Free harvest decree exceeds the Forest LawDecreto de libre cosecha excede la Ley Forestal

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at sixteen hours thirty minutes on January third, nineteen ninety-five.

Unconstitutionality action brought by the ECOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF PAQUERA, LEPANTO AND COBANO, against Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three.

Whereas:

1.- The plaintiff association brings its action against Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three, insofar as it modifies Article 25 of Executive Decree number 19886-MIRENEM, of September thirteenth, nineteen ninety, which is the Regulation to the Forestry Law (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), considering that the challenged norm is unconstitutional for having exceeded the scope of Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) number 7174, by creating, without legal basis, the free harvest certificate (certificado de libre cosecha), thereby specifically violating Articles 47 and 60 of said law, by implicitly eliminating the obligation of private individuals who obtain it to comply with the procedures set forth in the law regarding the Management Plan (Plan de Manejo) of the General Forestry Directorate (Dirección General Forestal) and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality regarding the use of local roads, thereby violating Articles 9, 11, 121 subsection 1.) and 140 subsections 18.) of the Political Constitution.

2.- In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), this Chamber is empowered to resolve on the merits the actions brought before it, when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment or they are identical or similar to previous resolved ones, with no grounds existing to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the issue.

Drafted by Judge Mora Mora, and;

Considering:

I.ON STANDING (LEGITIMACION). In this matter there is no pending issue to resolve because it concerns diffuse interests (intereses difusos) or interests that concern the community as a whole, given that the party bringing the action represents in an appropriate manner the ecological interests of Paquera, Lepanto and Cóbano, and furthermore, by virtue of the nature of what is claimed—the felling of trees without the control required by law—it constitutes a diffuse interest that concerns the national community as a whole. In this regard, by judgment number 3705-93, of fifteen hours on July thirtieth, nineteen ninety-three, this Chamber stated:

"Regarding the legal protection of the environment, the standing of private individuals to act judicially and achieve the application of norms that have that purpose or to request jurisdictional protection to safeguard their violated rights is of great importance. But it must be analyzed from several points of view, that is, in relation to the nature of the process, the claims and the intervening parties, and also taking into account that the breach of environmental norms can be caused by action or omission by both a private law subject and a public law subject. The latter, simply failing to exercise due control over the actions of private subjects when they infringe environmental norms, ignoring their functional competence, which requires them to exercise that control; or, directly infringing with their actions legal provisions intended to protect and conserve the environment. This Chamber in judgment number 2233-93, by stating that the preservation and protection of the environment is a fundamental right, allows for standing to resort to the amparo remedy. In environmental law, the procedural prerequisite of standing tends to extend and expand in such a dimension that it necessarily leads to the abandonment of the traditional concept, and it must be understood that in general terms, any person can be a party and that their right does not emanate from property titles, rights, or specific actions that they could exercise according to the rules of conventional law, but rather their procedural action responds to what modern scholars call diffuse interest, through which the original standing of the legitimate interested party or even the simple interested party is diffused among all the members of a certain category of persons who are thus equally affected by the illegal acts that violate them. Regarding the protection of the environment, the typically diffuse interest that gives a subject standing to bring an action is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the list of human rights, becoming a true 'reactive right' (derecho reaccional), which, as its name indicates, empowers its holder to 'react' against the violation originated in illegitimate acts or omissions. It is for this reason that the violation of this fundamental right constitutes a constitutional illegality, that is, a specific ground for an amparo action against specific acts or self-applicable norms, or, as the case may be, in an unconstitutionality action against all norms or acts not susceptible to amparo, and even against omissions, a category that in the case of the right to the environment becomes especially important because, given that it involves conserving the environment that nature has given us, the most frequent violation occurs due to the inertia of public authorities in carrying out the necessary acts to protect them. The Constitutional jurisdiction, as the legally suitable means necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution's law, is, besides being supreme, of essential public order, and this implies, in general, that a much more flexible and less formalistic standing is necessary to associate citizens with the interest of the Rule of Law itself in overseeing and, where appropriate, restoring its own legality. That concept of 'diffuse interests' aims to develop a form of standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been addressed by making way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final expansion, novel but necessary, so that this oversight becomes increasingly effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that compared to them, determined or easily identifiable specific persons or personalized groups are identified, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate ones or those concerning a community as a whole. These are, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive an actual or potential benefit or harm, more or less equal for all, which is why it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are collective—for being common to a generality—and individual, because they can be claimed in such capacity. And precisely this is what occurs in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as he is being affected by the pollution to which his community is subjected, but there also exists a collective interest, since the harm also occurs to the community as a whole. Thus, in matters concerning the Right to the Environment, standing belongs to the human being as such, since the harm to that fundamental right is suffered both by the community and by the individual in particular."

II. ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE

THE REGULATORY POWER (POTESTAD REGLAMENTARIA) OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. Repeatedly, this Chamber has stated that the regulatory power is reduced to very defined parameters that condition and limit it, since it can in no case violate the inherent and immanent dynamic derived from the division of powers (división de poderes) and that constitutes, so to speak, the very essence of the democratic system. One of those fundamental parameters of the regulatory power is the fact that within the democratic system, the public powers have clearly defined functions, without any of them being able to assume those of the others, since such transgression flagrantly violates the very concept of the division of powers that is embodied in various ways in Articles 9, 11, 121 subsection 1.) and 140 subsections 3.) and 18.) of the Constitution. This is what this Chamber has stated in a clear jurisprudential line that finds resonance in several of its decisions, among which it is appropriate to cite: number 1130-90, of seventeen hours thirty minutes on September eighteenth, nineteen ninety; number 1635-90, of seventeen hours on November fourteenth, nineteen ninety; number 1876-90, of sixteen hours on December nineteenth, nineteen ninety; and number 243-93, of fifteen hours forty-five minutes on January nineteenth, nineteen ninety-three. Thus, it has stated:

"II. The Executive Branch, although it does not have the power to issue laws—which is solely held by the Legislative Branch, by virtue of the provisions of Articles 105 and 121 of the Political Constitution—does participate in the formation of the legal system through the regulatory power that the Magna Carta confers upon it in Articles 140 subsections 3.) —which establishes the Administration's attribution to 'regulate the laws, execute them, sanction them and ensure their exact fulfillment'— and 18.) —which allows this Branch of the State to 'issue the regulations it deems appropriate for the internal regime of its offices and issue the other regulations and ordinances necessary for the prompt execution of the laws'—, a power that, as has been seen, is expressed through the decrees and regulations issued by the Public Administration. However, by virtue of the hierarchy of norms, in relation to the written sources of Law, normative primacy corresponds to the Political Constitution, followed by international treaties, then laws, and finally the regulations and decrees issued by the Public Administration. Therefore, the regulation is a secondary, subordinate, inferior, and complementary norm to the Law, requiring justification on a case-by-case basis, subject to the former in several senses: 1.) it is produced only in the areas that the law allows; 2.) it cannot attempt to nullify or contradict legal precepts; and 3.) it cannot substitute for the law where the latter is necessary to produce a certain effect or regulate a certain content. Thus, a regulation is any written norm issued by the Executive Branch in the performance of the functions and matters that are its own; the administrative function, which encompasses the organizational aspects of the public sector. By virtue of the foregoing, the Executive Branch may issue autonomous regulations (reglamentos autónomos), including those known as organizational regulations (reglamentos de organización), which refer to the institution and structure of the entities that constitute the Public Administration, among which are the Autonomous Service Regulations of the Ministries, according to the provisions of subsection 18.) of Article 140 of the Constitution. Likewise, by virtue of the provisions of the cited subsection 3.) of the same constitutional norm, the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of the branch are authorized to regulate the laws, which means that the Executive develops the concepts used in the law to make it effective and enforceable."

III.By reason of the foregoing, the challenged norm—Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three, insofar as it modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law, Executive Decree number 19886-MIRENEM, of September thirteenth, nineteen ninety—, insofar as it creates without legal basis the free harvest certificate and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures set forth in Forestry Law number 7174, is contrary to what is expressly provided in Articles 47 and 60 of the cited Forestry Law, regarding the procedures set forth in the law concerning the Management Plan of the General Forestry Directorate and the approval of the respective Municipality, regarding the use of local roads, and therefore it becomes unconstitutional, since it exceeds the regulatory power proper to the Executive Branch, thereby violating the provisions of Articles 9, 11, 121 subsection 1.) and 140 subsections 18.) of the Political Constitution.

IV.Likewise, by connection (conexidad), Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of April twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, must be analyzed, since it was repealed by the challenged norm, and which, through its first article, modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law in such a way that it creates the free harvest certificate and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures set forth in Articles 47 and 60 of the Forestry Law, regarding the procedures set forth in the law concerning the Management Plan of the General Forestry Directorate and the approval of the respective Municipality regarding the use of local roads, and therefore it is also unconstitutional, for the same reasons noted in the preceding considering, thereby violating Articles 9, 11, 121 subsection 1.) and 140 subsections 3.) and 18.) of the Political Constitution.

V.However, both Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of April twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, which entered into force as of its publication in the Gazette, that is, May twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, and Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three, which entered into force as of its publication in the Gazette, on May fifth, nineteen ninety-three, were repealed by Executive Decree number 2302-MIRENEM, of December fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three, which entered into force as of its publication in the Gazette, on May sixth, nineteen ninety-four. Thus, the unconstitutionality declared in this action is retroactive to the effective date of the Executive Decrees that are annulled, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith and until the repeal of that regulation.

Therefore:

The action is granted, and consequently, Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of February fifteenth, nineteen ninety-three, and by connection, the first article of Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of April twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two, are declared unconstitutional. In accordance with Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this judgment is declarative and retroactive to the effective date of said law, April fifth, nineteen ninety-three—Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM—and May twenty-third, nineteen ninety-two—Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM—, saving the rights acquired in good faith, obtained under its protection. Record in the official gazette La Gaceta and publish in the Judicial Bulletin (Boletín Judicial). Notify the Executive Branch and the General Forestry Directorate.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Rodolfo E. Piza E.

Luis Fernando Solano C.

Carlos Arguedas R.

In this matter, there is no pending issue to resolve because it concerns diffuse interests or those affecting the community as a whole, given that the petitioner adequately represents the ecological interests of Paquera, Lepanto, and Cóbano, and furthermore, by virtue of the nature of the claim —the felling of trees without the control required by law— it constitutes a diffuse interest, affecting the national community as a whole. In this regard, in judgment number 3705-93, at fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July, nineteen ninety-three, this Chamber stated:

"Regarding the legal protection of the environment, the standing of private individuals to act judicially and achieve the application of norms intended for that purpose, or to request jurisdictional protection to safeguard their violated rights, is of great importance. But it must be analyzed from several points of view, that is, in relation to the nature of the proceeding, the claims, and the intervening parties, and also considering that the breach of environmental norms can be caused by action or omission by either a private or a public law subject. The latter, simply by failing to exercise due control over the conduct of private subjects when they infringe environmental norms, ignoring their functional competence, which requires them to exercise that control; or, by directly infringing, through their conduct, legal provisions intended to protect and conserve the environment. This Chamber, in judgment number 2233-93, by stating that the preservation and protection of the environment is a fundamental right, allows for standing to resort to the amparo remedy. In environmental law, the procedural prerequisite of standing tends to extend and broaden to such a dimension that it necessarily leads to the abandonment of the traditional concept, it being understood that, in general terms, any person may be a party and that their right does not emanate from titles of ownership, rights, or specific actions that they could exercise according to the rules of conventional law, but rather that their procedural action responds to what modern scholars call the diffuse interest, whereby the original standing of the legitimate interested party, or even the simple interested party, is diffused among all the members of a certain category of persons who are thus equally affected by the illegal acts that harm them. Regarding the protection of the environment, the typically diffuse interest that legitimizes the subject to bring an action is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the list of human person rights, becoming a true "reactional right," which, as its name indicates, empowers its holder to "react" against the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions. That is why the violation of that fundamental right constitutes a constitutional illegality, that is, a specific cause for amparo against specific acts or self-applicable norms, or, as the case may be, in an action of unconstitutionality against all norms or against acts not subject to amparo, and even against omissions, a category which, in the case of the right to the environment, becomes especially important because, when it concerns conserving the environment that nature has given us, the most frequent violation occurs due to the inertia of public authorities in carrying out the acts necessary to protect it. Constitutional jurisdiction, as the legally ideal means necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the law of the Constitution, is, besides being supreme, of essential public order, and this generally implies that a much more flexible and less formalistic standing is necessary to associate citizens with the interest of the Rule of Law itself in overseeing and, as the case may be, restoring its own legality. That concept of "diffuse interests" aims to develop a form of standing which, in recent times, has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been provided for by opening the way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a novel but necessary final broadening, so that this oversight becomes increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests, although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law —as this Chamber has already stated— merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership merges with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that, against them, specific determined persons or personalized groups are identified or easily identifiable, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests, but from corporate interests or those affecting a collectivity as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but, at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, which is why it is accurately said that they are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests partake of a dual nature, since they are collective —for being common to a generality— and individual, and thus can be claimed in such character. And that is precisely what happens in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as he is being affected by the pollution affecting his community, but there also exists a collective interest, since the harm is also inflicted upon the community as a whole. Thus, concerning the Right to the Environment, standing belongs to the human being as such, because the harm to that fundamental right is suffered by both the community and the individual specifically."

II. ON THE MERITS OF THE MATTER

THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. This Chamber has repeatedly stated that the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) is reduced to very defined parameters that condition and limit it, since it may in no case violate the inherent and immanent dynamic derived from the division of powers and which constitutes, so to speak, the very essence of the democratic system. One of those fundamental parameters of the regulatory power is the fact that within the democratic system, the public powers have their functions clearly defined, without any of them being able to assume those proper to the others, since such transgression flagrantly violates the very concept of the division of powers, which is embodied in various ways in Articles 9, 11, 121, subsection 1.), and 140, subsections 3.) and 18.) of the Constitution. This Chamber has stated this in a clear jurisprudential line echoed in several of its decisions, among which it is pertinent to cite: number 1130-90, at seventeen hours thirty minutes on the eighteenth of September, nineteen ninety; number 1635-90, at seventeen hours on the fourteenth of November, nineteen ninety; number 1876-90, at sixteen hours on the nineteenth of December, nineteen ninety; and number 243-93, at fifteen hours forty-five minutes on the nineteenth of January, nineteen ninety-three. Thus, it has stated:

"II. The Executive Branch, although it does not have the power to issue laws —which is solely held by the Legislative Branch, by virtue of the provisions of Articles 105 and 121 of the Political Constitution—, does participate in the formation of the legal system through the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) that the Magna Carta confers upon it in Article 140, subsections 3.) —which indicates the Administration's attribution to "regulate the laws, execute them, sanction them, and ensure their exact compliance"— and 18.) —which allows this Power of the State to "issue the regulations it deems suitable for the internal regime of its offices and to issue the other regulations and ordinances necessary for the prompt execution of the laws"—, a power which, as has been seen, is expressed through the decrees and regulations issued by the Public Administration. However, by virtue of the hierarchy of norms, in relation to the written sources of Law, normative primacy corresponds to the Political Constitution, followed by international treaties, then laws, and finally the regulations and decrees issued by the Public Administration. Therefore, the regulation (reglamento) is a secondary, subordinate, inferior, and complementary norm to the Law, needing justification on a case-by-case basis, subject to the former in several senses: 1.) it is only produced in the areas that the law allows it; 2.) it cannot attempt to nullify or contradict legal precepts; and 3.) it cannot substitute for the law where the law is necessary to produce a certain effect or regulate a certain content. Thus, any written norm issued by the Executive Branch in the performance of the functions and matters proper to it is called a regulation (reglamento); the administrative type, which includes the organizational aspects of the public sector. By virtue of the foregoing, the Executive Branch may issue autonomous regulations (reglamentos autónomos), including the so-called organizational regulations (reglamentos de organización), which refer to the institution and structure of the entities that make up the Public Administration, among which are the Autonomous Service Regulations of the Ministries, according to the provisions of subsection 18.) of Article 140 of the Constitution. Likewise, by virtue of the provisions of the cited subsection 3.) of the same constitutional norm, the President of the Republic and the respective Minister of the branch are legitimized to regulate the laws, which means that the Executive develops the concepts used in the law to make it effective and enforceable."

III.By reason of the foregoing, the challenged norm —Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February, nineteen ninety-three, insofar as it modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forest Law, Executive Decree number 19886-MIRENEM, of the thirteenth of September, nineteen ninety—, insofar as it creates, without legal basis, the free harvest certificate (certificado de libre cosecha) and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures provided in Forest Law number 7174, is contrary to what is expressly provided in Articles 47 and 60 of the cited Forest Law, regarding the procedures provided in the law concerning the Management Plan of the Dirección General Forestal and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality, regarding the use of rural roads, for which reason it becomes unconstitutional, since it exceeds the regulatory power (potestad reglamentaria) proper to the Executive Branch, thereby violating the provisions of Articles 9, 11, 121, subsection 1.), and 140, subsections 18.) of the Political Constitution.

IV.Likewise, by connection, Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April, nineteen ninety-two, must be analyzed, since it was repealed by the challenged norm, and which, by its first article, modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forest Law in such a way that it creates the free harvest certificate (certificado de libre cosecha) and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures provided in Articles 47 and 60 of the Forest Law, regarding the procedures provided in the law concerning the Management Plan of the Dirección General Forestal and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality regarding the use of rural roads, for which reason it is also unconstitutional, for the same reasons noted in the preceding recital (considerando), thereby violating Articles 9, 11, 121, subsection 1.), and 140, subsections 3.) and 18.) of the Political Constitution.

V.However, both Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April, nineteen ninety-two, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, on the twenty-third of May, nineteen ninety-two, as well as Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February, nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, on the fifth of May, nineteen ninety-three, were repealed by Executive Decree number 2302-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of December, nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, on the sixth of May, nineteen ninety-four. In such a way that, the unconstitutionality declared in this action is retroactive to the effective date of the executive decrees being annulled, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith and until the repeal of that regulatory framework.

For these reasons:

The action is granted, and consequently, Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February, nineteen ninety-three, and, by connection, the first article of Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April, nineteen ninety-two, are declared unconstitutional. In accordance with Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the effective date of said law, the fifth of April, nineteen ninety-three —for Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM— and the twenty-third of May, nineteen ninety-two —for Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM—, with rights acquired in good faith, achieved under their protection, being safeguarded. Let it be recorded in the official journal La Gaceta and published in the Boletín Judicial. Notify the Executive Branch and the Dirección General Forestal.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Rodolfo E.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE.- San José, at sixteen hours thirty minutes on the third of January of nineteen ninety-five.

Action of unconstitutionality brought by the ASOCIACION ECOLOGICA DE PAQUERA, LEPANTO Y COBANO, against Decreto Ejecutivo number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February of nineteen ninety-three.

Resultando:

1.- The plaintiff association brings its action against Decreto Ejecutivo number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February of nineteen ninety-three, insofar as it amends Article 25 of Decreto Ejecutivo number 19886-MIRENEM, of the thirteenth of September of nineteen ninety, which is the Regulation to the Forestry Law (Reglamento a la Ley Forestal), considering that the challenged norm is unconstitutional, for having exceeded the scope of the Forestry Law (Ley Forestal) number 7174, creating without legal basis the certificate of free harvest (certificado de libre cosecha), thereby specifically violating Articles 47 and 60 of said law, by implicitly exempting private individuals who obtain it from complying with the procedures provided for in the law, regarding the Management Plan (Plan de Manejo) of the Dirección General Forestal and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality concerning the use of local roads, thereby violating Articles 9, 11, 121 subsection 1.) and 140 subsection 18.) of the Political Constitution.

2.- In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), this Chamber is empowered to resolve on the merits the actions brought before it, when it considers that there are sufficient elements of judgment or they are equal or similar to previous ones resolved, there being no grounds to vary the criterion or reasons of public interest that justify reconsidering the matter.

Drafted by Magistrate Mora Mora, and;

Considerando:

I.REGARDING STANDING. In this matter there is no pending issue to resolve because it involves diffuse interests or those that concern the community as a whole, given that the plaintiff represents in a suitable manner the ecological interests of Paquera, Lepanto, and Cóbano, and furthermore, by virtue of the nature of what is claimed -the felling of trees without the control required by law-, it constitutes a diffuse interest, which concerns the national community as a whole. In this regard, by judgment number 3705-93, at fifteen hours on the thirtieth of July of nineteen ninety-three, this Chamber stated:

"Regarding the legal protection of the environment (ambiente), the standing (legitimación) of private individuals to act judicially and achieve the application of the norms that have that purpose or to request jurisdictional protection to safeguard their violated rights, is of great importance. But it must be analyzed from various points of view, that is, in relation to the nature of the process, the claims, and the intervening parties, and also taking into account that the breach of environmental norms can be caused by the action or omission of either a subject of private law or public law. The latter, simply by omitting to exercise due control over the actions of private subjects, when they infringe environmental norms, ignoring their functional competence, which requires them to exercise that control; or, by directly infringing with their action juridical provisions intended to protect and conserve the environment. This Chamber, in judgment number 2233-93, by stating that the preservation and protection of the environment is a fundamental right, provides for standing (legitimación) to resort to the amparo route.

In environmental law, the procedural prerequisite of standing tends to extend and broaden in such a dimension that it necessarily leads to the abandonment of the traditional concept, and it must be understood that, in general terms, any person can be a party, and that their right does not emanate from property titles, rights, or concrete actions that they might exercise according to the rules of conventional law, but rather their procedural action responds to what modern legal scholars call the diffuse interest (interés difuso), through which the original standing of the legitimate interested party or even of the simple interested party is diffused among all the members of a certain category of persons who are thus equally affected by the illegal acts that harm them. In the case of environmental protection, the typically diffuse interest that gives standing to the subject to bring an action is transformed, by virtue of its incorporation into the list of rights of the human person, into a true "reactional right" (derecho reaccional), which, as its name indicates, empowers its holder to "react" against the violation originating from illegitimate acts or omissions. That is why the violation of that fundamental right constitutes a constitutional illegality, that is, a specific ground for amparo against concrete acts or self-applicable norms, or, as the case may be, in an unconstitutionality action against all norms or against acts not susceptible to amparo, and even against omissions, a category which, in the case of the right to the environment, becomes especially important, because when it comes to conserving the environment that nature has given us, the most frequent violation occurs due to the inertia of public authorities in carrying out the acts necessary to protect them. Constitutional jurisdiction (Jurisdicción Constitucional), as the legally suitable means necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the law of the Constitution, is, besides being supreme, of essential public order, and this implies, in general, that a much more flexible and less formalistic standing is necessary to associate citizens with the interest of the Rule of Law itself in overseeing and, where appropriate, restoring its own legality. That concept of "diffuse interests" (intereses difusos) aims to develop a form of standing, which in recent times has constituted one of the traditional principles of standing and which has been established, opening the way, especially in the field of administrative law, as a final novel but necessary broadening, so that this oversight is increasingly more effective and efficient. Diffuse interests (intereses difusos), although difficult to define and more difficult to identify, cannot be in our Law—as this Chamber has already stated—merely collective interests; nor so diffuse that their ownership is confused with that of the national community as a whole, nor so concrete that identified or easily identifiable specific persons, or personalized groups, result from them, whose standing would derive not from diffuse interests (intereses difusos), but from corporate interests or those that pertain to a collectivity as a whole. It concerns, then, individual interests, but at the same time, diluted in more or less extensive and amorphous groups of people who share an interest and, therefore, receive a benefit or a harm, actual or potential, more or less equal for all, for which reason it is rightly said that they are equal interests of the groups of people who find themselves in certain situations and, at the same time, of each one of them. That is, diffuse interests (intereses difusos) share a dual nature, since they are collective—being common to a generality—and individual, for which reason they can be claimed in such capacity. And precisely this is what happens in the present case, in which the petitioner evidently has an individual interest insofar as he is being affected by the pollution that his community is subjected to, but there also exists a collective interest, since the harm is also produced to the community as a whole. Thus, in the case of the Right to the Environment, standing corresponds to the human being as such, since the harm to that fundamental right is suffered by both the community and the individual in particular."

II. ON THE MERITS OF THE MATTER

THE REGULATORY POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. This Chamber has repeatedly stated that the regulatory power is reduced to very defined parameters that condition and limit it, since it can in no case violate the own and immanent dynamic that derives from the division of powers and that constitutes, so to speak, the very essence of the democratic system. One of those fundamental parameters of the regulatory power is the fact that within the democratic system, the public powers have clearly defined functions, and none of them may assume those proper to the others, since such transgression flagrantly violates the very concept of the division of powers that is set forth in various ways in Articles 9, 11, 121 paragraph 1.) and 140 paragraphs 3.) and 18.) of the Constitution. This Chamber has so stated in a clear jurisprudential line that finds echo in several of its resolutions, among which it is appropriate to cite: number 1130-90, of seventeen hours thirty minutes of the eighteenth of September of nineteen ninety; number 1635-90, of seventeen hours of the fourteenth of November of nineteen ninety; number 1876-90, of sixteen hours of the nineteenth of December of nineteen ninety; and number 243-93, of fifteen hours forty-five minutes of the nineteenth of January of nineteen ninety-three. Thus, it has indicated:

"II. The Executive Branch, although it does not have the power to enact laws—which is only held by the Legislative Branch, by virtue of the provisions of Articles 105 and 121 of the Political Constitution—does participate in the formation of the legal order through the regulatory power that the Magna Carta confers upon it in Articles 140 paragraphs 3.)—which states the power of the Administration to 'regulate the laws, execute them, sanction them, and ensure their exact fulfillment'—and 18.)—which allows this Power of the State to 'issue the regulations it deems appropriate for the internal regime of its offices and issue the other regulations and ordinances necessary for the prompt execution of the laws'—a power that, as has been seen, is expressed through decrees and regulations issued by the Public Administration. However, by virtue of the hierarchy of norms, in relation to the written sources of Law, normative primacy corresponds to the Political Constitution, followed by international treaties, then the laws, and finally the regulations and decrees issued by the Public Administration. Therefore, the regulation is a secondary, subordinate, inferior, and complementary norm to the Law, needing justification case by case, subordinated to the former in several ways: 1.) it is produced only in the areas that the law permits; 2.) it cannot attempt to render legal precepts ineffective or contradict them; and 3.) it cannot supplement the law where the law is necessary to produce a specific effect or regulate certain content. Thus, regulation is the term for any written norm issued by the Executive Branch in the performance of the functions and matters that are proper to it; the administrative one, which includes the organizational aspects of the public sector. By virtue of the foregoing, the Executive Branch may issue autonomous regulations, among which are the so-called organizational regulations, which refer to the institution and structure of the institutions that make up the Public Administration, among which are the Autonomous Service Regulations of the Ministries, according to the provisions of paragraph 18.) of Article 140 of the Constitution. Likewise, by virtue of the provisions of the cited paragraph 3.) of the same constitutional norm, the President of the Republic and the respective Minister, are empowered to regulate the laws, which means that the Executive develops the concepts used in the law to make it effective and enforceable."

III.By reason of the foregoing, the challenged norm—Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February of nineteen ninety-three, insofar as it modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law, Executive Decree number 19886-MIRENEM, of the thirteenth of September of nineteen ninety—insofar as it creates, without legal basis, the free-harvest certificate and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures provided in the Forestry Law number 7174, is contrary to what is expressly provided in Articles 47 and 60 of the cited Forestry Law, regarding the procedures provided in the law regarding the Management Plan of the General Directorate of Forestry and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality, as regards the use of rural public roads, and therefore becomes unconstitutional, since it exceeds the regulatory power proper to the Executive Branch, thereby violating the provisions of Articles 9, 11, 121 paragraph 1.) and 140 paragraphs 18.) of the Political Constitution.

IV.Likewise, for reasons of connectedness, Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April of nineteen ninety-two, must be analyzed, since it was repealed by the challenged norm, and which, through its first article, modifies Article 25 of the Regulation to the Forestry Law in such a way that it creates the free-harvest certificate and eliminates the obligation to comply with the procedures set forth in Articles 47 and 60 of the Forestry Law, with respect to the procedures provided in the law regarding the Management Plan of the General Directorate of Forestry and the approval (visto bueno) of the respective Municipality as regards the use of rural public roads, and therefore it also results unconstitutional, for the same reasons noted in the preceding considering clause, thereby transgressing Articles 9, 11, 121 paragraph 1.) and 140 paragraphs 3.) and 18.) of the Political Constitution.

V.However, both Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April of nineteen ninety-two, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, that is, the twenty-third of May of nineteen ninety-two, and Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February of nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, the fifth of May of nineteen ninety-three, were repealed by Executive Decree number 2302-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of December of nineteen ninety-three, and which entered into force upon its publication in the Gazette, the sixth of May of nineteen ninety-four. In such a way that, the unconstitutionality that is declared in this action is retroactive to the date of entry into force of the executive decrees that are annulled, without prejudice to rights acquired in good faith and until the repeal of those norms.

Therefore:

The action is granted, and consequently, Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM, of the fifteenth of February of nineteen ninety-three, and for connectedness, the first article of Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM, of the twenty-third of April of nineteen ninety-two, are declared unconstitutional. In accordance with Article 91 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction, this judgment is declaratory and retroactive to the date of entry into force of said law, the fifth of April of nineteen ninety-three—Executive Decree number 22017-MIRENEM—and the twenty-third of May of nineteen ninety-two—Executive Decree number 21198-MIRENEM—, saving rights acquired in good faith, achieved under their protection. Let it be recorded in the official journal La Gaceta and published in the Judicial Bulletin. Notify the Executive Branch and the General Directorate of Forestry.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora President Rodolfo E.

Piza E. Nombre43941 .

Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Nombre58935 M.

SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA.- San José, a las dieciséis horas treinta minutos del tres de enero de mil novecientos noventa y cinco.

Acción de inconstitucionalidad promovida por la ASOCIACION ECOLOGICA DE PAQUERA, LEPANTO Y COBANO, contra el Decreto Ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM, de quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y tres.

Resultando:

1.- La asociación accionante interpone su acción contra el Decreto Ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM, de quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y tres, en cuanto modifica el artículo 25 del Decreto Ejecutivo número 19886-MIRENEM, de trece de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa, que es el Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, por considerar que la norma impugnada es inconstitucional, por haber excedido los alcances de la Ley Forestal número 7174, creando sin fundamento legal el certificado de libre cosecha, transgrediendo con esto concretamente los artículos 47 y 60 de dicha ley, al eliminar implícitamente a los particulares que lo obtengan de cumplir con los trámites previstos en la ley, respecto del Plan de Manejo de la Dirección General Forestal y el visto bueno de la Municipalidad respectiva en lo que respecta al uso de caminos vecinales, transgrediendo con ello los artículos 9, 11, 121 inciso 1.) y 140 incisos 18.) de la Constitución Política.

2.- De conformidad con el párrafo segundo del artículo 9 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, esta Sala está facultada para resolver por el fondo las gestiones promovidas ante ella, cuando considere que existen elementos de juicio suficientes o resulten iguales o similares a anteriores resueltas, no existiendo motivos para variar el criterio o razones de interés público que justifiquen reconsiderar la cuestión.

Redacta el Magistrado Mora Mora, y;

Considerando:

I.SOBRE LA LEGITIMACION. En este asunto no existe asunto pendiente de resolver por tratarse de intereses difusos o que atañen a la colectividad en su conjunto, siendo que la promovente representa en forma idónea los intereses ecológicos de Paquera, Lepanto y Cóbano, y además, en virtud de la naturaleza de lo reclamado -la tala de árboles sin control requerido por ley-, constituye interés difuso, que atañe a la colectividad nacional como un todo. Al respecto, por sentencia número 3705-93, de las quince horas del treinta de julio de mil novecientos noventa y tres, esta Sala señaló:

"Tratándose de la protección jurídica del ambiente, la legitimación de los particulares para actuar judicialmente y lograr la aplicación de las normas que tienen esa finalidad o bien solicitar la tutela jurisdiccional para amparar sus derechos violados, es de gran importancia. Pero debe analizarse desde varios puntos de vista, es decir, en relación con la naturaleza del proceso, las pretensiones y las partes intervinientes y, también tomando en cuenta que el quebranto de las normas ambientales puede provocarlo con su actuacion u omisión, tanto un sujeto de derecho privado como de derecho público. Este último, simplemente omitiendo ejercer el control debido sobre la actuación de los sujetos privados, cuando infringen las normas ambientales, ignorando su competencia funcional, que le exige ejercer ese control; o bien, infringiendo directamente con su actuación disposiciones jurídicas destinadas a proteger y conservar el ambiente. Esta Sala en sentencia número 2233-93 al señalar que la preservación y protección del ambiente es un derecho fundamental, da cabida a la legitimación para acudir a la vía del amparo. En el derecho ambiental, el presupuesto procesal de la legitimación, tiende a extenderse y ampliarse en una dimensión tal, que lleva necesariamente al abandono del concepto tradicional, debidendo entender que en términos generales, toda persona puede ser parte y que su derecho no emana de títulos de propiedad, derechos o acciones concretas que pudiera ejercer según las reglas del derecho convencional, sino que su actuación procesal responde a lo que los modernos tratadistas denominan el interés difuso, mediante el cual la legitimación original del interesado legítimo o aún del simple interesado, se difunde entre todos los miembros de una determinada categoría de personas que resultan así igualmente afectadas por los actos ilegales que los vulneran. Tratándose de la protección del ambiente, el interés típicamente difuso que legitima al sujeto para accionar, se transforma, en virtud de su incorporación al elenco de los derechos de la persona humana, convirtiéndose en un verdadero "derecho reaccional", que, como su nombre lo indica, lo que hace es apoderar a su titular para "reaccionar" frente a la violación originada en actos u omisiones ilegítimos. Es por ello que la vulneración de ese derecho fundamental, constituye una ilegalidad constitucional, es decir, una causal específica de amparo contra los actos concretos o normas autoaplicativas o, en su caso, en la acción de inconstitucionalidad contra todas las normas o contra los actos no susceptibles de amparo, e incluso, contra las omisiones, categoría esta que en el caso del derecho al ambiente se vuelve especialmente importante, porque se trata de conservar el medio que la naturaleza nos ha dado, la violación más frecuente se produce por la inercia de las autoridades públicas en realizar los actos necesarios para protegerlos. La jurisdicción Constitucional, como medio jurídicamente idóneo necesario para garantizar la supremacía del derecho de la Constitución es, además de supremo, de orden público esencial, y ello implica, en general, que una legitimación mucho más flexibe y menos formalista, es necesaria para asociar a los ciudadanos al interés del propio Estado de Derecho de fiscalizar y, en su caso, restablecer su propia juridicidad. Ese concepto de "intereses difusos" tiene por objeto desarrollar una forma de legitimación, que en los últimos tiempos ha constituido uno de los principios tradicionales de la legitimación y que se ha prevenido abriendo paso, especialmente en el ámbito del derecho administrativo, como último ensanchamiento, novedoso pero necesario, para que esa fiscalización sea cada vez más efectiva y eficaz. Los intereses difusos, aunque de difícil definición y más difícil identificación, no pueden ser en nuestra Ley -como ya lo ha dicho esta Sala- los intereses meramente colectivos; ni tan difusos que su titularidad se confunda con la de la comunidad nacional como un todo, ni tan concretos que frente a ellos resulten identificadas o fácilmente identificables personas determinadas, o grupos personalizados, cuya legitimación derivaría, no de los intereses difusos, sino de los corporativos o que atañen a una colectividad en su conjunto. Se trata, entonces, de intereses individuales, pero, a la vez, diluidos en conjuntos más o menos extensos y amorfos de personas que comparten un interés y, por ende, reciben un beneficio o un perjuicio, actual o potencial, más o menos igual para todos, por lo que con acierto se dice que se trata de intereses iguales de los conjuntos de personas que se encuentran en determinadas situaciones y, a la vez, de cada una de ellas. Es decir, los intereses difusos participan de una doble naturaleza, ya que son colectivos -por ser comunes a una generalidad- e individuales, por lo que pueden ser reclamados en tal carácter. Y precisamente ello es lo que sucede en el presente caso, en el cual el recurrente, evidentemente, tiene un interés individual en el tanto está siendo afectado por la contaminación de que es objeto su comunidad, pero también existe un interés colectivo, ya que la lesión también se produce a la colectividad como un todo. De manera que, entratándose del Derecho al Ambiente, la legitimación corresponde al ser humano como tal, pues la lesión a ese derecho fundamental la sufre tanto la comunidad como el individuo en el particular."

II. SOBRE EL FONDO DEL ASUNTO

LA POTESTAD REGLAMENTARIA DEL PODER EJECUTIVO. En forma reiterada esta Sala ha dicho que la facultad reglamentaria está reducida a parámetros muy definidos que la condicionan y limitan, puesto que la misma en ningún caso puede violentar la dinámica propia e inmanente que deriva de la división de poderes y que constituye, por así decirlo, la esencia misma del sistema democrático. Uno de esos parámetros fundamentales de la facultad reglamentaria es el hecho de que dentro del sistema democrático, los poderes públicos tienen claramente definidas sus funciones, sin que pueda ninguno de ellos asumir las propias de los otros, pues tal transgresión viola flagrantemente el concepto mismo de la división de poderes que recogen de diversa manera los artículos 9, 11, 121 inciso 1.) y 140 incisos 3.) y 18.) constitucionales. Así lo ha dicho esta Sala en una nítida línea jurisprudencial que encuentra eco en varias resoluciones suyas, entre las que es oportuno citar: la número 1130-90, de las diecisiete horas treinta minutos del dieciocho de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa; la número 1635-90, de las diecisiete horas del catorce de noviembre de mil novecientos noventa; la número 1876-90, de las dieciséis horas del diecinueve de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa, y la número 243-93, de las quince horas cuarenta y cinco minutos del diecinueve de enero de mil novecientos noventa y tres. Así, ha señalado:

"II. El Poder Ejecutivo, aunque no tiene la facultad de dictar leyes -la cual únicamente la ostenta el Poder Legislativo, en virtud de lo dispuesto en los artículos 105 y 121 de la Constitución Política-, sí participa en la formación del ordenamiento jurídico a través de la potestad reglamentaria que la Carta Magna le confiere en los artículos 140 incisos 3.) -que señala la atribución de la Administración de "reglamentar las leyes, ejecutarlas, sancionarlas y velar por su exacto cumplimiento"- y 18.) -que permite a éste Poder del Estado para "darse el reglamento que convenga para el régimen interior de sus despachos y expedir los demás reglamentos y ordenanzas necesarias para la pronta ejecución de las leyes"-, potestad que, como se ha visto, se expresa a través de los decretos y reglamentos que dicte la Administración Pública. Sin embargo, en virtud de la jerarquía de las normas, en relación con las fuentes escritas del Derecho, corresponde la primacía normativa a la Constitución Política, le siguen los tratados internacionales, luego las leyes y por último los reglamentos y decretos dictados por la Administración Pública. Por ello, el reglamento es una norma secundaria, subalterna, inferior y complementaria de la Ley, necesitada de justificación caso por caso, supeditada a aquélla en varios sentidos: 1.) no se produce más que en los ámbitos que la la ley le permite; 2.) no puede intentar dejar sin efecto o contradecir los preceptos legales; y 3.) no puede suplir a la ley allí donde ésta es necesaria para producir un determinado efecto o regular cierto contenido. Así, se llama reglamento a toda norma escrita dictada por el Poder Ejecutivo en el desempeño de las funciones y materia que les son propias; la administrativa, que comprende los aspectos organizativos del sector público. En virtud de lo anterior, es que el Poder Ejecutivo puede dictar reglamentos autónomos, entre los que figuran los llamados reglamentos de organización, los cuáles se refieren a la institución y estructura de las instituciones que conforman la Administración Pública, entre los que se encuentran los Reglamentos Autónomos de Servicio de los Ministerios, según lo dispuesto en el inciso 18.) del artículo 140 constitucional. Asímismo, en virtud de lo dispuesto en el citado inciso 3.) de la misma norma constitucional, el Presidente de la República y el Ministro del ramo respectivo, están legitimados para reglamentar las leyes, lo cual significa que el Ejecutivo desarrolla los conceptos utilizados en la ley para hacerla efectiva y ejecutoria."

III.En razón de lo anterior, la norma impugnada -Decreto Ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM, de quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y tres, en cuanto modifica el artículo 25 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal, decreto ejecutivo número 19886-MIRENEM, de trece de setiembre de mil novecientos noventa-, en cuanto crea sin fundamento legal el certificado de libre cosecha y elimina la obligación de cumplir con los tramites previstos en la Ley Forestal número 7174, resulta contraria a lo dispuesto expresamente en los artículos 47 y 60 de la Ley Forestal citada, respecto de los trámites previstos en la ley respecto del Plan de Manejo de la Dirección General Forestal y el visto bueno de la Municipalidad respectiva, en lo que se refiere al uso de caminos vecinales, por lo que deviene en inconstitucional, ya que excede la potestad reglamentaria propia del Poder Ejecutivo, violando con ello lo dispuesto en los artículos 9, 11, 121 inciso 1.) y 140 incisos 18.) de la Constitución Política.

IV.Asímismo, por conexidad debe analizarse el Decreto Ejecutivo número 21198-MIRENEM, del veintitrés de abril de mil novecientos noventa y dos, ya que fue derogado por la norma impugnada, y que por el artículo primero modifica el artículo 25 del Reglamento a la Ley Forestal de manera tal que crea el certificado de libre cosecha y elimina la obligación de cumplir con los trámites dispuestos en los artículos 47 y 60 de la Ley Forestal, con respecto a los trámites previstos en la ley respecto del Plan de Manejo de la Dirección General Forestal y el visto bueno de la Municipalidad respectiva en lo que respecta al uso de caminos vecinales, por lo que también resulta inconstitucional, por las mismas razones anotadas en el considerando anterior, transgrediendo con ello los artículos 9, 11, 121 inciso 1.) y 140 incisos 3.) y 18.) de la Constitución Política.

V.Sin embargo, tanto el decreto ejecutivo número 21198-MIRENEM, de veintitrés de abril de mil novecientos noventa y dos, y que entró en vigencia a partir de su publicación en la Gaceta, sea el veintitrés de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y dos, como el decreto ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM, de quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y tres, y que entró en vigencia a partir de su publicación en la Gaceta, el cinco de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y tres, fueron derogados por el decreto ejecutivo número 2302-MIRENEM, de quince de diciembre de mil novecientos noventa y tres, y que entró en vigencia a partir de su publicación en la Gaceta, el seis de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y cuatro. De manera tal que, la inconstitucionalidad que en esta acción se declara es retroactiva a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de los decretos ejecutivos que se anulan, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos de buena fe y hasta la derogatoria de esa normativa.

Por tanto:

Se declara con lugar la acción y en consecuencia se declara inconstitucional el Decreto Ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM, de quince de febrero de mil novecientos noventa y tres, y por conexidad el artículo primero del Decreto Ejecutivo número 21198-MIRENEM, de veintitrés de abril de mil novecientos noventa y dos. De conformidad con el artículo 91 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional esta sentencia es declarativa y retroactiva a la fecha de entrada en vigencia de dicha ley, el cinco de abril de mil novecientos noventa y tres -el Decreto Ejecutivo número 22017-MIRENEM- y el veintitrés de mayo de mil novecientos noventa y dos -el decreto ejecutivo número 21198-MIRENEM-, dejándose a salvo los derechos adquiridos de buena fe, logrados a su amparo. Reséñese en el diario oficial La Gaceta y publíquese en el Boletín Judicial. Notifíquese al Poder Ejecutivo y a la Dirección General Forestal.

Luis Paulino Mora Mora Rodolfo E. Piza E. Nombre43941 . .

Luis Fernando Solano C. Nombre44110 .

Carlos Arguedas R. Nombre58935 M.