Facultative consultation on reforms to the Wildlife Conservation LawConsulta facultativa sobre reformas a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre

#/ Res. No. 2012-015840 CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and zero minutes on November seventh, two thousand twelve.

Optional legislative consultation on constitutionality filed by the deputies […], concerning the draft Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), processed under legislative file No. 17054.

Resultando:

1.- The consultation was received in the Secretariat of the Chamber at fourteen hours and twenty-eight minutes on October 4, 2012. The certified copy of legislative file number 17054 was received in the Chamber on October 10, 2012. Consequently, the deadline to evacuate the consultation expires on November 10, 2012.

2.- The legislators consult the draft approval of the amendment to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), which is processed in legislative file number 17,054 approved in first debate, by virtue of the fact that it suffers from defects of constitutionality not only regarding the procedure, but also regarding the merits. In relation to the procedure, they allege that the principle of connection (conexidad) was violated. In that sense, the purposes of the bill that entered the legislative process through the popular initiative are clearly defined in the statement of motives. The voted text is substantially different in terms of the object, purposes, and means, from the one that originally arrived at the Legislative Assembly. The substitute text approved in first debate not only has substantial differences in relation to the parent text, but also renounces the means suggested in the original text to achieve the proposed purposes, because it discarded the sanctioning part contained in chapters XII and XIII, articles 82 to 108. They also allege violation of the principle of amendment (enmienda), as the deputies found themselves materially unable to study it and make change proposals, because the constitutional deadline for the file had expired. The hasty introduction of the fourth version and its adoption by a majority implied the violation of the amendment right (derecho de enmienda) of the minorities. They further add that the principle of publicity was violated, as neither the substitute text approved in commission nor any of the versions that were known, not even the one that was voted on, were published. They state that the principle of initiative was violated. The text that the organization responsible for drafting the proposal and collecting signatures originally presented modified the terms of the original project, as if it were of private initiative. Furthermore, the approved text was voted on October second, notwithstanding that the constitutional deadline of the file expired on September twenty-seventh past and was not consulted in the terms of the mandatory consultations indicated by the Political Constitution. Regarding the merits, they hold that the third paragraph of Article 1 of the Wildlife Law promotes a particular non-application of the law in relation to indigenous peoples, which violates articles 11, 33, and 129 constitutional.

3.- The Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber deemed the present consultation filed by resolution at 11:02 hours on October 8, 2012.

4.- In the proceedings, the provisions of Article 100 of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) have been observed, and this resolution is issued within the term established by Article 101 idem.

Judge Cruz Castro writes; and,

Considerando:

I.- PRELIMINARY. In accordance with the provisions of Article 96, subsection b) of the Law on Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), we are faced with an optional consultation filed by eleven Deputies, so this Chamber will review only the specific points challenged by the petitioners and not general aspects of the constitutionality of the Law containing the challenged norm, as provided by Article 99 of the law governing this jurisdiction.

II.- THE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.- To analyze the aspects claimed in the optional consultation on constitutionality, they will be discussed in the following order:

• a)On the violation of the connection criterion (conexidad). Firstly, the petitioning Deputies challenge that the text of the bill that entered the legislative process through the popular initiative mechanism is very different from the text approved in first debate, which not only has substantial differences in relation to the parent text, but also renounced the means suggested in the original text to achieve the proposed purposes, because it discarded the sanctioning part contained in chapters XII and XIII, articles 82 to 108. In this regard, this Chamber in judgment No. 2010-16335 of fifteen hours fifty minutes on September 29, 2010, reiterated its previous decisions on the balance that must prevail between the initiative and amendment rights (derechos de iniciativa y enmienda) of the legislators and the limits that the constitutional principles of connection (conexidad) and democratic principle impose on them, in the following terms:

«the amendment right (derecho de enmienda) derives from the democratic principle and is expressly regulated by the Rules of the Legislative Assembly. Through it, deputies participate in the process of forming the law, so they can influence the definitive content of it through the presentation of motions aimed at modifying the content of the original project. In accordance with this Tribunal’s jurisprudence, this right must be observed during the entire process of forming the law and constitutes a parameter of constitutionality,’ so that a violation of its basic core causes the unconstitutionality of the norm that is approved. This right is intimately related to the right of initiative, also of mandatory observance during the procedure for approving a law. The latter involves participation, because it is the legitimate means of driving the legislative procedure for the production of a law that incorporates the points of view of the one who proposes it. The object of the right of initiative is fundamental, because it serves as a reference framework during the processing of the procedure and becomes an intrinsic limit for the presentation of amendments. In this sense, the Chamber has insisted that there exists a framework within which the Legislative Assembly can carry out what is called the transactional political function, for which it naturally has greater disposition and for which the Constitution structures it (starting from Article 105). Therefore, both the right of initiative and the right of amendment must be observed during the process of forming the law, but neither can prevail over the other. Thus, neither can the amendment right (derecho de enmienda) be used to convert the initial project into one substantially different from what was originally presented—this being one of its limits—nor can the initiative right prevail such that the Assembly—and the deputies in particular—see their powers of discussion and of adjusting the project as deemed pertinent limited. This is why it has been said that the text proposed through the original initiative right is what sets the general framework of the project, and it is within this framework that the modifications intended to be introduced through the exercise of the amendment right must be weighed.’ (see also resolutions #2008-10450 at 9:00 hours on June 23; #2008-5179 at 11:00 hours on April 4; #2008-2521 at 8:31 hours on February 22, all three from 2008; #2007-17104 at 9:36 hours on November 23, 2007; and #3513-94 at 8:57 hours on July 15, 1994, previously cited). In sum, a bill may be modified or complemented, as long as it preserves its original object and sense. Otherwise, recourse must be had to a new initiative and a new bill that contemplates the changes unlinked from the first project, fulfilling all the indispensable steps of the corresponding parliamentary procedure.

In the specific case, it is accredited that by order of June 5, 2008, the popular initiative procedure “Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, legislative file number 17,054" was submitted to the Legislative Assembly for consideration, which was referred for study and report to the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente. The bill in question was published in the official newspaper La Gaceta No. 126 of July 1, 2008. Subsequently, on August 8, 2012, the organization proposing the popular initiative—APREFLOFAS—made a series of modifications to the text of the project. On September 13, 2012, the report of the Subcommittee established to analyze and study file No. 17.054 recommended to the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente that the base text for discussion of the project be called "Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 of December 7, 1992" (Amendments and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317). On September 27, 2012, the Director of the Secretariat of the Legislative Assembly received from the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente the undecided file No. 17.054, which was approved in first debate in ordinary session No. 74 of October 2, two thousand twelve. In this regard, the substitution in the legislative iter of the texts from "Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre" to "Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317" is in no way contradictory to the popular initiative process that was presented to the legislative process, because fundamentally what is sought is to guarantee more effective protection of the wildlife (vida silvestre) existing in our country, which can be carried out through the enactment of a new law or the reform of the existing legislation. On multiple occasions, this Constitutional Tribunal has determined that a bill may be modified or complemented, as long as it preserves its original object and sense. The foregoing also applies to popular initiative projects where, if the essence of the law proposal that was presented by a determined group of citizens is maintained, it is possible to make a series of changes as was carried out in the present bill, by virtue of the fact that the connection (conexidad) does not have to be absolute. In this sense, the fact that the project of "Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317" approved in first debate discarded the sanctioning part contained in chapters XII called crimes against wildlife and XIII infractions against wildlife, contained in articles 82 to 108 of the project that was initially presented in the Legislative Assembly, in no way tends to infringe the principle of connection (conexidad), because said suppression does not affect the essence, objectives, and purposes of the project. On the other hand, the petitioners challenge that between the version of the popular initiative project that entered the Legislative Assembly for consideration and the text that was approved in first debate by the Plenary, there exist a series of substantial changes. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the filing brief of the consultation does not clearly and precisely indicate what the substantial changes were, as required by constitutional jurisprudence, which has repeatedly determined that the filing brief must express the articles of the project whose constitutionality is challenged or consulted, and clearly state the reasons for which it is estimated that a norm of the project may be unconstitutional, because otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible (see in this sense, judgments numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643). In sum, there is congruence, coherence, and substantial connection with the material and principal content of the bill, which is the protection of wildlife (vida silvestre). b) On the violation of the amendment right (derecho de enmienda) and the approval of the project in first debate outside the deadline. Secondly, the Deputies challenge that they found themselves materially unable to study the project in question and make change proposals to the last version of the project that was submitted for discussion in the plenary, by virtue of the fact that the constitutional deadline for the file had expired. In this regard, as it concerns a popular initiative project, what is provided in Article 6 of the Law on Popular Initiative (Ley de Iniciativa Popular), Law No. 8491 of April 3, 2006, is of particular interest, which states that:

Popular initiative projects must be voted on in the Legislative Assembly, within a maximum period of two years, except if they refer to constitutional amendments, in which case they will follow the procedure provided for in Article 195 of the Political Constitution. The computation of the period shall begin from the date on which the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate receives the project, and shall be suspended during legislative recesses and extraordinary sessions, if it is not convoked by the Executive Branch. If that period expires and the bill has not been voted on in first debate, it must be heard and submitted to a vote in the immediately following session of the Legislative Plenary or of the Commission with Full Legislative Power, as the case may be. For these purposes, if the initiative has not been decided upon, it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedural steps. The same rules shall be applicable to the processing in second debate and to the hearing of the reports of the Constitutional Consultation Commission (Comisión de Consulta de Constitucionalidad)’ (The underlining does not correspond to the original). In the specific case, the peremptory two-year period for voting on project No. 17054 in its first debate proceeding expired on September 27, 2012. For this reason, the President of the Legislative Assembly issued a resolution in light of the existing normative vacuum in relation to the procedure that must be followed to hear popular initiative bills for which the period to be voted on in the Plenary has expired, and agreed to submit it to a vote in the session of October 1 past, in which the quorum was broken, which is why the project was heard and approved in the immediately following session, which took place on October 2, without this implying a formal vice in the procedure. Note that the mentioned procedure was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Law on Popular Initiative (Ley de Iniciativa Popular), which provides that if the initiative has not been decided upon, it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedural steps and must be submitted to a vote in first debate before the Plenary. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber does not appreciate that the amendment right (derecho de enmienda) was thereby violated so as to invalidate the processing of the present bill, by virtue of the fact that there existed a legal period established by the legislator themselves that had to be respected for its vote before the Plenary. There exists a logical limitation on the amendment right, not only due to the provision of a peremptory period, but because the fact that it is a popular initiative project justifies a limit that allows for the discussion and processing of a project that possesses a qualified democratic origin.

• c)On the violation of the principle of publicity. Thirdly, it is challenged that the text of the bill approved in the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente nor any of the versions that were known, not even the one that was voted on, were published, to the detriment of the principle of publicity. In this regard, in judgment number 2011-001654 of fifteen hours and eight minutes on February 9, 2011, this Chamber stated in what is of interest:

On the obligation to publish bills. Article 129 of the Political Constitution establishes the obligation to publish laws approved by the Legislative Assembly and sanctioned by the Executive Branch; however, this obligation is not related to bills, which, due to their provisional nature, would be subject to motions of form and substance. The Political Constitution does not specifically regulate the obligation to publish bills or their Commission reports, much less the possibility for the Legislative Plenary to decide to dispense with these legislative procedure steps, as publication is a trend that has advanced in parliamentary practice in different countries, and exceptions are known, for example, in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary law, where they recently adopted it in England. The problem, consequently, translates into one of legislative practice or the norms that regulate it, which, in our country, arises from the autonomy that Article 121, subsection 22) of the Political Constitution grants to the Legislative Assembly, which puts into operation the constitutional values and principles that must be safeguarded in the process of forming laws, related to the democratic principle. Undoubtedly, the principle of publicity in the legislative procedure fulfills, in addition to formal functions, also material ones, not only in the preparatory acts of a bill, but when it is in other phases of the process, when the Legislative Assembly receives publicity by radio and television, given that the debates of the Legislative Plenary are open to the public (third paragraph of Article 117 of the Political Constitution). In this sense, these circumstances, and the obligation to publish bills is contained in the principle of publicity that must serve as a vector of legitimacy for every representative organ of popular sovereignty. In this sense, parliaments and their acts are of great value and transcendence for the democratic life of countries, and their actions must be allowed to be ventilated with transparency and publicly, as these are the political and legal centers of a Nation, and the primary place in which a disarticulated society must modulate itself. Now then, this Chamber’s jurisprudence has been decisive in assigning significant weight to the principle of publicity as a substantial requirement within the legislative process, regarding ordinary law and constitutional amendment.’ In the present case, it is accredited that in ordinary session No. 94-2008 of October 21, 2008, the Supreme Tribunal of Elections determined that the procedure for the review, validation, and computation of signatures supporting the popular initiative project in question was concluded, which had the support of 135,936 signatures of citizen voters who were registered on the electoral roll as of May two thousand eight. Subsequently, the project in question was transferred to the Legislative Assembly for consideration, which proceeded to its publication in the Official Newspaper La Gaceta No. 126 of July first, 2008. In this sense, the bill in question essentially shows respect for the democratic principle and the principle of publicity because it is a popular initiative that had the support of 5% of the citizens registered on the electoral roll, as ordered by Article 5 of the Law on Popular Initiative (Ley de Iniciativa Popular). Furthermore, it is accredited that the bill in question received the due publicity because it was published in the Official Newspaper in conformity as provided by Article 117 of the Rules of the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand, by virtue of the fact that in the present case the violation of the principle of connection (conexidad) is ruled out, because the modifications made to the bill in question in the legislative procedure are closely related—as indicated previously—to the subject matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife (vida silvestre), it is not necessary for the Legislative Assembly to proceed with the publication of the bill again prior to its vote in first debate before the Plenary.

• d)On the omission of mandatory consultation. Fourthly, the petitioning Deputies challenge that the bill was not consulted in the terms of the mandatory consultations determined by the Political Constitution. In this regard, the petitioners do not indicate clearly and precisely which institutions should have been consulted, as determined by the constitutional jurisprudence cited above in considering a). On the other hand, it is accredited by official communications dated December 9, 2008, that the President of the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente of the Legislative Assembly consulted on the cited project with the Minister of Finance, Minister of Health, Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la República), Comptroller General of the Republic (Contraloría General de la República), Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría de los Habitantes), National System of Conservation Areas of MINAET, Executive President of Incopesca, Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, National Council of Conservation Areas (CONAC), Executive Director, CONAGEBIO technical office, President of CEDARENA, Executive Director of MarViva, Executive Director of the Program for the Restoration of Marine Turtles (PRETOMA), Rector of the National University, Chief of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público), Executive Director of the Preservacionist Association of Wild Flora and Fauna (APREFLOFAS), Director of the Regional Office of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, Rector of the State Distance University (UNED), Rector of the University of Costa Rica (UCR), Rector of the Technological Institute of Costa Rica. The foregoing, based on Article 157 of the Rules of the Legislative Assembly (see folios 131 to 150 of the legislative file). Subsequently, it is accredited that in extraordinary session number 10 of September 18, 2012, the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente approved a motion to consult the substitute text of the bill in question with: MINAET, SINAC, Attorney General’s Office, Comptroller General of the Republic, Ombudsman’s Office, IUCN, APREFLOFAS, Municipalities of the entire country, Public Universities, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, CONAGEBIO, CONAC OF SINAC, INCOPESCA, MARViva, PRETOMA, CEDARENA (folio 821 of the legislative file). In addition, through official communications AMB-243-2012 to AMB-268-2012 of September 21 and 25, 2012, the Legislative Assembly requested a series of associations to issue their opinion on project No. 17054 within the 8 working days period established by Article 157 of the Rules of the Legislative Assembly, in particular to: the Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Abrojo Montezuma; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Alto Laguna de Osa; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Boruca; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Cabagra; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Rey Curré; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral China Kichá; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Bribrí Salamanca; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral, Salamanca, Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Chirrido Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Nairí Awarí (Cabécar); Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Matambú; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Guatuso; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Zaparón, Puriscal; Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral Humano de Guanacaste; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Kekoldi; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Bajo Chirrido Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Territorio Indígena Alto Conte, Corredores, Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral La Casona de Guaymí, Coto Brus, Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Salitre de Buenos Aires de Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Tayni (Cabécar), Regional Directorate of Dinadeco to issue their opinion on project No. 17054 within the 8 working days period established by Article 157 of the Rules of the Legislative Assembly (see folios 1118 to 1188 of the legislative file). The foregoing evidences that in the legislative procedure, the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente consulted a large number of governmental institutions and private associations so that they may submit their observations and suggestions on the project in question, which is why regarding this specific point no vice is accredited.

III.- ON THE MERITS. About the violation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination. On the other hand, the Deputies consider that the provisions of the third paragraph of Article one of the Wildlife Law violate the provisions of Articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, said numeral provides in what is of interest that: This law shall not apply to the conservation, sustainable management, protection, and adequate administration of wildlife (vida silvestre) that result from traditional practices, uses, and customs without profit motive of indigenous peoples within their territories. The foregoing in no way becomes a discriminatory inequality, but quite the contrary, it takes into account and respects the uses and customs that indigenous communities have in their territories. This Constitutional Tribunal on multiple occasions has recognized the State’s duty to respect the traditions of indigenous communities and to preserve their culture. Thus, in judgment number 2011-00281 of nine hours and thirty-six minutes on January 14, 2011, this Chamber provided in what is of interest:

III.- On constitutional legal protection in indigenous matters. A principle of recognition of indigenous peoples is inferred from the Political Constitution itself, based on the idea of state protection to achieve the preservation of their culture, which is reaffirmed in International Treaties duly ratified by Costa Rica. In reference to domestic legislation, the first regulation that makes reference to this situation is found in the Law on Vacant Lands (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos) number 13 of January 10, 1939, which establishes in its Article 8: "[...] an inalienable zone and the exclusive property of the indigenous people is declared, a prudential zone at the judgment of the Executive Branch in the places where Tribes of these exist, so that our autochthonous race may be conserved and to free them from future injustices". Norm that was expanded by Decree number 45 of December 3, 1945, by creating the Board for the Protection of the Aboriginal Races of the Nation (Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación), whose basic function tended to the protection of the lands of the aborigines, in order not to abandon them and to maintain their ethnic group. Subsequently, by Executive Decree number 34 of November 15, 1956, the indigenous reserves Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá were declared. The Legislative Assembly, by Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959, approved Convention number 107 of the International Labor Organization concerning the "Protection and integration of indigenous populations and other tribal and semi-tribal populations", which recognizes their legitimate right to have under their domain the lands of their property, whether individually and collectively, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the peoples' customs. The Law on Land and Colonization (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) number 2825 of October 14, 1961, also incorporated a chapter referring to the topic with the objective of protecting those lands and the autochthonous races.

Pursuant to this regulation, by Executive Decrees number 11 of April 2, 1996, and 26 of November 12, it was ordered that the three indigenous reserves created in 1956 be registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), today the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) (see the vote of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 223 at 15:30 hours on July 6, 1990). International Law, for its part, has been generous in recognizing the rights of these communities. Among such instruments, the following stand out: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 1, 2.1, 7, 17.1, and 27), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (27), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1.1 and 2), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (2, 13, and 23), and the American Convention on Human Rights (24 and 26). The International Labour Organization has been a pioneer in the area of indigenous protection. Conventions Nos. 107 and 169 contain a detailed enumeration of rights recognized for these peoples. Both Conventions—107 and 169—in their Part II, regulate the land ownership regime of indigenous lands. Additionally, constitutional jurisprudence number 1786-93 at 16:21 hours on April 21, 1993, and 06229-99 at 14:30 hours on August 11, 1999, among others, recognize the special protection of their territory and culture due to their conditions of vulnerability, not only current but also past, and without any limits other than those that human rights themselves impose on the conduct of all human beings. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Costa Rican State has broadly recognized the rights corresponding to the indigenous groups that inhabit the country. Furthermore, it has been held that groups of people belonging to autochthonous communities have the right to live on the lands where they have historically been settled, and the State must fully guarantee the enjoyment of this fundamental right. Our constitutional jurisprudence thus recognizes a superior hierarchy to International Conventions, such as ILO Convention No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), granting a higher degree of protection to indigenous persons and communities, that is, an elevated level of protection regarding those human rights embodied in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in ordinary Courts, for the decisions that, through custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples, derive from the communities themselves and their representatives' (The underlining is not from the original).

In the same vein, Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 7316 in November 1992, provides in its Article 4, paragraph 1 that: "Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned." Furthermore, Article 8 determines in its paragraphs 1 and 2 that: "1. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws. 2.

These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system nor with internationally recognized human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, to resolve conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle." Thus, the third paragraph of Article One of the Wildlife Law in no way violates the provisions of Articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution, but rather tends to respect and protect the uses and customs of the indigenous communities that exist in our country.

IV.- Conclusion. In view of the foregoing, this Chamber finds that there are no substantial violations of the legislative procedure, nor are there substantive defects, as consulted to the Chamber.

Therefore:

The legislative consultation is answered, in the sense that there are no constitutional defects of procedure, nor substantive defects in the topics consulted regarding the bill of Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, processed under legislative file No. 17054. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez append notes. Magistrate Armijo Sancho dissents, considering that the legislative procedure violated the principles of connexity (conexidad) and publicity.

Gilbert Armijo S. Presiding Judge pro tempore Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Roxana Salazar C. Teresita Rodríguez A.

Separate note of Magistrate Cruz Castro.

In the present case, I consider that there is no violation of the principle of connexity (conexidad) because the modifications made during the legislative procedure to the popular initiative bill that was submitted to the Legislative Assembly and the text that was approved in the first debate by the Plenary are closely related to the subject matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife, thereby preserving its original object and purpose. This is contrary to the position I held in the facultative constitutional consultation processed under file No. 08-003901-0007-CO resolved in judgment No. 2008-05179 at eleven hours on April 4, two thousand eight, in which I dissented because I considered that the modifications made in the legislative process to the bill consulted on that occasion exceeded the purpose of the original bill, resulting in an abusive and excessive exercise of the right to amend. I further consider that the diversity of subjects modified in the substitute bill did constitute a qualitative and essential variation of the original bill, a fact that contravenes the requirements of the principle of connexity (conexidad). For this reason, I consider it necessary to make it clear that there is a clear difference with the resolution cited above, because the underlying facts are different, given that in the present case, the bill under consultation did not undergo transcendental changes in the legislative procedure that would have altered the object and purpose of the original bill.

Fernando Cruz C.

Separate note of Magistrate Castillo Víquez.

In addition to the reasons given in the advisory opinion for reaching the conclusion that there are no procedural defects regarding the non-publication of the text approved in the Special Committee—neither the versions that were subsequently considered, nor even the one voted on, were published in the official gazette La Gaceta—I consider that the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) only require the publication of the bill, not of the motions or substitute texts that are approved in the various parliamentary bodies (see Articles 115 to 117, 121, and 130 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly). Moreover, the committee reports on the bill are only published if the reporting committee so agrees (see Articles 83 and 131 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly), which confirms that, unless expressly authorized by a provision of the Parliamentary Statute, the approval of motions or substitute texts need not be published in the official gazette La Gaceta. An additional reason to continue along this line of argument is that, viewing things from another perspective, the publication of substitute texts approved within parliamentary bodies is pointless, for the elementary reason that this would only make sense when novel concepts or regulations are introduced into them, an action prohibited by Constitutional Law—due to a violation of the principle of connexity (conexidad)—or when the parliamentary body so agrees for a specific purpose or as necessary for parliamentary work. On the other hand, the Chamber has admitted that the lack of publication, at a specific procedural moment, does not always constitute an invalidating defect of the legislative procedure. In this regard, it stated: "The Chamber does not consider that this circumstance harms the principle of publicity, typical of the legislative procedure: this principle, in the first place, is not satisfied by a single act, such as, for example, the publication of the proposal, but is carried out in the different phases of the procedure, and in the publicity itself to which the work of the legislative bodies is subject. Furthermore, the court observes that once the proposal was admitted (in the case on which this opinion is based), and the report of the Committee referred to in paragraph 3) of Article 195 was rendered, it was published, as was customary. Consequently, the Chamber concludes that the lack of publication of the proposal for constitutional reform at issue here does not constitute a defect that invalidates the procedure." (See Vote No. 11560-2001).

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure is not exhausted in the publication of the bill, but goes much further, since the Legislative Assembly, as a plural and democratic body, is subject to it at all stages. In accordance with the foregoing, the Political Constitution, in its Article 117, states that the sessions of the Legislative Assembly are public, unless for highly qualified reasons of general convenience it is agreed that they be secret by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the deputies present. This publicity of parliamentary work refers not only to the right of the inhabitants of the Republic to attend the galleries of the Legislative Assembly, which can only be cleared by the president of the Legislative Assembly when—by their signs of approval or disapproval, shouts, whistles, blows, or any other disorderly demonstration—they interrupt the work of the Assembly (see Article 27, paragraph 12 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—and the same occurs in the case of Permanent Committees with Full Legislative Power, where their presidents also have this power (see Article 56, paragraph j) of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—but also to the right that the mass media have to report on parliamentary work through various channels—radio, television, Internet, print media, etc.; and, even, the interest of political parties with parliamentary representation and the deputies that their interventions—oral, written, or otherwise—be disseminated through all media, thereby fulfilling a dual purpose: on the one hand, citizen control over the activity carried out by the members of Parliament, crucial in any democratic system, and on the other hand, accountability, in this case immediately, of the deputies to the citizenry. Thus, the act of publication of the bill is one of the many manifestations that the principle of publicity has in the parliamentary procedure. Furthermore, requiring the publication of substitute texts undermines one of the essential characteristics of Parliamentary Law: its ductility or flexibility, which negatively impacts parliamentary work and, in some cases, can lead to the failure of political agreements that have been reached. And it even goes against the purpose of Parliamentary Law. As is well known, the purpose of this Law is to allow Parliament to exercise its powers (legislative, self-regulatory, political control, integrative, jurisdictional, and administrative), especially: to be the channel through which the Legislative Assembly adopts, in a timely, democratic, and sovereign manner and in strict adherence to the principle of political pluralism, the fundamental political decisions, which are translated into final parliamentary acts, be they a legislative decree or a legislative agreement. It should not be forgotten that, due to parliamentary dynamics, political agreements within Parliament enjoy a constant precariousness until they materialize, not only because there is a timely and specific moment for their concretization, but also because of the permanent tension in which political actors find themselves due to the large number of political variables they handle at the same time. This means that the longer the time to concretize the political agreement, the greater the chances that it will break down. Hence the need for its timely execution and, in some cases, immediate execution, since the political reality varies constantly and can ruin what was agreed. For this reason, when the Legislative Assembly is forced, under the pretext of observing the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure, to publish substitute texts or motions in the official gazette La Gaceta, which implies a significant delay in adopting the political decision given the time it takes to do so, this undermines the very nature of the parliamentary body and its dynamic, against one of the characteristics and the purpose of Parliamentary Law, all of which is a nonsense in an essentially political body—some argue that the functioning of the Chamber is a reflection of the continuation of the electoral contest on a different plane—as is the Legislative Assembly.

Fernando Castillo V.

DISSENT OF MAGISTRATE ARMIJO SANCHO. I disagree with the conclusion reached by my colleagues, in the sense that the parliamentary procedure was not violated, because, in my opinion, in the processing of legislative file #17054, the principle of publicity and the deputies' right to amend were disregarded. The introduction of different substitute texts, by itself, does not constitute a defect of this nature, as long as the same initial material guiding thread is maintained. However, the fact of having incorporated a fourth text that integrally replaced the bill and having done so in the same plenary session in which it was approved in the first debate, without it having been distributed among the legislators with sufficient anticipation and clarity, placed them in a material impossibility of knowing the text being approved and exercising their right to make the proposals they deem pertinent, since there were still doubts regarding which text motions could be presented against (cf. minutes of plenary session #74 of Tuesday, October 2, 2012). Under these conditions, the basic conditions of parliamentary debate are absent, as are the requirements for knowledge of the acts being adopted and the eventual proposal of modifications. On this specific point, I dissent and declare that the procedure is unconstitutional, while on the other aspects consulted, I adhere to the majority decision of the Chamber.

Gilbert Armijo S.

They claim that the principle of initiative was violated. The text originally presented by the organization responsible for drafting the proposal and collecting the signatures modified the terms of the original bill, as if it were a private initiative. Moreover, the approved text was voted on October second, even though the constitutional deadline for the expediente expired on September twenty-seventh and it was not consulted in the terms of the mandatory consultations set forth in the Constitución Política. As to the merits, they maintain that the third paragraph of Article 1 of the Ley de Vida Silvestre promotes a particular disapplication of the law in relation to indigenous peoples, which violates articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Constitution.

3.- The Presidencia of the Sala Constitucional accepted the filing of this consulta by resolution at 11:02 a.m. of October eighth, 2012.

4.- In the proceedings, the provisions of Article 100 of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional have been observed, and this resolution is issued within the term established by Article 101 idem.

Drafted by Judge Cruz Castro; and,

Considering:

I.- PRELIMINARY NOTE. In accordance with the provisions of Article 96 subsection b) of the Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, we are in the presence of a facultative consulta filed by eleven Deputies, and therefore, this Chamber will review only the points specifically challenged by the petitioners, and not general aspects of constitutionality of the Law containing the challenged provision, as provided by Article 99 of the law governing this jurisdiction.

II.- THE PROCEDURE IN THIS SPECIFIC CASE.- To analyze the aspects claimed in the facultative consulta of constitutionality, they will be discussed in the following order:

• a)Regarding the violation of the criterion of conexidad. First, the petitioning Deputies question whether the text of the bill that entered the legislative process through the mechanism of popular initiative is very different from the text approved in the first debate, which not only has substantial differences in relation to the original text, but also abandoned the means suggested in the original text to achieve the proposed ends, since it discarded the punitive part contained in chapters XII and XIII, articles 82 to 108. In this regard, this Chamber, in judgment No. 2010-16335 of three fifty p.m. of September 29, 2010, reiterated its previous decisions on the balance that must prevail between the rights of initiative and amendment of the legislators and the limits imposed on them by the constitutional principles of conexidad and democratic principle, in the following terms:

«the right of amendment derives from the democratic principle and is expressly regulated by the Regulations of the Asamblea Legislativa. Through it, deputies participate in the lawmaking process, so they can influence its final content by presenting motions aimed at modifying the content of the original bill. In accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court, this right must be observed throughout the entire lawmaking process and constitutes a parameter of constitutionality, such that a violation of its essential core renders the approved provision unconstitutional. This right is intimately related to the right of initiative, which must also be mandatorily observed during the procedure for approving a law. The latter implies participation, because it is the legitimate means of initiating the legislative procedure for the creation of a law that incorporates the points of view of the person proposing it. The purpose of the right of initiative is fundamental, because it serves as a frame of reference during the procedure and becomes an intrinsic limit for the presentation of amendments. In this sense, the Chamber has insisted that there is a framework within which the Asamblea Legislativa can carry out what is called the transactional political function, for which it naturally has greater disposition and for which the Constitution structures it (starting from Article 105). Therefore, both the right of initiative and the right of amendment must be observed during the lawmaking process, but neither can prevail over the other. Thus, neither can the right of amendment be used to convert the initial bill into one substantially different from the one originally presented—this being one of its limits—nor can the right of initiative prevail in such a way that the Asamblea—and the deputies in particular—see their powers of discussion and adjustment of the bill as deemed pertinent limited. This is why it has been stated that the text proposed through the original right of initiative is what sets the general framework of the bill, and it is within this framework that modifications intended to be introduced through the exercise of the right of amendment must be weighed.’ (see also resolution #2008-10450 of 9:00 a.m. of June 23; #2008-5179 of 11:00 a.m. of April 4; #2008-2521 of 8:31 a.m. of February 22, all three from 2008; #2007-17104 of 9:36 a.m. of November 23, 2007; and #3513-94 of 8:57 a.m. of July 15, 1994, previously cited). In summary, a bill may be modified or supplemented, as long as it retains its original purpose and meaning. Otherwise, a new initiative and a new bill must be resorted to, which contemplates the changes detached from the first bill, fulfilling all essential steps of the corresponding parliamentary procedure.

In the specific case, it is accredited that by order of June 5, 2008, the ‘Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre’ popular initiative procedure, expediente legislativo number 17.054, was submitted to the knowledge of the Asamblea Legislativa, and it was referred for study and report to the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente. The bill in question was published in the official gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of July 1, 2008. Subsequently, on August 8, 2012, the organization proposing the popular initiative, APREFLOFAS, made a series of modifications to the text of the bill. On September 13, 2012, the report of the Subcomisión established to analyze and study expediente No. 17.054 recommended that the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente rename the base text for discussion of the bill ‘Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 of December 7, 1992’. On September 27, 2012, the Director of the Secretaría of the Asamblea Legislativa received from the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente the non-reporting (sin dictaminar) expediente No. 17.054, which was approved in the first debate during the ordinary session No. 74 of October second, two thousand twelve. In this regard, the substitution in the legislative iter of the texts from ‘Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre’ to ‘Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317’ is in no way contradictory to the popular initiative process submitted to the legislative process, for in essence, what is intended is to guarantee a more effective tutela of the existing wildlife (vida silvestre) in our country, which can be carried out through the enactment of a new law or the reform of existing regulations. On multiple occasions, this Constitutional Court has determined that a bill may be modified or supplemented, as long as it retains its original purpose and meaning. The foregoing also applies to popular initiative bills, where if the essence of the bill proposal submitted by a given group of citizens is maintained, a series of changes can be made, just as was carried out in the present bill, because the conexidad does not have to be absolute. In this sense, the fact that the bill of ‘Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317’ approved in the first debate discarded the punitive part contained in chapters XII, denominated crimes against wildlife (vida silvestre), and XIII, contraventions against wildlife (vida silvestre), contained in articles 82 to 108 of the bill initially submitted to the Asamblea Legislativa, in no way tends to infringe the principle of conexidad, since said suppression does not affect the essence, objectives, and purposes of the bill. On the other hand, the petitioners question whether between the version of the popular initiative bill that entered the knowledge of the Asamblea Legislativa and the text that was approved in the first debate by the Plenary, there are a series of substantial changes. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the petition for the consulta does not clearly and precisely indicate what the substantial changes were, as required by constitutional jurisprudence, which has repeatedly determined that the petition must state which articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and clearly state the reasons why a provision of the bill is considered unconstitutional, otherwise the consulta would be inadmissible (see in this regard, judgments numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643). In summary, there is congruence, coherence, and substantial connection with the material and principal content of the bill, which is the tutela of wildlife (vida silvestre). b) Regarding the violation of the right of amendment and the approval of the bill in the first debate outside the deadline. Secondly, the Deputies question whether they were materially prevented from studying the bill in question and proposing changes to the last version of the bill submitted for discussion in the plenary, because the constitutional deadline of the expediente had expired. In this regard, since it involves a popular initiative bill, the provisions of Article 6 of the Ley de Iniciativa Popular, Ley No. 8491 of April third, 2006, are of particular interest, indicating that:

Popular initiative bills must be voted on in the Asamblea Legislativa, within a maximum period of two years, unless they refer to constitutional reforms, in which case they shall follow the process established in Article 195 of the Constitución Política. The calculation of the period shall begin from the date on which the Secretaría of the Legislative Directorate receives the bill, and shall be suspended during legislative recesses and extraordinary sessions, if it is not convened by the Executive Branch. If that period expires and the bill has not been voted on in the first debate, it must be heard and submitted to a vote in the immediately following session of the Legislative Plenary or of the Comisión with Full Legislative Power, as applicable. For these purposes, if the initiative has not been reported on (dictaminada), it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedures. The same rules shall apply to the process in the second debate and the hearing of the reports of the Commission of Consultad de Constitucionalidad’ (The underline is not in the original). In the specific case, the peremptory period of two years for voting on bill No. 17054 in its first debate process expired on September twenty-seventh, 2012. For this reason, the President of the Asamblea Legislativa issued a resolution in light of the existing regulatory vacuum regarding the procedure to be followed for hearing popular initiative bills for which the deadline for being voted on in the Plenary has expired, and agreed to submit it to a vote in the session of October 1st, in which the quorum was broken, reason why the bill was heard and approved in the immediately following session, which took place on October 2, without this entailing a formal defect in the procedure. Note that the aforementioned procedure was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Ley de Iniciativa Popular, which states that if the initiative has not been reported on (dictaminada), it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedures and must be submitted to a vote in the first debate before the Plenary. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber does not find that this violated the right of amendment, which would invalidate the process of the present bill, because there was a legal deadline established by the legislator itself that had to be respected for its voting before the Plenary. There is a logical limitation to the right of amendment, not only due to the provision of a peremptory deadline, but also because the fact that it is a popular initiative bill justifies a limit that allows for the discussion and processing of a bill that possesses a qualified democratic origin.

• c)Regarding the violation of the principle of publicity. On a third level, it is questioned whether the text of the bill approved in the Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente, nor any of the versions considered, not even the one voted on, were published, to the detriment of the principle of publicity. In this regard, in judgment number 2011-001654 of three eight p.m. of February 9, 2011, this Chamber stated, as relevant:

Regarding the obligation to publish bills. Article 129 of the Constitución Política establishes the obligation to publish laws approved by the Asamblea Legislativa and sanctioned by the Executive Branch; however, this obligation is not related to bills, which, due to their provisional nature, would be subject to motions of form and substance. The Constitución Política does not specifically regulate the obligation to publish bills or their Commission reports, much less the possibility that the Legislative Plenary decides to dispense with these legislative procedural steps, since publication is a trend that has advanced in parliamentary practice in different countries, and exceptions are known, for example, in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary law, where it was recently adopted in England. The problem, consequently, translates into one of legislative practice or the norms that regulate it, which, in our country, originates from the autonomy granted by Article 121 subsection 22) of the Constitución Política to the Asamblea Legislativa, which puts into operation the constitutional values and principles that must be safeguarded in the lawmaking process, related to the democratic principle. Without a doubt, the principle of publicity in the legislative procedure fulfills, in addition to formal functions, also material ones, not only in the preparatory acts of a bill, but also when it is in other phases of the process, when the Asamblea Legislativa receives publicity through radio and television, given that the debates of the Legislative Plenary are open to the public (third paragraph of Article 117 of the Constitución Política). In this sense, these circumstances and the obligation to publish bills are contained in the principle of publicity, which must serve as a vector of legitimacy for any organ representative of popular sovereignty. In this sense, parliaments and their acts are of great value and transcendence for the democratic life of countries, and their actions must be allowed to be aired with transparency and in the public eye, as they are the political and legal centers of a Nation, and the primary place in which a disarticulated society must modulate itself. Now, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been decisive in assigning significant weight to the principle of publicity as a substantial requirement within the legislative process, regarding ordinary law and constitutional amendment’.

In the present case, it is accredited that in ordinary session No.

94-2008 of October 21, 2008, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal determined to conclude the procedure for reviewing, validating, and counting signatures supporting the popular initiative project in question, which was supported by 135,936 signatures of registered voters who were on the electoral roll as of May of two thousand eight. Subsequently, the project in question was referred to the Legislative Assembly, which proceeded to its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of the first of July of 2008. In this sense, the legislative bill in question essentially respects the democratic principle and the principle of publicity, given that it is a popular initiative that was supported by 5% of the citizens registered on the electoral roll, as mandated by article 5 of the Law of Popular Initiative. Furthermore, it is attested that the legislative bill in question received due publicity as it was published in the Official Gazette in accordance with the provisions of article 117 of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand, since a violation of the principle of connection (conexidad) is ruled out in this case, given that the amendments made to the legislative bill in question during the legislative procedure are closely related—as previously indicated—to the matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife, it was not necessary for the Legislative Assembly to proceed with the publication of the bill again prior to its vote in the first debate before the Plenary.

• d)Regarding the omission of obligatory consultation. On a fourth point, the consulting Deputies question that the legislative bill was not consulted in accordance with the terms of the obligatory consultations determined by the Political Constitution. In this regard, the consultants do not clearly and precisely indicate which institutions should have been consulted, as determined by the constitutional jurisprudence supra-cited in Whereas Clause a). On the other hand, it is attested by official letters dated December 9, 2008, that the President of the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment of the Legislative Assembly consulted the cited project to the Minister of Finance, Minister of Health, Attorney General's Office of the Republic, Comptroller General of the Republic, Ombudsman's Office, National System of Conservation Areas of MINAET, Executive President of Incopesca, Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, National Council of Conservation Areas (CONAC), Executive Director, technical office CONAGEBIO, President of CEDARENA, Executive Director of MarViva, Executive Director of the Program for the Restoration of Sea Turtles (PRETOMA), Rector of the National University, Head of the Public Ministry, Executive Director of the Preservacionista Association of Wild Flora and Fauna (APREFLOFAS), Director of the Regional Office of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, Rector of the State Distance University (UNED), Rector of the University of Costa Rica (UCR), Rector of the Technological Institute of Costa Rica. The foregoing, based on article 157 of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly (see folios 131 to 150 of the legislative file). Subsequently, it is attested that in extraordinary session number 10 of September 18, 2012, the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment approved a motion to send the substitute text of the legislative bill in question for consultation to: MINAET, SINAC, Attorney General's Office, Comptroller General of the Republic, Ombudsman's Office, UICN, APREFLOFAS, Municipalities nationwide, Public Universities, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, CONAGEBIO, CONAC of SINAC, INCOPESCA, MAR Viva, PRETOMA, CEDARENA (folio 821 of the legislative file). Additionally, through official letters AMB-243-2012 to AMB-268-2012 of September 21 and 25, 2012, the Legislative Assembly requested a series of associations to issue their criteria on bill No. 17054 within the 8 working-day period established by article 157 of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly, in particular to: the Integral Development Association of Abrojo Montezuma; Integral Development Association of Alto Laguna de Osa; Integral Development Association of Boruca; Integral Development Association of Cabagra; Integral Development Association of Rey Curré; Integral Development Association of China Kichá; Integral Development Association of Bribrí Salamanca; Integral Development Association of Salamanca, Cabécar; Integral Development Association of Chirrido Cabécar; Integral Development Association of Nairí Awarí (Cabécar); Integral Development Association of Matambú; Integral Development Association of Guatuso; Integral Development Association of Zaparón, Puriscal; Association for Integral Human Development of Guanacaste; Integral Development Association of Kekoldi; Integral Development Association of Bajo Chirrido Cabécar; Integral Development Association of the Alto Conte Indigenous Territory, Corredores, Puntarenas; Integral Development Association of La Casona de Guaymí, Coto Brus, Puntarenas; Integral Development Association of the Salitre Indigenous Reserve of Buenos Aires, Puntarenas; Integral Development Association of the Tayni (Cabécar) Indigenous Reserve; and the Regional Office of Dinadeco, for them to issue their criteria on bill No. 17054 within the 8 working-day period established by article 157 of the Regulation of the Legislative Assembly (see folios 1118 to 1188 of the legislative file). The foregoing demonstrates that in the legislative procedure, the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment consulted a large number of governmental institutions and private associations so that they could submit their observations and suggestions on the project in question, which is why, regarding this point, no defect is attested.

III.- ON THE MERITS. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination. On another point, the Deputies consider that the provisions of the third paragraph of the first article of the Wildlife Law violate the provisions of articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution. In this regard, the paragraph in question provides, in relevant part, that: This law shall not apply to the conservation, sustainable management, protection, and proper administration of wildlife resulting from traditional non-profit practices, uses, and customs of indigenous peoples within their territories. The foregoing in no way constitutes discriminatory inequality, but quite the contrary, it takes into account and respects the uses and customs that indigenous communities have in their territories. This Constitutional Tribunal has on multiple occasions recognized the State's duty to respect the traditions of indigenous communities and to preserve their culture. Thus, in judgment number 2011-00281 of nine hours and thirty-six minutes of January 14, 2011, this Chamber provided in relevant part:

III.- On constitutional legal protection in indigenous matters. A principle of recognition of indigenous peoples is inferred from the Political Constitution itself, supported by the idea of state protection to preserve their culture, which is reaffirmed in International Treaties duly ratified by Costa Rica. In reference to domestic legislation, the first regulation that addresses this situation is the Law of Vacant Lands number 13 of January 10, 1939, which establishes in its article 8: "[...] an inalienable zone of exclusive property of the indigenous people is declared, a prudent zone at the judgment of the Executive Branch in places where Tribes of these exist, in order that they conserve our autochthonous race and to liberate them from future injustices." A rule that was expanded by Decree number 45 of December 3, 1945, creating the Board for the Protection of the Aboriginal Races of the Nation, whose basic function tended toward the protection of the lands of the aboriginals, with the aim of not abandoning them and maintaining their ethnicity (étnia). Subsequently, by Executive Decree number 34 of November 15, 1956, the indigenous reserves Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá were declared. The Legislative Assembly, through Law number 2330 of April 9, 1959, approved Convention number 107 of the International Labor Organization concerning the "Protection and integration of indigenous populations and other tribal and semi-tribal populations," which recognizes their legitimate right to have under their domain the lands of their property, be it in individual or collective form, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the customs of the peoples. The Law of Lands and Colonization number 2825 of October 14, 1961, also incorporated a chapter referring to this subject with the purpose of protecting those lands and the autochthonous races. Based on these regulations, by Executive Decrees number 11 of April 2, 1996, and 26 of November 12, it was ordered that the three indigenous reserves created in 1956 be registered in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization, today the Institute of Agrarian Development (see the vote of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 223 of 15:30 hours of July 6, 1990). International Law, for its part, has been generous in the recognition of rights for these communities; among these instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (articles 1, 2.1, 7, 17.1, and 27), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (27), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1.1 and 2), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (2, 13, and 23), and the American Convention on Human Rights (24 and 26) stand out. The International Labor Organization has been the pioneer on the subject of indigenous protection. Conventions numbers 107 and 169 contain a detailed enumeration of rights recognized for these peoples. Both Conventions -107 and 169- in their Part II, regulate the regime of property of indigenous lands. On the other hand, constitutional jurisprudence number 1786-93 of 16:21 hours of April 21, 1993, 06229-99 of 14:30 hours of August 11, 1999, among others, recognize the special protection for their territory and culture due to their conditions of vulnerability, not only current, but also past, and with no other limits than those that human rights themselves impose on the conduct of all human beings. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Costa Rican State has broadly recognized the rights corresponding to the indigenous groups that inhabit the country. Furthermore, it has been held that groups of persons belonging to autochthonous communities have the right to live on the lands where they have historically been settled, and the State must fully guarantee the enjoyment of this fundamental right. In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a higher hierarchy for International Conventions, such as that of the ILO, No. 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), a superior degree of guardianship for indigenous persons and communities, that is, a high level of protection with respect to those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution itself, and which therefore demand respect, in ordinary Courts, for the decisions that, through the custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples, derive from the communities themselves and their representatives (The underlined text does not correspond to the original).

In the same sense, Convention No. 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, approved in our country by the Legislative Assembly through Law No. 7316 in November 1992, provides in its article 4, subsection 1, that: Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned. Moreover, article 8 determines in its subsections 1 and 2 that: ³1. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due account shall be taken of their customs or customary laws. 2.

Such peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system nor with internationally recognised human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, to resolve conflicts which may arise in the application of this principle.´ Thus, the third paragraph of the first article of the Wildlife Law in no way violates the provisions of articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution, but rather tends to respect and protect the uses and customs of the indigenous communities that exist in our country.

IV.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber finds that there are no substantial violations of the legislative procedure, nor are there defects on the merits, as is consulted to the Chamber.

Por tanto:

The legislative consultation is resolved, in the sense that there are no vices of unconstitutionality in the procedure, nor on the merits in the consulted matters of the legislative bill Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, processed in legislative file No. 17054. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez set forth a note. Magistrate Armijo Sancho dissents, considering that the principles of connection (conexidad) and publicity were violated in the legislative procedure.

i.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Roxana Salazar C. Teresita Rodríguez A.

Separate opinion of Magistrate Cruz Castro.

In the present case, I consider that there is no violation of the principle of conexity (principio de conexidad) because the modifications made during the legislative procedure to the popular initiative bill that was submitted to the Legislative Assembly and the text that was approved in the first debate by the Plenary are closely related to the matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife, thereby preserving its original purpose and meaning. This is contrary to the position I held in the facultative consultation of constitutionality processed under file No. 08-003901-0007-CO, resolved in judgment No. 2008-05179 at eleven o'clock on April 4, two thousand eight, in which I dissented because I considered that the modifications made in the legislative process to the bill consulted on that occasion exceeded the purpose of the original bill, producing an abusive and excessive exercise of the right of amendment. I also consider that the diversity of matters that were modified in the substitute bill did constitute a qualitative and essential variation of the original bill, a fact that contravenes the requirements of the principle of conexity (principio de conexidad). For this reason, I considered it necessary to demonstrate that there is a clear difference from the aforementioned resolution, as the premises are different, given that in the present case, the bill under consultation did not undergo transcendental changes in the legislative procedure that would have altered the object and purpose of the original bill.

Fernando Cruz C.

Separate opinion of Magistrate Castillo Víquez.

In addition to the reasons given in the advisory opinion to reach the conclusion that there are no procedural defects regarding the non-publication of the text approved by the Special Commission, nor the versions that were subsequently considered, not even the one voted on were published in the official gazette La Gaceta, I consider that the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly only require the publication of the bill, not the motions or substitute texts that are approved in the various parliamentary bodies (see articles 115 to 117, 121, and 130 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly). Furthermore, the committee reports on the bill are only published if the reporting committee so agrees (see articles 83 and 131 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly), which confirms that, unless an express rule of the Parliamentary Statute so authorizes, the approval of motions or substitute texts does not have to be published in the official gazette La Gaceta. An additional reason to continue along this line of argument is that, viewed from another perspective, the publication of the substitute texts approved within parliamentary bodies is futile, for the elemental reason that this would only make sense when novel concepts or regulations are introduced into them, an action prohibited by the Law of the Constitution—due to a violation of the principle of conexity (principio de conexidad)—or when the parliamentary body so agrees for a specific or necessary purpose for parliamentary work. Furthermore, the Chamber has admitted that the lack of publication, at a certain procedural moment, does not always constitute a vitiating defect of the legislative procedure. In this regard, it stated: "The Chamber does not consider that this circumstance harms the principle of publicity, typical of the legislative procedure: this principle, in the first place, is not satisfied by a single act, such as, for example, the publication of the proposal, but rather is fulfilled in the different phases of the procedure, and in the very publicity to which the work of the legislative bodies is subjected. Moreover, the court observes that once the proposal was admitted (in the case on which this opinion is based), and the report of the Commission referred to in subsection 3) of article 195 was rendered, this was published, as was customary. Consequently, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that the failure to publish the proposal for constitutional reform in question does not constitute a defect that invalidates the procedure." (See vote No. 11560-2001).

Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure is not exhausted by the publication of the bill but goes much further, since the Legislative Assembly, as a plural and democratic body, is subject to it at all stages. In accordance with the foregoing, the Political Constitution, in its numeral 117, states that the sessions of the Legislative Assembly are public, unless for highly qualified reasons and general convenience it is agreed that they be secret by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the deputies present. This publicity of parliamentary work refers not only to the right of the inhabitants of the Republic to attend the galleries of the Legislative Assembly, which can only be cleared by the president of the Legislative Assembly when, due to signs of approval or disapproval—shouts, whistles, banging, or any other disorderly demonstration—the work of the Assembly is interrupted (see article 27, subsection 12 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—the same occurs in the case of Permanent Commissions with Full Legislative Power, where their presidents also have this power (see article 56, subsection j of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—but also to the right of the mass media to report on parliamentary work through various channels—radio, television, Internet, print media, etc.—and even the interest of political parties with parliamentary representation and the deputies in having their interventions—oral, written, or of other kinds—disseminated by all means, which fulfills a dual purpose: on the one hand, citizen control over the activity carried out by the members of Parliament, crucial in any democratic system, and on the other, the rendering of accounts, in this case immediately, by the deputies to the citizenry. Thus, the act of publishing the bill is one of many manifestations of the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure. On the other hand, requiring the publication of substitute texts undermines one of the essential characteristics of Parliamentary Law: its ductility or flexibility, which negatively affects parliamentary work and, in some cases, can even thwart the political agreements that are reached. Moreover, it goes against the purpose of Parliamentary Law. As is well known, the purpose of this Law is to allow Parliament to exercise its powers (legislative, autonormative, political control, integrative, jurisdictional, and administrative), especially: to be the channel through which the Legislative Assembly adopts, in a timely, democratic, and sovereign manner and in strict adherence to the principle of political pluralism, the fundamental political decisions, which are translated into the final parliamentary acts, be they a legislative decree or a legislative agreement. It must not be lost sight of that, due to parliamentary dynamics, political agreements within Parliament are in a constant state of precariousness until they materialize, not only because there is an opportune and specific moment for their realization but also because of the permanent tension in which political actors find themselves due to the large number of political variables they handle at the same time, which means that the longer the time taken to concretize the political agreement, the greater the chances of it breaking down. Hence the need for its timely and, in some cases immediate, execution, since the political reality varies constantly and can ruin what was agreed. For this reason, when the Legislative Assembly is obliged, under the pretext of observing the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure, to publish the substitute texts or motions in the official gazette La Gaceta, which implies a significant delay in the adoption of the political decision given the time it takes to do so, this undermines the very nature of the parliamentary body and its dynamics, against one of the characteristics and purpose of Parliamentary Law, all of which is nonsensical in an essentially political body—there are those who maintain that the functioning of the Chamber is a reflection of the continuation of the electoral contest on a different plane—as is the Legislative Assembly.

Fernando Castillo V.

DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ARMIJO SANCHO. I differ from the conclusion reached by my colleagues, in the sense that the parliamentary procedure was not violated, since, in my judgment, in the processing of legislative file #17054, the principle of publicity and the right of amendment of the Deputies were disregarded. The introduction of different substitute texts, in itself, does not constitute a defect of that nature, as long as the same initial material thread is maintained. However, the fact of having incorporated a fourth text that integrally replaced the bill and having done so in the same plenary session in which it was approved in first debate, without it having been distributed among the legislators with sufficient advance notice and clarity, placed them in a material impossibility of knowing the text being approved and exercising their right to make the proposals they deem pertinent, as there were still doubts regarding which text motions could be presented (cf. minutes of plenary session #74 of Tuesday, October 2, 2012). Under these conditions, the basic conditions of parliamentary debate are absent, as well as the prerequisites for the knowledge of the acts being adopted and the eventual proposition of modifications. On this specific point, I dissent and declare that the procedure is unconstitutional, while on the other consulted aspects, I adhere to the majority decision of the Chamber.

Gilbert Armijo S.

**Legislative Proceeding File (Exp): 12-013018-0007-CO** **Resolution No. 2012-015840** CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER (SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE. San José, at sixteen hours and zero minutes of November seventh, two thousand twelve.

Consultation on the constitutionality of a bill, facultatively submitted by the deputies […], regarding the bill for the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), processed under legislative file No. 17054.

**Whereas (Resultando):** 1.- The consultation was received at the Secretariat (Secretaría) of the Chamber (Sala) at fourteen hours twenty-eight minutes on October 4, 2012. The certified copy of legislative file number 17054 was received at the Chamber (Sala) on October 10, 2012. Consequently, the deadline to evacuate the consultation expires on November 10, 2012.

2.- The legislators consult the bill for the approval of the reform to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), processed in legislative file number 17.054 approved in the first debate, on the grounds that it suffers from defects of constitutionality not only regarding the procedure, but also regarding the substance. Regarding the procedure, they allege that the principle of connectivity (conexidad) was violated. In that regard, the purposes of the bill that entered the legislative process through popular initiative are clearly defined in the statement of motives. The voted text is substantially different regarding the object, purposes, and means, from the one that originally arrived at the Legislative Assembly. The substitute text approved in the first debate not only has substantial differences in relation to the parent text, but it also renounces the means suggested in the original text to achieve the proposed purposes, since it discarded the penalizing (sancionatoria) part contained in chapters XII and XIII, articles 82 to 108. They also allege a violation of the principle of amendment, as the deputies were materially unable to study it and make proposals for change to it, since the constitutional term of the file had expired. The rushed introduction of the fourth version and its adoption by a majority, entailed the violation of the right of amendment of the minorities. They also add that the principle of publicity was violated, as neither the substitute text approved in committee nor any of the versions that were known, not even the one that was voted on, were published. They state that the principle of initiative was violated. The text that was originally presented by the organization responsible for drafting the proposal and collecting signatures, modified the terms of the original bill, as if it were of private initiative. Furthermore, the approved text was voted on October second, despite the fact that the constitutional term of the file expired on September twenty-seventh last, and it was not consulted in the terms of the mandatory consultations indicated by the Political Constitution. Regarding the substance, they argue that the third paragraph of Article 1 of the Wildlife Law (Ley de Vida Silvestre) promotes a particular non-application of the law in relation to indigenous peoples, which violates Articles 11, 33 and 129 of the Constitution.

3.- The Presidency of the Constitutional Chamber (Sala Constitucional) deemed the present consultation as submitted by resolution at 11:02 hours on October eighth, 2012.

4.- The proceedings have been conducted in compliance with the provisions of Article 100 of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional) and this resolution is issued within the term established by Article 101 idem.

Drafted by Judge Cruz Castro; and, **Considering (Considerando):** I.- PRELIMINARY. In accordance with the provisions of Article 96 subsection b) of the Law of Constitutional Jurisdiction (Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional), we are faced with a facultative consultation filed by eleven Deputies, so this Chamber will review only the extremes questioned in a specific manner by the petitioners and not general aspects of the constitutionality of the Law (Ley) containing the challenged rule, as provided by Article 99 of the law that governs this jurisdiction.

II.- THE PROCEDURE IN THE SPECIFIC CASE.- To analyze the aspects claimed in the facultative consultation of constitutionality, they will be discussed in the following order:

• a)Regarding the violation of the criterion of connectivity (conexidad). First, the petitioning Deputies question that the text of the bill that entered the legislative process through the mechanism of popular initiative is very different from the text approved in the first debate, which not only has substantial differences in relation to the parent text, but also renounced the means suggested in the original text to achieve the proposed purposes, since it discarded the penalizing (sancionatoria) part contained in chapters XII and XIII, articles 82 to 108. In this regard, this Chamber in judgment No. 2010-16335 of fifteen hours fifty minutes of September 29, 2010 reiterated its previous decisions on the balance that must prevail between the legislators' rights of initiative and amendment and the limits imposed on them by the constitutional and democratic principles of connectivity (conexidad), in the following terms:

«the right of amendment derives from the democratic principle and is expressly regulated by the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. Through it, deputies participate in the law-making process, so that they can influence the definitive content of the latter through the presentation of motions aimed at modifying the content of the original bill. In accordance with the jurisprudence of this Court, this right must be observed throughout the entire law-making process and constitutes a parameter of constitutionality, such that a violation of its basic core causes the unconstitutionality of the rule that is approved.

This right is intimately related to the right of initiative, also of mandatory observance during the procedure for the approval of a law. The latter presupposes participation, because it is the legitimate means of propelling the legislative procedure for the production of a law that incorporates the points of view of the one who proposes it. The object of the right of initiative is fundamental, because it serves as a referential framework during the processing of the procedure and becomes an intrinsic limit for the presentation of amendments. In this sense, the Chamber has insisted that there exists a framework within which the Legislative Assembly can carry out what is called a transactional political function, for which it has, naturally, greater disposition and for which the Constitution structures it (starting from Article 105). Therefore, both the right of initiative and the right of amendment must be observed during the law-making process, but neither can prevail over the other. Thus, neither can the right of amendment be used to convert the initial bill into one substantially different from the one originally presented—this being one of its limits—nor can the right of initiative prevail in such a way that the Assembly—and the deputies in particular—sees its powers of discussion and of adjusting the bill as deemed pertinent limited. It is for this reason that it has been said that the text proposed through the original right of initiative is what sets the general framework of the bill, and it is within this framework that the modifications intended to be introduced through the exercise of the right of amendment must be weighed.' (see also resolutions #2008-10450 of 9:00 hours on June 23; #2008-5179 of 11:00 hours on April 4; #2008-2521 of 8:31 hours on February 22, all three from 2008; #2007-17104 of 9:36 hours on November 23, 2007; and #3513-94 of 8:57 hours on July 15, 1994, previously cited). In sum, a bill may be modified or supplemented, as long as it retains its original object and purpose. Otherwise, a new initiative and a new bill must be resorted to, which contemplates the changes unlinked from the first bill, fulfilling all the indispensable steps of the corresponding parliamentary procedure.

In the specific case, it is proven that by order of June 5, 2008, a popular initiative procedure was presented for the knowledge of the Legislative Assembly—³Law for the Conservation of Wildlife, legislative file number 17.054, which was passed for study and report to the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment. The bill in question was published in the official gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of July 1, 2008. Subsequently, on August 8, 2012, the proposing organization of the popular initiative—APREFLOFAS—made a series of modifications to the text of the bill. On September 13, 2012, the report of the Sub-commission instituted to analyze and study File No. 17.054 recommended to the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment that the base text for discussion of the bill be called Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317 of December 7, 1992'. On September 27, 2012, the Director of the Secretariat of the Legislative Assembly received from the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment the undocketed File No. 17.054, which was approved in first debate in ordinary session No. 74 of October 2, two thousand twelve. In this regard, the substitution in the legislative iter of the texts of the Law for the Conservation of Wildlife with Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317 is in no way contradictory to the popular initiative process that was submitted to the legislative current, because at its core what is intended is to guarantee a more effective guardianship (tutela) of the existing wildlife in our country, which can be carried out through the enactment of a new law or the reform of existing regulations. On multiple occasions, this Constitutional Court has determined that a bill may be modified or supplemented, as long as it retains its original object and purpose. The foregoing also applies to popular initiative bills where, if the essence of the proposed law that was presented by a specific group of citizens is maintained, it is possible to carry out a series of changes just as was done in the present bill, by virtue of the fact that the connection (conexidad) does not have to be absolute. In this sense, the fact that the bill of Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law, Law No. 7317 approved in first debate discarded the punitive part contained in chapters XII denominated crimes against wildlife and XIII contraventions against wildlife, contained in articles 82 to 108 of the bill that was initially presented in the Legislative Assembly, in no way tends to infringe the principle of connection (conexidad), since said suppression does not affect the essence, objectives, and goals of the bill. On the other hand, the petitioners question that between the version of the popular initiative bill that entered the knowledge of the Legislative Assembly and the text that was approved in first debate by the Plenary, there exist a series of substantial changes. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the brief of interposition of the consultation does not indicate in a clear and precise manner what the substantial changes were, just as constitutional jurisprudence requires, which has repeatedly determined that the petitioning brief must express the articles of the bill whose constitutionality is questioned or consulted, and state clearly the reasons for which it is estimated that a provision of the bill may be unconstitutional, since otherwise the consultation would be inadmissible (see in this regard, judgments numbers 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643). In sum, there is congruence, coherence, and substantial connection with the material and principal content of the bill, which is the guardianship (tutela) of wildlife. b) Regarding the violation of the right of amendment and the approval of the bill in first debate outside the time limit. In the second place, the Deputies question that they were materially unable to study the bill in question and make change proposals to the last version of the bill that was submitted for discussion in the plenary, by virtue of the fact that the constitutional timeframe of the file had expired. In this regard, because it concerns a popular initiative bill, what is provided in Article 6 of the Law of Popular Initiative, Law No. 8491 of April 3, 2006, is of particular interest, which indicates that:

Popular initiative bills must be voted on in the Legislative Assembly, within a maximum period of two years, unless they refer to constitutional reforms, in which case, they will follow the procedure provided in Article 195 of the Political Constitution. The computation of the period shall begin from the date on which the Secretariat of the Legislative Directorate receives the bill, and shall be suspended during legislative recesses and extraordinary sessions, if it is not convened by the Executive Branch. If upon expiration of that period, the bill has not been voted on in first debate, it must be heard and submitted to a vote, in the immediately following session of the Legislative Plenary or of the Commission with Full Legislative Powers, as the case may be. For these purposes, if the initiative has not been docketed, it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedures. The same rules shall be applicable to the procedure in second debate and to the hearing of the reports of the Constitutional Consultation Commission' (The underlining does not correspond to the original). In the specific case, the peremptory two-year period for the voting of Bill No. 17054 in its first debate procedure was fulfilled on September 27, 2012. For this reason, the President of the Legislative Assembly issued a resolution in light of the existing normative vacuum in relation to the procedure to be followed for hearing popular initiative bills for which the period to be voted on in the Plenary has expired, and agreed to submit it to a vote in the session of October 1st past, in which the quorum was broken, which is why the bill was heard and approved in the immediately following session, which took place on October 2, without this involving a formal vice in the procedure. Note that the mentioned procedure was carried out in accordance with what is provided in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the Law of Popular Initiative which provides that if the initiative has not been docketed, it shall be deemed dispensed from all procedures and must be submitted to a vote in first debate before the Plenary. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber does not perceive that this has violated the right of amendment in a way that invalidates the processing of this bill, given that there existed a legal timeframe established by the legislator itself that had to be respected for its voting before the Plenary. There exists a logical limitation on the right of amendment, not only due to the provision of a peremptory timeframe, but the fact that it is a popular initiative bill justifies a limit that allows for discussing and processing a bill that possesses a qualified democratic origin.

• c)Regarding the violation of the principle of publicity. In the third place, it is questioned that the text of the bill approved in the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment, nor any of the versions that were heard, not even the one that was voted on, were published, to the detriment of the principle of publicity. In this regard, in judgment number 2011-001654 of fifteen hours eight minutes on February 9, 2011, this Chamber indicated in what is relevant:

Regarding the obligation to publish bills. Article 129 of the Political Constitution establishes the obligation to publish the laws approved by the Legislative Assembly and sanctioned by the Executive Branch, however this obligation is not related to bills, which, due to their provisional nature, would be subject to motions of form and substance. The Political Constitution does not specifically regulate the obligation to publish bills or their Commission reports, much less the possibility that the Legislative Plenary decides to dispense with these legislative procedure steps, because publication is a tendency that has advanced in parliamentary practice in different countries, and exceptions are known, for example, in Anglo-Saxon parliamentary law, where it has recently been adopted in England. The problem, consequently, translates to one of legislative practice or the norms that regulate it, which, in our country, originates with the autonomy proper that Article 121 subsection 22) of the Political Constitution grants to the Legislative Assembly, which puts into operation the constitutional values and principles that must be safeguarded in the process of law-making, related to the democratic principle. Without a doubt, the principle of publicity in the legislative procedure fulfills, in addition to formal functions, also material ones, not only in the preparatory acts of a bill, but when it is in other phases of the procedure, when the Legislative Assembly receives publicity by radio and television, given that the debates of the legislative Plenary are open to the public (third paragraph of Article 117 of the Political Constitution). In this sense, these circumstances and the obligation to publish bills are contained in the principle of publicity that must serve as a vector of legitimacy for any representative organ of popular sovereignty. In this sense, parliaments and their acts are of great value and transcendence for the democratic life of countries, and their actions must be allowed to be aired with transparency and facing the public, as these are the political and juridical centers of a Nation, and the primary place in which a disarticulated society must modulate itself. Now, the jurisprudence of this Chamber has been decisive in assigning significant weight to the principle of publicity as a substantial requirement within the legislative procedure, in what refers to ordinary law and constitutional amendment'.

In the present case, it is proven that in ordinary session No. 94-2008 of October 21, 2008, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal determined to conclude the procedure of review, validation, and computation of signatures supporting the popular initiative bill in question, which had the support of 135,936 signatures of citizen electors who were registered in the electoral roll as of May of two thousand eight. Subsequently, the bill in question was transferred to the knowledge of the Legislative Assembly which proceeded with its publication in the Official Gazette La Gaceta No. 126 of July 1, 2008. In this sense, the bill in question has, in essence, a respect for the democratic principle and for the principle of publicity because it is a popular initiative that had the support of 5% of the citizens registered in the electoral roll, just as Article 5 of the Law of Popular Initiative orders. Furthermore, it is proven that the bill in question received due publicity because it was published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 117 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand, by virtue of the fact that in the present case the violation of the principle of connection (conexidad) is ruled out, given that the modifications made in the legislative procedure to the bill in question are closely related—as previously indicated—to the matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife, it is not necessary for the Legislative Assembly to have proceeded with the publication of the bill again prior to its voting in first debate before the Plenary.

• d)Regarding the omission of mandatory consultation. In the fourth place, the consulting Deputies question that the bill was not consulted in the terms of the mandatory consultations determined by the Political Constitution. In this regard, the petitioners do not indicate in a clear and precise manner which institutions should have been consulted, just as the constitutional jurisprudence cited above in whereas clause a) determines. On the other hand, it is proven by official communications dated December 9, 2008, that the President of the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment of the Legislative Assembly consulted on the cited bill to the Minister of Finance, Minister of Health, Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Office of the Ombudsman, National System of Conservation Areas of MINAET, Executive President of Incopesca, Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, National Council of Conservation Areas (CONAC), Executive Director, technical office CONAGEBIO, President of CEDARENA, Executive Director of MarViva, Executive Director of the Sea Turtle Restoration Program (PRETOMA), Rector of the National University, Head of the Public Ministry, Executive Director of the Asociación Preservacionista of Flora and Fauna Silvestre (APREFLOFAS), Director of the Regional Office of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, Rector of the Distance State University (UNED), Rector of the University of Costa Rica (UCR), Rector of the Technological Institute of Costa Rica. The foregoing, based on Article 157 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (see folios 131 to 150 of the legislative file). Subsequently, it is proven that in extraordinary session number 10 of September 18, 2012, the Special Permanent Commission on the Environment approved a motion to consult the substitute text of the bill in question to: MINAET, SINAC, Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic, Office of the Ombudsman, UICN, APREFLOFAS, Municipalities of the entire country, Public Universities, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Health, CONAGEBIO, CONAC DEL SINAC, INCOPESCA, MAR Viva, PRETOMA, CEDARENA (folio 821 of the legislative file).

Furthermore, through official letters AMB-243-2012 to AMB-268-2012 dated September 21 and 25, 2012, the Legislative Assembly (la Asamblea Legislativa) requested a series of associations to issue their opinion on bill No. 17054 within the 8-business-day period established by Article (artículo) 157 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa), specifically to: the Integral Development Association of Abrojo Montezuma (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Abrojo Montezuma); Integral Development Association of Alto Laguna de Osa (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Alto Laguna de Osa); Integral Development Association of Boruca (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Boruca); Integral Development Association of Cabagra (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Cabagra); Integral Development Association of Rey Curré (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Rey Curré); Integral Development Association of China Kichá (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral China Kichá); Integral Development Association of Bribrí Salamanca (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Bribrí Salamanca); Integral Development Association, Salamanca, Cabécar (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral, Salamanca, Cabécar); Integral Development Association of Chirrido Cabécar (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Chirrido Cabécar); Integral Development Association of Nairí Awarí (Cabécar) (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Nairí Awarí (Cabécar)); Integral Development Association of Matambú (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Matambú); Integral Development Association of Guatuso (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Guatuso); Integral Development Association of Zaparón, Puriscal (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Zaparón, Puriscal); Association for the Comprehensive Human Development of Guanacaste (Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral Humano de Guanacaste); Integral Development Association of Kekoldi (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Kekoldi); Integral Development Association of Bajo Chirrido Cabécar (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Bajo Chirrido Cabécar); Integral Development Association of the Indigenous Territory of Alto Conte, Corredores, Puntarenas (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Territorio Indígena Alto Conte, Corredores, Puntarenas); Integral Development Association of La Casona de Guaymí, Coto Brus, Puntarenas (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral La Casona de Guaymí, Coto Brus, Puntarenas); Integral Development Association of the Salitre Indigenous Reserve of Buenos Aires de Puntarenas (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Salitre de Buenos Aires de Puntarenas); Integral Development Association of the Tayni Indigenous Reserve (Cabécar) (Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Tayni (Cabécar)), Dinadeco Regional Directorate (Dirección Regional de Dinadeco), to issue their opinion on bill No. 17054 within the 8-business-day period established by Article (artículo) 157 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) (see folios 1118 to 1188 of the legislative file). The foregoing demonstrates that in the legislative procedure, the Permanent Special Environmental Commission (la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente) consulted a large number of governmental institutions and private associations so that they could provide their observations and suggestions on the bill in question, which is why no defect is proven regarding this point.

III.- ON THE MERITS. Regarding the violation of the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, the Deputies consider that the provision in the third paragraph of article one of the Wildlife Law (Ley de Vida Silvestre) violates the provisions of articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política). In this regard, said numeral provides, insofar as it is relevant, that: This law shall not apply to the conservation, sustainable management, protection, and adequate administration of wildlife resulting from non-profit traditional practices, uses, and customs of the indigenous peoples within their territories. The foregoing in no way constitutes discriminatory inequality, but quite the opposite, it takes into account and respects the uses and customs that indigenous communities have in their territories. This Constitutional Court has on multiple occasions recognized the State's duty to respect the traditions of indigenous communities and to preserve their culture. Thus, in ruling number 2011-00281 of nine hours and thirty-six minutes on January 14, 2011, this Chamber resolved, insofar as it is relevant:

III.- On the constitutional legal protection regarding indigenous matters. It is inferred from the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) itself, a principle of recognition of indigenous peoples, based on the idea of state protection to preserve their culture, which is reaffirmed in International Treaties duly ratified by Costa Rica. In reference to domestic legislation, the first regulation that makes reference to this situation is found in the Vacant Lands Law (Ley de Terrenos Baldíos) number 13 of January 10, 1939, which establishes in its Article (artículo) 8: "[...] a prudential zone is declared inalienable and the exclusive property of the indigenous people, at the discretion of the Executive Branch in places where tribes of these exist, in order to preserve our native race and to liberate them from future injustices." This rule was expanded by Decree (Decreto) number 45 of December 3, 1945, creating the Board for the Protection of the Aboriginal Races of the Nation (Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación), whose basic function tended towards the protection of the aborigines' lands, with the aim of not abandoning them and maintaining their ethnicity. Subsequently, by Executive Decree (Decreto Ejecutivo) number 34 of November 15, 1956, the indigenous reserves Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra, and China Kichá were declared. The Legislative Assembly (La Asamblea Legislativa), by Law (Ley) number 2330 of April 9, 1959, approved Convention number 107 of the International Labour Organization (la Organización Internacional del Trabajo) concerning the "Protection and integration of indigenous and other tribal and semi-tribal populations," which recognizes their legitimate right to hold under their dominion the lands of their property, whether individually or collectively, and that succession shall be governed by the principles of the customs of the peoples. The Land and Colonization Law (Ley de Tierras y Colonización) number 2825 of October 14, 1961, also incorporated a chapter referring to the subject with the purpose of protecting those lands and the native races. Based on this regulation, through Executive Decrees (Decretos ejecutivos) number 11 of April 2, 1966, and 26 of November 12, it was ordered to register the three indigenous reserves created in 1956 in the name of the Institute of Lands and Colonization (Instituto de Tierras y Colonización), today the Institute of Agrarian Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario) (see the ruling of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court (la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema) of Justice, No. 223 at 15:30 hours on July 6, 1990). International Law, for its part, has been generous in the recognition of the rights of these communities; among such instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos) (articles 1, 2.1, 7, 17.1, and 27), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (27), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1.1 and 2), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (2, 13, and 23), and the American Convention on Human Rights (24 and 26) stand out. The International Labour Organization (la Organización Internacional del Trabajo) has been the pioneer in the area of indigenous protection. Conventions numbers 107 and 169 contain a detailed enumeration of rights recognized for these peoples. Both Conventions -107 and 169- in their Part II, regulate the property regime of indigenous lands. On the other hand, constitutional jurisprudence number 1786-93 of 16:21 hours on April 21, 1993, 06229-99 of 14:30 hours on August 11, 1999, among others, recognize the special protection for their territory and culture due to their conditions of vulnerability, not only current but also past, and without other limits than those same human rights impose on the conduct of all human beings. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Costa Rican State has broadly recognized the rights corresponding to the indigenous groups that inhabit the country. Furthermore, it has been held that groups of people belonging to native communities have the right to live on the lands where they have historically settled, and the State must fully guarantee the enjoyment of this fundamental right. In this way, our constitutional jurisprudence recognizes a higher hierarchy to International Conventions, such as that of the ILO (la OIT), No. (N°) 169 (Law 7316 of November 3, 1992), a higher degree of protection for indigenous persons and communities, that is, a high level of protection regarding those human rights contemplated in the Political Constitution (Constitución Política) itself, and which therefore demand respect, in ordinary Courts, for the decisions that, by way of custom and self-determination of said indigenous peoples, derive from the communities themselves and their representatives (The underlined text is not from the original).

In the same vein, Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization (OIT) on indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries, approved in our country by the Legislative Assembly (la Asamblea Legislativa) through Law No. 7316 in November 1992, provides in its article 4, paragraph 1, that: Special measures shall be adopted as appropriate to safeguard the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures, and environment of the peoples concerned. Furthermore, article 8 determines in its paragraphs 1 and 2 that: 1. In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws. 2.

These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system nor with internationally recognized human rights. Procedures shall be established, whenever necessary, to resolve conflicts that may arise in the application of this principle. Thus, the third paragraph of article one of the Wildlife Law (Ley de Vida Silvestre) in no way violates the provisions of articles 11, 33, and 129 of the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), as it rather tends to respect and protect the uses and customs of the indigenous communities that exist in our country.

IV.- Conclusion. By virtue of the foregoing, this Chamber considers that there are no substantial violations of the legislative procedure, nor are there defects on the merits, as consulted to the Chamber (la Sala).

Por tanto:

The legislative consultation is answered, in the sense that there are no procedural or substantive constitutional defects in the topics consulted regarding the bill Reforms and Additions to the Wildlife Conservation Law (Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre), Law No. 7317 of October 30, 1992, processed under legislative file No. 17054. Magistrates Cruz Castro and Castillo Víquez append a note. Magistrate Armijo Sancho issues a dissenting vote, considering that the principles of connection (conexidad) and publicity were violated in the legislative procedure.

Gilbert Armijo S. President a. i.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Roxana Salazar C. Teresita Rodríguez A.

Separate note of Magistrate Cruz Castro.

In the present case, I consider that there is no violation of the principle of connection (conexidad) by virtue of the fact that the modifications made to the popular initiative bill during the legislative procedure, which came to the attention of the Legislative Assembly (la Asamblea Legislativa), and the text that was approved in the first debate by the Plenary are closely related to the subject matter regulated in the bill, which is the protection of wildlife, thereby preserving its original purpose and meaning. The foregoing is contrary to the position I held in the non-binding consultation of constitutionality processed under file No. 08-003901-0007-CO resolved in ruling No. 2008-05179 of eleven hours on April 4, two thousand eight, in which I issued a dissenting vote because I considered that the modifications made in the legislative process to the bill consulted on that occasion exceeded the purpose of the original bill, producing an abusive and excessive exercise of the right of amendment. I further believe that the diversity of matters that were modified in the substitute bill did constitute a qualitative and essential variation of the original bill, a fact that contravenes the requirements of the principle of connection (conexidad). For this reason, I find it necessary to demonstrate that there is a clear difference with the aforementioned ruling, since the assumptions are different, by virtue of the fact that in the present case, the bill under consultation did not undergo transcendental changes in the legislative procedure that would have altered the purpose and aim of the original bill.

Fernando Cruz C.

Separate note of Magistrate Castillo Víquez.

In addition to the reasons given in the advisory opinion to reach the conclusion that there are no procedural defects in relation to the non-publication of the text approved in the Special Committee (Comisión Especial), nor the versions that were subsequently known—not even the one voted on were published in the official gazette La Gaceta—I consider that the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly (Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) only require the publication of the bill, not of the motions or substitute texts that are approved in the various parliamentary bodies (see articles 115 to 117, 121, and 130 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly). Furthermore, the committee reports on the bill are only published if the reporting committee so agrees (see articles 83 and 131 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly), which confirms that, unless expressly authorized by a rule of the Parliamentary Statute, the approval of motions or substitute texts need not be published in the official gazette La Gaceta. An additional reason to continue along this line of argument is that, viewing things from another perspective, the publication of the substitute texts approved within parliamentary bodies is pointless, for the elementary reason that it would only make sense when new concepts or regulations are introduced in them—an action prohibited by constitutional law (Derecho de la Constitución) due to violation of the principle of connection (conexidad)—or when the parliamentary body so agrees for a specific or necessary purpose for parliamentary work. On the other hand, the Chamber (la Sala) has admitted that the lack of publication, at a certain procedural moment, does not always constitute an invalidating defect of the legislative procedure. In this regard, it stated: "The Chamber does not consider that this circumstance harms the principle of publicity, typical of the legislative procedure: this principle, in the first place, is not satisfied by a single act, such as, for example, the publication of the proposal, but rather is realized in the different phases of the procedure, and in the very publicity to which the work of the legislative bodies is subject. Furthermore, the tribunal observes that once the proposal was admitted (in the case on which this opinion is based), and the report of the Committee referred to in subsection 3) of article 195 was rendered, it was published, as was customary. Consequently, the Chamber reaches the conclusion that the lack of publication of the constitutional amendment proposal at issue here does not constitute a defect that invalidates the procedure." (See vote No. 11560-2001).

Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure is not exhausted by the publication of the bill, but goes much further, since the Legislative Assembly, as a plural and democratic body, is subject to it at all its stages. In accordance with the above, the Political Constitution (Constitución Política), in its numeral 117, states that the sessions of the Legislative Assembly are public, unless for very qualified reasons and of general convenience it is agreed that they be secret by a vote of no less than two-thirds of the deputies present. This publicity of parliamentary work refers not only to the right of the inhabitants of the Republic (la República) to attend the galleries of the Legislative Assembly—which can only be cleared by the president of the Legislative Assembly when, by their signs of approval or disapproval, shouts, whistles, bangs, or any other disorderly demonstration, the work of the Assembly (la Asamblea) is interrupted (see article 27, subsection 12 of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—the same occurs in the case of the Permanent Committees with Full Legislative Power (Comisiones Permanentes con Potestad Legislativa Plena), where their presidents also have this power (see article 56, subsection j of the Regulations of the Legislative Assembly)—but also to the right of the mass media to report on parliamentary work through various channels—radio, television, Internet, written press, etc.—and even the interest of political parties with parliamentary representation and the deputies for their interventions—oral, written, or of another nature—to be disseminated by all means, thereby fulfilling a dual purpose: on the one hand, citizen control over the activity carried out by the members of Parliament, crucial in any democratic system, and on the other, the rendering of accounts, in this case immediately, by the deputies to the citizenry. Thus, the act of publishing the bill is one of many manifestations that the principle of publicity has in the parliamentary procedure. Furthermore, requiring the publication of substitute texts undermines one of the essential characteristics of parliamentary law (Derecho parlamentario): its ductility (ductibilidad) or flexibility, which negatively affects parliamentary work and, in some cases, may abort the political agreements that are reached. And it even goes against the purpose of parliamentary law. As is well known, the purpose of this law is to allow Parliament to exercise its powers (legislative, self-regulatory (autonormativa), political control, integrative (integrativa), jurisdictional, and administrative), especially: to be the channel through which the Legislative Assembly adopts, in a timely, democratic, and sovereign manner, and in strict adherence to the principle of political pluralism, the fundamental political decisions, which are translated into the final parliamentary acts, be they a legislative decree or a legislative agreement. It must not be lost sight of that, due to parliamentary dynamics, political agreements within Parliament enjoy constant precariousness until they materialize, not only because there is an opportune and specific moment for their concretization, but also because of the permanent tension in which the political actors find themselves due to the large number of political variables they manage at the same time, which means that the longer the time to concretize the political agreement, the greater the chances of it breaking. Hence the need for its timely execution and, in some cases immediate, since political reality constantly varies and can ruin what was agreed. For this reason, when the Legislative Assembly is obligated, under the pretext of observing the principle of publicity in the parliamentary procedure, to publish the substitute texts or motions in the official gazette La Gaceta, which implies a significant delay in the adoption of the political decision given the time it takes to do so, it undermines the very nature of the parliamentary body and its dynamics, and one of the characteristics and purpose of parliamentary law, all of which is a nonsense in an essentially political body—there are those who maintain that the functioning of the Chamber (la Cámara) is a reflection of the continuation of the electoral contest on a different plane—like the Legislative Assembly.

Fernando Castillo V.

DISSENTING VOTE OF MAGISTRATE ARMIJO SANCHO. I differ from the conclusion reached by my colleagues, in the sense that the parliamentary procedure was not violated, for, in my opinion, in the processing of legislative file #17054 the principle of publicity and the right of amendment of the Deputies were indeed disregarded. The introduction of different substitute texts, by itself, does not constitute a defect of that nature, as long as the same initial material theme is maintained. However, the fact of having incorporated a fourth text that integrally substituted the project and having done so in the same plenary session in which it was approved in the first debate, without it having been distributed among the legislators with sufficient notice and clarity, placed them in a material impossibility of knowing the text being approved and exercising their right to make the proposals they consider pertinent, since there were still doubts regarding which text motions could be presented against (cfr. minutes of plenary session #74 of Tuesday, October 2, 2012). Under these conditions, basic conditions of parliamentary debate are absent, as well as the prerequisites for the knowledge of the acts being adopted and the eventual proposal of modifications. On this specific point, I dissent and declare that the procedure is unconstitutional, while on the other aspects consulted, I adhere to the majority decision of the Chamber (la Sala).

Gilbert Armijo S.

#/ Res. Nº 2012-015840 SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA. San José, a las dieciséis horas y cero minutos del siete de noviembre del dos mil doce.

Consulta legislativa facultativa de constitucionalidad formulada por los diputados […], referente al proyecto Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, tramitado bajo expediente legislativo No. 17054.

Resultando:

1.- La consulta se recibió en la Secretaría de la Sala a las catorce horas veintiocho minutos del 4 de octubre del 2012. La copia certificada del 2012. En consecuencia, el plazo para evacuar la consulta vence el 10 de noviembre del 2012.

2.- Los legisladores consultan el proyecto de aprobación de reforma a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, que se tramita en el expediente legislativo número 17.054 aprobado en primer debate, en virtud de que adolece de vicios de constitucionalidad no solo en cuanto al procedimiento, sino también en cuanto al fondo. En relación con el procedimiento, alegan que se violó el principio de conexidad. En ese sentido, los fines del proyecto de ley que ingresó a la corriente legislativa a través de la iniciativa popular, están claramente definidos en la exposición de motivos. El texto votado, es sustancialmente diferente en cuanto al objeto, fines y medios, del que originalmente llegó a la Asamblea Legislativa. El texto sustitutivo aprobado en primer debate, no solamente tiene diferencias sustanciales en relación con el texto madre, sino que además renuncia a los medios sugeridos en el texto original para lograr los fines propuestos, pues desechó la parte sancionatoria contenida en los capítulos XII y XIII, artículos del 82 al 108. Alegan asimismo, violación al principio de enmienda, en tanto los diputados se vieron materialmente imposibilitados para estudiarlo y hacerle propuestas de cambio, pues había caducado el plazo constitucional del expediente. La introducción precipitada de la cuarta versión y su adopción por parte de una mayoría, supuso la violación del derecho de enmienda de las minorías. Agregan asimismo que se violó el principio de publicidad, en tanto ni el texto sustitutivo aprobado en comisión ni ninguna de las versiones que se conocieron, ni siquiera la que fue la votada, fueron publicadas. Manifiestan que se violó el principio de iniciativa. El texto que originalmente presentó la organización responsable de redactar la propuesta y recolectar las firmas, modificó los términos del proyecto original, como si fuera de iniciativa privada. Además, el texto aprobado se votó el dos de octubre, no obstante que el plazo constitucional del los términos de las consultas obligatorias que señala la Constitución Política. En cuanto al fondo, sostienen que el párrafo tercero del artículo 1° de la Ley de Vida Silvestre promueve una desaplicación particular de la ley en relación con los pueblos indígenas, lo cual viola los artículos 11, 33 y 129 constitucional.

3.- La Presidencia de la Sala Constitucional tuvo por presentada la presente consulta mediante resolución de las 11:02 horas del ocho de octubre del 2012.

4.- En los procedimientos se han acatado las disposiciones del artículo 100 de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional y esta resolución se dicta dentro del término que establece el artículo 101 idem.

Redacta el Magistrado Cruz Castro; y,

Considerando:

I.- DE PREVIO. De conformidad con lo que dispone el artículo 96 inciso b) de la Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional, nos encontramos frente a una consulta facultativa planteada por once Diputados, por lo que esta Sala revisará únicamente los extremos cuestionados en forma concreta por los consultantes y no aspectos generales de constitucionalidad de la Ley que contiene la norma impugnada, según lo dispone el artículo 99 de la ley que rige esta jurisdicción.

II.- EL PROCEDIMIENTO EN EL CASO CONCRETO.- Para analizar los aspectos reclamados en la consulta facultativa de constitucionalidad, se discutirán en el siguiente orden:

• a)Sobre la violación del criterio de conexidad. En primer lugar, los Diputados consultantes cuestionan que el texto del proyecto de ley que ingresó a la corriente legislativa a través del mecanismo de la iniciativa popular es muy diferente al texto aprobado en primer debate, el cual no solo tiene diferencias sustanciales en relación con el texto madre, sino que además renunció a los medios sugeridos en el texto original para lograr los fines propuestos, pues desechó la parte sancionatoria contenida en los capítulos XII y XIII, artículos del 82 al 108. Al respecto, ésta Sala en la sentencia No. 2010-16335 de las quince horas cincuenta minutos del 29 de septiembre de 2010 reiteró anteriores decisiones suyas sobre el balance que debe imperar entre los derechos de iniciativa y enmienda de los legisladores y los límites que a ellos imponen los principios constitucionales de conexidad y democrático, en los términos que siguen:

«el derecho de enmienda deriva del principio democrático y está regulado expresamente por el Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa. A través de él, los diputados participan en el proceso de formación de la ley, de manera que pueden influir en el contenido definitivo de ésta a través de la presentación de mociones tendentes a modificar el contenido del proyecto original. De conformidad con la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal, este derecho debe ser observado durante todo el proceso de formación de la ley y constituye parámetro de constitucionalidad´, de manera que una violación a su núcleo básico provoca la inconstitucionalidad de la norma que se aprueba. Este derecho se relaciona íntimamente con el derecho de iniciativa, también de observancia obligatoria durante el procedimiento de aprobación de una ley. Este último supone participación, porque es el medio legítimo de impulsar el procedimiento legislativo para la producción de una ley que recoja los puntos de vista de quien la propone. El objeto del derecho de iniciativa es fundamental, porque sirve de marco referencial durante la tramitación del procedimiento y se convierte en un límite intrínseco para la presentación de enmiendas. En este sentido, la Sala ha insistido en que existe un marco dentro del cual la Asamblea Legislativa puede realizar lo que se denomina función política transaccional, para la cual tiene, naturalmente, mayor disposición y para la cual la Constitución la estructura (a partir del artículo 105). Por ello, tanto el derecho de iniciativa como el de enmienda deben ser observados durante el proceso de formación de la ley, pero ninguno puede prevalecer sobre el otro. Así, ni el derecho de enmienda puede utilizarse para convertir el proyecto inicial en uno sustancialmente diferente al presentado originalmente siendo éste uno de sus límites-, ni el de iniciativa puede prevalecer de manera que la Asamblea -y los diputados en particular- vea limitadas sus potestades de discusión y de ajustar el proyecto según se estime pertinente. Es por ello que se ha dicho que el texto propuesto por medio del derecho de iniciativa original es el que fija el marco general del proyecto y se dentro de éste que deben ponderarse las modificaciones que se pretendan introducir por medio del ejercicio del derecho de enmienda.´(ver también las resolución #2008-10450 de las 9:00 horas del 23 de junio; #2008-5179 de las 11:00 horas del 4 de abril; #2008-2521 de las 8:31 horas del 22 de febrero, las tres de 2008; #2007-17104 de las 9:36 horas del 23 de noviembre de 2007; y la #3513-94 de las 8:57 horas del 15 de julio de 1994, anteriormente citada).En suma, puede modificarse o complementarse un proyecto de ley, en tanto éste conserve su objeto y sentido original. De lo contrario, deberá ocurrirse a una nueva iniciativa y a un nuevo proyecto de ley, que contemple los cambios desligados del primer proyecto, cumpliéndose todos los pasos indispensables del procedimiento parlamentario correspondiente .

En el caso, en concreto, se acredita que por auto del 5 de junio del 2008, fue presentado a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa procedimiento de iniciativa popular ³Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre, cual fue pasado a estudio e informe de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente. El proyecto de ley en cuestión fue publicado en el diario oficial La Gaceta No. 126 del 1 de julio del 2008. Posteriormente, en fecha 8 de agosto del 2012, la organización proponente de la iniciativa popular APREFLOFAS- realizó una serie de modificaciones al texto del proyecto. El 13 de septiembre del 2012, el informe de la Subcomisión instituida para analizar y estudiar el expediente No. 17.054 recomendó a la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente que el texto base de discusión del proyecto se denominara Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 del 7 de diciembre de 1992´. El 27 de septiembre del 2012, el Director de la Secretaría de la Asamblea Legislativa recibió de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente el expediente sin dictaminar No. 17.054, el cual fue aprobado en primer debate en la sesión ordinaria No. 74 del 2 de octubre del dos mil doce. Al respecto, la sustitución en el iter legislativo de los textos de Ley de Conservación de la Vida Silvestre por Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 en modo alguno es contradictorio con el proceso de iniciativa popular que fue presentado a la corriente legislativa, pues en el fondo lo que se pretende es garantizar una tutela más efectiva de la vida silvestre existente en nuestro país, lo cual puede llevarse a cabo a través de la promulgación de una nueva ley o de la reforma de la normativa ya existente. En múltiples ocasiones, éste Tribunal Constitucional ha determinado que puede modificarse o complementarse un proyecto de ley, en tanto éste conserve su objeto y sentido original. Lo anterior también aplica para los proyectos de iniciativa popular en donde si se mantiene la esencia de la propuesta de ley que fue presentada por un determinado grupo de ciudadanos, es posible realizar una serie de cambios tal y como se llevó a cabo en el presente proyecto de ley, en virtud de que la conexidad no tiene que ser absoluta. En este sentido, el hecho que de que el proyecto de Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 aprobado en primer debate haya desechado la parte sancionatoria contenida en los capítulos XII denominado delitos contra la vida silvestre y XIII contravenciones contra la vida silvestre, contenidos en los artículos del 82 al 108 del proyecto que fue inicialmente fue presentado en la Asamblea Legislativa, en ningún modo tiende a infringir el principio de conexidad, pues dicha supresión no afecta la esencia, objetivos y fines del proyecto. Por otra parte, los consultantes cuestionan que entre la versión del proyecto de iniciativa popular que ingresó a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa y el texto que fue aprobado en primer debate por el Plenario existen una serie de cambios sustanciales. No obstante lo anterior, en el escrito de interposición de la consulta no se indica de forma clara y precisa cuáles fueron los cambios sustanciales , tal y como lo exige la jurisprudencia constitucional, la cual de manera reiterada ha determinado que en el libelo de interposición debe expresarse los artículos del proyecto cuya constitucionalidad se cuestiona o consulta, y manifestarse de manera clara los motivos por los cuales se estima que una norma del proyecto puede ser inconstitucional, pues caso contrario la consulta sería inadmisible (ver en este sentido, las sentencias números 5399-95, 501-I-95, 5544-95, 1999-7085, 2001-11643). En suma, hay congruencia, coherencia y conexión sustancial con el contenido material y principal del proyecto de ley, el cual es la tutela de la vida silvestre. b) Sobre la violación del derecho de enmienda y de aprobación del proyecto en primer debate fuera del plazo. En segundo término, los Diputados cuestionan que se vieron materialmente imposibilitados para estudiar el proyecto en cuestión y hacerle propuestas de cambio a la última versión del proyecto que fue sometido a discusión en el plenario, en virtud de que el plazo constitucional del expediente había caducado. Al respecto por tratarse de un proyecto de iniciativa popular tiene particular interés lo dispuesto en el artículo 6 de la Ley de Iniciativa Popular, Ley No. 8491 del tres de abril del 2006, el cual indica que:

Los proyectos de iniciativa popular deberá ser votados en la Asamblea Legislativa, en un plazo máximo de dos años, salvo si se refieren a reformas constitucionales, en cuyo caso, seguirán el trámite previsto en el artículo 195 de la Constitución Política. El cómputo del plazo iniciará a partir de la fecha en que la Secretaría del Directorio Legislativo reciba el proyecto, y se suspenderá durante los recesos legislativos y las sesiones extraordinarias, si no es convocado por el Poder Ejecutivo. Si vencido ese plazo, el proyecto de ley no ha sido votado en primer debate, deberá ser conocido y sometido a votación, en la sesión inmediata siguiente del Plenario Legislativo o de la Comisión con Potestad Legislativa Plena, según sea el caso. Para estos efectos, si la iniciativa no ha sido dictaminada, se tendrá por dispensada de todos los trámites. Las mismas reglas serán aplicables al trámite en segundo debate y al conocimiento de los informes de la Comisión de Consultad de Constitucionalidad ´ (Lo subrayado no corresponde al original). En el caso en concreto, el plazo perentorio de dos años para la votación del proyecto No. 17054 en su trámite de primer debate se cumplió el veintisiete de septiembre del 2012. Por tal motivo, el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa emitió una resolución ante el vacío normativo existente en relación con el procedimiento que se debe seguir para conocer los proyectos de ley de iniciativa popular a los cuáles se le ha vencido el plazo para ser votado en el Plenario y acordó someterlo a votación en la sesión del 1 de octubre pasado, en la cuál se rompió el quórum, motivo por el cual el proyecto fue conocido y aprobado en la sesión inmediata después, la cuál se llevó a cabo el 2 de octubre, sin que ello conlleve un vicio formal en el procedimiento. Nótese que el procedimiento mencionado, se llevó a cabo de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo segundo del artículo 6 de la Ley de Iniciativa Popular el cuál dispone que si la iniciativa no ha sido dictaminada, se tendrá por dispensada de todos los trámites y deberá ser sometida a votación en primer debate ante el Plenario. En virtud de lo anterior, esta Sala no aprecia que con ello se haya vulnerado el derecho de enmienda que invalide el trámite del presente proyecto de ley, en virtud de que existía un plazo legal establecido por el propio legislador que debía ser respetado para su votación ante el Plenario. Existe una lógica limitación al derecho de enmienda, no sólo por la previsión de un plazo perentorio, sino que el hecho que sea un proyecto de iniciativa popular justifica un límite que permita discutir y tramitar un proyecto que posee un calificado origen democrático.

• c)Sobre la violación del principio de publicidad. En tercer plano se cuestiona que el texto del proyecto de ley aprobado en la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente ni ninguna de las versiones que se conocieron, ni siquiera la que fue la votada, fueron publicadas, en detrimento del principio de publicidad. Al respecto, en la sentencia número 2011-001654 de las quince horas ocho minutos del 9 de febrero del 2011, ésta Sala indicó en lo que interesa:

Sobre la obligación de publicar proyectos de ley. El artículo 129 de la Constitución Política establece la obligación de publicar las leyes aprobadas por la Asamblea Legislativa y sancionadas por el Poder Ejecutivo, sin embargo ésta obligación no está relacionada con proyectos de ley, que por su carácter provisional, estarían sujetos a mociones de forma y de fondo. La Constitución Política no regula específicamente la obligación de publicar proyectos de ley o sus informes de Comisión, mucho menos la posibilidad de que el Plenario Legislativo decida dispensar estos trámites de procedimiento legislativo, pues la publicación es una tendencia que ha avanzado en la práctica parlamentaria en diferentes países, y se conocen excepciones, por ejemplo, en el derecho parlamentario anglosajón, donde recientemente lo receptan en Inglaterra. El problema, en consecuencia, se traduce a uno de la práctica legislativa o de las normas que las regula, lo cual, en nuestro país, nace con la autonomía propia que le concede el artículo 121 inciso 22) de la Constitución Política a la Asamblea Legislativa, que pone en funcionamiento los valores y principios constitucionales que se deben resguardar en el proceso de formación de las leyes, relacionados con el principio democrático. Sin duda, el principio de publicidad en el procedimiento legislativo cumple además de funciones formales, también materiales, no solo en los actos preparatorios de un proyecto de ley, sino cuando se encuentra en otras fases del trámite, cuando la Asamblea Legislativa recibe la publicidad por radio y televisión, dado que los debates del Plenario legislativo están abiertos al público (párrafo tercero del artículo 117 de la Constitución Política). En tal sentido, estas circunstancias y la obligación de publicar los proyectos de ley está contenido en el principio de publicidad que debe servir como vector de legitimidad de todo órgano representativo de la soberanía popular. En tal sentido, los parlamentos y sus actos son de gran valor y trascendencia para la vida democrática de los países, y deben permitirse ventilar sus actuaciones con transparencia y de cara al público, al ser éstos los centros políticos y jurídicos de una Nación, y el lugar primario en el que una sociedad desarticulada debe modularse. Ahora bien, la jurisprudencia de esta Sala ha sido decisiva al asignarle un peso importante al principio de publicidad como un requisito sustancial dentro del trámite legislativo, en lo que se refiere a la ley ordinaria y a la enmienda constitucional´.

En el presente caso se acredita que en sesión ordinaria No. 94-2008 del 21 de octubre del 2008, el Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones determinó tener por concluido el procedimiento de revisión, validación y cómputo de firmas de apoyo al proyecto de iniciativa popular en cuestión, el cuál contó con el apoyo de 135.936 firmas de ciudadanos electores que se encontraban inscritos en el padrón electoral al mes de mayo de dos mil ocho. Posteriormente, el proyecto en cuestión fue trasladado a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa quién procedió a su publicación en el Diario Oficial La Gaceta No. 126 del primero de julio del 2008. En este sentido, el proyecto de ley en cuestión tiene en esencia un respeto al principio democrático y de publicidad por tratarse de una iniciativa popular que contó con el apoyo de un 5% de los ciudadanos inscritos en el padrón electoral, tal y como lo ordena el artículo 5 de la Ley de Iniciativa Popular. Además, se acredita que el proyecto de ley en cuestión recibió la debida publicidad pues fue publicado en el Diario Oficial de conformidad tal y como lo dispone el artículo 117 del Reglamento a la Asamblea Legislativa. Por otra parte, en virtud de que en el presente caso se descarta la violación al principio de conexidad en virtud de que las modificaciones que se le realizaron en el procedimiento legislativo al proyecto de ley en cuestión se encuentran estrechamente relacionadas tal y como se indicó anteriormente- con la materia que se regula en el proyecto de ley, como lo es la protección a la vida silvestre, no es necesario que la Asamblea Legislativa procediera a la publicación del proyecto de ley nuevamente de previo a su votación en primer debate ante el Plenario.

• d)Sobre la omisión de consulta obligatoria. En cuarto plano los Diputado consultantes cuestionan que el proyecto de ley no fue consultado en los términos de las consultas obligatorias que determina la Constitución Política. Al respecto, los consultantes no indican de forma clara y precisa que instituciones se debieron haber consultado, tal y como lo determina la jurisprudencia constitucional supra-citada en el considerando a). Por otra parte, se acredita por oficios con fecha 9 de diciembre del 2008, la Presidenta de la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente de la Asamblea Legislativa consultó el citado proyecto al Ministro de Hacienda, Ministra de Salud, Procuraduría General de la República, Contraloría General de la República, Defensoría de los Habitantes, Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación del MINAET, Presidente Ejecutivo de Incopesca, Ministro de Ambiente Energía y Telecomunicaciones, Consejo Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (CONAC), Directora Ejecutiva, oficina técnica CONAGEBIO, Presidenta de CEDARENA, Director Ejecutivo de MarViva, Director Ejecutivo del Programa de Restauración de Tortugas Marinas (PRETOMA), Rector de la Universidad Nacional, Jefe del Ministerio Público, Director Ejecutivo de la Asociación Preservacionista de Flora y Fauna Silvestre (APREFLOFAS), Directora de la Oficina Regional de la Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza, Rector de la Universidad Estatal a Distancia (UNED), Rectora de la Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR), Rector del Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica. Lo anterior, con fundamento en el artículo 157 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver folios 131 a 150 del expediente legislativo). Posteriormente, se acredita que en la sesión extraordinaria número 10 del 18 de septiembre del 2012, la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente aprobó una moción para que se consultase el texto sustitutivo del proyecto de ley en cuestión al: MINAET, SINAC, Procuraduría General, Contraloría General de la República, Defensoría de los Habitantes, UICN, APREFLOFAS, Municipalidades de todo el país, Universidades Públicas, Ministerio de Hacienda, Ministerio de Salud, CONAGEBIO, CONAC DEL SINAC, INCOPESCA, MAR Viva, PRETOMA, CEDARENA (folio 821 del expediente legislativo). Además, mediante oficios AMB-243-2012 al AMB-268-2012 del 21 y 25 de septiembre del 2012, la Asamblea Legislativa le solicitó a una serie de asociaciones que emitiera su criterio sobre el proyecto No .17054 en el plazo de 8 días hábiles que establece el artículo 157 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa, en particular a: la Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Abrojo Montezuma; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Alto Laguna de Osa; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Boruca; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Cabagra; Asociación de Desarrollo Integfral Rey Curré; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral China Kichá; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Bribrí Salamanca; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral, Salamanca, Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Chirrido Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Nairí Awarí (Cabécar); Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Matambú; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Guatuso; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Zaparón, Puriscal; Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral Humano de Guanacaste; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Kekoldi; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Bajo Chirrido Cabécar; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral de Territorio Indígena Alto Conte, Corredores, Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral La Casona de Guaymí, Coto Brus, Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Salitre de Buenos Aires de Puntarenas; Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Reserva Indígena Tayni (Cabécar), Dirección Regional de Dinadeco que emitiera su criterio sobre el proyecto No .17054 en el plazo de 8 días hábiles que establece el artículo 157 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa (ver folios 1118 a 1188 del expediente legislativo). Lo anterior evidencia que en el procedimiento legislativo la Comisión Permanente Especial de Ambiente consultó a un gran número de instituciones gubernamentales y asociaciones de carácter privado a fin de que se refieran sus observaciones, sugerencias sobre el proyecto en cuestión, motivo por el cual en cuanto a dicho extremo no se acredita ningún vicio.

III.- SOBRE EL FONDO. Acerca la violación al principio de igualdad y no discriminación. Por otra parte, los Diputados consideran que lo dispuesto en el párrafo tercero del artículo primero de la Ley de Vida Silvestre vulnera lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 33 y 129 de la Constitución Política. Al respecto, dicho numeral dispone en lo que interesa que: Esta ley no se aplicará a la conservación, el manejo sostenible, la protección y la adecuada administración de la vida silvestre, que resulten de prácticas, usos y costumbres tradicionales sin fines de lucro de lo pueblo indígenas dentro de sus territorios. Lo anterior, en modo alguno se convierte en una desigualdad discriminatoria, sino todo lo contrario, toma en cuenta y respeta los usos y costumbres que tienen las comunidades indígenas en sus territorios. Este Tribunal Constitucional en múltiples ocasiones ha reconocido el deber del Estado de respetar las tradiciones de las comunidades indígenas y de lograr preservar su cultura. Así en la sentencia número 2011-00281 de las nueve horas y treinta y seis minutos del 14 de enero del 2011, ésta Sala dispuso en lo que interesa:

III.- Sobre la protección jurídica constitucional en materia indígena. Se infiere de la propia Constitución Política un principio de reconocimiento de los pueblos indígenas, sustentado en la idea de protección estatal para lograr preservar su cultura, el cual es reafirmado en Tratados Internacionales debidamente ratificados por Costa Rica. En referencia a la legislación interna, la primera normativa que hace referencia a esta situación se encuentra la Ley de Terrenos Baldíos número 13 del 10 de enero de 1939, la cual establece en su artículo 8: "[...] se declara inalienable y de propiedad exclusiva de los indígenas, una zona prudencial a juicio del Poder Ejecutivo en los lugares en donde exista Tribus de éstos, a fin de que conserven nuestra raza autóctona y de liberarlos de futuras injusticias". Norma que fue ampliada por Decreto número 45 de 3 de diciembre de 1945, al crear la Junta de Protección de las Razas Aborígenes de la Nación, cuya función básica tendía a la protección de las tierras de los aborígenes, con el fin de no desampararles y mantener su étnia. Posteriormente, por Decreto Ejecutivo número 34 de 15 de noviembre de 1956 se declararon las reservas indígenas Boruca Térraba, Salitre Cabagra y China Kichá. La Asamblea Legislativa por Ley número 2330 de 9 de abril de 1959, aprobó el convenio número 107 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo relativo a la "Protección e integración de las poblaciones indígenas y de otras poblaciones tribales y semitribales", el cual reconoce su legítimo derecho a tener bajo su dominio las tierras de su propiedad, sea ello en forma individual y colectiva y que la sucesión se regirá por los principios de las costumbres de los pueblos. La Ley de Tierras y Colonización número 2825 de 14 de octubre de 1961 también incorporó un capítulo referido al tema con el objeto de proteger esas tierras y a las razas autóctonas. A partir de esta normativa, por Decretos ejecutivos número 11 del 2 de abril de de 1996, y 26 de 12 de noviembre, se ordenó inscribir a nombre del Instituto de Tierras y Colonización, hoy Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario las tres reservas indígenas creadas en 1956 (véase el voto de la Sala Primera de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, No.223 de las 15:30 horas del 6 de julio de 1990). El Derecho Internacional, por su parte, ha sido generoso en el reconocimiento de derechos de estas comunidades, entre dichos instrumentos se destaca la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (artículos 1, 2.1, 7, 17.1 y 27), Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (27), Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (1.1 y 2), Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre (2, 13 y 23), Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (24 y 26). La Organización Internacional del Trabajo ha sido la pionera en el tema de protección indígena. Los convenios números 107 y 169 contienen una detallada numeración de derechos reconocidos a estos pueblos. Ambos Convenios -107 y 169- en su Parte II, regulan sobre el régimen de propiedad de las tierras indígenas. Por otro lado, la jurisprudencia constitucional número 1786-93 de las 16:21 horas de 21 de abril de 1993, 06229-99 de las 14:30 horas del 11 de agosto de 1999, entre otras, reconocen la protección especial a su territorio y cultura en razón de sus condiciones de vulnerabilidad, no solo actual, sino también pasada, y sin otros límites que los mismos derechos humanos imponen a la conducta de todos los seres humanos. No cabe duda, por ende, que el Estado costarricense ha reconocido en forma amplia los derechos que corresponden a los grupos indígenas que habitan el país. Además se ha sostenido que los grupos de personas pertenecientes a las comunidades autóctonas tienen el derecho de vivir en las tierras donde históricamente han estado asentados, y el Estado debe garantizar plenamente el disfrute de este derecho fundamental. Reconoce de esa forma, nuestra jurisprudencia constitucional, una jerarquía superior a los Convenios Internacionales, tales como el de la OIT, N° 169 (Ley 7316 del 3 de noviembre de 1992), un grado de tutela superior a las personas y comunidades indígenas, es decir, un nivel elevado de protección´respecto de aquellos derechos humanos contemplados en la propia Constitución Política, y que por ende exigen el respeto, en los Tribunales ordinarios, de las decisiones que por la vía de la costumbre y la autodeterminación de dichos pueblos indígenas se deriven de las propias comunidades y sus representantes ´(Lo subrayado no corresponde al original).

En igual sentido, el Convenio No. 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) sobre los pueblos indígenas y tribunales en países independientes aprobado en nuestro país por la Asamblea Legislativa mediante Ley No. 7316 en el mes de noviembre de 1992 dispone en su artículo 4 inciso 1 que: Deberán adoptarse las medidas especiales que se precisen para salvaguardar las personas, las instituciones, los bienes, el trabajo, las culturas y el medio ambiente de los pueblos interesados. Además, el artículo 8 determina en sus incisos 1 y 2 que: ³1. Al aplicar la legislación nacional a los pueblos interesados deberán tomarse debidamente en consideración sus costumbres o su derecho consuetudinario. 2.

Dichos pueblos deberán tener el derecho de conservar sus costumbres e instituciones propias, siempre que éstas no sean incompatibles con los derechos fundamentales definidos por el sistema jurídico nacional ni con los derechos humanos internacionalmente reconocidos. Siempre que sea necesario, deberán establecerse procedimientos para solucionar los conflictos que puedan surgir en la aplicación de este principio´. Así las cosas, el párrafo tercero del artículo primero de la Ley de Vida Silvestre en modo alguno vulnera lo dispuesto en los artículos 11, 33 y 129 de la Constitución Política, pues más bien tiende a respetar y tutelar los usos y costumbres de las comunidades indígenas que existen en nuestro país.

IV.- Conclusión. En mérito de lo expuesto, estima esta Sala que no hay violaciones sustanciales al procedimiento legislativo, ni existen vicios por el fondo, como se consulta a la Sala.

Por tanto:

Se evacua la consulta legislativa, en el sentido que no existen vicios de constitucionalidad de procedimiento, ni de fondo en los temas consultados del proyecto de ley Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley de Conservación de Vida Silvestre, Ley No. 7317 del 30 de Octubre de 1992, tramitado en el ponen nota. El Magistrado Armijo Sancho salva el voto, al estimar que en el procedimiento legislativo se violaron los principios de conexidad y publicidad.

Gilbert Armijo S. Presidente a. i.

Ernesto Jinesta L. Fernando Cruz C.

Fernando Castillo V. Aracelly Pacheco S.

Roxana Salazar C. Teresita Rodríguez A.

Nota separada del Magistrado Cruz Castro.

En el presente caso considero que no existe una violación del principio de conexidad en virtud de que las modificaciones que se le realizaron en el procedimiento legislativo al proyecto de iniciativa popular que ingresó a conocimiento de la Asamblea Legislativa y el texto que fue aprobado en primer debate por el Plenario se encuentran estrechamente relacionadas con la materia que se regula en el proyecto de ley, como lo es la protección a la vida silvestre, con lo cual se conservo su objeto y sentido original. Lo anterior, es contrario a la posición que sostuv e en la consulta facultativa de constitucional tramitada bajo expediente No. 08-003901-0007-CO resuelta en sentencia No. 2008-05179 de las once horas del 4 de abril de dos mil ocho, en la cuál salvé el voto pues consideré que las modificaciones realizadas en el trámite legislativo al proyecto consultado en esa oportunidad excedieron las finalidad del proyecto original, produciéndose un ejercicio abusivo y excesivo del derecho de enmienda. Estimo, además, que la diversidad de materias que se modificaron en el proyecto sustitutivo, sí constituyó una variación cualitativa y esencial del proyecto original, hecho que contraviene las exigencias del principio de conexidad. Por tal motivo, consider o necesario evidenciar que existe una clara diferencia con la resolución supra-citada, pues los presupuestos son diferentes, en virtud de que en el presente caso, el proyecto en consulta no sufrió cambios trascendentales en el procedimiento legislativo que hayan alterado el objeto y finalidad del proyecto original.

Fernando Cruz C.

Nota separada del Magistrado Castillo Víquez.

Además de las razones que se dan en la opinión consultiva para llegar a la conclusión de que no hay vicios de procedimiento en relación con la no publicación del texto aprobado en la Comisión Especial ni las versiones que se conocieron después, ni siquiera la votada fueron publicadas en el diario oficial La Gaceta, considero que el Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa sólo exige la publicación del proyecto de ley, no de las mociones o textos sustitutivos que se aprueban en las diversas instancias parlamentarias (véanse los artículos 115 al 117, 121 y 130 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa). Más aún, sólo se publican los dictámenes del proyecto de ley si la comisión dictaminadora así lo acuerda (véanse los artículos 83 y 131 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa), lo que confirma que, salvo que así lo autorice una norma expresa del Estatuto Parlamentario, la aprobación de mociones ni de textos sustitutivos deben de publicarse en el diario oficial La Gaceta. Una razón adicional para seguir dentro de esta línea argumentativa es que, vistas las cosas sobre otro prisma, resulta ociosa la publicación de los textos sustitutivos que se aprueban en el seno de los órganos parlamentarios, por la elemental razón de que ello sólo tendría sentido cuando se introduzcan conceptos o regulaciones novedosas en éstos, acción que prohíbe el Derecho de la Constitución ±por violación al principio de conexidad-, o cuando así lo acuerde el órgano parlamentario con un fin específico o necesario para el trabajo parlamentario. Por otra parte, la Sala ha admitido que no siempre, la falta de publicación, en un determinado momento procesal, constituye un vicio invalidante del procedimiento legislativo. Al respecto indicó: La Sala no estima que esta circunstancia lesione el principio de publicidad, típico del procedimiento legislativo: este principio, en primer lugar, no se satisface por un acto único, como, por ejemplo, la publicación de la proposición, sino que se realiza en las diferentes fases del procedimiento, y en la propia publicidad a que están sometidos los trabajos de los órganos legislativos. Además, observa el tribunal que ya admitida la proposición (en el caso sobre el que versa esta opinión), y rendido el dictamen de la Comisión a que se refiere el inciso 3) del artículo 195, éste se publicó, como se estilaba. Por consiguiente, arriba la Sala a la conclusión de que la falta de publicación de la proposición de reforma constitucional de que aquí se trata, no configura un vicio que invalide el procedimiento´. (Véase el voto n.° 11560-2001).

A mayor abundamiento, hay que tener presente que el principio de publicidad en el procedimiento parlamentario no se agota en la publicación del proyecto de ley, sino que va mucho más allá, toda vez que la Asamblea Legislativa, como órgano plural y democrático, en todas sus etapas, se encuentra sometida a él. Acorde con lo anterior, la Constitución Política, en su numeral 117, señala que las sesiones de la Asamblea Legislativa son públicas, salvo que por razones muy calificadas y de conveniencia general se acuerden que sean secretas por votación no menor de dos tercios de los diputados presentes. Esta publicidad del trabajo parlamentario no sólo está referido al derecho que tienen los habitantes de la República de asistir a las barras de la Asamblea Legislativa, las cuales sólo pueden ser despejadas por el presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa cuando por sus signos de aprobación o de improbación gritos, silbidos, golpes o cualquier otra demostración desordenada-se interrumpa la labor de la Asamblea (véase el artículo 27, inciso 12 del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa) -igual ocurre en el caso de las Comisiones Permanentes con Potestad Legislativa Plena, donde sus presidentes también cuentan con esta atribución (véase el artículo 56, inciso j del Reglamento de la Asamblea Legislativa)-, sino también al derecho que tienen los medios de comunicación colectiva de informar sobre el trabajo parlamentario por diversos canales radio, televisión, Internet, prensa escrita, etc.-; e, incluso, el interés de los partidos políticos con representación parlamentaria y los (as) diputados (as) a que sus intervenciones orales, escritas o de otra índole- se difundan por todos los medios, con lo que se cumple un doble propósito, por una parte, con control ciudadano sobre la actividad que despliega los miembros del Parlamento, crucial en todo sistema democrático, y con la rendición de cuentas, en este caso de forma inmediata, de los diputados a la ciudadanía, por el otro. Así las cosas, el acto de publicación del proyecto de ley es una de tantas manifestaciones que tiene el principio de publicidad en el procedimiento parlamentario. Por otra parte, al exigirse la publicación de los textos sustitutivos se atenta contra una de las características esenciales del Derecho parlamentario: su ductibilidad o flexibilidad, lo que incide negativamente en el trabajo parlamentario y, en algunos casos, puede llegar a abortar los acuerdos políticos que se concertan. E, incluso, va en contra de la finalidad del Derecho parlamentario. Como es bien sabido, la finalidad de este Derecho es permitirle al Parlamento ejercer sus atribuciones (legislativa, autonormativa, el control político, integrativa, jurisdiccional y administrativa), en especial: ser el cauce a través del cual la Asamblea Legislativa adopta en forma oportuna, democrática y soberana y en estricto apego del principio de pluralismo político, las decisiones políticas fundamentales, las que se traduce en los actos parlamentarios finales, sean éstos un decreto legislativo o un acuerdo legislativo. No debe perderse de vista que, por la dinámica parlamentaria, los acuerdos políticos en el seno de Parlamento gozan de una constante precariedad hasta tanto no se materialicen, no sólo porque hay un momento oportuno y específico para su concretización, sino a causa de la permanente tensión en que se encuentran los actores políticos debido a la gran cantidad de variables políticas que manejan en un mismo momento, lo que significa que, entre más prolongando sea el tiempo para concretizar el acuerdo político, mayores son las posibilidades de que se rompa. De ahí la necesidad de su ejecución oportuna y, en algunos casos inmediata, ya que la realidad política varía constantemente y puede dar al traste con lo pactado. Por tal motivo, cuando se le obliga a la Asamblea Legislativa, so pretexto de observar el principio de publicidad en el procedimiento parlamentario, la publicación de los textos sustitutivos o mociones en el diario oficial La Gaceta, lo que implica un atraso importante en la adopción de la decisión política dado el tiempo que se demora para ello, se atenta contra la naturaleza misma del órgano parlamentario y su dinámica, contra una de las características y finalidad del Derecho parlamentario, todo lo cual resulta un despropósito en un órgano esencialmente político ±hay quienes sostienen que el funcionamiento de la Cámara es un reflejo de la continuación de la contienda electoral en un plano diferente-, como es la Asamblea Legislativa.

Fernando Castillo V.

VOTO SALVADO DEL MAGISTRADO ARMIJO SANCHO. Difiero de la conclusión a la que llegan mis compañeros, en el sentido que no se violentó el procedimiento parlamentario, pues, a mi juicio, en el trámite del expediente legislativo #17054 sí se desatendieron el principio de publicidad y el derecho de enmienda de los Diputados. La introducción de diferentes textos sustitutivos, por sí misma, no configura un vicio de esa índole, en el tanto se mantenga el mismo hilo conductor material inicialmente propuesto. Sin embargo, el hecho de haber incorporado un cuarto texto que sustituyó integralmente el proyecto y haberlo hecho en la misma sesión plenaria en que se aprobó en primer debate, sin que se haya distribuido entre los legisladores con suficiente antelación y claridad, los colocó en una imposibilidad material de conocer el texto que se aprobaba y ejercer su derecho de hacer las propuestas que consideran pertinentes, ya que existían dudas aún respecto de cuál texto podían presentarse mociones (cfr. acta de la sesión plenaria #74 del martes 2 de octubre de 2012). En esas condiciones están ausentes condiciones básicas del debate parlamentario, así como los presupuestos para el conocimiento de los actos que se adoptan y la eventual proposición de modificaciones. Sobre este extremo específico salvo mi voto y declaro que el trámite es inconstitucional, mientras que en los demás aspectos consultados me adhiero a la decisión mayoritaria de la Sala Gilbert Armijo S.