Constitutionality of Opening the Workers' Compensation Insurance Market under CAFTA-DRConstitucionalidad de la apertura a competencia del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo en el TLC CAFTA-DR

*100177120007CO* Res. No. 2012016628 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of November, two thousand twelve.

Unconstitutionality action brought by [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, in a common-law marriage, attorney, bearer of identity card number [Value 001], resident of Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, in his capacity as deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the 2010-2014 constitutional term, against subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the United States, Central America and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, approved by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008.

Whereas:

1.- By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours and twenty-five minutes on December twenty-first, two thousand ten, the plaintiff requests that the unconstitutionality of subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the United States, Central America and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, approved by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, be declared, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008. He alleges that such provisions injure Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, which protect social insurance and the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, enshrined in International Human Rights Treaties, pursuant to numerals 7 and 48 of the Constitution, by including the solidarity occupational hazard insurance within commercial opening obligations that imply commercial exploitation and for-profit purposes incompatible with the constitutional nature of that social insurance. He asserts that the purpose of these legal provisions is to convert occupational hazard insurance into a commercial service that would be exploited by companies other than the INS, with a clear for-profit intent, an aspect that, in his view, infringes the constitutional principles that protect insurance, to the detriment of workers and their families, as there is a risk to the social security system. In his grounds regarding the unconstitutionality of the rules he challenges, he states: “(…) also weakens and endangers the full application of the principle of universality of the fundamental right to social security, by allowing private operators to commercially exploit occupational hazard insurance, without imposing on them any obligation to equally serve workers from all labor activities nor a prohibition on selecting low-risk and high-profitability activities. All of this threatens the effective realization of the precept contained in Article 201 of the Labor Code, thereby injuring constitutional precepts established in Articles 73 and 74 of the Constitution, in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador”. (The highlighting belongs to the original text). He also affirms that the rules questioned in this action weaken the existing protection for uninsured workers, as, in his opinion, effective competition prevails, favoring the commercial regime and against the comprehensive protection of the labor sector. In that line of thought, he considers the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights to be violated, because the cited Treaty modifies the current regulatory framework of occupational hazard insurance in a way that reduces the current benefits of workers, a reform that diminishes and worsens the current advantages obtained by the beneficiaries. He summarizes that occupational hazard insurance constitutes a fundamental right of a benefit-providing nature, where the State has the obligation of progressive fulfillment, an aspect that, in his opinion, must be limited “to the respect, protection, guarantee, and promotion” of such rights and, by way of illustration, cites constitutional judgment number 2007-1378. He concludes that international instruments on human rights, such as the Protocol of San Salvador, must prevail over commercial treaties in case of incompatibility, and maintains that the circumstance that the challenged norm is included in an international treaty with a rank superior to the law (CAFTA-DR) does not exempt it from its unconstitutionality for violation of the principle of progressivity of the fundamental right to social security. For all the foregoing, he requests that the action filed be granted.

2.- In order to substantiate the standing he holds to bring this unconstitutionality action, he points to the injury to diffuse interests or interests of the community as a whole, which, in turn, translates into an individual injury for each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic, because social insurance provides basic protection to all persons inhabiting the country.

3.- By resolution of twelve hours and twelve minutes on February seventh, two thousand eleven, the action was admitted for processing, granting an audience to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

4.- Mrs. Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, submitted her report. She points out that occupational hazard insurance has some characteristics that could allow it to be classified as employer civil liability insurance, and others that would allow it to be situated as social insurance. Regarding the former, it is maintained that it constitutes a mechanism to protect the assets of the employer against the eventuality of an accident or an occupational disease that entails its obligation to indemnify the worker. For this reason, it is exclusively at the expense of the employer, and not as in tripartite-financed social insurance with the contribution of workers, employer, and the State. It directly protects the employer, indirectly the worker and his or her family. She also points out that occupational hazard insurance presumes the liability of the employer, derived from the exercise of its for-profit activity, while in social insurance, it is not possible to presume the specific liability of any of the intervening agents. For those who consider it social insurance, they maintain that it is vested with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against misfortunes derived from the exercise of his or her work. If it were not so, they say, it would have no explanation whatsoever that in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent power in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, it shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances), does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code, conceived to regulate a monopoly insurance system under the INS. Evidently, upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, and upon compliance with the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of rules not directly linked to the market opening, but with the characteristics of the insurance, that are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of compulsory nature of the insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as social insurance; numeral 205 of the same regulatory body provides that the INS must carry out annual settlements that include the formation of the technically necessary reserves, the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. This embodies the principle of service at cost, so as long as it remains in force, occupational hazard insurance must operate – at least in its basic coverage – on a not-for-profit basis. Likewise, numerals 221 and 231 point out the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if they would have corresponded to him or her had he or she been insured, subrogating the right to bring an action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the amounts disbursed, plus interest. These provisions underpin the principle of universality. At the regulatory level, occupational hazard insurance is governed by the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances,” approved by the National Council for the Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through article 8, numeral 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurance (article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (article 2). It was issued based on articles 25, 26, 27 and Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. In this regard, the Superintendency of Insurance will grant administrative authorization for the exercise of the insurance activity in the field of occupational hazard insurance “…provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that will be established in the regulation that the National Council issues for that purpose, in accordance with national legislation”. The Regulation, in article 8, foresees the possibility of offering compulsory insurance together with any other voluntary insurance (not subject to service at cost), allowing better coverage in the event that the worker sues the employer for an act or omission by the latter that gave rise to the occupational accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code and that payments of economic benefits will be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation of Occupational Hazards issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision whereby, for the worker who was not insured, the INS must grant the benefits, except in those cases where the employer had a valid policy with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, in which case the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity that received the premium. The Attorney General's Office does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is in itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies with the Worker Protection Law, the social security system regarding pensions was formed by four pillars. Within that scheme, there is private participation, under a competitive regime, for profit, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The rules establish that it must operate at cost, however, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, the participation of private companies, for profit, in the commercialization of occupational hazard insurance is not contrary to the Constitution, provided that a legal norm of legislative rank is issued that protects, at a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers up to now. There is no norm, of constitutional rank, that establishes that occupational hazard insurance must operate at cost, or without profit. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which shows that there is some flexibility to define the operation of that insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of workers' rights. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could endanger its competitiveness, even though the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances” is considered insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality is not in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions regulating the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code with respect to not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law itself establishes that this regulation must be issued “in accordance with National legislation”. Not acting in this way would go against not only the principle of universality, but also that of progressivity, since it could happen that the protection that the entire working class of the country currently enjoys is reduced to only a part of it. There is an obligation of constitutional rank to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.

5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 39, 40, and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin, of February 24, 25, and 28, 2011.

6.- By briefs presented by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipality of San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP) requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber consider them as active coadjuvants in this action. They likewise question the challenged norms in their capacities as workers and citizens, beneficiaries and users of social insurance, considering that they injure the constitutional principles protecting social insurance, derived from Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Constitution, specifically affecting the solidarity occupational hazard insurance. They indicate that the challenged norms obligate Costa Rica to allow the for-profit commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity insurance as of January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote number 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social insurance for occupational hazards contemplated in the fourth paragraph of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the foregoing, by clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 will not apply to the social insurance set forth in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Constitution and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), but excluding social insurance for occupational hazards, despite the fact that these also have constitutional rank and are governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the effect on the constitutional principles that protect social insurance for occupational hazards, since it provides that Costa Rica will not have to reform its regulations regarding this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations “are consistent” with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the commercial exploitation for profit of the social and solidarity insurance for occupational hazards is incompatible with the nature and the principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in terms of the levels of protection achieved by the country (affectation of the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the “Insurance Market Regulatory Law, includes a Comprehensive Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924”, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 of La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008. It reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and is intended to implement said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions must grant “authorizations” for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity occupational hazard insurance, as of January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same vices of constitutionality. They agree with Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of Articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and that it is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality, and service at cost. If its commercial exploitation for profit is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, injuring the rights of workers who suffer occupational accidents and illnesses, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.

7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican - North American Chamber of Commerce, submits a brief as a passive coadjuvant in the unconstitutionality action, with sufficient powers to intervene in the process, pointing out general aspects of the jurisdiction of the Chamber, as well as the limited effects that national law has on the obligations of public international law. If the State were forced to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the sovereign's will expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors, and exporters, and a ruling on its entirety would be necessary. Now, contrary to what is affirmed by the plaintiff, the Chamber has ruled on the opening of occupational hazard insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that compulsory occupational hazard insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, social insurance as defined by Article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he emphasizes that convenience or inconvenience is not the same as the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the plaintiff makes value judgments emphasizing the inconvenience of the challenged norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give effect to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself. Moreover, he points out that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in Judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that occupational hazard insurance is mentioned in Article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country (employers and workers alike) have to choose among different entities that offer occupational hazard coverage. He considers that the insurance is not part of social insurance, as these are defined by the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of occupational hazard insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and Article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent modifying the form of providing occupational hazard insurance. While he accepts that insurance against occupational hazards is constitutionally recognized, they are social insurance that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of this social insurance must be met that occupational hazard insurance does not have, regarding coverage, form of financing, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the funds may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent power, these insurances were separated and differentiated from occupational hazard insurance, as was regulated by Article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. While it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to the solidarity assistance of the worker, and that there is recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by Article 73 nor that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that occupational hazard insurance is a regime that the constituent power established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers it correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection granted by social insurance and occupational hazard insurance is not exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. In addition, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security managed by the Fund, and another of occupational hazard insurance managed by the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances managed by the Fund and the INS are delimited. He cites case law of the Chamber and opinions of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in which they point out that social insurance is exclusively that which protects workers against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. In that sense, the plaintiff's thesis of considering occupational hazard insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The plaintiff's thesis is not valid under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to the special provisions. Many of the plaintiff's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions which, as they are not based on doctrinal criteria, relevant judgments, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, do not express anything other than the plaintiff's personal feeling toward commercial opening. The Labor Code keeps intact the rules regarding provision, universality, compulsory nature, and other characteristics of occupational hazard insurance, expressly including that uninsured cases will continue to be attended to by the National Insurance Institute. There is no denaturalization of compulsory occupational hazard insurance. The fundamental core of occupational hazard insurance, as it pertains to worker protection, would not be changed by commercial opening or even by potential profit, since it would not cease to be universal, compulsory, and solidarity-based. It remains compulsory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers, and would remain solidarity-based since it will always be paid by the employer, and the uninsured will be attended to by the INS. By judgment 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulatorily develop the social guarantee of the right to subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all normative development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern the insurance through special provisions, but also does not imply a waiver, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the plaintiff, he points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, he relies on Judgment No. 1998-06450 insofar as it points to the democratic legitimacy that corresponds to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's case law, has not been violated, since to that end it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The plaintiff assumes, by the mere fact of allowing other entities to present the occupational hazard insurance service, that coverage and quality thereof will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence of this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. He requests that the action be dismissed.

8.- Freddy Sandí Brenes, Secretary General of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (hereinafter UPINS) appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his standing is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation corresponding to him on behalf of INS workers in relation to occupational hazards. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office, he emphasizes the fact that it reaches the conclusion that social occupational hazard insurance is truly a right and a social guarantee. He adduces that the recommendation put forward by the Attorney General's Office, proposing that since the challenged norms are not unconstitutional, legislation must be enacted to guarantee the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity.

It argues that an opening legislation guaranteeing these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces, in practice, a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and a disadvantage for the INS in terms of competition, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could violate other constitutional principles related to freedom of commerce, enshrined in constitutional Articles 46 and 28, and competition, leading us to the philosophical discussion in the area of Human Rights, regarding whether solidarity can be imposed in matters of commerce. It argues that the reasons why the challenged regulations are unconstitutional lie in the model of State chosen by the constituent power, therefore bringing up whether Costa Rica is a Social State under the Rule of Law or a Liberal State under the Rule of Law. Elucidating the above is essential considering that the opening of a social insurance against workplace risks, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, demands a special value judgment regarding the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been shaped to this day as a Social and Democratic State under the Rule of Law, governed among others by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituent framers dreamed of a Social State under the Rule of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State under the Rule of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent power in the first paragraph of constitutional Article 50. The constituent framers decided to balance labor-management relations, broadly outlining the following guarantees: a) allowing workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (constitutional Article 60), b) elevating to constitutional rank the right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and granting the status of law to the content of those negotiations (constitutional Article 62), c) constitutionally guaranteeing the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, severance pay (cesantía) can be interpreted as being included, but the article establishes neither a ceiling limit nor prohibits aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of individuals and their family members and dependents (Article 72), e) an insurance system is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of their salary amount, and the best possibilities of restoring themselves to continue working. This recognizes the importance of work as a means of livelihood, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, in which that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (constitutional Article 73), f) the constituent power includes and specifically “constitutionalizes” the rights and benefits not previously stated, but which derive from the Christian principle of social justice and which are indicated by law (or by collective bargaining agreements that have the force of law (Article 74). Regarding the legal nature of workplace risk insurance and its content, it alleges that the fact that its content is provided through law does not imply that it can be varied to worsen it simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that workplace risk insurance “shall be governed by special laws.” Within the study of legislative technique in human rights matters, this reference to the law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes an error by the constituent power, which in a certain way “de-constitutionalizes” what it intends to “constitutionalize.” Certainly, every constitutional norm has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or “the hard core” of that right. The social insurance for workplace risks is constituted by at least the following principles: the principle of universality, the principle of solidarity, the principle of generality, the principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), and service at cost. The social insurance for workplace risks has constitutional rank and is also recognized in ILO Convention 102, approved insofar as relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica have not only a value similar to the Political Constitution, but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to individuals, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutionality control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all workers in the country are covered by workplace accident insurance; a situation that, in our judgment, would be breached by the risk selection that different companies in the insurance market could make. Regarding the incompatibility of the constitutional principle of service at cost with the opening of this type of social insurance, it states that this derives directly from constitutional Article 73. This principle is developed simultaneously by labor legislation, establishing in those regulations that in this activity, there are no “profits” as such, but rather eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, towards the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council. As the same petitioner indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become private profits. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest them, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and would violate the principle of progressivity. This obligation to offer insurance at cost, we consider incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in constitutional Articles 46 and 28; therefore, the social insurance for workplace risks cannot legally be opened to free competition. On the matter of risk selection and the violation of the constitutional principles of universality and progressivity, it affirms that certainly, the mutually supportive coverage (cobertura solidaria) of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. The income from more profitable activities contributes to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the workplace risks insurance market, private companies will compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities that present lower loss ratios. This would leave less attractive risks, and those with statistically proven more accidents, again in the hands of probably the sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of “risk selection” functions as the fundamental concept that prevents a social insurance, which is mutually supportive, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating as a commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance is radically opposed to the conception of a social insurance like that for workplace risks, which is based on insuring all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or hazardousness. This confirms the position held here, in that what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization. In accordance with constitutional Article 74, social guarantees are inalienable (irrenunciables), and given that the legislator established the inalienability of social guarantees, said condition operates such that: the worker cannot waive them. Nor can the State allow that these guarantees are not available in its legislation.

9.- Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as acting Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it endows him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment matters, likewise due to the institutional dynamics with the trade partners of the Free Trade Agreement: United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the petitioner's standing, it is alleged that the harm transcends an individual harm to any person, that is, for the entire national community, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes his standing on the existence of a popular action, for the action is brought for the benefit of all inhabitants of the Nation in the face of an alleged injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. It further accuses that the action contains subjective assessments and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis; it confuses Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating constitutional and legal principles applicable from one insurance regime to another, thus conveniently intermingling the nature of each with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced to create a confrontation and incongruity of the national legal system with the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic completeness and legal certainty, ignoring international trade commitments and general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with international treaties, conventions, and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international legal order. The principles in question, aside from being specific to international law, constitute basic premises of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it must be pointed out, firstly, the principle according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws on the international plane; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to fulfill an international obligation. In relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of domestic law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must fulfill them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Similarly, international tribunals have sustained that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal character of international law norms is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed by its international obligations; the rights enshrined in international regulations are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level; and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, rather they modify the domestic legal system of nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first one, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. So that, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of customary lineage (international customs), a State—upon joining the international community—accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning conventional rules of international law—be those coming from a bilateral or multilateral treaty—the process is usually different from the former. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4) and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures relating to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements—denominations that for international law purposes are equivalent—and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution states that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over ordinary Law, which entails that, faced with a norm from an international treaty or convention, domestic norms of legal rank yield their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, for each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing to an indefinite future the realization of these rights under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, which is that of “progressivity” or “progressive development,” paradoxically included in Article 26 itself of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on “available resources,” which cannot be interpreted licentiously because it would delay their effectiveness, and would violate the general principles of international law “Pacta Sunt Servanda” and “Bona Fides,” and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights must be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all commitments acquired by the State, regardless of their origin and nature. Regarding the alleged hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively addressing human rights issues, it is worth noting that, pursuant to the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions, or that, even, compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are “dead letter,” which would be equivalent to evading or failing to fulfill international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of ruling 2010-11352, has recognized the need to interpret the Magna Carta harmoniously with the doctrine of human rights emanating from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the Nation's duty to modify the Political Constitution, exceptionally, in those insurmountable cases where it conflicts with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them into its legal system or not, so that it is consistent, congruent, and concordant with said international norms, principles, rights, and customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelacy, undue hierarchy, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or, based on said criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. Any thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement has as its basis another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered other than a gross infringement and evident breach of International Law and the Law of the Constitution. Furthermore, it compiles ruling No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, by which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, regarding the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference regarding the purpose of the Treaty, which would not address the advisability or not of the approval, nor the economic aspects surrounding the Treaty, but rather issues generating doubts of constitutionality. The congruence with the claims of the consultants and what was resolved reveals the necessity, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, that the ruling must be read as a whole, following a legal interpretation reasonable and proportional to the purpose pursued within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So that a light reading that partially and decontextualizedly interprets the text in question from the prevailing reality, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the whole of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and of the norms it deals with, which would indissolubly lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is not acceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to continue, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, quite well known by all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but rather an evident contravention of the general principles of International Law “Pacta Sunt Servanda” and “Bona fides,” which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.

Costa Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the way in which the Workplace Risk Insurance was provided in the country, the foregoing, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that support it, the rights that guarantee the same, or the coverage that this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of CAFTA-DR, the country—in the Area of Insurance Services—assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition—by said insurances, it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workplace Risk Insurance—starting January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called “Gradual Market Opening Commitments,” subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for workplace risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to subsection 2 quoted, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurances of constitutional Article 73, clarified that the social insurances contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, whereas the mandatory workplace risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or disagreements with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in a relative and exclusive Annex on Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, because the commitment of the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory workplace risk and vehicle insurances in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right, nor does it denature said mandatory insurances. The opening and possible provision by entities other than the Instituto Nacional de Seguros does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not oblige Costa Rica to modify the rules that regulate workplace risk insurance, provided that said rules are consistent with the obligations assumed under CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obliges the country to “…treat workplace risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be profitably exploited… the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the preceding section that define and characterize the social and mutually supportive nature of workplace risk insurance.” Nor is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obliges that “…must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, because it is a norm with a rank superior to national law,” because the commercialization of Workplace Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application and respect of the constitutional and mutually supportive principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as an insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or means by which the State must comply with said international precept, since by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, they are internally obliged by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the domestic legal system—be it as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law—to receive said international norms within the bosom of the national legal system and intrinsically give full force to the precepts emanating from the treaties, conventions, or international agreements. CAFTA-DR establishes a specific programmatic commitment, namely: the competitive opening of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workplace Risk Insurance, starting January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the way in which such an obligation will be carried out. It is here that the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as the main consequence the non-compliance with the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other State Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that would conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. With the purpose of complying with this and other insurance market opening commitments, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, was issued, which, in accordance with its Article 1 stating its objectives, it is clear that the same aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of insured parties or consumers of insurance services, the minimum requirements and rules for market regulation, and basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of CAFTA-DR for market opening for mandatory workplace risk and vehicle insurances, starting January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the General Superintendence of Insurance grants based on the Regulation issued for this purpose by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System. The mentioned Transitory is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the term contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to extend, as part of its supervision functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation that establishes the operational requirements for mandatory insurances in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, a body of maximum deconcentration attached to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, based on the competencies that the Laws grant it.

In this regard, it reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that heard and issued a report on the Insurance Market Regulatory Bill, to conclude that the nature of the Mandatory Occupational Hazard Insurance is a component that concerns the protection of workers' social security, which, in what is relevant, according to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, creates insurance against occupational risks that shall be exclusively at the expense of employers and shall be governed by special provisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined as a mercantile contract; rather, we are in the presence of an insurance whose regulation is found in the Constitution, given its importance within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to the fact that it can be offered in the market under a competitive scheme, an aspect that clearly would guarantee for the consumer and for the insured greater diversity of options and better coverage and underwriting conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (reviewed by constitutional consultation by the Chamber in judgment No. 2008-10450), a rule of public order and public interest, develops the commitments derived from CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the authorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of the insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity. It creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the effective competition of participating entities, in addition to modernizing and strengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the legal rule and based on the international commitment, the “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, which defines the minimum operating requirements for Occupational Hazard Insurance and Mandatory Automobile Insurance,” was issued, applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed insurance. The “Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” exists. The invocation of unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening would expose the country to a potential State-State dispute settlement panel, which would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance. Costa Rica could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits, Article 20.16 of CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to the reputation of Costa Rica in the framework of bilateral and multilateral processes of negotiation of trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even occur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios”.

Article 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent to provide and maintain a protection of superior rank to workers under the protection of the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social security is informed by the basic principles of universality, mandatory nature, and social solidarity. Judgments of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two social insurance systems, not mutually exclusive, that have the primary and imperative purpose of protecting the worker. One against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, and the other against occupational risks, which are at the exclusive and own expense of the employer (judgment 2008-016964). There are several consequences of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; first, the issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security regime, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social Security. Secondly, it was interpreted that there are principles of the Right to Social Security linked to the Social Insurance Regime of the CCSS, which are those related to universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (judgment 2001-10546). A third consequence is the linkage between the right to health and social security, insofar as the administration of social insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (judgment 2007-17971). The fourth consequence most highlighted from the jurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection granted by social insurance and by occupational hazard or labor insurance, which are different expressions of the fundamental right of social security and that manifest themselves in the legal system in a distinct way through the different norms that regulate the regimes of the social security system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational hazard insurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social security regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social security services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional rank, given that there is no legal or constitutional prohibition that prevents the commercialization of Occupational Hazard Insurance, since the regime is essentially distinct from that of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the occupational hazard insurance market is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, since this mandatory insurance continues to be treated by CAFTA-DR as an insurance distinct from the social security insurances of the CCSS without the nature of the same being altered. Regarding the Regime of Mandatory Insurance for Occupational Hazards or Occupational Risks, as a social security regime, it seeks to indemnify the worker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or illnesses, on the occasion of or as a consequence of the work they perform in a subordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational hazard regime is regulated infra-constitutionally in Title Four: On the Protection of Workers during the Exercise of Work of the Labor Code (Article 193 to 331), the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, and in the SUGESE Agreement 04-10, “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios” approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a manifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not detract from the fact that, doctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, we are in the presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. The historical fact underlies that it is a mercantile contract recognized in the Fundamental Norm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions, given its importance within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an innovative and additional element to the traditional conception of the law of mercantile insurance contracts. The competition scheme is not incompatible with the Constitution, nor do international instruments on human rights prescribe or give indications of such non-conformity. The report states the similarities and differences between the Illness, Disability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other contingencies Regime administered by the CCSS and the Regime of Mandatory Insurance for Occupational Hazards or Occupational Risks. Also concerning the principles of mandatory nature, universality, social solidarity, and non-waivability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social Security, because much of the constitutional jurisprudence that develops them has been transcribed; however, these will be analyzed from the perspective of the issue of respect for the essential content of that right.

According to the plaintiff's arguments, the principle of mandatory nature is not affected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or affect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as a constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The relevant provisions make the Insurance a mandatory insurance. In this sense, Article 193 of the Labor Code, which operationalizes the principle, remains in force; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the commitment was assumed to open the mandatory insurance market to competition starting on January 1, 2011. Thus, the reference that the article makes to the INS should be understood generically to mean the operators authorized by SUGESE in accordance with the “Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” issued by CONASSIF. The mandatory nature is in the Labor Code, the General Regulation of Occupational Hazards (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the aforementioned regulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia General de Seguros and the Technical Standard issued by each insurance entity.

The principle of universality is also not modified, denaturalized, or affected by CAFTA-DR or by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. The treaty does not assume anywhere the existence of a competitive market in which Occupational Hazard Insurance would cease to cover all workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the effective market opening, new private occupational hazard insurance operators will have the possibility of attracting a greater number of employers to contract that insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the principle of mandatory nature. The regulatory provision (Article 5) provides for the obligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the insured, and beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the specifications that the law and related regulations provide for mandatory insurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that offer mandatory insurance to subscribe to the necessary agreements or contracts with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the operational aspects derived from the medical attention provided by that institution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits indicated in Article 218 of the Labor Code. The hypothetical scenarios where the opening of the Occupational Hazard Insurance market will affect the finances of the INS, and consequently, the care of non-insured persons, but it points out what has been affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Corte Suprema de Justicia and the Labor Courts that the non-insured worker is not harmed from the perspective of the joint obligation, without prejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case, the Regulation contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an Occupational Hazard Insurance policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, they will be considered as non-insured and the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium. It highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Law of Judicial Collection of certifications issued by established entities, the competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those issued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited attention in an insurance market monopoly system, since the attentions or benefits that the insurance coverages contemplate are constrained by fundamental criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions of the workers.

The principle of social solidarity posits the duty to help those who have less based on the contribution of all, especially of those who have more. The appellant's arguments that the opening of the Occupational Hazard Insurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity because workers will have unequal protection lack any foundation. On this point, it is relevant to remember that the duty of insuring workers through Insurance does not correspond to the worker, but to the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic to conceive the functioning of an open and competitive Occupational Hazard Insurance market, in which workers will be left without insurance, because they will be “rejected” by private operators of occupational hazard benefits, because their salary is not “attractive,” since it is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance but their employer, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 73 of the Constitution and the norms of the Labor Code. For greater detail, note that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation to this insurance is that it is mandatory and compulsory, regardless of the working conditions and the salary earned, so that the employer always has the obligation to insure their workers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of underwriting and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Hazard Insurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of the activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in accordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, to ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can private or public insurance service providers, on a discriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers who wish to contract Insurance services with them, due to the authorization obtained from SUGESE in accordance with the Regulation issued by CONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance with national legislation. It follows from the foregoing that an insurance entity may reserve the right not to contract with an employer-client when the latter does not comply with the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the supervisory entity. In this sense, the plaintiff is incorrect when they state that private operators “will fight over the profitable segments of the market.” CAFTA-DR starts from the premise that in the competitive Insurance market, the insurance firms that are authorized by the State know in advance the rules that regulate competition and protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to offer a public offering of occupational hazard insurance and make a selection of the employers – clients to whom they wish to sell the occupational hazard insurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and regulatory norms, there can be no discrimination in the underwriting of workers, by virtue of the fact that the same principle of universality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to select or discriminate against workers based on their potential earnings and risk levels. Regarding the second stage, relative to the determination of coverage, it refers to Article 15 of the CONASSIF Regulation, which the plaintiff seems to ignore, resolving the issue of the minimum content of Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on the basic benefits established by the aforementioned norm. In the stage of determining coverage rates, it is allowed to establish categories of greater or lesser claim frequency, taking into account, among other items, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of activities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages are duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those coverages are determined under the technical actuarial bases that support the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with Article 205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be viable and financially sustainable, and to allow similar treatment to equals. The basic coverages functioned before CAFTA-DR and when the INS had the monopoly on mandatory insurance. The rates for each insurance entity are authorized by SUGESE in order to comply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors that the general provisions of the capital sufficiency and solvency regime demand, as well as to ensure sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities from their insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and discrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities, but also that the minimum basic coverage, equal for all workers, is met, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same for all workers. Thus, the additional benefits by way of additional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the employer has with the insurance entity, and that are at the expense of the latter, will imply, directly, an improvement in the treatment and attention to the worker, which in no way threatens the principle of universality or that of solidarity. Regarding non-waivability, the workers protected under this regime cannot waive the rights conferred by the same, as prescribed by said constitutional norm. That is, workers cannot, on their own initiative or through the action of a third party, waive the rights and benefits granted by reason of the Fundamental Right to Social Security. The plaintiff does not indicate why the principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers can waive Occupational Hazard Insurance; on the contrary, in the preamble of Section H “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services,” respect for the Political Constitution is reaffirmed, and with it the non-waivable nature of the rights and benefits of the Insurance.

Regarding the constitutional principles of the Illness, Disability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other contingencies Regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that are extensive to the Occupational Hazard Insurance Regime, such as the principles of sufficiency that is in force in Article 206 of the Labor Code where both the needs of the worker and the salary earned by the worker are taken into account. In fact, it functioned this way in times when the INS had the monopoly of Occupational Hazard Insurance and will continue functioning in the same terms, today in a market open to competition. It also alludes to the principle of automaticity of protection, referring to the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social security that translates into “… adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age, and death.” By extending this principle to Occupational Hazard Insurance, as part of the general social security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special nature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, mandatory and universal. This has functioned this way until now, where the hospitals of the Caja or private health centers must provide primary attention to anyone who has suffered a work accident or illness. The same immediate protection is received by non-insured workers. In any case, Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulation come to support what is provided in numeral 232 of the Labor Code.

It additionally points out the following differences between Occupational Hazard Insurance and the Social Insurances of the CCSS. Regarding the subject that performs the service or provides the coverage, in each one it indicates the respective institutional fields and coverages, as well as the commercial operators, concluding with the plaintiff's indication that it violates the Political Constitution. Furthermore, Occupational Hazard Insurance is at the exclusive expense of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme of the Social Insurances of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It is to the latter that the prohibition of transferring or using those funds for purposes other than those referring to its mission applies. There are differences regarding the use and destination of the funds and reserves of social insurance. The funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to Article 73 of the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity, Disability, and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply to the Mandatory Occupational Hazard Insurance Regime; there is no constitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves resulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in Article 73 when it refers to “social insurance” and “insurance against occupational risk.” Although this does not mean that these funds remain without regulation, as this is determined by legal means, but this is a very different one from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of constitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary benefits and the supposed service at cost. Regarding the first, it points out that neither CAFTA-DR nor the Insurance Market Regulatory Law alters Article 242 of the Labor Code, nor Articles 255 to 259, regarding the possibility of commutation of income. Furthermore, the so-called “service at cost” is not a principle of mandatory insurance, nor even a constitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in general, so the plaintiff confuses and extrapolates, based on rules of the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, undue consequences for the Occupational Hazard Insurance Regime. There is no evidence of the “service at cost” principle at the constitutional level, but rather with Article 205 of the Labor Code, which establishes that any surplus produced must be destined to constitute a reserve, to then erroneously suppose and conclude the existence of a presumed constitutional principle. Article 73 of the Constitution does not speak of income, as the plaintiff tries to argue, and makes an error in the analysis of the arguments presented, since the term the constituent used was “fund.” Rather, there is Article 28 of the Constitution that guarantees to every citizen freedom as a basic principle, developed by infra-constitutional norms such as the law, which must determine its scope and impose restrictions that concretize and harmonize them with the rest of the block of constitutionality and legality. Moreover, the observance of being proportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of the INS, according to Article 205 of the Labor Code, it must carry out annual liquidations; the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, 50%, to finance the programs developed by the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional, and the rest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. Similarly, it says that the INS, as an insurance entity, must comply with the precepts of Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, regarding technical provisions and reserves. Likewise, the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of the Law are obligated to comply with the mandates regarding technical provisions, reserves, and investments contained in the indicated numerals. But Article 205 of the Labor Code is not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the “service at cost” issue in vote 2007-9469, with this judgment having three main consequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide a service at cost would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no constitutional principle that forces telecommunications services, or in the case of Occupational Hazard Insurance, to be provided “at cost.” This is a decision that remains at the criterion of the legislator. CAFTA-DR also does not address the issue that the insurance must be commercialized “at cost.” Secondly, commercialization in a competitive market is not exclusive of the application of a social policy in the matter of occupational hazard insurance. It is worth remembering the preamble of Section H on “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services,” where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the opening process in the provision of insurance must be done based on the Political Constitution, its norms, and principles. But to comply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the services of the ORT be provided “at cost.” Finally, the third consequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that compels the ORT services to be provided “at cost.” However, what is guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of consumers to choose the service provider that best suits their interests (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). The freedom to choose is not incompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to “… achieve the universality and solidarity of the services that are opened to competition.” The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or right to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of the freedom of enterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and equity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, concerning the progressiveness of international fundamental rights law and the Mandatory Occupational Hazard Insurance regime. The minimum normative principle (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account as it postulates that there is a compendium of minimum labor and social security norms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the employer, or the insurance operators, so that contravention of these implies a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums form part of the essential content of the right to social security of occupational hazard insurance, whereby the essential content will also include, as part of its hard core, the minimum benefits or basic coverages of the recognized ORT. As long as the legislator does not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of occupational hazard insurance, through the enactment of legal norms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable, or deprive said right of the necessary protection. The norms under examination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the exercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or deprive it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The choice made by the State is the most favorable for workers covered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected right, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, allowing the exercise of the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in a clear derivation of the principles “pro libertatis” and “pro homine,” benefiting all workers of the Nation.

Reasonable profit is also argued, such that the hard core of content is not affected by a change in the entity providing the service or by allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the legal-philosophical essence or foundation of the right in question, and therefore there is no violation of the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights. The country has already consolidated an effective protection system that is not diminished. It does not consider there to be a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and ILO Convention No. 102 because their regulation is separate in both. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently enjoy, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that beneficiaries of the mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance regime have obtained to date. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit.

10.- Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative caucus of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadjuvants. In this regard, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations should be expanded to include the entirety of the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 Regulation, approved by CONASSIF through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing, insofar as the challenged Transitory Provision III of Law 8653, subsequently ordered CONASSIF and SUGESE to regulate a regime of full opening in the provision of Occupational Risks Social Insurance, no later than January 1, 2011, an administrative action that took effect as of December 22 of last year. They allege that the mere act of enacting said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, meant placing a public good or service of constitutional rank into commerce, which by its very conceptual-functional nature is entirely outside of commerce. They argue that the alleged unconstitutionality is already noticeable through literal-grammatical interpretation alone, considering that the constitutional provisions alleged (Title V of the Political Constitution) have a clean, clear, and precise wording, while their location in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They state that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the sole non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following rigorous syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State = Outside of commerce. Premise 2: Occupational Risk Insurance (RT) = Social Insurance that is part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Political Constitution. Sole non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside of commerce. Therefore, the challenged regulations are unconstitutional, including the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 regulation. It is also asserted that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly held by the INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing, considering that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, occupational risks were legislatively developed by a labor code, and are also shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization and by constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of the universality of the public occupational risks service, including uninsured cases, we can indeed imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State sabotaged from within to be forced to purchase hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly affirmed that a new regulatory framework that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and monetary benefits) brings to mind the foundational reasoning of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from making legislative regressions in matters of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave as a Superintendency of Social Insurances; it should be remembered that administration and regulation are the exclusive purview of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the veiled castration of the Labor Code, or doing nothing to prevent it, is tantamount to regressing in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the enactment of the challenged regulation, the coadjuvants made it known to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was in the public interest to proactively address this debate, for the sake of the legal and regulatory health in development (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failure to do so would destabilize the institutional framework and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that such an omissive conduct could even result in the diminution, affectation, or detriment of the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when enacting the CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10 Regulation. The DR-CAFTA itself, in its Chapter 16, subparagraph b) of Article III.2 of Section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Labor Code and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain nature (demanialidad) of the service, and thus the challenged regulations could be tacitly repealed in light of Chapter 16 of CAFTA itself. In other words, both legal systems, in apparent contradiction, are not, because each separately regulates different matters and principles: one public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less incompatibility regarding the same matter. Therefore, it is not proper for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Labor Code tacitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and exclusionary material jurisdiction over the SSRT service in favor of the State through the INS. That is, what is under discussion has more to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadjuvants state that, as legislators, they are prohibited from violating the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressivity of human rights), which would be consummated if legislation is approved that in one way or another worsens labor human rights, for example, those enshrined in Articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 of the Labor Code.

11.- Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) allege that they have standing to file the coadjuvancy brief in order to maintain that commercial opening will foster and produce a segmentation of the occupational insurance market, so that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social will have to assume the “collateral” damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of working people, particularly of the Caja and the rest of Costa Rican social security, with an indisputable legitimate interest of a collective nature, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from Article 332 of the Labor Code. They maintain that occupational risk insurance forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. However, while the last paragraph of said article provides that insurance against occupational risks shall be governed by special provisions—and those administered by the Caja are also governed by a special law—this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances are not part of social security, from the very framework of our Constitution. If any argumentation in this sense were valid, the constituent assembly simply would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. Thus, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Chamber has interpreted, occupational risk insurance substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security that inform constitutional Article 73 apply equally to all modalities of social insurance expressly contemplated in this numeral: the very particular situation, mostly of a historical nature, that the administration of occupational risk insurance was attributed to an institution other than the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, can in no way justify the understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. Commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must reach even those who are not insured; they state that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which will have fewer resources to cover these expenses. Companies are illicitly enriched at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the patrimony of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity, where care is based above what is earned, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the scheme of commercial opening, in a competitive regime, fosters market segmentation of “consumers,” with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit, where the protection provided must correspond to at least basic medical-assistance benefits, regardless of insurance premiums or the amount of workers' wages. The scheme restricts the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of benefits currently being provided. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that occupational risk insurance constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is only possible under a public, universal scheme, incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. That the Chamber has indicated that the social security system implies that public authorities will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which comes to prevent any modality of private management and administration of occupational risk insurance with a profit motive. The dignity of workers is also injured, because as a consequence of these new rules, within which the Instituto Nacional de Seguros will have to see how it survives, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of occupational risk insurance, in a regime of commercial exploitation, forces the modification of the Labor Code in matters of occupational risks. In this sense, they point to note 22, which conditions regulations on the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, and affirm that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent, incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the commercialization and privatization scheme of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for the promotion of worker health and the prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, health, and other benefits, there are also those that seek to promote health and the prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses. The profits that were previously used for the above will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies in this area will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and illnesses. Occupational risk insurances constitute an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which they cite the chapter on the Rights of Labor by John Paul II, noting that the Encyclical provides that in cases of work accidents, workers must have access to health care, even free of charge, which would be violated, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. They request that the action be declared with merit.

12.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by numeral 9 ibidem, as this resolution is deemed sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

13.- By resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued within this file document, several coadjuvancy briefs for and against the unconstitutionality action were admitted.

14.- The prescriptions of law have been observed in the proceedings.

Drafter: Magistrate Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- On preliminary questions and coadjuvancies.- By resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued within this file document, the briefs filed for the purpose of coadjuvating in the action by various interested parties were admitted, with the aim of adding their arguments to the file document. It is necessary to indicate that the order mentions only the names of the persons appearing in the proceeding; however, most do not do so in a personal capacity, but rather in representation of legal entities and social groups, which, for greater clarity, indicates below the capacity in which they act and whether they do so in representation of a legal person within the unconstitutionality action. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, holder of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, holder of identity card No. 6-155-443, as General Secretary of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, holder of identity card No. 9-029-769, as General Secretary of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada (SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, holder of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Concejo of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Agreement No. 13 of Ordinary Session No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, holder of identity card No. 2-287-015, as General Secretary of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, holder of identity card No. 1-897-818, Assistant General Secretary of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, ID No. 3-222-901, member of Servicio, Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, holder of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal condition and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, holder of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, holder of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his condition as General Secretary of the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, holder of identity card number 1-791-100, in his condition as Acting Minister of Foreign Trade; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the caucus of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis Chavarría Vega, holder of ID No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal capacity and as General Secretary of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, holder of identity card No. 2-343-472 in her personal capacity and as Assistant General Secretary of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, holder of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, is corrected, it being understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal entities. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the briefs of Mrs. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez are not on record, their writings not being found in the electronic file document, so the mentioned persons are not considered as coadjuvants in this action. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a coadjuvant, given that the brief is stated to have been filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, yet his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.

II.- The rules of standing in unconstitutionality actions. Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, requiring the existence of a matter pending resolution in administrative or judicial proceedings in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which could later allow the challenge of the applying act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question provides that it is applicable when "by the nature of the matter, there is no individual or direct harm," that is, when by that same nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not exactly their members directly. In second place, the possibility of turning to the defense of "diffuse interests (intereses difusos)" is foreseen; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this tribunal number 3750-93, at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three:

"… Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be, in our law—as this Chamber has already said—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, certain determined or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, arise whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is, then, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of persons who share an interest and, therefore, receive harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that it is a matter of equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a double nature, since they are at once collective—being common to a generality—and individual, for which they can be claimed in such a character." In summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a certain social need, a physical characteristic, ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under the protection of paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the qualification of "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the territorial integrity of the country, and the good management of public expenditure, among others. In this regard, two precisions must be made: on the one hand, the referred assets transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests (intereses difusos), since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups within it; environmental damage does not only affect the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or puts at serious risk the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the good management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is nothing more than a simple description inherent to its obligation—as a jurisdictional body—to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being understood in any way that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights (difusos); the foregoing would imply an undesirable upheaval in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of rights," which—as in the case of the Costa Rican model—starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole," it refers to the legal assets explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests with the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, that any person can come to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (popular action), but that every individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any attempt at an exhaustive enumeration.

III.- On admissibility. As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction does not recognize special standing for a deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the petitioner derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, acting as a lawyer and deputy, that is, in his personal condition and in his quality as a Deputy. In this sense, the questioning he makes refers to diffuse interests (intereses difusos), that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The petitioner's reasoning is based on the fact that said system must have a general and universal scope, actual or potential, accusing that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what was indicated by the petitioner, it should be noted that the action is proper in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of an occupational risk policy. In this sense, it is appropriate to hear the action, as is indeed done.

IV.- Object of the challenge. Request is made for the constitutionality review of subparagraph b) of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 “Financial Services”, of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which was ratified through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, which provides:

“III.

Gradual Market Opening Commitments […]

2.- Right of Establishment for Insurance Providers Costa Rica shall permit, on a non-discriminatory basis, the insurance service providers of a Party to establish themselves and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as provided below:

(a) any and all lines of insurance29 (except compulsory vehicle insurance (seguro obligatorio de vehículos) and occupational hazard insurance (seguros contra riesgos del trabajo)), no later than January 1, 2008; and 29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.

(b) any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.

For purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall permit insurance service providers to establish themselves through any legal form, as set forth in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential solvency and integrity requirements, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice.” Furthermore, the following provision of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, is also challenged:

“TRANSITORIO III.- Opening of the provision of compulsory insurance (seguros obligatorios) The State shall maintain the monopoly over Occupational Hazard Insurance (Seguros de Riesgos del Trabajo) and Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio Automotor), administered by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, in accordance with the provisions of Title IV of the Labor Code and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, respectively.

As of January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization to conduct insurance activity in the lines of Compulsory Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos) and Compulsory Occupational Hazard Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo) to the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications to be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council, in accordance with national legislation.

These norms are accused of infringing Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador, and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.

V.- On the merits.

A.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and the State.- Preliminary issues. It is worth highlighting from the beginning of this ruling that no one denies the importance that social security holds in our country and in the world. The petitioner, the Procuraduría General de la República, the various social organizations appearing in the case file, the deputies of the Partido Acción Ciudadana faction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, this Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, and in the advantage that the existence of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances provides for each and every inhabitant of this country. In this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled through the vocation and awareness that political and social actors have in the prevention and treatment of illnesses, and by ensuring spaces for medical provision and highly valuable medical services when a healthy person is plunged into a vulnerable situation due to illness. That said, the first manifestations are found in the various historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. Through them, the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism for social foresight can be observed. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of John Rawls have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what the best form of organizing a State would be, if one could start from nothing. He invites the operator to a hypothetical mental exercise consisting of divesting oneself of all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal figure of social security has a profound political and constitutional foundation. It proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, such that the designer of the society must not know which social, educational, or political status, lifestyle, or sex they might want, or might correspond to them once inserted into that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a fairly tempered and rational choice, so as not to be left at a disadvantage regarding the society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort at self-preservation, this decision-maker would calculate that if they were to end up on the lowest rung, they would secure a better share of the wealth of all for the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century, there were already several countries in the world with social security systems functioning—incipiently, but achieving results—it seems logical that, looking back today, such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as well as being present, such that, upon carrying out this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a great majority, including the most disadvantaged, and thereby not discriminate in access and services based on one’s origin (Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). The financing, consequently, would be carried out with the participation of the different social actors: the State, employers, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the substantive problem raised by the petitioner does not lie in a macro-level conflict regarding social insurances, but rather in a subset of them, because the constitutional norm recognizes this fundamental principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures it places in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica Regarding Insurance Services, the following in the preamble:

“[…] reaffirming its decision to ensure that the opening process of its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution; emphasizing that said process shall benefit the consumer and must be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation; recognizing its commitment to modernize the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) and Costa Rica’s legal framework in the insurance sector; Assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services.” It is important to point out that such care in the wording and declaration is not present for any of the other member countries of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement. The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the existing monopoly in insurance matters, but also because the State in Costa Rica has traditionally maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which is assumed as a commitment by the country, becomes palpable in point II of Section H, where, in the same manner, the obligation is set forth to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of the insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must remain in an impartial position regarding market participants, having the adequate powers, legal protection, and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers, and manage confidential information appropriately. This will be revisited in the ruling later.

Since what is questioned in the action is the constitutional regularity of the commercial Treaty norm and one of its implementing laws, insofar as it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must specify, for now, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpreting the scope of the social insurances contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be clarified is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurances administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. The Treaty permits, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of insurance, but as indicated, it saves the following in a footnote:

“For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.” From the foregoing recognition, it is clear that the social security protected by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is excluded from the Treaty. The foregoing is important for the interpretation of constitutional Article 73, because with this, the legislator of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente sealed a special result into the norm.

B.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good composed of the resources of Costa Rican society. Indeed, through the regulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter, this Constitutional Chamber has been able to construct the Right to Social Security, which, by its structure, should not be limited solely to the protection of the right to Health, but rather comprises many other benefits, which, all integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican society. To cite a ruling, it must be stated that:

“III.- Right to social security.- The purpose of the constituent in designing the social security system in our country was to guarantee to all citizens that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, would grant them at least the indispensable services in case of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. Article 73 of the Political Constitution, interpreted harmoniously with Article 50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right presupposes that the public powers shall maintain a public social security regime for all citizens that guarantees assistance and provides sufficient social benefits in situations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective scope of application of the right to social security incorporates the principle of universality, as it extends to all citizens, with a mandatory character. The objective scope starts from the principle of generality, in that it protects situations of need, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and insured beforehand, but rather as they effectively occur. Furthermore, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of protection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of protective automaticity, which translates into adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age, and death.

Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, interpreted in a harmonious manner, establish the right to social security for the benefit of all workers, informed by the principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of protection. Evidently, the provision of such services is conditioned upon the existence of some minimum requirements, but ones that are basic and necessary for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be coherent with the aforementioned principles.

The right to social security is a fundamental right, recognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent incorporated the chapter on Social Guarantees into the Political Constitution of 1871, which was subsequently confirmed in the constituent process of nineteen hundred forty-nine. …” (Ruling No. 2004-08013) Furthermore, on another occasion, the Chamber has also indicated that:

“IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the existence of social insurances, which are regulated by a system of mandatory contribution from the State, employers, and workers, in order to protect the latter against the risks of illness, maternity, disability, old age, and death. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is the autonomous entity charged with administering this type of insurance, with the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its operations, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its legal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them. It thus guarantees the establishment of social security and its nature, decrees the purpose of the social insurances, and regulates the destination of the respective funds. Social security was born for the protection of the worker and their family, as the human beings they are, and is provided from conception until death, seeking health and assisting in unforeseen misfortunes such as incapacity and death, as well as in states of vulnerability due to their very condition, such as those of old age, pension, and retirement.” (Ruling No. 1998-04636) The doctrine enunciated in the preceding precedent remains firm insofar as it interprets constitutional Article 73. As a consequence of the foregoing, social security is a fundamental axis, an axiom, and a reference point for Costa Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the Social State of Law, which signifies a constitutional value or a legally relevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate distribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability—which makes it attractive to national and international investment—and which, as such, is achieved through the tripartite contribution of the State, employers, and workers. Thus, people can have access to social security, to a regime of predictability for disability, old age, and death, just as they shall have it to health and to the fundamental provision of health services that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, places at the service of the population, being one of the best guarantees in individual aspirations toward a more equitable society. There are multiple studies that place our country within privileged positions, not being a developed country, yet it maintains high levels of public health coinciding with European countries more developed than ours. As indicated above, it achieves placing the least advantaged person in society in a better position, one that allows them to receive health benefits just like any other more advantaged person in society, as well as to the social solidarity of a person falling into circumstances of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic asymmetries should not count for the provision of services, because the original constituent legally guarantees the health of the population through institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to ensure its delivery. It should be noted then that the Executive Branch guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of the social insurances, through the constituent’s delegation to specific benefits reserved to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in the Free Trade Agreement regarding everything related to the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente foresaw the need to maintain what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943, incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949. With this, it reaffirmed, at the apex of the legal system, social security by establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual workers), its forms of financing (mandatory contributory from the State, employers, and workers), and scope (risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine). It designated the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as the public entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal and financial attributions, administrative autonomy, and government over social insurances, in like manner to erect a protective barrier around the resources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of that patrimony belonging to all beneficiaries. But, always within social security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they break the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the benefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would be permissible to exempt the compulsory vehicle insurance (seguros obligatorios de vehículos) and the compulsory occupational hazard insurance (seguros obligatorios contra riesgos de trabajo) from this regulation, to regulate them separately after the entry into force, at a time subsequent to January 1, 2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican Government would be consistent with the obligations imposed upon it by the Political Constitution, which indeed, as the Ministry of Foreign Trade indicates, is the case for the Government of the Republic, but which were reflected in the commitments assumed before the other member States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in national legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion raised in the action focuses on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question, where the discussion addressed since the referendum on the Free Trade Agreement and the complementary legislative agenda to the mentioned Treaty is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational hazards regime shares some of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, being placed as part of the social security regime established from the apex of the legal system; however, there must exist a constitutional interpretation in its proper dimension, especially regarding the issue of social insurances that protect against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law may determine, but with distinctions in the insurance against professional risk or occupational hazard of workers. Certainly, the normative aspects of greatest relevance to society must be situated in the Political Constitution to regulate or protect certain fundamental rights, themes that are the most essential in the Political Constitution for the purpose of pointing out the course along which ordinary legislation must develop, including the licenses that it may have contemplated. Although the foregoing marks a determined course as a country-decision, there also exist provisions that release those determinations to a reading proper to political science at a given moment, whose decision belongs to the political organs of the State. In the case of the social insurances that operate from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved its institutional monopoly, but in the second case, the texture of the norm was more open.

In the Chamber’s judgment, one may question the idea originally conceived by the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente of endowing the population with universal social insurances and the provision of services, if it is seen as being modified to the detriment of the least advantaged, with the change of the legal framework—as the petitioner and the coadjuvants accuse—insofar as it contradicts that universality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the monopoly of certain insurances, and which proves contrary to international human rights conventions. The discussion is more philosophical-political than philosophical-legal. The foregoing assertion shall be examined further below, to establish whether there is evidence that this is so or that international organizations lean toward a specific model of social insurance development to achieve those ideals. In that sense, there would be little legal space left for a Constitutional Court or for the State’s own political organs when ratifying an international normative body. Hence, one might ask what role corresponds to this Chamber as a Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be defined whether it can be questioned legally or if it is a matter that corresponds to the political bodies of the State. Regarding the first point, it should be noted that this Chamber must rule from the constitutional standpoint on the norms, but, regarding the second, on the competence to decide on the advisability or inadvisability of a Treaty, both questions must be in the same line with what this Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. This Chamber has leaned toward holding that it must not enter into analyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within its competence when resolving the legal aspect or deciding some particular meaning for the constitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental right is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and advisability of legislation, in itself, is not and should not be natural to jurisdictional activity. What is important to highlight here is that in the inter-organic relations of the State, the first called upon to control the timeliness and advisability of the Executive Branch’s international negotiations in its international relations in the form of International Treaties is the Asamblea Legislativa. In this sense, the abstract control that this Chamber holds, whether a priori or a posteriori, shall depend on the political action of the constitutional organ that resides in the Asamblea Legislativa, and on which the making of decisions by the majority is founded, through a competitive struggle, but where the timeliness and advisability of a norm is the exclusive purview of the Asamblea Legislativa. In any case, Ruling No. 1994-07005 states that:

“However, from the point of view that interests us now, this means that the State, or more properly, the organs responsible for strictly political and managerial competencies, must always act with the aim of stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the Executive Branch has negotiated this Treaty, bearing those constitutional objectives in mind. And it must also be understood that the Legislative Branch, upon reviewing the substance of said instrument, shall act in conformity with the same objectives. That is why we can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that the Treaty as such, or some of its provisions—discussed and debatable—may have for some sector, do not necessarily entail an aspect of constitutionality, in the sense that this Chamber must rule, because they lie at the level of mere advisability or timeliness. For example, some point out that despite the benefits of this type of commercial instruments, a country would not derive immediate or short-term advantages if it simultaneously embraces the old model (of import substitution, of subsidies) and the new model of commercial opening. That is why, in this regard, some experts believe that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica in that its tariffs have been lowered to a greater degree and long before our country began to do so. But even so, they continue, the treaty suits Costa Rica, because it will open a spectrum of very important investments, technology transfer, and job creation, which will invigorate its economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of competitive demand that it needs in order to adapt to a possible incorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement among Mexico, the United States of America, and Canada (NAFTA), as an almost immediate aspiration of the country, as those responsible within the central Government have expressed. In other words, the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario for moving on to the next, more complex and ambitious one. In any event, this Chamber warns that those aspects revolve around the policies that are behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not have the constitutional connotation to which this Chamber must confine its opinion.” C.- The legislator’s freedom of configuration in occupational hazard insurance (seguros de riesgos de trabajo). Now then, paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes:

“Insurance against professional risks shall be at the exclusive expense of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions.” The original constituent, on the subject of professional risks, endowed the legislator with greater flexibility, despite this effectively being considered within the social insurances, which is denoted by the breaking of the financial and regulatory scheme of the other social insurances. In this sense, one might think that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the Political Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with all the social security of the country, but evidently, the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it could have so determined by eliminating the final paragraph or by expressly incorporating that charge to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove the foregoing, one could question whether the unconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros could have been sustained regarding the topic of insurance for professional risks. But such an interpretation would not be plausible either; on the contrary, the legislator delegated, for many years, the coverage of social security in occupational hazards to another autonomous institution, distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such an interpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor was any constitutional irregularity noted, because it was a function of a public law subject that acted in a dual capacity, under public and private law.

The foregoing leads this Court to the possibility of channeling the interpretation of the final paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution in a more flexible manner, always maintaining harmony with the entire system, when it indicates that the insurance "shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers," since a lesser intensity of the State's presence can logically be derived, but without this signifying total absence. On the other hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that it is on his behalf that the worker performs the labor, and the working conditions he offers the worker are attributed to him, such that it is the Employer who is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and the State for ensuring or supervising the fulfillment of those obligations. As for the worker, no obligation falls upon him other than the obligations contained in labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the National Constituent Assembly places the worker as the recipient of protection, that is, he would ultimately be the beneficiary of this insurance. The original constituent foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, permitting a broader scope of action for the legislator when it states "shall be governed by special provisions," which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting an autonomous entity distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with establishing, offering, and executing occupational risk insurance. At this point, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in economic and social activity characteristic of a Social State of Law, or the prevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on pure commercial models or mixed market models with State oversight, regarding its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to reach is the following: the original constituent established a system to constitutionally regulate occupational risks so that they can be the subject of diverse legal and benefit-providing designs or structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing is clearly part of the large number of productive economic activities, as well as the jobs and risks that can exist in each of them. Precisely, this permitted, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly regime, which implied a different course for mandatory occupational risk insurance from the regulations of the Caja, and yet, this did not and would not make it unconstitutional, nor would greater openness in the Employer's choice, in the face of a greater offering of occupational risk insurance operators.

Other important consequences derive from the foregoing, in which we move from an Institution that operated under a monopolized insurance exploitation system, consequently a heavily intervened market, and later opted for a different, open one, with an impartial regulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. A regulatory body was thus foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. Consequently, the claimant's thesis may maintain an erroneous conception that the State disappeared completely within the aforementioned employer-worker-occupational risk scheme. It is recognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative decision, can declare that certain services are provided under a monopoly regime, or are provided under a free competition regime, without this necessarily signifying a detriment to the service. In such a way, it can liberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality. If a government decision negotiated by the parties in a Treaty, approved through citizen participation mechanisms (referendum), and once the ratification procedure is exhausted, places another State body to regulate commercial insurance activity impartially and on a non-discriminatory basis, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this sense, it must be said that the legitimacy of this decision is reinforced from its origin, because it originates in the constitutional reform that permits an authentic direct democratic exercise that in the year 2002 sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote with normative character. That in itself has a special weight, which, in principle, must be obeyed by the mechanisms and institutions based on a mature representative democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional review). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences given that it is a ratified agreement and because it is an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal posture of the State's internal bodies, at the moment the international regulations enter into force. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:

"The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including their observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise." Given that the mandatory occupational risk insurance regime had been operating from the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the staggered opening of the insurance market, including mandatory vehicle and occupational risk insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in due course. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process for the Securities Market Regulatory Law, the Chamber is consulted on the following problem:

"Violation of Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Constitution: unconstitutionality due to legislative omission to regulate solidarity insurance: they refer that this omission will cause a legal lack of protection relevant to the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because the present and future efficacy of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in matters of insurance derive from Article 73 of the Constitution is violated: mandatory nature, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, nonexistence of a cap on benefits, immediacy and mandatory nature of the provision of benefits to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of rents and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the tariffs of the insuring entity. Likewise, they argue that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between Articles 50 and 73 of the Constitution are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others that derive from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that we are facing a constitutional closing or closure norm of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open door in terms of enabling the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of the regulation of solidarity insurance will generate a labor lack of protection." In this sense, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:

"9.- Violation of Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.

According to the consulting deputies, the draft "Insurance Market Regulatory Law" is also unconstitutional by omission, to the extent that the establishment of social insurance is not contemplated. Regarding the control of constitutionality by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Court, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 2:39 p.m. on May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue the infraconstitutional regulations related to the referendum process), has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of it being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue "a law that develops a constitutional content or clause." Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that "the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social." Hence, in the aforementioned draft law, the Chamber does not appreciate the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, for which reason the consultation formulated in that sense must be resolved." There is no necessary loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the foregoing that Costa Rica is free and independent, and that as such it acquires an international obligation that it must observe according to the international law principle pacta sunt servanda; in this sense, binding oneself by an international commitment with different countries and obtaining commercial benefits from them is what is effectively pursued by this type of instrument. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars. The first is the ancient notion of freedom, such that in certain areas of people's lives, they are exempt from external conditioning of the person's volitional and cognitive capacity, so that life proceeds without undue interference, as long as morality or public order are not affected or third parties are not harmed. But furthermore, around this freedom —in the fundamental base of society and the State— a structured institutional framework is guaranteed to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom, as well as the social values that the original constituent has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are born with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere with that freedom. Moreover, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality, and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited insofar as the particular conduct may be contrary to morality, public order, or harm a third party (Article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy must be presumed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, it maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different institutions of the State. The foregoing means that, be it the Political Constitution, an international agreement, the law, or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them arbitrarily. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance his policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to the social good. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Law 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent himself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation through special provisions, that is, specific provisions through which ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents these from being varied by matter and in time.

For the time being, the monopoly of mandatory insurance in favor of the INS is broken starting from the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater offering of national and international services by occupational risk insurance companies. It is clear that the National Constituent Assembly did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurance, thus breaking a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of the indicated Article 73, of tripartite financing source for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator at liberty with the initiative of how to materialize insurance against occupational risks. The National Constituent Assembly left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurance. Under the original constituent's scheme, mandatory occupational risk insurance would be covered by the decisions that the legislator made under the concept "special provisions," which means that it not only designed this coverage with more leeway, but had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient power and resistance), and that in this matter it was received from a referendum process, as indeed happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit-providing activity of occupational risk insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a state monopoly activity, in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open towards the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, deriving from the Political Constitution, such as state oversight, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement that requires non-discriminatory regulations for all trade agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the insurance market offerors is prohibited. Returning to what was noted above, it is clear that the State, through legislation, can choose between providing Occupational Risk insurance under monopoly regimes or competition regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of physical or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent can effectively present itself in any of these spheres, the latter being the one chosen in the mentioned referendum.

D.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.- The claimant argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, for which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent as the case may be) assigns to the State that service or a strategic position in it, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the provision it demands, such as interested management for certain public activities that cannot leave the State's administration, or concession when it entrusts private physical or legal subjects with a determined provision of public services. As indicated previously, a prohibition cannot be derived from the 4th paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding a conditional element open to the constitutional norm by establishing greater freedom of configuration for the legislator. For the Court, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it very clearly embraces a form of State administrative oversight over private parties who can exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require the fulfillment of ex ante requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination, or what is the same, the existence of norms equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but in the same way, if there were no supply at all, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as indeed it does. The reports in the action, the numerous briefs of the interested coadjuvants allude to the different conditions that the companies that would be offerors in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must meet; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be disadvantaged, because we are facing regulatory minimums (or hard core of the fundamental right) in order to obtain authorization to compete in the market. The claimant's argument lies in the fact that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no committed obligations for the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking retribution and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, such affirmations must be taken with extreme care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, it ventures into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In this sense, international provisions must be norms that harbor space for the different national policies of the member States, in as much as they leave open the mechanisms to make the rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of results, but without being international conventions of means (as the claimant seems to pose it). Put another way, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:

"Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, to the maximum extent of available resources and taking into account their degree of development, in order to achieve progressively, and in accordance with domestic legislation, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol.

Article 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Legal Provisions If the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, the legislative or other measures that may be necessary to make those rights effective" (the bold text is not from the original).

One of the characteristics that distinguish human rights instruments from other treaties is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, in the others, what the High Parties decide to set as an objective in their reciprocal relations, boundary treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such to the human being, and not based on reciprocal concessions of interest to the States, and it will be he who assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties —especially multilateral ones— must adopt inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows them to deepen the agreed objective and end, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a given human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, such that it establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is at the disposal of each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and directing the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction is established, to adopt internal measures; it means that it can make use of public, private, or mixed forms, to obtain results in the direction of commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of benefits for occupational risk insurance, provided they conform to the international conventions that regulate the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the following:

"Article 9. Right to Social Security 1. Everyone has the right to social security that protects them against the consequences of old age and disability that physically or mentally prevents them from obtaining the means to lead a dignified and decent life. In the event of the death of the beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to their dependents.

2. In the case of persons who are working, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and subsidy or retirement pension in case of work accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth" (the bold text is not from the original).

The truth is that international regulations establish what the social security jargon in some ILO documents calls the social floor or social protection floor as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there do exist unfulfilled legal obligations enforceable domestically, or once this is exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that occupational risk insurance is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in case of accident or occupational disease. ILO Convention 102 attributes responsibility to the employer for the work environment of his employee, and it conforms to the 4th paragraph of constitutional Article 73. The important thing is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, where it establishes minimum standards for each of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of said systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State can choose at least three areas of protection. Important data arise from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 "Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization"] which indicates, among other things:

"185. Employment injury schemes that provide benefits are often organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and sometimes they are part of other branches of social security. Because of this link between risk and prevention at the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely from employer contributions. Contribution rates are often differentiated according to the level of accident or disease risk in the various types of economic activities." (pg. 76); The claimant alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, for the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressiveness of social rights. For this argument to be applicable, the regressiveness must be proven with the change of legal regime or it must be evident, but, even the ILO's own works do not endorse a single approach to the issue as the claimant seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, they are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, it is a matter of opportunity and convenience that must not occupy the Constitutional Chamber —in principle— it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which fall outside the law of the Political Constitution.

In this regard, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide; rather, it is up to the legislator to assess its timeliness and suitability, as well as its constitutional viability. As set forth above, first, there is no monopoly mandate or prohibition preventing mandatory occupational risk insurance from operating outside the institutional structures of the State; as a corollary, the State may use different private agents to carry out the necessary services, whether public or private. Extrapolating that this system implies a detriment to or loss of rights for service recipients does not reflect the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.

E.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as domestic law is located in the Political Constitution, such that it is up to the original or derived constituent power to decide and ensure the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be noted that international law has legal effects after its incorporation into the legal system, through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation worldwide allows for a broad differentiation of three main systems: those countries that require double parliamentary approval, both for treaty ratification and subsequently for specific legislative provisions to incorporate the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in Scandinavian countries. Next, the system in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally bind the country, but which will require national legislation to adopt international law, as in England and the countries that form part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where, with parliamentary approval of the actions of the Executive Branch, the incorporation of international regulations takes effect upon completion of the ratification process by the State, as in our country. Similarly, there are other problems, such as assigning normative hierarchy to the international legislation incorporated into the legal system; all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, find their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. Regarding incorporation, our country has the system situated in the last category, the most representative one; it is true that it only requires legislative approval or disapproval of the treaty, in which case, if the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, this is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to take effect with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has these consequences thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:

"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their enactment or from the day they designate, authority superior to laws.

Public treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or political organization of the country shall require approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-fourths of its total membership, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose".

But historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as they might be interpreted today. Thus, the rule is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it previously had a different, isolationist and restrictive wording, limiting public officials' ability to enter into international treaties, as follows:

"Article 7°-- No authority may enter into pacts, treaties or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Whoever does so shall be tried for treason against the Fatherland.

Any treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to the territorial integrity or political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-fourths of its total membership and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for that purpose".

A strict reading of the transcribed article leads to impracticability and an automatic contradiction, improper of constitutional reasoning with public international law, grounded in an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which disregarded a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment undertaken by the Executive Branch), and which allows for acquiring and granting mutually or multilaterally agreed-upon international rights and obligations by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in how they must conduct themselves in the international order, insofar as it acquires rights, as well as duties towards others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent a significant structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the original constituent power's fear against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and viewing things from a perspective for the country's benefit, once the waters returned to their normal level after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement of the legislative reform operated through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, as follows:

"Article 7.- This article enshrined the conservative view of the majority of the 1949 constituents, who felt deep hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within this nationalistic zeal, it went too far, by stating in the first paragraph that anyone who entered into 'pacts, treaties or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact or convention constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty or independence of any country. If said first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the leaders the country has had since 1949 onwards would have to be tried for such a serious crime. We believe that said paragraph should be deleted, as it is dangerous".

That correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in favor of proceeding with said modification, since if economic integration with Central America was sought, this had to be prioritized for its economic and development benefits, which was finally resolved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:

"If superior authority is not given to treaties and concordats over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of legal antinomies as they are called, of norms that clash, norms that provide the contrary, and that would constantly force us to appeal to the unconstitutionality or inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could put us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty, the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that ordinary law is subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty. This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of current forms whereby each norm governs within its determined area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and bursts upon the other territories, upon the other persons, upon the other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without the value of each country having been diminished. It is a sound norm, it is an advisable norm and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the ordinary norm".

In this sense, the derived constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, such that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly, ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, regarding obligations freely assumed, to have international law incorporated with sufficient potency and resistance to impose the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary legislation and regulations that contradict it or are in contradiction. The reason lies in the obligation to honor commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and bona fides. On the other hand, the reservation and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the sense of Article 27, of the importance that a party could not invoke the provisions of its domestic law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. What is provided in the Political Constitution was already discussed above. Hence, with reason, the Chamber, when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation consistent with Constitutional Law, as dictated by Article 73, subsection e) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, such that "the declaration shall be made only for the effects that they be interpreted and applied in harmony with the Constitution or, if its contradiction with it proves irremediable, its disapplication be ordered with general effects and its denunciation proceed". Consistent interpretation is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse yet, to the commission of infractions that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, even participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Similarly, the principle of the supremacy of International Law is unequivocally manifested. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be tacitly or expressly modified by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly state if the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.

The claimant mentions the violation of various social security principles, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and inalienability. In reality, in some cases, what the claimant points out are some of the legal provisions governing occupational risk established in the Código de Trabajo, such that the principle alleged by the claimant and the coadjuvants does not operate—that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Código de Trabajo, and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law. However, viewed prudentially, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Código de Trabajo must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, such that if Article 205 of the Código de Trabajo establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing laws, to give way to SUGESE and its competencies. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would fall within the competencies of SUGESE to establish mechanisms that allow obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional basis of Occupational Risk Insurance is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of the insurance, the automaticity of Convention 102 of the ILO, and inalienability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which the Chamber cannot say are infringed either. It should be highlighted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurance, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of occupational and professional accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, by being the moderator of commercial activity setting conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different market participants; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally required benefits continue to be effective in its jurisdiction, including being a market participant as established in Law No. 8622, which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes among other things, in the fourth paragraph, that:

"… The Superintendency shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency shall be mandatory for supervised entities and persons.

The Superintendency is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers. Likewise, it must adopt clear, transparent, and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ, train, and maintain a sufficient work team with high professional standards, who follow the appropriate confidentiality standards".

On the other hand, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:

"Objectives and functions of the Superintendencia General de Seguros The Superintendency's purpose is to ensure the stability and efficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to provide the broadest information to policyholders. To this end, it shall authorize, regulate, and supervise individuals or legal entities that intervene in acts or contracts related to the insurance, reinsurance activity, the public offering, and the conduct of insurance business. … Additionally, it shall have the following functions: a) … b) … j) Issue other norms and directives of a technical or operational nature. k) … q)".

In these functions, currently the Instituto Nacional de Seguros continues operating in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must cover the worker even if it omitted to report them, must cover them as uninsured. In this sense, there is no impact on the universal principle of protection of occupational risk insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, establishes:

"In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, INS shall have the full guarantee of the State".

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, because coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, in that it contains enforceable obligations with expired deadlines, the legal and regulatory provisions issued are done in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, foresees measures to guarantee that social floor necessary to maintain occupational health levels and an occupational risk regime, it is clearly in line with the Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the aforementioned Reglamento establishes:

"Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers If the worker was not insured against occupational risks, in accordance with the Código de Trabajo, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant them all the benefits they would have been entitled to had they been insured, except in those cases where the employer had an active Riesgos del Trabajo policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be borne by the insurance entity receiving the premium".

The supposed economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a constitutional nature problem; rather, it is the exclusive purview of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate for a presumed negative impact the Institution might have, such that this acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against occupational risks, whether private or public. In the Chamber's view, the article reinforces the worker's position, rather than weakening it, since the occupational risk insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory character as is attempted to be pointed out in the writ filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, among other norms, from which arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating matters it detects as necessary of a technical and operational nature for better service for workers suffering an occupational risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Código de Trabajo.

VI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing reasons, the action is declared without merit.

Por tanto:

The action is declared without merit. Judge Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the claimant deputy's condition. Judge Calzada and Judges Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.

.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate Ch.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712 Dissenting opinion of Judge Calzada Miranda and Judges Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro, with the latter drafting The undersigned Judges dissent in this action and consider that it should be declared with merit, with its consequences, based on the following.

Sub-subsection b), of Article III .2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 "Servicios Financieros", of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, and Transitory Provision III of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, approved through Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, insofar as they provide for the market opening of occupational risk insurance, present a constitutional friction.

The claimant considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurance (Articles 50, 73 and 74) by denaturing it and converting it into a for-profit commercial service. He indicates that occupational risk insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance integrates the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, Convention No. 102 of the ILO, Protocol of San Salvador Art. 9, ) and that occupational risk insurance integrates the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, inalienability, and others. This is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violates the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently already have, diminishing and worsening current advantages. Currently all income must be allocated to improvements for the benefit of workers.

In this regard, the undersigned Judges consider that the claimant is correct in his allegations and that the fact that the constituent power included occupational risk insurance within the Chapter on Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution evidences that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of the other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance.

The challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of occupational risk insurance within the commercial opening foreseen in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, are unconstitutional; this even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them universality and progressivity) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the way to distribute the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.

This type of insurance, by being constitutionally enshrined in Article 73 (and despite the fact that it does not state there that it will be managed monopolistically by INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which therefore, is incompatible with a commercial opening system (competition, profit).

Historically, occupational risk insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated artisans (mainly shoemakers, bakers, and mule keepers) with the objective of establishing a Savings Bank (see the Gaceta of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated relief for the working class.

This insurance had its own evolution. Before the theory of "social-occupational risk" triumphed, initially the employer's fault was required to give rise to liability, then it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, meaning it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather it was the employer who had to demonstrate that they had not been guilty or negligent in the distribution and organization of work.

In the early 20th century, the first formal attempts to provide true protection to the working class against occupational misfortunes are located. On June 26, 1907, the then deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented to Congress a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles. On May 24, 1910, the deputation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the "Caja de Previsión". On May 16, 1913, deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another bill on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles. For different circumstances, none of the previous projects had the necessary reception to become law.

In April 1924, the discussion of the Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo or the Ley de Reparación de Accidentes was suspended and immediately the discussion of the bill to create the Banco Nacional de Seguros began, which culminated with the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gives rise to this Institution. Thus, the Banco Nacional de Seguros is in charge of the administration of insurances, whose monopoly remains in the hands of the Costa Rican State.

Once the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the "Workplace Accident Compensation Law" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is said that "the National Insurance Institute is going to administer the occupational hazards (riesgos de trabajo) regime." The INS created the Workers' Department, tasked with administering this Law, which would later be called the Department of Occupational Hazards (Riesgos del Trabajo).

This Law No. 53 changed, underwent several reforms, and in 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) was enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation was incorporated into the Labor Code. At that time, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already existed. It had been created in November 1941. So, at this point, a first major discussion arises. Now that the Social Security Fund exists, should we give the occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS?

There is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute has 18 years of experience in handling workplace accidents, he deems it prudent for that congress to keep the occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute, and indeed the Labor Code is approved and the administration is kept in the hands of the Institute.

In 1949, when the current Political Constitution was promulgated, the convenience, or lack thereof, of the administration of Occupational Hazards in the hands of the Institute was debated, regarding the famous Article 73. Once again, the need for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund was raised. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafted this Political Constitution, ratified that the occupational hazards regime should remain differentiated, as it had been up to that moment, and remain in the hands of the National Insurance Institute.

In 1961, when Article 177 of the Political Constitution was amended through Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintained the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute. This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurance (seguros por riesgos de trabajo).

In 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approved Law No. 6727, which refers to the modification of Title IV of the Labor Code, it once again ratified the appropriateness of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and made some modifications:

· The concept of Occupational Hazards is broadened (Article 195).

· The Occupational Hazard Insurance (seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) is declared mandatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201).

· The concept of Occupational Health (Salud Ocupacional) appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273).

· In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer, regarding insurance, risk, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284).

· The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in Articles 285 and 286 of the aforementioned Code.

Today, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security regime, through the administration it has carried out for more than 70 years, with sufficient financial reserves to provide the care it has been providing.

As can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, contrary to what is stated in the majority vote, the idea was rather to unify the occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for it to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.

Ø Deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ "There are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles he then proceeded to enumerate. In the first place, it must be a single institution that covers all insurance. One of the failures of social insurance in some countries - like Chile - has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The technicians who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. In the second place, it is known that the greater number of members is what guarantees the success of social insurance (...) Furthermore, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number." Minute No. 125.- One hundred twenty-fifth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August eighth, nineteen forty-nine.

Ø Deputy VOLIO "since 1924 the Law on Workplace Accidents was enacted, entrusting the Insurance Bank - an essentially commercial institution - to take charge of that risk. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then the insurance against professional risks (seguros contra riesgos profesionales) must be assigned to Social Security. For the moment, the Fund is not in a position to assume those risks. Therefore, the logical thing is to leave things as they currently are, avoiding the problem that arises so that it can be resolved in due time and with more care." Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine.

Ø Deputy FACIO. "After November 8th, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute will continue working - as they have done up to now. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution can be found to the problem of the unification of social insurance, after mature and considered analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem." Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine.

Ø Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, on the other hand, he considers a charitable institution, since it does not profit in any way. He thinks that the only way to solve the problem of social insurance is by creating the necessary revenues for the Fund so that it can carry out its mission. Hence, the problem can be solved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on August ninth, nineteen forty-nine).

The above excerpts evidence the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurance. The very nature of these risks allows them to be considered part of social insurance. Occupational hazards are not an annex or addendum that can be detached from the definition and constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurance in a broad sense; for this reason, it is not admissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional risks mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated within the concept of social insurance defined by the constitution. The specialty of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize the insurance against professional risks. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize an insurance against professional risks with a legally and constitutionally different condition from the social insurance to which the first three paragraphs of Article 73 of the constitution casually refer. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of this insurance, because it is located in a norm that is what gives it that condition.

Therefore, the occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which the commercial opening legislation does not protect and which it cannot protect either, since a legal-rank regulation will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.

Due to the very nature of the social insurance against occupational hazards, whose raison d'être is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work performed, they suffer an accident or an illness, and which operates in our country in a mandatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent had all of this in mind when it decided to include this type of insurance within the chapter on social insurance, precisely because it functions as social insurance and not as individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.

Based on the arguments presented, we consider that this action must be declared with merit, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional norms of the Treaty in question.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Magistrate Gilberth Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C. Magistrate Magistrate Note from Magistrate Calzada. Different reasons regarding the claimant's standing. The majority vote determines that although Mr. Villalta [Name 001] derives his standing from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), his standing to file the action is recognized based on the understanding that this filing is made "in favor of an undetermined group of workers whose rights (...) could be injured (...) even if they were under the coverage of an occupational hazard policy" (sic); that is, the majority vote determines that the claimant's standing comes from this defense in favor of an undetermined group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests. In this regard, I consider that the standing of the claimant Deputy also comes from the defense of diffuse interests. As noted in recital (considerando) II of this same judgment, diffuse interests must not be confused with collective interests, while also they should not be understood in terms so broad that they are confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, "but united based on a specific social need," which is why "every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the national collectivity," without this being confused with the possibility that "any person may appeal to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests whatsoever." The precision that the majority criterion attempts to formulate is that even in the case of the defense of an undetermined group of workers, this does not configure the existence of a diffuse interest that allows granting the claimant the standing provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It is my criterion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that undetermined group of workers, but also on the fact that due to the subject matter intended to be regulated, it does indeed concern a matter on which there is a general interest of the population. It must be kept in mind that as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of occupational hazard insurance implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country when configuring the system of a Democratic and Social State of Law. In this sense, there is an interest of the community in general, and not only of the currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the risks to which a worker may be subjected; it is clear that the first interested party in these cases will be the worker – both for health and personal income reasons–, but it should not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance is because other people besides the specific worker are involved in it. On one hand, there is the direct family of the worker, who obtains a good part of their subsistence possibilities from the work performed by the latter; there is also the condition of the employer, who finds in the occupational hazards regime a solid backing against any misfortune, contributing thereby to cover any eventual liability that could be attributed to them; and there is also the State itself, which through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social well-being in the terms stated, while simultaneously guaranteeing that the affected person receives the attention required so that they can reintegrate in a timely and effective manner into active working life, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy with the least harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority criterion that repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing by not recognizing direct standing, the undersigned considers that they do hold it in certain circumstances. In my opinion, Deputies who hold that character for the Nation in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution, due to the nature of their position, hold a representation of national interests, which gives them, in principle, general standing to bring action on those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases in the action of unconstitutionality, but yes when qualifying the circumstances of paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in particular, the management of diffuse interests or those that pertain to the community as a whole, and very particularly when, precisely, it concerns challenging norms that directly impact a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the community they represent, as has been indicated in preceding lines. Naturally, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action - not provided for in the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction - by any person, nor does it permit free access through the action of unconstitutionality to the holder of an interest just by virtue of being one and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into consideration the transcendence of the issue regarding occupational hazards and the representation that, in general terms, a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly does hold, I consider that in addition to the standing recognized to the claimant by the majority criterion, they must also be recognized the standing indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

*100177120007CO* ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD [Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes on August eighth, two thousand thirteen.

Due to the painful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, let judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, be notified without his signature. The case file will be archived in due course.

Gilbert Armijo S. Acting Presiding Judge Constitutional Chamber For those who consider it a social insurance, they maintain that it is imbued with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against misfortunes arising from the exercise of their work. If it were not so, they say, there would be no explanation for the fact that in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent in Article 73 of the Political Constitution, it demonstrates that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but rather a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), conceived to regulate a monopolistic insurance system under the INS. Evidently, with the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, and upon the expiration of the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of norms not directly linked to the market opening, but rather to the characteristics of the insurance, which are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of compulsory insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as social insurance; provision 205 of the same regulatory body provides that the INS must perform annual settlements that include the formation of technically necessary reserves; the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance programs developed by the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional) and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. In it, the principle of service at cost is realized, so while it remains in force, insurance against occupational hazards (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) must operate—at least in its basic coverage—without profit-making ends. Similarly, provisions 221 and 231 indicate the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if they would have been entitled to them had they been insured, subrogating the right to take action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the sums disbursed, plus interest. The principle of universality is based on these provisions. At the regulatory level, insurance against occupational hazards is governed by the "Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios)", approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through Article 8, provision 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurances (Article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (Article 2). It was issued based on Articles 25, 26, 27 and Transitory Provision III of the Law Regulating the Insurance Market (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros). In this regard, the Insurance Superintendency (Superintendencia de Seguros) will grant administrative authorization to engage in insurance activity in the field of insurance against occupational hazards "… provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that will be established in the regulation that the National Council issues for that purpose, in accordance with national legislation". The Regulation, in Article 8, provides for the possibility of offering the compulsory insurance together with any other voluntary insurance (not subject to service at cost), allowing better coverage in the event that the worker sues the employer for an act or omission of the latter that caused the workplace accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code and that the payments of economic benefits will be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation on Occupational Hazards (Reglamento General de Riesgos de Trabajo) issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision where, for an uninsured worker, the INS must grant the benefits, except in those cases where the employer had a policy in force with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, a scenario in which the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity that received the premium. The Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría) does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is in itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies the Law on Worker Protection (Ley de Protección al Trabajador); the social security system regarding pensions was formed by four pillars. Within this scheme, there is private participation, under a competition regime, for profit, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The regulations establish that it must operate at cost; however, in the judgment of the Attorney General's Office, the participation of private companies, for profit, in the commercialization of insurance against occupational hazards, is not contrary to the Constitution, provided that regulations of legal rank are issued that protect, as a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers to date. There is no norm of constitutional rank that establishes that insurance against occupational hazards must operate at cost, or without profit-making ends. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which demonstrates that there is a certain flexibility to define the operation of this insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of workers' rights. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could jeopardize its competitiveness, even though the "Regulation of Operating Requirements for Compulsory Insurances" considers it insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality lies not in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions that regulate the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code regarding not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because Transitory Provision III of the Law Regulating the Insurance Market itself establishes that this regulation must be issued "in accordance with national legislation". Failure to act in this way would go against not only the principle of universality, but also that of progressivity, as it could result in the protection currently enjoyed by the entire working class of the country being reduced to only a part of it. There is a constitutional obligation to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.

5.- The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of Article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) were published in numbers 39, 40, and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial), of the days February 24, 25, and 28, 2011.

6.- By writings submitted by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipalidad de San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP), they requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber admit them as active coadjuvants in the present action. They likewise challenge the contested norms in their capacities as workers and citizens, beneficiaries and users of social insurances, considering that they harm the constitutional principles that protect social insurances, derived from Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Magna Carta, specifically affecting the solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance. They indicate that the contested norms obligate Costa Rica to allow the lucrative commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity-based insurance as of January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social occupational hazards insurance contemplated in the fourth paragraph of provision 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the above, clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 will not apply to the social insurances set forth in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Magna Carta and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS), but excluding the social occupational hazards insurances, despite these also having constitutional rank and being governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the impact on the constitutional principles that protect social occupational hazards insurance, as it provides that Costa Rica will not have to reform its regulations on this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations "are consistent" with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the lucrative commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance is incompatible with the nature and principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in the levels of protection achieved by the country (impact on the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the "Law Regulating the Insurance Market, Including Comprehensive Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924", Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 to La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008, reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and aims to implement said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones) must grant "authorizations" for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity-based occupational hazards insurance, as of January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same vices of constitutionality. They agree with the Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of Articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and it is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality, and service at cost. If its lucrative commercial exploitation is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, harming the rights of working people who suffer workplace accidents and illnesses, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.

7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican - North American Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio), submits a writing as a passive coadjuvant in the action of unconstitutionality, with sufficient faculties to intervene in the process; he points out general aspects of the Chamber's competence, as well as the limited effects that national law has on public international law obligations. If the State were forced to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the will of the sovereign expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors, and exporters, and it would have to be pronounced upon in its entirety. However, contrary to what was affirmed by the claimant, the Chamber has pronounced on the opening of occupational hazards insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that compulsory occupational hazards insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, a social insurance as defined by Article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he highlights that advisability or inadvisability is not equal to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the claimant makes value judgments emphasizing the inadvisability of the contested norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give efficacy to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself; he also notes that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that occupational hazards insurance is mentioned in Article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country (employers and workers alike) have to choose among different entities that offer coverage for occupational hazards. He considers that the insurance is not part of the social insurances, as these are defined by the Political Constitution, and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of occupational hazards insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and Article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent the modification of the form of providing occupational hazards insurance. While he accepts that insurances against occupational hazards are constitutionally recognized, social insurances are those that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of these social insurances must be met that occupational hazards insurance does not have, regarding coverage, financing method, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, and the funds cannot be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent, these insurances were separated and differentiated from occupational hazards insurance, as was regulated by Article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). Although it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to solidarity-based assistance to the worker, and that there is recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by Article 73 or that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that occupational hazards insurance is a regime that the constituent established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers it correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection provided by social insurances and occupational hazards insurances is not mutually exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. Furthermore, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security under the responsibility of the Fund, and another of insurance against occupational hazards under the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances under the responsibility of the Fund and the INS are delimited. He cites jurisprudence of the Chamber and opinions of the Attorney General's Office of the Republic indicating that social insurances are exclusively those that protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. In this sense, the claimant's thesis of considering occupational hazards insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The claimant's thesis is unfounded under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to special provisions. Many of the claimant's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions that, as they are not founded on doctrinal criteria, relevant judgments, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, express nothing more than the claimant's personal feeling toward commercial opening. The Labor Code retains intact the rules on the provision, universality, compulsory nature, and other characteristics of occupational hazards insurance, including expressly that uninsured cases will continue to be attended by the National Insurance Institute. There is no denaturation of compulsory occupational hazards insurance. The fundamental core of occupational hazards insurance, concerning the protection of the worker, would not be altered by commercial opening or even by a potential profit, given that it would not cease to be universal, compulsory, and solidarity-based. It remains compulsory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers; it would remain solidarity-based insofar as it will always be paid by the employer; the uninsured will be attended by the INS. By judgment 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulation-wise develop the social guarantee of the right to a subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all normative development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern the insurance through special provisions, but also, it does not imply renunciation, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the claimant, he points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, he relies on judgment No. 1998-06450 regarding the democratic legitimacy corresponding to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's jurisprudence, has not been violated, as for this to be the case, it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The claimant supposes that by the mere fact of allowing other entities to provide the service of occupational hazards insurance, the coverage and quality thereof will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence whatsoever of this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. He requests that the action be declared without merit.

8.- Freddy Sandí Brenes, General Secretary of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, hereinafter UPINS), appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his legitimacy is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation he holds on behalf of the workers of the INS in relation to occupational hazards. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office, he emphasizes the fact that it concludes that social occupational hazards insurance is truly a social right and guarantee. He adduces that the recommendation proposed by the Attorney General's Office, where it is proposed that since the contested norms are not unconstitutional, legislation must be enacted that guarantees the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity. He maintains that an opening legislation that guarantees these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces in practice a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and of disadvantage for the INS in competition matters, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could be violative of other constitutional principles related to freedom of trade, enshrined in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, and competition, bringing us to the philosophical discussion in the matter of Human Rights, regarding whether solidarity can be imposed in trade matters. He argues that the reasons why the contested regulations are unconstitutional lie in the model of State chosen by the constituent, for which he brings up whether Costa Rica is a Social State of Law or a Liberal State of Law. Clarifying the above is essential if one takes into account that the opening of a social insurance against occupational hazards, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, requires a special value judgment about the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been formed to date as a Social and Democratic State of Law, governed among other things by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituents dreamed of a Social State of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent in the first paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution. The constituents decided to balance worker-employer relations, outlining in general terms the following guarantees: a) allow workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (Article 60 of the Constitution), b) elevate to constitutional rank the right to agree on collective bargaining agreements, and grant the rank of law to the content of those negotiations (Article 62 of the Constitution), c) constitutionally guarantee the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, it can be interpreted that severance pay is included, but the article does not establish a cap limit, nor does it prohibit aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of people and their families and dependents (Article 72), e) a system of insurances is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of the amount of their salary, and the best possibilities of recovering to continue working. With this, the importance of work as a means of life is recognized, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, where that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (Article 73 of the Constitution), f) the constituent includes and in a concrete manner "constitutionalizes" the rights and benefits, not previously stated, but that derive from the Christian principle of social justice and that are indicated by law (or by collective bargaining agreements that have the rank of law) (Article 74). On the juridical nature of occupational hazards insurance and its content, he alleges that the fact that its content is provided through law does not imply that it can be varied to worsen it simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that occupational hazards insurance "will be governed by special laws". In the study of legislative technique in the matter of human rights, this reference to the law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes a mistake by the constituent, which in a certain way "de-constitutionalizes" what it intends to "constitutionalize".

Certainly, every norm of constitutional rank has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or the "hard core" of that right. The social insurance for occupational risks is constituted by at least the following principles: principle of universality, principle of solidarity, principle of generality, principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), and service at cost. The social insurance for occupational risks has constitutional rank and is also recognized in Convention 102 of the ILO, approved as relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but also, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutional control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all workers in the country are covered by insurance against occupational accidents; a situation which, in our opinion, would be breached by the risk selection that the different companies in the insurance market could make. Regarding the incompatibility of the constitutional principle of service at cost with the opening of this type of social insurance, it states that this derives directly from Article 73 of the Constitution. This principle is developed at the same time by labor legislation, establishing in that regulation that in this activity, there are no "profits" as such, but rather eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, in the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council. As the petitioner himself indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become private profits. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest it, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and the principle of progressivity would be violated. We consider that this obligation to offer insurance at cost is incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution; therefore, the social insurance for occupational risks cannot legally be opened to free competition. Regarding risk selection and the violation of the constitutional principles of universality and progressivity, it affirms that certainly the solidary coverage of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. Income from more profitable activities contributes to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the occupational risk insurance market, private companies will compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities that present fewer claims. This would leave the less attractive risks, with more statistically proven accidents, once again in the hands of the probably sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of "risk selection" functions as the fundamental concept that prevents a social insurance, which is solidary, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating as a commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance is radically opposed to the conception of a social insurance like that for occupational risks, which is based on the insuring of all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or danger. This confirms the position held herein insofar as what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization. In accordance with Article 74 of the Constitution, social guarantees are inalienable, and given that the legislator established the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad) of social guarantees, said condition operates in such a way that the worker cannot renounce them. Nor can the State permit that in its legislation these guarantees are not available.

**9.-** Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as acting Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered as a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it provides him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment, likewise due to the institutional dynamics with the trade partners of the Free Trade Agreement United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the petitioner's legal standing, it is alleged that the harm transcends an individual harm to any person, that is, for the national community in its entirety, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes his standing on the existence of a popular action, since the action is filed for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the Nation against an alleged injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. Furthermore, it accuses that the action has subjective appreciations and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis, confuses the Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating applicable constitutional and legal principles from one insurance regime to another, thereby conveniently intermingling the nature of each one with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced for a confrontation and inconsistency of the national order with the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic plenitude and legal certainty, ignoring international commercial commitments and the general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with treaties, international conventions and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international order. The principles in question, apart from being inherent to international law, constitute basic presuppositions of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it should be noted, firstly, that according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws at the international level; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to comply with an international obligation. In relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of a domestic Law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must comply with them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Likewise, international tribunals have held that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal nature of international law norms is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed within its international obligations, the rights that international regulations enshrine are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level, and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, but rather they modify the internal legal order of nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. Thus, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of a customary nature (international customs), a State – upon entering the international community – accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning the conventional rules of international law – that is, those that come from a bilateral or multilateral treaty – the process is usually different from the previous one. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided for in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4) and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures relating to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements – denominations that for the purposes of international law are equivalent – and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution indicates that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over that of common Law, which entails that in the presence of a norm from an international treaty or convention, domestic norms of legal rank yield their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, since each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing to an indefinite future the realization of these rights under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, which is that of "progressivity" or "progressive development", paradoxically enshrined in Article 26 itself of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on "available resources", which cannot be interpreted licentiously because it would delay their effectiveness and would violate the general principles of international law "Pacta Sunt Servanda" and "Bona Fides", and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all the commitments acquired by the State, regardless of the origin and nature of the same. Regarding the supposed hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively addressing human rights issues, it is not superfluous to point out that these, according to the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions or that, even, compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are "dead letter", which would be equivalent to evading or breaching international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of judgment 2010-11352, has recognized the need to interpret the Magna Carta harmoniously with the doctrine of human rights coming from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the duty of the Nation to modify the Political Constitution, exceptionally in those insurmountable cases where it clashes with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them or not into its legal order, so that it conforms, is congruent and concordant with said norms, principles, rights, and international customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelacy, improper hierarchization, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or, based on such criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. No thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement has as its basis another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered a gross infraction and evident lack to International Law and the Law of the Constitution, is acceptable. On the other hand, it compiles judgment No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, by which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, regarding the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference regarding the purpose of the Treaty, that it would not address the convenience or not of the approval, as well as the economic aspects that surround the Treaty, but rather issues that generate doubts of constitutionality. The congruence it maintains with the claims of the consultants and what was resolved, reveals the need, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, for the judgment to be read as a whole following a reasonable and proportional legal interpretation to the end pursued within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So much so that a light reading that partially and out-of-context of the prevailing reality interprets the text in question, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the set of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and of the norms it deals with, which would inevitably lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is unacceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to move forward, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, well known to all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but rather an evident contravention of the general principles of International Law "Pacta Sunt Servanda" and "Bona fides", which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.

Costa Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the manner in which Occupational Risk Insurance was provided in the country, the foregoing, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that sustain it, the rights that guarantee it, or the coverage that this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of the CAFTA-DR, the country – in the Matter of Insurance Services – assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition – by said insurance it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance – as of January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called "Gradual Market Opening Commitments", subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for occupational risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to the cited subsection 2, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurance of Article 73 of the Constitution, clarified that the social insurances contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, while the mandatory occupational risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would indeed be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or disagreements with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in an Annex relating to and exclusive to Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, since the commitment to the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right nor does it denature said mandatory insurances. The opening and possible provision by other entities other than the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not obligate Costa Rica to modify the norms that regulate occupational risk insurance, provided that such norms are consistent with the obligations assumed in the CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obligates the country to "...treat occupational risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be exploited lucratively... the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the preceding section that define and characterize the social and solidary nature of occupational risk insurance". Nor is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obligates that "...must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, as it is a norm with a rank superior to national law", because the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application and respect for the constitutional and solidary principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or the means by which the State must comply with said international precept, given that by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, these are internally obligated by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the domestic legal order – whether as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law – to receive said international norms within the bosom of the national order and intrinsically give full validity to the precepts emanating from international treaties, conventions, or agreements. The CAFTA-DR establishes a concrete programmatic commitment, namely: the competitive opening of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance, as of January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the form in which such obligation shall be carried out. It is here where the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as its main consequence the non-fulfillment of the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and of the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other States Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. For the purpose of complying with this and other insurance market opening commitments, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law was issued, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, which, in accordance with its Article 1 indicating its objectives, it is inferred that it aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in the CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of the insured or consumers of insurance services, the minimum requirements and rules for market regulation, and basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of the CAFTA-DR to open the market for mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance, as of January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the General Superintendence of Insurance (Superintendencia General de Seguros) grants based on the Regulation that the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero) issues for that purpose. The mentioned Transitory is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the deadline contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to extend, as part of its supervisory functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation that establishes the operating requirements for mandatory insurances in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System, a maximum deconcentrated body attached to the Central Bank of Costa Rica, based on the competences that the Laws grant it. In this sense, it reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that considered and reported on the Bill for the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to conclude that the nature of Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance is a component that concerns the protection of the social security of workers, which, as relevant, according to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, creates insurances against professional risks which shall be exclusively at the expense of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined as a commercial contract, but rather one is in the presence of an insurance whose regulation is found in the Constitution, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to it being able to be offered in the market under a competition scheme, an aspect that would clearly guarantee for the consumer and for the insured greater diversity of options and better coverage and insurance conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (heard in a constitutional consultation by the Chamber in judgment No.

(2008-10450), a norm of public order and public interest, implements the commitments derived from the CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the authorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity. It creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the effective competition of participating entities, in addition to modernizing and strengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the legal norm and based on the international commitment, the "Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, que define los requisitos mínimos de funcionamiento del seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y Seguro Obligatorio de Automóviles" was issued, applicable to insurance entities, in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed insurance. There exists the "Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros". The invocation of unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening would expose the country to a potential State-State dispute resolution panel, which would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance. It could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits, article 20.16 of the CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to Costa Rica's reputation within the framework of bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes for trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even occur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the "Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios".

Article 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent power to provide and maintain a superior-ranked protection for workers under the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social security is informed by the basic principles of universality, compulsory nature, and social solidarity. Judgments of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two systems of social insurance, not mutually exclusive, whose primary and imperative purpose is to protect the worker. One against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, and the other against occupational risks, which are the exclusive and sole responsibility of the employer (judgment 2008-016964). There are several consequences of the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence; firstly, the issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security system, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social Security. Secondly, it was interpreted that there exist principles of the Right to Social Security linked to the Social Insurance Regime of the CCSS, which are those related to universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (judgment 2001-10546). In a third consequence, regarding the link between the right to health and social security, inasmuch as the administration of social insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (judgment 2007-17971). The fourth consequence that stands out most from the jurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection provided by social insurance and by occupational or work-risk insurance, which are distinct expressions of the fundamental right to social security and which are manifested in the legal system in a different form through the different norms regulating the regimes of the social security system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational risk insurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social security regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social security services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional rank, since there is no legal or constitutional prohibition that impedes the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance, given that the regime is in essence distinct from that of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the occupational risk insurance market is in accordance with Constitutional Law, since this compulsory insurance continues to be treated by the CAFTA-DR as an insurance distinct from the social security insurances of the CCSS without its nature being altered. Regarding the Compulsory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime, as a social security regime it aims to compensate the worker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or illnesses, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform in a subordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational risk regime is regulated at an infra-constitutional level in Title Four: On the Protection of Workers During the Exercise of Work of the Labor Code (article 193 to 331), the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, and in Acuerdo SUGESE 04-10, "Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios" approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a manifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not detract from the fact that, doctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, one is in the presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. Underlying this is the historical fact that it is a commercial contract recognized in the Fundamental Norm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an innovative and additional element to the traditional conception of commercial insurance contract law. The competition scheme is not incompatible with the Constitution, nor do international human rights instruments prescribe or give indications of such non-conformity. The report sets out the similarities and differences between the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the CCSS and the Compulsory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime. Also, regarding the principles of compulsory nature, universality, social solidarity, and irrevocability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social Security, because a large part of the constitutional jurisprudence that develops them has been transcribed; however, they will be analyzed from the perspective of the subject of respect for the essential content of this right.

According to the plaintiff's arguments, the principle of compulsory nature is not affected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or affect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as a constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The relevant provisions make the Insurance a compulsory insurance. In this sense, article 193 of the Labor Code remains in force, which operationalizes the principle; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the commitment was assumed to open the compulsory insurance market to competition as of January 1, 2011. So that the reference made by the article to the INS should be understood generically to refer to the operators authorized by SUGESE, concordantly with the "Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros" issued by CONASSIF. The compulsory nature is in the Labor Code, the Reglamento General de Riesgos del Trabajo (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the aforementioned regulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia General de Seguros and the Norma Técnica issued by each insurance entity.

The principle of universality is also not modified, distorted, or affected by the CAFTA-DR or by the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. The treaty does not suppose anywhere the existence of a competitive market in which the Occupational Risk Insurance would cease to cover all workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the effective market opening, the new private operators of occupational risk insurance will have the possibility of attracting a greater number of employers to contract this insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the principle of compulsory nature. The regulatory provision (article 5) provides for the obligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the insured, and beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the specifications that the law and related regulations provide for compulsory insurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that offer compulsory insurance to enter into the necessary agreements or contracts with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the operational aspects derived from the medical care provided by that institution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits indicated in article 218 of the Labor Code. The hypothetical scenarios where the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market will affect the finances of the INS, and consequently, the care of uninsured persons, but it points out what was affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts that the uninsured worker is not harmed from the perspective of the joint obligation, without prejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case, the Reglamento contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an Occupational Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, they will be considered as uninsured and the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium. It highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Ley de Cobro Judicial for certifications issued by established entities, the competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those issued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited care in a monopoly insurance market system, because the care or benefits that the insurance coverages contemplate are constrained by fundamental criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions of the workers.

The principle of social solidarity posits the duty to help those who have less based on the contribution of all, especially those who have more. The appellant's arguments that the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity because workers will have unequal protection, such an argument lacks any foundation. On this point, it is relevant to remember that the duty to insure workers through the Insurance does not fall on the worker, but on the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic to conceive the operation of an open and competitive Occupational Risk Insurance market, in which workers will be left without insurance, because they will be "rejected" by private operators of occupational risk benefits, because their salary is not "attractive", since it is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance but their employer, in accordance with paragraph four of Article 73 of the Constitution and the norms of the Labor Code. For further detail, it should be noted that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation to this insurance is that it is compulsory and mandatory in nature, independently of working conditions and the salary earned, so that the employer always has the obligation to insure their workers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of insuring and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Risk Insurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of the activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in accordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, to ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can private or public providers of insurance services, on a discriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers who wish to contract Insurance services with them, due to the authorization obtained by SUGESE in accordance with the Reglamento issued by CONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance with national legislation. It follows from the above that an insurance entity could reserve the right to contract with an employer-client when the latter does not meet the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the supervisory entity. In this sense, the plaintiff is incorrect when they claim that private operators "will dispute the profitable market segments." The CAFTA-DR is based on the premise that in the competitive Insurance market, the insurance firms that are authorized by the State know in advance the rules that regulate competition and protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to provide a public offer of occupational risk insurance and make a selection of the employers – clients to whom they wish to sell occupational risk insurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and regulatory norms, there cannot be discrimination in the insuring of workers, by virtue of the fact that the same principle of universality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to select or discriminate against workers based on their potential profits and risk levels. As for the second stage, relating to the determination of coverage, it refers to article 15 of the CONASSIF Reglamento, which the plaintiff seems to ignore, and resolved the issue of the minimum content of Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the policy must cover the benefits established in article 218 of the Labor Code, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on the basic benefits that the aforementioned norm establishes. At the stage of determining rates for coverage, it is permitted to establish categories of higher or lower accident rates, taking into account, among other items, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of activities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages are duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those coverages are determined under the actuarial technical bases that support the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with article 205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be viable and financially sustainable, and to allow for similar treatment or treatment for equals. The basic coverages functioned before the CAFTA-DR and when the INS held the monopoly on compulsory insurance. The rates for each insurance entity are authorized by SUGESE so that they comply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors demanded by the general provisions of the capital adequacy and solvency regime, as well as ensuring sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities of their insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and discrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities, but also that the minimum basic coverages, equal for all workers, are met, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same for all workers. Thus, the additional benefits by way of additional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the employer has with the insurance entity, and which are at the employer's expense, will directly imply an improvement in the treatment and care of the worker, which does not in any way violate the principle of universality or that of solidarity. Regarding irrevocability, workers protected under this regime cannot renounce the rights conferred by it, as prescribed by this constitutional norm. This means that workers cannot, motu proprio or by the action of a third party, renounce the rights and benefits granted by reason of the Fundamental Right to Social Security. The plaintiff does not indicate why the principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers can renounce Occupational Risk Insurance; on the contrary, in the preamble of Section H "Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros", respect for the Political Constitution is reaffirmed, and with it the irrevocable nature of the rights and benefits of the Insurance.

Regarding the constitutional principles of the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social that are extensive to the Occupational Risk Insurance Regime, such as the principles of sufficiency that are in force in article 206 of the Labor Code where both the needs of the worker and the salary earned by the worker are taken into account. In fact, this is how it functioned in times when the INS held the monopoly on Occupational Risk Insurance and it will continue to function in the same terms, today in a market open to competition. It also alludes to the principle of automaticity of protection, referring to the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social security that translates into "… an adequate and immediate protection in terms of illness, disability, old age, and death." Making an extension of this principle to Occupational Risk Insurance, as part of the general social security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special nature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, compulsory and universal. This has functioned this way until now, where hospitals of the Caja or private health centers must provide primary care to anyone who has suffered a work accident or illness. Uninsured workers receive the same immediate protection. In any case, articles 20 and 21 of the Reglamento come to support what is provided in numeral 232 of the Labor Code.

The report additionally notes the following differences between the Occupational Risk Insurance and the CCSS Social Insurances. Regarding the subject that provides the benefit or coverage, in each case it indicates the respective institutional fields and coverages, as well as those of the commercial operators, to conclude with the plaintiff's indication that it violates the Political Constitution. Furthermore, the Occupational Risk Insurance is the exclusive responsibility of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme of the Social Insurances of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. It is the latter that the prohibition on transferring or using those funds for purposes other than those related to their mission applies to. There are differences regarding the use and destination of the social insurance funds and reserves. The funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to article 73 of the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity, Disability, and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply to the Compulsory Occupational Risk Insurance Regime; there is no such constitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves resulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in article 73 when it refers to "social insurance" and "insurance against occupational risk." Although this does not mean that these funds are left without regulation, as this is determined through legal channels, but this is a very different matter from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of constitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary benefits and the supposed cost-based service. Regarding the first, it indicates that neither the CAFTA-DR nor the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros alters article 242 of the Labor Code, nor articles 255 to 259, on the possibility of commutation of incomes. Furthermore, the so-called "cost-based service" is not a principle of compulsory insurance, nor even a constitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in general, so that the plaintiff confuses and extrapolates from norms of the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social undue consequences for the Occupational Risk Insurance Regime. There is no evidence of the "cost-based service" principle at the constitutional level, but rather with article 205 of the Labor Code, which establishes that any surplus produced must be destined to constitute a reserve, to then suppose and erroneously conclude the existence of a presumed constitutional principle. Article 73 of the Constitution does not speak of income, as the plaintiff attempts to argue, and makes an error in the analysis of the arguments presented, since the term used by the constituent power was that of "fund." There is rather article 28 of the Constitution that guarantees every citizen freedom as a basic principle, and developed by infra-constitutional norms such as the law, which shall determine its scope and impose restrictions that concretize and harmonize them with the rest of the block of constitutionality and legality. Furthermore, the observance of being proportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of the INS, according to article 205 of the Labor Code, it must make annual settlements, the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, 50%, to finance the programs developed by the Consejo de Salud Ocupacional and the rest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. In the same way, it says that the INS as an insurance entity must comply with the precepts of articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, in terms of technical provisions and reserves. Likewise, the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of article 7 of the Law are obliged to comply with the mandates in terms of technical provisions, reserves, and investments contained in the indicated numerals. But article 205 of the Labor Code is not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the issue of "cost-based service" in vote 2007-9469, with this judgment having three main consequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide a cost-based service would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no constitutional principle that obliges telecommunications services, or in the case of Occupational Risk Insurance, to be provided "at cost." That is a decision that remains at the discretion of the legislator. The CAFTA-DR also does not deal with the issue that the insurance must be commercialized "at cost." Secondly, commercialization in a competitive market is not exclusive of the application of a social policy regarding occupational risk insurance. It is worth recalling the preamble of Section H on "Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros", where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the opening process in the provision of insurance must be done based on the Political Constitution, its norms, and principles. But to comply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the SRT services must be provided "at cost." Finally, the third consequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that compels that SRT services be provided "at cost." However, what is guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of consumers to choose the service provider that best suits their interests (article 46 of the Constitución Política). The freedom to choose is not incompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to "... achieve the universality and solidarity of services that are opened to competition." The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or right to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of freedom of enterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and equity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, regarding the progressiveness of international fundamental rights law and the Obligatory Workers' Compensation Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo) regime. The principle of the normative minimum (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account, as it postulates that there is a compendium of minimum labor and social security norms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the employer, or the insurance operators, such that contravention of these constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums form part of the essential content of the right to social security of the workers' compensation insurance, whereby the essential content will also comprise, as part of its hard core, the minimum benefits or basic coverages of the recognized SRT. As long as the legislator does not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of the workers' compensation insurance, through the enactment of legal norms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable, or deprive said right of the necessary protection. The norms under examination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the exercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or deprive it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The choice made by the State is the most favorable for the workers covered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected right, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, allowing the exercise of the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in a clear derivation of the principles "pro libertatis" and "pro homine," benefiting all workers of the Nation. Reasonable profit is also argued, such that the hard core of content is not affected by a change in the entity providing the service or by allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the essence or legal-philosophical foundation of the right in question, hence there is no injury to the principle of progressiveness of fundamental rights. The country has already consolidated an effective protection system that is not seen as being diminished. It does not consider that there is a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and Convention No. 102 of the ILO because in both, its regulation is separate. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently have, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that the beneficiaries of the Obligatory Workers' Compensation Insurance regime have currently obtained. For the foregoing reasons, it requests that the acción de inconstitucionalidad be dismissed.

**10.-** The individuals Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative fraction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadyuvante. In this regard, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations must be expanded to include the entirety of Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, approved by CONASSIF, through article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing, given that the challenged Transitorio III of Ley 8653 subsequently ordered CONNASIF and SUGESE to regulate and govern a regime of total openness in the provision of Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo, no later than January first, two thousand eleven, an administrative action computed as of December twenty-second of last year. It alleges that the mere act of promulgating said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, meant placing into commerce a public good or service of constitutional rank that, for that very reason and by its own conceptual-functional nature, is entirely outside of commerce. It argues that the alleged unconstitutionality is evident by literal-grammatical interpretation alone, taking into account that the invoked constitutional regulations (Title V of the Constitución Política) have a clean, clear, and precise drafting, while their placement in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They declare that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the only non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following rigorous syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State=Outside of commerce. Premise 2: Riesgos del Trabajo (RT) insurance = Social insurance that forms part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Constitución Política. Only non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside of commerce. Therefore, the challenged norms are unconstitutional, including Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. It is also affirmed that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly managed by INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing considers that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (a fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, riesgos del trabajo were legislatively developed by a code in labor matters, and are also shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization and by constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of universality of the public service of riesgos del trabajo, including uninsured cases, we can imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State boycotted from within to be forced to buy hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly stated that a new regulatory norm that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and monetary benefits) brings to mind the substantive background of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from making legislative setbacks in the matter of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave like a Superintendency of Social Insurances; it should be remembered that administration and regulation are the exclusive competence of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the subterfuge castration of the Código de Trabajo, or doing nothing to prevent it, is equivalent to retreating in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the promulgation of the challenged regulation, the coadyuvantes pointed out to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was of public interest to assertively address this debate, in light of the budding regulatory legal health (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failing to do so would destabilize the institutionality and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that such an omissive conduct could even result in a decrease, affectation, or detriment to the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when promulgating Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. The DR-CAFTA itself, in its chapter 16, subparagraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Anexo 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Código de Trabajo and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain nature of the service, such that the challenged norms could be tacitly repealed in light of chapter 16 of CAFTA itself. In other words, both legal systems that are in apparent contradiction are not so, because each regulates distinct matters and principles on its own side: a public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is of private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less is there incompatibility on the same matter. Therefore, it is not appropriate for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Código de Trabajo tacitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and excluding material competence of the SSRT service in favor of the State through INS. That is, what is under discussion, more than anything, has to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadyuvantes express that they are forbidden, as legislators, to break the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressiveness of human rights), which would be consummated in the event of approving legislation that in one way or another worsens labor human rights, for example those enshrined in articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 of the Código de Trabajo.

**11.-** Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) claim they have grounds to file the coadyuvancia motion in order to maintain that the commercial opening will foster and produce a segmentation of the workers' compensation insurance market, such that the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social will have to assume the "collateral" damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of workers, particularly of the Caja and the rest of Costa Rican social security, with an undisputed legitimate collective interest, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from article 332 of the Código de Trabajo. They maintain that the riesgos del trabajo insurance forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of the Constitución Política. Nevertheless, although the last paragraph of said article provides that riesgos de trabajo insurance will be governed by special provisions—just as those administered by the Caja are also governed by a special law—this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances are not part of social security, part of the very foundation of our Constitution. If any argument in this vein were valid, the constituent assembly simply would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. As such, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Sala has interpreted, the riesgos del trabajo insurance substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security, which inform constitutional article 73, apply equally for all the modalities of social insurances that this numeral expressly contemplates: the very particular situation, mainly of a historical order, that the administration of the riesgos de trabajo insurance was attributed to another institution distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, in no way could justify an understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. The commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must extend even to those who are not insured; it points out that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the Instituto Nacional de Seguros and the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, which will have fewer resources to assume these expenses. Businesses illicitly enrich themselves at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the patrimony of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity, where care is based on need above earnings, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the commercial opening scheme, under a competition regime, fosters market segmentation of "consumers," with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit, where the protection provided must correspond to at least basic medical-care benefits, regardless of insurance premiums or the amount of workers' wages. The scheme restricts the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of the benefits currently being provided. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that riesgos de trabajo insurance constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is only possible under a public, universal scheme that is incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. The Sala has indicated that the social security system assumes that the public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which prevents any modality of private management and administration of riesgos de trabajo insurance for profit. The dignity of workers is also injured because, as a consequence of these new rules, within which the Instituto Nacional de Seguros will have to see how it survives, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of riesgos de trabajo insurance, in a regime of commercial exploitation, forces modification of the Código de Trabajo regarding riesgos de trabajo. In this sense, they point out footnote 22, which conditions the regulations to the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, affirming that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent and incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the commercialization and privatization scheme of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for promoting workers' health and prevention of occupational accidents and diseases will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, healthcare, and other benefits, there are also those aimed at promoting health and preventing accidents and occupational diseases. The profits previously used for the above will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies in this area will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and diseases. Riesgos del trabajo insurance constitutes an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which they cite the chapter on Labor Rights by John Paul II, pointing out that the Encyclical provides that in cases of work accidents, workers must have access to healthcare, even free of charge, which would be breached, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. They request that the acción be granted.

**12.-** The hearing indicated in articles 10 and 85 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Sala by numeral 9 ibidem, deeming this resolution sufficiently grounded in evident principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal.

**13.-** By resolution of seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued in this expediente, several motions for coadyuvancia in favor and against the acción de inconstitucionalidad were admitted.

**14.-** The legal prescriptions have been followed in the proceedings.

Drafted by Magistrate **Castillo Víquez**; and, **Considering:** **I.- On preliminary questions and regarding the coadyuvancias.-** By resolution of seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, issued in this expediente, the motions presented by various interested parties for the purpose of coadyuvar in the acción were admitted, with the purpose of adding their arguments to the expediente. It is necessary to indicate that the order only mentions the names of the individuals appearing in the process; however, most of them are not doing so in a personal capacity, but rather representing legal persons and social groups, which, for greater clarity, is indicated below regarding the capacity in which they act and whether they do so representing a legal person within the acción de inconstitucionalidad. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, bearer of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, bearer of identity card No. 6-155-443, as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, bearer of identity card No. 9-029-769, as Secretary General of the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada (SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, bearer of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Concejo of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Acuerdo No. 13 of Sesión Ordinaria No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, bearer of identity card No. 2-287-015, as Secretary General of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, bearer of identity card No. 1-897-818, Deputy Secretary General of the Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, identity card No. 3-222-901, member of Servicio, Paz y Justicia in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, bearer of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal capacity and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, bearer of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, bearer of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his capacity as Secretary General of the Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, bearer of identity card number 1-791-100, in his capacity as acting Minister of Comercio Exterior; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as was erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the fraction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis Chavarría Vega, bearer of identity card No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal capacity and as Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, bearer of identity card No. 2-343-472, in her personal capacity and as Deputy Secretary General of the Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, bearer of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution of seventeen hours eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven is corrected, and it should be understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal persons. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the motion of Mrs. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez is not recorded, whose briefs are not in the electronic expediente; therefore, the mentioned persons are not considered coadyuvantes in the present acción. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a coadyuvante, given that the brief states it was filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, yet his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.

**II.- The rules of standing (legitimación) in acciones de inconstitucionalidad.** Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regulates the conditions that determine the admissibility of acciones de inconstitucionalidad, requiring the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial forum in which the unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct injury; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Procurador General de la República, the Contralor General de la República, the Fiscal General de la República, or the Defensor de los Habitantes, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the assumptions provided for in paragraph 2 of article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, the questioned norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would later allow the impugnation of the applicatory act and its consequent use as a base matter.

The text in question provides that it is applicable when "<i>by the nature of the matter, no individual and direct harm exists</i>", that is, when by that same nature, the harm is collective (the antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of certain groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "<i>diffuse interests (intereses difusos)</i>" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by this Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in judgment number 3750-93 of this court, issued at fifteen hundred hours on the thirtieth of July, nineteen ninety-three) <div align="justify" style="margin-left:10mm; margin-right:10mm; text-indent:10mm; margin-top:0.00mm; margin-bottom:0.00mm;"><font face="Times New Roman" size="4"><span style=" font-size:14pt"><i>"... Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be, under our law —as this Chamber has already stated— merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, specific identifiable or easily identifiable persons, or personalized groups, emerge, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests that concern a community as a whole. It is, therefore, a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, suffer an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, for which it is rightly said that they are the equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) partake of a dual nature, since they are simultaneously collective —because they are common to a generality— and individual, for which they can be claimed in such capacity"</i></span></font></div> In summary, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a specific social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a specific personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (<i>diffuse</i>) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, it is clear that the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could bring under paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights that it has classified as "diffuse," such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two clarifications must be made: on the one hand, the referenced goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not specific groups thereof; environmental damage does not affect only the residents of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or seriously endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of Humanity; similarly, the defense of the proper management of public funds authorized in the Budget of the Republic is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration made by the Constitutional Chamber is no more than a simple description inherent to its obligation —as a jurisdictional body— to limit itself to hearing the cases brought before it, without it being possible in any way to understand that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse rights; the foregoing would imply an undesirable reversal in the scope of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of Rights," which —as in the case of the Costa Rican model— is based on the premise that what must be express are the limits on freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and therefore do not require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) speaks of interests "<i>that concern the community as a whole</i>," it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is not, therefore, that any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (actio popularis), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without it being valid in this field either to attempt any effort of exhaustive enumeration.

**III.- On admissibility.** As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) does not recognize special standing for a Deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the petitioner derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), acting as an attorney and Deputy, that is, in his personal capacity and in his capacity as Deputy. In this sense, the question he raises refers to diffuse interests, that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The petitioner's reasoning is based on the idea that said system must have a general and universal, effective or potential, scope, where he accuses that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what has been indicated by the petitioner, it should be noted that the action is admissible on behalf of an undetermined group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of some occupational risk insurance policy. In this sense, what is appropriate is to hear the action, as is indeed done.

** IV.- Object of the challenge.** The constitutional review of sub-paragraph b) of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 "Financial Services," of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana), which was ratified through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, is requested, which provides:

“**<i>III. Gradual Market Opening Commitments</i>** **<i> [...]</i>** **<i>2.- </u>Right of Establishment for Insurance Providers</u></i>** **<i> </i>** **<i> Costa Rica shall allow, on a non-discriminatory basis, the insurance service providers of a Party, to establish and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as provided below:</i>** **<i> </i>** **<i> </i>** **<i> </i>** **<i>(a)</i>**<font face="Times New Roman"><span style=" font-size:7pt"> </span></font> **<i>any and all lines of insurance</i>**<font face="Times New Roman" size="5"><span style=" font-size:17pt">**<i>²⁹</i>**</span></font><font face="Times New Roman" size="4"> **<i> (except mandatory vehicle insurance and occupational risk insurance), no later than January 1, 2008; and</i>** **<i> </i>** <font face="Times New Roman"><span style=" font-size:12pt">**<i>29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica (Constitución Política de República de Costa Rica) and supplied by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) as of the date of signature of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.</i>**</span></font> **<i> </i>** **<i> </i>** **<i>(b)</i>**<font face="Times New Roman"><span style=" font-size:7pt"> </span></font> **<i> any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.</i>** **<i> </i>** **<i>For purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall allow insurance service providers to establish through any juridical form, as established in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential solvency and integrity requirements, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice</i>**”.

Furthermore, the following provision of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros), Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, is also challenged:

**<i>“TRANSITORY III.- Opening in the provision of mandatory insurance</i>** **<i>The State shall maintain the monopoly on Occupational Risk Insurance (Seguros de Riesgos del Trabajo) and Mandatory Automobile Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio Automotor), administered by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in accordance with what is indicated in Title IV of the Labor Code (Código de trabajo) and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes (Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres), respectively.</i>** **<i>As of January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization for the exercise of insurance activity in the lines of Mandatory Vehicle Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos) and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo), to the entities indicated in sub-paragraphs a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications to be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council (Consejo Nacional), in accordance with national legislation.</i>**” It is claimed that these norms infringe Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador (Protocolo de San Salvador), and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.

** V.- On the merits.** **A.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and State.-** Preliminary questions. It deserves to be highlighted from the beginning of this judgment that no one denies the importance of social security in our country and in the world. The petitioner, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (Procuraduría General de la República), the various social organizations appearing in the case file, the Deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana) faction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Ministerio de Comercio Exterior), and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, the Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, in the advantage provided by the existence for each and every one of the inhabitants of this country of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances. In this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled due to the vocation and awareness of political and social actors, in the prevention and treatment of illnesses, and ensuring spaces for medical care and high-value medical services when a healthy person plunges into a vulnerable situation due to illness. Now, the first manifestations are found in the different historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. With them, one can observe the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism of social security. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of <i>John Rawls</i> have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what the best form of organization of a State would be, if one could start from scratch. He invites the operator into a hypothetical mental exercise consisting of divesting oneself of all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal figure of social security has deep political and constitutional roots. He proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, so that the designer of society must not know what social, educational, political status, lifestyle, and sex they would desire, or could correspond to them once inserted in that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a fairly tempered and rational choice, so as not to be at a disadvantage in the face of society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort of self-preservation by this <i>decider</i>, they would calculate that if they ended up at the humblest echelon, they would achieve a better ration of everyone's wealth in favor of the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century in the world there were already several countries with social security systems functioning, incipiently, but achieving results, it seems logical, looking back today, that such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as well as in the present, and that, by carrying out this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a great majority, even to the most disadvantaged, and thereby, not discriminate in access and services based on one's origin (Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). The financing, consequently, would be done with the participation of the different social actors: State, employer, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the underlying problem indicated by the petitioner does not lie in a macro-level conflict of social insurances, but in a parcel thereof, because the constitutional norms recognize this core principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures to place in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica on Insurance Services, the following in the preamble:

"[...] <i>reaffirming its decision to ensure that the opening process of its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution</i>; <i> </i> <i>emphasizing that said process shall be for the benefit of the consumer and shall be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation;</i> <i> </i> <i>recognizing its commitment to modernize the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros, INS) and the legal framework of Costa Rica in the insurance sector;</i> <i> </i> <i>Assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services”.</i> It is important to point out that this care in the approach and declaration is not held by any of the other member countries of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America (Tratado de Libre Comercio entre República Dominicana, Centroamérica y los Estados Unidos de América). The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the monopoly existing in insurance matters, but additionally, because the State in Costa Rica has traditionally maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which is assumed as a commitment by the country, becomes palpable in point II of Section H, where in the same way the obligation is recorded to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must maintain itself in an impartial position relative to the market participants, needing to have adequate powers, **legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers**, and manage confidential information appropriately. This will be taken up again in the judgment later.

Since what is questioned in the action is the constitutional regularity of the commercial Treaty norm and one of its implementing laws, in that it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must point out, for the time being, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpretation of the scope of the social insurances contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be cleared up is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurances administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social).

The Treaty permits, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of insurance, but as indicated, saves the following in a footnote:

"For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as of the date of the signing of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex." From the foregoing acknowledgment, it is clear that the social security protected by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social is excluded from the Treaty. The foregoing is important for the interpretation of Article 73 of the Constitution, because with this, the legislator of the National Constituent Assembly sealed a special result into the norm.

B.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good that is composed of resources from Costa Rican society. Indeed, by the regulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter, it has allowed this Constitutional Chamber to construct the Right to Social Security, which by its structure must not be limited solely to the protection of the right to Health, but rather encompasses many other benefits that, all integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican society. To cite a ruling, it must be stated that:

"III.- Right to social security.- The purpose of the constituent in designing the social security system in our country was to guarantee all citizens that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, would grant them at least the indispensable services in case of illness, disability, maternity, old age and death. Article 73 of the Political Constitution, interpreted harmonically with Article 50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right assumes that the public powers will maintain a public scheme of social security for all citizens in a way that guarantees assistance and provides sufficient social benefits in the face of situations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective scope of application of the right to social security incorporates the principle of universality, as it extends to all citizens, with a mandatory nature. The objective scope departs from the principle of generality, insofar as it protects situations of need, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and insured in advance, but rather as they effectively occur. Furthermore, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of protection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of protective automaticity, which translates into adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age and death.

Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, interpreted harmonically, establish the right to social security for the benefit of all workers, informed by the principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of protection. Evidently, the provision of such services is conditioned on the existence of some minimum requirements, but basic and necessary for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be coherent with the aforementioned principles.

The right to social security is a fundamental right, recognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1871, the chapter on Social Guarantees, which was subsequently confirmed in the constituent process of nineteen forty-nine. ..." (ruling No. 2004-08013) Furthermore, on another occasion the Chamber has also indicated that:

"IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the existence of social insurances, which are regulated by the system of forced contribution by the State, employer and workers, in order to protect the latter against the risks of illness, maternity, disability, old age and death. The Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, is the autonomous entity in charge of administering this type of insurance, with the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its managements, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its legal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them. It guarantees in this way, the establishment of social security and its nature, decrees the purpose of social insurances and regulates the destination of the respective funds. Social security was born in protection of the worker and his family, as the human beings that they are, and is provided from his conception until his death, seeking health and helping in unforeseen misfortunes such as disability and death, as well as in states of vulnerability due to his very condition such as those of old age, pension and retirement." (Ruling No. 1998-04636) The doctrine enunciated in the preceding precedent remains firm in how it interprets Article 73 of the Constitution; consequently, from what has been said, social security is a fundamental axis, an axiom and a reference point of Costa Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the Social State of Law, which means a constitutional value or legally relevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate distribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability and which makes it attractive to national and international investment, and as such, is achieved through the tripartite contribution of the State, employer, and worker. Thus, persons may have access to social security, to a scheme of predictability for disability, old age and death, as well as to health and to the primary provision of health services that the State, through the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, places at the service of the population, being one of the best guarantees in individual aspirations towards a more equitable society. Numerous studies place our country within privileged positions, not being a developed country, but it maintains high levels of public health coinciding with European countries more developed than ours. As indicated above, it achieves putting the least advantaged person in society in a better position, one that allows him to receive health benefits like any other better advantaged in society, as well as social solidarity if the person falls into situations of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic asymmetries should not count for the provision of services, since the original constituent legally guarantees the health of the population through institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social to oversee its delivery. It bears noting then, that the Executive Power guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of the social insurances, by mandate of the constituent, specific benefits reserved to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in the Free Trade Agreement everything related to the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. The National Constituent Assembly foresaw the need to keep incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949, what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943. With this, it reaffirmed, at the summit of the legal order, social security by establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual workers), its forms of financing (forced contributory for the State, employers and workers), and scope (risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines). It designated the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social as the public entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal and financial attributes, administrative and governmental autonomy in the social insurances, to likewise, erect a barrier of protection for the resources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of that patrimony of all the beneficiaries. But, always within social security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they break the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the benefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would admit excepting from this regulation the mandatory vehicle insurances and the mandatory occupational risk insurances, to regulate them separately after their entry into force, at an opportunity after January 1, 2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican Government would be consistent with the obligations imposed by the Political Constitution, which effectively, as indicated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is for the Government of the Republic, but which were embodied in the commitments assumed before the other member States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in national legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion that is raised in the action is focused on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question, from where the discussion addressed since the referendum of the Free Trade Agreement and the complementary agenda of laws to the aforementioned Agreement is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational risks scheme participates in some of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, by locating it as part of the social security scheme established from the summit of the legal order; nonetheless, a constitutional interpretation in its proper dimension must exist, especially vis-à-vis the issue of social insurances that protects against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines, but with distinctions in the insurances against professional risk or workers' risk. Certainly, the normative aspects of greatest relevance for society must be situated in the Political Constitution to regulate or protect certain fundamental rights, issues that are the most essential in the Political Constitution in order to point out the course along which ordinary legislation should develop, including the licenses that it may have contemplated. While the foregoing marks a determined course as a country-decision, there also exist provisions that release those determinations to a reading proper to political science at a determined moment, whose decision belongs to the political organs of the State. In the case of the social insurances that operate from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved its institutional monopoly, but in the second, the texture of the norm was more open.

In the judgment of the Chamber, it is worth questioning the idea originally conceived by the National Constituent Assembly of providing the population with universal social insurances and the provision of services, if it is seen modified to the detriment of the least advantaged, with the change of the legal framework –as the plaintiff and coadjuvants accuse- insofar as it contradicts that universality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the monopoly of certain insurances, and which is contrary to the international human rights conventions. The discussion is more philosophical-political, than philosophical-juridical. The foregoing assertion will be seen below, to establish whether there is evidence that this is so or that international organizations opt for a particular model of social insurance development to achieve those ideals. In that sense, the legal space that would remain for a Constitutional Court or the political organs of the State themselves when ratifying an international normative body would be little. Hence, one could ask what is the role that corresponds to the Chamber, as Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be defined whether it can be questioned juridically or it is an issue that corresponds to the political bodies of the State. As to the first, it bears indicating that the Chamber must pronounce from the constitutional point of view of the norms, but, as to the second, regarding the competence to decide on the convenience or inconvenience of a Treaty, both questions must go in the same line with what the Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. The Chamber has opted to maintain that it should not enter into analyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within its competence when resolving the juridical or deciding a particular sense on the constitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental right is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and convenience of the legislation, in itself, is not and should not be natural to jurisdictional activity. The important thing to highlight here is that in the interorganic relations of the State, the first called upon to control the timeliness and convenience of the international negotiations of the Executive Power in its international relations in the form of International Treaties is the Legislative Assembly. In this sense, the abstract control that this Chamber has, be it a priori or a posteriori, will depend on the political performance as a constitutional organ residing in the Legislative Assembly, and in which decision-making is founded on the majority, through a competitive struggle, but where the timeliness and convenience of a norm is the exclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly. In any case, by ruling No. 1994-07005 it is said that:

"Nevertheless, from the point of view that we are interested in pointing out now, that means that the State, or more properly, the organs that have strictly political and management competences in their charge, must always act in function of stimulating production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the Executive Power has negotiated this Treaty, having as a north those constitutional objectives. And it must also be understood that the Legislative Power, upon considering the merits of said instrument, will act in accordance with the same objectives. That is why we can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that the Treaty as such may have for any sector, or some of its foreseeable provisions, discussed and debatable, do not necessarily entail an aspect of constitutionality, in the sense that the Chamber must pronounce, for they lie at the level of mere convenience or timeliness. For example, some point out that notwithstanding the goodness of this type of commercial instruments, a country would not derive immediate or short-term advantages, if the old model (of import substitution, of subsidies), and the new model of commercial opening coincide in it. That is why in this regard, some experts estimate that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica because its tariffs have been reduced to a greater degree and much earlier than our country began in this. But even so, they continue saying, the treaty is convenient for Costa Rica, because a spectrum of very important investments, of technology transfer and job creation, will open up for it, which will dynamize its economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of competitive demand that it needs to adapt to a possible incorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the United States of America and Canada (NAFTA), as an almost immediate aspiration of the country, just as officials of the central Government have expressed. In other words, the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario for moving on to the next one, more complex and ambitious. In any case, the Chamber warns that these aspects revolve around the policies that are behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not have the constitutional connotation to which the Chamber must circumscribe its opinion." C.- The legislator's freedom of configuration in occupational risk insurances. Now then, the 4th paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes:

"The insurances against professional risks shall be the exclusive account of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions." The original constituent, on the issue of professional risks, provided the legislator with greater flexibility, despite this being effectively considered within the social insurances, which is denoted by the breaking of the financial and regulatory scheme of the other social insurances. In this sense, one could think that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the Political Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with all the social security of the country, but evidently, the National Constituent Assembly differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it could have determined it by eliminating the final paragraph or incorporating that mandate expressly to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove the foregoing, one could question whether the unconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, on the issue of professional risk insurances, could have been sustained. But such an interpretation would also not be plausible; on the contrary, the legislator delegated, for many years, the coverage of social security in occupational risks to another autonomous institution, distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such interpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor any constitutional irregularity being noticed, because it was in function of a subject of public law that acted in a dual capacity, of public and private law. The foregoing leads this Tribunal to the possibility of channeling in a more flexible way the interpretation of the final paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, always maintaining harmony with the whole system, when it is indicated that the insurances "shall be the exclusive account of the employers", because it can be derived –logically- a lesser intensity of the State's presence, but without the foregoing signifying a total absence. On the other hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that he is the one on whose assignment the worker performs the labor, and the working conditions he offers the worker are attributed to him, so that it is the Employer who is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and to the State, ensuring or supervising the fulfillment of those obligations. As for the worker, no obligation falls upon him beyond the obligations contained in the labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the National Constituent Assembly places the worker as the recipient of the protection, that is to say, he would finally be the beneficiary of these insurances. The original constituent foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, allowing a greater breadth of action for the legislator when it states "shall be governed by special provisions", which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting an autonomous entity distinct from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with establishing, offering and executing professional risk insurances. At this point, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in economic and social activity, proper to a Social State of Law, or the prevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on pure or mixed market models with the tutelage of the State, in what refers to its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to arrive at is the following: the original constituent established a system to constitutionally regulate occupational risks so that they can be the object of diverse legal and benefit designs or structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing clearly as part of the great quantity of productive economic activities, as well as the jobs and risks that may exist in each of them. Precisely, this allowed, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly scheme, which implied a different course for the mandatory occupational risk insurances from those regulations of the Caja, and nevertheless, this did not make it nor would make it unconstitutional, nor would a greater opening in the choice of the Employer, in the face of a greater offer of professional risk insurance operators, be so.

From the foregoing, other important consequences emerge, in which one passes from an Institution in which it operated under a monopolized insurance intervened market, and then opted for a different one of opening, with an impartial regulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. Thus, a regulatory body was foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. In consequence, the plaintiff's thesis may maintain an erroneous conception that the State disappeared completely within the aforesaid employer-worker-occupational risks scheme. It is recognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative decision, can declare that certain services be provided under a monopoly scheme, or be provided under a free competition scheme, without that –necessarily- signifying a detriment to the service. In such a way, it can liberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality.

If a government decision negotiated by the parties to a Treaty, approved through mechanisms of citizen participation (referendum), and having exhausted the ratification procedure, places another State organ to impartially regulate, on a non-discriminatory basis, the commercial activity of insurance, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this regard, the legitimacy of this decision must be said to be reinforced, because it originates from a constitutional amendment allowing an authentic direct democratic exercise that in 2002 sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote with normative character. That in itself carries a special weight, which in principle, must be observed by the mechanisms and institutions based on a representative and mature democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional review). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences as it is a ratified agreement and an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal stance of the internal organs of the State, at the moment the international regulation enters into force. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:

"*The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including its observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise*".

Given that the mandatory occupational risk insurance regime had been operating through the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the phased opening of the insurance market, including mandatory vehicle and occupational risk insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was duly analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Chamber is consulted on the following problem:

"*Violation of constitutional articles 50, 73 and 74: unconstitutionality by legislative omission to regulate solidary insurance: they state that this omission will cause relevant legal unprotectedness for the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because it violates the present and future effectiveness of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in insurance matters derive from constitutional article 73: mandatory nature, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, non-existence of a benefit cap, immediacy and mandatory nature of benefit provision to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of annuities and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the insurer's rates. Likewise, they argue that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between constitutional articles 50 and 73 are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others derived from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that we are before a constitutional closing or closure norm of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open gateway to enable the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of regulation of solidary insurance will generate labor unprotectedness.*" In this regard, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:

"***9.- Violation of articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.** * *According to the consulting deputies, the draft "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros" is also unconstitutional by omission, insofar as it does not contemplate the establishment of social insurance. Regarding constitutional review by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Tribunal, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 14:39 hrs. of May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue infraconstitutional regulations related to the referendum process) has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue "a law that develops a constitutional content or clause." Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that "the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social". Hence, in the aforementioned draft law, the Chamber does not perceive the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, reason for which the consultation formulated in that sense must be dismissed.*" There is not necessarily a loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the foregoing, that Costa Rica is free and independent, that as such it acquires an international obligation that must be observed according to the principle of international law *pacta sunt servanda*; in that sense, binding itself by an international commitment with the different countries and obtaining commercial benefits from them, is what is effectively pursued by this type of instruments. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars, the first is the ancient notion of freedom, so that certain areas of people's lives are exempt from external conditioning of the person's volitional and cognitive capacity, so that life unfolds without undue interference, provided that morality or public order are not affected or that third persons are not harmed. But in addition, around this freedom –in the fundamental base of society and the State– an institutionality structured to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom is guaranteed, as well as the social values that the original constituent has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are born with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere in that freedom. Furthermore, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited insofar as the individual conduct may be contrary to morality, public order or harm a third party (article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy must be deemed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different State institutions. The foregoing means that, whether it is the Political Constitution, an international agreement, a law or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue, where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them arbitrarily. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance their policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to social welfare. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Law 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent itself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation by special provisions, that is, specific provisions through which ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents the latter from varying them by subject matter and over time.

For now, the monopoly of mandatory insurance in favor of INS is broken upon the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater national and international service offering by occupational risk insurance companies. It is clear that the National Constituent Assembly did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurances, therefore it breaks a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of numeral 73 indicated, of tripartite source of financing for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator free to initiate how to materialize professional risk insurance. The National Constituent Assembly left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurances. Under the original constituent's scheme, mandatory occupational risk insurance would be protected by the decisions that the legislator made under the concept "*special provisions*", which means that not only did it design this coverage with more leeway, but it had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient potency and resistance), and that in this matter it received from a referendum process, as indeed happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit activity of occupational risk insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a monopolistic state activity in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open to the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, which derive from the Political Constitution, such as state oversight, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement that requires non-discriminatory regulations for all commercial agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the bidders in the insurance market is prohibited. Returning to what was indicated above, it is clear that the State, through legislation, can choose between providing Occupational Risk insurance under monopoly regimes or competitive regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of natural or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent can effectively be presented in any of the spheres, the latter being the one chosen in the aforementioned referendum.

**D.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.-** The plaintiff argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent, as applicable) assigns that service or a strategic position within it to the State, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the required provision, such as interested management for certain public activities that cannot leave the State administration, or the concession when it entrusts a specific provision of public services to private natural or legal persons. As previously indicated, a prohibition cannot be derived from paragraph 4 of article 73 of the Political Constitution due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding an open conditional element to the constitutional norm by establishing greater configuration freedom for the legislator. For the Tribunal, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it clearly embraces a form of administrative oversight of the State over individuals who may exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require compliance with *ex ante* requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination or, what is the same, the existence of rules equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but likewise, if no supply existed, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as indeed it does. The reports in the action, the extensive writings of the interested coadjuvants, allude to the different conditions that companies that would be bidders in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must meet; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be at a disadvantage, since we are facing regulatory minimums (or the hard core of the fundamental right) to be able to obtain the authorization to compete in the market. The plaintiff's argument lies in that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no obligations committed to the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking retribution and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, such statements must be taken with great care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, they venture into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In such sense, international provisions must be norms that harbor space for the different national policies of the Member States, insofar as they leave the mechanisms open to make the rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of result, but without being international conventions of means (as the plaintiff seems to pose it). Put another way, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this sense, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:

"*Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures* *The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, ***to the maximum of the available resources and taking into account their degree of development***, ***in order to achieve progressively***, ***and in accordance with their domestic legislation***, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol.* *Article 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Law Provisions* ***If the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions***, *the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to make those rights effective*" (the text in bold is not from the original).

One of the characteristics that distinguish human rights instruments from other treaties, is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, in the others, whatever the High Contracting Parties decide to stipulate as a goal in their reciprocal relations, boundary treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such at the human being, and not at reciprocal concessions of interest to the States, and it will be the State which assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties –especially multilateral ones– must adopt inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows it to deepen the agreed objective and purpose, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a given human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, in a manner that establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is at the disposal of each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and targeting the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction is established, to adopt internal measures; it means that it can resort to public, private or mixed forms, to obtain results in the direction of the commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of providing professional risk insurance, provided they are in accordance with the international conventions that regulate the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the "*Article 9. Right to Social Security* *1. Everyone has the right to social security that protects them against the consequences of old age and of disability that physically or mentally prevents them from obtaining the means to lead a dignified and decent life.* In the event of the death of the beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to their dependents.

2. When dealing with persons who are working, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and the subsidy or pension in cases of work-related accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth" (the text in bold is not from the original).

The truth is that international regulations establish what the social security jargon in some ILO documents calls the social floor or social protection floor as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there are indeed legal obligations that are unfulfilled and enforceable domestically, or once that avenue is exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that work-risk insurance (seguro de riesgo del trabajo) is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in the event of an accident or occupational disease. ILO Convention 102 attributes to the employer the responsibility for the employee's work environment, and it is in conformity with paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Constitution. The important thing is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, establishing minimum standards for each of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of such systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State may choose at least three areas of protection. Important data emerge from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 "Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization"] which indicates, among other things:

"185. Employment injury benefit schemes are usually organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and at other times they form part of other branches of social security. Because of this link between risk and prevention in the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely by employer contributions. Contribution rates are often differentiated according to the level of risk of accident or disease in the various types of economic activities." (p. 76); The claimant alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, to the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressivity of social rights. For this argument to be admissible, regression must be proven with the change in the legal regime or it must be evident, but neither the work of the ILO itself supports a single approach to the issue as the claimant seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, these are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate for implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, it is a matter of opportunity and convenience that should not concern the Sala Constitucional – in principle, it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which escape the law of the Political Constitution. In this sense, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide, but rather it is up to the legislator to assess its opportunity and convenience, as well as its constitutional viability. As set forth above, in the first place, there is no mandate of monopoly or prohibition for mandatory work-risk insurance (seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo) to operate outside the institutional structures of the State; a corollary of the foregoing is that the latter may avail itself of different private agents to carry out the necessary benefits, whether public or private. Extrapolating that this system implies a detriment or a loss of rights for the recipients of services does not reflect the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.

E.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as an internal norm is situated in the Political Constitution, such that it is up to the original or derivative constituent power to decide and provide for the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be mentioned that international law, after its incorporation into the legal system through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, clause 4) of the Political Constitution, has legal effects. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation in the world allows for a broad differentiation of three main systems: those countries that require a double parliamentary approval, both for the ratification of the treaty and then for specific legislative provisions to incorporate the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in the Scandinavian countries. The next, in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally bind the country, but which will require national legislation for the international law to be adopted, as in England and the countries that are part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where with parliamentary approval of what the Executive Branch has done, the incorporation of international regulations operates once the ratification process by the State is completed, as in our country. There are likewise other problems, such as the assignment of normative hierarchy to the international legislation incorporated into the legal system, with all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, having their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. In the case of incorporation, our country has the system that fell into the last category, the most representative, the truth being that it only requires the legislative approval or rejection of the treaty, in which case, once the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, it is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to operate with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has these consequences, thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:

"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their promulgation or from the day they designate, authority superior to the laws.

Public treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of its total membership, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose." But historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as might be interpreted today. Thus, the norm is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it previously had a different wording, isolationist and restrictive, so that public officials could celebrate international treaties in a limited way, which was the following:

"Article 7.-- No authority may enter into pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Whoever does so shall be tried for treason against the Fatherland.

Any treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to territorial integrity or the political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of its total membership and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose." A strict reading of the transcribed article gives rise to impracticability and automatic contradiction, inappropriate for constitutional reasoning with public international law, based on an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which disregarded a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment acquired by the Executive Branch), and which allows for acquiring and granting international rights and obligations mutually or multilaterally agreed upon by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in the way they must conduct themselves in the international order, as it acquires rights, as well as duties to others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent an important structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the original constituent power's fear against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and seeing things from a perspective for the benefit of the country, once things returned to normal after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement for the legislative reform carried out through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, in the following manner:

"Article 7.- This article enshrined the conservative criterion of the majority of the constituents of 1949, who felt a profound hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within this nationalist zeal, things went too far, by stating in the first paragraph that anyone who entered into 'pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact, or convention constitutes a limitation on the sovereignty or independence of any country. If that first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the rulers the country has had from 1949 onward would have to be tried for such a serious crime. We believe that said paragraph should be suppressed, as it is dangerous." That correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in to proceed with said modification, for if economic integration with Central America was sought, it had to be privileged for its economic and development benefits, which was finally resolved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:

"If superior authority is not given to treaties and concordats over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of what are called legal antinomies (sic), norms that clash, norms that provide one thing to the contrary, and that would constantly force us to resort to unconstitutionality or the inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could put us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty (sic), the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that ordinary law is subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty (sic). This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of ordinary forms whereby each norm governs within its specific area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and it bursts in upon other territories, upon other persons, upon other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without the value of each of the countries having been diminished. It is a healthy norm, it is an advisable norm, and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the ordinary norm." In this sense, the derivative constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, such that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly and ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, in the face of freely assumed obligations, so as to have international law incorporated with sufficient potency and resistance to enforce the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary and regulatory legislation that contradicts it or is in contradiction. The reason lies in the obligation to honor commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and of bona fides. On the other hand, the reservation and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the meaning of Article 27, of the importance that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. What is provided in the Political Constitution was already discussed above. Hence, with reason, this Chamber (Sala), when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation in accordance with Constitutional Law, as governed by Article 73, clause e) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, such that "the declaration shall be made only for the purposes of interpreting and applying them in harmony with the Constitution or, if their contradiction with it proves insurmountable, ordering their disapplication with general effects and proceeding to their denunciation." Interpretation in conformity is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse still, to committing infractions that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, even participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Equally, the principle of the supremacy of International Law is unequivocally manifested. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be modified tacitly or expressly by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly indicate whether the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.

The claimant mentions the violation of various principles of social security, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and non-waivability. In reality, in some cases, what the claimant points to are some of the legal provisions governing work risk (riesgo de trabajo) established in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), so that the principle alleged by the claimant and the coadjuvants, that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law, does not operate. However, prudently viewed, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, so that if Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing Laws, to give way to SUGESE and its competencies. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would be within the competencies of SUGESE to establish the mechanisms that allow for obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional foundation of Work-Risk Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo) is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of insurance, automaticity of ILO Convention 102, and non-waivability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, nor can this Chamber (Sala) say they are infringed. It should be noted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurance, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of work-related and occupational accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, by being the moderator of commercial activity establishing conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different participants in the market; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally enforceable benefits remain effective in its jurisdiction, even by being a participant in the market as established in Law No. 8622, and which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes, among other things, in the fourth paragraph, that:

"... The Superintendency (Superintendencia) shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency (Superintendencia) shall be of mandatory observance for the supervised entities and persons.

The Superintendency (Superintendencia) is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers.

Likewise, it must adopt a clear, transparent and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ, train and maintain a sufficient work team with high professional standards, who follow the appropriate standards of confidentiality".

On the other hand, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:

"*Objectives and functions of the General Superintendence of Insurance* *The Superintendence's purpose is to ensure the stability and the efficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to deliver the broadest information to the insured. To this end, it shall authorize, regulate and supervise the natural or legal persons that intervene in the acts or contracts related to the insurance, reinsurance activity, the public offering and the conduct of insurance business.* *…* *Additionally, it shall have the following functions:* *a) ...* *b) ...* *j) Issue the remaining technical or operational norms and guidelines.* *k) ...* *q)*".

Within those functions, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros currently continues to operate in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must assume the worker even if it omitted to report him, it must assume him as uninsured. In this sense, there is no impact on the universal principle of protection of the occupational hazards insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, states:

"*In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurances, the administration of the Occupational Hazards Insurance and the Mandatory Automobile Insurance, the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State*".

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, since coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, as it contains enforceable obligations of expired term, the legal and regulatory provisions that are issued are done so in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, provides the measures to guarantee that necessary social floor to maintain the levels of occupational health and of an occupational hazards regime, is clearly in consonance with the Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances, approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the aforementioned Regulation establishes:

"*Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers* *If the worker were not insured against occupational hazards, in accordance with the Labor Code, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant him all the benefits that would have corresponded to him had he been insured, except for those cases in which the employer had a current Occupational Hazards policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium*".

The alleged economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a problem of constitutional nature, but rather it is the exclusive purview of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate a presumed negative impact that the Institution could have, so that it acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against occupational hazards, be it private or public. In the Court's opinion, the Article reinforces the worker's position, instead of weakening it, since the occupational hazards insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory character as is intended to be pointed out in the brief filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, from the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, among other norms, whence arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating the matters it detects as necessary of a technical and operational nature for a better service for workers who suffer a workplace risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code.

VI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing, the action is declared without merit.

Therefore:

The action is declared without merit. Magistrate Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the petitioning deputy. Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.

.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate Ch.

**Acción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712** **<u>Dissenting opinion of Magistrate Calzada Miranda and Magistrates Armijo Sancho and Cruz Castro, authored by the latter</u>** **The undersigned Magistrates dissent in this action and consider that it must be declared with merit, with its consequences, based on the following.** **Sub-paragraph b), of Article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 "Financial Services", of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, ratified by Costa Rica through law no. 8622 of November 21, 2007, and Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, approved through law no. 8653 of July 22, 2008, in that they provide for the opening to the market of the occupational hazards insurance, present a constitutional friction.** **<u>The petitioner considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances (arts. 50, 73 and 74) by distorting it and converting it into a commercial service for profit. He indicates that the occupational hazards insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance forms part of the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, ILO convention no. 102, Protocol of San Salvador art. 9) and that the occupational hazards insurance forms part of the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, inalienability, and others. Which is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violate the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently already have, diminishing and worsening the current advantages. Currently, all income must be destined for improvements for the benefit of the workers.** **<u>In this regard</u>, the undersigned Magistrates consider that the petitioner is correct in his arguments and that, the fact that the constituent power included the insurance against occupational hazards within the Chapter of Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution, shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is, different from those of the other insurances) does not therefore cease to have the character of a social insurance.** **The challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of the insurance against occupational hazards within the commercial opening provided for in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, *are unconstitutional*; this is so even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them that of universality and progressivity) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the way to distribute the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.** **This type of insurance, because it is constitutionally enshrined in art. 73 (and even though it is not stated there that it will be administered monopolistically by the INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which therefore, is incompatible with a system of commercial opening (competition, profit).** **Historically, the occupational hazards insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated craftsmen (mainly shoemakers, bakers and mule keepers) with the purpose of establishing a Savings Bank (see La Gaceta of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated relief for the working class.** **This insurance had its own evolution. Before the theory of "social-labor risk" triumphed, the fault of the employer was initially required to give basis to the liability, later it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, that is, it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather it was the latter who had to demonstrate that he had not been guilty nor negligent, in the distribution and organization of work.** **At the beginning of the 20th century, the first formal attempts are located to provide true protection to the working class against workplace misfortunes. On June 26, 1907, the then-deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles to Congress. On May 24, 1910, the delegation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the "Caja de Previsión". On May 16, 1913, Deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another proposed law on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles.** Due to various circumstances, none of the previous projects received the necessary support to become law.

In April 1924, the discussion of the Occupational Hazards Law (Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo) or the Accident Compensation Law (Ley de Reparación de Accidentes) was suspended, and the discussion of the bill to create the National Insurance Bank (Banco Nacional de Seguros) immediately began, culminating in the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gave rise to this Institution. Thus, the National Insurance Bank was entrusted with the administration of insurances, the monopoly of which remained in the hands of the Costa Rican State.

Once the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the "Occupational Accident Compensation Law (Ley de reparación de accidentes de trabajo)" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is stated that "the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros, INS) shall administer the occupational hazard system." The INS created the Workers' Department (Departamento Obrero), tasked with administering this Law, which would later be called the Department of Occupational Hazards (Departamento de Riesgos del Trabajo).

This Law No. 53 changes, undergoes several reforms, and in 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation is incorporated into the Labor Code. At that time, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already exists. It had been created in November 1941. As such, a first major discussion arises here. Given that the Social Security Fund now exists, should we give the occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS.

There is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute (INS) has 18 years of experience in handling occupational accidents, he considers it prudent for that congress to keep the occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute (INS), and indeed the Labor Code is approved, and the administration remains in the hands of the Institute.

In 1949, when the current Political Constitution (Constitución Política) is enacted, the famous article 73 is debated, regarding the advisability or not of the administration of Occupational Hazards being in the hands of the Institute. The need for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund is once again raised. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafts this Political Constitution, ratifies that the occupational hazard system should remain differentiated, as it had been until that moment, and stay in the hands of the National Insurance Institute (INS).

In 1961, when article 177 of the Political Constitution is amended through Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintains the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute (INS). This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurances.

In 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approves Law No. 6727, which refers to the amendment of Title IV of the Labor Code, it again ratifies the advisability of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and makes some modifications:

- The concept of Occupational Hazards is expanded (Article 195). - Occupational Hazard insurance is declared mandatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201). - The concept of Occupational Health (Salud Ocupacional) appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273). - In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer regarding insurance, hazard, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284). - The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in articles 285 and 286 of the aforementioned Code.

Today, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security system, through the administration that for more than 70 years has been carried out, with sufficient financial reserves to provide the care that has been offered.

As can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly (Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), contrary to what is stated in the majority opinion, the idea was rather to unify occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for it to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.

- Deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ "there are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles that he then went on to list. First of all, there must be a single institution that encompasses all insurances. One of the failures of social insurances in some countries—like Chile—has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The experts who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. In the second place, it is known that the greater number of associates is what guarantees the success of social insurances (...) On the other hand, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number." Minutes No. 125.—One hundred twenty-fifth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the eighth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.

- Deputy VOLIO "since the year 1924, the Occupational Accident Law was promulgated, entrusting the Insurance Bank—an essentially commercial institution—to take on that hazard. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then professional hazard insurances must be assigned to the Social Insurance. For the moment, the Fund is not in a position to assume those hazards. Therefore, the logical step is to leave things as they currently are, sidestepping the problem that arises so it can be resolved in due time and with greater care." Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.

- Deputy FACIO. "After the 8th of November, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute (INS) will continue working—as they have done so far. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution can be found to the problem of unifying social insurances, after mature and reflective analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem." Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine.

- Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, in contrast, he considers a charitable institution since it does not profit in any way. He thinks the only way to solve the problem of social insurances is by creating for the Fund the necessary revenues so that it can fulfill its task. Hence, the problem can be resolved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minutes No. 126.—One hundred twenty-sixth minutes of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at three o'clock in the afternoon on the ninth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-nine).

The preceding excerpts evidence the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurances. The very nature of these hazards allows them to be considered part of social insurances. Occupational hazards are not an annex or aggregate that can be detached from the definition and the constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurances in a broad sense; for this reason, it is inadmissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional hazards mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated into the concept of social insurances defined by the constitution. The specialty of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize professional hazard insurance. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize professional hazard insurance with a legal and constitutional status different from the social insurances casually referred to in the first three paragraphs of article seventy-three of the constitution. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of these insurances, because it is placed in a norm that is what gives it that status.

Therefore, occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which commercial opening legislation does not protect and cannot protect, since a norm of legal rank will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.

By the very nature of occupational hazard social insurance, whose raison d'être is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform, they suffer an accident or illness, and which operates in our country in a mandatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent had all of this in mind when deciding to include this type of insurance within the chapter of social insurances, precisely because it functions as a social insurance and not as an individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.

Based on the arguments presented, we consider that this action must be declared with merit, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional norms of the Treaty in question.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. Magistrate (Magistrada) Gilberth Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C. Magistrate (Magistrado) Magistrate (Magistrado) Note from Magistrate (Magistrada) Calzada. Different reasons regarding the standing (legitimación) of the plaintiff. The majority opinion defines that although Mr. Villalta [Nombre 001] derives his standing from the defense of diffuse interests, his standing to bring the action is recognized based on the understanding that this filing is made "on behalf of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights (...) could be injured (...) even if they were under the coverage of an occupational hazard policy" (sic); that is, the majority opinion determines that the plaintiff's standing comes from this defense on behalf of an indeterminate group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests.

In this regard, I consider that the standing (legitimación) of the petitioning Deputy (Diputado) does also arise from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). As noted in Considering II (Considerando II) of this same judgment, diffuse interests must not be confused with collective interests, nor should they be understood in such broad terms as to be confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, "but united based on a determined social need," which is why "any individual may act in defense of those goods that affect the national collectivity," without this being confused with the possibility that "any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of any interests." The precision that the majority opinion attempts to formulate is that, even in the defense of an indeterminate group of workers, this does not constitute the existence of a diffuse interest that allows granting the petitioner the standing provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional). It is my opinion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that indeterminate group of workers, but also on the fact that the subject matter intended to be regulated does indeed concern a matter in which there is a general interest of the population. It should be borne in mind that, as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of occupational hazard insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country in configuring the system of a Democratic and Social State of Law (Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho). In this sense, there is an interest of the collectivity in general, and not only of the currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the risks a worker may be subjected to; it is clear that the first interested party in these cases will be the worker –both for reasons of health and personal income–, but it must not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance is so because other persons besides the specific worker are involved in it. On one hand, there is the worker's direct family, who obtains a good part of its subsistence possibilities from the work that person performs; there is also the condition of the employer (patrono) himself, who finds in the occupational hazard regime solid backing against any misfortune, thereby helping to cover any eventual liability that could be ascribed to him; and there is also the State (Estado) itself, which, through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social welfare in the stated terms, while ensuring that the affected person receives the care required to be able to rejoin active working life in a timely and effective manner, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy with the least possible harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority opinion that repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing by not recognizing a direct standing, the undersigned considers that they do hold it in certain circumstances. In my judgment, the Deputies who have that character by the Nation (Nación) in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), by the nature of their office hold a representation of national interests, which in principle gives them a general standing to act on those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases in the action of unconstitutionality (acción de inconstitucionalidad), but it does when qualifying the circumstances of the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, particularly the management of diffuse interests or those that concern the collectivity as a whole, and very particularly when, precisely, it concerns challenging norms that directly affect a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the collectivity they represent, as indicated above. Of course, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action (acción popular) –not provided for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law– on the part of any person, nor does it permit free access through the action of unconstitutionality to the holder of an interest merely for being a holder and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into consideration the importance of the subject matter of occupational hazards and the general representation that a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa) does hold, I consider that in addition to the standing recognized to the petitioner by the majority opinion, the standing indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law must also be recognized.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

*100177120007CO*

**SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.** San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes of the eighth of August of two thousand thirteen.

Due to the painful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes of the twenty-eighth of November of two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, is to be notified without his signature. The case file (expediente) will be archived in due course.

Gilbert Armijo S.

Acting President (Presidente a.i) Constitutional Chamber San José, at sixteen hours and thirty minutes on the twenty-eighth of November, two thousand twelve.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by [Name 001], of legal age, Costa Rican, in a common-law marriage, attorney, bearer of identity card number [Value 001], resident of Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, in his capacity as deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the constitutional period 2010-2014, against sub-paragraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, approved by law number 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, law number 8653 of July 22, 2008.

**Whereas:** **1.-** By brief received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at thirteen hours twenty-five minutes on December twenty-first, 2010, the claimant requests that the unconstitutionality be declared of sub-paragraph b) of article III.2 of section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12 “Financial Services” of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, approved by law number 8622 of November 21, 2007, as well as Transitory Provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, law number 8653 of July 22, 2008. He alleges that such provisions violate articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution that protect social insurances and the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, enshrined in International Human Rights Treaties, in accordance with numerals 7 and 48 of the Fundamental Charter, due to the inclusion of the solidarity workers' compensation insurance in commercial opening obligations that involve commercial exploitation and for-profit ends incompatible with the constitutional nature of that social insurance. He asserts that the purpose of these legal provisions is to convert the workers' compensation insurance into a commercial service that would be exploited by companies other than the INS, with a clear for-profit intention, an aspect which, in his opinion, infringes the constitutional principles that protect insurances, to the detriment of working men and women and their families, as there exists a risk against the social security system. In his reasoning on the unconstitutionality of the norms he challenges, he points out: *“(...) it also weakens and endangers the full application of the principle of universality of the fundamental right to social security, by allowing private operators (sic) to commercially exploit the workers' compensation insurance, **without imposing on them any obligation to attend equally to working men and women of all labor activities nor any prohibition on selecting low-risk and high-profitability activities.** All this undermines the effective realization of the precept contained in article 201 of the Labor Code, thereby violating constitutional precepts established in articles 73 and 74 of the Magna Carta, in relation to article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador”*. (The highlighting belongs to the original text). He further states that the norms challenged in this action weaken the existing protection for uninsured working persons, as effective competition prevails, according to his opinion, in favor of the commercial regime and against the comprehensive protection of the labor sector. In this line of thought, he considers the breach of the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights, because the cited Treaty modifies the current normative regulation of workers' compensation insurance in a way that reduces the current benefits of working persons, a reform that diminishes and worsens the current advantages obtained by the beneficiary persons. He synthesizes that workers' compensation insurance constitutes a fundamental right of a prestational nature, where the State has the obligation of progressive compliance, an aspect that, in his view, must be circumscribed *“to the respect, protection, guarantee and promotion”* of such rights and, by way of illustration, he cites constitutional judgment number 2007-1378. He concludes that international instruments on human rights, such as the Protocol of San Salvador, must prevail over commercial treaties in case of incompatibility, and maintains that the circumstance that the challenged norm is included in an international treaty with a rank superior to law (TLC-EUCARD) does not exonerate it from its unconstitutionality for infringement of the principle of progressivity of the fundamental right to social security. For all the foregoing, he requests that the action filed be declared well-founded.

**2.-** In order to substantiate his standing to bring this action of unconstitutionality, he points to the injury to diffuse interests or interests of the community as a whole, which, in turn, translates into an individual injury for each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic, because social insurances grant basic protection to all persons inhabiting the country.

**3.-** By order at twelve hours and twelve minutes on February seventh, two thousand eleven, the action was admitted, granting a hearing to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic.

**4.-** Mrs. Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, in her capacity as Attorney General of the Republic, rendered her report. She points out that workers' compensation insurance has some characteristics that could allow it to be classified as an employer's civil liability insurance, and others that would allow it to be placed as a social insurance. Regarding the former, it is argued that it constitutes a mechanism to safeguard the employer's assets against the eventuality of a workplace accident or an occupational disease that entails his obligation to indemnify the worker. For this reason, it is borne exclusively by the employer, and not as in social insurances financed on a tripartite basis with the contribution of workers, employer and the State. The employer is directly protected, indirectly the worker and his family. She also points out that in workers' compensation insurance, the employer's liability is presumed, derived from the exercise of his lucrative activity, whereas in social insurances, it is not possible to presume the specific liability of any of the intervening agents. For those who consider it a social insurance, they maintain that it is vested with an evident public interest, to protect the worker (as a member of society and an active subject in economic production) against the misfortunes arising from the exercise of his work. If this were not so, they say, there would be no explanation as to why in most countries where it has been established, mechanisms are implemented to protect uninsured workers. Being regulated by the constituent in article 73 of the Political Constitution, it shows that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances), does not thereby cease to have the character of a social insurance. The basic regulations are in the Labor Code, conceived to regulate a monopolistic insurance system under the INS. Evidently, upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America and the Dominican Republic, and upon the expiration of the deadlines for the opening of the insurance market, it must be understood that this monopoly was tacitly repealed; however, there is a series of norms not directly linked to the market opening, but to the characteristics of the insurance, which are still in force. Article 193 of the Labor Code establishes the principle of mandatory nature of the insurance, a characteristic that reinforces its nature as a social insurance; numeral 205 of the same normative body provides that the INS must make annual settlements that include the formation of technically necessary reserves, and the surpluses must become part of a distribution reserve, where 50% will be allocated to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council and the other 50% to incorporate improvements to the regime. The principle of service at cost is concretized herein, so as long as it remains in force, the workers' compensation insurance must operate—at least in its basic coverage—without for-profit ends. Likewise, numerals 221 and 231 point to the obligation of the INS to grant all benefits to the uninsured worker as if he had been entitled to them had he been insured, subrogating the right to bring action against the employer for the expenses incurred. The insurance establishes the possibility of resorting to the courts to collect from the employer the sums disbursed, plus their interest. The principle of universality is founded on these provisions. At the regulatory level, workers' compensation insurance is governed by the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances” (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios), approved by the National Council for Supervision of the Financial System (CONASSIF), through article 8, numeral 1, of session 894-2010, of December 10, 2010 (published in La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). It defines the minimum operating requirements for social insurances (article 1), and is applicable to insurance entities in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed (article 2). It was issued based on articles 25, 26, 27 and transitory provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. In this sense, the Superintendency of Insurance will grant administrative authorization for the exercise of the insurance activity in the field of workers' compensation insurance “... *provided they comply with the terms, conditions and specifications that will be established in the regulation issued for that purpose by the National Council, in accordance with national legislation*”. The Regulation, in article 8, provides for the possibility of offering the mandatory insurance with any other voluntary insurance (without being subject to the service at cost principle), allowing better coverage in case the worker sues the employer for an act or omission of the latter that motivated the workplace accident. Article 15 of the Regulation provides that the policy must cover the benefits established in article 218 of the Labor Code and that payments of economic benefits shall be governed by the Labor Code and by the General Regulation of Workplace Risks issued by the Executive Branch. Article 20 contains a provision where, for a worker who was not insured, the INS must grant him the benefits, except for those cases in which the employer had a policy in force with any other insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, in which case the benefits shall be borne by the insurance entity that received the premium. The Office of the Attorney General does not consider that the opening of the insurance market is itself contrary to the Constitution. It points to Argentina as an example where organizations of this nature operate, but also states that the participation of private companies within the social security system is not novel. It specifies that under the Worker Protection Law, the social security system regarding pensions became composed of four pillars. Within that scheme, there is private participation, under a competition regime, with for-profit intent, without this having been considered, in itself, as contrary to the Political Constitution. The norms establish that it must operate at cost, however, in the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General, the participation of private, for-profit companies, in the commercialization of workers' compensation insurance, is not contrary to the Constitution, as long as legislation of legal rank is issued that protects, at a minimum, the benefits that have been granted to workers up to this moment. There is no norm of constitutional rank that establishes that workers' compensation insurance must operate at cost, or without for-profit ends. Article 73 of the Political Constitution itself refers to special provisions, which shows that there exists a certain flexibility to define the operation of that insurance, provided it does not imply a worsening of the rights of workers. In the opinion of the advisory body, the INS must attend to uninsured workers, which could endanger its competitiveness, even though the “Regulation of Operating Requirements for Mandatory Insurances” (Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguro Obligatorios) is considered insufficient to balance the obligations of the different insurers with respect to the INS and, ultimately, to ensure compliance with the principle of universality. The unconstitutionality does not lie in the norms, but in the absence of legal provisions regulating the matter. The regulation cannot vary the Labor Code with respect to not attending to uninsured workers, due to the principle of normative hierarchy; and because transitory provision III of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law itself establishes that this regulation must be issued “*in accordance with National legislation*”. Failure to act in this way would be contrary not only to the principle of universality, but also to that of progressivity, since it could occur that the protection currently available to the entire working class of the country is reduced to only a part of it. There exists an obligation of constitutional rank to issue social legislation that protects the principle of universality and progressivity for the benefit of the country's workers.

**5.-** The edicts referred to in the second paragraph of article 81 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction were published in numbers 39, 40 and 41 of the Judicial Bulletin, of the days 24, 25 and 28 of February 2011.

**6.-** Through briefs presented by Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños and Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Peace and Justice Service in Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipality of San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (student), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP), they requested, in their respective capacities, that the Chamber consider them as active coadjuvants in the present action. Likewise, they challenge the contested norms in their conditions as workers and citizens who are beneficiaries and users of social insurances, considering that they violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances, derived from articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Magna Carta, specifically affecting the solidarity workers' compensation insurance. They indicate that the challenged norms oblige Costa Rica to permit the for-profit commercial exploitation of this social and solidarity insurance starting from January 1, 2011. In turn, footnote number 21 of the Treaty (Chapter 12) recognizes that this obligation refers to the social workers' compensation insurance contemplated in the fourth paragraph of numeral 73 of the Political Constitution. Note 29 reinforces the foregoing, by clarifying that Annex 12.9.2 shall not apply to the social insurances set forth in the first, second and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Magna Carta and administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (CCSS), but excluding social workers' compensation insurance, despite the fact that these also have constitutional rank and are governed by the same principles. Finally, note 22 reaffirms the impact on the constitutional principles that protect social workers' compensation insurance, since it provides that Costa Rica shall not have to reform its regulations on this insurance (Labor Code), provided that said regulations “are consistent” with the obligations of Annex 12.9.2, knowing that the for-profit commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity workers' compensation insurance is incompatible with the nature and the principles on which that insurance is based and implies a regression in terms of the levels of protection achieved by the country (impact on the principle of progressivity). On the other hand, Transitory Provision III of the “Insurance Market Regulatory Law, includes Integral Reform to Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924”, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, published in Supplement No. 30 to La Gaceta No. 152 of August 7, 2008. It reiterates the obligation contained in the Free Trade Agreement and has the purpose of implementing said obligation, by establishing that the Superintendency of Pensions must grant “authorizations” for the commercial exploitation of the social and solidarity workers' compensation insurance, starting from January 1, 2011. In this sense, said norm is affected by the same defects of constitutionality. They coincide with Deputy [Name 001] regarding the scope of the action, of articles 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution and is covered by the principles of solidarity, universality and service at cost. If its for-profit commercial exploitation is permitted, these principles would be seriously affected, injuring the rights of working persons who suffer workplace accidents and occupational diseases, this being the most serious threat that social guarantees have faced in recent years.

**7.-** José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican – North American Chamber of Commerce, presents a brief as passive coadjuvant of the action of unconstitutionality, with sufficient powers to intervene in the process, pointing out general aspects of the Chamber's competence, as well as of the limited effects that national law has on obligations of public international law. If the State were to find itself obligated to denounce the Treaty, there would be a disregard of the will of the sovereign expressed in a referendum on October 7, 2007, the elimination of legal certainty for consumers, importers, investors and exporters, and it would have to rule on it in its entirety. Now, contrary to what is stated by the claimant, the Chamber has pronounced on the opening of workers' compensation insurance in previous judgments such as number 2007-9469. The representative of the Association maintains that mandatory workers' compensation insurance does not qualify as, nor is it, a social insurance as defined by article 73 of the Political Constitution. In any case, he highlights that advisability or inadvisability is not equivalent to the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a norm (judgment 1994-7005), hence he considers that the claimant makes value judgments emphasizing the inadvisability of the challenged norms. Legislative or administrative omission to give efficacy to a norm does not entail the unconstitutionality of the norm itself; in addition, he points out that any restriction on the freedom of choice of citizens must be interpreted restrictively, which was enshrined in Judgment No. 1992-3550. He points out that while it is clear that workers' compensation insurance is mentioned in article 73 of the Constitution, it is imperative that this Chamber harmonize its existence with the individual freedom that all inhabitants of our country have (employers and workers alike) to choose among different entities that offer coverage for workplace risks. He considers that the insurance does not form part of the social insurances, as these are defined by the Political Constitution and, therefore, is not governed by the same principles or provisions of the third paragraph of article 73 of the Political Constitution. He argues that the opening of workers' compensation insurance does not in any way violate the benefits and protections that said insurance provides to citizens, and article 74 of the Political Constitution does not prevent the modification of the form of providing workers' compensation insurance. While he accepts that workers' compensation insurance is constitutionally recognized, social insurances are those that exclusively protect workers against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system. For the coadjuvant, a series of characteristics of these social insurances must be met that workers' compensation insurance does not have, in terms of coverage, form of financing, under the protection of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund and the funds may not be transferred or used for purposes other than those that motivated their creation. By the will of the constituent, these insurances were separated and differentiated from workers' compensation insurance, as was regulated by article 1 of the Constitutive Law of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. While it could be considered that it forms part of the right to social security that contributes to the solidarity assistance to the worker, and that there is a recognition as such, it does not imply that said insurance is defined by article 73 nor that its 3rd paragraph is applicable. Judgment No. 2008-16964 clearly established the delimitation that workers' compensation insurance is a regime that the constituent established separately and which is governed by different rules. He considers correct that the Chamber in the judgment reaches the consideration that the protection granted by social insurances and workers' compensation insurance is not exclusive, regarding the perception of their respective benefits. In addition, two systems coexist in our legal system, one of social security under the responsibility of the Fund, and another of workers' compensation insurance under the responsibility of the National Insurance Institute, whose characteristics and sources of financing are different. Thus, the insurances under the responsibility of the Fund and of the INS are delimited. He cites jurisprudence of the Chamber and opinions of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in which they point out that social insurances are exclusively those that protect workers against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies that the law determines, as administered and governed by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund through a tripartite contribution system.

In that sense, the claimant's thesis of considering workplace risk insurance as a social insurance governed by the same principles established in Article 73 of the Political Constitution is erroneous. The claimant's thesis is inadmissible under any assumption, given the separation from the general system and because they are governed by special provisions. The determination of a potential additional cost or profit would be subject to the special provisions. Many of the claimant's statements are simple assertions and personal opinions that, not being based on doctrinal criteria, relevant rulings, regulatory changes, or any other justification or relevant source, express nothing more than the claimant's personal feeling towards commercial opening. The Labor Code preserves intact the rules on the provision, universality, mandatory nature, and other characteristics of workplace risk insurance, expressly including that uninsured cases will continue to be attended by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros). There is no denaturalization of mandatory workplace risk insurance. The fundamental core of workplace risk insurance, as it pertains to the protection of the worker, would not be altered by commercial opening or even by a potential profit, since it would not cease to be universal, mandatory, and solidarity-based. It remains mandatory, universal for all workers who must be insured by their employers, it would remain solidarity-based because it will always be paid by the employer, and the uninsured will be attended by the INS. By ruling 1998-6450, the Chamber analyzed Article 236 of the Labor Code, to conclude that it is not unconstitutional, but rather that its development complies with the constitutional mandate to legislatively and regulatorily develop the social guarantee of the right to a subsidy. Article 74 does not guarantee the immutability of norms, since all regulatory development complies with the constitutional mandate to govern insurance through special provisions, but furthermore, it does not imply renunciation, nor that it cannot be expanded or reduced. In disagreement with the claimant, it points out that the scope of the right to social security is preeminently defined by the legislator. In this sense, it relies on ruling No. 1998-06450 insofar as it points to the democratic legitimacy corresponding to the Legislative Assembly, which is responsible for detailing the content of the right to social security. On the other hand, the principle of progressivity, in light of the Chamber's jurisprudence, has not been violated, since to demonstrate this, it must be proven that the measure taken implies a decrease in the benefits received by the citizen. The claimant supposes that by the mere fact of allowing other entities to present workplace risk insurance services, its coverage and quality will be deteriorated, but there is no evidence whatsoever regarding this. On the contrary, the opening comes to guarantee the right of every inhabitant to choose among various insurance operators, in accordance with Article 46 of the Constitution. It requests that the action be declared without merit.

**8.-** Freddy Sandí Brenes, Secretary General of the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (hereinafter UPINS) appears as a coadjuvant. He alleges that his legal standing is derived from the purposes entrusted to UPINS in its statutes, Article 5, subsections b), d), g), and n), in addition to the representation that corresponds to him on behalf of the INS workers in relation to workplace risks. Regarding the conclusions of the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría), he emphasizes the fact that it reaches the conclusion that social workplace risk insurance is indeed a right and a social guarantee. He argues that the recommendation put forward by the Attorney General's Office, where it is proposed that since the challenged norms are not unconstitutional, legislation should be enacted that guarantees the principles of universality, solidarity, and progressivity. He maintains that an opening legislation that guarantees these principles would lead to two possible scenarios: a) legislation without apparent constitutional friction that produces, in practice, a real situation of lack of protection for a certain sector and a disadvantage for the INS in terms of competition, and b) legislation such as that proposed by the Attorney General's Office could violate other constitutional principles related to freedom of commerce, enshrined in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, and competition, leading us to the philosophical discussion in the field of Human Rights about whether solidarity can be imposed in commerce. He argues that the reasons why the challenged regulations are unconstitutional are found in the model of State chosen by the constituent assembly, for which reason he raises whether Costa Rica is a Social State of Law or a Liberal State of Law. Elucidating the above is essential if one considers that the opening of a social insurance against workplace risks, which constitutes a true fundamental right of workers, demands a special value judgment about the principles underlying our Constitution. Costa Rica has been formed until today as a Social and Democratic State of Law, governed, among other things, by the Christian principle of social justice. Our constituent framers dreamed of a Social State of Law, and that is the philosophy of our Political Constitution and through which this action of unconstitutionality will be resolved. The main goal of the Social State of Law in Costa Rica is to be a Welfare State, and this purpose is embodied by the constituent framers in the first paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution. The constituent framers decided to balance worker-employer relations, establishing in general terms the following guarantees: a) allowing workers to obtain economic, social, and professional benefits through unions (Article 60 of the Constitution), b) elevating to constitutional rank the right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, and granting legal status to the content of those negotiations (Article 62 of the Constitution), c) constitutionally guaranteeing the right of workers dismissed without just cause to obtain compensation, when they are not covered by unemployment insurance. Within this article, it can be interpreted that severance pay is found, but the article does not establish a cap limit, nor does it prohibit aid in the case of justified dismissal (Article 63), d) The State has committed to taking protective measures against unemployment, recognizing the enormous problems that unemployment triggers in the lives of people and their families and dependents (Article 72), e) an insurance system is established that assures the working class access to health regardless of their salary amount, and the best possibilities of recovering to continue working. This recognizes the importance of work as a means of life, and the terrible repercussions that a workplace accident can have, in which that capacity is lost momentarily or permanently (Article 73 of the Constitution), f) the constituent includes and specifically "constitutionalizes" the rights and benefits not stated above, but that derive from the Christian principle of social justice and that are indicated by law (or collective bargaining agreements that have the force of law) (Article 74). Regarding the legal nature of workplace risk insurance and its content, he alleges that the fact that its content is given through law does not imply that it can be varied to make it worse simply through a legislative change. Article 73 indicates that workplace risk insurance "shall be governed by special laws." Within the study of legislative drafting technique in the field of human rights, this reference to law to give content to a fundamental right constitutes an error by the constituent framer, which in a certain way "deconstitutionalizes" what it intends to "constitutionalize." Certainly, every norm of constitutional rank has a legal development, which is correct, insofar as that legislation does not violate the fundamental principles or the "hard core" of that right. The hard core of social workplace risk insurance is constituted by at least the following principles: principle of universality, principle of solidarity, principle of generality, principle of sufficiency, the principle of inalienability, and service at cost. Social workplace risk insurance has constitutional rank and is also recognized in Convention 102 of the ILO, approved in what is relevant by Costa Rica, and in the Protocol of San Salvador. For the Union of Personnel of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS), the Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA, becomes an instrument that dismantles the Costa Rican social security system. The Constitutional Chamber has determined that the Human Rights instruments in force in Costa Rica not only have a value similar to the Political Constitution, but that, to the extent that they grant greater rights or guarantees to persons, they prevail or predominate over the Constitution itself. In view of the primacy of said Human Rights instruments over the Constitution itself, they integrate the Law of the Constitution and are part of the constitutionality control of the legal system. Based on said Convention, the State of Costa Rica must guarantee that all the country's workers are covered by insurance against workplace accidents; a situation that, in our opinion, would be unfulfilled due to the risk selection that different companies in the insurance market could carry out. Regarding the incompatibility of the principle of service at cost under the Constitution with the opening of this type of social insurance, he says that it derives directly from Article 73 of the Constitution. This principle is developed at the same time by labor legislation, establishing in that regulation that in this activity, there are no "profits" as such, but eventual surpluses that must be reinvested, in equal percentages, to the improvement of the same regime, such as financing programs for the development of the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional). As the claimant himself indicates, the amount of surpluses for 2010 amounted to more than fifteen billion. That important sum is invested for the benefit of the workers themselves, but if it is opened to competition, it would be lost to the workers, as it would become profits of a private nature. If it is regulated by making a part of these surpluses profits and the rest under the obligation to reinvest it, it would be equally unconstitutional due to the worsening of conditions and the principle of progressivity would be violated. This obligation to offer insurance at cost, we consider incompatible with the principle of freedom of enterprise and commerce, also enshrined in the Political Constitution in Articles 46 and 28 of the Constitution, therefore, social workplace risk insurance cannot legally be opened to free competition. Regarding risk selection and the violation of the principles of universality and progressivity under the Constitution, he affirms that certainly the solidarity-based coverage of all categories of workers is possible because the insurance is administered under social criteria, and not commercial ones. Income from more profitable activities contribute to the financing of those that are less profitable. It is to be expected that in an opening of the workplace risk insurance market, private companies compete to obtain premiums in the most lucrative activities and those that present fewer claims. This would leave the least attractive risks, and those with more statistically proven accidents, once again in the hands of the probably sole provider for that risk. Precisely, the impossibility of "risk selection" functions as the fundamental concept that prevents social insurance, which is solidarity-based, mandatory, and compulsory for employers, from operating like commercial insurance in a competitive market. The concept of risk selection in insurance radically opposes the conception of social insurance like that for workplace risks, which is based on the insurance of all types of risks, without differentiating exposure or dangerousness. This confirms the position held here insofar as what was approved by the Free Trade Agreement is totally incompatible with Articles 73 and 74 of our Political Constitution and with Convention 102 of the International Labor Organization. In accordance with Article 74 of the Constitution, social guarantees are inalienable, and since the legislator established the inalienability of social guarantees, said condition operates in such a way that: the worker cannot renounce them. Nor can the State allow that these guarantees are not available in its legislation.

**9.-** Mr. Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, in his capacity as interim Minister of Foreign Trade, requests to be considered a passive coadjuvant in the action, based on the Law creating the ministry, insofar as it endows him with the competence to negotiate and sign international treaties and agreements on trade and investment, likewise due to the institutional dynamic with the commercial partners of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic. Regarding the claimant's legal standing, it is alleged that the injury transcends an individual injury to any person, that is, for the national community in its entirety, thus attempting to exercise a popular action, which has been denied by the Chamber. It presupposes its legal standing on the existence of a popular action, since the action is filed for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the Nation against a supposed injury of generalized effects, thereby confusing the concept of diffuse interest or collectivity with that of the national community. Furthermore, it accuses that the action contains subjective assessments and personal conjectures for the purpose of supporting and sustaining its thesis, confuses the Costa Rican social security regimes by extrapolating applicable constitutional and legal principles from one insurance regime to another, thereby conveniently intermingling the nature of each one with the particular conditions of each type of insurance. The interpretation of norms is forced to create confrontation and inconsistency between the national legal system and the international one, against the principle of hermeneutic plenitude and legal certainty, ignoring international commercial commitments and the general principles of international law. The general principles of international law, together with international treaties, conventions, and agreements, international custom, the jurisprudence of international bodies and organizations, and doctrine, constitute valid sources of law in the international legal system. The principles in question, apart from being inherent to international law, constitute basic premises of the norms that make up the international legal system. For the importance of the action, it should be noted, firstly, that according to which treaties prevail over domestic laws at the international level; as well as the one that prescribes that a State cannot invoke its own legislation to fail to comply with an international obligation. In the relations between the parties to a treaty, the provisions of a domestic law cannot prevail over those of a treaty (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, approved by Costa Rica through Law No. 7615 of July 24, 1996). In Public International Law, from the moment a State assumes international obligations of any nature, it must comply with them in good faith (Article 26 of the aforementioned Convention). Likewise, international tribunals have held that the Principle of the Primacy of international law over national law prescribes that international law cannot be abrogated or abolished by domestic or state law. The legal nature of the norms of international law is extremely clear, namely that state action is necessarily framed by its international obligations, the rights that international regulations enshrine are enforceable both at the international level and at the state level, and the commitments assumed by States before the community of nations are more than simple declarations of principles or good intentions, but rather modify the internal legal system of the nations. On the other hand, there is the issue of the reception and transformation of international law into national law. In principle, there are two possible mechanisms for international law to be valid under the national law of each State. In the first, the State requires a prior process of reception or incorporation (adoption) of customary rules and another of transformation of conventional rules or those emanating from treaties. So, in the case of universally recognized rules of international law of customary lineage (international customs), a State - upon entering the international community - accepts, in principle, such rules or a good part of them. This process, based on the Anglo-Saxon practice that customary international law is part of national law (International Law is part of the Law of the Land), is called reception or incorporation. In the second mechanism concerning conventional rules of international law - that is, those that come from a bilateral or multilateral treaty - the process is usually different from the previous one. Thus, for such norms to validly become part of national law, their prior transformation is required through the procedure provided for in the constitutional system of each State. This procedure consists of the head of State signing the treaty, the deliberative body approving it, and finally, the same head of State ratifying it. In Costa Rica, Articles 7, 48, 121 subsection 4), and 140 subsection 10) of the Political Constitution regulate both the procedures related to the transformation process of international treaties, conventions, or agreements - denominations that for the purposes of international law are equivalent - and the hierarchy of international and national norms in the Costa Rican legal system. Article 7 of the Political Constitution indicates that international treaties or conventions, as a normative source of the Costa Rican legal system, occupy a preponderant position over that of common Law, which entails that when faced with a norm originating from an international treaty or convention, internal norms of legal rank cede their order of precedence as normative sources. Regarding the academic explanation of establishing generations of human rights (first, second, and third), it has had devastating consequences, since each Nation has categorized or sectorized rights according to its own vision, postponing the realization of these rights to an indefinite future under the protection of a concept akin to this theory, that of "progressivity" or "progressive development," paradoxically included in Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José), which makes those rights dependent on "available resources," which cannot be interpreted in a libertine manner because it would delay their effectiveness and violate the general principles of international law "Pacta Sunt Servanda" and "Bona Fides," and the resolutions of the international jurisdictional bodies mentioned supra. It is important that a unifying and integrating interpretation of all rights be chosen, so as to ensure compliance with all the commitments acquired by the State, regardless of their origin and nature. Regarding the supposed hierarchy of international treaties and conventions on matters other than those exclusively dealing with human rights issues, it is worth noting that, under the internal constitutional order, although once approved they form part of the legal system subject to constitutional norms, it is not possible to affirm that the commitments acquired by the country are of a lower hierarchy compared to other international treaties and conventions or that, even compared to the Political Constitution itself, said commitments are "dead letter," which would be equivalent to evading or failing to comply with international obligations legitimately acquired by the country. The Chamber, on the occasion of ruling 2010-11352, has recognized it as necessary to harmoniously interpret the Magna Carta with the doctrine of human rights coming from international instruments. Furthermore, it has accepted the Nation's duty to exceptionally modify the Political Constitution in those insurmountable cases where it clashes with the norms, principles, rights, and customs recognized by the international community, regardless even of whether the country has incorporated them into its legal system or not, so that it is compliant, congruent, and concordant with said norms, principles, rights, and international customs. It is not possible to accept the nonsense of interpreting a possible fictitious prelation, undue hierarchization, or illicit progressivity of the norms, principles, and rights recognized by the international community, or else, based on such criteria, the occurrence of discrimination founded on other obligations of international and national law, subject to the national legal system. No thesis or doctrine that proposes or suggests that a violation or transgression of an international treaty, convention, or agreement is based on another international instrument, the Political Constitution itself, or a national Law, cannot be considered a gross infraction and evident lack of International Law and the Law of the Constitution. On the other hand, it compiles ruling No. 2007-09469 of ten o'clock on July 3, 2007, through which the Chamber resolved the consultation raised by several deputies and the Ombudsman, on the constitutionality of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007). It alludes to the reference on the purpose of the Treaty, which would not go into the convenience or not of the approval, as well as the economic aspects surrounding the Treaty, but rather to themes that generate doubts of constitutionality. The congruence it maintains with the pretensions of the consultants and what was resolved makes evident the need, in application of the rules of legal hermeneutics, for the ruling to be read as a whole following a reasonable and proportional legal interpretation to the pursued end within the socio-historical context of the consultation and the subsequent events of popular consultation (referendum). So that a light reading that interprets the text in question partially and decontextualized from the prevailing reality, that is to say, without taking into consideration the nature of the acts and facts to which it refers and the entirety of the legal system, is insufficient for an adequate understanding of it and the norms it deals with, which would indissolubly lead to absurd and contradictory interpretative results. It is not acceptable that there are omissions in what was resolved by the Constitutional Chamber. The resolution allowed the popular consultation process to continue, culminating in the historic referendum of the year 2007, well known to all; and the consequent approval of the international commitments acquired by Costa Rica. With the approval through the legislative process, or else, through a referendum, it would not be contrary to constitutional principles, but an evident contravention to the general principles of International Law "Pacta Sunt Servanda" and "Bona fides," which would expose the country to possible international sanctions.

Costa Rica acquired the international commitment to modify the manner in which Occupational Risk Insurance was provided in the country, without altering, modifying, or contravening the constitutional principles that support it, the rights it guarantees, or the coverage this insurance provides to Costa Rican workers. In Section H: Costa Rica of Annex 12.9.2 Specific Commitments, of Chapter Twelve: Financial Services of CAFTA-DR, the country—in the Matter of Insurance Services—assumed the obligation to open the mandatory insurance market to competition—by said insurance it refers to Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance—as of January 1, 2011. According to the Third Section called “Gradual Market Opening Commitments,” subsection 2 transcribes the commitment, as well as note 20 of subsection 1, for occupational risk insurance, and note 22 of subsection 1. Finally, note 29 to the cited subsection 2, with the clear aim of clarifying any confusion between the types of social security insurance of Article 73 of the Constitution, clarified that the social insurance contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, administered and provided by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, are excluded from the application of Annex 12.9.2 referred to above, while the mandatory occupational risk insurance contemplated in the final paragraph of Article 73 would indeed be subject to commercial opening. To avoid possible inconsistencies or non-conformities with the Political Constitution, the treaty lists the reservations in a relative Annex exclusive to Non-Conforming Measures. They were not reserved in Annex II on Non-Conforming Measures, because the commitment to the commercial opening of the insurance market, in general; and of mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance in particular, does not contravene any constitutional principle or fundamental right nor does it denature said mandatory insurance. The opening and possible provision by entities other than the Instituto Nacional de Seguros does not contravene its nature as an insurance component of social security. Note number 22 does not obligate Costa Rica to modify the norms regulating occupational risk insurance, provided that said norms are consistent with the obligations assumed in CAFTA-DR. It is not true that it obligates the country to “…treat occupational risk insurance as just another financial service, a commercial insurance that can be exploited for profit … the implementation of this obligation is not compatible with the full validity and application of the principles enunciated in the previous section that define and characterize the social and solidarity-based nature of occupational risk insurance.” Neither is it true that an inconsistency in note 22 obligates that “…it must be resolved in favor of the commercial exploitation obligation imposed in the challenged norm, as it is a norm with a rank superior to national law,” because the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance in the country in a market open to competition does not exclude the application of and respect for the constitutional and solidarity-based principles that shelter it, given its special nature and as insurance that forms part of the Costa Rican social security regime. The international obligations acquired do not regulate the form or the means by which the State must comply with said international precept, since by reason of the sovereignty of States and general principles of international law, they are internally obligated by said norm to adapt or make the necessary modifications in the internal legal system—whether as part of the process of incorporation or transformation of international law—to receive said international norms within the national legal system and intrinsically give full validity to the precepts emanating from international treaties, conventions, or agreements. CAFTA-DR establishes a concrete programmatic commitment, namely: the opening to competition of the mandatory insurance market, specifically Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance, as of January 1, 2011. However, said international norm does not establish the manner in which such obligation shall be carried out. It is here where the issuance of legal and regulatory norms makes its appearance. Inaction would have as its main consequence the non-compliance with the acquired obligation, which would constitute a transgression of legal certainty and the general principles of international law, opening the possibility for other State Parties to resort to international panels and arbitrations that conclude with the imposition of concrete sanctions on the country. Hence, legal provisions contrary to the treaty must be modified. With the purpose of complying with this and other market-opening commitments for insurance, the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, was issued, which, in accordance with its Article 1 indicating its objectives, shows that it aims to effectively articulate the commitments acquired by Costa Rica in CAFTA-DR, by establishing the rights of the insured or consumers of insurance services, the requirements and minimum rules for market regulation, and the basic norms required for the operation of an open and competitive insurance market in the country. Hence, Transitory Provision III was included, which reproduces the international obligation of CAFTA-DR to open the market for mandatory occupational risk and vehicle insurance, as of January 1, 2011, in accordance with the administrative authorization that the Superintendencia General de Seguros grants based on the Regulation issued for that purpose by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. The mentioned Transitory Provision is transcribed to conclude that it reiterates the timeframe contained in the Treaty, empowering the State body created in Article 25 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law to extend, as part of its supervisory functions and technical competence, the administrative authorization based on the regulation establishing the operational requirements for mandatory insurance in an open and effectively competitive market, which must be issued by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, the highest deconcentrated body attached to the Banco Central de Costa Rica, based on the competencies granted to it by the Laws. In this sense, it reviews the minutes of the sessions of the Special Commission that reviewed and reported on the Bill for the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, to conclude that the nature of Mandatory Occupational Risk Insurance is a component pertaining to the protection of workers' social security, which, as relevant, according to Article 73 of the Political Constitution, creates insurance against professional risks that will be at the exclusive expense of the employers and will be governed by special provisions. It is not a private commercial insurance in the strict sense, defined as a commercial contract, but rather one is in the presence of insurance whose regulation is found in the Constitution itself, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. The foregoing, without detriment to it being able to be offered in the market under a competition scheme, an aspect that would clearly guarantee for the consumer and the insured greater diversity of options and better coverage and insurance conditions. The Insurance Market Regulatory Law (reviewed for constitutionality by the Constitutional Chamber in ruling No. 2008-10450), a norm of public order and public interest, develops the commitments derived from CAFTA-DR, by creating and establishing the framework for the authorization, regulation, supervision, and operation of the insurance, reinsurance, insurance intermediation, and auxiliary services activity. It creates the conditions for the development of the insurance market and the effective competition of the participating entities, in addition to modernizing and strengthening the Instituto Nacional de Seguros. That in compliance with the legal norm and based on the international commitment, the “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance, which defines the minimum operational requirements for Occupational Risk Insurance and Mandatory Automobile Insurance” was issued, applicable to insurance entities, in the categories of general insurance, personal insurance, or mixed. There exists the “Regulation on authorizations, registrations, and operational requirements for entities supervised by the Superintendencia General de Seguros.” The invocation of unconstitutionality to fail to comply with the market opening would expose the country to a potential State-State dispute settlement panel, which would bring with it possible sanctions for non-compliance. It could face legal sanctions (such as suspension of benefits, Article 20.16 of CAFTA) and non-legal ones, such as damage to Costa Rica's reputation within the framework of bilateral and multilateral negotiation processes for trade and investment agreements. The foregoing could even occur in the face of a precautionary measure that suspends the application of the “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance.” Article 73 is the product of a manifest concern of the constituent power to provide and maintain superior-rank protection for workers under the principle of non-discrimination and social justice; social security is informed by the basic principles of universality, mandatory nature, and social solidarity. Rulings of the Constitutional Chamber recognize two systems of social insurance, not mutually exclusive, whose primary and imperative purpose is to protect the worker. One against the risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies determined by law, and the other against professional risks, which are at the exclusive and own expense of the employer (ruling 2008-016964). There are several consequences of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Chamber; firstly, the issue of the origin and characteristics of the Costa Rican social security regime, with the recognition of the fundamental Right to Social Security. Secondly, it was interpreted that there exist principles of the Right to Social Security linked to the Regime of Social Insurance of the CCSS, which are those related to universality, generality, sufficiency of protection, and social solidarity (ruling 2001-10546). A third consequence is the linkage of the right to health and social security, insofar as the administration of social insurance is prescribed to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (ruling 2007-17971). The fourth consequence most highlighted from the jurisprudence is the distinction it makes between the protection granted by social insurance and by occupational or work risk insurance, which are distinct expressions of the fundamental right of social security and which manifest in the legal system in a distinct form through the different norms regulating the regimes of the social security system, without being mutually exclusive. The occupational risk insurance system, even though it has some similarities with the social security regime administered by the CCSS, is distinct from the social security services provided by that autonomous entity of constitutional rank, since there is no legal or constitutional prohibition preventing the commercialization of Occupational Risk Insurance, given that the regime is in essence distinct from that of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. For this reason, the opening of the occupational risk insurance market is in accordance with the Law of the Constitution, since this mandatory insurance continues to be treated by CAFTA-DR as insurance distinct from the social security insurance of the CCSS without its nature being altered. Regarding the Mandatory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime, as a social security regime, it seeks to compensate the worker for those occupational risks that cause accidents or illnesses, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work they perform in a subordinate and remunerated manner. Currently, the occupational risk regime is regulated at the infra-constitutional level in Title Four: On the Protection of Workers during the Exercise of Work of the Labor Code (Articles 193 to 331), the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, and in SUGESE Agreement 04-10, “Regulation on Operational Requirements for Mandatory Insurance” approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Although it is a manifestation of the Right to Social Security, this does not diminish that, doctrinally, as a manifestation of the will of the parties, one is in the presence of a special or sui generis private commercial insurance. The historical fact underlies that it is a commercial contract recognized in the Fundamental Norm of the Nation and in human rights treaties and conventions, given its transcendence within the conception of social justice and the recognition of the right to preventive and curative health. It is an innovative and additional element to the traditional conception of commercial insurance contract law. The competition scheme is not incompatible with the Constitution, nor do international instruments on human rights prescribe or give indications of such non-conformity. The report sets out the similarities and differences between the Regime of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies administered by the CCSS and the Mandatory Occupational Risk or Professional Risk Insurance Regime. It also discusses the principles of mandatory nature, universality, social solidarity, and inalienability that inform the Fundamental Right of Social Security, since a large part of the constitutional jurisprudence developing them has been transcribed; however, they will be analyzed from the perspective of the issue of respect for the essential content of that right.

According to the allegations of the claimant, the principle of mandatory nature is not affected given that no commitment has been acquired to vary or affect this principle, since it is recognized in the Treaty itself as a constitutional principle that must be respected and observed. The pertinent provisions make the Insurance a mandatory insurance. In this sense, Article 193 of the Labor Code, which operationalizes the principle, remains in force; however, it cannot be exclusive to the INS, but rather the commitment was assumed to open the mandatory insurance market to competition as of January 1, 2011. Thus, the reference that the article makes to the INS must be understood generically as referring to the operators authorized by SUGESE concordantly with the “Regulation on authorizations, registrations, and operational requirements for entities supervised by the Superintendencia General de Seguros” issued by CONASSIF. The mandatory nature is found in the Labor Code, the General Regulation on Occupational Risks (DE No. 13466-TSS), and the mentioned regulation, as well as the circulars and agreements of the Superintendencia General de Seguros and the Technical Norm issued by each insurance entity.

The principle of universality also is not modified, denatured, or affected by CAFTA-DR or by the Insurance Market Regulatory Law. The treaty nowhere supposes the existence of a competitive market in which Occupational Risk Insurance would cease to cover all workers; rather, the current norms presuppose that with the effective market opening, the new private occupational risk insurance operators will have the possibility of attracting a greater number of employers to contract that insurance, by virtue of the duty derived from the principle of mandatory nature. The regulatory provision (Article 5) provides for the obligation of the insurance entity to comply with the policyholder, the insured, and the beneficiaries defined in the insurance policy, with the specifications that the law and related regulations provide for mandatory insurance. Even this norm authorizes insurance entities that offer mandatory insurance to sign the necessary agreements or contracts with the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social in order to coordinate the operational aspects derived from the medical care provided by that institution. The regulation obligates that the policy cover the benefits indicated in Article 218 of the Labor Code. Hypothetical scenarios where the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market will affect the finances of the INS, and consequently, the care of uninsured persons, but it points out what has been affirmed by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Labor Courts that the uninsured worker is not harmed from the perspective of joint and several obligation, without prejudice to judicial action against the non-compliant employer. In any case, the Regulation contemplates this situation, given that if the employer had an Occupational Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker, they will be considered as uninsured and the benefits will be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium. It highlights the powers granted by the regulation in use of the Judicial Collection Law for certifications issued by established entities, the competent authority of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, or those issued by directors of private institutions. There is no unlimited care in a monopoly insurance market system, since the care or benefits contemplated by the insurance coverages are constrained to fundamental criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and equity based on the real needs and conditions of the workers.

The principle of social solidarity proposes the duty to help those who have less based on the contribution of all, especially those who have more. The appellant's allegations that the opening of the Occupational Risk Insurance market affects the principle of universality and solidarity because workers will have unequal protection, such an argument lacks any foundation. At this point, it is relevant to recall that the duty to insure workers through the Insurance does not fall on the worker, but on the employer. In this sense, it is simplistic to conceive the functioning of an open and competitive Occupational Risk Insurance market in which workers will be left without insurance, because they will be "rejected" by private operators of occupational risk benefits because their salary is not "attractive," since it is not the worker who assumes the economic costs of the insurance but their employer, in accordance with paragraph four of constitutional Article 73 and the norms of the Labor Code. For greater detail, note that, in reality, the first guarantee for workers in relation to this insurance is that it is of a mandatory and compulsory nature, regardless of the working conditions and the salary earned, so that the employer always has the obligation to insure their workers. A distinction must be made between the initial stage of insurance contracting and the stage of determining the coverage of the Occupational Risk Insurance. In the first, all workers, regardless of the activity they perform, must be insured by their employer in accordance with the principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination, to ensure the solidarity of the regime. Nor can private or public insurance service providers, on a discriminatory basis, refuse to provide or render services to employers who wish to contract the Insurance services with them, due to the authorization obtained from SUGESE in accordance with the Regulation issued by CONASSIF, so that these are technically sustainable and in accordance with national legislation. It follows from the foregoing that an insurance entity could reserve the right to contract with an employer-client when the latter does not meet the requirements contained in the policy authorized by the supervisory entity. In this sense, the claimant is not correct when stating that private operators “will dispute the profitable segments of the market.” CAFTA-DR starts from the premise that in the competitive Insurance market, the insurance firms authorized by the State know in advance the rules that regulate competition and protect the consumer. That is, they are not authorized to make a public offering of occupational risk insurance and make a selection of employers—clients to whom they wish to sell occupational risk insurance services; in addition to the guarantees established in the laws and regulatory norms, there can be no discrimination in the insuring of workers, by virtue of the fact that the very principle of universality imposes the obligation on insurance entities not to select or discriminate against workers based on their potential profitability and risk levels. Regarding the second stage, relating to the determination of coverage, it refers to Article 15 of the Regulation of CONASSIF, which the claimant seems to ignore, resolved the issue of the minimum content of the Insurance benefits, as it prescribes that the policy must cover the benefits established in Article 218 of the Labor Code, that is, it establishes a minimum coverage based on the basic benefits established by the aforementioned norm. At the stage of determining rates for coverage, it is indeed permitted to establish categories of higher or lower loss ratios, taking into account, among other items, the salary earned by the insured workers and the types of activities they perform. This means that while the basic coverages are duly defined by the Labor Law, the rates for those coverages are determined under the actuarial technical bases that support the mathematical equation of the insurance, in accordance with Article 205 of the Labor Code. This is necessary for the insurance to be financially viable and sustainable, and to allow similar treatment for equals. The basic coverages functioned before CAFTA-DR and when the INS held the monopoly on mandatory insurance. The rates for each insurance entity are authorized by SUGESE in order for them to comply with the technical-actuarial and legal requirements and rigors demanded by the general provisions of the capital adequacy and solvency regime, as well as to ensure sufficient technical provisions to guarantee the fulfillment of the obligations of the associated entities from their insurance contracts. This guarantees control over abuses and discrimination in the setting of rates for insurance entities, but also ensures compliance with the minimum basic coverage equal for all workers, whereby the minimum coverage will be the same for all workers. Thus, additional benefits by way of additional coverages derived from the contractual relationship that the employer has with the insurance entity, and which are at the employer's expense, will directly imply an improvement in the treatment and care of the worker, which in no way violates the principle of universality or that of solidarity.

Regarding the inalienability (irrenunciabilidad), workers protected under this regime cannot waive the rights conferred by it, as prescribed by said constitutional norm. This means that workers cannot, *motu proprio* or through the action of a third party, waive the rights and benefits granted by virtue of the Fundamental Right to Social Security. The claimant does not indicate why the principle is violated, when the treaty does not suggest that workers can waive the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo); on the contrary, in the preamble of Section H “Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services,” respect for the Political Constitution is reaffirmed, and with it the inalienable (irrenunciable) nature of the rights and benefits of the Insurance.

Regarding the constitutional principles of the Sickness, Disability, Maternity, Old Age, Death, and other contingencies Regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) that are extensive to the Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo), such as the principles of sufficiency (suficiencia) that is in force in Article 206 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) where both the needs of the worker and the salary earned by the worker are taken into account. In fact, this is how it functioned in times when INS held the monopoly of the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo) and will continue to function in the same terms, today in a market open to competition. It also alludes to the principle of automaticity (automaticidad) of protection, referring to the jurisprudence of the Chamber as a principle of social security that translates into “… *an adequate and immediate protection in matters of sickness, disability, old age, and death*.” Extending this principle to the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo), as part of the general social security system, the coverage of this insurance of a special nature must be immediate and automatic, in other words, mandatory and universal. This has functioned this way until now, where the hospitals of the Fund (Caja) or private health centers must provide primary care to anyone who has suffered an occupational accident or disease. The same immediate protection is received by uninsured workers. In any case, Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulation support what is provided in numeral 232 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

It additionally points out the following differences between the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) and the Social Insurances (Seguros Sociales) of the CCSS. Regarding the subject that provides the service or coverage, it points out in each case the respective institutional fields and coverages, as well as those of commercial operators, to conclude with the claimant's indication that it violates the Political Constitution. Furthermore, the Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo) is exclusively at the expense of employers and does not follow the tripartite contributory scheme of the Social Insurances (Seguros Sociales) of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social). It is the latter that are reached by the prohibition of transferring or using those funds for purposes other than those related to their mission. There are differences regarding the use and destination of the funds and reserves of social insurances (seguros sociales). The funds and reserves resulting from the administration according to Article 73 of the Magna Carta are for the social security services of the Maternity, Disability and Death Regime of the CCSS. The same limitation does not apply to the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo); there is no such constitutional limitation on the destination of the funds or reserves resulting from the commercialization of the insurance. There is even a distinction in Article 73 when it refers to “social insurances (seguros sociales)” and “insurances against occupational risk (seguros contra riesgo profesional).” Although this does not mean that these funds remain unregulated, since this is determined by legal means, but this is a very different path from a constitutional one. On the other hand, it points out the non-existence of constitutional or legal principles: the case of extraordinary benefits and the supposed service at cost. Regarding the former, it points out that neither CAFTA-DR nor the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros) alters Article 242 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), nor Articles 255 to 259, on the possibility of commuting annuities (conmutación de rentas). Furthermore, the so-called “service at cost” is not a principle of mandatory insurances, not even a constitutional principle of the fundamental right to social security in general, such that the claimant confuses and extrapolates, from norms of the disability, old age, and death regime administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), undue consequences for the Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo). There is no evidence of the principle “service at cost” at a constitutional level, but rather concerning Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), which establishes that any surplus produced must be used to constitute a reserve, to then erroneously suppose and conclude the existence of an alleged constitutional principle. Constitutional Article 73 does not speak of income, as the claimant attempts to argue, and commits an error in the analysis of the arguments presented, since the term used by the constituent was that of “fund.” Rather, Article 28 of the Constitution exists, which guarantees every citizen liberty as a basic principle, and developed by infra-constitutional norms such as the law, which must determine its scope and impose restrictions that make them concrete and harmonize with the rest of the block of constitutionality and legality. Furthermore, the observance of being proportionate and rational must be respected. In the case of INS, according to Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), it must perform annual settlements; the surpluses must become part of a pay-as-you-go reserve, 50%, to finance the programs developed by the Occupational Health Council (Consejo de Salud Ocupacional) and the rest to incorporate improvements to the Regime. In the same way, it says that INS as an insurance entity must comply with the precepts of Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Insurance Market Regulatory Law (Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros), regarding technical provisions and reserves. Similarly, the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of the Law are obliged to comply with the mandates regarding technical provisions, reserves, and investments contained in the indicated numerals. But Article 205 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is not applicable to them. The Chamber also already resolved the issue of “service at cost” in vote 2007-9469, this ruling having three main consequences: First, the possibility of imposing the obligation to provide a service at cost would be reserved to the Law, that is, there is no constitutional principle that obliges telecommunications services, or in the case of Occupational Risks Insurance (Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo), to be provided “at cost.” This is a decision that remains at the discretion of the legislator. CAFTA-DR also does not address the issue that insurance must be commercialized “at cost.” Secondly, commercialization in a competitive market is not exclusive of the application of a social policy regarding occupational risks insurance. It is worth recalling the preamble of Section H on “*Specific Commitments of Costa Rica in Matters of Insurance Services*,” where the country reaffirmed its commitment that the opening process in the provision of insurance must be carried out based on the Political Constitution, its norms and principles. But to comply with these norms and principles, it is not a requirement that the services of the SRT must be provided “at cost.” Finally, the third consequence is that there is no constitutional provision or principle that compels the services of the SRT to be provided “at cost.” However, what is guaranteed at the constitutional level is the freedom of consumers to choose the service provider that best suits their interests (Article 46 of the Political Constitution). The freedom to choose is not incompatible with the commitment acquired by the country to “… *achieve universality and solidarity of the services that are opened to competition*.” The Constitutional Court has recognized the principle or right to reasonable profit, that is, that in the exercise of freedom of enterprise and commerce, there must be proportionality, reasonableness, and equity in the profit or benefit obtained. Finally, on the progressivity of international law of fundamental rights and the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance Regime (Régimen de Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo). The principle of the minimum normative standard (minimum minimorum) must be taken into account, which postulates that there exists a compendium of minimum labor and social security norms, guarantees, duties, and rights that must be ensured by the State, the employer, or the insurance operators, such that contravention of these constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. These minimums form part of the essential content of the right to social security of occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo), whereby the essential content will also comprise, as part of its hard core, the minimum benefits or basic coverages of the SRT recognized. As long as the legislator does not restrict or limit the essential content of the right to social security of occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo), through the promulgation of legal norms that limit, make impracticable, hinder beyond what is reasonable, or strip said right of the necessary protection. The norms under examination do not entail restrictions or limits that make the exercise of the right to social security impracticable, nor do they hinder or strip it of the necessary protection to be effective in society. The choice made by the State is the most favorable for workers covered by the insurance, since instead of restricting the protected right, it expanded the possibility of extending and improving coverage, being able to exercise the right to choose the provider according to their interests, in a clear derivation of the principles “*pro libertatis*” and “*pro homine*,” benefiting all workers of the Nation. Reasonable profit is also argued, in such a way that the hard core of content is not affected by changing the subject providing the service or allowing its commercialization; it does not affect the principles or the essence or legal-philosophical foundation of the right in question, hence there is no injury to the principle of progressivity of fundamental rights. The country already consolidated an effective system of protection that is not seen as diminished. It does not consider that there is a conflict with the Protocol of San Salvador and ILO Convention No. 102 because in both, their regulation is separate. CAFTA-DR does not reduce the benefits that workers currently have, nor does it diminish or worsen the advantages that beneficiaries of the Mandatory Occupational Risks Insurance regime (Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo) have currently obtained. For the foregoing, it requests that the unconstitutionality action be declared without merit.

**10.-** Messrs. and Mmes. Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, and Carmen Muñoz Q., all members of the legislative faction of the Partido Acción Ciudadana, appear as coadjuvant. In this sense, they emphasize that the block of challenged regulations should be expanded to include the entirety of Regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, approved by CONASSIF, through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010. The foregoing insofar as the currently challenged Transitory III of Law 8653 subsequently ordered CONNASIF and SUGESE to regulate a regime of total opening in the provision of the Social Insurance of Occupational Risks (Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo), no later than January first, 2011, an administrative action that was computed starting from December 22 of last year. It alleges that the mere act of promulgating said regulation, in addition to its essential normative content, implied placing into commerce a public good or service of constitutional rank that, for the same reason and by its own conceptual-functional nature, is entirely outside of commerce. It argues that the alleged unconstitutionality is noticeable by mere literal-grammatical interpretation, this taking into account that the alleged constitutional regulations (Title V of the Political Constitution) enjoy clean, clear, and precise wording, while their location in the dogmatic part of the constitutional text is strategic. They state that the corresponding premises are obvious and irrefutable, as is the only non-fallacious conclusion derived from the following strict syllogism: Premise 1: Essential functions of the State = Outside commerce. Premise 2: Occupational Risks Insurance (RT) = Social Insurance (Seguro Social) that forms part of Social Security. Premise 3: Social Security = essential function of the State in light of Title V of the Political Constitution. Only non-fallacious conclusion: RT = public service outside commerce. Therefore, the challenged regulations are unconstitutional, including regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. Likewise, it is affirmed that the management of RT insurance, beyond being a simple monopoly under the charge of INS, is in truth a core part of social security, that is, an essential function of the State. The foregoing, taking into account that RT is a social insurance of constitutional rank (fundamental social guarantee) for the working population inhabiting the country. Furthermore, occupational risks were legislatively developed by a code in labor matters, being additionally shielded by Convention 102 of the International Labor Organization and also through constitutional jurisprudence. Regarding the issue of the universality of the public service of occupational risks, including uninsured cases, we can indeed imagine private insurers leaning on the State, as well as a State boycotted from within to be forced to buy hospital services from the private sector, which would be unheard of. It is explicitly stated that a new regulatory norm that contaminates the successful social regime through the insertion of intrusive commercial principles (for example, risk selectivity, or a regulation establishing illegal caps on current medical-health, rehabilitation, and cash benefits) brings to memory the mentioned background of that constitutional vote where the State was prohibited from carrying out legislative reversals in matters of Labor Human Rights. It would be totally unconstitutional for SUGESE to behave as a Superintendency of Social Insurances; remember that administration and regulation is exclusively the competence of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) by express constitutional mandate. Promoting the veiled castration of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) or doing nothing to prevent it, is equivalent to regressing in matters of Labor Human Rights. Shortly before the promulgation of the challenged regulation, the coadjuvants made it known to the authorities of CONASSIF and SUGESE that it was of public interest to assertively address this debate, in light of the budding normative legal health (official letters JGC/097/10 and JGC/175/10). In fact, they warned that failing to do so would destabilize the institutionality and risk the social peace of the Costa Rican working class. They were also warned that an omissive conduct of that sort could even result in diminishment, affectation, or prejudice to the public treasury and the Financial Administration of the State. They allege that such distortions were not avoided by these public authorities when promulgating Regulation CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. DR-CAFTA itself, in its chapter 16, subparagraph b) of Article III.2 of Section H of Annex 12.9.2 of Chapter 12, confirms the validity of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) and its legal provisions aimed at the public domain (demanialidad) of the service, so the challenged regulations could be implicitly repealed in light of the same chapter 16 of CAFTA. In other words, both legal systems in apparent contradiction are not so, because each regulates on its own matters and principles distinct from each other: a public law system regulates a type of mandatory, compulsory, and universal social insurance, while the other system, which is private law, is responsible for regulating voluntary, waivable, and selective commercial insurances. Consequently, there is no identity in the scope of regulation (material, temporal, spatial, and personal). Much less incompatibility on the same matter. Therefore, it is not appropriate for SUGESE or CONASSIF to consider the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) implicitly repealed in light of DR-CAFTA, not even partially or to the detriment of the exclusive and excluding material competence of the SSRT service in favor of the State through INS. That is to say, what is under discussion has more to do with unresolved legal antinomies and apparent or partial incompatibilities. Finally, the coadjuvants express that as legislators, they are prohibited from breaking the fundamental principle of non-regression of labor human rights (which is the practical application of the constitutional principle of progressivity of human rights), which would be consummated if legislation that in one way or another worsens labor human rights were approved, for example, those collected in Articles 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, and 259 by the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo).

**11.-** Luis Chavarría Vega and Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) allege that they have standing to file the coadjuvancy action in order to maintain that the commercial opening will promote and produce a segmentation of the occupational insurance market, such that the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social) will be responsible for assuming the “collateral” damages of market logic, and secondly, in their capacity as representatives of working people, particularly of the Fund and the rest of Costa Rican security, with an indisputable legitimate collective interest, in seeking the defense of the social security system, which is a mandate derived from Article 332 of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo). It maintains that occupational risks insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) forms an integral and inseparable part of social security, in accordance with the provisions of Article 73 of the Political Constitution. However, that the last paragraph of said article provides that insurances against occupational risks will be governed by special provisions —those administered by the Fund (Caja) are also governed by a special law—, this wording could never justify any interpretation that seeks to maintain that these insurances do not form part of social security, of the very foundation of our Constitution. If any argumentation in this sense were valid, simply, the constituent would not have included its regulation in the constitutional text. This being the case, the last paragraph cannot be artificially separated from the rest of the provisions of the same constitutional norm. As the Chamber has interpreted, occupational risks insurance (seguro de riesgos del trabajo) substantively integrates the Costa Rican social security system. Thus, the common principles of social security, which inform constitutional Article 73, apply equally to all modalities of social insurances that this numeral expressly contemplates: the very particular situation, mainly of a historical order, that the administration of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo) was attributed to another institution distinct from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), could in no way justify the understanding that this insurance was excluded from the application of those same principles. The commercial opening has serious consequences for the principle of universality, whose coverage must extend even to those who are not insured; it points out that commercial exploitation, with a selfish profit motive, will have the inevitable consequence that the cost of care and other benefits for the uninsured population will have to be assumed by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) and the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social), which will have fewer resources to assume these expenses. Companies illicitly enrich themselves at the expense of the public resources of those institutions that are the heritage of the Costa Rican population. Regarding the principle of solidarity where care is based above what is earned, it is fundamental that the source of income obtained by the system does not depend on market rules that select the insurable population by risk level. Unfortunately, the scheme of commercial opening, under a competition regime, promotes the segmentation of the market of “consumers,” with a serious impact on the financial sustainability of the regime. Regarding the principle of sufficient or minimum benefit where the protection provided must correspond to the benefits, at least basic medical-assistance, regardless of the insurance premiums or the amount of workers' salaries. With the scheme, the possibilities of guaranteeing workers at least the quality of the benefits currently being provided are restricted. They maintain that the State must satisfy the fundamental right to social benefit. The recognition that occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo) constitutes a fundamental right to social benefit presupposes the state obligation to satisfy it, which is not possible except under a public, universal scheme, incompatible with any modality of privatization of the commercialization of that insurance. That the Chamber has indicated that the social security system supposes that public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens at the highest rank, which comes to prevent any modality of private management and administration of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo), for profit. The dignity of workers is also injured, because as a consequence of these new rules, within which the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros) will have to see how it subsists, the quality of benefits will suffer a notable deterioration and uninsured workers will be reduced to a second-class condition. They consider that there is a dismantling and repeal of labor legislation; the commercial opening of occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo de trabajo), under a regime of commercial exploitation, obliges the modification of the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) in matters of occupational risks. In this sense, they point out note 22, which conditions the regulations to the obligations assumed in the Treaty, including the Annex, affirming that our labor legislation becomes inconsistent, incompatible with the principles of freedom of enterprise and free competition, which are at the base of the scheme of commercialization and privatization of the insurance market. They consider that public policies for promoting workers' health and preventing occupational accidents and diseases will be abandoned; in addition to pecuniary, health, and other benefits, there are also those that seek to promote health and the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. The profits that were previously used for the foregoing will be entering the accounts of private insurers, and public policies on this matter will be left without funds, which will increase occupational accidents and diseases. Occupational risks insurances (seguros de riesgos del trabajo) constitute an expression of the social doctrine of the Church, for which it cites the chapter on the Rights of Labor by John Paul II, pointing out that the Encyclical provides that in cases of occupational accidents, workers must have access to health care, even free of charge, which would be broken, for the reasons given and by provision of the Free Trade Agreement. It requests that the action be declared with merit.

12.- The hearing provided for in Articles 10 and 85 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law is dispensed with, based on the power granted to the Chamber by Article 9 ibidem, considering this resolution to be sufficiently grounded in clear principles and norms, as well as in the jurisprudence of this Court.

13.- By resolution issued at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, rendered within this case file, several joinder motions in favor of and against the unconstitutionality action were admitted.

14.- The legal requirements have been fulfilled in the proceedings.

Drafted by Judge Castillo Víquez; and,

Considering:

I.- On preliminary matters and joinders.- By resolution issued at seventeen hours and eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, rendered within this case file, the motions presented by various interested parties were admitted for the purpose of joining in the action, with the aim of adding their arguments to the case file. It is necessary to indicate that the order only mentions the names of the individuals appearing in the proceeding; however, for the most part they do not do so in a personal capacity, but rather in representation of legal entities and social groups, which, for greater clarity, is indicated below regarding the capacity in which they act and whether they do so in representation of a moral person within the unconstitutionality action. Thus, Mélida Cedeño Castro, holder of identity card number 9-058-394, as President of the Secondary Education Teachers' Association (Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza, APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, holder of identity card No. 6-155-443, as General Secretary of the Costa Rican Education Workers' Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense, SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, holder of identity card No. 9-029-769, as General Secretary of the Union of Public and Private Enterprise Workers (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada, SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, holder of identity card No. 1-967-546, authorized by the Council of San Ramón, Alajuela, by Agreement No. 13 of Ordinary Session No. 71 of March 15, 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, holder of identity card No. 2-287-015, as General Secretary of the Union of Professionals, Technicians, and Similar Employees of Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, holder of identity card No. 1-897-818, Deputy General Secretary of the Union of Professionals, Technicians, and Similar Employees of Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, identity card No. 3-222-901, member of Service, Peace and Justice in Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, holder of identity card number 1-1019-0231, in his personal capacity and as a student; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, holder of identity card No. 1-433-939, in his capacity as President of the Costa Rican – North American Chamber of Commerce; Freddy Sandí Brenes, holder of identity card No. 1-508-235, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Personnel Union of the National Insurance Institute (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, holder of identity card number 1-791-100, in his capacity as a.i. Minister of Foreign Trade; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (and not Juan Carlos Méndez as was erroneously indicated), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, all deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC) fraction; Luis Chavarría Vega, holder of identity card No. 3-0158-0023, in his personal character and as General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, holder of identity card No. 2-343-472 in her personal character and as Deputy General Secretary of the National Union of Employees of the Fund and Social Security (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, holder of identity card No. 1-457-390, for the National Association of Public and Private Employees (ANEP). Consequently, the resolution of seventeen hours eighteen minutes on March thirtieth, two thousand eleven, is corrected, it being understood, unless otherwise indicated, that they act in representation of the indicated legal entities. Furthermore, the indicated resolution is corrected, as the motion of Ms. Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez, and Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez is not on record, their briefs not being found in the electronic case file, such that the aforementioned persons are not considered joiners in the present action. Finally, Mr. Mario Enrique Mora Badilla is not considered a joinder, given that the brief claims to be filed by Mr. Mora Badilla, however his signature does not appear, but rather that of Mr. Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.

II.- The standing rules in unconstitutionality actions. Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law regulates the requirements that determine the admissibility of unconstitutionality actions, demanding the existence of a pending matter to be resolved in an administrative or judicial venue in which unconstitutionality is invoked, a requirement that is not necessary in the cases provided for in the second and third paragraphs of that article, that is, when by the nature of the norm there is no individual or direct harm; when it is based on the defense of diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, or when it is filed by the Attorney General of the Republic, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Prosecutor General of the Republic, or the Ombudsman, in these latter cases, within their respective spheres of competence. According to the first of the scenarios provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, the challenged norm must not be susceptible to concrete application, which would subsequently allow the challenge of the applicative act and its consequent use as a base matter. The text in question states that it is appropriate when "by the nature of the matter, no individual or direct harm exists", that is, when by that very nature, the harm is collective (antonym of individual) and indirect. This would be the case of acts that harm the interests of specific groups or corporations as such, and not properly those of their members directly. Secondly, the possibility of resorting in defense of "diffuse interests" is provided for; this concept, whose content has been gradually delineated by the Chamber, could be summarized in the terms used in the judgment of this tribunal number 3750-93, issued at fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three) "... Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and even more difficult to identify, cannot be in our law - as this Chamber has already stated - merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that against them, determined or easily identifiable persons are identified, or personalized groups, whose standing would derive, not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones that concern a community in its entirety. It is therefore a matter of individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous sets of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential harm, more or less equal for all, so it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups that find themselves in certain circumstances and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, as they are at once collective – because they are common to a generality – and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such character." In summary, diffuse interests are those whose ownership belongs to groups of persons not formally organized, but united based on a particular social need, a physical characteristic, their ethnic origin, a certain personal or ideological orientation, the consumption of a certain product, etc. The interest, in these cases, is blurred, diluted (diffuse) among an unidentified plurality of subjects. In these cases, of course, the challenge that a member of one of these sectors could make under the protection of paragraph 2 of Article 75 must necessarily refer to provisions that affect them as such. This Chamber has enumerated various rights to which it has given the classification of "diffuse", such as the environment, cultural heritage, the defense of the country's territorial integrity, and the proper management of public spending, among others. In this regard, two precisions must be made: on the one hand, the referred goods transcend the sphere traditionally recognized for diffuse interests, since they refer in principle to aspects that affect the national community and not particular groups thereof; environmental damage does not affect only the neighbors of a region or the consumers of a product, but rather harms or gravely endangers the natural heritage of the entire country and even of humanity; likewise, the defense of the proper management of the public funds authorized in the Republic's Budget is an interest of all the inhabitants of Costa Rica, not just of any one group of them. On the other hand, the enumeration that the Constitutional Chamber has made is merely a simple description proper to its obligation – as a jurisdictional body – to limit itself to hearing the cases submitted to it, without it being possible in any way to be understood that only those rights that the Chamber has expressly recognized as such can be considered diffuse interests; the foregoing would imply an undesirable overturning of the reaches of the Rule of Law, and of its correlative "State of rights", which – as in the case of the Costa Rican model – starts from the premise that what must be express are the limits to freedoms, since these underlie the human condition itself and do not therefore require official recognition. Finally, when paragraph 2 of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law speaks of interests "that concern the community as a whole", it refers to the legal goods explained in the preceding lines, that is, those whose ownership rests in the very holders of sovereignty, in each one of the inhabitants of the Republic. It is therefore not a case of any person being able to resort to the Constitutional Chamber in protection of any interests (popular action), but rather that every individual can act in defense of those goods that affect the entire national community, without any attempt at a exhaustive enumeration being valid in this field either.

III.- On admissibility. As this Chamber has previously established in other precedents, the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law does not recognize special standing for a deputy of the Legislative Assembly; however, the plaintiff derives it from the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction Law, who acts as a lawyer and deputy, that is, in his personal condition and in his capacity as Deputy. In this sense, the questioning he makes refers to diffuse interests, that is, regarding the scope and recognition of the social security system for a certain type of workers. The plaintiff's reasoning is based on the idea that said system must have a general and universal scope, effective or potential, wherein he accuses that the challenged provisions harm each and every one of the inhabitants of the Republic. Notwithstanding what the plaintiff indicates, it should be noted that the action has standing in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights to that scope and recognition could be harmed, even if they were under the coverage of a workers' compensation insurance (póliza de riesgos de trabajo) policy. In this sense, what is appropriate is to hear the action, as is indeed done.

IV.- Object of the challenge. The examination of constitutionality is requested of subparagraph b) of article III.2, of Section H, of Annex 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 "Financial Services", of the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, which was ratified by Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, which provides:

"III. Gradual Market Opening Commitments [...]

2.- Right of Establishment for Insurance Suppliers Costa Rica shall permit, on a non-discriminatory basis, insurance service suppliers of a Party to establish and effectively compete to supply insurance services directly to the consumer in its territory, as set forth below:

(a) any and all lines of insurance29 (except mandatory vehicle insurance and workers' compensation insurance (seguros contra riesgos del trabajo)), no later than January 1, 2008; and (b) any and all lines of insurance, no later than January 1, 2011.

For purposes of this commitment, Costa Rica shall permit insurance service suppliers to establish through any legal form, as set out in Article 12.4(b). It is understood that Costa Rica may establish prudential requirements of solvency and integrity, which shall be consistent with comparable international regulatory practice." 29 For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of Article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and supplied by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social) as of the date of signature of this Treaty, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex.

Furthermore, the following provision is also challenged from the Insurance Market Regulatory Law, Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008:

"TRANSITORIO III.- Opening in the provision of mandatory insurance The State shall maintain the monopoly on Workers' Compensation Insurance (Riesgos del Trabajo) and Mandatory Automobile Insurance, administered by the National Insurance Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguros), in accordance with what is indicated in title IV of the Labor Code and the Law on Transit on Public Land Routes, respectively.

Starting January 1, 2011, the Superintendency shall grant, when so requested, administrative authorization for the exercise of insurance activity in the branches of Mandatory Vehicle Insurance and Mandatory Workers' Compensation Insurance (Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo), to the entities indicated in subsections a) and b) of Article 7 of this Law, provided they comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications that shall be established in the regulation that the National Council shall issue for such effect, in accordance with national legislation." It is alleged that these norms infringe Articles 50, 73, and 74 of the Political Constitution, Articles 7 and 48 of the Constitution in relation to Article 9.2 of the Protocol of San Salvador and numerals 2, 31, and Part VI of Convention No. 102 of the ILO Convention.

V.- On the merits.

A.- Social security as a fundamental pillar of Costa Rican society and the State.- Preliminary questions. It deserves to be highlighted from the beginning of this judgment that no one denies the importance that social security has in our country and in the world. The plaintiff, the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República), the different social organizations appearing in the case file, the deputies of the Citizens' Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana) fraction, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and others, hold a serious and firm general agreement on the value of social security for our country. In line with the foregoing, the Chamber adds the evident role that social security plays in development, in social peace, in individual and collective well-being, in the advantage that the existence, for each and every one of the inhabitants of this country, of access to adequate (timely) coverage and provision of social insurances provides.

In this sense, the foregoing is fulfilled by the vocation and awareness that political and social actors have in the prevention and treatment of diseases, and by ensuring spaces for medical provision and high-value medical services when a healthy person is plunged into a situation of vulnerability due to illness. Now, the first manifestations are found in the different historical developments of social security in Germany, England, Belgium, among other European countries. With them, one can observe the certainty of creating a social security system as a mechanism of social welfare. Among political and social philosophers, the thought and words of *John Rawls* have a profound logic when he argued his political theory of the social contract, an interesting revelation in light of his proposition of what would be the best form of organization for a State, if one could start from nothing. He invites the operator to a hypothetical mental exercise that would consist of shedding all prejudice to create an imaginary society. Thus, the legal concept of social security has a deep political and constitutional root. He proposes to respond to social demands based on the hypothetical suppression of all known personal and individual conditions, so that the designer of the society must not know which social, educational, political status, lifestyle, and sex they would want, or could correspond to them, once inserted into that hypothetical society. As a product of this mental exercise, they would possibly arrive at a quite tempered and rational choice, in order not to be at a disadvantage, in the face of society and those institutions that would govern, given that in an effort of self-preservation this *decider* would calculate that if they remained in the humblest rank, they would achieve a better portion of everyone's wealth in favor of the general welfare of all. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century there were already several countries in the world with social security systems operating, incipiently, but achieving results, it seems logical, looking back today, that such an institution has a place in the mind of the original constituent, as it is also present that, by performing this hypothetical suppression, it leads to creating a universal health system that must guarantee equitable and equal treatment to a vast majority, even to the most disadvantaged, and with it, not discriminate in access and services based on one's origin (articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution). Financing, consequently, would be done with the participation of the different social actors, the State, employer, and workers. As a consequence of the foregoing, a first impression of this Court is that the underlying problem indicated by the claimant does not lie in a conflict at the macro level of social insurance, but rather in a portion of it, because the constitutional norms recognize this foundational principle of Costa Rican society. So much so that the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica itself ensures that it places in Section H: Specific Commitments of Costa Rica on Insurance Services Matters, the following in the preamble:

"[…] *reaffirming its decision to ensure that the process of opening its insurance services sector is based on its Political Constitution*; *emphasizing that said process will be for the benefit of the consumer and must be achieved gradually and on the basis of prudential regulation*; *recognizing its commitment to modernize the National Insurance Institute (INS) and the Costa Rican legal framework in the insurance sector*; *Assumes through this Annex the following specific commitments on insurance services*." It is important to note that this care in the approach and declaration is not held by any of the other member countries of the Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic, Central America, and the United States of America. The foregoing, perhaps due to the level of development of the existing monopoly on insurance, but also because traditionally the State in Costa Rica has maintained an important role in commercial activities and social investment, that is, it is a highly regulated country whose commitments were more complex. This characteristic, which the country assumes as a commitment, is palpable in point II of Section H, where the obligation is similarly set forth to establish an insurance regulatory authority, which shall be independent of insurance service providers and where it is declared that it shall not be accountable to them. It must maintain an impartial position from market participants, having to have adequate powers, **legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers**, and handle confidential information appropriately. This will be taken up in the ruling later on.

As what is challenged in the action is the constitutional regularity of the norm of the trade Agreement and one of its implementing laws, insofar as it allows the opening of certain types of insurance, we must specify, for now, the scope of those norms, and whether there is a problem of interpretation of the scope of the social insurance contained in the Political Constitution. A first aspect that must be clarified is that upon the entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, it does not include the social insurance administered by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The Agreement allows, on a non-discriminatory basis, any and all lines of insurance, but as indicated, it saves the following in a footnote:

*"For greater certainty, the social security services referred to in the first, second, and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica and provided by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund as of the date of signing this Agreement, shall not be subject to any commitment included in this Annex."* From the above recognition, it is clear that the social security protected by the Costa Rican Social Security Fund is excluded from the Agreement, the foregoing is important for the interpretation of constitutional article 73, because with this the legislator of the National Constituent Assembly sealed a special result in the norm.

**B.- Social Security is a social and instrumental good that is composed of resources from Costa Rican society.** In effect, due to the regulation established by the constituent in the Fundamental Charter, it has allowed this Constitutional Chamber to construct the Right to Social Security, which by its structure must not be limited solely to the protection of the right to Health, but rather comprises many other benefits, which all integrated, produce a constitutional value of Costa Rican society. To cite a ruling, it must be indicated that:

"**III.- Right to social security.-** *The purpose of the constituent in designing the social security system in our country was to guarantee all citizens that the State, through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, would grant them at least the indispensable services in case of illness, disability, maternity, old age, and death. Article 73 of the Political Constitution, interpreted harmoniously with article 50 idem, enshrines the Right to Social Security. This right assumes that the public powers will maintain a public social security regime for all citizens so that it guarantees assistance and provides sufficient social benefits in situations of need to preserve health and life. The subjective scope of application of the right to social security incorporates the principle of universality, as it extends to all citizens, with a compulsory nature. The objective scope is based on the principle of generality, insofar as it protects situations of need, not to the extent that they have been foreseen and insured in advance, but insofar as they effectively occur. Additionally, it incorporates the principles of sufficiency of protection, according to quantitative and qualitative modules, and of protective automaticity, which translates into adequate and immediate protection in matters of illness, disability, old age, and death.* *Articles 50 and 73 of the Political Constitution, 11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, interpreted harmonically, establish the right to social security for the benefit of all workers, based on the principles of universality, generality, and sufficiency of protection. Evidently, the provision of such services is conditioned on the existence of some minimum, but basic and necessary requirements for the subsistence of the system, which, however, must be consistent with the aforementioned principles.* *The right to social security is a fundamental right, recognized by the Costa Rican State when the derived constituent incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1871 the chapter of Social Guarantees, which was later confirmed in the constituent process of nineteen forty-nine. ..."* (ruling No. 2004-08013) Additionally, on another occasion, the Chamber has also indicated that:

*"IV.- Article 73 of our Political Constitution establishes the existence of social insurance, which are regulated by the system of forced contribution of the State, employer, and workers, with the purpose of protecting the latter against the risks of illness, maternity, disability, old age, and death. The Costa Rican Social Security Fund is the autonomous entity in charge of administering this type of insurance, with the autonomy that allows it to have its own initiative for its management, as well as to execute its tasks and fulfill its legal obligations, setting goals and the means to achieve them. It guarantees in this way, the establishment of social security and its nature, decrees the purpose of social insurance, and regulates the destination of the respective funds. Social security was born in protection of the worker and their family, as the human beings they are, and is provided from conception until death, striving for health and helping in unforeseen misfortunes such as disability and death, as well as in states of helplessness due to its very condition, such as old age, pension, and retirement." (Ruling No. 1998-04636)* The doctrine set forth in the above precedent remains firm in interpreting constitutional article 73, consequently from what has been said, social security is a fundamental axis, an axiom, and a reference point of Costa Rican society, one of the most important manifestations of the Social State of Law, which means a constitutional value or legally relevant good that guarantees social welfare, the adequate distribution of wealth to achieve the country's social stability and which makes it attractive to national and international investment, and which as such, is done through the tripartite contribution of the State, employer, and worker. Thus, people can have access to social security, to a regime of predictability for disability, old age, and death, just as they will have access to health and the primary provision of health services that the State, through the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, places at the service of the population, being one of the best guarantees in individual aspirations towards a more equitable society. There are multiple studies that place our country within privileged positions, not being a developed country, but it maintains high levels of health consistent with European countries more developed than ours. As indicated above, it succeeds in putting the least advantaged person in society in a better position, in one that allows them to receive health benefits like any other more advantaged person in society, as well as access to social solidarity if the person falls into circumstances of social vulnerability. In other words, social and economic asymmetries must not count for the provision of services, since the original constituent legally guarantees the health of the population through institutional creation, that is, by entrusting the Costa Rican Social Security Fund to oversee its delivery. It is worth noting then, that the Executive Branch guaranteed in the negotiation process, and was consistent with the degree of administrative and governmental autonomy of social insurance, by mandate of the constituent to specific benefits reserved to the Costa Rican Social Security Fund in the Free Trade Agreement, everything related to the first, second, and third paragraphs of article 73 of the Political Constitution. The National Constituent Assembly foresaw the need to keep incorporated into the Political Constitution of 1949, what was established in the Political Constitution of 1871, reformed in 1943. With it, it reaffirmed, at the apex of the legal system, social security by establishing beneficiaries of the system (manual and intellectual workers), its forms of financing (forced contributory for the State, employers, and workers), and scope (risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines). It designated the Costa Rican Social Security Fund as the public entity in charge of these benefits, endowing it with legal and financial attributions, administrative and governmental autonomy in social insurance, in order to likewise settle a protection barrier to the resources and reserves of that autonomous entity to prevent future diversions of that patrimony belonging to all beneficiaries. But, always within social security, other insurances are regulated with the particularity that they break the previous financial scheme, the causes that generate the benefits, and the regulations. Therefore, it must be examined whether it would be permissible to exempt from this regulation the mandatory vehicle insurance and the mandatory occupational risk insurance, to regulate them separately after the entry into force, at a time after January 1, 2011. In other words, the position assumed by the Costa Rican Government would be consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Political Constitution, which effectively, as the Ministry of Foreign Trade indicates, is for the Government of the Republic, but which were embodied in the commitments assumed before the other member States of the Free Trade Agreement, and their implementation in national legislation. Consequently, the crux of the discussion raised in the action is focused on the fourth paragraph of the numeral in question, where the discussion addressed since the referendum on the Free Trade Agreement and the complementary legislative agenda to the mentioned Agreement is reiterated. In this sense, the occupational risk regime shares some of the characteristics defined by the original constituent, locating it as part of the social security regime established from the apex of the legal system, however, there must be a constitutional interpretation in its proper dimension, especially regarding the issue of social insurance that protects against risks of illness, disability, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies that the law determines, but with distinctions in insurance against professional risk or workers' risk. Certainly, the most relevant normative aspects for society must be situated in the Political Constitution to regulate or protect certain fundamental rights, topics that are the most essential in the Political Constitution with the purpose of indicating the course along which ordinary legislation must develop, including the licenses that it may have contemplated. While the above marks a determined course as a country-decision, there are also provisions that release those determinations to an interpretation proper to political science at a given moment, whose decision belongs to the political bodies of the State. In the case of social insurance operating from the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, there is no doubt that the original constituent itself reserved its institutional monopoly, but in the latter, the texture of the norm was more open.

In the Chamber's opinion, it is worth questioning the idea originally conceived by the National Constituent Assembly of providing the population with universal social insurance and the provision of services, if it is seen modified to the detriment of the least advantaged, with the change in legal framework – as the claimant and coadjutants allege – insofar as it contradicts that universality by being founded on a commercial opening that modifies the monopoly of certain insurances, and which is contrary to international human rights conventions. The discussion is more philosophical-political than philosophical-legal. The above assertion will be seen below, to establish whether there is evidence that this is the case or that international organizations favor a particular social insurance development model to achieve those ideals. In that sense, there would be little legal space left for a Constitutional Court or the State's own political bodies when ratifying an international normative body. Hence, it is worth asking what role corresponds to the Chamber, as a Constitutional Court. In this sense, it must be defined whether it can be legally challenged or if it is a matter that corresponds to the political bodies of the State. Regarding the former, it is worth indicating that the Chamber must rule from a constitutional point of view on the norms, but, regarding the latter, on the competence to decide on the advisability or inadvisability of a Treaty, both issues must follow the same line as what the Chamber elucidated in the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. The Chamber has leaned towards maintaining that it must not enter into analyzing a political issue that escapes judicial decision, although it is within its competence when resolving the legal issue or deciding some particular meaning to the constitutional interpretation of a norm when some fundamental right is in conflict, but establishing the timeliness and advisability of legislation, per se, is not and must not be natural to jurisdictional activity. What is important to highlight here is that in the inter-branch relations of the State, the first one called to control the timeliness and advisability of the Executive Branch's international negotiations in its international relations in the form of International Treaties is the Legislative Assembly. In this sense, the abstract control that this Chamber has, whether a priori or a posteriori, will depend on the political action as a constitutional body that resides in the Legislative Assembly, and on which decision-making is founded by the majority, through a competitive struggle, but where the timeliness and advisability of a norm is the exclusive purview of the Legislative Assembly. In any event, ruling No. 1994-07005 states that:

"*However, from the point that interests us now to point out, that means that the State, or more properly, the bodies that are charged with strictly political and management competences, must always act in order to stimulate production and the most adequate distribution of wealth. It must be understood, then, that the Executive Branch has negotiated this Agreement, having those constitutional objectives as its guide. And it must also be understood that the Legislative Branch, upon considering the substance of said instrument, will act in accordance with the same objectives. That is why we can conclude, in principle, that the advantages or disadvantages that the Agreement as such may have for some sector, or some of its provisions, discussed and debatable, do not necessarily entail an aspect of constitutionality, in the sense that the Chamber must rule, since they lie at the level of mere advisability or timeliness. For example, some point out that despite the goodness of this type of commercial instrument, a country would not derive immediate or short-term advantages, if the old model (of import substitution, of subsidies), and the new model of commercial opening coincide in it. That is why in this respect, some experts estimate that Mexico has an advantage over Costa Rica because its tariffs have been reduced to a greater degree and much earlier than our country began to do so.*" But even so, they continue to say that the treaty is beneficial for Costa Rica, because it will open up a spectrum of very important investments, technology transfer, and job creation, which will invigorate its economy and, additionally, because it will place it at a level of competitive demand that it needs to adapt to a possible incorporation into the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement between Mexico, the United States of America, and Canada (NAFTA), as a nearly immediate aspiration of the country, as expressed by officials of the central Government. In other words, the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico becomes an indispensable scenario for moving on to the next, more complex and ambitious one. In any case, the Chamber warns that these aspects revolve around the policies behind the philosophy of the Treaty, but do not have the constitutional connotation to which the Chamber must circumscribe its opinion." **C.- The legislator's freedom of configuration regarding workers' compensation insurance.** Now then, paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes:

*"Insurance against occupational hazards (riesgos profesionales) shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers and shall be governed by special provisions".* The original constituent assembly, on the subject of occupational hazards, endowed the legislator with greater flexibility, even though this is effectively considered within social security, which is denoted by the breaking of the financial and regulatory scheme of the other social security branches. In this sense, it could be thought that a possible comprehensive reading of Article 73 of the Political Constitution would advise entrusting the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with all of the country's social security, but evidently, the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente differentiated that possibility, because, otherwise, it could have determined it by eliminating the final paragraph or by expressly incorporating that mandate to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. To prove the foregoing, one could question whether the unconstitutionality of the creation and monopolistic function of the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, regarding occupational hazard insurance, could have been sustained. But such an interpretation would not be plausible either; on the contrary, the legislator delegated, for many years, the coverage of social security for workers' compensation to another autonomous institution, different from the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configured by the ordinary legislator, without such an interpretation of the norm compromising its constitutionality, nor was any constitutional irregularity noted, because it was based on a subject of public law acting in a dual capacity, of public and private law. The foregoing leads this Tribunal to the possibility of channeling the interpretation of the final paragraph of Article 73 of the Political Constitution in a more flexible way, always maintaining harmony with the whole system, when it indicates that the insurance "*shall be the exclusive responsibility of the employers*," since a lesser intensity of the State's presence can be derived—logically—, but without the foregoing signifying total absence. On the other hand, the employer would be the main contributor, given that it is he on whose behalf the worker performs the labor, and the working conditions he offers to the worker are attributed to him, in such a way that it is the Employer who is responsible for ensuring and assuming the safety of his employees, and the State, for ensuring or supervising compliance with these obligations. As for the worker, no obligation falls on him other than the obligations contained in the labor law, because it is obvious that this decision of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente places the worker as the recipient of the protection, that is, he would ultimately be the beneficiary of these insurances. The original constituent assembly foresaw a more flexible normative scheme, allowing a greater scope of action for the legislator when it indicates "*shall be governed by special provisions*," which, as indicated above, it exercised by entrusting an autonomous entity other than the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social with establishing, offering, and executing occupational hazard insurance. At this point, one could choose between the marked presence of the State in economic and social activity typical of a Social State of Law, or the prevalence of solutions through an economic fabric based on pure or mixed market mercantile models with State tutelage, regarding its delivery. The point this Chamber wishes to arrive at is the following: the original constituent assembly established a system to constitutionally regulate workers' compensation so that it can be the object of diverse legal and benefit-providing designs or structures, based on the legislator's freedom of configuration. The foregoing, clearly as part of the large number of productive economic activities, as well as the jobs and risks that may exist in each one of them. Precisely, this allowed, by a legislative decision, opting for the Instituto Nacional de Seguros to exercise this activity under a monopoly regime, which implied a different course for compulsory workers' compensation insurance from those regulations of the Caja, and nevertheless, this did not and would not make it unconstitutional, just as a greater opening in the choice of the Employer, faced with a greater supply of occupational hazard insurance operators, would not.

Other important consequences are deduced from the foregoing, in which one passes from an Institution which operated under a monopolized insurance exploitation system, consequently a heavily intervened market, and then opted for a different one of opening, with an impartial regulatory authority, with adequate powers, with legal protection and financial resources to exercise its functions and powers. A regulatory body was thus foreseen that must ensure and prevent harm to the worker. Consequently, the plaintiff's thesis may maintain an erroneous conception that the State completely disappeared within the aforementioned employer-worker-workers' compensation scheme. It is recognized by Public Law that the State, through a legislative decision, can declare certain services to be provided under a monopoly regime, or provided under a free competition regime, without this—necessarily—signifying detriment to the service. In such a way, it can liberalize certain activities so that they operate under the market modality. If a government decision negotiated by the parties in a Treaty, approved through citizen participation mechanisms (referendum), and after exhausting the ratification procedure, places another State body to impartially regulate and on a non-discriminatory basis the commercial activity of insurance, this forms part of one of the many legal options available for legislating. In this sense, it must be said that the legitimacy of this decision is reinforced because it originates in the constitutional reform that permits an authentic direct democratic exercise which, in the year 2002, sought to give citizen participation to government decisions, which culminated in a popular vote of a normative character. That in itself has a special weight, which, in principle, must be complied with by the mechanisms and institutions based on a representative and mature democracy, by the different social and political actors (of course, the foregoing does not exclude the possibility of exercising constitutional control). From a normative point of view, the foregoing has important natural consequences as it involves a ratified agreement and being an international instrument, which implies changing the legal system that had been operating for many years in our country, automatically modifying the legal stance of the internal organs of the State, at the moment the international regulations come into effect. In this sense, these are obligations that bind all the powers and functions of the State. It is important to mention Article 1.4: Scope of Obligations which states:

"*The Parties shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures to make effective the provisions of this Treaty, including their observance by state governments, unless this Treaty provides otherwise*".

Given that the compulsory workers' compensation insurance (seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo) regime had been operating through the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, the international agreement establishes the phased opening of the insurance market, including compulsory vehicle and workers' compensation insurance. The truth is that the modernization of the Institute and the opening of the legal framework to break the monopoly was a direct result of the approval of the Free Trade Agreement, which was analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber in due course. In the legislative consultation formulated during the legislative process of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, the Chamber was consulted on the following problem:

*"Violation of constitutional articles 50, 73 and 74: unconstitutionality due to legislative omission to regulate solidarity insurance: they refer that this omission will cause a relevant legal lack of protection for the Constitution to the detriment of the inhabiting population of Costa Rica, specifically because the present and future efficacy of the catalog of social guarantees and fundamental labor rights that in terms of insurance derive from constitutional article 73 is violated: obligatoriness, universality, compulsory regime, provision of benefits even in favor of uninsured workers, non-existence of a benefit cap, immediacy and obligatoriness of the provision of benefits to the worker, possibility of granting extraordinary benefits in justified cases, possibility of commutation of pensions and above all impossibility of contemplating profits in the insurer's tariffs. Likewise, they allege that the socio-labor rights and benefits contemplated between constitutional articles 50 and 73 are inalienable and that their enumeration does not exclude others that derive from the Christian principle of social justice, which implies that it is a constitutional closing norm or closure of the social guarantees system, which leaves a permanently open gateway in order to enable the constitutionalization of all present and future social and labor legislation. They allege that the omission of the regulation of solidarity insurance will generate a lack of labor protection."* In this sense, the Chamber resolved by judgment No. 2008-10450 that:

*"**9.-** **Violation of Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, due to the legislative omission to establish social insurance.** * *According to the consulting deputies, the "Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros" bill is also unconstitutional by omission, to the extent that the establishment of social insurance is not contemplated. Regarding constitutionality control by omission, it must be mentioned that this Constitutional Tribunal, since judgment No. 2005-05649 of 14:39 hrs. of May 11, 2005 (directed against the legislative omission to issue the infraconstitutional regulations relating to the referendum process), has recognized the normativity of all constitutional provisions, the scope of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, as well as the possibility of being violated by action, or by the omission of public authorities with normative power to issue "**a law that develops a constitutional content or clause."** Hence, the control of unconstitutional omissions is precisely the greatest scope of the recognition of the Constitution as a legal norm, fully enforceable against the actions of public powers, and the principle of constitutional supremacy. Under this perspective, if the mandates established in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution are carefully analyzed, it is clearly evident that "the administration and government of social insurance are in charge of an autonomous institution, called Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social." Hence, in the aforementioned bill, the Chamber does not appreciate the existence of any unconstitutional omission that violates the rights protected in Articles 50, 73 and 74 of the Political Constitution, reason for which the consultation made in that sense must be resolved."* There is not necessarily a loss of labor protection for workers. It follows from the above that Costa Rica is free and independent, that as such it acquires an international obligation that it must observe according to the international law principle *pacta sunt servanda*; in this sense, binding itself by an international commitment with the different countries and obtaining from them commercial benefits is what is effectively pursued with this type of instruments. On the other hand, as a democratic Republic, the parameter and center of all state interest is the human person, based on two fundamental pillars, the first is the ancient notion of freedom, so that in certain areas of people's lives, they are exempt from external conditioning factors on the volitional and cognitive capacity of the person, so that life passes without undue interference, as long as morality or public order is not affected or third parties are not harmed. But furthermore, around this freedom—in the fundamental base of society and the State—an institutionality structured to protect the individual in the exercise of that freedom is guaranteed, as well as the social values that the original constituent assembly has decided to protect, which would derive from the protection of the individual against third parties. Hence, it could be said that the different branches of government exist, with checks and balances, different institutions that were designed to control each other, that control others, etc., but that are created with the purpose of guaranteeing an adequate balance to guarantee the fundamental rights of the human being against the State. The important thing is that only the Political Constitution and the Law can interfere with that freedom. Furthermore, only through a law that complies with democratic principles, proportionality and reasonableness, can they limit that freedom that the individual possesses; that which the Political Constitution guarantees could be limited as long as the particular conduct may be contrary to morality, public order or may harm a third party (Article 28 of the Political Constitution). With greater reason, a norm that has been approved through the exercise of representative democracy, must be deemed a legitimate norm, through direct democracy, as in the case of the Free Trade Agreement, approved by Referendum Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, maintains a stricter legitimacy for the different State institutions. The foregoing means that, be it the Political Constitution, an international agreement, the law or another normative provision, the fulfillment of the tasks must be guaranteed, without it being valid to argue, where the norm does not impose conditions or guidelines, to establish them in a capricious manner. It must be remembered that the Political Constitution itself must be assumed as a legal framework that allows the ruler to advance his policies, according to the prevailing times, adjusting measures or relaxing them, with a view to social welfare. Hence, it would not be appropriate to establish the constitutionalization of legislative provisions, as some coadjuvants maintain based on the reform to the Labor Code through Ley 6727 of March 9, 1982, if the original constituent assembly itself foresaw normative flexibility by establishing its regulation through special provisions, that is, specific ones through which the ordinary law could be modified by another law, nothing prevents them from varying them by subject matter and over time.

For the time being, the monopoly of compulsory insurance in favor of INS is broken starting from the approval by referendum of the FTA, which allows a greater national and international supply of services by workers' compensation insurance companies. It is clear that the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente did not give the same regulatory treatment to all insurance, thereby breaking a primary aspect of social security that it had established in the first paragraph of the aforementioned numeral 73, of a tripartite source of financing for the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, to leave the legislator free initiative on how to materialize insurance against occupational hazards. The Asamblea Nacional Constituyente left the choice to the legislator, who, in effect, did so by entrusting the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, initially, with professional social insurance. Under the original constituent assembly's scheme, compulsory workers' compensation insurance would be protected by the decisions the legislator made under the concept "*special provisions*," which means that it not only designed this coverage with more leeway but had to do so through special regulations (with sufficient potency and resistance), and that in this matter it received it from a referendum process, as in effect happened on October 7, 2007. Even though the benefit-providing activity of workers' compensation insurance was entrusted to the Instituto Nacional de Seguros, as a monopolistic state activity, in favor of a State institution, a change in the regulations produced a system more open towards the market economy as in other areas of national life, but subject to important limitations, deriving from the Political Constitution, such as state tutelage, treatment under equal conditions, as well as from the Free Trade Agreement which requires non-discriminatory regulations for all trade agents. In this sense, privileged treatment of any of the insurance market suppliers is prohibited. Returning to what was indicated above, it is clear that the State through legislation can choose between providing Workers' Compensation Insurance in monopoly regimes or competition regimes. In this sense, the monopoly can be exercised by the State or with the collaboration of natural or legal persons of private law, or participate in a scenario that seeks to satisfy market preferences based on a free market scheme. The treatment given by the original constituent assembly can effectively be presented in any of these areas, the latter being the one chosen in the aforementioned referendum.

**D.- Generic modalities of contracting with companies. Absence of a prohibitive norm.-** The plaintiff argues that the Political Constitution contains a prohibition for the State to authorize private companies in activities related to certain public services, but the argument is weak. In reality, this is very far from what has occurred throughout the history of the development of administrative law regarding concessions and other more complex forms of administrative contracting. In this sense, there are certain activities of marked general interest, which by a political decision of the legislator (or constituent assembly in its case) assigns that service or a strategic position in it to the State, but from there, many contractual figures have been derived to face the required provision, such as interested management (gestión interesada) for certain public activities that cannot leave the State's administration, or the concession when it entrusts private natural or legal persons with a determined public service provision. As indicated previously, a prohibition cannot be derived from paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution, due to the open texture of the norm that breaks with the scheme of the first three paragraphs of the mentioned article, adding an open conditional element to the constitutional norm by establishing greater freedom of configuration for the legislator. For the Tribunal, when the Free Trade Agreement requires insurance operators to obtain authorization from a Regulatory Authority, it very clearly embraces a form of administrative tutelage of the State over private individuals who may exercise a freedom or right in the market, but require the fulfillment of *ex ante* requirements, which all competitors in the market must meet, without discrimination or, what is the same, the existence of norms equally applicable to all agents, which allows supply to respond to demand, but in the same way, if there were no supply at all, it is clear that the state entity would not cease to operate, as in effect it does.

The reports in the action, the respective briefs of the interested coadjuvants, refer to the different conditions that companies that would be offerors in the mandatory occupational risk insurance market must fulfill; consequently, it cannot be said that the worker would be at a disadvantage, since we are dealing with regulatory minimums (or the hard core of the fundamental right) in order to obtain authorization to compete in the market. The plaintiff's argument is that the universality of the fundamental right to social security is endangered, given that there are no obligations committed to the universal care of workers by commercial companies, because as companies seeking remuneration and profit, they will endanger the protection system devised by the original constituent, the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo), and the Protocol of San Salvador, as well as ILO Convention 102. However, these assertions must be taken with great care, given that far from being a strictly legal matter, they venture into political aspects of the legislative decision and the means to achieve certain objectives. In this sense, international provisions must be norms that accommodate space for the different national policies of the Member States, insofar as they leave open the mechanisms to make rights effective, normally in the face of international commitments or obligations of result, but without being international conventions of means (as the plaintiff seems to suggest). In other words, the provisions leave the implementation mechanisms to the countries so that they adopt the minimum measures according to their own social and economic context. In this regard, it must be taken into account that the Protocol of San Salvador establishes:

"Article 1. Obligation to Adopt Measures The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through cooperation among the States, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of available resources and taking into account their degree of development, in order to achieve progressively, and in accordance with their domestic legislation, the full effectiveness of the rights recognized in this Protocol." "Article 2. Obligation to Adopt Domestic Legal Provisions If the exercise of the rights established in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to make those rights effective" (the text in bold is not from the original).

One of the characteristics that distinguishes human rights instruments from other treaties is precisely that their object is very different from the rest of public international law, given that in the former the end and objective is the human being, while in the others, it is what the High Contracting Parties decide to establish as an objective in their reciprocal relations, border treaties, extradition of fugitives from justice, technical and scientific cooperation, etc. In the former, the international commitment is directed as such to the human being, and not to the reciprocal concessions of interest of the States, and it will be the State that assumes the commitments to materialize the human rights agreed upon and recognized in favor of the human being. However, International Treaties—especially multilateral ones—must adopt an inclusive language for the different legal and political systems of the parties that allows deepening the objective and end agreed upon, based on the obligations freely accepted and received by their legal systems. Hence, it could not be affirmed that a specific human rights treaty imposes a single legal scheme to solve problems in the respective jurisdictions, such that it establishes only one way to carry out the objectives of international legislation; on the contrary, it is left to each party to carry it out, locating its strengths, and directing the greatest efforts and resources once the state of affairs in its own jurisdiction has been established, in order to adopt internal measures; this means that it can resort to public, private, or mixed forms to obtain results in the direction of the commitments adopted at the international level and for the benefit of its inhabitants. A corollary of the foregoing is that, in a structural decision, nothing would hinder determining other forms of providing occupational hazard insurance (seguro de riesgos profesionales), provided they are in conformity with the international conventions regulating the country's commercial relations and those of human rights. Thus, the Protocol of San Salvador establishes regarding the "Article 9. Right to Social Security 1. Everyone shall have the right to social security protecting him from the consequences of old age and of disability which prevents him, physically or mentally, from securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. In the event of the death of a beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to his dependents.

2. In the case of persons who are employed, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and subsidy or retirement in cases of work accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and after childbirth" (the text in bold is not from the original).

The truth is that international regulations establish what the jargon of social security calls, in some ILO documents, the social floor or social protection floor (piso social or piso de protección social) as a minimum of fundamental obligations that could indeed be justiciable; there do exist unfulfilled legal obligations that are demandable domestically, or, once exhausted, at the international level. Therefore, it is true that occupational risk insurance (seguro de riesgo del trabajo) is conceived for an employment relationship of dependency or subordination, in which medical benefits must be guaranteed to the worker in case of an accident or occupational illness. ILO Convention 102 attributes responsibility to the employer for the work environment of their employee, and is in conformity with paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Constitution. What is important is that ILO Convention 102 contains nine branches of social security, where it establishes minimum standards for each one of them, and enunciates principles for the sustainability and good governance of such systems. This convention includes a flexibility clause so that upon ratifying the Treaty, the State can choose at least three areas of protection. Important data arise from the ILO Report [International Labour Conference, 100th session, 2011 "Social Security for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization"] which indicates, among other things:

"185. Employment injury schemes that provide benefits are usually organized on a contributory basis; sometimes they constitute a separate fund and at other times form part of other social security branches. Due to this link between risk and prevention in the workplace, in many countries employment injury schemes are organized separately from other schemes and are financed solely by employer contributions. Contribution rates are usually differentiated according to the level of accident or disease risk in the various types of economic activities." (p. 76); The plaintiff alleges that the position of uninsured persons is weakened, to the benefit of the commercial regime and to the detriment of the worker. This translates into a violation of the principle of progressivity (principio de progresividad) of social rights. For this argument to be admissible, regressivity must be proven with the change of legal regime or it must be evident, but neither does the ILO's own work endorse a single approach to the issue as the plaintiff seeks to demonstrate, when, on the contrary, these are decisions linked to the legislator's freedom of configuration. In this sense, international law does not advocate for implementing immovable policies within national efforts to achieve internationally protected objectives; on the contrary, there must be a space for the implementation of international obligations, which would be violated if countries do not legislate or act in their efforts to improve internationally protected benefits. As has been indicated, this is a matter of opportunity and convenience that should not occupy the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional)—in principle, it is not its responsibility to resolve whether the measure is more or less convenient, given that it would be entering into a field of speculation and absent clear rules to elucidate the fundamental rights claimed, which escape the law of the Political Constitution. In this sense, not every new measure introduced into the legal system is a matter for the constitutional judge to decide, but rather it corresponds to the legislator to assess its opportunity and convenience, as well as its constitutional viability. As stated above, firstly, there is no mandate of monopoly or prohibition for mandatory occupational risk insurance (seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo) to operate outside the institutional structures of the State; a corollary of the foregoing is that the State can use different private agents to carry out the necessary benefits, whether public or private. To extrapolate that this system implies a detriment or a loss of rights for the recipients of services does not correspond to the prevailing reality of administrative contracting.

E.- Constitutional hierarchy of international treaties and their effects on national legislation.- The normative rank of international law as an internal norm is located in the Political Constitution, so that it corresponds to the original or derived constituent power to decide and procure the procedure for incorporating that law into the national legal system, as well as to resolve the problem of its normative hierarchy. Preliminarily, it must be mentioned that international law, after its incorporation into the legal system, through the legislative approval procedure contained in Article 121, subsection 4) of the Political Constitution, has legal effects. An analysis of the legal systems for incorporating international legislation in the world allows differentiating, broadly speaking, three main systems: those countries that require a double parliamentary approval, both for the ratification of the treaty and subsequently for the specific legislative provisions for the incorporation of the international treaty as domestic provisions, which operates in the Scandinavian countries. Next, in countries where only the will of the Executive is sufficient to internationally commit the country, but which will require national legislation for the international law to be adopted, such as in England and the countries that form part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and finally, those where, with parliamentary approval of what was acted upon by the Executive Branch, the incorporation of international regulations operates once the ratification process by the State is completed, as in our country. Likewise, other problems exist, such as the assignment of the normative hierarchy of the international legislation that is incorporated into the legal system, with all these decisions, far from being resolved in the sphere of international law, having their solution rooted in the primary organization, within the domain of each Nation. In the case of incorporation, our country has the system that was placed in the last category, the most representative, the truth being that it only requires the legislative approval or rejection of the treaty; in which case, if the former is obtained and ratification proceeds, it is sufficient for the incorporation of international law to operate with preeminence over other ordinary national provisions. The foregoing has those consequences, thanks to Article 7 of the Political Constitution, which establishes:

"Article 7.- Public treaties, international conventions, and concordats duly approved by the Legislative Assembly shall have, from their promulgation or from the day they designate, authority superior to the laws.

Public treaties and international conventions referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country shall require approval by the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of the total of its members, and that of two-thirds of the members of a Constituent Assembly, convened for that purpose." But historically, the negotiation and incorporation of treaties was not always received in that manner by our legislation; on the contrary, its treatment was extremely cautious and distrustful. The effects of international law were not always as clear as they might be interpreted today. Thus, the norm is the result of a constitutional reform in 1968, as it had another wording, isolationist and restrictive, so that public officials could conclude international treaties in a limited way, which was the following:

"Article 7°-- No authority may conclude pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic. Anyone who does so shall be tried for treason to the Fatherland.

Any treaty or convention processed by the Executive Branch, referring to the territorial integrity or the political organization of the country, shall require the approval of the Legislative Assembly, by a vote of no less than three-quarters of the total of its members and that of two-thirds of the votes of a Constituent Assembly convened for that purpose." A strict reading of the transcribed article gives rise to impracticability and automatic contradiction, improper of constitutional reasoning with public international law, based on an exacerbated anti-Central American Federation sentiment, but which ignored a basic foundation of representative democracy, precisely the effects of the free exercise of sovereignty, in the freely expressed will (by the parliamentary majorities that approve a commitment acquired by the Executive Branch), and that allows acquiring and granting mutually or multilaterally concerted international rights and obligations by different States. The international obligation acquired by a country in public international law implies certainty in the manner in which they must conduct themselves in the international order, as it acquires rights, as well as duties to others, and vice versa. Hence, our country underwent an important structural reform in 1968 when it modified the normative hierarchy of international law, given that Article 7 of the Political Constitution originally established that extreme, protectionist position against a strong Executive Branch, perhaps a provision that certainly represented the fear of the original constituent power against those hegemonic Executive Branches typical of Latin American countries. But, after a thorough, measured political and social analysis, and seeing things in a perspective for the benefit of the country, when the waters returned to their normal level after 1949, it was decided to open the pragmatic mechanism for incorporating international law into the legal system. Precisely, the explanatory statement of the legislative reform operated through Law 4123 of May 29, 1968, clearly describes the protectionist aims of the reformed Article 7, in the following manner:

"Article 7.- This article enshrined the conservative criterion of the majority of the constituents of 1949, who felt a profound hostility towards any form of rapprochement with the Central American countries. Within that nationalist zeal, they went too far, by pointing out in the first paragraph that anyone who concluded 'pacts, treaties, or conventions that oppose the sovereignty and independence of the Republic' would be considered a traitor to the Fatherland. Every treaty, pact, or convention constitutes a limitation of the sovereignty or independence of any country. If said first paragraph were to be applied strictly, all the rulers that the country has had from 1949 onwards would have to be tried for such a grave crime. We believe that said paragraph should be suppressed, as it is dangerous." That correction, accurate and adjusted to international law, prevails today in Article 7 of the Political Constitution. Historical reasons weighed in to proceed with said modification, because if economic integration with Central America was intended, it had to be privileged for the economic and development benefits, which was finally solved through the hierarchical placement of international law. In the discussion of the constitutional reform, the following can be cited:

"If treaties and concordats are not given superior authority over ordinary law, we will have the constant presence of conflicts, of legal antinomies (sic) as they are called, of norms that clash, norms that provide contrary things, and that would constantly force us to resort to unconstitutionality or the inapplicability of one of these norms before our courts. This would undermine the Central American common market, and could place us in a bad predicament. That is why it is necessary to make this innovation, to take this step of placing the treaty (sic), the convention, the concordat in a status superior to ordinary law, so that the current law remains subordinated to this superior conception of the treaty (sic). This is, I repeat, a legal institute of community law. This is a modification of the traditional law of the common forms that each norm governs within its specific area or territorial sphere, within a certain scope in which sovereignty is exercised by a State, and it breaks into other territories, over other persons, over other sovereignties, imposing provisions, without having diminished the value of each of the countries. It is a healthy norm, it is an advisable norm, and it is the only solution there is to avoid the conflict of the treaty with the current norm." In this sense, the derived constituent power opted for a practical solution to the problem of legal antinomies, so that once an international treaty is approved by the Legislative Assembly and ratified by the Executive Branch, it is incorporated into national law with a privileged position within the legal system. This is logical, consistent, and clearly less erosive for the objectives proposed by the High Contracting Parties, in the face of freely assumed obligations, to have international law incorporated with the potency and sufficient resistance to impose the terms of the Treaty and not be modified by ordinary and regulatory legislation that contradicts it or is in contradiction with it. The reason lies in the obligation to honor the commitments freely acquired by the contracting countries in good faith: the principle pacta sunt servanda and bona fides.

On the other hand, the reservations and declarations made by the delegation that signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear the express recognition of the meaning of Article 27, of the importance that a party could not invoke the provisions of its domestic law, such as the lack of ordinary legislation, to fail to comply with a treaty. The provisions of the Political Constitution were already discussed above. Hence, rightly, the Chamber, when examining the unconstitutionality of an international treaty, must first opt for an interpretation in accordance with Constitutional Law, as provided by Article 73, subsection e) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, so that "the declaration shall be made only for the purposes of interpreting and applying them in harmony with the Constitution or, if their contradiction with it proves irreconcilable, ordering their non-application with general effects and proceeding to their denunciation." Conforming interpretation is preferable before proceeding to the denunciation of international obligations, or worse, to the commission of violations that would entail multiple consequences, many of which may go beyond economic sanctions, prestige and recognition, including participation in cooperation forums and receiving international assistance. Likewise, the principle of supremacy of International Law is unequivocally demonstrated. The foregoing implies that a treaty could be contrary to the Political Constitution, but not when it contradicts ordinary national legislation, which, by its hierarchy, would be tacitly or expressly modified by the Treaty, and the implementing law (in the case of non-self-executing treaties), which must expressly indicate whether the legislation maintains certain norms of the legal system despite the approval of the Treaty.

The plaintiff mentions the violation of various social security principles, such as service at cost, universality, sufficiency of protection, automaticity of protection, extraordinary benefits, and irrevocability. In reality, regarding some, what the plaintiff points out are some of the legal provisions governing work-related risk established in the Labor Code, so that the principle alleged by the plaintiff and the intervening parties, that paragraph 4 of Article 73 of the Political Constitution establishes a field of attraction for the rights contemplated in the Labor Code, and therefore, they cannot be modified even by law, does not apply. However, viewed prudentially, the legislator has the competence to ensure the effectiveness of many of these principles as long as they are compatible with international obligations, even under the liberalization of the insurance market. In this sense, a truism is that the Labor Code must be interpreted in accordance with the market opening, so that if Article 205 of the Labor Code establishes the Instituto Nacional de Seguros as the entity administering the insurance, this was clearly modified by the Treaty and the implementing Laws, to give rise to SUGESE and its powers. For example, the principle of service at cost that is claimed would be a contradiction with the operation of a commercial activity, which would be within the powers of SUGESE to establish the mechanisms that allow obtaining a reasonable profit. But, the constitutional foundation of Work-Related Risk Insurance is compatible with the principle of universality, sufficiency of protection or social floor of the insurance, the automaticity of ILO Convention 102, and the irrevocability of Article 74 of the Political Constitution, which the Chamber cannot say are violated either. It should be noted that when international instruments refer to a basic regime, one of fundamental protections in social insurances, it means the establishment of a legal regime that grants certain rights to medical benefits and compensation in cases of occupational and work-related accidents, regardless of who provides it. In this sense, the State has a leading role at various levels: first, as the moderator of commercial activity by establishing conditions and requirements for non-discriminatory operation among the different market participants; and second, it means that it must also agree on the necessary conditions so that internationally enforceable benefits continue to be effective in its jurisdiction, even by participating in the market as established in Law No. 8622, and which in turn reforms Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924. Article 28 of Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, establishes, among other things, in the fourth paragraph that:

“… The Superintendency shall govern its activities by the provisions of this Law, its regulations, and other applicable laws. The general norms and directives issued by the Superintendency shall be of mandatory observance for the supervised entities and persons.

The Superintendency is an operationally independent and responsible body in the exercise of its functions; it has sufficient powers, legal protection, and financial resources to execute its functions and exercise its powers. Likewise, it must adopt clear, transparent, and consistent regulation and supervision, and must employ, train, and maintain a sufficient work team with high professional standards, who follow the appropriate standards of confidentiality.” Furthermore, Article 29 of the same regulatory body establishes:

“Objectives and functions of the Superintendencia General de Seguros The purpose of the Superintendency is to ensure the stability and efficient functioning of the insurance market, as well as to provide the broadest information to the insured. To this end, it shall authorize, regulate, and supervise the natural or legal persons that intervene in the acts or contracts related to the insurance, reinsurance activity, public offering, and the conduct of insurance business.

…

Additionally, the following functions shall correspond to it:

a) …

b) …

• j)Issue other technical or operational norms and directives.

k) …

q).” In these functions, at present, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros continues operating in the Insurance Market, in addition to providing the same mandatory insurance services, operating, for the advantage of the uninsured worker, with a residual capacity, as well as the established guarantee that the private company contracted by an employer must assume the worker even if it omitted to report them, as an uninsured worker. In this sense, there is no affectation of the universal principle of protection of work-related risk insurance, automaticity of protection, sufficiency of protection, among others. In this sense, it is important to highlight that the fourth paragraph of Article 1 of the aforementioned Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924 establishes:

“In the development of insurance activity in the country, which includes the administration of commercial insurance, the administration of the Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo and the Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, the INS shall have the full guarantee of the State.” Several important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing, because, coupled with what is established by the Free Trade Agreement, in that it contains enforceable obligations that are past due, the legal provisions and regulations that are issued are done in honor of the execution of the international obligations acquired by the country. The foregoing is consistent with the second level mentioned, insofar as the State, through its insurer, provides the measures to guarantee that necessary social floor to maintain occupational health levels and a work-related risk regime, is clearly in line with the Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, approved by the Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero through Article 8, numeral I, of the minutes of session 894-2010, held on December 10, 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 of December 22, 2010). In this sense, the mentioned Regulation establishes:

“Article 20. Cases of uninsured workers If the worker is not insured against work-related risks, in accordance with the Labor Code, the Instituto Nacional de Seguros shall grant them all the benefits that would have corresponded to them had they been insured, except in those cases where the employer had a valid Work-Related Risk policy with any insurance entity and omitted to report the worker to be considered within the insurance protection. In those cases, the workers shall be considered as uninsured and the benefits shall be the responsibility of the insurance entity receiving the premium.” The supposed economic impact of that State guarantee is not strictly a constitutional issue, but rather it is the exclusive province of the legislator to establish the necessary economic measures to compensate for a presumed negative impact that the Institution could have, so that it acts in favor of the population of workers not covered by the Employer against work-related risks, whether private or public. In the Chamber's opinion, the article reinforces the position of the worker, instead of weakening it, since the work-related risk insurance has not lost its mandatory, universal, and compulsory nature as is intended to be pointed out in the brief filing the action. Additionally, the regulatory power of SUGESE emanates directly from the Free Trade Agreement, from the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, among other norms, from which arises the obligation to treat the different market actors in a non-discriminatory manner, but also, with the possibility of regulating the matters it detects are necessary of a technical and operational nature for better service for workers who suffer an occupational risk, which includes interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code.

VI.- Conclusion. For all the foregoing reasons, the action is declared without merit.

Por tanto:

The action is declared without merit. Magistrate Calzada Miranda gives different reasons regarding the standing of the plaintiff deputy. Magistrate Calzada and Magistrates Armijo and Cruz dissent and declare the action with merit with its consequences.

.

Ana Virginia Calzada M. President Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate Ch.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712 Voto particular de la Magistrada Calzada Miranda y los Magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro, con redacción del último We, the undersigned Magistrates, dissent in this action and consider that it should be declared with merit, with its consequences, based on the following.

Sub-subsection b), of Article III.2, of Section H, of Anexo 12.9.2, of Chapter 12 “Servicios Financieros”, of the Tratado de Libre Comercio between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, ratified by Costa Rica through Law No. 8622 of November 21, 2007, and Transitory III of the Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, approved through Law No. 8653 of July 22, 2008, insofar as they provide for the market opening of work-related risk insurance, present a constitutional friction.

The plaintiff considers that said regulations: 1. Violate the constitutional principles that protect social insurances (Arts. 50, 73, and 74) by denaturing it and converting it into a for-profit commercial service. He indicates that work-related risk insurance is a constitutionally protected social insurance. He indicates that the Constitutional Chamber and international treaties have recognized that this insurance is part of the social security system (SCV 2008-16964, ILO Convention No. 102, Protocol of San Salvador Art. 9), and that work-related risk insurance is part of the fundamental right to social security, which is governed by principles such as mandatory nature, service at cost, universality, irrevocability, and others. Which is incompatible with equating it to just another financial service. 2. Violate the principle of progressiveness of fundamental rights: by reducing the benefits that workers currently have, decreasing and worsening the current advantages. Currently all income must be allocated to improvements for the benefit of workers.

**In This Regard**, the undersigned Magistrates consider that the claimant is correct in his arguments and that the fact that the constituent assembly included occupational hazard insurance (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) within the Chapter of Social Rights and Guarantees of the Political Constitution demonstrates that it is not a simple civil liability insurance, but rather a social insurance, which even though it may be governed by special provisions (that is to say, different from those of the other insurances) does not thereby cease to have the character of social insurance.

The challenged norms, insofar as they allow the inclusion of occupational hazard insurance (seguro contra riesgos del trabajo) within the commercial opening provided for in the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic, **are unconstitutional**; this is so even if a law is subsequently enacted that protects the principles governing that insurance (among them the principle of universality and that of progressiveness) and regulates aspects such as the care of uninsured workers, the manner of distributing the costs of that care among the different insurers, matters relating to the insurance of unattractive activities, matters related to prevention in occupational health, among others.

This type of insurance, by being constitutionally enshrined in Article 73 (and despite the fact that it does not state there that it shall be administered monopolistically by the INS), is a type of social insurance (and therefore, subject to certain principles for the benefit of workers), which, consequently, is incompatible with a system of commercial opening (competition, profit).

Historically, occupational hazard insurance dates back to the year 1868, when Father Francisco Calvo had associated artisans (mainly shoemakers, bakers, and mule tenders) with the object of establishing a Savings Bank (Caja de Ahorros) (see the Official Gazette of November 9, 1868), as a kind of differentiated assistance for the working class.

This insurance underwent its own evolution. Before the theory of "social-labor risk" triumphed, the fault of the employer was initially required to establish liability, then it moved from Roman fault to contractual fault, or through the intervention of evidence, that is, it was not the worker who had to prove the employer's fault, but rather the latter who had to demonstrate that he had not been culpable or negligent in the distribution and organization of work.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the first formal attempts to provide true protection to the working class against labor misfortunes are located. On June 26, 1907, the then-deputy Enrique Pinto Fernández presented to Congress a bill on workplace accidents consisting of 16 articles. On May 24, 1910, the delegation of the province of Heredia, headed by Lic. Alfredo González Flores and supported by Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla and Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas, presented to Congress a bill to create the "Welfare Fund (Caja de Previsión)". On May 16, 1913, Deputy Alberto Vargas Calvo presented another legislative proposal on workplace accidents, with a total of 30 articles. Due to different circumstances, none of the previous projects received the necessary acceptance to become law.

In April 1924, the discussion of the Occupational Hazard Law (Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo) or the Accident Compensation Law (Ley de Reparación de Accidentes) was suspended, and discussion immediately began on the bill to create the National Insurance Bank (Banco Nacional de Seguros), which culminated with the enactment of Law No. 12 of October 30, 1924, which gave rise to this Institution. Thus, the National Insurance Bank took charge of the administration of insurances, the monopoly of which remains in the hands of the Costa Rican State.

Once the creation of the National Insurance Bank was concluded, the discussion of the bill to establish the "Law on compensation for workplace accidents (Ley de reparación de accidentes de trabajo)" continued, a discussion that concluded with the approval of Law No. 53 of January 31, 1925, on accident compensation, and it is stated "the National Insurance Institute is going to administer the occupational hazard regime (régimen de riesgos de trabajo)". The INS created the Workers' Department (Departamento Obrero), as the entity responsible for administering this Law, which would later be called the Occupational Hazards Department (Departamento de Riesgos del Trabajo).

This Law No. 53 changes, undergoes several reforms, and in the year 1943, when the Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) is enacted, the Law on Accident Compensation is incorporated into the Labor Code. At that moment, in 1943, the Costa Rican Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) already exists. It had been created in November 1941. Such that here a first major discussion arises. If now that the Social Security Fund exists, should we give occupational hazards to the Fund or leave them with the INS.

There is a very interesting message from Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia to Congress, where he points out, among other things, that given that the National Insurance Institute has 18 years of experience in handling workplace accidents, he considers it prudent that this congress keep occupational hazards in the hands of the National Insurance Institute, and indeed the Labor Code is approved and the administration is kept in the hands of the Institute.

In 1949, when the current Political Constitution was enacted, there was debate on the famous Article 73 regarding the convenience or not of the administration of Occupational Hazards in the hands of the Institute. Again, the need was raised for occupational hazards to be in the hands of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund. The Legislative Assembly, the Constituent Assembly in this case, which drafted this Political Constitution, ratified that the occupational hazard regime (régimen de riesgos del trabajo) should continue to be differentiated, as it had been until that moment, and remain in the hands of the National Insurance Institute.

In 1961, when Article 177 of the Political Constitution was modified by Law No. 2738, the Legislative Assembly again maintained the position that Occupational Hazards should continue to be administered by the National Insurance Institute. This circumstance does not modify the condition that constitutionally corresponds to occupational hazard insurances.

In 1982, when the Legislative Assembly approved Law No. 6727, which refers to the modification of Title IV of the Labor Code, it again ratified the advisability of Occupational Hazards continuing to be administered by the INS, and made some modifications:

· The concept of Occupational Hazards is expanded (Article 195).

· Occupational Hazard insurance is declared obligatory, universal, and compulsory (Article 201).

· The concept of Occupational Health appears, linked to promoting and maintaining the highest level of physical, mental, and social well-being of the worker (Article 273).

· In accordance with the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Article 66), a set of responsibilities is assigned to the employer regarding the insurance, the risk, and prevention (Articles 214, 215, and 284).

· The worker is granted benefits (Articles 218 and 221) but also obligations, as established in Articles 285 and 286 of the said Code.

Today, we were in the presence of a totally consolidated Social Security regime, through the administration that for more than 70 years has been carried out, with sufficient financial reserves, to provide care such as that which has been provided.

As can be seen from the excerpt of the Minutes of the National Constituent Assembly, contrary to what is stated in the majority vote, the idea was rather to unify occupational hazard insurance with the CCSS and not for this to be left to the discretion of the legislator so that in the future there would be commercial opening.

The deputy VOLIO JIMENEZ "there are several principles that cannot be left out of this discussion, principles that he then proceeded to enumerate. Firstly, it must be a single institution that encompasses all insurances. One of the failures of social insurances in some countries -such as Chile- has been due precisely to the multiplication of Funds. The technicians who came to our country recommended unity in this aspect. Secondly, it is known that the greater number of associates is what guarantees the success of social insurances (...) On the other hand, Social Insurance is based on mutuality, that is, on the cooperation of all to achieve the good of the greatest number." Minute No. 125.- One hundred twenty-fifth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the eighth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.

The deputy VOLIO "since the year 1924 the Law on Workplace Accidents was enacted, entrusting the Insurance Bank -an essentially commercial institution- to take charge of that risk. Once our social insurance has been strengthened, then occupational hazard insurances should be assigned to the Social Insurance. For the moment, the Fund is not in a capacity to assume those risks. Therefore, the logical thing is to leave things as they are currently, avoiding the problem that arises so that it can be resolved in due time and with more thoroughness." Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.

Deputy FACIO. "After November 8th, the Social Security Fund and the National Insurance Institute will continue working -as they have done until now-. If things are left as they are, no one has any reason to be alarmed. However, the possibility remains open so that in the future an adequate solution to the problem of the unification of social insurances can be found, after mature and thoughtful analysis and studies of the different aspects of the problem." Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine.

Mr. MONTEALEGRE stated that, in his opinion, the National Insurance Institute is a commercial Bank. The Fund, on the other hand, he considers a charitable institution, since it does not profit in any way. He thinks that the only way to resolve the problem of social insurances is by creating for the Fund the necessary revenues so that it can fulfill its mission. Hence, the problem can be resolved by agreeing that a part of the profits of the Insurance Bank will pass to the Fund. (Minute No. 126.- One hundred twenty-sixth minute of the session held by the National Constituent Assembly at fifteen hundred hours on the ninth day of August, nineteen forty-nine).

The preceding excerpts demonstrate the full incorporation of occupational hazards into social insurances. The very nature of these hazards allows them to be considered part of social insurances. Occupational hazards are not an annex or aggregate that can be detached from the definition and the constitutional limitations imposed by the fundamental norm. The norm speaks of social insurances in a broad sense, for this reason it is not admissible to assume that the mention of insurance against professional hazards mentioned in the last paragraph is not integrated within the concept of social insurances that the constitution defines. The special nature of the provisions governing this type of insurance does not deconstitutionalize professional hazard insurance. The discussion in the constituent assembly never evidenced the intention to recognize a professional hazard insurance with a juridically and constitutionally different condition from the social insurances casually referred to in the first three paragraphs of Article seventy-three of the constitution. There is no reason to vary the constitutional legal nature of these insurances, because it is located in a norm that is what gives it that condition.

Therefore, occupational hazard insurance is a constitutionally enshrined social insurance, governed by several principles, which commercial opening legislation does not protect and which it also cannot protect, since a norm of legal rank will never be sufficient and suitable to make social security compatible with a market system.

By the very nature of social occupational hazard insurance (seguro social de riesgos del trabajo), whose reason for being is to ensure the compensation of the worker when, on the occasion or as a consequence of the work he performs, he suffers an accident or an illness, and which functions in our country in an obligatory, universal, and compulsory manner, it is incompatible for it to operate under a market scheme and under the law of supply and demand. The Constituent Assembly had all of this in mind when it decided to include this type of insurance within the chapter on social insurances, precisely because it functions as a social insurance and not as an individual insurance, subject to supply and demand.

For the reasons set forth, we consider that this action must be granted, with all its consequences, that is, proceeding to annul the unconstitutional provisions of the Treaty in question.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Gilberth Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C. Magistrado Magistrado Note by Magistrada Calzada. Different reasons regarding the standing (legitimación) of the petitioner. The majority opinion defines that although Mr. Villalta [Name 001] derives his standing (legitimación) from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos), his standing (legitimación) to file the action is recognized on the basis that it must be understood that he is filing it “in favor of an indeterminate group of workers whose rights (...) could be harmed (...) even if they were under the coverage of a workplace hazard insurance policy” (sic); that is, the majority opinion determines that the petitioner's standing (legitimación) comes from this defense in favor of an indeterminate group of workers, and not necessarily from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). In this regard, I believe that the petitioner Deputy's standing (legitimación) also derives from the defense of diffuse interests (intereses difusos). As noted in Considerando II of this same judgment, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) should not be confused with collective interests, nor should they be understood in such broad terms that they become confused with the interests of the national community; in other words, they are interests whose ownership belongs to groups of people not formally organized, “but united by a specific social need,” which is why “any individual can act in defense of those assets that affect the national community,” without being confused with the possibility that “any person may come before the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) in protection of just any interests.” The precision that the majority opinion attempts to formulate is that even in the case of the defense of an indeterminate group of workers, this does not constitute the existence of a diffuse interest (interés difuso) that would grant the petitioner the standing (legitimación) provided for in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. It is my opinion that in the case under study, the presence of that diffuse interest (interés difuso) is indeed configured, which is based not only on the existence of that indeterminate group of workers, but also on the fact that, due to the subject matter intended to be regulated, it indeed concerns a matter in which a general interest of the population does exist. It must be kept in mind that, as indicated in this same judgment, the nature of workplace hazard insurance implies that it is consubstantial with the social security regime chosen by our country when configuring the system of the Democratic and Social State of Law (Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho). In this sense, there exists an interest of the community in general, and not only of currently active workers, in the existence of social coverage against the hazards to which a worker may be subjected; it is clear that the primary interested party in these cases will be the worker –both for reasons of health and personal income–, but it must not be lost sight of that the social configuration of this type of insurance exists because other people besides the specific worker are involved. On the one hand, there is the worker's direct family, who obtains a good part of their subsistence possibilities from the work that he performs; there is also the employer's own condition, who finds in the workplace hazard regime solid backing against any misfortune, thereby helping to cover any eventual liability that could be imposed upon them; and there is also the State itself, which, through the existence of this type of insurance, contributes to social welfare in the aforementioned terms, while at the same time guaranteeing that the affected person receives the care they require so that they can rejoin active working life, and to the movement and dynamism of the national economy, in a timely and effective manner with the least harm to employers, workers, and their families. Additionally, unlike the majority opinion which repeatedly rejects the Deputy's standing (legitimación) by not recognizing direct standing (legitimación), the undersigned considers that they do possess it in certain cases. In my judgment, Deputies who hold that character by the Nation in accordance with the provisions of Article 106 of the Political Constitution, by the nature of their office, hold a representation of national interests, which gives them, in principle, a general standing (legitimación) to pursue those interests, although not necessarily to do so in all cases through the unconstitutionality action, but indeed when it comes to qualifying the circumstances of the 2nd paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, in particular, the management of diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or those that concern the community as a whole, and very particularly when it is precisely a matter of challenging provisions that directly impact a sphere of interests that completely transcend the individual and are, by definition, interests of the community they represent, as has been indicated above. Of course, this definition does not imply admitting the existence of a popular action (acción popular) -not provided for in the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- by just any person, nor does it permit free access through the unconstitutionality action to the holder of an interest merely because they are such and without meeting the legally established admissibility requirements. In conclusion, taking into account the importance of the subject of workplace hazards and the representation that a Deputy to the Legislative Assembly does generally hold, I believe that in addition to the standing (legitimación) recognized to the petitioner by the majority opinion, he must also be recognized the standing (legitimación) indicated in the second paragraph of Article 75 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

*100177120007CO* | EXPEDIENTE: | 10-017712-0007-CO | | PROCESO: | ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD | | ACCIONANTE: | [Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA | SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, at fifteen hours and thirty-three minutes on August eighth, two thousand thirteen.

Due to the sorrowful passing of Luis Paulino Mora Mora, let judgment number 2012016628 of sixteen hours and thirty minutes on November twenty-eighth, two thousand twelve, issued in this matter, be notified without his signature. The case file (expediente) will be archived in due course.

Gilbert Armijo S. Presidente a.i Sala Constitucional

*100177120007CO* Res. Nº 2012016628 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y treinta minutos del veintiocho de noviembre del dos mil doce.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por [Nombre 001] , mayor, costarricense, en unión libre, abogado, portador de la cédula de identidad número [Valor 001], vecino de Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, en su calidad de diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa para el período constitucional 2010-2014, contra el subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la sección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros” del Tratado de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, aprobado por ley número 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, así como el Transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, ley número 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008.

Resultando:

1.- Por escrito recibido en la Secretaría de la Sala a las trece horas veinticinco minutos del veintiuno de diciembre de 2010, el accionante solicita que se declare la inconstitucionalidad del subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la sección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros” del Tratado de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, aprobado por ley número 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, así como el Transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, ley número 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008. Alega que tales disposiciones lesionan los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política que tutelan los seguros sociales y del principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales, consagrado en los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos, al tenor de los numerales 7 y 48 de la Carta Fundamental, por la inclusión del seguro solidario de riesgos de trabajo en obligaciones de apertura comercial que implican la explotación mercantil y fines de lucro incompatibles con la naturaleza constitucional de ese seguro social. Asegura que la finalidad con tales disposiciones legales es convertir el seguro de riesgos del trabajo en un servicio comercial que sería explotado por empresas diversas al INS, con una clara intención lucrativa, aspecto que, a su parecer, infringe los principios constitucionales que protegen los seguros, en detrimento de las trabajadoras y trabajadores y de sus familias, al existir un riesgo contra el sistema de seguridad social. En su fundamento sobre la inconstitucionalidad de las normas que impugna, señala: “ (…) también debilita y pone en peligro la plena aplicación del principio de universalidad del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social, al permitir (sic) operadores privados exploten mercantilmente el seguro de riesgos del trabajo, sin imponerles obligación alguna de atender por igual a trabajadores y trabajadoras de todas las actividades laborales ni prohibición de seleccionar las actividades de bajo riesgo y alta rentabilidad. Todo esto atenta contra la efectiva realización del precepto contenido en el artículo 201 del Código de Trabajo, lesionando por ende preceptos constitucionales establecidos en los artículos 73 y 74 de la Carta Magna, en relación con el artículo 9.2 del Protocolo de San Salvador”. (Lo destacado pertenece al texto de origen). Además afirma, que las normas cuestionadas en la presente acción debilitan la tutela existente para las personas trabajadoras no aseguradas, al prevalecer, según su opinión, la competencia efectiva, en pro del régimen comercial y contra la protección integral del sector laboral. En ese orden de ideas, considera el quebranto del principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales, porque el citado Tratado modifica la regulación normativa vigente del seguro de riesgos del trabajo de manera que reduce los beneficios actuales de las personas trabajadoras, reforma que disminuye y desmejora las ventajas actuales obtenidas por las personas beneficiarias. Sintetiza que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo constituye un derecho fundamental de carácter prestacional, donde el Estado tiene la obligación de cumplimiento progresivo, aspecto que, en su criterio, debe circunscribirse “al respeto, protección, garantía y promoción” de tales derechos y, a modo de ilustración, cita la sentencia constitucional número 2007-1378. Concluye que los instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos humanos, como el Protocolo de San Salvador, deben predominar sobre tratados comerciales en caso de incompatibilidad, sostiene que la circunstancia de que, la norma impugnada esté incluida en un tratado internacional con rango superior a la ley (TLC-EUCARD) no la exonera de su inconstitucionalidad por infracción del principio de progresividad del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social. Por todo lo expuesto, solicita declarar con lugar la acción interpuesta.

2.- A efecto de fundamentar la legitimación que ostenta para promover esta acción de inconstitucionalidad, señala la lesión a intereses difusos o intereses de la colectividad en su conjunto, la que, a su vez, se traduce en una lesión individual para cada uno de las y los habitantes de la República, porque los seguros sociales otorgan una protección básica a todas las personas habitantes del país.

3.- Por resolución de las doce horas con doce minutos del siete de febrero del dos mil once, se le dio curso a la acción, confiriéndole audiencia a la Procuraduría General de la República.

4.- La señora Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, en su condición de Procuradora General de la República rindió su informe. Señala que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo tiene algunas características que podrían permitir catalogarlo como un seguro de responsabilidad civil del patrono, y otras que permitirían ubicarlo como un seguro social. En cuanto a lo primero, se sostiene que constituye un mecanismo para resguardar el patrimonio del patrono ante la eventualidad de un accidente o una enfermedad laboral que suponga su obligación de indemnizar al trabajador. Por ello corre por cuenta exclusiva del patrono, y no como en los seguros sociales financiados de forma tripartita con la contribución de los trabajadores, patrono y el Estado. Se protege directamente al patrono, indirectamente al trabajador y su familia. Además señala que el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo se presume la responsabilidad del patrono, derivada del ejercicio de su actividad lucrativa, mientras que en los seguros sociales, no es posible presumir la responsabilidad específica de alguno de los agentes que intervienen. Para quienes se trata de un seguro social sostienen que está revestido de un evidente interés público, para proteger al trabajador (como miembro de la sociedad y sujeto activo en la producción económica) contra los infortunios derivados del ejercicio de su trabajo. Si no fuera así, dicen, no tendría se implementen mecanismos para proteger a los trabajadores no asegurados. Al estar regulado por el constituyente en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, evidencia que no se trata de un simple seguro de responsabilidad civil, sino de un seguro social, que aun cuando pueda regirse por disposiciones especiales (valga decir, distintas a las de los otros seguros) no por ello deja de tener el carácter de seguro social. Las regulaciones básicas están en el Código de Trabajo, concebida para regular un sistema monopólico de seguros bajo el INS. Evidentemente, al entrar en vigencia el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, y al cumplirse los plazos para la apertura del mercado de seguros, debe entenderse que ese monopolio quedó tácitamente derogado; sin embargo, existe una serie de normas no vinculadas directamente con la apertura del mercado, sino con las características del seguro, que aún se encuentran vigentes. El artículo 193 del Código de Trabajo establece el principio de obligatoriedad del seguro, característica que refuerza su naturaleza de seguro social; el numeral 205 del mismo cuerpo normativo dispone que el INS debe hacer liquidaciones anuales que incluyan la formación de las reservas técnicamente necesarias, los excedentes deben pasar a formar parte de una reserva de reparto, donde se destinará 50% a financiar los programas que desarrolle el Consejo de Salud Ocupacional y el otro 50% a incorporar mejoras al régimen. En él se concreta el principio de servicio al costo, por lo que mientras se mantenga vigente, el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo debe funcionar –al menos en su cobertura básica- sin fines de lucro. De igual manera señalan los numerales 221 y 231 la obligación del INS de otorgar todas las prestaciones al trabajador no asegurado como si le hubiesen correspondido haber estado asegurado, subrogándose el derecho de accionar contra el patrono por los gastos en que hubiese incurrido. El seguro establece la posibilidad de acudir a los tribunales para cobrar al patrono las sumas erogadas, más sus intereses. En esas disposiciones se fundamenta el principio de universalidad. A nivel reglamentario, el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo se rige por el “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios”, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero (CONASSIF), mediante el artículo 8, numeral 1, de la sesión 894-2010, del 10 de diciembre de 2010 (publicado en La Gaceta No. 248 del 22 de diciembre de 2010). Define los requisitos mínimos de funcionamiento de los seguros sociales (artículo 1°), y es aplicable a las entidades aseguradoras en las categorías de seguros generales, seguros personales o mixtas (artículo 2). Se emitió con base en los artículos 25, 26, 27 y el transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. En este sentido, la Superintendencia de Seguros otorgará autorización administrativa para el ejercicio de la actividad aseguradora en el ámbito del seguro contra riesgos del trabajo “… siempre y cuando cumplan los términos, las condiciones y las especificaciones que se establecerán en el reglamento que para tal efecto dicte el Consejo Nacional, de acuerdo con la legislación nacional”. El Reglamento, en el artículo 8, prevé la posibilidad de ofrecer el seguro obligatorio con cualquier otro seguro voluntario (sin sujeción al servicio al costo), permitiendo mejor cobertura en caso de que el trabajador demande al patrono por hecho u omisión de éste último que hayan motivado el accidente laboral. El artículo 15 del Reglamento dispone que la póliza debe cubrir las prestaciones establecidas en el artículo 218 del Código de Trabajo y que los pagos de prestaciones económicas se regirán por el Código de Trabajo y por el Reglamento General de Riesgos de Trabajo emitido por el Poder Ejecutivo. El artículo 20 contiene una disposición donde el trabajor que no estuviese asegurado, el INS debe otorgarle las prestaciones, salvo aquellos casos en que el patrono tuviese vigente una póliza con cualquier otra entidad aseguradora y omitiera reportar al trabajador, supuesto en el cual las prestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad aseguradora que recibió la prima. La Procuraduría no estima que la apertura del mercado de seguros sea en sí misma contraria a la Constitución. Señala a Argentina como un ejemplo donde operan organizaciones de esta naturaleza, pero además expresa que la participación de empresas privadas dentro del sistema de seguridad social no es novedosa. Puntualiza a la Ley de Protección al Trabajador, el sistema de seguridad social en materia de pensiones quedó conformado por cuatro pilares. Dentro de ese esquema existe participación privada, bajo un régimen de competencia, con ánimo de lucro, sin que ello haya sido estimado, por sí mismo, como contrario a la Constitución Política. Las normas establecen que debe funcionar al costo, sin embargo, a juicio de la Procuraduría, la participación de empresas privadas, con ánimo de lucro, en la comercialización del seguro contra riesgos del trabajo, no es contraria a la Constitución, siempre que se emita la normativa de rango legal que tutele, como mínimo, los beneficios que se le han otorgado hasta el momento a los trabajadores. No existe norma alguna, de rango constitucional, que establezca que el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo deba funcionar al costo, o sin fines de lucro. El propio artículo 73 de la Constitución Política remite a disposiciones especiales, lo que evidencia que existe cierta flexibilidad para definir el funcionamiento de ese seguro, siempre que no implique una desmejora de los derechos de los trabajadores. En el criterio del órgano asesor, el INS debe atender a los trabajadores no asegurados, lo que podría poner en peligro su competitividad, aun cuando el “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguro Obligatorios”, considera insuficiente para equilibrar las obligaciones de las diferentes aseguradoras con respecto al INS y, en definitiva, para asegurar el cumplimiento del principio de universalidad. La inconstitucionalidad no está en las normas, sino en la ausencia de disposiciones legales que regule la materia. El reglamento no puede variar el Código de Trabajo respecto de no atender a los trabajadores no asegurados, por el principio de jerarquía normativa; y porque el propio transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros establece que ese reglamento debe dictarse “de acuerdo con la legislación Nacional”. De no actuar así, iría en contra no solamente del principio de universalidad, sino también del de progresividad, pues podría ocurrir que la protección con que cuenta en la actualidad toda clase trabajadora del país se vea reducida a solamente una parte de ella. Existe una obligación de rango constitucional, de emitir una legislación social que tutele el principio de universalidad y de progresividad en beneficio de los trabajadores del país.

5.- Los edictos a que se refiere el párrafo segundo del artículo 81 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional fueron publicados en los números 39, 40 y 41 del Boletín Judicial, de los días 24, 25 y 28 de febrero de 2011.

6.- Por escritos presentados por Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños y Lucía Ramírez Segura (BPDC), Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega (Servicio Paz y Justicia en Costa Rica), Alexander Rodríguez Chaves (Municipalidad de San Ramón), Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo (estudiante), Marvin Rodríguez Cordero (SEC), Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada (SITEPP), Mélida Cedeño Castro (APSE), Albino Vargas Barrantes (ANEP) solicitaron, en sus respectivas condiciones, a la Sala que les tuviera como coadyuvantes activos en la presente acción. De igual manera cuestionan las normas impugnadas en sus condiciones de trabajadores y ciudadanos beneficiarios y usuarios de los seguros sociales, por considerar que lesionan los principios constitucionales que protegen los seguros sociales, derivados de los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Carta Magna, afectando concretamente el seguro solidario de riesgos del trabajo. Indican que las normas impugnadas obligan a Costa Rica a permitir la explotación comercial lucrativa de este seguro social y solidario a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. A su vez, la nota al pie de página número 21 del Tratado (Capítulo 12) reconoce que esta obligación se refiere al seguro social de riesgos del trabajo contemplado en el párrafo cuarto del numeral 73 de la Constitución Política. La nota 29 refuerza lo anterior, al aclarar que el Anexo 12.9.2 no se aplicará a los seguros sociales consignados en los párrafos primero, segundo y tercero del artículo 73 de la Carta Magna y administrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), pero excluyendo los seguros sociales de riesgos del trabajo, a pesar de que estos también tienen rango constitucional y se rigen por los mismos principios. Por último, la nota 22 reafirma la afectación a los principios constitucionales que protegen al seguro social del riesgo del trabajo, ya que dispone que Costa Rica no tendrá que reformar sus regulaciones sobre este seguro (Código de Trabajo), siempre que dichas regulaciones “sean consistentes” con las obligaciones del Anexo 12.9.2, a sabiendas de que la explotación comercial con fines de lucro del seguro social y solidario de riesgos de trabajo es incompatible con la naturaleza y los principios en que se basa ese seguro e implica un retroceso en cuanto a los niveles de protección alcanzados por el país (afectación al principio de progresividad). Por otra parte, el Transitorio III de la “Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, incluye Reforma Integral a la Ley No. 12 de 30 de octubre de 1924”, Ley No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, publicada en el Alcance No. 30 de La Gaceta No. 152 del 7 de agosto de 2008. Reitera la obligación contenida en el Tratado de Libre Comercio y tiene por finalidad implementar dicha obligación, al establecer que la Superintendencia de Pensiones deberá otorgar “autorizaciones” para la explotación comercial del seguro social y solidario de riesgos del trabajo, a partir del 1° de enero de 2011. En este sentido, dicha norma se encuentra afectada por los mismos vicios de constitucionalidad. Coinciden con el diputado [Nombre 001] en cuanto a los alcances de la acción, de los artículos 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política y se encuentra cubierto por los principios de solidaridad, universalidad y servicio al costo. Si se permite su explotación comercial con fines de lucro, estos principios resultarían seriamente afectados, lesionando los derechos de las personas trabajadoras que sufren accidentes y enfermedades laborales, siendo este la amenaza más grave que han enfrentado las garantías sociales en los últimos años.

7.- José Antonio Muñoz Fonseca, en su condición de Presidente de la Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio, presenta escrito como coadyuvante pasivo de la acción de inconstitucionalidad, con suficientes facultades para intervenir en el proceso, señala aspectos generales de la competencia de la Sala, así como de los limitados efectos que tiene el derecho nacional sobre las obligaciones del derecho internacional público. Si el Estado se viera en la obligación de denunciar el Tratado, habría un desconocimiento de la voluntad del soberano expresada en referéndum el 7 de octubre de 2007, la eliminación de la seguridad jurídica para los consumidores, importadores, inversionistas y exportadores, y habría que pronunciarse en su totalidad. Ahora bien, contrario a lo afirmado por el accionante, la Sala se ha pronunciado sobre la apertura de seguros de riesgos de trabajo en sentencias anteriores como la número 2007-9469. El representante de la Asociación sostiene que el seguro obligatorio contra riesgos de trabajo no califica como, ni es, un seguro social según lo define el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. En todo caso, destaca que la conveniencia o inconveniencia no es igual a la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de una norma (sentencia 1994-7005), de ahí que considera que el accionante hace juicios de valor haciendo hincapié en la inconveniencia de las normas impugnadas. La omisión legislativa o administrativa para dar eficacia a una norma no conlleva la inconstitucionalidad de la norma misma, además señala que toda restricción a la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos debe interpretarse restrictivamente, lo que quedó entronizado en la sentencia No. 1992-3550. Señala que si bien es claro que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo es mencionado en el artículo 73 de la Constitución, es imperativo que esta Sala armonice su existencia con la libertad individual que tienen todos los habitantes de nuestro país (patronos y trabajadores por igual) de elegir entre distintas entidades que ofrezcan cobertura con los riesgos del trabajo. Considera que el seguro no forma parte de los seguros sociales, conforme son éstos definidos por la Constitución Política y, por ende, no se rige por los mismos principios o disposiciones del párrafo tercero del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. Argumenta que la apertura de los seguros de riesgos del trabajo no violenta en forma alguna las prestaciones y protecciones que dicho seguro provee a los ciudadanos, y el artículo 74 de la Constitución Política no impide que se modifique la forma de prestación del seguro de riesgos de trabajo. Si bien acepta que los seguros contra riesgos profesionales se encuentran reconocidos constitucional-mente, son seguros sociales lo que exclusivamente protegen a los trabajadores contra los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine, conforme administrados y gobernados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social mediante un sistema de contribución tripartita. Para el coadyuvante deben cumplirse con una serie de características de estos seguros sociales que no tiene el seguro de riesgos de trabajo, en temas de cobertura, forma de financiación, al amparo de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social y los fondos no podrán ser transferidos ni empleados en finalidades distintas a las que motivaron su creación. Por voluntad del constituyente se separó y diferenció esos seguros con el seguro de riesgo de trabajo, según quedó regulado por el artículo 1 de la Ley Constitutiva de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Si bien podría considerarse que forma parte del derecho a la seguridad social que contribuye en la asistencia solidaria al trabajador, y de que existe un reconocimiento como tal, no implica que dicho seguro esté definido por el artículo 73 ni su párrafo 3° sea aplicable. La sentencia No. 2008-16964 estableció con claridad la delimitación que el seguro de riesgo de trabajo es un régimen que el constituyente estableció por separado y el cual se rige por reglas diferentes. Considera correcto que la Sala en la sentencia llegue a la consideración que la protección que otorgan los seguros sociales y los seguros de riesgos de trabajo no es excluyente, en cuanto a la percepción de sus respectivos beneficios. Además de que coexisten en nuestro ordenamiento dos sistemas, uno de seguridad social a cargo de la Caja, y otro de seguro contra los riesgos profesionales a cargo del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, cuyas características y fuentes de financiamiento son distintas. Así se delimita los seguros a cargo de la Caja y del INS. Cita jurisprudencia de la Sala y opiniones de la Procuraduría General de la República en la que señalan que los seguros sociales son exclusivamente aquellos que proteger a los trabajadores contra riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine, conforme administrados y gobernados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social mediante un sistema de contribución tripartita. En ese sentido, la tesis del accionante de considerar al seguro de riesgo del trabajo como un seguro social regido por los mismos principios establecidos en el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política es errónea. No cabe la tesis del accionante bajo ningún supuesto, dada la separación del sistema general y porque se rigen por disposiciones especiales. La determinación de un potencial costo adicional o lucro estaría sujeta a las disposiciones especiales. Muchas de las manifestaciones del accionante son simples aseveraciones y opiniones personales que, al no estar fundamentadas en criterios doctrinales, sentencias relevantes, cambios normativos, o cualquier otra justificación o fuente relevante, no expresan otra cosa más que el sentir personal del accionante hacia la apertura comercial. El Código de Trabajo tiene incólumes las reglas sobre la prestación, universalidad, obligatoriedad y demás características del seguro de riesgos del trabajo, incluyendo expresamente que los casos no asegurados seguirán siendo atendidos por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. No hay desnaturalización del seguro obligatorio de riesgos del trabajo. El núcleo fundamental del seguro de riesgos del trabajo, en lo que atañe a la protección del trabajador, no sería variado por la apertura comercial o incluso por un potencial lucro, toda vez que éste no dejaría de ser universal, obligatorio y solidario. Sigue siendo obligatorio, universal para todos los trabajadores que deben ser asegurados por sus patronos, sería siendo solidario por cuanto será pagada siempre por el patrono, los no asegurados serán atendidos por el INS. Por sentencia 1998-6450 la Sala analizó el artículo 236 del Código de Trabajo, para concluir que no es inconstitucional, sino que más bien su desarrollo cumple con el mandato constitucional de desarrollar legislativa y reglamentariamente la garantía social del derecho al subsidio. El artículo 74 no garantiza la inmutabilidad de las normas, ya que todo desarrollo normativo cumple con el mandato constitucional de regir el seguro mediante disposiciones especiales, pero además, no implica renuncia, ni que no se pueda ampliar o reducir. En desacuerdo con el accionante, señala que el alcance del derecho a la seguridad social es preeminentemente definido por el legislador. En este sentido, se apoya en la sentencia No. 1998-06450 en cuanto señala a la legitimidad democrática que le corresponde a la Asamblea Legislativa, a la que le compete detallar el contenido del derecho a la seguridad social. Por otra parte, el principio de progresividad, a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Sala, no se ha violentado, pues para ello se debe acreditar que la medida tomada implica una disminución en las prestaciones recibidas por el ciudadano. El accionante supone por el mero hecho de permitir que otras entidades presenten el servicio de seguros de riesgos de trabajo, que la cobertura y calidad del mismo se verá deteriorada, pero sobre esto no hay evidencia alguna. Por el contrario, la apertura viene a garantizar el derecho de todo habitante a elegir entre varios operadores de seguros, de conformidad con el artículo 46 constitucional. Solicita declarar sin lugar la acción.

8.- Freddy Sandí Brenes, Secretario General de la Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (en adelante UPINS) se apersona como coadyuvante. Alega en cuanto a la legitimación le viene dada por los fines encomendados a UPINS en sus estatutos, artículo 5, incisos b), d), g) y n), además de la representación que le corresponde en nombre de los trabajadores del INS en relación con los riesgos del trabajo. Sobre las conclusiones de la Procuraduría, recalca el hecho que ésta llega a la conclusión de que el seguro social de riesgos del trabajo realmente es un derecho y una garantía social. Aduce que la recomendación planteada por la Procuraduría, donde se propone que al no resultar las normas impugnadas inconstitucionales, debe promulgarse una legislación que garantice los principios de universalidad, solidaridad y progresividad. Sostiene que una legislación de apertura que garantice esos principios llevaría a dos posible escenarios: a) una legislación sin aparente roce constitucional que produce en la práctica una situación real de desprotección hacia cierto sector y de desventaja para el INS en materia de competencia y b) una legislación como la que propone la Procuraduría, podría ser violatoria de otros principios constitucionales, relacionados con la libertad de comercio, consagrado en los artículos 46 y 28 constitucionales, y competencia, llevándonos a la discusión filosófica en materia de Derechos Humanos, sobre si la solidaridad es posible imponerla en materia de comercio. Argumenta que las razones por las cuales la normativa impugnada resulta inconstitucional se encuentra en el modelo de Estado elegido por el constituyente, por lo que trae a colación si Costa Rica es un Estado Social de Derecho o un Estado Liberal de Derecho. Dilucidar lo anterior es esencial si se toma en cuenta que la apertura de un seguro social contra riesgos del trabajo, que se constituye en un verdadero derecho fundamental de los trabajadores, exige un especial juicio de valor acerca de los principios que subyacen en nuestra Constitución. Costa Rica se ha formado hasta hoy como un Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, regido entre otros por el principio cristiano de justicia social. Nuestros constituyentes soñaron con un Estado Social de Derecho y esa es la filosofía de nuestra Constitución Política y a través de la cual esta acción de inconstitucionalidad será resuelta. La meta principal del Estado Social de Derecho en Costa Rica, es ser un Estado del Bienestar y esta finalidad está plasmada por el constituyente en el primer párrafo del artículo 50 constitucional. Los constituyentes decidieron equilibrar las relaciones obrero-patronales, marcando en términos generales las siguientes garantías: a) permitir que los trabajadores obtuvieran a través de los sindicatos beneficios económicos, sociales y profesionales (artículo 60 constitucional), b) elevar a rango constitucional el derecho a concertar convenciones colectivas, y otorgar rango de ley al contenido de esas negociaciones (artículo 62 constitucional), c) garantizar constitucionalmente el derecho de los trabajadores despedidos sin justa causa a obtener una indemnización, cuando no están cubiertos por un seguro de desocupación. Dentro de este artículo puede interpretarse que se encuentra la cesantía, pero el artículo no establece límite de tope, ni prohíbe ayuda en caso de despido justificado (artículo 63), d) El Estado se ha comprometido a tomar medidas de protección contra la desocupación, reconociendo los enormes problemas que el desempleo desencadena en la vida de las personas y de sus familiares y dependientes (artículo 72), e) se establece un sistema de seguros que le asegure a la clase trabajadora el acceso a la salud independientemente del monto de su salario, y a las mejores posibilidades de restaurarse para continuar laborando. Con ello se reconoce la importancia del trabajo como medio de vida, y las terribles repercusiones que puede tener un accidente laboral, en el que se pierda esa capacidad momentánea o permanentemente (artículo 73 constitucional), f) el constituyente incluye y de manera concreta “constitucionaliza” los derechos y beneficios, no enunciados anteriormente, pero que se deriven del principio cristiano de justicia social y que indique la ley (o las convenciones colectivas que tienen rango de ley (artículo 74). Sobre la naturaleza jurídica del seguro de riesgos del trabajo y su contenido, alega que el hecho de que su contenido se de a través dé la ley no implica que puede variarse para desmejorarlo simplemente a través de un cambio legislativo. El artículo 73 indica que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo “se regirá por leyes especiales”. Dentro del estudio de técnica legislativa en materia de derechos humanos, ésta referencia a la ley para darle contenido a un derecho fundamental, se configura un error del constituyente, que en cierta forma “desconstitucionaliza” lo que pretende “constitucionalizar”. Ciertamente, toda norma de rango constitucional tiene un desarrollo legal, lo cual es correcto, en el tanto esa legislación no violente los principios fundamentales o “el núcleo duro” de ese derecho. Del seguro social de riesgos del trabajo lo constituyen al menos los siguientes principios: principio de universalidad, principio de solidaridad, principio de generalidad, principio de suficiencia, el principio de irrenunciabilidad y el servicio al costo. El seguro social de riesgos del trabajo tiene rango constitucional y se encuentra también reconocido en la convención 102 de la OIT, aprobada en lo que interesa por Costa Rica y en el protocolo de San Salvador. Para la Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS), el Tratado de Libre Comercio, conocido como CAFTA, viene a convertirse en un instrumento que desmantela el sistema de seguridad social costarricense. Tanto la Sala Constitucional, la que ha determinado que los instrumentos de Derechos Humanos vigentes en Costa Rica tienen no solamente un valor similar a la Constitución Política, sino que, en la medida en que otorguen mayores derechos o garantías a las personas, prevalecen o predominan sobre la propia Constitución. En vista de la primacía de dichos instrumentos de Derechos Humanos sobre la misma Constitución, integran el Derecho de la Constitución y son parte del control de constitucionalidad del ordenamiento jurídico. Con fundamento en dicho Convenio, el Estado de Costa Rica debe garantizar que todos los trabajadores del país estén cubiertos con un seguro contra accidentes del trabajo; situación que, en nuestro criterio, se vería incumplida por la selección de riesgo que podrían hacer las diferentes empresas del mercado asegurador. En cuanto a la incompatibilidad del principio de servicio al costo constitucional, con la apertura de este tipo de seguro social dice que ésta se deriva directamente del artículo 73 constitucional. Este principio es desarrollado a la vez por la legislación laboral, estableciendo en esa normativa que en esta actividad, no existen “utilidades” como tal, sino eventuales excedentes que deben ser reinvertidos, en porcentajes iguales a la mejora del mismo régimen, tales como financiar los programas para el desarrollo del Consejo de Salud Ocupacional. Como indica el mismo accionante, el monto de excedentes para el 2010 ascendió a más de quince mil millones. Esa importante suma se invierte en beneficio de los mismos trabajadores, pero si se abre a la competencia, se perdería para los trabajadores, pues se convertiría en utilidades de carácter privado. Si se regula haciendo una parte de estos excedentes, utilidades y el resto bajo la obligación de reinvertirlo, sería igualmente inconstitucional por la desmejora en las condiciones y se violentaría el principio de progresividad. Esta obligación de ofrecer el seguro al costo, consideramos que es incompatible con el principio de libertad de empresa y comercio, consagrado también en la Constitución Política en los artículos 46 y 28 constitucionales, por lo tanto, el seguro social de riesgos del trabajo no puede jurídicamente abrirse a la libre competencia. Sobre la selección del riesgo, y la violación de los principios de universalidad y progresividad constitucionales, afirma que ciertamente la cobertura solidaria de todas las categorías de trabajadores es posible porque el seguro se administra bajo criterios sociales, y no mercantiles. Los ingresos por actividades más rentables coadyuvan en el financiamiento de las que son menos rentables. Es de esperar que en una apertura del mercado del seguro de riesgos del trabajo las empresas privadas compitan por obtener las primas en las actividades más lucrativas y que presenten menos siniestralidad. Ello dejaría los riesgos menos atractivos, y con más accidentes estadísticamente comprobados, de nuevo en manos del probablemente único oferente para ese riesgo. Precisamente, la imposibilidad de “selección de riesgo”, funciona como el concepto fundamental que impide que un seguro social, que es solidario, obligatorio y forzoso para los patronos, pueda operar como un seguro comercial en un mercado en competencia. El concepto de selección de riesgo en seguro, se opone radicalmente a la concepción de un seguro social como el de riesgos del trabajo, que tiene como fundamento el aseguramiento de todo tipo de riesgos, sin diferenciar exposición o peligrosidad. Esto confirma la posición aquí sostenida en tanto lo aprobado por el Tratado de Libre Comercio es totalmente incompatible con los artículos 73 y 74 de nuestra Constitución Política y con el convenio 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. De conformidad con el artículo 74 constitucional las garantías sociales son irrenunciables, siendo que el legislador estableció la irrenunciabilidad de las garantías sociales, dicha condición opera de suerte tal que: el trabajador no puede renunciar a ellas. Tampoco puede el Estado permitir que en su legislación no se encuentra disponibles estas garantías.

9.- El señor Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, en su condición de ministro a.í. de Comercio Exterior solicita se le tenga como coadyuvante pasivo de la acción, con fundamento en la Ley de creación del ministerio, en cuanto le dota de la competencia para negociar y suscribir tratados y convenios internacionales en materia de comercio e inversión, de igual manera por la dinámica institucional con los socios comerciales del Tratado de Libre Comercio Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana. En cuanto a la legitimación del accionante se alega que la lesión trasciende una lesión individual a cualquier persona, es decir para la comunidad nacional en su totalidad, por lo que se pretende ejercer una acción popular, que ha sido negada por la Sala. Presupone su legitimación en la existencia de una acción popular, pues la acción se interpone en beneficio de todos los habitantes de la Nación ante una supuesta lesión de efectos generalizados, con lo cual se confunde el concepto de interés difuso o colectividad con el de comunidad nacional. Además acusa que la acción tiene apreciaciones subjetivas y conjeturas personales con el propósito de apoyar y sustentar su tesis, confunde los regímenes de la seguridad social costarricense extrapolando principios constitucionales y legales aplicables de un régimen de seguros a otro, con lo que entremezcla convenientemente la naturaleza de cada uno con las condiciones particulares de cada tipo de seguro. Se fuerza la interpretación de normas para una confrontación e incongruencia del ordenamiento nacional con el internacional a contrapelo del principio de plenitud hermenéutica y la seguridad jurídica, desconociendo los compromisos internacionales en materia comercial y los principios generales del derecho internacional. Los principios generales del derecho internacional junto con los tratados, convenciones y acuerdos internacionales, la costumbre internacional, la jurisprudencia de los órganos y organizaciones internacionales y la doctrina, se constituyen como fuentes válidas de derecho en el ordenamiento internacional. Los principios en mención, a parte de ser propios del derecho internacional, se constituyen como presupuestos básicos de las normas que componen el ordenamiento jurídico internacional. Para la importancia de la acción debe señalarse, primeramente, aquel según el cual los tratados prevalecen sobre las leyes internas en el plano internacional; así como el que prescribe que un Estado no puede invocar su propia legislación para dejar de cumplir una obligación internacional. Las relaciones entre las partes de un tratado, las disposiciones de una Ley interna no pueden prevalecer sobre la de un tratado (artículo 27 de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, aprobada por Costa Rica mediante Ley No. 7615 de 24 de julio de 1996). En el Derecho Internacional Público, desde el momento en que un Estado asume obligaciones internacionales de cualquier naturaleza, debe cumplirlas de buena fe (artículo 26 de la mencionada Convención). Asimismo, los tribunales internacionales han sustentado que el Principio de la Primacía del derecho internacional sobre el derecho nacional prescribe que el derecho internacional no puede ser abrogado ni abolido por el derecho interno o estatal. El carácter jurídico de las normas de derecho internacional es sumamente claro, a saber que la actuación estatal está necesariamente enmarcada en su obligaciones internacionales, los derechos que la normativa internacional consagra son ejecutables tanto a nivel internacional como a nivel estatal y los compromisos asumidos por los Estados frente a la comunidad de naciones son más que simples declaraciones de principios o buenas intenciones, sino que modifican el ordenamiento jurídico interno de las naciones. Por otra parte, está el tema de la recepción y transformación del derecho internacional en el derecho nacional. En principio existen dos posibles mecanismos para que el derecho internacional sea válido conforme el derecho nacional de cada Estado. En el primero de ellos, el Estado requiere de un proceso previo de recepción o incorporación (adoption) de las reglas consuetudinarias y otro de transformación de las reglas convencionales o emanadas de tratados. De modo que, tratándose de las reglas universalmente reconocidas del derecho internacional de estirpe consuetudinaria (costumbres internacionales), un Estado –al ingresar a la comunidad internacional- acepta, en principio, tales reglas o buena parte de ellas. A este proceso, basado en la práctica anglosajona de que el derecho internacional consuetudinario hace parte del derecho nacional (Internacional Law is part of the Law of the Land), se le llama recepción o incorporación. En el segundo mecanismo concerniente a las reglas convencionales del derecho internacional – sea aquellas que provienen de una tratado bilateral o multilateral- el proceso suele ser diferente al anterior. Así, para que tales normas puedan entrar a formar parte válidamente del derecho nacional, se requiere su previa transformación mediante el procedimiento previsto en el sistema constitucional de cada Estado. Este procedimiento consiste en que el jefe del Estado suscribe el tratado, el órgano deliberativo lo aprueba y finalmente el mismo jefe de Estado lo ratifica. En Costa Rica, los artículos 7, 48, 121 inciso 4) y 140 inciso 10) de la Constitución Política, regulan tanto los procedimientos relativos al proceso de transformación de los tratados, convenios o acuerdos internacionales –denominaciones que para efectos del derecho internacional son equivalentes- como la jerarquía de las normas internacionales y nacionales en el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense. El artículo 7 de la Constitución Política señala que los tratados o convenios internacionales, como fuente normativa del ordenamiento jurídico costarricense, ocupan una posición preponderante a la de la Ley común, lo cual conlleva a que ante la norma proveniente de un tratado o convenio internacional, las normas internas de rango legal ceden su orden de prelación como fuentes normativas. En cuanto a la explicación académica de establecer generaciones de derechos humanos (primera, segunda y tercera) ha tenido consecuencias devastadoras, pues cada Nación ha categorizado o sectorizado los derechos según su visión propia, postergando para un futuro indefinido la realización de estos derechos al amparo en un concepto afín a esta teoría, que es el de “progresividad” o “desarrollo progresivo”, paradójicamente recogido en el mismo artículo 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José), la que hace depender esos derechos a los “recursos disponibles”, lo cual no puede interpretarse de forma libertina porque retrasaría su efectividad, y violentaría los principios generales del derecho internacional “Pacta Sunt Servanda” y “Bona FIDES”, y las resoluciones de los órganos jurisdiccionales internacionales mencionados supra. Es importante que deba optarse por una interpretación unificadora e integradora de todos los derechos, de modo que se asegure el cumplimiento de todos los compromisos adquiridos por el Estado, independientemente del origen y naturaleza de los mismos. En cuanto a la supuesta jerarquía de los tratados y convenios internacionales sobre materias distintas a los que exclusivamente abordan temas de derechos humanos, no está demás señalar, que estos conforme al orden constitucional interno, si bien una vez aprobados forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico con sujeción a las normas constitucionales, no es posible afirmar que los compromisos adquiridos por el país son de una menor jerarquía frente a otros tratados y convenios internacionales o que, incluso, frente a la misma Constitución Política, dichos compromisos sean “letra muerta”, lo que equivaldría a eludir o incumplir obligaciones internacionales legítimamente adquiridas por el país. La Sala, con ocasión de la sentencia 2010-11352, ha reconocido necesario interpretar armónicamente la Carta Magna con la doctrina de los derechos humanos proveniente de los instrumentos internacionales. Además ha aceptado el deber de la Nación de modificar la Constitución Política, de forma excepcional en aquellos casos insalvables en los que esta roce con las normas, principios, derechos y costumbres reconocidos por la comunidad internacional, independientemente incluso, de si el país los ha incorporado o no al ordenamiento, de modo que esta sea conforme, congruente y concordante con dichas normas, principios, derechos y costumbres internacionales. No es posible aceptar el sinsentido de interpretar una posible prelación ficticia, jerarquización indebida o progresividad ilícita de las normas, principios y derechos reconocidos por la comunidad internacional, o bien, con base en dichos criterios, la ocurrencia de una discriminación fundada en otras obligaciones de derecho internacional y nacional, sujeto al ordenamiento jurídico nacional. No resulta aceptable toda tesis o doctrina que proponga o que sugiera que una violación o trasgresión a un tratado, convenio o acuerdo internacional tenga como fundamento otro instrumento internacional, la misma Constitución Política o una Ley nacional, no pueda ser considerado una grosera infracción y evidente falta al Derecho Internacional y al Derecho de la Constitución. Por otra parte, recopila la sentencia No. 2007-09469 de las diez horas del 3 de julio de 2007, mediante la cual la Sala resolvió la consulta planteada por varios diputados y el Defensor de los Habitantes, sobre la constitucionalidad del tratado de Libre Comercio República Dominicana-Centroamérica-Estados Unidos (Ley No. 8622 del 21 de noviembre de 2007). Hace alusión a la referencia sobre la finalidad del Tratado, que no entraría a la conveniencia o no de la aprobación, así como los aspectos económicos que envuelven al Tratado, sino a temas que generan dudas de constitucionalidad. La congruencia que guarda con las pretensiones de los consultantes y lo resuelto, deja en evidencia la necesidad, en aplicación de las reglas de la hermenéutica jurídica, que la sentencia deba leerse como un todo siguiendo una interpretación jurídica razonable y proporcional al fin perseguido dentro del contexto socio-histórico de la consulta y de los eventos posteriores de consulta popular (refrendo). De manera que una lectura ligera que interprete de modo parcial y descontextualizada de la realidad imperante el texto de marras, valga decir, sin tomar en consideración la naturaleza de los actos y hechos a que se refiere y el conjunto del ordenamiento jurídico, es insuficiente para un adecuado entendimiento del mismo y de las normas sobre las que este trata, lo cual conllevaría indisolublemente a resultados interpretativos absurdos y contradictorios. No es de recibo que existan omisiones en lo resuelto por la Sala Constitucional. La resolución permitió que el proceso de consulta popular siguiera adelante, culminando con el histórico referéndum del año 2007, harto conocido por todos; y la consecuente aprobación de los compromisos internacionales adquiridos por Costa Rica. Con la aprobación mediante el proceso legislativo, o bien, mediante un referéndum, no sería contraria a los principios constitucionales, sino una evidente contravención a los principios generales del Derecho Internacional “Pacta Sunt Servanda” y “Bona fides”, lo cual expondría al país a posibles sanciones internacionales.

Costa Rica adquirió el compromiso internacional de modificar el modo en el que el Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, se prestaba en el país, lo anterior, sin alterar, modificar o contravenir los principios constitucionales que lo sustentan, los derechos que garantizan el mismo o la cobertura que brinda este seguro a los trabajadores costarricenses. En la Sección H: Costa Rica del Anexo 12.9.2 Compromisos Específicos, del Capítulo Doce: Servicios Financieros del CAFTA-DR, el país –en Materia de Servicios de Seguros- asumió la obligación de abrir a la competencia el mercado de seguros obligatorios –por dichos seguros se refiere al Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos y al Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo- a partir del 01 de enero de 2011. De acuerdo con la Sección Tercera denominada “Compromisos Graduales de Apertura del Mercado”, el inciso 2 transcribe el compromiso, así como la nota 20 del inciso 1, para el seguro contra riesgos de trabajo, y la nota 22 del inciso 1. Finalmente la nota 29 al inciso 2 de cita, con el claro afán de esclarecer cualquier confusión entre los tipos de seguros de la seguridad social del artículo 73 constitucional, aclaró que los seguros sociales contenidos en los párrafos 1°, 2° y 3° del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, administrados y prestados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, están excluidos de la aplicación del Anexo 12.9.2 referido arriba, en el tanto que el seguro obligatorio de riesgo del trabajo contemplado en el párrafo final del artículo 73 sí sería objeto de apertura comercial. Para evitar posibles inconsistencias o inconformidades con la Constitución Política, el tratado enlista las reservas en un Anexo relativo y exclusivo a Medidas Disconformes. No se reservaron en el Anexo II sobre Medidas Disconformes, pues el compromiso de la apertura comercial del mercado de seguros, en general; y de los seguros obligatorios de riesgos del trabajo y de vehículos en particular, no contraviene ningún principio constitucional o derecho fundamental ni desnaturaliza dichos seguros obligatorios. La apertura y posible prestación por parte de otras entidades distintas al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, no contraviene su naturaleza de seguro componente de la seguridad social. La nota número 22 no obliga a Costa Rica a modificar las normas que regulan el seguro contra riesgos de trabajo, toda vez que siempre que dichas normas sean consistentes con las obligaciones asumidas en el CAFTA-DR. No es cierto que obliga al país a “…tratar el seguro de riesgos de trabajo como un servicio financiero más, un seguro comercial que pueda explotarse lucrativamente … la implementación de esta obligación no es compatible con la plena vigencia y aplicación de los principios enunciados en el apartado anterior que definen y caracterizan la naturaleza social y solidario del seguro de riesgos de trabajo”. Tampoco es cierto que una inconsistencia la nota 22 obliga a que “ …debe resolverse a favor de la obligación de explotación comercial impuesta en la norma impugnada, por tratarse de una norma con rango superior a la ley nacional”, debido a que la comercialización del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo en el país en un mercado abierto a la competencia no excluye la aplicación y el respeto a los principios constitucionales y solidarios que lo cobijan, dada su naturaleza especial y como seguro que forma parte del régimen de seguridad social costarricense. Las obligaciones internacionales adquiridas no regulan la forma o los medios en que el Estado deberá dar cumplimiento a dicho precepto internacional, toda vez que en razón de la soberanía de los Estados y principios generales del derecho internacional, éstos internamente están obligados por dicha norma a adaptar o realizar las modificaciones necesarias en el ordenamiento jurídico interno – sea como parte del proceso de incorporación o transformación del derecho internacional- para recibir dichas normas internacionales en el seno del ordenamiento nacional e intrínsecamente dar vigencia plena a los preceptos que dimanan de los tratados, convenios o acuerdos internacionales. El CAFTA-DR establece un compromiso programático concreto, a saber: la apertura en competencia del mercado de seguros obligatorios, específicamente el Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos y el Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo, a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. No obstante, dicha norma internacional no establece la forma en que tal obligación se llevará a cabo. Es aquí donde la emisión de normas legales y reglamentarias, hacen su aparición. La inacción tendría como consecuencia principal el incumplimiento de la obligación adquirida, lo cual se configuraría como una trasgresión a la seguridad jurídica y a los principios generales del derecho internacional, abriendo la posibilidad de otros Estados Parte recurran a paneles y arbitrajes internacionales que concluyan con la imposición de sanciones concretas al país. De ahí que las disposiciones legales contrarias al tratado deben modificarse. Con el propósito de cumplir con este y otros compromiso de apertura del mercado de seguros, se emitió la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, Ley No. 8653 del 22 de julio de 2008, la cual, de conformidad con su artículo 1 señala sus objetivos, se desprende que la misma pretende articular efectivamente los compromisos adquiridos por Costa Rica en el CAFTA-DR, al establecer los derechos de los asegurados o consumidores de servicios de seguros, los requisitos y las reglas mínimas de regulación del mercado y normas básicas requeridas para la operación de un mercado abierto y en competencia de seguros en el país. De ahí que se incluyó el Transitorio III, que reproduce la obligación internacional del CAFTA-DR de apertura del mercado para seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo y de vehículos, a partir del 1° de enero de 2011, de conformidad con la autorización administrativa que la Superintendencia General de Seguros otorgue con fundamento en el Reglamento que al efecto emita el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Se transcribe el mencionado Transitorio para concluir que reitera el plazo contenido en el Tratado, facultando al órgano del Estado a que se crea en el artículo 25 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, a extender como parte de sus funciones de supervisión y competencia técnica, la autorización administrativa con base en el reglamento que establezca los requisitos de funcionamiento de los seguros obligatorios en un mercado abierto y en competencia efectiva, el cual debe emitir el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero, órgano de desconcentración máxima adscrito al Banco Central de Costa Rica, con fundamento en las competencia que las Leyes le otorgan. En este sentido, repasa las actas de las sesiones de la Comisión Especial que conoció y dictaminó el Proyecto de Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, para concluir que la naturaleza del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo, es un componente que atañe a la protección de la seguridad social de los trabajadores, el cual en lo que interesa, según el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, crea los seguros contra riesgos profesionales que serán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales. No es un seguro comercial privado en sentido estricto, definido como un contrato mercantil, sino que se está en presencia de un seguro cuya regulación se encuentra desde la Constitución, dada su trascendencia dentro de la concepción de la justicia social y el reconocimiento del derecho a una salud preventiva y curativa. Lo anterior, sin detrimento de que se pueda ofrecer en el mercado bajo un esquema de competencia, aspecto que claramente garantizaría para el consumidor y para el asegurado mayor diversidad de opciones y mejores condiciones de cobertura y aseguramiento. La Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros (conocida por consulta de constitucionalidad por la Sala en sentencia No. 2008-10450), norma de orden público e interés público, desarrolla los compromisos derivados del CAFTA-DR, al crear y establecer el marco para la autorización, la regulación, la supervisión y el funcionamiento de la actividad aseguradora, reaseguradora, intermediación de seguros y servicios auxiliares. Crea las condiciones para el desarrollo del mercado asegurador y la competencia efectiva de las entidades participantes, además de modernizar y fortalecer al Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Que en cumplimiento de la norma legal y con base en el compromiso internacional se emitió el “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, que define los requisitos mínimos de funcionamiento del seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y Seguro Obligatorio de Automóviles”, aplicables a las entidades aseguradoras, en las categorías de seguros generales, seguros personales o mixtos. Existe el “Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros”. La invocación de inconstitucionalidad para incumplir con la apertura del mercado Estado-Estado, que traería consigo posibles sanciones por incumplimiento. Se podría enfrentar sanciones legales (como suspensión de beneficios, artículo 20.16 del CAFTA) y no legales, como el daño a la reputación de Costa Rica en el marco de procesos bilaterales y multilaterales de negociación de acuerdos comerciales y de inversión. Lo anterior incluso podría darse ante una medida cautelar que suspenda la aplicación del “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios”.

El artículo 73 es producto de una manifiesta preocupación del constituyente de brindar y mantener una protección de rango superior a los trabajadores al amparo del principio de no discriminación y de justicia social, la seguridad social se informa de los principios básicos de universalidad, obligatoriedad y solidaridad social. Sentencias de la Sala Constitucional reconoce dos sistemas de seguros sociales, no excluyentes entre sí, que tienen como fin primordial e imperativa proteger al trabajador. Uno contra los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que determine la ley, y la otra contra riesgos profesionales, que corren por cuenta exclusiva y propia del patrono (sentencia 2008-016964). Hay varias consecuencias de la jurisprudencia de la Sala Constitucional, en lo primero, el tema del origen y características del régimen costarricense de seguridad social, con el reconocimiento del Derecho fundamental a la Seguridad Social. En segundo lugar, se interpretó que existen unos principios del Derecho a la Seguridad Social ligados al Régimen de los Seguros Sociales de la CCSS, los cuales son los relacionados con la universalidad, generalidad, suficiencia de la protección y solidaridad social (sentencia 2001-10546). En una tercera consecuencia en la vinculación del derecho a la salud y la seguridad social, en cuanto se prescribe la administración de los seguros sociales a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (sentencia 2007-17971). La cuarta consecuencia que más se destaca de la jurisprudencia es la distinción que realiza entre la protección otorgada por los seguros sociales y por los seguros de riesgos laborales o del trabajo, los cuales son expresiones distintas del derecho fundamental de la seguridad social y que se manifiestan en el ordenamiento jurídico en forma distinta a través de las diferentes normas que regulan los regímenes del sistema de seguridad social, sin que sean excluyentes entre sí. El sistema de seguros de riesgos laborales, aun cuando tiene algunas similitudes con el régimen de seguridad social administrado por la CCSS, es distinto a los servicios de seguridad social prestados por esa entidad autónoma de rango constitucional, toda vez que no existe alguna prohibición legal o constitucional, que impida la comercialización de los Seguros de Riesgos de Trabajo, dado que el régimen es en esencia distinto del de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez y muerte. Por esta razón, la apertura del mercado de seguros de riesgos del trabajo es conforme con el Derecho de la Constitución, toda vez que este seguro obligatorio continúa siendo tratado por el CAFTA-DR, como un seguro distinto de los seguros de la seguridad social de la CCSS sin que la naturaleza del mismo sea alterada. En cuanto al Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo o Riesgos Profesionales, como régimen de seguridad social persigue indemnizar al trabajador por aquellos riesgos laborales que provoquen accidentes o enfermedades, con ocasión o a consecuencia del trabajo que desempeñan de manera subordinada y remunerada. Actualmente, el régimen de riegos del trabajo, está regulado infraconstitucionalmente en el Título Cuarto: De la Protección de los Trabajadores durante el Ejercicio del Trabajo del Código de Trabajo (artículo 193 a 331), la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros y en el Acuerdo SUGESE 04-10, “Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios” aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero. Si bien es una manifestación del Derecho a la Seguridad Social, ello no demerita que, doctrinariamente, como una manifestación de voluntad de las partes, se esté en presencia de un seguro comercial privado especial o sui géneris. Subyace el hecho histórico de que es un contrato mercantil reconocido en la Norma Fundamental de la Nación y en los tratados y convenio de derechos humanos, dada su trascendencia dentro de la concepción de la justicia social y el reconocimiento del derecho a una salud preventiva y curativa. Es un elemento innovador y adicional a la concepción tradicional del derecho de los contratos mercantiles de seguros. El esquema de competencia no es incompatible con la Constitución, ni los instrumentos internacionales en materia de derechos humanos prescriben o dan indicios de tal disconformidad. En el informe se enuncian las similitudes y diferencias entre el Régimen de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias administrado por la CCSS y del Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo o Riesgos Profesionales. También sobre los principios de obligatoriedad, universalidad, solidaridad social e irrenunciabilidad que informan el Derecho Fundamental de la Seguridad Social, debido a que ha sido transcrita gran parte de la jurisprudencia constitucional que los desarrolla, no obstante, los mismos serán analizados desde la perspectiva de tema del respeto al contenido esencial de ese derecho.

Conforme a los alegatos del accionante, el principio de obligatoriedad no se ve afectado dado que no se ha adquirido ningún compromiso para variar o afectar este principio, toda vez que se reconoce en el mismo Tratado, como un principio constitucional que se debe respetar y observar. Las disposiciones atinentes hacen del Seguro un seguro obligatorio. En este sentido sigue vigente el artículo 193 del Código de Trabajo que operativaza el principio, sin embargo no puede ser exclusivo del INS, sino que se asumió el compromiso de abrir a la competencia el mercado de seguros obligatorios a partir del 1 de enero de 2011. De forma que la referencia que hace el artículo al INS se debe entender genéricamente a los operadores autorizados por la SUGESE concordantemente con el “Reglamento sobre autorizaciones, registros y requisitos de funcionamiento de entidades supervisadas por la Superintendencia General de Seguros” emitidos por CONASSIF. La obligatoriedad está en el Código de Trabajo, el Reglamento General de Riesgos del Trabajo (DE No. 13466-TSS) y el mencionado reglamento, así como las circulares y acuerdos de la Superintendencia General de Seguros y la Norma Técnica emitida por cada entidad aseguradora.

El principio de universalidad tampoco es modificado, desnaturalizado o afectado por el CAFTA-DR o por la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros. El tratado no supone en ninguna parte la existencia de un mercado c ompetitivo en que el Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo dejaría de cubrir a todos los trabajadores, más bien presuponen las normas vigentes que con la efectiva apertura del mercado, los nuevos operadores privados de seguros de riesgos del trabajo tendrán la posibilidad de atraer a una mayor cantidad de patronos a contratar ese seguro, en virtud del deber que se deriva del principio de obligatoriedad. La disposición reglamentaria (artículo 5) prevé la obligación de la entidad aseguradora de cumplir con el tomador, el asegurado y beneficiarios definidos en la póliza de seguro, con las especificaciones que la ley y normativa conexa disponen para los seguros obligatorios. Incluso, esta norma autoriza a las entidades aseguradoras que oferten seguros obligatorios a suscribir los convenios o contratos necesarios con la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social a efecto de coordinar los aspectos operativos derivados de la atención médica brindada por esa institución. El reglamento obliga que la póliza cubra las prestaciones indicadas en el 218 del Código de Trabajo. Los escenarios hipotéticos donde la apertura del mercado del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo afectará las finanzas del INS, y en consecuencia, la atención de las personas no aseguradas, pero señala lo afirmado por la Sala Segunda de la Corte Suprema de Justicia y de los Tribunales de Trabajo de que el trabajador no asegurado no se perjudica desde la perspectiva de la obligación solidaria, sin perjuicio de la acción judicial contra el patrono incumpliente. En todo caso, el Reglamento contempla esta situación, dado que sí el patrono tuviera una póliza de Riesgos del Trabajo con cualquier entidad aseguradora y omitiera reportar al trabajador, se les considerará como no asegurado y las prestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad aseguradora receptora de la prima. Destaca las facultades otorgadas por el reglamento en uso de la Ley de Cobro Judicial de las certificaciones emitidas por las entidades establecidas, la autoridad competente de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social o las emitidas por directores de las instituciones privadas. No hay atención ilimitada en un sistema de monopolio del mercado de seguros, pues las atenciones o prestaciones que contemplan las coberturas del seguro, se encuentran constreñidas a criterios fundamentales de razonabilidad, proporcionalidad y equidad basados en las necesidades y condiciones reales de los trabajadores.

El principio de solidaridad social plantea el deber de ayudar a quienes menos tienen a base de la contribución de todos, especialmente de los que más tienen. Los alegatos del recurrente de que la apertura del mercado del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo afecta el principio de universalidad y la solidaridad porque los trabajadores tendrán una protección desigual, tal argumento carece de fundamento alguno. En este punto es relevante recordar que el deber de aseguramiento de los trabajadores mediante el Seguro no le corresponde al trabajador, sino al patrono. En este sentido, es una simpleza concebir el funcionamiento de un mercado del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo abierto y en competencia, en el que los trabajadores se quedarán sin seguro, pues serán “rechazados” por lo operadores privados de las prestaciones de riesgos del trabajo, porque su salario no es “atractivo”, toda vez que no es el trabajador quien asume los costos económicos del seguro sino su patrono, de conformidad con el párrafo cuatro del artículo 73 constitucional y las normas del Código de Trabajo. Para mayor detalle, nótese que, en realidad, la primera garantía para los trabajadores en relación con este seguro es que el mismo es de carácter obligatorio y forzoso, independientemente de las condiciones de trabajo y del salario devengado, de forma que el patrono siempre tiene la obligación de asegurar a sus trabajadores. Debe hacerse una distinción entre la etapa inicial de aseguramiento y la etapa de determinación de la cobertura del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo. En la primera todos los trabajadores, independiente de la actividad que realicen, deben ser asegurados por su patrono de conformidad con los principios de universalidad, igualdad y de no discriminación, para asegurar la solidaridad del régimen. Tampoco pueden los proveedores privados o públicos de servicios de seguros, sobre una base discriminatoria, negarse a brindar o prestar los servicios a los patronos que deseen contratar los servicios del Seguro con ellos, por la autorización obtenido por la SUGESE de conformidad con el Reglamento emitido por el CONASSIF, de modo que estos son técnicamente sostenibles y conforme con la legislación nacional. Se desprende de lo anterior, que una entidad aseguradora podría reservarse de contratar con un patrono-cliente cuando éste no cumpla con los requisitos contenidos en la póliza autorizada por la entidad supervisora. En este sentido, no lleva razón el accionante cuando afirma que los operadores privados “se disputarán los segmentos rentables del mercado”. El CAFTA-DR parte de la premisa de que en el mercado competitivo del Seguro las firmas aseguradoras que están autorizadas por parte del Estado conocen de antemano las reglas que regulan la competencia y protegen al consumidor. Es decir, no están autorizadas para brindar oferta pública de seguros de riesgos del trabajo y hagan una selección de los patronos – clientes a los que desean vender los servicios de seguro de riesgos del trabajo, además de las garantías establecidas en las leyes y normas reglamentarias, no puede haber una discriminación en el aseguramiento de los trabajadores, en virtud de que el mismo principio de universidad impone la obligación a las entidades aseguradoras de no seleccionar o discriminar a los trabajadores con base en su utilidades potenciales y niveles de riesgo. En cuanto a la segunda etapa, relativa a la determinación de la cobertura, se refiere al artículo 15 del Reglamento del CONASSIF, que parece desconocer el accionante, resolvió el tema del contenido mínimo de las prestaciones del Seguro, pues prescribe que la póliza debe cubrir las prestaciones establecidas en el artículo 218 del Código de Trabajo, es decir, establece un mínimo de cobertura con fundamento en las prestaciones básicas que establece la norma precitada. En la etapa de determinación de las tarifas por cobertura, sí se permite establecer categorías de mayor o menor siniestralidad, tomando en cuenta, entre otros rubros, el salario devengado por los seguros de trabajadores y los tipos de actividades que realizan. Ello significa que mientras las coberturas básicas están debidamente definidas por la Ley Laboral, las tarifas de esas coberturas, son determinadas bajo las bases técnicas actuariales que soportan la ecuación matemática del seguro, de conformidad con el artículo 205 del Código de Trabajo. Esto es necesario para que el seguro sea viable y sostenible financieramente, y permita un tratamiento similar o a los iguales. Las coberturas básicas funcionaba desde antes del CAFTA-DR y cuando el INS tenía el monopolio de los seguros obligatorios. Las tarifas para cada entidad aseguradora son autorizadas por la SUGESE con el fin de que cumplan con los requerimientos y rigores técnico-actuariales y jurídicos, que exigen las disposiciones generales del régimen de suficiencia de capital y solvencia, así como asegurar las provisiones técnicas suficientes para garantizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones de las entidades asociadas de sus contratos de seguros. Ello garantiza control sobre abusos y discriminaciones en la fijación de tarifas para las entidades aseguradoras, sino que además se cumpla con los mínimos de cobertura básica iguales para todos los trabajadores, con lo cual la cobertura mínima será la misma para todos los trabajadores. Así, los beneficios adicionales por concepto de coberturas adicionales que se deriven de la relación contractual que tenga el patrono con la entidad aseguradora, y que corren por cuenta de éste, implicarán, de forma directa, un mejoramiento en el trato y la atención al trabajador, lo cual no atenta de ninguna manera contra el principio de universalidad o el de solidaridad. Sobre la irrenunciabilidad, los trabajadores protegidos bajo este régimen no pueden renunciar a los derechos conferidos por el mismo, tal como lo prescribe dicha norma constitucional. Eso es que los trabajadores no pueden, motu propio o por acción de un tercero, renunciar a los derechos y beneficios que se otorgan con motivo del Derecho Fundamental a la Seguridad Social. El accionante no indica porqué se vulnera el principio, cuando el tratado no sugiere que los trabajadores pueden renunciar al Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, por el contrario, en el preámbulo de la Sección H “Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros”, se reafirma el respeto a la Constitución Política, y con ello al carácter irrenunciable de los derechos y beneficios del Seguro.

En cuanto a los principio constitucionales del Régimen de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social que son extensivos al Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo, como son los principios de suficiencia que se encuentra vigente en el artículo 206 del Código de Trabajo donde se toma en cuenta tanto las necesidades del trabajador como el salario devengado por el trabajador. De hecho, así funcionaba en tiempos en que el INS tenía el monopolio del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo y continuará funcionando en los mismos términos, hoy en día en un mercado abierto a la competencia. Hace alusión también al principio de automaticidad de la protección, a lo que se refiera a la jurisprudencia de la Sala como un principio de la seguridad social que se traduce en “… una adecuada e inmediata protección en materia de enfermedad, invalidez, vejez y muerte”. Haciendo una extensión de este principio al Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo, como parte del sistema general de seguridad social, la cobertura de este seguro de naturaleza especial debe ser inmediata y automática, en otras palabras obligatoria y universal. Esto ha funcionado así hasta ahora, donde los hospitales de la Caja o los centros privados de salud, deben dar una atención primaria a quien haya sufrido un accidente o enfermedad del trabajo. La misma protección inmediata reciben los trabajadores no asegurados. En todo caso, los artículos 20 y 21 del Reglamento viene a apoyar lo que dispone el numeral 232 del Código de Trabajo.

Apunta adicionalmente las siguientes diferencias entre el Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo y los Seguros Sociales de la CCSS. En cuanto al sujeto que realiza la prestación o brinda la cobertura, en cada una señala los respectivos campos y coberturas institucionales, así como de los operadores comerciales, para terminar con la indicación del accionante de que viola la Constitución Política. Además, el Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo es de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y no sigue el esquema contributivo tripartito de los Seguros Sociales de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Es a éstos últimos los que alcanza la prohibición de transferir ni emplear esos fondos a otras finalidades que las referentes a su cometido. Hay diferencias en cuanto al uso y destino de los fondos y reservas de los seguros sociales. Los fondos y reservas resultantes de la administración según el artículo 73 de la Carta Magna es para los servicios de seguridad social del Régimen de Maternidad, Invalidez y Muerte de la CCSS. La misma limitación no aplica para el Régimen del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo, no existe esa limitación constitucional sobre el destino de los fondos o reservas producto de la comercialización del seguro. Incluso existe una distinción en el artículo 73 cuando se refiere a “seguros sociales” y los “seguros contra riesgo profesional”. Aunque no quiere decir que estos fondos queden sin regulación, pues ello se determina por la vía legal, pero esta es una muy distinta a una constitucional. Por otra parte, señala la inexistencia de principios constitucionales o legales: el caso de los beneficios extraordinarios y el supuesto servicio al costo. En cuanto a lo primero señala que ni el CAFTA-DR o la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, no altera el artículo 242 del Código de Trabajo, ni los artículo 255 al 259, sobre la posibilidad de conmutación de rentas. Además el denominado “servicio al costo” no es un principio de los seguros obligatorios, ni siquiera un principio constitucional del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social en general, de modo que el accionante confunde y extrapola a partir de normas del régimen de invalidez, vejez y muerte administrado por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social consecuencias indebidas para el Régimen del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo. No existe evidencia del principio “servicio al costo” a nivel constitucional, sino con el artículo 205 del Código de Trabajo, que establece que cualquier excedente que se produzca deberá destinarse a constituir una reserva, para luego suponer y concluir erróneamente la existencia de un presunto principio constitucional. El artículo 73 constitucional no habla de ingresos, como intenta aducir el accionante y comete un error en el análisis de los argumentos presentados, toda vez que el término que usó el constituyente fue el de “fondo”. Existe más bien el artículo 28 de la Constitución que garantiza a todo ciudadano la libertad como principio básico, y desarrollado por normas infraconstitucionales como la ley, la que deberá determinar sus alcances e imponer restricciones que los concreticen y armonicen con el resto del bloque de constitucionalidad y de legalidad. Además, debe respetarse la observancia de ser proporcionadas y racionales. En el caso del INS, según el artículo 205 del Código de Trabajo, debe hacer liquidación anuales, los excedentes deben pasar a ser parte de una reserva de reparto, el 50%, a financiar los programas que desarrolle el Consejo de Salud Ocupacional y el resto a incorporar mejoras al Régimen. Del mismo modo, dice que el INS como entidad aseguradora, debe cumplir con los preceptos de los artículos 13, 14 y 15 de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, en materia de las provisiones técnicas y reservas. De igual manera, las entidades señaladas en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 7 de la Ley están obligadas a cumplir con los mandatos en materia de las provisiones técnicas, reservas e inversiones contenidos en los numerales señalados. Pero el 205 del Código de Trabajo no les es aplicable. La Sala ya resolvió además el tema de “servicio al costo” en el voto 2007-9469, siendo que esta sentencia tiene tres principales consecuencias: Primero, la posibilidad de imponer la obligación de brindar un servicio al costo estaría reservada a la Ley, es decir, no existe un principio constitucional que obligue a que los servicios de telecomunicaciones, o en el caso del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo, a ser prestados “al costo”. Esa es una decisión que queda a criterio del legislador. El CAFTA-DR tampoco trata el tema de que el seguro deba comercializarse “al costo”. En segundo lugar, la comercialización en un mercado competitivo no es excluyente de la aplicación de una política social en materia del seguro de riesgos de trabajo. Cabe recordar el preámbulo de la Sección H sobre “Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros”, donde el país reafirmó su compromiso de que el proceso de apertura en la prestación del seguro tiene que hacerse con fundamento en la Constitución Política, sus normas y principios. Pero para cumplir con estas normas y principios no es requisito que los servicios del SRT tengan que ser prestados “al costo”. Por último, la tercera consecuencia es que no existe una disposición o principio constitucional que compela a que los servicios del SRT se presten “al costo”. Sin embargo, lo que sí está garantizado a nivel constitucional es la libertad de los consumidores a elegir el prestador de servicios que más les convenga a sus intereses (artículo 46 de la Constitución Política). La libertad de elegir no es incompatible con el compromiso adquirido por el país de “… lograr la universalidad y solidaridad de los servicios que se abran a la competencia”. El Tribunal Constitucional ha reconocido el principio o derecho al lucro razonable, es decir, que en el ejercicio de la libertad de empresa y de comercio debe existir proporcionalidad, razonabilidad y equidad en el lucro o beneficio obtenido. Finalmente, sobre la progresividad del derecho internacional de los derechos fundamentales y el régimen de Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo. Debe tomarse en cuenta el principio del mínimo normativo (minimum minimorum) en cuanto postula que existe un compendio de normas, garantías, deberes y derechos mínimos laborales y de la seguridad social que debe ser asegurados por el Estado, el patrono o los operadores de seguros, de forma que la contravención a éstos importa una vulneración a los derechos fundamentales. Estos mínimos forman parte del contenido esencial del derecho a la seguridad social de los seguros de riesgos del trabajo, con lo cual el contenido esencial comprenderá también como parte de su núcleo duro, las prestaciones mínimas o coberturas básicas del SRT reconocidas. Mientras el legislador no restrinja o limite el contenido esencial del derecho a la seguridad social de los seguros de riesgos del trabajo, mediante la promulgación de las normas jurídicas que limiten, hagan impracticable, dificulten más allá de lo razonable o despojen a dicho derecho de la necesaria protección. Las normas bajo examen no conllevan restricciones o límites que hagan impracticable el ejercicio del derecho a la seguridad social, ni tampoco dificultan o lo despojen de la necesaria protección para ser efectos en la sociedad. La escogencia que hizo el Estado resulta la más favorable para los trabajadores cubiertos por el seguro, toda vez que en lugar de restringir el derecho protegido amplió la posibilidad de extender y mejorar la cobertura, pudiendo ejercer el derecho de elección del proveedor conforme a sus intereses, en una clara derivación de los principios “pro libertatis” y “ pro homine”, beneficiando a todos los trabajadores de la Nación. Se argumenta también el lucro razonable, de manera que el núcleo duro de contenido, no se afecta con que cambie el sujeto que presta el servicio o que se permita su comercialización, no afecta los principios ni la esencia o fundamento jurídico-filosófico del derecho de marras, de ahí que no exista ninguna lesión al principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales. El país ya consolidó un sistema efectivo de protección y que no se ve desmejorado. No estima que exista conflicto con el protocolo de San Salvador y el Convenio No. 102 de la OIT porque en ambos su regulación es separada. El CAFTA-DR no reduce los beneficios con que hoy cuentan los trabajadores, ni disminuye o desmejora las ventajas que en la actualidad han obtenido los beneficiarios del régimen del Seguro obligatorio de Riesgos de Trabajo. Por lo expuesto, pide declarar sin lugar la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

10.- Los señores y señoras Jorge Gamboa Corrales, María Jeannette Ruiz, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Gustavo Arias Navarro, Manrique Oviedo, Juan Carlos Mendoza, María Eugenia Venegas Renauld, y Carmen Muñoz Q., todos integrantes de la fracción legislativa del Partido Acción Ciudadana se apersonan como coadyuvante. En este sentido, recalcan que el bloque de normativa impugnada debe ser ampliado incluyendo la totalidad del Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10, aprobado por el CONASSIF, mediante artículo 8, numeral I, del acta de la sesión 894-2010. Lo anterior en tanto que el hoy impugnado transitorio III de la Ley 8653, ulteriormente le ordenó al CONNASIF y a la SUGESE el reglamentar y regular un régimen de apertura total en la prestación del Seguro Social de Riesgos del Trabajo, a más tardar el primero de enero 2011, actuación administrativa que se computo a partir del 22 de diciembre del año pasado. Alega que el solo acto de promulgación de dicho reglamento, además de su contenido normativo esencial, implicó colocar dentro del comercio un bien o servicio público de rango constitucional que por lo mismo y por su propia naturaleza conceptual-funcional está totalmente fuera del comercio. Aduce que ya por la sola interpretación literal-gramatical se hace notar la inconstitucionalidad alegada, esto teniendo en cuenta que la normativa constitucional alegada (título V de la Constitución Política) goza de una redacción limpia, clara y precisa, al tiempo que su ubicación en la parte dogmática del texto constitucional resulta estratégico. Manifiestan que las premisas correspondientes son obvias e irrefutables, al igual que la única conclusión no falaz que se deriva del siguiente silogismo de rigor: Premisa 1: Funciones esenciales del Estado=Fuera del comercio. Premisa 2: Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo (RT) = Seguro Social que forma parte de la Seguridad Social. Premisa 3: Seguridad Social = función esencial del Estado a la luz del título V de la Constitución Política. Única conclusión no falaz: RT = servicio público fuera del comercio. Por lo tanto, la normativa impugnada es inconstitucional, incluyendo el reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. Asimismo se asegura que la gestión del seguro RT, más allá de ser un simple monopolio a cargo del INS, en verdad se trata de una parte medular en la seguridad social, es decir, una función esencial del Estado. Lo anterior teniendo en cuenta que RT es un seguro social de rango constitucional (garantía social fundamental) para la población trabajadora habitante del país. Además, los riesgos del trabajo, fueron desarrollados legislativamente por un código en materia laboral, siendo además blindados por el Convenio 102 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y también por medio de jurisprudencia constitucional. En cuanto al tema de la universalidad del servicio público de riesgos del trabajo, incluyendo los casos no asegurados, sí podemos imaginar aseguradoras privadas recostándose en el Estado, así como un Estado boicoteado desde adentro para ser forzado a comprarle servicios hospitalarios al sector privado, lo cual sería inaudito. Se afirma exitoso régimen social mediante la inserción de principios comerciales intrusos (por ejemplo selectividad del riesgo, o un reglamento estableciendo topes ilegales a las prestaciones médico-sanitarias, de rehabilitación y en dinero vigentes) viene a la memoria el fondo mencionado de aquel voto constitucional donde se le prohibía al Estado la realización de retrocesos legislativos en materia de Derechos Humanos Laborales. Sería totalmente inconstitucional que la SUGESE se comporte como una Superintendencia de Seguros Sociales, recuérdese que la administración y reglamentación compete exclusivamente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social por mandato constitucional expreso. Promover la castración solapada del Código de Trabajo o no hacer nada para impedirlo, equivale a retroceder en materia de Derechos Humanos Laborales. Poco antes de la promulgación del reglamento impugnado, los coadyuvantes le hicieron ver a las autoridades del CONASSIF y de la SUGESE que era de interés público abordar asertivamente este debate, en función de la salud jurídica normativa en ciernes (oficios JGC/097/10 y JGC/175/10). De hecho, advirtieron que de no hacerlo se desestabilizaría la institucionalidad y arriesgaría la paz social de la clase trabajadora costarricense. También se les advirtió que una conducta omisiva por el estilo incluso podría redundar en disminución, afectación o perjuicio del erario público y de la Administración Financiera del Estado. Alegan que tales distorsiones no fueron evitadas por estas autoridades públicas a la hora de promulgar el Reglamento CONASSIF-SUGESE 04-10. El mismo DR-CAFTA, en su capítulo 16, subinciso b) del artículo III.2 de la sección H del Anexo 12.9.2 del Capítulo 12 confirma la vigencia del Código de Trabajo y sus disposiciones legales tendientes a la demanialidad del servicio, por lo que la normativa impugnada podría estar derogada tácitamente a la luz del mismo capítulo 16 del CAFTA. En otras palabras, ambos ordenamientos legales en aparente contradicción no lo están, debido a que cada cual regula por su lado materias y principios distintos entre sí: un ordenamiento de derecho público regula un tipo de seguro social obligatorio, forzoso y universal, mientras que el otro ordenamiento, que es de derecho privado, se encarga de regular seguros comerciales voluntarios, renunciables y selectivos. En consecuencia, no hay identidad en el ámbito de regulación (material, temporal, espacial y personal). Mucho menos incompatibilidad sobre la misma materia. Por tanto no procede que SUGESE o CONASSIF tengan por tácitamente derogado el Código de Trabajo a luz del DR-CAFTA, ni siquiera parcialmente o en perjuicio de la competencia material exclusiva y excluyente del servicio SSRT a favor del Estado por medio del INS. Es decir, lo que está en discusión más que todo tiene que ver con antinomias jurídicas irresueltas e incompatibilidades aparentes o parciales. Por último, los coadyuvantes expresan tener prohibido quebrantar como legisladores que son el principio fundamental de no regresión de los derechos humanos laborales (que es la aplicación práctica del principio constitucional de progresividad de los derechos humanos) lo cual quedaría consumado en caso de aprobar la legislación que de una u otra forma desmejore derechos humanos laborales, por ejemplo aquellos recogidos en los artículos 193, 201, 205, 206, 231, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, y 259 por el Código de Trabajo.

11.- Luis Chavarría Vega y Martha Elena Rodríguez González (UNDECA) alegan que les asiste razón para interponer la gestión de coadyuvancia con el fin de sostener que la apertura comercial fomentará y producirá una segmentación del mercado de seguros de trabajo, de suerte que le corresponderá al Instituto Nacional de Seguros y la Caja Costarricense de Seguros Social asumir los daños “colaterales” de la lógica de mercado, y en segundo lugar, en el carácter de representantes de las personas trabajadoras, particularmente de la Caja y resto de la seguridad costarricense, con un indiscutible interés legitimo de carácter colectivo, en procurar la defensa del sistema de seguridad social, que es un mandato que se deriva del artículo 332 del Código de Trabajo. Sostiene que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo forma parte integral e inescindible de la seguridad social, de conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. No obstante, que el último párrafo de dicho artículo dispone que los seguros contra riesgos de trabajo se regirán por disposiciones especiales –que los que administra la Caja también se rigen por ley especial-, esta redacción jamás podría justificar alguna interpretación que pretenda sostener que estos seguros no forman parte de la seguridad social, de la propia solera de nuestra Constitución. De ser válida alguna argumentación en este sentido, simplemente, el constituyente no hubiera incluido su regulación en el texto constitucional. Así las cosas, no se puede separar artificiosamente el último párrafo, del resto de las disposiciones de la misma norma constitucional. Como lo ha interpretado la Sala, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo integra sustantivamente el sistema de la seguridad social costarricense. Así lo principios comunes de la seguridad social, que informan el artículo 73 constitucional, se aplican parejo para todas las modalidades de seguros sociales que expresamente contempla este numeral: que la situación muy particular, más que todo de orden histórico, que la administración del seguro de riesgo de trabajo, se le haya atribuido a otra institución distinta de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, en nada podría justificar que se pudiera entender que ese seguro quedó excluido de la aplicación de esos mismos principios. La apertura comercial tiene serias consecuencias con el principio de universalidad, cuya cobertura debe alcanzar hasta quienes no se encuentran asegurados; señala que la explotación mercantil, con una finalidad egoísta de lucro, tendrá como inevitable consecuencia que el costo de atención y otras prestaciones de la población no asegurada, tendrá que asumirla el Instituto Nacional de Seguros y la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, que dispondrá de menos recursos para asumir estos gastos. Las empresas se enriquecen ilícitamente a costa de los recursos públicos de aquellas instituciones que son patrimonio de la población costarricense. En cuanto al principio de la solidaridad donde la atención se basa por encima de lo devengado, es fundamental que la fuente de los ingresos que obtenga el sistema, no dependan de reglas de mercado que seleccionen, por nivel de riesgo, la población asegurable. Desafortunadamente, el esquema de apertura comercial, en régimen de competencia, fomenta la segmentación del mercado, de los “consumidores, con serio impacto en la sostenibilidad financiera del régimen. En cuanto al principio de prestación suficiente o mínima donde la protección que se brinde, debe corresponder a las prestaciones, por lo menos, básicas médico-asistenciales, indistintamente de las primas de aseguramiento o monto de los salarios de los trabajadores. Con el esquema se restringe las posibilidades que se le pueda garantizar a los trabajadores, al menos, la calidad de las prestaciones que actualmente se están suministrando. Sostienen que el Estado debe satisfacer el derecho fundamental a la prestación social. El reconocimiento que el seguro de riesgo de trabajo configura un derecho fundamental de prestación social, presupone la obligación estatal de satisfacerlo, lo cual no es posible sino bajo un esquema público, universal, incompatible, con cualquier modalidad de privatización de la comercialización de ese seguro. Que la Sala ha señalado que el sistema de la seguridad social supone que los poderes públicos mantendrán un régimen público de seguridad social para todos los ciudadanos en el más alto rango, lo cual viene a impedir cualquier modalidad de gestión y administración privada del seguro de riesgo de trabajo, con un propósito de lucro. La dignidad de los trabajadores también se lesiona, porque a consecuencia de esas nuevas reglas, dentro de las que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros tendrá que ver como subsiste, la calidad de las prestaciones sufrirá un notable deterioro y los trabajadores no asegurados quedarán reducidos a una condición de segunda categoría. Consideran que existe un desmantelamiento y derogatoria de la legislación laboral, la apertura comercial del seguro de riesgo de trabajo, en un régimen de explotación mercantil, obliga a modificar el Código de Trabajo, en materia de riesgos de trabajo. En este sentido señalan la nota 22, que condiciona las regulaciones a las obligaciones asumidas en el Tratado, incluyendo el Anexo, afirma que nuestra legislación laboral deviene inconsistente, incompatible con los principios de libertad de empresa y libre competencia, que están en la base del esquema de comercialización y privatización de mercado de seguros. Consideran que se abandonarán las políticas públicas de promoción de la salud de los trabajadores y prevención de accidentes y enfermedades profesionales, además de las prestaciones pecuniarias, sanitarias y otras, también están las que buscan promocionar la salud y la prevención de accidentes y enfermedades laborales. Las utilidades que antes se ocupaban a lo anterior estarán ingresando a las cuentas de las aseguradoras privadas, y se quedarán sin fondos las políticas públicas en esta materia, lo que aumentará accidentes y enfermedades del trabajo. Los seguros de riesgos del trabajo constituyen expresión de la doctrina social de la Iglesia, para lo cual cita el capítulo de los Derechos del Trabajo de Juan Pablo II, señalando que la Encíclica dispone que en casos de accidentes de trabajo los trabajadores deben tener acceso a la asistencia sanitaria, incluso gratuitamente, lo que sería quebrantado, por las razones dadas y por disposición del Tratado de Libre Comercio. Pide declarar con lugar la acción.

12.- Se prescinde de la vista señalada en los artículos 10 y 85 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, con base en la potestad que otorga a la Sala el numeral 9 ibídem, al estimar suficientemente fundada esta resolución en principios y normas evidentes, así como en la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal.

13.- Por resolución de las diecisiete horas y dieciocho minutos del treinta de marzo de dos mil once, dictada dentro de este expediente, fueron admitidas varias gestiones de coadyuvancia a favor y en contra de la acción de inconstitucionalidad.

14.- En los procedimientos se han cumplido las prescripciones de ley.

Redacta el Magistrado Castillo Víquez; y,

Considerando:

I.- Sobre cuestiones preliminares y de las coadyuvancias.- Mediante resolución de las diecisiete horas y dieciocho minutos del treinta de marzo de dos mil once, dictada dentro de este expediente, fueron admitidas las gestiones presentadas con la finalidad de coadyuvar en la acción, por diversos interesados, con la finalidad de agregar sus argumentos al nombres de las personas que se apersonan al proceso, sin embargo en su mayoría no lo hacen a título personal, sino en representación de personas jurídicas y agrupaciones sociales, lo que, para mayor claridad, se señala a continuación la condición en que actúan y si lo hacen en representación de una persona moral dentro de la acción de inconstitucionalidad. De esta forma, Mélida Cedeño Castro, portadora de la cédula de identidad número 9-058-394, como Presidenta de la Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE); Marvin Rodríguez Cordero, portador la cédula de identidad No. 6-155-443, como Secretario General del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC); Luis Ángel Serrano Estrada, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 9-029-769, como Secretario General del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Pública y Privada (SITEPP); Alexander Rodríguez Chaves, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-967-546, autorizado por el Concejo de San Ramón, Alajuela, por Acuerdo No. 13 de la Sesión Ordinaria No. 71 del 15 de marzo de 2011; Carlos Manuel Vega Bolaños, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 2-287-015, como Secretario General del Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Lucía Ramírez Segura, portadora de la cédula de identidad No. 1-897-818, Secretaria General Adjunta del Sindicato Unión de Profesionales, Técnicos y Similares del Banco Popular (UNPROBANPO); Gustavo Enrique Cabrera Vega, cédula No. 3-222-901, miembro del Servicio, Paz y Justicia en Costa Rica (SERPAJ-CR); Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-1019-0231, en su condición personal y de estudiante; José A. Muñoz Fonseca, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-433-939, en su calidad de Presidente de la Cámara Costarricense – Norteamericana de Comercio; Freddy Sandí Brenes, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-508-235, en su condición de Secretario General de la Unión de Personal del Instituto Nacional de Seguros (UPINS); Fernando Ocampo Sánchez, portador de la cédula de identidad número 1-791-100, en su condición de Ministro a.í. de Comercio Exterior; Gustavo Arias Navarro, María Jeannette Ruiz, Jorge Gamboa, Carmen Muñoz Q., Claudio Monge, Victor Hernández Cerdas, Juan Carlos Mendoza (y no Juan Carlos Méndez como erróneamente se indicó), María Eugenia Venegas Renault, Manrique Oviedo, todos diputados de la fracción del Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC); Luis Chavarría Vega, portador de la cédula No. 3-0158-0023, en su carácter personal y de Secretario General de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Martha Elena Rodríguez González, portadora de la cédula de identidad No. 2-343-472 en su carácter personal y de Secretaria General Adjunta de la Unión Nacional de Empleados de la Caja y la Seguridad Social (UNDECA); Albino Vargas Barrantes, portador de la cédula de identidad No. 1-457-390, por la Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP). En consecuencia se corrige la resolución de las diecisiete horas dieciocho minutos del treinta de marzo de dos mil once, debiendo entenderse si no se indica lo contrario que actúan en representación de las personas jurídicas señaladas. Por otra parte, se corrige la señalada resolución, al no constar la gestión de la señora Ligia Fallas Rodríguez, Darwin Orozco Barrantes, Doris Salas Suárez y Orlando Rodríguez Vásquez, cuyos escritos no se encuentran en el expediente electrónico, de manera que no se tiene a los mencionadas personas como coadyuvantes en la presente acción. Por último, no se tiene como coadyuvante al señor Mario Enrique Mora Badilla, dado que en el escrito se afirma interpuesto por el señor Mora Badilla, sin embargo no aparece su firma, sino la del señor Shirani Josué Rojas Castillo.

II.- Las reglas de legitimación en las acciones de inconstitucionalidad. El artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional regula los presupuestos que determinan la admisibilidad de las acciones de inconstitucionalidad, exigiendo la existencia de un asunto pendiente de resolver en sede administrativa o judicial en el que se invoque la inconstitucionalidad, requisito que no es necesario en los casos previstos en los párrafos segundo y tercero de ese artículo, es decir, cuando por la naturaleza de la norma no haya lesión individual o directa; cuando se fundamente en la defensa de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, o cuando sea presentada por el Procurador General de la República, el Contralor General de la República, el Fiscal General de la República o el Defensor de los Habitantes, en estos últimos casos, dentro de sus respectivas esferas competenciales. De acuerdo con el primero de los supuestos previstos por el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, la norma cuestionada no debe ser susceptible de aplicación concreta, que permita luego la impugnación del acto aplicativo y su consecuente empleo como asunto base. Dispone el texto en cuestión que procede cuando "por la naturaleza del asunto, no exista lesión individual ni directa", es decir, cuando por esa misma naturaleza, la lesión sea colectiva (antónimo de individual) e indirecta. Sería el caso de actos que lesionen los intereses de determinados grupos o corporaciones en cuanto tales, y no propiamente de sus miembros en forma directa. En segundo lugar, se prevé la posibilidad de acudir en defensa de "intereses difusos "; este concepto, cuyo contenido ha ido siendo delineado paulatinamente por parte de la Sala, podría ser resumido en los términos empleados en la sentencia de este tribunal número 3750-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres) "… Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificados o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos que atañen a una comunidad en su conjunto. Se trata entonces de intereses individuales, pero a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende reciben un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos que se encuentran en determinadas circunstancias y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son a la vez colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter" En síntesis, los intereses difusos son aquellos cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social, una característica física, su origen étnico, una determinada orientación personal o ideológica, el consumo de un cierto producto, etc. El interés, en estos casos, se encuentra difuminado, diluido (difuso) entre una pluralidad no identificada de sujetos. En estos casos, claro, la impugnación que el miembro de uno de estos sectores podría efectuar amparado en el párrafo 2° del artículo 75, deberá estar referida necesariamente a disposiciones que lo afecten en cuanto tal. Esta Sala ha enumerado diversos derechos a los que les ha dado el calificativo de "difusos", tales como el medio ambiente, el patrimonio cultural, la defensa de la integridad territorial del país y del buen manejo del gasto público, entre otros. Al respecto deben ser efectuadas dos precisiones: por un lado, los referidos bienes trascienden la esfera tradicionalmente reconocida a los intereses difusos, ya que se refieren en principio a aspectos que afectan a la colectividad nacional y no a grupos particulares de ésta; un daño ambiental no afecta apenas a los vecinos de una región o a los consumidores de un producto, sino que lesiona o pone en grave riesgo el patrimonio natural de todo el país e incluso de la Humanidad; del mismo modo, la defensa del buen manejo que se haga de los fondos públicos autorizados en el Presupuesto de la República es un interés de todos los habitantes de Costa Rica, no tan solo de un grupo cualquiera de ellos. Por otra parte, la enumeración que ha hecho la Sala Constitucional no pasa de una simple descripción propia de su obligación -como órgano jurisdiccional- de limitarse a conocer de los casos que le son sometidos, sin que pueda de ninguna manera llegar a entenderse que solo pueden ser considerados derechos difusos aquellos que la Sala expresamente haya reconocido como tales; lo anterior implicaría dar un vuelco indeseable en los alcances del Estado de Derecho, y de su correlativo "Estado de derechos", que -como en el caso del modelo costarricense- parte de la premisa de que lo que debe ser expreso son los límites a las libertades, ya que éstas subyacen a la misma condición humana y no requieren por ende de reconocimiento oficial. Finalmente, cuando el párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional habla de intereses "que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto", se refiere a los bienes jurídicos explicados en las líneas anteriores, es decir, aquellos cuya titularidad reposa en los mismos detentadores de la soberanía, en cada uno de los habitantes de la República. No se trata por ende de que cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses (acción popular), sino que todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan a toda la colectividad nacional, sin que tampoco en este campo sea válido ensayar cualquier intento de enumeración taxativa.

III.- Sobre la admisibilidad. Como lo ha establecido con anterioridad esta Sala en otros precedentes, la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional no reconoce una legitimación especial al diputado de la Asamblea Legislativa, sin embargo la deriva el accionante de lo dispuesto por el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, quien acciona como abogado y diputado, es decir, en su condición personal y en su calidad de Diputado. En este sentido, el cuestionamiento que hace se refiere a los intereses difusos, es decir, en cuanto al alcance y reconocimiento del sistema de seguridad social para cierto tipo de trabajadores. El razonamiento del accionante se basa en que dicho sistema debe tener un alcance general y universal, efectivo o potencial, donde acusa que las disposiciones impugnadas lesionan a cada uno y a todos los habitantes de la República. No obstante lo señalado por el accionante, cabe indicar que la acción tiene cabida en favor de un grupo indeterminado de trabajadores cuyos derechos a aquél alcance y reconocimiento podrían ser lesionados, incluso aunque estuvieran bajo la cobertura de alguna póliza de riesgos de trabajo. En este sentido, lo que procede es conocer de la acción, como en efecto se hace.

IV.- Objeto de la impugnación. Se pide el examen de constitucionalidad del sub inciso b) del artículo III.2, de la Sección H, del Anexo 12.9.2, del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros”, del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, que se ratificó por medio de la Ley No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, el que dispone:

“III. Compromisos Graduales de Apertura del Mercado […]

2.- Derecho de Establecimiento para Proveedores de Seguros Costa Rica permitirá, sobre una base no discriminatoria, a los proveedores de servicios de seguros de una Parte, a establecerse y efectivamente competir para suministrar directamente al consumidor servicios de seguros en su territorio, según se dispone a continuación:

(a) cualquiera y todas las líneas de seguros 29 (excepto el seguro obligatorio de vehículos y seguros contra riesgos del trabajo), a más tardar el 1 de enero del 2008; y 29 Para mayor certeza, los servicios de seguridad social referidos en el primer, segundo y tercer párrafos del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política de República de Costa Rica y suministrados por la Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social a partir de la fecha de la firma de este Tratado, no estarán sujetos a ningún compromiso incluido en este Anexo.

(b) cualquiera y todas las líneas de seguros, a más tardar el 1 de enero del 2011.

Para efectos de este compromiso Costa Rica deberá permitir a los proveedores de servicios de seguros establecerse a través de cualquier forma jurídica, según se establece en el Artículo 12.4(b). Se entenderá que Costa Rica podrá establecer requisitos prudenciales de solvencia e integridad, que serán conformes con la práctica internacional regulatoria comparable”.

Por otra parte, se impugna también de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, Ley No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, la siguiente disposición:

“TRANSITORIO III.- Apertura en la prestación de seguros obligatorios El Estado mantendrá el monopolio de los seguros de Riesgos del Trabajo y Seguro Obligatorio Automotor, administrados por el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, de conformidad con lo indicado en el título IV del Código de trabajo y la Ley de tránsito por vías públicas terrestres, respectivamente.

A partir del 1º de enero de 2011, la Superintendencia otorgará, cuando así lo soliciten, autorización administrativa para el ejercicio de la actividad aseguradora en los ramos de Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos y del Seguro Obligatorio de Riesgos del Trabajo, a las entidades señaladas en los incisos a) y b) del artículo 7 de esta Ley, siempre y cuando cumplan los términos, las condiciones y las especificaciones que se establecerán en el reglamento que para tal efecto dicte el Consejo Nacional, de acuerdo con la legislación nacional.

Se acusa que estas normas infringen los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política, los artículos 7 y 48 constitucionales en relación con el artículo 9.2 del Protocolo de San Salvador y los numerales 2, 31 y Parte VI del Convenio No. 102 de la Convención de la OIT.

V.- Sobre el fondo.

A.- La seguridad social como un pilar fundamental de la sociedad y del Estado costarricense.- Cuestiones preliminares. Merece destacar desde el principio de esta sentencia, es que nadie niega la importancia que tiene la seguridad social en nuestro país y en el mundo. El accionante, la Procuraduría General de la República, las diferentes organizaciones sociales apersonadas al expediente, los diputados de la fracción del Partido Acción Ciudadana, el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, y otros, tienen un serio y firme acuerdo general sobre el valor de la seguridad social para nuestro país. En consonancia con lo anterior, agrega la Sala el evidente papel que la seguridad social desempeña en el desarrollo, en la paz social, en el bienestar individual y colectivo, en la ventaja que proporciona la existencia para todos y cada uno de los habitantes de este país el acceso de una cobertura y prestación adecuada (oportuna) de los seguros sociales. En este sentido, se cumple lo anterior por la vocación y conciencia que tienen los actores políticos y sociales, en la prevención y tratamiento de las enfermedades, y asegurando espacios para la prestación médica y servicios médicos de alta valía cuando una persona saludable se precipita en una situación vulnerable por enfermedad. Ahora bien, las primeras manifestaciones se encuentran en los diferentes desarrollos históricos de la seguridad social en Alemania, Inglaterra, Bélgica, entre otros países europeos. Con ellas, se puede observar la certeza de crear un sistema de la seguridad social como un mecanismo de previsión social. Entre los filósofos políticos y sociales, tiene una profunda lógica el pensamiento y las palabras de John Rawls cuando argumentó su teoría política del contrato social, una interesante revelación ante su planteamiento de cuál sería la mejor forma de organización de un Estado, si se pudiera empezar de la nada. Invita al operador a un ejercicio mental hipotético que consistiría en privarse de todo prejuicio para crear una sociedad imaginaria. Así, la figura jurídica de la seguridad social tiene uno profundo raigambre político y constitucional. Propone responder a las exigencias sociales a partir de la supresión hipotética de toda condición personal e individual conocida, de manera que, el diseñador de la sociedad no debe saber a cuál estatus social, educativo, político, estilo de vida y sexo, que quisiera, o pudieran corresponderle una vez inserto en aquella sociedad hipotética. Como producto de este ejercicio mental, posiblemente arribaría a una elección bastante temperada y racional, para no quedar en desventaja, frente a la sociedad y aquellas instituciones que gobernarían, dado que en un esfuerzo de auto preservación de este decisor calcularía que si quedara en el escalafón más humilde, lograría una mejor ración de la riqueza de todos a favor del bienestar general de todos. Aunque a los inicios del Siglo XX en el mundo ya habían varios países con sistemas de seguridad social funcionando, incipientemente, pero logrando resultados, pareciera lógico, que hoy mirando al pasado, tal institución tiene cabida en la mente del constituyente originario, como también presente, que, de realizar esta supresión hipotética, lleva a crear un sistema universal de salud que debe garantizar un tratamiento equitativo e igual a una gran mayoría, incluso a los más desaventajados, y con ello, no discriminar en el acceso y servicios por el origen que se tuviera (artículos 50 y 73 de la Constitución Política). El financiamiento, en consecuencia, se haría con la participación de los diferentes actores sociales, Estado, patrono y trabajadores. Consecuencia de lo anterior, una primera impresión de este Tribunal es que el problema de fondo señalado por el accionante no radica en un conflicto de nivel macro de los seguros sociales, sino de una parcela de ellos, porque la normativa constitucional reconoce este principio toral de la sociedad costarricense. Tan es así que el propio Gobierno de la República de Costa Rica se asegura de colocar en la Sección H: Compromisos Específicos de Costa Rica en Materia de Servicios de Seguros, lo siguiente en el preámbulo:

“[…] reafirmando su decisión de asegurar que el proceso de apertura de su sector de servicios de seguros se base en su Constitución Política; enfatizando que dicho proceso será en el beneficio del consumidor y deberá alcanzarse gradualmente y sobre la base de regulación prudencial; reconociendo su compromiso de modernizar el Instituto Nacional de Seguros (INS) y el marco jurídico de Costa Rica en el sector de seguros; Asume a través de este Anexo los siguientes compromisos específicos sobre servicios de seguros”.

Es importante señalar que ese cuidado en la aproximación y declaratoria no se tiene por parte de ninguno de los otros países miembros del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre República Dominicana, Centroamérica y los Estados Unidos de América. Lo anterior, quizá por el nivel de desarrollo del monopolio existente en materia de seguros, pero además, porque tradicionalmente el Estado en Costa Rica ha mantenido un importante rol en actividades comerciales y de inversión social, es decir, es un país altamente regulado cuyos compromisos eran más complejos. Esta característica que se asume como un compromiso por el país se hace palpable en el punto II de la Sección H, donde de igual manera se consigna la obligación de establecer una autoridad reguladora de seguros, que será independiente de los proveedores de servicios de seguros y donde se declara que no responderá a ellos. Debe mantenerse en una posición imparcial de los participantes del mercado, debiendo tener los poderes adecuados, protección legal y recursos financieros para ejercer sus funciones y poderes, y manejar la información confidencial en forma apropiada. Esto será retomado en la sentencia posteriormente.

Como lo que se cuestiona en la acción es la regularidad constitucional de la norma del Tratado comercial y una de sus leyes de implementación, en cuanto permite la apertura de ciertos tipos de seguros, debemos puntualizar, por lo pronto, el alcance de esas normas, y si existe un problema de interpretación del alcance de los seguros sociales contenidos en la Constitución Política. Un primer aspecto que debe despejarse es que al entrar en vigor el Tratado de Libre Comercio, no incluye los seguros sociales administrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. El Tratado permite sobre una base no discriminatoria, cualquiera y todas las líneas de seguros, pero como se indicó, salva en una nota al pie de página lo siguiente:

“Para mayor certeza, los servicios de seguridad social referidos en el primer, segundo y tercer párrafos del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política de la República de Costa Rica y suministrados por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social a partir de la fecha de la firma de este Tratado, no estarán sujetos a ningún compromiso incluido en este Anexo”.

Del reconocimiento anterior, está claro que la seguridad social amparada por la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social queda excluida del Tratado, lo anterior, es importante para la interpretación del artículo 73 constitucional, porque con esto el legislador de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente selló en la norma un especial resultado.

B.- La Seguridad Social es un bien social e instrumental que se compone de recursos de la sociedad costarricense. En efecto por la regulación establecida por el constituyente en la Carta Fundamental, ha permitido a esta Sala Constitucional construir el Derecho a la Seguridad Social, la que por su estructura no debe estar limitada únicamente a la tutela del derecho a la Salud, sino que comprende muchas otras prestaciones, que todas integradas, producen un valor constitucional de la sociedad costarricense. Por citar una sentencia, debe indicarse que:

“III.- Derecho a la seguridad social.- El propósito del constituyente al diseñar el sistema de seguridad social en nuestro país fue garantizar a todos los ciudadanos que el Estado, a través de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, les otorgaría al menos los servicios indispensables en caso de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez y muerte. El artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, interpretado armónicamente con el artículo 50 idem, consagra el Derecho de la Seguridad Social. Este derecho supone que los poderes públicos mantendrán un régimen público de seguridad social para todos los ciudadanos de manera que garantice la asistencia y brinde las prestaciones sociales suficientes ante situaciones de necesidad para preservar la salud y la vida. El ámbito subjetivo de aplicación del derecho de la seguridad social incorpora el principio de universalidad, pues se extiende a todos los ciudadanos, con carácter de obligatoriedad. El ámbito objetivo parte del principio de generalidad, en tanto protege situaciones de necesidad, no en la medida en que éstas hayan sido previstas y aseguradas con anterioridad, sino en tanto se produzcan efectivamente. Además, incorpora los principios de suficiencia de la protección, según módulos cuantitativos y cualitativos y de automaticidad protectora, lo que se traduce en la adecuada e inmediata protección en materia de enfermedad, invalidez, vejez y muerte.

Los artículos 50 y 73 de la Constitución Política, 11 de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y 9 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, interpretados de manera armónica, establecen el derecho a la seguridad social en beneficio de todos los trabajadores, informado en los principios de universalidad, generalidad, y suficiencia de la protección. Evidentemente, la prestación de tales servicios está condicionada a la existencia de algunos requisitos mínimos, pero básicos y necesarios para la subsistencia del sistema, los que sin embargo, deben ser coherentes con los principios antes mencionados.

El derecho a la seguridad social es un derecho fundamental, reconocido por el Estado costarricense cuando el constituyente derivado incorporó en la Constitución Política de 1871, el capítulo de las Garantías Sociales, que posteriormente fue confirmado en el proceso constituyente de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve. ...” (sentencia No. 2004-08013) Además, en otra oportunidad la Sala también ha indicado que:

“IV.- El artículo 73 de nuestra Constitución Política establece la existencia de los seguros sociales, los cuales se regulan por el sistema de contribución forzosa del Estado, patrono y trabajadores, con el fin de proteger a éstos contra los riesgos de enfermedad, maternidad, invalidez, vejez y muerte. La Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, es la entidad autónoma encargada de administrar este tipo de seguros, con la autonomía que le permite tener iniciativa propia para sus gestiones, así como para ejecutar sus tareas y dar cumplimiento a sus obligaciones legales, fijándose metas y los medios para cumplirlas. Garantiza de esta forma, el establecimiento de la seguridad social y su naturaleza, decreta la finalidad de los seguros sociales y regula el destino de los fondos respectivos. La seguridad social nació en protección del trabajador y de su familia, como seres humanos que son, y se brinda desde su concepción hasta su muerte, procurando la salud y ayudando en infortunios imprevistos como la incapacidad y la muerte, así como en los estados de desprotección por su misma condición como son los de vejez, pensión y jubilación.” (Sentencia No. 1998-04636) La doctrina que enuncia el anterior precedente se mantiene firme en cuanto interpreta el artículo 73 constitucional, en consecuencia de lo dicho, la seguridad social es un eje fundamental, un axioma y un referente de la sociedad costarricense, una de las manifestaciones más importantes del Estado Social de Derecho, lo que significa un valor constitucional o bien jurídicamente relevante que garantiza el bienestar social, la adecuada distribución de la riqueza para lograr la estabilidad social del país y que le hace atractivo a la inversión nacional e internacional, y que como tal, se hace mediante la contribución tripartita del Estado, patrono, y trabajador. Así, las personas puedan tener acceso a la seguridad social, a un régimen de previsibilidad por invalidez, vejez y muerte, así como lo tendrá a la salud y a la prestación primordial de servicios de salud que el Estado a través de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social pone al servicio de la población, siendo una de las mejores garantías en las aspiraciones individuales hacia una sociedad más equitativa. Son múltiples los estudios que colocan a nuestro país dentro de las posiciones privilegiadas, no siendo un país desarrollado, pero mantiene niveles de salubridad altos coincidentes con países europeos más desarrollados que el nuestro. Como se indicó arriba, se logra poner en una mejor posición a la persona menos aventajada en la sociedad, en una que le permite recibir prestaciones de salud como cualquier otra mejor aventajada en la sociedad, así como a la solidaridad social de caer la persona en supuestos de vulnerabilidad social. En otras palabras, las asimetrías sociales y económicas no deben contar para la prestación de servicios, por cuanto el constituyente originario garantiza jurídicamente la salud de la población mediante la creación institucional, es decir al encargar a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social para que vele por su entrega. Cabe señalar entonces, que el Poder Ejecutivo garantizó en el proceso de negociación, y fue consecuente con el grado de autonomía administrativa y de gobierno de los seguros sociales, por encargo del constituyente a específicas prestaciones reservadas a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social en el Tratado de Libre Comercio todo lo relacionado con el párrafo primero, segundo y tercero del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política. La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente previó la necesidad de mantener incorporado en la Constitución Política de 1949, lo establecido en la Constitución Política de 1871, reformada en 1943. Con ello, reafirmó, en la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico la seguridad social estableciendo beneficiarios del sistema (trabajadores manuales e intelectuales), sus formas de financiamiento (contributivo forzoso para el Estado, patronos y trabajadores), y alcances (riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine). Designó a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social como el ente público encargado de estas prestaciones, dotándolo de atribuciones jurídicas y financieras, autonomía administrativa y de gobierno en los seguros sociales, para de igual manera, zanjar una barrera de protección a los recursos y reservas de ese ente autónomo para prevenir futuros desvíos de ese patrimonio de todos los beneficiarios. Pero, siempre dentro de la seguridad social, se regulan otros seguros con la particularidad de que rompen el anterior esquema financiero, de causas que generan las prestaciones y de regulaciones. Por ello, debe examinarse si admitiría exceptuar de esta normativa los seguros obligatorios de vehículos y los seguros obligatorios contra riesgos de trabajo, para regularlos por separado posteriormente a la entrada en vigencia, en oportunidad posterior al 1° de enero de 2011. En otras palabras, la posición asumida por el Gobierno costarricense sería consistente con las obligaciones que le impone la Constitución Política, que efectivamente, como lo indica el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, lo es para el Gobierno de la República, pero que quedaron plasmadas en los compromisos asumidos ante los otros Estados miembros del Tratado de Libre Comercio, y su implementación en la legislación nacional. Consecuentemente, el meollo de la discusión que se plantea en la acción se focaliza en el párrafo cuarto del numeral en cuestión, de donde se reitera la discusión abordada desde el referéndum del Tratado de Libre Comercio y la agenda complementaria de leyes al mencionado Tratado. En este sentido, el régimen de riesgos del trabajo participa de algunas de las características definidas por el constituyente originario, al ubicarla como parte del régimen de la seguridad social establecida desde la cúspide del ordenamiento jurídico, sin embargo, debe existir una interpretación constitucional en su justa dimensión, especialmente frente al tema de los seguros sociales que protege de los riesgos de enfermedad, invalidez, maternidad, vejez, muerte y demás contingencias que la ley determine, pero con distinciones en los seguros contra el riesgo profesional o riesgo de los trabajadores. Ciertamente, los aspectos normativos de mayor relevancia para la sociedad deben situarse en la Constitución Política para regular o proteger determinados derechos fundamentales, temas que son los más esenciales en la Constitución Política con el fin de señalar el derrotero por donde debe desarrollarse la legislación ordinaria, incluidas las licencias que pudiera haber contemplado. Si bien lo anterior marca un determinado rumbo como decisión-país, también existen disposiciones que liberan esas determinaciones a una lectura propia de la ciencia política en un determinado momento, cuya decisión pertenece a los órganos políticos del Estado. En el caso de los seguros sociales que operan desde la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social no existe duda que el propio constituyente originario reservó su monopolio institucional, pero en lo segundo la textura de la norma fue más abierta.

A juicio de la Sala, cabe cuestionarse la idea originalmente concebida por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de dotar a la población de seguros sociales universales y de la prestación de servicios, si se ve modificado en perjuicio de los menos aventajados, con el cambio de marco jurídico –como acusa el accionante y los coadyuvantes- en el tanto que contradice esa universalidad por estar fundado en una apertura comercial que modifica el monopolio de ciertos seguros, y que resulta contrario al a los convenios internacionales de derechos humanos. La discusión es más filosófica-política, que filosófica-jurídica. La anterior aseveración se verá más abajo, para establecer si existe evidencia que eso sea así o que los organismos internacionales se decanten por un determinado modelo de desarrollo de seguros sociales para alcanzar esos ideales. En ese sentido, sería poco el espacio jurídico que quedaría para un Tribunal Constitucional o los propios órganos políticos del Estado al ratificar un cuerpo normativo internacional. De ahí que, cabría preguntarse cuál es el papel que le corresponde a la Sala, como Tribunal Constitucional. En este sentido, debe definirse si se puede cuestionar jurídicamente o es un tema que corresponde a los cuerpos políticos del Estado. En cuanto a lo primero, cabe indicar que la Sala debe pronunciarse desde el punto de vista constitucional de las normas, pero, en cuanto a lo segundo, a la competencia para decidir sobre la conveniencia o inconveniencia de un Tratado, ambas cuestiones deben ir en la misma línea con lo que la Sala dilucidó en el Tratado de Libre Comercio con México. La Sala se ha decantado por sostener que no debe entrar a analizar un tema político que escapa a la decisión judicial, aunque si está en su competencia al resolver lo jurídico o decidir algún sentido particular a la interpretación constitucional de una norma cuando algún derecho fundamental está en conflicto, pero establecer la oportunidad y conveniencia de la legislación, en sí, no es ni debe ser natural de la actividad jurisdiccional. Lo importante que debe destacarse aquí es que en las relaciones interorgánicas del Estado, el primero llamado en controlar la oportunidad y conveniencia de las negociaciones internacionales del Poder Ejecutivo en sus relaciones internacionales en la forma de Tratados Internacionales es la Asamblea Legislativa. En este sentido, el control abstracto que tiene esta Sala, sea a priori o a posteriori, dependerá de la actuación política como órgano constitucional que reside en la Asamblea Legislativa, y en el que se funda en la toma de decisiones por la mayoría, mediante una lucha competitiva, pero donde la oportunidad y conveniencia de una norma es de resorte exclusivo de la Asamblea Legislativa. En todo caso, por sentencia No. 1994-07005 se dice que:

“Sin embargo, desde el punto que nos interesa señalar ahora, eso significa que el Estado, o más propiamente, los órganos que tienen a su cargo competencias estrictamente políticas y de gestión, deben actuar siempre en función de estimular la producción y el más adecuado reparto de la riqueza. Ha de entenderse, pues, que el Poder Ejecutivo ha negociado este Tratado, teniendo como norte esos objetivos constitucionales. Y ha de entenderse, también, que el Poder Legislativo, al conocer el fondo del instrumento dicho, actuará de conformidad con los mismos objetivos. Por eso es que podemos concluir, en principio, que las ventajas o desventajas que tenga para algún sector el Tratado como tal, o algunas de sus previsiones, discutidas y discutibles, no necesariamente entrañan un aspecto de constitucionalidad, en el sentido que debe pronunciar la Sala, pues radican en el nivel de la mera conveniencia u oportunidad. Por ejemplo, algunos señalan que no obstante la bondad de este tipo de instrumentos comerciales, un país no derivaría ventajas inmediatas o en el corto plazo, si coinciden en él el viejo modelo (de sustitución de importaciones, de subsidios), y el nuevo modelo de apertura comercial. Por eso es que a este respecto, algunos expertos estiman que México lleva ventaja a Costa Rica por cuanto sus aranceles han sido rebajados en grado mayor y mucho tiempo antes de que nuestro país se iniciara en ello. Pero aún así, siguen diciendo, a Costa Rica le conviene el tratado, por cuanto se le abrirá un espectro de inversiones muy importantes, de transferencia de tecnología y creación de empleos, que dinamizarán su economía y, adicionalmente, porque le pondrá en un nivel de exigencia competitiva que necesita para adaptarse a una posible incorporación a los beneficios del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre México, Estados Unidos de América y Canadá (NAFTA), como aspiración casi inmediata del país, tal y como han expresado responsables del Gobierno central. En otras palabras, el Tratado de Libre comercio con México se convierte en un escenario indispensable para pasar al siguiente, más complejo y ambicioso. De toda suerte, la Sala advierte que esos aspectos giran en torno a las políticas que están detrás de la filosofía del Tratado, pero no tienen la connotación constitucional a que la Sala debe circunscribir su opinión.” C.- La libertad de configuración del legislador en los seguros de riesgos de trabajo. Ahora bien, el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política establece:

“Los seguros contra riesgos profesionales serán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos y se regirán por disposiciones especiales”.

El constituyente originario, en el tema de los riesgos profesionales, dotó al legislador de mayor flexibilidad, pese a que este efectivamente considerado dentro de los seguros sociales, lo que se denota con el rompimiento del esquema financiero y regulatorio de los demás seguros sociales. En este sentido, podría pensarse que una posible lectura integral del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política aconsejaría encargar a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social de toda la seguridad social del país, pero evidentemente, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente diferenció esa posibilidad, porque, de lo contrario, lo pudo haber determinado eliminando el párrafo final o incorporando ese encargo expresamente a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Para probar lo anterior, se podría cuestionar si se pudo haber sostenido la inconstitucionalidad de la creación y función monopolística del Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en el tema de los seguros por riesgos profesionales. Pero tal interpretación tampoco sería plausible, por el contrario, el legislador delegó, por muchos años, la cobertura de la seguridad social en los riesgos de trabajo en otra institución autónoma, distinta a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, configurada por el legislador ordinario, sin que tal interpretación de la norma comprometiera su constitucionalidad, ni se advirtiera irregularidad constitucional alguna, porque estaba en función de un sujeto de derecho público que actuaba en una doble capacidad, de derecho publico y privado. Lo anterior, lleva a este Tribunal a la posibilidad de encausar de un modo más flexible la interpretación del párrafo final del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, siempre guardando armonía con todo el sistema, cuando se indica que los seguros “serán de exclusiva cuenta de los patronos”, pues puede derivarse –lógicamente- una menor intensidad de la presencia del Estado, pero sin que lo anterior signifique ausencia total. Por otra parte, el patrono sería el principal contribuyente, dado que es él quien por encargo el trabajador ejecuta la labor, y se le atribuye a él las condiciones laborales que ofrece al trabajador, de manera que es el Patrono al que le corresponde velar y asumir por la seguridad de sus empleados, y al Estado, velar o fiscalizar el cumplimiento de esas obligaciones. En cuanto al trabajador no recae obligación alguna más que las obligaciones contenidas en la ley laboral, porque obvio que esta decisión de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, coloca al trabajador como destinatario de la protección, es decir, finalmente sería él el beneficiario de estos seguros. El constituyente originario previó un esquema normativo más flexible, permitiendo una mayor amplitud de acción para el legislador cuando señala “se regirán por disposiciones especiales”, que como se indicó arriba, lo ejerció al encargar a un ente autónomo distinto a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social el establecer, ofrecer y ejecutar los seguros de riesgo profesional. En este punto, se podría escoger entre la marcada presencia del Estado en la actividad económica y social propio de un Estado Social de Derecho, o la prevalencia de soluciones mediante un tejido económico a partir de modelos mercantiles puros o mixtos de mercado con la tutela del Estado, en lo que se refiere a su entrega. El punto al que esta Sala quiere arribar es el siguiente: el constituyente originario estableció un sistema para regular constitucionalmente los riesgos de trabajo para que puedan ser objeto de diversos diseños o estructuras jurídicas y prestacionales, basado en la libertad de configuración del legislador. Lo anterior claramente como parte de la gran cantidad de actividades económicas productivas, así como los empleos y riesgos que pueden existir en cada uno de ellos. Precisamente, ello permitió, por una decisión legislativa, optar para que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros ejerciera esta actividad en régimen de monopolio, lo que implicó un rumbo diferente para los seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo a aquellas regulaciones de la Caja, y sin embargo, ello no lo hacía ni lo haría inconstitucional, como tampoco, una mayor apertura en la escogencia del Patrono, frente a una oferta mayor de operadores de los seguros de riesgos profesionales.

Se desprende de lo anterior otras consecuencias importantes, en las que se pasa de una Institución en la cual operaba bajo un sistema de explotación de seguros monopolizado, consecuentemente un mercado fuertemente intervenido, y luego se optó por uno distinto de apertura, con una autoridad reguladora imparcial, con poderes adecuados, con protección legal y recursos financieros para ejercer sus funciones y poderes. Se previó así un órgano regulador que debe velar e impedir el perjuicio para el trabajador. En consecuencia, la tesis del accionante puede mantener una errónea concepción de que el Estado desapareció por completo dentro del mencionado esquema patrono-trabajador-riesgos de trabajo. Está reconocido por el Derecho Público que el Estado, a través de una decisión legislativa, puede declarar determinados servicios que se presten en régimen de monopolio, o se presten en un régimen de libre competencia, sin que ello –necesariamente- signifique detrimento en el servicio. De tal manera, puede liberar ciertas actividades para que operen bajo la modalidad del mercado. Si una decisión de gobierno negociada por las partes en un Tratado, aprobada mediante mecanismos de participación ciudadana (referéndum), y agotado el procedimiento de ratificación, coloca a otro órgano del Estado para regular imparcialmente y sobre una base no discriminatoria la actividad comercial de los seguros, ello forma parte de una de las tantas opciones jurídicas que se tiene para legislar. En este sentido, la legitimidad de esta decisión se debe decir que nace reforzada, porque la misma se origina en la reforma constitucional que permite un auténtico ejercicio democrático directo que en el año 2002 pretendió dar participación ciudadana a las decisiones de gobierno, que culminó en una votación popular con carácter normativo. Eso en sí, tiene un peso especial, que en principio, debe ser acatado por los mecanismos e instituciones basadas en una democracia representantiva y madura, por los distintos actores sociales y políticos (claro está, lo anterior, no excluye la posibilidad del ejercicio del control de constitucionalidad). Desde el punto de vista normativo, lo anterior tiene consecuencias naturales importantes al tratarse de un convenio ratificado y por ser un instrumento internacional, que implica cambiar el sistema jurídico que venía operando desde hace muchos años en nuestro país, modificando automáticamente la postura jurídica de los órganos internos del Estado, en el momento en que entre en vigencia la normativa internacional. En este sentido, son obligaciones que vinculan a todos los poderes y funciones del Estado. Es importante mencionar el artículo 1.4: Alcance de las Obligaciones que dice:

“Las Partes garantizarán la adopción de todas las medidas necesarias para hacer efectivas las disposiciones de este Tratado, incluida su observancia por parte de los gobiernos estatales, salvo que este Tratado disponga otra cosa”.

Dado que el régimen del seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo venía operando desde el Instituto Nacional de Seguros, el acuerdo internacional establece la apertura por plazos del mercado de los seguros, incluido el seguro obligatorio de vehículos y de riesgos de trabajo. Lo cierto es que la modernización del Instituto y la apertura del marco jurídico para romper el monopolio fue un resultado directo de la aprobación del Tratado de Libre Comercio, el cual fue analizado por la Sala Constitucional oportunamente. En la consulta legislativa que se formuló en el trámite legislativo la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Valores, se consulta a la Sala sobre el siguiente problema:

“Violación de los artículos 50, 73 y 74 constitucionales: inconstitucionalidad por omisión legislativa de normar seguros solidarios: refieren que esta omisión causará una desprotección jurídica relevante para la Constitución en perjuicio de la población habitante de Costa Rica, específicamente porque se conculca la eficacia presente y futura del catálogo de las garantías sociales y derechos laborales fundamentales que en materia de seguros derivan del artículo 73 constitucional: obligatoriedad, universalidad, régimen forzoso, suministro de prestaciones aún a favor de trabajadores no asegurados, inexistencia de tope de prestaciones, inmediatez y obligatoriedad del suministro de prestaciones al trabajador, posibilidad de otorgar beneficios extraordinarios en casos justificados, posibilidad de conmutación de rentas y sobretodo imposibilidad de contemplar utilidades en las tarifas del ente asegurador. De igual manera, aducen que los derechos y beneficios socio-laborales contemplados entre los artículos 50 y 73 constitucionales son irrenunciables y que su enumeración no excluye otros que se deriven del principio cristiano de justicia social, lo que implica que se está ante una norma constitucional de cierre o de clausura del sistema de garantías sociales, que deja un portillo permanentemente abierto en función de habilitar la constitucionalización de toda aquella legislación social y laboral presente y futura. Alegan que la omisión de la regulación de los seguros solidarios va a generar una desprotección laboral.” En este sentido, la Sala resolvió por sentencia No. 2008-10450 que:

“9.- Violación a los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política, por la omisión legislativa de establecer seguros sociales.

Según los diputados consultantes el proyecto de “Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros”, también es inconstitucional por omisión, en la medida en que no se contempla el establecimiento de los seguros sociales. Sobre el control de constitucionalidad por omisión se debe mencionar que este Tribunal Constitucional, desde la sentencia N°2005-05649 de las 14:39 hrs. de 11 de mayo de 2005 (dirigida contra la omisión legislativa de dictar la normativa infraconstitucional relativa al proceso de referéndum) se ha reconocido la normatividad de todas las disposiciones constitucionales, los alcances del principio de supremacía de la Constitución, así como la posibilidad de ser vulnerada por acción, o por la omisión de las autoridades públicas con poder normativo de dictar “una ley que desarrolle un contenido o cláusula constitucional”. De ahí que el control de las omisiones inconstitucionales es precisamente el mayor alcance del reconocimiento de la Constitución como norma jurídica, exigible plenamente a la actuación de los poderes públicos, y el principio de supremacía constitucional. Bajo esta perspectiva, si se analiza con detenimiento los mandatos establecidos en los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política a todas luces es evidente que “la administración y el gobierno de los seguros sociales están a cargo de una institución autónoma, denominada Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social”. De ahí que en el proyecto de ley aludido la Sala no aprecia la existencia de alguna omisión inconstitucional que vulnere los derechos protegidos en los artículos 50, 73 y 74 de la Constitución Política, razón por la cual se debe evacuar la consulta formulada en ese sentido.” No hay necesariamente pérdida de protección laboral para los trabajadores. Sigue a lo anterior, que Costa Rica es libre e independiente, que como tal adquiere una obligación internacional que debe observar según el principio de derecho internacional pacta sunt servanda; en tal sentido, obligarse por un compromiso internacional con los diferentes países y obtener de éstos beneficios comerciales, es lo que efectivamente se persigue de este tipo de instrumentos. Por otra parte, como República democrática el parámetro y centro de todo interés estatal es la persona humana, con base en dos pilares fundamentales, la primera es la antiquísima noción de la libertad, de manera que en ciertas áreas de la vida de las personas se encuentran exentas de condicionamientos externos a la capacidad volitiva y cognitiva de la persona, de manera que la vida transcurra sin injerencias indebidas, siempre y cuando no se afecte la moral, o el orden público o que no perjudiquen a terceras personas. Pero además, alrededor de esta libertad –en la base fundamental de la sociedad y el Estado- queda garantizada una institucionalidad estructurada para proteger al individuo en el ejercicio de esa libertad, así como a los valores sociales que el constituyente originario ha decidido proteger, que se derivarían de la protección del individuo frente a terceros. De ahí que, pudiera decirse que existen las diferentes ramas de gobierno, con pesos y contrapesos, diferentes instituciones que se diseñaron para controlarse entre sí, que controlan a otros, etc., pero que nacen con el fin de garantizar un balance adecuado para garantizar los derechos fundamentales del ser humano frente al Estado. Lo importante es que, únicamente la Constitución Política y en Ley puede interferir en esa libertad. Además, solo mediante una ley que cumpla con los principios democráticos, de proporcionalidad y razonabilidad, pueden limitar aquella libertad que posee el particular; la que garantiza la Constitución Política podría limitarse en el tanto la conducta particular pueda ser contraria a la moral, el orden público o que perjudique a tercero (artículo 28 de la Constitución Política). Con mayor razón, una norma que ha sido aprobada mediante el ejercicio de la democracia representativa, debe reputarse una norma legítima, mediante la democracia directa, como en el caso del Tratado de Libre Comercio, aprobado por Ley de referéndum No. 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, mantiene una legitimación más estricta para las diferentes instituciones del Estado. Lo anterior significa que, sea la Constitución Política, un acuerdo internacional, la ley u otra disposición normativa, el cumplimiento de los cometidos debe garantizarse, sin que sea válido, argumentar donde la norma no impone condiciones o pautas, establecerlas de modo antojadizo. Debe recordarse que la misma Constitución Política debe asumirse como un marco jurídico que permite al gobernante avanzar sus políticas, de acuerdo a los tiempos que imperan, ajustando medidas o relajándolas, con miras al bien social. De ahí que no sería procedente establecer la constitucionalización de disposiciones legislativas, como sostienen algunos coadyuvantes a partir de la reforma al Código de Trabajo mediante Ley 6727 de 9 de marzo de 1982, si el mismo constituyente originario previó la flexibilidad normativa al establecer su regulación por disposiciones especiales, es decir, específicas mediante las cuales la ley ordinaria podría ser modificada por otra ley, nada impide que éstas las varíe por la materia y en el tiempo.

Por lo pronto, el monopolio de los seguros obligatorios en favor del INS se rompe a partir de la aprobación por referéndum del TLC, lo que permite una mayor oferta de servicios nacional e internacional por parte de empresas de seguros de riesgos de trabajo. Está claro que la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente no dio el mismo tratamiento regulatorio a todos los seguros, por lo que rompe un aspecto primario de la seguridad social que había establecido en el párrafo primero del numeral 73 indicado, de fuente tripartita de financiación de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, para dejar en libertad al legislador la iniciativa de cómo materializar los seguros contra riesgos profesionales. La Asamblea Nacional Constituyente dejó la elección al legislador, el que, en efecto lo hizo al encargar al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, en un inicio los seguros sociales profesionales. Bajo el esquema del constituyente originario, el seguro obligatorio de riesgos de trabajo, estaría amparado por las decisiones que el legislador tomara bajo el concepto “disposiciones especiales”, lo que significa que no solo diseñó esta cobertura con más holgura, sino lo debía hacer mediante normativa especial (con suficiente potencia y resistencia), y que en esta materia recibió de un proceso de referéndum, como en efecto sucedió el día 7 de octubre de 2007. Aun cuando la actividad prestacional del seguro de riesgos de trabajo fue encargada al Instituto Nacional de Seguros, como una actividad estatal monopólica, a favor de una institución del Estado, un cambio en la normativa produjo un sistema más abierto hacia la economía de mercado como en otras áreas de la vida nacional, pero sujeto a limitaciones importantes, que se derivan de la Constitución Política, como es una tutela estatal, un tratamiento en igualdad de condiciones, como también del Tratado Libre Comercio que exige regulaciones no discriminatorias para todos los agentes de comercio. En este sentido, está prohibido un tratamiento privilegiado de alguno de los oferentes del mercado de seguros. Retomando lo señalado arriba, es claro que el Estado a través de la legislación puede escoger entre prestar los seguros de Riesgo de Trabajo en regímenes de monopolio o regímenes de competencia. En este sentido, el monopolio lo puede ejercer el Estado o con la colaboración de personas físicas o jurídicas de derecho privado, o participar en un escenario que busca satisfacer las preferencias del mercado basado en un esquema libre de mercado. El tratamiento dado por el constituyente originario efectivamente se puede presentar en cualquier de los ámbitos, siendo este último el escogido en el mencionado referéndum.

D.- Modalidades genéricas de contratación con empresas. Ausencia de una norma prohibitiva.- El accionante argumenta que la Constitución Política contiene una prohibición para el Estado de autorizar a empresas privadas en actividades relacionadas con ciertos servicios públicos, pero el argumento es débil. En realidad, ello está muy alejado de lo que ha ocurrido a lo largo de la historia del desarrollo del derecho administrativo en cuanto a las concesiones y otras formas más complejas de la contratación administrativa. En este sentido, existen ciertas actividades de marcado interés general, que por una decisión política del legislador (o constituyente en su caso) asigna al Estado ese servicio o una posición estratégica en ella, pero a partir de ahí, se han derivado muchas figuras contractuales para afrontar la prestación que exige, como la gestión interesada para ciertas actividades públicas que no pueden salir de la administración del Estado, o la concesión cuando encarga a sujetos físicos o jurídicos privados una determinada prestación de servicios públicos. Como se indicó anteriormente, no se puede derivar del párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política, una prohibición por la textura abierta de la norma que rompe con el esquema de los primeros tres párrafos del artículo mencionado, agregando un elemento condicional abierta a la norma constitucional al establecer mayor libertad de configuración para el legislador. Para el Tribunal cuando el Tratado de Libre Comercio exige a las operadoras de seguros una autorización por parte de una Autoridad Reguladora, con toda claridad acoge una forma de tutela administrativa del Estado sobre particulares que pueden ejercer una libertad o derecho en el mercado, pero requieren del cumplimiento de requisitos ex ante, que deben cumplir todos los competidores en el mercado, sin discriminación o lo que es lo mismo, la existencia de normas igualmente aplicables a todos los agentes, lo que permite que la oferta responda a la demanda, pero de igual manera, si no existiera oferta alguna, es claro que la entidad estatal no dejaría de operar, como en efecto lo hace. Los informes en la acción, los sendos escritos de los coadyuvantes interesados hacen alusión a las distintas condiciones que deben cumplir las empresas que serían oferentes en el mercado de seguros obligatorios de riesgo de trabajo, en consecuencia, no puede decirse que el trabajador quedaría en desventaja, por cuanto estamos frente a mínimos regulatorios (o núcleo duro del derecho fundamental) para poder obtener la autorización para competir en el mercado. El argumento del accionante radica en que se pone en peligro la universalidad del derecho fundamental a la seguridad social, dado que no existen obligaciones comprometidas a la atención universal de trabajadores por parte de empresas mercantiles, porque como empresas que buscan la retribución y el lucro, pondrán en peligro el sistema de protección ideado por el constituyente originario, el Código de Trabajo y el Protocolo de San Salvador, así como del Convenio 102 de la OIT. Sin embargo dichas afirmaciones deben tomarse con sumo cuidado, dado que lejos de ser un asunto estrictamente jurídico, incursiona en aspectos políticos de la decisión legislativa y de medios para alcanzar determinados objetivos. En tal sentido, las disposiciones internacionales deben ser normas que albergan espacio para las distintas políticas nacionales de los Estados miembros, en el tanto dejan abierta los mecanismos para hacer efectivos los derechos, normalmente frente a compromisos u obligaciones internacionales de resultados, pero sin ser convenios internacionales de medios (como parece plantearlo el accionante). Dicho de otra manera, las disposiciones dejan los mecanismos de implementación a los países para que éstos adopten las medidas mínimas según el propio contexto social y económico. En este sentido, debe tomarse en cuenta que el Protocolo de San Salvador establece:

“Artículo 1. Obligación de Adoptar Medidas Los Estados partes en el presente Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derecho Humanos se comprometen a adoptar las medidas necesarias tanto de orden interno como mediante la cooperación entre los Estados, especialmente económica y técnica, hasta el máximo de los recursos disponibles y tomando en cuenta su grado de desarrollo, a fin de lograr progresivamente, y de conformidad con la legislación interna , la plena efectividad de los derechos que se reconocen en el presente Protocolo.

Artículo 2. Obligación de Adoptar Disposiciones de Derecho Interno Si el ejercicio de los derechos establecidos en el presente Protocolo no estuviera ya garantizado por disposiciones legislativas o de otro carácter, los Estados partes se comprometen a adoptar, con arreglo a sus procedimientos constitucionales y a las disposiciones de este Protocolo, las medidas legislativas o de otro carácter que fueren necesarias para hacer efectivos tales derechos” (lo escrito en negrita no es del original).

Una de las características que distinguen a los instrumentos de derechos humanos de los demás tratados, es precisamente que su objeto es muy distinto al resto del derecho internacional público, dado que en los primeros el fin y objetivo es el ser humano, en los demás, lo que las Altas Partes decidan al pautar como objetivo en sus relaciones recíprocas, tratados limítrofes, de extradición de fugitivos de la justicia, cooperación técnica y científica, etc. En los primeros, el compromiso internacional se dirige como tal al ser humano, y no en las concesiones recíprocas de interés de los Estados, y será él quien asume los compromisos para materializar los derechos humanos pactados y reconocidos a favor del ser humano. Sin embargo, los Tratados Internacionales –especialmente multilaterales- deben adoptar un lenguaje inclusivo para los diferentes sistemas jurídicos y políticos de las partes que le permita profundizar el objetivo y fin pactado, a partir de las obligaciones libremente aceptadas y receptadas por sus ordenamientos jurídicos. De ahí que, no podría afirmarse que un determinado tratado de derechos humanos impone un único esquema jurídico para solucionar problemas en las respectivas jurisdicciones, de manera que establece solo una forma para llevar a cabo los objetivos de la legislación internacional, por el contrario, queda a disposición de cada parte llevarlo a cabo, localizando sus fortalezas, y ubicando los mayores esfuerzos y recursos una vez establecido el estado de cosas en su propia jurisdicción, para adoptar las medidas internas; significa que puede echar mano a las formas públicas, privadas o mixtas, para obtener resultados en dirección a los compromisos adoptados a nivel internacional y en beneficio de sus habitantes. Corolario de lo anterior, es que en una decisión estructural, nada obstaculizaría determinar otras formas de prestaciones del seguro de riesgos profesionales, siempre que sean conformes a los convenios internacionales que regulan las relaciones comerciales del país y las de los derechos humanos. Así, en el Protocolo de San Salvador establece en cuanto al “Artículo 9. Derecho a la Seguridad Social 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a la seguridad social que la proteja contra las consecuencias de la vejez y de la incapacidad que la imposibilite física o mentalmente para obtener los medios para llevar una vida digna y decorosa. En caso de muerte del beneficiario, las prestaciones de seguridad social serán aplicadas a sus dependientes.

2. Cuando se trate de personas que se encuentran trabajando, el derecho a la seguridad social cubrirá al menos la atención médica y el subsidio o jubilación en caso de accidentes de trabajo o de enfermedad profesional y, cuando se trate de mujeres, licencia retribuida por maternidad antes y después del parto” (lo escrito en negrita no es del original).

Lo cierto es que la normativa internacional establece lo que la jerga de la seguridad social denomina en algunos de los documentos de la OIT el piso social o piso de protección social como un mínimo de obligaciones fundamentales que sí podrían ser justiciables, sí existen obligaciones jurídicas no cumplidas y exigibles en forma doméstica, o agotada ésta, a nivel internacional. Por ello, es cierto que el seguro de riesgo del trabajo se concibe para una relación laboral de dependencia o subordinación, en la que debe garantizarse prestaciones médicas al trabajador en caso de accidente o enfermedad laboral. El Convenio 102 de la OIT atribuye al patrono la responsabilidad por el entorno laboral de su empleado, y se encuentra conforme con el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 constitucional. Lo importante es que el Convenio 102 de la OIT contiene nueve ramas de la seguridad social, donde establece normas mínimas para cada una de ellas, y enuncia principios para la sostenibilidad y buena gobernanza de dichos sistemas. Este convenio incluye una cláusula de flexibilidad de manera que al ratificar el Tratado, el Estado puede escoger por lo menos tres áreas de protección. Datos importantes surgen del Informe de la OIT [Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo, 100 reunión, 2011 "Seguridad Social para la justicia social y una globalización equitativa"] el cual indica, entre otras cosas:

“185. Los regímenes de accidentes del trabajo que ofrecen prestaciones suelen estar organizados sobre una base contributiva; a veces constituyen un fondo separado y otras veces forman parte de otras ramas de la seguridad social. Debido a este vínculo entre el riesgo y la prevención en el lugar de trabajo, en muchos países los regímenes de accidentes del trabajo están organizados en forma separada de otros regímenes y se financian únicamente con cotizaciones de los empleadores. Las tasas de cotización suelen diferenciarse de acuerdo con el nivel de riesgo del accidente o enfermedad en los diversos tipos de actividades económicas.” (pag. 76); El accionante alega que se debilita la posición de las personas no aseguradas, para beneficio del régimen comercial y perjuicio del trabajador. Esto se traduce en un quebranto del principio de progresividad de los derechos sociales. Para que sea procedente este argumento debe acreditarse la regresividad con el cambio de régimen jurídico o que el mismo sea evidente, pero, ni los trabajos de la propia OIT avalan un único acercamiento al tema como pretende demostrar el accionante, cuando, por el contrario, son decisiones vinculadas con la libertad de configuración del legislador. En este sentido, el derecho internacional no aboga por implementar políticas inamovibles dentro de los esfuerzos nacionales para alcanzar los objetivos internacionalmente tutelados, por el contrario, debe existir un espacio para la implementación de las obligaciones internacionales, las que se quebrantarían si los países no legislan o actúan en sus esfuerzos por mejorar las prestaciones protegidas internacionalmente. Como se ha indicado, se trata de un tema de oportunidad y conveniencia que no debe ocupar a la Sala Constitucional – en principio- no le corresponde resolver si la medida es más o menos conveniente, dado que sería entrar en un campo de la especulación y ausentes reglas claras para dilucidar los derechos fundamentales reclamados, que escapan al derecho de la Constitución Política. En este sentido, no toda medida nueva que se introduzca en el ordenamiento jurídico es un asunto de resorte del juez constitucional, sino que corresponde al legislador valorar su oportunidad y conveniencia, así como su viabilidad constitucional. Como se expuso arriba, en primer lugar, no existe un mandato de monopolio o prohibición para que los seguros obligatorios de riesgos de trabajo operen fuera de las estructuras institucionales del Estado, corolario de lo anterior, éste puede servirse de diferentes agentes privados para llevar a cabo las prestaciones necesarias, sean públicas o privadas. Extrapolar que este sistema implica un menoscabo o una pérdida de derechos de los destinatarios de servicios, no obedece a la realidad imperante de la contratación administrativa.

E.- Jerarquía constitucional de los tratados internacionales y sus efectos en la legislación nacional.- El rango normativo del derecho internacional como norma interna se ubica en la Constitución Política, de manera que corresponde al constituyente originario o derivado decidir y procurar el procedimiento de incorporación de ese derecho al ordenamiento nacional, como también resolver el problema de su jerarquía normativa. Preliminarmente, debe mencionarse que el derecho internacional después de su incorporación al ordenamiento jurídico, mediante el procedimiento legislativo de aprobación contenido en el artículo 121 inciso 4) de la Constitución Política, tiene efectos jurídicos. Un análisis de los sistemas jurídicos de incorporación de la legislación internacional en el mundo permite diferenciar, a grosso modo, tres sistemas principales: aquellos países que exigen una doble aprobación parlamentaria, tanto para la ratificación del tratado y luego de las disposiciones legislativas específicas para la incorporación del tratado internacional como disposiciones domésticas, que opera en los países escandinavos. El siguiente, en los países donde solo basta la voluntad del Ejecutivo para comprometer internacionalmente al país, pero que requerirán de la legislación nacional para que se adopte el derecho internacional, como en Inglaterra y los países que forman parte de la mancomunidad británica de naciones, y finalmente, aquellos que con la aprobación parlamentaria a lo actuado por el Poder Ejecutivo opera la incorporación de la normativa internacional cumplido el proceso de ratificación por el Estado, como en nuestro país. Existen de igual manera, otros problemas como la asignación de la jerarquía normativa de la legislación internacional que se incorpora al ordenamiento jurídico, siendo que todas estas decisiones, lejos de resolverse en el ámbito del derecho internacional, su solución se radica en la organización primaria, dentro del dominio de cada Nación. En el caso de la incorporación, nuestro país tiene el sistema que se ubicó en el último sistema, el más representativo, siendo lo cierto que solo requiere de la aprobación o improbación legislativa del tratado, en cuyo caso obtenido lo primero, si se procede a la ratificación, es suficiente para que opere la incorporación del derecho internacional con preeminencia a las demás disposiciones nacionales ordinarias. Lo anterior tiene esas consecuencias, gracias al artículo 7 de la Constitución Política, que establece:

“Artículo 7.- Los tratados públicos, los convenios internacionales y los concordatos debidamente aprobados por la Asamblea Legislativa, tendrán desde su promulgación o desde el día que ellos designen, autoridad superior a las leyes.

Los tratados públicos y los convenios internacionales referentes a la integridad territorial o la organización política del país, requerirán aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, por votación no menor de las tres cuartas partes de la totalidad de sus miembros, y la de los dos tercios de los miembros de una Asamblea Constituyente, convocada al efecto”.

Pero históricamente la negociación e incorporación de tratados no siempre fue receptado de esa manera por nuestra legislación, por el contrario, su tratamiento fue extremadamente cauteloso y receloso. No siempre los efectos del derecho internacional eran tan claros como podría interpretarse hoy en día. Así, la norma es el resultado de una reforma constitucional en 1968, pues contaba con otra redacción, aislacionista y restrictiva para que los funcionarios públicos pudieran celebrar tratados internacionales, de forma limitada la que era la siguiente:

“Artículo 7°-- Ninguna autoridad puede celebrar pactos, tratados o conve­nios que se opongan a la soberanía e independencia de la República. Quien lo haga será juzgado por traición a la Patria.

Cualquier tratado o convención que tramite el Poder Ejecutivo, referente a la integridad territorial o a la organización política del país, requerirá la aprobación de la Asamblea Legislativa, por votación no menor de las tres cuarta partes de la totalidad de sus miembros y la de los dos tercios de votos de una Asamblea Constituyente convocada al efecto”.

Una lectura estricta del artículo trascrito da lugar a la impracticabilidad y el contrasentido automático, impropio de un razonamiento constitucional con el derecho internacional público, fundamentado en un exacerbado sentimiento anti Federación Centroamericana, pero que desconocía un fundamento básico de la democracia representativa, precisamente los efectos del ejercicio libre de la soberanía, en la voluntad libremente expresada (por las mayorías parlamentarias que aprueban un compromiso adquirido por el Poder Ejecutivo), y que permite adquirir y conceder derechos y obligaciones internacionales concertadas mutuamente o multilateralmente por diferentes Estados. La obligación internacional adquirida por un país en el derecho internacional público implica certeza en la forma en que deben conducirse en el orden internacional, por cuanto adquiere derechos, como a su vez deberes a otros, y viceversa. De de ahí que, nuestro país sufrió una importante reforma estructural en 1968 cuando modificó la jerarquía normativa del derecho internacional, dado que en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política establecía originalmente aquella posición extrema, proteccionista, contra un Poder Ejecutivo fuerte, quizá una disposición que representaba ciertamente el temor del constituyente originario contra aquellos Poderes Ejecutivos hegemónicos propios de los países latinoamericanos. Pero, luego de un análisis político y social concienzudo, mesurado, y vistas las cosas en una perspectiva para el beneficio del país, al regresar las aguas a su nivel normal luego de 1949, se optó por abrir el mecanismo pragmático de incorporación del derecho internacional al ordenamiento jurídico. Precisamente, la 4123 de 29 de mayo de 1968, claramente describe los fines proteccionistas del reformado artículo 7, de la siguiente manera:

“Artículo 7.- En este artículo se consagró el criterio conservador de la mayoría de los constituyentes de 1949, que sentía una profunda hostilidad hacia toda forma de acercamiento con los países centroamericanos. Dentro de ese celo nacionalista se fue demasiado lejos, al señalar en el párrafo primero que se consideraría traidor de la Patria, a quien celebrare “pactos, tratados o convenios que se opongan a la soberanía e independencia de la República”. Todo tratado, pacto o convenio constituyen una limitación de la soberanía o independencia de cualquier país. Si fuera a aplicarse dicho párrafo primero en forma estricta, todos los gobernantes que ha tenido el país desde 1949 en adelante, habrían de ser juzgados por tan grave delito. Creemos nosotros que dicho párrafo debe suprimirse, por peligroso”.

Esa corrección, cierta y ajustada al derecho internacional, prevalece hoy en el artículo 7 de la Constitución Política. Razones históricas pesaron para proceder a dicha modificación, pues si se pretendía una integración económica con centroamérica, ésta debía ser privilegiada por los beneficios económicos y de desarrollo, lo que finalmente se solucionó a través de la ubicación jerárquica del derecho internacional. En la discusión de la reforma constitucional, se puede citar lo siguiente:

“Si no se le da autoridad superior a los tratados y a los concordatos sobre la ley ordinaria, tendremos la constante presencia de conflictos, de antónomias (sic) jurídicas que se llaman, de normas que chocan, normas que disponen una cosa en contrario, y que nos obligarían constantemente a recurrir de la inconstitucionalidad o de la inaplicabilidad de una de estas normas ante nuestros tribunales. Ello vendría a minar el mercado común centroamericano, y nos podría en un mal predicado. Por eso es necesario hacer esta innovación, dar este paso de colocar el tratato (sic), el convenio, el concordato en un status superior a la ley ordinaria, para que la ley corriente quede subordinada a esta concepción superior del tratato (sic). Esto es repito, un instituto jurídico del derecho comunitario. Esta es una modificación del tradicional derecho de las formas corrientes de que cada norma rige dentro de su determinada área o esfera territorial, dentro de cierto ámbito en que se ejerce la soberanía por parte de un Estado, e irrumpe sobre los demás territorios, sobre las demás personas, sobre las demás soberanías, imponiendo disposiciones, sin que se haya mermado el valor de cada uno de los países. Es una norma sana, es una norma aconsejable y es la única solución que hay para evitar el conflicto del tratado con la norma corriente”.

En este sentido, el constituyente derivado optó por una solución práctica al problema de las antinomias jurídicas, de manera que aprobado un tratado internacional por parte de la Asamblea Legislativa, ratificado por el Poder Ejecutivo, éste se incorpora al derecho nacional con una posición privilegiada dentro del ordenamiento jurídico. Esto es lógico, consecuente y claramente menos erosivo para los objetivos propuestos por las Altas Partes, frente a las obligaciones asumidas libremente, para tener el derecho internacional incorporado con la potencia y resistencia suficiente para imponer los términos del Tratado y no ser modificado por legislación ordinaria y reglamentaria que le contradiga o que esté en contradicción. La razón está en la obligación de honrar los compromisos libremente adquiridos por los países contratantes de buena fe: principio pacta sunt servanda y de bona fides. Por otra parte, la reserva y declaraciones realizadas por la delegación que firmó el Convenio de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, dejó en claro el reconocimiento expreso del sentido del artículo 27, de la importancia de que una parte no podría invocarse las disposiciones de su derecho interno, como la falta de legislación ordinaria, para incumplir un tratado. Lo dispuesto en la Constitución Política ya fue discutido arriba. De ahí que, con razón, la Sala al examinar la inconstitucionalidad de un tratado internacional debe optar primero por una interpretación conforme al Derecho de la Constitución, según lo pauta el artículo 73 inciso e) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, de manera que “la declaratoria se hará solamente para los efectos de que se interpreten y apliquen en armonía con la Constitución o, si su contradicción con ella resultare insalvable, se ordene su desaplicación con efectos generales y se proceda a su denuncia”. La interpretación conforme es preferible antes de proceder a la denuncia de las obligaciones internacionales, o peor aún, a la comisión de infracciones que conllevaría múltiples consecuencias, muchas de las cuales pueden ir más allá de sanciones económicas, de prestigio y reconocimiento, incluso de participación en foros de cooperación y para recibir asistencia internacional. De igual manera se pone de manifiesto, en forma inequívoca, el principio de supremacía de Derecho Internacional. Lo anterior supone que un tratado podría ser contrario a la Constitución Política, pero no cuando contradice la legislación nacional ordinaria, que por su jerarquía, se vería modificada tácita o expresamente por el Tratado, y la ley de implementación (en el caso de tratados non-self executing), el que expresamente debe señalar si la legislación mantiene determinadas normas del ordenamiento jurídico pese a la aprobación del Tratado.

El accionante menciona el quebrantamiento de diversos principios de la seguridad social, como el servicio al costo, universalidad, suficiencia de la protección, automaticidad de la protección, beneficios extraordinarios e irrenunciabilidad. En realidad en algunos, lo que señala el accionante son algunas de las disposiciones legales que rigen el riesgo de trabajo establecido en el Código de Trabajo, de manera que, no opera el principio alegado por el accionante y de los coadyuvantes, de que el párrafo 4° del artículo 73 de la Constitución Política establece un campo de atracción para los derechos contemplados en el Código de Trabajo, y por ende, no pueden ser modificados ni siquiera por ley. Sin embargo, visto prudencialmente, el legislador tiene la competencia de asegurar la eficacia de muchos de estos principios mientras sean compatibles con las obligaciones internacionales, aún bajo la liberalización del mercado de los seguros. En este sentido, una verdad de Perogrullo es que el Código de Trabajo debe ser interpretado conforme a la apertura del mercado, de manera que si en el artículo 205 del Código de Trabajo establece al Instituto Nacional de Seguros como el ente administrador del seguro, ello claramente fue modificado por el Tratado y la Leyes de implementación, para dar lugar a la SUGESE y sus competencias. Por ejemplo, el principio de servicio al costo que se reclama sería un contrasentido con la operación de una actividad comercial, la cual estaría dentro de las competencias de SUGESE para establecer los mecanismos que permita obtener un lucro razonable. Pero, el fundamento constitucional del Seguro de Riesgos de Trabajo es compatible con el principio de universalidad, suficiencia de la protección o piso social del seguro, de la automaticidad del Convenio 102 de la OIT, e irrenunciabilidad del artículo 74 de la Constitución Política, lo que tampoco puede decir la Sala que son infringidos. Debe destacarse que cuando los instrumentos internacionales se refieren a un régimen básico, uno de protecciones fundamentales en los seguros sociales, significa el establecimiento de un régimen jurídico que otorgue determinados derechos a las prestaciones médicas y de indemnización en casos de accidentes laborales y profesionales, independientemente de quien lo preste. En este sentido, el Estado tiene un papel protagónico en diversos niveles: el primero al ser el moderador de la actividad comercial estableciendo condiciones y requisitos para la operación no discriminatoria entre los diferentes intervinientes en el mercado; y segundo, significa que también deberá acordar las condiciones necesarias para que las prestaciones internacionalmente exigibles sigan siendo efectivas en su jurisdicción, incluso, siendo partícipe del mercado como se estableció en la Ley No. 8622, y que a su vez reforma la Ley No. 12 de 30 de octubre de 1924. El artículo 28 de la Ley No. 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, establece entre otras cosas, en el párrafo cuarto establece que:

“… La Superintendencia regirá sus actividades por lo dispuesto en esta Ley, sus reglamentos y las demás leyes aplicables. Las normas generales y directrices dictadas por la Superintendencia, serán de observancia obligatoria para las entidades y personas supervisadas.

La Superintendencia es un órgano operacionalmente independiente y responsable en el ejercicio de sus funciones; tiene suficientes poderes, protección legal y recursos financieros para ejecutar sus funciones y ejercer sus poderes. Asimismo, debe adoptar una clara, transparente y consistente regulación y supervisión, y debe emplear, entrenar y mantener un equipo de trabajo suficiente con altos estándares profesionales, quienes sigan los estándares apropiados de confidencialidad”.

Por otra parte, el artículo 29 del mismo cuerpo normativo establece:

“Objetivos y funciones de la Superintendencia General de Seguros La Superintendencia tiene por objeto velar por la estabilidad y el eficiente funcionamiento del mercado de seguros, así como entregar la más amplia información a los asegurados. Para ello, autorizará, regulará y supervisará a las personas, físicas o jurídicas, que intervengan en los actos o contratos relacionados con la actividad aseguradora, reaseguradora, la oferta pública y la realización de negocios de seguros.

…

Adicionalmente, le corresponderán las siguientes funciones:

a) …

b) …

• j)Dictar las demás normas y directrices de carácter técnico u operativo.

k) …

q)”.

En esas funciones, en la actualidad el Instituto Nacional de Seguros continúa en funcionamiento en el Mercado de los Seguros, además de brindar los mismos servicios de seguros obligatorios, operando, para ventaja del trabajador no asegurado, queda con una capacidad residual, así como la garantía establecida de que la empresa privada contratada por un patrono, debe asumir al trabajador aun cuando omitiera reportarlo, debe asumirlo como no asegurado. No hay en este sentido afectación al principio universal de protección del seguro de riesgos de trabajo, automaticidad de la protección, suficiencia de la protección, entre otros. En este sentido, es importante resaltar que el párrafo cuarto del artículo 1° de la mencionada Ley No. 12 del 30 de octubre de 1924 establece:

“En el desarrollo de la actividad aseguradora en el país, que incluye la administración de los seguros comerciales, la administración del Seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo y del Seguro Obligatorio de Vehículos Automotores, el INS contará con plena garantía del Estado”.

Se pueden extraer varias conclusiones importantes de lo anterior, pues aunado a lo establecido por el Tratado de Libre Comercio, en cuanto contiene obligaciones exigibles de plazo vencido, las disposiciones legales como reglamentarias que se dictan, se hacen en honor a la ejecución de las obligaciones internacionales adquiridas por el país. Lo anterior es consistente con el segundo nivel mencionado, en el tanto en que el Estado a través de su aseguradora prevé las medidas para garantizar aquel piso social necesario para mantener los niveles de salud ocupacional como de un régimen de riesgos de trabajo, está claramente en consonancia con el Reglamento de Requisitos de Funcionamiento de los Seguros Obligatorios, aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Supervisión del Sistema Financiero mediante artículo 8, numeral I, del acta de la sesión 894-2010, celebrada el 10 de diciembre del 2010 (La Gaceta No. 248 del 22 de diciembre de 2010). En este sentido, el mencionado Reglamento establece:

“Artículo 20. Casos de trabajadores no asegurados Si el trabajador no estuviera asegurado contra los riesgos del trabajo, de conformidad con el Código de Trabajo, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros le otorgará todas las prestaciones que le hubiesen correspondido de haber estado asegurado, salvo aquellos casos en que el patrono tuviera vigente una póliza de Riesgos del Trabajo con cualquier entidad aseguradora y omitiera reportar al trabajador para ser considerado dentro de la protección de seguro. En esos casos, los trabajadores se considerarán como no asegurados y las prestaciones estarán a cargo de la entidad aseguradora receptora de la prima”.

No es un problema estrictamente de naturaleza constitucional el supuesto impacto económico de aquella garantía del Estado, sino que es de resorte exclusivo del legislador establecer las medidas económicas necesarias para compensar un presunto impacto negativo que pudiera tener la Institución, de manera que ello actúa a favor de la población de trabajadores no cubierto por el Patrono contra los riesgos de trabajo, sea este privado o público. En el criterio de la Sala, el artículo refuerza la posición del trabajador, en vez de debilitarlo, toda vez que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo no ha perdido su carácter obligatorio, universal y forzoso como se pretende señalar en el escrito de interposición de la acción. Adicionalmente, la potestad reglamentaria de la SUGESE emana directamente del Tratado de Libre Comercio, de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, entre otras normas, de donde surge la obligación de tratar en forma no discriminatoria a los diferentes actores del mercado, pero además, con la posibilidad de regular las materias que detecte sean necesarias de carácter técnico y operativo para un mejor servicio para los trabajadores que sufren un riesgo laboral, lo que incluye interpretar las disposiciones del Código de Trabajo.

VI.- Conclusión. Por todo lo expuesto, se declara sin lugar la acción.

Por tanto:

Se declara sin lugar la acción. La magistrada Calzada Miranda da razones diferentes sobre la legitimación de la condición del diputado accionante. La Magistrada Calzada y los Magistrados Armijo y Cruz, salvan el voto y declaran con lugar la acción con sus consecuencias.

.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Presidenta Luis Paulino Mora M. Gilbert Armijo S.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Enrique Ulate Ch.

Acción de Inconstitucionalidad no.10-017712 Voto particular de la Magistrada Calzada Miranda y los Magistrados Armijo Sancho y Cruz Castro, con redacción del último Los suscritos Magistrados salvamos el voto en esta acción y consideramos que debe declararse con lugar, con sus consecuencias, con fundamento en lo siguiente.

El sub inciso b), del artículo III .2, de la Sección H, del Anexo 12.9.2, del Capítulo 12 “Servicios Financieros”, del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, ratificado por Costa Rica por medio de la ley n.° 8622 de 21 de noviembre de 2007, y el transitorio III de la Ley Reguladora del Mercado de Seguros, aprobada por medio de la ley n.° 8653 de 22 de julio de 2008, en tanto disponen la apertura al mercado del seguro de riesgos del trabajo, presentan un roce constitucional.

El accionante considera que dicha normativa: 1. Viola los principios constitucionales que protegen los seguros sociales (arts. 50, 73 y 74) por desnaturalizarlo y convertirlo en un servicio comercial con ánimo de lucro. Indica que el seguro de riesgos del trabajo es un seguro social protegido constitucionalmente. Indica que la Sala Constitucional y los tratados internacionales han reconocido que este seguro integra el sistema de seguridad social (SCV 2008-16964, convenio no.102 de OIT, protocolo de San Salvador art.9, ) y que el seguro de riesgos de trabajo integra el derecho fundamental a la seguridad social, que se rige por principios como obligatoriedad, servicio al costo, universalidad, irrenunciabilidad y otros. Lo cual es incompatible con equipararlo a un servicio financiero más. 2. Viola el principio de progresividad de los derechos fundamentales: al reducir los beneficios con lo que hoy ya cuentan los trabajadores, disminuyendo y desmejorando las ventajas actuales. Actualmente todos los ingresos deben destinarse a mejoras en beneficio de los trabajadores.

Al respecto, los suscritos Magistrados consideramos que el accionante lleva razón en sus alegatos y que, el hecho de que el constituyente haya incluido el seguro contra riesgos del trabajo dentro del Capítulo de Derechos y Garantías Sociales de la Constitución Política, evidencia que no se trata de un simple seguro de responsabilidad civil, sino de un seguro social, que aun cuando pueda regirse por disposiciones especiales (valga decir, distintas a las de los otros seguros) no por ello deja de tener el carácter de seguro social.

Las normas impugnadas, en tanto permiten la inclusión del seguro contra riesgos del trabajo dentro de la apertura comercial prevista en el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Estado Unidos, Centroamérica y República Dominicana, son inconstitucionales ; ello aunque se dicte con posterioridad una ley que proteja los principios que rigen ese seguro (entre ellos el de universalidad y el de progresividad ) y regule aspectos como lo concerniente a la atención de los trabajadores no asegurados, la forma de distribuir los costos de esa atención entre los diferentes aseguradores, lo relativo al aseguramiento de actividades poco atractivas, lo relacionado con la prevención en materia de salud ocupacional, entre otros.

Este tipo de seguro, por estar consagrado constitucionalmente en el art.73 (y a pesar de que allí no se dice que será administrado monopólicamente por el INS), es un tipo de seguro social (y por lo tanto, sometido a ciertos principios en beneficio de los trabajadores), que por lo tanto, resulta incompatible con un sistema de apertura comercial (competencia, lucro).

Históricamente, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo data desde el año 1868, en que el Padre Francisco Calvo había asociado a los artesanos (principalmente zapateros, panaderos y cuidadores de mulas) con el objeto de establecer una Caja de Ahorros (véase la Gaceta del 9 de noviembre de 1868), como una especie de socorro diferenciado para la clase trabajadora.

Este seguro tuvo su propia evolución. Antes de triunfar la teoría del "riesgo social-laboral", inicialmente se exigía la culpa del patrono para dar base a la responsabilidad, luego se pasó de la culpa romana a la culpa contractual, o por la intervención de la prueba, es decir, no era el trabajador quién tenía que probar la culpa del patrono, sino que era éste el que debía demostrar que no había sido culpable ni negligente, en la distribución y organización del trabajo.

En los inicios del siglo XX, se ubican los primeros intentos formales para brindar una verdadera protección a la clase trabajadora ante los infortunios laborales . El 26 de junio de 1907 el entonces diputado Enrique Pinto Fernández presenta al Congreso un proyecto de ley de accidentes de trabajo constituido por 16 artículos. El 24 de mayo de 1910, la diputación de la provincia de Heredia, encabezada por el Lic. Alfredo González Flores y apoyada por Juan Rafael Arias Bonilla y Tranquilino Sáenz Rojas presentan al Congreso un proyecto de ley para crear la "Caja de Previsión" . El 16 de mayo de 1913, el diputado Alberto Vargas Calvo, presenta otra propuesta de ley sobre accidentes del trabajo, con un total de 30 artículos. Por diferentes circunstancias, ninguno de los proyectos anteriores tuvo la acogida necesaria para llegar a convertirse en ley.

En abril de 1924 se suspende la discusión de la Ley de Riesgos del Trabajo o la Ley de Reparación de Accidentes e inmediatamente se inicia la discusión del proyecto de ley para crear el Banco Nacional de Seguros, la cual culmina con la promulgación de la Ley N° 12 del 30 de Octubre de 1924, que da origen a esta Institución. Así, el Banco Nacional de Seguros se encarga de la administración de los seguros, cuyo monopolio queda en manos del Estado Costarricense.

Concluida la creación del Banco Nacional de Seguros, se continúa con la discusión del proyecto de ley para establecer la "Ley de reparación de accidentes de trabajo", discusión que concluye con la aprobación de la Ley N° 53 del 31 de enero de 1925, sobre reparación de accidentes y se dice "el Instituto Nacional de Seguros va a administrar el régimen de riesgos de trabajo". El INS creó el Departamento Obrero, como encargado de administrar esta Ley, el cual posteriormente se llamará Departamento de Riesgos del Trabajo.

Esta ley N° 53 cambia, tiene varias reformas y en el año de 1943 cuando se promulga el Código de Trabajo se incorpora dentro del Código de Trabajo la Ley sobre Reparación de Accidentes. En ese momento, en 1943, ya existe la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. Había sido creada en noviembre de 1941. De tal suerte que aquí se plantea una primera gran discusión. Si ahora que existe la Caja del Seguro Social, los riesgos del trabajo se los damos a la Caja o se los dejamos al INS.

Hay un mensaje muy interesante del Doctor Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia al Congreso, donde él señala, entre otras cosas, que dado que el Instituto Nacional de Seguros tiene 18 años de experiencia en el manejo de los accidentes de trabajo, él considera prudente que ese congreso mantenga los riesgos de trabajo en manos del Instituto Nacional de Seguros y efectivamente se aprueba el Código de Trabajo y se mantiene la administración en manos del Instituto.

En 1949, cuando se promulga la Constitución Política vigente, se debate, sobre el famoso artículo 73, la conveniencia o no de la administración de los Riesgos del Trabajo en manos del Instituto. De nuevo se plantea la necesidad que los riesgos del trabajo estén en manos de la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social. La Asamblea Legislativa, la Constituyente en este caso, que redacta esta Constitución Política, ratifica que el régimen de riesgos del trabajo siga siendo diferenciado, como había sido hasta ese momento y permanezca en manos del Instituto Nacional de Seguros.

En 1961 cuando se modifica el artículo 177 de la Constitución Política mediante la Ley N°2738, la Asamblea Legislativa mantiene nuevamente la posición de que los Riesgos del Trabajo se continúen administrando por parte del Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Esta circunstancia no modifica la condición que constitucionalmente corresponden a los seguros por riesgos de trabajo.

En 1982, cuando la Asamblea Legislativa aprueba la Ley N° 6727, que se refiere a la modificación del Título IV del Código de Trabajo, ratifica de nuevo la conveniencia de que los Riesgos del Trabajo continúen siendo administrados por el INS, y realiza algunas modificaciones:

· Se amplía el concepto de Riesgos del Trabajo (Artículo 195).

· El seguro de Riesgos del Trabajo se declara obligatorio, universal y forzoso (Artículo 201).

· Aparece el concepto de Salud Ocupacional, ligado a promover y mantener el más alto nivel de bienestar físico, mental y social del trabajador (Artículo 273).

· En consonancia con la Constitución Política de Costa Rica (Artículo 66), se asigna un conjunto de responsabilidades al patrono, respecto al seguro, al riesgo y la prevención (Artículos 214, 215 y 284).

· Al trabajador se le otorgan beneficios (Artículos 218 y 221) pero también obligaciones, según lo establecen los artículos 285 y 286 del citado Código.

Hoy en día, estábamos en presencia de un régimen de Seguridad Social totalmente consolidado, a través de la administración que por más de 70 años ha efectuado, con reservas financieras suficientes, para dar una atención como la que se viene brindando.

Como se puede ver del extracto de las Actas de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, contrario a lo que se dice en el voto de mayoría, más bien la idea era unificar el seguro de riesgos del trabajo con CCSS y no que éste quedara al arbitrio del legislador para que en un futuro hubiera apertura comercial.

Ø El diputado VOLIO JIMENEZ “existen varios principios que no pueden dejarse al margen de esta discusión, principios que luego pasó a enumerar. En primer lugar de be ser una sola institución la que abarque todos los seguros. Uno de los fracasos de los seguros sociales en algunos países -como Chile- se ha debido precisamente a la multiplicación de Cajas. Los técnicos que vinieron a nuestro país recomendaron a este aspecto la unidad. En segundo término, es sabido que el mayor número de asociados es lo que garantiza el éxito de los seguros sociales (…) Por otra parte, el Seguro Social, se basa en la mutualidad, es decir, en la cooperación de todos para lograr el bien del mayor número.” Acta No. 125.- Centésima vigésima quinta acta de la sesión celebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas del día ocho de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve.

Ø El diputado VOLIO “desde el año 1924 se promulgó la Ley de Accidentes de Trabajo, encargándose al Banco de Seguros -institución esencialmente comercial- tomar bajo su cargo ese riesgo. Una vez que nuestro seguro social se haya fortalecido, entonces los seguros contra riesgos profesionales deben adscribirse al Seguro Social. Por el momento, la Caja no está en capacidad de asumir esos riesgos. Por lo tanto, lo lógico es dejar las cosas como están actualmente, esquivando el problema que se presenta para que se resuelva a su tiempo y con más detenimiento.” Acta No. 126.- Centésima vigésima sexta acta de la sesión celebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas día nueve de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve.

Ø Diputado FACIO . “ Después del 8 de noviembre continuarán trabajando -como hasta ahora lo han hecho- la Caja del Seguro Social y el Instituto Nacional de Seguros. Si se dejan las cosas como están, nadie tiene por qué alarmarse. Sin embargo, queda abierta la posibilidad para que en el futuro se encuentre una solución adecuada al problema de la unificación de los seguros sociales, después de maduros y reflexionado análisis y estudios de los distintos aspectos del problema.” Acta No. 126.- Centésima vigésima sexta acta de la sesión celebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas día nueve de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve.

Ø El señor MONTEALEGRE manifestó que, según su criterio, el Instituto Nacional de Seguros es un Banco comercial. La Caja, en cambio, la considera como una institución de beneficencia, ya que no lucra en ninguna forma. Piensa que el único modo de resolver el problema de los seguros sociales, es creándole a la Caja las rentas necesarias para que pueda realizar su cometido. De ahí que el problema se puede resolver acordando que una parte de las ganancias del Banco de Seguros pasarán a la Caja. (Acta No. 126.- Centésima vigésima sexta acta de la sesión celebrada por la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a las quince horas día nueve de agosto de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve).

Los extractos anteriores evidencian la incorporación plena de los riesgos del trabajo a los seguros sociales. La propia naturaleza de estos riesgos permiten considerarles parte de los seguros sociales. Los riesgos del trabajo no son un anexo o agregado que pueda desprenderse de la definición y las limitaciones constitucionales que impone la norma fundamentl. La norma habla de los seguros sociales en sentido amplio, por esta razón no es admisible que se asuma que la mención a los seguros contra riesgos profesionales que se menciona en el último párrafo, no se integran dentro del concepto de los seguros sociales que define la constitución. La especialidad de las disposiciones que rigen este tipo de seguro, no desconstitucionaliza el seguro de riesgos profesionales. La discusión en la constituyente nunca evidenció la pretensión reconocer un seguro de riesgos profesionales con una condición jurídica y constitucionalmente diferente a los seguros sociales a los que se refiere casualmente los tres primeros párrafos del artículo setenta y tres de la constitución. No hay razón para variar la naturaleza jurídico constitucional de estos seguros, porque se ubica en una norma que es la que le da esa condición.

Por lo tanto, el seguro de riesgos del trabajo es un seguro social consagrado constitucionalmente, regido por varios principios, que la legislación de apertura comercial no protege y que tampoco puede proteger, pues una normativa de rango legal nunca será suficiente e idónea para hacer compatible la seguridad social con un sistema de mercado.

Por la naturaleza misma del seguro social de riesgos del trabajo, cuya razón de ser es asegurar la indemnización del trabajador cuando con ocasión o por consecuencia del trabajo que desempeña sufra un accidente o una enfermedad, y que funciona en nuestro país de modo obligatorio, universal y forzoso, resulta incompatible que opere bajo un esquema de mercado y bajo la ley de oferta y demanda. Todo ello lo tuvo en mente el Constituyente cuando decidió incluir este tipo de seguro dentro del capítulo de los seguros sociales, justamente porque funciona como un seguro social y no como un seguro individual, sujeto a la oferta y demanda.

Por los argumentos expuestos, consideramos que esta acción debe declararse con lugar, con todas sus consecuencias, es decir, procediendo a anularse las normas inconstitucionales del Tratado en cuestión.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

Gilberth Armijo S. Fernando Cruz C.

Magistrado Magistrado Nota de la Magistrada Calzada. Razones diferentes sobre la legitimación del accionante. El voto de mayoría define que a pesar que el señor Villalta [Nombre 001] deriva su legitimación a partir de la defensa de intereses difusos, se le reconoce su legitimación para interponer la acción a partir de que debe entenderse que esta interposición la efectúa «en favor de un grupo indeterminado de trabajadores cuyos derechos (…) podrían ser lesionados (…) aunque estuvieran bajo la cobertura de alguna póliza de riesgos de trabajo» (sic); es decir, el voto de mayoría determina que la legitimación del accionante proviene de esta defensa a favor de un grupo indeterminado de trabajadores, y no necesariamente de la defensa de los intereses difusos. Al respecto, considero que la legitimación del Diputado accionante sí proviene también de la defensa de intereses difusos. Tal como se señala en el considerando II de esta misma sentencia, los intereses difusos no deben ser confundidos con los intereses colectivos, al mismo tiempo que tampoco deben ser entendidos en términos tan amplios que se confundan con los intereses de la comunidad nacional; en otras palabras, son intereses cuya titularidad pertenece a grupos de personas no organizadas formalmente, «pero unidas a partir de una determinada necesidad social», razón por la cual «todo individuo puede actuar en defensa de aquellos bienes que afectan la colectividad nacional», sin que se confunda con la posibilidad de que «cualquier persona pueda acudir a la Sala Constitucional en tutela de cualesquiera intereses». La precisión que intenta formular el criterio de mayoría, es que aún tratándose de la defensa de un grupo indeterminado de trabajadores, ello no configura la existencia de un interés difuso que permita otorgarle al accionante la legitimación prevista en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional. Es mi criterio que en el caso bajo estudio sí se configura la presencia de ese interés difuso, el cual se fundamenta no sólo en la existencia de aquel grupo indeterminado de trabajadores, sino también en que por el tema que se pretende regular, sí se trata, en efecto, de una materia sobre la que sí existe un interés general de la población. Debe tenerse presente que tal como se indica en esta misma sentencia, la naturaleza del seguro de riesgos del trabajo implica que el mismo sea consustancial con el régimen de seguridad social por el que optó nuestro país al configurar el sistema de Estado Democrático y Social de Derecho. En este sentido, existe un interés de la colectividad en general, y no sólo de los trabajadores activos en este momento, sobre la existencia de una cobertura social ante los riesgos que pueda verse sometido un trabajador; es claro que el primer interesado en estos casos será el trabajador –tanto por motivos de salud como de ingresos propios-, pero no debe perderse de vista, que la configuración social de este tipo de seguro lo es porque en el mismo se ven involucradas otras personas además del trabajador en concreto. Por una parte, está la familia directa del trabajador, quien obtiene buena parte de sus posibilidades de subsistencia del trabajo que aquel realiza; también se tiene la condición del mismo patrono, quien encuentra en el régimen de riesgos del trabajo, un sólido respaldo ante cualquier infortunio, contribuyendo a cubrir con ello cualquier eventual responsabilidad que pudiera irrogársele; y también se encuentra el propio Estado, quien a través de la existencia de este tipo de seguro, contribuye al bienestar social en los términos dichos, al mismo tiempo que garantiza que la persona afectada reciba la atención que requiere para que pueda reincorporarse de manera oportuna y efectiva a la vida laboral activa, y al movimiento y dinamismo de la economía nacional con el menor de los perjuicios para los patronos, los trabajadores y sus familias. Adicionalmente, a diferencia del criterio de mayoría que en forma reiterada rechaza la legitimación del Diputado al no reconocerle una legitimación directa, la suscrita considera que sí la ostentan en determinados supuestos. A mi juicio, los Diputados que tienen ese carácter por la Nación de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 106 de la Constitución Política, por la naturaleza de su cargo ostentan una representación de los intereses nacionales, que les da en principio una legitimación general para accionar esos intereses, aunque no necesariamente para hacerlo en todos los casos en la acción de inconstitucionalidad, pero sí a la hora de calificar las circunstancias del párrafo 2° del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, en particular, la gestión de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, y muy en particular cuando, precisamente, se trate de impugnar normas que inciden directamente sobre una esfera de intereses que trascienden por completo lo individual y son, por definición, intereses de la colectividad que ellos representan, tal como se ha indicado líneas atrás. Desde luego que esta definición no implica admitir la existencia de una acción popular -no prevista en la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional- por parte de cualquier persona, ni tampoco permitir el libre acceso mediante la acción de inconstitucionalidad al titular de un interés por el sólo hecho de serlo y sin reunir los requisitos de admisibilidad legalmente establecidos. En conclusión, tomando en consideración la trascendencia del tema sobre los riesgos de trabajo y la representación que en términos generales sí ostenta un Diputado a la Asamblea Legislativa, considero que además de la legitimación reconocida al accionante por el criterio de mayoría, debe reconocérsele también la legitimación señalada en el párrafo segundo del artículo 75 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional.

Ana Virginia Calzada M.

*100177120007CO* ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD [Nombre 001] FLOREZESTRADA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las quince horas y treinta y tres minutos del ocho de agosto del dos mil trece.

Por motivo del doloroso fallecimiento Luis Paulino Mora Mora, notifíquese la sentencia número 2012016628 de las dieciséis horas y treinta minutos del veintiocho de noviembre del dos mil doce, dictada en este asunto, sin su firma. El expediente se archivará en su momento.

Gilbert Armijo S.

Presidente a.i Sala Constitucional