofar as it does not seek to incentivize or stimulate co-incineration, but only to produce a regulatory framework for that activity in case there are individuals interested in carrying it out; that exercise is not, per se, contrary to the constitutional right to the environment or its principles if we adhere to its content, since such regulation includes, as can be seen, a specific regime of operating conditions and controls that are added to, and do not substitute, all the other general requirements demanded by the various environmental protection laws, with the purpose of protecting the natural environment in different ways. The Court does not find that Decree 39136 contains an authorization for co-incineration conceived as an independent, open alternative, without limits or controls, and it is even less observed that an incentive or stimulus for such activity has been established above the activities located higher in the order of priorities set by the law. In this order of considerations, it is clear that it cannot be overlooked that the activity of waste co-incineration, poorly conceived or scarcely regulated, would raise serious doubts of constitutionality, as it is a potentially more polluting activity compared to waste reduction, its reuse, or recycling, which leave a smaller footprint on the environment. But that is not the case when co-incineration is conceived as a subordinate or subsidiary option, just as it is presented in the challenged Decree. Unlike the plaintiffs and the position held by some coadjuvants, the Chamber understands that the State does no wrong in producing a regulatory norm for the activity of waste co-incineration, as it is a lawful activity, since formally there is no prohibition for its realization and rather—from the perspective of the constitutional right to the environment and its principles—it can well have its place within waste management, provided its possibility of use is regulated and normatively arranged in cases where it results less polluting than other available means for waste disposal. As stated, its utility and environmental value will depend on which activities we compare it with, for if we confront it with waste reduction, reuse, or recycling, its disadvantage would be clear, and that is why Decree 39136 does well when it emphasizes the impediment to co-incineration of waste susceptible to those treatments; but in contrast, co-incineration will be advantageous if compared with the option of disposing of waste in open-air dumps that, unfortunately, still subsist in our country, and regarding which the plaintiffs omit any comparison or assessment. Furthermore, no greater evidentiary elements are provided on the manner in which the normative set, which clearly regulates a subordinate operation, would have the effect of producing, in reality, an effective induction towards the activity of co-incineration, to the detriment of the other waste disposal activities that are located above it in the order of relevance legally established for waste disposal. And even less so are convincing reasons given for the Court to take as certain or at least highly probable the future conduct of the diverse actors in this matter. Thus, the Chamber considers that Decree 39136 is not contrary to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment nor to any of its principles that have been embraced by the Chamber as an integral part of the Law of the Constitution.
**VI.- Point B: Disregard of international obligations with the promulgation of Decree 39136.** The plaintiffs question that the thermal treatment of solid waste in the presence of air generates harmful gases that are released into the atmosphere, which injures part of the clauses of various international instruments to which Costa Rica is a party. It is mentioned, on one hand, that the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer set obligations to protect health and the environment against the adverse effects of activities that may affect the ozone layer. It is considered that the objective established in articles 1 and 4 of Decree 39136 violates the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources. It is added that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, whose Annex A mentions waste incineration, include it within the express limiting activities to achieve the reduction of greenhouse gases. The plaintiffs argue non-compliance with international instruments, indicating that by allowing the incineration industry, the international objective provided for in the cited instruments of avoiding the generation of greenhouse gases and minimizing the effect on the ozone layer is transgressed, all of which exposes human health. On this point, this Court does not find that the plaintiffs demonstrate in this proceeding the manner in which the challenged Decree and its provisions breach what is specifically arranged in the cited international instruments, as the Chamber is only warned about the risky effects of incineration activity for human life. It is stated that article 3 of Decree 39136 establishes the different gas emissions produced by the incineration activity, but it is not specified which provisions of the cited international Conventions and Protocol are breached or contain prohibitive norms that have been transgressed. To reinforce this conclusion of the Court, it is therefore considered necessary to review what the international instruments on the matter addressed by Decree 39136 provide. Regarding what the international instruments provide, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Law 7228 of May 6, 1991, permits the control, limitation, reduction, or prevention of activities that may have adverse effects on the ozone layer. Of interest, it provides in its article 2, paragraph 2 that the Parties shall, to the extent of their capabilities, adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures to control, limit, reduce, or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or control should it be found that these activities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from the modification or likely modification of the ozone layer. For its part, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Law 7223 of April 8, 1991), aims to adopt preventive measures to equitably control the total global emissions of specific substances, namely: chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, halons, and methyl bromides, for their elimination based on scientific advances, technical and economic aspects, and the needs of developing countries. In accordance with said Protocol, Costa Rica has taken specific actions, such as the prohibition of the use of chlorofluorocarbons and halons since 2010, and in the case of hydrochlorofluorocarbons, their importation is restricted through substance quotas, among others. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Law 7414 of June 13, 1994, also empowers to foresee, prevent, or reduce to a minimum the causes of climate change, and among the commitments that the Parties assume is to promote and support technologies, practices, and processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol, Law 8219 of March 8, 2002, and the cited Convention on Climate Change, coincide in committing their Parties to achieve individual and legally binding objectives to limit or reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases, namely: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol aims to comply with the quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments, applying policies and measures according to national circumstances. While the Kyoto Protocol lists waste incineration among the activities that harm the environment, it is true that it is not prohibited; it is from this basis that the Parties acquire commitments to avoid or control the activity in protection of the environment and public health. From the foregoing, this Court agrees with what was indicated by the advisory body of the State, in concluding that Decree 39136 is consistent with those international conventions, and with the principles of non-regression and sustainable development, and progressivity, since it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, through waste separation and control operations for incineration, in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or categories of sources cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration. It also sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted in accordance with Law 8839. Among the measures that the Decree requires to be implemented are waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, temperature control, and monitoring of atmospheric emissions (articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Decree). Thus conceived, the Chamber understands that the operation is compatible with the obligations contained in article 50 of the Constitution, and with international commitments and the principle of progressivity, since measures are adopted that do not degrade the level of protection but are synchronized with the protection of the environment and health, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set in accordance with parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and the rules of science and technique. Equally, this Chamber holds as true the statement of the advisory body of the State, to the effect that the regulation contained in the challenged Decree converges with the purposes considered for the adoption of European Directive 2010/75/EU. In accordance with all the foregoing, it is concluded that the issuance of the discussed Decree does not contradict the goals and legal commitments acquired by Costa Rica through the signing of international treaties on these topics, for which reason the action must be declared without merit on this point.
**VII.- Point C: Claim of injury to the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, with the promulgation of Decree 39136.** Also with this action of unconstitutionality, it is alleged that Decree 39136 renders ineffective Executive Decree 38500-S-MINAE, "National Moratorium on Thermal Transformation Activities of Ordinary Solid Waste," a situation that the plaintiffs believe violates the principles of objectivization and non-regression recognized by constitutional environmental doctrine, given that there are no studies verifying that the primary processes of the hierarchy have already been fulfilled.
They likewise consider that the principle of non-regression is violated insofar as Decree 39136 authorizes an environmentally risky activity, even with the controls established in said regulatory body; this determines a regression with respect to the prior legal situation since Decree 38500-S-MINAE better ensured environmental protection. In relation to this allegation, the authorities issued their report and insist that the nature of Executive Decree 38500-S-MINAE, "National Moratorium on Ordinary Solid Waste Thermal Transformation Activities" (hereinafter, the Moratorium Decree), must not be lost sight of. This measure, they state, was adopted as a temporary provision to achieve the time necessary to shape the technical measures required to faithfully comply with Law 8839, articles 4, 6, and 42. Regarding this point, the text of the cited Moratorium Decree states literally:
"Article 1.- A national moratorium is established on ordinary solid waste thermal transformation activities, until such time as the Environment and Health Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts to health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839, denominated the Integrated Waste Management Law.
Article 2.- It becomes effective upon its publication." This provision was subjected to constitutionality analysis regarding its validity in relation to the appropriate protection of the Right to the environment, and in judgment 2014-16162, the Constitutional Chamber stated the following on this point:
"III.- In this case, the reasoning of the challenged Decree is clear in indicating that among the principles contained in the Integrated Waste Management Law 'is the Precautionary Principle, according to which where there is a danger of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective measures in terms of costs to prevent the degradation of the environment or health.' Likewise, that 'technologies are being promoted in the country that seek the production of electric energy through the thermal transformation (combustion, gasification, pyrolysis, plasma, among others) of ordinary solid waste, which could contravene the spirit of the Integrated Waste Management Law No. 8839, as well as entail a risk to human health and the environment because thermal transformation processes are sensitive to the composition of the raw material and the technique used for its transformation regarding the results of their atmospheric emissions.' Finally, that 'the proposals for technologies known to date represent very disparate electric generation yields, which makes evident the need to analyze said technologies based on their energy recovery capacity, in order to ensure the national interest in the matter.' The State, in application of the precautionary principle and for the sake of protecting the environment and human health, seeks to suspend the thermal transformation activity of ordinary solid waste until the corresponding technical studies are carried out. For their part, the plaintiffs consider that said moratorium, far from protecting the environment, causes harm since said technical transformation, in addition to producing new energy, quickly resolves the disposal of solid waste. This Tribunal appreciates that, at bottom, there is no collision between the challenged norm and Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but rather a discrepancy between what is provided in the challenged Decree and the plaintiffs' arguments about what is the best way to protect the environment and human health. It is not for the Chamber to decide the merits of one or another way of disposing of solid waste. The Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Ministry of Health, in the challenged decree, in compliance with what is provided not only in Article 50 of the Political Constitution but also in the Integrated Waste Management Law, have taken the initiative to review the possible consequences that the thermal transformation of solid waste may have on health and the environment, in order to take the appropriate measures, and it is not appropriate for the Chamber to intervene in such matters, of an eminently technical nature, which are clearly outside its competence. Consequently, the action must be dismissed on this point." (Emphasis added) Both the wording of said Decree itself, and the way in which it was understood and interpreted by this Chamber in the recently cited judgment, allow the conclusion that the moratorium did not intend to become a permanent regulation within the legal framework related to environmental protection. On the contrary, it is evident from the transcribed texts that it was a decision in accordance with the precautionary principle, and that it established a temporary state of affairs while the State, through its authorities, managed to produce the studies and instruments to ensure respect for the right to human health and to enjoy an ecologically sound and balanced environment. Thus, with Decree 39136 and its provisions, the State considers itself satisfied regarding the existence of those technical conditions and their suitability to achieve the pursued end, insofar as – according to its criteria – the coincineration activity, carried out according to the strict terms of the Decree, ensures full protection of health and the environment. The plaintiffs find that design generally insufficient and therefore affirm that the Decree fails to ensure health and the environment, as there is no sufficient scientific basis, particularly in relation to the issue of hazardous waste, the emission of toxic gases acknowledged in Article 3 of Decree 39136, and the safety distances of incineration plants, whereby there would be an injury to the principle of objectification, as the due technical support for its operation is lacking. Against this reproach, in the reports of the Health and Environment authorities, the Chamber is advised that Decree 39136 regulates the incineration activity more safely, since the regulations provide the necessary technical measures for the adequate control of coincineration as one of the alternatives for solid waste recovery (valorización) contained in Law 8839, and therefore the repeal of the Moratorium Decree does not disregard the principles of objectification, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. Indeed, Decree 39136 promotes prior separation of recoverable waste, a prerequisite for the thermal treatment of waste, and with respect to the violation of the principle of objectification, it must be noted that in the environmental feasibility studies it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and SETENA to verify compliance with the provisions of Decree 39136 and all other applicable regulations before authorizing the activity and, of course, throughout its operational life. No special studies are required, since in each case a specific evaluation must be carried out that will define whether or not the operation of the coincineration activity intended to be carried out is environmentally admissible. Finally, it is not superfluous to note that a correct analysis of the Moratorium Decree also allows for the rejection of any impact on the principle of non-regression, because, apart from the temporary nature of that legal act, the prohibition of the activity ordered at that time was conditional until "the Environment and Health Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts to health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839 denominated the Integrated Waste Management Law." What the authorities maintain in this regard is that with the design for the operation and control of coincineration activities set forth in Decree 39136, added to the application of other applicable control norms, sufficient technical and scientific certainty is achieved – in their view – regarding the protection of health and the environment, and also compliance with the provisions of Law 8839. From that perspective, the Chamber understands that it is not possible to claim any regression regarding the provisions of the Moratorium Decree if what was expressed there was the suspension of the activity until the authorities confirmed the existence of the required conditions, and for this reason it could be said that the competent bodies have adhered to such provisions when issuing Decree 39136. For the Tribunal, and with regard to the claims related to constitutional rights, Decree 39136 does not render ineffective the efforts achieved in the regulations governing the matter; the Executive Branch took actions to control and regulate the thermal processing of waste and thereby organize the exercise of this activity that is provided for in Law 8839; the coincineration activity of solid waste has been regulated, and conditions and limits have been established to minimize any impact on the environment and health from the coincineration activity. The Tribunal thus concludes that on this point, the violation of the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters is not proven.
VIII.- Point D: Claim regarding the lack of trained professionals for the coincineration activity authorized by Decree 39136. The plaintiffs allege the absence of trained professionals to verify that the waste coincineration activity does not become a threat or injury to health or the environment, since the very Decree under discussion indicates in Transitional Provision II the need for training of professionals for the start-up and initial commissioning, supervision (regencia), materials studies, mechanical resistance, operation, and environmental control of the installations. It is considered that this situation contravenes the spirit of Constitutional Article 50 due to the risk from pollution effects and eventual environmental damages. On this point, the tribunal observes that the plaintiffs point out that the absence of trained professionals will result in a coincineration activity that produces environmental damages and harm to human health. This is an obvious issue but one that has precisely been addressed by Decree 39136 in its Transitional Provision II, and what can be observed is that the conclusions drawn by the plaintiffs from the text of said provision do not conform to a systematic reading of the challenged decree. The cited second transitional provision states:
TRANSITIONAL PROVISION II: Within a period of six (6) months, the Federated College of Engineers and Architects (Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos), the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines), and the College of Chemists of Costa Rica (Colegio de Químicos de Costa Rica) must train their professionals to carry out the activities of start-up and initial commissioning, supervision (regencia), materials studies, mechanical resistance, operation, and environmental control of the regulated installations, in order to guarantee throughout the useful life of the installation that, at the time of state operating authorization and its renewals, what is indicated in this regulation is complied with. Within that same period, the cited Professional Colleges must implement a system of electronic endorsement of the documentation that, by the law governing them, must be submitted to public institutions.
Meanwhile, Transitional Provision IV complements the idea by providing:
"TRANSITIONAL PROVISION IV: SETENA will not hear EIA processes for coincineration installations during the first nine (9) months counted from the publication of this regulation in the official gazette La Gaceta." As can be noted, if Decree 39136 is fully complied with, by the time the authorization processes begin, the problem pointed out by the plaintiffs will not exist because the training ordered by the Decree for the different authorities and specifically for the Professional Colleges mentioned will have been completed. Therefore, there is no injury in the design of Decree 39136 to the rights to the environment or human health, in the specific terms raised in this point by the plaintiffs, but it is not superfluous to additionally indicate that the competent authorities clarify that every new technology requires training of the professionals and technicians who will develop projects and verify the application of the regulations, and that in the present case there are programs within the Ministry of Health, with support from the Emission and Immission Standards Council (Consejo de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión) created by Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, and international commitments for training. Therefore, on this point, no violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution is noted.
IX.- Second group of claims: Infractions arising from the provisions of Decree 39136 or from omissions of the cited regulations.
X.- Lack of specific regulation for incineration of hazardous waste.
A lack of specific regulation for the incineration of hazardous waste is alleged, due to its level of risk and toxicity in the air. The claim is made that between 3% and 10% of ordinary solid waste corresponds to hazardous waste, which would be taken for incineration, increasing the contaminating potential. The Chamber observes in this regard that the challenged Decree establishes that co-incineration with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, under separation and control operations to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Whereas Clause 5, articles 4 in fine, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). The rejection of hazardous waste in co-incineration processes is also provided for in Decree 39136. Furthermore, it prohibits waste recovery activities from waste previously disposed of in landfills or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosive waste, including mineral acids, waste containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals or contaminated with them, waste of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from health care services, their teaching establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons destined for destruction, Persistent Organic Compounds, and Polyvinyl Chloride waste (Article 5). In turn, numerals 22 and 23 of Decree 39136 set the emission limits and maximums for dioxins, furans, polychlorinated biphenyls, and heavy metals. According to the reports rendered by the authorities of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the co-incineration limits are more updated and stricter than those provided in Decree 31837-S, which regulates the operating conditions for hazardous waste treatment and is based on Technical guidelines on the environmentally sound co-processing of hazardous wastes. In this aspect, a violation of the right to a healthy environment is alleged; however, the argument is based on the possible effects that may arise from a lack of attention to the regulation at the time of its implementation, so the harm that the regulation itself might contain and that would make it deserving of annulment is not substantiated.
**XI. Regarding the claim concerning the risk and lack of regulatory measures for the final products of incineration.** The plaintiffs consider that the right to a healthy environment and the health of the population, as well as the precautionary principle, are seriously threatened by the omission to regulate the issue of the final disposal of the final products of incineration. With respect to the protection of the environment and health, Decree 39136 contains extensive regulatory provisions, especially in Articles 6, 10, 13, 14, and 16, where the rules are set for all types of final products from co-incineration, both gases and ashes, and also including sludge from wastewater treatment, unless a chemical analysis indicates otherwise (Article 16). Based on such rules, their separate storage is mandated; the approval of a Comprehensive Hazardous Solid Waste Management Program is required; tests to establish the physical and chemical characteristics, their contaminating potential, and hazardousness in accordance with the Regulation on the procedure for conducting the extraction test to determine constituents that make a waste hazardous due to its toxicity to the environment, Decree 27002-MINAE of April 29, 1998 (La Gaceta No. 101 of May 27, 1998); in addition to monthly analyses and a daily log in accordance with Decree 37788. Therefore, this specific point must be dismissed on the understanding that the specific provisions contained in Decree 39136, added to the rest of the established monitoring and control regulations, prove to be a sufficiently protective framework for the environment and health, all without prejudice to the fact that specific activities or state omissions that may risk such rights in specific cases can be reviewed by the competent authorities and, in cases of serious and direct harm, by this Chamber itself.
**XII.- Constitutional injuries originating from Article 7 of Decree 39136, relating to protected distances and populations.-** The plaintiffs question that Decree 39136 contains a list of institutions and populations that must be protected from proximity to co-incineration plants, but without technical justification, universities and residences are left without such protection. This harms the principle of objectivation in environmental matters and the right to life and equality. They believe that all persons should have special protection so that co-incinerators are not within a 1000-meter radius set by the Decree. They also dispute this protection radius distance, considering that particular atmospheric factors are not taken into account. On this issue, the Court observes that the articles addressing the matter are numerals 7 and 9 of Decree 39136; these provisions state in the pertinent part:
"Article 7. (...) vii.- A quantitative risk assessment contemplating the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the facility, and the mitigation and control measures for such risks. **Blast wave studies and safety distances** must be included to facilities of official centers of the National Child Care and Development Network (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI, and comprehensive care centers, public, private, and mixed, for persons up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas, and chemical industries that store combustible or flammable products on the surface in quantities exceeding 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries, within a radius of 1000 m., as well as their consequences for health and the environment." "Article 9.- On the application for a Location Permit before the Ministry of Health. Co-incineration facilities must maintain a location distance of one thousand (1000) m. to facilities of official centers of the National Child Care and Development Network (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI, and comprehensive care centers, public, private, and mixed, for persons up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas, and chemical industries that store combustible or flammable products on the surface in quantities exceeding 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries." That is, it concerns the inclusion, on the one hand, of special impact studies and safety measures, and on the other, the setting of location restrictions concerning a certain type of institution, which are objectively deserving of greater protection, due to the concentration of persons who can be presumed to have lesser capacity to follow instructions and, in general, to act on their own in compliance with instructions. Therein lies, for the Chamber, the key to the distinction and its justification, which from that perspective is reasonable and adequate.- However, in addition to the foregoing, the advisory body of the Chamber is correct in pointing out that this list cannot be read as a decree of lack of protection for the rest of the population, and this is clear when atmospheric dispersion studies and a general quantitative risk assessment are required. Added to the above is the fact that the location and approval of proposed sites for co-incineration facilities must be in accordance with the approved Territorial Planning, or a conforming land use issued by the respective Municipality, as well as the application for a location permit before the Ministry of Health, which allows reporting the distance to various facilities and evaluating studies on wind and the population to be served, among others (Articles 8 and 9 of Decree 39136). From this, it follows that the regulation has indeed considered the analysis of technical aspects that must be evaluated by the competent environmental and health authorities, and regarding such matters, this Court goes only as far as to determine that the regulations contain the bodies and processes responsible for ensuring the technical correctness of the proposals, and that their decisions are framed by provisions that allow for the protection of the environment and, of course, the health of the people.- As indicated above, the Chamber understands that the Decree, on this topic of protecting the health and safety of the population, establishes rules that are added to and do not replace all the other existing protection measures regarding the environment and the health of the population. It is clear, then, that there is no injury to the principle of equality regarding the protection owed to the general population, and there is no reason to annul Articles 7 and 9 if their purpose is to add to the regulatory framework that must be complied with in environmental matters to operate a waste co-incineration plant.
**XIII.- The State's omission to produce a decree on the incineration of hazardous waste.-** The plaintiffs note that instead of a decree like 39136, which regulates the incineration of **ordinary** waste, what should have been issued, due to its evident need, is a regulation that orders and sets strict standards for a **treatment system for hazardous solid waste**, which includes as part of the same the waste from the incineration process, and that this absence injures, by **omission**, the principles of objectivation, progressivity, and non-regression. They add that this absence is more marked by the lack of an appropriate failure control mechanism and by the existence of Transitional Provision VI of Decree 39136, which imposes the limits of the cited Decree on the incineration of hazardous waste, thereby implicitly recognizing the absence of specific regulations.- The Court understands that, on the first point, the interested parties merely state what must be considered their particular criterion on the timeliness and necessity of issuing a Decree on hazardous waste management instead of the challenged Decree, so there is no constitutional argument to support that claim. Secondly, there exists in the challenged Decree (Article 17 of the discussed Decree) a system with rules and parameters that serve to order the shutdown of the incineration process.- Finally, regarding the third aspect, it should be noted that Transitional Provision VI proves to be an additional safety measure, which in principle has no application for the activity being authorized by the Decree, which only permits incineration of ordinary waste and expressly excludes the incineration of hazardous waste.- This is how this Court sees it, understanding that said provision is in no way authorizing the incineration of hazardous waste, which would require a regulatory framework quite different from the content of Decree 39136.- However, it is not unnecessary to point out, as the State's advisory body does, that the management and disposal of hazardous waste **is indeed normatively regulated** in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Law 7438 of October 6, 1994; the General Health Law, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973; the Regulation for the Management of Industrial Hazardous Wastes, Decree 27001 of April 29, 1998; and in the General Regulation for the Classification and Management of Hazardous Waste, Decree 37788 of February 15, 2013. It is affirmed that specific regulations are also available, such as, for example, the Regulation on the management of infectious-contagious waste generated in establishments providing health care and related services, Decree 30965 of December 17, 2002; the Regulation of requirements, conditions, and controls for the use of alternative fuels in cement kilns, Decree 31837 of April 1, 2004; the Regulation for the Declaration of Special Management Waste, Decree 38272 of January 7, 2014; and, the Regulation on air emission limits for glass melting furnaces, Decree 38237 of February 3, 2014. From all the above, it can be concluded that the challenged Decree 39136 does not violate the Political Constitution on this point.
**XIV.- Regarding the deadlines for the granting of permits by the authorities.** The plaintiffs believe that the deadlines given to the authorities of the Ministry of Health in the final paragraph of Article 9, to authorize the location of incineration plants and grant the operating permit, are excessively short and therefore affect the right to enjoy a healthy environment and thereby the health of the people. The respective paragraph of the cited article states:
"Article 9.- (...) The Ministry of Health must issue the resolution regarding the location permit application within the following ten (10) business days after receiving the application with complete information. In justified cases, the deadline may be extended with prior notification to the interested party, but said extension may not exceed ten (10) business days. If the permit is granted, its validity will be one year from the date of issuance of the resolution granting it. (...)" The plaintiffs consider that the 10 days established to carry out the prior work of verifying technical and legal conditions are insufficient, thereby increasing the contaminating risk of the waste incineration activity.
In this regard, the Attorney General's Office agrees with the plaintiffs concerning the inadequacy of the ten-day period for the Ministry of Health to properly analyze and assess a decision of such relevance. The Chamber understands the concern reflected in the cited arguments and comprehends that haste is not the appropriate attitude when the authorization of activities is at stake, activities that necessarily entail the possibility of eventualities and contingencies that may put people's health or the environment at risk.- However, on this point, and as the Attorney General's Office also indicates, in resolving the matter this Chamber must take into account the settled jurisprudence of this Court, which has held that time limits in environmental matters -as is the case here- cannot and should not be considered peremptory but merely procedural, just as it has also been clearly affirmed that in this environmental matter neither does the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) operate, for which reason it is deemed that the rule does not present a constitutional problem in that sense, since the lack of a response within the indicated time limit could not be taken as a tacit or implicit authorization for carrying out the co-incineration activity regulated by the Decree under discussion.- **XV.- Conclusions**. The plaintiffs complain that Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE violates Articles 7 and 50 of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional principles of sustainable development, environmental education, precautionary principle, objectification, and progressivity. From the analysis of the different arguments presented in the action, it is concluded that, in general, the challenged Decree contains the pertinent regulations for the limits, control, and operation of the co-incineration activity of solid waste, both ordinary and hazardous, so that we are not in the presence of uncontrolled authorizations of the thermal waste treatment process as a threat to the environment. It is not evident in this process that the regulation of the solid waste co-incineration process breaches international commitments undertaken for the protection of the ozone layer, the reduction of greenhouse gases, and the safeguarding of air and the environment ratified by Costa Rica. It is equally concluded that a part of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs in the filing brief lack the required substantiation to request the annulment of the regulatory rule for unconstitutionality, and in several cases it is a matter of setting forth the way in which -in the opinion of the interested parties- the matter should be ordered. It emerges from the filing brief that the plaintiffs make considerations about the scope of the regulation and allege possible effects of the regulation when put into practice; however, no evidence is provided that the problems they anticipate have their origin specifically and concretely in the strict application of the provisions of Decree 39136; in such a way, the claim regarding possible effects that the activity regulated in the challenged Decree may bring with it, but without having technically accredited its existence and its direct link to the rule under dispute, prevents carrying out the constitutional review of the rule to eventually eliminate it from the legal system. It is clear that the foregoing does not mean that the authorities and interested parties cannot return to the Chamber to subsequently challenge, through the corresponding procedural route, the injuries that may be occurring due to the defective implementation of the regulation at the corresponding time. For all the foregoing, it is therefore appropriate to declare the action without merit.
**Por tanto:** The action filed is declared without merit. Magistrate Cruz Castro notes his dissent.
Ernesto Jinesta L.
| Fernando Cruz C. | Fernando Castillo V. |
| Paul Rueda L. |
NOTE BY JUSTICE CRUZ CASTRO: The arguments put forward by the petitioners raise transcendental questions and assessments; however, the challenged regulations were enacted within acceptable parameters for the protection of the environment, as stated in the opinion I subscribe to. I consider that the norms challenged in the action are at the limit of what is admissible in the constitutional protection of the environment. The objections raised by the appellants become an important point of reference when assessing the problems and threats that may arise in the application of Decree 39136. The co-incineration of solid waste, both ordinary and hazardous, is a highly sensitive and vulnerable activity regarding the effective protection of the environment, especially due to the validity of such important principles as the preventive principle and "in dubio pro natura". I consider that what we have resolved in this judgment does not fully close the questions that the petitioners have very rightly raised; the effective execution of the challenged Decree will raise new perspectives on the matter, and it may well be that in the future, better elements of judgment, derived from practice, will emerge, in which the objections raised in the action deserve reconsideration and a thorough analysis.
Fernando Cruz C.
*160022900007CO* **Exp: 16-002290-0007-CO** **Res. No. 2016-017375** **CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at eleven hours and forty minutes on the twenty-third of November of two thousand sixteen.** Action of unconstitutionality filed by ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ and ALLAN ASTORGA GATGENS, holders of identity card numbers 2-0365-0227, 3-0252-0451, respectively, against Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE *(Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios)*, published in Digital Supplement No. 069 to La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2015. Intervening in this matter are Ana Lorena Brenes in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic; Fernando Llorca Castro, as Minister of Health; Mrs. Irene Cañas Díaz, in her capacity as Acting Minister of Environment and Energy (hereinafter MINAE). Also participating as active coadjuvants are the following persons: Fabián de Jesús Pacheco Rodríguez, Edgardo Araya Sibaja, Melissa Flores Núñez, representing the Asociación de Desarrollo de Residencial Ciudad Cariari, Andrés Camacho L. and others, Yorleny Rodríguez Conejo and others, Amanda Araya Rivas and others, Ernesto Monge and others, Minor Picado Camareno and others, Fernando Araya Anderson, Yerling Ruiz Vásquez and others, Héctor González Pacheco. Participating as passive coadjuvants are the Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesiones Afines, and the Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de Guanacaste R.L.
(CoopeGuanacaste R.L.).
**Whereas:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at 3:00 p.m. on February 18, 2016, the petitioners request that the unconstitutionality of Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulations on operating conditions and emission control for facilities for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, be declared, deeming it contrary to Articles 7, 21, 33, and 50 of the Political Constitution, as well as to the environmental principles of objectification, progressivity, non-regression, sustainable development, scientific guardianship, precaution, shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source. They allege that said regulation establishes the operating requirements and maximum emission limits for facilities for the co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, which implies authorizing or permitting the incineration of waste generated in dwellings or from other sources whose waste is similar to that of dwellings. They consider that by authorizing or enabling the operation of co-incineration facilities, the integrated management of ordinary solid waste is being discouraged and, instead, priority is being given in practice to the incineration of such waste over implementing other more environmentally friendly options, as required by the Integrated Solid Waste Management Law; all of the foregoing violates the logic of protection, education, sustainable development, and environmental awareness that emanates from Article 50 of the Political Constitution. They add that Executive Decree No. 38500-S-MINAE of June 11, 2014, established a moratorium on the waste incineration industry to reduce air pollution; however, it was repealed by Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE in its Article 36, without having conducted the studies to verify that the primary processes of the hierarchy provided for in Article 4 of the General Waste Law had been fulfilled; they consider that this repeal transgresses the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. They state that, with the current Regulations, by permitting the operation of incinerators, the international obligations of the Costa Rican State to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or that may result from human activities such as incineration, which generate the emission of gases that can modify the ozone layer, are breached. These obligations are provided for in the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Law No. 7228) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, instruments that are integrated into the Costa Rican legal system as established by Article 7 of the Political Constitution. They state that opening up to the incineration industry transgresses the international objective provided for in said norms of avoiding the generation of greenhouse gases, such that the challenged Decree is regressive and violative of the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources. They add that Costa Rica has ratified other conventions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, which guide the avoidance of gases that cause the ozone layer depletion effect and constitute express limitations to avoid greenhouse effect gases; however, Article 3 of the challenged Decree states that there will be emanations of gases such as total organic carbon, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, where dioxins and furans are toxic to human life. They point out that from the annexes of the Regulations, it is apparent that permitting the incineration activity is a latent risk to human life, in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, and results in a clash against sustainable development. They allege that there are no trained professionals to verify that the incineration processes are carried out adequately, as derived from the second transitory provision of the challenged regulation. They add that for establishments and facilities that incinerate hazardous waste, the emission limits of the challenged regulation are applied until the State establishes the specific regulations for the incineration of hazardous waste, which implies that a percentage of the waste taken for incineration would be hazardous waste, increasing the contaminating potential of the dioxins and slags produced as a final product of the process, apart from the emissions that may be produced. They affirm that the challenged regulation is regressive and transgresses the principle of scientific guardianship, since it comes to public light for application without specific norms existing. They allege that the incineration of ordinary solid waste constitutes an activity of high environmental risk and can cause very serious environmental damage to biodiversity and the health of the general population. They argue that the final product of incineration is gases, highly polluting, and hazardous waste that require a very strict environmental control mechanism that, if absent, can produce grave and serious damage to the environment and health. They consider that the precautionary principle is violated, insofar as an activity is authorized without establishing express measures regarding what will be done with the final waste. They explain that Article 7 of the challenged Decree establishes the need for a quantitative risk assessment (evaluación de riesgos cuantitativos) that contemplates the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the co-incineration facility and the mitigation and control measures for said risks. They allege that Article 7 of the challenged decree excludes universities and residences from the 1000-meter protection radius concerning co-incinerators, which they deem violative of Article 21 in relation to Articles 33 and 50, all of the Political Constitution. They question the 1000-meter protection distance established in the decree, without taking particular atmospheric factors into consideration. Likewise, they state that the 20-day limit that the Ministry of Health has to issue an opinion regarding the location permit application is not justified; they consider that this attacks the right to life, health, and a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, by establishing rigid terms for the delivery of permits by the Ministry of Health. They allege that the challenged regulation violates the constitutional principles of shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at the source, since it can be inferred from these that incineration processes should not be viable and instead establish a tacit prohibition on incinerating waste. They point out that Article 33, Table 5 of the challenged Decree establishes a protocol to follow due process in case of non-compliance with the emission limits, without suspending the incineration processes while the corrections are made, which causes the industry to continue polluting the population with emissions of dioxins or furans.
**2.-** In order to substantiate the standing they hold to bring this unconstitutionality action, they indicate that they are assisted by diffuse interests, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law.
**3.-** By resolution of 1:40 p.m. on February 24, 2016, the action was allowed to proceed, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE).
**4.-** The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic submitted its report. It indicates that this unconstitutionality action challenges Decree 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, Regulations on operating conditions and emission control for facilities for *co-incineration* of ordinary solid waste (Supplement 69 to La Gaceta No. 170 of September 1, 2015), insofar as it authorizes the incineration of ordinary solid waste generated in dwellings or similar sources. It argues that the challenged Decree establishes operating requirements and maximum emission limits for *co-incineration* facilities for ordinary solid waste, as an option *subordinate* to the other prior processes in the hierarchy for integrated waste management provided for in Article 4 of Law 8839 (Decree 39136, Articles 1, 2, 4, and 15 subsection a). It points out that the Integrated Waste Management Law, No. 8839 of June 24, 2010, contemplates energy recovery as one of the alternatives for waste valorization (Articles 4, 6, and 42), subject to the hierarchy for integrated management that gives priority to material recovery over energy recovery, according to technical criteria. Thus, it indicates that the challenged Decree regulates in its Article 3 energy valorization through the co-incineration process, and Article 5, subsection 3 of the same norm expressly prohibits "*the use of thermal treatment systems for ordinary solid waste that are not for electricity generation, energy recovery, or material recovery*". For its part, Article 4 *in fine* of Decree 39136 reiterates that "*waste for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, must not be subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration*". Likewise, among the requirements that the Environmental Impact Assessment (evaluación de impacto ambiental, EIA) and the location permit application before the Ministry of Health must include, are the facilities for separation, classification, and recovery of valorizable waste that must not be incinerated (Articles 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j), 10 subsections k) and l). It adds that Article 15 *ibidem* requires having a storage area for waste in accordance with the Regulations for Recovery Centers for Valorizable Waste, Decree 35906-S of January 27, 2010; the generation and composition studies for ordinary waste must observe Decree 37745-S, Officialization of the Methodology for Generation and Composition Studies of Ordinary Solid Waste; and, ordinary waste must be handled and stored in compliance with the Regulations on the Management of Ordinary Solid Waste, Decree 36093-S of July 15, 2010. It considers that the Decree being challenged respects the priority established by Law 8839 for integrated waste management, among which energy valorization is found. With respect to the obligations derived from international conventions, it affirms that the Decree under analysis is consistent with the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Law 7228 of May 6, 1991), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Law 7223 of April 8, 1991), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Law 7414 of June 13, 1994), and the Kyoto Protocol (Law 8219 of March 8, 2002), incorporated into our legal system according to Article 7 of the Constitution; these instruments establish international commitments and controls for the reduction of substances affecting the ozone layer. It considers that the Decree under analysis is consistent with the principles of non-regressivity and sustainable development, and gives progressivity to domestic regulations, as it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, under separation and control operations in order to prevent the formation of organic pollutants. Likewise, one of the sectors or source categories cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, specifically waste incineration, is regulated and subjected to technical limits. The Regulations also set the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Law 8839. The foregoing is compatible with the obligations contained in Article 50 of the Constitution and the principle of progressivity, as measures are adopted that tend toward the protection of the environment and health, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set according to the parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and the rules of science and technique. Regarding the emanations of gases that may be toxic to human health as a product of the incineration activity, it is noted that the challenged Decree considers that the co-incineration of waste with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, under separation and control operations in order to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Considering 5, Articles 4 *in fine*, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). Furthermore, it prohibits the activities of recovery of waste previously disposed of in sanitary landfills or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosives, including mineral acids, those containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals or contaminated with them, waste of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from health care services, their teaching establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons destined for destruction, Persistent Organic Compounds, and Polyvinyl Chloride Waste (Article 5). For its part, Article 21 of the challenged Regulations indicates the technical parameters for establishing the maximum emission limits for general pollutants. The *normal reference conditions* (273.15 K and 101.325 kPa on a dry basis, referenced to 11% oxygen) and the *maximum emission limits* established in the cited Article 21 of Decree 39136 coincide with those of Annex VIII, Part 2, of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of November 24, 2010, on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control). Regarding the reproach against the repeal of the moratorium provided for in Decree 38500 of June 11, 2014, it clarifies that said measure was conceived as a transitory provision to adopt the necessary technical measures to comply with Law 8839. It is not considered that Decree 39136 violates the principle of non-regression, since the norm does not diminish the degree of environmental protection, but rather, in consonance with the Law, regulates the energy recovery of solid waste. With Decree 39136, the necessary technical measures are provided for the adequate control of co-incineration as one of the alternatives for the valorization of solid waste contained in Law 8839, and the repeal of Decree 38500 does not disregard the principles of objectification, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality either. It affirms that regarding the allegation of the absence of trained professionals, Transitory Provision II of Decree 36136 is consistent with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, under which commitments are established to promote and support education and training programs that foster the creation of national human and institutional capacity. For its part, the challenged Decree considers the role of the Technical Council for Emission and Immission Standards in the analysis and assessment of regulatory compliance. Regarding the activity of incinerating hazardous waste, it considers that the challenged norm is preventive and temporary, because the emission limits provided for therein are applied to the incineration of hazardous waste; the foregoing is consistent with the State's duty of prevention and the principles recognized by constitutional jurisprudence. It concludes that insofar as the application of the limits imposed by Transitory Provision VI of the challenged Decree improves the current protection against emissions from authorized hazardous waste incineration processes, this would be in accordance with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the principles of progressivity and non-regression in environmental matters. Regarding the allegation of the incorporation of hazardous waste into co-incineration processes, it is considered that Decree 39136 establishes that the co-incineration of waste with a content greater than 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, under separation and control operations, in order to prevent the formation of organic pollutants. In relation to the operation of the incineration system, it considers that the challenged regulation demands immediate shutdown under anomalous conditions, provides for verification of compliance, as well as establishes the corrective and sanctioning regime. Regarding the gases and waste product of co-incineration and potential damage to the environment and health, it is affirmed that the challenged Decree provides for the separate storage of solid waste resulting from incineration. It considers that as Law 8839 provides for sanitary landfills as the last option in the hierarchy for waste management, Decree 39136 requires compliance with the Regulations on Sanitary Landfills. Regarding the lack of a decree for the incineration of hazardous waste, it considers that the principles of objectification, progressivity, and non-regression are not violated since the handling and disposal of hazardous waste is regulated in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, in the General Health Law, and various regulations.
Regarding safety distances and the alleged violation of the principles of equality, healthy environment, and objectification, it considers that comparing the challenged rule with the content of the principle of equality, there is no violation, because it is reasonable and consistent with the preventive principle to admit the setback distance with respect to populations that are considered vulnerable, which include all types of educational and hospital centers, and risk installations due to their handling of combustible or flammable products in quantities greater than 1000 m³, agricultural activities, and food processing industries. It argues that the regulation requires the approval of an environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) that considers atmospheric dispersion studies and a quantitative risk evaluation, and the location of co-incineration (coincineración) installations must be in accordance with the approved Territorial Planning (Ordenamiento Territorial) or a land-use conformity (uso de suelo conforme) issued by the Municipality, as well as the distance to be accredited in the permit before the Ministry of Health. Regarding the timeframe for installation permits, it alludes that the timeframes of 10 business days provided in Articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, given the rigor and technical complexity in the analysis of applications for this type of project, with an impact on the environment and public health, are insufficient and contrary to the principle of legal reasonableness (constitutional judgments 7294-1998 and 2410-2007), and therefore the one-month timeframe of Article 331 of Law 6227 must be respected. It considers that if the Chamber considers that these timeframes are not contrary to the Law of the Constitution, it would be possible to interpret that upon their expiration, tacit approval (silencio positivo) does not operate pursuant to Article 4 of Law 7575. The same can be said regarding the 30-day timeframe granted to the Ministry of Health to issue, if applicable, the authorization of the activity and the detail of authorized materials for co-incineration (Article 24). Regarding the principles of shared responsibilities, internalization of costs, and prevention at source, it analyzes that the general principles that underpin the integrated waste management (gestión integral de residuos) are not violated because they are recognized in the Law and are addressed by Decree 39136 in several of its articles. Regarding the protocols in case of non-compliance with emission limits, it is added that Decree 39136, in its Article 17, establishes the immediate stoppage of the process under abnormal conditions, which coincides with the provisions of European Directive 2010/75/EU. Regarding the non-fulfillment of national goals by allowing incineration processes, it is appreciated that Decree 39136 is consistent with international conventions and the principle of progressivity to domestic regulations, because it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, under separation and control operations in order to avoid the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or categories of sources cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, related to waste, such as waste incineration, and sets the technical limits and control mechanisms for the permitted activity in accordance with Law 8839. The implementation of clean development mechanisms in public policies has been considered in the National Development Plan 2011-2014 and 2015-2018. It concludes that Decree 39136 is consistent with the Law of the Constitution, with the exception of the timeframes of 10 business days provided in Articles 9 in fine and 24 of Decree 39136, which injure the principle of legal reasonableness, unless it is considered that upon their expiration, tacit approval does not operate, and in that order the 30-day timeframe of numeral 24 ibidem must also be interpreted. It considers that Transitory Provision VI of Decree 39136 is constitutional insofar as it is interpreted that the limits set forth therein will be applicable when, in accordance with the principle of progressivity, they improve the current protection against emissions from hazardous waste incineration processes that are already authorized.
5.- Mr. Fernando Llorca Castro, in his capacity as Minister of Health, responds to the granted hearing, stating the criteria expressed by the Director and Acting Head of the Health Services Standardization Unit in Human Environment, of the Directorate of Human Environment Protection, of the Ministry of Health, in which they state that Decree 39136 does not contravene the Kyoto Protocol since Annex A, in relation to Article 3 of the Protocol, only indicates which processes must be taken into consideration for the country to comply with the requirements established in said international instrument. It considers that the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources and greenhouse gases is not violated, since the Decree seeks to reverse the emissions of gases that generate global warming. Thereby, the international objective provided for in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol is also not transgressed. It considers, with respect to the regulation of gas emissions emitted by solid waste co-incineration activities, that the establishment of maximum limits of pollutants in solid waste in atmospheric emissions, as well as the establishment of maximum permissible limits in wastewater for solids, heavy metals, as well as for dioxins and furans, allows compliance with the precept of Article 50 of the Constitution. Regarding the protective distances and surrounding zones, it estimates that Article 7 of the Decree seeks to establish a balance between the protection of public health and that of vulnerable groups, emphasizing the protection of sensitive populations. It affirms that Article 4 of the Decree establishes the obligation to comply with Law 8839 and the appellants do not analyze the variety of actions and regulations that the Ministry of Health has issued to ensure the proper management of waste, in adherence to the hierarchy in integrated waste management. It considers that priority is given to recycling over thermal treatment; it clarifies that co-incineration is not the last stage in the hierarchized waste management. It refers that the law establishes an order of priority, that if one of these cannot be fulfilled, alternatives at the lower level continue to be sought, which does not imply that the first ones must be fully complied with prior to using the subsequent ones; therefore, the repeal of the moratorium does not transgress the principles of objectification and non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. It affirms that the Municipalities and the general population have the obligation to achieve the separate collection of waste and, for their part, co-incinerators must have spaces for its separation, in order to ensure that they are not processed; likewise the regulation clearly establishes prohibitions for specific materials that must not be co-incinerated. It points out that in the challenged Decree there are indeed limits for the management of co-incineration by-products, which guarantees that environmental principles, such as the precautionary principle, are not violated and compliance with Article 50 of the Constitution is guaranteed. It clarifies that co-processing and co-incineration are methods that allow energy utilization (aprovechamiento energético), permitted by Law, so it should not be interpreted that there is any tacit prohibition on incineration. It affirms that regarding the training of the professionals in charge, the Decree establishes the duty for every company and responsible professional to create the required capacity, within a reasonable timeframe. It clarifies that dioxin and furan emissions produced by industry, at concentration levels below the maximum permissible level, are subject to a warning before closure, in respect of due process. It notes that the regulation establishes the obligation to submit and implement a Corrective Actions Plan. It confirms that the Environmental Impact Assessment (Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental), provided for in the Organic Law of the Environment (Ley Orgánica del Ambiente), No. 7554 of 1995, is the predictive control mechanism to regulate productive activities based on the protection of the environment. It expands on the above by pointing out that the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (Secretaría Técnica Ambiental, SETENA) is the national technical body responsible for determining whether productive activities are dangerous for the environment and, in the event that environmental damage is determined, does not authorize environmental viability (viabilidad ambiental). Based on the report rendered, it is considered that it is the obligation of the State and mainly of MINAE and the Ministry of Health, in that order, to take the necessary measures to avoid damage to the environment, guaranteeing, defending, and preserving the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, to protect the health of people, the environment, and life in general. It concludes that Decree 39136 is in accordance with the environmental and sanitary parameters that the Costa Rican population requires.
6.- Ms. Irene Cañas Díaz, in her capacity as Acting Minister of Environment and Energy (hereinafter MINAE), responds to the granted hearing, stating the criteria expressed by the Director of the Directorate of Environmental Quality Management (Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental), of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, in which she states that Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE came to regulate the activity of waste incineration in a safer manner, thereby fulfilling the principle of progressivity. She clarifies that Executive Decree DE-38500-S-MINAE was a temporary measure while the technical regulation was being developed that would allow thermal waste treatment processes in a safer manner. She points out that the challenged Regulation establishes as a prerequisite to the thermal treatment of waste, that the hierarchization processes provided for in the law (reduction, reuse, and recycling) be complied with and that the prior separation of recoverable waste be carried out. She adds that the hierarchization of waste does not require technical studies, but rather compliance with the separation of recoverable waste. She warns that in the environmental viability studies, compliance with the provisions of the challenged Decree must be verified; thus, a specific evaluation must be carried out in each case. In relation to compliance with international obligations provided for in the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, she points out that the questioned Decree establishes a series of technical measures to guarantee that dioxins and furans will not be produced in the waste co-processing processes, such as waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, real-time temperature control, atmospheric emission monitoring, among others. She points out that the Regulation provides for, in the first place, the hierarchization in waste management and, as a last option, thermal treatment, understood as co-incineration when the energy produced during thermal treatment is utilized. She expands that this matter is regulated at the international level by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to which Costa Rica is a party through Law No. 8538 and Executive Decree No. 33438. She refers that the challenged Decree does not permit open-air waste incineration, since that would produce high emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as emissions of dioxins and furans, hence the ozone layer is not affected, nor would greenhouse gas emissions be produced beyond those already emitted in current waste management processes. Thus then, the Kyoto Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, and the Montreal Protocol are not breached. In relation to the gas emanations produced in the thermal treatment processes of organic waste, she affirms that the Decree points them out in order to propose actions for their reduction, as well as to monitor compliance with the maximum emission limits for pollutants permitted in the current national regulations. Regarding the training of professionals and technicians in the matter of incineration processes, she highlights that any new technology requires preparing the people who will develop projects and verify the application of the regulations; she clarifies that the Ministry of Health, with the support of the Council for Emission and Immission Standards (Consejo de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión), are scheduled in response to the identified need. Regarding the incineration of hazardous waste, she points out that currently Executive Decree 31837-S regulates the operating conditions for the treatment of hazardous waste and is based on Technical Guidelines on national environmental co-processing of hazardous waste in cement kilns; even so, the questioned Decree expands the limits of co-incineration for this type of waste, since they are more updated and are regulated more strictly compared to the provisions of Decree No. 31837-S. For her part, regarding the indication related to the content of hazardous waste found in ordinary waste, she warns that the Decree establishes the materials and substances that cannot be treated in incineration processes; the obligation to separate hazardous waste is provided. It is established that the environmental impact assessment (estudio de impacto ambiental) must include the installations for separation, classification, and recovery of recoverable waste that must not be incinerated. She refers that Article 16 of the challenged Regulation indicates that the ashes resulting from thermal treatment are considered hazardous solid waste and must therefore be disposed of appropriately, following the provisions of the General Regulation for the classification and management of hazardous waste. She highlights that the Decree establishes the regulations that must be considered for the management of this type of waste; likewise, Article 5 of Decree 39136-S-MINAE expressly indicates the substances and materials prohibited from being incinerated. For her part, she indicates that the Decree establishes the maximum atmospheric emission limits permitted for the different pollutants that could be produced, limits that are in accordance with national and international regulations. The work regime of a thermal waste treatment installation is also regulated to minimize the possibility of producing pollutants. She states that protection measures and safety distances are ensured from the environmental viability studies submitted to SETENA; she argues that 1000 meters is the minimum distance that an incineration installation could be located with respect to towns, which may be greater according to the results of the environmental impact assessments (estudios de impacto ambiental) before SETENA. She affirms that the 20-day timeframe for the Ministry of Health to issue an opinion on applications to carry out incineration activities, finds that it is reasonable; she points out that this timeframe was considered by the Ministry of Health during the discussion and drafting process of the Regulation. Finally, in relation to the protocol for cases of non-compliance with emission limits established in Article 33, table 5 of the challenged Decree, she clarifies that this regulation defines the ranges of action based on the results of laboratory measurements and evaluations, which take into account the maximum limits defined in international literature on health effects; likewise, two mechanisms aimed at preventing the eventual production of dioxins and furans are contemplated. She does not share the appellants' assertion about the non-existence of a technical criterion to regulate the activity; she affirms that a commission was formed with participants from the public, private, academic sectors, etc., to work on the issue.
7.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 69, 70, and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of the days April 12, 13, and 14, 2016.
8.- By resolution of 10:20 a.m. on May 5, 2016, the Presidency of the Chamber admitted the joinders in favor of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged Decree filed by FABIÁN DE JESÚS PACHECO RODRÍGUEZ identity card number 110170021; EDGARDO ARAYA SIBAJA identity card number 204830663; MELISSA FLORES NÚÑEZ identity card number 701260268, representing the CIUDAD CARIARI RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO DE RESIDENCIAL CIUDAD CARIARI) legal entity number 3-002-361677; ANDRÉS CAMACHO L. identity card number 113680148 and others; YORLENY RODRÍGUEZ CONEJO identity card number 111220107 and others; AMANDA ARAYA RIVAS identity card number 111320483; ERNESTO MONGE identity document number 1304295982) and others; MINOR PICADO CAMARENO (identity card number 502580179 and others); on April 1, 2016, by FERNANDO ARAYA ANDERSON identity card number 0108230617; YERLING RUIZ VÁSQUEZ identity card number 603040331 and others; HÉCTOR GONZÁLEZ PACHECO identity card number 0105990966. In all of them, the arguments raised by the plaintiffs are reiterated and made explicit, and the need for the Decree to be invalidated is affirmed because it presents a threat both to their respective interests and generally to their right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.
9.- In the same resolution, the joinders in favor of the validity of the norm, presented by ALBERTO ANTILLÓN ARROYO identity card number 108310616 in his capacity as PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS (COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS QUÍMICOS Y PROFESIONALES AFINES) legal entity number 3-007-383731; MIGUEL GÓMEZ COREA (identity card number 502230027), in his capacity as GENERAL MANAGER OF THE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION COOPERATIVE OF GUANACASTE R.L. (COOPERATIVA DE ELECTRIFICACIÓN RURAL DE GUANACASTE R.L., COOPEGUANACASTE R.L.), were also accepted.
In both cases, respective briefs were submitted providing a specific analysis of the sub-legal provisions under discussion and giving the reasons why they are deemed to adequately comply with the norms and principles related to the right to a healthy environment.
10.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 69, 70 and 71 of the Judicial Bulletin, on the days of April 12, 13 and 14, 2016.
11.- The hearing indicated in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by section 9 thereof, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.
12.- In the proceedings, the prescriptions of law have been complied with.
Drafted by Magistrate Hernández López; and,
Considering:
I.- On admissibility. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of actions of unconstitutionality, and requires a matter pending resolution in an administrative or judicial venue in which the unconstitutionality is invoked. This requirement is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. In the case, the action is an exercise in defense of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment enshrined in Article 50 of the Political Constitution. On this point, since before its establishment through the constitutional reform of 1994, such right as well as broad standing for its defense had been established by this Court. To this jurisprudential line must be added that currently the Political Constitution itself expressly recognizes procedural standing, vested in any person, for the defense of the environment as provided by the current text of Article 50 of the Political Constitution.
II.- Standing in the specific case. The petition of this action of unconstitutionality seeks the annulment of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, “Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios”, because it authorizes the activity of incineration of ordinary and hazardous solid waste, which, in their opinion, is contrary to the principles of progressivity, objectivation of environmental law, and non-regression of human rights. Thus, the case is fully situated as a defense of the right enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution, so the action is admissible in accordance with its express text.
III.- Grouping of the claims for the purposes of analysis. The action of unconstitutionality requests the declaration of unconstitutionality of Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE of June 15, 2015, named “Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios” and hereinafter referred to only as “Decreto 39136.” As its name indicates, this regulatory body establishes several specific requirements, but not the only ones to be met, if one wishes to obtain state authorization to carry out the activity of co-incineration of ordinary solid waste, and imposes the operating conditions and the control mechanisms for such activity. The claims against this normative body can be separated into two clear streams: the first groups several infractions that have arisen from the fact of the promulgation of Decreto 39136, as a legal action of the State. It is argued that said promulgation injures the constitutional right to the environment and several of the principles that have been derived from it, as well as a group of international obligations acquired by the country. The second stream includes claims against specific provisions of Decreto 39136 whose content injures – by action or omission – several constitutional principles in environmental matters as well as the principle of equality. Thus, the Chamber will address both sectors of claims separately.
IV.It is also worth noting that the review of some of the points raised allows the conclusion that they lack sufficient elements of judgment to serve the purpose of properly substantiating the infractions being denounced, as required by the Law that regulates constitutional jurisdiction. Such defect will be specified in each case where it arises, in application of a clear jurisprudential line on this point, as can be seen, for example, from the following citations:
“The action of unconstitutionality is filed with the argument that the challenged Decreto Ejecutivo is harmful, injures and infringes the fundamental rights to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, the right to health, and the international commitments signed with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the opportunity granted to the plaintiffs, it is confirmed what the Procuraduría General de la República indicates, that there is no concrete analysis of the provisions of the challenged Decreto Ejecutivo that are considered unconstitutional, but rather it limits itself to establishing generic and abstract discrepancies against the entirety of the Reglamento, moreover against all activity carried out by sugar mills and estates, as they maintain that they cause drawbacks in the quality of life and health of the surrounding inhabitants, without specifying what arguments of constitutionality must be taken into account against each of the provisions or groups of norms of the challenged Reglamento. […] The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction establishes the obligation to authenticate the briefs for filing actions of unconstitutionality, since it is deemed necessary that there be arguments put forth by a legal professional, which this Court does not rule out responds to a serious study of the technical and scientific background of a specific matter, given the diversity and universality of the norms of the legal system. Unlike guarantee proceedings, i.e., the remedies of habeas corpus and amparo, which any interested party can file directly before the constitutional jurisdiction in defense of their fundamental rights, generally against acts or omissions that injure them in their private sphere (although not always, as in environmental cases), in proceedings for the defense of the Political Constitution (such as the action of unconstitutionality), the legislator entrusted the authenticating lawyer with a task whose demand is even greater, if you will more elaborate and exhaustive, which must be expressed in the filing brief by reason of their professional duty, to demonstrate to the Court the injury to the constitutional norm by a norm of lower rank, undermining the principle of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 10 of the Political Constitution. Precisely the material and formal elaboration of the Law, as well as of the other secondary provisions, entails a process that is extremely costly for the State, in which organized civil society has participated in many ways for or against its elaboration, and whose procedures of formation, approval and promulgation must not be analyzed lightly. In this regard, this Chamber must recognize that there is a reduced space for this Court to remedy the manifest absences of the legal professionals who authenticate the briefs in this constitutional jurisdiction, without exposing the impartiality and analysis owed to each of the actions of unconstitutionality.” (Sentencia número 005285-2012 of 15:03 hours of April 25, 2012).
And later in sentencia número 2014-004239, it reaffirmed:
“IV.- On the lack of concreteness of the arguments of unconstitutionality. The Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in its Article 3, provides that 'The Political Constitution shall be deemed infringed when this results from the confrontation of the text of the questioned norm or act, its effects, or its interpretation or application by public authorities, with the constitutional norms and principles.' However, for this Court to deem the infraction configured and declare the unconstitutionality of the challenged norm or act, with the consequent annulment and expulsion from the legal system, whoever promotes an action of unconstitutionality has the burden of demonstrating how that provision infringes the constitutional norm or principle and, in addition, must indicate why the claim should be upheld. This is termed by this Chamber as the burden of argumentation, that is, that ‘a norm that is facially contrary to the Constitution shifts the burden of argumentation to those who maintain that in reality there is no conflict between that norm and the Political Constitution; the opposite occurs if action is taken against a norm that upon initial examination does not appear contrary to the Constitution, in which case it is the plaintiff who must advance arguments that convince regarding the unconstitutionality’ (see sentencia número 0184-95 of 16:30 hours of January 10, 1995).”
Point A. Injury to the waste management design established in domestic law norms of higher rank than Decreto 39136. The plaintiffs indicate that the issuance of Decreto 39136 injures the Right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment in general and particularly the precautionary principle; that of non-regression; that of objectivation and the right to sustainable development. They understand that the activity of co-incineration of solid waste that the decree authorizes and regulates is harmful to the environment, given the current situation of waste management in our country. A contradiction is asserted with the waste management design contained in the Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos número 8839, (hereinafter Ley 8839) since with the issuance of the challenged Decreto 39136, co-incineration is highlighted and facilitated to the detriment of other activities and practices that are more environmentally friendly, which goes against the hierarchy in integrated waste management envisioned in Ley 8839 and, therefore, also contravenes the principles indicated above. They estimate that in practice priority will be given to co-incineration over other options, such as reuse and recycling, contained in the Plan de Residuos Sólidos of the year 2008 (PRESOL). It is also argued that the Decree “incentivizes,” or even that it “stimulates,” co-incineration, which entails an environmental risk, thus violating the Right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. In this specific line, the plaintiffs allude to the violation of the principles of the Sistema Integral de Tratamiento de Residuos: shared responsibility, internalization of costs and prevention at the source, in addition to environmental education. Regarding all these grievances, the Court considers that the key to the decision on this specific point lies in properly understanding the purpose sought by the challenged regulation and the way in which that purpose has been embodied in the regulatory design. In the first place, it must be clear that the activity regulated by Decreto 39136 is an activity intended to fit into the system of environmental protection measures. Co-incineration of waste cannot be compared with merely extractive activities, for example, because the prohibition of the latter brings only advantages for the environment; in contrast, this Chamber's intervention in the case of the Co-incineration Decree must take into account that carrying out the activity may have an impact on the environment, but preventing it may also have impacts. The Chamber understands that on this point the plaintiffs' perspective is correct in that the possible damages of the co-incineration activity must be assessed, but it is also partial because it does not give full weight to the harmful consequences for the environment that may result from preventing it from being carried out. It is from this latter perspective that a more complete and thorough understanding of Decreto 39136 is acquired, which includes among its preambles and reasoning the need to regulate the activity of co-incineration of ordinary waste in order to eliminate the negative impacts on public health and the environment.
Likewise, it establishes that the co-incineration of waste with recycling or reuse potential must be avoided, for which purpose a separation process for this type of waste must exist at the co-incineration plant. Additionally, the incineration of hazardous waste, as listed in the decree, or waste with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, is not permitted, requiring a specific separation and control operation to prevent the formation of organic pollutants such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. The challenged Decree also includes among its foundations the fact that protecting people's health and the environment requires natural and legal persons wishing to engage in the activity to establish and maintain rigorous operational conditions and technical requirements for the co-incineration activity. Among the main regulations found in Decree 39136, operational requirements and maximum emission limits are established for ordinary solid waste *co-incineration* facilities, always as a *subordinate* option to other prior processes in the waste management hierarchy provided for in Article 4 of Law 8839. In delimiting the scope of the activity regulated by the Regulation, Article 3 differentiates between co-incineration and incineration; it regulates energy recovery through the *co-incineration* process, understood as "thermal treatment of waste with recovery of the heat produced by combustion, including incineration by oxidation of waste, as well as pyrolysis, gasification or other thermal treatment processes, for example the plasma process, insofar as the substances resulting from the treatment are subsequently incinerated". The energy recovery sought to be made viable by the challenged Decree is contained in the Solid Waste Plan (Decreto 34647 of May 28, 2008, "Approval and Declaration of Public and National Interest of the Solid Waste Plan–Costa Rica (PRESOL), which remains as a guiding framework, in accordance with Article 1 of Decreto Ejecutivo 37567 of November 2, 2012, General Regulation to the Law for Integrated Waste Management. On the other hand, regarding the limits of the thermal treatment process by co-incineration, Article 4 *in fine* of Decree 39136 reiterates that "waste for recycling or reuse, in accordance with the hierarchy, **must not be** subjected to the thermal treatment process by co-incineration". (emphasis not in original). It follows from all the foregoing that Decree 39136 has been constructed coincidentally with the very perspective held by the plaintiffs, in the sense that co-incineration should not be the priority mechanism for waste disposal and that efforts should be directed toward adherence to Law 8839 and its hierarchy. Indeed, Decree 39136 embraces this concept and repeats the need to respect the hierarchy in integrated waste management. Its Article 1 states that "co-incineration must be the last option, once the hierarchy in integrated waste management, established in Article 4 of Ley Nº 8839 of June 24, 2010 'Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos', published in La Gaceta Nº 135 of July 13, 2010, has been fulfilled." Thus, if—as the plaintiffs claim—we accept that Law 8839 is a valid development and an acceptable and valid framework within the principles of the constitutional right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, then we must understand that the Decree—insofar as it replicates the provisions of said law and does not deviate from it—also complies with and adheres to constitutional requirements. Contrary to what the plaintiffs indicated, this Court finds that Decree 39136 does not contradict the law, neither expressly nor implicitly; rather,—by express text—it leaves intact the preferential attention and priority stimulation of activities such as reduction, reuse, and recycling. The option set forth by the authorities in the discussed Decree meshes with the law insofar as it does not seek to incentivize or stimulate co-incineration, but only to produce a regulatory framework for that activity in case there are subjects interested in carrying it out; that exercise is not, per se, contrary to constitutional environmental law or its principles if we adhere to its content, since such regulation includes, as observed, a specific regime of operating and control conditions that are added to, and do not replace, all other general requirements demanded by the various environmental protection laws, with the purpose of protecting the natural environment in different ways. This Court does not find that Decree 39136 contains an authorization for co-incineration conceived as an independent, open alternative, without limits or controls, and even less is it observed that an incentive or stimulus has been established for this activity over the activities located higher in the order of priorities set by law. In this order of considerations, it is clear that one must not lose sight of the fact that the activity of waste co-incineration, poorly conceived or scarcely regulated, would raise serious doubts of constitutionality as it is a potentially more polluting activity compared to waste reduction, reuse, or recycling, which leave a smaller footprint on the environment. But that is not the case when co-incineration is conceived as a subordinate or subsidiary option, as presented in the challenged Decree. Unlike the plaintiffs and the position held by some coadjuvants, this Chamber understands that the State does no wrong in producing regulations for the waste co-incineration activity, as it is a lawful activity, since formally there is no prohibition against its execution and rather—from the perspective of the constitutional right to the environment and its principles—it may well have its place within waste management, provided its possibility of use is regulated and normatively provided for in cases where it proves less polluting than other available means of waste disposal. As stated, its utility and environmental value will depend on which activities we compare it to, for if we confront it with waste reduction, reuse, or recycling, its disadvantage would be clear, and that is why Decree 39136 does well when it emphasizes the prohibition of co-incineration of waste susceptible to those treatments; but instead, co-incineration will be advantageous if compared to the option of disposing of waste in open-air dumps which, unfortunately, still persist in our country, and on which the plaintiffs omit any comparison or assessment. Moreover, no further evidence is provided as to the manner in which the regulatory set, which clearly regulates a subordinate operation, would have the effect of actually producing an effective inducement toward the co-incineration activity, to the detriment of the other waste disposal activities that rank above it in the legally established order of relevance for waste disposal. And even less are convincing reasons given for this Court to deem as certain or at least highly probable the future conduct of the various actors in this matter. Thus, this Chamber considers that Decree 39136 is not contrary to the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment nor to any of its principles that have been adopted by this Chamber as an integral part of Constitutional Law.
**VI.- <u>Point B</u>: Disregard of international obligations with the enactment of Decree 39136.** The plaintiffs question that the thermal treatment of solid waste in the presence of air generates harmful gases released into the atmosphere, which injures part of the clauses of various international instruments to which Costa Rica is a party. It is mentioned, on one hand, that the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer establish obligations to protect health and the environment against the adverse effects of activities that may affect the ozone layer. It is considered that the objective established in Articles 1 and 4 of Decree 39136 violates the principle of progressivity in the elimination of polluting sources. It is added that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, whose Annex A mentions waste incineration, are among the activities expressly limiting the achievement of greenhouse gas reduction. The plaintiffs argue the non-compliance with international instruments, indicating that by allowing the incineration industry, the international objective provided for in the cited instruments of avoiding the generation of greenhouse gases and minimizing the effect on the ozone layer is transgressed, all of which exposes human health. On this point, this Court does not find that the plaintiffs have demonstrated in this process the manner in which the challenged Decree and its provisions fail to comply with what is specifically provided in the cited international instruments, as this Chamber is only warned about the risky effects of the incineration activity for human life. It is set forth that Article 3 of Decree 39136 establishes the different gas emissions produced by the incineration activity, but it is not specified which provisions of the cited international Conventions and Protocol are breached or contain prohibitive norms that have been transgressed. To reinforce this conclusion of the Court, it is therefore considered necessary to review what is provided by the international instruments on the matter that Decree 39136 deals with. Regarding what the international instruments provide, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Law 7228 of May 6, 1991, allows the control, limitation, reduction, or prevention of activities that may have adverse effects on the ozone layer. Of interest, it provides in its Article 2, paragraph 2 that the Parties shall, to the extent possible, adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures to control, limit, reduce, or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or control should it be found that these activities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the ozone layer. For its part, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Law 7223 of April 8, 1991), aims to adopt preventive measures to equitably control the total global emissions of specific substances, namely: chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, halons, and methyl bromides, for their elimination based on scientific advances, technical and economic aspects, and the needs of developing countries. In accordance with said Protocol, Costa Rica has taken specific actions, such as the prohibition on the use of chlorofluorocarbons and halons since 2010, and in the case of hydrochlorofluorocarbons, their importation is restricted through substance quotas, among others. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Law 7414 of June 13, 1994, also empowers parties to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change, and among the commitments assumed by the Parties is to promote and support technologies, practices, and processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol, Law 8219 of March 8, 2002, and the cited Convention on Climate Change, coincide in committing their Parties to achieving individual and legally binding targets to limit or reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases, namely: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol aims to fulfill quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments by applying policies and measures according to national circumstances. While the Kyoto Protocol lists waste incineration in the list of activities that harm the environment, the fact is that it is not prohibited; it is from this basis that the Parties acquire commitments to avoid or control the activity in order to safeguard the environment and public health. Based on the foregoing, this Court agrees with what was stated by the State's advisory body in concluding that Decree 39136 is consistent with those international conventions, and with the principles of non-regression and sustainable development, and progressivity, insofar as it provides for the reduction of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine, through separation and control operations for waste to be incinerated, in order to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Likewise, it regulates and subjects to technical limits one of the sectors or source categories cited in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol, relating to waste, such as waste incineration. It also establishes the technical limits and control mechanisms for the activity permitted under Law 8839. Among the measures that the Decree mandates are waste classification, minimum operating temperatures, temperature control, and atmospheric emissions monitoring (Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Decree). Thus conceived, the operation, as understood by this Chamber, is compatible with the obligations contained in Article 50 of the Constitution, and with international commitments and the principle of progressivity, since measures are adopted that do not degrade the level of protection but rather are synchronized with the protection of the environment and health, which is verified by observing that the maximum permitted levels are set according to parameters of reasonableness and proportionality, and the rules of science and technique. Similarly, this Chamber holds as true the assertion of the State's advisory body that the regulation contained in the challenged Decree converges with the purposes considered for the adoption of European Directive 2010/75/EU. In accordance with all the foregoing, it is concluded that the issuance of the discussed Decree does not contradict the goals and legal commitments acquired by Costa Rica through the signing of international treaties on these issues, and therefore, on this point, the action must be declared without merit.
**VII.- <u>Point C</u>: Claim of injury to the principles of objectivation and non-regression in environmental matters, with the enactment of Decree 39136.** Also with this unconstitutionality action, it is alleged that Decree 39136 leaves without effect the Decreto Ejecutivo 38500-S-MINAE, "National Moratorium on Thermal Transformation Activities of Ordinary Solid Waste," a situation that the plaintiffs believe violates the principles of objectivation and non-regression recognized by constitutional environmental doctrine, given that there are no studies verifying that the primary processes of the hierarchy have already been fulfilled.
They likewise consider that the principle of non-regression (principio de no regresión) is violated inasmuch as Decree 39136 authorizes an environmentally risky activity, even with the controls established in said regulatory body; this determines a regression with respect to the prior legal situation, since Decree 38500-S-MINAE better ensured environmental protection. In relation to this allegation, the authorities issued their report and insist that one cannot lose sight of the nature of Executive Decree 38500-S-MINAE, “National Moratorium on Thermal Transformation Activities of Ordinary Solid Waste” (hereinafter referred to as the Moratorium Decree). This measure, it is indicated, was adopted as a temporary provision to achieve the time necessary to shape the technical measures required to faithfully comply with Law 8839, sections 4, 6, and 42. With regard to this point, the text of the aforementioned Moratorium Decree literally states:
“Article 1.—A national moratorium is hereby established on thermal transformation activities of ordinary solid waste, until such time as the Health and Environment Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts on health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839, called the Integrated Waste Management Law.
Article 2.—It shall be effective as of its publication.” This provision was subjected to constitutional analysis regarding its validity relative to the appropriate protection of the Right to a healthy environment, and in judgment 2014-16162, the Constitutional Chamber stated the following on this point:
“III.— In this case, the basis of the challenged Decree is clear in indicating that among the principles contained in the Integrated Waste Management Law ‘is the Precautionary Principle, according to which, where there is danger of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason to postpone the adoption of effective measures based on costs to prevent the degradation of the environment or health.’ Likewise, that ‘technologies are being promoted in the country that seek the production of electric energy through the thermal transformation (combustion, gasification, pyrolysis, plasma, among others) of ordinary solid waste, which could contravene the spirit of the Integrated Waste Management Law No. 8839, as well as carry a risk to the health of people and the environment because thermal transformation processes are sensitive to the composition of the raw material and to the technique used for its transformation regarding the results of its atmospheric emissions.’ Finally, that ‘the proposals for technologies known to date represent very disparate electric generation yields, which makes evident the need to analyze said technologies based on their capacity for energy recovery, in order to ensure the national interest in the matter.’ The State, in application of the precautionary principle and for the sake of protecting the environment and people’s health, seeks to suspend the activity of thermal transformation of ordinary solid waste until such time as the corresponding technical studies are carried out. For their part, the plaintiffs consider that said moratorium, far from protecting the environment, causes harm since said technical transformation, in addition to producing new energy, swiftly resolves the disposal of solid waste. This Court appreciates that, in essence, there is no collision between the challenged rule and Article 50 of the Political Constitution, but rather a discrepancy between what is provided in the challenged Decree and the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the best way to protect the environment and people’s health. It is not for this Chamber to decide on the merits of one or another way of disposing of solid waste. The Ministry of Environment and Energy and the Ministry of Health, in the challenged decree, in compliance with what is provided not only in Article 50 of the Political Constitution but also in the Integrated Waste Management Law, have taken the initiative to review the possible consequences on health and the environment that the thermal transformation of solid waste may have, in order to take the appropriate measures, without it being proper for this Chamber to interfere in such matters, of an eminently technical nature, which are clearly outside its competence. Consequently, the action must be dismissed regarding this point.” (The emphasis is not from the original) Both the very wording of said Decree, and the manner in which it was understood and interpreted by this Chamber in the judgment just cited, allow us to conclude that the moratorium was not intended to become a permanent regulation within the legal framework relative to environmental protection. On the contrary, it is evident from the transcribed texts that it was a decision made in accordance with the precautionary principle (principio precautorio), and that it established a temporary state of affairs while the State, through its authorities, managed to produce the studies and instruments to ensure respect for the right to human health and to enjoy an ecologically sound and balanced environment.— Thus, with Decree 39136 and its provisions, the State considers itself satisfied regarding the existence of those technical conditions and of their suitability to achieve the pursued end, inasmuch as—according to its criterion—the co-incineration (coincineración) activity, carried out under the strict terms of the Decree, ensures full protection of health and the environment. The plaintiffs generally find that design insufficient, and for that reason they assert that the Decree fails to ensure health and the environment, as there is no sufficient scientific basis, particularly in relation to the issue of hazardous waste (residuos peligrosos), that of the emission of toxic gases recognized in Article 3 of Decree 39136, and the safety distances of incineration plants, whereby there would be injury to the principle of technical objectivity (principio de objetivación), as the due technical support for its operation is lacking. Faced with this reproach, in the reports of the Health and Environment authorities, the Chamber is advised that Decree 39136 regulates the incineration activity in a safer manner, as the regulations provide the technical measures necessary for the adequate control of co-incineration as one of the alternatives for the valorization of solid waste contained in Law 8839, so the repeal (derogación) of the Moratorium Decree does not disregard the principles of technical objectivity, non-regression in environmental matters, reasonableness, and proportionality. Indeed, Decree 39136 promotes the prior separation of recoverable waste, a prerequisite for thermal treatment of waste, and with respect to the violation of the principle of technical objectivity, it is understood that in the environmental feasibility studies it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and SETENA to verify compliance with the provisions of Decree 39136 and all other applicable regulations prior to authorizing the activity, and of course for the entire time it is in operation. Special studies are not required, since in each case a specific evaluation must be carried out that will define whether or not it is environmentally admissible to operate the co-incineration activity intended to be conducted. Finally, it is worth noting that a correct analysis of the Moratorium Decree also allows us to rule out any affectation of the principle of non-regression, because, apart from the temporary nature of that legal act, the prohibition of the activity ordered at that time was conditional until ‘the Health and Environment Authorities have technical and scientific certainty that said activity will not cause impacts on health and the environment and it is guaranteed that this practice does not contravene the principles of Law No. 8839, called the Integrated Waste Management Law.’ What the authorities maintain in this regard is that with the design for the operation and control of co-incineration activities set forth in Decree 39136, added to the application of the other control rules that are applicable, a sufficient technical and scientific certainty is achieved—in their criterion—regarding the protection of health and the environment, and additionally, compliance with the provisions of Law 8839. From that perspective, the Chamber understands that no regression can be claimed with respect to what was provided by the Moratorium Decree if what was expressed therein was the suspension of the activity until the authorities confirmed the existence of the required conditions, and therefore it could be said that the competent bodies have adhered to such provisions in issuing Decree 39136. For the Court, and with regard to the claims related to constitutional rights, Decree 39136 does not come to nullify the efforts achieved in the regulations governing the issue; the Executive Branch took actions to control and regulate the thermal processing of waste and thereby order the exercise of this activity that is provided for in Law 8839; the activity of co-incineration of solid waste has been regulated, and the conditions and limits have been established to minimize any impact on the environment and health from the co-incineration activity. The Court thus concludes that on this point, the violation of the principles of technical objectivity and non-regression in environmental matters is not accredited.
VIII.— Point D: Claim regarding the lack of trained professionals for the co-incineration activity authorized in Decree 39136. The plaintiffs allege the absence of trained professionals to verify that the co-incineration of waste activity does not become a threat to or an injury to health or the environment, since the Decree under discussion itself indicates in Transitory Provision II the need for professional training for start-up and initial commissioning activities, site management, material studies, mechanical resistance, operation, and environmental control of the installations. This situation is considered to contravene the spirit of Constitutional Article 50 due to the risk from contamination effects and eventual environmental damage. On this point, the court notes that the plaintiffs indicate that the absence of trained professionals will result in a co-incineration activity that produces damage to the environment and to people’s health.— It is an obvious question, but one that has precisely been addressed by Decree 39136 in its Transitory Provision II, and what can be observed is that the conclusions the plaintiffs draw from the text of that provision do not conform to a systematic reading of the challenged decree. The cited Transitory Provision II states:
TRANSITORY PROVISION II: Within a period of six (6) months, the Federated College of Engineers and Architects (Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos), the College of Chemical Engineers and Related Professionals (Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines), and the College of Chemists of Costa Rica (Colegio de Químicos de Costa Rica), must train their professionals to carry out the activities of start-up and initial commissioning, site management, material studies, mechanical resistance, operation, and environmental control of the regulated installations, in order to guarantee throughout the useful life of the installation that, at the time of state operating authorization and its renewals, what is indicated in this regulation is complied with. Within this same period, the cited Professional Colleges must implement an electronic endorsement system for the documentation that, by the law that governs them, must be submitted to public institutions.
Meanwhile, Transitory Provision IV complements the idea by providing:
“TRANSITORY PROVISION IV: SETENA shall not hear the processes of environmental impact assessment for co-incineration installations during the first nine (9) months counted from the publication of this regulation in the official gazette La Gaceta.” As can be noted, if the Decree is fully heeded, by the time the authorization processes begin, the problem the plaintiffs point out will not exist because the training ordered by the Decree to the different authorities, and specifically to the professional colleges specifically mentioned, will have been completed.— Therefore, there is no injury present in the design of Decree 39136 to the rights to the environment or to people’s health, in the specific terms raised on this point by the plaintiffs, but it is worth additionally indicating that the competent authorities clarify that any new technology requires training the professionals and technicians who will develop projects and verify the application of regulations, and that in the present case there are programs in the Ministry of Health, with support from the Emission and Immission Standards Council (Consejo de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión) created by Decree 36551 of April 27, 2011, and international commitments for training. On this point, it is therefore not observed that a violation of Article 50 of the Political Constitution is produced.
IX.— Second group of claims: Infractions arising from the provisions of Decree 39136 or from omissions of the cited regulation.
X.— Lack of specific regulation for incineration of hazardous waste.
The lack of specific regulation for the incineration of hazardous waste is challenged, due to its level of risk and air toxicity. It is reproached that between 3% and 10% of ordinary solid waste corresponds to hazardous waste, which would be taken to incineration, increasing the contaminating potential. The Chamber observes on this matter that the challenged Decree establishes that co-incineration with a content exceeding 1% of halogenated compounds expressed as chlorine must be avoided, under separation and control operations to prevent the formation of organic pollutants, such as dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls (Considering 5, Articles 4 in fine, 7 subsection a.iv), 9 subsection j, 10 subsections k and l, and 22). The rejection of hazardous waste in co-incineration processes is also provided for in Decree 39136. Furthermore, it prohibits the recovery activities of waste previously disposed of in sanitary landfills or dumps; the incineration and co-incineration of radioactive or nuclear waste, electrical and electronic waste, whole batteries and accumulators or parts containing heavy metals, corrosive substances, including mineral acids, those containing cyanide, asbestos, heavy metals or contaminated with them, waste of unknown or unpredictable composition, hazardous waste from health care services, their teaching establishments and laboratories, explosives, chemical or biological weapons destined for destruction, Persistent Organic Pollutants, and Polyvinyl Chloride waste (Article 5). For their part, numerals 22 and 23 of Decree 39136 set the emission limits and maximums for dioxins, furans, polychlorinated biphenyls, and heavy metals. According to the reports rendered by the authorities of the Ministry of Environment and Energy, the co-incineration limits are more updated and stricter than those provided in Decree 31837-S, which regulates the operating conditions for hazardous waste treatment and is based on Technical guidelines on environmentally sound co-processing of hazardous wastes. In this aspect, the violation of the right to a healthy environment is alleged; however, the argument is based on the possible effects that may arise from the lack of attention to the regulations at the time of their implementation, so the impact that the regulations themselves may contain and that would make them deserving of annulment is not substantiated.
**XI. Regarding the claim about the risk and lack of regulatory measures on the final products of incineration.** The plaintiffs consider that the right to a healthy environment and the health of the population, as well as the precautionary principle, are seriously threatened by the omission to regulate the final disposal of the final products of incineration. In order to safeguard the environment and health, Decree 39136 contains extensive regulatory provisions, especially in Articles 6, 10, 13, 14, and 16, where the rules are set for all types of final products of co-incineration, both gases and ashes, and also including sludge from wastewater treatment, unless a chemical analysis indicates otherwise (Article 16). Based on such rules, their separate storage is ordered; the approval of a Comprehensive Hazardous Solid Waste Management Program is required; tests are required to establish the physical and chemical characteristics, their contaminating potential, and hazardousness in accordance with the Regulation on the procedure to carry out the extraction test to determine constituents that make a waste hazardous due to its toxicity to the environment, Decree 27002-MINAE of April 29, 1998 (La Gaceta No. 101 of May 27, 1998); in addition to monthly analyses and a daily record in accordance with Decree 37788. Therefore, this specific point must be dismissed on the understanding that the specific provisions contained in Decree 39136, added to the rest of the established monitoring and control regulations, constitute a sufficiently protective framework for the environment and health, all without prejudice to the fact that specific activities or state omissions that may endanger such rights in specific cases can be reviewed by the competent authorities and, in cases of serious and direct impacts, by this Chamber itself.
**XII.- Constitutional violations originating from Article 7 of Decree 39136, relating to distances and protected populations.-** The plaintiffs question that Decree 39136 contains a list of institutions and populations that must be protected from proximity to co-incineration plants, but without technical justification, universities and residences are left without such protection. This violates the principle of objectification in environmental matters and the right to life and equality. They believe that all people should have special protection so that co-incinerators are not within a 1000-meter radius set by the Decree. Furthermore, they also discuss this protection radius distance, considering that particular atmospheric factors are not taken into consideration. On this issue, the Court observes that the articles addressing the matter are numerals 7 and 9 of Decree 39136; these norms state in pertinent part:
"Article 7. (...) vii.- Quantitative risk assessment that contemplates the contingency scenarios that could affect the normal operation of the facility, and the mitigation and control measures for such risks. **Blast wave studies and safety distances** must be included for facilities of official centers of the National Network for Childcare and Development (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI and public, private and mixed comprehensive care centers for persons up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas and chemical industries that superficially store combustible or flammable products in quantities greater than 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries, within a radius of 1000 m., as well as their consequences for health and the environment." "Article 9.- Of the application for a Location Permit before the Ministry of Health. Co-incineration facilities must maintain a location distance of one thousand (1000) m. from facilities of official centers of the National Network for Childcare and Development (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI and public, private and mixed comprehensive care centers for persons up to twelve years of age), public and private educational centers, public and private health establishments (hospitals and clinics), storage and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas or natural gas and chemical industries that superficially store combustible or flammable products in quantities greater than 1000 m3, agricultural activities, and food processing industries." That is to say, it concerns the inclusion, on the one hand, of special impact studies and safety measures and, on the other, the setting of location restrictions regarding a certain type of institution, which are objectively deserving of greater protection, due to the concentration of people who can be presumed to have lesser abilities to follow instructions and, in general, to act on their own in compliance with instructions. Therein lies, for the Chamber, the key to the distinction and its justification, which from that perspective is reasonable and adequate.- But, in addition to the above, the advisory body of the Chamber is correct in pointing out that this listing cannot be read as a decree of non-protection for the rest of the population, and that is clear when atmospheric dispersion studies and a general quantitative risk assessment are required. Added to the above is that the location and approval of sites proposed for co-incineration facilities must be in accordance with the approved Land-Use Planning (Ordenamiento Territorial), or, a conforming land use issued by the respective Municipality, as well as the application for a location permit before the Ministry of Health that allows reporting the distance to various facilities and evaluating studies on wind and the population to be served, among others (Articles 8 and 9 of Decree 39136). Hence, it is deduced that the regulations have indeed considered the analysis of technical aspects that must be assessed by the competent environmental and health authorities, and regarding such matters, this Court goes only so far as to determine that within the legal system there exist the bodies and processes responsible for ensuring the technical correctness of the proposals, and that their decisions are framed by provisions that allow the protection of the environment and, of course, the health of the people.- As indicated above, the Chamber understands that the Decree, on this issue of protecting the health and safety of the population, establishes rules that are added to and do not replace all the other existing protective measures regarding the environment and the health of the population. It is therefore clear that there is no violation of the principle of equality regarding the protection owed to the general population, and there is no reason to annul Articles 7 and 9 if their purpose is to add to the regulatory framework that must be complied with in environmental matters to operate a co-incineration plant for waste.
**XIII.- Omission of the State to produce a decree for the incineration of hazardous waste.-** The plaintiffs note that instead of a decree like 39136, which regulates the incineration of **ordinary** waste, what should have been issued, due to its evident need, is a regulation that orders and sets strict standards for a **hazardous solid waste treatment system**, which includes the waste from the incineration process as part of it, and that in the face of this absence, the principles of objectification, progressivity, and non-regression are violated **by omission**. They add that this absence is more pronounced due to the lack of an appropriate failure control mechanism and the existence of Transitional Provision VI of Decree 39136, which imposes the limits of said Decree on the incineration of hazardous waste, thereby implicitly recognizing the absence of specific regulations.- The Court understands that, on the first point, the interested parties merely express what must be considered their particular opinion on the timeliness and necessity of issuing a Decree on hazardous waste management instead of the challenged Decree, and therefore, there is no constitutional argument to support that claim. Secondly, a system with rules and parameters to order the shutdown of the incineration process exists in the challenged Decree (Article 17 of the discussed Decree).- Finally, regarding the third aspect, it should be noted that Transitional Provision VI is an additional safety measure, which in principle does not apply to the activity being authorized by the Decree, which only allows the incineration of ordinary waste and expressly excludes the incineration of hazardous waste.- This is how this Court sees it, understanding that said norm is not at all authorizing the incineration of hazardous waste, which would require a regulatory framework quite different from that contained in Decree 39136.- However, it is worth noting, as the State's advisory body does, that the management and disposal of hazardous waste **is normatively regulated** in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Law 7438 of October 6, 1994; the General Health Law, No. 5395 of October 30, 1973; the Regulation for the Management of Industrial Hazardous Wastes, Decree 27001 of April 29, 1998; and, in the General Regulation for the Classification and Management of Hazardous Waste, Decree 37788 of February 15, 2013. It is also affirmed that specific regulations exist, such as, for example, the Regulation on the management of infectious-contagious waste generated in establishments providing health care and related services, Decree 30965 of December 17, 2002; the Regulation of requirements, conditions, and controls for the use of alternative fuels in cement kilns, Decree 31837 of April 1, 2004; the Regulation for the Declaration of Special Management Waste, Decree 38272 of January 7, 2014; and, the Regulation on air emission limits for glass melting furnaces, Decree 38237 of February 3, 2014. From all the above, it can be concluded that the challenged Decree 39136 does not violate the Political Constitution on this point.
**XIV.- On the deadlines for granting permits by the authorities.** The plaintiffs consider that the deadlines granted to the authorities of the Ministry of Health in the final paragraph of Article 9, to authorize the location of incineration plants and grant the operating permit, are excessively short and therefore affect the right to a healthy environment and thereby the health of the people. The respective paragraph of the cited article states:
"Article 9.- (...) The Ministry of Health must issue the resolution regarding the location permit application, within ten (10) working days following receipt of the application with complete information. In justified cases, the deadline may be extended upon prior notification to the interested party, but said extension may not exceed ten (10) working days. If the permit is granted, its validity shall be one year from the date of issuance of the resolution granting it. (...)" The plaintiffs consider that the 10 days established to carry out the prior work of verifying technical and legal conditions are insufficient, which increases the contaminant risk of the waste incineration activity.
In this regard, the Attorney General's Office agrees with the plaintiffs concerning the inadequacy of the ten-day period for the Ministry of Health to properly analyze and assess a decision of such relevance. The Chamber understands the concern reflected in the cited arguments and comprehends that haste is not the appropriate attitude when the authorization of activities is at stake, activities that necessarily entail the possibility of eventualities and contingencies that may put people's health or the environment at risk.- However, on this point, and as the Attorney General's Office also indicates, in resolving the matter this Chamber must take into account the settled jurisprudence of this Court, which has held that time limits in environmental matters -as is the case here- cannot and should not be considered peremptory but merely procedural, just as it has also been clearly affirmed that in this environmental matter neither does the figure of positive silence (silencio positivo) operate, for which reason it is deemed that the rule does not present a constitutional problem in that sense, since the lack of a response within the indicated time limit could not be taken as a tacit or implicit authorization for carrying out the co-incineration activity regulated by the Decree under discussion.- **XV.- Conclusions**. The plaintiffs complain that Executive Decree No. 39136-S-MINAE violates Articles 7 and 50 of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional principles of sustainable development, environmental education, precautionary principle, objectification, and progressivity. From the analysis of the different arguments presented in the action, it is concluded that, in general, the challenged Decree contains the pertinent regulations for the limits, control, and operation of the co-incineration activity of solid waste, both ordinary and hazardous, so that we are not in the presence of uncontrolled authorizations of the thermal waste treatment process as a threat to the environment. It is not evident in this process that the regulation of the solid waste co-incineration process breaches international commitments undertaken for the protection of the ozone layer, the reduction of greenhouse gases, and the safeguarding of air and the environment ratified by Costa Rica. It is equally concluded that a part of the arguments presented by the plaintiffs in the filing brief lack the required substantiation to request the annulment of the regulatory rule for unconstitutionality, and in several cases it is a matter of setting forth the way in which -in the opinion of the interested parties- the matter should be ordered. It emerges from the filing brief that the plaintiffs make considerations about the scope of the regulation and allege possible effects of the regulation when put into practice; however, no evidence is provided that the problems they anticipate have their origin specifically and concretely in the strict application of the provisions of Decree 39136; in such a way, the claim regarding possible effects that the activity regulated in the challenged Decree may bring with it, but without having technically accredited its existence and its direct link to the rule under dispute, prevents carrying out the constitutional review of the rule to eventually eliminate it from the legal system. It is clear that the foregoing does not mean that the authorities and interested parties cannot return to the Chamber to subsequently challenge, through the corresponding procedural route, the injuries that may be occurring due to the defective implementation of the regulation at the corresponding time. For all the foregoing, it is therefore appropriate to declare the action without merit.
**Por tanto:** The action filed is declared without merit. Magistrate Cruz Castro notes his dissent.
Ernesto Jinesta L.
| Fernando Cruz C. | Fernando Castillo V. |
| Paul Rueda L. |
</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> <td style="width: 226.35pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="302"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;">Nancy Hernández L.</span></p> </td> </tr> <tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 4;"> <td style="width: 220.95pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="295"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> <td style="width: 226.35pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="302"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> </tr> <tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 5;"> <td style="width: 220.95pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="295"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> <td style="width: 226.35pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="302"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> </tr> <tr style="mso-yfti-irow: 6; mso-yfti-lastrow: yes;"> <td style="width: 220.95pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="295"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;">José P. Hernández G.</span></p> </td> <td style="width: 226.35pt; padding: 0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;" valign="top" width="302"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;">Luis Fdo. Salazar A.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span lang="ES-TRAD" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black; mso-ansi-language: ES-TRAD;"> </span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; line-height: normal; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; font-family: 'Courier New'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: ES;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: right; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="right"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black;">Expediente 16-002290-0007-CO</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black;">NOTE BY JUSTICE CRUZ CASTRO: The arguments put forth by the petitioners raise transcendent questions and assessments, however, the challenged regulations are enacted within acceptable parameters for the protection of the environment, as set forth in the opinion I subscribe to. I consider that the rules challenged in the action are at the limit of what is admissible in the constitutional protection of the environment. The objections raised by the appellants become an important reference point when assessing the problems and threats that may arise in the application of Decreto 39136. The co-incineration of solid waste, both ordinary and hazardous, is a very sensitive and vulnerable activity in the effective protection of the environment, especially due to the force of principles as important as the preventive principle and “in dubio pro natura”. I consider that what we have decided in this judgment does not entirely close the questions that the petitioners have very aptly proposed; the effective execution of the challenged Decree will raise new perspectives on the subject, and it may well be that in the future there will be better elements of judgment, derived from practice, in which the objections raised in the action may merit reconsideration and a thorough analysis.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES" style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: center; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;" align="center"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; color: black;">Fernando Cruz C.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: ES;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: 35.5pt; line-height: 150%; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;"><span lang="ES" style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 150%; font-family: 'Arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: ES;"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"> </p> </div>
marayaa nsalazar 2 0 2018-08-01T20:10:00Z 2018-08-01T20:10:00Z 3 15341 84379 PJ 703 199 99521 12.00 21 false false false ES-CR X-NONE X-NONE *160022900007CO* Res. Nº 2016-017375 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las once horas con cuarenta minutos del veintitrés de noviembre de dos mil dieciséis.
Acción Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por ALVARO SAGOT RODRIGUEZ y ALLAN ASTORGA GATGENS, portadores de las cédulas de identidad números 2-0365-0227, 3-0252-0451, respectivamente, contra el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S- MINAE (Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios), publicado en el Alcance Digital No. 069 a La Gaceta No. 170 del 1 de septiembre de 2015. Intervienen en este asunto Ana Lorena Brenes en condición de Procuradora General de la República; Fernando Llorca Castro, como Ministro de Salud; La señora Irene Cañas Díaz, en su condición de Ministra a.í. de Ambiente y Energía (en adelante MINAE). Participan además, en condición de coadyuvantes activos la siguientes personas: Fabián de Jesús Pacheco Rodríguez, Edgardo Araya Sibaja, Melissa Flores Núñez, en representación de la Asociación de Desarrollo de Residencial Ciudad Cariari, Andrés Camacho L. y otros, Yorleny Rodríguez Conejo y otros, Amanda Araya Rivas y otros, Ernesto Monge y otros, Minor Picado Camareno y otros, Fernando Araya Anderson, Yerling Ruiz Vásquez y otros, Héctor González Pacheco. Como coadyuvantes pasivos participan el Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesiones Afines, y la Cooperativa de Electrificación Rural de Guanacaste R.L. (CoopeGuanacaste R.L.).
Resultando:
1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las quince horas del dieciocho de febrero de 2016, los accionantes solicitan que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S- MINAE de 15 de junio de 2015 de 15 de junio de 2015, Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, por estimarlo contrario a los artículos 7, 21, 33 y 50 de la Constitución Política, así como, a los principios ambientales de objetivación, progresividad, no regresión, desarrollo sustentable, tutela científica, precautorio, responsabilidades compartidas, internalización de costos y prevención en la fuente. Alegan que dicha normativa establece los requisitos de operación y límites máximos de emisión para las instalaciones de coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, lo que implica autorizar o permitir la incineración de aquellos residuos generados en viviendas o de otras fuentes cuyos residuos sean similares a los de las viviendas. Estiman que al autorizarse o habilitarse el funcionamiento de instalaciones de coincineración, se está desestimulando el manejo integral de los residuos sólidos ordinarios y en su lugar, se está propiciando que, en la práctica, se otorgue prioridad a la incineración de tales residuos antes que implementar otras opciones más amigables para el ambiente, como lo exige la Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos Sólidos; todo lo anterior violenta la lógica de protección, educación, desarrollo sustentable y concientización ambiental que emana del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Añaden que el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 38500-S-MINAE de 11 de junio de 2014 establecía una moratoria a la industria de la incineración de residuos para disminuir la contaminación del aire, sin embargo fue derogado por Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE en su artículo 36, sin haber efectuado los estudios que verificaran que se habían cumplido los procesos primarios de la jerarquización previstos en el artículo 4 de la Ley General de Residuos; estiman que esta derogatoria transgrede los principios de objetivación y no regresión en materia ambiental, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Expresan que, con el Reglamento vigente, al permitirse el funcionamiento de las incineradoras, se incumplen las obligaciones internacionales del Estado costarricense para proteger la salud humana y el medio ambiente contra los efectos adversos resultantes o que puedan resultar de las actividades humanas como la incineración, que generan la emisión de gases que pueden modificar la capa de ozono. Dichas obligaciones están previstas en la Convención de Viena para la Protección de la Capa de Ozono (Ley No. 7228) y el Protocolo de Montreal relativo a las sustancias que agotan la capa de ozono, instrumentos que integran el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense según lo establece el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. Expresan que abrirse a la industria de la incineración transgrede el objetivo internacional previsto en dichas normas de evitar la generación de gases de efecto invernadero, por lo que el Decreto cuestionado resulta regresivo y violatorio del principio de progresividad en la eliminación de fuentes contaminantes. Agregan que Costa Rica ha ratificado otros convenios como el Convenio Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático y el Protocolo de Kyoto que guían para evitar los gases que generan el efecto disminución de la capa de ozono y constituyen limitantes expresos para evitar los gases con efecto invernadero; no obstante en el artículo 3 del Decreto cuestionado se expone que existirán emanaciones de gases tales como carbono orgánico total, dióxido de azufre, óxidos de nitrógeno, en donde las dioxinas y furanos son tóxicos para la vida humana. Señalan que de los anexos del Reglamento se aprecia que permitir la actividad de incineración es un riesgo latente para la vida humana, en infracción del artículo 21 constitucional y resulta un choque contra el desarrollo sustentable. Alegan que no existen profesionales capacitados para verificar que los procesos de incineración se realicen adecuadamente, según se deriva del transitorio segundo del reglamento cuestionado. Agregan que para los establecimientos e instalaciones que incineren residuos peligros, se aplican los límites de emisión del reglamento cuestionado, hasta tanto el Estado establezca la normativa específica para la incineración de residuos peligrosos, lo que implica que un porcentaje de los residuos que se llevarían a la incineración serían residuos peligrosos lo que aumenta el potencial contaminante de las dioxinas y escorias que se producen como producto final del proceso, aparte de las emisiones que pueden ser producidas. Afirman que la normativa impugnada es regresiva y transgresora del principio de tutela científica, ya que sale a la luz pública para aplicarse, sin existir normas específicas. Alegan que, la incineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios supone una actividad de alto riesgo ambiental y que, puede provocar muy serios daños ambientales a la biodiversidad y a la salud de la población en general. Argumentan que el producto final de la incineración son gases, sumamente contaminantes y residuos peligrosos que requieren un muy estricto mecanismo de control ambiental que, de no darse, pueden producir graves y serios daños al ambiente y la salud. Estiman que se violenta el principio precautorio, en tanto se autoriza una actividad sin establecer medidas expresas sobre lo que se hará con los desechos finales. Explican que el artículo 7 del Decreto cuestionado, establece la necesidad de una evaluación de riesgos cuantitativos, que contemple los escenarios de contingencia que podrían afectar la operación normal de la instalación de coincineración y las medidas de mitigación y control de dichos riesgos. Alegan que el artículo 7 del decreto cuestionado excluye de protección a universidades y residencias del radio de protección de 1000 metros respecto de las coincineradoras, lo que estima violatorio del numeral 21 en relación con los ordinales 33 y 50 todos, de la Constitución Política. Cuestionan la distancia de 1000 metros de protección establecida en el decreto, sin tomar en consideración factores atmosféricos particulares. Asimismo, expresan que, no se justifica el límite de 20 días que tiene el Ministerio de Salud para emitir criterio respecto de la solicitud de permiso de ubicación; consideran que con ello se atenta contra el derecho a la vida, a la salud y a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, al establecer términos rígidos para entregar los permisos por parte del Ministerio de Salud. Alegan que el reglamento impugnado quebranta los principios constitucionales de responsabilidades compartidas, internalización de costos y prevención en la fuente, ya que de éstos se extrae que los procesos de incineración no deberían ser viables y en cambio establecen una prohibición tácita a incinerar residuos. Señalan que el artículo 33, cuadro 5 del Decreto cuestionado, establece un protocolo para seguir un debido proceso en caso de incumplirse los límites de emisiones, sin que se suspendan los procesos de incineración mientras se hacen las correcciones, lo que provoca que la industria siga contaminando a la población con emisiones de dioxinas o furanos.
2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señalan que le asisten los intereses difusos, de conformidad con lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.
3.- Por resolución de las trece horas cuarenta minutos del veinticuatro de febrero de dos mil dieciséis, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República, al Ministerio de Salud y al Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE).
4.- La Procuraduría General de la República rindió su informe. Señala que en esta acción de inconstitucionalidad se impugna el Decreto 39136-S-MINAE de 15 de junio de 2015, Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, (Alcance 69 a La Gaceta No. 170 de 1° de setiembre de 2015), en el tanto autoriza la incineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios generados en viviendas o fuentes similares. Argumenta que el Decreto impugnado establece requisitos de operación y límites máximos de emisión para las instalaciones de coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, como opción subordinada a los otros procesos previos en la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley 8839 (Decreto 39136, artículos 1, 2, 4 y 15 inciso a). Señala que la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos, No. 8839 de 24 de junio de 2010, contempla el aprovechamiento energético como una de las alternativas de valorización de los residuos (artículos 4, 6 y 42), supeditada a la jerarquización para la gestión integral que da prioridad a la recuperación de materiales sobre el aprovechamiento energético, según criterios técnicos. Así, indica que el Decreto cuestionado regula en su artículo 3 la valorización energética a través del proceso de coincineración y, por su parte el artículo 5 inciso 3 de la misma norma prohíbe expresamente “la utilización de sistemas de tratamiento térmico de residuos sólidos ordinarios que no sean para generación eléctrica, recuperación energética o de materiales”. Por su parte el artículo 4 in fine del Decreto 39136 reitera que “los residuos para reciclaje o reutilización, de acuerdo con la jerarquización, no deben ser sometidos al proceso de tratamiento térmico por coincineración”. Asimismo, entre los requisitos que deben incluir el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental y la solitud de permiso de ubicación ante el Ministerio de Salud, se encuentran las instalaciones de separación, clasificación y recuperación de residuos valorizables que no se deben incinerar (artículos 7 inciso a.iv), 9 inciso j), 10 incisos k) y l). Por su parte, añade que el artículo 15 ibídem exige contar con un área de almacenamiento para los residuos conforme al Reglamento de Centros de Recuperación de Residuos Valorizables, Decreto 35906-S de 27 de enero de 2010; los estudios de generación y composición de los residuos ordinarios deben observar el Decreto 37745-S, Oficialización de la Metodología para Estudios de Generación y Composición de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios; y, los residuos ordinarios se deben manejar y almacenar cumpliendo el Reglamento sobre el Manejo de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios, Decreto 36093-S de 15 de julio de 2010. Considera que el Decreto que se impugna respeta la prioridad establecida por la Ley 8839 para la gestión integral de residuos, entre la que se encuentra la valorización energética. Con respecto de las obligaciones derivadas de convenios internacionales, afirma que el Decreto analizado es acorde con el Convenio de Viena para la protección de la capa de ozono (Ley 7228 de 6 de mayo de 1991), el Protocolo de Montreal relativo a las Sustancias Agotadoras de la Capa de Ozono (Ley 7223 de 8 de abril de 1991), el Convenio de Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático (Ley 7414 de 13 de junio de 1994) y, el Protocolo de Kioto (Ley 8219 de 8 de marzo de 2002), incorporados en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, según el artículo 7 Constitucional; dichos instrumentos establecen compromisos internacionales y controles para la reducción de sustancias afectantes de la capa de ozono. Estima que el Decreto analizado es acorde con los principios de no regresividad y desarrollo sustentable, y da progresividad a la normativa interna, por cuanto dispone la reducción de los compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, bajo operaciones de separación y control a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos. Asimismo, se regula y somete a límites técnicos uno de los sectores o categorías de fuentes citados en el Anexo A del Protocolo de Kyoto, relativo a los desechos, como lo es la incineración de desechos. El Reglamento fija también los límites técnicos y mecanismos de control para la actividad permitida conforme a la Ley 8839. Lo anterior es compatible con las obligaciones contenidas en el artículo 50 Constitucional y el principio de progresividad, pues se adoptan medidas que tienden a la protección del ambiente y la salud, lo cual se constata al observar que los niveles máximos permitidos se fijan conforme a los parámetros de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, y a las reglas de la ciencia y la técnica. En cuanto a las emanaciones de gases que pueden ser tóxicas para la salud humana producto de la actividad de incineración, se advierte que el Decreto cuestionado considera que debe evitarse la coincineración de residuos con un contenido superior al 1% de compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, bajo operaciones de separación y control a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos, como dioxinas, furanos y bifenilos policlorados (Considerando 5, artículos 4 in fine, 7 inciso a.iv), 9 inciso j, 10 incisos k y l, y 22). Además, prohíbe las actividades de recuperación de residuos previamente dispuestos en rellenos sanitarios o vertederos; la incineración y coincineración de residuos radiactivos o nucleares, eléctricos y electrónicos, baterías y acumuladores enteros o partes que contengan metales pesados, corrosivos, incluidos los ácidos minerales, que contengan cianuro, amianto, metales pesados o contaminados con éstos, de composición desconocida o impredecible, peligrosos provenientes de los servicios de atención de salud, sus establecimientos de enseñanza y laboratorios, explosivos, armas químicas o biológicas destinadas a su destrucción, Compuestos Orgánicos Persistentes y Residuos de Polivinilo Cloruro (artículo 5). Por su parte el artículo 21 del Reglamento impugnado señala los parámetros técnicos para establecer los límites máximos de emisión para contaminantes generales. Las condiciones normales de referencia (273,15 K y 101,325 kPa en base seca, referidos a 11 % de oxígeno) y los límites máximos de emisión que se establecen en el citado artículo 21 del Decreto 39136, coinciden con los del Anexo VIII, Parte 2, de la Directiva 2010/75/UE del Parlamento Europeo y el Concejo de 24 de noviembre de 2010, sobre las emisiones industriales (prevención y control integrados de la contaminación). En cuanto al reproche contra la derogatoria de la moratoria prevista en el Decreto 38500 de 11 de junio de 2014, aclara que dicha medida se concibió como una disposición transitoria para adoptar las medidas técnicas necesarias para dar cumplimiento a la Ley 8839. No se considera que el Decreto 39136 quebrante el principio de no regresión, ya que la norma no disminuye el grado de tutela ambiental, sino que, en consonancia con la Ley, regula el aprovechamiento energético de residuos sólidos. Con el Decreto 39136 se disponen de las medidas técnicas necesarias para el adecuado control de la coincineración como una de las alternativas de valorización de los residuos sólidos contenida en la Ley 8839, y la derogación del Decreto 38500 no desatiende tampoco los principios de objetivación, no regresión en materia ambiental, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Afirma que respecto del alegato sobre ausencia de profesionales capacitados, el Transitorio II del Decreto 36136 es congruente con el Convenio Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático y el Protocolo de Kioto, según los cuales se establecen compromisos para promover y apoyar programas de educación y capacitación que fomenten la creación de capacidad nacional- humana e institucional. Por su parte, el Decreto cuestionado, considera la función del Consejo Técnico de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión en el análisis y valoración de cumplimiento de la normativa. En cuanto a la actividad de incineración de residuos peligrosos, estima que la norma impugnada es preventiva y temporal, porque la incineración de residuos peligrosos se le aplican los límites de las emisiones previstos en la misma, lo anterior es acorde con la labor de prevención del Estado y los principios reconocidos por la jurisprudencia constitucional. Concluye que en el tanto la aplicación de los límites que impone el Transitorio VI del Decreto cuestionado mejoren la protección actual frente a las emisiones procedentes de los procesos de incineración de residuos peligrosos que se encuentren autorizados, ello estaría de acuerdo con el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado y a los principios de progresividad y no regresión en materia ambiental. Sobre el alegato de la incorporación de residuos peligrosos en los proceso de coincineración, se considera que el Decreto 39136 establece se debe evitar la coincineración de residuos con un contenido superior al 1% de compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, bajo operaciones de separación y control, a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos. En relación con el funcionamiento del sistema de incineración, considera que la normativa impugnada exige la detención inmediata en condiciones anómalas, prevé comprobación de cumplimiento, así como se establece el régimen correctivo y sancionatorio. En cuanto a los gases y residuos producto de la coincineración y eventuales daños al ambiente y a la salud, se afirma que el Decreto impugnado dispone el almacenamiento separado de los residuos sólidos producto de la incineración. Considera que al disponer la Ley 8839 a los rellenos sanitarios como última opción en la jerarquía para la gestión de desechos, el Decreto 39136 exige se debe cumplir con el Reglamento sobre Rellenos Sanitarios. Sobre la falta de un decreto de incineración de residuos peligrosos, estima que no se vulneran los principios de objetivación, progresividad y no regresión ya que el manejo y disposición de residuos peligrosos está regulado en el Convenio de Basilea sobre Control Fronterizo de Desechos Peligrosos y su Eliminación, en la Ley General de Salud y diversos reglamentos. Sobre las distancias de seguridad y la alegada violación a los principios de igualdad, ambiente sano y objetivación, considera que confrontando la norma impugnada con el contenido del principio de igualdad, no hay quebranto, porque es razonable y acorde al principio preventivo admitir la distancia de retiro respecto a poblaciones que son consideradas vulnerables, donde se incluyen todo tipo de centros educativos y hospitalarios, e instalaciones de riesgo por su manejo de productos combustibles o inflamables en cantidades superiores a los 1000 m³, actividades agrícolas e industrias de procesamiento de alimentos. Plantea que la normativa exige la aprobación de un estudio de impacto ambiental que considere estudios de dispersión atmosférica y una evaluación cuantitativa de riesgos y, la ubicación de las instalaciones de coincineración deben estar acorde con el Ordenamiento Territorial aprobado o un uso de suelo conforme emitido por la Municipalidad, así como la distancia a acreditar en el permiso ante el Ministerio de Salud. Sobre el plazo para los permisos de instalación, alude que los plazos de 10 días hábiles previstos en los artículos 9 in fine y 24 del Decreto 39136, ante la rigurosidad y complejidad técnica en el análisis de las solicitudes para este tipo de proyectos, con incidencia en el ambiente y la salud pública, son insuficientes y contrarios al principio de razonabilidad jurídica (sentencias constitucionales 7294-1998 y 2410-2007), por lo que ha de respetarse el plazo de un mes del artículo 331 de la Ley 6227. Considera que en caso de que la Sala considere que esos plazos no son contrarios al Derecho de la Constitución, cabría interpretar que a su vencimiento no opera el silencio positivo conforme al artículo 4 de la Ley 7575. Lo mismo cabe decir respecto al plazo de 30 días otorgado al Ministerio de Salud para que emita, si procede, la autorización de la actividad y el detalle de materiales autorizados para coincinerar (artículo 24). Sobre los principios de responsabilidades compartidas, internalización de los costos y prevención en la fuente, analiza que no se violentan principios generales que fundamentan la gestión integral de residuos por cuanto están reconocidos en la Ley y son atendidos por el Decreto 39136 en varios de sus artículos. En cuanto a los protocolos en caso de incumplirse los límites de emisión, se agrega que el Decreto 39136, en su artículo 17, establece la detención inmediata del proceso en condiciones anómalas, lo cual coincide con lo estipulado en la Directiva Europea 2010/75/UE. Respecto del incumplimiento de metas nacionales al permitirse los procesos de incineración, se aprecia que el Decreto 39136 es acorde a los convenios internacionales y al principio de progresividad a la normativa interna, porque dispone la reducción de los compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, bajo operaciones de separación y control a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos, como dioxinas, furanos y bifenilos policlorados. Asimismo, regula y somete a límites técnicos uno de los sectores o categorías de fuentes citados en el Anexo A del Protocolo de Kyoto, relativo a los desechos, como lo es la incineración de desechos, y fija los límites técnicos y mecanismos de control para la actividad permitida conforme a la Ley 8839. La implementación de los mecanismos de desarrollo limpio en políticas públicas, se han considerado en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2011-2014 y 2015-2018. Concluye que el Decreto 39136 resulta conforme al Derecho de la Constitución, con excepción de los plazos de 10 días hábiles previstos en los artículos 9 in fine y 24 del Decreto 39136, que lesionan el principio de razonabilidad jurídica, salvo que se considere que a su vencimiento no opera el silencio positivo, y en ese orden ha de interpretarse también el plazo de 30 días del numeral 24 ibídem. Considera que el Transitorio VI del Decreto 39136 es constitucional en tanto se interprete que los límites en él dispuestos serán aplicables cuando, conforme al principio de progresividad, mejoren la protección actual frente a las emisiones de los procesos de incineración de residuos peligrosos que se encuentren ya autorizadas.
5.- El señor Fernando Llorca Castro, en su condición de Ministro de Salud contesta la audiencia concedida, manifestando los criterios vertidos por el Director y Jefe a.í. de la Unidad de Normalización de Servicios de Salud en Ambiente Humano, de la Dirección de Protección al Ambiente Humano, del Ministerio de Salud, en el que manifiestan que el Decreto 39136 no entra en contraposición con el Protocolo de Kyoto ya que el Anexo A, en relación con el artículo 3 del Protocolo, solo indica cuales procesos deben ser tomados en consideración para que el país cumpla con las exigencias establecidas en dicho instrumento internacional. Considera que no se viola el principio de progresividad en la eliminación de fuentes contaminantes y gases de efecto invernadero, ya que el Decreto busca revertir las emisiones de gases generadores del calentamiento global. Con ello tampoco se transgrede el objetivo internacional previsto en la Convención de Viena y Protocolo de Montreal. Considera, con respecto a la regulación de emisiones de gases emitidos por las actividades de coincineración de residuos sólidos, que el establecimiento de límites máximos de contaminantes en los residuos sólidos en las emisiones atmosféricas, así como el establecimiento de máximos permisibles en aguas residuales para sólidos, metales pesados, así como para dioxinas y furanos, permite cumplir con el precepto del artículo 50 constitucional. Sobre las distancias de protección y zonas circundantes, estima que el artículo 7 del Decreto busca establecer un balance entre la protección de la salud pública y aquella de los grupos vulnerables, haciendo énfasis en la protección de poblaciones sensibles. Afirma que el artículo 4 del Decreto establece la obligatoriedad de cumplir con la Ley 8839 y los recurrentes no analizan la variedad de acciones y de reglamentos que el Ministerio de Salud ha emitido para asegurar el buen manejo de los residuos, en apego a la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos. Considera que se da prioridad al reciclaje sobre el tratamiento térmico; aclara que la coincineración no es la última etapa en la gestión jerarquizada de residuos. Refiere que la ley establece un orden de prioridad, que de no poder cumplirse una de estas se continúe buscando alternativas en el nivel inferior, lo que no implica que debe cumplirse las primeras en su totalidad, de previo a utilizar las subsiguientes; por lo que la derogatoria de la moratoria, no transgrede los principios de objetivación y de no regresión en materia ambiental, de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Afirma que las Municipalidades y la población en general, tienen la obligación de lograr la recolección separada de los residuos y, por su parte los coincineradores deben contar con espacios para su separación, a fin de asegurar que no sean procesados; asimismo la normativa establece claramente prohibiciones para materiales específicos que no deben coincinerarse. Señala que en el Decreto impugnado sí existen límites para el manejo de los subproductos de la coincineración, lo que garantiza que no se violenten principios ambientales, como el principio precautorio y se garantice el cumplimiento del artículo 50 constitucional. Aclara que el coprocesamiento y la coincineración son métodos que permiten el aprovechamiento energético, permitido por la Ley, por lo que no debe interpretarse que exista alguna prohibición tácita a la incineración. Afirma que sobre la capacitación de los profesionales encargados, el Decreto establece el deber para toda empresa y profesional responsable de crear la capacidad requerida, dentro de un plazo razonable. Aclara que las emisiones de dioxinas y furanos producidas por la industria, en niveles de concentraciones inferiores al nivel máximo permisible, se les hace una prevención antes de la clausura, en atención al debido proceso. Acota que la normativa establece la obligación de presentar e implementar un Plan de Acciones Correctivas. Confirma que la Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, prevista en la Ley Orgánica del Ambiente, No. 7554 de 1995, es el mecanismo de control predictivo para regular las actividades productivas en función de la protección del medio ambiente. Amplía lo anterior al señalar que la Secretaría Técnica Ambiental (SETENA) es el órgano técnico nacional encargado de determinar si las actividades productivas son peligrosas para el ambiente y en caso de que se determine el daño ambiental no autoriza la viabilidad ambiental. Con fundamento en el informe rendido, se considera que es obligación del Estado y principalmente del MINAE y del Ministerio de Salud, por su orden, tomar las medidas necesarias para evitar el daño al ambiente, garantizando, defendiendo y preservando el derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, proteger la salud de las personas, el ambiente y la vida en general. Concluye que el Decreto 39136 está conforme a los parámetros ambientales y sanitarios que requiere la población costarricense.
6.- La señora Irene Cañas Díaz, en su condición de Ministra a.í. de Ambiente y Energía (en adelante MINAE) contesta la audiencia concedida, manifestando el criterio vertido por la Directora de la Dirección de Gestión de Calidad Ambiental, del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, en el que manifiesta que el Decreto No. 39136-S-MINAE vino a regular la actividad de incineración de residuos de una manera más segura, por lo que se cumple el principio de progresividad. Aclara que el Decreto Ejecutivo DE-38500-S-MINAE fue una medida temporal mientras se elaboraba la normativa técnica que permitiera los procesos de tratamiento térmico de residuos de una manera más segura. Señala que el Reglamento accionado establece como requisito previo al tratamiento térmico de residuos, que se cumplan los procesos de jerarquización previstos en la ley (reducción, reutilización y reciclaje) y, se realice la separación previa de residuos valorizables. Añade que la jerarquización de residuos no requiere estudios técnicos, sino que se cumpla con la separación de residuos valorizables. Advierte que en los estudios de viabilidad ambiental debe verificarse el cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el Decreto accionado; así en cada caso se debe realizar una evaluación específica. En relación con el cumplimiento de las obligaciones internacionales previstas en el Convención de Viena y el Protocolo de Montreal sobre la protección de la capa de ozono, señala que el Decreto cuestionado establece una serie de medidas técnicas para garantizar que no se producirán dioxinas y furanos en los procesos de coprocesamiento de los residuos, tales como la clasificación de residuos, temperaturas mínimas de operación, control de temperaturas en tiempo real, monitoreo de emisiones atmosféricas, entre otras. Señala que el Reglamento prevé en primer lugar la jerarquización en el manejo de residuos y como última opción el tratamiento térmico, entendida la coincineración cuando se aproveche la energía que se produce durante el tratamiento térmico. Amplía que esta materia está tutelada a nivel internacional por el Convenio de Estocolmo sobre Contaminantes Orgánicos Persistentes, del cual Costa Rica es parte por Ley No. 8538 y el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 33438. Refiere que el Decreto impugnado no permite la incineración de residuos a cielo abierto, ya que ello produciría altas emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero, así como emisiones de dioxinas y furanos, de allí que no se afecta la capa de ozono, ni se producirían emisiones de gases con efecto invernadero más allá de las que ya se emiten en los procesos actuales de manejo de residuos. Así entonces, no se incumplen el Protocolo de Kyoto, el Convenio de Estocolmo, ni el Protocolo de Montreal. En relación con las emanaciones de gases que se producen en los procesos de tratamiento térmico de residuos orgánicos, afirma que el Decreto las señala con el fin de plantear acciones para su reducción, así como dar seguimiento al cumplimiento de los límites máximos de emisión para contaminantes, permitidos en la normativa nacional vigente. Sobre la capacitación de profesionales y técnicos en materia de procesos de incineración, destaca que toda nueva tecnología requiere preparar a las personas que desarrollarán proyectos y verificarán la aplicación de la normativa; aclara que el Ministerio de Salud, con apoyo del Consejo de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión están programadas en atención a la necesidad identificada. En cuanto a la incineración de residuos peligrosos, señala que actualmente el Decreto Ejecutivo 31837-S regula las condiciones de operación para el tratamiento de residuos peligrosos y se fundamenta en Directrices Técnicas sobre coprocesamiento ambiental nacional de los desechos peligrosos en hornos cementeros; aun así, el Decreto cuestionado amplía los límites de coincineración para este tipo de residuos, ya que están más actualizados y se regulan de manera más estricta respecto de lo que dispone el Decreto No. 31837-S. Por su parte, respecto del señalamiento relacionado con el contenido de residuos peligrosos que se encuentran en los residuos ordinarios, advierte que el Decreto establece los materiales y sustancias que no pueden ser tratados en procesos de incineración; se dispone la obligación de separar los residuos peligrosos. Se establece que en el estudio de impacto ambiental se deben incluir las instalaciones de separación, clasificación y recuperación de residuos valorizables que no se deben incinerar. Refiere que el artículo 16 del Reglamento impugnado señala que las cenizas resultantes del tratamiento térmico son consideradas residuos sólidos peligrosos y deben por ello disponerse de forma apropiada, siguiendo lo establecido en el Reglamento General para la clasificación y manejo de residuos peligrosos. Destaca que el Decreto establece los reglamentos que deben ser considerados para el manejo de este tipo de residuos; asimismo el artículo 5 del Decreto 39136-S-MINAE señala expresamente las sustancias y materiales prohibidos para ser incinerados. Por su parte, indica que el Decreto establece los límites máximos de emisión atmosférica permitidos de los distintos contaminantes que podrían producirse, límites que están acordes con la normativa nacional e internacional. También se regula el régimen de trabajo de una instalación de tratamiento térmico de residuos para minimizar posibilidad de producir contaminantes. Manifiesta que las medidas de protección y distancias de seguridad están aseguradas desde los estudios de viabilidad ambiental que se presentan ante SETENA; argumenta que 1000 metros es la distancia mínima que podría ubicarse una instalación de incineración respecto de los poblados, la cual puede ser superior según los resultados de los estudios de impacto ambiental ante SETENA. Afirma que el plazo de 20 días para que el Ministerio de Salud emita criterio en las solicitudes para realizar actividades de incineración, encuentra que el mismo es razonable; señala que dicho plazo fue considerado por el Ministerio de Salud durante el proceso de discusión y elaboración del Reglamento. Finalmente en relación con el protocolo para los casos de incumplimiento de los límites de emisiones establecido en el artículo 33 cuadro 5 del Decreto impugnado, aclara que dicha normativa define los rangos de acción en función de los resultados de las mediciones y evaluaciones de laboratorio, las cuales toman en cuenta los límites máximos definidos en la literatura internacional de afectación a la salud; asimismo se contemplan dos mecanismos tendentes a prevenir la eventual producción de dioxinas y furanos. No comparte la afirmación de los accionantes sobre la inexistencia de un criterio técnico para regular la actividad, afirma que se integró una comisión con participantes del sector público, privado, académico, etc para trabajar el tema.
7.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 69, 70y 71 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 12, 13 y 14 de abril de 2016.
8.- Mediante resolución de las 10:20 minutos del 5 de mayo de 2016, la Presidencia de la Sala admitió las coadyuvancias en favor de la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto impugnado presentadas por FABIÁN DE JESÚS PACHECO RODRÍGUEZ cédula de identidad número 110170021; EDGARDO ARAYA SIBAJA cédula de identidad número 204830663; MELISSA FLORES NÚÑEZ cédula de identidad número 701260268, en representación de la ASOCIACIÓN DE DESARROLLO DE RESIDENCIAL CIUDAD CARIARI cédula de persona jurídica número 3-002-361677; ANDRÉS CAMACHO L.cédula de identidad número 113680148 y otros; YORLENY RODRÍGUEZ CONEJO cédula de identidad número 111220107 y otros; AMANDA ARAYA RIVAS cédula de identidad número 111320483; ERNESTO MONGE documento de identidad número 1304295982) y otros; MINOR PICADO CAMARENO (cédula de identidad número 502580179 y otros; el 01 de abril de 2016, por FERNANDO ARAYA ANDERSON cédula de identidad número 0108230617; YERLING RUIZ VÁSQUEZ cédula de identidad número 603040331 y otros; HÉCTOR GONZÁLEZ PACHECO cédula de identidad número 0105990966. En todos ellos se reiteran y explicitan los argumentos planteados por parte de los accionantes y se afirma la necesidad de que el Decreto sea invalidado por presentar una amenaza tanto a sus respetivos intereses como en general a su derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado.
9.- En la misma resolución, también se aceptaron las coadyuvancias en favor de la validez de norma, presentadas por ALBERTO ANTILLÓN ARROYO cédula de identidad número 108310616 en su condición de PRESIDENTE DEL COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS QUÍMICOS Y PROFESIONALES AFINES cédula de persona jurídica número 3-007-383731; MIGUEL GÓMEZ COREA (cédula de identidad número 502230027), en su condición de GERENTE GENERAL DE LA COOPERATIVA DE ELECTRIFICACIÓN RURAL DE GUANACASTE R.L. (COOPEGUANACASTE R.L.). En ambos casos, se aportaron sendos escritos donde se hace un análisis puntual de las disposiciones infralegales discutidas y se dan las razones por las cuales se estima que cumplen adecuadamente con las normas y principios relacionados con el derecho a un ambiente sano.- 10.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 69, 70 y 71 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 12, 13 y 14 de abril de 2016.
11.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.
12.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.
Redacta la Magistrada Hernández López; y,
Considerando:
I.- Sobre la admisibilidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, y exige un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el cual se invoque la inconstitucionalidad. Este requisito no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el procurador General de la República, el contralor General de la República, el fiscal General de la República o el defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. En el caso, la acción como un ejercicio de defensa del derecho constitucional al ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado recogido en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política. Sobre el punto, desde antes de su establecimiento mediante la reforma constitucional de 1994, tal derecho así como una legitimación amplia para su defensa habían sido establecidos por parte de este Tribunal.- A esa línea jurisprudencial debe sumarse que actualmente la propia Constitución Política recoge expresamente una legitimación procesal, radicada en cualquier persona, para la defensa del ambiente según lo dispuesto por el texto actual del artículo 50 de la Constitución Política.
II.- Legitimación en el caso concreto. La petitoria de esta acción de inconstitucionalidad busca que se anule el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE de 15 de junio de 2015, “Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios”, porque autoriza la actividad de incineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios y peligrosos, lo cual, en su criterio, resulta contrario a los principios de progresividad, objetivación del derecho ambiental y de no regresión de los derechos humanos. Así pues, el caso se ubica plenamente como defensa del derecho recogido en el artículo 50 Constitucional por lo que la acción resulta admisible a tenor de su texto expreso.- III.- Agrupación de los reclamos a efectos de su análisis. La acción de inconstitucionalidad pide la declaratoria de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE de 15 de junio de 2015 denominado “Reglamento sobre condiciones de operación y control de emisiones de instalaciones para coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios” y en adelante solamente referido como el “Decreto 39136”. Como su nombre lo indica, dicho conjunto normativo establece varios requisitos específicos, pero no los únicos a cumplir, si se quiere lograr una autorización estatal para realizar la actividad de coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, y se imponen las condiciones de operación y los mecanismos de control de tal actividad. Los reclamos contra ese cuerpo normativo pueden separarse en dos claras vertientes: la primera, agrupa varias infracciones que han surgido por el hecho de la promulgación del Decreto 39136, en tanto que actuación jurídica del Estado. Se sostiene que con dicha promulgación se lesiona el derecho constitucional al ambiente y varios de los principios que han sido derivados de él y además un grupo de obligaciones internacionales adquiridas por el país. La segunda vertiente incluye reclamos contra disposiciones concretas del Decreto 39136 cuyo contenido lesiona –por acción u omisión- varios principios constitucionales en materia ambiental así como el principio de igualdad. De ese modo, la Sala abordará por separado ambos sectores de reclamos.
IV.Cabe advertir igualmente, que la revisión de algunos de los puntos planteados permite concluir que carecen de elementos de juicio suficientes que sirvan a la finalidad de fundamentar debidamente las infracciones que se denuncian, según lo exige la Ley que regula la jurisdicción Constitucional. Tal defecto se irá precisando en cada caso en que se presente, lo anterior en aplicación de una clara línea jurisprudencial, sobre el punto, como se aprecia por ejemplo de las siguientes citas:
“La acción de inconstitucionalidad se interpone con el argumento de que el Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado es nocivo, lesiona e infringe los derechos fundamentales a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, el derecho a la salud y a los compromisos internacionales suscritos con el Protocolo de Kyoto. Pese a la oportunidad otorgada a los accionantes, se confirma lo que indica la Procuraduría General de la República, de que no existe un análisis concreto de las disposiciones del Decreto Ejecutivo impugnado que se consideran inconstitucionales, sino que el mismo se limita a establecer discrepancias de forma genérica y en abstracto contra la totalidad del Reglamento, más aún contra toda actividad que desempeñan los ingenios Azucareros y Haciendas, pues sostienen que causan inconvenientes en la calidad de vida y en la salud de los habitantes circunvecinos, sin concretar qué argumentos de constitucionalidad se deben tomar en cuenta en contra de cada una de las disposiciones o grupos del normas del Reglamento impugnado. […] El párrafo primero del artículo 78 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional establece la obligación de autenticar los escritos de interposición de acciones de inconstitucionalidad, toda vez que se estima necesario que existan argumentos esgrimidos por un profesional en Derecho, que no descarta este Tribunal responda a un serio estudio del fondo técnico y científico de una determinada materia, dada la diversidad y universalidad de las normas del ordenamiento jurídico. A diferencia de los procesos de garantías, es decir, los recursos de hábeas corpus y de amparo, que los puede interponer directamente cualquier interesado ante la jurisdicción constitucional en defensa de sus derechos fundamentales, generalmente contra actos u omisiones que le lesionan en su esfera particular (aunque no siempre como en los casos ambientales), en los procesos de defensa de la Constitución Política (como la acción de inconstitucionalidad), el legislador confió al abogado autenticante una labor cuya exigencia es aún mayor, si se quiere más elaborada y exhaustiva que debe plasmar en el libelo de interposición en razón de su oficio profesional, para demostrar al Tribunal la lesión a la norma constitucional por parte de una norma de menor rango, socavando el principio de supremacía constitucional contenida en el artículo 10 de la Constitución Política. Precisamente la elaboración material y formal de la Ley, así como de las demás disposiciones secundarias, suponen un proceso sumamente costoso para el Estado, en la que de muchas maneras para su elaboración ha participado la sociedad civil organizada a favor o en contra, y cuyos procedimientos de formación, aprobación y promulgación no debe analizarse a la ligera. En este sentido, debe reconocer esta Sala que existe un reducido espacio para este Tribunal para socorrer las ausencias manifiestas de los profesionales en derecho que autentican los escritos en esta jurisdicción constitucional, sin exponer la imparcialidad y análisis que se debe a cada una de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad”. (Sentencia número 005285-2012 de 15.03 horas de 25 de abril de 2012).
Y posteriormente en la sentencia número. 2014-004239, reafirmó:
“IV.- Sobre la falta de concreción de los argumentos de inconstitucionalidad. La Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en su artículo 3, dispone que “Se tendrá por infringida la Constitución Política cuando ello resulte de la confrontación del texto de la norma o acto cuestionado, de sus efectos, o de su interpretación o aplicación por las autoridades públicas, con las normas y principios constitucionales”. Ahora bien, para que este Tribunal tenga por configurada la infracción y declarar la inconstitucionalidad de la norma o acto impugnado, con la consecuente anulación y expulsión del ordenamiento jurídico, quien promueva una acción de inconstitucionalidad tiene la carga de demostrar cómo esa disposición infringe la norma o principio constitucional y, además, debe indicar por qué debe estimarse la demanda. Ello es denominado por esta Sala como la carga de la argumentación, es decir, que “una norma que facialmente sea contraria a la Constitución, vuelca la carga de la argumentación a quienes sostengan que en realidad no hay conflicto entre esa norma y la Constitución Política; lo contrario sucede si se acciona contra una norma que en primer examen no parece contraria a la Constitución, en cuya hipótesis es el accionante el que debe avanzar con los argumentos que convenzan acerca de la inconstitucionalidad ” (véase sentencia número 0184-95 de las 16:30 horas del 10 de enero de 1995).”
Punto A. Lesión al diseño de manejo de residuos fijado en normas de Derecho interno con rango superior al Decreto 39136.- Los accionantes señalan que la emisión del Decreto 39136 lesiona el Derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado en general y particularmente el principio precautorio; el de no regresión; el de objetivación y del derecho a un desarrollo sustentable. Entienden que la actividad de coincineración de residuos sólidos que el decreto autoriza y regula es perjudicial para el ambiente, dada la situación actual del manejo de residuos en nuestro país. Se afirma una contradicción con el diseño de manejo de residuos que recoge la Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos número 8839, (en adelante la Ley 8839) pues con la emisión del Decreto 39136 impugnado se destaca y facilita la coincineración en perjuicio de otras actividades y prácticas más amigables con el ambiente, lo cual va contra la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos prevista en la Ley 8839 y, por ende, contraviene también los principios arriba señalados. Estiman que en la práctica se dará prioridad a la coincineración frente a otras opciones, como la reutilización y el reciclaje, contenidos en el Plan de Residuos Sólidos del año 2008 (PRESOL). Se sostiene también que el Decreto “incentiva”, o bien que “estimula” la coincineración, la cual conlleva un riesgo ambiental, por lo que atenta contra el Derecho a vivir en un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado. En esta línea específica, los accionantes aluden al quebranto de los principios del Sistema Integral de Tratamiento de Residuos: responsabilidad compartida, internalización de costos y prevención en la fuente, amén de la educación ambiental. Sobre todos estos agravios, estima el Tribunal que la clave para la decisión en este punto específico radica en comprender apropiadamente la finalidad que se busca con la normativa impugnada y la forma en que esa finalidad se ha plasmado en el diseño normativo. En primer término debe tenerse claro que la actividad regulada por el decreto 39136 es una actividad que pretende engarzar en el sistema de medidas de protección medio ambiental.- No puede compararse la coincineración de residuos con actividades meramente extractivas por ejemplo, pues la prohibición de éstas últimas trae solamente ventajas para el medio ambiente; en cambio la intervención de esta Sala en el caso del Decreto de coincineración de residuos debe tener en cuenta que la realización de la actividad puede tener impacto sobre el ambiente, pero también puede tenerlos su impedimento. La Sala entiende que en este punto la perspectiva de los accionantes es correcta respecto de que deben valorarse los posible daños de la actividad de coincineración, pero es también parcial porque no se otorga todo el peso que tiene a las consecuencias nocivas para el ambiente que pueden resultar de impedir que se lleve a cabo.- Es desde esta última perspectiva que se adquiere una comprensión más completa y cabal del Decreto 39136, que incluye entre sus consideraciones y motivación, la necesidad de normar la actividad de coincineración de residuos ordinarios con el objeto de eliminar los impactos negativos a la salud pública y el ambiente. Asimismo, establece que se debe evitar la coincineración de residuos con potencial de reciclaje o reutilización para lo cual debe existir en la planta de coincineración un proceso de separación de este tipo de residuos.- Además, no se permite la incineración de residuos peligrosos, los cuales se enlistan en el decreto, o bien aquellos con un contenido superior al 1% de compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, por lo que debe existir una específica operación de separación y control con el objeto de evitar la formación de los contaminantes orgánicos, como las dioxinas, furanos y bifenilos policlorados. El Decreto impugnado también contempla entre sus fundamentos el hecho de que la protección a la salud de las personas y el ambiente exige de las personas físicas y jurídicas que se quieran dedicar a la actividad, el establecimiento y mantenimiento de condiciones operativas y de requisitos técnicos rigurosos en la actividad de coincineración. Entre las principales regulaciones que se encuentran en el Decreto 39136, se establecen requisitos de operación y límites máximos de emisión para las instalaciones de coincineración de residuos sólidos ordinarios, siempre como opción subordinada a los otros procesos previos en la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos prevista en el artículo 4 de la Ley 8839. Al delimitar el alcance de la actividad que regula el Reglamento, el artículo 3 hace la diferenciación entre coincineración e incineración; se regula la valorización energética a través del proceso de coincineración, entendido como aquél “tratamiento térmico de residuos con recuperación del calor producido por la combustión, incluida la incineración por oxidación de residuos, así como la pirólisis, la gasificación u otros procesos de tratamiento térmico, por ejemplo el proceso de plasma, en la medida en que las sustancias resultantes del tratamiento se incineren posteriormente”. La valorización energética que se busca hacer viable con el Decreto impugnado está contenida en el Plan de Residuos Sólidos (Decreto 34647 de 28 de mayo de 2008, “Aprobación y Declaratoria de Interés Público y Nacional del Plan de Residuos Sólidos–Costa Rica (PRESOL), el cual se mantiene como marco de orientación, de acuerdo con el artículo 1 del Decreto Ejecutivo 37567 de 2 de noviembre de 2012, Reglamento General a la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos. Por otra parte, en cuanto a los límites del proceso de tratamiento térmico por coincineración, el artículo 4 in fine del Decreto 39136 reitera que “los residuos para reciclaje o reutilización, de acuerdo con la jerarquización, no deben ser sometidos al proceso de tratamiento térmico por coincineración”.(el destacado no es del original). Se desprende de lo todo anterior que, el Decreto 39136 se ha construido de manera coincidente con la propia perspectiva sostenida por los accionantes en el sentido que la coincineración no ha de ser el mecanismo prioritario para la disposición de los residuos y que los esfuerzos deben orientarse hacia el apego a la ley 8839 y su jerarquización. En efecto, el Decreto 39136 acoge tal concepto y repite la necesidad de respetar la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos. En su artículo 1 se indica que la “coincineración debe ser la última opción, una vez cumplida la jerarquización en la gestión integral de residuos, establecida en el artículo 4 de la Ley Nº 8839 del 24 de junio del 2010 "Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos", publicada en La Gaceta N° 135 del 13 de julio del 2010.” De tal forma, si –tal como pretenden los accionantes- aceptamos que la Ley 8839 es un desarrollo válido y un marco aceptable y válido dentro de los principios del derecho constitucional del ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, entonces debemos entender que el Decreto -en el tanto en que replica lo dispuesto en dicha ley y no se aparta de ella- también cumple y se apega a las exigencias constitucionales.- Contrario a lo indicado por los accionantes- este Tribunal encuentra que el Decreto 39136 no contradice la ley ni expresa ni implícitamente; más bien, –a texto expreso- deja intacta la atención preferente y el estímulo prioritario de actividades como la reducción, la reutilización y el reciclaje. La opción plasmada por las autoridades, en el Decreto discutido se engarza con la ley en el tanto no busca incentivar ni estimular la coincineración, sino solamente producir un marco de regulación para esa actividad en caso de que existan sujetos interesados en su realización; ese ejercicio no es, per se, contrario al derecho constitucional al ambiental ni a sus principios si nos atenemos a su contenido, pues tal regulación incluye, según se aprecia, un régimen específico de condiciones de operación y control que se suman, y no sustituyen, a todos los demás requisitos generales exigidos por las distintas leyes protectoras del ambiente, con la finalidad de proteger de distintas formas el entorno natural. No encuentra el Tribunal que exista en el Decreto 39136, una autorización para la coincineración concebida como una alternativa independiente, abierta, sin límites ni controles, y menos aún se observa que se haya establecido un incentivo o un estímulo de tal actividad por encima de las actividades ubicadas por encima en el orden de prioridades fijado por la ley.- En este orden de consideraciones, está claro que no puede perderse de vista que la actividad de coincineración de residuos, mal concebida o escasamente regulada plantearía serias dudas de constitucionalidad al tratarse de una actividad potencialmente más contaminante en comparación con la reducción de residuos, con su reutilización o con el reciclaje, los cuales dejan una menor huella en el ambiente. Pero ese no es el caso cuando la coincineración está concebida como una opción subalterna o subsidiaria, tal cual se presenta en el Decreto impugnado. A diferencia de los accionantes y la posición sostenida por algunos coadyuvantes, la Sala entiende que no hace mal el Estado en producir una normativa de regulación de la actividad de coincineración de residuos pues se trata de una actividad lícita, puesto que formalmente no existe prohibición para su realización y más bien -desde la perspectiva del derecho constitucional al ambiente y sus principios- bien puede tener su lugar dentro del manejo de residuos, siempre que se regule y disponga normativamente su posibilidad de empleo en los casos en que resulte menos contaminante que otros medios disponibles para la disposición de residuos.- Como se dijo su utilidad y valor ambiental dependerá de con cuáles actividades la comparemos pues la confrontamos con reducción de residuos, la reutilización o el reciclaje, resultaría clara su desventaja y por eso hace bien el Decreto 39136 cuando enfatiza el impedimento de coincineración de residuos susceptibles de aquellos tratamientos; pero en cambio, la coincineración será ventajosa si se le compara con la opción de disponer de los residuos en los vertederos a cielo abierto que, lamentablemente, aún subsisten en nuestro país, y sobre los que cuales los accionantes omiten comparación o valoración alguna. Por lo demás, no se aportan mayores elementos de prueba, sobre la manera en que el conjunto normativo, que claramente regula una operación subalterna, tendría el efecto de producir, en la realidad, una efectiva inducción hacia la actividad de coincineración, en detrimento de las otras actividades de disposición de residuos que se ubican por encima de ella en el orden de relevancia legalmente establecido para la disposición de residuos. Y menos aún, se dan razones convincentes para que el Tribunal tenga por cierta o por lo menos altamente probable la futura conducta de los diversos actores en esta materia. De tal forma, la Sala estima que el Decreto 39136 no resulta contrario al derecho a un ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado ni a ninguno de sus principios que han sido acogidos por la Sala como parte integrante del Derecho de la Constitución.
VI.- Punto B: Irrespeto de obligaciones internacionales con la promulgación del Decreto 39136. Los accionantes cuestionan que el tratamiento térmico de los residuos sólidos en presencia de aire genera gases dañinos que se liberan a la atmósfera, lo cual lesiona parte del clausulado de distintos instrumentos internacionales a los que Costa Rica está adherida.- Se menciona por una parte, que la Convención de Viena para la Protección de la Capa de Ozono y el Protocolo de Montreal, relativo a las sustancias que agotan la capa de ozono, fijan obligaciones para proteger la salud y el ambiente contra los efectos adversos de las actividades que puedan afectar la capa de ozono. Se estima que el objetivo establecido en los artículos 1 y 4 del Decreto 39136 violenta el principio de progresividad en la eliminación de fuentes contaminantes. Se añade que el Convenio Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático y el Protocolo de Kyoto, cuyo Anexo A menciona la incineración de residuos, dentro de las actividades limitantes expresos para lograr la reducción de los gases con efecto invernadero. Los accionantes argumentan el incumplimiento de los instrumentos internacionales, indicando que al permitir la industria de la incineración se transgrede el objetivo internacional previsto en los instrumentos citados de evitar la generación de gases de efecto invernadero y minimizar el efecto sobre la capa de ozono, todo lo cual expone la salud humana. Sobre este punto, no encuentra este Tribunal que los accionantes acrediten en este proceso la forma en que el Decreto impugnado y sus disposiciones incumplen lo específicamente dispuesto en los instrumentos internacionales citados pues únicamente se advierte a la Sala sobre los efectos riesgosos de la actividad de incineración para la vida humana. Se expone que el artículo 3 del Decreto 39136 establece las diferentes emisiones de gases que se producen con la actividad de incineración, pero no se concreta cuáles disposiciones de los Convenios y Protocolo internacionales citados se incumplen o bien contienen normas prohibitivas que hayan sido transgredidas. Para reforzar esta conclusión del Tribunal, se considera entonces necesario repasar lo que disponen los instrumentos internacionales en la materia que ocupa el Decreto 39136. Respecto de lo que disponen los instrumentos internacionales, el Convenio de Viena para la protección de la capa de ozono, Ley 7228 de 6 de mayo de 1991, permite el control, límite, reducción o prevención de actividades que puedan tener efectos adversos para la capa de ozono. En lo de interés, dispone en su artículo 2 párrafo 2 que las Partes en la medida de sus posibilidades adoptarán las medidas legislativas o administrativas adecuadas para controlar, limitar, reducir o prevenir las actividades humanas bajo su jurisdicción o control en el caso de que se compruebe que estas actividades tienen o pueden tener efectos adversos como resultado de la modificación o probable modificación de la capa de ozono. Por su parte el Protocolo de Montreal relativo a las Sustancias Agotadoras de la Capa de Ozono (Ley 7223 de 8 de abril de 1991), tiene como objetivo adoptar medidas preventivas para controlar equitativamente el total de emisiones mundiales de sustancias específicas, a saber: clorofluorocarbonos, hidroclorofluorocarbonos, halones y metilbromuros, para su eliminación sobre la base de adelantos científicos, aspectos técnicos, económicos y necesidades de los países en desarrollo. De acuerdo con dicho Protocolo, Costa Rica ha tomado acciones específicas, como la prohibición en el uso de los clorofluorocarbonos y los halones desde el 2010 y en el caso de los hidroclorofluorocarbonos tienen importación restringida a través de cuotas de sustancia, entre otras. El Convenio Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio Climático, Ley 7414 de 13 de junio de 1994, también faculta a prever, prevenir o reducir al mínimo las causas del cambio climático y entre los compromisos que las Partes asumen se encuentra el promover y apoyar tecnologías, prácticas y procesos que controlen, reduzcan o prevengan las emisiones antropógenas de gases de efecto invernadero. El Protocolo de Kyoto, Ley 8219 de 8 de marzo de 2002, y la citada Convención sobre el Cambio Climático, coinciden en comprometer a sus Partes a lograr objetivos individuales y jurídicamente vinculantes para limitar o reducir sus emisiones de seis gases de efecto invernadero, a saber: dióxido de carbono, metano, óxido nitroso, hidrofluorocarbonos, perfluorocarbonos y hexafluoruro de azufre. Adicionalmente el Protocolo de Kyoto tiene como objetivo cumplir con los compromisos cuantificados de limitación y reducción de las emisiones, aplicando políticas y medidas según las circunstancias nacionales. Si bien el Protocolo de Kioto tiene a la incineración de residuos en la lista de actividades que perjudican el medio ambiente, es lo cierto que no se encuentra prohibida; es a partir de ello, que las Partes adquieren compromisos para evitar o controlar la actividad en resguardo del ambiente y la salud pública. A partir de lo expuesto, este Tribunal concuerda con lo señalado por el órgano asesor del Estado, al concluir que el Decreto 39136 es acorde con esos convenios internacionales, y con los principios de no regresividad y desarrollo sustentable, y de progresividad, por cuanto dispone la reducción de los compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, a través de operaciones de separación y control de residuos a incinerar, a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos, como dioxinas, furanos y bifenilos policlorados. Asimismo, regula y somete a límites técnicos uno de los sectores o categorías de fuentes citados en el Anexo A del Protocolo de Kyoto, relativo a los desechos, como lo es la incineración de desechos. También fija los límites técnicos y mecanismos de control para la actividad permitida conforme a la Ley 8839. Entre las medidas que el Decreto obliga a realizar se encuentran la clasificación de residuos, las temperaturas mínimas de operación, el control de temperaturas, el monitoreo de emisiones atmosféricas (artículos 12,13 y 15 Decreto). Así concebida la operación, entiende la Sala que resulta compatible con las obligaciones contenidas en el artículo 50 Constitucional, y con los compromisos internacionales y el principio de progresividad, pues se adoptan medidas que no degradan el nivel de protección sino que se sincronizan con la protección del ambiente y la salud, lo cual se constata al observar que los niveles máximos permitidos se fijan conforme a los parámetros de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, y a las reglas de la ciencia y la técnica. Igualmente, esta Sala tiene por cierta la afirmación del órgano asesor del Estado, en cuanto a que la regulación recogida en el Decreto impugnado converge con los propósitos considerados para la adopción de la Directiva Europea 2010/75/UE. De acuerdo con todo lo anterior, se concluye que la emisión del Decreto discutido, no contradice las metas y los compromisos jurídicos adquiridos por Costa Rica a través de la firma de tratados internacionales sobre estos temas, por lo que en este punto la acción debe declararse sin lugar.
VII.- Punto C: Reclamo por lesión a los principios de objetivación y no regresión en materia ambiental, con la promulgación del Decreto 39136. También con la presente acción de inconstitucionalidad, se acusa que el Decreto 39136 deja sin efecto el Decreto Ejecutivo 38500-S-MINAE, “Moratoria Nacional de las Actividades de Transformación Térmica de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios”, situación que estiman los accionantes atenta contra los principios de objetivación y no regresión reconocidos por la doctrina ambiental constitucional, dado que no existen los estudios que verifiquen que se han cumplido ya los procesos primarios de la jerarquización. Consideran igualmente que se transgrede el principio de no regresión en el tanto el Decreto 39136 autoriza una actividad riesgosa ambientalmente, aun con los controles que se establecen en dicho cuerpo normativo; esto determina una regresión respecto de la situación jurídica anterior pues el Decreto 38500-S-MINAE aseguraba de mejor manera la protección del ambiente. En relación con este alegato, las autoridades emitieron su informe e insisten en que no puede perderse de vista cuál es la naturaleza del Decreto Ejecutivo 38500-S-MINAE, “Moratoria Nacional de las Actividades de Transformación Térmica de Residuos Sólidos Ordinarios” (denominado en adelante, Decreto de Moratoria), Tal medida, se indica, fue adoptada como una disposición temporal para lograr el espacio de tiempo necesario para plasmar las medidas técnicas necesarias que permitan dar fiel cumplimiento a la Ley 8839, numerales 4, 6 y 42. En lo que se refiere a este punto, el texto del citado Decreto de moratoria señala textualmente:
“Artículo 1º-Se establece una moratoria nacional a las actividades de transformación térmica de residuos sólidos ordinarios, hasta tanto no exista por parte de las Autoridades de Ambiente y Salud certeza técnica y científica de que dicha actividad no causará impactos a la salud y al ambiente y se garantice que ésta práctica no va en contra de los principios de la Ley Nº 8839 denominada Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos.
Artículo 2º-Rige a partir de su publicación.” Esta disposición fue sometida al análisis de constitucionalidad respecto de su validez frente a la apropiada protección del Derecho al ambiente y en la sentencia 2014-16162, la Sala Constitucional expuso sobre este punto lo siguiente:
“III.- En este caso, la fundamentación del Decreto impugnado es clara en indicar que dentro de los principios contenidos en la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos “se encuentra el Principio Precautorio, según el cual cuando exista peligro de daño grave o irreversible, la falta de certeza científica no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del ambiente o la salud”. Asimismo que, “en el país se están promoviendo tecnologías que pretenden la producción de energía eléctrica mediante la transformación térmica (combustión, gasificación, pirolisis, plasma, entre otros) de residuos sólidos ordinarios, que podrían contravenir el espíritu de la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos Nº 8839, así como acarrear un riesgo a la salud de las personas y el ambiente por cuanto los procesos de transformación térmica son sensibles a la composición de la materia prima y a la técnica utilizada para su transformación en cuanto a los resultados de sus emisiones a la atmósfera”. Finalmente, que “las propuestas de las tecnologías conocidas a la fecha, representan rendimientos de generación eléctrica muy disímiles, lo que hace evidente la necesidad de analizar dichas tecnologías en función de su capacidad de recuperación energética, con el fin de asegurar el interés nacional en la materia”. El Estado, en aplicación del principio precautorio y en aras de la protección del ambiente y la salud de las personas, busca suspender la actividad de transformación térmica de residuos sólidos ordinarios hasta tanto no sean realizados los estudios técnicos correspondientes. Por su parte, los accionantes estiman que dicha moratoria, lejos de proteger en ambiente, ocasiona un daño ya que la dicha trasformación técnica, además de producir nuevas energías, resuelve con agilidad la disposición de los desechos sólidos. Este Tribunal aprecia que, en el fondo, no hay una colisión entre la norma impugnada y el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política, sino una discrepancia entre lo dispuesto en el Decreto impugnado y los argumentos del accionante sobre cuál es la mejor forma de proteger el ambiente y la salud de las personas. No le corresponde decidir a la Sala la bondad de una u otra forma de disponer de los desechos sólidos. El Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía y el Ministerio de Salud, en el decreto impugnado, en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto no sólo en el artículo 50 de la Constitución Política sino en la Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos, han tomado la iniciativa de revisar las posibles consecuencias que sobre la salud y el ambiente pueda tener la transformación térmica de desechos sólidos, para tomar las medidas del caso, sin que sea procedente para la Sala inmiscuirse en tales temas, de carácter eminentemente técnico, que están claramente fuera de su competencia. En consecuencia, la acción debe ser desestimada en cuanto a este extremo.” (El destacado no es del original) Tanto la propia redacción de dicho Decreto, como la forma en que se entendió e interpretó por parte de esta Sala en la sentencia recién citada, permiten concluir que la moratoria no tuvo la pretensión de convertirse en una regulación permanente dentro del marco jurídico relativo a la protección ambiental. Por el contrario, resulta evidente de los textos transcritos que se trató de una decisión al tenor del principio precautorio, y que estableció un estado de cosas temporal mientras el Estado, a través de sus autoridades, lograba producir los estudios e instrumentos para asegurar el respeto del derecho de la salud de las personas y a disfrutar de un ambiente ecológicamente sano y equilibrado.- Así, con Decreto 39136 y sus disposiciones, el Estado se da por satisfecho respecto de la existencia de esas condiciones técnicas y de su propiedad para lograr el fin perseguido, en el tanto en que –según su criterio- la actividad de coincineración, llevada a cabo según los estrictos términos del Decreto, asegura una cabal protección de la salud y el ambiente. Los accionantes encuentran insuficiente en general ese diseño y por ello es que afirman que el Decreto falla en asegurar la salud y el ambiente, al no existir una base científica suficiente, particularmente en relación con el tema de los residuos peligrosos, el de la emisión de gases tóxicos reconocidos en el artículo 3 del Decreto 39136 y las distancias de seguridad de las plantas de incineración, por lo que habría lesión al principio de objetivación, al no contarse con el debido respaldo técnico para su funcionamiento. Frente a este reproche, en los informes de las autoridades de Salud y Ambiente, se advierte a la Sala, que el Decreto 39136 regula de manera más segura la actividad de incineración, pues la normativa dispone las medidas técnicas necesarias para el adecuado control de la coincineración como una de las alternativas de valorización de los residuos sólidos contenida en la Ley 8839, por lo que la derogación del Decreto de moratoria no desatiende los principios de objetivación, no regresión en materia ambiental, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. En efecto, el Decreto 39136 promueve que se realice la separación previa de residuos valorizables, requisito previo al tratamiento térmico de residuos y con respecto al quebranto al principio de objetivación, se tiene que en los estudios de viabilidad ambiental corresponde al Ministerio de Salud y a la Setena verificar que se cumpla lo dispuesto en el Decreto 39136 y todas las demás regulaciones aplicables de previo a autorizar la actividad y por supuesto en todo el tiempo en que esté en funcionamiento. No se requieren estudios especiales, ya que en cada caso se debe realizar una evaluación específica que definirá si resulta o no ambientalmente admisible la operación de la actividad de coincineracion que se pretenda llevar a cabo. Finalmente, no sobra señalar que un correcto análisis del Decreto de Moratoria, permite también descartar alguna afectación del principio de no regresión, porque, aparte de la naturaleza temporal de ese acto jurídico, la prohibición de la actividad dispuesta en su momento lo fue de manera condicional hasta que “exista por parte de las Autoridades de Ambiente y Salud certeza técnica y científica de que dicha actividad no causará impactos a la salud y al ambiente y se garantice que ésta práctica no va en contra de los principios de la Ley Nº 8839 denominada Ley para la Gestión Integral de Residuos”. Lo que sostienen las autoridades al respecto es que con el diseño para la operación y control de las actividades de coincineración recogido en el Decreto 39136 sumada a la aplicación de las demás normas de control que resulten aplicables, se logra -en su criterio- una suficiente certeza técnica y científica respecto de la protección de la salud y el ambiente y además el cumplimiento de las previsiones de la ley 8839. Desde tal perspectiva, entiende la Sala que no cabe afirmar regresión alguna respecto de lo dispuesto por el Decreto de Moratoria si lo que allí se expresó fue la suspensión de la actividad hasta que las autoridades confirmaran la existencia de las condiciones exigidas y por ello podría decirse que los órganos competentes se han apegado a tales disposiciones al emitir el Decreto 39136. Para el Tribunal, y en lo que se refiere a los reclamos relacionados con derechos constitucionales, el Decreto 39136 no viene a dejar sin efecto los esfuerzos alcanzados en la normativa que regula el tema; el Poder Ejecutivo tomó acciones para controlar y regular el procesamiento térmico de residuos y ordenar con ello el ejercicio de esta actividad que está prevista en la Ley 8839; se ha regulado la actividad de coincineración de residuos sólidos, y se han establecido las condiciones y límites para minimizar cualquier impacto al ambiente y a la salud desde la actividad de coincineración. Concluye así el Tribunal que en este punto no se acredita el quebranto a los principios de objetivación y no regresión en materia ambiental.
VIII.- Punto D: Reclamo por la falta de profesionales capacitados para la actividad de coincineración que se autoriza en el Decreto 39136. Se alega por parte de los accionantes la ausencia de profesionales capacitados para verificar que la actividad de coincineración de residuos no se convierta en una amenaza o una lesión a la salud o al ambiente, pues el propio Decreto discutido indica en el Transitorio II la necesidad de capacitación de profesionales para las actividades de arranque y puesta en marcha inicial, regencia, estudios de materiales, resistencia mecánica, operación y control ambiental de las instalaciones. Se considera que esta situación contraviene el espíritu del artículo 50 Constitucional debido al riesgo por los efectos de contaminación y eventuales daños ambientales. En este punto, observa el tribunal que los accionantes señalan que la ausencia de profesionales capacitados resultará en una actividad de coincineración que produzca daños ambientales y a la salud de las personas.- Se trata una cuestión obvia pero que precisamente ha sido abordada por el Decreto 39136 en su transitorio II y lo que puede apreciarse es que las conclusiones que extraen los accionantes del texto de tal disposición no se ajustan a una lectura sistemática del decreto impugnado. El citado transitorio segundo señala:
TRANSITORIO SEGUNDO: En un plazo de seis (6) meses el Colegio Federado de Ingenieros y Arquitectos, el Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos y Profesionales Afines y el Colegio de Químicos de Costa Rica, deben capacitar a sus profesionales para la realización de las actividades de arranque y puesta en marcha inicial, regencia, estudios de materiales, resistencia mecánica, operación y control ambiental de las instalaciones normadas, a fin de garantizar durante la vida útil de la instalación que se cumple, al momento de la autorización estatal de funcionamiento y sus renovaciones, con lo indicado en este reglamento. En ese mismo plazo los citados Colegios Profesionales, deben implementar un sistema de refrendo electrónico de la documentación que por la ley que los rige, debe presentarse a las instituciones públicas” Mientras tanto el transitorio IV complementa la idea al disponer:
“TRANSITORIO CUARTO: SETENA no conocerá los procesos de EsIA para instalaciones de coincineración durante los primeros nueve (9) meses contados a partir de la publicación del presente reglamento en el diario oficial La Gaceta.” Como puede notarse, si el Decreto es atendido cabalmente, para el momento en que se inicien los procesos de autorización el problema que apuntan los accionantes no existirá porque se habrá cumplido con la capacitación que ordena el Decreto a las distintas autoridades y en concreto a los Colegios profesionales que se mencionan específicamente.- No existe entonces en el diseño del Decreto 39136 ninguna lesión a los derechos al ambiente o a la salud de las personas, en los términos concretos planteados en este punto por los accionantes, pero no sobra indicar, adicionalmente, que las autoridades competentes aclaran que toda nueva tecnología requiere capacitar a los profesionales y técnicos que desarrollarán proyectos y verificarán la aplicación de la normativa y que en el presente caso se cuentan con programas en el Ministerio de Salud, con apoyo de Consejo de Normas de Emisión e Inmisión creado por el Decreto 36551 de 27 de abril de 2011 y compromisos internacionales para capacitación. Sobre este extremo no se advierte entonces que se produzca quebranto al artículo 50 de la Constitución Política.
IX.-Segundo grupo de reclamos: Infracciones surgidas de las disposiciones del Decreto 39136 o por omisiones de la citada normativa.
X.- Falta de regulación de específica para incineración de residuos peligrosos. Se acusa la falta de regulación específica para la incineración de residuos peligrosos, debido a su nivel de riesgo y toxicidad en el aire. Se reprocha que entre el 3% y el 10% de los residuos sólidos ordinarios corresponden a residuos peligrosos, los que se llevarían a la incineración, aumentando el potencial contaminante. Observa la Sala sobre el particular, que el Decreto impugnado establece que debe evitarse la coincineración con un contenido superior al 1% de compuestos halogenados expresados en cloro, bajo operaciones de separación y control a fin de evitar la formación de contaminantes orgánicos, como dioxinas, furanos y bifenilos policlorados (Considerando 5, artículos 4 in fine, 7 inciso a.iv), 9 inciso j, 10 incisos k y l, y 22). También está previsto en el Decreto 39136 el rechazo de los residuos peligrosos en los procesos de coincineración. Además, prohíbe las actividades de recuperación de residuos previamente dispuestos en rellenos sanitarios o vertederos; la incineración y coincineración de residuos radiactivos o nucleares, eléctricos y electrónicos, baterías y acumuladores enteros o partes que contengan metales pesados, corrosivos, incluidos los ácidos minerales, que contengan cianuro, amianto, metales pesados o contaminados con éstos, de composición desconocida o impredecible, peligrosos provenientes de los servicios de atención de salud, sus establecimientos de enseñanza y laboratorios, explosivos, armas químicas o biológicas destinadas a su destrucción, Compuestos Orgánicos Persistentes y residuos de Polivinilo Cloruro (artículo 5). Por su parte los numerales 22 y 23 del Decreto 39136 fijan los límites y máximos de emisión para dioxinas, furanos, bifenilos policlorados y metales pesados. De acuerdo con los informes rendidos por las autoridades del Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía, los límites de coincineración están más actualizados y más estrictos que lo dispuesto en el Decreto 31837-S, el cual regula las condiciones de operación para tratamiento de residuos peligrosos y se fundamenta en Directrices técnicas sobre coprocesamiento ambiental de los desechos peligrosos. En este aspecto se acusa el quebranto al derecho a un ambiente sano, sin embargo el argumento se sustenta en los posibles efectos que puedan originarse por la falta de atención de la normativa al momento de su puesta en práctica, por lo que no se concreta la afectación que la normativa en sí misma, pueda contener y que la haga merecedora de su anulación.
XI.Sobre el reclamo por el riesgo y la falta de medidas regulatorias sobre los productos finales de incineración, Los accionantes consideran se amenaza seriamente el derecho al ambiente sano y la salud de la población y el principio precautorio por la omisión de regular el tema de la disposción final de los productos finales de la incineracion. En orden al resguardo del ambiente y la salud, el Decreto 39136 contiene una amplia normativa reguladora, especialmente en los artículos 6, 10 13 14 y 16 donde se fijan las reglas para todos los tipos de productos finales de la coincineración, tanto gases como cenizas e incluidos también los lodos procedentes del tratamiento de aguas residuales, salvo análisis químico que indique lo contrario (artículo 16). Con base en tales reglas se dispone su almacenamiento de manera separada; la aprobación de un Programa de Manejo Integral de Residuos Sólidos Peligrosos; pruebas para establecer las características físicas y químicas, su potencial contaminante y peligrosidad conforme al Reglamento sobre el procedimiento para llevar a cabo la prueba de extracción para determinar constituyentes que hacen un residuo peligroso por su toxicidad al ambiente, Decreto 27002-MINAE de 29 de abril de 1998 (La Gaceta No. 101 de 27 de mayo de 1998); además de análisis mensuales y un registro diario conforme al Decreto 37788. Por ello este punto concreto debe desestimarse por entenderse que las disposiciones concretas recogidas en el Decreto 39136, sumados al resto de normativa de vigilancia y control establecidas, resultan ser un marco suficientemente protector del ambiente y la salud, todo sin perjuicio de que las actividades concretas o las omisiones estatales que puedan llegar a arriesgar en casos concretos tales derechos, puedan ser revisadas por las autoridades competentes y, en casos de afectaciones graves y directas por la propia Sala.
XII.- Lesiones constitucionales originadas en el artículo 7 del Decreto 39136, relativo a las distancias y poblaciones protegidas.- Los accionantes se cuestionan que el Decreto 39136 contiene una lista de instituciones y poblaciones que deberán ser protegidas de la cercanía la plantas de coincineración, pero sin justificación técnica se deja sin tal protección a universidades y residencias. Con ello se lesiona el principio de objetivación en materia ambiental y el derecho a la vida y la igualdad. Estiman que todas las personas deben tener una protección especial para que las coincineradoras no estén a un radio de 1000 metros que fija el Decreto. Además discuten también esa distancia del radio de protección, por considerar que no se toman en consideración factores atmosféricos particulares. Sobre esta cuestión, observa el Tribunal que los artículos que recogen la cuestión son los numerales 7 y 9 el Decreto 39136; esas normas señalan en lo pertinente:
"Artículo 7. (…)
vii.- Evaluación de riesgos cuantitativa que contemple los escenarios de contingencia que podrían afectar la operación normal de la instalación, y las medidas de mitigación y control de dichos riesgos. Se deben incluir estudios de onda expansiva y distancias de seguridad a instalaciones de centros oficiales de la Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI y centros de atención integral públicos, privados y mixtos para personas hasta de doce años de edad), centros educativos públicos y privados, establecimientos de salud públicos y privados (hospitales y clínicas), almacenamiento y distribución de gas licuado de petróleo o gas natural e industrias químicas que almacenen en forma superficial productos combustibles o inflamables en cantidades superiores a los 1000 m3, actividades agrícolas e industrias de procesamiento de alimentos. en un radio de 1000 m., así como sus consecuencias a la salud y el ambiente.” “Artículo 9.- De la solicitud de Permiso de Ubicación ante el Ministerio de Salud.
Las instalaciones de coincineración deberán guardar una distancia de localización de mil (1000) m. a instalaciones de centros oficiales de la Red Nacional de Cuido y Desarrollo Infantil (CEN-CINAI, CECUDI y centros de atención integral públicos, privados y mixtos para personas hasta de doce años de edad), centros educativos públicos y privados, establecimientos de salud públicos y privados (hospitales y clínicas), almacenamiento y distribución de gas licuado de petróleo o gas natural e industrias químicas que almacenen en forma superficial productos combustibles o inflamables en cantidades superiores a los 1000 m3, actividades agrícolas e industrias de procesamiento de alimentos.” Es decir, se trata de la inclusión, por una parte, de estudios especiales de impacto y medidas de seguridad y por otra, de la fijación de restricciones de ubicación respecto de cierto tipo de instituciones, que son objetivamente merecedoras de mayor resguardo, por la concentración de personas de las que se puede presumir que tiene menores capacidades para seguir instrucciones y en general de actuar por sí mismas en acatamiento de instrucciones. Allí radica para la Sala la clave de la distinción y su justificación que desde esa perspectiva resulta razonable y adecuada.- Pero, además de lo anterior, lleva razón el órgano asesor de la Sala al señalar que ese listado no puede leerse como un decreto de desprotección para el resto de la población y eso queda claro cuando se exigen estudios de dispersión atmosférica y una evaluación cuantitativa de riesgos general. Se suma a lo anterior que la ubicación y aprobación de lugares propuestos para las instalaciones de coincineración deben estar acorde con el Ordenamiento Territorial aprobado, o bien, un uso de suelo conforme emitido por la Municipalidad respectiva, así como la solicitud de permiso de ubicación ante el Ministerio de Salud que permita reportar la distancia respecto a diversas instalaciones y valorar estudios sobre el viento y sobre la población a servir, entre otros (artículos 8 y 9 del Decreto 39136). De allí que se desprende que la normativa sí ha considerado el análisis de aspectos de orden técnico que han de ser valorados por las autoridades ambientales y de salud competentes y respecto de tales temas, este Tribunal llega hasta el punto de determinar que existan dentro del ordenamiento los órganos y procesos encargados de velar por la corrección técnica de las propuestas, y que sus decisiones estén enmarcadas por disposiciones que permitan la protección del ambiente y por supuesto de la salud de las personas.- Como se ha indicado más arriba, la Sala entiende que el Decreto, en este tema de protección de la salud y seguridad de la población, lo que hace es fijar unas reglas que se suman y no sustituyen a todas las demás medidas de protección existentes respecto del ambiente y la salud de la población. Es claro entonces que no hay lesión del principio de igualdad frente a la protección que se debe a la población en general y no existe motivo para anular los artículos 7 y 9 si su finalidad es sumar al marco normativo que debe cumplirse en materia ambiental para operar una planta de coincineración de residuos.
XIII.- Omisión del Estado de producir un decreto de incineración de residuos peligrosos.- Los accionantes anotan que en vez de un decreto como 39136 que regula la incineración de residuos ordinarios, lo que debió emitirse por su evidente necesidad es un reglamento que ordene y fije estrictas normas para un sistema de tratamiento de los residuos sólidos peligrosos, que incluya como parte del mismo los residuos del proceso de incineración, y que ante esa ausencia se lesionan por omisión los principios de objetivación, progresividad y no regresión. Agregan que esa ausencia es más marcada por la ausencia de mecanismo apropiado de control de fallos y por la existencia del transitorio VI del Decreto 39136 que impone a la incineración de residuos peligrosos, los límites del citado Decreto con lo cual se reconoce implícita la ausencia de normativa específica.- El Tribunal entiende que, sobre el primer punto, los interesados solo emiten lo que debe considerarse su criterio particular sobre la oportunidad y necesidad de emitir un Decreto de manejo de residuos peligrosos en vez del Decreto impugnado, de modo que no existe ningún alegato de constitucionalidad para sustentar ese reclamo. En segundo lugar, existe en el Decreto impugnado (artículo 17 del Decreto discutido) un sistema con reglas y parámetros que sirven para ordenar la detención del proceso de incineración.- Finalmente en cuanto al tercer aspecto, cabe indicar que el Transitorio VI resulta ser una medida de seguridad adicional, que en principio no tiene aplicación para la actividad que está siendo autorizada por el Decreto, el cual solo permite incineración de residuos ordinarios y excluye expresamente la incineración de residuos peligrosos.- Así lo ve este Tribunal que entiende que dicha norma, no está en absoluto autorizando la incineración de residuos peligrosos, lo cual requeriría una marco regulatorio bastante distinto del contenido en el Decreto 39136.- Sin embargo no sobra apuntar, como lo hace el órgano asesor del Estado que el manejo y disposición de los residuos peligrosos sí está normativamente regulado en el Convenio de Basilea sobre Control Fronterizo de Desechos Peligrosos y su Eliminación, Ley 7438 de 6 de octubre de 1994; la Ley General de Salud, No. 5395 de 30 de octubre de 1973; el Reglamento para el Manejo de los Desechos Peligrosos Industriales, Decreto 27001 de 29 de abril de 1998; y, en el Reglamento General para la Clasificación y Manejo de Residuos Peligrosos, Decreto 37788 de 15 de febrero de 2013. Se afirma que se cuenta igualmente con reglamentación específica, como por ejemplo, el Reglamento sobre la gestión de los desechos infecto-contagiosos que se generan en establecimientos que prestan atención a la salud y afines, Decreto 30965 de 17 de diciembre de 2002; el Reglamento de requisitos, condiciones y controles para la utilización de combustibles alternos en los hornos cementeros, Decreto 31837 de 1° de abril de 2004; el Reglamento para la Declaratoria de Residuos de Manejo Especial, Decreto 38272 de 7 de enero de 2014; y, el Reglamento sobre límites de emisiones al aire para hornos de fundición de vidrio, Decreto 38237 de 3 de febrero de 2014. De todo lo anterior, cabe concluirse que el Decreto 39136 impugnado no lesiona la Constitución Política en este punto.
XIV.- Sobre los plazos para otorgamiento de permisos por parte de las autoridades. Estiman los accionantes que los plazos conferidos a las autoridades del Ministerio de Salud en el párrafo final del artículo 9, para autorizar la ubicación de las plantas de incineración y otorgar el permiso de funcionamiento es excesivamente corto y por ende afecta el derecho a gozar de un ambiente sano y con ello la salud de las personas. El párrafo respectivo del citado artículo expresa:
“Artículo 9.- (...)
El Ministerio de Salud, debe emitir la resolución respecto a la solicitud de permiso de ubicación, dentro de los diez (10) días hábiles siguientes al recibo de la solicitud con la información completa. En casos justificados el plazo podrá ser ampliado previa notificación al interesado, pero dicha prórroga no podrá exceder los diez (10) días hábiles. En caso que se otorgue el permiso la vigencia será de un año a partir de la fecha de la emisión de la resolución que lo otorgue. (…)” Consideran los accionantes que los 10 días establecidos para llevar a cabo la labor previa de verificación de condiciones técnicas y jurídicas son insuficientes, por lo que se eleva el riesgo contaminante de la actividad de incineración de residuos. En este aspecto la Procuraduría concuerda con los accionantes respecto de la escasez del plazo de diez días para que el Ministerio de Salud pueda analizar y valorar apropiadamente una decisión de semejante relevancia. La Sala entiende la preocupación que traslucen los citados argumentos y compende que la premura no es la actitud apropiada cuando está de por medio la autorización de actividades que necesariamente conllevan la posibilidad de eventualidades y contingencias que pueden poner en riesgo la salud de las personas o el ambiente.- Sin embargo, en este punto, y como también lo indica la Procuraduría, al resolver la cuestión esta Sala debe tener en cuenta la asentada jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, que ha sostenido que los plazos en materia ambiental -tal como resulta ser este caso- no pueden ni deben considerarse perentorios sino meramente ordenatorios, al igual que se ha afirmado además con claridad que en esta materia ambiental tampoco opera la figura del silencio positivo, por lo que se estima que la norma no presenta problema constitucional en dicho sentido, pues la falta de respuesta en el plazo señalado, no podría tomarse como una autorización tácita o implícita para la realización de la actividad de coincineración que regula el Decreto discutido.- XV.- Conclusiones. Los accionantes reprochan que el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 39136-S-MINAE, transgrede los artículos 7, 50 Constitucionales, así como los principios constitucionales de desarrollo sostenible, educación ambiental, precautorio, objetivación, progresividad. Del análisis de los diferentes argumentos presentados en la acción, se concluye que en general el Decreto impugnado contiene las regulaciones atinentes a los límites, el control y el funcionamiento de la actividad de coincineración de residuos sólidos, tanto ordinarios como peligrosos, de manera que no estamos en presencia de autorización no controladas del proceso térmico de tratamientos de residuos como amenaza del medio ambiente. No se evidencia en este proceso que con la regulación del proceso de coincineración de residuos sólidos se incumplan compromisos internacionales adquiridos para la protección de la capa de ozono, la disminución de gases con efecto invernadero y el resguardo del aire y el medio ambiente ratificados por Costa Rica. Se concluye igualmente que una parte de los argumentos presentados por los accionantes en el escrito de interposición, carecen de la fundamentación requerida para solicitar la anulación de la norma reglamentaria por inconstitucional y en varios casos se trata de la exposición de la forma en que -a juicio de los interesados- debería ordenarse la cuestión. Se desprende del escrito de interposición que los accionantes realizan consideraciones sobre el alcance del reglamento y acusan posibles efectos de la reglamentación cuando se ponga en práctica; no obstante no se aporta ninguna evidencia de que los problemas que anticipan tengan su origen específica y concretamente en la aplicación estricta de las disposiciones del Decreto 39136; de tal modo, el reclamo sobre posibles efectos que puede traer aparejada la actividad regulada en el Decreto impugnado, pero sin que se haya acreditado su existencia técnicamente y su vínculo directo con la norma que se disputa, impide llevar a cabo el juicio de constitucionalidad de la norma para eventualmente eliminarla del ordenamiento jurídico. Claro está que lo anterior no significa que las autoridades e interesados no puedan volver a la Sala para acusar en su momento y por la vía procesal correspondiente las lesiones que puedan estarse produciendo por la defectuosa puesta en práctica de la regulación en su momento correspondiente. Por lo todo lo expuesto, procede entonces declarar sin lugar la acción.
Por tanto:
Se declara sin lugar la acción planteada. El Magistrado Cruz Castro pone nota.
Ernesto Jinesta L.
Fernando Cruz C.
Fernando Castillo V.
Paul Rueda L.
Nancy Hernández L.
José P. Hernández G.
Luis Fdo. Salazar A.
NOTA DEL MAGISTRADO CRUZ CASTRO: Los argumentos que exponen los accionantes, plantean interrogantes y valoraciones trascendentales, empero, la normativa objetada se promulga dentro de los parámetros aceptables para la protección del ambiente, tal como se expone en el voto que suscribo. Considero que las normas objetadas en la acción, están en el límite de lo que es admisible en la tutela constitucional del ambiente. Las objeciones expuestas por los recurrentes, se convierten en un punto de referencia importante al valorar los problemas y las amenazas que pueden surgir en la aplicación del Decreto 39136. La coincineración de residuos sólidos, tanto ordinarios, como peligrosos, es una actividad muy sensible y vulnerable en la efectiva tutela del ambiente, especialmente por la vigencia de principios tan importantes como el preventivo y el “in dubio pro natura”. Considero que lo que hemos resuelto en esta sentencia, no cierra totalmente los interrogantes que muy bien han propuesto los accionantes; la ejecución efectiva del Decreto objetado, suscitará nuevas perspectivas sobre el tema y bien podría ser que en un futuro se tengan mejores elementos de juicio, derivados de la práctica, en la que las objeciones planteadas en la acción merezcan reconsideración y un concienzudo análisis.
Fernando Cruz C.
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